THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

The State, Respondent, 

v. 

Lawrence Burgess, Petitioner. 

Appellate Case No. 2011-194288 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Appeal From Lexington County 

James W. Johnson, Jr., Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 27405 

Heard October 16, 2013 – Filed July 2, 2014 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED 

Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of Columbia, for 

Petitioner. 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney 

General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General 

Salley W. Elliott, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Deborah 

R.J. Shupe, all of Columbia; Solicitor Donald V. Myers, of Lexington, 

for Respondent. 

JUSTICE BEATTY: Lawrence Burgess was convicted of possession of 

crack cocaine with intent to distribute and sentenced to three years in prison and 

ordered to pay a $25,000 fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Burgess, 
 

393 S.C. 396, 712 S.E.2d 1 (Ct. App. 2011). Following the denial of his petition 

for rehearing, Burgess petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the 

decision. We granted the petition to analyze whether: (1) the multi-jurisdictional 

drug-enforcement agreement, which formed the purported basis of the arresting 

officer's authority to arrest Burgess outside of the officer's territorial jurisdiction, 

satisfied the statutory prerequisites to constitute a valid agreement; and (2) Burgess 

should have been permitted to cross-examine the arresting officer with his 

personnel records pursuant to Rule 608(c) of the South Carolina Rules of 

Evidence. Although we find the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed Burgess's 

conviction, we disagree with the court's conclusion regarding the multijurisdictional drug-enforcement agreement. Accordingly, we affirm as modified. 

I. Factual / Procedural History 

On March 2, 2006, officers with the Lexington County Narcotics 

Enforcement Team (NET) executed a search warrant for a trailer at 7120 Two 

Notch Road in Batesburg, South Carolina, which had been the site of several 

controlled drug buys. When Agent Billy Laney of the Lexington County Sheriff's 

Department and Officer Emmitt Gilliam of the Batesburg-Leesville Police 

Department pulled into the driveway, they saw Burgess and another individual 

standing by a trailer that was not the target of the search warrant. The officers then 

witnessed Burgess run around the back of the trailer. Officer Gilliam ran around 

the other side of the trailer "to cut him off." When Officer Gilliam got within five 

to six feet of Burgess, he commanded him to stop and put his hands up. Officer 

Gilliam placed Burgess under arrest and handcuffed him with the assistance of 

Agent Eric Kirkland of the Lexington County Sheriff's Department. Agent Laney 

"backtracked" Burgess's steps to where Burgess had been standing and discovered 

a pill bottle top and pieces of crack cocaine on the ground. The substance found on 

the ground was chemically tested and determined to be 5.67 grams of crack 

cocaine. As a result, a Lexington County grand jury indicted Burgess for 

possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute. 

In a pre-trial hearing, Burgess moved to dismiss the charge for lack of 

jurisdiction. Burgess asserted that Officer Gilliam lacked authority to arrest 

Burgess in an area outside the officer's territorial jurisdiction of the BatesburgLeesville town limits. Although the State maintained that the Lexington County 

Multi-Agency Narcotics Enforcement Team Agreement (NET Agreement) 

conferred authority for extra-territorial jurisdiction, Burgess disputed its validity on 
 

the ground it failed to comply with the statutory prerequisites of sections 23-1-2101 

and 23-1-2152

 of the South Carolina Code. 

1

 At the time of the agreement's execution, section 23-1-210 provided in relevant 

part: 

(A) Any municipal or county law enforcement officer may be 

transferred on a temporary basis to work in law enforcement in any 

other municipality or county in this State under the conditions set 

forth in this section, and when so transferred shall have all powers and 

authority of a law enforcement officer employed by the jurisdiction to 

which he is transferred. 

(B) Prior to any transfer as authorized in subsection (A), the 

concerned municipalities or counties shall enter into written 

agreements stating the conditions and terms of the temporary 

employment of officers to be transferred. The bond for any officer 

transferred shall include coverage for his activity in the municipality 

or county to which he is transferred in the same manner and to the 

same extent provided by bonds of regularly employed officers of that 

municipality or county. 

S.C. Code Ann. § 23-1-210 (2007) (emphasis added). In 2007, subsection (A) was 

amended to provide that "[a]ny municipal or county law enforcement officer may 

be transferred or assigned on a temporary basis to work in law enforcement within 

multijurisdictional task forces established for the mutual aid and benefit of the 

participating jurisdictions." Act No. 3, 2007 S.C. Acts 4 (emphasis added). 

2

 Section 23-1-215 provided in relevant part: 

(A) In the event of a crime where multiple jurisdictions, either 

county or municipal, are involved, law enforcement officers are 

authorized to exercise jurisdiction within other counties or 

municipalities for the purpose of criminal investigation only if a 

written agreement between or among the law enforcement agencies 

involved has been executed. This limitation on law enforcement 

activity shall not apply to any activity authorized by § 17-13-40. 

(B) Any law enforcement officer working under this agreement is 

vested with equal authority and jurisdiction outside his resident 
 

Initially, Burgess argued that section 23-1-215 was the controlling statute 

because it provides authority for the institution of "agreements between multiple 

law enforcement jurisdictions." Because the governing bodies of BatesburgLeesville and Lexington County were not provided written notice of the NET 

Agreement's execution as required by subsection (E) of section 23-1-215, Burgess 

claimed the agreement was invalid. Additionally, Burgess asserted that section 23-

1-210 did not apply to the NET Agreement as that section is limited "to the 

temporary transfer of an officer." In the alternative, he argued that the agreement 

did not comply with section 23-1-210 because it was executed by law enforcement 

officers and not by "council members." 

In response to Burgess's motion, the State presented a copy of the NET 

Agreement that was entered into by eleven law enforcement agencies in Lexington 

County3

 on September 18, 2001.4 The NET Agreement, which referenced sections 

23-1-210 and 23-1-215,5

 stated in relevant part: 

jurisdiction for the purpose of investigation, arrest, or any other 

activity related to the criminal activity for which the agreement was 

drawn. 

. . . . 

(E) The respective governing bodies of the political subdivisions, 

wherein each of the law enforcement agencies entering into the 

agreement authorized in subsection (A) is located, must be notified by 

its agency of the agreement's execution and termination. The 

notification must be in writing and accomplished within seventy-two 

hours of the agreement's execution and within seventy-two hours of 

the agreement's termination. 

.C. Code Ann. § 23-1-215 (2007) (emphasis added). In 2007, this code section 

as amended. Act No. 3, 2007 S.C. Acts 5. This amendment, however, does not 

ffect the disposition of this case. 

 The agencies included Batesburg-Leesville Police Department, Cayce 

epartment of Public Safety, Chapin Police Department, Columbia Metropolitan 

irport Police Department, Gaston Police Department, Irmo Police Department, 

exington County Sheriff's Department, Pine Ridge Police Department, South 

ongaree Police Department, Springdale Police Department, and West Columbia 

olice Department. 

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WHEREAS, it is the desire and intent of the parties to evidence 

their joint undertaking for the provision of mutual assistance in 

criminal narcotics investigations by the creation and operation of a 

multijurisdictional task force within Lexington County. 

WHEREAS, the parties as set out above, by and through their 

representatives affixing their signatures below, consent and agree to 

span the geopolitical boundaries of all areas of Lexington County to 

the fullest extent allowed under South Carolina law for the express 

purpose of investigating the illegal use of controlled substances and 

related crimes by creating this Lexington County Multi-Agency 

Narcotics Enforcement Team [.] 

. . . . 

1. SCOPE OF SERVICES 

It is agreed that the law enforcement agency parties shall assign, on 

a temporary basis, officers to participate in the Lexington County 

Multijurisdictional Drug Enforcement Unit for the duration of this 

agreement or until this agreement is rescinded as set forth herein. 

2. TERM AND RENEWAL 

This agreement is effective as to each party at the date and time of 

signing and will automatically renew one year from the above date 

unless a party exercises its right to terminate as further described 

herein. 

4

 The NET Agreement was amended in May 2002 and July 2005 to add other law 

enforcement agencies; however, the substantive provisions of the agreement 

remained the same. 

5

 The NET Agreement also referenced Article VIII, Section 13 of the South 

Carolina Constitution and section 17-13-45 of the South Carolina Code. These 

sections, however, are not at issue in the instant case. See S.C. Const. art. VIII, § 

13 (authorizing joint administration of functions and exercise of powers among 

counties, municipalities, or other political subdivisions of the State); S.C. Code 

Ann. § 17-13-45 (2003) (providing authority for law enforcement responding to 

distress call or request for assistant in an adjacent jurisdiction). 
3. VESTING OF AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION 

To the fullest extent permitted by the Constitution and statutes of 

this State, officers assigned under this agreement and so transferred 

shall be vested with authority, jurisdiction, rights, immunities, and 

privileges to include the authority to execute criminal process and 

the power of arrest as any other duly commissioned officer of any 

other party. 

. . . . 

10. RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECTIVE GOVERNING BODIES 

 

Each party is responsible for any notice, reporting, or approval 

requirements to their respective governing body as may be 

required under South Carolina law. 

11. OFFICERS ASSIGNED 

Each party agrees to designate and transmit in writing, the names 

of those individuals assigned to perform duties under this 

agreement to the other parties. Upon receipt, such is to be made a 

part of and is incorporated by reference into this agreement. 

In explaining the agreement, the State showed that it was signed by Chief 

Wallace Oswald on behalf of the Town of Batesburg-Leesville. According to the 

State, Chief Oswald entered into the NET Agreement based on the advice and 

consent of the Batesburg-Leesville Town Council (Town Council). The State 

introduced a videotape of an August 31, 2001 Town Council meeting during which 

Chief Oswald informed Town Council of "that pending matter between the 

solicitor and the town of Batesburg[-]Leesville forming a multi-jurisdictional 

agreement for continued narcotics work in Lexington County." 

The State also introduced minutes from the January 8 and December 10, 

2002, Lexington County Council (County Council) meetings through the Clerk of 

the County Council. The January 8 minutes show County Council considered 

grant application requests from the sheriff's department for a NET. The December 

10 minutes reflect that County Council voted in favor of grant requests regarding 

additional staff positions in both the solicitor's and sheriff's office to focus on the 

NET. 
In conjunction with the minutes, the State presented testimony from 

Marguerite Crapps, the mayor pro tem of the Batesburg-Leesville Town Council. 

When asked whether the Batesburg-Leesville Town Council was "on board with 

the chief of police [to] enter into this agreement on the behalf of Town Council of 

Batesburg-Leesville," Crapps responded, "Yes." 

Lieutenant Byron Snellgrove, who was employed with the narcotics unit of 

the Lexington County Sheriff's Department, was the NET supervisor at all times 

relevant to this case. Lieutenant Snellgrove testified Chief Oswald and the Town 

of Batesburg-Leesville assigned Officer Gilliam, of the Batesburg-Leesville Police 

Department, to the NET. He then assigned Officer Gilliam to the BatesburgLeesville area of Lexington County "to take care of cases inside the town limits as 

well as outside the town limits." After Officer Gilliam advised Lieutenant 

Snellgove that "there were drug [sales] going on at 7120 Two Notch Road," 

Lieutenant Snellgrove asked Gilliam "to try to make a case or get into that location 

one way or another." Lieutenant Snellgrove then requested that Officer Gilliam 

help with the drug problem at that location pursuant to the NET Agreement. 

Based on this evidence, the State contended that the notice requirement of 

section 23-1-215 was met because both County Council and Town Council had 

actual notice of the NET Agreement and approved their respective law 

enforcement agencies' participation in the NET. In contrast to the defense, the 

State believed the notice provision of section 23-1-215 was "purely ministerial and 

administrative," similar to the ten-day notice requirement for the return of a search 

warrant to the magistrate upon the execution of the search warrant. Thus, the State 

asserted that section 23-1-215(E) should not be "strictly construed" to require 

written notice. 

Additionally, the State maintained the NET Agreement satisfied the 

provisions of section 23-1-210. Because the governing bodies had actual notice of 

the NET Agreement and its terms, the State claimed that chief law enforcement 

officers were authorized to enter into these agreements "with the advice and 

consent of county council." The State explained that Chief Oswald "acting as 

agent for the corporate municipality of Batesburg[-]Leesville [had] apparent 

authority to bind them . . . because he had the total responsibility of law 

enforcement within that town." 

After hearing arguments, the trial judge found the State failed to present 

evidence that written notification had been given within 72 hours of the 

agreement's execution as required by section 23-1-215(E). The judge, however, 
ruled that the NET Agreement complied with section 23-1-210 because he found 

nothing in the statute "that would prohibit either a county or a municipality . . . 

from authorizing in some way the chief of police or the sheriff to enter into such 

agreements." Although the judge was unclear as to which code section the NET 

Agreement was based, he concluded the agreement was created pursuant to section 

23-1-210. As a result, the judge denied Burgess's motion to dismiss. 

Subsequently, the State made a motion in limine to exclude Officer Gilliam's 

personnel records. The judge sustained the State's motion, but indicated that he 

would consider the motion if Burgess "wanted to get into" these records. 

During Officer Gilliam's testimony, Burgess sought to cross-examine him 

about why he was no longer with NET and to introduce his personnel records. The 

records, which describe three incidents that took place after Burgess's arrest but 

before trial, involved a disagreement with other officers about the use of 

confidential informants, his use of profanity, and his threat to harm another officer. 

The incidents resulted in a two-day suspension, a demotion to the rank of Corporal, 

and a ninety-day period of probation. The judge excluded the records, finding the 

personnel matters were irrelevant and highly prejudicial. 

Ultimately, the jury found Burgess guilty of possession of crack cocaine 

with intent to distribute. Burgess appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, 

which affirmed. State v. Burgess, 393 S.C. 396, 712 S.E.2d 1 (Ct. App. 2011). In 

so ruling, the court upheld the trial judge's decision that the NET Agreement 

complied with the requirements of section 23-1-210. Id. at 402, 712 S.E.2d at 4. 

Specifically, the court found: (1) the concerned municipalities and county entered 

into a written agreement to create multi-jurisdictional law enforcement authority; 

(2) the agreement complied with the requirements of section 23-1-210 by stating 

the employment conditions and maintaining compensation from permanent 

employment; and (3) the officers acting with the NET were transferred to it on a 

temporary basis. Id. The court further found Chief Oswald informed Town 

Council of the NET Agreement before its execution, and Town Council gave him 

the authority to enter into the agreement. Id. 

Additionally, the court distinguished the case from State v. Boswell, 391 

S.C. 592, 707 S.E.2d 265 (2011), which was decided by this Court during the 

pendency of Burgess's appeal.6 The Court of Appeals found Boswell inapposite as 

 

6 In Boswell, the defendant was convicted of first-degree burglary. Boswell, 391 

S.C. at 594, 707 S.E.2d at 265. On appeal, Boswell argued, among other issues, 
 

 

 

 

the NET Agreement was not entered pursuant to the Law Enforcement Assistance 

and Support Act and, thus, section 23-20-50(A) of the Act did not apply. Burgess, 

393 S.C. at 403, 712 S.E.2d at 4-5. Rather, the court found the NET Agreement 

was "made pursuant to section 23-1-210, part of a different chapter from the Law 

Enforcement Assistance and Support Act entitled 'General Provisions.' " Id. 

Having found the NET Agreement was valid pursuant to section 23-1-210, 

the court declined to address its validity under section 23-1-215. Id. at 403-04, 712 

S.E.2d at 5. 

As to the judge's ruling regarding the admission of Officer Gilliam's 

personnel records, the Court of Appeals found the trial judge did not abuse his 

discretion in excluding these records. Id. at 404-05, 712 S.E.2d at 5. In so ruling, 

the court interpreted the judge's decision "as a finding that the records did not have 

a legitimate tendency to show bias on the part of the officer." Id. at 405, 712 

S.E.2d at 5. The court noted that each incident in Officer Gilliam's personnel 

records occurred after Burgess's arrest and none of the incidents related directly to 

Burgess. Id. Additionally, the court concluded that while the personnel incidents 

"might show Gilliam to be hot-tempered and uncooperative with other officers, 

they do not show his bias against Burgess, or otherwise relate to Gilliam's 

credibility." Id. 

Burgess petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of 

the Court of Appeals. This Court granted the petition. 

that the trial judge erred in declining to suppress his confessions as they were the 

direct result of an unlawful arrest by officers acting outside their territorial 

jurisdiction. Id. at 594, 707 S.E.2d at 266. Specifically, Boswell contended the 

Lexington County officers were without authority to arrest him for a crime that 

occurred in Calhoun County. Id. at 598, 707 S.E.2d at 268. The State offered 

evidence of a 1999 multi-jurisdictional agreement entered into between the 

Calhoun County and Lexington County Sheriff's Departments that purported to 

confer the authority of officers to arrest in the other county's jurisdiction. Id. In 

assessing the validity of the agreement, this Court applied section 23-20-50(A) of 

the Law Enforcement Assistance and Support Act. Id. at 601, 707 S.E.2d at 270. 

Because the agreement was "not voted on by the county council" as required by 

section 23-20-50(A) of the Act, this Court deemed it invalid. Id. at 602, 707 

S.E.2d at 270. 
 

II. Discussion 

A. Multi-Jurisdictional Agreement 

In advocating the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals, Burgess 

posits three arguments. First, he contends that Boswell is dispositive as he broadly 

construes the holding to require all multi-jurisdictional agreements to be voted on 

by the governing body of each jurisdiction pursuant to section 23-20-50(A). 

Second, he asserts the agreement failed to strictly comply with the provisions of 

section 23-1-210 as the "State presented no written verification that the 

Batesburg/Leesville town council authorized the Chief of Police to entered into the 

agreement [on] behalf of the council." Burgess further notes that "there is no 

mention of the County authorizing Sheriff Metts to enter into the agreement on 

behalf of the County." Finally, Burgess maintains that it is "questionable" whether 

section 23-1-215 is applicable to the facts of the instant case as he believes this 

code section only applies to situations where a crime has occurred in multiple 

jurisdictions.7

 Even if applicable, Burgess avers that law enforcement failed to 

comply with the statutorily required written notice provision of subsection (E). 

Because the validity of a multi-jurisdictional agreement is dependent upon strict 

compliance, he disputes the State's contention that actual notice is sufficient. 

1. Implications of Boswell 

We agree with the Court of Appeals that Boswell is not controlling as it is 

factually and legally distinguishable. However, as will be discussed, we find the 

interpretation of Boswell by the Court of Appeals was entirely too narrow. 

7

 As a threshold matter, Burgess asserts that any argument regarding the 

applicability of section 23-1-215 is not preserved for appellate review because the 

State did not appeal the trial judge's decision as to this statute and raised it for the 

first time in its final brief to the Court of Appeals and in its return to Burgess's 

petition for a writ of certiorari. We find the issue is properly before this Court 

because the State challenged the trial judge's ruling on this issue as an additional 

sustaining ground to the Court of Appeals and to this Court. See I'On, L.L.C. v. 

Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 420, 526 S.E.2d 716, 723 (2000) ("The 

appellate court may review respondent's additional reasons and, if convinced it is 

proper and fair to do so, rely on them or any other reason appearing in the record to 

affirm the lower court's judgment."). 
 

 

 

Initially, we note that Burgess did not argue to the trial judge or to the Court 

of Appeals that section 23-20-50(A) was applicable; therefore, any argument 

regarding this statute is not preserved for appellate review. See State v. Sheppard, 

391 S.C. 415, 706 S.E.2d 16 (2011) (stating that an issue may not be raised for the 

first time on appeal). Furthermore, unlike the agreement in Boswell, the NET 

agreement in the instant case does not reference section 23-20-50 or contain a 

provision outlining the public safety situations identified in section 23-20-30.8 

Thus, we agree with the ultimate conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals 

regarding the inapplicability of Boswell. 

However, we find the court interpreted Boswell too narrowly as it infers that 

section 23-20-50(A) either conflicts with or is mutually exclusive from sections 

23-1-210 and 23-1-215. This is an incorrect reading of Boswell. Because all of 

these code sections are contained within Title 23, which is entitled "Law 

Enforcement and Public Safety," these sections cannot be read in isolation as the 

Court of Appeals appears to have done. See Higgins v. State, 307 S.C. 446, 415 

S.E.2d 799 (1992) (recognizing rule of statutory construction that statutes must be 

read as a whole and sections which are part of the same general statutory scheme 

must be construed together and each given effect, if it can be done by any 

reasonable construction). 

Although we question why the General Assembly has failed to consolidate 

these sections into one that would govern all multi-jurisdictional agreements, we 

believe the separate sections were enacted as a result of legislative progression. 

Specifically, section 23-1-210 was enacted in 1981 to address the temporary 

transfer of law enforcement officers to another jurisdiction, section 23-1-215 was 

enacted in 1987 to expressly address crimes that occur in multiple jurisdictions, 

and section 23-20-50 was enacted in 2000 to authorize law enforcement to assist 

other jurisdictions with certain public safety concerns.9 Notably, the drafters of 

these agreements appear to recognize this interrelationship as the agreements 

usually include a reference to all of these sections. 

8 The agreement in Boswell implicitly included section 23-20-50 as it notes that 

one of the purposes of the agreement is to "provide mutual aid in the event of 

natural disaster, disorder, or other emergency situations." It also expressly 

provided that the agreement does not affect any agreements regarding narcotics 

investigations. 

9

 Act No. 109, 1981 S.C. Acts 402; Act No. 107, 1987 S.C. Acts 262; Act No. 

382, 2000 S.C. Acts 2604. 
2. Propriety of NET Agreement under sections 23-1-210 and 23-1-

215 

Even though Boswell is not dispositive of the instant case, it is nonetheless 

instructive because it stands for the proposition that statutes governing multijurisdictional agreements must be strictly complied with to ensure the validity of 

the agreement. See Boswell, 391 S.C. at 602, 707 S.E.2d at 270 (recognizing the 

significance of territorial jurisdiction and concluding that a "more stringent 

approach needs to be followed in order to confer this type of authority"). Applying 

this principle to the instant case, we hold the NET Agreement is invalid as it does 

not satisfy the statutory requirements of either section 23-1-210 or section 23-1-

215. 

a. Section 23-1-210 

As a matter of state statute, the Town of Batesburg-Leesville and Lexington 

County operate and govern through Town Council and County Council. See S.C. 

Code Ann. § 4-9-30(3), (13) (1986 & Supp. 2013) ("[E]ach county government 

within the authority granted by the Constitution and subject to the general law of 

this State shall have the following enumerated powers which shall be exercised by 

the respective governing bodies thereof: (3) to make and execute contracts . . . 

(13) to participate in multi-county projects and programs authorized by the general 

law and appropriate funds therefor . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 5-7-160 (2004) ("All 

powers of the municipality are vested in the council, except as otherwise provided 

by law, and the council shall provide for the exercise thereof and for the 

performance of all duties and obligations imposed on the municipality by law." 

(emphasis added)). 

Consistent with this general authorization of power, subsection (B) of 

section 23-1-210 mandates that "the concerned municipalities or counties" enter 

into written agreements providing for the transfer of its law enforcement officers to 

another municipality or county. S.C. Code Ann. § 23-1-210(B) (2007). Certainly, 

there is evidence that County Council approved grant requests to fund additional 

staff positions associated with NET and Town Council was verbally informed of 

the "pending matter between the solicitor and the town of Batesburg[-] Leesville 

forming a multi-jurisdictional agreement." These procedures, however, did not 

constitute express approval by "the concerned municipalities or counties" as to the 

actual NET Agreement. In fact, the record reveals that the terms of the NET 

Agreement were never presented to the governing bodies for their approval. 

Instead, the only evidence is that Chief Oswald and Sheriff Metts entered into the 
 

 

NET Agreement on behalf of their law enforcement agencies. Thus, without the 

express approval of Town Council and County Council, the NET Agreement failed 

to strictly comply with the statutory requirements of section 23-1-210. 

Notwithstanding the lack of strict statutory compliance, the State contends 

the agreement is, nevertheless, valid as the governing entities provided Chief 

Oswald and Sheriff Metts with apparent authority to enter into the NET 

Agreement. We reject this contention as Town Council and County Council could 

not delegate this authority. 

Because the authority to enter into these agreements was statutorily 

conferred upon the governing entities, these entities were prohibited from 

abdicating this power and delegating it to a law enforcement officer. See 2A 

Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 10:46 (3d ed. 1996) 

("Usually a power conferred without limitation upon the municipal corporation 

may be exercised by the common council or legislative body as the general agent 

of the corporation, and by no other authority. A fortiori, power conferred upon the 

council or legislative body in express terms cannot be delegated otherwise than in 

accordance with the expression of terms." (footnotes omitted)); 62 C.J.S. 

Municipal Corporations § 206 (Supp. 2013) ("The governing body of a municipal 

corporation, entrusted by the state with the police power, is prevented from 

delegating its high functions to any body or officer; instead, it may be discharged 

or exercised only by those to whom the state commits it." (footnotes omitted)); see 

also Newman v. McCullough, 212 S.C. 17, 25-26, 46 S.E.2d 252, 256 (1948) 

(recognizing that a municipal council, "acting as a governmental agency, . . . is 

bound always to act as trustee of the power delegated to it and may not surrender 

or restrict any portion of such power conferred upon it"). 

Thus, strictly construing section 23-1-210, we are constrained to find the 

NET Agreement was invalid as Town Council and County Council were the only 

entities authorized to enter into this multi-jurisdictional agreement. If law 

enforcement agencies are to have this authority, it is for the General Assembly and 

not this Court to grant them this authority. See 80 C.J.S. Sheriffs & Constables § 

51 (Supp. 2013) ("Sheriffs and constables have all the powers and duties 

appertaining to their office at common law except as modified by a statute or the 

state constitution.").10 

10 Even assuming Chief Oswald was authorized to enter into the NET Agreement 

on behalf of the Town of Batesburg-Leesville, we find Officer Gilliam was not 

"transferred on a temporary basis to work in law enforcement in any other 
 

b. Section 23-1-215 

Although not addressed by the Court of Appeals, we find the trial judge 

correctly ruled the NET Agreement did not comply with the provisions of section 

23-1-215 as the State presented no evidence that County Council or Town Council 

received written notification within seventy-two hours of the execution of the NET 

Agreement as required by subsection (E). S.C. Code Ann. § 23-1-215(E) (2007). 

Furthermore, it is arguable that section 23-1-215 was factually inapplicable 

as one could construe this section to govern only the investigation of past crimes 

rather than to provide blanket extra-territorial jurisdiction to officers addressing 

potential criminal activity. As titled, the purpose of section 23-1-215 is to 

authorize "[a]greements between multiple law enforcement jurisdictions for 

purpose of criminal investigation." Id. § 23-1-215. Subsection (A) then states in 

the past tense, "[i]n the event of a crime" involving multiple jurisdictions;11 thus, 

by implication, the statute authorizes agreements for the investigation of completed 

crimes spanning multiple jurisdictions. 

In the instant case, Officer Gilliam was assigned to assist in the execution of 

a search warrant for a specific trailer at 7120 Two Notch Road. Because Burgess 

was not the subject of this investigation as he did not reside at this trailer and was 

arrested near a trailer that was not the target of the search warrant, we do not 

municipality or county in this State." Id. § 23-1-210(A). Notably, the agreement 

was executed in September 2001 and the arrest occurred in March 2006. There is 

also evidence that Officer Gilliam worked on NET for at least a year and a half. 

Thus, although he may have been assigned to assist in the execution of the search 

warrant, Officer Gilliam had relied on the provisions of the NET Agreement to 

claim extra-territorial authority for an extended duration. Accordingly, even 

though "temporary" is not defined by section 23-1-210, Officer Gilliam's extended 

service under the NET Agreement cannot be construed as a "temporary" transfer as 

intended by the statute. See State v. Hudson, 336 S.C. 237, 519 S.E.2d 577 (Ct. 

App. 1999) (acknowledging rule of statutory construction that when faced with an 

undefined statutory term, the court must interpret the term in accord with its usual 

and customary meaning). 

11 We note the 2007 amendment to section 23-1-215 expressly included past tense 

language stating, "In the event of a crime or crimes that have occurred . . . ." S.C. 

Code Ann. § 23-1-215(A) (Supp. 2013) (emphasis added). 
 

believe section 23-1-215 could be interpreted to confer authority on Officer 

Gilliam to arrest Burgess. 

c. Valid Conviction Despite Invalid Agreement 

Despite our finding that the NET Agreement was invalid, we conclude that 

Burgess's conviction was, nevertheless, valid. Although Officer Gilliam lacked 

authority to arrest Burgess, Agents Laney and Kirkland, who were authorized with 

territorial jurisdiction in Lexington County, played an integral role in the arrest and 

discovery of the drugs that formed the basis of the conviction. 

Section 44-53-375(B) of the South Carolina Code creates a permissive 

inference that possession of one or more grams of a "cocaine base" is "prima facie 

evidence" of possession with intent to distribute. S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-375(B) 

(Supp. 2007).12 "Possession may be actual or constructive." State v. Ballenger, 

322 S.C. 196, 199, 470 S.E.2d 851, 854 (1996). "Actual possession occurs when 

the drugs are found to be in the actual physical custody of the person charged with 

possession, while constructive possession occurs when the person charged with 

possession has dominion and control over either the drugs or the premises upon 

which the drugs are found." Id. (citation omitted). 

Here, the evidence was sufficient to prove Burgess possessed crack cocaine 

with intent to distribute. Notably, Burgess fled when Agent Laney and Officer 

Gilliam arrived at the target location; thus, indicating consciousness of guilt. See 

State v. Walker, 366 S.C. 643, 655, 623 S.E.2d 122, 128 (Ct. App. 2005) 

("Unexplained flight is admissible as indicating consciousness of guilt, for it is not 

as likely that one who is blameless and conscious of that fact would flee."). 

Officer Gilliam apprehended Burgess with the assistance of Agent Kirkland. 

Agent Laney then independently searched for and discovered 5.67 grams of crack 

cocaine and a pill bottle top in the area from which Burgess fled. 

Even if we assume that Burgess's arrest was invalid, such an assumption 

would be of no consequence to Burgess as this Court has held that "the illegality of 

an initial arrest did not bar the accused person's subsequent prosecution and 

conviction of the offense charge." State v. Biehl, 271 S.C. 201, 204, 246 S.E.2d 

859, 860 (1978). The Biehl Court pointed out that no evidence used in Biehl's trial 

was acquired as a result of the arrest. The same is true in Burgess's trial. The 

12 Because the offense occurred in March 2006, we cite to the code section in 

effect at that time. 
 

 

recovery of the crack cocaine by Agent Laney was directly related to Burgess's 

conduct during his furtive flight. Burgess attempted to flee immediately when he 

saw the arrival of Agent Laney and Officer Gilliam. Agent Laney followed 

Burgess's furtive flight path and found the drugs in an area where Burgess had 

been standing. Thus, the crack cocaine, which formed the basis for Burgess's 

conviction, was not fruit of the arrest. Specifically, the drugs were not found on 

Burgess's person nor were they located as a result of anything Burgess said after he 

was arrested. Rather, the drugs were independently found by Agent Laney of the 

Lexington County Sheriff's Office. 

Finally, Burgess's reliance on our decision in Boswell is unavailing. After 

Boswell was arrested, he confessed to the arresting officers. Boswell, 391 S.C. at 

597, 707 S.E.2d at 267. Accordingly, we held that the confessions should have 

been excluded at trial as they were the fruit of the invalid arrest. Id. at 606, 707 

S.E.2d at 272. However, in this case, Burgess did not confess nor were the drugs 

found on his person or his property. 

In light of the foregoing, we find the invalid NET Agreement did not negate 

the authority of Agents Laney and Kirkland to charge Burgess with the offense for 

which he was convicted. 

III. Cross-Examination 

Burgess next asserts the trial judge erred in refusing to allow crossexamination about Officer Gilliam's personnel records as the records constituted 

evidence of bias and motive to misrepresent pursuant to Rule 608(c), SCRE. 

Burgess maintains that Officer Gilliam's credibility as a witness was "a key 

issue at trial" because he was the only witness to testify that Burgess dropped a pill 

bottle that contained crack cocaine residue. Burgess also notes that neither Agent 

Laney nor Officer Gilliam witnessed Burgess in actual possession of the crack 

cocaine that was discovered on the ground. In view of this evidence, Burgess 

contends "the jury . . . had a right to know about Gilliam's disciplinary problems 

and removal from the NET because the information had a legitimate tendency to 

throw light on the accuracy, truthfulness and sincerity of Gilliam's testimony." 

Specifically, Burgess claims "[t]he records portray Gilliam as an overzealous 

narcotics officer who was willing to use unreliable confidential informants in order 

to make an arrest and who violated protocols of the NET concerning the use of 

confidential informants." 
"Rule 608(c), SCRE, provides that bias, prejudice or any motive to 

misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the 

witness or by evidence otherwise adduced." State v. Sims, 348 S.C. 16, 25, 558 

S.E.2d 518, 523 (2002). "Rule 608(c) 'preserves South Carolina precedent holding 

that generally, anything having a legitimate tendency to throw light on the 

accuracy, truthfulness, and sincerity of a witness may be shown and considered in 

determining the credit to be accorded his testimony.' " Id. (quoting State v. Jones, 

343 S.C. 562, 570, 541 S.E.2d 813, 817 (2001)). 

"As a general rule, a trial court's ruling on the proper scope of crossexamination will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion." State v. 

Quattlebaum, 338 S.C. 441, 450, 527 S.E.2d 105, 109 (2000). An abuse of 

discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling either lacks evidentiary support or is 

based on an error of law. State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 631 S.E.2d 262 (2006). 

We find the Court of Appeals correctly upheld the trial judge's decision 

prohibiting Burgess from cross-examining Officer Gilliam about his personnel 

records as we discern no abuse of discretion. Significantly, each of the disciplinary 

incidents occurred after Burgess's arrest and did not involve Burgess. Furthermore, 

Officer Gilliam's hostile actions were directed at co-workers rather than subjects of 

criminal investigation. Thus, Burgess failed to offer evidence that Officer Gilliam 

lacked credibility due to bias against Burgess. Accordingly, the trial judge 

properly limited Burgess's cross-examination of Officer Gilliam. Cf. Baldez v. 

State, 386 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012) (discussing Rule 608 and holding that 

trial judge did not err in prohibiting defendant from cross-examining the arresting 

officer concerning his disciplinary suspension for the sole purpose of showing the 

officer's lack of credibility as the defendant never argued that the officer was 

untrustworthy due to bias or interest against the defendant). 

IV. Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, we hold the NET Agreement was invalid and, thus, 

did not confer extra-territorial jurisdiction upon Officer Gilliam. See State v. 

Harris, 299 S.C. 157, 159, 382 S.E.2d 925, 926 (1989) ("The jurisdiction of a 

municipal police officer, absent statutory authority, generally does not extend 

beyond the territorial limits of the municipality."). Our decision should not be 

construed as invalidating all multi-jurisdictional agreements. Instead, we 

recognize the import of these agreements and emphasize that they are not invalid 

per se. The validity of these agreements, however, is dependent upon strict 

compliance with the applicable statutes. Because the NET Agreement in the 
 

instant case failed to satisfy the statutory requirements, we are constrained to find 

that it is invalid. 

However, despite the invalidity of the NET Agreement, we find the Court of 

Appeals correctly affirmed Burgess's conviction as Officer Gilliam's lack of 

authority did not negate Agents Laney's and Kirkland's authority in Lexington 

County. Thus, Officer Gilliam's lack of authority did not vitiate the valid 

conviction. Moreover, we find the Court of Appeals correctly upheld the trial 

judge's decision prohibiting Burgess from cross-examining Officer Gilliam 

regarding his personnel records as we discern no abuse of discretion. 

Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. 

TOAL, C.J., KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur. PLEICONES, J., 

concurring in result only.