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74–003PDF 2012

NATO: THE CHICAGO SUMMIT AND U.S. POLICY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EURASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 26, 2012

Serial No. 112–166

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EURASIA

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Tina S. Kaidanow, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State ................ 8

Mr. James Townsend, Deputy Assistant Secretary, European and NATO Policy, U.S. Department of Defense ......................................................................... 20

Mr. Damon Wilson, executive vice president, The Atlantic Council ................... 41

Mr. Luke Coffey, Margaret Thatcher Fellow, The Heritage Foundation ............ 50

Stephen Flanagan, Ph.D., Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Diplomacy and National Security, Center for Strategic and International Studies ...................... 67

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana, and chairman, Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 5

The Honorable Tina S. Kaidanow: Prepared statement ....................................... 11

Mr. James Townsend: Prepared statement ........................................................... 22

Mr. Damon Wilson: Prepared statement ............................................................... 44

Mr. Luke Coffey: Prepared statement .................................................................... 52

Stephen Flanagan, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ..................................................... 70

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 88

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 89

Written responses from the Honorable Tina S. Kaidanow to questions submitted for the record by: 

The Honorable Gus Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida ........................................................................................................... 90

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York ...................................................................................................... 92

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NATO: THE CHICAGO SUMMIT AND U.S. 

POLICY 

THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EURASIA, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jean Schmidt presiding. 

Ms. SCHMIDT [presiding]. Now I would like to open the subcommittee hearing on Europe and Eurasia. Since I have already 

given an opening statement, I am not going to say basically the 

same thing again, but echo that belief that we need to expand the 

membership in NATO to many of the countries that were mentioned here today. 

But now I would like to ask Mr. Meeks if he has an opening 

statement. 

Mr. MEEKS. I do. Since I gave mine, basically, on the Georgian 

markup and resolution, I do want to make some comments specifically about NATO and the Chicago Summit and U.S. policy. 

I want to thank, again, Chairman Burton, for scheduling this 

hearing. It is very timely, as it is leading up to the Chicago Summit. 

NATO remains the United States’ premiere defense alliance and 

an essential instrument for peace, in my estimation. The Chicago 

Summit will take place this year as allied leaders grapple with severe budgetary constraints, wind down the ISAF presence in Afghanistan, and develop the capability to respond to increasing 

threats to global strategic stability and peace. 

Contemplating these challenges, it is useful to look at the continuum of NATO policymaking or at least at recent history. At the 

2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO adopted a new strategic concept which 

outlines NATO’s vision for the coming decade. Realization of this 

strategy will enable the alliance to respond to a full range of evolving threats, including to energy and cyber security and migration, 

and will provide stability beyond the geography of the alliance. 

But I mentioned constraints. In implementing this strategy and 

in anticipating, confronting, and eliminating threats to peace and 

stability, NATO must do more with less. In this age of austerity 

on both sides of the Atlantic, defense budgets, all budgets, are 

under pressure. Defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP vary 

from 4.8 percent in the United States to 0.8 percent in some member states, and raises the questions of readiness of NATO assets. 

This is a concern that must be addressed. 

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Some alliance members, for example Latvia, are working toward 

meeting the commitment despite financial difficulties. As they 

chart their way out of the financial crises, their long-term budget 

planning will raise defense spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2020. 

State Secretary of Latvian Ministry of Defense, Mr. Janis Sarts, recently stated that, ‘‘the current defense budget was appropriate for 

the time of the crisis, and we were able to do it thanks to the understanding of other NATO member states. But we should not expect that we will be able to live on the account of others in the future.’’

Since the Cold War, NATO has expanded from 16 to 28 members, a fact that has been a driver for reform and generated stability throughout Europe. The alliance vision for a Europe whole, 

free, and at peace remains unrealized. The goal is attainable; integration into Euro-Atlantic structures of all European countries that 

so desire is the path, the correct path toward it, in my estimation. 

NATO allies Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, and 

Montenegro have expressed their aspirations to join NATO, and alliance leaders recognized their aspirations at the Bucharest, 

Strasbourg/Kehl, and Lisbon Summits. 

Passing complex reforms, maintaining high levels of public support, and, above all, committing troops, expertise, funding, material, and political support to critical operations in Afghanistan, 

Kosovo, and Libya, these nations have repeatedly asserted NATO 

membership as a strategic policy goal. We, the NATO member 

states, must acknowledge these gestures by providing these countries roadmaps to membership. 

Two issues concern me, though, about NATO’s enlargement prospects. My concern is that there is an apparent lack of cohesion 

within the alliance regarding Georgia becoming a member of 

NATO, and whether perception or politics, it is unhealthy for the 

future of NATO and the future of Georgia to let this question linger. I hope that the Chicago Summit will bring some clarity there. 

My other concern relates to bilateral conflicts playing out within 

NATO. Today we are seeing bilateral conflicts between alliance 

members, aspirant countries, and partners; notably, Greece and 

Macedonia’s disagreement over the name issue that keeps Macedonia out of NATO; Turkey and NATO-partner Israel’s multidimensional discord that led to Turkey preventing Israel from attending partnership meetings at the NATO Summit. 

I am troubled that these unresolved issues undermine core 

NATO values and hamper alliance functions and capabilities. I 

urge all parties, NATO members and non-NATO members, to consider the broader ramifications of using NATO as a venue to gain 

leverage in bilateral disputes. I call on my congressional colleagues 

and the administration to convey this message to all of the relevant 

parties. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this timely hearing. 

I look forward to hearing our witnesses’ thoughts on how we can 

maintain a NATO as the essential forum for allied security consultations, decisions, and action. 

Mr. BURTON [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Meeks. 

I apologize for my temporary absence. We had a bunch of votes 

in another committee, but it is good to be back. 

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In less than a month, leaders of NATO member states will converge, as my colleague said, in Chicago for the Chicago Summit. As 

are my colleagues, I am a strong supporter of NATO. Based on the 

bedrock of the common principles of democracy, individual liberty, 

and the rule of law, over the course of the 63 years of its history, 

the alliance has evolved to protect the freedom and security of all 

of its members. 

Is that call from the President for me? [Laughter.] 

NATO will evolve through the Chicago Summit as it has done 

through the past Summits, including Riga, Bucharest, and Lisbon. 

We are here to discuss how NATO will evolve. 

It is clear that the Summit will address Afghanistan and NATO’s 

commitment through 2014 and beyond. The alliance should also 

take this opportunity to begin to formulate a coherent strategy toward the Middle East and North Africa, including Libya, Syria, 

and Iran, that works with and develops the alliance’s partners in 

the region. 

I was critical of the military action in Libya. As we have learned, 

once the military goes in and does its job, the next step often remains unclear as to what we do and not fully understanding the 

internal political dynamics of the countries that we are trying to 

help. The resulting instability can lead to greater threats and further instability. NATO needs to think beyond the military stage 

and prepare for the political realities after fighting. 

Toward that end, a number of us have made statements on the 

Floor about the United States being involved in these affairs without Congress passing resolutions dealing with those things. I have 

stated in numerous articles that Congress needs to be involved in 

the decision making process and that neither the President nor one 

or more Senators should unilaterally make decisions to involve us 

in military conflicts without the consent and the support of Congress. 

I am concerned with the effects of the European financial crisis 

on NATO. As I have previously stated, I am skeptical of the steps 

Europe has taken to solve the crisis and feel that the crisis is not 

over. Clearly, this ongoing crisis has impacted, and will continue to 

impact, the resources that the alliance’s European members are 

willing and able to invest in defense. Of the 28 NATO members, 

only three currently meet the common commitment to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense. At the same time, further cuts are 

expected, and that is something that we ought to all be concerned 

about. 

I agree with the concerns then-Secretary Gates voiced last summer in Brussels; there will be growing difficulty for the U.S. to sustain its current support for NATO if the American taxpayer continues to carry the bulk of the burden of the alliance. NATO must 

always work to improve cooperation and coordination among its 

members; however, such actions are the very essence of what it 

means to participate in an alliance and are not a replacement for 

adequate funding. While I understand and embrace the need for 

austerity and reduced government spending on both sides of the 

Atlantic, particularly here, I urge all members of the alliance to incorporate the 2 percent commitment in their long-term budgetary 

goals. I hope that is discussed very thoroughly in Chicago. 

4

However, at the same time, I urge the administration to make 

it clear that, despite the need for increased focus on Asia, the 

United States remains committed to achieving and maintaining the 

longstanding goal of a Europe: Whole, free, and at peace. 

The concerns that I have just raised are based on my steadfast 

support of NATO. The alliance stands with the U.S.-EU economic 

cooperation as a cornerstone of global stability. The alliance must 

increase cooperation with key partners around the globe to better 

leverage transatlantic leadership in the face of diverse challenges. 

However, NATO must also remain committed to enlargement by 

providing paths for qualified aspirant countries that embrace the 

alliance’s common values to enter the ‘‘open door.’’ As we have seen 

in Afghanistan, such countries already provide the alliance with 

important capabilities. 

If we do not provide clear pathways toward future admission into 

the alliance, and, thus, the transatlantic community, we create conditions where these countries can slide backwards, away from Europe and further away from democracy and stability. 

Although the Summit would be far more productive if held in Indianapolis—that is my hometown—or Little Rock, as my colleague 

just said. Little Rock? Is that in America, Little Rock? [Laughter.] 

Chicago will present an important opportunity for the alliance’s 

leadership to solidify a final strategy for Afghanistan, formulate a 

coherent strategy for supporting stable democratic development in 

the Middle East and North Africa, and establish a unified vision 

for NATO’s future that reaffirms its members’ support for maintaining a robust alliance while enhancing cooperation with key 

global partners and maintaining a responsible open-door policy. 

I am very eager to hear the testimony from our witnesses today 

and learn more about NATO’s future. 

Do we have any other members who would like to make an opening statement? The gentleman from New York, Mr. Engel. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burton follows:]

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Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to make a 

short opening statement to add to what I said before. 

I think it is very important. You know, when the Soviet Union 

fell, and I was a member of this committee way back then, as you 

were, Mr. Chairman, I called for expansion of NATO as quickly as 

possible because I really believe that you strike while the iron is 

hot. 

We now see that, since it is so much later and that Russia has 

to some degree regained its footing, it is opposing expansion of 

NATO as somehow a perceived threat to them, but it isn’t. 

I still believe that NATO should expand and that countries that 

want to get into NATO ought to become members of NATO. Georgia, the Ukraine, Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia 

ought to become members of NATO. They want to, and we should 

welcome them with open arms. I think it is very, very important. 

I know that I am eagerly awaiting the testimony of Ambassador 

Kaidanow, who I know served in Pristina, Kosovo, as our Ambassador. I am anxious to hear what she has to say about that as well. 

I finally want to, again, reiterate what I said before. I think it 

is an absolute disgrace that Turkey is, as of now, blocking Israel 

from participating in the NATO meeting. Israel has participated in 

many NATO meetings before. I want to condemn it and hope that 

the government in Ankara changes its attitude. 

With that, I want to say that I agree, essentially, with everything that has been said by all my colleagues on both sides of the 

aisle. 

And with that, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. GRIFFIN [presiding]. Do any of the members want to make 

opening statements? Would you like to? 

[No response.] 

Okay. Then, I would like to introduce the witnesses. Thank you 

all for being here with us today. 

Testifying on the first panel, on behalf of the Department of 

State, is Ambassador Tina Kaidanow, Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for the Bureau of Europe and Eurasia. Ambassador 

Kaidanow assumed her current position on July 1st, 2011. Previously, she served as the Bureau’s Deputy Assistant Secretary responsible for issues related to Greece, Turkey, Cypress, and the 

Caucuses. Previously, Ms. Kaidanow served as the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Kosovo. A career member of the U.S. Diplomatic Service, Ambassador Kaidanow has served in a variety of 

positions focused primarily on Southeastern Europe at the Department of State and the National Security Council. 

Ms. Kaidanow holds a bachelor of arts and master of arts degree 

from the University of Pennsylvania and a master of philosophy degree in political science from Columbia University in New York. 

Representing the Department of Defense is Mr. James J. Townsend, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and 

NATO Policy. In this position, Mr. Townsend is responsible for 

managing the day-to-day defense relationship between the United 

States, NATO, the EU, and the nations of Europe. 

Before taking up his current position, which represents a return 

to the Pentagon, Mr. Townsend was Vice President of the Atlantic 

8

Council of the United States and Director of the Council’s Program 

on International Security. 

Mr. Townsend has previously served as Principal Director of European and NATO Policy and Director of the Defense Plans Division at the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels, Belgium, among 

other positions, including the office of Congressman Charles Edward Bennett. 

Mr. Townsend earned a BA from Duke University and an MA 

from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies 

in international economics and American foreign policy. 

Thank you both for being here today. 

Ambassador Kaidanow, if you would like to start? 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TINA S. KAIDANOW, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. KAIDANOW. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Meeks, and members of the committee, thank you all for inviting 

us here today to discuss the NATO Summit, which the United 

States is proud to be hosting in Chicago on May 20th and 21st of 

this year. 

Our hosting of the Summit is actually a tangible symbol of the 

importance of NATO to the United States, as well as an opportunity to underscore to the American people the continued value of 

this alliance to the security challenges that we face today. 

With your permission, I would like to submit my full statement 

for the record and provide just a brief summary at this point. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Without objection. 

Ms. KAIDANOW. Thank you. 

At NATO’s last Summit in Lisbon nearly 18 months ago, allies 

unveiled a new strategic concept that defines NATO’s focus in the 

21st century. Building on the decisions taken in Lisbon, allies have 

three objectives for this Summit, and I would characterize them as 

Afghanistan-related, capabilities, and partnerships. 

On Afghanistan, the ISAF coalition, which is comprised of 90,000 

U.S. troops serving alongside 36,000 troops from NATO allies and 

5,300 from partner countries, has made significant progress in preventing the country from serving as a safe haven for terrorists and 

ensuring that Afghans are able to provide for their own security. 

These are both necessary conditions to fulfill the President’s goal 

to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda. 

At Chicago, the United States anticipates three major 

deliverables. One, an agreement on an interim milestone in 2013 

when ISAF’s mission will shift from combat to support for the Afghan National Security Forces, the ANSF. Second, an agreement 

on the cost, size, and sustainment of the ANSF beyond 2014. And 

third, a roadmap for NATO’s post-2014 role in Afghanistan. 

On capabilities, NATO’s ability to deploy an effective fighting 

force in the field makes this alliance unique. However, its capacity 

to deter and to respond to security challenges will only be as successful as its forces are able, effective, interoperable, and modern. 

In the current era of fiscal austerity, NATO can still maintain a 

strong defense, but doing so requires innovation, creativity, and efficiencies. The United States is modernizing its presence in Europe 

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at the same time that our NATO allies and NATO as an institution 

are engaged in similar steps. This is a clear opportunity for our European allies to take on greater responsibility. The United States 

continues to encourage allies strongly to meet the 2 percent benchmark for defense spending and to contribute politically, financially, 

and operationally to the strength of the alliance. 

In addition to the total level of defense spending, we should also 

focus on how these limited resources are allocated and for what priorities. NATO has made progress toward pooling more national resources or what NATO Secretary General Rasmussen has described 

as ‘‘smart defense.’’ These efforts are exemplified through the capabilities package that the United States anticipates leaders will endorse in Chicago, which includes missile defense, alliance ground 

surveillance, and Baltic air policing. 

Finally, the Chicago Summit will highlight NATO’s success in 

working with a growing number of partners all across the globe. 

Effective partnerships allow the alliance to extend its reach, to act 

with greater legitimacy, to share burdens, and to benefit from the 

capabilities of others. 

Allies will not take decisions on further enlargement of NATO in 

Chicago, but they will, nevertheless, send a clear and positive message to aspirant countries in support of their membership goals. 

The United States has been very clear that NATO’s door remains 

open to new members that meet the alliance’s standards. Bosnia 

and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Georgia are all 

working closely with allies to meet NATO criteria, so that they may 

enter the alliance. 

Macedonia has fulfilled key criteria required of NATO members 

and has contributed to regional and to global security. The United 

States fully supports the U.N. process, led by Ambassador Nimitz, 

and regularly engages with both Greece and Macedonia in order to 

find a mutually-acceptable solution to the name dispute in order to 

fulfill the decision taken at the NATO Summit in Bucharest and 

extend a membership offer to Macedonia. 

In the case of Montenegro, the United States is assisting reform 

efforts by taking steps to embed a Defense Advisor in the Ministry 

of Defense. We encourage other allies to consider similar capacitybuilding measures. 

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the recent agreement on registering 

defense properties is a significant step forward toward fulfilling the 

conditions laid out at the NATO Foreign Minister’s meeting in 

Tallinn in April 2010. NATO should spare no effort in assisting the 

Bosnian Government’s implementation of this decision, which 

would allow them to submit their first Annual National Program 

this fall. 

With regard to Georgia, U.S. security assistance and military engagement support the country’s defense reforms, train and equip 

Georgian troops for participation in ISAF operations, and advance 

its NATO interoperability. In January, President Obama and President Saakashvili agreed to enhance this cooperation to advance 

Georgian military modernization, defense reform, and self-defense 

capabilities. 

U.S. assistance programs provide additional support to ongoing 

democratic and economic reform efforts in Georgia, a critical part 

10

of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, where they have made important strides. U.S. support for Georgia’s territorial integrity within its internationally-recognized borders remains absolutely steadfast, and our non-recognition of the separatist regions of Abkhazia 

and South Ossetia will not change. 

Finally, let me say a word about NATO’s relationship with Russia. 2012 marks the 15th anniversary of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 10th anniversary of the NATO Russia Council. We 

commemorated those anniversaries at a NATO-Russia foreign ministers meeting last week in Brussels. 

The NRC is founded on our commitment to cooperate in areas of 

mutual interest and address issues of disagreement. The best example of cooperation is our joint efforts in Afghanistan, where Russia’s transit support has been critical to the mission’s success. At 

the same time, NATO continues to seek cooperation with Russia on 

missile defense in order to enhance our individual capabilities to 

counter this threat. 

While we strive for cooperation, we have also been frank in our 

discussions with Russia that we will continue to develop and deploy 

our missile defenses irrespective of the status of missile defense cooperation with Russia. Let me be clear. NATO is not a threat to 

Russia, nor is Russia a threat to NATO. 

It is no secret that there are issues on which allies and Russia 

differ. Russia has been critical of NATO’s operation in Libya. We 

also disagree fundamentally over the situation in Georgia. Since 

2008, NATO has strongly supported Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. 

As we look to Chicago, these three Summit priorities that I mentioned, defining the next phase of the transition in Afghanistan, 

outlining a vision for addressing 21st century challenges in a period of austerity, and expanding our partnerships, all show just 

how much NATO has evolved since its founding six decades ago. 

The reasons for the alliance’s continued success are very clear. 

NATO has over the last 63 years proven to be an adaptable, durable, and cost-effective provider of security. In Chicago, the United 

States will work with its allies and its partners to ensure that the 

alliance remains vibrant and capable for many more years to come. 

With that, I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Kaidanow follows:]

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Mr. GRIFFIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Townsend? 

STATEMENT OF MR. JAMES TOWNSEND, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, EUROPEAN AND NATO POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. TOWNSEND. Thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member 

Meeks, and members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me 

here today to discuss the NATO Summit, which the United States 

will host in Chicago in May. 

I will describe for the committee what we hope to achieve at the 

Summit from the Defense Department point of view and its relevance for U.S. national security. I particularly look forward to 

hearing the committee’s views on the Summit and the priorities 

you have for its outcome. 

I would like to submit my full statement for the record and give 

you a summary of my statement this afternoon. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Without objection. 

Mr. TOWNSEND. NATO heads of state and government come together at a Summit every few years not only to approve important 

pieces of alliance business, but also to renew at the highest level 

the commitment allies have made to one another in the North Atlantic Treaty. This commitment to come to one another’s defense, 

as expressed in Article 5 of the Treaty, is a solemn one that has 

only been invoked once—after the United States was attacked on 

September 11th, 2001. 

This commitment was critical during the Cold War to help deter 

the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact from attacking the United 

States and our allies. Even with the end of the Cold War, this Article 5 commitment remains the core of the alliance. NATO serves 

as the organizing framework to ensure that we have allies willing 

and able to fight alongside us in conflict, and provides an integrated military structure that puts the military teeth behind alliance political decisions to take action. In addition to ensuring the 

interoperability of our allies, NATO serves as a hub and an integrator of a network of global security partners. 

The NATO air and maritime operation in Libya illustrates this 

point. The operation began as a coalition of the willing, involving 

the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. However, 

when NATO answered the U.N.’s call to protect the Libyan people, 

it was able to take on the mission and execute it successfully. Had 

NATO not been there, or had NATO been too weak an institution 

to take on such an operation, the coalition would have had to carry 

on alone. 

Keeping NATO strong both politically and militarily is critical to 

ensuring NATO is ready when it is needed. This has been true for 

the past 20 years, when the turbulence of the international system 

has demanded that NATO respond nearly continuously to crises 

throughout the globe. 

Today, for example, NATO forces are in Afghanistan, in the Balkans, countering pirates in waters off Somalia, and have concluded 

operations in Libya. Looking out into the future, challenges to the 

United States and our allies can come from ballistic missile proliferation, cyber attack, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, as 

21

well as from the instability that can come from turbulence in the 

Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere. We must be ready to 

meet emerging threats, and we would prefer to meet these challenges together with allies, and not alone. 

So, the strategic context for the Summit, and for our work at 

NATO every day, is: How can we keep NATO and the allies ready 

and able to meet the challenges of today and in the future? This 

is especially complex today, as the European economic crisis compels allies to cut defense spending and force structure in order to 

reduce their debt and decrease government spending. 

Allies, too, have different views and priorities regarding perceptions of the threat and the traditions of their own military forces. 

Not every ally sees the world and their role in it the way we do. 

But one thing we all agree on is that we need the alliance to be 

unified and strong. Allies look to the United States to lead the way 

in keeping NATO strong, capable, and credible. 

That is where we come to the Summit. At Chicago, heads of state 

and government will agree or approve work that we committed to 

at the last Summit at Lisbon 18 months ago. 

At Chicago, this work will focus on three areas: No. 1, an agreement on a strategic plan for Afghanistan. No. 2, military capabilities and how we can achieve and make certain of these capabilities 

in this time of austerity. And the third area is NATO partnerships. 

The United States has three Summit objectives: No. 1, charting 

a clear path for the completion of transition and reaffirming 

NATO’s commitment to the long-term security of Afghanistan. No. 

2, maintaining NATO’s core defense capabilities during this period 

of austerity and building a force ready for future challenges. And, 

No. 3, deepening the engagement of NATO’s partner nations in alliance operation and activities. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to complete my statement here, as 

I said, submit my complete statement for the record, and go 

straight to questions. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you 

today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Townsend follows:]

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Mr. POE [presiding]. The chair will reserve its right to ask questions. I will turn to the ranking member, Mr. Meeks, for his questions. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me start out with this: One of the questions that I am most 

frequently asked when I travel abroad, or am meeting with European officials or parliamentarians, relates to the administration’s 

so-called ‘‘pivot to Asia.’’ They have a concern, you know, those that 

I speak with. They ask about, what does that mean? Does pivoting 

to Asia mean moving away from Europe? 

So, I would like to put that question to you. What does it mean, 

and how is the concept of a pivot playing out in NATO? How are 

NATO members approaching the issue with the administration as 

we get ready to go to Chicago? 

Ms. KAIDANOW. Thank you, Congressman. I think that is a very 

important question, and you are right, it is important to address 

it very forthrightly. 

What I would say is, first of all, that Europe remains a central 

preoccupation of the United States. Its security is essential to us, 

as well as its cooperation as a partner in terms of global endeavors. 

Pretty much everything we do globally, the Europeans are right 

there by our side. I think it is important to establish that right 

away. Our commitment to Article 5, which is the enduring commitment to European security, is very, very strong. 

I would say that the notion of a pivot to Asia is really a 

mischaracterization in many ways. It is not a pivot away from Europe to Asia. I think what our strategic defense review was attempting to do—and my colleague can speak to this even more 

than I can—was to posit that we have now emerged from a decade 

or more of war, essentially, conflict. And in that decade, perforce, 

we had to devote our time, our attention, our energy, and our resources in many ways to Afghanistan, to Iraq, to other things. 

Thankfully, we are now emerging from some of that. 

The question of how we utilize resources in the era after that is 

a salient one, it is important, and whether we are able to conserve 

some of those resources. So, I think the question for us now is really, how do we smartly, intelligently retool a bit, so not pivot to Asia 

from Europe, but maintain our commitment to Europe, which is 

just as strong as it ever was, but also take into account the impact 

of Asia and the Asia Pacific region as an increasingly-important 

part of what we do? So, I think we are doing both of those things 

very successfully. 

You noted that you hear from some of our allies. Well, of course, 

we have been talking to our allies extensively about our force posture in Europe, and so forth. We will maintain a very strong posture in Europe. We actually are deploying new capabilities—again, 

my colleague can speak to that as well—but an aviation detachment in Poland, missile defense assets in Poland, Romania, Turkey, elsewhere. These are the kinds of things that I think are elements of a new approach and a new response to threats that are 

emerging over time. 

I think our European allies have been very cognizant of the reasons for that. I think they agree that, whereas once upon a time 

it might have made sense to keep four heavy brigades, heavy comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:37 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\EE\042612\74003 HFA PsN: SHIRL
29

bat teams in Europe, that doesn’t really make sense anymore. 

What makes sense now is this new approach that I outlined, including rotational elements from the United States that might help 

to augment NATO’s response force and also train together with our 

European colleagues such that we have greater interoperability for 

the inevitable operations that will come our way. 

So, there is, I think, good understanding among our European allies as to why we are doing a number of the things we are doing. 

We have talked to them extensively. We will talk to them more, of 

course. 

Just recently, of course, Secretary Clinton and Secretary Panetta 

were there for the joint foreign and defense ministerial meeting to 

make this point, as they did in Munich earlier, and so forth. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. Because we know that, when we look at 

our values and where there are shared interests, the ones we turn 

to first and on whom we count on most in a crisis is our European 

allies. 

Let me ask Mr. Townsend in the little time we have left. Another 

issue that I have been looking at is that in the past NATO leaders 

have recognized the importance of energy security, and energy security is important to me. At previous Summits, they committed 

themselves to addressing these issues as an alliance. 

But there appears, however, to be a lack of an agreement on the 

importance of the Southern Corridor, the significance of the North 

Stream Pipeline, and the reliance or dependence of some NATO 

members on Russian energy resources. 

And so, I was just wondering, has NATO ceased to pursue the 

goal of energy securance as an alliance? I know I am out of time, 

but I am trying to sneak that in, and we will come back. 

Mr. TOWNSEND. Thank you, Chairman. That is a great question, 

as was your first question that Ambassador Kaidanow so ably addressed, and that we can certainly come back to as well. 

But on energy security, this is something that the alliance has 

been working on for at least 10 years now and grappling with. It 

is a tough question. It is not just a military question or a defenserelated question. It involves economies, finance, geography, and 

business. It is something that, in terms of finding a home, is difficult. NATO talks about this because it involves security and the 

security of allies. And so, those discussions we have quite a bit 

within the alliance, as we look at future challenges and what 

NATO can do. 

Energy security is discussed at the European Union as well, 

which certainly plays a large role in this. Nations themselves recognize that energy security is a security issue of the future that 

they need to grapple with now in terms of diversification, in terms 

of how can they meet their security needs in other ways. And so, 

it is something that is part of the context that we have to work 

within as we look into the future. We talk about future challenges 

in terms of ballistic missile proliferation or WMD. We look at it in 

terms of terrorism. But energy security is in there as well. 

The NATO role in energy security is probably more limited than 

it is in these other areas, but it is something that is important as 

planners at NATO think about future areas of instability, what 

happens if energy is denied a nation, what role might come to the 

30

alliance, what role might come to the European Union or to that 

particular nation, how might we have to help out in terms of the 

nation trying to handle the results of something coming out of an 

energy crisis. 

So, it is part of the context. It is something that, as the years 

go on, we are going to have to work very closely with the European 

Union and with nations to make sure we are provided for in facing 

this kind of challenge. 

Mr. POE. The chair will recognize the gentlewoman from Ohio, 

Ms. Schmidt. 

Ms. SCHMIDT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is a question to both of you. As we approach the Chicago 

Summit, I believe it is important to send a strong message to the 

nations aspiring to have NATO membership that the United States 

remains committed toward that end. 

As you both know, NATO’s new strategic concept adopted at the 

Lisbon Summit in November 2010 reaffirmed the alliance’s longstanding commitment to keep NATO’s open door to any European 

country in a position to undertake the commitments and obligations of membership and contribute to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. However, NATO hasn’t added any members since 2009, 

despite the many contributions of our non-NATO partners such as 

Macedonia, Montenegro, Georgia, Bosnia, Herzegovina to the operations and stability of NATO. 

So, it is a three-part question. First, does NATO enlargement remain a priority to this administration? And if so, why isn’t it on 

the Chicago agenda? 

Two, in recent remarks at the Heritage Foundation, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice spoke strongly in favor of NATO 

expansion and stated that, in her opinion, Macedonia is ready for 

full membership. Would you agree with her assessment? And if not, 

why? 

And three, in what ways is the United States assisting those 

countries, Georgia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia, to prepare 

them for NATO membership? 

Ms. KAIDANOW. Thank you. 

Congresswoman, I don’t think we can agree strongly enough with 

you that keeping NATO’s door firmly open is in U.S. interest as 

well as in the interest of the alliance. We have seen over the years 

the incredible stabilizing impact of the enlargement of NATO and 

the inclusion of countries in Central and Eastern Europe. I anticipate that that process will, in fact, continue, and we are very committed to it. 

You asked whether this will be addressed on the Chicago agenda. 

In fact, it will. We didn’t speak to it in my opening remarks, but 

I anticipate, and we have been very strongly supportive of, a ministerial-level that will likely be held with the four aspirant countries, to again underscore how important we believe the process of 

enlargement is, to make sure that everyone understands that that 

process will continue. And I am sure we will find other ways as 

well to highlight enlargement and to look——

Ms. SCHMIDT. So, you are going to be speaking to the four countries, but what about to NATO members as well, to open it up and 

have the question——

31

Ms. KAIDANOW. Right. 

Ms. SCHMIDT [continuing]. Will we accept or not accept? 

Ms. KAIDANOW. Such a meeting, if it is held—and I would anticipate that it will be, but NATO has not yet made final decisions—

would include all allies. So, it would be the allies as well as the 

aspirants. But I think, again, the point here is to make sure that, 

both in word and in deed, we are doing everything we can. 

Your third question, which I will skip to, is about our assistance 

to those aspirants, which I think I detailed at some length in my 

opening remarks is fairly extensive. In each of those cases, we have 

worked very, very closely with the aspirant countries, both on 

democratic and economic reforms, which are also a precursor to 

NATO membership, but as well on defense reform, defense modernization, and so forth. 

You asked specifically about Macedonia. So, I will address that 

briefly. We have said, and as you articulated, I think former Secretary of State Rice also mentioned, that we believe Macedonia is 

ready for NATO membership. We saw at Bucharest that the alliance articulated that, subject to resolution of the name dispute 

with Greece. It is our deep desire and hope that they will, in fact, 

resolve that name dispute as soon as possible. And we very strongly support the process that has been undertaken by U.N. Special 

Envoy Nimitz, who has been engaged in this intensively. 

It is our hope that that will happen as quickly as possible, although NATO is a consensus-based organization. And therefore, it 

will take that decision as an organization. And so, we will invest 

every diplomatic effort we can in trying to see that that dispute is 

resolved. 

Mr. TOWNSEND. Thank you for the question, which, along with 

Ambassador Kaidanow, I have to say that from the Department of 

Defense view and my own personal view, having worked with these 

nations from the very beginning of Partnership for Peace and the 

whole enlargement process back in the mid-nineties, we on an everyday basis in the Pentagon as well as at NATO are working with 

these nations in terms of helping them in their defense reforms, in 

mil-to-mil, if you will, military-to-military channels, working specifically with their militaries to get them ready for membership, 

make sure they are able, interoperable, and a very credible candidate when their time comes to come into the alliance. 

I want to say that, as far as Georgia is concerned, we have been 

very pleased with the kinds of work that Georgia has been able to 

do on its defense side. It was pointed out earlier that they are 

doing some very good work in Afghanistan, in a very tough area 

of Afghanistan. Our military, our Marines, have been working with 

them. Secretary Panetta, in fact, has talked and visited with Georgians as well. 

So, this is something that, as the Ambassador said, we have 

taken——

Mr. POE. Summarize your statement there, Mr. Townsend. 

Mr. TOWNSEND. Okay. Thank you. 

We take it very seriously and we take it almost on a daily basis. 

Thank you. 

Mr. POE. The chair recognizes Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

32

Ambassador Kaidanow, could you please tell me that the administration is working actively to get Turkey to reverse its position 

on blocking Israel from attending the Summit? 

Ms. KAIDANOW. Congressman, just to say, first of all, Israel is an 

active and a valued partner for the alliance and for the United 

States, but for the alliance, through what is know as the Mediterranean Dialogue. The Mediterranean Dialogue is essentially a 

grouping of seven countries from that region. 

There has been no contemplation of a Mediterranean Dialogue 

Summit-level meeting at Chicago. So, I think we ought to be clear 

on that. 

However, let me restate and say again how important and valued 

a partner Israel is for NATO. The United States is strongly supportive of that partnership. We hope that that partnership will continue and, in fact, we are very much engaged in Mediterranean 

Dialogue events. There was a meeting in Morocco in March to 

which we sent a representative from the State Department as well 

as other representatives. So, we are very committed to the NATO/

Israel partnership, and we will continue to be. 

Mr. ENGEL. But what is Turkey objecting to, then, if there are 

no plans to meet and discuss this? 

Ms. KAIDANOW. Again, the meetings that have been contemplated for Chicago are ISAF meetings—ISAF meetings are important, but Israel is not a contributor to ISAF—as well as an operational partners’ meeting, which is also not something that Israel 

has been involved in. 

So, I can’t speak to what it is the Turks are speaking to, but I 

can tell you exactly what is the case, which is, again, that Israel 

is an incredibly valuable partner for NATO and we are strongly 

supportive of that. 

Mr. ENGEL. Are we telling Turkey to knock it off? 

Ms. KAIDANOW. We have been very clear with all of our alliance 

partners, including the Turks, about our feelings with respect to 

Israel as a valued partner. 

Mr. ENGEL. Okay, but it is not a matter of Israel being a valued 

partner. It is a matter of Turkey, out of the blue, because of some 

kind of personal dispute, in my estimation, not acting like a country that tries to do what is good for the alliance, but acting like 

a petulant child trying to use the alliance for its own purposes. I 

think that is important. 

Ms. KAIDANOW. Congressman, we have been very sorry, very regretful to see the deterioration in relations between Turkey and 

Israel. And it is our view that these are two important and valuable partners to us, and we would like to see them repair that relationship as quickly as possible. 

Mr. ENGEL. All right. Let me ask you this, Ambassador: You 

know Kosovo as well as anybody here. As a former Ambassador, 

you are very much aware of—you and I have had many discussions 

about how much they want to join the key Euro-Atlantic institutions, including both NATO and the EU. They are making that 

progress toward that end. Yesterday, Brunei, the 90th country, recognized them. But the progress is very slow. 

When Serbia became an EU candidate country, the EU immediately began a study on whether Kosovo should get a Stabilization 

33

and Association Agreement. While Serbia has been granted visa 

liberalization by the EU, Kosovo has not even been presented a 

roadmap for visa liberalization. 

Likewise, Kosovo aspires to eventual NATO membership, but the 

future is unclear. All of the other Balkan countries are either in 

NATO or members of the Partnership for Peace, not Kosovo. So, I 

think it is time for Kosovo’s second-class status to end. 

I am wondering if you could comment on that. Please describe 

whether Kosovo has a future in NATO. What is her path to eventual NATO membership? When can she join the Partnership for 

Peace and other NATO programs for other aspirants? And are 

there ways the Kosovo Security Forces can partner with U.S. 

forces? 

Ms. KAIDANOW. Thank you, Congressman. 

I would say several things. First of all, I think you know that the 

United States has been incredibly supportive of Kosovo’s territorial 

integrity, its sovereignty, its independence. We are strongly in 

favor of supporting Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic future. 

It is important, I think, in terms of regional stability as well as 

European stability more broadly, that Kosovo continue down a path 

toward both EU integration and eventually toward NATO accession 

as well, although that is a far distance away. 

The one thing I would say, though, is we do have the institutional issue of some non-recognizers of Kosovo in the alliance. That 

presents certain obstacles that we do have to contend with. 

I will say this: The United States is incredibly and strongly supportive of a future relationship between NATO and the Kosovo Security Force, the KSF. We think that there is an appropriate role 

for NATO to continue to help train the KSF within its mandate, 

which has been clear. And I think that there is room there for activity and for further kinds of interaction. We will continue to be 

supportive of that at NATO. 

The rest of the things will follow. But I think, again, for now, we 

have a path forward and we want to pursue it. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

If I might be able to slip in one more question, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. POE. Yes. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you. 

Let me ask Secretary Townsend, I would like to hear from you, 

actually, also from Ambassador Kaidanow, that the U.S. has no 

plans to reduce U.S. forces in KFOR in the foreseeable future. 

During the last few years, we and our European partners have 

been reducing the number of troops in KFOR, but with increased 

tensions with Serbia in northern Kosovo, that process has been reduced. But I have heard that additional rapid-reaction troops have 

recently arrived. 

I personally think that we should increase by at least a few battalions our force presence in Kosovo at least through the end of the 

year. With Serbian elections raising the temperature and continued 

lawlessness of criminality continuing in northern Kosovo, we simply cannot be too careful. 

So, I am wondering if either one of you, or both, could describe 

plans for U.S. force commitments to KFOR now and for the foreseeable future? Are there enough troops in KFOR to handle likely 

34

threats to peace and stability? And will KFOR work with UEX and 

Kosovo police to end the Serbian lawlessness in northern Kosovo? 

Mr. TOWNSEND. Thank you, Congressman. 

The situation in Kosovo, as we have been discussing right now, 

is one that causes concern. We rely very much on the KFOR commander and on SACEUR to advise us and to advise the alliance on 

what he feels he needs. 

Right now, the word we are getting is that he has got the forces 

that he needs in terms of KFOR there. As you point out, UEX is 

there. There are other actors in the field. The situation on the 

ground will certainly dictate what the size of KFOR and what the 

alliance actions will be there. 

Right now, we feel that the KFOR size is right. I think for the 

foreseeable future this will be the case. But we talk frequently to 

the KFOR commander and to SACEUR to make sure that, as 

things change, we are ready to take action. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. I am going to center on two countries, Georgia and 

Macedonia, and that is the two I want to address. Both of them 

have troops in Afghanistan; Georgia, 950, I believe, going to go up 

to a battalion level. And I want to talk about them first. 

I was in Georgia a week after the Russians invaded. It made the 

international news for a couple of days and, then, nobody is talking 

about it except the folks in Georgia. They still don’t like the Russians there. 

I understand conflicting reports. But one reason Georgia doesn’t 

get into NATO is because the Russians are still there. How does 

that factor in, if it does, in why Georgia is still not in NATO? Then, 

I will address Macedonia. 

Ms. KAIDANOW. Thank you. 

Let me state right away that it is our firm conviction that no sovereign nation should be in any way circumscribed from choosing its 

own alliances, and that, at the end of the day, it is for every nation 

to decide on its own allegiances and alliances. So, again, the Russian presence in the occupied areas of Georgia are not an impact 

or don’t have an impact on our overall decisions with respect to 

Georgia. 

The United States, again, has been very strongly supportive of 

Georgian sovereignty, of Georgian territorial integrity, as has 

NATO. I think we will continue to be in ways that are demonstrable. I spoke to some of those in my opening statement. 

Just recently, as I said, the Presidents of the United States and 

of Georgia met here in Washington, had a very good set of conversations. We anticipate that we will have further conversations 

at high levels over the next little while. And so, again, I think our 

commitment has been shown. 

Mr. POE. Madam Ambassador, I am certainly no diplomat. I have 

been called a lot of things in my life, but diplomat is not one of 

them. 

The Russians are still there. I think they have occupied a sovereign country. Twenty percent or twenty-five percent of their nation is occupied, the Georgians. What is being done about that, if 

anything, besides talking about it? 

35

Ms. KAIDANOW. I think, I mean, the reality of the situation is 

that what we are doing is actually multiple aspects of what we are 

doing on behalf of Georgia. What we have done rhetorically is important. I think it continues to be important that we assert our 

continuing support for Georgia’s territorial integrity and its sovereignty. That is not unimportant; it is quite important. 

But, in a practical sense, what we are doing, again, is we are 

supplying support for Georgia’s multiple efforts across the board to 

sustain reform, democratic reform, economic reform, all of which 

are important and where Georgia has made some really significant 

and important strides. 

You noted, Mr. Chair, that we are actually witnessing some of 

the benefits of that because Georgia has now, again, contributed in 

a very meaningful way in Afghanistan, continues to so do, without 

caveats, by the way. So, we are recognizing all of those things. We 

acknowledge them, and in ways that are much more concrete 

even—again, we are assisting them. This administration approved 

the final tranche of $1 billion worth of assistance for Georgia. So, 

I think in all of those ways, again, we have been very forthright 

and very forthcoming and very appreciative of Georgia’s efforts. 

Mr. POE. Let’s turn to Macedonia. Macedonia, likewise with 

Georgia, has troops in Afghanistan serving along with Americans, 

NATO troops, or even some of our NATO troops, our other NATO 

allies have not, in my opinion, shared the responsibility that they 

have under NATO. They are not in NATO because Greece continues or has blocked their admission into NATO, which is their 

right under the fact that they are a NATO member. 

My understanding is that they blocked the membership of Macedonia into NATO when Macedonia agreed to apply for membership under the name the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 

With that application, the Greeks then said no, although in December of last year the International Court of Justice ruled that Greece 

violated an agreement it had with Macedonia when it vetoed that 

membership. How does that factor into NATO membership of Macedonia with that International Court ruling against Greece, if it 

does? 

Ms. KAIDANOW. Congressman, again, I think we have articulated 

many times, and we will say it many more times, that we are 

strongly supportive of Macedonia’s accession to NATO under the 

conditions that were laid out by the allies at Bucharest. That 

means that, as soon as the name dispute is resolved, we will be in 

a position to allow Macedonia into the alliance. 

Mr. POE. Time is short. 

So, the court ruling is irrelevant as to whether or not they are 

going to get in, because the agreement is, if I understand you correctly, that Macedonia and Greece have to work out the name issue 

in spite of what the court ruled? 

Ms. KAIDANOW. I wouldn’t say it is in spite of the court ruling, 

and we do hope that the court ruling will provide the impetus for 

them to find a resolution, to which, again, we will invest some diplomatic effort. But the problem is that they have to find a mutually-acceptable resolution. It is a consensus-based organization, you 

are correct. 

36

So, I think that is the ultimate point here, is we will help. We 

can help in some ways, but, ultimately, the two sides have to find 

a way forward. 

Mr. POE. You wouldn’t have any ideas on how they could resolve 

that, would you? 

Ms. KAIDANOW. We always have good ideas. But, again, it is really up to them. 

I do want to say that I think they have engaged themselves in 

some productive discussions. We want to encourage that. I think 

that we hope, certainly after the Greek elections, which are nigh 

upon us, that we will see, again, another effort on their part to actually engage. 

Mr. POE. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. Deutch? 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have a question now about Turkey again, just to follow up on 

what my colleague, Mr. Engel, discussed with you. I understand 

from your comments earlier that there are no Mediterranean Dialogue-level talks planned for Chicago. Is the reason that there are 

no Mediterranean Dialogue talks planned because Turkey objected 

to having them at all? 

Ms. KAIDANOW. No. No. There just has not been contemplation 

of a Summit-level—and, in fact, as far as I am aware, there has 

never been a Summit-level dialog of the Mediterranean Dialogue, 

in other words, a Summit-level meeting of the Mediterranean Dialogue. It just hasn’t occurred. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I heard you explain that you don’t know, since 

there is no dialog planned, Mediterranean Dialogue-level planned, 

you are not sure what it was Turkey was objecting to. If I can refer 

back to the earlier plan earlier in the year for Israel to contribute 

a missile ship to a NATO mission in the Mediterranean Sea, Active 

Endeavour, my understanding there is that that contribution was 

never made because Turkey objected and blocked that. 

Secretary Townsend, I can ask you as well. 

Ms. KAIDANOW. Maybe my colleague has more to offer on that. 

I am not aware, actually, of that particular incident or that particular issue, but we can certainly look at it. 

Jim? 

Mr. TOWNSEND. Let us take that question. I am not aware of 

that, either, but let us check into it and get back to you or your 

staff. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Okay. Just as you explore, my understanding from 

reports just today is that that would have been the first time that 

Israel actively participated in one of NATO’s military operations. If 

you could both look into that and let us know if there are reports 

that they were asked not to participate because of a decision by 

Turkey, that would be most helpful for us to have that information. 

Secretary, you also said in your exchange with Mr. Engel that 

there has been an invaluable relationship between Israel and 

NATO. Can you describe Israel’s participation in NATO activities 

and some of the benefits of that participation? 

Ms. KAIDANOW. The Mediterranean Dialogue is a forum, essentially, for those countries in that region to come together and discuss a number of different kinds of issues on which, hopefully, 

37

again in the future we can find a little bit more granularity and 

a way to progress. 

In fact, in this meeting in Morocco in March, there were a number of items on the agenda that were treated. I think Israel has an 

interest in a lot of that because, again, it is looking to expand its 

partnerships not just with NATO, but with some of the other countries involved. I think there is a lot of scope there for discussion. 

There has not necessarily been things that I can point to concretely 

that have been done thus far, but that is not to say that there isn’t 

quite a lot of room for other kinds of endeavors. 

If you would like more information on that, we can provide that 

as well. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I would. I would like this. 

Secretary Townsend, you mentioned earlier that you are pleased 

with Georgia’s progress on defense. Georgia, as you know, has been 

the second-largest non-NATO contributor to ISAF forces. If their 

NATO candidacy continues to stall, do you see this affecting Georgia’s strategic relationship with NATO, other NATO countries, or 

the United States? 

Mr. TOWNSEND. Thank you. 

Well, you know, in terms of its relationship with NATO, there is 

a NATO Georgia Commission which meets to assist the Georgians 

in making reforms and doing things to make sure that they stay 

and continue to build as a very good candidate to come into the alliance. So, there is already an institutional link between NATO and 

the NATO allies and Georgia. 

On a bilateral basis with the United States, I did say that we 

have been very impressed with not just their own military reform 

efforts, but also their abilities that we saw on the ground in Afghanistan. So, this relationship between the United States bilaterally, between our Defense Department and the Georgians and 

our military will always be strong as well. 

They work with other allies in Afghanistan, too. So, I think when 

you talk to many allies and they think about Georgia as a member 

of the alliance, they look at what the Georgians have done, the 

work in the NATO Georgia Commission, I think it is a very good 

story that we are all seeing. It is a matter of, as the Ambassador 

said, going through and making sure that as far as we are concerned on the defense side, that when they are ready to come into 

the alliance, that they are at their very best state. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And if I could just ask a yes-or-no question, Mr. 

Chairman, just one last point of clarification? 

Secretary, on the Mediterranean Dialogue piece again, I understand there are no Mediterranean-Dialogue-level talks in Chicago 

at the Summit. I assume as well that, as a result, since there won’t 

be those talks, that they are no non-NATO Mediterranean Dialogue 

members who will be coming to Chicago to participate. 

Ms. KAIDANOW. That is not necessarily the case, again, because 

some of these memberships in partnership organizations are overlapping. So, in other words, it may be the case that others that are 

members of the Mediterranean Dialogue would be there, but for 

other reasons, either for ISAF or for the operational partners’ discussion. 

38

Mr. DEUTCH. Okay. I would welcome some details in response to 

that question as well. 

Ms. KAIDANOW. Sure. Sure. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BURTON [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. 

I just have a couple of comments, and I apologize for my tardiness. I had to do something for my spouse. She has a little bit of 

a health problem. So, I apologize for not being here for your whole 

testimony. 

I have got two things I would like to mention. First of all, NATO 

was very instrumental and helpful in Libya. As I mentioned in my 

opening remarks, there are a number of us that did not mind seeing Colonel Gaddafi leave the scene. But the military attack on 

Libya with the help of the United States did involve billions of dollars, at least a couple of billion dollars of military funds. It also involved, I am confident, some boots on the ground, although they 

didn’t say that there were any. I think it was there for probably 

intelligence purposes. 

But, nevertheless, I hope that it will be conveyed to this administration, just like any other administration, that unless it is compliant with the Constitution or the War Powers Act, that the President does not have authority to take us into a military conflict 

without the support of Congress, Democrats or Republicans. I think 

it is extremely important that that message be sent very clearly, 

especially during this NATO meeting, because I know there will be 

people talking about Syria and going in there and maybe going into 

someplace else like the Sudan, where 400,000 people have been 

killed. 

But before we go into conflict, the case needs to be made to the 

American people through their congressional representatives. I 

hope that message will be very clear, and I hope you will convey 

that. 

The second thing I would like to say is that I have been over to 

Europe, along with my colleague, Mr. Meeks, and others. We were 

there very much concerned about the economic problems that Europe faces because it will have an impact on us, without any doubt, 

if everything goes south over there. So, we are very concerned 

about that. 

Even though these countries that are having some difficulties 

right now are facing many of the problems we are, they still need 

to pony-up their 2 percent of GDP, as Secretary Gates said, to help 

us. We can’t bear the burden of military action or supporting 

NATO without the help of our NATO allies. And there are only 

three of them that I think are doing that right now. 

So, I hope that gets to them loud and clear. I don’t know if any 

media is here or not. But it is extremely important that our NATO 

allies, even though I know there are economic problems over in Europe, that they are willing and ready and able to support NATO 

with their 2 percent contribution. 

If you have any comments on that, that is fine. 

Ms. KAIDANOW. I would just say, Mr. Chairman, that we understand the importance of the commitments that allies make. They 

understand the importance of those commitments, too, I would say. 

39

I recognize that not all of them have met their 2 percent benchmark, and that is something we continue to press for. But I would 

also say that we are really struck by, even in a time of fiscal austerity and a time of difficulty in terms of financial crisis, a number 

of our colleagues and a number of our allies have really stuck to 

their commitments, particularly with respect to Afghanistan. They 

are very committed to the 2014 timeline that was outlined in Lisbon. I think we have seen really good solidarity in terms of their 

willingness to stick in with us. We should acknowledge that. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, I think that is great, and I do appreciate that. 

I know that they are there, a number of those countries. But we 

have a $15 trillion, almost $16 trillion national debt right now. 

Ms. KAIDANOW. Agreed. 

Mr. BURTON. And the country faces fiscal problems. And so, if we 

are going to do our part, and we want to do our part, we need to 

make sure that, even though they are having some of these problems, they know that they need to do it as well. 

I yield the balance of my time to my good buddy, Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. I just wanted to follow up real quick on something 

that you just indicated. I know that Secretary General Rasmussen 

has been clear that NATO has not discussed or begun even a preliminary planning for a possible intervention in Syria. But the debate is raging still here, whether you talk to Senators Lieberman 

or McCain, who believe that NATO should at least be actively considering the possibility. 

And so, I was just wondering. I mean, I think that Mr. Burton 

indicated that we know that that possibility is going to come up. 

Well, people are talking about it. 

I would just like to get your thoughts on whether or not NATO 

should be considering the lives that are being lost. I know the justification for going into Libya. I wonder what your thoughts are. 

Should we at least be discussing it? 

Ms. KAIDANOW. Congressman, I think it is still our deep desire 

to try to resolve the issues in Syria in a peaceful manner that allows for a transition away from the Assad regime to something else 

that will cause less bloodshed rather than more. 

I think we are all watching the situation there very, very carefully. It is not an easy one, obviously. We are still weighing the 

best way to address this, and we are doing it in cooperation with 

a number of our partners, European partners, in particular. 

I don’t want to speculate necessarily on what NATO’s role should 

or should not be. I will just say, again, that we are all watching 

it very, very carefully, particularly, obviously, those countries that 

are bordering on Syria, including Turkey, including some others. 

So, we want to just keep an eye on it and do everything that we 

can as the U.S. Government, again, to ensure a peaceful transition 

and to make sure that we end the bloodshed as quickly as possible. 

Mr. BURTON. I want to follow up on that real quickly, and then 

we will go to our next panel. That is, NATO does not represent the 

Congress of the United States. I mean, the Congress of the United 

States represents the American people. If the case is to be made 

that NATO should take some action, then the case has to be made 

to the Congress of the United States, so that the people’s representatives will pass a resolution to take action. 

40

In previous administrations, almost without exception, we have 

not taken any military action without the consent and support of 

the Congress. That is in compliance with the Constitution and the 

War Powers Act. 

And so, the President, to his credit, has been reluctant to take 

any action and has not talked to Congress about it. But I hope it 

is conveyed to him very clearly that, if he thinks it needs to be 

done, if our NATO allies think it needs to be done, they need to 

come to Mr. Meeks, myself, and other Members of Congress and 

make the case, and for us to pass a resolution to give the President 

the authority under the Constitution and the War Powers Act. 

Thank you very much. 

We will go to our next panel. 

We really appreciate your being here. 

Ms. KAIDANOW. Thank you. 

Mr. TOWNSEND. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BURTON. The next panel consists of Damon Wilson. He is the 

Executive Vice President of the Atlantic Council, where his work 

is committed to advancing a Europe whole, free, and at peace. 

From 2007 to 2009, Mr. Wilson served as a Special Assistant to the 

President and Senior Director of European Affairs at the National 

Security Council. Mr. Wilson has previously served as the Executive Secretary and Chief of Staff at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad 

and as Deputy Director of the private office of the NATO Secretary 

General, among other positions. 

Mr. Wilson received his BA in political science from Duke—you 

have got a good basketball team there usually—and his MA from 

Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs. 

Mr. Luke Coffey studies and writes on U.S./UK relations as the 

Margaret Thatcher Fellow at the Heritage Foundation. He focuses, 

in particular, on defense and security matters, including the role 

of NATO and the European Union in transatlantic security. 

Before joining Heritage, the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, in 2012, Mr. Coffey served at the UK Ministry of Defense as 

a Senior Special Advisor to then-British Defense Secretary Liam 

Fox. He was the only non-UK citizen appointed by Prime Minister 

David Cameron to provide advice to senior British ministers. 

Mr. Coffey’s work in British politics followed his service to the 

United States as a commissioned officer in the U.S. Army’s Military Police Corps. He spent his entire time on active duty overseas 

and was stationed in Italy with the Army’s Southern European 

Task Force. In 2005, Mr. Coffey deployed to Afghanistan for a year. 

He is responsible for developing theater-level policies for enemy detainees in U.S. custody and support of counterinsurgency strategy. 

Mr. Coffey received his MS in politics and government at the European Union from the London School of Economics, and he also 

holds a BA degree in political science from the University of Missouri, St. Louis, and has an associate arts degree in military 

science from Wentworth Military Academy in Lexington, Missouri. 

Dr. Stephen Flanagan holds a Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Diplomacy and National Security at CSIS. Before joining CSIS in 2007, 

he served as Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies 

and Vice President for Research at the National Defense University 

41

for 7 years. He held several senior positions in government between 

1989 and 1999, where he helped develop U.S. strategy for the postCold War era. In 2009 and 2010, he served as lead advisor to 

former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in her capacity as 

chair of the group of experts that developed the foundation for 

NATO’s strategic concept. 

Earlier in his career, he was a professional staff member of the 

U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and he also held faculty and research appointments at Harvard University’s Kennedy 

School of Government, the National War College, the International 

Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Council on Foreign Relations. 

He earned his BA in political science from Columbia University 

in 1973 and his PhD in international relations from the Fletcher 

School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, in 1979. 

You guys have great credentials. I am very impressed with that. 

So, first, we will just start with you, Mr. Wilson. If you could 

keep your opening remarks to 5 minutes, it would be great. We will 

try to be liberal, if necessary. Oh, excuse me, conservative but liberal. [Laughter.] 

STATEMENT OF MR. DAMON WILSON, EXECUTIVE VICE 

PRESIDENT, THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Chairman Burton, Ranking Member 

Meeks. It is a pleasure to be with you today. 

As NATO leaders gather in Chicago next month, they will seek 

to achieve consensus on a difficult mission in Afghanistan to protect military capabilities in a time of deep budget cuts and to forge 

more meaningful partnerships with allies in Asia and the Middle 

East. I would like to make the case that in Chicago NATO should 

also make room for a serious discussion, a future enlargement, and 

pursue a more ambitious partnership agenda. Furthermore, I believe the major allies must look beyond Chicago and focus on their 

own commitments within the alliance to ensure NATO’s health into 

the next decade. I will briefly address these three themes and submit my full testimony for the record. 

First, enlargement. NATO says that Chicago will not be an enlargement Summit. Indeed, the allies are not prepared to offer invitations to candidate nations. However, it would be a mistake not 

to use Chicago to give a boost to future enlargement. 

First, the aspirants have earned it. Each has demonstrated it is 

able to contribute to security, including by providing forces to Afghanistan. 

Despite economic challenges, allies should remember that enlargement makes Europe more stable and NATO stronger. In Chicago, leaders can make clear that NATO’s open-door policy remains 

a cornerstone of the alliance’s strategy. 

Specifically, the alliance should underscore the urgency of resolving Macedonia’s only obstacle to membership, the dispute with 

Greece over Macedonia’s name; recognize Montenegro’s rapid 

progress and uniquely-good relations with all its neighbors; make 

clear that NATO’s commitment that Georgia will become a member 

is genuine, and agree that Georgia’s path to membership is through 

the NATO Georgia Commission, and welcome Bosnia/Herzegovina 

42

into the membership action plan, as it meets a key final benchmark. 

Chicago should also announce that all nations of the Western 

Balkans who desire membership and are prepared to meet alliance 

obligations will be welcomed into NATO as they qualify, to include 

Serbia and Kosovo. And NATO leaders could commit to take decisions on enlargement at their next Summit in 2014. Such a statement would signal NATO’s intention to enlarge and further 

incentivize candidates to implement tough reforms. 

In conjunction, Washington, Paris, and Berlin should launch a 

concerted serious strategy to resolve the Macedonia name issue 

once and for all. With this approach, NATO can ensure that the 

lack of invitations does not signal that the enlargement process is 

stalling. 

Second, ambitious partnership initiatives. Countries such as Australia, Sweden, the UAE, and Jordan have been crucial partners in 

Libya and Afghanistan. For NATO to remain effective in an era of 

borderless threats and emerging powers, it will have to develop 

stronger global partnerships. Chicago will spotlight the role of 

these partners, but a Summit can achieve more. 

First, the Partnership for Peace should end its geographic limitations and open up its charter and programs to any nation that 

seeks to cooperate with the alliance, regardless of geography. 

Second, the alliance should introduce a program for those who 

desire closer interoperability with NATO, short of membership, 

such as Sweden. These partners should be able to complete a process to qualify as NATO interoperable armed forces and, as such, be 

eligible for special access to alliance structures, including participating in decisions for operations in which their forces are deployed. 

Third, NATO allies should help transformations in the Middle 

East and North Africa succeed by opening up the toolkit that 

proved so effective in assisting the transitions of nations in Central 

and Eastern Europe. 

And finally, rather than pivot from Europe to Asia, the United 

States should consider an initiative that binds our European and 

Canadian allies with America’s specific allies as a precursor to ultimately forging alliances with the alliance. 

Finally, preparing for the next decade. Beyond the formal agenda 

in Chicago, I believe leaders must begin to repair a growing rift 

within the alliance. NATO’s credibility is threatened by the debt 

crisis and major cuts in defense spending. The crisis has weakened 

Europe’s military capabilities, sapped its ambitions for global leadership, and called into question U.S. leadership within the alliance. 

An alliance adrift would be an historic, strategic setback for the 

United States. NATO remains home to the United States’ most capable and willing allies. They serve as force multipliers for the 

United States foreign policy worldwide. The best example is 40,000 

troops in Afghanistan. 

Therefore, for NATO to thrive, the United States will have to 

demonstrate strong leadership of the alliance and Europe will have 

to maintain its global ambitions. If the U.S. disengages, it will find 

Europe less willing to act with us globally. So, as we draw-down 

forces and begin to end over a decade of continuous operations, the 

43

U.S. military must redouble its efforts to train with allied forces to 

preserve their ability to fight together. 

But U.S. leadership is no substitute for European political ambition. All allies have a responsibility to strengthen NATO, but 

France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Turkey will determine 

whether Europe remains our top global partner. France needs to 

continue President Sarkozy’s approach of cooperating, rather than 

competing with the United States. The United Kingdom must 

maintain the ambition and the defense investments necessary to 

preserve its special relationship with Washington. And Germany 

must begin to show the same level of ambition to influence global 

events as it does for its economic leadership. 

And Turkey, NATO’s only member growing in influence, should 

be challenged to act more responsibly within NATO by offering it 

a position of leadership in the alliance commensurate to the leading role it plays in the emerging Middle East. 

With the right mix of U.S. leadership, European ambition, and 

stronger global partnerships, NATO and Chicago can begin to trade 

its dim and dismal future that Secretary Gates warned of for another decade of success. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. Coffey? 

STATEMENT OF MR. LUKE COFFEY, MARGARET THATCHER 

FELLOW, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. COFFEY. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the 

committee, I am honored to speak before your esteemed committee 

about the upcoming NATO Summit in Chicago. 

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will summarize my full 

statement that I would like to submit to the record. 

Having lived and worked in Europe before joining the Heritage 

Foundation, I have firsthand understanding why a strong transatlantic relationship is a necessity for America and not just a luxury. This is why the Summit in Chicago will be so important. 

The top three items on the Summit’s agenda will likely be Afghanistan, Smart Defense, and NATO partnerships. Mr. Chairman, 

I would like to take these in turn. 

First, Afghanistan. For the Chicago Summit to be considered a 

success, two outcomes regarding Afghanistan must be realized. 

First, even as more of the country is transitioning from ISAF to Afghan security lead, this cannot be used as an excuse for our NATO 

members to leave the country prematurely. Any withdrawal of 

ISAF forces from Afghanistan should be based on improved security conditions on the ground and on sound military advice. When 

these security conditions are met, NATO’s eventual withdrawal 

from Afghanistan should be a phaseout and not a walkout. There 

should be no rush to the door. 

Supporting this, the conditions-based language that was used in 

the 2010 Lisbon Summit declaration should also be used in the 

Chicago Summit declaration. Secondly, there must be a clear commitment made by NATO to Afghanistan post-2015, in particular, 

regarding the financial support for the AMSF. So far, the United 

Kingdom, with the third largest GDP in NATO, has been the only 

country to publicly commit funds for the AMSF after 2015. However, with the budgetary requirements of $4 billion per annum, the 

$110 million that the UK has pledged will pay for the first 10 days 

of the year. So, in this area, NATO has a long way to go. 

After Afghanistan, Smart Defense will feature on the Summit’s 

agenda. Smart Defense aims to encourage allies to cooperate in developing, acquiring, and maintaining military capabilities in a more 

economically-efficient manner in this age of austerity. At the Summit, we expect NATO to agree to a number of Smart Defense measures. While the aims of Smart Defense are noble, I fear that the 

initiative is likely to amount to little beyond a list of aspirations 

if there is no new funding attached to these proposals. 

As Libya pointed out, Europe relies too much on the U.S. to pick 

up the slack when key enablers are required for alliance operations. This is a result of a decrease in defense spending across Europe combined with a lack of political will to use military capability 

when and where it may be needed. 

Mr. Chairman, as you have already pointed out, only three of the 

28 NATO members meet the 2 percent mark of GDP spending. As 

expected, France fell below the 2 percent mark in 2011. Spain, with 

51

the world’s 12th largest economy, was only able to spend less than 

1 percent of GDP on defense. 

To put this into perspective, with an annual budget of $4.5 billion for the NYPD, New York City spends more in policing than 13 

NATO members spend on their defense. Spending on EU defense 

initiatives also exacerbates the dire financial situation since it can 

divert scarce resources away from NATO. Every euro or pound that 

is spent on EU defense is one less that can be invested into the 

NATO alliance. 

For this reason, the U.S. should send a clear message that it 

does not support deeper EU defense integration. The language describing Smart Defense may read well in a Summit declaration, but 

until there is real money backing up real investment, delivering 

real capability to the battlefield, Smart Defense will be meaningless to the men and women serving on the frontlines. 

Finally, the issue of NATO partnerships. In light of the 2011 

popular uprisings across North Africa and the Middle East, there 

is a renewed focus on how NATO works with regional partners. 

NATO has done little to enhance the Mediterranean Dialogue and 

the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. This needs to change. 

A step in the right direction out of Chicago would be a formal 

invitation for Libya to join the Mediterranean Dialogue. Building 

on lessons learned, working with Gulf states during the Libya operation, there could be more concrete proposals to enhance the 

Istanbul Cooperation Initiative by expanding its membership or 

agreeing to individual partnership and cooperation programs with 

the Gulf states. 

Another aspect of NATO’s partnerships is enlargement or, in the 

case of Chicago, the lack thereof. Regarding enlargement, there are 

two specific issues I would like to highlight. The first is Georgia. 

Georgia spends approximately 4 percent of GDP on defense and, as 

was already mentioned, will soon become the largest per-capita 

troop contributor to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The Summit 

declaration must include strong and clear language reaffirming 

NATO’s commitment to Georgia’s eventual membership to the alliance. 

Secondly, Macedonia should have been given full membership 4 

years ago and should be given membership at Chicago. It is an absurdity that the Greeks, who, frankly, relied heavily on the financial goodwill of their European neighbors, continue to veto Macedonia’s membership because of a name dispute. And the U.S. should 

apply more pressure to the Greeks to agree to a compromise with 

Macedonia. 

In conclusion, it is in America’s interest to see a successful Summit. With the perception that the administration is shifting its defense priorities from Europe to Asia, America’s NATO allies should 

not be forgotten. NATO has done more to promote democracy, 

peace, and security in Europe than any other multilateral organization, including the European Union. It is essential that the United 

States continues to be an active participant in the alliance’s future. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to taking your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Coffey follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Coffey. 

Mr. Flanagan? 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN FLANAGAN, PH.D., HENRY A. KISSINGER CHAIR IN DIPLOMACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY, 

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. FLANAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to be 

here before you today, and, Mr. Meeks, coming back. 

I have a prepared statement that reviews the political and strategic context of the Chicago Summit and offers some perspectives 

from the vantage point of U.S. interest in each of the three principal elements of the Summit agenda: Afghanistan, military capabilities, and partnerships. I also comment on some of the missing 

elements of the agenda that we have touched on already today: Enlargement and the further development of partnerships, but also 

the Nuclear Posture Review, the Defense and Deterrence Posture 

Review, which we haven’t touched on yet today. 

But I would ask that my prepared statement be made available 

for the record, sir. 

The vision and the mission statement articulated in the 2010 

Lisbon Summit, the strategic concept which articulated a notion of 

active engagement and modern defense remains valid. I think the 

Chicago Summit needs to illustrate that the alliance is actually implementing and delivering on those Lisbon decisions, particularly 

on Afghanistan. 

But, given the dramatic changes in the international environment and in the fiscal situation in both Europe and the United 

States, the Obama administration and other allied governments I 

think have rightly chosen to make this more than an implementation Summit and to demonstrate that they are adjusting and 

adapting NATO’s strategy to cope with these developments. 

The Chicago Summit, on a political basis, also needs to reaffirm 

both sides of the transatlantic commitment. We have touched on 

some of this already, as members of the committee know. 

You need no reminder on the whole question of inequitable burden-sharing and the continued slide in European defense spending. 

And indeed, the sad news is that even the NATO figures early this 

month have now reduced to only two countries meeting the 2 percent target goal, the UK and Greece. France has just slipped below 

1.9. 

American leaders, rightly, should have the expectation that Chicago should come up with some kind of a credible plan to redress 

this imbalance. Smart Defense and other military capabilities initiatives expected to be endorsed at Chicago have the potential to 

at least staunch the erosion of European military capabilities by 

assuring allocation of their remaining, and still considerable, defense resources is done more wisely. 

At the same time, and we have touched on this earlier in the discussion today, a number of European leaders are concerned—and, 

Mr. Burton, you raised it earlier; it was Mr. Meeks, I am sorry, 

that raised it—hearing a number of Europeans concerned about 

how committed the U.S. is in the context of this realignment of our 

engagement and military assets toward East Asia and the Pacific, 

and the sense that perhaps Europe is going to be left to its own 

68

in future crises or more in the lead, with the U.S. in a supporting 

role. 

So, I think President Obama and others would do well to affirm 

in Chicago what he noted on the eve of the Lisbon Summit and 

several times since: That the United States does not have any 

other partner in any other region of the world like our European 

allies, and that we will continue and remain committed to European security and to working with our European allies to maintain 

our interests around the world in a more effective partnership. 

Now, to talk a bit briefly about some of the successful outcomes, 

I think there are three, and we have touched on most of them already today. First of all, there has to be a credible commitment for 

assisting Afghanistan in maintaining its security through the transition to an Afghan lead in 2014 and beyond. 

Secondly, I think we need a long-term strategy for allied defense 

planning and integration with some flagship initiatives and a detailed implementation plan to ensure that NATO has the critical 

military capability it needs for collective defense in addressing 

emerging security challenges. 

There needs to be greater transparency in national defense 

spending and planning, so that allies can have a better sense of 

how their national decisions that are being made on an annual 

basis are having an impact on the overall capability of the alliance 

in various future contingencies. 

Concrete steps also need to be taken, I think, for strengthening 

NATO’s diverse networks of partnerships. These would include 

measures to engage some of the key contributors to alliance operations more effectively, but also I think, as we have touched on earlier today, to enhance our engagement with some of the countries 

in the Mediterranean Basin. 

Now we can talk about the effectiveness and the viability of all 

of these commitments I think perhaps in the questions and answers. But let me just talk a little bit about a couple of the missing 

elements of the agenda. 

Since the Lisbon Summit, we have made progress on what is 

called the Berlin Partnership Package in the alliance. That is to 

allow NATO to work more flexibly and more nimbly with all of its 

allies, to open up the entire partnership tool-kit to various partners 

according to their interests and level of capacity. But, still, this 

partnership agenda seems to be the least-developed element of the 

Chicago agenda. 

Of course, one of the big missing elements has been any kind of 

progress on the partnership with Russia, which of course has been 

hampered by progress on the missile defense dialogue, even though 

cooperation on Afghanistan has continued. So, there won’t be a 

NATO Russia Council meeting in Chicago, but there is hope that 

Russia will come to the ISAF contributors’ meeting. I think we still 

do need and should welcome Russia’s support on some of those elements of our operations in Afghanistan. 

Under consideration, as I said, is this issue of how to deal more 

effectively with the key contributors to our current operations and 

how to do that in a way that gives recognition and gives them some 

sense of a stake in some of these operations that they are contributing to in very effective ways. 

69

But, as I say, there is also an opportunity to leverage some of 

the gains that we have made both with a number of Arab countries 

after the Libyan operation, but also the Mediterranean cooperation 

that we have had, particularly in the area of maritime security, to 

continue to enhance that capability, so that we can deal with a 

number of potential contingencies and instabilities in the Mediterranean Basin, but also to try to help advance the security sector 

reform in those areas. 

As I said, there are two big issues that are out of the agenda that 

perhaps we can come back to in the discussion and question and 

answer. The whole question of enlargement, I do think that the 

Summit can set the framework for further decisions, reaffirm the 

commitments that have been made already in previous Summits 

going back to Bucharest and since, but also to set the stage for 

2014, when the next Summit will be held, to actually move ahead 

with the membership of a number of the four—and, hopefully, one 

will be sooner; that is Macedonia—that those four recognized aspirant countries will go forward. 

But, lastly, the alliance does need to come up with a clear strategy for maintaining an appropriate mix of nuclear forces, conventional, and missile defense in our overall alliance strategy. There 

has not been a consensus, particularly over some of the aspects of 

the nuclear question, within the alliance to achieve that. That was 

one of the Lisbon Summit taskings. It didn’t have any specific 

timeline, but it is one that I think still warrants being addressed 

in the coming years. But, in the interim, there are some other steps 

that we can take to enhance that dialogue and, also, the discussions with the Russians over enhancing regional stability. 

So, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Meeks. I look forward to 

the questions and answers. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Flanagan follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. I don’t think you heard me a while ago when I 

mentioned you couldn’t remember who asked the question or made 

the comment. I said Mr. Meeks and I look an awful lot alike, so 

I can understand the confusion. 

Mr. MEEKS. He is my dad. [Laughter.] 

Mr. BURTON. He is my buddy. 

I want to be serious for a moment. I was shaving the other morning, and before I ask questions, I want to mention something. I was 

shaving and I had the television on. I heard them say something 

about a young man who was injured in Afghanistan with an IED. 

And I walked out and I saw a picture of him with his wife and his 

child. You talk about a good-looking American family; this was it. 

He lost both of his arms and both of his legs. It is a human disaster 

that I can’t hardly fathom. 

And the reason I bring that up is we have so much technology 

now and so many war materials and systems that we can actually, 

from a satellite and a guy sitting at a computer 1,000 miles away, 

we can put a missile right down somebody’s chimney and blow 

them all to hell. 

I am probably one of the biggest supporters of the military and 

of strong defense, and a big supporter of NATO. And I don’t know 

that anybody at NATO is going to hear what I am going to say, 

but I really believe that we ought to take a different look at how 

we conduct wars. With the technology we have and the satellites 

that we have, it seems to me that we could pinpoint, maybe with 

some observers on the ground and some intelligence people on the 

ground, we could pinpoint the figures that we have got to knock 

out and do it without putting ground troops in that are going to 

come back in pieces. 

It is just tragic. We have been there 10 years. This young man’s 

life is ruined. His wife’s life is ruined. His children’s life is, I am 

sure, going to be affected adversely. 

I started thinking about World War II. You guys are too young 

to remember it, and I was just a kid, a baby. But we invaded Europe and we went after Japan. We used whatever technology we 

had to limit the casualties. We did that by firebombing Dresden, 

Germany, and firebombing Berlin, and hundreds of thousands of 

innocent civilians were killed. In Japan, hundreds of thousands of 

innocent civilians were killed. But we probably saved 0.5 million 

American lives and allied lives by not invading the island of Japan. 

Now the reason I mention this is—this is just one man’s perspective—we need to evaluate how we conduct military wars in the future. We don’t need to send 100,000 or 150,000 young men and 

women into combat and have them come back in pieces when we 

have the technology that we have. 

We see bad guys, bad regimes, and we want to get rid of them. 

We could do it like that. And I don’t want to see any more young 

men come back with no arms and no legs. I am so sick of this. 

When I hear people talk about NATO and about our allies and 

about war, and everything, it is always the troops. And, Mr. Coffey, 

I understand what you are saying; we don’t want to have a unilateral pullout right now. We don’t want to let the Iranians and the 

Taliban and al-Qaeda know that we are pulling, stopping, and running and leaving. 

77

But, at the same time, we need to start realizing that there is 

no antiseptic war. There are going to be civilian casualties. We saw 

that in World War II to the tune of about 40- or 50 million people. 

When it comes to allied forces and American young men and 

women, I want to start using the technology that we have so we 

don’t put them at any more risk than is absolutely necessary. The 

bad guys, I want to kill them. I don’t want to see Americans killed 

any more than has to happen. 

This idea that we are going to have an antiseptic war, and we 

are going to put hundreds of thousands of troops in there, when we 

know we have the technology to knock out most of the bad guys 

by just using the technology we have, I just don’t understand it. 

So, that is just my little tirade today. I hope somebody is listening out there because, if we are going to go after bad regimes and 

bad guys, and we make a collective decision to do it, then do it. 

Then do it with what we have without risking any more lives than 

are necessary. 

Now I just have one question, and you can all answer this. You 

may not agree with me; Mr. Meeks may not agree with me. I don’t 

know. 

But when we go to that NATO meeting in Chicago, as you said, 

there are only two countries now that meet the 2 percent. I think 

we do, more than do that. But there are only two countries. 

The allies that are putting up the money and the resources need 

to be very firm and say, ‘‘Look, if Greece can reach 2 percent and 

they are bankrupt, then, by golly, the others can cough up that 

money.’’ I hope that gets in the paper someplace. If Greece can do 

it with all the fiscal problems they are having, then the others 

ought to be able to do it as well. 

If you have any comments here, you are welcome to make them. 

Mr. COFFEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

On the point about the lack of spending by our European allies, 

I couldn’t agree with you more. What I think that the administration needs to do more of is to publicly point out and make this 

point and press this point home. 

I had a unique experience working in British politics and seeing 

things many times from the other side, from maybe more of a European point of view, how American policy can impact our allies in 

Europe and our special relationship in the UK. 

I can tell you that at the many NATO ministerial meetings I attended, or even the NATO Summit in Lisbon, I saw how effective 

American leadership can be when it is used, and how many of our 

European allies value the leadership attributes that America 

brings to the table. 

When former Secretary Gates gave his farewell address in Brussels, it sent shockwaves through many European capitals. It was 

talked about in bilateral meetings. It was talked about in the press, 

the commentators, the editorials. It was major news in the defense 

world. 

But, then, when he left, that sort of drive to really focus this 

issue and not be scared to name and shame kind of went away. 

When Secretary Panetta gave his first speech at Brussels, everyone 

was on edge—I remember this—about what Secretary Panetta is 

going to say. Is he going to pick up where Secretary Gates left off? 

78

And his speech was much more tame. Now it could be because he 

was new and he wanted to be polite the first time at a NATO ministerial. But it was noticed. So, I don’t think we should underestimate the effect American leadership can have when we raise these 

issues publicly. That is my first point. 

The second point I would like to point out is sometimes in the 

U.S. we fail to realize the lack of importance attached to the ministries of defense in Europe relative to the importance we attach 

to the DoD in the U.S. or the MOD in the UK. In many European 

countries, the ministry of defense has a lower stature in terms of 

Cabinet ranking. 

So, we can talk until the cows come home to defense ministers 

in European capitals, but if you really want to start to unlock this, 

you are going to have to start addressing this issue at the foreign 

ministerial level and, better yet, at the head-of-government level. 

Thank you. 

Mr. BURTON. Anybody else? 

Mr. WILSON. If I might just add to your first point, I just want 

to thank you for your powerful opening remarks there. I had the 

opportunity to serve in Iraq as a diplomat at our Embassy and in 

Afghanistan with NATO, and I understand where you are coming 

from with your poignant remarks. 

I think it really puts an emphasis on two things, technology and 

tactics. If you think about what we need to be able to do with our 

allies, in the Kosovo air campaign the air campaign was 90 percent 

U.S., 10 percent Europeans, because they weren’t up-to-speed with 

precision-guided munitions, the kind of technology that is required 

in modern warfare to minimize civilian casualties. 

The reality is in Libya it was the reverse, 10/90, where we had 

pushed our European colleagues to be able to fight in all weather 

environments, using precision-guided munitions. It wasn’t perfect 

and there are still real challenges, but I think this puts an imperative on keeping our allies with us as we move forward on technology. That is why the alliance acquisition of UAVs and precisionguided munitions remain a top priority in the capabilities package. 

But it is also the tactics. We are in 10 years of Afghanistan, but 

we just have completed the Libya operation without troops on the 

ground with no casualties, with probably the most minimal civilian 

casualties of the modern military operation. It is fairly remarkable. 

And then, finally, I think your comments inform NATO strategy 

and Afghanistan post-2014. If the alliance is going to remain in a 

training capacity, the real issue is how do we continue to have 

counterterrorism capabilities that can use more modern technology, 

more pinpointed strikes, that de-emphasize the importance of 

ground troops. I think that is a key part of what role the alliance 

will play post-2014. 

Finally, on defense spending, I would say we should give a nod 

to some of our allies. Norway and Estonia are two of the smaller 

allies that are keeping up on the defense-spending side. But the reality is that American haranguing on the 2 percent hasn’t produced 

results. Part of what the challenge is, is that political ambition of 

our European allies is going to drive their decisions on defense. So, 

we have to bring them with us to feel a sense of responsibility and 

ownership for the challenges we are facing on the global agenda. 

79

This is why you take our European allies with us as we pivot to 

Asia. We don’t pivot away from Europe to Asia. We have to bring 

them with us to underscore that our European partners are our goto partners in solving any problem. And therefore, a sense of ownership and political ambition will help drive defense spending. 

In the near-term, they are dealing with budget crises. And so, I 

think our expectations should be for them to develop, if not to see 

in the budget today, for us to see them with plans that show over 

the next coming years, as their economies recover, that they have 

a plan to restore spending, so that they get back up to 2 percent. 

If not in 1 year, we see the 5-year plan. 

Mr. FLANAGAN. Mr. Burton, I just had two other perspectives on 

your very compelling statement about the nature of warfare in recent years. I think that Libya is actually an example of the way 

in which the U.S. conducted that operation and addressed your 

concerns in two ways. First of all, it did apply technology. It was 

precision-guided munitions that a number of allies had, including 

a number of smaller allies who were quite successful with this. 

Support was provided and refueling and target acquisitions by the 

United States, but, nonetheless, a number of these allies did. Of 

course, you had the results that were alluded to earlier of relatively 

limited civilian casualties with enormous damage to the capacity of 

Gaddafi forces to go after innocent civilians and to wreak the kind 

of slaughter in Benghazi and other cities that were in the horizon. 

But, secondly, I think the decision to—and there were a number 

of reasons motivating this—but the decision to let two willing and 

capable European allies, the UK and France, coupled with a number of other very capable smaller allies, to play the leading role in 

some of the actual conduct of strike missions, with the U.S., again, 

completely embedded in the operation and supporting, but not 

playing a leading role, once again, in yet another operation in the 

Arab Middle East, I think this was a way to encourage Europeans 

and to show them that—and it certainly wasn’t pretty and there 

were many shortcomings, but it did show that Europe could play 

a leading role in dealing with a relatively-simple contingency on 

their periphery with some U.S. support. 

Again, I wouldn’t say this is a model for all future operations, 

but there are instances where Europe has taken action somewhat 

independently along its periphery, lesser operations in the Balkans 

and elsewhere. I think we should be encouraging that at a time 

when the U.S. is going to be feeling a heavy sense of demand on 

engagement in the Far East and other areas of the world. 

Thank you. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Meeks? 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As I sit here and listen, I am reminded more and more why this 

alliance is so important. Being a New Yorker, of course, 9/11 was 

significant. The day after 9/11 was the first, and I believe the only, 

time that NATO invoked Article 5, emphasizing the point of an attack against one of us was an attack against all of us. That is so 

significant as I listen and think. 

I agree with Mr. Burton in that no one wants to see our young 

men and women coming back maimed and hurt and families disVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:37 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\EE\042612\74003 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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seminated as a result of war. If we have technologies to prevent 

such, we want to do so. 

I just want to add—and I am pretty sure Mr. Burton would 

agree—that not only am I talking about American casualties and 

innocent individuals, but our allied casualties and civilians, innocent civilians. We don’t want the loss of innocent lives, because all 

of us are human beings. We want to save as many people as we 

possibly can, civilians, those that are not committing heinous acts, 

those who are not the bad guys. 

We want to go after the bad guys and save as many of the good 

guys, because oftentimes that is the reason why we go to war. That 

is the reason why we went to war in Libya. We wanted to help the 

good guys and help save civilian lives, and not have innocent people die. Surely, if we can do something to prevent our young men 

and women from being victims during war, I think that we should 

move in that direction. 

My question, I guess, that I throw out first, because there is this 

great need, I think, of having NATO. Dr. Flanagan, you just talked 

about the model that was used in the Libya mission, which I pretty 

much agreed with. The only concern that I have is that the threat 

perceptions or the cost/benefit analysis looked different within the 

alliance. 

You mentioned how we let Britain and France take the lead, and 

it was a successful operation because we also had Sweden and the 

Gulf states involved. But there were other partners that stayed 

out. 

That raises the question of, what about future operations? Will 

it increasingly be, say, the coalitions of the willing within the alliance? If that is so, then what does that mean for the future of 

NATO? 

Again, I stress I think that these are important, but one of the 

concerns that I have, just now analyzing what took place in Libya 

and thinking about the future. So, I would love to get your response on that. 

Mr. FLANAGAN. Yes, Mr. Meeks, I think that is very good insight. 

I do think that is a challenge that the alliance is going to confront. 

Among an alliance of 20 countries, you don’t have the common assessment. There wasn’t certainly the sense that some of the Northern European allies had, particularly one big one, Germany, had 

about the situation in Libya and how it affected their security. 

What I think is important is the key thing is what enabled the 

alliance to move forward so effectively was the degree of integration and interoperability that developed through the unified military structure. It is important to maintain that. 

And this is going to be important in the context of a Smart Defense debate because of this whole notion of if countries move toward specialization, and they don’t have certain capabilities, are 

they going to be available to them from other allies when they need 

them, when the alliance as a whole wants to put together either 

a coalition of the willing under an alliance framework or even some 

other kind of ad hoc operation that would still benefit from the levels of military integration that exist? So, I think it is important 

that we not encourage this to be the preferred option, but I think 

81

we have to live with the reality that it may be the option because 

not all allies will see as much urgency on certain operations. 

But, to me, the key thing is to maintain the integration that exists within the military structure to continue, and particularly with 

our residual presence in Europe, to maintain the kind of training 

and interaction with European forces after our withdrawal from Afghanistan, to ensure that we can work effectively with all of our 

European partners to deal with a range of different contingencies; 

and that even if it is not full-blown, it is not all 28 countries contributing, as we have seen in Afghanistan and elsewhere before, 

still, it can be an effective and a more legitimate operation, blessed 

by the entire alliance, even if it ends up being sort of this notion 

of a less-than-full contribution by all member states. 

We have never had, even in the old defense of the central region, 

we never had a fully equitable contribution by all allies in defense 

of the alliance or in the conduct of some of those preparations. But 

the key thing is to have that sense that there is resolve and commitment of all allies to any operation that the alliance undertakes. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. WILSON. Congressman Meeks, if I might add to that, I was 

working at NATO headquarters on 9/11, working for Secretary 

General Lord Robertson. I was watching on the TV in his office as 

the second plane hit the second tower in New York. As an American at NATO headquarters, on the one hand, I felt a sense of frustration and helplessness that I couldn’t do anything, that I wasn’t 

in the United States, that I wasn’t able to help respond. 

As the alliance went into action that day and began to consider 

invoking Article 5 for the first time in its history, it underscored 

to me how solemn this commitment is and the extent of this degree 

of solidarity, and how unique this alliance is. At a time of our nation under attack, these countries are willing to say that they will 

consider it an attack on themselves and be there with us. 

If you think about Afghanistan and the casualties that our allies 

have suffered in Afghanistan, on September 10th, 2001, I never 

would have guessed that you could imagine our European partners 

would have deployed to us in combat 3,000 miles away in Afghanistan for a decade. It was inconceivable. And yet, despite all the 

flaws and problems and caveats, that is what they have done. It 

is a pretty remarkable feat. 

First and foremost, most of them have done it out of a sense of 

solidarity with us. I think it is easy to take that for granted. So, 

I value your comments. 

On the Libya point, I think part of NATO’s strength is its adaptability, its flexibility. That is good for us. That is good for the alliance. But, at the end of the day, the reason NATO is enduring is 

because of the sense of solidarity that we felt on 9/11. It really is 

about trust among allies and partners. 

And so, this issue of some of the allies not contributing to Libya 

is a serious issue. Now some of the smaller ones didn’t really have 

assets that would have been applicable in an air campaign over 

Libya. But Germany, Poland, they did. I think as we think about 

the alliance and the way forward, while its flexibility is a strength, 

and while there should be allies that can step up and step back in 

certain operations, it is something that we have to constantly work 

82

at because it is a sense of trust and solidarity that at the end day 

makes sure that Article 5 itself is actually credible. And so, we 

can’t take that for granted. 

While I think Libya was a success in many regards, it is a warning bell, I think as you have said. If you let this go too far—in fact, 

some allies told us that, because they sensed that Libya wasn’t a 

first-order priority of the United States, because it wasn’t important enough to us, that maybe it wasn’t going to be important 

enough for them to commit forces. I think that is a potentially corrosive trend over the long-term and something that we have to 

guard against. 

Mr. COFFEY. Congressman Meeks, I cannot agree with you more 

and with my two colleagues here around the table, the value NATO 

brings in terms of solidarity with the United States. I want to see 

NATO as an alliance succeed. I want to see it transformed. I want 

to see it ready to take on 21st century threats. 

While I will point out the positives, and there are many, as 

Damon said, about 10 years later, imagining so many European 

troops fighting in Afghanistan, I will also not make excuses for my 

friends, because I don’t think that is what friends do. Friends help 

friends. 

In that regard, with Libya, I think Libya was a success insofar 

as NATO was able to quickly stand up the command structure to 

allow the operation——

[The microphone shuts off.] 

Mr. MEEKS. Try the button. 

Mr. COFFEY. I will speak loudly. 

Mr. MEEKS. Hit the button. The button didn’t get hit by accident? 

Mr. COFFEY. As was pointed out, only half of NATO members actually contributed anything to the operation. I think only seven actually conducted air-to-ground strike operations. 

There were some notable surprises, especially with the Norwegians, the Danes, and the Belgians, who at the time were at 

about the 2-year mark without having government, which probably 

says something. 

But I think that we should really focus on how we can learn lessons from Libya and how to improve similar operations in the future. But I would caution against comparing Libya to other campaigns such as Afghanistan or other NATO contingency operations 

in the past because it was on a completely different scale. 

For example, well, every day there are roughly about 200 air sorties flown in Libya. Compare that to, roughly, 2,000 that were 

flown every day in the opening days of Iraq. So, again, a completely 

different scale. 

Compared to what we are trying to achieve in Afghanistan, 

which is basically trying to train-up an indigenous force, the Afghan National Security Forces, to take over an insurgency, again, 

that is completely different from what we were experiencing in 

Libya. 

I would like to conclude by going back to Afghanistan and say 

that we have all been touched. I would say most Americans have 

been touched in one way or the other, by losing colleagues, friends, 

or family members in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and other wars. But we 

83

need to make sure that we set clear objectives for what we are trying to achieve. 

In Afghanistan, the standard for NATO should be a pretty low 

standard. It should be simply to create the conditions where the Afghans can take over the counterinsurgency mission, so western 

troops can leave. The AMSF are the ticket out for western troops. 

It is their country. It is their fight. It will ultimately impact on our 

security if they don’t get it right. That is why we have to help 

them. But that is where we need to be. 

By 2014–2015, we need to see an AMSF that is capable of carrying on with the counterinsurgency campaign. And by 2015, there 

will be an insurgency in Afghanistan. We should prepare the public 

for that now. But India, with the largest democracy in the world, 

still fights two insurgencies inside its borders. So, it doesn’t mean 

that we have failed. 

I think maybe that is another aspect of Chicago that will be important that I failed to mention, is that we should start preparing 

the public for what we should eventually expect out of Afghanistan 

when western troops withdraw. 

Thank you. 

Mr. BURTON. Let me just ask one real quick question regarding 

Libya. As I understand it, the NATO treaty is, if there is an attack 

on one, it is an attack on all and they all respond collectively to 

the threat. That was not the case in Libya. There was no attack 

on any NATO ally. There was a decision made by some of the leaders, France and the United States as well as some others, that 

there were humanitarian tragedies going on, and that Muammar 

Gaddafi was a tyrant and should be replaced. There was no threat 

to any country that I know of. 

And so, since there was no attack on anyone, I can understand 

why Germany and other countries might say, ‘‘Hey, wait, why are 

we getting into this thing?’’ So, I think that needs to be made very 

clear. NATO was designed, as I understand it, to be a defense 

mechanism against attacks on any one of the NATO allies. But if 

there is no attack, obviously, there is a question about whether 

there is an obligation for all of the NATO allies to go in and attack 

a country because one or two countries may say, ‘‘Hey, this guy has 

got to go.’’

Real quickly, yes, sir? 

Mr. COFFEY. I will quickly comment on that, Mr. Chairman. 

You are right that it wasn’t an Article 5 mission. In fact, as was 

already pointed out, there has only been one Article 5 declaration 

since the beginning of NATO. But, actually, the Article 5 declaration isn’t for ISAF and Afghanistan. It was as a result of September 11th. Those were Operation Eagle and Operation Active 

Endeavour. 

There have been many NATO operations in the past that have—

well, in fact, by definition, since it has only been invoked once, Article 5, every other NATO operation has been a non-Article 5 operation. So, I wouldn’t say that, just because something isn’t a direct 

threat to the alliance, that the alliance shouldn’t act. 

But I would certainly agree with you. Actually, I was one of the 

ones who was very cautious and skeptical in the beginning about 

intervening in Libya. I would agree with you that NATO needs to 

84

be very selective when and where it intervenes and how it intervenes, because Libya is not a closed book, and there is still a lot 

to be said for what is going to happen with Libya. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MEEKS. Let me just real quick, again, just feeding off of you 

a little bit, because it is compelling and history makes you think. 

When do you get involved? When don’t you? I think of the innocent 

lives in Rwanda. Should we have gotten involved in the Sudan? 

Could we have saved thousands, hundreds of thousands, of Jewish 

lives if we had gotten involved earlier during the Holocaust? 

What are our responsibilities as countries and as human beings? 

So, all of that has a play in this. Sometimes, I guess, when you get 

involved, you don’t know what the outcome, what the recording of 

history will say, whether you acted too late, as I believe we did 

with reference to the Holocaust, and we didn’t do much of anything 

in Rwanda. Or whether you interceded when you should not have. 

I mean, that is something that I think that is all part of our decisionmaking process as we move forward, which is a very challenging and difficult thing for any country to make a decision. 

I would hope that that is why the alliance is built, so that we 

can have those kinds of conversations and trying to make those 

kind of collective decisions and not leave it just to one country to 

make that decision, but let’s try to work together for our united 

selves to make that decision, which I think, then, would put us in 

a better place as we move down the road. Another reason why I 

just think that the alliance is so important, so important. 

Let me just get off this topic because we have been here long 

enough. But I do want to ask one, because we asked a lot of questions of the administration in regards to Georgia’s aspirations to 

join NATO. I would just like to know from you whether or not you 

think that, without government control of the Russian-occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, how would NATO’s Article 

5 apply to those occupied territories? I would just like to get your 

thoughts on that. 

Lastly, I think, Dr. Flanagan, you were there this morning, a 

meeting; the EU delegation is hosting a big symposium today about 

the EU’s common security and defense policy and NATO/EU cooperation. I would just like to get your assessment on this cooperation. 

Mr. WILSON. If I might start on Georgia, if the alliance said that 

Georgia could not enter NATO until Russia withdrawal from 

Abkhazia and South Ossetia, we, by default, would be giving Russia a veto over our decisions about enlargement. That is a path the 

alliance can’t go down, shouldn’t go down. So, this is a complicated 

and difficult issue. But we brought Germany into the alliance when 

it was divided. 

I think that part of the resolution of this difficult situation in the 

South Caucasus in Georgia will be clarity on the part of the alliance that its commitment at Bucharest that Georgia will be a 

member, that we demonstrate that that is genuine. And it would 

continue to work with Georgia through the NATO Georgia Commission to help it both with defense reforms, internal political reforms, 

to better prepare it, and that, as it prepares, we are serious about 

bringing it into the alliance. 

85

This will have to create and force the dynamic that creates a 

more auspicious environment for the negotiations over Abkhazia 

and South Ossetia. But if we back up and lead and say we can’t 

touch Georgia until Russia withdraws, we basically have acceded 

the turf to a decision in Moscow, and we can’t go down that path 

in my view. 

Mr. COFFEY. Following up quickly on Georgia before Dr. Flanagan goes on to talk about CSDP, I think that the Georgians actually need to make clear that they are happy for there to be some 

sort of compromise or arrangement with eventual Georgian membership into NATO that excludes South Ossetia and Abkhazia for 

the time being, until that situation is peacefully resolved with Russia. 

I believe this is the stated policy of the Georgian Government. I 

don’t believe that they have done a very good job of convening this 

message to NATO allies. But President Saakashvili has made a 

non-use-of-force pledge on regaining the two occupied territories. 

So, by definition of pledging not to use force, he has automatically 

implied that he sets aside NATO’s Article 5 commitment if Georgia 

was to become a member of NATO. 

Thank you. 

Mr. BURTON. I might just add real quickly here that Russia’s accession into the WTO could have been stopped by Georgia. And so, 

Georgia has already acceded to one aspect of the problems that 

they face in those occupied territories. 

I think you are absolutely right, it will be the same thing. 

Mr. COFFEY. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. Actually, that decision, 

the agreement made between Georgians and the Russians over this 

issue of Russia’s membership in the WTO actually shows that 

President Saakashvili is willing to take a pragmatic stance when 

it is required. 

Thank you. 

Mr. FLANAGAN. Mr. Meeks, yes, with regard to the CSDP, the 

Common Security and Defense Policy, I think the theme of some 

of this morning was that, well, some had declared that perhaps it 

was, if not dead, nearly dormant. But I think we heard that there 

are important operations still underway, some not very prominent 

in Central Africa, and helping Sudan and others. But some actually 

quite significant, including the Atalanta anti-piracy operation 

which is working with both NATO and the U.S. task forces that are 

operating out there in that region. 

The EU has not set up lots of duplicative structures, as many 

had feared. They don’t have the resources to do it. I think one of 

the strengths that the EU can bring to these kinds of operations, 

in particular, in their mission in the Horn of Africa, they have also 

been providing some financial support to assisting the Somalians 

with enhancing their security, with some of the legal elements of 

going after some of the piracy money and finances. 

So, the notion that the EU can bring, because of the other elements of the EU institutions that can bring along some of the areas 

of civilian capacity, together with the European military capacity, 

I think is some of the kinds of things we should encourage. 

Again, not big and duplicative missions that should be focused on 

NATO, but some of these lesser activities where, in showing that 

86

Europe is building the Union in all of its dimensions, that this is 

something that I think in the end provides net benefit to the 

United States and to all of the allies. 

Thank you. 

Mr. BURTON. Gentlemen, thank you very much. This has been a 

very informative panel. I am sorry we kept you so long, but it was 

worth the wait, I think. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 5:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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