In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 19-2956 

REGINALD PITTMAN, by and through his guardian and next 

friend, ROBIN M. HAMILTON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

COUNTY OF MADISON, ILLINOIS, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Illinois 

No. 3:08-cv-00890-SMY-DGW — Staci M. Yandle, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED MAY 18, 2020 — DECIDED AUGUST 14, 2020 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. 

BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Reginald Pittman attempted suicide at the Madison County jail in 2007. Although the attempt 

failed, it left him in a vegetative state. Through his guardian, 

Pittman filed this § 1983 suit against Madison County and 

then-Madison County jail employees, Sergeant Randy Eaton 

and Deputy Matthew Werner, alleging that they violated the 
2 No. 19-2956 

Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide him with adequate medical care. In 2018, the suit went to trial for the second time, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. We reverse the district court’s denial of Pittman’s 

motion for a new trial and remand because we conclude that 

one of the jury instructions erroneously directed the jury to 

evaluate Pittman’s Fourteenth Amendment claim according 

to a subjective rather than objective standard. 

I. 

In 2007, Reginald Pittman was a pretrial detainee at the 

Madison County jail. At the time, Sergeant Randy Eaton and 

Deputy Matthew Werner were employees of the county jail. 

After four months of detention, Pittman attempted suicide by 

hanging himself with a blanket. The suicide attempt left 

Pittman in a vegetative state. In his suicide note, he stated that 

the guards were “f***ing” with him and would not give him 

access to “crisis [counseling].” 

After Pittman’s suicide attempt, Bradley Banovz, an inmate housed near Pittman’s cell, substantiated the claim that 

Pittman had made in his suicide note. In an interview with a 

county detective, which was captured on video, Banovz 

stated that in the days leading up to Pittman’s suicide attempt, Pittman had asked both Werner and Eaton to refer him 

to crisis counseling. According to Banovz, while both defendants promised Pittman that they would schedule him for 

counseling, neither of them followed through with their 

promises. 

Pittman filed a § 1983 suit against Madison County, Werner, and Eaton. As is relevant on this appeal, Pittman claimed 

that the defendants violated the Due Process Clause of the 
No. 19-2956 3 

Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide him with adequate medical care. The defendants moved for summary 

judgment, which was granted in 2011. We reversed and remanded the suit. Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. Cnty. of Madison 

(Pittman I), 746 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2014). On remand, the parties went to trial for the first time, which resulted in a jury 

verdict in favor of the defendants in 2015. Pittman appealed 

again. Among other things, he challenged the district court’s 

exclusion of Banovz’s video interview. We concluded that the 

district court’s exclusion of the video interview was a reversible error and remanded for a new trial. Pittman ex rel. Hamilton 

v. Cnty. of Madison (Pittman II), 863 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2017). 

In 2018, the case went to trial for the second time. Once 

again, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants. Pittman 

filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. On what is 

now his third appeal, Pittman challenges one of the jury instructions and two evidentiary rulings by the district court. 

II. 

Pittman’s principal challenge on appeal concerns a pivotal 

jury instruction.1 According to Pittman, the instruction misstated the law: instead of requiring the jury to determine 

1 The defendants argue that Pittman did not preserve this challenge 

because his objection to the jury instruction was neither timely nor sufficiently specific under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51. See Schobert v. Ill. 

Dep't of Transp., 304 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that to preserve 

an objection to a jury instruction under Rule 51, the objection must be 

timely and must “distinctly state the matter objected to and the ground of 

the objection”). We’re wholly unconvinced by this argument. As for the 

timing, the record indicates that Pittman raised his objection early enough 

in the proceedings to give the district court the opportunity to review his 

objection before instructing the jury. See id. at 729–30 (“There are no formal 

requirements [for the timing of the objection], but pragmatically speaking 
4 No. 19-2956 

whether the defendants acted in an objectively reasonable 

manner, the instruction required the jury to ascertain the defendants’ subjective intent. We decide de novo whether a jury 

instruction misstated the law, but even if it did, we will reverse only if the misstatement “misguide[d] the jury to the extent that the complaining party suffered prejudice.” Viramontes v. City of Chicago, 840 F.3d 423, 428 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). 

The challenged jury instruction required the jury to make 

four findings: (1) “[t]here was a strong likelihood that 

[Pittman] would seriously harm himself,” (2) the defendants 

“were aware of ... or strongly suspected facts showing [this] 

strong likelihood,” (3) they “consciously failed to take reasonable measures to prevent [Pittman] from harming himself,” 

and (4) Pittman “would have suffered less harm if [the defendants] had not disregarded the risk.” Pittman argues that 

the instruction is inconsistent with the objectively reasonable 

standard that we recently articulated in Miranda v. County of 

Lake, 900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018). 

Before Miranda, this circuit evaluated a Fourteenth 

Amendment due process claim brought by a pretrial detainee 

under the deliberate indifference standard, which “requires a 

showing that the defendant had a ‘sufficiently culpable state 

the district court must be made aware of the error prior to instructing the 

jury, so that the judge can fix the problem before the case goes to the 

jury.”). Moreover, the record shows that Pittman identified the alleged error in the jury instruction with sufficient specificity by arguing that the 

instruction did not comply with the newly articulated objective standard 

in Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018). Thus, the objection was “sufficiently detailed to draw the court’s attention to the defect.” 

Williamson v. Handy Button Mach. Co., 817 F.2d 1290, 1295 (7th Cir. 1987). 

Pittman preserved his challenge for appeal. 
No. 19-2956 5 

of mind’ and asks whether the official actually believed there 

was a significant risk of harm.” Id. at 350 (citation omitted).

This standard tracked the subjective inquiry employed for 

Eighth Amendment claims—and that made it a misfit. “Pretrial detainees stand in a different position” than convicted 

prisoners, so “the punishment model is inappropriate for 

them.” Id. Moreover, our approach was undercut by the Supreme Court’s decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, which held 

that an excessive-force claim brought by a pretrial detainee 

under the Fourteenth Amendment must be evaluated under 

an objective test rather than the subjective deliberate indifference standard. 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). So in Miranda, we 

changed course. Taking our cue from Kingsley, we held that 

an objective standard applies to medical-needs claims 

brought by pretrial detainees such as the one brought by 

Pittman. 900 F.3d at 352. Under this standard, the jury must 

answer two questions. First, it must decide whether the “defendants acted purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even 

recklessly.” Id. at 353. Second, it must determine whether the 

defendants’ actions were “objectively reasonable.” Id. at 354. 

Pittman argues that the jury instruction conflicts with this 

test because the jury was told to consider whether the 

defendants “were aware of ... or strongly suspected” facts 

showing a likelihood that Pittman would harm himself and 

whether the defendants “consciously failed to take reasonable 

measures” to avert that harm. (emphasis added). According 

to Pittman, this language directed the jury to apply the nowdefunct subjective test rather than the objective test that 

governs under Miranda. 

Pittman’s argument fails as to the instruction that the jury 

decide whether the defendants “were aware of ... or strongly 
6 No. 19-2956 

suspected facts showing” a strong likelihood that Pittman 

would harm himself. This language goes to Miranda’s first inquiry: whether the defendants acted “purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly.” At bottom, Miranda’s first 

inquiry encompasses all states of mind except for negligence 

and gross negligence. Miranda, 900 F.3d at 353. The challenged language accurately conveyed this standard to the 

jury: if the defendants “were aware” that their actions would 

be harmful, then they acted “purposefully” or “knowingly”; 

if they were not necessarily “aware” but nevertheless 

“strongly suspected” that their actions would lead to harmful 

results, then they acted “recklessly.” This much is consistent 

with Miranda. 

But the district court erred by telling the jury to determine 

whether the defendants “consciously failed to take reasonable 

measures to prevent [Pittman] from harming himself.” (emphasis added). This language conflicts with Miranda’s second 

inquiry: whether the defendants acted in an “objectively reasonable” manner. By using the word “consciously,” the instruction erroneously introduced a subjective element into the 

inquiry. Under Miranda’s standard, whether the defendants’ 

failure to take reasonable measures was the result of a conscious decision is irrelevant; they are liable if their actions (or 

lack thereof) were objectively unreasonable. See Kingsley, 135 S. 

Ct. at 2470 (holding that the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force claim turned on whether the defendants’ conduct was “objectively unreasonable” rather than on 

whether the defendants were “subjectively aware” that that 

their conduct was unreasonable). Because the word “consciously” rendered the jury instruction impermissibly subjective, the jury instruction misstated the law. 
No. 19-2956 7 

This error likely “confused or misled” the jury. Boyd v. Ill. 

State Police, 384 F.3d 888, 894 (7th Cir. 2004). Although the 

word “consciously” is the only aspect of the instruction that 

conflicts with Miranda, we consider “the instructions as a 

whole, along with all of the evidence and arguments.” Susan 

Wakeen Doll Co. v. Ashton-Drake Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 452 (7th 

Cir. 2001). Here, the evidence and arguments presented at 

trial by both Pittman and the defendants reveal that the word 

“consciously” was likely prejudicial. Pittman presented the 

transcript of Banovz’s video interview to convince the jury 

that the defendants ignored Pittman’s multiple requests for 

crisis counseling. For their part, the defendants sought to 

avoid liability by arguing that, despite knowing that Pittman 

had been placed on suicide watch a few months before his suicide attempt and had an episode of extensive crying around 

the same time, they were nevertheless unaware of the actual 

risk that Pittman posed to himself. They supported this argument by testifying, among other things, that they were not familiar with the jail’s suicide-prevention policies, were not able 

to identify suicide risks, and could not remember whether 

they had been trained on handling suicidal inmates. In other 

words, the defendants argued and presented evidence to 

show that they did not consciously fail to take reasonable 

measures to prevent Pittman’s suicide attempt. In light of the 

evidence presented at trial and the arguments made by the 

defendants, the use of the word “consciously” likely steered 

the jury toward the subjective deliberate indifference standard. And that error “likely made [a] difference in the outcome,” Guzman v. City of Chicago, 689 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 

2012), because a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendants’ failure to provide medical care for Pittman was ob-
8 No. 19-2956 

jectively unreasonable, but not a conscious failure. In sum, because the jury instruction misstated Miranda’s objective standard and the error was likely prejudicial, we reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial. 

III. 

Pittman also challenges two of the district court’s evidentiary rulings: one barring any witness testimony as to whether 

the defendants acted in a “deliberately indifferent” manner 

and another excluding Banovz’s testimony that he notified 

unnamed guards that Pittman was suicidal. “‘We review [the] 

district court’s rulings on [the] motions in limine for an abuse 

of discretion’ because ‘decisions regarding the admission and 

exclusion of evidence are peculiarly within the competence of 

the district court.’” Von der Ruhr v. Immtech Int'l, Inc., 570 F.3d 

858, 862 (7th Cir. 2009) (alterations in original) (citation omitted). We conclude that neither ruling amounted to an abuse 

of discretion. 

A. 

Pittman’s first challenge pertains to the district court’s 

grant of the defendants’ motion in limine to bar witnesses 

from testifying that the defendants were “deliberately indifferent” toward him. Before we dive into the merits of this 

challenge, we must first address the defendants’ contention 

that Pittman failed to preserve it. Relying on this circuit’s ruling in Jenkins v. Keating, the defendants argue that Pittman 

forfeited this challenge by failing to renew his objection to the 

pretrial evidentiary ruling at some point during the trial. 147 

F.3d 577, 581 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[I]n order to preserve for appeal 

the merits of a pre-trial ruling on a motion in limine, the party 

who unsuccessfully opposes the motion must accept the 
No. 19-2956 9 

court’s invitation to renew his or her challenge to it at trial.”). 

The defendants’ reliance on Jenkins is misplaced, however, because that case turned on the district court’s stated willingness to reconsider its pretrial ruling. By contrast, if a pretrial 

ruling is definitive, the objecting party need not renew his objection to it. FED. R. EVID. 103(b) (“Once the court rules definitively on the record—either before or at trial—a party need 

not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of 

error for appeal.”); see also Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 563 

(7th Cir. 1999) (“[A] definitive ruling in limine preserves an 

issue for appellate review, without the need for later objection 

... .”). 

In this case, the district court gave the parties no reason to 

believe that its grant of the defendants’ motion in limine was 

anything but definitive. Although the order contains little 

analysis, it makes clear that granting such a motion is warranted only if “the evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.” (emphasis added). And the order contains no 

conditional language other than a passing boilerplate reference to the fact that a ruling on a motion in limine is “subject 

to change.” Notably, unlike the district court in Jenkins, the 

district court in this case did not invite Pittman to renew his 

challenge at any point during the trial. 147 F.3d at 586; see also 

United States v. Addo, 989 F.2d 238, 242 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding 

that a party abandons an objection if he fails to accept the district court’s invitation to renew his objection during trial). Because the pretrial ruling was definitive, Pittman did not have 

to renew his objection at trial to preserve it. 

Securing review of his argument, however, is as far as 

Pittman gets because the district court’s ruling survives 

scrutiny. Admittedly, the district court’s reasoning was 
10 No. 19-2956 

flawed. It asserted that allowing any witness to testify that the 

defendants were “deliberately indifferent” toward Pittman 

would violate Federal Rules of Evidence 701, 702, and 704, 

which together prohibit lay and expert witnesses from 

offering outcome-determinative opinions. See FED. R. EVID. 

701 (setting forth the rule regarding lay witness testimony); 

FED. R. EVID. 702 (expert witness testimony); FED. R. EVID. 704 

(testimony regarding an ultimate issue). That’s wrong; under 

Rule 704(a), “[a]n opinion is not objectionable just because it 

embraces an ultimate issue.” FED. R. EVID. 704(a). But this 

mistake does not undercut the district court’s decision to 

exclude the testimony because its decision is easily justified. 

“Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must be helpful to the 

trier of fact, and Rule 403 provides for exclusion of evidence 

which wastes time.” FED.R. EVID. 704(a) advisory committee’s 

notes to 1972 Proposed Rules; see also FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The 

court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the 

following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading 

the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 

cumulative evidence.”). In light of Miranda, any testimony 

about the defendants’ alleged “deliberate indifference” was 

far more likely to confuse the jury than to help it. See McCann 

v. Ogle Cnty., 909 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2018) (explaining that 

under Miranda, “a standard of objective reasonableness, and 

not deliberate indifference, governs claims under the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s Due Process Clause for inadequate medical 

care provided to pretrial detainees” (emphasis added)). 

Excluding the testimony, therefore, was an eminently 

reasonable choice. See Smith v. Hunt, 707 F.3d 803, 807–08 (7th 

Cir. 2013) (“A decision is an abuse of discretion only if ‘no 
No. 19-2956 11 

reasonable person would agree with the decision made by the 

trial court.’” (citation omitted)).2

B. 

Pittman also argues that the district court was wrong to 

exclude Banovz’s testimony that he had notified unnamed 

guards that Pittman was suicidal. We can dispose of this contention succinctly because we already rejected it in Pittman’s 

last appeal. The district court’s decision to exclude Banovz’s 

testimony as to the unnamed guards was among the various 

rulings before us in Pittman II. Although we remanded for a 

new trial because we concluded that the district court’s exclusion of the Banovz’s video interview was an abuse of discretion, we expressly rejected all of Pittman’s other challenges. 

See Pittman II, 863 F.3d at 738 (“Pittman’s brief raises several 

other issues relating to how the judge conducted the trial. 

None of these arguments has merit.”). Pittman gives us no 

reason to depart from our previous ruling on this issue, so we 

affirm the district court’s grant of the defendants’ motion. Tice 

v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 373 F.3d 851, 853 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[A] ruling made in an earlier phase of a litigation controls the later 

phases unless a good reason is shown to depart from it.”). 

2 Pittman also argues that the exclusion was improper because the 

parties had signed a written stipulation prior to the second trial, agreeing 

that the testimony of any witness who testified at the first trial could be 

presented to the jury without further foundation or authentication. This 

argument is likewise unpersuasive. As we’ve explained, the district 

court’s decision to bar witnesses from testifying that the defendants were 

deliberately indifferent toward Pittman was proper for reasons other than 

foundation or authentication. 
12 No. 19-2956 

* * * 

Although we find no error in the district court’s evidentiary rulings, the erroneous jury instruction requires us to 

REVERSE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for a 

new trial.