NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ISIAH ROMONT HILL, Plaintiff/Appellant, 

v.

STATE OF ARIZONA, et al., Defendants/Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-CV 21-0486 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2020-092928 

The Honorable Peter A. Thompson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Isiah Romont Hill, Florence

Plaintiff/Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Kelly Gillilan-Gibson

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

FILED 2-17-2022
HILL v. STATE, et al.

Decision of the Court

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Chief Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Isiah Hill appeals the superior court’s judgment dismissing 

his complaint for injunctive relief against the State of Arizona, the Maricopa 

County Adult Probation Department, Probation Chief Michael Cimino, and 

the Arizona Department of Corrections and its director, David Shinn 

(collectively, “Appellees”). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 2007, Hill pled guilty to multiple charges, including illegal 

control of an enterprise, conspiracy, kidnapping, and attempted child 

prostitution. The superior court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms, 

the longest of which was sixteen years, followed by a five-year probation 

term.

¶3 In his complaint, Hill sought to enjoin Appellees from 

imposing his probation term when he is released from prison. He alleged 

his indictment was invalid because the State presented illegally obtained 

wiretap evidence to the grand jury. He contended, as a result, the superior 

court lacked jurisdiction to impose probation. Hill further alleged that 

Appellees conceded that his sentence was unlawful because the State did 

not respond to similar allegations he made in a prior lawsuit. See Hill v. 

State, 2 CA-CV 2016-0007, 2016 WL 2348373 (Ariz. App. May 4, 2016) (mem. 

decision). Hill also cited his petition for writ of certiorari to the United 

States Supreme Court in another case, see Hill v. White, 568 U.S. 836 (2012), 

and the fact that the State respondents in that case did not file a response 

brief.

¶4 Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. The superior court granted 

the motion and denied Hill’s motion for reconsideration. Hill timely 

appealed. 

¶5 We have jurisdiction over Hill’s appeal under Article 6, 

Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes 

(“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1).
HILL v. STATE, et al.

Decision of the Court

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DISCUSSION

¶6 We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 

12(b)(6). Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 355-56, ¶ 7 (2012). We will 

affirm dismissal if the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any facts that 

can be proven in the complaint. Mohave Disposal, Inc. v. City of Kingman, 186 

Ariz. 343, 346 (1996). 

¶7 As he did in the superior court, Hill argues that the indictment 

was based on unlawfully obtained wiretap evidence, which deprived the 

superior court of jurisdiction, and that the State conceded this point because 

the State defendants in another case he filed did not respond to his petition 

for writ of certiorari.1 

¶8 In essence, Hill’s complaint in this case challenged his 

criminal sentence and probation term. A civil complaint, however, may not 

be used to collaterally attack a criminal conviction. See State ex rel. Collins 

v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 71, 75 (1988) (holding a defendant may not 

collaterally attack a prior conviction absent a narrow exception because

post-conviction proceedings provide an adequate avenue); see also Cox v. 

Mackenzie, 70 Ariz. 308, 312 (1950) (holding a plaintiff may not collaterally 

attack a probate order by filing a civil action). Rather, post-conviction relief 

provisions available to a defendant, see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32, 33, provide a 

“single comprehensive remedy,” State v. Shrum, 220 Ariz. 115, 118, ¶¶ 11–

12 (2009); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.3(a) (stating Rule 33 replaces and 

incorporates all trial court post-plea remedies except those obtainable by 

Rule 24 motions and habeas corpus). Accordingly, because Hill’s complaint 

was a challenge to his conviction, it did not state a claim for which the court 

could grant relief. See Coleman, 230 Ariz. at 356, ¶¶ 8-9. 

¶9 Moreover, A.R.S. § 12-1802(4) in most cases prohibits a 

superior court from issuing an injunction “[t]o prevent enforcement of a 

public statute by officers of the law for the public benefit.” Although the 

statute does not prevent a plaintiff from challenging the validity of a law or 

an abuse of power by public officials, see Boruch v. State ex rel. Halikowski, 

242 Ariz. 611, 615-17, ¶¶ 11-19 (App. 2017), here Hill did not contend that 

the Probation Department exceeded its authority. Nor did he challenge the 

1 Hill’s opening brief does not comply with Rule 13(a)(7) of the Arizona 

Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure because it does not cite legal authorities 

or include appropriate references to the record. Nevertheless, we decline 

to reject the brief on that basis, see Clemens v. Clark, 101 Ariz. 413, 414 (1966), 

and choose to address the merits of Hill’s arguments.
HILL v. STATE, et al.

Decision of the Court

4 

statute authorizing probation or contest the validity of his plea agreement. 

Hill instead sought to stop the Probation Department from performing its

statutory duties, an injunction which the superior court did not have 

authority to order. See id. at 616, ¶ 15; see also State ex rel. Berger v. Myers, 

108 Ariz. 248, 249-50 (1972) (holding that when the defendant alleged the 

State presented illegally obtained evidence to the grand jury, § 12-1802(4) 

prohibited an injunction against the county attorney and grand jury). 

¶10 Finally, in any event, the record plainly contradicts essential 

allegations of Hill’s complaint. Contrary to Hill’s assertions, this court did 

not hold that the State conceded his sentence was unlawful, see Hill, 2 CACV 2016-0007, at *1, ¶ 5 (affirming the denial of Hill’s special action petition 

because his allegations were unsupported). The United States Supreme 

Court did not grant certiorari in his case, see White, 568 U.S. at 836, and the

State in that case did not concede his allegations by not filing a response 

brief, see U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 15(1) (stating that an opposition brief is not 

mandatory except in capital cases or when ordered by the Court). 

CONCLUSION

¶11 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the superior court’s 

judgment dismissing Hill’s complaint.