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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket Nos. 41973/41974

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOSHUA MICHAEL LANEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 701

Filed: August 27, 2014

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 

OPINION AND SHALL NOT 

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Lynn G. Norton, District Judge. 

Order revoking probation and requiring execution of concurrent unified five-year

sentence with two-year determinate term for unlawful possession of a firearm; 

and seven-year sentence with three-year determinate term, for two counts of 

felony possession of a controlled substance, affirmed; denial of I.C.R. 35 motion, 

affirmed.

Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP; Dennis Benjamin, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge; LANSING, Judge;

and GRATTON, Judge

PER CURIAM

In these consolidated appeals, Joshua Michael Laney pled guilty to one count of 

possession of a controlled substance (Docket No. 41973), Idaho Code § 37-2732(c); and one 

count of possession of a controlled substance, I.C. § 37-2732(c) and one count of unlawful 

possession of a firearm, I.C. § 18-3316 (Docket No. 41974). The district court imposed a unified 

five-year sentence with a two-year determinate term in Docket No. 41973 and a unified sevenyear sentence with a three-year determinate term in Docket No. 41974. The district court 

ordered the sentences in both cases to run concurrently, and retained jurisdiction in both cases. 

At the conclusion of the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court placed Laney on 
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probation. Several months later, probation violations were filed in both cases and Laney

admitted to violating several terms of the probation in these cases. The district court revoked 

probation and again retained jurisdiction, after which it reinstated Laney on probation. 

Subsequently, Laney again admitted to violating his probation and consequently the district court

ordered execution of the original sentences. Laney timely filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 

motion for reduction of sentence, which the district court denied. Laney appeals, asserting that 

the district court abused its discretion by revoking probation in both cases, and by denying his 

Rule 35 motion.

It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and 

conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 

Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 

P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 

1988). In determining whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation 

is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. State v. 

Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 

P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation 

has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the 

court is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 

325, 834 P.2d at 327; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). 

The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction. State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 

162, 244 P.3d 1244, 1248 (2010). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal 

only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 

P.2d at 327. In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the 

conduct underlying the trial court’s decision to revoke probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 

618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the 

record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are properly 

made part of the record on appeal. Id.

Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review 

and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well 

established and need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 

P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-
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73 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). 

When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. 

Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). 

When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of 

probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original 

judgment. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our 

review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring 

between the original sentencing and the revocation of the probation. Id. Thus, this Court will 

consider the elements of the record before the trial court that are properly made part of the record 

on appeal and are relevant to review of the sentence.

A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency, 

addressed to the sound discretion of the court. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d 

23, 24 (2006); State v. Gill, 150 Idaho 183, 186, 244 P.3d 1269, 1272 (Ct. App. 2010). In 

presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of 

new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the 

motion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). Upon review of the 

record, including any new information submitted with Laney’s Rule 35 motion, we conclude no 

abuse of discretion has been shown. Therefore, the district court’s order denying Laney’s Rule 

35 motion is affirmed.

Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot 

say that the district court abused its discretion either in revoking probation or in ordering 

execution of Laney’s original sentences without modification. Therefore, the order revoking 

probation and directing execution of Laney’s previously suspended sentences and the order 

denying Laney’s Rule 35 motion are affirmed.