This opinion is subject to revision before final

publication in the Pacific Reporter

2018 UT 53

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISCIPLINE OF BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN

BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN,

Appellant,

v.

OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,

Appellee.

No. 20170058

Filed September 24, 2018

On Direct Appeal

Third District, Salt Lake

The Honorable Todd M. Shaughnessy

No. 110917794

Attorneys:

Billy L. Walker, Barbara Townsend, Adam C. Bevis, Salt Lake City, 

for appellee

Brian W. Steffensen, Salt Lake City, for appellant

JUSTICE HIMONAS authored the opinion of the Court, in which

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE,

JUSTICE PEARCE, and JUSTICE PETERSEN joined.

JUSTICE HIMONAS, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 Brian Steffensen appeals the judgment of the district court 

disbarring him from practicing law for violations of the Utah Rules 

of Professional Conduct involving, inter alia, failure to file taxes.

Mr. Steffensen asks this court to reverse the district court’s findings 

of misconduct, direct that the case against him be dismissed, and 

vacate the sanction of disbarment. We affirm the district court’s 
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Opinion of the Court

2

findings of misconduct, reverse the district court’s imposition of 

sanctions, and remand to the district court for a new sanctions

determination.

BACKGROUND

¶2 After graduating from Stanford Law School in 1980, 

Mr. Steffensen became a member of the bar and began working as a 

lawyer in a large firm.1 He primarily represented a major bank 

focused on transactional work and real estate development. He left 

the firm approximately seven years later, continuing to work as a 

lawyer in a sole proprietorship. Then, in 1995, Mr. Steffensen

incorporated the first of his many professional law firms. 

¶3 Mr. Steffensen repeatedly failed to maintain accounting 

practices that would keep his law firms viable. Mr. Steffensen 

acknowledges his “gross[] negligen[ce]” in “failing to file . . .

employee withholding tax returns.” Additionally, Mr. Steffensen

opened a new law firm each time the previous one financially 

floundered. To date, Mr. Steffensen has incorporated five firms 

subsequent to his sole proprietorship. Financial trouble led to the 

demise of at least three previous firms,2 with taxes left unpaid. The

law firm currently in operation is AAA Law, PC.

1 While we may “draw different inferences from the facts in 

order to make an independent determination of the correctness of 

the discipline the district court imposed,” In re Discipline of Lundgren, 

2015 UT 58, ¶ 9, 355 P.3d 984 (citation omitted) (internal quotation 

marks omitted), “we always give serious consideration to the 

findings and [rulings] of the [district court],” In re Discipline of 

Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 213 (Utah 1997) (alterations in original) (citation 

omitted). As not all of the evidence afforded to the district court is 

before us, we establish a background that is culled from the district 

court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, Steffensen’s own 

testimony in the portion of the record we do have, and the briefing 

before us unless otherwise noted.

2 At the time of Mr. Steffensen’s deposition in August 2013, he 

had bank accounts for both his fourth law firm, SB Law, PC, and his 

fifth, AAA Law, PC. There is little other information about SB Law, 

PC in the record. 
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Opinion of the Court

3

¶4 Mr. Steffensen’s first incorporated law firm—Brian W. 

Steffensen, a Professional Law Corporation (Firm #1)—operated 

from 1995 to 2001 and closed, resulting in an Internal Revenue 

Service (IRS) seizure of all assets “because of his failure to pay 

withholding taxes.” Mr. Steffensen also had problems with the Utah 

State Tax Commission with Firm #1. Mr. Steffensen admits having 

someone apply for a withholding account number for Firm #1 in 

1995. So he has known since at least 1995 that he had a responsibility 

to withhold money from the employees’ paychecks and pay that 

money to the Tax Commission. He also admits to knowing that 

filing a return was required even if no taxes were due and claims 

that he filed all returns for Firm #1. And, although he filed returns, 

he never remitted the taxes. 

¶5 Upon the heels of the IRS seizure, Mr. Steffensen

established Steffensen Law, PC (Firm #2), which operated from 2002

to 2003. Operations under this firm ended due to “the exact same 

problems with payroll and the Tax Commission” as the first. In the 

same year, 2003, Mr. Steffensen started his third law firm, S Law,

P.C. (Firm #3), which ceased operation in 2007 “because the

financial and tax irregularities continued to exist.” When Firm #3 

closed, Mr. Steffensen established his next firm, SB Law, PC (Firm 

#4), which remained in operation until 2013. When that firm was in 

financial jeopardy, he established AAA Law, PC (Firm #5),

Mr. Steffensen’s currently operating law firm. 

¶6 The Tax Commission began to scrutinize Mr. Steffensen’s 

employee tax withholding practices in 2006 when the filing process 

of one of his employees was suspended and came under review by 

the Tax Commission because her W2 from Firm #3 did not have a 

state withholding tax number. The Tax Commission investigated 

both Mr. Steffensen’s business and personal taxes. While the Tax 

Commission started with investigating only Mr. Steffensen’s law 

firm listed on the questionable W2, it soon discovered several 

withholding accounts for other businesses and began investigating 

those as well. 

¶7 In September 2008, the Tax Commission completed an 

investigation of Mr. Steffensen and recommended he be criminally 

charged with violating: (1) Utah Code section 76-8-1101(1)(c)(i),
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Opinion of the Court

4

Failure to File; (2) Utah Code section 76-8-1101(1)(d)(i), Willful 

Evasion; and (3) Utah Code section 76-6-513(2), Unlawful Dealings 

of Property by a Fiduciary.3

¶8 The Tax Commission’s investigation uncovered a number 

of potential violations of tax law on Mr. Steffensen’s part. As of July 

2008, Firm #1 had an unpaid outstanding withholding tax account 

balance of $44,395.46. Mr. Steffensen broke seven payment 

arrangements regarding this balance. Regarding Firm #2,

Mr. Steffensen perpetuated the same problems he had with the first 

firm. Additionally, Mr. Steffensen used invalid state withholding tax 

identification numbers, and the W2s he distributed to employees 

falsely declared that money had been withheld and remitted. And, 

as of September 2008, he still owed $48,895.17 for withholding taxes, 

penalties, and interest for tax years 2002–2006. Moreover, in 

operating Firm #3, Mr. Steffensen failed to file withholding returns 

for 2003 through 2006. He failed to remit withholdings for this firm’s 

entire existence. 

3 It is unclear both which versions of these statutes the Tax 

Commission recommended Mr. Steffensen be charged under and 

which versions of these statutes Mr. Steffensen was ultimately 

charged under in May 2009. See infra ¶ 9. This is immaterial, 

however, for purposes of this appeal because the parties seem to 

have chosen to litigate this case under the current versions of these 

statutes—especially with respect to Utah Code section 

76-8-1101(c)(i). 

Although Mr. Steffensen was charged in 2009 for acts that 

occurred between 2003 and 2008, the parties chose to frame the issue 

both here and below in terms of the current version of Utah Code 

section 76-8-1101(c)(i), which was amended in May 2014. In May 

2014, the Legislature changed the mens rea element from “intent,” 

the mens rea element in the statute since at least 2001 and before any 

of the crimes Mr. Steffensen was charged with allegedly took place, 

to “knowingly and intentionally.” In light of the parties’ choice to 

consistently litigate this issue under the current version of the 

statute, we, too, choose to analyze the parties’ claims under the 

current version of the statute.
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Opinion of the Court

5

¶9 In May 2009, Mr. Steffensen was charged with one count 

each of Failing to Render a Proper Tax Return (for tax years 2003–

2008), Intent to Evade (for tax years 2003–2008), and Unlawful 

Dealing of Property by a Fiduciary (for years 2003–2006). On March 

1, 2010, Mr. Steffensen entered into a diversion agreement with the 

State in which he did not admit to guilt but did admit there was 

probable cause for the charges against him. In that agreement, the 

charges were amended to an “attempt to commit a crime,” UTAH 

CODE § 76-4-101,4 namely “knowingly and intentionally, and 

without a reasonable good faith basis, fail[ing] to make, render, sign 

or verify any return within the time required by law,” 

id. § 76-8-1101(1)(c)(i). Mr. Steffensen in turn paid all taxes along 

with penalties. 

¶10 After receiving notice of Mr. Steffensen’s criminal charges 

in September 2009, the Office of Professional Conduct (OPC) alleged 

three violations in its case against Mr. Steffensen. The first claim 

under rule 8.4(b) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct is that 

Mr. Steffensen engaged in criminal conduct that reflects adversely 

on his fitness to practice law. The second claim under rule 8.4(c) is 

that he engaged in dishonest conduct. And the third claim under 

rule 8.4(a) is that he engaged in misconduct by violating or 

attempting to violate the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.5

¶11 The district court concluded that Mr. Steffensen violated 

rule 8.4(b) and (c) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. The 

court found professional misconduct under rule 8.4(b) for 

“committ[ing] the criminal act [under Utah Code section 

76-8-1101(1)(c)(i)] of Failing to Render a Proper Tax Return [and] . . . 

committ[ing] the criminal act [under Utah Code section 76-4-101] of

Attempted Failing to Render a Proper Tax Return.” The district 

4 It is likewise unclear which version of this statute 

Mr. Steffensen was charged with. In any event, it does not bear on 

our resolution of this case. 

5 The parties cite to no particular version of the Rules of 

Professional Conduct or the Rules Governing the Utah State Bar in 

their briefs here or their filings below. Accordingly, we evaluate the 

parties’ arguments under the current rules, which contain the same 

language as the rules offered by the parties in their briefing.
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Opinion of the Court

6

court concluded that these “committed criminal acts,” established 

“[b]y a preponderance of the evidence,” “reflect adversely on [Mr. 

Steffensen’s] honesty, truthfulness or fitness as a lawyer [i]n other 

respects.”

¶12 The district court concluded that Mr. Steffensen committed 

professional misconduct under rule 8.4(c) because he “engaged in 

conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”6

In addition to the criminal acts under rule 8.4(b), the district court 

found (1) that Mr. Steffensen, “in the context of operating the law 

firm,” failed “to remit to the Tax Commission the amounts that [his] 

employees were ultimately obligated to pay in their taxes,” which 

was “dishonest;” (2) that he distributed “W2s to [his] employees 

stating that the tax monies had been withheld and remitted” when 

they had not, which constituted a misrepresentation; and (3) “that 

he presented [financial statements] to his bank in order to get a 

loan” that were in conflict with “forms he presented to the Tax 

Commission to obtain a financial hardship exemption” and

therefore that “Mr. Steffensen’s statements about his income and 

finances [that] he presented to the Tax Commission to receive a 

financial hardship exemption contained material 

misrepresentations.”

¶13 The district court held a sanctions hearing and concluded

that the violations of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 

justified the disbarment of Mr. Steffensen under Rule Governing the 

Utah State Bar 14-605(a)(1) and (a)(2). Mr. Steffensen appeals. We 

have jurisdiction pursuant to article VIII, section 4 of the Utah 

Constitution and Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(c).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶14 The Utah Supreme Court has a constitutional mandate to 

“govern the practice of law, including . . . the conduct and discipline 

of persons admitted to practice law.” UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 4. 

Because of this mandate, professional discipline cases form a unique 

subset of the cases we hear and have a unique standard of review.

6 Because we find some ambiguity in the district court’s written 

order regarding its rule 8.4(c) findings, we have turned to the court’s

oral ruling to resolve that ambiguity.
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Opinion of the Court

7

¶15 While we generally “presume that the [lower tribunal’s] 

findings of fact are correct” unless clearly erroneous, in attorney 

discipline cases we “reserve the right to draw inferences from basic 

facts which may differ from the inferences drawn by the [lower 

tribunal].” In re Discipline of Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 213 (Utah 1997) 

(alterations in original) (citations omitted). Additionally, although 

“we always give serious consideration to the findings and [rulings] 

of the [district court],” “we must treat the ultimate determination of 

discipline as our responsibility.” Id. (alterations in original) 

(citations omitted). We therefore must “make an independent 

determination of the correctness of the discipline the district court 

imposed.” In re Discipline of Lundgren, 2015 UT 58, ¶ 9, 355 P.3d 984 

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re 

Discipline of Crawley, 2007 UT 44, ¶ 17, 164 P.3d 1232.

ANALYSIS

¶16 In our analysis, we first clarify the interpretation and 

application of rule 8.4(b) and (c) of the Utah Rules of Professional 

Conduct discussing violations of professional misconduct. And, 

finding that Mr. Steffensen did commit professional misconduct, we 

then turn to the imposition of sanctions for those violations to 

determine whether the court applied the proper standard in its 

sanctioning of him. On the record before us, we find that the district

court erred in its imposition of sanctions for Mr. Steffensen’s 

violations, but understandably so given the inconsistencies in the 

comment section of rule 8.4.7

I. THE VIOLATIONS OF THE UTAH RULES

OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

¶17 This court regulates members of the bar both by 

constitutional mandate and inherent authority. UTAH CONST. art. 

VIII, § 4 (“The Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice of 

law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and 

discipline of persons admitted to practice law.”); Barnard v. Utah 

7 We recognize the lack of clarity in comment [1a] for rule 8.4 of 

the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct regarding the imposition of 

sanctions and refer these issues to the rules committee for further 

consideration. See infra ¶ 51.
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Opinion of the Court

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State Bar, 804 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 1991) (“[T]he authority of this 

Court to regulate the admission and discipline of attorneys existed 

as an inherent power of the judiciary from the beginning.” (citation 

omitted)). In order to maintain the integrity of the profession, we

promulgate the Rules of Professional Practice to guide lawyers and 

judges in matters of discipline. In Utah, 

[a] lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the 

legal system and a public citizen having special 

responsibility for the quality of justice. Every lawyer is 

responsible to observe the law and the Rules of 

Professional Conduct, shall take the Attorney’s Oath 

upon admission to the practice of law, and shall be 

subject to the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and 

Disability.

UTAH R. PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 1. Chapter 13 of the Supreme Court

Rules of Professional Practice establishes the Utah Rules of 

Professional Conduct.

¶18 To assist with our regulatory responsibility, we have

authorized and designated the Utah Bar Association (Bar) to 

administer the rules and regulations which govern the practice of 

law in Utah. R. GOVERNING UTAH STATE BAR 14-102. Responsibilities 

of the Bar include, but are not limited to, advancing “the 

administration of justice according to law;” “regulat[ing] and 

disciplin[ing] . . . persons practicing law;” “maintain[ing] integrity 

. . . and high standards of conduct among those practicing law;” and 

“promot[ing] professionalism, competence and excellence in those 

practicing law.” Id. 14-202; see also id. 14-102. The OPC aids the Bar 

in performing the duties related to violations of the Utah Rules of 

Professional Conduct. Id. 14-504.

¶19 Under the Rules Governing the Utah State Bar, the OPC can 

bring a formal complaint charging an attorney with professional 

misconduct before the district court with the permission of a 

screening panel. Id. 14-511(a). When “[f]ormal disciplinary and 

disability proceedings” are convened, they “are civil in nature.” Id. 

14-501(c). This remains true even when, as here, questions of 

criminal conduct arise in finding a violation of the Utah Rules of 

Professional Conduct. Id.; see also In re Discipline of Steffensen, 2016 

UT 18, ¶ 12, 373 P.3d 186. Such cases are also bifurcated, meaning 

that they are conducted in two phases: adjudication of the

allegations of misconduct and, if necessary, a determination of the 

appropriate sanction. R. GOVERNING UTAH STATE BAR 14-511. 
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Opinion of the Court

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¶20 In these proceedings brought before the district court by the 

OPC, the court concluded Mr. Steffensen violated both rule 8.4(b) 

and (c). Mr. Steffensen challenges the admissibility of evidence that 

the court allowed in his adjudication hearing as well as the court’s 

determination of his mental state. He argues that the evidence was 

irrelevant and prejudicial. We hold that the evidence was relevant

and admissible. Mr. Steffensen also argues that the district court’s 

determination that his actions were “knowing and intentional” was

not supported by the evidence. We disagree and affirm the district 

court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law at the adjudication 

hearing.

A. Admission of Evidence and Expert Witness Challenge

¶21 At each stage of the trial, Mr. Steffensen objected with 

regularity to the relevance, unfair prejudice, and admissibility of the 

evidence. On appeal, Mr. Steffensen challenges the admission of 

evidence regarding (1) his failure to file personal tax returns, (2) his 

failure to file corporate tax returns, (3) his personal banking records, 

and (4) his personal estate planning. In less than one page, he 

summarily claims that the admission of this evidence violated Utah 

Rules of Evidence 401, 403, and 404(b)(1). But Mr. Steffensen fails to 

expound on his arguments—he does not discuss the challenged 

evidence (beyond listing broad categories) or explain why that 

evidence was irrelevant under rule 401, unfairly prejudicial under 

rule 403, or admitted in violation of rule 404(b)(1).

¶22 These arguments are inadequately briefed. “Appellants 

have the burden to clearly set forth the issues . . . and to provide 

reasoned argument and [valid] legal authority.” Espenschied Transp.

Corp. v. Fleetwood Servs., Inc., 2018 UT 32, ¶ 19, 422 P.3d 829

(alterations in original) (citation omitted). “[W]e are not a depository 

in which [a party] may dump the burden of argument and 

research.” Id. (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

¶23 Mr. Steffensen fails to meet these requirements. And 

Mr. Steffensen further does not address the district court’s response 

to his objections—that the objections would go to the weight of the 

evidence, not the admissibility. The court also noted that it would 

“give those documents the weight that they deserve[d],” and further 

conceded that the court would “give counsel an opportunity to 

argue that [the court] should give them no weight.” 
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Opinion of the Court

10

¶24 With the exception of one reference to a loan application,8

the court appears to have given very little, if any, weight to the 

objected-to evidence in coming to its conclusions. Based on the 

nature of the proceeding as a bench trial, we have little doubt that 

the district court only considered appropriate relevant and 

nonprejudicial evidence, and there is nothing in the district court’s 

findings to indicate otherwise. See State v. Park, 404 P.2d 677, 679 

(Utah 1965) (“[B]ecause . . . the [district] court will be somewhat 

more discriminating in appraising both the competency and the 

rulings properly to be given evidence, the rulings on evidence are 

looked upon with a greater degree of indulgence when the trial is to 

the court than when it is to the jury.”).

¶25 Mr. Steffensen makes two additional challenges to the 

testimony of Heather Gamon, a special agent or criminal 

investigator for the Tax Commission. Mr. Steffensen’s first challenge 

is that Ms. Gamon was either (1) testifying as an undisclosed expert, 

or, in the alternative, (2) not testifying as an expert and thereby 

providing testimony that violated Utah Rule of Evidence 701. 

Second, Mr. Steffensen argues that if Ms. Gamon were testifying as 

an expert, her testimony violated Utah Rule of Evidence 704(b).9

8 We ultimately find the district court’s factual finding based on 

this evidence deficient and reject it as a basis for finding a violation 

of Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(c). See infra ¶¶ 38–45. Thus 

we do not rely on it to advance the district court’s conclusion that 

Mr. Steffensen committed professional misconduct under rule 8.4(c). 

And, therefore, any error concerning the loan application is 

harmless.

9 Utah Rule of Evidence 704(b) provides that, “[i]n a criminal 

case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the 

defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that 

constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those 

matters are for the trier of fact alone.” Lawyer discipline cases “are 

civil in nature,” not criminal, a point we highlighted in 

Mr. Steffensen’s previous appeal in this case. R. GOVERNING UTAH 

STATE BAR 14-501(c); see also In re Discipline of Steffensen, 2016 UT 18, 

¶ 12, 373 P.3d 186 (“[A]ttorney discipline cases . . . are not criminal. 

They are civil.” (citations omitted)).
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Opinion of the Court

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These challenges are unpreserved.10 We will not consider 

unpreserved objections on appeal absent plain error or exceptional 

circumstances. State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, ¶ 15, 321 P.3d 1136. 

Because no argument for plain error or exceptional circumstances 

exists here, we decline to consider these challenges.

¶26 We find no error in the district court’s determination on the 

relevance, unfair prejudice, and admissibility of the evidence and 

we will not consider the unpreserved challenges regarding expert 

witness opinion testimony. Therefore, we must next turn to whether 

the district court erred in concluding that Mr. Steffensen violated 

the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.

B. Violations of Rule 8.4(b) and (c)

1. Violation of Rule 8.4(b)

¶27 Rule 8.4(b) states that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a 

lawyer to . . . (b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the 

lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other 

respects.” UTAH R. PROF’L CONDUCT 8.4(b). To qualify as 

professional misconduct a criminal act alone is insufficient. It must 

also reflect poorly on the qualities required of a practicing attorney

(i.e., “honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other 

respects”). Id. Here, the court concluded, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that Mr. Steffensen committed the criminal acts of Failure 

to Render a Proper Tax Return and Attempted Failure to Render a 

Proper Tax Return. It further concluded that these “criminal acts 

reflect adversely on his honesty, truthfulness or fitness as a lawyer 

[i]n other respects[]” in violation of rule 8.4(b).

10 “[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal[,] the issue must be 

presented to the [district] court in such a way that the [district] court 

has an opportunity to rule on that issue.” Brookside Mobile Home Park, 

Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, ¶ 14, 48 P.3d 968 (citation omitted).

Mr. Steffensen argues that he preserved these issues for our review. 

But the portion of the transcript he cites as preserving challenges to 

expert and opinion testimony were objections to an exhibit on those 

grounds, not the testimony of Ms. Gamon. This is insufficient to 

preserve an objection to Ms. Gamon’s testimony on the expert 

testimony grounds Mr. Steffensen now raises.
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Opinion of the Court

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¶28 Finding that Mr. Steffensen failed to render a proper tax 

return, a violation of Utah Code section 76–8–1101(1)(c)(i), required

finding that Mr. Steffensen “knowingly and intentionally, and 

without a reasonable good faith basis, fail[ed] to . . . render . . . any 

return within the time required by law.”11 Mr. Steffensen does not 

dispute that during the four-year period in question his law firm did 

not render tax returns. And the district court found no evidence of a 

good faith basis for the failure. Therefore, the main issue before the 

district court was whether Mr. Steffensen acted knowingly and 

intentionally.

¶29 Mr. Steffensen argues that he did not “knowingly and 

intentionally” fail to file, but rather that his employees failed to file.

On the other hand, the OPC presented circumstantial evidence of 

Mr. Steffensen’s state of mind, requiring the district court to make a 

credibility determination by weighing the evidence before it. Here 

the court determined that the criminal acts were committed 

“knowingly or intentionally.” Circumstantial evidence before the 

district court supported its findings of fact, which in turn support 

the determination that Mr. Steffensen met the mens rea required by 

statute in failing to file the tax returns.12 When making 

determinations based on circumstantial evidence, the district court 

does not do this in a vacuum. Rather, the court uses common sense 

to make inferences and find facts. And while we recognize that 

attorney discipline cases have a unique standard of review in which 

we might draw different inferences than the district court, see supra 

¶¶ 14–15, we do not do this indiscriminately. In general, we adhere 

to our standard level of deference, and “[s]o long as there is some 

evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings . . . 

11 There are three other ways of proving a violation of Utah Code 

section 76–8–1101(1)(c)(i): (1) failing to supply timely information, 

(2) rendering a false or fraudulent return or statement, or 

(3) supplying false or fraudulent information. Because the district 

court does not rely on these violations for his criminal acts, we do 

not address them.

12 Holding that evidence is sufficient to support the finding of 

failure to file necessarily includes finding that the evidence supports

the attempted failure to file charge.
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Opinion of the Court

13

can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops.” State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 

342, 345 (Utah 1985); see also In re Discipline of Reneer, 2014 UT 18, 

¶ 11, 325 P.3d 104 (“Under this less deferential . . . standard of 

review, we still ‘presume that the [district court’s] finds of fact are correct, 

although we may set those findings aside if they are not supported 

by the evidence.’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).

¶30 The district court’s findings regarding Mr. Steffensen’s 

mental state were certainly not clearly erroneous. Mr. Steffensen has 

had a lengthy career as a practicing lawyer. “Mr. Steffensen is a 

bright and accomplished lawyer, not someone with ignorance of the 

laws.” He has worked for large firms, as a solo practitioner, and at 

small law firms he owned and operated. Mr. Steffensen testified that 

he knew about the requirements surrounding withholding taxes. 

Mr. Steffensen had dealt with the ramifications of failing to pay 

federal taxes and as a result “would have been acutely aware of his 

obligations going forward.” “There were numerous offenses” and 

“numerous occasions of his failure to remit.” Mr. Steffensen also

testified that because he failed to remit withholding taxes, he has 

paid penalties and fines (totaling about $100,000), approximately 

double what he would have paid had he remitted the taxes timely.

¶31 Mr. Steffensen offered only his own testimony to the 

district court as a defense. He offers the same testimony to us to 

challenge the district court’s order.13 He claims that he delegated all 

financial responsibilities to his staff and that the tax problems arose 

from incompetence. Mr. Steffensen argues that, during the period in 

question, stressful and difficult problems at home impaired his 

functions at work.14 Mr. Steffensen claims that, as a “bright and 

13 It is unclear in his brief whether Mr. Steffensen is challenging

the sufficiency of the evidence to support the district court’s factual 

findings or whether he is arguing that the factual findings do not 

support the conclusion that he violated rule 8.4(b). Regardless of 

which challenge Mr. Steffensen is lodging, we conclude that the 

district court’s factual findings and ultimate rule 8.4(b) 

determination are adequately supported.

14 The district court considered this as a mitigating factor for the 

sanctions but did not make any factual findings regarding these 

circumstances during the adjudication proceedings. 
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Opinion of the Court

14

accomplished lawyer,” he would not operate against his own 

self-interest when he knew that criminal liability would only attach 

to his failure to render the tax returns, with only financial liability 

attaching to his failure to pay.

¶32 In balancing the weight of the circumstantial evidence of 

Mr. Steffensen’s mental state on the one hand and Mr. Steffensen’s 

personal testimony to the contrary on the other, the question turns 

on his credibility.15 On this matter, we defer to the district court.16 It 

was reasonable for the district court to conclude that Mr. Steffensen 

was fully aware of his tax obligations. Indeed, at oral argument, 

Mr. Steffensen candidly admitted that even those closest to him with 

the best ability to judge his character found his story hard to 

swallow. Moreover, considering this admission in addition to all the 

other factual findings before us, we choose to defer to the district 

court’s determination and find that the evidence supports the 

district court’s findings, which in turn support its legal conclusion 

that, by a preponderance of the evidence, Mr. Steffensen violated 

Utah Code sections 76-8-1101(1)(c)(i) and 76-4-101 by knowingly 

and intentionally failing to render a tax return and attempting to do 

so.

15 At oral arguments, Steffensen conceded that the district court 

necessarily made a credibility determination in finding that he had 

violated the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 

16 This is the quintessential type of a district court finding to 

which we give deference. See supra ¶ 15. “We defer to the [district] 

court’s ability and opportunity to evaluate credibility and 

demeanor.” Am. Fork City v. Thayne, 2012 UT App 130, ¶ 4, 279 P.3d 

840 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing State v. Goodman, 763 

P.2d 786, 787 (Utah 1988)). “[W]e defer to [the district court’s] 

findings unless the record demonstrates clear error. Thus, a 

challenge to the district court’s credibility determination fails if [the 

challenging party] has provided no reason for this court to depart 

from the deference we grant the [district] court to make credibility 

determinations.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).
Cite as: 2018 UT 53

Opinion of the Court

15

¶33 Having agreed with the district court that Mr. Steffensen’s 

conduct satisfies the “criminal acts” element of professional 

misconduct under rule 8.4(b), we also agree that these acts reflect 

negatively “on a lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness . . . in 

other respects.” UTAH R. PROF’L CONDUCT 8.4(b). “Attorneys occupy 

a position of trust because their clients rely on their honesty, skill, 

and good judgment.” In re Discipline of Bates, 2017 UT 11, ¶ 19, 391 

P.3d 1039. When a lawyer intentionally fails to file and render taxes, 

his “honesty” and “trustworthiness” are unquestionably called into 

doubt. Knowingly and intentionally avoiding one’s employee 

withholding tax obligations as owner of a law firm also undermines 

the public’s trust in the legal profession. See UTAH R. PROF’L 

CONDUCT 8.4 cmt. 2 (“Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect 

adversely on fitness to practice law, such as . . . the offense of willful 

failure to file an income tax return.”).

¶34 Taxes generally fail to provide the payer with a warm and 

fuzzy feeling. “Our new Constitution is now established, and has an 

appearance that promises permanency; but in this world nothing 

can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.” 10 Letter from 

Benjamin Franklin to Jean Baptiste Le Roy (Nov. 13, 1789), in THE 

WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 68, 69 (Albert Henry Smyth ed. 

1907). Certain or not, “knowingly and intentionally” failing to file 

taxes is a crime that reflects adversely on a lawyer’s fitness to 

practice law. 

2. Violation of Rule 8.4(c)

¶35 Rule 8.4(c) defines “engag[ing] in conduct involving 

dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” as professional 

misconduct. UTAH R. PROF’L CONDUCT 8.4(c). Unlike rule 8.4(b), 

which requires criminal conduct, rule 8.4(c) looks at professional 

misconduct irrespective of criminality. The district court concluded 

that “Mr. Steffensen engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, 

fraud, deceit or misrepresentation and his conduct violated Rule 

8.4(c) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.” We agree.

¶36 The district court concluded that Mr. Steffensen had 

committed three violations of rule 8.4(c). First, the district court

concluded that Mr. Steffensen’s failure to remit money that was not 

owned by his firm was dishonest conduct. Specifically, in addition 

to failing to render proper tax returns, Mr. Steffensen also failed to 

remit withholding taxes. By his own testimony, the money was 

never withheld because there was only enough money to cover the 

net income of his employees. The district court found that 
IN RE DISCIPLINE OF STEFFENSEN

Opinion of the Court

16

“Mr. Steffensen acknowledged that funds that were to be withheld 

from employee’s checks were not withheld. Instead, [he] calculated 

his payroll obligations on the net amount and in doing so underpaid 

his employees.” Despite maintaining a “client trust account,” 

Mr. Steffensen failed to maintain the similar “Tax Commission trust 

account” for his employees’ tax funds. The court acknowledged that 

“[t]he tax monies Mr. Steffensen failed to remit were not owned by 

him or his law firm,” and this “had the potential for causing 

substantial damage to his employees.” 

¶37 Second, and relatedly, Mr. Steffensen provided W2s to his

employees that reflected that money was withheld and remitted to 

the state government. The district court concluded that representing 

to his employees that money was withheld and remitted to the state 

when it was not clearly fell within the bounds of misrepresentation. 

¶38 Finally, the district court concluded that Mr. Steffensen 

violated rule 8.4(c) because he presented financial statements “to his 

bank in order to get a loan [that] conflicted with forms he presented 

to the Tax Commission to obtain a financial hardship exemption.” 

The statements contained in his financial hardship application 

“contained material misrepresentations.” 

¶39 Mr. Steffensen makes only two challenges to the district 

court’s conclusion that he violated rule 8.4(c). The first is that for the 

same reasons the OPC could not show he acted “knowingly and 

intentionally” for purposes of rule 8.4(b), it could not show that he 

“knowingly and intentionally engaged in conduct involving 

dishonesty, deceit or misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(c).” 

We have already affirmed the district court’s determination that 

Mr. Steffensen acted knowingly and intentionally.17

17 The district court determined that “Mr. Steffensen did 

knowingly and intentionally fail to render the tax returns and fail to 

pay the withholding taxes.” Although we only considered the 

district court’s determination of whether Mr. Steffensen acted 

knowingly and intentionally with regards to failing to render the 

return when evaluating the district court’s determination that 

Mr. Steffensen violated rule 8.4(b), the district court’s conclusion on 

failing to pay the taxes was based upon the exact same 
Cite as: 2018 UT 53

Opinion of the Court

17

¶40 The second challenge is with regard to the discrepancies 

between the bank loan application and the information and records 

given to the Tax Commission when he applied for a hardship 

exemption. Mr. Steffensen argues that the finding that the 

discrepancies in his information given to the bank and the Tax 

Commission constituted a misrepresentation was erroneous.

According to Mr. Steffensen, the district court’s finding was based 

on the following discrepancy: in 2005, he listed shares of restricted 

stock as part of his financial assets on a loan application but then did 

not list them as part of his 2008 hardship exemption application to 

the Tax Commission. Mr. Steffensen admits that the documents 

contained “substantially different financial information,” but 

contends that it was because the restricted stock had no value by 

2008, a fact to which he testified at trial. 

¶41 In response, the OPC argues that “[n]o evidence was 

introduced to corroborate Mr. Steffensen’s testimony regarding the 

stated loss of value.” Additionally, the OPC agrees that the 

discrepancy discussed by Mr. Steffensen was one of the 

misrepresentations found by the district court, but contends that 

“there were other discrepancies that the district court found to be 

misleading when Mr. Steffensen provided information to the Tax 

Commission.” 

¶42 The OPC does not provide any record support for its 

assertion that the district court found other material 

misrepresentations and we cannot find any support for this 

contention in the district court’s order.18 Therefore, we focus on 

 

circumstantial evidence. For the exact same reasons discussed 

above, see supra ¶¶ 28–32, we will not disrupt the district court’s 

determination of “knowingly and intentionally” with respect to 

failing to pay the taxes.

18 The district court’s order on the specific factual basis for the 

misrepresentations is unclear. The district court makes two relevant 

findings in its order, which read, in full: (1) “Mr. Steffensen’s 

financial statements that he presented to his bank in order to get a 

loan conflicted with forms he presented to the Tax Commission to 

obtain a financial hardship exemption” and (2) “Mr. Steffensen’s 

statements about his income and finances which he presented to the 

Tax Commission to receive a financial hardship exemption 

contained material misrepresentations.” 
IN RE DISCIPLINE OF STEFFENSEN

Opinion of the Court

18

whether the district court erred in determining that the 

discrepancies in the stock assets listed on the 2005 loan application 

and 2008 hardship exemption application constituted a material 

misrepresentation. We conclude that it did. 

¶43 Mr. Steffensen testified at trial that the stock had no value 

by the time he submitted his hardship exemption application in 

2008. The OPC offers us no evidence, direct or circumstantial, to 

contradict Mr. Steffensen’s testimony. Instead, the OPC hangs its hat 

on the fact that Mr. Steffensen never presented evidence of the 

stocks’ decrease in value.19 This is insufficient.

¶44 The OPC has the burden of proving that Mr. Steffensen 

committed each violation of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 

by a preponderance of the evidence. See R. GOVERNING UTAH STATE 

BAR 14-517; In re Discipline of Steffensen, 2016 UT 18, ¶ 5, 373 P.3d 

186. The OPC cannot meet this burden of proving that 

Mr. Steffensen’s hardship application contained a misrepresentation 

by merely highlighting that he did not provide additional support 

to his uncontradicted testimony explaining the discrepancy. Because 

the OPC fails to provide any evidentiary support that undermines 

Mr. Steffensen’s explanation for the discrepancy, we conclude that 

the district court erred in determining that the hardship exemption 

application contained a misrepresentation.

¶45 Therefore, we reject the district court’s third finding of a 

violation of rule 8.4(c), but leave the other two findings—the 

dishonest conduct in failing to remit the tax monies and the 

misrepresentations on the W2s—untouched. Therefore, in 

determining the appropriate sanctions for Mr. Steffensen’s 

violations of rule 8.4(c), only the two remaining violations should be 

considered.

II. DISBARMENT IS AN INAPPROPRIATE SANCTION UNDER

RULE 14-605(a)(1) OR (a)(2)

¶46 We typically defer to the district court’s findings in attorney 

discipline cases in circumstances like this where the district court 

19 Mr. Steffensen claims that he did not submit evidence at trial 

on the 2008 value of the stocks because he “did not know that this 

would be an issue at trial.” 
Cite as: 2018 UT 53

Opinion of the Court

19

has to make a credibility determination of a witness. However,

when the analysis involves “the discipline actually imposed,” this 

task invokes “our constitutional responsibility” and “requires us to 

make an independent determination as to its correctness.” In re 

Discipline of Grimes, 2012 UT 87, ¶ 12, 297 P.3d 564 (citation omitted). 

In doing so, we are conscious of the serious consequences that can 

result. “Disbarment is the harshest sanction available for attorney 

misconduct. It . . . result[s] in the complete loss of [the attorney’s] 

career and reputation.” In re Discipline of Bates, 2017 UT 11, ¶ 20, 391 

P.3d 1039 (third alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Because disbarment is so harmful to an 

attorney, we do not take its imposition lightly. And, in this case, we 

find disbarment under rule 14-605(a)(1) or (a)(2) of the Rules

Governing the Utah State Bar unsubstantiated, and we remand for a 

new determination of the appropriate sanction. 

A. Disbarment Under Rule 14-605(a)(1)

¶47 Rule 14-605(a)(1) states, in relevant part, that disbarment is 

appropriate when a lawyer “knowingly engages in professional 

misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Utah Rules 

of Professional Conduct.” R. GOVERNING UTAH STATE BAR

14-605(a)(1). Notably, rule 8.4(b) and (c) are absent in rule 

14-605(a)(1), which governs sanctions for the other sections of Utah 

Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4. We presume this omission was

intentional. Further, the structure of the rule confirms that this 

omission was no mistake.

¶48 Rule 14-605 distinguishes between behavior that qualifies 

for disbarment, suspension, reprimand, and admonition. Not all 

professional misconduct defined in rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) results 

in presumptive disbarment, and it is therefore graded using specific 

criteria as shown in rule 14-605(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1), and (d)(1).

Violations of rule 8.4(b) or (c) are notably absent from 14-605(a)(1), 

(b)(1), (c)(1), and (d)(1). Instead, the appropriate sanctions for 

violations of rule 8.4(b) or (c) appear in other subsections of rule 

14-605.

¶49 The language of subsections (a)(2) and (b)(2) mirror the 

criminal conduct requirements of rule 8.4(b), providing for sanctions 

when an attorney “engages in serious criminal conduct,” R.

GOVERNING UTAH STATE BAR 14-605(a)(2), or “engages in criminal 

conduct” that does not meet the requirements of subsection (a)(2), 

id. 14-605(b)(2). Similarly, the language of subsections (a)(3) and 

(c)(2) provide for sanctions for “dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
IN RE DISCIPLINE OF STEFFENSEN

Opinion of the Court

20

misrepresentation,” mirroring the misconduct in rule 8.4(c). This

structure and the nature of the language of rule 14-605 confirm that 

the omission of rule 8.4 sections (b) and (c) from rule 14-605(a)(1) is

not only intentional, but also significant.

¶50 The OPC argues that by virtue of comment [1a] of rule 8.4,

any violation of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct falls under 

the umbrella of rule 8.4(a) when the time for sanctions arrives.20

This cannot be the case. To begin, “[t]he comments are intended as 

guides to interpretation, but [only] the text of each rule is 

authoritative.” UTAH R. PROF’L. COND. pmbl. 21. Although comment 

[1a] is not authoritative, it does “explain[] and illustrate[] the 

meaning and purpose of the rule.” Id. As to rule 8.4(a), comment 

[1a] explains that a violation of another Utah Rule of Professional 

Conduct may not be the sole basis for charging 8.4(a) as a separate 

violation. Vitally, however, comment [1a] “defines professional 

misconduct as a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct,” 

thus bringing any violation of the Utah Rules of Professional 

Conduct under the imposition of sanctions standards found in rule 

14-605.21 UTAH R. PROF’L. COND. 8.4(a) cmt. [1a].

20 This comment provides:

A violation of paragraph (a) based solely on the 

lawyer’s violation of another Rule of Professional 

Conduct shall not be charged as a separate violation. 

However, this rule defines professional misconduct as 

a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as the 

term professional misconduct is used in the Supreme 

Court Rules of Professional Practice, including the 

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. In this 

respect, if a lawyer violates any of the Rules of 

Professional Conduct, the appropriate discipline may 

be imposed pursuant to Rule 14–605.

UTAH R. PROF. COND. 8.4(a) cmt [1a].

21 Professional misconduct that falls under rule 8.4(b), (c), (d), (e) 

or (f) cannot also fall under rule 8.4(a) for the purpose of sanctions. 

Conduct that violates other rules of professional conduct, however, 

falls under rule 8.4(a) for the purpose of sanctions.
Cite as: 2018 UT 53

Opinion of the Court

21

¶51 We recognize that the language of comment [1a] is 

confusing and could be read to incorporate all violations of the Utah 

Rules of Professional Conduct, including rule 8(b) through (f), into 

its grasp. But we believe a fairer reading of the comment limits its 

scope to violations of rules other than rule 8.4. If a violation of any 

of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct could also be a violation 

of rule 8.4(a), rule 14-605(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1), and (d)(1) would 

encompass the entirety of rule 8.4, including rule 8.4(b) and (c),

rendering the rest of rule 14-605 superfluous. Indeed, rule 8.4(a) 

would subsume every other rule in the Utah Rules of Professional 

Conduct, including rule 8.4(d), (e), and (f). We do not believe that 

comment [1a] intended such a result.

¶52 Additionally, we must give meaning to the text of rule 

14-605 as written, and that meaning is clear: Professional 

misconduct as defined by rule 8.4(b) and (c) is expressly and 

intentionally excluded from rule 14-605(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1), and 

(d)(1). Violations of rule 8.4(b) do not trigger disbarment under rule 

14-605(a)(1) when violated but must be assessed under subsections 

(a)(2) and (b)(2) for the appropriateness of disbarment. Similarly, 

violations of rule 8.4(c) do not trigger disbarment under rule 

14-605(a)(1) but must be assessed under subsections (a)(3) and (c)(2).

B. Disbarment Is Inappropriate Under Rule 14-605(a)(2)

¶53 Absent aggravating or mitigating factors, “serious criminal 

conduct” gives rise to a presumptive sanction of disbarment under 

rule 14-605(a)(2) when “a necessary element” of the crime “includes

intentional interference with the administration of justice, false 

swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or 

theft; or the sale, distribution, or importation of controlled 

substances; or the intentional killing of another; or an attempt or 

conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of these 

offenses.” Otherwise, if one of these elements is not necessarily

included, but the criminal act in question “nevertheless seriously 

adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law,” the 

presumptive sanction is suspension. R. GOVERNING UTAH STATE BAR

14-605(b)(2).

¶54 Mr. Steffensen argues that rule 14-605(a)(2) cannot apply to 

him because the district court did not enter a specific finding that 

his criminal conduct was “serious.” In this case, we do not need to 

reach the seriousness issue because we find that neither of the 

criminal acts specifically found by the district court have one of the 

listed elements as a necessary element.
IN RE DISCIPLINE OF STEFFENSEN

Opinion of the Court

22

¶55 In order to determine the necessary elements of a crime, we 

follow a categorical approach. See State v. Tulley, 2018 UT 35, ¶ 59, __ 

P.3d __. Under a categorical approach, we “examine[] the ordinary 

case of [a] defendant’s crime and not the particular conduct in 

which the defendant engaged.” Id. (second alteration in original) 

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we 

must “identify the minimum criminal conduct necessary for 

conviction under a particular statute and look only to the statutory 

definitions—i.e., the elements of [the] . . . offense[], and not to the 

particular [underlying] facts.” Id. (alterations in original) (citation 

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶56 In its conclusions of law for the violation of rule 8.4(b) 

adjudication phase order, the district court specifically concluded

that Mr. Steffensen committed the criminal acts of Failing to Render 

a Proper Tax Return and Attempted Failing to Render a Proper Tax 

Return. This required the district court to conclude that 

Mr. Steffensen “knowingly and intentionally, and without a 

reasonable good faith basis, fail[ed] to . . . render . . . any return

within the time required by law” and that he also attempted to do 

so. See UTAH CODE §§ 76-8-1101(1)(c)(i); 76-4-101. But the district 

court was not required to find, as a necessary element, that 

Mr. Steffensen’s criminal conduct included “intentional interference 

with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, 

fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution, 

or importation of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of 

another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to 

commit any of these offenses.” R. GOVERNING UTAH STATE BAR

14-605(a)(2). Because neither of the criminal acts found by the 

district court have one of the necessary elements listed in rule 

14-605(a)(2), we hold that disbarment is unwarranted under that 

subsection. 

C. Appropriate Sanction Under Rule 14-605

¶57 We have rejected the appropriateness of disbarment as the 

presumptive22 sanction under rule 14-605(a)(1) or (a)(2). The court 

22 The district court found “that the mitigating circumstances 

[did] not warrant a deviation from the presumptive sanction.” 

Because we reject the district court’s imposition of sanctions and 
Cite as: 2018 UT 53

Opinion of the Court

23

did not make any conclusions of law in the sanctions hearing about 

disbarment under rule 14-605(a)(3). Without specific findings that a 

violation of rule 8.4(c) falls under the requirements of rule 

14-605(a)(3), including that it “seriously adversely reflects on the 

lawyer’s fitness to practice law” and is “intentional misconduct” 

other than conduct that would fall under rule 14-605(a)(1) or (a)(2), 

we will not presume disbarment is the appropriate sanction under 

rule 14-605(a)(3). “[A]lthough we always give serious consideration 

to the findings and [rulings] of the [district court],” we will not hold 

that disbarment is appropriate without clear documentation of the 

rationale and reasoning for the court’s conclusion. In re Discipline of 

Bates, 2017 UT 11, ¶ 17 (second and third alterations in original) 

(citation omitted); see also In re Discipline of Ince, 957 P.2d 1233, 1236 

(Utah 1998) (“With respect to the discipline actually imposed, our 

constitutional responsibility requires us to make an independent 

determination as to its correctness.”). 

¶58 This does not imply that Mr. Steffensen’s conduct must go 

unsanctioned. Rule 14-605 leaves open several possibilities, 

including that his conduct for violating rule 8.4(c) falls under rule 

14-605(a)(3) or (c)(2), and that his conduct for violating rule 8.4(b) 

“seriously adversely reflects on [Mr. Steffensen’s] fitness to practice 

law,” warranting suspension under rule 14-605(b)(2). 

¶59 Here, the district court does find that “Mr. Steffensen’s 

failure to remit tax monies [not owned by him or his law firm but 

belonging to the employees] affected his employees who were 

entitled to rely on him to remit their taxes.” This “failure to remit” 

the money that should have been held in trust for his employees 

“had the potential for causing substantial damage to his 

employees”23 and was dishonest conduct. And, “[t]he distribution 

 

remand for a new sanctions determination, we do not consider 

Mr. Steffensen’s challenges to the district court’s conclusion on the 

aggravating and mitigating factors.

23 The district court also found that “Mr. Steffensen’s violation of 

the Rules of Professional Conduct caused or at least potentially 

caused serious injury to Mr. Steffensen’s former employees and to 

the public.” For purposes of sanctions, this finding falls under rule 

14-605(a)(1). To avoid any confusion, we take this opportunity to 

highlight that rule 14-605(a)(1) requires a finding that the lawyer’s 

professional misconduct “causes serious or potentially serious 
IN RE DISCIPLINE OF STEFFENSEN

Opinion of the Court

24

of W2s to the employees stating that the tax monies had been 

withheld and remitted” was dishonest conduct and a 

misrepresentation under rule 8.4(c). The “potential for causing 

substantial damage to his employees” is not the same as “seriously 

adversely reflect[ing] on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.” In the 

orders before us, the district court did not make any determinations 

as to the appropriate sanctions that misconduct under rule 8.4(c) 

merits other than lumping this misconduct together with the 

misconduct found in rule 8.4(b) to reach disbarment under rule 

14-605(a)(1). We have rejected rule 14-605(a)(1) as inappropriate for 

violations of rule 8.4(b) or (c). And we have further rejected rule 

14-605(a)(2) as the appropriate sanction for violations of rule 8.4(b).

¶60 Without reopening the proceedings, we leave it to the 

district court to interpret its own order and encourage the court to 

include more detailed findings specific to each violation and the 

rationale behind the sanction imposed for each violation. In doing 

so, we implore all state district courts to be detailed in their findings 

and to be clear in tying the sanction imposed to the professional 

misconduct found. Therefore, having rejected disbarment under 

rule 14-605(a)(1) and (a)(2), we remand to the district court for 

clarification of its findings of fact and conclusions of law in its order 

regarding Mr. Steffensen’s sanctions for professional misconduct 

under rule 8.4(b) and (c).

CONCLUSION

¶61 Having reviewed the findings and conclusions from both 

Mr. Steffensen’s adjudication and sanction hearings, we hold that 

there was no clear error in concluding that Mr. Steffensen had 

violated rule 8.4(b) and (c) of the Utah Rules of Professional 

Conduct. However, upon analyzing and clarifying the interpretation 

and application of rule 14-605, we hold that disbarment is 

unwarranted under subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2).

¶62 While we could enter a final judgment in this case under 

our constitutional mandate, we deem it more prudent to remand to 

the district court for reconsideration of the appropriate sanctions. 

 

injury.” R. GOVERNING UTAH STATE BAR 14-605(a)(1) (emphasis 

added). It is insufficient to find, as the district court did here, that 

the misconduct “potentially caused serious injury.” (Emphasis 

added.) 
Cite as: 2018 UT 53

Opinion of the Court

25

With a cold record before us, we recognize that the district court is 

better situated, in the first instance, to make the necessary 

determinations under Rule Governing the Utah State Bar 14-605. 

¶63 For this reason, we affirm the district court’s finding of 

violations of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, reverse the 

ruling on Mr. Steffensen’s disbarment, and remand to the district 

court for a new determination of the appropriate sanctions.