1

The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, United States District Judge

for the Eastern District of Missouri.

 2We appointed present counsel to represent Swope on appeal,

and we express our appreciation for his zealous efforts on Swope's

behalf.

___________

No. 94-2473

___________

Carl Thomas Swope, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Dr. John K. Cameron, Ph.D.; *

Michele Flowers, Psychologist, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

 Submitted: June 12, 1995

 Filed: January 19, 1996 ___________

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, JOHN R. GIBSON and WOLLMAN,

Circuit Judges. ___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from the district court's1 order granting

the appellees' motion for summary judgment and denying the

appellant's motion for appointment of counsel in this action

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 We affirm.

Carl Thomas Swope was incarcerated at the Farmington

Correction Center (FCC) in Farmington, Missouri, from January 6,

1989, to November 13, 1989, and then again from February 28, 1991,

to July 28, 1992. Dr. John Cameron was the Chief Treatment

Psychologist for the Missouri Department of Corrections during the
-2-

time in question. Michele Flowers was employed by the Department

of Corrections as an Associate Psychologist II from July 1988 to

January 1992. Since January 1992, she has been employed by the

Department as a Psychologist I.

Swope's initial complaint, filed pro se, alleged that Cameron

and Flowers had been deliberately indifferent to his serious need

for psychological treatment.

On January 29, 1993, the district court granted Swope's motion

for appointment of counsel and appointed Alan K. Goldstein to

represent Swope. Mr. Goldstein filed an amended complaint on

Swope's behalf on March 15, 1993. Mr. Goldstein subsequently

filed, under seal, a motion for leave to withdraw. On December 23,

1993, the district court entered an order granting, "good cause

appearing," the motion. On December 27, 1993, Swope wrote a letter

to the district court requesting that new counsel be appointed to

represent him. On January 5, 1994, the district court entered a

memorandum and order denying this request. In doing so, the

district court considered the factors that we have held must be

taken into consideration in ruling on a motion for appointment of

counsel. See, e.g., Rayes v. Johnson, 969 F.2d 700 (8th Cir.),

cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 658 (1992); Johnson v. Williams, 788 F.2d

1319 (8th Cir. 1986); and Nelson v. Redfield Lithograph Printing,

728 F.2d 1003 (8th Cir. 1984).

In granting summary judgment to Cameron and Flowers, the

district court pointed to the fact that Swope had been seen by a

psychologist or psychiatrist on at least eight occasions during his

first period of incarceration. Swope's course of treatment also

included a physical examination at the Mineral Area Regional

Medical Center (MARMC) on October 11, 1989. On October 24, 1989,

Swope was given a neurological consultation at MARMC. Swope was

sent to MARMC for evaluation on November 12, 1982, after a possible

ingestion of foreign substances. He was released the following day
-3-

and transferred to Potosi Correctional Center, where he was

examined that same day by a psychologist.

Swope was returned to FCC on February 28, 1991. He was placed

in the Corrections Treatment Center, a specialized mental health

program, where his behavior was closely monitored. Swope was

discharged from the Treatment Center on March 21, 1991, the

discharging psychologist noting that Swope was not in need of any

mental health services. Upon his return to FCC, Swope was seen by

a psychologist or psychiatrist on several occasions prior to his

transfer from FCC on July 28, 1992. None of the psychologists or

psychiatrists who examined Swope during the time he was

incarcerated at FCC indicated that Swope suffered from any chronic

mental illness that would have warranted his admission to the

Social Rehabilitation Unit there.

The district court concluded that Swope had failed to

establish a genuine issue of material fact on the question whether

Cameron and Flowers had been deliberately indifferent to his

serious medical needs.

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Swope's motion for appointment of new counsel

after the court granted Mr. Goldstein's motion to withdraw. As

indicated above, the district court took into account the factors

that our decisions say must be considered when ruling on such a

motion. Those factors include whether the plaintiff has presented

non-frivolous allegations; whether the plaintiff will substantially

benefit from the appointment of counsel; whether there is a further

need to investigate further and present the facts relating to the

plaintiff's claim; and whether the factual and legal issues

presented by the action are complex. See Rayes, 969 F.2d at 703.

In reviewing a ruling denying a motion for appointment of

counsel, substantial deference should be given to the district
-4-

court's ruling in those cases in which the district court has

relieved the original attorney from the appointment. Here, the

district court found that there was good cause to relieve Mr.

Goldstein of his appointment, for reasons that the court found

warranted keeping the motion for withdrawal under seal. We cannot

believe that the district court would have taken this action

lightly. Accordingly, we affirm the order denying the motion for

appointment of counsel.

On the merits of the action, we agree with the district court

that at most Swope established only a claim of dissatisfaction with

the treatment he was given, a showing insufficient to establish an

Eighth Amendment violation. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976);

Smith v. Marcantonio, 910 F.2d 500, 502 (8th Cir. 1990). 

The district court's order is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.