NIST Special Publication 800-53 

 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls 

for Federal Information Systems 

and Organizations 

JOINT TASK FORCE 

TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVE 

I N F O R M A T I O N S E C U R I T Y

INITIAL PUBLIC DRAFT

Computer Security Division 

Information Technology Laboratory 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930 

February 2012 

U.S. Department of Commerce 

John E. Bryson, Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Patrick D. Gallagher, Under Secretary for Standards and Technology 

and Director
Special Publication 800-53 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations

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Reports on Computer Systems Technology 

The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical 

leadership for the nation’s measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test 

methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the 

development and productive use of information technology. ITL’s responsibilities include the 

development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for 

the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in 

federal information systems. The Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL’s research, 

guidelines, and outreach efforts in information system security, and its collaborative activities 

with industry, government, and academic organizations. 
Special Publication 800-53 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations

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Authority

This publication has been developed by NIST to further its statutory responsibilities under the 

Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), Public Law (P.L.) 107-347. NIST is 

responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines, including minimum 

requirements for federal information systems, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to 

national security systems without the express approval of appropriate federal officials exercising 

policy authority over such systems. This guideline is consistent with the requirements of the 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130, Section 8b(3), Securing Agency 

Information Systems, as analyzed in Circular A-130, Appendix IV: Analysis of Key Sections. 

Supplemental information is provided in Circular A-130, Appendix III, Security of Federal 

Automated Information Resources. 

Nothing in this publication should be taken to contradict the standards and guidelines made 

mandatory and binding on federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory 

authority. Nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing 

authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, Director of the OMB, or any other federal official. 

This publication may be used by nongovernmental organizations on a voluntary basis and is not 

subject to copyright in the United States. Attribution would, however, be appreciated by NIST. 

 NIST Special Publication 800-53, 375 pages 

(February 2012) 

CODEN: NSPUE2 

 

 

Public comment period: February 28 through April 6, 2012 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Attn: Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory 

100 Bureau Drive (Mail Stop 8930) Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930 

Electronic mail: sec-cert@nist.gov 

Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in order to 

describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply 

recommendation or endorsement by NIST, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or 

equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose. 

There may be references in this publication to other publications currently under development by NIST 

in accordance with its assigned statutory responsibilities. The information in this publication, including 

concepts and methodologies, may be used by federal agencies even before the completion of such 

companion publications. Thus, until each publication is completed, current requirements, guidelines, 

and procedures, where they exist, remain operative. For planning and transition purposes, federal 

agencies may wish to closely follow the development of these new publications by NIST. 

Organizations are encouraged to review all draft publications during public comment periods and 

provide feedback to NIST. All NIST publications, other than the ones noted above, are available at 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications. 
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Compliance with NIST Standards and Guidelines

In accordance with the provisions of FISMA,1 the Secretary of Commerce shall, on the basis of 

standards and guidelines developed by NIST, prescribe standards and guidelines pertaining to 

federal information systems. The Secretary shall make standards compulsory and binding to the 

extent determined necessary by the Secretary to improve the efficiency of operation or security of 

federal information systems. Standards prescribed shall include information security standards 

that provide minimum information security requirements and are otherwise necessary to improve 

the security of federal information and information systems. 

• Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) are approved by the Secretary of 

Commerce and issued by NIST in accordance with FISMA. FIPS are compulsory and 

binding for federal agencies.2

 FISMA requires that federal agencies comply with these 

standards, and therefore, agencies may not waive their use. 

• Special Publications (SPs) are developed and issued by NIST as recommendations and 

guidance documents. For other than national security programs and systems, federal 

agencies must follow those NIST Special Publications mandated in a Federal Information 

Processing Standard. FIPS 200 mandates the use of Special Publication 800-53, as 

amended. In addition, OMB policies (including OMB Reporting Instructions for FISMA 

and Agency Privacy Management) state that for other than national security programs 

and systems, federal agencies must follow certain specific NIST Special Publications.3

• Other security-related publications, including NIST interagency reports (NISTIRs) and 

ITL Bulletins, provide technical and other information about NIST's activities. These 

publications are mandatory only when specified by OMB. 

• Compliance schedules for NIST security standards and guidelines are established by 

OMB in policies, directives, or memoranda (e.g., annual FISMA Reporting Guidance).4

 

 

1

 The E-Government Act (P.L. 107-347) recognizes the importance of information security to the economic and 

national security interests of the United States. Title III of the E-Government Act, entitled the Federal Information 

Security Management Act (FISMA), emphasizes the need for organizations to develop, document, and implement an 

organization-wide program to provide security for the information systems that support its operations and assets. 

2

 The term agency is used in this publication in lieu of the more general term organization only in those circumstances 

where its usage is directly related to other source documents such as federal legislation or policy. 

3

 While federal agencies are required to follow certain specific NIST Special Publications in accordance with OMB 

policy, there is flexibility in how agencies apply the guidance. Federal agencies apply the security concepts and 

principles articulated in the NIST Special Publications in accordance with and in the context of the agency’s missions, 

business functions, and environment of operation. Consequently, the application of NIST guidance by federal agencies 

can result in different security solutions that are equally acceptable, compliant with the guidance, and meet the OMB 

definition of adequate security for federal information systems. Given the high priority of information sharing and 

transparency within the federal government, agencies also consider reciprocity in developing their information security 

solutions. When assessing federal agency compliance with NIST Special Publications, Inspectors General, evaluators, 

auditors, and assessors consider the intent of the security concepts and principles articulated within the specific 

guidance document and how the agency applied the guidance in the context of its mission/business responsibilities, 

operational environment, and unique organizational conditions. 

4 Unless otherwise stated, all references to NIST publications in this document (i.e., Federal Information Processing 

Standards and Special Publications) are to the most recent version of the publication. 
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Acknowledgements

This publication was developed by the Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative Interagency 

Working Group with representatives from the Civil, Defense, and Intelligence Communities in an 

ongoing effort to produce a unified information security framework for the federal government. 

The National Institute of Standards and Technology wishes to acknowledge and thank the senior 

leaders from the Departments of Commerce and Defense, the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence, the Committee on National Security Systems, and the members of the interagency 

technical working group whose dedicated efforts contributed significantly to the publication. The 

senior leaders, interagency working group members, and their organizational affiliations include: 

U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

Teresa M. Takai Adolpho Tarasiuk Jr. 

DoD Chief Information Officer Assistant Director of National Intelligence and 

 Intelligence Community Chief Information 

 Officer 

Richard Hale Charlene Leubecker

Deputy Chief Information Officer for Identity Deputy Intelligence Community Chief 

and Information Assurance Information Officer 

Dominic Cussatt Catherine A. Henson 

Acting Director Information Assurance Policy Director, Data Management

and Strategy

Kurt Eleam Roger Caslow 

Policy Advisor Chief, Risk Management and Information 

Security Programs Division 

National Institute of Standards and Technology Committee on National Security Systems 

Charles H. Romine Teresa M. Takai 

Director, Information Technology Laboratory Chair, CNSS

William C. Barker Dominic Cussatt 

Cyber Security Advisor, Information Technology Laboratory CNSS Subcommittee Co-Chair 

Donna Dodson Kevin Deeley 

Chief, Computer Security Division CNSS Subcommittee Co-Chair 

Ron Ross Lance Dubsky 

FISMA Implementation Project Leader CNSS Subcommittee Co-Chair

Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative Interagency Working Group 

Ron Ross Gary Stoneburner Richard Graubart Kelley Dempsey 

NIST, JTF Leader Johns Hopkins APL The MITRE Corporation NIST 

Esten Porter Bennett Hodge Karen Quigg Christian Enloe 

The MITRE Corporation Booz Allen Hamilton The MITRE Corporation NIST 

Kevin Stine Jennifer Fabius Daniel Faigin Arnold Johnson 

NIST The MITRE Corporation The Aerospace Corporation NIST 

In addition to the above acknowledgments, a special note of thanks goes to Peggy Himes and 

Elizabeth Lennon of NIST for their superb technical editing and administrative support. The 

authors also wish to recognize Marshall Abrams, Deb Bodeau, Nadya Bartol, George Moore, 

Jennifer Guild, John Mildner, Cynthia Irvine, George Dinolt, Dawn Cappelli, Cass Kelly, Tom 

Macklin, Steve LaFountain, Tim McChesney, Joji Montelibano, Carol Woody, Steve Lipner, 

Matt Coose, and the entire team from the NIST Computer Security Division for their exceptional 

contributions in helping to improve the content of the publication. And finally, the authors also 

gratefully acknowledge and appreciate the significant contributions from individuals, working 
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PAGE vi

groups, and organizations in the public and private sectors, both nationally and internationally, 

whose thoughtful and constructive comments improved the overall quality, thoroughness, and 

usefulness of this publication. 

 
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Notes to Reviewers

NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4 (Initial Public Draft), represents the culmination of 

a year-long initiative to update the content of the security controls catalog and the guidance for 

selecting and specifying security controls for federal information systems and organizations. The 

project was conducted as part of the Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative in cooperation 

and collaboration with the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, the Committee 

on National Security Systems, and the Department of Homeland Security. The proposed changes 

included in Revision 4 are directly linked to the current state of the threat space (i.e., capabilities, 

intentions, and targeting activities of adversaries) and the attack data collected and analyzed over 

a substantial time period. In particular, the major changes in Revision 4 include: 

• New security controls and control enhancements; 

• Clarification of security control requirements and specification language; 

• New tailoring guidance including the introduction of overlays; 

• Additional supplemental guidance for security controls and enhancements; 

• New privacy controls and implementation guidance; 

• Updated security control baselines; 

• New summary tables for security controls to facilitate ease-of-use; and 

• Revised minimum assurance requirements and designated assurance controls. 

Many of the changes were driven by particular cyber security issues and challenges requiring 

greater attention including, for example, insider threat, mobile and cloud computing, application 

security, firmware integrity, supply chain risk, and the advanced persistent threat (APT). In most 

instances, with the exception of the new privacy appendix, the new controls and enhancements 

are not labeled specifically as “cloud” or “mobile computing” controls or placed in one section of 

the catalog. Rather, the controls and enhancements are distributed throughout the control catalog 

in various families and provide specific security capabilities that are needed to support those new 

computing technologies and computing approaches. The breadth and depth of the security and 

privacy controls in the control catalog must be sufficiently robust to protect the wide range of 

information and information systems supporting the critical missions and business functions of 

the federal government—from the Department of Homeland Security, to the DoD warfighters, to 

the Federal Aviation Administration, to the Social Security Administration. 

As the federal government continues to implement its unified information security framework

using the core publications developed under the Joint Task Force, there is also a significant 

transformation underway in how federal agencies authorize their information systems. Near realtime risk management and the ability to design, develop, and implement effective continuous 

monitoring programs, depends first and foremost, on the organization’s ability to develop a strong 

information technology infrastructure—in essence, building stronger, more resilient information 

systems using system components with sufficient security capability to protect core missions and 

business functions. The security and privacy controls in this publication, along with the flexibility 

inherent in the implementation guidance, provide the requisite tools to implement effective, riskbased, cyber security programs—capable of addressing the most sophisticated of threats on the 

horizon. 

 
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To support the public review process, NIST will publish a markup version of Appendices D, F, 

and G (i.e., baseline allocations and the catalog of security controls for information systems and 

organizations) to show the proposed changes to the individual security controls. This will help 

organizations plan for any future update actions they may wish to undertake after Revision 4 is 

finalized. There will not be any markups provided for the main chapters or the other appendices. 

We would like to express our sincere appreciation to the many organizations and individuals in 

the public and private sectors who took the time to submit contributions to the update of Special 

Publication 800-53. Your feedback to us during the public review period is invaluable as we 

attempt to provide state-of-the-practice cyber security and privacy guidance to our customers. 

-- RON ROSS

 JOINT TASK FORCE LEADER

 FISMA IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT LEADER
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DEVELOPING COMMON INFORMATION SECURITY FOUNDATIONS

COLLABORATION AMONG PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR ENTITIES

In developing standards and guidelines required by FISMA, NIST consults with other federal agencies 

and offices as well as the private sector to improve information security, avoid unnecessary and costly 

duplication of effort, and ensure that NIST publications are complementary with the standards and 

guidelines employed for the protection of national security systems. In addition to its comprehensive 

public review process, NIST collaborates with the Department of Defense (DoD), the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the Intelligence Community (IC), and the Committee on 

National Security Systems (CNSS) to establish a common foundation for information security across 

the federal government. A common security foundation will provide the Intelligence, Defense, and 

Civil sectors of the federal government and their contractors, more uniform and consistent ways to 

manage the risk to organizational operations (including missions, functions, image, and reputation), 

organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation that results from the operation 

and use of information systems. A common foundation will also provide a strong basis for reciprocal 

acceptance of security assessment results and facilitate information sharing. NIST is also working with 

public and private sector entities to establish specific mappings and relationships between the security 

standards and guidelines developed by NIST and the International Organization for Standardization 

and International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC). 
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FIPS 200 AND SP 800-53 

IMPLEMENTING INFORMATION SECURITY STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES

FIPS Publication 200, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information 

Systems, is a mandatory federal standard developed by NIST in response to FISMA. To comply 

with the federal standard, organizations first determine the security category of their information 

system in accordance with FIPS Publication 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal 

Information and Information Systems, derive the information system impact level from the security 

category in accordance with FIPS 200, and then apply the appropriately tailored set of baseline 

security controls in NIST Special Publication 800-53, Security and Privacy Controls for Federal 

Information Systems and Organizations. Organizations have flexibility in applying the baseline 

security controls in accordance with the guidance provided in Special Publication 800-53. This 

allows organizations to tailor the relevant security control baseline so that it more closely aligns 

with their mission and business requirements and environments of operation. 

FIPS 200 and NIST Special Publication 800-53, in combination, ensure that appropriate security 

requirements and security controls are applied to all federal information and information systems. 

An organizational assessment of risk validates the initial security control selection and determines if 

additional controls are needed to protect organizational operations (including mission, functions, 

image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation. The 

resulting set of security controls establishes a level of security due diligence for the organization. 
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PRIVACY CONTROLS 

PROVIDING PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR FEDERAL INFORMATION

Appendix J, Privacy Control Catalog, is a new addition to NIST Special Publication 800-53. It is 

intended to address the privacy needs of federal agencies. The objective of the Privacy Appendix is 

fourfold: 

• Provide a structured set of privacy controls, based on international standards and best practices, 

that help organizations enforce requirements deriving from federal privacy legislation, policies, 

regulations, directives, standards, and guidance; 

• Establish a linkage and relationship between privacy and security controls for purposes of 

enforcing respective privacy and security requirements which may overlap in concept and in 

implementation within federal information systems, programs, and organizations; 

• Demonstrate the applicability of the NIST Risk Management Framework in the selection, 

implementation, assessment, and monitoring of privacy controls deployed in federal 

information systems, programs, and organizations; and 

• Promote closer cooperation between privacy and security officials within the federal 

government to help achieve the objectives of senior leaders/executives in enforcing the 

requirements in federal privacy legislation, policies, regulations, directives, standards, and 

guidance. 

There is a strong similarity in the structure of the privacy controls in Appendix J and the security 

controls in Appendices F and G. Moreover, the use of privacy plans in conjunction with security 

plans provides an opportunity for organizations to select the appropriate set of security and privacy 

controls in accordance with organizational mission/business requirements and the environments in 

which the organizations operate. Incorporating the same concepts used in managing information 

security risk, helps organizations implement privacy controls in a more cost-effective, risked-based 

manner while simultaneously protecting individual privacy and meeting compliance requirements. 

Standardized privacy controls provide a more disciplined and structured approach for satisfying 

federal privacy requirements and demonstrating compliance to those requirements. 
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Cautionary Note 

IMPLEMENTING CHANGES BASED ON REVISIONS TO SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-53 

When NIST publishes revisions to Special Publication 800-53, there are four primary types of changes 

made to the document: (i) security controls or control enhancements are added to or withdrawn from 

Appendices F and G and/or to the low, moderate, and high baselines; (ii) supplemental guidance is 

modified; (iii) material in the main chapters or appendices is modified; and (iv) language is clarified 

and/or updated throughout the document. 

When modifying existing tailored security control baselines at Tier 3 in the risk management hierarchy 

(as described in Special Publication 800-39) and updating security controls at any tier as a result of 

Special Publication 800-53 revisions, organizations should take a measured, risk-based approach in 

accordance with organizational risk tolerance and current risk assessments. Unless otherwise directed 

by OMB policy, the following activities are recommended to implement changes to Special Publication 

800-53: 

• First, organizations determine if any added security controls/control enhancements are applicable 

to organizational information systems or environments of operation following tailoring guidelines 

in this publication. 

• Next, organizations review changes to the supplemental guidance, guidance in the main chapters 

and appendices, and updated/clarified language throughout the publication to determine if changes 

apply to any organizational information systems and if any immediate actions are required. 

• Finally, once organizations have determined the entirety of changes necessitated by the revisions 

to the publication, the changes are integrated into the established continuous monitoring process to 

the greatest extent possible. The implementation of new or modified security controls to address 

specific, active threats is always the highest priority for sequencing and implementing changes. 

Modifications such as changes to templates or minor language changes in policy or procedures are 

generally the lowest priority and are made in conjunction with the established review cycle. 
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Table of Contents

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 1

1.1 PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY .................................................................................................. 2

1.2 TARGET AUDIENCE.................................................................................................................. 3

1.3 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER SECURITY CONTROL PUBLICATIONS.................................................... 3

1.4 ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES ........................................................................................ 4

1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THIS SPECIAL PUBLICATION .......................................................................... 5

CHAPTER TWO THE FUNDAMENTALS ................................................................................... 6

2.1 MULTITIERED RISK MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................. 6

2.2 SECURITY CONTROL STRUCTURE ............................................................................................. 8

2.3 SECURITY CONTROL BASELINES............................................................................................. 11

2.4 COMMON CONTROLS ............................................................................................................. 13

2.5 EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTS AND PROVIDERS ........................................................................... 16

2.6 ASSURANCE AND TRUSTWORTHINESS .................................................................................... 18

2.7 REVISIONS AND EXTENSIONS ................................................................................................. 22

CHAPTER THREE THE PROCESS........................................................................................ 23

3.1 SELECTING SECURITY CONTROL BASELINES ........................................................................... 23

3.2 TAILORING BASELINE SECURITY CONTROLS ............................................................................ 25

3.3 DOCUMENTING THE CONTROL SELECTION PROCESS ............................................................... 36

3.4 NEW DEVELOPMENT AND LEGACY SYSTEMS ........................................................................... 39

APPENDIX A REFERENCES.............................................................................................. A-1

APPENDIX B GLOSSARY ................................................................................................. B-1

APPENDIX C ACRONYMS ................................................................................................. C-1

APPENDIX D SECURITY CONTROL BASELINES – SUMMARY ................................................ D-1

APPENDIX E ASSURANCE AND TRUSTWORTHINESS .......................................................... E-1

APPENDIX F SECURITY CONTROL CATALOG ...................................................................... F-1

APPENDIX G INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAMS ............................................................ G-1

APPENDIX H INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION SECURITY STANDARDS ................................... H-1

APPENDIX I OVERLAY TEMPLATE ...................................................................................... I-1

APPENDIX J PRIVACY CONTROL CATALOG ........................................................................ J-1
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Prologue

“...Through the process of risk management, leaders must consider risk to US interests from 

adversaries using cyberspace to their advantage and from our own efforts to employ the global 

nature of cyberspace to achieve objectives in military, intelligence, and business operations... “ 

 “...For operational plans development, the combination of threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts 

must be evaluated in order to identify important trends and decide where effort should be applied 

to eliminate or reduce threat capabilities; eliminate or reduce vulnerabilities; and assess, 

coordinate, and deconflict all cyberspace operations...” 

“...Leaders at all levels are accountable for ensuring readiness and security to the same degree 

as in any other domain..." 

-- THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS 

 OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

THE NEED TO PROTECT INFORMATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 

he selection and implementation of security controls for organizations and information 

systems5

 are important tasks that can have major implications on the operations6 and assets 

of organizations7

 as well as the welfare of individuals and the Nation. Security controls are 

the safeguards/countermeasures employed within organizational information systems to protect 

the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information systems and the information that 

is processed, stored, and transmitted by those systems. There are several important questions that 

should be answered by organizations when addressing the information security considerations for 

information systems: 

• What security controls are needed to adequately mitigate risk incurred by using information 

and information systems in the execution of organizational missions and business functions? 

• Have the selected security controls been implemented or is there a realistic implementation 

plan in place? 

• What is the desired or required level of assurance that the selected security controls, as 

implemented, are effective in their application? 8 

The answers to these questions are not given in isolation but rather in the context of an effective 

risk management process for the organization that identifies, mitigates as deemed necessary, and 

monitors on an ongoing basis, risks9

 arising from its information and information systems. NIST 

Special Publication 800-39 provides guidance on risk management describing three tiers of risk 

management with respect to information security—organization level (Tier 1), mission/business 

process level (Tier 2), and information system level (Tier 3). The security controls defined in this 

publication and recommended for use by organizations in achieving their information protection 

needs should be employed as part of a well-defined and documented risk management process 

that supports organizational information security programs.10

 

5

 An information system is a discrete set of information resources organized expressly for the collection, processing, 

maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of information. Information systems also include specialized 

systems such as industrial/process controls systems, telephone switching/private branch exchange (PBX) systems, and 

environmental control systems. Information systems can be viewed from a logical and physical perspective as complex 

system-of-systems when there are multiple systems involved with a high degree of connectivity and interaction among 

the systems. 

6

 Organizational operations include mission, functions, image, and reputation. 

7

 The term organization describes an entity of any size, complexity, or positioning within an organizational structure 

(e.g., a federal agency or, as appropriate, any of its operational elements). 

8

 Security control effectiveness addresses the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating as 

intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security requirements for the information 

system in its operational environment or enforcing/mediating established security policies. 

9

 Information security-related risks are those risks that arise from the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of 

information or information systems and consider the potential adverse impacts to organizational operations and assets, 

individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. 

10 The program management controls (Appendix G) complement the security controls for an information system 

(Appendix F) by focusing on the organization-wide information security requirements that are independent of any 

particular information system and are essential for managing information security programs. 

T
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It is of paramount importance that responsible officials understand the risks and other factors that 

could adversely affect organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and 

the Nation.11 These officials must also understand the current status of their security programs 

and the security controls planned or in place to protect their information and information systems 

in order to make informed judgments and investments that mitigate risks to an acceptable level. 

The ultimate objective is to conduct the day-to-day operations of the organization and accomplish 

the organization’s stated missions and business functions with what the OMB Circular A-130 

defines as adequate security, or security commensurate with risk resulting from the unauthorized 

access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information. 

1.1 PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY

The purpose of this publication is to provide guidelines for selecting and specifying security 

controls for organizations and information systems supporting the executive agencies of the 

federal government to meet the requirements of FIPS 200, Minimum Security Requirements for 

Federal Information and Information Systems. The guidelines apply to all components12 of an 

information system that process, store, or transmit federal information. The guidelines have been 

developed to achieve more secure information systems and effective risk management within the 

federal government by: 

• Facilitating a more consistent, comparable, and repeatable approach for selecting and 

specifying security controls for information systems and organizations; 

• Providing a stable, yet flexible catalog of security controls to meet current information 

protection needs and the demands of future protection needs based on changing threats, 

requirements, and technologies; 

• Providing a recommendation for minimum security controls for information systems 

categorized in accordance with FIPS 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal 

Information and Information Systems;

• Creating a foundation for the development of assessment methods and procedures for 

determining security control effectiveness; and 

• Improving communication among organizations by providing a common lexicon that 

supports discussion of risk management concepts. 

The guidelines in this special publication are applicable to all federal information systems13 other 

than those systems designated as national security systems as defined in 44 U.S.C., Section 3542. 

The guidelines have been broadly developed from a technical perspective to complement similar 

guidelines for national security systems and may be used for such systems with the approval of 

appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems.14 State, local, and 

tribal governments, as well as private sector organizations are encouraged to consider using these 

guidelines, as appropriate. 

 

11 Includes risk to U.S. critical infrastructure/key resources as described in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7. 

12 Information system components include, for example, mainframes, workstations, servers (e.g., database, electronic 

mail, authentication, web, proxy, file, domain name), input/output devices (e.g., scanners, copiers, printers), network 

components (e.g., firewalls, routers, gateways, voice and data switches, wireless access points, network appliances, 

sensors), operating systems, middleware, and applications. 

13 A federal information system is an information system used or operated by an executive agency, by a contractor of an 

executive agency, or by another organization on behalf of an executive agency. 

14 CNSS Instruction 1253 provides implementing guidance for national security systems. 
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1.2 TARGET AUDIENCE

This publication is intended to serve a diverse audience of information system and information 

security professionals including: 

• Individuals with information system, security, and/or risk management and oversight 

responsibilities (e.g., authorizing officials, chief information officers, senior information 

security officers,15 information system managers, information security managers); 

• Individuals with information system development responsibilities (e.g., program managers, 

system designers and developers, information security engineers, systems integrators); 

• Individuals with information security implementation and operational responsibilities (e.g., 

mission/business owners, information system owners, common control providers, information 

owners/stewards, information security engineers, system administrators, information system 

security officers); 

• Individuals with information security assessment and monitoring responsibilities (e.g., 

auditors, Inspectors General, system evaluators, assessors, independent verifiers/validators, 

analysts, information system owners); and 

• Commercial companies producing information technology products and systems, creating 

information security-related technologies, and providing information security services. 

1.3 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER SECURITY CONTROL PUBLICATIONS

To create a technically sound and broadly applicable set of security controls for information 

systems and organizations, a variety of sources were considered during the development of this 

special publication. The sources included security controls from the defense, audit, financial, 

healthcare, industrial/process control, and intelligence communities as well as controls defined by 

national and international standards organizations. The objective of NIST Special Publication 

800-53 is to provide a set of security controls that can satisfy the breadth and depth of security 

requirements16 levied on organizations, mission/business processes, and information systems and 

that is consistent with and complementary to other established information security standards. 

The catalog of security controls in Special Publication 800-53 can be effectively used to protect 

information and information systems from traditional and advanced persistent threats in varied 

operational, environmental, and technical scenarios. The controls can also be used to demonstrate 

compliance with a variety of governmental, organizational, or institutional security requirements. 

Organizations have the responsibility to select the appropriate security controls, to implement the 

controls correctly, and to demonstrate the effectiveness of the controls in satisfying established 

security requirements.17 The security controls facilitate the development of assessment methods 

and proceduresthat can be used to demonstrate control effectiveness in a consistent/repeatable 

manner—thus contributing to the organization’s confidence that security requirements continue to 

be satisfied on an ongoing basis. 

 

15 At the agency level, this position is known as the Senior Agency Information Security Officer. Organizations may 

also refer to this position as the Senior Information Security Officer or the Chief Information Security Officer. 

16 Security requirements are those requirements levied on an information system that are derived from laws, Executive 

Orders, directives, policies, instructions, regulations, standards, guidelines, or organizational (mission) needs to ensure 

the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information being processed, stored, or transmitted. 

17 NIST Special Publication 800-53A provides guidance on assessing the effectiveness of security controls defined in 

this publication. 
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1.4 ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

Organizations18 use FIPS 199 to categorize their information and information systems. Security 

categorization is accomplished as an organization-wide activity19 with the involvement of seniorlevel organizational personnel including, for example, authorizing officials, chief information 

officers, senior information security officers, information owners/stewards, information system 

owners, and risk executive (function). Information is categorized at Tier 1 (organization level) 

and at Tier 2 (mission/business process level). As required by FIPS 200, organizations use the 

security categorization results from Tiers 1 and 2 to designate organizational information systems 

at Tier 3 (information system level) as low-impact, moderate-impact, or high-impact systems. For 

each information system at Tier 3, the recommendation for security controls from the baseline

controls defined in Appendix D is the starting point for the security control tailoring process. 

While the security control selection process is generally focused on information systems at Tier 3, 

the process is generally applicable across all three tiers of risk management. 

FIPS 199 security categorization associates information and the operation/use of organizational 

information systems with the potential worst-case adverse impact on organizational operations 

and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.20 Organizational assessments of risk, 

including the use of specific and credible threat information, vulnerability information, and the 

likelihood of such threats exploiting vulnerabilities to cause adverse impacts, guide and inform 

the tailoring process and the final selection of security controls.21 The final, agreed-upon set of 

security controls addressing specific organizational mission/business needs and tolerance for risk 

is documented with appropriate rationale in the security plan for the information system.22 The 

use of security controls from Special Publication 800-53 (including the baseline controls as a 

starting point in the control selection process), facilitates a more consistent level of security for 

federal information systems and organizations, while simultaneously preserving the flexibility 

and agility organizations need to address an increasingly sophisticated and hostile threat space, 

specific organizational missions/business functions, rapidly changing technologies, and in some 

cases, unique environments of operation. 

Achieving adequate information security for organizations, mission/business processes, and 

information systems is a multifaceted undertaking that requires: 

• Clearly articulated security requirements and security specifications; 

• Well-designed and well-built information technology products based on state-of-the-practice 

hardware, firmware, and software development processes; 

• Sound systems/security engineering principles and practices to effectively integrate 

information technology products into organizational information systems; 

 

18 Organizations typically exercise managerial, operational, and financial control over their information systems and the 

security provided to those systems, including the authority and capability to implement or require the security controls 

deemed necessary to protect organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. 

19 See FIPS Publication 200, footnote 7. 

20 Considerations for potential national-level impacts and impacts to other organizations in categorizing organizational 

information systems derive from the USA PATRIOT Act and Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs). 

21 Risk assessments can be accomplished in a variety of ways depending on the specific needs of organizations. NIST 

Special Publication 800-30 provides guidance on the assessment of risk as part of an overall risk management process. 

22 Authorizing officials or designated representatives, by accepting the completed security plans, agree to the set of 

security controls proposed to meet the security requirements for organizations (including mission/business processes) 

and/or designated information systems.
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• Continuous monitoring of organizations and information systems to determine the ongoing 

effectiveness of deployed security controls, changes in information systems and environments 

of operation, and compliance with legislation, directives, policies, and standards;23 and 

• Comprehensive information security planning and system development life cycle 

management.24

From an engineering viewpoint, information security is just one of many required operational 

capabilities for information systems that support organizational mission/business processes—

capabilities that must be funded by organizations throughout the system development life cycle in 

order to achieve mission/business success. It is important that organizations realistically assess 

the risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation 

arising from implemented mission/business processes and by placing information systems into 

operation or continuing current system operations. Finally, information security requirements for 

organizational information systems must be satisfied with the full knowledge and consideration of 

the risk management strategy25 of the organization, in light of the potential cost, schedule, and 

performance issues associated with the acquisition, deployment, and operation of the information 

systems.26

1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THIS SPECIAL PUBLICATION

The remainder of this special publication is organized as follows: 

• Chapter Two describes the fundamental concepts associated with security control selection 

and specification including: (i) multitiered risk management; (ii) the structure of security 

controls and how the controls are organized into families; (iii) security control baselines as 

starting points for the tailoring process; (iv) the use of common controls and inheritance of 

security capabilities; (v) external environments and service providers; (vi) assurance and 

trustworthiness; and (vii) revisions and extensions to security controls and control baselines. 

• Chapter Three describes the process of selecting and specifying security controls for 

organizational information systems including: (i) selecting appropriate security control 

baselines; (ii) tailoring the baseline controls and developing overlays; (iii) documenting the 

security control selection process; and (iv) applying the selection process to new and legacy 

systems. 

• Supporting appendices provide essential security control selection and specification-related 

information including: (i) general references; (ii) definitions and terms; (iii) acronyms; (iv) 

baseline security controls for low-impact, moderate-impact, and high-impact information 

systems; (v) guidance on assurance and trustworthiness; (vi) a master catalog of security 

controls; (vii) information security program management controls; (viii) two-way mappings 

to international security standards; (ix) an overlay template for baseline tailoring; and (x) a 

master catalog of privacy controls.

 

23 NIST Special Publication 800-137 provides guidance on continuous monitoring of organizational information 

systems and environments of operation. 

24 NIST Special Publication 800-64 provides guidance on the information security considerations in the system 

development life cycle. 

25 NIST Special Publication 800-39 provides guidance on information security risk management applied at multiple 

tiers including the organization level, mission/business process level, and information system level. 

26 In addition to information security requirements, organizations must also address privacy requirements that derive 

from federal legislation and policies. Organizations can employ the privacy controls in Appendix J in conjunction with 

the security controls in Appendix F to achieve comprehensive security and privacy protection. 
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CHAPTER TWO

THE FUNDAMENTALS

SECURITY CONTROL STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION, BASELINES, AND ASSURANCE 

his chapter presents the fundamental concepts associated with security control selection 

and specification including: (i) three-tier risk management; (ii) the structure of security 

controls and the organization of the controls in the control catalog; (iii) security control 

baselines; (iv) the identification and use of common security controls; (v) security controls in 

external environments; (vi) security control assurance; and (vii) future revisions to the security 

controls, the control catalog, and baseline controls. 

2.1 MULTITIERED RISK MANAGEMENT

The selection and specification of security controls for an information system is accomplished as 

part of an organization-wide information security program for the management of risk—that is, 

the risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation 

associated with the operation of information systems. Risk-based approaches to security control 

selection and specification consider effectiveness, efficiency, and constraints due to applicable 

federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines. To 

integrate the risk management process throughout the organization and more effectively address 

mission/business concerns, a three-tiered approach is employed that addresses risk at the: (i) 

organization level; (ii) mission/business process level; and (iii) information system level. The risk 

management process is carried out seamlessly across the three tiers with the overall objective of 

continuous improvement in the organization’s risk-related activities and effective inter-tier and 

intra-tier communication among all stakeholders having a shared interest in the mission/business 

success of the organization. Figure 1 illustrates the three-tiered approach to risk management 

along with some of its key characteristics.

 

FIGURE 1: THREE-TIERED RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH 

T

TIER 1

ORGANIZATION

TIER 2

MISSION / BUSINESS PROCESSES

TIER 3

INFORMATION SYSTEMS

- Inter- Tier and Intra-Tier 

Communications 

- Feedback Loop for 

Continuous Improvement 

TACTICAL RISK

STRATEGIC RISK

- Traceability and Transparency of 

Risk-Based Decisions 

- Organization-Wide 

Risk Awareness 
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Tier 1 provides a prioritization of organizational missions/business functions which in turn drives 

investment strategies and funding decisions—promoting cost-effective, efficient information 

technology solutions consistent with the strategic goals and objectives of the organization and 

measures of performance. Tier 2 includes: (i) defining the mission/business processes needed to 

support the organizational missions/business functions; (ii) determining the security categories of 

the information systems needed to execute the mission/business processes; (iii) incorporating 

information security requirements into the mission/business processes; and (iv) establishing an 

enterprise architecture (including an embedded information security architecture) to facilitate the 

allocation of security controls to organizational information systems and the environments in 

which those systems operate. The Risk Management Framework (RMF), depicted at Figure 2, is 

the primary means for addressing risk at Tier 3.27 This publication focuses on Step 2 of the RMF, 

the security control selection process, in the context of the three tiers in the organizational risk 

management hierarchy. 

FIGURE 2: RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 

The RMF addresses the security concerns of organizations related to the design, development, 

implementation, operation, and disposal of information systems and the environments in which 

those systems operate. The RMF consists of the following six steps: 

 

27 NIST Special Publication 800-37 provides guidance on the implementation of the Risk Management Framework. A 

complete listing of all publications supporting the RMF and referenced in Figure 2 is provided in Appendix A. 

Repeat as necessary 

RISK 

MANAGEMENT 

FRAMEWORK 

Security Life Cycle 

Step 1

CATEGORIZE 

Information Systems 

Step 6 FIPS 199 / SP 800-60 

MONITOR 

Security Controls 

SP 800-53A 

Step 3 

IMPLEMENT 

Security Controls 

SP 800 Series 

Step 2 

SELECT 

Security Controls 

FIPS 200 / SP 800-53 

Step 5 

AUTHORIZE 

Information Systems 

SP 800-37 

Step 4

ASSESS 

Security Controls 

SP 800-53A 

Organizational Inputs 

Laws, Directives, Policy Guidance 

Strategic Goals and Objectives 

Information Security Requirements 

Priorities and Resource Availability 

Architecture Description 

Mission/Business Processes 

FEA Reference Models 

Segment and Solution Architectures 

Information System Boundaries 

Starting 

Point

Risk Management 

Strategy 
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• Categorize the information system based on a FIPS 199 impact analysis;28

• Select an initial set of baseline security controls for the information system based on system 

impact level and apply tailoring guidance, as needed; 

• Implement the security controls and document the design, development, and implementation 

details for the controls; 

• Assess the security controls to determine the extent to which the controls are implemented 

correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting 

the security requirements for the system;29

• Authorize information system operation based on a determination of risk to organizational 

operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation resulting from the 

operation and use of the information system and the decision that this risk is acceptable; and 

• Monitor the security controls in the information system and environment of operation on an 

ongoing basis to determine control effectiveness, changes to the system/environment, and 

compliance to legislation, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards. 

2.2 SECURITY CONTROL STRUCTURE

Security controls described in this publication have a well-defined organization and structure. For 

ease of use in the security control selection and specification process, controls are organized into 

eighteen families.

30 Each family contains security controls related to the general security topic of 

the family. A two-character identifier uniquely identifies security control families, for example, 

PS (Personnel Security). Security controls may involve aspects of policy, oversight, supervision, 

manual processes, actions by individuals, or automated mechanisms implemented by information 

systems/devices. Table 1 lists the security control families and the associated family identifiers in 

the security control catalog. 

TABLE 1: SECURITY CONTROL IDENTIFIERS AND FAMILY NAMES 

ID FAMILY ID FAMILY

AC Access Control MP Media Protection 

AT Awareness and Training PE Physical and Environmental Protection 

AU Audit and Accountability PL Planning 

CA Security Assessment and Authorization PS Personnel Security 

CM Configuration Management RA Risk Assessment 

CP Contingency Planning SA System and Services Acquisition 

IA Identification and Authentication SC System and Communications Protection 

IR Incident Response SI System and Information Integrity 

MA Maintenance PM Program Management 

 

28 CNSS Instruction 1253 provides security categorization guidance for national security systems. 

29 NIST Special Publication 800-53A provides guidance on assessing the effectiveness of security controls. 

30 Of the eighteen security control families in NIST Special Publication 800-53, seventeen families are described in the 

security control catalog in Appendix F, and are closely aligned with the seventeen minimum security requirements for 

federal information and information systems in FIPS 200. One additional family (Program Management [PM] family) 

in Appendix G provides controls for information security programs. This family, while not referenced in FIPS 200, 

provides security controls at the organization level rather than the information system level.
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The security control structure consists of the following components: (i) a control section; (ii) a 

supplemental guidance section; (iii) a control enhancements section; (iv) a references section; 

and (v) a priority and baseline allocation section. The following example from the Auditing and 

Accountability family illustrates the structure of a typical security control. 

AU-3 CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS 

Control: The information system produces audit records that contain sufficient information to, at a 

minimum, establish what type of event occurred, when the event occurred, where the event 

occurred, the source of the event, the outcome of the event, and the identity of any user or subject 

associated with the event. 

Supplemental Guidance: Audit record content that may be necessary to satisfy the requirement of 

this control includes, for example, time stamps, source and destination addresses, user/process 

identifiers, event descriptions, success/fail indications, filenames involved, and access control or 

flow control rules invoked. Event outcomes can include indicators of event success or failure and 

event-specific results (e.g., the security state of the information system after the event occurred). 

Related controls: AU-2, AU-8, AU-12, SI-11. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS | ADDITIONAL AUDIT INFORMATION 

The information system includes [Assignment: organization-defined additional, more detailed 

information] in the audit records for audit events identified by type, location, or subject. 

Supplemental Guidance: Detailed information that organizations may consider in audit records 

includes, for example, full-text recording of privileged commands or the individual identities 

of group account users. Organizations consider limiting the additional audit information to 

only that information explicitly needed for specific audit requirements. This facilitates the use 

of the audit trails by not including information that could potentially be misleading or could 

make it more difficult to locate information of interest. 

(2) CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS | CENTRAL MANAGEMENT OF AUDIT RECORDS 

The organization centrally manages the content of audit records generated by [Assignment: 

organization-defined information system components]. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement requires that the content to be captured in 

audit records be configured from a central location (necessitating automation). Related 

controls: AU-6, AU-7.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AU-3 MOD AU-3 (1) HIGH AU-3 (1) (2)

The control section describes specific security-related activities or actions to be carried out by 

organizations or by information systems. The term information system refers to those functions in 

selected security controls that generally involve the implementation of information technology 

(e.g., hardware, software, and firmware). Conversely, the term organization refers to activities in 

security controls that are likely to be process-driven or entity-driven—that is, at least some part of 

the security control is likely to be implemented through human/procedural-based actions. Security 

controls that use the term organization may still require some degree of automation to be fulfilled. 

Similarly, security controls that use the term information system may have some elements that are 

process-driven or entity-driven. Using the terms organization and/or information system does not 

preclude the application of security controls at any of the tiers in the risk management hierarchy 

(i.e., organization level, mission/business process level, information system level), as appropriate. 
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For some security controls in the control catalog, a degree of flexibility is provided by allowing 

organizations to define input values for certain parameters associated with the controls. This 

flexibility is achieved through the use of assignment and selection statements embedded within 

the security controls and control enhancements. Assignment and selection statements provide 

organizations with the capability to tailor security controls and control enhancements based on: 

(i) organizational security requirements to support specific missions, business functions, or 

operational needs; and (ii) requirements originating in federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, 

policies, regulations, standards, or guidelines.31 For example, organizations can specify additional 

information needed for audit records to support audit event processing by information systems 

(see AU-3 example above), particular actions to be taken by information systems in the event of 

audit failures, the frequency of conducting system backups, restrictions on password use, or the 

distribution list for organizational policies and procedures.32 Once specified,33 the organizationdefined values for assignment/selection statements become part of the security control, and the 

control implementation is assessed against the completed control statement. Selection statements 

narrow the potential input values by providing a specific list of items from which organizations 

must choose.34

The supplemental guidance section provides additional information related to a specific security 

control, but contains no additional requirements. Organizations can apply the supplemental 

guidance as appropriate, when defining, developing, and/or implementing security controls. The 

supplemental guidance provides important considerations for implementing security controls in 

the context of operational environments, mission/business requirements, or assessments of risk. 

Security control enhancements may also contain supplemental guidance, typically provided in 

situations where the guidance is not generally applicable to the entire control but instead focused 

on the particular control enhancement. The supplemental guidance sections for security controls 

and control enhancements may contain a list of related controls. Related controls: (i) directly 

impact or support the implementation of a particular security control or control enhancement; (ii) 

address a closely related security capability; or (iii) are referenced in the supplemental guidance. 

Security control enhancements are by definition related to the base control. Related controls that 

are listed in the supplemental guidance for the base controls are not repeated in the supplemental 

guidance for the control enhancements. However, there may be related controls identified for 

control enhancements that are not listed in the base control. 

The security control enhancements section provides statements of security capability to: (i) add 

functionality/specificity to a control; and/or (ii) increase the strength of a control. In both cases, 

control enhancements are used in information systems and environments of operation requiring 

greater protection than provided by the base control due to the potential adverse organizational 

impacts or when organizations seek additions to the base control functionality/specificity based 

on organizational assessments of risk. Security control enhancements are numbered sequentially 

within each control so that the enhancements can be easily identified when selected to supplement 

 

31 In general, organization-defined parameters used in assignment and selection statements in the basic security 

controls apply also to all control enhancements associated with those controls. 

32 Organizations determine whether specific assignment or selection statements are completed at Tier 1 (organization 

level), Tier 2 (mission/business process level), Tier 3 (information system level), or combination thereof. 

33 Organizations may choose to define specific values for security control parameters in policies, procedures, or 

guidance (which may be applicable to more than one information system) referencing the source documents in the 

security plan in lieu of explicitly completing the assignment/selection statements within the control as part of the plan. 

34 Security controls are generally designed to be technology- and implementation-independent and therefore do not 

contain specific requirements in these areas. Organizations provide such requirements as deemed necessary in the 

security plan for the information system. 
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the base control. Each security control enhancement has a short subtitle to indicate the intended 

security capability provided by the control enhancement. In the AU-3 example, if the first control 

enhancement is selected, the control designation becomes AU-3 (1). The numerical designation of 

a control enhancement is used only to identify the particular enhancement within the control. The 

designation is not indicative of either the strength of the control enhancement or any hierarchical 

relationship among the enhancements. If a security control enhancement is selected, then the base 

security control must also be selected. 

The references section includes a list of applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, 

policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines (e.g., OMB Circulars/Memoranda, Homeland 

Security Presidential Directives, FIPS Publications, and NIST Special Publications) that are 

relevant to a particular security control.35 The references provide appropriate federal legislative 

and policy mandates as well as specific supporting information for the implementation of security 

controls and control enhancements. The references section also contains pertinent websites for 

organizations to use in obtaining additional information for security control implementation and 

assessment. 

The priority and baseline allocation section provides: (i) the recommended priority codes used for 

sequencing decisions during security control implementation; and (ii) the initial allocation of 

security controls and control enhancements to the baselines for low-impact, moderate-impact, and 

high-impact information systems. Organizations can use the priority code designation associated 

with each security control to assist in making sequencing decisions for control implementation 

(i.e., a Priority Code 1 [P1] control has a higher priority for implementation than a Priority Code 

2 [P2] control, and a Priority Code 2 [P2] control has a higher priority for implementation than a 

Priority Code 3 [P3] control). This recommended sequencing prioritization helps to ensure that 

the foundational security controls upon which other controls depend are implemented first, thus 

enabling organizations to deploy controls in a more structured and timely manner in accordance 

with available resources. The implementation of security controls by sequence priority code does 

not imply the achievement of any defined level of risk mitigation until all of the security controls 

in the security plan have been implemented. The priority codes are used only for implementation 

sequencing, not for making security control selection decisions. 

2.3 SECURITY CONTROL BASELINES

Organizations are required to adequately mitigate the risk arising from use of information and 

information systems in the execution of missions and business functions. A significant challenge 

for organizations is to determine the most cost-effective, appropriate set of security controls, 

which if implemented and determined to be effective, would mitigate risk while complying with 

security requirements defined by applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, regulations, policies, 

directives, or standards (e.g., FISMA, OMB Circular A-130, HSPD-12, FIPS Publication 200). 

There is no one correct set of security controls that addresses all organizational security concerns 

in all situations. Selecting the most appropriate set of security controls for a specific situation or 

information system to adequately mitigate risk is an important task that requires a fundamental 

understanding of organizational mission/business priorities, the mission and business functions 

the information systems will support, and the environments of operation where the systems will 

reside. With that understanding, organizations can demonstrate how to most effectively assure the 

confidentiality, integrity, and availability of organizational information and information systems 

in a manner that supports mission/business needs while demonstrating due diligence. Selecting, 

 

35 Publications listed in the references section refer to the most recent versions of the publications. References are 

provided to assist organizations in applying the security controls and are not intended to be inclusive or complete. 
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implementing, and maintaining an appropriate set of security controls to adequately protect the 

information systems employed by organizations requires strong collaboration with system owners 

to understand ongoing changes to missions/business functions, the environments of operations, 

and how the systems are used. 

To assist organizations in making the appropriate selection of security controls for information 

systems, the concept of baseline controls is introduced. Baseline controls are the starting point for 

the security control selection process described in this document and are chosen based on the 

security category and associated impact level of information systems determined in accordance 

with FIPS 199 and FIPS 200, respectively.36 Appendix D provides a listing of baseline security 

controls. Three sets of baseline controls have been identified corresponding to the low-impact, 

moderate-impact, and high-impact information systems using the high water mark defined in 

FIPS 200 and used in Section 3.1 of this document to provide an initial set of security controls for 

each impact level.37

Appendix F provides a comprehensive catalog of security controls for information systems and 

organizations, arranged by control families. Chapter Three provides additional information on 

how to use FIPS 199 security categories and FIPS 200 impact levels in applying the tailoring 

guidance to the baseline security controls to achieve adequate risk mitigation.Tailoring guidance, 

described in Section 3.2, allows organizations to customize the initial security control baselines 

selected using the results from organizational assessments of risk. Tailoring actions include: (i) 

identifying and designating common controls in initial security control baselines; (ii) applying 

scoping considerations; (iii) selecting compensating controls; (iv) assigning specific values to 

organization-defined security control parameters; (v) supplementing baselines with additional 

security controls or control enhancements; and (vi) providing additional specification information 

for control implementation. 

 

 

36 CNSS Instruction 1253 provides guidance on security control baselines for national security systems. 

37 The baseline security controls contained in Appendix D are not necessarily absolutes in that the tailoring guidance 

described in Section 3.2 provides organizations with the ability to eliminate certain controls or specify compensating 

controls in accordance with the terms and conditions established by authorizing officials. 

Implementation Tip 

There are additional security controls and control enhancements that appear in the security control 

catalog (Appendix F) that are found in only higher-impact baselines or not used in any of the baselines. 

These additional security controls and control enhancements for information systems are available to 

organizations and can be used in tailoring security control baselines to achieve the needed level of 

protection in accordance with organizational assessments of risk. Moreover, the security controls and 

control enhancements contained in higher-level baselines can also be used to strengthen the level of 

protection provided in lower-level baselines, if deemed appropriate. At the end of the security control 

selection process, the agreed-upon set of controls in the security plan must be sufficient to adequately 

mitigate risks to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation 

based on the organizational risk tolerance. 
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2.4 COMMON CONTROLS

Common controls are security controls that are inheritable by one or more organizational 

information systems. Security controls are inheritable by information systems or information 

system components when the systems/components receive protection from controls but the 

controls are developed, implemented, assessed, authorized, and monitored by entities other than 

those responsible for the systems/components—entities internal or external to the organizations 

where the systems/components reside. Common controls can be inherited from many sources 

including, for example, the organization, organizational mission/business lines, sites, enclaves, 

environments of operations, or other information systems. Many of the controls needed to protect 

organizational information systems (e.g., security awareness training, incident response plans, 

physical access to facilities, rules of behavior) are excellent candidates for common control 

status. In addition, there can also be a variety of technology-based common controls (e.g., Public 

Key Infrastructure [PKI], authorized secure standard configurations for clients/servers, access 

control systems, boundary protection, cross-domain solutions). By centrally managing and 

documenting the development, implementation, assessment, authorization, and monitoring of 

common controls, security costs can be amortized across multiple information systems. 

The organization assigns responsibility for common controls to appropriate organizational 

officials (i.e., common control providers) and coordinates the development, implementation, 

assessment, authorization, and monitoring of the controls.38 The identification of common 

controls at the organization level is most effectively accomplished as an organization-wide 

exercise with the active involvement of chief information officers, senior information security 

officers, the risk executive (function), authorizing officials, information owners/stewards, 

information system owners, and information system security officers. The organization-wide 

exercise considers the security categories of the information systems within the organization and 

the security controls necessary to adequately mitigate the risks arising from the use of those 

systems (see baseline security controls in Section 2.3).39 Common control identification for those 

controls that impact multiple information systems, but not all systems across the organization 

could benefit from taking a similar approach. Key stakeholders associated with those controls 

including, but not limited to, authorizing officials, information system owners, and information 

system security officers, collaborate to identify opportunities to effectively employ common 

controls at the mission/business line, site, or enclave level. 

When common controls protect multiple organizational information systems of differing impact 

levels, the controls are implemented with regard to the highest impact level among the systems. If 

the common controls are not implemented at the highest impact level of the information systems, 

system owners will need to factor this situation into their assessments of risk and take appropriate 

risk mitigation actions (e.g., adding security controls or control enhancements, changing assigned 

values of security control parameters, implementing compensating controls, or changing certain 

aspects of mission/business processes). Implementing common controls that are less than 

effective or that provide insufficient security capability for higher-impact information systems 

can have a significant adverse impact on organizational missions or business functions. 

 

 

38 The Chief Information Officer, Senior Information Security Officer, or other designated organizational officials at 

the senior leadership level assign responsibility for the development, implementation, assessment, authorization, and 

monitoring of common controls to appropriate entities (either internal or external to the organization). 

39 Each common control identified by the organization is reviewed for applicability to each specific organizational 

information system, typically by information system owners and authorizing officials. 
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Common controls are generally documented in the organization-wide information security 

program plan unless implemented as part of a specific information system, in which case the 

controls are documented in the security plan for that system.40 Organizations have the flexibility 

to describe common controls in a single document or in multiple documents with references or 

pointers, as appropriate. In the case of multiple documents, the documents describing common 

controls are included as attachments to the information security program plan. If the information 

security program plan contains multiple documents, organizations specify in each document the 

organizational officials responsible for development, implementation, assessment, authorization, 

and monitoring of the respective common controls. For example, the organization may require 

that the Facilities Management Office develop, implement, assess, authorize, and continuously 

monitor physical and environmental protection controls from the PE family when such controls 

are not associated with a particular information system but instead, support multiple systems. 

When common controls are included in a separate security plan for an information system (e.g., 

security controls employed as part of an intrusion detection system providing boundary protection 

inherited by one or more organizational information systems), the information security program 

plan indicates which separate security plan contains a description of the common controls. 

Security controls not designated as common controls are considered system-specific or hybrid

controls. System-specific controls are the primary responsibility of information system owners 

and their respective authorizing officials. Organizations assign a hybrid status to security controls 

when one part of the control is common and another part of the control is system-specific. For 

example, an organization may choose to implement the Incident Response Policy and Procedures 

security control (IR-1) as a hybrid control with the policy portion of the control designated as 

common and the procedures portion of the control designated as system-specific. Hybrid controls 

may also serve as predefined templates for further control refinement. Organizations may choose, 

for example, to implement the Contingency Planning security control (CP-2) as a predefined 

template for a generalized contingency plan for all organizational information systems with 

individual information system owners tailoring the plan, where appropriate, for system-specific 

uses. Partitioning security controls into common, hybrid, and system-specific controls can result 

in significant savings to organizations in implementation and assessment costs as well as a more 

consistent application of security controls organization-wide. While security control partitioning 

into common, hybrid, and system-specific controls is straightforward and intuitive conceptually, 

the actual application within organizations takes a significant amount of planning and 

coordination. At the information system level, determination of common, hybrid, or systemspecific security controls follows the development of a tailored baseline. It is necessary to first 

determine what security capability is needed before organizations assign responsibility for how 

security controls are implemented, operated, and maintained. 

 

40 Information security program plans are described in Appendix G. 

Implementation Tip 

Maintaining a record of security control selection and control status can be addressed in one or multiple 

documents or security plans. If using multiple documents, consider providing pointers or references to 

the necessary information in the relevant documents rather than requiring duplication of information. 

Using references to relevant documentation reduces the amount of time and resources needed by 

organizations to generate such information. Other benefits include greater security awareness and 

understanding of the overall information system capabilities. Increased awareness and understanding 

supports better integration of information security into organizational information systems, components, 

and services. 
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Security plans for individual information systems identify which security controls required for 

those systems have been designated by organizations as common controls and which controls 

have been designated as system-specific or hybrid controls. Information system owners are 

responsible for any system-specific implementation details associated with common controls. 

These implementation details are identified and described in the security plans for the individual 

information systems. Senior information security officers for organizations coordinate with 

common control providers (e.g., facility/site managers, human resources managers, intrusion 

detection system owners) to ensure that the required controls are developed, implemented, and 

assessed for effectiveness. Collectively, the security plans for individual information systems and 

the organization-wide information security program plans provide complete coverage for all 

security controls employed within organizations. 

Common controls, whether employed in organizational information systems or environments of 

operation, are authorized by senior officials with at least the same level of authority/responsibility 

for managing risk as the authorization officials for information systems inheriting the controls. 

Authorization results for common controls are shared with the appropriate information system 

owners and authorizing officials. A plan of action and milestones is developed and maintained for 

common controls that have been determined through independent assessments, to be less than 

effective. Information system owners dependent on common controls that are less than effective 

consider whether they are willing to accept the associated risk or if additional tailoring is required 

to address the weaknesses or deficiencies in the controls. Such risk-based decisions are influenced 

by available resources, the trust models employed by the organization, and the risk tolerance of 

authorizing officials and the organization.41 Common controls are subject to the same assessment 

and monitoring requirements as system-specific controls employed in individual organizational 

information systems. Because common controls impact more than one system, a higher degree of 

confidence regarding the effectiveness of those controls may be required. 

The determination as to whether a security control is a common, hybrid, or system-specific is 

context-based. Security controls cannot be determined to be common, hybrid, or system-specific 

simply based on reviewing the language of the control. For example, a control may be systemspecific for a particular information system, but at the same time that control could be a common 

control for another system, which would inherit the control from the first system. One indicator of 

whether a system-specific control may also be a common control for other information systems is 

to consider who or what depends on the functionality of that particular control. If a certain part of 

an information system or solution external to the system boundary depends on the control, then 

that control may be a candidate for common control identification. 

 

41 NIST Special Publication 800-39 provides guidance on trust models, including validated, direct historical, mediated, 

and mandated trust models. 

Implementation Tip 

The selection of common controls is most effectively accomplished on an organization-wide basis with 

the involvement of the organization’s senior leadership (i.e., authorizing officials, chief information officer, 

senior information security officer, information system owners, mission/business owners, information 

owners/stewards, risk executive [function]). These individuals have the collective corporate knowledge to 

understand the organization’s priorities, the importance of the organization’s operations and assets, and 

the relative importance of the organizational information systems that support those operations/assets. 

The organization’s senior leaders are also in the best position to select the common controls for each 

security control baseline and assign specific organizational responsibilities for developing, implementing, 

assessing, authorizing, and monitoring those controls. 
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2.5 EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTS AND PROVIDERS

Organizations are becoming increasingly reliant on information system services provided by 

external providers to conduct important missions and business functions. External information 

system services are computing and information technology services implemented outside of the 

traditional security authorization boundaries established by organizations for their information 

systems. Those traditional authorization boundaries linked to physical space and control of assets, 

are being extended (both physically and logically) with the growing use of external services. In 

this context, external services can be provided by: (i) entities within the organization but outside 

of the security authorization boundaries established for organizational information systems; (ii) 

entities outside of the organization either in the public sector (e.g., federal agencies) or private 

sector (e.g., commercial service providers); or (iii) some combination of the public and private 

sector options. External information system services include, for example, the use of serviceoriented architectures (SOAs), cloud-based services (infrastructure, platform, software), or data 

center operations. External information system services may be used by, but are typically not part 

of, organizational information systems. In some situations, external information system services 

may completely replace or heavily augment the routine functionality of internal organizational 

information systems. 

FISMA and OMB policy require that external providers processing, storing, or transmitting 

federal information or operating information systems on behalf of the federal government meet 

the same security requirements that federal agencies are required to meet. Security requirements 

for external service providers including the security controls for external information systems are 

expressed in contracts or other formal agreements. Organizations are responsible and accountable 

for the information security risk incurred by the use of information system services provided by 

external providers. Such risk is addressed by incorporating the Risk Management Framework 

(RMF) as part of the terms and conditions of the contracts with external providers. Organizations 

can require external providers to implement all steps in the RMF except the security authorization 

step, which remains an inherent federal responsibility directly linked to managing the information 

security risk related to the use of external information system services.42 Organizations can also 

require external providers to provide appropriate evidence to demonstrate that they have complied 

with the RMF in protecting federal information. 

Relationships with external service providers are established in a variety of ways, for example, 

through joint ventures, business partnerships, outsourcing arrangements (i.e., through contracts, 

interagency agreements, lines of business arrangements), licensing agreements, and/or supply 

chain exchanges. The growing use of external service providers and new relationships being 

forged with those providers present new and difficult challenges for organizations, especially in 

the area of information system security. These challenges include: 

• Defining the types of external information system services provided to organizations; 

• Describing how those external services are protected in accordance with the information 

security requirements of organizations; and 

• Obtaining the necessary assurances that the risk to organizational operations and assets, 

individuals, other organizations, and the Nation arising from the use of the external services 

is acceptable. 

 

42 To effectively manage information security risk, organizations can authorize the information systems of external 

providers that are part of the information technologies or services (e.g., infrastructure, platform, or software) provided 

to the federal government. Security authorization requirements are expressed in the terms and conditions of contracts 

with external providers of those information technologies and services. 
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The degree of confidence that the risk from using external services is at an acceptable level 

depends on the trust43 that organizations place in external service providers. In some cases, the 

level of trust is based on the amount of direct control organizations are able to exert on external 

service providers with regard to employment of security controls necessary for the protection of 

the service/information and the evidence brought forth as to the effectiveness of those controls. 

The level of control is usually established by the terms and conditions of the contracts or servicelevel agreements with the external service providers and can range from extensive control (e.g., 

negotiating contracts or agreements that specify detailed security requirements for the providers) 

to very limited control (e.g., using contracts or service-level agreements to obtain commodity 

services44 such as commercial telecommunications services). In other cases, levels of trust are 

based on factors that convince organizations that required security controls have been employed 

and that determinations of control effectiveness exist. For example, separately authorized external 

information system services provided to organizations through well-established lines of business 

relationships may provide degrees of trust in such services within the tolerable risk range of the 

authorizing officials and organizations using the services. 

The provision of services by external providers may result in certain services without explicit 

agreements between organizations and the providers. Whenever explicit agreements are feasible 

and practical (e.g., through contracts, service-level agreements), organizations develop such 

agreements and require the use of the security controls in Appendix F of this publication. When 

organizations are not in a position to require explicit agreements with external service providers 

(e.g., services are imposed on organizations, services are commodity services), organizations 

establish explicit assumptions about service capabilities with regard to security. In situations 

where organizations are procuring information system services or information technologies 

through centralized acquisition vehicles (e.g., governmentwide contracts by the General Services 

Administration or other preferred and/or mandatory acquisition organizations), it may be more 

efficient and cost-effective for contract originators to establish and maintain stated levels of trust 

with external service providers (including the definition of required security controls and level of 

assurance with regard to the provision of such controls). Organizations subsequently acquiring 

information system services or technologies from centralized contracts can take advantage of the 

negotiated trust levels established by the procurement originators and thus avoid costly repetition 

of activities necessary to establish such trust.45 Centralized acquisition vehicles (e.g., contracts) 

may also require the active participation of organizations. For example, organizations may be 

required by provisions in contracts or agreements to install public key encryption-enabled client 

software recommended by external service providers. 

 

 

43 The level of trust that organizations place in external service providers can vary widely, ranging from those who are 

highly trusted (e.g., business partners in a joint venture that share a common business model and common goals) to 

those who are less trusted and represent greater sources of risk (e.g., business partners in one endeavor who are also 

competitors in another market sector). 

44 Commercial providers of commodity-type services typically organize their business models and services around the 

concept of shared resources and devices for a broad and diverse customer base. Therefore, unless organizations obtain 

fully dedicated services from commercial service providers, there may be a need for greater reliance on compensating 

security controls to provide the necessary protections for the information system that relies on those external services. 

Organizational assessments of risk and risk mitigation activities reflect this situation. 

45 For example, procurement originators could authorize information systems providing external services to the federal 

government under the specific terms and conditions of the contracts. Federal agencies requesting such services under 

the terms of the contracts would not be required to reauthorize the information systems when acquiring such services 

(unless the request included services outside the scope of the original contracts). 
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Ultimately, the responsibility for adequately mitigating unacceptable risks arising from the use of 

external information system services remains with authorizing officials. Organizations require 

that appropriate chains of trust be established with external service providers when dealing with 

the many issues associated with information system security. Organizations establish and retain a 

level of trust that participating service providers in the potentially complex consumer-provider 

relationship provide adequate protection for the services rendered to organizations. The chain of 

trust can be complicated due to the number of entities participating in the consumer-provider 

relationship and the types of relationships between the parties. External service providers may 

also outsource selected services to other external entities, making the chain of trust more difficult 

and complicated to manage. Depending on the nature of the services, organizations may find it 

impossible to place significant trust in external providers. This situation is due not to any inherent 

untrustworthiness on the part of providers, but to the intrinsic level of risk in the services.46

Where a sufficient level of trust cannot be established in the external services and/or providers, 

organizations can: (i) mitigate the risk by employing compensating controls; (ii) accept the risk 

within the level of organizational risk tolerance; (iii) transfer risk by obtaining insurance to cover 

potential losses; or (iv) avoid risk by choosing not to obtain the services from certain providers 

(resulting in performance of missions/business operations with reduced levels of functionality or 

possibly no functionality at all).47 For example, in the case of cloud-based information systems 

and/or services, organizations might require as a compensating control, that all information stored 

in the cloud be encrypted because there is insufficient confidence in the security implemented by 

cloud providers. Alternatively, organizations may require encrypting some of the information 

stored in the cloud (depending on the criticality/sensitivity of such information)—accepting 

additional risk but limiting the risk by not storing all information in an unencrypted form. 

2.6 ASSURANCE AND TRUSTWORTHINESS

Whether information systems are deployed to support the operations of the national air traffic 

control system, a nuclear power plant providing electricity for a large city, a major financial 

institution, or the military services and warfighters, the systems must be reliable, trustworthy, and 

resilient. Reliability, trustworthiness, resilience are also important characteristics for the day-today mission/business operations of organizations supported, for example, by email systems and 

web servers. Trustworthiness with respect to information systems, expresses the degree to which 

the systems (including the information technology products that are used to build those systems) 

can be expected to preserve the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information being 

processed, stored, or transmitted by the systems across the full range of threats. Trustworthy 

information systems are systems that are believed to be capable of operating within defined levels 

of risk despite the environmental disruptions, human errors, structural failures, and purposeful 

attacks that are expected to occur in their environments of operation. Information security plays 

an important part in achieving trustworthy information systems—systems that have the reliability 

to successfully carry out assigned missions/business functions under conditions of stress and 

uncertainty and in specified environments. 

Two key components of information security affecting the trustworthiness of information systems 

are security functionality and security assurance. Security functionality is typically defined in 

terms of the security features, functions, mechanisms, services, procedures, and architectures 

implemented within organizational information systems or the environments in which those 

systems operate. Security assurance is the measure of confidence that the security functionality is 

 

46 There may also be risk in disallowing certain functionality because of security concerns. Security is merely one of 

multiple considerations in an overall risk determination. 

47 Alternative providers offering a higher basis for trust, usually at a higher cost, may be available. 
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implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to 

meeting the security requirements for the system—thus, accurately mediating and enforcing 

established security policies. Together, the security functionality and security assurance combine 

to provide a security capability for organizations, mission/business processes, and information 

systems—a capability necessary to respond to ongoing risks to organizational operations and 

assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. With regard to increasingly sophisticated 

and hostile cyber attacks, organizations need an adequate security capability to prevent attacks, 

deter attacks, respond to attacks (i.e., limiting harm), and restore/recover from attacks. Figure 3 

illustrates the relationship of security functionality and security assurance to security capability 

and the concept of trustworthiness in information systems. 

FIGURE 3: TRUSTWORTHINESS MODEL

To achieve the needed security capability and to meet stated security requirements, organizations 

select and employ security controls from Appendix F. Security controls address both security 

functionality and assurance. Some controls focus primarily on functionality (e.g., PE-3, Physical 

Access Control; IA-2, Identification and Authentication; SC-13, Cryptographic Protection; and 

AC-2, Account Management). Other controls focus primarily on assurance (e.g., CA-2, Security 

Assessment; SA-17, Developer Security Architecture and Design; and CM-3, Configuration 

Change Control). Finally, certain security controls can support both security functionality and 

assurance (e.g., RA-5, Vulnerability Scanning; SC-3, Security Function Isolation; and AC-25, 

TRUSTWORTHINESS 

Information Systems 

Security Capability 

Prevent Attacks, Deter Attacks, Limit Harm from Attacks, 

Respond to Attacks, Recover from Attacks 

Development

Actions 

Operational

Actions 

ASSURANCE 

 Measures of Confidence 

Security Strength 

Correctness, Completeness, 

Resistance to Tamper and Bypass 

FUNCTIONALITY 

 Security Features, Functions, Services, 

Mechanisms, Procedures 

Enables Understanding of Security Capability 

Security Evidence 

Development Artifacts, Test/Evaluation Results, Flaw Reports 
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Reference Monitor Function). Focusing on assurance-related controls during system development 

and acquisition can help organizations develop and obtain information systems and information 

system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) that are more reliable and less 

likely to fail based on developmental actions. These actions include, for example, ensuring that 

developers employ configuration management/control and security engineering principles. Once 

information systems are deployed, assurance-related controls can help organizations continue to 

have confidence in the reliability of the systems based on operational actions. These actions 

include, for example, conducting integrity checks on software/firmware components, monitoring 

established secure configuration settings, or conducting penetration testing to find vulnerabilities 

in the information systems and organizations. 

Thus, organizations can obtain security assurance by the actions taken by information system 

developers, implementers, operators, maintainers, and assessors with regard to the development, 

implementation, operation, maintenance, and assessment of the security functionality needed to 

achieve a stated security capability, satisfy security requirements, and enforce/mediate security 

policies. Actions by individuals and/or groups during the development/operation of information 

systems produce security evidence that contributes to the assurance, or measures of confidence, in 

the security capability. The depth and coverage of these actions (as described in Appendix E) also 

contribute to the efficacy of the evidence and measures of confidence. The evidence produced by 

developers, implementers, operators, assessors, and maintainers during the system development 

life cycle (e.g., developmental artifacts, assessment results, warranties, and evaluation/validation 

certificates) contributes to the understanding of the security capability achieved by organizations. 

As shown in Figure 3, the strength of security functionality48 plays an important part in being able 

to achieve the needed security capability. Information system developers can increase the strength 

of security functionality by employing as part of the hardware/software/firmware development 

process: (i) well-defined security policies and policy models; (ii) structured/rigorous design and 

development techniques; and (iii) sound system/security engineering principles. The development 

artifacts generated by these development activities (e.g., functional specifications, high/low-level 

designs, implementation representations [source code], and the results from static/dynamic testing 

and code analysis) can provide important evidence that the information systems (including the 

components composing those systems) will be more reliable and trustworthy. Security evidence 

can also be generated from testing conducted by independent, accredited, third-party assessment 

organizations (e.g., ISO/IEC 15408 evaluations by Common Criteria Testing Laboratories, FIPS 

140 cryptographic module testing by Cryptographic and Security Testing Laboratories, and other 

assessment activities by government and private sector organizations). 

 

 

48 The security strength of an information system component (i.e., hardware, software, or firmware) is determined by 

the degree to which the security functionality implemented within that component is correct, complete, resistant to 

direct attacks (strength of mechanism), and resistant to by-pass or tampering. 

The Compelling Argument for Assurance 

Organizations do not implement assurance requirements just to create documentation and paperwork. 

Rather, organizations implement such requirements to achieve a needed security capability—ensuring 

that the required strength of security features, functions, services, and mechanisms is present in critical 

information system components, and that organizations have an appropriate degree of confidence 

through the generation of security evidence, that the capability will be there when needed. 
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In addition to the evidence produced in the development environment, organizations can produce 

evidence from the operational environment that contributes to the assurance of functionality and 

ultimately, security capability. Operational evidence includes, for example, flaw reports, records 

of remediation actions, the results of security incident reporting, and the results of organizational 

continuous monitoring activities49 that determine the effectiveness of deployed security controls, 

changes to information systems and environments of operation, and current compliance to federal 

legislation, policies, directives, regulations, and standards. Security evidence, whether obtained 

from development or operational activities, enables a better understanding of the actual security 

capability achieved by organizations. Together, the actions taken during the system development 

life cycle by developers, implementers, operators, maintainers, and assessors and the evidence 

produced as part of those actions, help organizations determine the extent to which the security 

functionality within their information systems is implemented correctly, operating as intended, 

and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting stated security requirements and 

enforcing or mediating established security policies—thus providing greater confidence in the 

security capability. 

Appendix E provides more detailed information on minimum assurance requirements, assurancerelated controls in the security control baselines in Appendix D, and specific recommendations 

for additional developmental and operational actions organizations can employ to increase the 

level of assurance in critical information systems or system components.50

 

49 Continuous monitoring activities occur at all three tiers in the risk management hierarchy described in NIST Special 

Publication 800-39. 

50 Security requirements are a subset of the overall functional requirements established for organizational information 

systems and environments of operation. Minimum security requirements for information and information systems are 

established in FIPS Publication 200. Assurance requirements are a subset of security requirements. Minimum assurance 

requirements for low-, moderate-, and high-impact information systems and the associated assurance-related controls 

needed to satisfy those requirements are listed in Appendix E. 

Why Assurance Matters 

The importance of security assurance can be described by using the example of a light switch on a wall 

in the living room of your house. Individuals can observe that by simply turning the switch on and off, the 

switch appears to be performing according to its functional specification. This is analogous to conducting 

black-box testing of security functionality in an information system or system component. However, the 

more important question might be—what does the light switch look like from behind the wall? What types 

of components were used to construct the switch, how was the switch assembled, and did the switch 

manufacturer follow industry best practices in the development process? This is analogous to the many 

developmental activities that address the quality of the security functionality in the system or component, 

including, for example, design principles, coding techniques, code analysis, testing, and evaluation. 

The security assurance requirements in Appendix E address the light switch problem from the front of 

the wall perspective, and potentially from the behind the wall perspective, depending on the measure of 

confidence needed about the component in question. For organizational missions/business functions 

that are less critical (i.e., low impact), lower levels of assurance of functionality might be appropriate. 

However, as missions/business functions become more important (i.e., moderate or high impact) and 

information systems and organizations become more susceptible to advanced persistent threats (APT) 

by high-end adversaries, increased levels of assurance of functionality not only might make sense but 

actually be required. In addition, as organizations become more dependent on external information 

system services and providers, assurance becomes more important—providing insight and measures of 

confidence to organizations in understanding and verifying the security capability of external providers 

and the services provided to the federal government. Thus, when the potential impact to organizational 

operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation is great, an increasing level of 

effort must be directed at what is happening behind the wall. 
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2.7 REVISIONS AND EXTENSIONS

The security controls listed in this publication represent the state-of-the-practice safeguards and 

countermeasures for federal information systems and organizations. The security controls51 will 

be carefully reviewed and revised periodically to reflect: 

• Experience gained from using the controls; 

• Changing security requirements; 

• Emerging threats, vulnerabilities, and attack methods; and 

• Availability of new technologies. 

The security controls in the security control catalog are expected to change over time, as controls 

are withdrawn, revised, and added. The security controls defined in the low, moderate, and high 

baselines are also expected to change over time as the level of security and due diligence for 

mitigating risks within organizations changes. In addition to the need for change, the need for 

stability is addressed by requiring that proposed modifications to security controls go through a 

rigorous public review process to obtain both public and private sector feedback and to build 

consensus for such change. This provides over time, a stable, flexible, and technically sound set 

of security controls for the federal government, contractors, and any other organizations using the 

security control catalog. 

 

51 The privacy controls listed in Appendix J will also be updated on a regular basis using similar criteria. 

Implementation Tip 

New security controls and control enhancements will be developed on a regular basis using state-of-thepractice information from national-level threat and vulnerability databases as well as information on the 

tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by adversaries in launching cyber attacks. The proposed 

modifications to security controls and security control baselines will be carefully weighed during each 

revision cycle, considering the desire for stability of the security control catalog and the need to respond 

to changing threats, vulnerabilities, attack methods, and information technologies. The overall objective 

is to raise the foundational level of information security over time. Organizations may choose to develop 

new security controls when there is a specific security capability required and the appropriate controls 

are not available in Appendices F or G. 
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CHAPTER THREE

THE PROCESS

SELECTION AND SPECIFICATION OF SECURITY CONTROLS 

his chapter describes the process of selecting and specifying security controls and control 

enhancements for organizational information systems to include: (i) selecting appropriate 

security control baselines; (ii) tailoring the baselines; (iii) documenting the security control 

selection process; and (iv) developing community-wide tailored baselines, based on specialized 

missions, business functions, and environments of operation. 

3.1 SELECTING SECURITY CONTROL BASELINES

In preparation for selecting and specifying the appropriate security controls for organizational 

information systems and their respective environments of operation, organizations first determine 

the criticality and sensitivity of the information to be processed, stored, or transmitted by those 

systems. This process, known as security categorization, is described in FIPS Publication 199.52

The security categorization standard is based on a simple and well-established concept—that is, 

determining the security priorities for organizational information systems. Security categorization 

results facilitate the selection of appropriate security controls (i.e., safeguards/countermeasures) 

to adequately protect those information systems. The security controls selected for information 

systems are commensurate with the potential adverse impact on organizational operations and 

assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation if there is a loss of confidentiality, integrity, 

or availability. FIPS Publication 199 requires organizations to categorize information systems as 

low-impact, moderate-impact, or high-impact for the stated security objectives of confidentiality, 

integrity, and availability. The potential impact values assigned to the security objectives are the 

highest values (i.e., high water mark) from the security categories that have been determined for 

each type of information processed, stored, or transmitted by those information systems.53 The 

generalized format for expressing the security category (SC) of an information system is: 

SC information system = {(confidentiality, impact), (integrity, impact), (availability, impact)}, 

where the acceptable values for potential impact are low, moderate, or high. 

Since the potential impact values for confidentiality, integrity, and availability may not always be 

the same for a particular information system, the high water mark concept (introduced in FIPS 

Publication 199) is used in FIPS Publication 200 to determine the impact level of the information 

system for the express purpose of selecting an initial set of security controls from one of the three 

security control baselines.54 Thus, a low-impact system is defined as an information system in 

which all three of the security objectives are low. A moderate-impact system is an information 

system in which at least one of the security objectives is moderate and no security objective is 

greater than moderate. Finally, a high-impact system is an information system in which at least 

one security objective is high. 

 

52 CNSS Instruction 1253 provides security categorization guidance for national security systems. 

53 NIST Special Publication 800-60, Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to Security 

Categories, provides guidance on the assignment of security categories to information systems. 

54 The high water mark concept is employed because there are significant dependencies among the security objectives 

of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. In most cases, a compromise in one security objective ultimately affects 

the other security objectives as well. Accordingly, security controls are not categorized by security objective. Rather, 

the security controls are grouped into baselines to provide a general protection capability for classes of information 

systems based on impact level. 

T
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Once the impact level of the information system is determined, organizations begin the security 

control selection process.55 The first step in selecting and specifying security controls for the 

information system is to choose an appropriate set of baseline controls. The selection of the initial 

security control baseline is based on the impact level of the information system as determined by 

the security categorization process described above. The organization selects one of three sets of 

baseline security controls from Appendix D corresponding to the low-impact, moderate-impact, 

or high-impact rating of the information system.56 Note that not all security controls are assigned 

to baselines, as indicated by the phrase not selected. Similarly, not all control enhancements are 

assigned to baselines, as indicated by the security control being not selected or the enhancement 

number enclosed in parenthesis, not appearing in any baseline. The use of the term baseline is 

intentional. The security controls and control enhancements listed in the initial baselines are not a 

minimum, but rather a proposed starting point from which controls and controls enhancements 

may be removed or added based on the tailoring guidance in Section 3.2. 

The security control baselines in Appendix D address the security needs of a broad and diverse 

set of constituencies (including individual users and organizations). The baselines reflect some 

underlying assumptions including, for example: (i) the environments in which organizational 

information systems operate; (ii) the nature of operations conducted by organizations; (iii) the 

functionality employed within information systems; (iv) the types of threats facing organizations, 

missions/business processes, and information systems; and (v) the type of information processed, 

stored, or transmitted by information systems. Articulating the underlying assumptions is a key 

element in the initial risk framing step of the risk management process described in NIST Special 

Publication 800-39. Some of the assumptions that underlie the baselines in Appendix D include: 

• Information systems are located in fixed, physical facilities, complexes, or locations; 

• User data/information in organizational information systems is relatively persistent;57

• Information systems are multi-user (either serially or concurrently) in operation; 

 

55 The general security control selection process may be augmented or further detailed by additional sector-specific 

guidance as described in Section 3.4 and Appendix I, baseline tailoring using overlays. 

56 CNSS Instruction 1253 provides security control baselines for national security systems. 

57 Persistent data/information refers to data/information with utility for a relatively long duration (e.g., days, weeks). 

Implementation Tip 

To determine the impact level of an information system: 

• First, determine the different types of information that are processed, stored, or transmitted by the 

information system. NIST Special Publication 800-60 provides common information types.

• Second, using the impact levels in FIPS 199 and the recommendations of NIST Special Publication 

800-60, categorize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of each information type. 

• Third, determine the information system security categorization, that is, the highest impact level for 

each security objective (confidentiality, integrity, availability) from among the categorizations for the 

information types associated with the information system.

• Fourth, determine the overall impact level of the information system from the highest impact level 

among the three security objectives in the system security categorization.

Note: For national security systems, organizations use CNSSI 1253 for security categorization.
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• Some user data/information in organizational information systems is not shareable with other 

users who have authorized access to the same systems; 

• Information systems exist in networked environments; 

• Information systems are general purpose in nature; and 

• Organizations have the necessary structure, resources, and infrastructure to implement the 

controls.58

If one or more of these assumptions is not valid, then some of the security controls assigned to the 

initial baselines in Appendix D may not be applicable—a situation that can be readily addressed 

by applying the tailoring guidance in Section 3.2 and the results of organizational assessments of 

risk. Conversely, there are also some underlying assumptions that are specifically not reflected in 

the baselines. These include: 

• Insider threats exist within organizations; 

• Classified data/information is processed, stored, or transmitted by information systems; 

• Advanced persistent threats (APTs) exist within organizations; 

• Selected data/information requires specialized protection based on federal legislation, 

directives, regulations, or policies; and 

• Information systems need to communicate with other systems across different policy 

domains. 

If any of the above assumptions apply, then additional security controls from Appendix F would 

likely be needed to ensure adequate protection—a situation that can also be effectively addressed 

by applying the tailoring guidance in Section 3.2 (specifically, security control supplementation) 

and the results of organizational assessments of risk. 

3.2 TAILORING BASELINE SECURITY CONTROLS 

After selecting the initial set of baseline security controls from Appendix D, organizations initiate 

the tailoring process to modify appropriately and align the controls more closely with the specific 

conditions within the organization (i.e., conditions related to organizational missions/business 

functions, information systems, or environments of operation). The tailoring process includes: 

• Identifying and designating common controls in initial security control baselines; 

• Applying scoping considerations to the remaining baseline security controls; 

• Selecting compensating security controls, if needed; 

• Assigning specific values to organization-defined security control parameters via explicit 

assignment and selection statements; 

• Supplementing baselines with additional security controls and control enhancements, if 

needed; and 

• Providing additional specification information for control implementation. 

 

58 In general, federal departments and agencies will satisfy this assumption. The assumption becomes more of an issue 

for nonfederal entities such as municipalities, first responders, and small (business) contractors. Such entities may not 

be large enough or sufficiently resourced to have elements dedicated to providing the range of security capabilities that 

are assumed by the baselines. Organizations consider such factors in their risk-based decisions. 
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The tailoring process, as an integral part of security control selection and specification, is part of a 

comprehensive organizational risk management process—framing, assessing, responding to, and 

monitoring information security risk. Organizations use risk management guidance to facilitate 

risk-based decision making regarding the applicability of security controls in the security control 

baselines. Ultimately, organizations use the tailoring process to achieve cost-effective, risk-based 

security that supports organizational mission/business needs. Tailoring activities are coordinated 

with and approved by selected organizational officials (e.g., authorizing officials, risk executive 

[function], chief information officers, senior information security officers, information system 

owners, or common control providers) prior to implementing the security controls. Organizations 

have the flexibility to perform the tailoring process at the organization level for all information 

systems (either as a required tailored baseline or as the starting point for system-specific tailoring 

activities), in support of a particular line of business or mission/business process, at the individual 

information system level, or by using a combination of the above.59 

Conversely, organizations do not remove security controls for operational convenience. Tailoring 

decisions regarding security controls should be defensible based on mission/business needs and 

accompanied by explicit risk-based determinations. Tailoring decisions, including the specific 

rationale for those decisions, are documented in the security plans for organizational information 

systems. Every security control from the initial set of security controls must be accounted for 

either by the organization or by the information system owner. If particular security controls are 

not implemented or tailored out, then the associated rationale is recorded in security plans (or 

references/pointers to other relevant documentation are provided) for the information systems and 

approved by appropriate organizational officials as part of the security plan approval process.60 

Documenting significant risk management decisions in the security control selection process is 

imperative in order for authorizing officials to have the necessary information to make credible, 

risk-based decisions with regard to the authorization of information systems. Since information 

systems, environments of operation, and personnel associated with the system development life 

cycle are subject to change, providing the assumptions, constraints, and rationale supporting those 

important risk decisions allows for a better understanding in the future of the security state of the 

information systems or environments of operation at the time the original risk decisions were 

made and facilitates identifying changes, when previous risk decisions are revisited.

Identifying and Designating Common Controls

Common controls are controls that are inheritable by one or more organizational information 

systems. If an information system inherits a common control, then that system does not need to 

explicitly implement that control—that is, the security capability is being provided by another 

entity. Therefore, when the security controls in Appendix F call for an information system to 

implement or perform a particular security function, it should not be interpreted to mean that all 

systems that are part of larger, more complex systems or all components of a particular system 

need to implement the control or function. Organizational decisions on which security controls 

are designated as common controls may greatly affect the responsibilities of individual system 

owners with regard to the implementation of controls in a particular baseline. Common control 

selection can also affect the overall resource expenditures by organizations (i.e., the greater the 

number of common controls implemented, the greater potential cost savings).

 

59 See also Section 3.4 and Appendix I, security control baseline tailoring using overlays. 

60 The level of detail required in documenting tailoring decisions in the security control selection process is at the 

discretion of organizations and reflects the FIPS 199 impact levels of the respective information systems implementing 

or inheriting the controls. 
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Applying Scoping Considerations

Scoping considerations, when applied in conjunction with risk management guidance, provide 

organizations with a more granular foundation with which to make risk-based decisions.61 The 

application of scoping considerations can eliminate unnecessary security controls from the initial 

security control baselines and help to ensure that organizations select only those controls that are 

needed to provide the appropriate level of protection for organizational information systems—

protection based on the missions and business functions being supported by those systems and the 

environments in which the systems operate. Organizations may apply the scoping considerations 

described below to assist with making risk-based decisions regarding security control selection 

and specification—decisions that can potentially affect how the baseline security controls are 

applied and implemented by organizations: 

• CONTROL ALLOCATION AND PLACEMENT CONSIDERATIONS— 

The term information system can refer to systems at multiple levels of abstraction ranging 

from system-of-systems to individual single-user systems. The growing complexity of many 

information systems requires careful analysis in the allocation/placement of security controls 

within the three tiers in the risk management hierarchy (organization level, mission/business 

process level, and information system level) without imposing any specific architectural 

views or solutions.62 Security controls in the initial baselines represent an information systemwide set of controls that may not be applicable to every component in the system. Security 

controls are applicable only to information system components that provide or support the 

information security capability addressed by the controls.63 Organizations make explicit riskbased decisions about where to apply or allocate specific security controls in organizational 

information systems in order to achieve the needed security capability and to satisfy security 

requirements.64 An example of this type of allocation is applying the requirement from AC-17 

(5) (i.e., protecting wireless access to information systems using authentication/encryption) to 

all wireless access except for wireless access to visitor sub-networks which are not connected 

to other system components. 

• OPERATIONAL/ENVIRONMENTAL-RELATED CONSIDERATIONS— 

Several of the security controls in the baselines are based on the assumption of the existence 

of certain operational/environmental factors. Where these factors are absent or significantly 

diverge from the baseline assumptions, it is justifiable to tailor the baseline. Some of the more 

common operational/environmental factors include: 

- Mobility 

The mobility of physical hosting environments can impact the set of security controls 

selected for organizational information systems. As noted above, the initial set of security 

 

61 The scoping considerations listed in this section are exemplary and not intended to limit organizations in rendering 

risk-based decisions based on other organization-defined considerations with appropriate rationale. 

62 This is especially true with the advent of service-oriented architectures where specific services are provided to 

implement a single function. 

63 For example, auditing controls are typically applied to components of an information system that provide auditing 

capability (e.g., servers, etc.) and are not necessarily applied to every user-level workstation within the organization. 

Organizations should carefully assess the inventory of components that compose their information systems to 

determine which security controls are applicable to the various components. 

64 As information technology advances, more powerful and diverse functionality can be found in smart phones, tablets, 

and other types of mobile devices. While tailor guidance may support not allocating a particular security control to a 

specific technology or device, any residual risk associated with the absence of that control must be addressed in risk 

assessments to adequately protect organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. 
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controls assigned to the baselines in Appendix D assumes the operation of information 

systems in fixed facilities and non-mobile locations. If those information systems operate 

primarily in mobile environments, the initial set of security controls should be tailored 

appropriately to account for the differences in mobility and accessibility of the locations 

where the systems reside. For example, many of the security controls in the Physical and 

Environmental Protection (PE) family that are selected in all initial baselines reflect the 

belief that the information systems reside in physical facilities/complexes that require 

appropriate physical protections. Such controls would likely not provide added value for 

mobile environments such as ships, aircraft, automobiles, vans, or space-based systems.65

- Single-User Operations 

For information systems that are designed to operate as single-user systems (e.g., smart 

phones, personal digital assistants, tablets, laboratory equipment), several of the security 

controls that address sharing among users may not be needed. Thus, security controls 

such as SC-4 (Information in Shared Resources), AC-10 (Concurrent Session Control), 

and AC-3 (Access Enforcement)66 would not be required in single-user operations and 

could reasonably be tailored out of the baseline at the discretion of organizations. 

- Data Connectivity and Bandwidth 

While many information systems are interconnected, there are some systems which for 

security or operational reasons, lack networking capabilities—that is, the systems are 

considered standalone systems. For non-networked systems, security controls such as 

AC-17 (Remote Access), SC-8 (Transmission Confidentiality), AC-18 (Wireless Access), 

SC-9 (Transmission Integrity), and SC-7 (Boundary Protection), are not applicable and 

may be tailored out of the security control baselines at the discretion of organizations. In 

addition to standalone systems, there are information systems that have very limited or 

sporadic bandwidth (e.g., tactical systems supporting DoD warfighter missions and law 

enforcement missions). For such systems, the application of the security controls would 

need to be examined carefully as the limited and/or sporadic bandwidth could impact the 

practicality of implementing those controls and the viability of adversaries staging cyber 

attacks over the limited bandwidth. 

- Limited Functionality Systems 

What constitutes an information system under the E-Government Act of 2002 is quite 

broad. Fax machines, printers, scanners, pagers, cellular telephones, digital cameras, and 

telephone answering machines can all be categorized as information systems. These types 

of systems often lack some of the general processing capabilities assumed in the 

baselines. The nature of these constraints may limit the types of threats that these systems 

face, and hence the appropriateness of some of the security controls. Thus, a control such 

as SI-3, Malicious Code Protection (required in all baselines) may not be very practical 

for information systems that are not capable of executing code (e.g., text-only pagers). 

However, because there is often no clear delineation between these types of systems (e.g., 

smart phones combine the digital capabilities of telephones, cameras, and computers), it 

is important that the application of security controls to limited functionality systems be 

done judiciously and always take into account the intended use of the systems, system 

capabilities, and the risk of compromise. 

 

65 The mobile nature of devices means that it is possible that for some period of time the devices may reside in fixed 

facilities or complexes in fixed locations. During that time, the PE controls would likely apply. 

66 Organizations consider for single-user systems, whether individual users have administrator privileges before 

removing AC-3 from security control baselines. 
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- Information and System Non-Persistence 

There is often an assumption that user information within organizational information 

systems is persistent for a considerable period of time. However, for some applications 

and environments of operation (e.g., tactical systems, industrial control systems), the 

persistence of user information is often very limited in duration. For information systems 

processing, storing, or transmitting such non-persistent information, several security 

controls in the Contingency Planning (CP) family such as CP-6, Alternate Storage Site, 

CP-9, Alternate Processing Site, and CP-10, Information System Backup, may not be 

practical and can be tailored out at the discretion of organizations. For similar reasons, 

controls such as MP-6, Media Sanitization, and SC-28, Protection of Information at Rest, 

are good candidates for removal through tailoring. In addition to the non-persistence of 

information, the information systems/services may be non-persistent as well. This can be 

achieved by the use of virtualization techniques to establish non-persistent instantiations 

of operating systems and applications. Depending on the duration of the instantiations, 

some baseline controls might not be applicable. For example, patching requirements, 

such as those specified in CM-2, Baseline Configuration, may not be applicable if the 

duration of the system instantiation or use is shorter than the period of time required for 

achieving patch compliance. 

- Public Access 

When public access to organizational information systems is allowed, security controls 

should be applied with discretion since some security controls from the specified control 

baselines (e.g., identification and authentication, personnel security controls) may not be 

applicable for public access. Thus, in the case of the general public accessing government 

websites (e.g., to download publically accessible information such as forms, emergency 

preparedness information), security controls such as AC-7, Unsuccessful Login Attempts, 

AC-17, Remote Access, IA-2, Identification and Authentication (organizational users), 

IA-4, Identifier Management, and IA-5, Authentication Management typically would not 

be relevant for validating access authorizations or privileges. However, many of these 

controls would still be needed for identifying and authenticating organizational personnel 

that maintain and support information systems providing such public access websites and 

services. Similarly, many of the security controls may still be required for users accessing 

nonpublic information systems through such public interfaces, for example, to access or 

change personal information. 

• TECHNOLOGY-RELATED CONSIDERATIONS— 

Security controls that refer to specific technologies (e.g., wireless, cryptography, public key 

infrastructure) are applicable only if those technologies are employed or are required to be 

employed within organizational information systems. Security controls that can be explicitly 

or implicitly supported by automated mechanisms do not require the development of such 

mechanisms if the mechanisms do not already exist or are not readily available in commercial 

or government off-the-shelf products. If automated mechanisms are not readily available, 

cost-effective, or technically feasible, compensating security controls, implemented through 

nonautomated mechanisms or procedures, are used to satisfy specified security controls or 

control enhancements (see terms and conditions for applying compensating controls below). 

• SECURITY OBJECTIVE-RELATED CONSIDERATIONS— 

Security controls that support only one or two of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability 

security objectives may be downgraded to the corresponding control in a lower baseline (or 

modified or eliminated if not defined in a lower baseline) only if, the downgrading action: (i) 

reflects the FIPS 199 security category for the supported security objective(s) before moving 
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to the FIPS 200 impact level (i.e., high water mark);67 (ii) is supported by an organizational 

assessment of risk; and (iii) does not adversely affect the level of protection for the securityrelevant information within the information system.68 For example, if an information system 

is categorized as moderate impact using the high water mark concept because confidentiality 

and/or integrity are moderate but availability is low, there are several controls that only 

support the availability security objective and that potentially could be downgraded to low 

baseline requirements—that is, it may be appropriate not to implement CP-2(1) because the 

control enhancement supports only availability and is selected in the moderate baseline but 

not in the low baseline. The following security controls and control enhancements are 

potential candidates for downgrading: 

- Confidentiality: AC-21, MA-3 (3), MP-2 (1), MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-5 (3), MP-5 (4), 

MP-6 (1), MP-6 (2), PE-4, PE-5, SC-4, SC-9, SC-9 (1); 

- Integrity: CM-5, CM-5 (1), CM-5 (3), SC-8, SC-8 (1), SI-7, SI-7 (1), SI-7 (5), SI-10; and 

- Availability: CP-2 (1), CP-2 (2), CP-2 (3), CP-2 (4), CP-2 (5), CP-2 (8), CP-3 (1), CP-4 

(1), CP-4 (2), CP-4 (4), CP-6, CP-6 (1), CP-6 (2), CP-6 (3), CP-7, CP-7 (1), CP-7 (2), 

CP-7 (3), CP-7 (4), CP-8, CP-8 (1), CP-8 (2), CP-8 (3), CP-8 (4), CP-9 (1), CP-9 (2), CP9 (3), CP-9 (5), CP-10 (2), CP-10 (3), CP-10 (4), CP-10 (5), CP-11, MA-6, PE-9, PE-10, 

PE-11, PE-11 (1), PE-13 (1), PE-13 (2), PE-13 (3), PE-15 (1).69 

• POLICY/REGULATORY-RELATED CONSIDERATIONS— 

Security controls that address matters governed by applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, 

directives, policies, standards, or regulations are required only if the employment of those 

controls reflects the types of information and information systems covered by the applicable 

laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, standards, or regulations. 

• MISSION REQUIREMENTS-RELATED CONSIDERATIONS— 

Some security controls may not be applicable (or appropriate) if implementing those controls 

has the potential to degrade, debilitate, or otherwise hamper critical organizational missions 

and/or business functions. For example, if the mission requires that an uninterrupted display 

of mission-critical information be available at an operator console (e.g., air traffic controller 

console), the implementation of AC-11 (Session Lock) or SC-10 (Network Disconnect) may 

not be appropriate.

 

67 When applying the high water mark in Section 3.1, some of the original FIPS 199 confidentiality, integrity, or 

availability security objectives may have been upgraded to a higher security control baseline. As part of this process, 

security controls that uniquely support the confidentiality, integrity, or availability security objectives may have been 

upgraded unnecessarily. Consequently, it is recommended that organizations consider appropriate and allowable 

downgrading actions to ensure cost-effective, risk-based application of security controls. 

68 Information that is security-relevant at the information system level (e.g., password files, network routing tables, 

cryptographic key management information) is distinguished from user-level information within the same system. 

Certain security controls are used to support the security objectives of confidentiality and integrity for both user-level 

and system-level information. Caution should be exercised in downgrading confidentiality or integrity-related security 

controls to ensure that downgrading actions do not result in insufficient protection for the security-relevant information 

within the information system. Security-relevant information must be protected at the high water mark in order to 

achieve a similar level of protection for any of the security objectives related to user-level information. 

69 Downgrading actions apply only to the moderate and high baselines. Security controls that are uniquely attributable 

to confidentiality, integrity, or availability that would ordinarily be considered as potential candidates for downgrading 

(e.g., AC-16, AU-10, IA-7, PE-12, PE-14, AR-2 [previously PL-5], SC-5, SC-13, SC-14, SC-16) are eliminated from 

consideration because the controls are either selected for use in all baselines and have no enhancements that could be 

downgraded, or the controls are optional and not selected for use in any baseline. Organizations should exercise caution 

when considering downgrading security controls that do not appear in the list in Section 3.2 to ensure that downgrading 

actions do not affect security objectives other than the objectives targeted for downgrading. 
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Selecting Compensating Security Controls 

With the diverse nature of today’s information systems, organizations may find it necessary on 

occasion to employ compensating security controls. Compensating controls are alternative 

security controls employed by organizations in lieu of specific controls in the low, moderate, or 

high baselines described in Appendix D—controls that provide equivalent/comparable protection 

for organizational information systems and the information processed, stored, or transmitted by 

those systems.70 This may occur, for example, when organizations are unable to effectively 

implement specific security controls in the baselines or when, due to the specific nature of the 

information systems or environments of operation, the controls in the baselines are not a costeffective means of obtaining the needed risk mitigation. Compensating controls are typically 

selected after applying the scoping considerations in the tailoring guidance to the initial set of 

baseline security controls. Compensating controls may be employed by organizations only under 

the following conditions: 

• Organizations select compensating controls from Appendix F; if appropriate compensating 

controls are not available, organizations adopt suitable compensating controls from other 

sources;71

• Organizations provide supporting rationale for how compensating controls provide equivalent 

security capabilities for organizational information systems and why the baseline security 

controls could not be employed; and 

• Organizations assess and accept the risk associated with implementing compensating controls 

in organizational information systems. 

Assigning Security Control Parameter Values 

Security controls and control enhancements containing embedded parameters (i.e., assignment 

and selection statements) give organizations the flexibility to define certain portions of controls 

and enhancements to support specific organizational requirements. After the initial application of 

scoping considerations and the selection of compensating controls, organizations review the 

security controls and control enhancements for assignment/selection statements and determine 

appropriate organization-defined values for the identified parameters. Parameter values may be 

prescribed by applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, or 

standards. Once organizations define the parameter values for security controls and control 

enhancements, the assignments and selections become a part of the control and enhancement.72

Organizations may choose to specify the values for security control parameters before selecting 

compensating controls since the specification of the parameters completes the control definitions 

and may affect compensating control requirements. There can also be significant benefits in 

collaborating on the development of parameter values. For organizations that work together on a 

frequent basis, it may be useful for those organizations to develop a mutually agreeable set of 

uniform values for security control parameters. Doing so may assist organizations in achieving a 

greater degree of reciprocity when depending upon the information systems and/or services 

offered by other organizations. 

 

70 More than one compensating control may be required to provide the equivalent protection for a particular security 

control in Appendix F. For example, organizations with significant staff limitations may compensate for the separation 

of duty security control by strengthening the audit, accountability, and personnel security controls. 

71 Organizations should make every attempt to select compensating controls from the security control catalog in 

Appendix F. Organization-defined compensating controls are employed only when organizations determine that the 

security control catalog does not contain suitable compensating controls. 

72 Parameter values can also be defined as part of overlay development described in Section 3.4. 
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Supplementing Security Control Baselines 

The final determination of the appropriate set of security controls necessary to provide adequate 

security for organizational information systems and the environments in which those systems 

operate is a function of the assessment of risk and what is required to sufficiently mitigate the 

risks to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.73 

In many cases, additional security controls or control enhancements (beyond those controls and 

enhancements contained in the baselines in Appendix D) will be required to address specific 

threats to and vulnerabilities in organizations, mission/business processes, and/or information 

systems and to satisfy the requirements of applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, 

policies, standards, or regulations. The risk assessment in the security control selection process 

provides important inputs to determine the necessity and sufficiency of the security controls and 

control enhancements in the initial baselines. Organizations are encouraged to make maximum 

use of Appendix F to facilitate the process of supplementing the baselines with additional security 

controls and/or control enhancements.74

Situations Requiring Potential Baseline Supplementation 

Organizations may be subject to conditions that, from an operational, environmental, or threat 

perspective, warrant the selection and implementation of additional (supplemental) controls to 

achieve adequate protection of organizational missions/business functions and the supporting 

information systems. Examples of conditions and additional controls that might be required are 

provided below. 

• ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREAT

Security control baselines do not assume that the current threat environment is one where 

adversaries have achieved a significant foothold and presence within organizations and 

organizational information systems—that is, organizations are dealing with an advanced 

persistent threat. Adversaries continue to attack organizational information systems and the 

information technology infrastructure and are successful in some aspects of such attacks. To 

more fully address the advanced persistent threat, concepts such as insider threat protection 

(CM-5 (4)), diversity/heterogeneity (SC-27 and SC-29), deception (SC-26 and SC-30), nonpersistence (SC-25 and SC-34), and segmentation (SC-7 (13)) can be considered. 

• CROSS-DOMAIN SERVICES 

Security control baselines do not assume that information systems have to operate across 

multiple security policy domains. The baselines assume a flat view of information flows (i.e., 

the same security policies in different domains when information moves across authorization 

boundaries). To address cross-domain services and transactions, some subset of the AC-4 

security control enhancements can be considered to ensure adequate protection of information 

when transferred between information systems with different security policies. 

• MOBILITY

The use of mobile devices might result in the need for additional security controls and control 

enhancements not selected in the initial baselines. For example, AC-7 (2), which requires the 

purging of information after an organization-defined number of unsuccessful login attempts, 

could be selected in order to address the threat of theft or loss of mobile devices. 

 

73 Considerations for potential national-level impacts and impacts to other organizations in categorizing organizational 

information systems derive from the USA PATRIOT Act and Homeland Security Presidential Directives. 

74 Security controls and control enhancements selected to supplement baselines are allocated to appropriate information 

system components in the same manner as the control allocations carried out by organizations in the initial baselines. 
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• HIGHLY SENSITIVE INFORMATION AND INFORMATION SHARING

In some environments, highly sensitive information (e.g., classified information,75 Controlled 

Unclassified Information) may be resident on organizational information systems without all 

users having the necessary privileges and authorizations to access all of the information. In 

those situations, additional security controls and/or control enhancements would be required 

to ensure that sensitive information is not accessed by unauthorized users (or processes acting 

on behalf of users). More stringent access controls/identification and authentication controls 

include, for example, AC-3 (3), AC-3 (4), AC-16, and IA-4 (4). When classified information 

is being processed, stored, or transmitted on information systems that are jointly owned by 

multiple entities (e.g., coalition partners in political and military alliances), more restrictive 

controls for maintenance personnel may be required including, for example, MA-5 (4). 

• APPLICATION-LAYER SECURITY

Organizations can employ security controls at multiple layers within information systems. 

For example, operating systems typically provide access control capability that includes the 

identification and authentication of users. Applications can also provide an access control 

capability requiring users to go through a second level of identification and authentication, 

thus rendering an additional level of protection for organizational information systems. 

Processes for Identifying Additional Needed Security Controls 

Organizations can employ a requirements definition approach or a gap analysis approach in 

selecting security controls and control enhancements to supplement initial baselines. In the 

requirements definition approach, organizations obtain specific and credible threat76 information 

(or make reasonable assumptions) about the activities of adversaries with certain capabilities or 

attack potential (e.g., skill levels, expertise, available resources). To effectively withstand cyber 

attacks from adversaries with the stated capabilities or attack potential, organizations strive to 

achieve a certain level of defensive capability or cyber preparedness. Organizations can select 

additional security controls and control enhancements from Appendix F to obtain such defensive 

capability or level of preparedness. In contrast to the requirements definition approach, the gap 

analysis approach begins with an organizational assessment of its current defensive capability or 

level of cyber preparedness. From that initial capability assessment, organizations determine the 

types of threats they can reasonably expect to counter. If the current organizational defensive 

capabilities or levels of cyber preparedness are insufficient, the gap analysis determines the 

required capabilities and levels of preparedness. Organizations subsequently define the security 

controls and control enhancements from Appendix F needed to achieve the desired capabilities or 

cyber-preparedness levels. 

Enhancing Information Security without Changing Control Selection 

There may be situations in which organizations cannot apply sufficient security controls within 

their information systems to adequately reduce or mitigate risk (e.g., when using certain types of 

information technologies or employing certain computing paradigms). Therefore, alternative 

strategies are needed to prevent organizational missions/business functions from being adversely 

affected— strategies that consider the mission and business risks resulting from an aggressive use 

of information technology. Restrictions on the types of technologies used and how organizational 

information systems are employed provide an alternative method to reduce or mitigate risk that 

 

75 The example is illustrative only. CNSS Instruction 1253 provides specific guidance regarding security controls 

required for national security systems, including those systems containing classified information. 

76 While this example focuses on threats to information systems from purposeful attacks, the threat space of concern to 

organizations also includes environmental disruptions and human errors. 
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may be used in conjunction with, or instead of, supplemental security controls. Restrictions on the 

use of information systems and specific information technologies may be, in some situations, the 

only practical or reasonable actions organizations can take in order to have the capability to carry 

out assigned missions/business functions in the face of determined adversaries. Examples of use 

restrictions include: 

• Limiting the information that information systems can process, store, or transmit or the 

manner in which organizational missions/business functions are automated; 

• Prohibiting external access to organizational information by removing selected information 

system components from networks (i.e., air gapping); and 

• Prohibiting moderate- or high-impact information on organizational information system 

components to which the public has access, unless an explicit risk determination is made 

authorizing such access. 

Providing Additional Specification Information for Control Implementation

Since security controls are statements of security capability at higher levels of abstraction, the 

controls may lack sufficient information for successful implementation. Therefore, additional 

detail may be necessary to fully define the intent of a given security control for implementation 

purposes and to ensure that the security requirements related to that control are satisfied. 

Organizations ensure that, where existing security control information (e.g., selections and 

assignments) is not sufficient to fully define the intended application of the control, such 

information is provided. Organizations have the flexibility to determine whether additional detail 

is included as a part of the control statement (e.g., in supplemental guidance) or in a separate 

control addendum section. Providing additional detail does not allow organizations to change the 

intent of the security control or modify in any manner, the original language in the control. The 

additional implementation information can be documented either in security plans or systems and 

security engineering plans. The type of additional detail that might be necessary for a security 

control to be fully specified for implementation purposes is provided in the SI-7 (7) example 

below: 

SI-7 SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY 

(7) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION 

The information system employs cryptographic mechanisms to detect unauthorized changes to 

software, firmware, and information. 

Supplemental Guidance: Cryptographic mechanisms used for the protection of integrity include, 

for example, digital signatures and the computation and application of signed hashes using 

asymmetric cryptography, protecting the confidentiality of the key used to generate the hash, 

and using the public key to verify the hash information. Related control: SC-13.

Additional implementation detail for SI-7 (7): 

Digital signatures are applied to all traffic for which non-repudiation is required employing 

SHA-256 or another approved NIST algorithm demonstrably of at least the same strength of 

mechanism. 

Baseline Tailoring Using Overlays

The previous sections described the process of tailoring a set of initial baseline security controls 

to achieve a more focused and relevant security capability for organizations. In certain situations, 

it may be necessary for organizations to apply tailoring guidance to the baselines to develop a set 

of security controls for community-wide use or to address specialized requirements, technologies, 
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or unique missions/environments of operation.77 For example, the federal government may decide 

to establish a governmentwide set of security controls and implementation guidance for: (i) public 

key infrastructure (PKI) systems that could be uniformly applied to all PKI systems implemented 

within federal agencies; or (ii) cloud-based information systems that are uniformly applied to all 

federal agencies procuring or implementing cloud services. Alternatively, to address particular 

communities of interest with specialized requirements, the Department of Defense, for example, 

may decide to establish a set of security controls and implementation guidance for its tactical 

operations and environments by applying the tailoring guidance to the standard security control 

baselines for national security systems to achieve more specialized solutions. In each of the above 

examples, tailored baselines can be developed for each information technology area or for the 

unique circumstances/environments and promulgated to large communities of interest—thus 

achieving standardized security capabilities, consistency of implementation, and cost-effective 

security solutions. 

To address the need for developing community-wide and specialized sets of security controls for 

information systems and organizations, the concept of overlay is introduced. An overlay is a fully 

specified set of security controls, control enhancements, and supplemental guidance derived from 

the application of tailoring guidance in Section 3.2 to security control baselines in Appendix D.78

Overlays complement the initial security control baselines by: (i) providing the opportunity to add 

or eliminate controls; (ii) providing security control applicability and interpretations for specific 

information technologies, computing paradigms, environments of operation, types of information 

systems, types of missions/operations, operating modes, industry sectors, and statutory/regulatory 

requirements; (iii) establishing community-wide parameter values for assignment and/or selection 

statements in security controls and control enhancements; and (iv) extending the supplemental 

guidance for security controls, where necessary. Organizations typically use the overlay concept 

when there is divergence from the basic assumptions used to create the initial security control 

baselines (see Section 3.1). If organizations are not divergent from the basic assumptions for the 

initial baselines, then there is likely no need to create an overlay. Alternatively, the baselines may 

be missing key assumptions which would then justify creating an overlay with the additional 

assumptions. 

The full range of tailoring activities are available to organizations to provide a disciplined and 

structured approach for developing tailored baselines supporting the areas described above. 

Overlays provide an opportunity to build consensus across communities of interest and develop 

security plans for organizational information systems that have broad-based support for very 

specific circumstances, situations, and/or conditions. Categories of overlays that may be useful 

include, for example: 

• Communities of interest (e.g., healthcare, intelligence, financial, law enforcement); 

• Information technologies/computing paradigms (e.g., cloud/mobile, PKI, Smart Grid); 

• Industry sectors (e.g., nuclear power, transportation); 

• Environments of operation (e.g., space, tactical); 

• Types of information systems (e.g., industrial/process control systems, weapons systems); 

• Types of missions/operations (e.g., counter terrorism, first responders, research, development, 

test, and evaluation); 

 

77 This type of tailoring can be conducted at the federal level or by individual organizations. 

78 CNSS Instruction 1253 provides tailoring guidance and security control baselines for national security systems. 
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• Operating modes (e.g., single-user systems, standalone systems); 

• Coalitions and partnerships (e.g., allied collaboration/sharing, cross-domain solutions); and 

• Statutory/regulatory requirements (e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Health 

Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Privacy Act). 

Organizations can effectively use the risk management concepts defined in NIST Special 

Publication 800-39 when developing overlays. The successful development of overlays requires 

the involvement of: (i) information security professionals who understand the specific subject 

area that is the focus of the overlay development effort; and (ii) subject matter experts in the 

overlay area who understand the security controls in Appendix F and the initial baselines in 

Appendix D. The format and structure for developing overlays is provided in Appendix I. 

Multiple overlays can be applied to a single security control baseline. The tailored baselines that 

result from the overlay development process may be more or less stringent than the original 

security control baselines. Risk assessments can help determine if the risk from implementing the 

tailored baselines falls within the risk tolerance of the organizations/communities of interest 

developing the overlays. In general, overlays are intended to reduce the need for ad hoc tailoring 

of baselines by organizations through the selection of a set of controls and control enhancements 

that more closely correspond to common circumstances, situations, and/or conditions. However, 

the use of overlays does not in any way preclude organizations from performing further tailoring 

(i.e., overlays can also be subject to tailoring) to reflect organization-specific needs, assumptions, 

or constraints. But it is anticipated that the use of overlays would greatly reduce the number and 

extent of organization-specific ad hoc tailoring. 

3.3 DOCUMENTING THE CONTROL SELECTION PROCESS

Organizations document the relevant decisions taken during the security control selection process, 

providing a sound rationale for those decisions. This documentation is essential when examining 

the security considerations for organizational information systems with respect to the potential 

mission/business impact. The resulting set of security controls and the supporting rationale for the 

selection decisions (including any information system use restrictions required by organizations), 

Implementation Tip 

Many organizations operate complex information systems, often referred to as a system-of-systems. 

Enterprise architecture plays a key part in the security control selection process for these types of 

information systems. Organizations can address the complex system problem by dividing the system 

into two or more subsystems and applying the FIPS 199 security categorization and FIPS 200 impact 

level determination to each subsystem. Applying separate impact levels to each subsystem does not 

change the overall impact level of the information system; rather, it allows constituent subsystems to 

receive a separate allocation of security controls instead of deploying higher impact controls across 

every subsystem. It is not valid to treat the subsystems as entirely independent entities, however, since 

the subsystems are interdependent and interconnected. Organizations develop security architectures to 

allocate security controls among subsystems including monitoring and controlling communications at key 

internal boundaries within the system-of-systems and provide system-wide controls that meet or exceed 

the highest information system impact level of the constituent subsystems inheriting security capabilities 

from those system-wide controls. Organizations also consider that replicated subsystems within complex 

systems may exhibit common vulnerabilities that can be exploited by common threat sources—thereby 

negating the redundancy that might be relied upon as a risk mitigation measure. The impact due to a 

security incident against one constituent subsystem might cascade and impact many subsystems at the 

same time. 
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are documented in the security plans. Documenting significant risk management decisions in the 

security control selection process is imperative so that authorizing officials can have access to the 

necessary information to make informed authorization decisions for organizational information 

systems.79 Without such information, the understanding, assumptions, constraints, and rationale 

supporting those important risk management decisions will, in all likelihood, not be available 

when the state of the information systems or environments of operation change, and the original 

risk decisions are revisited. Figure 3 summarizes the security control selection process, including 

the selection of initial baselines and the tailoring of the baselines by applying the guidance in 

Section 3.2. 

FIGURE 3: SECURITY CONTROL SELECTION PROCESS 

Iterative Nature of Security Control Tailoring 

The security control tailoring process described above, while appearing to be sequential in nature, 

can also have an iterative aspect. Organizations may choose to execute the tailoring steps in any 

order based on organizational needs and the information generated from risk assessments. For 

example, some organizations may establish the parameter values for security controls in the initial 

baselines prior to selecting compensating controls. Other organizations may delay completing 

assignment and selection statements in the controls until after the supplementation activities have 

been completed. Organizations may also discover that when fully specifying security controls for 

the intended environments of operation, there may be difficulties that arise which may trigger the 

need for additional (supplemental) controls. Finally, the security control tailoring process is not 

static—that is, organizations revisit the tailoring step as often as needed based on ongoing 

organizational assessments of risk. 

In addition to the iterative and dynamic nature of the security control tailoring process, there may 

also be side effects as controls are added and removed from the baselines. Security controls in 

Appendix F can have some degree of dependency and functional overlap with other controls. In 

many cases, security controls work together to achieve a security capability. Thus, removing a 

particular security control from a baseline during the tailoring process may have unintended side 

effects (and potentially adverse impacts) on the remaining controls. Alternatively, adding a new 

 

79 The security control selection process also applies to common control providers and the authorizing officials 

rendering authorization decisions for common controls deployed within organizations. 

 Tailoring Guidance 

• Identifying and Designating Common Controls 

• Applying Scoping Considerations 

• Selecting Compensating Controls 

• Assigning Security Control Parameter Values 

• Supplementing Baseline Security Controls 

• Providing Additional Specification Information 

for Implementation

Assessment of Organizational Risk 

DOCUMENT SECURITY CONTROL DECISIONS 

 Rationale that the agreed-upon set of security controls for the information system provide adequate 

protection of organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. 

INITIAL 

SECURITY 

CONTROL 

BASELINE 

(Low, Mod, High) 

 

Before Tailoring 

TAILORED 

SECURITY 

CONTROL 

BASELINE 

(Low, Mod, High) 

 

After Tailoring 
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security control to a baseline during the tailoring process may eliminate or reduce the need for 

certain specific controls because the new control provides a better security capability than the 

capability provided by other controls. For example, if organizations implement SC-30 (1) and 

SC-30 (2) using virtualization techniques to randomly/frequently deploy diverse and changing 

operating systems and applications, this approach could potentially limit the requirement to 

update the security configurations in CM-2 (2). Therefore, the addition or removal of security 

controls is viewed with regard to the totality of the information security needs of the organization 

and its information systems, and not simply with regard to the controls being added or removed. 

Other Considerations 

Organizational tailoring decisions are not carried out in a vacuum. While such decisions are 

rightly focused on information security considerations, it is important that the decisions be 

aligned with other risk factors that organizations address routinely. Risk factors such as cost, 

schedule, and performance are considered in the overall determination of which security controls 

to employ in organizational information systems and environments of operation. For example, in 

military command and control systems in which lives may be at stake, the adoption of security 

controls is balanced with operational necessity. With respect to the air traffic control system and 

consoles used by air traffic controllers, the need to access the consoles in real time to control the 

air space far outweighs the security need for an AC-11 (Session Lock) capability. In short, the 

security control selection process (to include tailoring activities described in Section 3.2) should 

be integrated into the overall risk management process as described in NIST Special Publication 

800-39. 

Finally, organizations factor scalability into the security control selection process—that is, 

controls are scalable with regard to the extent/rigor of the implementation. Scalability is guided 

by the FIPS 199 security categorizations and the associated FIPS 200 impact levels of the 

information systems where the controls are to be applied. For example, contingency plans for 

high-impact information systems may contain significant amounts of implementation detail and 

be quite lengthy. In contrast, contingency plans for low-impact systems may contain considerably 

less detail and be quite succinct. Organizations use discretion in applying the security controls to 

organizational information systems, giving consideration to the scalability factors in particular 

operational environments. Scaling controls to the appropriate impact level facilitates a more costeffective, risk-based approach to security control implementation—expending only the level of 

resources necessary to achieve sufficient risk mitigation and adequate security. 

Implementation Tip 

In diverging from the security control baselines during the tailoring process, organizations should 

consider some very important linkages between various controls and control enhancements. These 

linkages are captured in the selection of controls and enhancements in the baselines and are especially 

significant when developing overlays (described in Section 3.2 and Appendix I). In some instances, the 

linkages are such that it is not meaningful to include a specific security control or control enhancement 

without some other control or enhancement. In essence, the totality of the controls and enhancements 

provide a required security capability. Some linkages are fairly obvious such as that between Access 

Control | Mandatory Access Control enhancement (AC-3 (7)) and Security Attributes (AC-16). But other 

linkages may be more subtle. This is especially true in the case where the linkage is between security 

functionality-related controls and security assurance-related controls as described in Appendix E. For 

example, is it not particularly meaningful to implement Access Control | MAC enhancement AC-3 (7) 

without also implementing a Reference Monitor Function (AC-25). Organizations are encouraged to pay 

careful attention to the related controls section of the Supplemental Guidance for the security controls to 

help in identifying such linkages. 
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3.4 NEW DEVELOPMENT AND LEGACY SYSTEMS

The security control selection process described in this section can be applied to organizational 

information systems from two different perspectives: (i) new development; and (ii) legacy. For 

new development systems, the security control selection process is applied from a requirements 

definition perspective since the systems do not yet exist and organizations are conducting initial 

security categorizations. The security controls included in the security plans for the information 

systems serve as a security specification and are expected to be incorporated into the systems 

during the development and implementation phases of the system development life cycle. In 

contrast, for legacy information systems, the security control selection process is applied from a 

gap analysis perspective when organizations are anticipating significant changes to the systems 

(e.g., during major upgrades, modifications, or outsourcing). Since the information systems 

already exist, organizations in all likelihood have completed the security categorization and 

security control selection processes resulting in the establishment of previously agreed-upon 

security controls in the respective security plans and the implementation of those controls within 

the information systems. Therefore, the gap analysis can be applied in the following manner: 

• First, reconfirm or update as necessary, the FIPS 199 security category and FIPS 200 impact 

level for the information system based on the different types of information that are currently

being processed, stored, or transmitted by the system. 

• Second, review the existing security plan that describes the security controls that are currently 

employed considering any updates to the security category and information system impact 

level as well as any changes to the organization, mission/business processes, the system, or 

the operational environment. Reassess the risk and revise the security plan as necessary, 

including documenting any additional security controls that would be needed by the system to 

ensure that the risk to organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other 

organizations, and the Nation, remains at an acceptable level. 

• Third, implement the security controls described in the updated security plan, document in the 

plan of action and milestones any controls not implemented, and continue with the remaining 

steps in the Risk Management Framework in the same manner as a new development system. 

Applying Gap Analyses to External Service Providers 

The gap analysis perspective is also applied when interacting with external service providers. As 

described in Section 2.6, organizations are becoming increasingly reliant on external providers for 

information system services. Using the steps in the gap analysis described above, organizations 

can effectively use the acquisition process and appropriate contractual vehicles to require external 

providers to carry out the security categorization and security control selection steps in the RMF. 

The resulting information can help determine what security controls the external provider either 

has in place or intends to implement for the information system services that are to be provided. 

If a security control deficit exists, the responsibility for adequately mitigating unacceptable risks 

arising from the use of external information system services remains with authorizing officials. In 

such situations, organizations can reduce the organizational risk to an acceptable level by: 

• Using the existing contractual vehicle to require the external provider to meet the additional 

security control requirements established by the organization; 

• Negotiating with the provider for additional security controls if the existing contractual 

vehicle does not provide for such added requirements; 

• Approving the use of compensating controls by the provider; or 
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• Employing alternative risk mitigation actions80 within the organizational information system 

when a contract either does not exist or the contract does not provide the necessary leverage 

for organizations to obtain the needed security controls. 

 

 

80 For example, local policies, procedures, and/or compensating controls could be established by organizations to serve 

as alternative mitigation actions for risks identified in a gap analysis. 

Implementation Tip 

Security controls are typically deployed as a unified set to achieve a desired security capability. The loss 

of one security objective (e.g., integrity) can adversely affect the other objectives (e.g., confidentiality 

and availability). When selecting security controls for nondisclosure purposes, organizations consider 

the security categorization of user data and system-level data—where system data may require stronger 

protection in the form of additional security controls. 
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APPENDIX A

REFERENCES

LAWS, POLICIES, DIRECTIVES, REGULATIONS, MEMORANDA, STANDARDS, AND GUIDELINES 

LEGISLATION AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS

1. E-Government Act [includes FISMA] (P.L. 107-347), December 2002. 

2. Federal Information Security Management Act (P.L. 107-347, Title III), December 2002. 

3. Paperwork Reduction Act (P.L. 104-13), May 1995. 

4. USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56), October 2001. 

5. Privacy Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-579), December 1974. 

6. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, As Amended By Public Law No. 

104-231, 110 Stat. 3048, Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996.

7. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (P.L. 104-191), August 1996. 

8. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-703), August 1954. 

9. Executive Order 13556, Controlled Unclassified Information, November 2010.

POLICIES, DIRECTIVES, INSTRUCTIONS, REGULATIONS, AND MEMORANDA

1. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 5, Administrative Personnel, Section 731.106, 

Designation of Public Trust Positions and Investigative Requirements (5 C.F.R. 

731.106). 

2. Code of Federal Regulations, Part 5 Administrative Personnel, Subpart C—Employees 

Responsible for the Management or Use of Federal Computer Systems, Section 930.301 

through 930.305 (5 C.F.R 930.301-305). 

3. Committee for National Security Systems (CNSS) Instruction 4009, National Information 

Assurance Glossary, June 2006. 

4. Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) Instruction 1253, Security 

Categorization and Control Selection for National Security Systems, Version 1, October 

2009. 

5. Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/9, Physical Security Standards For Sensitive 

Compartmented Information Facilities, November 2002. 

6. Federal Continuity Directive 1 (FCD 1), Federal Executive Branch National Continuity 

Program and Requirements, February 2008. 

7. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, 

Prioritization, and Protection, December 2003. 

8. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12, Policy for a Common Identification 

Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, August 2004. 

9. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 20 (National Security Presidential Directive 

51), National Continuity Policy, May 2007. 
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10. Intelligence Community Directive Number 704, Personnel Security Standards and 

Procedures Governing Eligibility For Access To Sensitive Compartmented Information 

And Other Controlled Access Program Information, October 2008. 

11. National Communications System (NCS) Directive 3-10, Minimum Requirements for 

Continuity Communications Capabilities, July 2007. 

12. National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Instruction 

(NSTISSI) 7003, Protective Distribution Systems (PDS), December 1996. 

13. Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-130, Appendix III, Transmittal 

Memorandum #4, Management of Federal Information Resources, November 2000. 

14. Office of Management and Budget, Federal Enterprise Architecture Program 

Management Office, FEA Consolidated Reference Model Document, Version 2.3, 

October 2007. 

15. Office of Management and Budget, Federal Segment Architecture Methodology (FSAM), 

January 2009. 

16. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 01-05, Guidance on Inter-Agency 

Sharing of Personal Data - Protecting Personal Privacy, December 2000. 

17. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 02-01, Guidance for Preparing and 

Submitting Security Plans of Action and Milestones, October 2001. 

18. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 03-19, Reporting Instructions for the 

Federal Information Security Management Act and Updated Guidance on Quarterly IT 

Security Reporting, August 2003. 

19. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 03-22, OMB Guidance for 

Implementing the Privacy Provisions of the E-Government Act of 2002, September 2003. 

20. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 04-04, E-Authentication Guidance for 

Federal Agencies, December 2003. 

21. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 04-26, Personal Use Policies and File 

Sharing Technology, September 2004. 

22. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 05-08, Designation of Senior Agency 

Officials for Privacy, February 2005. 

23. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 05-24, Implementation of Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12—Policy for a Common Identification 

Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, August 2005. 

24. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 06-15, Safeguarding Personally 

Identifiable Information, May 2006. 

25. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 06-16, Protection of Sensitive 

Information, June 2006. 

26. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 06-19, Reporting Incidents Involving 

Personally Identifiable Information and Incorporating the Cost for Security in Agency 

Information Technology Investments, July 2006. 

27. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum, Recommendations for Identity Theft 

Related Data Breach Notification Guidance, September 2006. 
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28. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 07-11, Implementation of Commonly 

Accepted Security Configurations for Windows Operating Systems, March 2007. 

29. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 07-16, Safeguarding Against and 

Responding to the Breach of Personally Identifiable Information, May 2007. 

30. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 07-18, Ensuring New Acquisitions 

Include Common Security Configurations, June 2007. 

31. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 08-22, Guidance on the Federal 

Desktop Core Configuration (FDCC), August 2008. 

32. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 08-23, Securing the Federal 

Government’s Domain Name System Infrastructure, August 2008. 

33. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Designation and Sharing of Controlled 

Unclassified Information (CUI), May 2008. 

34. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Classified Information and Controlled 

Unclassified Information, May 2009. 

35. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 11-33, FY 2011 Reporting Instructions 

for the Federal Information Security Management Act and Agency Privacy Management, 

September 2011. 

STANDARDS

1. International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission 

27001, Information Security Management System Requirements, October 2005. 

2. International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission 

15408-1, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Evaluation criteria for IT 

security -- Part 1: Introduction and general model, October 2005. 

3. International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission 

15408-2, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Evaluation criteria for IT 

security -- Part 2: Security functional requirements, October 2005. 

4. International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission 

15408-3, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Evaluation criteria for IT 

security -- Part 3: Security assurance requirements, October 2005. 

5. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing 

Standards Publication 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 

2001. 

National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing 

Standards Publication 140-3 (Draft), Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules,

December 2009. 

6. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing 

Standards Publication 180-3, Secure Hash Standard (SHS), October 2008. 

7. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing 

Standards Publication 186-3, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), June 2009. 

8. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing 

Standards Publication 188, Standard Security Label for Information Transfer, September 

1994. 
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9. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing 

Standards Publication 190, Guideline for the Use of Advanced Authentication Technology 

Alternatives, September 1994. 

10. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing 

Standards Publication 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), November 2001. 

11. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing 

Standards Publication 198-1, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), 

July 2008. 

12. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing 

Standards Publication 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information 

and Information Systems, February 2004. 

13. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing 

Standards Publication 200, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and 

Information Systems, March 2006. 

14. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing 

Standards Publication 201-1, Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees 

and Contractors, March 2006. 

GUIDELINES

1. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), 

2009. 

2. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-12, An 

Introduction to Computer Security: The NIST Handbook, October 1995. 

3. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-13, 

Telecommunications Security Guidelines for Telecommunications Management Network, 

October 1995. 

4. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-14, Generally 

Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Information Technology Systems, 

September 1996. 

5. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-15, Minimum 

Interoperability Specification for PKI Components (MISPC), Version 1, September 1997. 

6. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-16, Revision 1 

(Draft), Information Security Training Requirements: A Role- and Performance-Based 

Model, March 2009. 

7. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-17, Modes of 

Operation Validation System (MOVS): Requirements and Procedures, February 1998. 

8. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-18, Revision 1, 

Guide for Developing Security Plans for Federal Information Systems, February 2006. 

9. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-19, Mobile Agent 

Security, October 1999. 

10. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-20, Modes of 

Operation Validation System for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TMOVS): 

Requirements and Procedures, April 2000. 
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11. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-21-1, Second 

Edition, Guideline for Implementing Cryptography in the Federal Government, 

December 2005. 

12. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-22, Revision 1a, 

A Statistical Test Suite for Random and Pseudorandom Number Generators for 

Cryptographic Applications, April 2010. 

13. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-23, Guidelines to 

Federal Organizations on Security Assurance and Acquisition/Use of Tested/Evaluated 

Products, August 2000. 

14. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-24, PBX 

Vulnerability Analysis: Finding Holes in Your PBX Before Someone Else Does, August 

2000. 

15. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-25, Federal 

Agency Use of Public Key Technology for Digital Signatures and Authentication, October 

2000. 

16. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-27, Revision A, 

Engineering Principles for Information Technology Security (A Baseline for Achieving 

Security), June 2004. 

17. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-28, Version 2, 

Guidelines on Active Content and Mobile Code, March 2008. 

18. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-29, A 

Comparison of the Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules in FIPS 140-1 and 

FIPS 140-2, June 2001. 

19. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-30, Risk 

Management Guide for Information Technology Systems, July 2002. 

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-30, Revision 1 

(Draft), Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments, September 2011. 

20. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-32, Introduction 

to Public Key Technology and the Federal PKI Infrastructure, February 2001. 

21. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-33, Underlying 

Technical Models for Information Technology Security, December 2001. 

22. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-34, Revision 1, 

Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems, May 2010. 

23. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-35, Guide to 

Information Technology Security Services, October 2003. 

24. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-36, Guide to 

Selecting Information Security Products, October 2003. 

25. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-37, Revision 1, 

Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal Information Systems: A 

Security Life Cycle Approach, February 2010. 

26. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-38A—

Addendum, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of 

Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode, October 2010. 
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27. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-38B, 

Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for 

Authentication, May 2005. 

28. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-38C, 

Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for 

Authentication and Confidentiality, May 2004. 

29. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-38D, 

Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) 

and GMAC, November 2007. 

30. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-39, Managing 

Information Security Risk: Organization, Mission, and Information System View, March 

2011. 

31. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-40, Version 2, 

Creating a Patch and Vulnerability Management Program, November 2005. 

32. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-41, Revision 1, 

Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall Policy, September 2009. 

33. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-43, Systems 

Administration Guidance for Windows 2000 Professional System, November 2002. 

34. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-44, Version 2, 

Guidelines on Securing Public Web Servers, September 2007. 

35. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-45, Version 2, 

Guidelines on Electronic Mail Security, February 2007. 

36. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-46, Revision 1, 

Guide to Enterprise Telework and Remote Access Security, June 2009. 

37. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-47, Security 

Guide for Interconnecting Information Technology Systems, August 2002. 

38. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-48, Revision 1, 

Guide to Securing Legacy IEEE 802.11 Wireless Networks, July 2008. 

39. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-49, Federal 

S/MIME V3 Client Profile, November 2002. 

40. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-50, Building an 

Information Technology Security Awareness and Training Program, October 2003. 

41. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-51, Revision 1, 

Guide to Using Vulnerability Naming Schemes, February 2011. 

42. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-52, Guidelines 

for the Selection and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations, June 2005. 

43. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-53A, Revision 1, 

Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and 

Organizations: Building Effective Security Assessment Plans, June 2010. 

44. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-54, Border 

Gateway Protocol Security, July 2007. 
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APPENDIX A PAGE A-7

45. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-55, Revision 1, 

Performance Measurement Guide for Information Security, July 2008. 

46. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-56A (Revised), 

Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm 

Cryptography, March 2007. 

47. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-57 (Revised), 

Recommendation for Key Management, March 2007. 

48. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-58, Security 

Considerations for Voice Over IP Systems, January 2005. 

49. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-59, Guideline for 

Identifying an Information System as a National Security System, August 2003. 

50. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-60, Revision 1, 

Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to Security Categories, 

August 2008. 

51. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-61, Revision 1, 

Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, March 2008. 

52. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-63-1, Electronic 

Authentication Guideline, December 2011. 

53. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-64, Revision 2, 

Security Considerations in the System Development Life Cycle, October 2008. 

54. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-65, Integrating 

IT Security into the Capital Planning and Investment Control Process, January 2005. 

55. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-66, Revision 1, 

An Introductory Resource Guide for Implementing the Health Insurance Portability and 

Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule, October 2008. 

56. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-67, Revision 1, 

Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, 

January 2012. 

57. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-68, Revision 1, 

Guide to Securing Microsoft Windows XP Systems for IT Professionals: A NIST Security 

Configuration Checklist, October 2008. 

58. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-69, Guidance for 

Securing Microsoft Windows XP Home Edition: A NIST Security Configuration 

Checklist, September 2006. 

59. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-70, Revision 2, 

National Checklist Program for IT Products--Guidelines for Checklist Users and 

Developers, February 2011. 

60. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-72, Guidelines 

on PDA Forensics, November 2004. 

61. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-73-3, Interfaces 

for Personal Identity Verification, February 2010. 
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APPENDIX A PAGE A-8

62. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-76-1, Biometric 

Data Specification for Personal Identity Verification, January 2007. 

63. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-77, Guide to 

IPsec VPNs, December 2005. 

64. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-78-1, Revision 3, 

Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification (PIV), 

December 2010. 

65. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-79-1, Guidelines 

for the Accreditation of Personal Identity Verification Card Issuers, June 2008. 

66. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-81, Secure

Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment Guide, Revision 1, April 2010. 

67. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-82, Guide to 

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security, June 2011. 

68. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-83, Guide to

Malware Incident Prevention and Handling, November 2005. 

69. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-84, Guide to 

Test, Training, and Exercise Programs for IT Plans and Capabilities, September 2006. 

70. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-85A-2, PIV Card 

Application and Middleware Interface Test Guidelines (SP 800-73-3 Compliance), July 

2010. 

71. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-85B-1, (Draft) 

PIV Data Model Test Guidelines, September 2009. 

72. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-86, Guide to

Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response, August 2006. 

73. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-87, Revision 1, 

Codes for the Identification of Federal and Federally-Assisted Organizations, April 

2008. 

74. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-88, Guidelines 

for Media Sanitization, September 2006. 

75. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-89, 

Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature Applications, 

November 2006. 

76. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-90A, 

Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit

Generators, January 2012. 

77. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-92, Guide to

Computer Security Log Management, September 2006. 

78. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-94, Guide to

Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS), February 2007. 

79. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-95, Guide to

Secure Web Services, August 2007. 
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80. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-96, PIV Card /

Reader Interoperability Guidelines, September 2006. 

81. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-97, Establishing 

Robust Security Networks: A Guide to IEEE 802.11i, February 2007. 

82. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-98, Guidelines 

for Securing Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Systems, April 2007. 

83. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-100, Information 

Security Handbook: A Guide for Managers, October 2006. 

84. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-101, Guidelines 

on Cell Phone Forensics, May 2007. 

85. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-103 (Draft), An

Ontology of Identity Credentials, Part I: Background and Formulation, October 2006. 

86. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-104, A Scheme 

for PIV Visual Card Topography, June 2007. 

87. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-106, Randomized 

Hashing Digital Signatures, February 2009. 

88. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-107 (Draft), 

Recommendation for Applications Using Approved Hash Algorithms (Revised), 

September 2011. 

89. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-108, 

Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions, October 2009. 

90. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-111, Guide to

Storage Encryption Technologies for End User Devices, November 2007. 

91. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-113, Guide to 

SSL VPNs, July 2008. 

92. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-114, User's

Guide to Securing External Devices for Telework and Remote Access, November 2007. 

93. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-115, Technical 

Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment, September 2008. 

94. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-116, A 

Recommendation for the Use of PIV Credentials in Physical Access Control Systems 

(PACS), November 2008. 

95. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-117, Version 1.0, 

Guide to Adopting and Using the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP), July 

2010. 

96. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-118 (Draft), 

Guide to Enterprise Password Management, April 2009. 

97. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-121, Revision 1 

(Draft), Guide to Bluetooth Security, September 2011. 

98. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-122, Guide to 

Protecting the Confidentiality of Personally Identifiable Information (PII), April 2010. 
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99. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-123, Guide to 

General Server Security, July 2008. 

100. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-124, Guidelines 

on Cell Phone and PDA Security, October 2008. 

101. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-128, Guide for 

Security-Focused Configuration Management of Information Systems, August 2011. 

102. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-137, Information 

Security Continuous Monitoring for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, 

September 2011. 

103. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-142, Practical 

Combinatorial Testing, October 2010. 

104. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-144, Guidelines 

for Security and Privacy in Public Cloud Computing, December 2011. 

105. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-145, A NIST 

Definition of Cloud Computing, September 2011. 

106. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-146 (Draft), 

Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, May 2011. 

107. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-147, Basic 

Input/Output System (BIOS) Protection Guidelines, April 2011. 

108. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-153 (Draft), 

Guidelines for Securing Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs), September 2011. 

109. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-155 (Draft), 

BIOS Integrity Measurement Guidelines, December 2011. 
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APPENDIX B PAGE B-1

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY

COMMON TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

Appendix B provides definitions for security terminology used within Special Publication 800-53. 

Unless specifically defined in this glossary, all terms used in this publication are consistent with 

the definitions contained in CNSS Instruction 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary. 

Adequate Security 

[OMB Circular A-130, 

Appendix III] 

Security commensurate with the risk and the magnitude of harm 

resulting from the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or 

modification of information. 

Advanced Persistent 

Threat 

An adversary that possesses sophisticated levels of expertise and 

significant resources which allow it to create opportunities to 

achieve its objectives by using multiple attack vectors (e.g., 

cyber, physical, and deception). These objectives typically 

include establishing and extending footholds within the 

information technology infrastructure of the targeted 

organizations for purposes of exfiltrating information, 

undermining or impeding critical aspects of a mission, program, 

or organization; or positioning itself to carry out these objectives 

in the future. The advanced persistent threat: (i) pursues its 

objectives repeatedly over an extended period of time; (ii) adapts 

to defenders’ efforts to resist it; and (iii) is determined to maintain 

the level of interaction needed to execute its objectives. 

Agency See Executive Agency. 

All Source Intelligence 

[Department of Defense, 

Joint Publication 1-02]

Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that 

incorporate all sources of information, most frequently including 

human resources intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement 

and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open source 

data in the production of finished intelligence. 

Assessment See Security Control Assessment. 

Assessor See Security Control Assessor. 

Assurance 

[CNSSI 4009] 

Measure of confidence that the security features, practices, 

procedures, and architecture of an information system accurately 

mediates and enforces the security policy. 

Assurance Case 

[Software Engineering 

Institute, Carnegie Mellon 

University] 

A structured set of arguments and a body of evidence showing 

that an information system satisfies specific claims with respect 

to a given quality attribute. 

Attribute-Based Access 

Control 

Access control based on attributes associated with and about 

subjects, objects, targets, initiators, resources, or the environment. 

An access control rule set defines the combination of attributes 

under which an access may take place. 
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APPENDIX B PAGE B-2

Audit Log 

[CNSSI 4009]

A chronological record of information system activities, including 

records of system accesses and operations performed in a given 

period. 

Audit Reduction Tools 

[CNSSI 4009]

Preprocessors designed to reduce the volume of audit records to 

facilitate manual review. Before a security review, these tools can 

remove many audit records known to have little security 

significance. These tools generally remove records generated by 

specified classes of events, such as records generated by nightly 

backups. 

Audit Trail 

[CNSSI 4009] 

A chronological record that reconstructs and examines the 

sequence of activities surrounding or leading to a specific 

operation, procedure, or event in a security-relevant transaction 

from inception to final result. 

Authentication 

[FIPS 200] 

Verifying the identity of a user, process, or device, often as a 

prerequisite to allowing access to resources in an information 

system. 

Authenticator The means used to confirm the identity of a user, processor, or 

device (e.g., user password or token). 

Authenticity The property of being genuine and being able to be verified and 

trusted; confidence in the validity of a transmission, a message, or 

message originator. See Authentication. 

Authorization 

(to operate)

The official management decision given by a senior 

organizational official to authorize operation of an information 

system and to explicitly accept the risk to organizational 

operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), 

organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the 

Nation based on the implementation of an agreed-upon set of 

security controls. 

Authorization Boundary All components of an information system to be authorized for 

operation by an authorizing official and excludes separately 

authorized systems, to which the information system is 

connected. 

Authorize Processing See Authorization. 

Authorizing Official A senior (federal) official or executive with the authority to 

formally assume responsibility for operating an information 

system at an acceptable level of risk to organizational operations 

(including mission, functions, image, or reputation), 

organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the 

Nation. 

Availability 

[44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542] 

Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information. 
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APPENDIX B PAGE B-3

Baseline Configuration A documented set of specifications for an information system, or 

a configuration item within a system, that has been formally 

reviewed and agreed on at a given point in time, and which can be 

changed only through change control procedures. The baseline 

configuration is used as a basis for future builds, releases, and/or 

changes. 

Boundary Protection Monitoring and control of communications at the external 

boundary of an information system to prevent and detect 

malicious and other unauthorized communications, through the 

use of boundary protection devices (e.g., gateways, routers, 

firewalls, guards, encrypted tunnels). 

Boundary Protection 

Device 

A device with appropriate mechanisms that: (i) facilitates the 

adjudication of different interconnected system security policies 

(e.g., controlling the flow of information into or out of an 

interconnected system); and/or (ii) provides information system 

boundary protection. 

Chief Information Officer 

[PL 104-106, Sec. 5125(b)] 

Agency official responsible for: 

(i) Providing advice and other assistance to the head of the 

executive agency and other senior management personnel of the 

agency to ensure that information technology is acquired and 

information resources are managed in a manner that is consistent 

with laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and 

priorities established by the head of the agency; 

(ii) Developing, maintaining, and facilitating the implementation 

of a sound and integrated information technology architecture for 

the agency; and 

(iii) Promoting the effective and efficient design and operation of 

all major information resources management processes for the 

agency, including improvements to work processes of the agency. 

Note: Organizations subordinate to federal agencies may use the term Chief 

Information Officer to denote individuals filling positions with similar security 

responsibilities to agency-level Chief Information Officers. 

Chief Information Security 

Officer 

See Senior Agency Information Security Officer. 

Classified Information Information that has been determined: (i) pursuant to Executive 

Order 12958 as amended by Executive Order 13292, or any 

predecessor Order, to be classified national security information; 

or (ii) pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to 

be Restricted Data (RD). 

Commodity Service An information system service (e.g., telecommunications service) 

provided by a commercial service provider typically to a large 

and diverse set of consumers. The organization acquiring and/or 

receiving the commodity service possesses limited visibility into 

the management structure and operations of the provider, and 

while the organization may be able to negotiate service-level 

agreements, the organization is typically not in a position to 

require that the provider implement specific security controls. 
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APPENDIX B PAGE B-4

Common Carrier In a telecommunications context, a telecommunications company 

that holds itself out to the public for hire to provide 

communications transmission services. Note: In the United 

States, such companies are usually subject to regulation by 

federal and state regulatory commissions. 

Common Control 

[NIST SP 800-37; CNSSI 

4009] 

A security control that is inherited by one or more organizational 

information systems. See Security Control Inheritance. 

Common Control Provider 

[NIST SP 800-37] 

An organizational official responsible for the development, 

implementation, assessment, and monitoring of common controls 

(i.e., security controls inherited by information systems). 

Common Criteria 

[CNSSI 4009]

Governing document that provides a comprehensive, rigorous 

method for specifying security function and assurance 

requirements for products and systems. 

Common Secure 

Configuration 

A recognized standardized and established benchmark that 

stipulates specific secure configuration settings for a given 

information technology platform. 

Compensating Security 

Controls 

[CNSSI 4009, Adapted]

The security controls employed in lieu of the recommended 

controls in the security control baselines described in NIST 

Special Publication 800-53 and CNSS Instruction 1253 that 

provide equivalent or comparable protection for an information 

system or organization.

Confidentiality 

[44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542] 

Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and 

disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and 

proprietary information. 

Configuration Control 

[CNSSI 4009] 

Process for controlling modifications to hardware, firmware, 

software, and documentation to protect the information system 

against improper modifications before, during, and after system 

implementation. 

Configuration Item An aggregation of information system components that is 

designated for configuration management and treated as a single 

entity in the configuration management process. 

Controlled Area Any area or space for which an organization has confidence that 

the physical and procedural protections provided are sufficient to 

meet the requirements established for protecting the information 

and/or information system. 

Controlled Unclassified 

Information 

[E.O. 13556] 

A categorical designation that refers to unclassified information 

that does not meet the standards for National Security 

Classification under Executive Order 12958, as amended, but is 

(i) pertinent to the national interests of the United States or to the 

important interests of entities outside the federal government, and 

(ii) under law or policy requires protection from unauthorized 

disclosure, special handling safeguards, or prescribed limits on 

exchange or dissemination. Henceforth, the designation CUI 

replaces Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU). 
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APPENDIX B PAGE B-5

Countermeasures 

[CNSSI 4009] 

Actions, devices, procedures, techniques, or other measures that 

reduce the vulnerability of an information system. Synonymous 

with security controls and safeguards. 

Covert Channel Analysis 

[CNSSI 4009]

Determination of the extent to which the security policy model 

and subsequent lower-level program descriptions may allow 

unauthorized access to information. 

Covert Storage Channel 

[CNSSI 4009]

Covert channel involving the direct or indirect writing to a 

storage location by one process and the direct or indirect reading 

of the storage location by another process. Covert storage 

channels typically involve a finite resource (e.g., sectors on a 

disk) that is shared by two subjects at different security levels. 

Covert Timing Channel 

[CNSSI 4009]

Covert channel in which one process signals information to 

another process by modulating its own use of system resources 

(e.g., central processing unit time) in such a way that this 

manipulation affects the real response time observed by the 

second process. 

Cyber Attack 

[CNSSI 4009]

An attack, via cyberspace, targeting an enterprise’s use of 

cyberspace for the purpose of disrupting, disabling, destroying, or 

maliciously controlling a computing environment/infrastructure; 

or destroying the integrity of the data or stealing controlled 

information. 

Cyber Security 

[CNSSI 4009]

The ability to protect or defend the use of cyberspace from cyber 

attacks. 

Cyberspace 

[CNSSI 4009]

A global domain within the information environment consisting 

of the interdependent network of information systems 

infrastructures including the Internet, telecommunications 

networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 

controllers.

Defense-in-Breadth 

[CNSSI 4009]

A planned, systematic set of multidisciplinary activities that seek 

to identify, manage, and reduce risk of exploitable vulnerabilities 

at every stage of the system, network, or subcomponent life cycle 

(system, network, or product design and development; 

manufacturing; packaging; assembly; system integration; 

distribution; operations; maintenance; and retirement). 

Defense-in-depth Information security strategy integrating people, technology, and 

operations capabilities to establish variable barriers across 

multiple layers and missions of the organization. 

Developer See Information System Developer. 

Discretionary Access 

Control 

A type of access control that restricts access to objects based on 

the identity of subjects or groups to which subjects belong. The 

access controls are discretionary because subjects with certain 

privileges are capable of passing those privileges on to any other 

subjects, either directly or indirectly. Nondiscretionary access 

controls restrict this capability. 
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APPENDIX B PAGE B-6

Domain 

[CNSSI 4009]

An environment or context that includes a set of system resources 

and a set of system entities that have the right to access the 

resources as defined by a common security policy, security 

model, or security architecture. See Security Domain. 

Enterprise 

[CNSSI 4009]

An organization with a defined mission/goal and a defined 

boundary, using information systems to execute that mission, and 

with responsibility for managing its own risks and performance. 

An enterprise may consist of all or some of the following 

business aspects: acquisition, program management, financial 

management (e.g., budgets), human resources, security, and 

information systems, information and mission management. See 

Organization. 

Enterprise Architecture 

[CNSSI 4009]

The description of an enterprise’s entire set of information 

systems: how they are configured, how they are integrated, how 

they interface to the external environment at the enterprise’s 

boundary, how they are operated to support the enterprise 

mission, and how they contribute to the enterprise’s overall 

security posture. 

Environment of Operation 

[NIST SP 800-37] 

The physical surroundings in which an information system 

processes, stores, and transmits information. 

Executive Agency 

[41 U.S.C., Sec. 403] 

An executive department specified in 5 U.S.C., Sec. 101; a 

military department specified in 5 U.S.C., Sec. 102; an 

independent establishment as defined in 5 U.S.C., Sec. 104(1); 

and a wholly owned Government corporation fully subject to the 

provisions of 31 U.S.C., Chapter 91. 

Exfiltration The unauthorized transfer of information from an information 

system. 

External Information 

System (or Component) 

An information system or component of an information system 

that is outside of the authorization boundary established by the 

organization and for which the organization typically has no 

direct control over the application of required security controls or 

the assessment of security control effectiveness. 

External Information 

System Service 

An information system service that is implemented outside of the 

authorization boundary of the organizational information system 

(i.e., a service that is used by, but not a part of, the organizational 

information system) and for which the organization typically has 

no direct control over the application of required security controls 

or the assessment of security control effectiveness. 

External Information 

System Service Provider 

A provider of external information system services to an 

organization through a variety of consumer-producer 

relationships including but not limited to: joint ventures; business 

partnerships; outsourcing arrangements (i.e., through contracts, 

interagency agreements, lines of business arrangements); 

licensing agreements; and/or supply chain exchanges. 

External Network A network not controlled by the organization. 
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APPENDIX B PAGE B-7

Failover The capability to switch over automatically (typically without 

human intervention or warning) to a redundant or standby 

information system upon the failure or abnormal termination of 

the previously active system. 

Federal Agency See Executive Agency. 

Federal Enterprise 

Architecture 

[FEA Program Management 

Office]

A business-based framework for governmentwide improvement 

developed by the Office of Management and Budget that is 

intended to facilitate efforts to transform the federal government 

to one that is citizen-centered, results-oriented, and market-based. 

Federal Information 

System 

[40 U.S.C., Sec. 11331] 

An information system used or operated by an executive agency, 

by a contractor of an executive agency, or by another 

organization on behalf of an executive agency. 

FIPS-Validated 

Cryptography 

A cryptographic module validated by the Cryptographic Module 

Validation Program (CMVP) to meet requirements specified in 

FIPS 140-2 (as amended). As a prerequisite to CMVP validation, 

the cryptographic module is required to employ a cryptographic 

algorithm implementation that has successfully passed validation 

testing by the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program 

(CAVP). See NSA-Approved Cryptography. 

Guard (System) 

[CNSSI 4009, Adapted]

A mechanism limiting the exchange of information between 

information systems or subsystems. 

High-Impact System 

[FIPS 200]

An information system in which at least one security objective 

(i.e., confidentiality, integrity, or availability) is assigned a FIPS 

199 potential impact value of high. 

Hybrid Security Control 

[CNSSI 4009]

A security control that is implemented in an information system 

in part as a common control and in part as a system-specific 

control. 

See Common Control and System-Specific Security Control. 

Identity-Based Access 

Control 

Access control based on the identity of the user (typically relayed 

as a characteristic of the process acting on behalf of that user) 

where access authorizations to specific objects are assigned based 

on user identity. 

Impact The effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, 

individuals, other organizations, or the Nation (including the 

national security interests of the United States) of a loss of 

confidentiality, integrity or availability of information or an 

information system. 

Impact Value The assessed potential impact resulting from a compromise of the 

confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information expressed 

as a value of low, moderate or high. 

Incident 

[FIPS 200] 

An occurrence that actually or potentially jeopardizes the 

confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information system 

or the information the system processes, stores, or transmits or 

that constitutes a violation or imminent threat of violation of 

security policies, security procedures, or acceptable use policies. 
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APPENDIX B PAGE B-8

Industrial Control System An information system used to control industrial processes such 

as manufacturing, product handling, production, and distribution. 

Industrial control systems include supervisory control and data 

acquisition (SCADA) systems used to control geographically 

dispersed assets, as well as distributed control systems (DCSs) 

and smaller control systems using programmable logic controllers 

to control localized processes. 

Information 

[CNSSI 4009] 

[FIPS 199] 

Any communication or representation of knowledge such as facts, 

data, or opinions in any medium or form, including textual, 

numerical, graphic, cartographic, narrative, or audiovisual. 

An instance of an information type.

Information Owner 

[CNSSI 4009] 

Official with statutory or operational authority for specified 

information and responsibility for establishing the controls for its 

generation, collection, processing, dissemination, and disposal. 

Information Resources 

[44 U.S.C., Sec. 3502] 

Information and related resources, such as personnel, equipment, 

funds, and information technology. 

Information Security 

[44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542] 

The protection of information and information systems from 

unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or 

destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and 

availability. 

Information Security 

Architecture 

An embedded, integral part of the enterprise architecture that 

describes the structure and behavior for an enterprise’s security 

processes, information security systems, personnel and 

organizational sub-units, showing their alignment with the 

enterprise’s mission and strategic plans.

Information Security 

Policy 

[CNSSI 4009] 

Aggregate of directives, regulations, rules, and practices that 

prescribes how an organization manages, protects, and distributes 

information. 

Information Security 

Program Plan 

Formal document that provides an overview of the security 

requirements for an organization-wide information security 

program and describes the program management controls and 

common controls in place or planned for meeting those 

requirements. 

Information Steward 

[CNSSI 4009]

An agency official with statutory or operational authority for 

specified information and responsibility for establishing the 

controls for its generation, collection, processing, dissemination, 

and disposal. 

Information System 

[44 U.S.C., Sec. 3502] 

A discrete set of information resources organized for the 

collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, 

or disposition of information. 

[Note: Information systems also include specialized systems such 

as industrial/process controls systems, telephone switching and 

private branch exchange (PBX) systems, and environmental 

control systems.] 
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APPENDIX B PAGE B-9

Information System 

Boundary 

See Authorization Boundary. 

Information System 

Developer 

A general term that includes developers or manufacturers of 

information technology products (including hardware, software, 

firmware), systems integrators, vendors, and product resellers. 

Information System Owner 

(or Program Manager) 

Official responsible for the overall procurement, development, 

integration, modification, or operation and maintenance of an 

information system. 

Information System 

Resilience 

The ability of an information system to continue to: (i) operate 

under adverse conditions or stress, even if in a degraded or 

debilitated state, while maintaining essential operational 

capabilities; and (ii) recover to an effective operational posture in 

a time frame consistent with mission needs. 

Information System 

Security Officer 

[CNSSI 4009] 

Individual with assigned responsibility for maintaining the 

appropriate operational security posture for an information 

system or program. 

Information Security Risk The risk to organizational operations (including mission, 

functions, image, reputation), organizational assets, individuals, 

other organizations, and the Nation due to the potential for 

unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or 

destruction of information and/or information systems. 

Information SystemRelated Security Risks

Risks that arise through the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or 

availability of information or information systems and consider 

impacts to the organization (including assets, mission, functions, 

image, or reputation), individuals, other organizations, and the 

Nation. See Risk.

Information Technology 

[40 U.S.C., Sec. 1401] 

Any equipment or interconnected system or subsystem of 

equipment that is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, 

manipulation, management, movement, control, display, 

switching, interchange, transmission, or reception of data or 

information by the executive agency. For purposes of the 

preceding sentence, equipment is used by an executive agency if 

the equipment is used by the executive agency directly or is used 

by a contractor under a contract with the executive agency which: 

(i) requires the use of such equipment; or (ii) requires the use, to a 

significant extent, of such equipment in the performance of a 

service or the furnishing of a product. The term information 

technology includes computers, ancillary equipment, software, 

firmware, and similar procedures, services (including support 

services), and related resources. 

Information Type 

[FIPS 199] 

A specific category of information (e.g., privacy, medical, 

proprietary, financial, investigative, contractor sensitive, security 

management) defined by an organization or in some instances, by 

a specific law, Executive Order, directive, policy, or regulation. 
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APPENDIX B PAGE B-10

Integrity 

[44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542] 

Guarding against improper information modification or 

destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation 

and authenticity. 

Internal Network A network where: (i) the establishment, maintenance, and 

provisioning of security controls are under the direct control of 

organizational employees or contractors; or (ii) cryptographic 

encapsulation or similar security technology implemented 

between organization-controlled endpoints, provides the same 

effect (at least with regard to confidentiality and integrity). An 

internal network is typically organization-owned, yet may be 

organization-controlled while not being organization-owned. 

Label See Security Label. 

Line of Business The following OMB-defined process areas common to virtually 

all federal agencies: Case Management, Financial Management, 

Grants Management, Human Resources Management, Federal 

Health Architecture, Information Systems Security, Budget 

Formulation and Execution, Geospatial, and IT Infrastructure. 

Local Access Access to an organizational information system by a user (or 

process acting on behalf of a user) communicating through a 

direct connection without the use of a network. 

Low-Impact System 

[FIPS 200]

An information system in which all three security objectives (i.e., 

confidentiality, integrity, and availability) are assigned a FIPS 

199 potential impact value of low. 

Malicious Code Software or firmware intended to perform an unauthorized 

process that will have adverse impact on the confidentiality, 

integrity, or availability of an information system. A virus, worm, 

Trojan horse, or other code-based entity that infects a host. 

Spyware and some forms of adware are also examples of 

malicious code. 

Malware See Malicious Code. 

Managed Interface An interface within an information system that provides boundary 

protection capability using automated mechanisms or devices. 

Marking See Security Marking. 

Media 

[FIPS 200] 

Physical devices or writing surfaces including, but not limited to, 

magnetic tapes, optical disks, magnetic disks, Large-Scale 

Integration (LSI) memory chips, and printouts (but not including 

display media) onto which information is recorded, stored, or 

printed within an information system. 

Metadata Information describing the characteristics of data including, for 

example, structural metadata describing data structures (e.g., data 

format, syntax, and semantics) and descriptive metadata 

describing data contents (e.g., information security labels).
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Mobile Code Software programs or parts of programs obtained from remote 

information systems, transmitted across a network, and executed 

on a local information system without explicit installation or 

execution by the recipient. 

Mobile Code Technologies Software technologies that provide the mechanisms for the 

production and use of mobile code (e.g., Java, JavaScript, 

ActiveX, VBScript). 

Mobile Device Portable cartridge/disk-based, removable storage media (e.g., 

floppy disks, compact disks, USB flash drives, external hard 

drives, and other flash memory cards/drives that contain nonvolatile memory). 

Portable computing and communications device with information 

storage capability (e.g., notebook/laptop computers, personal 

digital assistants, cellular telephones, digital cameras, and audio 

recording devices). 

Moderate-Impact System 

[FIPS 200]

An information system in which at least one security objective 

(i.e., confidentiality, integrity, or availability) is assigned a FIPS 

199 potential impact value of moderate and no security objective 

is assigned a FIPS 199 potential impact value of high. 

Multifactor Authentication Authentication using two or more factors to achieve 

authentication. Factors include: (i) something you know (e.g. 

password/PIN); (ii) something you have (e.g., cryptographic 

identification device, token); or (iii) something you are (e.g., 

biometric). See Authenticator. 

National Security 

Emergency Preparedness 

Telecommunications 

Services 

[47 C.F.R., Part 64, App A] 

Telecommunications services that are used to maintain a state of 

readiness or to respond to and manage any event or crisis (local, 

national, or international) that causes or could cause injury or 

harm to the population, damage to or loss of property, or degrade 

or threaten the national security or emergency preparedness 

posture of the United States. 

National Security System 

[44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542] 

Any information system (including any telecommunications 

system) used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of an 

agency, or other organization on behalf of an agency—(i) the 

function, operation, or use of which involves intelligence 

activities; involves cryptologic activities related to national 

security; involves command and control of military forces; 

involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or 

weapons system; or is critical to the direct fulfillment of military 

or intelligence missions (excluding a system that is to be used for 

routine administrative and business applications, for example, 

payroll, finance, logistics, and personnel management 

applications); or (ii) is protected at all times by procedures 

established for information that have been specifically authorized 

under criteria established by an Executive Order or an Act of 

Congress to be kept classified in the interest of national defense 

or foreign policy. 
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Network 

[CNSSI 4009] 

Information system(s) implemented with a collection of 

interconnected components. Such components may include 

routers, hubs, cabling, telecommunications controllers, key 

distribution centers, and technical control devices. 

Network Access Access to an information system by a user (or a process acting on 

behalf of a user) communicating through a network (e.g., local 

area network, wide area network, Internet). 

Nondiscretionary Access 

Control 

A type of access control that restricts access to objects based on 

the identity of subjects or groups to which the subjects belong. 

The access controls are nondiscretionary because subjects with 

certain privileges are restricted from passing those privileges on 

to any other subjects, either directly or indirectly—that is, the 

information system strictly enforces the access control policy 

based on the rule set established by the policy. 

Non-Local Maintenance Maintenance activities conducted by individuals communicating 

through a network; either an external network (e.g., the Internet) 

or an internal network. 

Non-Organizational User A user who is not an organizational user (including public users). 

Non-repudiation Protection against an individual falsely denying having performed 

a particular action. Provides the capability to determine whether a 

given individual took a particular action such as creating 

information, sending a message, approving information, and 

receiving a message. 

NSA-Approved 

Cryptography 

Cryptography that consists of: (i) an approved algorithm; (ii) an 

implementation that has been approved for the protection of 

classified information in a particular environment; and (iii) a 

supporting key management infrastructure. 

Object Passive information system-related entity (e.g., devices, files, 

records, tables, processes, programs, domains) containing or 

receiving information. Access to an object (by a subject) implies 

access to the information it contains. See Subject. 

Operations Security 

[CNSSI 4009]

Systematic and proven process by which potential adversaries can 

be denied information about capabilities and intentions by 

identifying, controlling, and protecting generally unclassified 

evidence of the planning and execution of sensitive activities. The 

process involves five steps: identification of critical information, 

analysis of threats, analysis of vulnerabilities, assessment of risks, 

and application of appropriate countermeasures.

Organization 

[FIPS 200, Adapted] 

An entity of any size, complexity, or positioning within an 

organizational structure (e.g., a federal agency or, as appropriate, 

any of its operational elements). 

Organizational User An organizational employee or an individual the organization 

deems to have equivalent status of an employee (e.g., contractor, 

guest researcher, individual detailed from another organization, 

individual from allied nation). 
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Overlay A specification of security controls, control enhancements, and 

supplemental guidance derived from the application of tailoring 

guidance to security control baselines. The overlay specification 

may be more stringent or less stringent than the original security 

control baseline specification. 

Penetration Testing A test methodology in which assessors, typically working under 

specific constraints, attempt to circumvent or defeat the security 

features of an information system. 

Plan of Action and 

Milestones 

[OMB Memorandum 02-01]

A document that identifies tasks needing to be accomplished. It 

details resources required to accomplish the elements of the plan, 

any milestones in meeting the tasks, and scheduled completion 

dates for the milestones. 

Potential Impact 

[FIPS 199] 

The loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability could be 

expected to have: (i) a limited adverse effect (FIPS 199 low); (ii) 

a serious adverse effect (FIPS 199 moderate); or (iii) a severe or 

catastrophic adverse effect (FIPS 199 high) on organizational 

operations, organizational assets, or individuals. 

Privacy Impact 

Assessment 

[OMB Memorandum 03-22]

An analysis of how information is handled: (i) to ensure handling 

conforms to applicable legal, regulatory, and policy requirements 

regarding privacy; (ii) to determine the risks and effects of 

collecting, maintaining, and disseminating information in 

identifiable form in an electronic information system; and (iii) to 

examine and evaluate protections and alternative processes for 

handling information to mitigate potential privacy risks. 

Privileged Account An information system account with authorizations of a 

privileged user. 

Privileged Command A human-initiated command executed on an information system 

involving the control, monitoring, or administration of the system 

including security functions and associated security-relevant 

information. 

Privileged User 

[CNSSI 4009] 

A user that is authorized (and therefore, trusted) to perform 

security-relevant functions that ordinary users are not authorized 

to perform. 

Protective Distribution 

System 

Wire line or fiber optic system that includes adequate safeguards 

and/or countermeasures (e.g., acoustic, electric, electromagnetic, 

and physical) to permit its use for the transmission of unencrypted 

information. 

Reciprocity Mutual agreement among participating organizations to accept 

each other’s security assessments in order to reuse information 

system resources and/or to accept each other’s assessed security 

posture in order to share information. 
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Records The recordings (automated and/or manual) of evidence of 

activities performed or results achieved (e.g., forms, reports, test 

results), which serve as a basis for verifying that the organization 

and the information system are performing as intended. Also used 

to refer to units of related data fields (i.e., groups of data fields 

that can be accessed by a program and that contain the complete 

set of information on particular items). 

Red Team Exercise An exercise, reflecting real-world conditions, that is conducted as 

a simulated adversarial attempt to compromise organizational 

missions and/or business processes to provide a comprehensive 

assessment of the security capability of the information system 

and organization. 

Remote Access Access to an organizational information system by a user (or a 

process acting on behalf of a user) communicating through an 

external network (e.g., the Internet). 

Remote Maintenance Maintenance activities conducted by individuals communicating 

through an external network (e.g., the Internet). 

Removable Media Portable electronic storage media such as magnetic, optical, and 

solid state devices, which can be inserted into and removed from 

a computing device, and that is used to store text, video, audio, 

and image information. Examples include hard disks, floppy 

disks, zip drives, compact disks, thumb drives, pen drives, and 

similar USB storage devices.

Resilience See Information System Resilience. 

Restricted Data 

[Atomic Energy Act of 1954] 

All data concerning (i) design, manufacture, or utilization of 

atomic weapons; (ii) the production of special nuclear material; or 

(iii) the use of special nuclear material in the production of 

energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed from 

the Restricted Data category pursuant to Section 142 [of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954]. 

Risk 

[FIPS 200, Adapted] 

A measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a 

potential circumstance or event, and typically a function of: (i) 

the adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance or event 

occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence. 

Information system-related security risks are those risks that arise 

from the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of 

information or information systems and reflect the potential 

adverse impacts to organizational operations (including mission, 

functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, 

individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. 
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Risk Assessment The process of identifying risks to organizational operations 

(including mission, functions, image, reputation), organizational 

assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation, resulting 

from the operation of an information system. 

Part of risk management, incorporates threat and vulnerability 

analyses, and considers mitigations provided by security controls 

planned or in place. Synonymous with risk analysis. 

Risk Executive (Function) 

[CNSSI 4009]

An individual or group within an organization that helps to ensure 

that: (i) security risk-related considerations for individual 

information systems, to include the authorization decisions for 

those systems, are viewed from an organization-wide perspective 

with regard to the overall strategic goals and objectives of the 

organization in carrying out its missions and business functions; 

and (ii) managing risk from individual information systems is 

consistent across the organization, reflects organizational risk 

tolerance, and is considered along with other organizational risks 

affecting mission/business success.

Risk Management 

[CNSSI 4009, adapted] 

The program and supporting processes to manage information 

security risk to organizational operations (including mission, 

functions, image, reputation), organizational assets, individuals, 

other organizations, and the Nation, and includes: (i) establishing 

the context for risk-related activities; (ii) assessing risk; (iii) 

responding to risk once determined; and (iv) monitoring risk over 

time. 

Risk Mitigation 

[CNSSI 4009] 

Prioritizing, evaluating, and implementing the appropriate riskreducing controls/countermeasures recommended from the risk 

management process. 

Risk Monitoring Maintaining ongoing awareness of an organization’s risk 

environment, risk management program, and associated activities 

to support risk decisions. 

Risk Response Accepting, avoiding, mitigating, sharing, or transferring risk to 

organizational operations (i.e., mission, functions, image, or 

reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other 

organizations, or the Nation. 

Role-Based Access 

Control 

Access control based on user roles (i.e., a collection of access 

authorizations a user receives based on an explicit or implicit 

assumption of a given role). Role permissions may be inherited 

through a role hierarchy and typically reflect the permissions 

needed to perform defined functions within an organization. A 

given role may apply to a single individual or to several 

individuals. 

Safeguards 

[CNSSI 4009] 

Protective measures prescribed to meet the security requirements 

(i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability) specified for an 

information system. Safeguards may include security features, 

management constraints, personnel security, and security of 

physical structures, areas, and devices. Synonymous with security 

controls and countermeasures. 
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APPENDIX B PAGE B-16

Sanitization A general term referring to the actions taken to render data 

written on media unrecoverable by both ordinary and, for some 

forms of sanitization, extraordinary means. 

Scoping Considerations A part of tailoring guidance providing organizations with specific 

policy/regulatory-related, technology-related, system component 

allocation-related, operational/environmental-related, physical 

infrastructure-related, public access-related, scalability-related, 

common control-related, and security objective-related 

considerations on the applicability and implementation of 

individual security controls in the security control baseline. 

Security 

[CNSSI 4009]

A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance 

of protective measures that enable an enterprise to perform its 

mission or critical functions despite risks posed by threats to its 

use of information systems. Protective measures may involve a 

combination of deterrence, avoidance, prevention, detection, 

recovery, and correction that should form part of the enterprise’s 

risk management approach. 

Security Assurance See Assurance. 

Security Attribute An abstraction representing the basic properties or characteristics 

of an entity with respect to safeguarding information; typically 

associated with internal data structures (e.g., records, buffers, 

files) within the information system and used to enable the 

implementation of access control and flow control policies, 

reflect special dissemination, handling or distribution instructions, 

or support other aspects of the information security policy. 

Security Authorization See Authorization. 

Security Authorization 

Boundary 

See Authorization Boundary. 

Security Capability The set of mutually-reinforcing security controls that provides the 

requisite level of trustworthiness for organizational information 

systems. 

Security Categorization The process of determining the security category for information 

or an information system. Security categorization methodologies 

are described in CNSS Instruction 1253 for national security 

systems and in FIPS 199 for other than national security systems. 

See Security Category.

Security Category 

[FIPS 199, Adapted; CNSSI 

4009] 

The characterization of information or an information system 

based on an assessment of the potential impact that a loss of 

confidentiality, integrity, or availability of such information or 

information system would have on organizational operations, 

organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the 

Nation. 
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Security Control 

[FIPS 199, Adapted] 

The safeguards or countermeasures prescribed for an information 

system or an organization to protect the confidentiality, integrity, 

and availability its information. 

Security Control 

Assessment 

[CNSSI 4009, Adapted]

The testing or evaluation of security controls to determine the 

extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating 

as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to 

meeting the security requirements for an information system or 

organization. 

Security Control Assessor The individual, group, or organization responsible for conducting 

a security control assessment.

Security Control Baseline 

[FIPS 200]

The set of minimum security controls defined for a low-impact, 

moderate-impact, or high-impact information system. 

Security Control 

Enhancements 

Statements of security capability to: (i) build in additional, but 

related, functionality to a security control; and/or (ii) increase the 

strength of the control. 

Security Control 

Inheritance 

[CNSSI 4009]

A situation in which an information system or application 

receives protection from security controls (or portions of security 

controls) that are developed, implemented, assessed, authorized, 

and monitored by entities other than those responsible for the 

system or application; entities either internal or external to the 

organization where the system or application resides. See 

Common Control. 

Security Domain 

[CNSSI 4009]

A domain that implements a security policy and is administered 

by a single authority. 

Security Functionality The security-related features, functions, mechanisms, services, 

procedures, and architectures implemented within organizational 

information systems or the environments in which those systems 

operate.

Security Functions The hardware, software, and/or firmware of the information 

system responsible for enforcing the system security policy and 

supporting the isolation of code and data on which the protection 

is based. 

Security Impact Analysis 

[CNSSI 4009]

The analysis conducted by an organizational official to determine 

the extent to which changes to the information system have 

affected the security state of the system. 

Security Incident See Incident. 

Security Label The means used to associate a set of security attributes with a 

specific information object as part of the data structure for that 

object. 

Security Marking Human-readable information affixed to information system 

components, removable media, or output indicating the 

distribution limitations, handling caveats and applicable security 

markings. 
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Security Objective 

[FIPS 199]

Confidentiality, integrity, or availability. 

Security Plan Formal document that provides an overview of the security 

requirements for an information system or an information security 

program and describes the security controls in place or planned 

for meeting those requirements. 

See System Security Plan or Information Security Program Plan. 

Security Policy 

[CNSSI 4009] 

A set of criteria for the provision of security services. 

Security Requirements 

[FIPS 200] 

Requirements levied on an information system that are derived 

from applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, 

standards, instructions, regulations, procedures, or organizational 

mission/business case needs to ensure the confidentiality, 

integrity, and availability of the information being processed, 

stored, or transmitted. 

Security Service 

[CNSSI 4009]

A capability that supports one, or more, of the security 

requirements (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability). Examples 

of security services are key management, access control, and 

authentication. 

Security-Relevant 

Information 

Any information within the information system that can 

potentially impact the operation of security functions or the 

provision of security services in a manner that could result in 

failure to enforce the system security policy or maintain isolation 

of code and data. 

Senior (Agency) 

Information Security 

Officer 

[44 U.S.C., Sec. 3544]

Official responsible for carrying out the Chief Information 

Officer responsibilities under FISMA and serving as the Chief 

Information Officer’s primary liaison to the agency’s authorizing 

officials, information system owners, and information system 

security officers. 

Note: Organizations subordinate to federal agencies may use the term Senior 

Information Security Officer or Chief Information Security Officer to denote 

individuals filling positions with similar responsibilities to Senior Agency 

Information Security Officers. 

Senior Information 

Security Officer 

See Senior Agency Information Security Officer. 

Sensitive Information 

[CNSSI 4009]

Information, the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or 

modification of, that could adversely affect the national interest or 

the conduct of federal programs, or the privacy to which 

individuals are entitled under 5 U.S.C. Section 552a (the Privacy 

Act), but that has not been specifically authorized under criteria 

established by an Executive Order or an Act of Congress to be 

kept classified in the interest of national defense or foreign 

policy. 
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APPENDIX B PAGE B-19

Sensitive Compartmented 

Information 

[CNSSI 4009]

Classified information concerning or derived from intelligence 

sources, methods, or analytical processes, which is required to be 

handled within formal access control systems established by the 

Director of National Intelligence. 

Spam The abuse of electronic messaging systems to indiscriminately 

send unsolicited bulk messages. 

Special Access Program 

[CNSSI 4009]

A program established for a specific class of classified 

information that imposes safeguarding and access requirements 

that exceed those normally required for information at the same 

classification level. 

Spyware Software that is secretly or surreptitiously installed into an 

information system to gather information on individuals or 

organizations without their knowledge; a type of malicious code. 

Subject Generally an individual, process, or device causing information to 

flow among objects or change to the system state. See Object. 

Subsystem A major subdivision or component of an information system 

consisting of information, information technology, and personnel 

that performs one or more specific functions. 

Supplementation The process of adding security controls or control enhancements 

to a security control baseline as part of the tailoring process 

(during security control selection) in order to adequately meet the 

organization’s risk management needs. 

Supply Chain A system of organizations, people, activities, information, and 

resources, possibly international in scope, that provides products 

or services to consumers. 

System See Information System. 

System Security Plan 

[NIST SP 800-18] 

Formal document that provides an overview of the security 

requirements for an information system and describes the security 

controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements. 

System-Specific Security 

Control 

A security control for an information system that has not been 

designated as a common security control or the portion of a 

hybrid control that is to be implemented within an information 

system. 

Tailored Security Control 

Baseline 

A set of security controls resulting from the application of 

tailoring guidance to a security control baseline. See Tailoring. 

Tailoring The process by which security control baselines are modified by: 

(i) identifying and designating common controls; (ii) applying 

scoping considerations; (iii) selecting compensating controls; (iv) 

assigning specific values to organization-defined security control 

parameters; (v) supplementing baselines with additional security 

controls or control enhancements; and (vi) providing additional 

specification information for control implementation. 
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APPENDIX B PAGE B-20

Threat 

[CNSSI 4009, Adapted] 

Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact 

organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or 

reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other 

organizations, or the Nation through an information system via 

unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of 

information, and/or denial of service. 

Threat Assessment 

[CNSSI 4009] 

Formal description and evaluation of threat to an information 

system. 

Threat Source 

[FIPS 200]

The intent and method targeted at the intentional exploitation of a 

vulnerability or a situation and method that may accidentally 

trigger a vulnerability. Synonymous with threat agent. 

Trusted Path A mechanism by which a user (through an input device) can 

communicate directly with the security functions of the 

information system with the necessary confidence to support the 

system security policy. This mechanism can only be activated by 

the user or the security functions of the information system and 

cannot be imitated by untrusted software. 

Trustworthiness 

[CNSSI 4009] 

The attribute of a person or enterprise that provides confidence to 

others of the qualifications, capabilities, and reliability of that 

entity to perform specific tasks and fulfill assigned 

responsibilities. 

Trustworthiness 

(Information System) 

The degree to which an information system (including the 

information technology components that are used to build the 

system) can be expected to preserve the confidentiality, integrity, 

and availability of the information being processed, stored, or 

transmitted by the system across the full range of threats. A 

trustworthy information system is a system that is believed to be 

capable of operating within defined levels of risk despite the 

environmental disruptions, human errors, structural failures, and 

purposeful attacks that are expected to occur in its environment of 

operation. 

User 

[CNSSI 4009, adapted]

Individual, or (system) process acting on behalf of an individual, 

authorized to access an information system. 

See Organizational User and Non-Organizational User. 

Vulnerability 

[CNSSI 4009] 

Weakness in an information system, system security procedures, 

internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited or 

triggered by a threat source. 

Vulnerability Assessment 

[CNSSI 4009] 

Formal description and evaluation of the vulnerabilities in an 

information system. 
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APPENDIX C

ACRONYMS

COMMON ABBREVIATIONS 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

CIO Chief Information Officer 

CISO Chief Information Security Officer 

CNSS Committee on National Security Systems 

CUI Controlled Unclassified Information 

DNS Domain Name System 

DoD Department of Defense 

FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards 

FISMA Federal Information Security Management Act 

HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

ICS Industrial Control System 

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 

IPsec Internet Protocol Security 

ISO/IEC International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical 

Commission 

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 

NISTIR National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency Report 

NSA National Security Agency 

NSTISSI National Security Telecommunications and Information System Security 

Instruction 

ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

OPSEC Operations Security 

PIV Personal Identity Verification 

PKI Public Key Infrastructure 

RD Restricted Data 

RDTE Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 

SAISO Senior Agency Information Security Officer 

SAMI Sources And Methods Information 

SBU Sensitive But Unclassified 

SCI Sensitive Compartmented Information 
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TSP Telecommunications Service Priority 

VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol 

VPN Virtual Private Network 
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APPENDIX D

SECURITY CONTROL BASELINES – SUMMARY

LOW-IMPACT, MODERATE-IMPACT, AND HIGH-IMPACT INFORMATION SYSTEMS 

his appendix contains the security control baselines that represent the starting point in 

determining the security controls for low-impact, moderate-impact, and high-impact 

information systems.81 The three security control baselines are hierarchical in nature with 

regard to the security controls employed in those baselines.82 If a security control is selected for 

one of the baselines, the family identifier and control number are listed in the appropriate column. 

If a security control is not used in a particular baseline, the entry is marked not selected. Security 

control enhancements, when used to supplement security controls, are indicated by the number of 

the enhancement. For example, an IR-2 (1) in the high baseline entry for the IR-2 security control 

indicates that the second control from the Incident Response family has been selected along with 

control enhancement (1). Some security controls and enhancements in the security control catalog 

are not used in any of the baselines in this appendix but are available for use by organizations if 

needed. This situation occurs, for example, when the results of a risk assessment indicate the need 

for additional security controls or control enhancements in order to adequately mitigate risk to 

organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. 

Organizations can use the recommended priority code designation associated with each security 

control in the baselines to assist in making sequencing decisions for control implementation (i.e., 

a Priority Code 1 [P1] control has a higher priority for implementation than a Priority Code 2 [P2] 

control; a Priority Code 2 [P2] control has a higher priority for implementation than a Priority 

Code 3 [P3] control). This recommended sequencing prioritization helps ensure that security 

controls upon which other controls depend are implemented first, thus enabling organizations to 

deploy controls in a more structured and timely manner in accordance with available resources. 

The implementation of security controls by sequence priority code does not imply any defined 

level of risk mitigation until all controls in the security plan have been implemented. The priority 

codes are used only for implementation sequencing, not for making security control selection 

decisions. Table D-1 summarizes sequence priority codes for the baseline security controls in 

Table D-2. 

TABLE D-1: SECURITY CONTROL PRIORITIZATION CODES 

Priority Code Sequencing Action 

Priority Code 1 (P1) FIRST Implement P1 security controls first. 

Priority Code 2 (P2) NEXT Implement P2 security controls after implementation of P1 controls. 

Priority Code 3 (P3) LAST Implement P3 security controls after implementation of P1 and P2 controls. 

Unspecified Priority Code (P0) NONE Security control not selected for baseline. 

 

81 A complete description of all security controls is provided in Appendices F and G. In addition, separate documents 

for individual security control baselines (listed as Annexes 1, 2, and 3) are available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications. 

82 The hierarchical nature applies to the security requirements of each control (i.e., the base control plus all of its 

enhancements) at the low-impact, moderate-impact, and high-impact level in that the control requirements at a 

particular impact level (e.g., CP-4 Contingency Plan Testing—Moderate: CP-4 (1)) meets a stronger set of security 

requirements for that control than the next lower impact level of the same control (e.g., CP-4 Contingency Plan 

Testing—Low: CP-4). 

T 
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-2

In addition to Table D-2, the sequence priority codes and security control baselines are annotated 

in a priority and baseline allocation summary section below each security control in Appendix F. 

TABLE D-2: SECURITY CONTROL BASELINES 

CNTL 

NO. CONTROL NAME

PRIORITY

CONTROL BASELINES 

LOW MOD HIGH 

Access Control 

AC-1 Access Control Policy and Procedures P1 AC-1 AC-1 AC-1 

AC-2 Account Management P1 AC-2 AC-2 (1) (2) (3) 

(4) 

AC-2 (1) (2) (3) 

(4) (5) (12) (13) 

AC-3 Access Enforcement P1 AC-3 AC-3 AC-3 

AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement P1 Not Selected AC-4 AC-4 

AC-5 Separation of Duties P1 Not Selected AC-5 AC-5 

AC-6 Least Privilege P1 Not Selected AC-6 (1) (2) (5) AC-6 (1) (2) (3) 

(5) 

AC-7 Unsuccessful Login Attempts P2 AC-7 AC-7 AC-7 

AC-8 System Use Notification P1 AC-8 AC-8 AC-8 

AC-9 Previous Logon (Access) Notification P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

AC-10 Concurrent Session Control P2 Not Selected Not Selected AC-10 

AC-11 Session Lock P3 Not Selected AC-11 AC-11 

AC-12 Withdrawn --- --- --- --- 

AC-13 Withdrawn --- --- --- --- 

AC-14 Permitted Actions without Identification or 

Authentication 

P1 AC-14 AC-14 AC-14 

AC-15 Withdrawn --- --- --- --- 

AC-16 Security Attributes P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

AC-17 Remote Access P1 AC-17 AC-17 (1) (2) 

(3) (4) 

AC-17 (1) (2) 

(3) (4) 

AC-18 Wireless Access P1 AC-18 AC-18 (1) AC-18 (1) (4) 

(5) 

AC-19 Access Control for Mobile Devices P1 AC-19 AC-19 (6) AC-19 (6) 

AC-20 Use of External Information Systems P1 AC-20 AC-20 (1) (2) AC-20 (1) (2) 

AC-21 Collaboration and Information Sharing P0 Not Selected AC-21 AC-21 

AC-22 Publicly Accessible Content P2 AC-22 AC-22 AC-22 

AC-23 Data Mining Protection P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

AC-24 Access Control Decisions P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

AC-25 Reference Monitor Function P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

Awareness and Training 

AT-1 Security Awareness and Training Policy and 

Procedures 

P1 AT-1 AT-1 AT-1 

AT-2 Security Awareness P1 AT-2 AT-2 (2) AT-2 (2) 

AT-3 Security Training P1 AT-3 AT-3 AT-3 

AT-4 Security Training Records P3 AT-4 AT-4 AT-4 

AT-5 Contacts with Security Groups and 

Associations 

P3 Not Selected AT-5 AT-5 

Audit and Accountability 

AU-1 Audit and Accountability Policy and 

Procedures 

P1 AU-1 AU-1 AU-1 
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CNTL 

NO. CONTROL NAME

PRIORITY

CONTROL BASELINES 

LOW MOD HIGH 

AU-2 Auditable Events P1 AU-2 AU-2 (3) (4) AU-2 (3) (4) 

AU-3 Content of Audit Records P1 AU-3 AU-3 (1) AU-3 (1) (2) 

AU-4 Audit Storage Capacity P1 AU-4 AU-4 AU-4 

AU-5 Response to Audit Processing Failures P1 AU-5 AU-5 AU-5 (1) (2) 

AU-6 Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting P1 AU-6 AU-6 (1) (3) (9) AU-6 (1) (3) (5) 

(6) (9) 

AU-7 Audit Reduction and Report Generation P2 Not Selected AU-7 (1) AU-7 (1) 

AU-8 Time Stamps P1 AU-8 AU-8 (1) AU-8 (1) 

AU-9 Protection of Audit Information P1 AU-9 AU-9 (4) AU-9 (2) (3) (4) 

AU-10 Non-repudiation P1 Not Selected Not Selected AU-10 

AU-11 Audit Record Retention P3 AU-11 AU-11 AU-11 

AU-12 Audit Generation P1 AU-12 AU-12 AU-12 (1) (3) 

AU-13 Monitoring for Information Disclosure P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

AU-14 Session Audit P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

AU-15 Alternate Audit Capability P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

AU-16 Cross-Organizational Auditing P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

Security Assessment and Authorization 

CA-1 Security Assessment and Authorization 

Policies and Procedures 

P1 CA-1 CA-1 CA-1 

CA-2 Security Assessments P2 CA-2 CA-2 (1) CA-2 (1) (2) 

CA-3 Information System Connections P1 CA-3 CA-3 CA-3 

CA-4 Withdrawn --- --- --- --- 

CA-5 Plan of Action and Milestones P3 CA-5 CA-5 CA-5 

CA-6 Security Authorization P3 CA-6 CA-6 CA-6 

CA-7 Continuous Monitoring P3 CA-7 CA-7 (1) CA-7 (1) 

Configuration Management 

CM-1 Configuration Management Policy and 

Procedures 

P1 CM-1 CM-1 CM-1 

CM-2 Baseline Configuration P1 CM-2 CM-2 (1) (3) CM-2 (1) (2) (3) 

(6) 

CM-3 Configuration Change Control P1 Not Selected CM-3 (2) CM-3 (1) (2) 

CM-4 Security Impact Analysis P2 Not Selected CM-4 CM-4 (1) 

CM-5 Access Restrictions for Change P1 Not Selected CM-5 CM-5 (1) (2) (3) 

CM-6 Configuration Settings P1 CM-6 CM-6 CM-6 (1) (2) 

CM-7 Least Functionality P1 CM-7 CM-7 (1) (4) CM-7 (1) (2) (5) 

CM-8 Information System Component Inventory P1 CM-8 CM-8 (1) (5) CM-8 (1) (2) (3) 

(4) (5) 

CM-9 Configuration Management Plan P1 Not Selected CM-9 CM-9 

CM-10 Software Usage Restrictions P1 CM-10 CM-10 CM-10 

CM-11 User-Installed Software P1 CM-11 CM-11 CM-11 

Contingency Planning 

CP-1 Contingency Planning Policy and 

Procedures 

P1 CP-1 CP-1 CP-1 

CP-2 Contingency Plan P1 CP-2 CP-2 (1) (3) (8) CP-2 (1) (2) (3) 

(4) (5) (8) 
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-4

CNTL 

NO. CONTROL NAME

PRIORITY

CONTROL BASELINES 

LOW MOD HIGH 

CP-3 Contingency Training P2 CP-3 CP-3 CP-3 (1) 

CP-4 Contingency Plan Testing P2 CP-4 CP-4 (1) CP-4 (1) (2) (4) 

CP-5 Withdrawn --- --- --- --- 

CP-6 Alternate Storage Site P1 Not Selected CP-6 (1) (3) CP-6 (1) (2) (3) 

CP-7 Alternate Processing Site P1 Not Selected CP-7 (1) (2) (3) CP-7 (1) (2) (3) 

(4) 

CP-8 Telecommunications Services P1 Not Selected CP-8 (1) (2) CP-8 (1) (2) (3) 

(4) 

CP-9 Information System Backup P1 CP-9 CP-9 (1) CP-9 (1) (2) (3) 

(5) 

CP-10 Information System Recovery and 

Reconstitution 

P1 CP-10 CP-10 (2) (3) CP-10 (2) (3) 

(4) (5) 

CP-11 Predictable Failure Prevention P1 Not Selected Not Selected CP-11 

CP-12 Alternate Communications Protocols P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

CP-13 Safe Mode P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

Identification and Authentication 

IA-1 Identification and Authentication Policy and 

Procedures 

P1 IA-1 IA-1 IA-1 

IA-2 Identification and Authentication 

(Organizational Users) 

P1 IA-2 (1) IA-2 (1) (2) (3) 

(8) 

IA-2 (1) (2) (3) 

(4) (8) (9) 

IA-3 Device-to-Device Identification and 

Authentication 

P1 Not Selected IA-3 IA-3 

IA-4 Identifier Management P1 IA-4 IA-4 IA-4 

IA-5 Authenticator Management P1 IA-5 (1) IA-5 (1) (2) (3) IA-5 (1) (2) (3) 

IA-6 Authenticator Feedback P1 IA-6 IA-6 IA-6 

IA-7 Cryptographic Module Authentication P1 IA-7 IA-7 IA-7 

IA-8 Identification and Authentication (NonOrganizational Users) P1 IA-8 IA-8 IA-8 

IA-9 Service Identification and Authentication P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

IA-10 Alternative Authentication P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

IA-11 Adaptive Identification and Authentication P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

IA-12 Reauthentication P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

Incident Response 

IR-1 Incident Response Policy and Procedures P1 IR-1 IR-1 IR-1 

IR-2 Incident Response Training P2 IR-2 IR-2 IR-2 (1) (2) 

IR-3 Incident Response Testing P2 Not Selected IR-3 (2) IR-3 (1) (2) 

IR-4 Incident Handling P1 IR-4 IR-4 (1) IR-4 (1) (4) 

IR-5 Incident Monitoring P1 IR-5 IR-5 IR-5 (1) 

IR-6 Incident Reporting P1 IR-6 IR-6 (1) IR-6 (1) 

IR-7 Incident Response Assistance P3 IR-7 IR-7 (1) IR-7 (1) 

IR-8 Incident Response Plan P1 IR-8 IR-8 IR-8 

IR-9 Information Spillage Response P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

Maintenance 

MA-1 System Maintenance Policy and Procedures P1 MA-1 MA-1 MA-1 

MA-2 Controlled Maintenance P2 MA-2 MA-2 MA-2 (2) 

MA-3 Maintenance Tools P2 Not Selected MA-3 (1) (2) MA-3 (1) (2) (3) 
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-5

CNTL 

NO. CONTROL NAME

PRIORITY

CONTROL BASELINES 

LOW MOD HIGH 

MA-4 Non-Local Maintenance P1 MA-4 MA-4 (1) (2) MA-4 (1) (2) (3) 

MA-5 Maintenance Personnel P1 MA-5 MA-5 MA-5 (1) 

MA-6 Timely Maintenance P1 Not Selected MA-6 MA-6 

Media Protection 

MP-1 Media Protection Policy and Procedures P1 MP-1 MP-1 MP-1 

MP-2 Media Access P1 MP-2 MP-2 (1) MP-2 (1) 

MP-3 Media Marking P1 Not Selected MP-3 MP-3 

MP-4 Media Storage P1 Not Selected MP-4 MP-4 

MP-5 Media Transport P1 Not Selected MP-5 (4) MP-5 (3) (4) 

MP-6 Media Sanitization P1 MP-6 MP-6 MP-6 (1) (2) (3) 

MP-7 Media Use P1 MP-7 MP-7 (1) (2) MP-7 (1) (2) 

MP-8 Media Downgrading P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

Physical and Environmental Protection 

PE-1 Physical and Environmental Protection 

Policy and Procedures 

P1 PE-1 PE-1 PE-1 

PE-2 Physical Access Authorizations P1 PE-2 PE-2 PE-2 

PE-3 Physical Access Control P1 PE-3 PE-3 PE-3 (1) 

PE-4 Access Control for Transmission Medium P1 Not Selected PE-4 PE-4 

PE-5 Access Control for Output Devices P1 Not Selected PE-5 PE-5 

PE-6 Monitoring Physical Access P1 PE-6 PE-6 (1) PE-6 (1) (2) 

PE-7 Withdrawn --- --- --- --- 

PE-8 Visitor Access Records P3 PE-8 PE-8 PE-8 (1) 

PE-9 Power Equipment and Cabling P1 Not Selected PE-9 PE-9 

PE-10 Emergency Shutoff P1 Not Selected PE-10 PE-10 

PE-11 Emergency Power P1 Not Selected PE-11 PE-11 (1) 

PE-12 Emergency Lighting P1 PE-12 PE-12 PE-12 

PE-13 Fire Protection P1 PE-13 PE-13 (1) (2) 

(3) 

PE-13 (1) (2) 

(3) 

PE-14 Temperature and Humidity Controls P1 PE-14 PE-14 PE-14 

PE-15 Water Damage Protection P1 PE-15 PE-15 PE-15 (1) 

PE-16 Delivery and Removal P1 PE-16 PE-16 PE-16 

PE-17 Alternate Work Site P1 Not Selected PE-17 PE-17 

PE-18 Location of Information System Components P2 Not Selected PE-18 (1) PE-18 (1) 

PE-19 Information Leakage P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

PE-20 Port and I/O Device Access P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

Planning 

PL-1 Security Planning Policy and Procedures P1 PL-1 PL-1 PL-1 

PL-2 System Security Plan P1 PL-2 PL-2 (3) PL-2 (3) 

PL-3 Withdrawn --- --- --- --- 

PL-4 Rules of Behavior P1 PL-4 PL-4 (1) PL-4 (1) 

PL-5 Withdrawn --- --- --- --- 

PL-6 Withdrawn --- --- --- --- 

PL-7 Security Concept of Operations P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

PL-8 Security Architecture P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 
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CNTL 

NO. CONTROL NAME

PRIORITY

CONTROL BASELINES 

LOW MOD HIGH 

Personnel Security 

PS-1 Personnel Security Policy and Procedures P1 PS-1 PS-1 PS-1 

PS-2 Position Categorization P1 PS-2 PS-2 PS-2 

PS-3 Personnel Screening P1 PS-3 PS-3 PS-3 

PS-4 Personnel Termination P2 PS-4 PS-4 PS-4 (1) (2) 

PS-5 Personnel Transfer P2 PS-5 PS-5 PS-5 

PS-6 Access Agreements P3 PS-6 PS-6 PS-6 

PS-7 Third-Party Personnel Security P1 PS-7 PS-7 (1) PS-7 (1) 

PS-8 Personnel Sanctions P3 PS-8 PS-8 (1) PS-8 (1) 

Risk Assessment 

RA-1 Risk Assessment Policy and Procedures P1 RA-1 RA-1 RA-1 

RA-2 Security Categorization P1 RA-2 RA-2 RA-2 

RA-3 Risk Assessment P1 RA-3 RA-3 RA-3 

RA-4 Withdrawn --- --- --- --- 

RA-5 Vulnerability Scanning P1 RA-5 RA-5 (1) RA-5 (1) (2) (3) 

(4) (5) (7) 

System and Services Acquisition 

SA-1 System and Services Acquisition Policy and 

Procedures 

P1 SA-1 SA-1 SA-1 

SA-2 Allocation of Resources P1 SA-2 SA-2 SA-2 

SA-3 System Development Life Cycle P1 SA-3 SA-3 SA-3 

SA-4 Acquisition Process P1 SA-4 SA-4 (1) (4) SA-4 (1) (2) (4) 

SA-5 Information System Documentation P2 SA-5 SA-5 (1) (3) (6) SA-5 (1) (2) (3) 

(6) 

SA-6 Withdrawn --- --- --- --- 

SA-7 Withdrawn --- --- --- --- 

SA-8 Security Engineering Principles P1 Not Selected SA-8 SA-8 

SA-9 External Information System Services P1 SA-9 SA-9 (2) SA-9 (2) (3) 

SA-10 Developer Configuration Management P1 Not Selected SA-10 SA-10 

SA-11 Developer Security Testing P2 Not Selected SA-11 SA-11 

SA-12 Supply Chain Protection P1 Not Selected Not Selected SA-12 

SA-13 Withdrawn --- --- --- --- 

SA-14 Critical Information System Components P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

SA-15 Development Process, Standards, and 

Tools 

P2 Not Selected Not Selected SA-15 

SA-16 Developer-Provided Training P2 Not Selected Not Selected SA-16 

SA-17 Developer Security Architecture and Design P1 Not Selected Not Selected SA-17 

SA-18 Tamper Resistance and Detection P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

SA-19 Anti-Counterfeit P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

System and Communications Protection 

SC-1 System and Communications Protection 

Policy and Procedures 

P1 SC-1 SC-1 SC-1 

SC-2 Application Partitioning P1 Not Selected SC-2 SC-2 

SC-3 Security Function Isolation P1 Not Selected Not Selected SC-3 (6) 

SC-4 Information in Shared Resources P1 Not Selected SC-4 SC-4 
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CNTL 

NO. CONTROL NAME

PRIORITY

CONTROL BASELINES 

LOW MOD HIGH 

SC-5 Denial of Service Protection P1 SC-5 SC-5 SC-5 

SC-6 Resource Availability P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

SC-7 Boundary Protection P1 SC-7 SC-7 (1) (3) (4) 

(5) (7) 

SC-7 (1) (3) (4) 

(5) (6) (7) (8) 

SC-8 Transmission Integrity P1 Not Selected SC-8 (1) SC-8 (1) 

SC-9 Transmission Confidentiality P1 Not Selected SC-9 (1) SC-9 (1) 

SC-10 Network Disconnect P2 Not Selected SC-10 SC-10 

SC-11 Trusted Path P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and 

Management 

P1 SC-12 SC-12 SC-12 (1) 

SC-13 Cryptographic Protection P1 SC-13 SC-13 SC-13 

SC-14 Public Access Protections P1 SC-14 SC-14 SC-14 

SC-15 Collaborative Computing Devices P1 SC-15 SC-15 SC-15 

SC-16 Transmission of Security Attributes P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

SC-17 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates P1 Not Selected SC-17 SC-17 

SC-18 Mobile Code P1 Not Selected SC-18 SC-18 

SC-19 Voice Over Internet Protocol P1 Not Selected SC-19 SC-19 

SC-20 Secure Name /Address Resolution Service 

(Authoritative Source) 

P1 SC-20 SC-20 SC-20 

SC-21 Secure Name /Address Resolution Service 

(Recursive or Caching Resolver) 

P1 SC-21 SC-21 SC-21 

SC-22 Architecture and Provisioning for 

Name/Address Resolution Service 

P1 SC-22 SC-22 SC-22 

SC-23 Session Authenticity P1 Not Selected SC-23 SC-23 

SC-24 Fail in Known State P1 Not Selected Not Selected SC-24 

SC-25 Thin Nodes P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

SC-26 Honeypots P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

SC-27 Operating System-Independent Applications P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

SC-28 Protection of Information at Rest P1 Not Selected SC-28 SC-28 

SC-29 Heterogeneity P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

SC-30 Concealment and Misdirection P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

SC-31 Covert Channel Analysis P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

SC-32 Information System Partitioning P1 Not Selected SC-32 SC-32 

SC-33 Withdrawn --- --- --- --- 

SC-34 Non-Modifiable Executable Programs P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

SC-35 Technical Surveillance Countermeasures 

Survey 

P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

SC-36 Honeyclients P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

SC-37 Distributed Processing and Storage P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

SC-38 Malware Analysis P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

SC-39 Out-of-Band Channels P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

SC-40 Operations Security P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

SC-41 Process Isolation P1 SC-41 SC-41 SC-41 

SC-42 Wireless Link Protection P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 
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CNTL 

NO. CONTROL NAME

PRIORITY

CONTROL BASELINES 

LOW MOD HIGH 

System and Information Integrity 

SI-1 System and Information Integrity Policy and 

Procedures 

P1 SI-1 SI-1 SI-1 

SI-2 Flaw Remediation P1 SI-2 SI-2 (2) SI-2 (1) (2) 

SI-3 Malicious Code Protection P1 SI-3 SI-3 (1) (2) (3) SI-3 (1) (2) (3) 

SI-4 Information System Monitoring P1 SI-4 SI-4 (2) (4) (5) 

(6) 

SI-4 (2) (4) (5) 

(6) 

SI-5 Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives P1 SI-5 SI-5 SI-5 (1) 

SI-6 Security Function Verification P1 Not Selected Not Selected SI-6 

SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity 

P1 Not Selected SI-7 (1) (8) SI-7 (1) (2) (5) 

(8) (15) 

SI-8 Spam Protection P1 Not Selected SI-8 (1) (2) SI-8 (1) (2) 

SI-9 Information Input Restrictions P2 Not Selected SI-9 SI-9 

SI-10 Information Input Validation P1 Not Selected SI-10 SI-10 

SI-11 Error Handling P2 Not Selected SI-11 SI-11 

SI-12 Information Output Handling and Retention P2 SI-12 SI-12 SI-12 

SI-13 Withdrawn --- --- --- --- 

SI-14 Non-Persistence P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

Program Management 

PM-1 Information Security Program Plan P1 

Deployed organization-wide. 

Supporting all baselines. 

PM-2 Senior Information Security Officer P1 

PM-3 Information Security Resources P1 

PM-4 Plan of Action and Milestones Process P1 

PM-5 Information System Inventory P1 

PM-6 Information Security Measures of 

Performance 

P1 

PM-7 Enterprise Architecture P1 

PM-8 Critical Infrastructure Plan P1 

PM-9 Risk Management Strategy P1 

PM-10 Security Authorization Process P1 

PM-11 Mission/Business Process Definition P1 

PM-12 Insider Threat Program P1 

PM-13 Information Security Workforce P1 

PM-14 Operations Security Program P1 

PM-15 Testing, Training, and Monitoring P1 

 
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The following tables (D-3 through D-19) provide a summary of all security controls and control 

enhancements in Appendix F by family and name. The tables also illustrate: (i) the allocation of 

security controls and control enhancements to security control baselines: (ii) security controls and 

control enhancements that have been withdrawn; and (iii) security controls and enhancements that 

have assurance-related characteristics or properties (i.e., assurance-related controls). 

TABLE D-3: SUMMARY — ACCESS CONTROLS 

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

AC-1 Access Control Policy and Procedures A x x x

AC-2 Account Management x x x

AC-2 (1) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED SYSTEM ACCOUNT 

MANAGEMENT

x x

AC-2 (2) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | REMOVAL OF TEMPORARY / EMERGENCY 

ACCOUNTS

x x

AC-2 (3) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DISABLE INACTIVE ACCOUNTS x x

AC-2 (4) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED AUDIT ACTIONS x x

AC-2 (5) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | INACTIVITY LOGOUT / TYPICAL USAGE 

MONITORING

x

AC-2 (6) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC PRIVILEGE MANAGEMENT

AC-2 (7) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | ROLE-BASED SCHEMES

AC-2 (8) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC ACCOUNT CREATION

AC-2 (9) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF SHARED 

GROUPS / ACCOUNTS

AC-2 (10) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | SHARED / GROUP ACCOUNT REQUESTS /

APPROVALS

AC-2 (11) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | SHARED / GROUP ACCOUNT CREDENTIAL 

RENEWALS

AC-2 (12) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | USAGE CONDITIONS x

AC-2 (13) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | ACCOUNT REVIEWS x

AC-2 (14) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | ACCOUNT MONITORING / ATYPICAL USAGE

AC-2 (15) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DISABLE ACCOUNTS FOR HIGH-RISK 

INDIVIDUALS

AC-3 Access Enforcement x x x

AC-3 (1) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | RESTRICTED ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED 

FUNCTIONS

W Incorporated into AC-6. 

AC-3 (2) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | DUAL AUTHORIZATION

AC-3 (3) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | NONDISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL

AC-3 (4) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL

AC-3 (5) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY-RELEVANT INFORMATION

AC-3 (6) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | PROTECTION OF USER AND SYSTEM 

INFORMATION

W Incorporated into MP-4 and SC-28.

AC-3 (7) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL

AC-3 (8) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL

AC-3 (9) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | REVOCATION OF ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS

AC-3 (10) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | NETWORK ACCESS SECURITY-RELATED 

FUNCTIONS

AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement x x

AC-4 (1) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | OBJECT SECURITY ATTRIBUTES

AC-4 (2) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | PROCESSING DOMAINS
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-10

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

AC-4 (3) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | CONDITION / OPERATIONAL 

CHANGES

AC-4 (4) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | CONTENT CHECK ENCRYPTED 

DATA

AC-4 (5) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | EMBEDDED DATA TYPES

AC-4 (6) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | METADATA

AC-4 (7) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | ONE-WAY FLOW MECHANISMS

AC-4 (8) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY POLICY FILTERS

AC-4 (9) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | HUMAN REVIEWS

AC-4 (10) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | ENABLE / DISABLE SECURITY 

POLICY FILTERS

AC-4 (11) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | CONFIGURATION OF SECURITY 

POLICY FILTERS

AC-4 (12) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DATA TYPES IDENTIFIERS

AC-4 (13) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DECOMPOSITION INTO POLICYRELEVANT SUBCOMPONENTS

AC-4 (14) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | POLICY FILTER CONSTRAINTS 

ON DATA STRUCTURES AND CONTENT

AC-4 (15) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DETECTION OF UNSANCTIONED 

INFORMATION

AC-4 (16) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | INFORMATION TRANSFERS ON 

INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS

AC-4 (17) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DOMAIN AUTHENTICATION

AC-4 (18) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY ATTRIBUTE BINDING

AC-4 (19) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | PROTECTION OF METADATA

AC-4 (20) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

AC-4 (21) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | PHYSICAL / LOGICAL 

SEPARATION OF INFORMATION FLOWS

AC-5 Separation of Duties x x

AC-6 Least Privilege x x

AC-6 (1) LEAST PRIVILEGE | AUTHORIZE ACCESS TO SECURITY FUNCTIONS x x

AC-6 (2) LEAST PRIVILEGE | NON-PRIVILEGED ACCESS FOR NONSECURITY 

FUNCTIONS

x x

AC-6 (3) LEAST PRIVILEGE | NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED COMMANDS x

AC-6 (4) LEAST PRIVILEGE | SEPARATE PROCESSING DOMAINS

AC-6 (5) LEAST PRIVILEGE | PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS x x

AC-6 (6) LEAST PRIVILEGE | PRIVILEGED ACCESS BY NON-ORGANIZATIONAL 

USERS

AC-6 (7) LEAST PRIVILEGE | REVIEW OF USER PRIVILEGES

AC-6 (8) LEAST PRIVILEGE | PRIVILEGE LEVELS FOR CODE EXECUTION

AC-7 Unsuccessful Login Attempts x x x

AC-7 (1) UNSUCCESSFUL LOGIN ATTEMPTS | AUTOMATIC ACCOUNT LOCK W Incorporated into AC-7.

AC-7 (2) UNSUCCESSFUL LOGIN ATTEMPTS | PURGE MOBILE DEVICE

AC-8 System Use Notification x x x

AC-9 Previous Logon (Access) Notification 

AC-9 (1) PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | UNSUCCESSFUL LOGONS

AC-9 (2) PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | SUCCESSFUL / UNSUCCESSFUL 

LOGONS
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-11

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

AC-9 (3) PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | NOTIFICATION OF ACCOUNT 

CHANGES

AC-9 (4) PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | ADDITIONAL LOGON INFORMATION

AC-10 Concurrent Session Control x

AC-11 Session Lock x x

AC-11 (1) SESSION LOCK | PATTERN-HIDING DISPLAYS W Incorporated into AC-11.

AC-12 Session Termination W Incorporated into SC-10.

AC-13 Supervision and Review — Access Control W Incorporated into AC-2 and AU-6.

AC-14 Permitted Actions without Identification or Authentication x x x

AC-14 (1) PERMITTED ACTIONS WITHOUT IDENTIFICATION OR AUTHENTICATION 

| NECESSARY USES

W Incorporated into AC-14.

AC-15 Automated Marking W Incorporated into MP-3.

AC-16 Security Attributes 

AC-16 (1) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | DYNAMIC ATTRIBUTE ASSOCIATION

AC-16 (2) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE VALUE CHANGES BY 

AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS

AC-16 (3) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | MAINTENANCE OF ATTRIBUTE 

ASSOCIATIONS BY INFORMATION SYSTEM

AC-16 (4) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ASSOCIATION OF ATTRIBUTES BY 

AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS

AC-16 (5) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE DISPLAYS FOR OUTPUT DEVICES

AC-16 (6) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | MAINTENANCE OF ATTRIBUTE ASSOCIATION 

BY ORGANIZATION

AC-16 (7) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | CONSISTENT ATTRIBUTE INTERPRETATION

AC-16 (8) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ASSOCIATION TECHNIQUES / TECHNOLOGIES

AC-16 (9) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE REASSIGNMENT

AC-16 (10) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE CONFIGURATION BY 

AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS

AC-16 (11) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | PERMITTED ATTRIBUTES FOR SPECIFIED 

INFORMATION SYSTEMS

AC-16 (12) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | PERMITTED VALUES AND RANGES FOR 

ATTRIBUTES

AC-17 Remote Access x x x

AC-17 (1) REMOTE ACCESS | AUTOMATED MONITORING / CONTROL x x

AC-17 (2) REMOTE ACCESS | PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY / INTEGRITY 

USING ENCRYPTION

x x

AC-17 (3) REMOTE ACCESS | MANAGED ACCESS CONTROL POINTS x x

AC-17 (4) REMOTE ACCESS | PRIVILEGED COMMANDS / ACCESS x x

AC-17 (5) REMOTE ACCESS | MONITORING FOR UNAUTHORIZED CONNECTIONS W Incorporated into AC-17.

AC-17 (6) REMOTE ACCESS | PROTECTION OF INFORMATION

AC-17 (7) REMOTE ACCESS | ADDITIONAL PROTECTION FOR SECURITY 

FUNCTION ACCESS

W Incorporated into AC-3.

AC-17 (8) REMOTE ACCESS | DISABLE NONSECURE NETWORK PROTOCOLS W Incorporated into CM-7.

AC-17 (9) REMOTE ACCESS | DISCONNECT / DISABLE ACCESS

AC-18 Wireless Access x x x

AC-18 (1) WIRELESS ACCESS | AUTHENTICATION AND ENCRYPTION x x

AC-18 (2) WIRELESS ACCESS | MONITORING UNAUTHORIZED CONNECTIONS W Incorporated into AC-18.

AC-18 (3) WIRELESS ACCESS | DISABLE WIRELESS NETWORKING

AC-18 (4) WIRELESS ACCESS | RESTRICT CONFIGURATIONS BY USERS x
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-12

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

AC-18 (5) WIRELESS ACCESS | CONFINE WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS x

AC-19 Access Control for Mobile Devices x x x

AC-19 (1) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | USE OF WRITABLE /

REMOVABLE MEDIA

W Incorporated into MP-7.

AC-19 (2) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | USE OF PERSONALLY 

OWNED REMOVABLE MEDIA

W Incorporated into MP-7.

AC-19 (3) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | USE OF REMOVABLE MEDIA 

WITH NO IDENTIFIABLE OWNER

W Incorporated into MP-7.

AC-19 (4) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | RESTRICTIONS FOR 

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

AC-19 (5) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | PERSONALLY OWNED 

DEVICES

AC-19 (6) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | FULL DISK ENCRYPTION x x

AC-19 (7) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | CENTRAL MANAGEMENT 

OF MOBILE DEVICES

AC-19 (8) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | REMOTE PURGING OF 

INFORMATION

AC-19 (9) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | TAMPER DETECTION

AC-20 Use of External Information Systems x x x

AC-20 (1) USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | LIMITS ON AUTHORIZED 

USE

x x

AC-20 (2) USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | PORTABLE STORAGE 

MEDIA

x x

AC-20 (3) USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | PERSONALLY OWNED 

INFORMATION SYSTEMS / DEVICES

AC-20 (4) USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | NETWORK ACCESSIBLE 

STORAGE DEVICES

AC-21 Collaboration and Information Sharing x x

AC-21 (1) COLLABORATION AND INFORMATION SHARING | AUTOMATED 

DECISION SUPPORT

AC-21 (2) COLLABORATION AND INFORMATION SHARING | INFORMATION 

SEARCH AND RETRIEVAL

AC-22 Publicly Accessible Content x x x

AC-23 Data Mining Protection 

AC-24 Access Control Decisions 

AC-24 (1) ACCESS CONTROL DECISIONS | TRANSMIT ACCESS AUTHORIZATION 

INFORMATION

AC-24 (2) ACCESS CONTROL DECISIONS | NO USER OR PROCESS IDENTITY

AC-25 Reference Monitor Function A
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-13

TABLE D-4: SUMMARY — AWARENESS AND TRAINING CONTROLS 

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

AT-1 Security Awareness and Training Policy and Procedures A x x x

AT-2 Security Awareness A x x x

AT-2 (1) SECURITY AWARENESS | PRACTICAL EXERCISES A

AT-2 (2) SECURITY AWARENESS | INSIDER THREAT A x x

AT-3 Security Training A x x x

AT-3 (1) SECURITY TRAINING | ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS A

AT-3 (2) SECURITY TRAINING | PHYSICAL SECURITY CONTROLS A

AT-3 (3) SECURITY TRAINING | PRACTICAL EXERCISES A

AT-4 Security Training Records A x x x

AT-5 Contacts with Security Groups and Associations A x x
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-14

TABLE D-5: SUMMARY — AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY CONTROLS 

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

AU-1 Audit and Accountability Policy and Procedures A x x x

AU-2 Auditable Events x x x

AU-2 (1) AUDITABLE EVENTS | COMPILATION OF AUDIT RECORDS FROM 

MULTIPLE SOURCES

W Incorporated into AU-12.

AU-2 (2) AUDITABLE EVENTS | SELECTION OF AUDIT EVENTS BY COMPONENT W Incorporated into AU-12.

AU-2 (3) AUDITABLE EVENTS | REVIEWS AND UPDATES x x 

AU-2 (4) AUDITABLE EVENTS | PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS x x 

AU-3 Content of Audit Records x x x 

AU-3 (1) CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS | ADDITIONAL AUDIT INFORMATION x x 

AU-3 (2) CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS | CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OF 

PLANNED AUDIT RECORD CONTENT

x 

AU-4 Audit Storage Capacity x x x 

AU-4 (1) AUDIT STORAGE CAPACITY | TRANSFER TO ALTERNATE STORAGE

AU-5 Response to Audit Processing Failures x x x 

AU-5 (1) RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES | AUDIT STORAGE 

CAPACITY

x 

AU-5 (2) RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES | REAL-TIME ALERTS x 

AU-5 (3) RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES | CONFIGURABLE 

TRAFFIC VOLUME THRESHOLDS

AU-5 (4) RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES | SHUTDOWN ON 

FAILURE

AU-6 Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting A x x x 

AU-6 (1) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | PROCESS INTEGRATION A x x 

AU-6 (2) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | AUTOMATED SECURITY 

ALERTS

W Incorporated into SI-4.

AU-6 (3) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CORRELATE AUDIT 

REPOSITORIES

A x x 

AU-6 (4) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CENTRAL REVIEW AND 

ANALYSIS

AU-6 (5) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | INTEGRATION /

SCANNING AND MONITORING CAPABILITIES

A x 

AU-6 (6) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CORRELATION WITH 

PHYSICAL MONITORING

A x 

AU-6 (7) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | PERMITTED ACTIONS W Incorporated into AU-6.

AU-6 (8) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | FULL TEXT ANALYSIS OF 

PRIVILEGED COMMANDS

A

AU-6 (9) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CORRELATION WITH 

INPUT FROM NON-TECHNICAL SOURCES

A x x

AU-7 Audit Reduction and Report Generation A x x

AU-7 (1) AUDIT REDUCTION AND REPORT GENERATION | AUTOMATIC 

PROCESSING

A x x

AU-7 (2) AUDIT REDUCTION AND REPORT GENERATION | AUTOMATIC SORTING

AU-8 Time Stamps x x x

AU-8 (1) TIME STAMPS | SYNCHRONIZATION WITH AUTHORITATIVE TIME 

SOURCE

x x

AU-8 (2) TIME STAMPS | SECONDARY AUTHORITATIVE TIME SOURCE

AU-9 Protection of Audit Information x x x

AU-9 (1) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | HARDWARE WRITE-ONCE 

MEDIA
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-15

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

AU-9 (2) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | AUDIT BACKUP ON SEPARATE 

PHYSICAL SYSTEMS / COMPONENTS

x

AU-9 (3) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | CRYPTOGRAPHIC 

PROTECTION

x

AU-9 (4) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | ACCESS BY SUBSET OF 

PRIVILEGED USERS

x x

AU-9 (5) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | DUAL AUTHORIZATION

AU-9 (6) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | READ ONLY ACCESS

AU-10 Non-repudiation A x

AU-10 (1) NON-REPUDIATION | ASSOCIATION OF IDENTITIES A

AU-10 (2) NON-REPUDIATION | VALIDATE BINDING OF INFORMATION PRODUCER 

IDENTITY

A

AU-10 (3) NON-REPUDIATION | CHAIN OF CUSTODY A

AU-10 (4) NON-REPUDIATION | VALIDATE BINDING OF INFORMATION REVIEWER 

IDENTITY

A

AU-10 (5) NON-REPUDIATION | DIGITAL SIGNATURES W Incorporated into SI-7.

AU-11 Audit Record Retention x x x

AU-12 Audit Generation x x x

AU-12 (1) AUDIT GENERATION | SYSTEM-WIDE / TIME-CORRELATED AUDIT TRAIL x

AU-12 (2) AUDIT GENERATION | STANDARDIZED FORMATS

AU-12 (3) AUDIT GENERATION | CHANGES BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS x

AU-13 Monitoring for Information Disclosure A

AU-14 Session Audit A

AU-14 (1) SESSION AUDIT | SYSTEM START-UP A

AU-15 Alternate Audit Capability 

AU-16 Cross-Organizational Auditing 

AU-16 (1) CROSS-ORGANIZATIONAL AUDITING | IDENTITY PRESERVATION

AU-16 (2) CROSS-ORGANIZATIONAL AUDITING | SHARING OF AUDIT 

INFORMATION

 
Special Publication 800-53 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations

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APPENDIX D PAGE D-16

TABLE D-6: SUMMARY — SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION CONTROLS 

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

CA-1 Security Assessment and Authorization Policies and 

Procedures 

A x x x

CA-2 Security Assessments A x x x 

CA-2 (1) SECURITY ASSESSMENTS | INDEPENDENT ASSESSORS A x x 

CA-2 (2) SECURITY ASSESSMENTS | TYPES OF ASSESSMENTS A x 

CA-2 (3) SECURITY ASSESSMENTS | EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS A 

CA-3 Information System Connections A x x x 

CA-3 (1) INFORMATION SYSTEM CONNECTIONS | UNCLASSIFIED NATIONAL 

SECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTIONS

CA-3 (2) INFORMATION SYSTEM CONNECTIONS | CLASSIFIED NATIONAL 

SECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTION

CA-3 (3) INFORMATION SYSTEM CONNECTIONS | PROHIBIT CONNECTIONS TO 

PUBLIC NETWORKS

CA-4 Security Certification W Incorporated into CA-2.

CA-5 Plan of Action and Milestones A x x x 

CA-5 (1) PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR 

ACCURACY / CURRENCY

A 

CA-6 Security Authorization A x x x 

CA-7 Continuous Monitoring A x x x 

CA-7 (1) CONTINUOUS MONITORING | INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT A x x 

CA-7 (2) CONTINUOUS MONITORING | TYPES OF ASSESSMENTS W Incorporated into CA-2.

 
Special Publication 800-53 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations

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APPENDIX D PAGE D-17

TABLE D-7: SUMMARY — CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT CONTROLS 

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

CM-1 Configuration Management Policy and Procedures A x x x

CM-2 Baseline Configuration A x x x 

CM-2 (1) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | REVIEWS AND UPDATES A x x 

CM-2 (2) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR ACCURACY 

/ CURRENCY

A x 

CM-2 (3) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | RETENTION OF PREVIOUS 

CONFIGURATIONS

A x x 

CM-2 (4) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE W Incorporated into CM-7.

CM-2 (5) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | AUTHORIZED SOFTWARE W Incorporated into CM-7.

CM-2 (6) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | DEVELOPMENT AND TEST 

ENVIRONMENTS

A x 

CM-3 Configuration Change Control A x x 

CM-3 (1) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | AUTOMATED DOCUMENT /

NOTIFICATION / PROHIBITION OF CHANGES

A x 

CM-3 (2) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | TEST / VALIDATE / DOCUMENT 

CHANGES

A x x 

CM-3 (3) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | AUTOMATED CHANGE 

IMPLEMENTATION

CM-3 (4) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | SECURITY REPRESENTATIVE

CM-4 Security Impact Analysis A x x 

CM-4 (1) SECURITY IMPACT ANALYSIS | SEPARATE TEST ENVIRONMENTS A x 

CM-4 (2) SECURITY IMPACT ANALYSIS | VERIFICATION OF SECURITY 

FUNCTIONS

A 

CM-5 Access Restrictions for Change x x 

CM-5 (1) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | AUTOMATED ACCESS 

ENFORCEMENT / AUDITING

x 

CM-5 (2) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | AUDIT SYSTEM CHANGES x 

CM-5 (3) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | SIGNED COMPONENTS x 

CM-5 (4) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | TWO-PERSON RULE

CM-5 (5) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | LIMIT PRODUCTION /

OPERATIONAL PRIVILEGES

CM-5 (6) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | LIMIT LIBRARY PRIVILEGES

CM-5 (7) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | AUTOMATIC IMPLEMENTATION 

OF SECURITY SAFEGUARDS

W Incorporated into SI-7.

CM-6 Configuration Settings x x x 

CM-6 (1) CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | AUTOMATED CENTRAL MANAGEMENT /

APPLICATION / VERIFICATION

x 

CM-6 (2) CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | RESPOND TO UNAUTHORIZED CHANGES x 

CM-6 (3) CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | UNAUTHORIZED CHANGE DETECTION W Incorporated into SI-7.

CM-6 (4) CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | CONFORMANCE DEMONSTRATION W Incorporated into CA-2 and CA-7.

CM-7 Least Functionality x x x 

CM-7 (1) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | PERIODIC REVIEW x x 

CM-7 (2) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | PREVENT PROGRAM EXECUTION x 

CM-7 (3) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | REGISTRATION COMPLIANCE

CM-7 (4) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE x 

CM-7 (5) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | AUTHORIZED SOFTWARE x 

CM-8 Information System Component Inventory A x x x 
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-18

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

CM-8 (1) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | UPDATES DURING 

INSTALLATIONS / REMOVALS

A x x 

CM-8 (2) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | AUTOMATED 

MAINTENANCE

A x 

CM-8 (3) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | AUTOMATED 

UNAUTHORIZED COMPONENT DETECTION

A x 

CM-8 (4) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | PROPERTY 

ACCOUNTABILITY INFORMATION

A x 

CM-8 (5) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | ALL COMPONENTS 

WITHIN AUTHORIZATION BOUNDARY

A x x 

CM-8 (6) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | ASSESSED 

CONFIGURATIONS / APPROVED DEVIATIONS

CM-9 Configuration Management Plan x x 

CM-9 (1) CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PLAN | ASSIGNMENT OF 

RESPONSIBILITY

CM-10 Software Usage Restrictions x x x 

CM-11 User-Installed Software x x x 

CM-11 (1) USER-INSTALLED SOFTWARE | AUTOMATED ALERTS FOR 

UNAUTHORIZED INSTALLATIONS
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-19

TABLE D-8: SUMMARY — CONTINGENCY PLANNING CONTROLS 

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

CP-1 Contingency Planning Policy and Procedures A x x x

CP-2 Contingency Plan x x x 

CP-2 (1) CONTINGENCY PLAN | COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANS x x 

CP-2 (2) CONTINGENCY PLAN | CAPACITY PLANNING x 

CP-2 (3) CONTINGENCY PLAN | RESUME ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESS 

FUNCTIONS

x x 

CP-2 (4) CONTINGENCY PLAN | RESUME ALL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS x 

CP-2 (5) CONTINGENCY PLAN | CONTINUE ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESS 

FUNCTIONS

x 

CP-2 (6) CONTINGENCY PLAN | ALTERNATE PROCESSING / STORAGE SITE

CP-2 (7) CONTINGENCY PLAN | COORDINATE WITH EXTERNAL SERVICE 

PROVIDERS

CP-2 (8) CONTINGENCY PLAN | IDENTIFY CRITICAL ASSETS x x 

CP-3 Contingency Training A x x x 

CP-3 (1) CONTINGENCY TRAINING | SIMULATED EVENTS A x 

CP-3 (2) CONTINGENCY TRAINING | AUTOMATED TRAINING ENVIRONMENTS A 

CP-4 Contingency Plan Testing A x x x 

CP-4 (1) CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANS A x x 

CP-4 (2) CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE A x 

CP-4 (3) CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | AUTOMATED TESTING A 

CP-4 (4) CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | FULL RECOVERY / RECONSTITUTION A x 

CP-5 Contingency Plan Update W Incorporated into CP-2.

CP-6 Alternate Storage Site x x 

CP-6 (1) ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITE x x 

CP-6 (2) ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | RECOVERY TIME / POINT OBJECTIVES x 

CP-6 (3) ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | ACCESSIBILITY x x 

CP-7 Alternate Processing Site x x 

CP-7 (1) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITE x x 

CP-7 (2) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | ACCESSIBILITY x x 

CP-7 (3) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | PRIORITY OF SERVICE x x 

CP-7 (4) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | CONFIGURATION FOR USE x 

CP-7 (5) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | EQUIVALENT INFORMATION 

SECURITY SAFEGUARDS

W Incorporated into CP-7.

CP-7 (6) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | INABILITY TO RETURN TO PRIMARY 

SITE

CP-8 Telecommunications Services x x 

CP-8 (1) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | PRIORITY OF SERVICE 

PROVISIONS

x x 

CP-8 (2) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | SINGLE POINTS OF FAILURE x x 

CP-8 (3) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | SEPARATION OF PRIMARY /

ALTERNATE PROVIDERS

x 

CP-8 (4) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | PROVIDER CONTINGENCY PLAN x 

CP-8 (5) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | ALTERNATE 

TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICE TESTING

CP-9 Information System Backup x x x 

CP-9 (1) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | TESTING FOR RELIABILITY /

INTEGRITY

x x 
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-20

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

CP-9 (2) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | TEST RESTORATION USING 

SAMPLING

x 

CP-9 (3) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | SEPARATE STORAGE FOR CRITICAL 

INFORMATION

x 

CP-9 (4) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | PROTECTION FROM UNAUTHORIZED 

MODIFICATION

W Incorporated into CP-9.

CP-9 (5) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | TRANSFER TO ALTERNATE SITE x 

CP-9 (6) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | REDUNDANT SECONDARY SYSTEM

CP-9 (7) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | TWO-PERSON RULE

CP-10 Information System Recovery and Reconstitution x x x 

CP-10 (1) INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION |

CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING

W Incorporated into CP-4.

CP-10 (2) INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION |

TRANSACTION RECOVERY

x x 

CP-10 (3) INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION |

COMPENSATING SECURITY CONTROLS

x x 

CP-10 (4) INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | RESTORE 

WITHIN TIME PERIOD

x 

CP-10 (5) INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | FAILOVER 

CAPABILITY

x 

CP-10 (6) INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION |

COMPONENT PROTECTION

CP-11 Predictable Failure Prevention A x 

CP-11 (1) PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | TRANSFERRING COMPONENT 

RESPONSIBILITIES

A 

CP-11 (2) PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | TIME LIMIT ON PROCESS 

EXECUTION WITHOUT SUPERVISION

A 

CP-11 (3) PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | MANUAL TRANSFER BETWEEN 

COMPONENTS

A 

CP-11 (4) PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | STANDBY COMPONENT 

INSTALLATION / NOTIFICATION

A 

CP-12 Alternate Communications Protocols 

CP-13 Safe Mode A 
Special Publication 800-53 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations

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APPENDIX D PAGE D-21

TABLE D-9: SUMMARY — IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION CONTROLS 

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

IA-1 Identification and Authentication Policy and Procedures A x x x

IA-2 Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) x x x

IA-2 (1) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO 

PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

x x x 

IA-2 (2) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO NONPRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

x x 

IA-2 (3) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | LOCAL ACCESS TO 

PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

x x 

IA-2 (4) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | LOCAL ACCESS TO NONPRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

x 

IA-2 (5) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP 

AUTHENTICATORS

IA-2 (6) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO 

PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - SEPARATE DEVICE

IA-2 (7) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO NONPRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - SEPARATE DEVICE

IA-2 (8) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO 

PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - REPLAY RESISTANT

x x 

IA-2 (9) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO NONPRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - REPLAY RESISTANT

x 

IA-2 (10) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | SINGLE SIGN-ON

IA-3 Device-to-Device Identification and Authentication x x 

IA-3 (1) DEVICE-TO-DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION |

CRYPTOGRAPHIC BIDIRECTIONAL AUTHENTICATION

IA-3 (2) DEVICE-TO-DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION |

CRYPTOGRAPHIC BIDIRECTIONAL AUTHENTICATION

W Incorporated into IA-3.

IA-3 (3) DEVICE-TO-DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | DYNAMIC 

ADDRESS ALLOCATION

IA-4 Identifier Management x x x 

IA-4 (1) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | PROHIBIT ACCOUNT IDENTIFIERS AS 

PUBLIC IDENTIFIERS

IA-4 (2) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | SUPERVISOR AUTHORIZATION

IA-4 (3) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | MULTIPLE FORMS OF CERTIFICATION

IA-4 (4) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | IDENTIFY USER STATUS

IA-4 (5) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC MANAGEMENT

IA-4 (6) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | CROSS-ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT

IA-5 Authenticator Management x x x 

IA-5 (1) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PASSWORD-BASED 

AUTHENTICATION

x x x 

IA-5 (2) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PKI-BASED AUTHENTICATION x x 

IA-5 (3) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | IN PERSON REGISTRATION x x 

IA-5 (4) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED TOOLS FOR 

STRENGTH DETERMINATION

IA-5 (5) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | CHANGE AUTHENTICATORS PRIOR 

TO DELIVERY

IA-5 (6) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PROTECTION OF AUTHENTICATORS

IA-5 (7) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | NO EMBEDDED UNENCRYPTED 

STATIC AUTHENTICATORS

IA-5 (8) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | MULTIPLE INFORMATION SYSTEM 

ACCOUNTS
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-22

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

IA-5 (9) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | CROSS-ORGANIZATION 

MANAGEMENT

IA-5 (10) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC AUTHENTICATOR 

ASSOCIATION

IA-5 (11) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | HARDWARE TOKEN-BASED 

AUTHENTICATION

IA-5 (12) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION

IA-6 Authenticator Feedback x x x 

IA-7 Cryptographic Module Authentication x x x 

IA-8 Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational 

Users) 

x x x 

IA-9 Service Identification and Authentication 

IA-9 (1) SERVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | INFORMATION 

EXCHANGE

IA-9 (2) SERVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | TRANSMISSION OF 

DECISIONS

IA-10 Alternative Authentication 

IA-11 Adaptive Identification and Authentication 

IA-12 Reauthentication 

 
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-23

TABLE D-10: SUMMARY — INCIDENT RESPONSE CONTROLS 

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

IR-1 Incident Response Policy and Procedures A x x x

IR-2 Incident Response Training A x x x

IR-2 (1) INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING | SIMULATED EVENTS A x

IR-2 (2) INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING | AUTOMATED TRAINING 

ENVIRONMENTS

A x

IR-3 Incident Response Testing A x x

IR-3 (1) INCIDENT RESPONSE TESTING | AUTOMATED TESTING A x

IR-3 (2) INCIDENT RESPONSE TESTING | COORDINATION WITH RELATED 

PLANS

A x x

IR-4 Incident Handling x x x

IR-4 (1) INCIDENT HANDLING | AUTOMATED INCIDENT HANDLING PROCESSES x x

IR-4 (2) INCIDENT HANDLING | DYNAMIC RECONFIGURATION

IR-4 (3) INCIDENT HANDLING | CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS

IR-4 (4) INCIDENT HANDLING | INFORMATION CORRELATION x

IR-4 (5) INCIDENT HANDLING | AUTOMATIC DISABLING OF INFORMATION 

SYSTEM

IR-4 (6) INCIDENT HANDLING | INSIDER THREATS - SPECIFIC CAPABILITIES

IR-4 (7) INCIDENT HANDLING | INSIDER THREATS - INTRA-ORGANIZATION 

COORDINATION

IR-4 (8) INCIDENT HANDLING | CORRELATION WITH EXTERNAL 

ORGANIZATIONS

IR-4 (9) INCIDENT HANDLING | DYNAMIC RESPONSE CAPABILITY

IR-4 (10) INCIDENT HANDLING | SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION

IR-5 Incident Monitoring A x x x

IR-5 (1) INCIDENT MONITORING | AUTOMATED TRACKING / DATA COLLECTION 

/ ANALYSIS

A x

IR-6 Incident Reporting x x x

IR-6 (1) INCIDENT REPORTING | AUTOMATED REPORTING x x

IR-6 (2) INCIDENT REPORTING | VULNERABILITIES RELATED TO INCIDENTS

IR-6 (3) INCIDENT REPORTING | COORDINATION WITH SUPPLY CHAIN

IR-7 Incident Response Assistance x x x

IR-7 (1) INCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR 

AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION / SUPPORT

x x

IR-7 (2) INCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE | COORDINATION WITH EXTERNAL 

PROVIDERS

IR-8 Incident Response Plan x x x

IR-9 Information Spillage Response 

IR-9 (1) INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | RESPONSIBLE PERSONNEL

IR-9 (2) INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | TRAINING

IR-9 (3) INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | POST-SPILL OPERATIONS

IR-9 (4) INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | EXPOSURE TO UNAUTHORIZED 

PERSONNEL

 
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-24

TABLE D-11: SUMMARY — MAINTENANCE CONTROLS 

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

MA-1 System Maintenance Policy and Procedures A x x x

MA-2 Controlled Maintenance x x x

MA-2 (1) CONTROLLED MAINTENANCE | RECORD CONTENT W Incorporated into MA-2.

MA-2 (2) CONTROLLED MAINTENANCE | AUTOMATED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES x

MA-3 Maintenance Tools x x

MA-3 (1) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | INSPECT TOOLS x x

MA-3 (2) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | INSPECT MEDIA x x

MA-3 (3) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL x

MA-3 (4) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | AUTOMATED RESTRICTED TOOL USE

MA-4 Non-Local Maintenance x x x

MA-4 (1) NON-LOCAL MAINTENANCE | AUDITING AND REVIEW x x

MA-4 (2) NON-LOCAL MAINTENANCE | DOCUMENT NON-LOCAL MAINTENANCE x x

MA-4 (3) NON-LOCAL MAINTENANCE | COMPARABLE SECURITY / SANITIZATION x

MA-4 (4) NON-LOCAL MAINTENANCE | AUTHENTICATION / SEPARATION OF 

MAINTENANCE SESSIONS

MA-4 (5) NON-LOCAL MAINTENANCE | APPROVALS AND NOTIFICATIONS

MA-4 (6) NON-LOCAL MAINTENANCE | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

MA-4 (7) NON-LOCAL MAINTENANCE | REMOTE DISCONNECT VERIFICATION

MA-5 Maintenance Personnel x x x

MA-5 (1) MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT APPROPRIATE 

ACCESS

x

MA-5 (2) MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR 

CLASSIFIED SYSTEMS

MA-5 (3) MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS FOR 

CLASSIFIED SYSTEMS

MA-5 (4) MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | FOREIGN NATIONALS

MA-6 Timely Maintenance x x

 
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-25

TABLE D-12: SUMMARY — MEDIA PROTECTION CONTROLS 

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

MP-1 Media Protection Policy and Procedures A x x x

MP-2 Media Access x x x

MP-2 (1) MEDIA ACCESS | AUTOMATED RESTRICTED ACCESS x x

MP-2 (2) MEDIA ACCESS | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

MP-3 Media Marking x x

MP-4 Media Storage x x

MP-4 (1) MEDIA STORAGE | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

MP-4 (2) MEDIA STORAGE | OFF-LINE STORAGE

MP-5 Media Transport x x

MP-5 (1) MEDIA TRANSPORT | PROTECTION OUTSIDE OF CONTROLLED AREAS W Incorporated into MP-5.

MP-5 (2) MEDIA TRANSPORT | DOCUMENTATION OF ACTIVITIES W Incorporated into MP-5.

MP-5 (3) MEDIA TRANSPORT | CUSTODIANS x

MP-5 (4) MEDIA TRANSPORT | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION x x

MP-6 Media Sanitization x x x

MP-6 (1) MEDIA SANITIZATION | TRACKING / DOCUMENTING / VERIFYING x

MP-6 (2) MEDIA SANITIZATION | EQUIPMENT TESTING x

MP-6 (3) MEDIA SANITIZATION | NON-DESTRUCTIVE TECHNIQUES x

MP-6 (4) MEDIA SANITIZATION | CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION W Incorporated into MP-6.

MP-6 (5) MEDIA SANITIZATION | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION W Incorporated into MP-6.

MP-6 (6) MEDIA SANITIZATION | MEDIA DESTRUCTION W Incorporated into MP-6.

MP-6 (7) MEDIA SANITIZATION | TWO-PERSON RULE

MP-7 Media Use x x x

MP-7 (1) MEDIA USE | ORGANIZATIONAL RESTRICTIONS x x

MP-7 (2) MEDIA USE | PROHIBITION OF USE WITHOUT OWNER x x

MP-8 Media Downgrading 

MP-8 (1) MEDIA DOWNGRADING | TRACKING / DOCUMENTING

MP-8 (2) MEDIA DOWNGRADING | EQUIPMENT TESTING

MP-8 (3) MEDIA DOWNGRADING | CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

MP-8 (4) MEDIA DOWNGRADING | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

 
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-26

TABLE D-13: SUMMARY — PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CONTROLS 

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

PE-1 Physical and Environmental Protection Policy and 

Procedures 

A x x x

PE-2 Physical Access Authorizations x x x

PE-2 (1) PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS | ACCESS BY POSITION / ROLE

PE-2 (2) PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS | TWO FORMS OF 

IDENTIFICATION

PE-2 (3) PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS | RESTRICT UNESCORTED 

ACCESS

PE-3 Physical Access Control x x x

PE-3 (1) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | INFORMATION SYSTEM ACCESS x

PE-3 (2) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | FACILITY / INFORMATION SYSTEM 

BOUNDARIES

PE-3 (3) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | CONTINUOUS GUARDS / ALARMS /

MONITORING

PE-3 (4) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | LOCKABLE CASINGS

PE-3 (5) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | TAMPER PROTECTION

PE-3 (6) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | PENETRATION TESTING

PE-4 Access Control for Transmission Medium x x

PE-5 Access Control for Output Devices x x

PE-5 (1) ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTPUT DEVICES | AUTOMATED ACCESS 

CONTROL / IDENTITY LINKAGE

PE-6 Monitoring Physical Access A x x x

PE-6 (1) MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | INTRUSION ALARMS /

SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT

A x x

PE-6 (2) MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | AUTOMATED INTRUSION 

RECOGNITION / RESPONSES

A x

PE-6 (3) MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | VIDEO SURVEILLANCE A 

PE-7 Visitor Control W Incorporated into PE-2 and PE-3.

PE-8 Visitor Access Records A x x x

PE-8 (1) VISITOR ACCESS RECORDS | AUTOMATED RECORDS MAINTENANCE /

REVIEW

x

PE-8 (2) VISITOR ACCESS RECORDS | PHYSICAL ACCESS RECORDS W Incorporated into PE-2.

PE-9 Power Equipment and Cabling x x

PE-9 (1) POWER EQUIPMENT AND CABLING | REDUNDANT CABLING

PE-9 (2) POWER EQUIPMENT AND CABLING | AUTOMATIC VOLTAGE CONTROLS

PE-10 Emergency Shutoff x x

PE-10 (1) EMERGENCY SHUTOFF | ACCIDENTAL / UNAUTHORIZED ACTIVATION W Incorporated into PE-10.

PE-11 Emergency Power x x

PE-11 (1) EMERGENCY POWER | LONG-TERM ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY -

MINIMAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

x

PE-11 (2) EMERGENCY POWER | LONG-TERM ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY -

SELF-CONTAINED

PE-12 Emergency Lighting x x x

PE-12 (1) EMERGENCY LIGHTING | ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESS 

FUNCTIONS

PE-13 Fire Protection x x x

PE-13 (1) FIRE PROTECTION | DETECTION DEVICES / SYSTEMS x x

PE-13 (2) FIRE PROTECTION | SUPPRESSION DEVICES / SYSTEMS x x
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-27

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

PE-13 (3) FIRE PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC FIRE SUPPRESSION x x

PE-13 (4) FIRE PROTECTION | INSPECTIONS

PE-14 Temperature and Humidity Controls x x x

PE-14 (1) TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY CONTROLS | AUTOMATIC CONTROLS

PE-14 (2) TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY CONTROLS | MONITORING WITH 

ALARMS / NOTIFICATIONS

PE-15 Water Damage Protection x x x

PE-15 (1) WATER DAMAGE PROTECTION | AUTOMATION SUPPORT x

PE-16 Delivery and Removal x x x

PE-17 Alternate Work Site x x

PE-18 Location of Information System Components x x

PE-18 (1) LOCATION OF INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS | FACILITY SITE x x

PE-19 Information Leakage 

PE-19 (1) INFORMATION LEAKAGE | NATIONAL EMISSIONS / TEMPEST POLICIES 

AND PROCEDURES

PE-20 Port and I/O Device Access 

 
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-28

TABLE D-14: SUMMARY — PLANNING CONTROLS 

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

PL-1 Security Planning Policy and Procedures A x x x

PL-2 System Security Plan A x x x

PL-2 (1) SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN | CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS W Incorporated into PL-7.

PL-2 (2) SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN | FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE W Incorporated into PL-8.

PL-2 (3) SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN | PLAN / COORDINATE WITH OTHER 

ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITIES

A x x

PL-3 System Security Plan Update W Incorporated into PL-2.

PL-4 Rules of Behavior A x x x

PL-4 (1) RULES OF BEHAVIOR | SOCIAL MEDIA AND NETWORKING 

RESTRICTIONS

A x x

PL-5 Privacy Impact Assessment W Incorporated into Appendix J, AR-2.

PL-6 Security-Related Activity Planning W Incorporated into PL-2.

PL-7 Security Concept of Operations 

PL-8 Security Architecture 

 
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-29

TABLE D-15: SUMMARY — PERSONNEL SECURITY CONTROLS 

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

PS-1 Personnel Security Policy and Procedures A x x x

PS-2 Position Categorization x x x

PS-3 Personnel Screening x x x

PS-3 (1) PERSONNEL SCREENING | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

PS-3 (2) PERSONNEL SCREENING | FORMAL INDOCTRINATION

PS-3 (3) PERSONNEL SCREENING | ADDITIONAL SCREENING CRITERIA

PS-3 (4) PERSONNEL SCREENING | INFORMATION WITH SPECIAL PROTECTION 

MEASURES

PS-4 Personnel Termination x x x

PS-4 (1) PERSONNEL TERMINATION | POST-EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS x

PS-4 (2) PERSONNEL TERMINATION | AUTOMATED NOTIFICATION x

PS-5 Personnel Transfer x x x

PS-6 Access Agreements A x x x

PS-6 (1) ACCESS AGREEMENTS | INFORMATION REQUIRING SPECIAL 

PROTECTION

W Incorporated into PS-3.

PS-6 (2) ACCESS AGREEMENTS | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REQUIRING 

SPECIAL PROTECTION

A 

PS-7 Third-Party Personnel Security A x x x

PS-7 (1) THIRD-PARTY PERSONNEL SECURITY | NOTIFICATIONS A x x

PS-8 Personnel Sanctions x x x

PS-8 (1) PERSONNEL SANCTIONS | NOTIFICATIONS x x

 
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-30

TABLE D-16: SUMMARY — RISK ASSESSMENT CONTROLS 

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

RA-1 Risk Assessment Policy and Procedures A x x x

RA-2 Security Categorization x x x

RA-3 Risk Assessment A x x x

RA-4 Risk Assessment Update W Incorporated into RA-3.

RA-5 Vulnerability Scanning A x x x

RA-5 (1) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | UPDATE TOOL CAPABILITY A x x

RA-5 (2) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | UPDATE BY FREQUENCY / WHEN 

IDENTIFIED

A x

RA-5 (3) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | BREADTH /DEPTH OF COVERAGE A x

RA-5 (4) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | DISCOVERABLE INFORMATION A x

RA-5 (5) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | PRIVILEGED ACCESS A x

RA-5 (6) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | AUTOMATED TREND ANALYSES A 

RA-5 (7) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | AUTOMATED DETECTION AND 

NOTIFICATION OF UNAUTHORIZED COMPONENTS

A x

RA-5 (8) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | REVIEW HISTORIC AUDIT LOGS A 

RA-5 (9) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | PENETRATION TESTING AND ANALYSES A 

RA-5 (10) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | CORRELATE SCANNING INFORMATION A 

 
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-31

TABLE D-17: SUMMARY — SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION CONTROLS 

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

SA-1 System and Services Acquisition Policy and Procedures A x x x

SA-2 Allocation of Resources A x x x

SA-3 System Development Life Cycle A x x x

SA-4 Acquisition Process A x x x

SA-4 (1) ACQUISITION PROCESS | FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIES OF SECURITY 

CONTROLS

A x x

SA-4 (2) ACQUISITION PROCESS | DESIGN / IMPLEMENTATION INFORMATION 

FOR SECURITY CONTROLS

A x

SA-4 (3) ACQUISITION PROCESS | DEVELOPMENT METHODS / TECHNIQUES /

PRACTICES

A 

SA-4 (4) ACQUISITION PROCESS | ASSIGNMENT OF COMPONENTS TO 

SYSTEMS

A x x

SA-4 (5) ACQUISITION PROCESS | COMPONENT CONFIGURATIONS A 

SA-4 (6) ACQUISITION PROCESS | USE OF INFORMATION ASSURANCE 

PRODUCTS

A 

SA-4 (7) ACQUISITION PROCESS | U.S. GOVERNMENT PROTECTION PROFILES A 

SA-4 (8) ACQUISITION PROCESS | CONTINUOUS MONITORING PLAN A 

SA-5 Information System Documentation A x x x

SA-5 (1) INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIES 

OF SECURITY CONTROLS

A x x

SA-5 (2) INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | SECURITY-RELEVANT 

EXTERNAL SYSTEM INTERFACES

A x

SA-5 (3) INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | HIGH-LEVEL DESIGN A x x

SA-5 (4) INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | LOW-LEVEL DESIGN A 

SA-5 (5) INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | SOURCE CODE A 

SA-5 (6) INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | FUNCTIONS / PORTS /

PROTOCOLS / SERVICES IN USE

A x x

SA-6 Software Usage Restrictions W Incorporated into CM-10 and SI-7.

SA-7 User-Installed Software W Incorporated into CM-11 and SI-7.

SA-8 Security Engineering Principles A x x

SA-9 External Information System Services A x x x

SA-9 (1) EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | RISK ASSESSMENTS /

ORGANIZATIONAL APPROVALS

A 

SA-9 (2) EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | IDENTIFICATION OF FUNCTIONS /

PORTS / PROTOCOLS / SERVICES

A x x

SA-9 (3) EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | ESTABLISH / MAINTAIN CHAIN OF 

TRUST WITH PROVIDERS

A x

SA-9 (4) EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | CONSISTENT INTERESTS OF 

CONSUMERS AND PROVIDERS

A 

SA-9 (5) EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | PROCESSING, STORAGE, AND 

SERVICE LOCATION

A 

SA-10 Developer Configuration Management A x x

SA-10 (1) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | SOFTWARE /

FIRMWARE INTEGRITY VERIFICATION

A 

SA-10 (2) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | ALTERNATIVE 

CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PROCESSES

A 

SA-10 (3) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | HARDWARE INTEGRITY 

VERIFICATION

A 

SA-11 Developer Security Testing A x x
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-32

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

SA-11 (1) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING | CODE ANALYSIS TOOLS A 

SA-11 (2) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING | THREAT AND VULNERABILITY 

ANALYSES / FLAW REMEDIATION

A 

SA-11 (3) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING | INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF 

TESTING / RESULTS

A 

SA-11 (4) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING | MANUAL CODE REVIEWS A 

SA-11 (5) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING | PENETRATION TESTING A 

SA-11 (6) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING | UNIT / INTEGRATION / REGRESSION 

TESTING

A 

SA-11 (7) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING | ATTACK SURFACE REVIEWS A 

SA-11 (8) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING | VERIFY SCOPE OF TESTING A 

SA-12 Supply Chain Protection A x

SA-12 (1) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | ACQUISITION STRATEGIES / TOOLS /

METHODS

A 

SA-12 (2) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | SUPPLIER REVIEWS A 

SA-12 (3) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | TRUSTED SHIPPING AND 

WAREHOUSING

W Incorporated into SA-12.

SA-12 (4) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | DIVERSITY OF SUPPLIERS W Incorporated into SA-12.

SA-12 (5) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | LIMITATION OF HARM A 

SA-12 (6) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | MINIMIZING PROCUREMENT TIME W Incorporated into SA-12.

SA-12 (7) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | ASSESSMENTS PRIOR TO SELECTION /

ACCEPTANCE / UPDATE

A 

SA-12 (8) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | USE OF ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE A 

SA-12 (9) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | OPERATIONS SECURITY A 

SA-12 (10) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | UNAUTHORIZED MODIFICATIONS A 

SA-12 (11) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | VALIDATE AS GENUINE AND NOT 

ALTERED

A 

SA-12 (12) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | PENETRATION TESTING / ANALYSIS OF 

SUPPLY CHAIN ELEMENTS

A 

SA-12 (13) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL AGREEMENTS A 

SA-12 (14) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | CRITICAL INFORMATION SYSTEM 

COMPONENTS

A 

SA-12 (15) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | PROCESSES TO ADDRESS 

WEAKNESSES OR DEFICIENCIES

A 

SA-13 Trustworthiness W Incorporated into Appendix E.

SA-14 Critical Information System Components A 

SA-14 (1) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | NO ALTERNATIVE SOURCING W Incorporated into SA-12.

SA-15 Development Process, Standards, and Tools A x

SA-15 (1) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | QUALITY 

METRICS

A 

SA-15 (2) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | SECURITY 

TRACKING TOOLS

A 

SA-15 (3) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | CRITICALITY 

ANALYSIS

A 

SA-15 (4) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | THREAT 

MODELING / VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

A 

SA-15 (5) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | ATTACK 

SURFACE REDUCTION

A 

SA-15 (6) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | CONTINUOUS 

IMPROVEMENT

A 
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-33

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

SA-15 (7) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | AUTOMATED 

VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

A 

SA-15 (8) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | REUSE OF 

THREAT / VULNERABILITY INFORMATION

A 

SA-16 Developer-Provided Training A x

SA-17 Developer Security Architecture and Design A x

SA-17 (1) DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | FORMAL 

POLICY MODEL

A 

SA-17 (2) DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | SECURITYRELEVANT COMPONENTSA 

SA-17 (3) DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | FORMAL 

CORRESPONDENCE

A 

SA-18 Tamper Resistance and Detection A 

SA-18 (1) TAMPER RESISTANCE AND DETECTION | MULTIPLE PHASES OF SDLC A 

SA-19 Anti-Counterfeit A 

 
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-34

TABLE D-18: SUMMARY — SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION CONTROLS 

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

SC-1 System and Communications Protection Policy and 

Procedures 

A x x x

SC-2 Application Partitioning A x x

SC-2 (1) APPLICATION PARTITIONING | INTERFACES FOR NON-PRIVILEGED 

USERS

A 

SC-3 Security Function Isolation A x

SC-3 (1) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | HARDWARE SEPARATION A 

SC-3 (2) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | ACCESS / FLOW CONTROL 

FUNCTIONS

A 

SC-3 (3) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | MINIMIZE NONSECURITY 

FUNCTIONALITY

A 

SC-3 (4) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | MODULE COUPLING A 

SC-3 (5) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | LAYERED STRUCTURES A 

SC-3 (6) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | BOUNDARY PROTECTION 

MECHANISMS

A x

SC-3 (7) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | MODULE COHESION A 

SC-4 Information in Shared Resources x x

SC-4 (1) INFORMATION IN SHARED RESOURCES | SECURITY LEVELS W Incorporated into SC-4.

SC-4 (2) INFORMATION IN SHARED RESOURCES | CLASSIFICATION LEVELS /

SECURITY CATEGORIES

SC-5 Denial of Service Protection x x x

SC-5 (1) DENIAL OF SERVICE PROTECTION | RESTRICT INTERNAL USERS

SC-5 (2) DENIAL OF SERVICE PROTECTION | EXCESS CAPACITY / BANDWIDTH /

REDUNDANCY

SC-5 (3) DENIAL OF SERVICE PROTECTION | DETECTION / MONITORING

SC-6 Resource Availability A 

SC-7 Boundary Protection x x x

SC-7 (1) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PHYSICALLY SEPARATED SUBNETWORKS x x

SC-7 (2) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PUBLIC ACCESS W Incorporated into SC-7.

SC-7 (3) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ACCESS POINTS x x

SC-7 (4) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | EXTERNAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 

SERVICES

x x

SC-7 (5) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | DENY BY DEFAULT / ALLOW BY EXCEPTION x x

SC-7 (6) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | RESPONSE TO RECOGNIZED FAILURES x

SC-7 (7) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | REMOTE DEVICES x x

SC-7 (8) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ROUTE TRAFFIC TO AUTHENTICATED 

PROXY SERVERS

x

SC-7 (9) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | RESTRICT OUTGOING COMMUNICATIONS 

TRAFFIC

SC-7 (10) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | UNAUTHORIZED EXFILTRATION

SC-7 (11) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | RESTRICT INCOMING COMMUNICATIONS 

TRAFFIC

SC-7 (12) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | HOST-BASED PROTECTION

SC-7 (13) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ISOLATION OF SECURITY TOOLS /

MECHANISMS / SUPPORT COMPONENTS

SC-7 (14) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | UNAUTHORIZED PHYSICAL CONNECTIONS

SC-7 (15) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ROUTE PRIVILEGED NETWORK ACCESSES
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-35

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

SC-7 (16) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PREVENT DISCOVERY OF COMPONENTS /

DEVICES

SC-7 (17) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | AUTOMATED ENFORCEMENT OF 

PROTOCOL FORMATS

SC-7 (18) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | FAIL SECURE

SC-7 (19) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | BLOCKING INBOUND / OUTBOUND 

COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC

SC-7 (20) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | DYNAMIC ISOLATION / SEGREGATION

SC-8 Transmission Integrity x x

SC-8 (1) TRANSMISSION INTEGRITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC OR ALTERNATE 

PHYSICAL PROTECTION

x x

SC-8 (2) TRANSMISSION INTEGRITY | INTEGRITY PRIOR TO TRANSMISSION

SC-9 Transmission Confidentiality x x

SC-9 (1) TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC OR ALTERNATE 

PHYSICAL PROTECTION

x x

SC-9 (2) TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY | PRIOR TO TRANSMISSION

SC-9 (3) TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC OR 

ALTERNATIVE PROTECTION FOR MESSAGE EXTERNALS

SC-9 (4) TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY | CONCEAL / RANDOMIZE 

COMMUNICATIONS

SC-10 Network Disconnect x x

SC-11 Trusted Path A 

SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management x x x

SC-12 (1) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT |

AVAILABILITY

x

SC-12 (2) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT |

SYMMETRIC KEYS

SC-12 (3) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT |

ASYMMETRIC KEYS

SC-12 (4) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | PKI 

CERTIFICATES

W Incorporated into SC-12.

SC-12 (5) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | PKI 

CERTIFICATES / HARDWARE TOKENS

W Incorporated into SC-12.

SC-13 Cryptographic Protection x x x

SC-13 (1) CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | FIPS-VALIDATED CRYPTOGRAPHY

SC-13 (2) CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | NSA-APPROVED CRYPTOGRAPHY

SC-13 (3) CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT FORMAL 

ACCESS APPROVALS

SC-13 (4) CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | DIGITAL SIGNATURES

SC-14 Public Access Protections x x x

SC-15 Collaborative Computing Devices x x x

SC-15 (1) COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | PHYSICAL DISCONNECT

SC-15 (2) COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | BLOCKING INBOUND /

OUTBOUND COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC

W Incorporated into SC-7.

SC-15 (3) COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | DISABLING / REMOVAL IN 

SECURE WORK AREAS

SC-15 (4) COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | EXPLICITLY INDICATE 

CURRENT PARTICIPANTS

SC-16 Transmission of Security Attributes 

SC-16 (1) TRANSMISSION OF SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | INTEGRITY VALIDATION
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CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

SC-17 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates x x

SC-18 Mobile Code x x

SC-18 (1) MOBILE CODE | IDENTIFY UNACCEPTABLE CODE / TAKE CORRECTIVE 

ACTIONS

SC-18 (2) MOBILE CODE | ACQUISITION / DEVELOPMENT / USE

SC-18 (3) MOBILE CODE | PREVENT DOWNLOADING / EXECUTION

SC-18 (4) MOBILE CODE | PREVENT AUTOMATIC EXECUTION 

SC-18 (5) MOBILE CODE | ALLOW EXECUTION IN ONLY IN CONFINED 

ENVIRONMENTS

SC-19 Voice Over Internet Protocol x x

SC-20 Secure Name /Address Resolution Service 

(Authoritative Source) 

x x x

SC-20 (1) SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (AUTHORITATIVE 

SOURCE) | CHILD SUBSPACES

W Incorporated into SC-20.

SC-20 (2) SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (AUTHORITATIVE 

SOURCE) | DATA ORIGIN / INTEGRITY

SC-21 Secure Name /Address Resolution Service 

(Recursive or Caching Resolver) 

x x x

SC-21 (1) SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (RECURSIVE OR 

CACHING RESOLVER) | DATA ORIGIN / INTEGRITY

W Incorporated into SC-21.

SC-22 Architecture and Provisioning for 

Name/Address Resolution Service 

x x x

SC-23 Session Authenticity x x

SC-23 (1) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | INVALIDATE SESSION IDENTIFIERS AT 

LOGOUT

SC-23 (2) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | USER-INITIATED LOGOUTS / MESSAGE 

DISPLAYS

SC-23 (3) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | UNIQUE SESSION IDENTIFIERS

SC-23 (4) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | UNIQUE SESSION IDENTIFIERS WITH 

RANDOMIZATION

SC-23 (5) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | ALLOWED CERTIFICATE AUTHORITIES

SC-24 Fail in Known State A x

SC-25 Thin Nodes 

SC-26 Honeypots 

SC-26 (1) HONEYPOTS | DETECTION OF MALICIOUS CODE W Incorporated into SC-36.

SC-27 Operating System-Independent Applications 

SC-28 Protection of Information at Rest x x

SC-28 (1) PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AT REST | CRYPTOGRAPHIC 

PROTECTION

SC-29 Heterogeneity A 

SC-29 (1) HETEROGENEITY | VIRTUALIZATION TECHNIQUES A 

SC-30 Concealment and Misdirection A 

SC-30 (1) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | VIRTUALIZATION TECHNIQUES W Incorporated into SC-29.

SC-30 (2) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | RANDOMNESS A 

SC-30 (3) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | CHANGE PROCESSING /

STORAGE LOCATIONS

A 

SC-30 (4) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | MISLEADING INFORMATION A 

SC-30 (5) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | CONCEALMENT OF SYSTEM 

COMPONENTS

A 
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-37

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

SC-31 Covert Channel Analysis A 

SC-31 (1) COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS | TESTING OF DEVELOPER-IDENTIFIED 

COVERT CHANNELS

W Incorporated into SC-31.

SC-31 (2) COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS | MAXIMUM BANDWIDTH A 

SC-31 (3) COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS | MEASURE BANDWIDTH IN 

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

A 

SC-32 Information System Partitioning A x x

SC-33 Transmission Preparation Integrity W Incorporated into SC-8.

SC-34 Non-Modifiable Executable Programs A 

SC-34 (1) NON-MODIFIABLE EXECUTABLE PROGRAMS | NO WRITABLE STORAGE A 

SC-34 (2) NON-MODIFIABLE EXECUTABLE PROGRAMS | INTEGRITY PROTECTION 

/ READ-ONLY MEDIA

A 

SC-35 Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Survey 

SC-36 Honeyclients 

SC-37 Distributed Processing and Storage A 

SC-37 (1) DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING AND STORAGE | DIVERSITY OF 

IMPLEMENTATION

A 

SC-37 (2) DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING AND STORAGE | POLLING TECHNIQUES A 

SC-38 Malware Analysis A 

SC-39 Out-of-Band Channels A 

SC-39 (1) OUT-OF-BAND CHANNELS | ENSURE DELIVERY / TRANSMISSION A 

SC-40 Operations Security A 

SC-41 Process Isolation A x x x

SC-41 (1) PROCESS ISOLATION | HARDWARE SEPARATION A 

SC-41 (2) PROCESS ISOLATION | THREAD ISOLATION A 

SC-42 Wireless Link Protection 

SC-42 (1) WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE

SC-42 (2) WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | REDUCE DETECTION POTENTIAL

SC-42 (3) WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | IMITATIVE OR MANIPULATIVE 

COMMUNICATIONS DECEPTION

SC-42 (4) WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | SIGNAL PARAMETER IDENTIFICATION

 
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-38

TABLE D-19: SUMMARY — SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY CONTROLS 

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

SI-1 System and Information Integrity Policy and Procedures A x x x

SI-2 Flaw Remediation x x x

SI-2 (1) FLAW REMEDIATION | CENTRAL MANAGEMENT AND AUTOMATIC 

SOFTWARE / FIRMWARE UPDATES

x 

SI-2 (2) FLAW REMEDIATION | AUTOMATED FLAW REMEDIATION STATUS x x 

SI-2 (3) FLAW REMEDIATION | TIME TO REMEDIATE FLAWS / CORRECTIVE 

ACTIONS

SI-2 (4) FLAW REMEDIATION | AUTOMATED PATCH MANAGEMENT TOOLS W Incorporated into SI-2.

SI-3 Malicious Code Protection x x x

SI-3 (1) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | CENTRAL MANAGEMENT x x 

SI-3 (2) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC UPDATES x x 

SI-3 (3) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | NON-PRIVILEGED USERS x x 

SI-3 (4) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | UPDATES ONLY BY PRIVILEGED 

USERS

SI-3 (5) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | REMOVABLE MEDIA W Incorporated into MP-7.

SI-3 (6) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | TESTING / VERIFICATION

SI-3 (7) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | NON SIGNATURE-BASED DETECTION

SI-3 (8) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | DETECT UNAUTHORIZED COMMANDS

SI-4 Information System Monitoring A x x x

SI-4 (1) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | SYSTEM-WIDE INTRUSION 

DETECTION SYSTEM

A 

SI-4 (2) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED TOOLS FOR REALTIME ANALYSISA x x 

SI-4 (3) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED TOOL 

INTEGRATION

A 

SI-4 (4) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | INBOUND AND OUTBOUND 

COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC

A x x 

SI-4 (5) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | NEAR REAL-TIME ALERTS A x x 

SI-4 (6) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | RESTRICT NON-PRIVILEGED 

USERS

A x x 

SI-4 (7) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED RESPONSE TO 

SUSPICIOUS EVENTS

A 

SI-4 (8) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | PROTECTION OF MONITORING 

INFORMATION

A 

SI-4 (9) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | TESTING OF MONITORING 

TOOLS

A 

SI-4 (10) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | VISIBILITY OF ENCRYPTED 

COMMUNICATIONS

A 

SI-4 (11) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | ANALYZE COMMUNICATIONS 

TRAFFIC ANOMALIES

A 

SI-4 (12) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED ALERTS A 

SI-4 (13) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | ANALYZE TRAFFIC / EVENT 

PATTERNS

A 

SI-4 (14) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | WIRELESS INTRUSION 

DETECTION

A 

SI-4 (15) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | WIRELESS TO WIRELINE 

COMMUNICATIONS

A 

SI-4 (16) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | CORRELATE MONITORING 

INFORMATION

A 
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-39

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

SI-4 (17) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | INTEGRATED SITUATIONAL 

AWARENESS

A 

SI-4 (18) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | ANALYZE TRAFFIC / COVERT 

EXFILTRATION

A 

SI-4 (19) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | INDIVIDUALS POSING GREATER 

RISK

A 

SI-4 (20) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | PRIVILEGED USER A 

SI-4 (21) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | PROBATIONARY PERIODS A 

SI-4 (22) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | UNAUTHORIZED NETWORK 

SERVICES

A 

SI-4 (23) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | HOST-BASED DEVICES A 

SI-5 Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives A x x x

SI-5 (1) SECURITY ALERTS, ADVISORIES, AND DIRECTIVES | AUTOMATED 

ALERTS AND ADVISORIES

A x 

SI-6 Security Function Verification A x 

SI-6 (1) SECURITY FUNCTION VERIFICATION | NOTIFICATION OF FAILED 

SECURITY TESTS

W Incorporated into SI-6.

SI-6 (2) SECURITY FUNCTION VERIFICATION | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR 

DISTRIBUTED TESTING

SI-6 (3) SECURITY FUNCTION VERIFICATION | REPORT VERIFICATION 

RESULTS

SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity A x x 

SI-7 (1) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | INTEGRITY 

SCANS

A x x 

SI-7 (2) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | AUTOMATED 

NOTIFICATIONS

A x 

SI-7 (3) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CENTRALLYMANAGED INTEGRITY TOOLSA 

SI-7 (4) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | TAMPEREVIDENT PACKAGINGW Incorporated into SA-12.

SI-7 (5) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | AUTOMATED 

RESPONSE TO INTEGRITY VIOLATIONS

A x 

SI-7 (6) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY |

CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

A 

SI-7 (7) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | HARDWAREBASED PROTECTIONA 

SI-7 (8) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY |

INTEGRATION OF DETECTION AND RESPONSE

A x x 

SI-7 (9) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | AUDITING 

CAPABILITY FOR SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

A 

SI-7 (10) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | VERIFY 

BOOT PROCESS

A 

SI-7 (11) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | PROTECTION 

OF BOOT FIRMWARE

A 

SI-7 (12) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CONFINED 

ENVIRONMENTS WITH LIMITED PRIVILEGES

A 

SI-7 (13) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | INTEGRITY 

VERIFICATION

A 

SI-7 (14) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CODE 

EXECUTION IN PROTECTED ENVIRONMENTS

A 

SI-7 (15) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | BINARY OR 

MACHINE EXECUTABLE CODE

A x 
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APPENDIX D PAGE D-40

CNTL 

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name 

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

SI-8 Spam Protection x x 

SI-8 (1) SPAM PROTECTION | CENTRAL MANAGEMENT OF PROTECTION 

MECHANISMS

x x 

SI-8 (2) SPAM PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC UPDATES x x 

SI-8 (3) SPAM PROTECTION | CONTINUOUS LEARNING CAPABILITY

SI-9 Information Input Restrictions x x 

SI-9 (1) INFORMATION INPUT RESTRICTIONS | PROTECT REMOTE COMMANDS

SI-9 (2) INFORMATION INPUT RESTRICTIONS | DETECT UNAUTHORIZED 

COMMANDS

SI-10 Information Input Validation A x x 

SI-10 (1) INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | MANUAL OVERRIDE CAPABILITY

SI-10 (2) INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | REVIEW / RESOLUTION OF ERRORS

SI-10 (3) INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | PREDICTABLE BEHAVIOR

SI-10 (4) INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | REVIEW / TIMING INTERACTIONS

SI-11 Error Handling x x 

SI-12 Information Output Handling and Retention x x x 

SI-13 Predictable Failure Prevention W Incorporated into CP-11.

SI-14 Non-Persistence A 

 
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APPENDIX E PAGE E-1

APPENDIX E

ASSURANCE AND TRUSTWORTHINESS

MEASURES OF CONFIDENCE FOR LOW, MODERATE, AND HIGH-IMPACT SYSTEMS 

ecurity assurance is a critical aspect in determining the trustworthiness of information 

systems. Assurance is the measure of confidence that the security functions, features, 

practices, procedures, mechanisms, and architecture of organizational information systems 

accurately mediate/enforce established security policies.83 The objective of this appendix is:

• To encourage acquisition organizations to include assurance requirements in procurements of 

information systems, system components, and services; 

• To encourage hardware, software, and firmware developers to employ development practices 

that result in more trustworthy information technology products and systems; 

• To encourage information systems integrators to select information technology products that 

have been built with higher assurance and to employ sound systems and security engineering 

techniques and methods during the systems integration process; and 

• To increase security capability by facilitating the deployment of more trustworthy 

information technology products within critical information systems or system components. 

Minimum security requirements for federal information and information systems are required by 

FIPS Publication 200. These requirements, including the minimum assurance requirements, can 

be satisfied by selecting and implementing the security controls in the low, moderate, or high 

baselines in Appendix D.84 The assurance-related controls in the baselines reflect the minimum 

assurance requirements that are generally applicable to federal information and information 

systems.85 However, considering the current threat space (i.e., capabilities, intentions, targeting 

activities of adversaries) and the risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other 

organizations, and the Nation, posed by the advanced persistent threat (APT), organizations may 

choose to implement additional assurance-related controls from Appendix F. These additional 

controls can be selected based on the tailoring guidance provided in Section 3.2. Organizations 

can also consider creating specific high-assurance overlays for critical missions and business 

functions, specialized environments of operation, or information technologies (see Section 3.2 

and Appendix I). When assurance-related controls cannot be satisfied, organizations can propose 

compensating controls (e.g., procedural or operational solutions to compensate for insufficient 

technology-based solutions) or assume a greater degree of risk with regard to the actual security 

capability achieved. 

 

83 Assurance can also be viewed as the extent to which the security functionality is implemented correctly, operating as 

intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting stated security requirements. 

84 CNSS Instruction 1253 provides security control baselines for national security systems. Therefore, the assurancerelated controls in the baselines established for the national security community, if so designated, may differ from those 

controls designated in Tables E-1 through E-3. 

85 It is difficult to determine if a given security control baseline from Appendix D provides the assurance needed across 

all applicable information technologies, users, platforms, and organizations. For example, while the use of formal 

methods might be appropriate in a cross-domain product, different assurance techniques might be appropriate for a 

complex air traffic control system or for a web server providing emergency preparedness information from the 

Department of Homeland Security. Still, the existing baselines do have assurance aspects that reflect the minimum 

assurance that is anticipated to be common across all technologies, users, platforms, and organizations. 

S 
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APPENDIX E PAGE E-2

As illustrated in Figure 3 (Section 2.6), the actions taken by developers, implementers, operators, 

and assessors produce many different types of security evidence that is used to provide assurance 

in the security functionality employed in the information systems and environment in which those 

systems operate—ultimately contributing to the security capability achieved and trustworthiness 

of the systems. With regard to the security evidence produced, the depth and coverage of such 

evidence can affect the level of assurance in the functionality implemented. Depth and coverage 

are attributes associated with assessment methods and the generation of security evidence. The 

assessment methods can be applied to developmental and operational assurance. With regard to 

developmental assurance, depth is associated with the rigor, level of detail, and formality of the 

artifacts produced during the design and development of the hardware, software, and firmware 

components of information systems (e.g., functional specifications, high-level design, low-level 

design, and implementation representation). The level of detail available in development artifacts 

can affect the type of testing, evaluation, and analysis conducted during the system development 

life cycle (e.g., black-box testing, gray-box testing, white-box testing, static/dynamic analysis). 

For operational assurance, the depth attribute addresses the number and types of assurance-related 

security controls selected and implemented. In contrast, the coverage attribute is associated with 

the assessment methods employed during development and operations, addressing the scope and 

breadth of assessment objects included in the assessments (e.g., number/types of tests conducted 

on source code, number of software modules reviewed, number of network nodes/mobile devices 

scanned for vulnerabilities, number of individuals interviewed to check basic understanding of 

contingency responsibilities).86

The following sections provide a description of the minimum assurance requirements for federal 

information systems and the assurance-related controls that are included in each of the security 

control baselines in Appendix D to ensure the requirements are satisfied. The criteria for whether 

a particular security control is assurance-related or functionality-related is based on the overall 

characteristics or properties of the control. In general, assurance-related controls are controls that 

address: (i) processes, procedures, techniques, or methodologies for designing and developing 

information systems, system components (i.e., hardware, software, or firmware), or supporting 

operational processes including improving the quality of those systems/components/processes; or 

(ii) developmental/operational activities that produce security evidence, help determine security 

control effectiveness or risk (e.g., audit, testing, evaluation, analysis, assessment, verification, 

validation, monitoring, authorization), or improve personnel skills, expertise, and understanding 

(e.g., security awareness/training, incident response training, contingency training). 

Security controls may be designated as assurance-related controls even when the controls exhibit 

some functional characteristics or properties as well (e.g., SI-4, Information System Monitoring). 

The distinction between functionality and assurance is less important when describing the 

assurance-related controls in the baselines—primarily because the security controls in the three 

baselines after the tailoring process is applied, become part of the security plans for information 

systems or organizations. However, the distinction becomes more important in Table E-4 when 

organizations can exercise the option of selecting additional security controls on an optional basis 

to increase the assurance in security functionality. The controls in Table E-4 were identified using 

the same criteria as described above for the designation of assurance-related controls in the initial 

baselines. Whether security controls are designated as functionality-related or assurance-related, 

the controls contribute to the security capability achieved by organizations. 

 

86 NIST Special Publication 800-53A provides guidance on the generation of security evidence related to security 

assessments conducted during the system development life cycle. 
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APPENDIX E PAGE E-3

Minimum Assurance for Low-Impact Systems 

Assurance Requirement: The organization, based on its security requirements, security policies, and needed 

security capabilities, has an expectation of: (i) a limited strength of security functionality; and (ii) a limited

degree of confidence supported by the depth and coverage of associated security evidence, that the security 

functionality is complete, consistent, and correct. 

Supplemental Guidance: Security functionality and assurance are implemented in the form of security 

controls selected from Appendix F. Minimum assurance for low-impact systems and the information 

technology components that compose those systems, aligns with that which is readily achievable with 

unmodified, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products and services. Due to the limited strength of 

functionality expected for low-impact systems, the depth and coverage of security evidence produced is 

minimal and is not expected to be more than what is routinely provided by COTS manufacturers, vendors, 

and resellers, supplemented by the results of security control assessments and monitoring of organizational 

information systems and environments of operation. For other than technology-based functionality, the 

emphasis is on a limited degree of confidence in the completeness, correctness, and consistency of 

procedural/operational security functionality (e.g., policies, procedures, physical security, and personnel 

security). Minimum assurance requirements in the form of developmental and operational assurance 

controls for low-impact information systems are listed in Table E-1. Organizations, through the tailoring 

process (including an organizational assessment of risk), may choose to designate other security controls as 

assurance-related and add to the minimum set in Table E-1. 

TABLE E-1: MINIMUM ASSURANCE CONTROLS FOR LOW-IMPACT SYSTEMS87

ID CONTROLS ID CONTROLS 

AC AC-1 MP MP-1 

AT AT-1, AT-2, AT-3, AT-4 PE PE-1, PE-6, PE-8 

AU AU-1, AU-6 PL PL-1, PL-2, PL-4 

CA CA-1, CA-2, CA-3, CA-5, CA-6, CA-7 PS PS-1, PS-6, PS-7 

CM CM-1, CM-2, CM-8 RA RA-1, RA-3, RA-5 

CP CP-1, CP-3, CP-4 SA SA-1, SA-2, SA-3, SA-4, SA-5, SA-9 

IA IA-1 SC SC-1, SC-41 

IR IR-1, IR-2, IR-5 SI SI-1, SI-4, SI-5 

MA MA-1 

 

 

87 Implementing the assurance-related controls from Appendix D represented in Table E.1 will satisfy the minimum 

assurance requirements for low-impact systems mandated by FIPS 200. 
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Minimum Assurance for Moderate-Impact Systems 

Assurance Requirement: The organization, based on its security requirements, security policies, and needed 

security capabilities, has an expectation of: (i) a moderate strength of security functionality; and (ii) a 

moderate degree of confidence supported by the depth and coverage of associated security evidence, that 

the security functionality is complete, consistent, and correct. 

Supplemental Guidance: Security functionality and assurance are implemented in the form of security 

controls selected from Appendix F. Minimum assurance for moderate-impact systems and the information 

technology components that compose those systems, adds to the expectations at the low assurance level by 

incorporating higher-end COTS security capabilities, perhaps some special development, establishing more 

secure configuration settings, and likely some additional assessment of implemented capability. Due to the 

moderate strength of functionality expected for moderate-impact systems, the security evidence produced is 

more substantial than the minimal evidence produced for low-impact systems but still in the range of what 

can be provided by COTS manufacturers, vendors, and resellers, supplemented by the results of additional 

security control assessments and ongoing monitoring of organizational information systems/environments 

of operation. For non-technology-based functionality, the emphasis is on a moderate degree of confidence 

in the completeness, correctness, and consistency of procedural/operational security functionality (e.g., 

policies, procedures, physical security, and personnel security). Minimum-assurance requirements in the 

form of developmental and operational assurance controls for moderate-impact information systems are 

listed in Table E-2. Organizations, through the tailoring process (including an organizational assessment of 

risk), may choose to designate other security controls as assurance-related and add to the minimum set in 

Table E-2. 

TABLE E-2: MINIMUM ASSURANCE CONTROLS FOR MODERATE-IMPACT SYSTEMS88

ID CONTROLS ID CONTROLS 

AC AC-1 MP MP-1 

AT AT-1, AT-2, AT-2 (2), AT-3, AT-4, AT-5 PE PE-1, PE-6, PE-6 (1), PE-8 

AU AU-1, AU-6, AU-6 (1), AU-6 (3), AU-6 (9), AU-7, AU-7 (1) PL PL-1, PL-2, PL-2 (3), PL-4, PL-4 (1)

CA CA-1, CA-2, CA-3, CA-2 (1), CA-5, CA-6, CA-7, CA-7 (1) PS PS-1, PS-6, PS-7, PS-7 (1)

CM CM-1, CM-2, CM-2 (1), CM-2 (3), CM-3, CM-3 (2), CM-4, CM8, CM-8 (1), CM-8 (5)RA RA-1, RA-3, RA-5, RA-5 (1)

CP CP-1, CP-3, CP-4, CP-4 (1) SA SA-1, SA-2, SA-3, SA-4, SA-4 (1), SA-5, SA-5 (1), SA-5 (3), 

SA-8, SA-9, SA-9 (2), SA-10, SA-11

IA IA-1 SC SC-1, SC-2, SC-32, SC-41 

IR IR-1, IR-2, IR-3, IR-3 (2), IR-5 SI SI-1, SI-4, SI-4 (2), SI-4 (4), SI-4 (5), SI-4 (6), SI-5, SI-7, SI-7 

MA MA-1 (1), SI-7 (8), SI-10

 

 

88 Implementing the assurance-related controls from Appendix D represented in Table E.2 will satisfy the minimum 

assurance requirements for moderate-impact systems mandated by FIPS 200. The bold text indicates the delta from the 

low baseline (i.e., the assurance-related controls added to the low baseline to produce the increased level of assurance 

in the moderate baseline). 
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Minimum Assurance for High-Impact Systems 

Assurance Requirement: The organization, based on its security requirements, security policies, and needed 

security capabilities, has an expectation of: (i) a high strength of security functionality; and (ii) a high

degree of confidence supported by the depth and coverage of associated security evidence, that the security 

functionality is complete, consistent, and correct. 

Supplemental Guidance: Security functionality and assurance are implemented in the form of security 

controls selected from Appendix F. Minimum assurance for high-impact systems and the information 

technology components that compose those systems, adds to the expectations at the moderate assurance 

level by incorporating higher-end COTS security capabilities that result from the application of commonly 

accepted good commercial development practices for reducing latent flaw rates, some special development, 

and additional assessment of implemented capability. Due to the high strength of functionality expected for 

high-impact systems, the security evidence produced is more comprehensive than the evidence produced 

for moderate-impact systems. The security evidence is supplemented by the results of additional security 

control assessments and the ongoing monitoring of organizational information systems/environments of 

operation. For non-technology-based functionality, the emphasis is on the high degree of confidence in the 

completeness, correctness, and consistency of procedural/operational security functionality (e.g., policies, 

procedures, physical security, and personnel security). Minimum assurance requirements in the form of 

developmental and operational assurance controls for high-impact information systems are listed in Table 

E-3. Organizations, through the tailoring process (including an organizational assessment of risk), may 

choose to designate other security controls as assurance-related and add to the minimum set in Table E-3. 

TABLE E-3: MINIMUM ASSURANCE CONTROLS FOR HIGH-IMPACT SYSTEMS89

ID CONTROLS ID CONTROLS 

AC AC-1 MP MP-1 

AT AT-1, AT-2, AT-2 (2), AT-3, AT-4, AT-5 PE PE-1, PE-6, PE-6 (1), PE-6 (2), PE-8 

AU AU-1, AU-6, AU-6 (1), AU-6 (3), AU-6 (5), AU-6 (6), AU-6 (9), 

AU-7, AU-7 (1), AU-10

PL PL-1, PL-2, PL-2 (3), PL-4, PL-4 (1) 

CA CA-1, CA-2, CA-3, CA-2 (1), CA-2 (2), CA-5, CA-6, CA-7, CA7 (1) PS PS-1, PS-6, PS-7, PS-7 (1) 

CM CM-1, CM-2, CM-2 (1), CM-2 (2), CM-2 (3), CM-2 (6), CM-3, 

CM-3 (1), CM-3 (2), CM-4, CM-4 (1), CM-8, CM-8 (1), CM-8 

(2), CM-8 (3), CM-8 (4), CM-8 (5) 

RA RA-1, RA-3, RA-5, RA-5 (1), RA-5 (1), RA-5 (2), RA-5 (3), RA5 (4), RA-5 (5), RA-5 (7)

CP CP-1, CP-3, CP-3 (1), CP-4, CP-4 (1), CP-4 (2), CP-4 (4), CP11SA SA-1, SA-2, SA-3, SA-4, SA-4 (1), SA-4 (2), SA-5, SA-5 (1), 

SA-5 (2), SA-5 (3), SA-8, SA-9, SA-9 (2), SA-9 (3), SA-10, SA11, SA-12, SA-15, SA-16, SA-17

IA IA-1 SC SC-1, SC-2, SC-3, SC-3 (6), SC-24, SC-32, SC-41 

IR IR-1, IR-2, IR-2 (1), IR-2 (2), IR-3, IR-3 (1), IR-3 (2), IR-5, IR-5 

(1)

SI SI-1, SI-4, SI-4 (2), SI-4 (4), SI-4 (5), SI-4 (6), SI-5, SI-5 (1), SI6, SI-7, SI-7 (1), SI-7 (2), SI-7 (5), SI-7 (8), SI-7 (15), SI-10 

MA MA-1 

 

89 Implementing the assurance-related controls from Appendix D represented in Table E.3 will satisfy the minimum 

assurance requirements for high-impact systems mandated by FIPS 200. The bold text indicates the delta from the 

moderate baseline (i.e., the assurance-related controls added to the moderate baseline to produce the increased level of 

assurance in the high baseline). 
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Developmental and Operational Activities to Achieve High Assurance 

Raising the bar on assurance can be difficult and costly for organizations—but sometimes 

essential for critical applications, missions, or business functions. Determining what parts of the 

organization’s information technology infrastructure demand higher assurance of implemented 

security functionality is a Tier 1/Tier 2 risk management activity (see Figure 1 in Chapter Two). 

This type of activity occurs when organizations determine the security capability necessary to 

protect organizational operations (i.e., mission, functions, image, and reputation), organizational 

assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. Determining required security capability 

is an integral part of the organizational risk management process described in NIST Special 

Publication 800-39—specifically in the development of the risk response strategy following the 

risk framing and risk assessment steps (where organizations establish priorities, assumptions, 

constraints, risk tolerance and assess threats, vulnerabilities, mission/business impacts, and 

likelihood of threat occurrence).90 After the security capability is determined at Tiers 1 and 2 and 

reflected in the design of the enterprise architecture and associated mission/business processes, 

the focus subsequently turns to the organizational information systems that are needed to support 

those processes. Organizations can use the Risk Management Framework (RMF), described in 

NIST Special Publication 800-37, to ensure that the appropriate assurance levels are achieved for 

the information systems and system components deployed to carry out core missions and business 

functions. This is primarily a Tier 3 activity but can have some overlap with Tiers 1 and 2, for 

example, in the area of common control selection. 

Trustworthy information systems are difficult to build from a software and systems development 

perspective. However, there are a number of design, architectural, and implementation principles 

that, if used, can result in more trustworthy systems. These core security principles include, for 

example, simplicity, modularity, layering, domain isolation, least privilege, least functionality, 

and resource isolation/encapsulation. Information technology products and systems exhibiting a 

higher degree of trustworthiness (i.e., products/systems having the requisite security functionality 

and security assurance) are expected to exhibit a lower rate of latent design/implementation flaws 

and a higher degree of penetration resistance against a range of threats including, for example, 

sophisticated cyber attacks, natural disasters, accidents, and intentional/unintentional errors.91 The 

vulnerability and susceptibility of organizational missions/business functions and supporting 

information systems to known threats, the environments of operation where those systems are 

deployed, and the maximum acceptable level of information security risk, guide the degree of 

trustworthiness needed. 

 

90 As illustrated in Figure 3 in Chapter Two, the ability to achieve the appropriate security capability is linked to the 

concept of trustworthy information systems. 

91 Organizations also rely to a great extent on security assurance from an operational perspective as illustrated by the 

assurance-related controls in Tables E-1 through E-3. Operational assurance is obtained by other than developmental 

actions, including for example, defining and applying security configuration settings on information technology 

products, establishing policies and procedures, assessing security controls, and conducting a rigorous continuous 

monitoring program. In some situations, to achieve the necessary security capability with weak or deficient information 

technology, organizations compensate by increasing their operational assurance. 

Ensuring Better Outcomes 

Having security functionality in critical organizational information systems and environments of operation 

without appropriate assurance is like skydiving without a backup parachute—you don’t need it until you 

need it. And without it, the outcome is very predictable. 
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While the assurance-related controls92 allocated to the low, moderate, and high baselines in the 

previous sections, represent minimum assurance requirements, organizations can, over time, 

choose to raise the level of assurance in their information systems—increasing the level of 

trustworthiness accordingly. This is accomplished by adding assurance-related controls to the 

controls in the baselines to increase both the strength of security functionality and degree of 

confidence that the functionality is correct, complete, and consistent—making the functionality 

highly resistant to penetration, tamper, or bypass. Security functionality that is highly resistant to 

penetration, tamper, and bypass requires a significant work factor on the part of adversaries to 

compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the information system or system 

components where that functionality is employed.

Since high-assurance information technology products may be more costly and difficult to obtain, 

organizations may choose to partition their information systems into distinct subsystems to isolate 

the critical components and focus the high-assurance efforts on a more narrowly defined subset of 

information resources. Organizations that find it difficult to achieve high-assurance information 

technology solutions may have to rely to a greater extent on procedural or operational protections 

to ensure mission and business success. This includes, for example, reengineering critical mission 

and business processes to be less susceptible to high-end threats. Table E-4 provides additional 

developmental and operational activities that organizations can initiate or require to achieve an 

enhanced level of assurance (up to and including high assurance) as part of their overall security 

capability. The list of assurance-related controls is not exhaustive. Organizations, through the 

tailoring process (including an organizational assessment of risk), may choose to designate other 

security controls as assurance-related and add to the exemplar set in Table E-4. 

TABLE E-4: ASSURANCE CONTROLS FOR ENHANCED ASSURANCE93

ID CONTROLS ID CONTROLS 

AC AC-25 MP No additional controls. 

AT AT-2 (1), AT-3 (remaining enhancements) PE PE-6 (3)

AU AU-6 (8), AU-10 (remaining enhancements), AU-13, AU-14, 

AU-14 (1)

PL No additional controls. 

CA CA-2 (3), CA-5 (1) PS PS-6 (2)

CM CM-4 (2) RA RA-5 (6), RA-5 (8), RA-5 (9), RA-5 (10)

CP CP-3 (2), CP-4 (3), CP-11 (remaining enhancements), CP-13 SA SA-4 (remaining enhancements), SA-5 (remaining 

enhancements), SA-9 (remaining enhancements), SA-10

(remaining enhancements), SA-11 (remaining enhancements), 

SA-12 (remaining enhancements), SA-14, SA-15 (remaining 

enhancements), SA-17 (remaining enhancements), SA-18, 

SA-18 (1), SA-19

IA No additional controls. SC SC-2 (1), SC-3 (remaining enhancements), SC-6, SC-11, SC29, SC-29 (1), SC-30 (plus enhancements), SC-31 (plus 

enhancements), SC-34 (plus enhancements), SC-37 (plus 

enhancements), SC-38, SC-39, SC-39 (1), SC-40, SC-41

(remaining enhancements) 

IR No additional controls. SI SI-4 (remaining enhancements),SI-7 (remaining 

MA enhancements), SI-14 No additional controls. 

 

92 Assurance-related controls are those security controls in Appendix F that contribute to achieving measures of 

confidence in the security functionality deployed in organizational information systems and environments of operation. 

The assurance-related controls can provide both developmental assurance (e.g., providing greater strength of function, 

more reliable, trustworthy information system components, and more disciplined system/security engineering practices 

during system integration) and operational assurance (e.g., verifying secure configuration settings, providing security 

training, and conducting penetration testing). 

93 The assurance-related controls in Table E.4 represent the additional security controls needed to achieve enhanced 

levels of assurance—that is, the controls needed to go beyond the minimum assurance and assurance-related controls in 

Tables E-1, E-2, and E-3. 
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Assurance and Continuous Monitoring 

As the federal government transitions to a strategy of near real-time risk management and continuous 

monitoring of information systems and organizations, the role of security assurance takes on greater 

importance. Ongoing monitoring to understand the security state of organizational information systems 

and current information security risks is much more effective if the underlying information technology 

infrastructure is strong—that is, more resistant to cyber attacks and capable of absorbing such attacks 

and continuing to operate even in a debilitated or degraded state. Implementing continuous monitoring 

programs on weak or deficient information technology infrastructures is not as effective and may give a 

false sense of security with regard to the protection of critical missions/business functions. Security 

assurance works in a complementary manner with security functionality to strengthen the underlying IT 

infrastructure and organizational information systems (including the hardware, software, and firmware 

components that compose those systems). A simple example illustrates the relationship of assurance to 

continuous monitoring. Checking broken, weak, or deficient locks on the external doors of a house once 

a day or ten times a day makes little difference. Installing strong locks with the right protective capability 

first, and then checking the locks more frequently can make a significant difference in protecting the 

house and its contents. 
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APPENDIX F

SECURITY CONTROL CATALOG 

SECURITY CONTROLS, ENHANCEMENTS, AND SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE 

he catalog of security controls in this appendix provides a range of safeguards and 

countermeasures for organizations and information systems. The organization of the 

security control catalog, the structure of the controls, and the concept of allocating security 

controls and control enhancements to the initial baselines in Appendix D are described in Chapter 

Two. The security controls in the catalog are expected to change over time, as controls are 

withdrawn, revised, and added. In order to maintain stability in security plans and automated 

tools supporting the implementation of NIST Special Publication 800-53, security controls and 

control enhancements will not be renumbered each time a control or enhancement is withdrawn. 

Rather, notations of security controls and controls enhancements that have been withdrawn over 

time will be maintained in the catalog for historical purposes. 

There may, on occasion, be redundancy in requirements that appear in the security controls and 

control enhancements that are part of the security control catalog. This overlap in requirements is 

intended to reinforce the security requirements from the perspective of multiple controls and/or 

enhancements. For example, the requirement for strong identification and authentication when 

conducting remote maintenance activities appears in the MA family in the specific context of 

systems maintenance activities conducted by organizations. The identification and authentication 

requirement also appears in a more general context in the IA family. While these requirements 

appear to be redundant (i.e., overlapping), they are, in fact, mutually reinforcing and not intended 

to require additional effort on the part of organizations in the development and implementation of 

security programs. 

 

T
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Fundamentals of the Catalog 

Security controls and control enhancements in Appendices F and G are generally designed to be 

policy-neutral and technology/implementation-independent. Organizations provide information 

about security controls and control enhancements in two ways: 

• By specifying security control implementation details (e.g., platform dependencies) in the 

associated security plan for the information system or security program plan for the 

organization; and 

• By establishing specific values in the variable sections of selected security controls through the 

use of assignment and selection statements. 

Assignment and selection statements provide organizations with the capability to specialize 

security controls and control enhancements based on organizational security requirements or 

requirements originating in federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, 

standards, or guidelines. Organization-defined parameters used in assignment and selection 

statements in the basic security controls apply also to all control enhancements associated with 

those controls. Control enhancements strengthen the fundamental security capability in the base 

control but are not a substitute for using assignment or selection statements to provide greater 

specificity to the control. Assignment statements for security controls and control enhancements 

do not contain minimum or maximum values (e.g., testing contingency plans at least annually). 

Organizations should consult specific federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, or guidelines as the definitive sources for such information. The absence of 

minimum and maximum values from the security controls and control enhancements does not 

obviate the need for organizations to comply with requirements in the controlling source 

publications. 

The first security control in each family (i.e., the dash-1 control) generates requirements for 

specific policies and procedures that are needed for the effective implementation of the other 

security controls in the family. Therefore, individual controls and control enhancements in a 

particular family do not call for the development of such policies and procedures. Supplemental 

guidance sections of security controls and control enhancements do not contain any requirements 

or references to FIPS or NIST Special Publications. NIST publications are, however, included in 

a references section for each security control. 

In support of the Joint Task Force initiative to develop a unified information security framework 

for the federal government, security controls and control enhancements for national security 

systems are included in this Appendix. The inclusion of such controls and enhancements is not 

intended to impose security requirements on organizations that operate national security systems. 

Rather, organizations can use the security controls and control enhancements on a voluntary basis 

with the approval of federal officials exercising policy authority over national security systems. In 

addition, the security control priorities and security control baselines listed in Appendix D and in 

the priority and baseline allocation summary boxes below each security control in Appendix F, 

apply to non-national security systems only unless otherwise directed by the federal officials with 

national security policy authority.
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Using the Catalog

Organizations employ security controls in federal information systems and the environments in 

which those systems operate in accordance with FIPS Publication 199, FIPS Publication 200, and 

NIST Special Publications 800-39 and 800-37. Security categorization of federal information and 

information systems, as required by FIPS 199, is the first step in the risk management process.94

Next, organizations select an appropriate set of security controls for their information systems by 

satisfying the minimum security requirements set forth in FIPS 200. Appendix D includes three 

security control baselines that are associated with the designated impact levels of organizational 

information systems as determined during the security categorization process.95 After baseline 

selection, organizations tailor the baselines by: (i) identifying/designating common controls; (ii) 

applying scoping considerations; (iii) selecting compensating controls, if needed; (iv) assigning 

control parameter values in selection and assignment statements; (v) supplementing the baseline 

controls with additional controls and control enhancements from the security control catalog; and 

(vi) providing additional information for control implementation. Organizations can also use the 

baseline tailoring process with the overlay concept described in Section 3.2 and Appendix I. Risk 

assessments, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-30, guide/inform the security control 

selection process.96

 

94 CNSS Instruction 1253 provides guidance for security categorization of national security systems. 

95 CNSS Instruction 1253 provides guidance on security control baselines for national security systems and specific 

tailoring requirements associated with such systems. 

96 There are additional security controls and control enhancements that appear in the catalog that are not used in any of 

the initial baselines. These additional controls and control enhancements are available to organizations and can be used 

in the tailoring process to achieve the needed level of protection in accordance with organizational risk assessments. 
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FAMILY: ACCESS CONTROL 

AC-1 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY AND PROCEDURES 

Control: The organization develops, disseminates, and reviews/updates [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]: 

a. A formal, documented access control policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 

responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and 

compliance; and 

b. Formal, documented procedures to facilitate the implementation of the access control policy 

and associated access controls. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the AC family. 

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations. The procedures 

can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if 

needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and 

procedures. Related control: PM-9. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AC-1 MOD AC-1 HIGH AC-1

AC-2 ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT 

Control: The organization manages information system accounts, including: 

a. Identifying account types (e.g., individual, shared/group, system, application, 

guest/anonymous, emergency, and temporary); 

b. Establishing conditions for group and role membership; 

c. Specifying authorized users of the information system, group and role membership, and 

account access authorizations (i.e., privileges) for each account; 

d. Requiring approvals by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel] for requests to create 

accounts; 

e. Creating, enabling, modifying, disabling, and removing accounts (including adding and 

deleting members from groups or roles); 

f. Authorizing and monitoring the use of shared/group, guest/anonymous, emergency, and 

temporary accounts; 

g. Notifying account managers: 

- When accounts (including shared/group, emergency, and temporary accounts) are no 

longer required; 

- When users are terminated or transferred; or 

- When individual information system usage or need-to-know changes; 
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h. Associating access authorizations and other attributes as required by the organization with 

each information system account; 

i. Granting access to the system based on: 

- A valid access authorization; 

- Intended system usage; and 

- Other attributes as required by the organization or associated missions/business functions; 

j. Reviewing accounts for compliance with account management requirements [Assignment: 

organization-defined frequency]; and 

k. Establishing a process for modifying shared/group account credentials when individuals are 

removed from the group. 

Supplemental Guidance: The identification of authorized users of the information system and the 

specification of access privileges reflects the requirements in other security controls in the security 

plan. Users requiring administrative privileges on information system accounts receive additional 

scrutiny by appropriate organizational personnel (e.g., system owner, mission/business owner, or 

chief information security officer) responsible for approving such accounts and privileged access. 

Organizations may choose to define access privileges or other attributes by account, by type of 

account, or a combination of both. Other attributes required for authorizing access include, for 

example, restrictions on time-of-day, day-of-week, and point-of-origin. Temporary and emergency 

accounts are accounts intended for short-term use. Organizations establish temporary accounts as a 

part of normal account activation procedures when there is a need for short-term accounts without 

the demand for immediacy in account activation. Organizations establish emergency accounts in 

response to crisis situations and with the need for rapid account activation. Therefore, emergency 

account activation may bypass normal account authorization processes. Emergency and temporary 

accounts are not to be confused with infrequently used accounts (e.g., local login accounts used for 

special tasks defined by organizations or when network resources are unavailable). Such accounts 

remain available and are not subject to automatic termination dates. Conditions for disabling or 

deactivating accounts include, for example: (i) when shared/group, emergency, or temporary 

accounts are no longer required; or (ii) when individuals are transferred or terminated. Related 

controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-5, AC-6, AC-10, AC-17, AC-19, AC-20, AU-9, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, IA8, CM-5, CM-6, CM-11, MA-3, MA-4, MA-5, PL-4, SC-13, SI-9. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED SYSTEM ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT

The organization employs automated mechanisms to support the management of information 

system accounts. 

(2) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | REMOVAL OF TEMPORARY / EMERGENCY ACCOUNTS

The information system automatically removes temporary and emergency accounts after 

[Assignment: organization-defined time period for each type of account]. 

(3) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DISABLE INACTIVE ACCOUNTS

The information system automatically disables inactive accounts after [Assignment: organizationdefined time period].

(4) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED AUDIT ACTIONS

The information system automatically audits account creation, modification, enabling, disabling, 

and removal actions and notifies, as required, [Assignment: organization-defined personnel]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AU-2, AU-12.

(5) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | INACTIVITY LOGOUT / TYPICAL USAGE MONITORING

The organization requires that users log out when [Assignment: organization defined time-period 

of expected inactivity and/or description of when to log out]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SI-4.

 
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(6) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC PRIVILEGE MANAGEMENT

The information system performs [Assignment: organization-defined dynamic management of user 

privileges and associated access authorizations] within [Assignment: organization-defined time 

period]. 

Supplemental Guidance: In contrast to conventional access control approaches which employ 

static information system accounts and predefined sets of user privileges, dynamic access 

control approaches (e.g., service-oriented architectures) rely on run time access control 

decisions facilitated by dynamic privilege management. While user identities may remain 

relatively constant over time, user privileges may change more frequently based on ongoing 

mission/business requirements and operational needs of organizations. Dynamic privilege 

management can include, for example, the immediate revocation of privileges from users, as 

opposed to requiring that users terminate and restart their sessions to reflect any changes in 

privileges. Dynamic privilege management can also refer to mechanisms that change the 

privileges of users based on dynamic rules as opposed to editing specific user profiles. This 

type of privilege management includes, for example, automatic adjustments of privileges if 

users are operating out of their normal work times, or if information systems are under duress 

or in emergency maintenance situations. This control enhancement also includes the ancillary 

effects of privilege changes, for example, the potential changes to encryption keys used for 

communications. Related control: AC-16. 

(7) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | ROLE-BASED SCHEMES

The organization: 

(a) Establishes and administers privileged user accounts in accordance with a role-based access 

scheme that organizes allowed information system access and privileges into roles; 

(b) Monitors privileged role assignments; and 

(c) Takes [Assignment: organization-defined actions] when privileged role assignments are no 

longer appropriate. 

Supplemental Guidance: Privileged roles are organization-defined roles assigned to individuals 

that allow those individuals to perform certain security-relevant functions that ordinary users 

are not authorized to perform. These privileged roles include, for example, key management, 

account management, network and system administration, database administration, and web 

administration. 

(8) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC ACCOUNT CREATION

The information system creates accounts dynamically. 

Supplemental Guidance: Dynamic approaches for creating information system accounts (e.g., as 

implemented within service-oriented architectures) rely on establishing accounts (identities) at 

run time for entities that were previously unknown. Organizations plan for the dynamic 

creation of information system accounts by establishing trust relationships and mechanisms 

with appropriate authorities to validate related authorizations and privileges. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: AC-16. 

(9) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF SHARED GROUPS / ACCOUNTS

The organization prohibits the use of shared/group accounts that do not meet [Assignment: 

organization-defined conditions for establishing shared/group accounts]. 

(10) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | SHARED / GROUP ACCOUNT REQUESTS / APPROVALS

The organization employs automated mechanisms to request and approve membership and use of 

shared/group accounts. 

(11) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | SHARED / GROUP ACCOUNT CREDENTIAL RENEWALS

The information system enforces the renewal of shared/group account credentials if members 

leave the group.

(12) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | USAGE CONDITIONS

The organization determines [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances and/or usage 

conditions] for [Assignment: organization-defined information system accounts]. 
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Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can describe the specific conditions or circumstances 

under which information system accounts can be used, for example, by restricting usage to 

certain days of the week, time of day, or specific durations of time. 

(13) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | ACCOUNT REVIEWS

The organization conducts [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] reviews of information 

system accounts (including access authorizations and shared/group account memberships). 

(14) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | ACCOUNT MONITORING / ATYPICAL USAGE

The organization: 

(a) Monitors information system accounts for [Assignment: organization-defined atypical use]; 

and 

(b) Reports atypical usage of information system accounts to [Assignment: organization-defined 

personnel]. 

(15) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DISABLE ACCOUNTS FOR HIGH-RISK INDIVIDUALS

The organization applies account management capabilities to expeditiously disable accounts of 

users posing a significant risk. 

Supplemental Guidance: Users posing a significant risk to organizations include individuals for 

whom reliable evidence or intelligence indicates either the intention to use authorized access 

to information systems to cause harm or through whom adversaries will cause harm. Harm 

includes potential adverse impacts to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other 

organizations, or the Nation. Close coordination between authorizing officials, information 

system administrators, and human resource managers is essential in order for timely execution 

of this control enhancement. 

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AC-2 MOD AC-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) HIGH AC-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (12) (13)

AC-3 ACCESS ENFORCEMENT 

Control: The information system enforces approved authorizations for logical access to information 

and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies. 

Supplemental Guidance: Access enforcement includes controlling access to information system 

accounts during login (e.g., restricting login access by time of day, day of week, or location). 

Subsequent to account access, access control policies (e.g., identity-based policies, role-based 

policies, attribute-based policies) and access enforcement mechanisms (e.g., access control lists, 

access control matrices, cryptography) control access between active entities or subjects (i.e., users 

or processes acting on behalf of users) and passive entities or objects (e.g., devices, files, records, 

domains) in information systems. In addition to enforcing authorized access at the information 

system level and recognizing that information systems can host many applications and services in 

support of organizational missions and business operations, access enforcement mechanisms can 

also be employed at the application and service level to provide increased information security. 

Organizations also consider implementing an audited, explicit override of automated mechanisms 

in the event of emergencies or other serious events. If organizations employ encryption of stored 

information (i.e., information at rest) as an access enforcement mechanism, the cryptography is 

FIPS 140 (as amended)-compliant. For classified information, the cryptography used depends on 

the classification level of the information and the clearances of the individuals having access to the 

information. Related controls: AC-2, AC-4, AC-5, AC-6, AC-16, AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, AC-20, 

AC-21, AC-22, AU-9, CM-5, CM-6, CM-11, MA-3, MA-4, MA-5, PE-3, SC-13, SI-9. 

 
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Control Enhancements: 

(1) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | RESTRICTED ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-6]. 

(2) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | DUAL AUTHORIZATION

The information system enforces dual authorization for [Assignment: organization-defined 

privileged commands and/or other organization-defined actions]. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses dual authorization. Dual 

authorization mechanisms require the approval of two authorized individuals in order to 

execute. Organizations do not require dual authorization mechanisms when immediate 

responses are necessary to ensure public and environmental safety. Related controls: CP-9, 

MP-6. 

(3) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | NONDISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL

The information system enforces [Assignment: organization-defined nondiscretionary access 

control policies] over [Assignment: organization-defined users and information resources] where 

the policy rule set for each policy specifies: 

(a) Access control information (i.e., attributes) employed by the policy rule set; and 

(b) Required relationships among the access control information to permit access. 

Supplemental Guidance: Nondiscretionary access control is a type of access control that 

restricts access to objects based on the identity of subjects or groups to which the subjects 

belong. The access controls are nondiscretionary because subjects are restricted from passing 

privileges (i.e., access permissions) or information on to any other subjects or objects—that is, 

information systems strictly and uniformly enforce access control policies based on the rule 

sets established by the policies. Nondiscretionary policies include, for example, mandatory 

access control, type enforcement, and originator-controlled access control. 

(4) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL 

The information system enforces a discretionary access control policy. 

Supplemental Guidance: Discretionary access control is a type of access control that restricts 

access to objects based on the identity of subjects or groups to which subjects belong. The 

access controls are discretionary because subjects are not restricted from passing privileges 

(i.e., access permissions) or information to any other subjects or objects. Nondiscretionary 

access controls, in contrast, restrict this capability. 

(5) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY-RELEVANT INFORMATION 

The information system prevents access to [Assignment: organization-defined security-relevant 

information] except during secure, non-operable system states. 

Supplemental Guidance: Security-relevant information is any information within information 

systems that can potentially impact the operation of security functions or the provision of 

security services in a manner that could result in failure to enforce system security policies or 

maintain the isolation of code and data. Security-relevant information includes, for example, 

filtering rules for routers/firewalls, cryptographic key management information, configuration 

parameters for security services, and access control lists. Secure, non-operable system states 

include the times in which information systems are not performing mission/business-related 

processing (e.g., the system is off-line for maintenance, troubleshooting, boot-up, shut down). 

Related controls: CM-3, CM-6.

(6) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | PROTECTION OF USER AND SYSTEM INFORMATION

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-4 and SC-28].

(7) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL 

The information system enforces a mandatory access control policy over [Assignment: 

organization-defined users and information resources] and controls access based on [Assignment: 

organization-defined hierarchical security levels and formal access compartments]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations implement mandatory access control policies using the 

Bell-LaPadula security model, or some variation of the security model, which defines allowed 

accesses to information resources based on hierarchical security levels and user privileges. 

Hierarchical security levels include, for example: (i) unclassified, confidential, secret, top-
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secret; and (ii) public, sensitive, and senior-executive-only. Organizations also employ formal 

access compartments defining explicit information categories when applying mandatory 

access control policies with regard to hierarchical security levels. Organizations require 

formal access authorizations to specific compartments in order for access to be granted. 

(8) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL

The information system enforces a role-based access control policy over [Assignment: 

organization-defined users and information resources] and controls access based upon 

[Assignment: organization-defined roles and users authorized to assume such roles]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Role-based access control is a type of nondiscretionary access control. 

(9) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | REVOCATION OF ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS

The information system revokes access authorizations resulting from changes to the security 

attributes of subjects and objects based on [Assignment: organization-defined rules governing 

revocation of access authorizations].

Supplemental Guidance: Revocation of access rules may differ based on the types of access 

revoked. For example, if a subject (i.e., user or process) is removed from a group, access may 

not be revoked until the next time the object (e.g., file) is opened or until the next time the 

subject attempts a new access to the object. Revocation based on changes to security labels 

may take effect immediately. Organizations can provide alternative approaches on how to 

make revocations immediate if information systems cannot provide such capability and 

immediate revocation is necessary. Related control: AC-16.

(10) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | NETWORK ACCESS SECURITY-RELATED FUNCTIONS 

The organization ensures that network sessions for accessing [Assignment: organization-defined 

security functions and security-relevant information] employ [Assignment: organization-defined 

additional security safeguards] and are audited. 

Supplemental Guidance: Additional security safeguards typically include more than standard 

bulk or session layer encryption (e.g., Secure Shell [SSH], Virtual Private Networking [VPN] 

with blocking mode enabled) deployed by organizations. Related controls: AU-2, AU-12, SC7, SC-8, SC-9.

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AC-3 MOD AC-3 HIGH AC-3

AC-4 INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT 

Control: The information system enforces approved authorizations for controlling the flow of 

information within the system and between interconnected systems in accordance with applicable 

flow control policies. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information flow control regulates where information is allowed to travel 

within an information system and between information systems (as opposed to who is allowed to 

access the information) and without explicit regard to subsequent accesses to that information. 

Flow control restrictions include, for example, keeping export-controlled information from being 

transmitted in the clear to the Internet, blocking outside traffic that claims to be from within the 

organization, restricting web requests to the Internet that are not from the internal web proxy 

server, and limiting information transfers between organizations based on data structures and 

content. Organizations commonly employ information flow control policies and enforcement 

mechanisms to control the flow of information between designated sources and destinations (e.g., 

networks, individuals, devices) within information systems and between interconnected systems. 

Flow control is based on the characteristics of the information and/or the information path. Flow 

enforcement occurs, for example, in boundary protection devices (e.g., gateways, routers, guards, 

encrypted tunnels, firewalls) that employ rule sets or establish configuration settings that restrict 

information system services, provide a packet-filtering capability based on header information, or 
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APPENDIX F-AC PAGE F-10

message-filtering capability based on message content (e.g., implementing key word searches or 

document characteristics). Organizations also consider the trustworthiness of filtering and 

inspection mechanisms (including hardware, firmware, and software components) that are critical 

to information flow enforcement. Control enhancements 3 through 21 are primarily intended to 

address cross-domain solution needs. Related controls: AC-17, AC-19, AC-21, CM-6, CM-7, SA8, SC-2, SC-5, SC-7, SC-18. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | OBJECT SECURITY ATTRIBUTES 

The information system enforces information flow control using explicit security attributes on 

information, source, and destination objects as a basis for flow control decisions. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information flow enforcement mechanisms compare security attributes 

on information (data content and data structure), source and destination objects, and respond 

appropriately (e.g., block, quarantine, alert administrator) when the mechanisms encounter 

information flows not explicitly allowed by information flow policies. Flow enforcement 

using explicit security attributes can be used, for example, to control the release of certain 

types of information. Related control: AC-16.

(2) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | PROCESSING DOMAINS 

The information system enforces information flow control using protected processing domains as 

a basis for flow control decisions. 

Supplemental Guidance: Protected processing domains are processing spaces with controlled 

interactions with other processing spaces, thus enabling control of information flows between 

these spaces and to/from data/information objects. A protected processing domain includes, 

for example, domain type enforcement where information system processes are assigned to 

domains, information is identified by types, and information flows are controlled based on 

allowed information accesses (determined by domain and type), allowed signaling among 

domains, and allowed process transitions to other domains. 

(3) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | CONDITION / OPERATIONAL CHANGES 

The information system enforces dynamic information flow control based on policy that allows or 

disallows information flows based on changing conditions or operational considerations. 

Supplemental Guidance: Changing conditions include, for example, changes in organizational 

risk tolerance due to changes in the immediacy of mission/business needs, changes in threat 

environments, and detection of potentially harmful events. Related control: SI-4. 

(4) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | CONTENT CHECK ENCRYPTED DATA 

The information system prevents encrypted data from bypassing content-checking mechanisms. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SI-4. 

(5) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | EMBEDDED DATA TYPES 

The information system enforces [Assignment: organization-defined limitations] on embedding 

data types within other data types. 

Supplemental Guidance: Embedding data types within other data types may result in reduced 

flow control effectiveness. Data type embedding includes, for example, inserting executable 

files as objects within word processing files or inserting references or descriptive information 

into a media file. 

(6) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | METADATA

The information system enforces information flow control based on [Assignment: organizationdefined metadata]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Metadata is information used to describe the characteristics of data. 

Metadata can include structural metadata describing data structures (e.g., data format, syntax, 

and semantics) or descriptive metadata describing data contents (e.g., age, location, telephone 

number). Enforcing allowed information flows based on metadata enables simpler and more 

effective flow control. Organizations consider the trustworthiness of metadata with regard to 

data integrity (i.e., protecting against unauthorized changes to metadata tags) and the binding 

of metadata to the data payload (i.e., ensuring sufficiently strong binding techniques with 

appropriate levels of assurance). Related controls: AC-16, SI-7. 
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(7) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | ONE-WAY FLOW MECHANISMS 

The information system enforces [Assignment: organization-defined one-way flows] using 

hardware mechanisms. 

(8) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY POLICY FILTERS

The information system enforces information flow control using [Assignment: organization-defined 

security policy filters] as a basis for flow control decisions for [Assignment: organization-defined 

information flows]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organization-defined security policy filters can address data structures 

and content. For example, security policy filters for data structures can check for maximum 

file lengths, maximum field sizes, and data/file types (for structured and unstructured data). 

Security policy filters for data content can check for specific words (e.g., dirty/clean word 

filters), metadata content, and hidden content. Structured data permits the interpretation of 

data content by applications. Unstructured data typically refers to digital information without 

a particular data structure or with a data structure that does not facilitate the development of 

rule sets to address the particular sensitivity of the information conveyed by the data or the 

associated flow enforcement decisions. Unstructured data consists of: (i) bitmap objects that 

are inherently non-language-based (i.e., image, video, or audio files); and (ii) textual objects 

that are based on written or printed languages (e.g., commercial off-the-shelf word processing 

documents, spreadsheets, or emails). Organizations can implement more than one security 

policy filter to meet information flow control objectives (e.g., employing clean word lists in 

conjunction with dirty word lists may help to reduce false positives).

(9) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | HUMAN REVIEWS 

The information system enforces the use of human reviews for [Assignment: organization-defined 

security policy filters] and [Assignment: organization-defined information flows]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Human reviews regarding information flow enforcement decisions are 

necessary when information systems are not capable of making such flow control decisions or 

when organizations deem human reviews necessary. Organizations define policy filters for all 

cases where automated flow control decisions are not possible or deemed to be not sufficient. 

(10) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | ENABLE / DISABLE SECURITY POLICY FILTERS 

The information system provides the capability for privileged administrators to enable/disable 

[Assignment: organization-defined security policy filters]. 

(11) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | CONFIGURATION OF SECURITY POLICY FILTERS 

The information system provides the capability for privileged administrators to configure 

[Assignment: organization-defined security policy filters] to support different security policies. 

Supplemental Guidance: For example, to reflect changes in security policies, administrators can 

change the list of “dirty words” that security policy mechanisms check in accordance with the 

definitions provided by organizations. 

(12) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DATA TYPES IDENTIFIERS 

The information system, when transferring information between different security domains, 

identifies information flows by [Assignment: organization-defined data type identifiers]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Data type identifiers include, for example, filenames, file types, file 

signatures/tokens, and multiple internal file signatures/tokens.

(13) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DECOMPOSITION INTO POLICY-RELEVANT SUBCOMPONENTS 

The information system, when transferring information between different security domains, 

decomposes information into policy-relevant subcomponents for submission to policy 

enforcement mechanisms. 

Supplemental Guidance: Policy enforcement mechanisms apply filtering, inspection, and/or 

sanitization rules to the policy-relevant subcomponents of information to facilitate flow 

enforcement prior to transferring such information to different security domains. Parsing 

transfer files facilitates policy decisions on source, destination, certificates, classification, 

attachments, and other security-related component differentiators. Policy rules for crossdomain transfers include, for example, limitations on embedding components or information 

types within other components/information types, prohibiting multiple levels of component or 
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information type embedding beyond the capability of inspection tools, and prohibiting the 

transfer of archived data types.

(14) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | POLICY FILTER CONSTRAINTS ON DATA STRUCTURES AND CONTENT 

The information system, when transferring information between different security domains, 

implements [Assignment: organization-defined security policy filters] requiring fully enumerated 

and rigid formats that restrict data structure and content. 

Supplemental Guidance: Data structure and content restrictions reduce the range of potential 

malicious and/or unsanctioned content in cross-domain transactions. Security policy filters 

that restrict data structures include, for example, restricting file sizes and field lengths. Data 

content policy filters include, for example: (i) encoding formats for character sets (e.g., 

Universal Character Set Transformation Formats, American Standard Code for Information 

Interchange); (ii) restricting character data fields to only contain alpha-numeric characters; 

(iii) prohibiting special characters; and (iv) restricting the use of archived data types. 

(15) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DETECTION OF UNSANCTIONED INFORMATION

The information system, when transferring information between different security domains, detects 

[Assignment: organized-defined unsanctioned information] and prohibits the transfer of such 

information in accordance with the [Assignment: organization-defined security policy]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Detection of unsanctioned information includes, for example, checking 

all information to be transferred for malicious code and dirty words. Related control: SI-3.

(16) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | INFORMATION TRANSFERS ON INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS 

The information system enforces [Assignment: organization-defined security policies] regarding 

information transferred to and from interconnected systems. 

Supplemental Guidance: Transferring information between information systems representing 

different security domains with different security policies introduces risk that such transfers 

violate one or more domain security policies. In such situations, information owners/stewards 

provide guidance at designated policy enforcement points between interconnected systems. 

Organizations consider mandating specific architectural solutions when required to enforce 

specific security policies. Solutions include, for example: (i) prohibiting information transfers 

between interconnected systems; (ii) employing hardware mechanisms to enforce one-way 

information flows; and (iii) implementing trustworthy regrading mechanisms to reassign 

security attributes/security labels.

(17) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DOMAIN AUTHENTICATION 

The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates source and destination domains for 

information transfer. 

Supplemental Guidance: Attribution is a critical component of a security concept of operations. 

The ability to identify source and destination points for information flowing in information 

systems, allows the forensic reconstruction of events when required, and encourages policy 

compliance by attributing policy violations to specific organizations/individuals. Successful 

domain authentication requires that information system labels distinguish among systems, 

organizations, and individuals involved in preparing, sending, receiving, or disseminating 

information. Related controls: IA-2, IA-3, IA-4, IA-5.

(18) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY ATTRIBUTE BINDING 

The information system binds security attributes to information using [Assignment: organizationdefined binding techniques] to achieve [Assignment: organization-defined strength of binding] and 

to facilitate information flow policy enforcement. 

Supplemental Guidance: Binding strength and the assurance associated with binding techniques 

play an important part in the trust organizations have in the information flow enforcement 

process. The binding techniques affect the number and degree of additional reviews required 

by organizations. Related controls: AC-16, SC-16. 

(19) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | PROTECTION OF METADATA 

The information system, when transferring information between different security domains, applies 

the same security safeguards to metadata as it applies to data payloads. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement requires the protection of metadata and the 

data to which the metadata applies. Some organizations distinguish between metadata and 
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APPENDIX F-AC PAGE F-13

data payloads (i.e., only the data to which the metadata is bound). Other organizations do not 

make such distinctions, considering metadata and the data to which the metadata applies as 

part of the payload. All information (including metadata and the data to which the metadata 

applies) is subject to filtering and inspection.

(20) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined devices in approved configurations] 

to control the flow of classified information across security domains. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations define approved devices and configurations in crossdomain policies, guidance, and solutions in accordance with the types of information flows 

across classification boundaries. 

(21) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | PHYSICAL / LOGICAL SEPARATION OF INFORMATION FLOWS 

The information system separates information flows logically or physically using [Assignment: 

organization-defined mechanisms and/or techniques] to accomplish [Assignment: organizationdefined required separations by types of information]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Enforcing the separation of information flows by type can enhance 

protection by ensuring that information is not commingled while in transit and by enabling 

flow control by transmission paths perhaps not otherwise achievable. Types of separable 

information include, for example, inbound and outbound communications traffic, service 

requests and responses, and information of differing security categories. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD AC-4 HIGH AC-4

AC-5 SEPARATION OF DUTIES 

Control: The organization: 

a. Separates [Assignment: organization-defined duties of individuals]; 

b. Documents separation of duties of individuals; and 

c. Defines information system access authorizations to support separation of duties. 

Supplemental Guidance: Separation of duties addresses the potential for abuse of authorized 

privileges and helps to reduce the risk of malevolent activity without collusion. Separation of 

duties includes, for example: (i) dividing mission functions and information system support 

functions among different individuals and/or roles; (ii) conducting information system support 

functions with different individuals (e.g., system management, programming, configuration 

management, quality assurance and testing, and network security); and (iii) ensuring security 

personnel administering access control functions do not also administer audit functions. Related 

controls: AC-3, AC-6, PE-3, PE-4. 

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD AC-5 HIGH AC-5
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AC-6 LEAST PRIVILEGE 

Control: The organization employs the concept of least privilege, allowing only authorized 

accesses for users (and processes acting on behalf of users) which are necessary to accomplish 

assigned tasks in accordance with organizational missions and business functions. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations employ the concept of least privilege for specific duties and 

information systems (including specific functions, ports, protocols, and services). The concept of 

least privilege is also applied to information system processes, ensuring that the processes operate 

at privilege levels no higher than necessary to accomplish required organizational missions and/or 

functions. Organizations consider the creation of additional processes, roles, and information 

system accounts as necessary to achieve least privilege. Organizations also apply least privilege 

concepts to the design, development, implementation, and operations of information systems. 

Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, CM-6, CM-7, PL-2. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) LEAST PRIVILEGE | AUTHORIZE ACCESS TO SECURITY FUNCTIONS 

The organization explicitly authorizes access to [Assignment: organization-defined security 

functions (deployed in hardware, software, and firmware) and security-relevant information]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Security functions include, for example, establishing system accounts, 

configuring access authorizations (i.e., permissions, privileges), setting events to be audited, 

and setting intrusion detection parameters. Security-relevant information includes, for 

example, filtering rules for routers/firewalls, cryptographic key management information, 

configuration parameters for security services, and access control lists. Explicitly authorized 

personnel include, for example, security administrators, system and network administrators, 

system security officers, system maintenance personnel, system programmers, and other 

privileged users. Related controls: AC-17, AC-18, AC-19.

(2) LEAST PRIVILEGE | NON-PRIVILEGED ACCESS FOR NONSECURITY FUNCTIONS 

The organization requires that users of information system accounts, or roles, with access to 

[Assignment: organization-defined security functions or security-relevant information], use nonprivileged accounts or roles, when accessing nonsecurity functions. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement limits exposure when operating from within 

privileged accounts or roles. The inclusion of roles addresses situations where organizations 

implement access control policies such as role-based access control and where a change of 

role provides the same degree of assurance in the change of access authorizations for both the 

user and all processes acting on behalf of the user as would be provided by a change between 

a privileged and non-privileged account. Related control: PL-4. 

(3) LEAST PRIVILEGE | NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED COMMANDS 

The organization authorizes network access to [Assignment: organization-defined privileged 

commands] only for [Assignment: organization-defined compelling operational needs] and 

documents the rationale for such access in the security plan for the information system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Network access is any access across a network connection in lieu of 

local access (i.e., user being physically present at the device). Related control: AC-17.

(4) LEAST PRIVILEGE | SEPARATE PROCESSING DOMAINS 

The information system provides separate processing domains to enable finer-grained allocation 

of user privileges. 

Supplemental Guidance: Providing separate processing domains for finer-grained allocation of 

user privileges includes, for example: (i) using virtualization techniques to allow additional 

privileges within a virtual machine while restricting privileges to other virtual machines or to 

the underlying actual machine; (ii) employing hardware and/or software domain separation 

mechanisms; and (iii) implementing separate physical domains. Related controls: AC-4, SC30, SC-32. 

(5) LEAST PRIVILEGE | PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS 

The organization limits authorization to privileged accounts on the information system to 

[Assignment: organization-defined personnel]. 
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Supplemental Guidance: Privileged accounts, including super user accounts, are typically 

described as root or administrator for various types of commercial off-the-shelf operating 

systems. Limiting privileged account authorization includes, for example, configuring 

information systems and devices (e.g., notebook computers, servers, workstations, personal 

digital assistants, smart phones), such that day-to-day users do not have access to privileged 

information or functions. Organizations may differentiate in the application of this control 

enhancement between allowed privileges for local information system accounts and for 

domain accounts provided organizations retain the ability to control system configurations for 

key security parameters and as otherwise necessary to sufficiently mitigate risk. Related 

control: CM-6.

(6) LEAST PRIVILEGE | PRIVILEGED ACCESS BY NON-ORGANIZATIONAL USERS 

The organization prohibits privileged access to the information system by non-organizational 

users. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: IA-8. 

(7) LEAST PRIVILEGE | REVIEW OF USER PRIVILEGES

The organization reviews [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] the privileges assigned to 

[Assignment: organization-defined roles or classes of users] to determine if the need for such 

privileges is still valid. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: CA-7. 

(8) LEAST PRIVILEGE | PRIVILEGE LEVELS FOR CODE EXECUTION 

The information system ensures that [Assignment: organization-defined software] does not 

execute at higher privilege levels than users executing the software. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD AC-6 (1) (2) (5) HIGH AC-6 (1) (2) (3) (5)

AC-7 UNSUCCESSFUL LOGIN ATTEMPTS 

Control: The information system: 

a. Enforces a limit of [Assignment: organization-defined number] consecutive invalid login 

attempts by a user during a [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and 

b. Automatically [Selection: locks the account/node for an [Assignment: organization-defined 

time period]; locks the account/node until released by an administrator; delays next login 

prompt according to [Assignment: organization-defined delay algorithm]] when the 

maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies regardless of whether the login occurs via a local or 

network connection. Due to the potential for denial of service, automatic lockouts initiated by 

information systems are usually temporary and automatically release after a predetermined time 

period established by organizations. If a delay algorithm is selected, organizations may choose to 

employ different algorithms for different information system components based on the capabilities 

of those components. Responses to unsuccessful login attempts may be implemented at both the 

operating system and the application levels. Related controls: AC-2, AC-9, AC-14, IA-5. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) UNSUCCESSFUL LOGIN ATTEMPTS | AUTOMATIC ACCOUNT LOCK

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-7].

(2) UNSUCCESSFUL LOGIN ATTEMPTS | PURGE MOBILE DEVICE 

The information system purges information from [Assignment: organization-defined mobile 

devices] based on [Assignment: organization-defined purging requirements/techniques] after 

[Assignment: organization-defined number] consecutive, unsuccessful device login attempts. 
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Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies only to mobile devices for which a 

login occurs (e.g., personal digital assistants, smart phones). In certain situations, this control 

enhancement may not apply to mobile devices if the information on the device is encrypted 

with sufficiently strong encryption mechanisms, making purging unnecessary. The login is to 

the mobile device, not to any one account on the device. Therefore, successful logins to any 

accounts on mobile devices reset the unsuccessful login count to zero. Organizations define 

information to be purged carefully in order to avoid over purging which may result in devices 

becoming unusable. Related controls: AC-19, MP-5, MP-6, SC-13. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW AC-7 MOD AC-7 HIGH AC-7

AC-8 SYSTEM USE NOTIFICATION 

Control: The information system: 

a. Displays an approved system use notification message or banner before granting access to the 

system that provides privacy and security notices consistent with applicable federal laws, 

Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance and states that: 

- Users are accessing a U.S. Government information system; 

- Information system usage may be monitored, recorded, and subject to audit; 

- Unauthorized use of the information system is prohibited and subject to criminal and civil 

penalties; and 

- Use of the information system indicates consent to monitoring and recording; 

b. Retains the notification message or banner on the screen until users take explicit actions to log 

on to or further access the information system; and 

c. For publicly accessible systems: 

- Displays the system use information [Assignment: organization-defined conditions], before 

granting further access; 

- Displays references, if any, to monitoring, recording, or auditing that are consistent with 

privacy accommodations for such systems that generally prohibit those activities; and 

- Includes in the notice given to public users of the information system, a description of the 

authorized uses of the system. 

Supplemental Guidance: System use notifications can be implemented using warning banners 

displayed when individuals log in to information systems. System use notifications are only used 

for access via interactive login interfaces with human users and are not required when interactive 

login interfaces do not exist. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AC-8 MOD AC-8 HIGH AC-8
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AC-9 PREVIOUS LOGON (ACCESS) NOTIFICATION 

Control: The information system notifies the user, upon successful interactive logon (access) to the 

system, of the date and time of the last logon (access). 

Supplemental Guidance: This control is intended to cover both traditional logons to information 

systems and accesses to systems that occur in other types of architectural configurations (e.g., 

service oriented architectures). Related controls: AC-7, PL-4. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | UNSUCCESSFUL LOGONS

The information system notifies the user, upon successful logon/access, of the number of 

unsuccessful logon/access attempts since the last successful logon/access. 

(2) PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | SUCCESSFUL / UNSUCCESSFUL LOGONS

The information system notifies the user of the number of [Selection: successful logons/accesses; 

unsuccessful logon/access attempts; both] during [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. 

(3) PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | NOTIFICATION OF ACCOUNT CHANGES 

The information system notifies the user of changes to [Assignment: organization-defined 

security-related characteristics/parameters of the user’s account] during [Assignment: 

organization-defined time period]. 

(4) PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | ADDITIONAL LOGON INFORMATION 

The information system notifies the user, upon successful interactive logon (access), of the 

following additional information: [Assignment: organization-defined information to be included in 

addition to the date and time of the last logon (access)]. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement permits organizations to specify additional 

information to be provided to users upon login including, for example, the location of last 

logon. User location is defined as that information which can be determined by information 

systems, for example, IP addresses from which network logins occurred, device identifiers, or 

notifications of local logins.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

AC-10 CONCURRENT SESSION CONTROL 

Control: The information system limits the number of concurrent sessions for each [Assignment: 

organization-defined account] to [Assignment: organization-defined number]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may define the maximum number of concurrent sessions for 

information system accounts globally, by account type (e.g., privileged user, non-privileged user, 

domain, specific application), by account, or a combination. For example, organizations may limit 

the number of concurrent sessions for system administrators or individuals working in particularly 

sensitive domains or mission critical applications. This control addresses concurrent sessions for 

information system accounts and does not address concurrent sessions by single users via multiple 

system accounts. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH AC-10
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AC-11 SESSION LOCK 

Control: The information system: 

a. Prevents further access to the system by initiating a session lock after [Assignment: 

organization-defined time period] of inactivity or upon receiving a request from a user; 

b. Conceals information previously visible on the display with a publicly viewable image; and 

c. Retains the session lock until the user reestablishes access using established identification and 

authentication procedures. 

Supplemental Guidance: Session locks are temporary actions taken when users stop work and move 

away from the immediate vicinity of information systems but do not want to log out because of the 

temporary nature of their absences. Session locks are implemented where session activities can be 

determined. This is typically at the operating system level, but can also be at the application level. 

Session locks are not an acceptable substitute for logging out of information systems, for example, 

if organizations require users to log out at the end of workdays. Publicly viewable patterns can 

include, for example, screen saver patterns, photographic images, solid colors, or a blank screen, 

so long as none of those patterns convey sensitive information. Related control: AC-7. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) SESSION LOCK | PATTERN-HIDING DISPLAYS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-11].

References: OMB Memorandum 06-16.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P3 LOW Not Selected MOD AC-11 HIGH AC-11

AC-12 SESSION TERMINATION 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-10]. 

AC-13 SUPERVISION AND REVIEW — ACCESS CONTROL 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-2 and AU-6]. 

AC-14 PERMITTED ACTIONS WITHOUT IDENTIFICATION OR AUTHENTICATION 

Control: The organization: 

a. Identifies [Assignment: organization-defined user actions] that can be performed on the 

information system without identification or authentication; and 

b. Documents and provides supporting rationale in the security plan for the information system, 

user actions not requiring identification or authentication. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses situations in which organizations determine that no 

identification or authentication is required in organizational information systems. Organizations 

may allow a limited number of user actions without identification or authentication (e.g., when 

individuals access public websites or other publicly accessible federal information systems such as 

http://www.usa.gov) and only to the extent necessary to accomplish mission/business objectives. 

Organizations also identify actions that normally require identification or authentication but may 

under certain circumstances (e.g., emergencies), allow identification or authentication mechanisms 

to be bypassed. Such bypasses may occur, for example, via a software-readable physical switch 

that commands bypass of the login functionality and is protected from accidental or unmonitored 
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APPENDIX F-AC PAGE F-19

use. This control does not apply to situations where identification and authentication have already 

occurred and are not repeated, but rather to situations where identification and authentication have 

not yet occurred. Related controls: CP-2, IA-2. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

(1) PERMITTED ACTIONS WITHOUT IDENTIFICATION OR AUTHENTICATION | NECESSARY USES

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-14]. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AC-14 MOD AC-14 HIGH AC-14

AC-15 AUTOMATED MARKING 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-3]. 

AC-16 SECURITY ATTRIBUTES 

Control: The organization: 

a. Provides the means to associate [Assignment: organization-defined types of security 

attributes] having [Assignment: organization-defined security attribute values] with 

information in storage, in process, and/or in transmission; and 

b. Ensures that the security attribute associations are made and retained with the information. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information is represented internally within information systems using 

abstractions known as data structures. Internal data structures can represent different types of 

entities, both active and passive. Active entities, also known as subjects, are typically associated 

with individuals, devices, or processes acting on behalf of individuals. Passive entities, also known 

as objects, are typically associated with data structures such as records, buffers, tables, files, interprocess pipes, and communications ports. Security attributes, a form of metadata, are abstractions 

representing the basic properties or characteristics of active and passive entities with respect to 

safeguarding information. These attributes may be associated with active entities (i.e., subjects) 

that have the potential to send or receive information, to cause information to flow among objects, 

or to change the information system state. These attributes may also be associated with passive 

entities (i.e., objects) that contain or receive information. The association of security attributes to 

subjects and objects is referred to as binding and is typically inclusive of setting the attribute value 

and the attribute type. Security attributes when bound to data/information, enables the enforcement 

of information security policies (both for access control and information flow control), either via 

organizational processes or via information system functions or mechanisms. The term security 

labeling refers to the association of security attributes with subjects and objects represented by 

internal data structures within organizational information systems, to enable information systembased enforcement of information security policies. Security labels include, for example, access 

authorizations (i.e., privileges), data life cycle protection (i.e., encryption and data expiration), 

nationality, affiliation as contractor, and classification of information in accordance with legal and 

compliance requirements. The term security marking refers to the association of security attributes 

with objects in a human-readable form, to enable organizational process-based enforcement of 

information security policies. The AC-16 base control represents the requirement for user-based 

attribute association (marking). The enhancements to AC-16 represent additional requirements 

including information system-based attribute association (labeling). Types of attributes include, 

for example, classification level (for objects) and clearance level (for subjects). An example of a 

value for both of these attribute types is Top Secret. Related controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-21, AU10, SC-16, MP-3. 
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APPENDIX F-AC PAGE F-20

Control Enhancements: 

(1) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | DYNAMIC ATTRIBUTE ASSOCIATION

The information system dynamically associates security attributes with [Assignment: organizationdefined subjects and objects] in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined security 

policies] as information is created and combined. 

Supplemental Guidance: Dynamic association of security attributes is appropriate whenever the 

security characteristics of information changes over time. Security attributes may change, for 

example, due to information aggregation issues (i.e., the security characteristics of individual 

information elements are different from the combined elements), changes in individual access 

authorizations (i.e., privileges), and changes in the security category of information. Related 

control: AC-4. 

(2) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE VALUE CHANGES BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS 

The information system provides authorized individuals the capability to define or change the 

value of associated security attributes. 

Supplemental Guidance: The content or assigned values of security attributes can directly affect 

the ability of individuals to access organizational information. Therefore, it is important for 

information systems to be able to limit the ability to create or modify security attributes to 

authorized individuals. Related controls: AC-6, AU-2. 

(3) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | MAINTENANCE OF ATTRIBUTE ASSOCIATIONS BY INFORMATION SYSTEM 

The information system maintains the association of [Assignment: organization-defined security 

attributes] to [Assignment: organization-defined subjects and objects] with sufficient assurance 

that the attribute associations can be used as the basis for automated policy actions. 

Supplemental Guidance: Automated policy actions include, for example, access control 

decisions or information flow control decisions.

(4) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ASSOCIATION OF ATTRIBUTES BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS 

The information system supports the association of [Assignment: organization-defined security 

attributes] with [Assignment: organization-defined subjects and objects] by authorized individuals. 

Supplemental Guidance: The support provided by information systems can vary to include: (i) 

prompting users to select specific security attributes to be associated with specific information 

objects; (ii) employing automated mechanisms for categorizing information with appropriate 

attributes based on defined policies; or (iii) ensuring that the combination of selected security 

attributes selected is valid. Organizations consider the creation, deletion, or modification of 

security attributes when defining auditable events. Related control: AU-2. 

(5) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE DISPLAYS FOR OUTPUT DEVICES 

The information system displays security attributes in human-readable form on each object that 

the system transmits to output devices to identify [Assignment: organization-identified special 

dissemination, handling, or distribution instructions] using [Assignment: organization-identified 

human readable, standard naming conventions]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information system outputs include, for example, pages, screens, or 

equivalent. Information system output devices include, for example, printers and video 

displays on computer workstations, notebook computers, and personal digital assistants. 

(6) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | MAINTENANCE OF ATTRIBUTE ASSOCIATION BY ORGANIZATION

The organization associates, and maintains the association of [Assignment: organization-defined 

security attributes] with [Assignment: organization-defined subjects and objects] in accordance 

with [Assignment: organization-defined security policies]. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement requires individual users (as opposed to the 

information system) to maintain associations of security attributes with subjects and objects. 

(7) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | CONSISTENT ATTRIBUTE INTERPRETATION

The organization provides a consistent interpretation of security attributes transmitted between 

distributed information system components. 

Supplemental Guidance: In order to enforce security policies across multiple components in 

distributed information systems (e.g., distributed database management systems, cloud-based 

systems, and service-oriented architectures), organizations provide a consistent interpretation 

of security attributes that are used in access enforcement and flow enforcement decisions. 
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Organizations establish agreements and processes to ensure that all distributed information 

system components implement security attributes with consistent interpretations in automated 

access/flow enforcement actions.

(8) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ASSOCIATION TECHNIQUES / TECHNOLOGIES 

The information system employs [Assignment: organization-defined techniques or technologies] 

with [Assignment: organization-defined level of assurance] in associating security attributes to 

information. 

Supplemental Guidance: The association (i.e., binding) of security attributes to information 

within information systems is of significant importance with regard to conducting automated 

access enforcement and flow enforcement actions. The association of such security attributes 

can be accomplished with technologies/techniques providing different levels of assurance. For 

example, information systems can cryptographically bind security attributes to information 

using digital signatures with the supporting cryptographic keys protected by hardware devices 

(sometimes known as hardware roots of trust).

(9) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE REASSIGNMENT 

The organization ensures that security attributes associated with information are only reassigned 

via re-grading mechanisms validated using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques or 

procedures]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Validated re-grading mechanisms are employed by organizations to 

provide the requisite levels of assurance for security attribute reassignment activities. The 

validation is facilitated by ensuring that re-grading mechanisms are single purpose and of 

limited function. Since security attribute reassignments can affect security policy enforcement 

actions (e.g., access/flow enforcement decisions), using trustworthy re-grading mechanisms is 

important to ensure that such mechanisms perform in a consistent/correct mode of operation. 

(10) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE CONFIGURATION BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS 

The information system provides authorized individuals the capability to define or change the type 

and value of security attributes available for association with subjects and objects. 

Supplemental Guidance: The content or assigned values of security attributes can directly affect 

the ability of individuals to access organizational information. Therefore, it is important for 

information systems to be able to limit the ability to create or modify security attributes to 

authorized individuals only. Related controls: AC-6, AU-2. 

(11) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | PERMITTED ATTRIBUTES FOR SPECIFIED INFORMATION SYSTEMS 

The organization establishes the permitted [Assignment: organization-defined set security 

attributes] for [Assignment: organization-defined information systems]. 

Supplemental Guidance: The content or assigned values of security attributes can directly affect 

the ability of individuals to access organizational information. Organizations can define the 

specific types of attributes needed for selected information systems to support missions and/or 

business functions. Related controls: AC-6, AU-2. 

(12) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | PERMITTED VALUES AND RANGES FOR ATTRIBUTES 

The organization determines the permitted [Assignment: organization-defined values or ranges] for 

each of the established security attributes. 

Supplemental Guidance: There is potentially a wide range of values that can be assigned to any 

given security attribute. Release markings could include, for example, US only, NATO, or 

NOFORN (not releasable to foreign nationals). By specifying permitted attribute ranges and 

values, organizations can ensure that the security attribute values are meaningful and relevant. 

Related controls: AC-6, AU-2. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected
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AC-17 REMOTE ACCESS 

Control: The organization: 

a. Documents allowed methods of remote access to the information system; 

b. Establishes usage restrictions and implementation guidance for each allowed remote access 

method; 

c. Monitors for unauthorized remote access to the information system [Assignment: 

organization-defined frequency] and takes [Assignment: organization-defined actions] if an 

unauthorized connection is discovered; 

d. Authorizes remote access to the information system prior to allowing such connections; and 

e. Enforces requirements for remote connections to the information system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Remote access is access to organizational information systems by users (or 

processes acting on behalf of users) communicating through external networks (e.g., the Internet). 

Remote access methods include, for example, dial-up, broadband, and wireless. Virtual private 

networks (VPNs), when adequately provisioned with appropriate security controls, are considered 

internal networks. While access across virtual private networks is not considered remote access, 

organizations still rely on external networks to protect availability of connections. Organizations 

can establish backup virtual private networks to mitigate the risk from relying on such external 

networks. VPNs with encrypted tunnels can affect the capability of organizations to adequately 

monitor network traffic for malware. Remote access controls apply to information systems other 

than public web servers or systems designed for public access. This control addresses explicit 

authorization prior to allowing remote access without specifying formats for such authorizations. 

While organizations may use system interconnection agreements to authorize remote access 

connections, such agreements are not required by this control. Enforcing access restrictions for 

remote connections is addressed in AC-3. Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-18, AC-19, AC-20, 

CA-3, CA-7, CM-8, IA-2, IA-3, IA-8, MA-4, PE-17, PL-4, SC-10, SI-4.

Control Enhancements: 

(1) REMOTE ACCESS | AUTOMATED MONITORING / CONTROL 

The organization employs automated mechanisms to facilitate the monitoring and control of 

remote access methods. 

Supplemental Guidance: Automated monitoring and control of remote access sessions allows 

organizations to detect cyber attacks and also ensure ongoing compliance with remote access 

policies by auditing activities of remote users on a variety of information system components 

(e.g., servers, workstations, notebook computers, smart phones). Related controls: AU-2, AU12.

(2) REMOTE ACCESS | PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY / INTEGRITY USING ENCRYPTION 

The information system employs cryptography to protect the confidentiality and integrity of remote 

access sessions. 

Supplemental Guidance: The encryption strength of mechanism is selected based on the security 

categorization of the information. Related controls: SC-8, SC-9, SC-13. 

(3) REMOTE ACCESS | MANAGED ACCESS CONTROL POINTS 

The information system routes all remote accesses through a limited number of managed access 

control points. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SC-7.

(4) REMOTE ACCESS | PRIVILEGED COMMANDS / ACCESS 

The organization authorizes the execution of privileged commands and access to security-relevant 

information via remote access only for [Assignment: organization-defined compelling operational 

needs] and documents the rationale for such access in the security plan for the information 

system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: AC-6.

 
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APPENDIX F-AC PAGE F-23

(5) REMOTE ACCESS | MONITORING FOR UNAUTHORIZED CONNECTIONS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-17].

(6) REMOTE ACCESS | PROTECTION OF INFORMATION 

The organization ensures that users protect information about remote access mechanisms from 

unauthorized use and disclosure. 

(7) REMOTE ACCESS | ADDITIONAL PROTECTION FOR SECURITY FUNCTION ACCESS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-3].

(8) REMOTE ACCESS | DISABLE NONSECURE NETWORK PROTOCOLS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-7].

(9) REMOTE ACCESS | DISCONNECT / DISABLE ACCESS 

The organization provides the capability to expeditiously disconnect or disable remote access to 

the information system. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement requires organizations to have the capability 

to rapidly disconnect current users remotely accessing the information system and/or disable 

further remote access. The speed of disconnect or disablement varies based on the criticality 

of missions/business functions and the need to eliminate immediate or future remote access to 

organizational information systems. 

References: NIST Special Publications 800-46, 800-77, 800-113, 800-114, 800-121.

Priority and Baseline Allocation: 

P1 LOW AC-17 MOD AC-17 (1) (2) (3) (4) HIGH AC-17 (1) (2) (3) (4)

AC-18 WIRELESS ACCESS 

Control: The organization: 

a. Establishes usage restrictions and implementation guidance for wireless access; 

b. Authorizes wireless access to the information system prior to connection; 

c. Enforces requirements for wireless connections to the information system; 

d. Monitors for unauthorized wireless connections to the information system [Assignment: 

organization-defined frequency]; and 

e. Takes [Assignment: organization-defined actions] in response, if unauthorized connections 

are discovered. 

Supplemental Guidance: Wireless technologies include, for example, microwave, satellite, packet 

radio (UHF/VHF), 802.11x, and Bluetooth. Wireless networks use authentication protocols (e.g., 

EAP/TLS, PEAP), which provide credential protection and mutual authentication. In certain 

situations, wireless signals may radiate beyond the confines of organization-controlled facilities. 

Organizations proactively search for unauthorized wireless connections including the conduct of 

thorough scans for unauthorized wireless access points. Scans are not limited to those areas within 

facilities containing information systems, but also include areas outside of facilities as needed, to 

verify that unauthorized wireless access points are not connected to the systems. Organizational 

response actions include, for example, disabling unauthorized wireless connections. Related 

controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-17, AC-19, CA-3, CA-7, CM-8, IA-2, IA-3, IA-8, PL-4, SI-4. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) WIRELESS ACCESS | AUTHENTICATION AND ENCRYPTION

The information system protects wireless access to the system using authentication of [Selection 

(one or more): users; devices] and encryption. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: SC-8, SC-9, SC-13.

 
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(2) WIRELESS ACCESS | MONITORING UNAUTHORIZED CONNECTIONS 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-18].

(3) WIRELESS ACCESS | DISABLE WIRELESS NETWORKING 

The organization disables, when not intended for use, wireless networking capabilities internally 

embedded within information system components prior to issuance and deployment. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: AC-19.

(4) WIRELESS ACCESS | RESTRICT CONFIGURATIONS BY USERS 

The organization identifies and explicitly authorizes users allowed to independently configure 

wireless networking capabilities. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational authorizations to allow selected users to configure 

wireless networking capability are enforced in part, by the access enforcement mechanisms 

employed within organizational information systems. Related controls: AC-3, SC-15.

(5) WIRELESS ACCESS | CONFINE WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS 

The organization confines [Assignment: organization-defined wireless communications] to 

organization-controlled boundaries. 

Supplemental Guidance: Actions that may be taken by organizations to confine wireless 

communications to organization-controlled boundaries include, for example: (i) reducing the 

power of wireless transmissions such that the transmissions cannot transit physical perimeters 

of organizations; (ii) employing measures to control wireless emanations (e.g., TEMPEST); 

and (iii) configuring wireless accesses such that the accesses are point to point in nature. 

Related control: PE-19.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-48, 800-94, 800-97.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AC-18 MOD AC-18 (1) HIGH AC-18 (1) (4) (5)

AC-19 ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES 

Control: The organization: 

a. Establishes usage restrictions and implementation guidance for organization-controlled 

mobile devices; 

b. Authorizes connection of mobile devices meeting organizational usage restrictions and 

implementation guidance to organizational information systems; 

c. Monitors for unauthorized connections of mobile devices to organizational information 

systems; 

d. Enforces requirements for the connection of mobile devices to organizational information 

systems; 

e. Disables information system functionality that provides the capability for automatic execution 

of code on mobile devices without user direction; 

f. Issues mobile devices with [Assignment: organization-defined configurations] to individuals 

traveling to locations that the organization deems to be of significant risk; and 

g. Applies [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to mobile devices returning 

from locations deemed to be of significant risk in accordance with organizational policies and 

procedures. 

Supplemental Guidance: Mobile devices include portable computing and communications devices 

with information storage capability (e.g., notebook computers, personal digital assistants, cellular 

telephones, digital cameras, and audio recording devices). Organization-controlled mobile devices 

include those devices for which organizations have the authority to specify and ability to enforce 
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APPENDIX F-AC PAGE F-25

specific security requirements. Usage restrictions and implementation guidance related to mobile 

devices include, for example, configuration management, device-to-device identification and 

authentication, implementation of mandatory protective software (e.g., malicious code detection, 

firewall), scanning devices for malicious code, updating virus protection software, scanning for 

critical software updates and patches, conducting primary operating system (and possibly other 

resident software) integrity checks, and disabling unnecessary hardware (e.g., wireless, infrared). 

Information system functionality that provides the capability for automatic execution of code, 

include, for example, AutoRun and AutoPlay.

Organizational policies and procedures for mobile devices used by individuals departing on and 

returning from travel include, for example, determining which locations are of concern, defining 

required configurations for the devices, ensuring that the devices are configured as intended before 

travel is initiated, and applying specific safeguards to the device after travel is completed. 

Specially configured mobile devices include, for example, computers with sanitized hard drives, 

limited applications, and additional hardening (e.g., more stringent configuration settings). 

Specified safeguards applied to mobile devices upon return from travel include, for example, 

examining the device for signs of physical tampering and purging/reimaging the hard disk drive. 

Protecting information residing on mobile devices is covered in the media protection family. 

Related controls: AC-3, AC-7, AC-18, AC-20, CM-2, IA-2, IA-3, MP-2, MP-4, MP-5, PL-4, SC7, SI-3, SI-4. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | USE OF WRITABLE / REMOVABLE MEDIA

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-7].

(2) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | USE OF PERSONALLY OWNED REMOVABLE MEDIA

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-7].

(3) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | USE OF REMOVABLE MEDIA WITH NO IDENTIFIABLE OWNER

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-7].

(4) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | RESTRICTIONS FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 

The organization: 

(a) Prohibits the use of unclassified mobile devices in facilities containing information systems 

processing, storing, or transmitting classified information unless specifically permitted by the 

authorizing official; and 

(b) Enforces the following restrictions on individuals permitted by the authorizing official to use 

unclassified mobile devices in facilities containing information systems processing, storing, 

or transmitting classified information: 

- Connection of unclassified mobile devices to classified information systems is 

prohibited; 

- Connection of unclassified mobile devices to unclassified information systems requires 

approval from the authorizing official; 

- Use of internal or external modems or wireless interfaces within the unclassified mobile 

devices is prohibited; and 

- Unclassified mobile devices and the information stored on those devices are subject to 

random reviews and inspections by [Assignment: organization-defined security officials], 

and if classified information is found, the incident handling policy is followed. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CA-6, IR-4.

(5) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | PERSONALLY OWNED DEVICES 

The organization [Selection: restricts; prohibits] the connection of personally-owned, mobile 

devices to organizational information systems. 

(6) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | FULL DISK ENCRYPTION

The organization uses full-disk encryption to protect the confidentiality of information on 

[Assignment: organization-defined mobile devices]. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to mobile devices that are 

organization-controlled.
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(7) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | CENTRAL MANAGEMENT OF MOBILE DEVICES 

The organization centrally manages [Assignment: organization-defined mobile devices]. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to mobile devices that are 

organization-controlled and excludes portable storage media.

(8) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | REMOTE PURGING OF INFORMATION 

The organization provides the capability to remotely purge information from [Assignment: 

organization-defined mobile devices]. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement protects organizational information on 

mobile devices if the devices are obtained by unauthorized individuals.

(9) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | TAMPER DETECTION 

The organization inspects [Assignment: organization-defined mobile devices] [Selection (one or 

more): at random; at [Assignment: organization-defined frequency], upon [Assignment: 

organization-defined indications of need for inspection]] to detect tampering. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses both physical and logical 

tampering. Related controls: SI-4, SI-7.

References: OMB Memorandum 06-16; NIST Special Publications 800-114, 800-124.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AC-19 MOD AC-19 (6) HIGH AC-19 (6)

AC-20 USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS 

Control: The organization establishes terms and conditions, consistent with any trust relationships 

established with other organizations owning, operating, and/or maintaining external information 

systems, allowing authorized individuals to: 

a. Access the information system from external information systems; and 

b. Process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information using external information 

systems. 

Supplemental Guidance: External information systems are information systems or components of 

information systems that are outside of the authorization boundary established by organizations 

and for which organizations typically have no direct supervision and authority over the application 

of required security controls or the assessment of control effectiveness. External information 

systems include, for example: (i) personally owned information systems/devices (e.g., notebook 

computers, cellular telephones, or personal digital assistants); (ii) privately owned computing and 

communications devices resident in commercial or public facilities (e.g., hotels, train stations, 

convention centers, or airports); (iii) information systems owned or controlled by nonfederal 

governmental organizations; and (iv) federal information systems that are not owned by, operated 

by, or under the direct supervision and authority of organizations. This control also addresses the 

use of external information systems for the processing, storage, or transmission of organizational 

information, including, for example, accessing cloud-based information systems and services (e.g., 

infrastructure as a service [IAAS], platform as a service [PAAS], software as a service [SAAS]) 

from organizational information systems. For some external information systems (i.e., systems 

operated by other federal agencies, including organizations subordinate to those agencies), the 

trust relationships that have been established between those organizations and the originating 

organization may be such, that no explicit terms and conditions are required. Information systems 

within these organizations would not be considered external. These situations occur when, for 

example, there are pre-existing sharing/trust agreements (either implicit or explicit) established 

between federal agencies and/or organizations subordinate to those agencies, or when such trust 

agreements are specified by applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, or policies. Authorized 

individuals include, for example, organizational personnel, contractors, or other individuals with 

authorized access to organizational information systems and over which organizations have the 
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authority to impose rules of behavior with regard to system access. Restrictions that organizations 

impose on authorized individuals need not be uniform, as those restrictions may vary depending 

upon the trust relationships between organizations. Therefore, organizations may choose to impose 

different security restrictions on contractors than on state, local, or tribal governments. 

This control does not apply to the use of external information systems to access public interfaces 

to organizational information systems (e.g., individuals accessing federal information through 

www.usa.gov). Organizations establish terms and conditions for the use of external information 

systems in accordance with organizational security policies and procedures. Terms and conditions 

address as a minimum: (i) types of applications that can be accessed on organizational information 

systems from external information systems; and (ii) the highest security category of information 

that can be processed, stored, or transmitted on external information systems. Related controls: 

AC-3, AC-17, AC-19, CA-3, PL-4, SA-9. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | LIMITS ON AUTHORIZED USE 

The organization permits authorized individuals to use an external information system to access 

the information system or to process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information only 

when the organization: 

(a) Verifies the implementation of required security controls on the external system as specified 

in the organization’s information security policy and security plan; or 

(b) Retains approved information system connection or processing agreements with the 

organizational entity hosting the external information system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: CA-2.

(2) USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | PORTABLE STORAGE MEDIA

The organization limits the use of organization-controlled portable storage media by authorized 

individuals on external information systems. 

Supplemental Guidance: Limits on the use of organization-controlled portable storage media in 

external information systems include, for example, complete prohibition of the use of such 

devices or restrictions on how the devices may be used and under what conditions the devices 

may be used.

(3) USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | PERSONALLY OWNED INFORMATION SYSTEMS / DEVICES 

The organization [Selection: restricts; prohibits] the use of personally owned information systems 

or devices to process, store, or transmit federal information. 

(4) USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | NETWORK ACCESSIBLE STORAGE DEVICES 

The organization prohibits the use of [Assignment: organization-defined network accessible 

storage devices] in external information systems. 

Supplemental Guidance: Network accessible storage devices in external information systems 

include, for example, online storage devices in public, hybrid, or community cloud-based 

systems.

References: FIPS Publication 199.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AC-20 MOD AC-20 (1) (2) HIGH AC-20 (1) (2)

AC-21 COLLABORATION AND INFORMATION SHARING 

Control: The organization: 

a. Facilitates information sharing by enabling authorized users to determine whether access 

authorizations assigned to the sharing partner match the access restrictions on the information 

for [Assignment: organization-defined information sharing circumstances where user 

discretion is required]; and 
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b. Employs [Assignment: organization-defined information sharing circumstances and 

automated mechanisms or manual processes required] to assist users in making information 

sharing/collaboration decisions. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to information that may be restricted in some manner 

(e.g., privileged medical information, contract-sensitive information, proprietary information, 

personally identifiable information, classified information, information related to special access 

programs/compartments) based on some formal or administrative determination. Depending on the 

particular information-sharing circumstances, sharing partners may be defined at the individual, 

group, or organizational level. Information may be defined by content, type, security category, or 

classification level. Related control: AC-3. 

 Control Enhancements: 

(1) COLLABORATION AND INFORMATION SHARING | AUTOMATED DECISION SUPPORT 

The organization employs automated mechanisms to enable authorized users to make informationsharing decisions based on access authorizations of sharing partners and access restrictions on 

information to be shared. 

(2) COLLABORATION AND INFORMATION SHARING | INFORMATION SEARCH AND RETRIEVAL 

The information system implements information search and retrieval services that enforce 

[Assignment: organization-defined information sharing restrictions]. 

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD AC-21 HIGH AC-21

AC-22 PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE CONTENT 

Control: The organization: 

a. Designates individuals authorized to post information onto a publicly accessible information 

system; 

b. Trains authorized individuals to ensure that publicly accessible information does not contain 

nonpublic information; 

c. Reviews the proposed content of information prior to posting onto the publicly accessible 

information system to ensure nonpublic information is not included; and 

d. Reviews the content on the publicly accessible information system for nonpublic information 

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and removes such information, if discovered. 

Supplemental Guidance: In accordance with federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, 

regulations, standards, and/or guidance, the general public is not authorized access to nonpublic 

information (e.g., information protected under the Privacy Act and proprietary information). This 

control addresses information systems that are accessible to the general public, typically without 

identification or authentication. The posting of information on non-organization information 

systems is covered by organizational policy. Related controls: AC-3, AC-4, AT-2, AT-3, AU-13. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW AC-22 MOD AC-22 HIGH AC-22
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AC-23 DATA MINING PROTECTION 

Control: The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined data mining and data 

harvesting techniques] for [Assignment: organization-defined data storage objects] to adequately 

protect against data mining and data harvesting. 

Supplemental Guidance: Data storage objects include, for example, databases, database records, and 

database fields. Data mining and data harvesting techniques include, for example, limiting the 

types of responses provided to database queries or limiting the number or frequency of database 

queries to increase the work factor required to determine the contents of databases. This control 

can also be employed by organizations to reduce the effectiveness of information harvesting from 

social networking sites, thus, limiting the amount of information that can be obtained from those 

sites. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

AC-24 ACCESS CONTROL DECISIONS 

Control: The organization establishes [Assignment: organization-defined procedures] to ensure 

[Assignment: organization-defined access control decisions] are applied to each access request 

prior to access control enforcement. 

Supplemental Guidance: Access control decisions (also known as authorization decisions) occur 

when authorization information is applied to specific accesses. In contrast, access enforcement 

occurs when information systems enforce access control decisions. While it is common to have 

access control decisions and access enforcement implemented by the same entity, it is not required 

and it is not always an optimal implementation choice. For some architectures and distributed 

information systems (e.g., service-oriented architectures), different services may perform access 

control decisions and access control enforcement. 

 Control Enhancements:

(1) ACCESS CONTROL DECISIONS | TRANSMIT ACCESS AUTHORIZATION INFORMATION 

The information system transmits [Assignment: organization-defined access authorization 

information including supporting security attributes] in a secure manner to [Assignment: 

organization-defined information systems] that make access control decisions. 

Supplemental Guidance: Authorization information is provided to entities (e.g., information 

systems, services or components) making access control decisions. In distributed systems 

including for example, service-oriented architectures (SOA), authorization processes and 

access control decisions may occur in separate parts of the distributed systems. In such 

instances, it is important that authorization information is transmitted securely so timely 

access control decisions can be carried out at the appropriate locations. To support the access 

control decisions, it may be necessary to transmit as part of the authorization information, 

supporting security attributes. This is due to the fact that within distributed systems, there are 

various access control decisions that need to be made and different entities (e.g., services) 

make these decisions in a serial fashion, each requiring some security attributes to make the 

decisions. 

(2) ACCESS CONTROL DECISIONS | NO USER OR PROCESS IDENTITY

The information system makes access control decisions based on [Assignment: organizationdefined security attributes] that do not include the identity of the user or process acting on behalf 

of the user. 

Supplemental Guidance: In certain situations, it is important that access control decisions can be 

made without information regarding the identity of the users issuing the requests. These are 
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generally instances where preserving individual privacy is of paramount importance. In other 

situations, user identification information is simply not needed for access control decisions 

and, especially in the case of distributed information systems, transmitting such information 

with the needed degree of assurance may be very expensive or difficult to accomplish. 

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

AC-25 REFERENCE MONITOR FUNCTION

Control: The information system implements a reference validation mechanism for [Assignment: 

organization-defined access control policies] that is tamperproof, always invoked, and small 

enough to be subject to analysis and testing. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information is represented internally within information systems using 

abstractions known as data structures. Internal data structures can represent different types of 

entities, both active and passive. Active entities, also known as subjects, are typically associated 

with individuals, devices, or processes acting on behalf of individuals. Passive entities, also known 

as objects, are typically associated with data structures such as records, buffers, tables, files, interprocess pipes, and communications ports. Reference validation mechanisms typically enforce 

nondiscretionary access control policies—a type of access control that restricts access to objects 

based on the identity of subjects or groups to which the subjects belong. The access controls are 

nondiscretionary because subjects with certain privileges (i.e., access permissions) are restricted 

from passing those privileges on to any other subjects, either directly or indirectly—that is, the 

information system strictly enforces the access control policy based on the rule set established by 

the policy. The tamperproof property of the reference validation mechanism prevents adversaries 

from compromising the functioning of the mechanism. The always invoked property prevents 

adversaries from bypassing the mechanism and hence violating the security policy. The smallness

property helps to ensure the completeness in the analysis and testing of the mechanism to detect 

weaknesses or deficiencies (i.e., latent flaws) that would prevent the enforcement of the security 

Related controls: AC-3, AC-16, SC-3, SC-41. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected
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FAMILY: AWARENESS AND TRAINING 

AT-1 SECURITY AWARENESS AND TRAINING POLICY AND PROCEDURES 

Control: The organization develops, disseminates, and reviews/updates [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]: 

a. A formal, documented security awareness and training policy that addresses purpose, scope, 

roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, 

and compliance; and 

b. Formal, documented procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security awareness and 

training policy and associated security awareness and training controls. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the AT family. 

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations. The procedures 

can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if 

needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and 

procedures. Related control: PM-9. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-16, 800-50, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AT-1 MOD AT-1 HIGH AT-1

AT-2 SECURITY AWARENESS 

Control: The organization provides basic security awareness training to information system users 

(including managers, senior executives, and contractors): 

a. As part of initial training for new users; 

b. When required by information system changes; and 

c. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations determine the appropriate content of security awareness 

training and security awareness techniques based on the specific organizational requirements and 

the information systems to which personnel have authorized access. The content includes a basic 

understanding of the need for information security and user actions to maintain security and to 

respond to suspected security incidents. The content also addresses awareness of the need for 

operations security. Security awareness techniques can include, for example, displaying posters, 

offering supplies inscribed with security reminders, generating email advisories/notices from 

senior organizational officials, displaying logon screen messages, and conducting information 

security awareness events. Related controls: AT-3, AT-4. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) SECURITY AWARENESS | PRACTICAL EXERCISES 

The organization includes practical exercises in security awareness training that simulate actual 

cyber attacks. 

Supplemental Guidance: Practical exercises may include, for example, no-notice social 

engineering attempts to collect information, gain unauthorized access, or simulate the adverse 
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impact of opening malicious email attachments or invoking malicious web links. Related 

controls: CA-2, CA-7, CP-4, IR-3. 

(2) SECURITY AWARENESS | INSIDER THREAT 

The organization includes security awareness training on recognizing and reporting potential 

indicators of insider threat. 

Supplemental Guidance: Potential indicators and possible precursors of insider threat can 

include concerning behaviors such as inordinate, long-term job dissatisfaction, attempts to 

gain access to information not required for job performance, unexplained access to financial 

resources, bullying or sexual harassment of fellow colleagues, workplace violence, and other 

serious violations of organizational policies, procedures, directives, rules, and/or practices. 

Security awareness training includes how to communicate employee/management concerns 

regarding potential indicators of insider threat through appropriate organizational channels in 

accordance with established organizational policies and procedures. Related control: PM-12. 

References: C.F.R. Part 5 Subpart C (5 C.F.R 930.301); NIST Special Publication 800-50.

Priority and Baseline Allocation: 

P1 LOW AT-2 MOD AT-2 (2) HIGH AT-2 (2)

AT-3 SECURITY TRAINING 

Control: The organization provides role-based security training to information system users: 

a. Before authorizing access to the information system or performing assigned duties; 

b. When required by information system changes; and 

c. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations determine the appropriate content of security training based 

on the assigned roles and responsibilities of individuals and the specific security requirements of 

organizations and the information systems to which personnel have authorized access. In addition, 

organizations provides enterprise architects, information system developers, software developers, 

acquisition/procurement officials, information system managers, system/network administrators, 

personnel performing independent verification and validation activities, security control assessors, 

and other personnel having access to system-level software, adequate security-related technical 

training specifically tailored for their assigned duties. Comprehensive security training addresses 

management, operational, and technical roles and responsibilities covering physical, personnel, 

and technical safeguards and countermeasures. Organizations also provide the security training 

necessary for individuals to carry out their responsibilities related to operations and supply chain 

security within the context of organizational information security programs. Role-based security 

training also applies to federal contractors providing services to federal agencies. Related controls: 

AT-2, AT-4, PS-7, SA-3. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) SECURITY TRAINING | ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS 

The organization provides [Assignment: organization-defined personnel] with initial and 

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] training in the employment and operation of 

environmental controls. 

Supplemental Guidance: Environmental controls include, for example, fire suppression and 

detection devices/systems, sprinkler systems, handheld fire extinguishers, fixed fire hoses, 

smoke detectors, temperature/humidity, HVAC, and power within the facility. Organizations 

identify personnel with specific roles and responsibilities associated with environmental 

controls requiring specialized training. Related controls: PE-1, PE-13, PE-14, PE-15.

 
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(2) SECURITY TRAINING | PHYSICAL SECURITY CONTROLS

The organization provides [Assignment: organization-defined employees] with initial and 

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] training in the employment and operation of 

physical security controls. 

Supplemental Guidance: Physical security controls include, for example, physical access control 

devices, physical intrusion alarms, monitoring/surveillance equipment, and security guards 

(deployment and operating procedures). Organizations identify personnel with specific roles 

and responsibilities associated with physical security controls requiring specialized training. 

Related controls: AT-4, PE-2, PE-3, PE-4, PE-5.

(3) SECURITY TRAINING | PRACTICAL EXERCISES

The organization includes practical exercises in security training that reinforce training objectives. 

Supplemental Guidance: As an example of practical exercises, organizations might provide 

security training for software developers that includes simulated cyber attacks exploiting 

common software vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer overflows). These types of practical exercises 

help developers better understand the effects of such vulnerabilities and appreciate the need 

for security coding standards and processes. 

References: C.F.R. Part 5 Subpart C (5 C.F.R. 930.301); NIST Special Publications 800-16, 800-

50.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AT-3 MOD AT-3 HIGH AT-3

AT-4 SECURITY TRAINING RECORDS 

Control: The organization: 

a. Documents and monitors individual information system security training activities including 

basic security awareness training and specific information system security training; and 

b. Retains individual training records for [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Documentation for specialized training may be maintained by individual 

supervisors at the option of the organization. Related controls: AT-2, AT-3, PM-15. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P3 LOW AT-4 MOD AT-4 HIGH AT-4

AT-5 CONTACTS WITH SECURITY GROUPS AND ASSOCIATIONS 

Control: The organization establishes and institutionalizes contact with selected groups and 

associations within the security community: 

- To facilitate ongoing security education and training for organizational personnel; 

- To maintain currency with recommended security practices, techniques, and technologies; and 

- To share current security-related information including threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents. 

Supplemental Guidance: Ongoing contact with security groups and associations is of paramount 

importance in an environment of rapidly changing technologies and threats. Security groups and 

associations include, for example, special interest groups, forums, professional associations, news 
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groups, and/or peer groups of security professionals in similar organizations. Organizations select 

groups and associations based on organizational missions/business functions. Organizations share 

threat, vulnerability, and incident information consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive 

Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. Related control: SI-5. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P3 LOW Not Selected MOD AT-5 HIGH AT-5
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FAMILY: AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY 

AU-1 AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization develops, disseminates, and reviews/updates [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]: 

a. A formal, documented audit and accountability policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 

responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and 

compliance; and 

b. Formal, documented procedures to facilitate the implementation of the audit and 

accountability policy and associated audit and accountability controls. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the AU family. 

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations. The procedures 

can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if 

needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and 

procedures. Related control: PM-9. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AU-1 MOD AU-1 HIGH AU-1

AU-2 AUDITABLE EVENTS 

Control: The organization: 

a. Determines that the information system must be capable of auditing the following events: 

[Assignment: organization-defined auditable events]; 

b. Coordinates the security audit function with other organizational entities requiring auditrelated information to enhance mutual support and to help guide the selection of auditable 

events; 

c. Provides a rationale for why the auditable events are deemed to be adequate to support afterthe-fact investigations of security incidents; and 

d. Determines that the following events are to be audited within the information system: 

[Assignment: organization-defined subset of the auditable events defined in AU-2 a. to be 

audited along with the frequency of (or situation requiring) auditing for each identified 

event]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations identify events which need to be auditable as significant and 

relevant to the security of organizational information systems and the environments in which those 

systems operate in order to meet specific/ongoing audit needs. In determining auditable events, 

organizations consider the specific auditing appropriate for each of the security controls to be 

implemented. To balance auditing requirements with other information system needs, this control 

also requires identifying that subset of auditable events that are audited at a given point in time. 

For example, organizations may determine that information systems must have the capability to 

log every file access both successful and unsuccessful, but not activate that capability except for 

specific circumstances due to the extreme burden on system performance. Audit records can be 
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generated at various levels of abstraction, including at the packet level as information traverses the 

network. Selecting the right level of abstraction is a critical aspect of an audit capability and can 

facilitate the identification of root causes to problems. Organizations also consider in the definition 

of audible events, the auditing necessary to cover related events such as the various steps in 

distributed, transaction-based processes (e.g., processes that are distributed across multiple 

organizations) and actions in service-oriented architectures. Related controls: AC-6, AC-17, AU-3, 

AU-12, MA-4, MP-2, SI-4. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) AUDITABLE EVENTS | COMPILATION OF AUDIT RECORDS FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AU-12]. 

(2) AUDITABLE EVENTS | SELECTION OF AUDIT EVENTS BY COMPONENT

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AU-12]. 

(3) AUDITABLE EVENTS | REVIEWS AND UPDATES 

The organization reviews and updates the auditable events [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency].

(4) AUDITABLE EVENTS | PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS 

The organization includes execution of privileged functions in the events to be audited by the 

information system. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-92; Web: CSRC.NIST.GOV/PCIG/CIG.HTML.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AU-2 MOD AU-2 (3) (4) HIGH AU-2 (3) (4)

AU-3 CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS 

Control: The information system produces audit records containing information that, at a 

minimum, establishes what type of event occurred, when the event occurred, where the event 

occurred, the source of the event, the outcome of the event, and the identity of any user or subject 

associated with the event. 

Supplemental Guidance: Audit record content that may be necessary to satisfy the requirement of 

this control, includes, for example, time stamps, source and destination addresses, user/process 

identifiers, event descriptions, success/fail indications, filenames involved, and access control or 

flow control rules invoked. Event outcomes can include indicators of event success or failure and 

event-specific results (e.g., the security state of the information system after the event occurred). 

Related controls: AU-2, AU-8, AU-12, SI-11. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS | ADDITIONAL AUDIT INFORMATION 

The information system includes [Assignment: organization-defined additional, more detailed 

information] in the audit records for audit events identified by type, location, or subject. 

Supplemental Guidance: Detailed information that organizations may consider in audit records 

includes, for example, full-text recording of privileged commands or the individual identities 

of group account users. Organizations consider limiting the additional audit information to 

only that information explicitly needed for specific audit requirements. This facilitates the use 

of the audit trails by not including information that could potentially be misleading or could 

make it more difficult to locate information of interest. 

(2) CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS | CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OF PLANNED AUDIT RECORD CONTENT 

The information system provides centralized management and configuration of the content to be 

captured in audit records generated by [Assignment: organization-defined information system 

components]. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement requires that the content to be captured in 

audit records be configured from a central location (necessitating automation). Organizations 
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coordinate the selection of required audit content to support the centralized management and 

configuration capability provided by the information system. Related controls: AU-6, AU-7. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AU-3 MOD AU-3 (1) HIGH AU-3 (1) (2)

AU-4 AUDIT STORAGE CAPACITY 

Control: The organization allocates audit record storage capacity in accordance with [Assignment: 

organization-defined audit record storage requirements].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations consider the types of auditing to be performed and the audit 

processing requirements when allocating audit storage capacity. Allocating sufficient audit storage 

capacity reduces the likelihood of such capacity being exceeded and resulting in the potential loss 

or reduction of auditing capability. Related controls: AU-2, AU-5, AU-6, AU-7, AU-11, SI-4. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) AUDIT STORAGE CAPACITY | TRANSFER TO ALTERNATE STORAGE 

The information system off-loads audit records [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] onto 

a different system or media than the system being audited. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses information systems that lack the 

capacity to store audit records for long periods of time. Off-loading is the process of moving 

audit records from the primary information system to a secondary or alternate system. It is a 

common process in information systems with limited audit storage capacity; the audit storage 

is used only in a transitory fashion until the system can communicate with the secondary or 

alternate system designated for storing the audit records, at which point the information is 

transferred. The transfer process is designed to preserve the integrity and confidentiality of 

audit records. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AU-4 MOD AU-4 HIGH AU-4

AU-5 RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES 

Control: The information system: 

a. Alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel] in the event of an audit processing 

failure; and 

b. Takes the following additional actions: [Assignment: organization-defined actions to be taken 

(e.g., shut down information system, overwrite oldest audit records, stop generating audit 

records)]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Audit processing failures include, for example, software/hardware errors, 

failures in the audit capturing mechanisms, and audit storage capacity being reached or exceeded. 

Organizations may choose to define additional actions for different audit processing failures (e.g., 

by type, by location, by severity, or a combination of such factors). This control applies to each 

audit data storage repository (i.e., distinct information system component where audit records are 

stored), the total audit storage capacity of organizations (i.e., all audit data storage repositories 

combined) or both. Related controls: AU-4, SI-12. 

 
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Control Enhancements: 

(1) RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES | AUDIT STORAGE CAPACITY 

The information system provides a warning to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel, roles, 

and/or locations] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] when allocated audit 

record storage volume reaches [Assignment: organization-defined percentage] of repository 

maximum audit record storage capacity. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may have multiple audit data storage repositories 

distributed across multiple information system components, with each repository having 

different storage volume capacities.

(2) RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES | REAL-TIME ALERTS 

The information system provides a real-time alert to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel, 

roles, and/or locations] when the following audit failure events occur: [Assignment: organizationdefined audit failure events requiring real-time alerts]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Alerts provide organizations with urgent messages. Real-time alerts 

provide these messages at information technology speed (i.e., the time from event detection to 

alert occurs in seconds or less).

(3) RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES | CONFIGURABLE TRAFFIC VOLUME THRESHOLDS 

The information system enforces configurable traffic volume thresholds reflecting limits on 

auditing capacity related to network traffic volume and [Selection: rejects; delays] network traffic 

above those thresholds. 

(4) RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES | SHUTDOWN ON FAILURE 

The information system invokes a system shutdown in the event of [Assignment: organizationdefined audit failures], unless an alternate audit capability exists. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations determine the types of audit failures that trigger 

automatic information system shutdowns. Related control: AU-15.

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AU-5 MOD AU-5 HIGH AU-5 (1) (2)

AU-6 AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING 

Control: The organization: 

a. Reviews and analyzes information system audit records [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency] for indications of inappropriate or unusual activity; 

b. Reports findings to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel]; 

c. Adjusts the level of audit review, analysis, and reporting within the information system when 

there is a change in risk based on law enforcement information, intelligence information, or 

other credible sources of information; and 

d. Specifies the permitted actions for each [Selection (one or more): information system process; 

role; user] associated with the review, analysis, and reporting of audit information. 

Supplemental Guidance: Audit review, analysis, and reporting covers all auditing performed by 

organizations including, for example, auditing that results from monitoring of account usage, 

remote access, wireless connectivity, mobile device connection, configuration settings, system 

component inventory, use of maintenance tools and non-local maintenance, physical access, 

temperature and humidity, equipment delivery and removal, communications at the information 

system boundaries, use of mobile code, and use of VoIP. Permitted actions for information system 

processes, roles, and/or users associated with the review, analysis, and reporting of audit records 

include, for example, read, write, execute, append, and delete. Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC6, AC-17, AC-19, AT-3, AT-5, AU-7, CA-7, CM-6, CM-8, CM-10, CM-11, IA-5, IR-5, IR-6, 
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MA-3, MA-4, PE-3, PE-6, PE-14, PE-16, SC-7, SC-18, SC-19, SI-4, SI-7. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | PROCESS INTEGRATION 

The information system integrates audit review, analysis, and reporting processes to support 

organizational processes for investigation and response to suspicious activities. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AU-12, PM-7.

(2) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | AUTOMATED SECURITY ALERTS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-4]. 

(3) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CORRELATE AUDIT REPOSITORIES 

The organization analyzes and correlates audit records across different repositories to gain 

organization-wide situational awareness. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organization-wide situational awareness includes awareness across all 

three tiers of risk management (i.e., organizational, mission/business process, and information 

system) and supports cross-organization awareness. Related controls: AU-12, IR-4. 

(4) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CENTRAL REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 

The information system provides the capability to centrally review and analyze audit records from 

multiple components within the system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms for centralized reviews and analyses include, 

for example, Security Information Management products. Related controls: AU-2, AU-12. 

(5) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | INTEGRATION / SCANNING AND MONITORING CAPABILITIES 

The organization integrates analysis of audit records with analysis of vulnerability scanning 

information, performance data, and information system monitoring information to further enhance 

the ability to identify inappropriate or unusual activity. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement does not require vulnerability scanning, the 

generation of performance data, or information system monitoring. Rather, the enhancement 

requires that the analysis of information being otherwise produced in these areas is integrated 

with the analysis of audit information. Security Event and Information Management System 

tools can facilitate audit record aggregation/consolidation from multiple information system 

components as well as audit record correlation and analysis. The use of standardized audit 

record analysis scripts developed by organizations (with localized script adjustments, as 

necessary), provides more cost-effective approaches for analyzing audit record information 

collected. The correlation of audit record information with vulnerability scanning information 

is important in determining the veracity of vulnerability scans and correlating attack detection 

events with scanning results. Correlation with performance data can help uncover denial of 

service attacks or cyber attacks resulting in unauthorized use of resources. Correlation with 

system monitoring information can assist in uncovering attacks and in better relating audit 

information to operational situations. Related controls: AU-12, IR-4, RA-5.

(6) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CORRELATION WITH PHYSICAL MONITORING 

The organization correlates information from audit records with information obtained from 

monitoring physical access to further enhance the ability to identify suspicious, inappropriate, 

unusual, or malevolent activity. 

(7) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | PERMITTED ACTIONS 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AU-6].

(8) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | FULL TEXT ANALYSIS OF PRIVILEGED COMMANDS 

The organization performs a full-text analysis of audited privileged commands in a physicallydistinct component or subsystem of the information system, or other information system that is 

dedicated to that analysis. 

Supplemental Guidance: Full text analysis refers to analysis that considers the full text of 

privileged commands (i.e., commands and all parameters) as opposed to analysis that only 

considers the name of the command. Full text analysis includes, for example, the use of 

pattern matching and heuristics. Related controls: AU-3, AU-9, AU-11, AU-12. 

 
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(9) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CORRELATION WITH INPUT FROM NON-TECHNICAL SOURCES 

The organization correlates input from non-technical sources with audit information to enhance 

organization-wide situational awareness. 

Supplemental Guidance: Non-technical sources include for example, human resources records 

documenting organizational policy violations (e.g., sexual harassment incidents, previous 

arrests, and/or improper use of organizational information assets). Such information can lead 

organizations to a more directed analytical effort to detect potential malicious insider activity. 

Organizations consider limiting access to information from non-technical sources to minimize 

potential privacy issues. 

Related control: AT-2. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AU-6 MOD AU-6 (1) (3) (9) HIGH AU-6 (1) (3) (5) (6) (9)

AU-7 AUDIT REDUCTION AND REPORT GENERATION 

Control: The organization employs an audit reduction and report generation capability that: 

a. Supports expeditious, on-demand audit review, analysis, and reporting requirements and afterthe-fact investigations of security incidents; and 

b. Does not alter original audit records. 

Supplemental Guidance: Audit reduction and report generation capabilities do not always emanate 

from the same information system or from the same organizational entities conducting auditing 

activities. Related control: AU-6. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) AUDIT REDUCTION AND REPORT GENERATION | AUTOMATIC PROCESSING 

The information system provides the capability to automatically process audit records for events 

of interest based on the content of [Assignment: organization-defined audit fields within audit 

records]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Events of interest can be identified by the content of specific audit 

record fields including for example, identities of individuals, event types, event locations, 

event times, event dates, system resources involved, IP addresses involved, or information 

objects accessed. Organizations may define audit event criteria to any degree of granularity 

required, for example, locations selectable by general networking location (e.g., by network or 

subnetwork) or selectable by specific information system component. Related controls: AU-2, 

AU-12. 

(2) AUDIT REDUCTION AND REPORT GENERATION | AUTOMATIC SORTING 

The information system provides the capability to automatically sort audit records for events of 

interest based on the content of [Assignment: organization-defined audit fields within audit 

records]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Sorting of audit records may be based upon the contents of audit 

record fields, for example: (i) date/time of events; (ii) user identifiers; (iii) Internet Protocol 

(IP) addresses involved in the event; (iv) type of event; or (v) event success/failure.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD AU-7 (1) HIGH AU-7 (1)
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AU-8 TIME STAMPS 

Control: The information system: 

a. Uses internal system clocks to generate time stamps for audit records; and 

b. Generates time in the time stamps that can be mapped to Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) 

or Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) and meets [Assignment: organization-defined granularity of 

time measurement]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Time stamps generated by the information system include date and time. 

Time is commonly expressed in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), a modern continuation of 

Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), or local time with an offset from UTC. Granularity of time 

measurements refers to the degree of synchronization between information system clocks and 

reference clocks, for example, clocks synchronizing within hundreds of milliseconds or within 

tens of milliseconds. Organizations may define different time granularities for different system 

components. Related controls: AU-3, AU-12. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) TIME STAMPS | SYNCHRONIZATION WITH AUTHORITATIVE TIME SOURCE 

The information system synchronizes internal information system clocks [Assignment: 

organization-defined frequency] with [Assignment: organization-defined authoritative time source]. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement provides uniformity of time stamps for 

information systems with multiple system clocks and systems connected over a network. 

Related controls: AU-12.

(2) TIME STAMPS | SECONDARY AUTHORITATIVE TIME SOURCE 

The information system identifies a secondary authoritative time source that is located in a 

different geographic region than the primary authoritative time source. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AU-8 MOD AU-8 (1) HIGH AU-8 (1)

AU-9 PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION 

Control: The information system protects audit information and audit tools from unauthorized 

access, modification, and deletion. 

Supplemental Guidance: Audit information includes all information (e.g., audit records, audit 

settings, and audit reports) needed to successfully audit information system activity. This control 

focuses on technical protection of audit information. Physical protection of audit information is 

addressed by media protection controls and physical and environmental protection controls. 

Related controls: AC-3, AC-6, MP-2, MP-4, PE-2, PE-3, PE-6. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | HARDWARE WRITE-ONCE MEDIA

The information system writes audit trails to hardware-enforced, write-once media. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to the initial generation of audit 

trails (i.e., the collection of audit records that represents the audit information to be used for 

detection, analysis, and reporting purposes) and to the backup of those audit trails. The 

enhancement does not apply to the initial generation of audit records prior to being written to 

an audit trail. Write-once, read-many (WORM) media includes, for example, Compact DiskRecordable (CD-R) and Digital Video Disk-Recordable (DVD-R). In contrast, the use of 

switchable write-protection media such as on tape cartridges or Universal Serial Bus (USB) 

drives results in write-protected, but not write-once, media. Related controls: AU-4, AU-5. 

 
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(2) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | AUDIT BACKUP ON SEPARATE PHYSICAL SYSTEMS / COMPONENTS 

The information system backs up audit records [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] onto 

a physically different system or system component than the system or component being audited. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement helps to ensure that a compromise of the 

information system being audited does not also result in a compromise of the audit records. 

Related controls: AU-4, AU-5, AU-11.

(3) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION 

The information system employs cryptographic mechanisms to protect the integrity of audit 

information and audit tools. 

Supplemental Guidance: Cryptographic mechanisms used for protecting the integrity of audit 

information include, for example, signed hash functions using asymmetric cryptography 

enabling distribution of the public key to verify the hash information while maintaining the 

confidentiality of the secret key used to generate the hash. Related controls: AU-10, SC-12, 

SC-13.

(4) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | ACCESS BY SUBSET OF PRIVILEGED USERS 

The organization authorizes access to management of audit functionality to only [Assignment: 

organization-defined subset of privileged users]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Individuals with privileged access to an information system and who 

are also the subject of an audit by that system, may affect the reliability of audit information 

by inhibiting audit activities or modifying audit records. This control enhancement requires 

that privileged access be further defined between audit-related privileges and other privileges, 

thus, limiting the users with audit-related privileges. Related controls: AC-5.

(5) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | DUAL AUTHORIZATION 

The organization requires and enforces dual authorization for [Selection (one or more): changes to; 

deletion of] [Assignment: organization-defined audit information]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may choose different selection options for different 

types of audit information. Related controls: AC-3, MP-2.

(6) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | READ ONLY ACCESS 

The organization authorizes read access to audit information to [Assignment: organization-defined 

subset of privileged users]. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AU-9 MOD AU-9 (4) HIGH AU-9 (2) (3) (4)

AU-10 NON-REPUDIATION 

Control: The information system protects against an individual falsely denying having performed 

[Assignment: organization-defined actions to be covered by non-repudiation].

Supplemental Guidance: Types of individual actions covered by non-repudiation include, for 

example, creating information, sending and receiving messages, approving information (e.g., 

indicating concurrence or signing a contract). Non-repudiation protects individuals against later 

claims by: (i) authors of not having authored particular documents; (ii) senders of not having 

transmitted messages; (iii) receivers of not having received messages; or (iv) signatories of not 

having signed documents. Non-repudiation services can be used to determine if information 

originated from a particular individual, or if an individual took specific actions (e.g., sending an 

email, signing a contract, approving a procurement request) or received specific information. 

Organizations obtain non-repudiation services by employing various techniques or mechanisms 

(e.g., digital signatures, digital message receipts). Related controls: SC-12, SC-8, SC-13, SC-16, 

SC-17, SC-23. 

 
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Control Enhancements:

(1) NON-REPUDIATION | ASSOCIATION OF IDENTITIES 

The information system: 

(a) Associates the identity of the information producer with the information; and 

(b) Provides the means for authorized individuals to determine the identity of the producer of the 

information. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement supports audit requirements that provide 

organizational personnel with the means to identify who produced specific information in the 

event of an information transfer. Organizations determine and approve the strength of the 

binding between the information producer and the information based on the security category 

of the information and relevant risk factors. Related controls: AC-4, AC-16. 

(2) NON-REPUDIATION | VALIDATE BINDING OF INFORMATION PRODUCER IDENTITY

The information system: 

(a) Validates the binding of the information producer identity to the information; and 

(b) Performs [Assignment: organization-defined actions] in the event of a validation error. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement prevents the modification of information 

between production and review. The validation of bindings can be achieved, for example, by 

the use of cryptographic checksums. Organizations determine if validations are in response to 

user requests or generated automatically. Related controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-16. 

(3) NON-REPUDIATION | CHAIN OF CUSTODY 

The information system maintains reviewer/releaser identity and credentials within the established 

chain of custody for all information reviewed or released. 

Supplemental Guidance: If the reviewer is a human or if the review function is automated but 

separate from the release/transfer function, the information system associates the identity of 

the reviewer of the information to be released with the information and the information label. 

In the case of human reviews, this control enhancement provides appropriate organizational 

officials the means to identify who reviewed and released the information. In the case of 

automated reviews, this control enhancement ensures that only approved review functions are 

employed. Related controls: AC-4, AC-16.

(4) NON-REPUDIATION | VALIDATE BINDING OF INFORMATION REVIEWER IDENTITY 

The information system: 

(a) Validates the binding of the information reviewer identity to the information at the transfer or 

release points prior to release/transfer between [Assignment: organization-defined security 

domains]; and 

(b) Performs [Assignment: organization-defined actions] in the event of a validation error. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement prevents the modification of information 

between review and transfer/release. The validation of bindings can be achieved, for example, 

by the use of cryptographic checksums. Organizations determine validations are in response 

to user requests or generated automatically. Related controls: AC-4, AC-16, SC-16.

(5) NON-REPUDIATION | DIGITAL SIGNATURES 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-7].

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH AU-10
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AU-11 AUDIT RECORD RETENTION 

Control: The organization retains audit records for [Assignment: organization-defined time period 

consistent with records retention policy] to provide support for after-the-fact investigations of 

security incidents and to meet regulatory and organizational information retention requirements.

Supplemental Guidance: Organization retain audit records until it is determined that they are no 

longer needed for administrative, legal, audit, or other operational purposes. This includes, for 

example, retention and availability of audit records relative to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 

requests, subpoenas, and law enforcement actions. Organizations develop standard categories of 

audit records relative to such types of actions and standard response processes for each type of 

action. The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) General Records Schedules 

provide federal policy on record retention. Related controls: AU-4, AU-5, AU-9. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P3 LOW AU-11 MOD AU-11 HIGH AU-11

AU-12 AUDIT GENERATION 

Control: The information system: 

a. Provides audit record generation capability for the auditable events defined in AU-2 at 

[Assignment: organization-defined information system components]; 

b. Allows [Assignment: organization-defined personnel] to select which auditable events are to 

be audited by specific components of the information system; and 

c. Generates audit records for the audited events defined in AU-2 with the content defined in 

AU-3. 

Supplemental Guidance: Audits records can be generated from many different information system 

components. Audited events are events for which audits are to be generated. These events are 

typically a subset of all events for which the information system is capable of generating audit 

records. Related controls: AC-3, AU-2, AU-3, AU-6, AU-7. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) AUDIT GENERATION | SYSTEM-WIDE / TIME-CORRELATED AUDIT TRAIL 

The information system compiles audit records from [Assignment: organization-defined 

information system components] into a system-wide (logical or physical) audit trail that is timecorrelated to within [Assignment: organization-defined level of tolerance for relationship between 

time stamps of individual records in the audit trail].

Supplemental Guidance: Audit trails are time-correlated if the time stamps in the individual 

audit records can be reliably related to the time stamps in other audit records to achieve a time 

ordering of the records within organizational tolerances. Related controls: AU-8, AU-12. 

(2) AUDIT GENERATION | STANDARDIZED FORMATS 

The information system produces a system-wide (logical or physical) audit trail composed of audit 

records in a standardized format. 

Supplemental Guidance: Audit information that is normalized to common standards promotes 

interoperability and exchange of such information between dissimilar devices and information 

systems. This facilitates production of event information that can be more readily analyzed 

and correlated. Standard formats for audit records include, for example, system log records 

and audit records compliant with Common Event Expressions (CEE). If logging mechanisms 

within information systems do not conform to standardized formats, systems may convert 

individual audit records into standardized formats when compiling system-wide audit trails.
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(3) AUDIT GENERATION | CHANGES BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS 

The information system provides the capability for [Assignment: organization-defined individuals 

or roles] to change within [Assignment: organization-defined time period], the auditing to be 

performed based on [Assignment: organization-defined selectable event criteria]. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement enables organizations to extend or limit 

auditing as necessary at specific points in time to meet organizational requirements. Auditing 

that is limited to conserve information system resources may be extended to address certain 

threat situations. In addition, auditing may be limited to a more focused set of audit events to 

facilitate audit reduction, analysis, and reporting. Organizations can establish time thresholds 

in which audit actions can be changed, for example, near real-time, within minutes, or within 

hours. Related control: AU-7.

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AU-12 MOD AU-12 HIGH AU-12 (1) (3)

AU-13 MONITORING FOR INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 

Control: The organization monitors [Assignment: organization-defined open source information] 

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] for evidence of unauthorized exfiltration or 

disclosure of organizational information. 

Supplemental Guidance: Open source information includes, for example, social networking sites. 

Related controls: PE-3, SC-7. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

AU-14 SESSION AUDIT 

Control: The information system provides the capability for authorized users to: 

a. Capture/record and log all content related to a user session; 

b. Remotely view/hear all content related to an established user session in real time; and 

c. Select the user session to capture/record or view/hear. 

Supplemental Guidance: Session auditing activities are developed, integrated, and used in 

consultation with legal counsel in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, 

directives, policies, or regulations. Related controls: AC-3, AU-4, AU-5, AU-9, AU-11. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) SESSION AUDIT | SYSTEM START-UP 

The information system initiates session audits at system start-up. 

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected
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AU-15 ALTERNATE AUDIT CAPABILITY 

Control: The organization provides an alternative audit capability in the event of a failure in 

primary audit capability that provides [Assignment: organization-defined alternative audit 

functionality].

Supplemental Guidance: Since alternative audit capability may be a short-term protection employed 

until the failure in the primary auditing capability is corrected, organizations may determine that 

the alternative audit capability need only provide a subset of the primary audit functionality that is 

impacted by the failure. Related control: AU-5. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

AU-16 CROSS-ORGANIZATIONAL AUDITING 

Control: The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined methods] for coordinating 

[Assignment: organization-defined audit information] among external organizations when audit 

information is transmitted across organizational boundaries. 

Supplemental Guidance: When organizations use information systems and/or services of external 

organizations, the auditing capability necessitates a coordinated approach across organizations. 

For example, maintaining the identity of individuals that requested particular services across 

organizational boundaries may often be very difficult, and doing so may prove to have significant 

performance ramifications. Therefore, it is often the case that cross-organizational auditing (e.g., 

the type of auditing capability provided by service-oriented architectures) simply captures the 

identity of individuals issuing requests at the initial information system, and subsequent systems 

record that the requests emanated from authorized individuals. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) CROSS-ORGANIZATIONAL AUDITING | IDENTITY PRESERVATION 

The organization requires that the identity of individuals be preserved in cross organizational audit 

trails. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies when there is a need to be able to 

trace actions that are performed across organizational boundaries to a specific individual. 

(2) CROSS-ORGANIZATIONAL AUDITING | SHARING OF AUDIT INFORMATION 

The organization provides cross-organizational audit information to [Assignment: organizationdefined organizations] based on [Assignment: organization-defined cross organizational sharing 

agreements]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Because of the distributed nature of the audit information, cross 

organization sharing of audit information may be essential for effective analysis of the 

auditing being performed. For example, the audit records of one organization may not provide 

sufficient information to determine the appropriate or inappropriate use of organizational 

information resources by individuals in other organizations. In some instances, only the home 

organizations of individuals have the appropriate knowledge to make such determinations, 

thus requiring the sharing of audit information among organizations.

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

 
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FAMILY: SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION

CA-1 SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization develops, disseminates, and reviews/updates [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]: 

a. Formal, documented security assessment and authorization policy that address purpose, scope, 

roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, 

and compliance; and 

b. Formal, documented procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security assessment 

and authorization policy and associated security assessment and authorization controls. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the CA family. 

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations. The procedures 

can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if 

needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and 

procedures. Related control: PM-9. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-37, 800-53A, 800-100. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CA-1 MOD CA-1 HIGH CA-1

CA-2 SECURITY ASSESSMENTS 

Control: The organization: 

a. Develops a security assessment plan that describes the scope of the assessment including: 

- Security controls and control enhancements under assessment; 

- Assessment procedures to be used to determine security control effectiveness; and 

- Assessment environment, assessment team, and assessment roles and responsibilities; 

b. Assesses the security controls in the information system and its environment of operation 

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine the extent to which the controls 

are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with 

respect to meeting established security requirements; 

c. Produces a security assessment report that documents the results of the assessment; and 

d. Provides the results of the security control assessment to [Assignment: organization-defined 

individuals or roles]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations assess security controls in organizational information 

systems and the environments in which those systems operate as part of: (i) initial and ongoing 

security authorizations; (ii) FISMA annual assessments; (iii) continuous monitoring; and (iv) 

system development life cycle activities. Security assessments: (i) ensure that information security 

is built into organizational information systems; (ii) identify weaknesses and deficiencies early in 

the development process; (iii) provide essential information needed to make risk-based decisions 

as part of security authorization processes; and (iv) ensure compliance to vulnerability mitigation 
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procedures. Organizations can use other types of assessment activities such as vulnerability 

scanning, penetration testing, and information system monitoring to ensure that the security 

posture of information systems during the entire life cycle is maintained. Security assessment 

reports document assessment results in sufficient detail as deemed necessary by organizations, to 

determine the accuracy and completeness of the reports and whether security controls are 

implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to 

meeting security requirements. The FISMA requirement for assessing security controls at least 

annually does not require additional assessment activities to those activities already in place in 

organizational security authorization processes. Security assessment results are provided to the 

individuals or roles appropriate for the types of assessments being conducted. For example, 

assessments conducted in support of security authorization decisions are provided to authorizing 

officials or authorizing official designated representatives. 

To satisfy annual assessment requirements, organizations can use assessment results from the 

following sources: (i) initial or ongoing information system authorizations; (ii) continuous 

monitoring; or (iii) system development life cycle activities. Organizations ensure that security 

assessment results are current, relevant to the determination of security control effectiveness, and 

obtained with the appropriate level of assessor independence. Existing security control assessment 

results can be reused to the extent that the results are still valid and can also be supplemented with 

additional assessments as needed. Subsequent to initial authorizations and in accordance with 

OMB policy, organizations assess security controls during continuous monitoring. Organizations 

establish the frequency for ongoing security control assessments in accordance with organizational 

continuous monitoring strategies. Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts provide useful 

examples of vulnerability mitigation procedures. External audits (e.g., audits by external entities 

such as regulatory agencies) are outside the scope of this control. Related controls: CA-5, CA-6, 

CA-7, PM-9, RA-5, SA-11, SA-12, SI-4. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) SECURITY ASSESSMENTS | INDEPENDENT ASSESSORS

The organization employs assessors or assessment teams with [Assignment: organization-defined 

level of independence] to conduct security control assessments. 

Supplemental Guidance: Independent assessors or assessment team are individuals or groups 

who conduct impartial assessments of organizational information systems. Impartiality 

implies that assessors are free from any perceived or actual conflicts of interest with regard to 

the development, operation, or management of the organizational information systems under 

assessment or to the determination of security control effectiveness. Independent assessments 

can be obtained from elements within organizations or can be contracted to public or private 

sector entities outside of organizations. Authorizing officials determine the required level of 

independence based on the security categories of information systems and/or the ultimate risk 

to organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals. Authorizing officials also 

determine if the level of assessor independence provides sufficient assurance that the results 

are sound and can be used to make credible, risk-based decisions. This includes determining 

whether contracted security assessment services have sufficient independence, for example, 

when information system owners are not directly involved in contracting processes or cannot 

unduly influence the impartiality of assessors conducting assessments. In special situations, 

for example, when organizations that own the information systems are small or organizational 

structures require that assessments are conducted by individuals that are in the developmental, 

operational, or management chain of system owners, independence in assessment processes 

can be achieved by ensuring that assessment results are carefully reviewed and analyzed by 

independent teams of experts to validate the completeness, accuracy, integrity, and reliability 

of the results. Organizations recognize that assessments performed for purposes other than 

direct support to authorization decisions are, when performed by assessors with sufficient 

independence, more likely to be useable for such decisions thereby reducing need to repeat 

assessments.

 
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(2) SECURITY ASSESSMENTS | TYPES OF ASSESSMENTS

The organization includes as part of security control assessments, [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency], [Selection: announced; unannounced], [Selection (one or more): in-depth 

monitoring; vulnerability scanning; malicious user testing; insider threat assessment; penetration 

testing; red team exercises; performance/load testing; [Assignment: organization-defined other 

forms of security assessment]]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Penetration testing can be conducted on the hardware, software, or 

firmware components of an information system and exercises both physical and technical 

security controls. A standard method for penetration testing includes, for example: (i) pretest 

analysis based on full knowledge of the target system; (ii) pretest identification of potential 

vulnerabilities based on pretest analysis; and (iii) testing designed to determine exploitability 

of identified vulnerabilities. All parties agree to the detailed rules of engagement before the 

commencement of any penetration testing scenarios. Organizations correlate the penetration 

testing rules of engagement with the tools, techniques, and procedures that are anticipated to 

be employed by threat-sources carrying out attacks. Organizational risk assessments guide 

decisions on the level of independence required for personnel conducting penetration testing. 

Red team exercises reflect simulated adversarial attempts to compromise organizational 

mission/business processes, thus providing a comprehensive assessment of the security state 

of information systems and organizations. While penetration testing may be laboratory-based 

testing, organizations use red team exercises to provide more comprehensive assessments that 

reflect real-world conditions. Organizations can also employ information system monitoring, 

insider threat assessments, malicious user testing, and other forms of testing (e.g., verification 

and validation) to improve readiness by exercising organizational capabilities and indicating 

current performance levels as a means of focusing actions to improve security. Organizations 

conduct assessment activities in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, 

directives, policies, regulations, and standards. Authorizing officials approve the assessment 

methods in coordination with the organizational risk executive function. Organizations can 

incorporate vulnerabilities uncovered during assessments into vulnerability remediation 

processes. Related controls: PE-3, SI-2. 

(3) SECURITY ASSESSMENTS | EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS

The organization accepts the results of an assessment of [Assignment: organization-defined 

information system] performed by [Assignment: organization-defined external organization] when 

the assessment meets [Assignment: organization-defined requirements]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may often rely on assessments of specific information 

systems by other (external) organizations. Utilizing such existing assessments (i.e., reusing 

existing assessment evidence) can significantly decrease the time and resources required for 

organizational assessments by limiting the amount of independent assessment activities that 

organizations need to perform. The factors that organizations may consider in determining 

whether to accept assessment results from external organizations can vary. Determinations for 

accepting assessment results can be based on, for example, past assessment experiences one 

organization has had with another organization, the reputation that organizations have with 

regard to assessments, the level of detail of supporting assessment documentation provided, or 

mandates imposed upon organizations by federal legislation, policies, or directives.

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-37, 800-39, 800-53A, 800-115, 

800-137.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW CA-2 MOD CA-2 (1) HIGH CA-2 (1) (2)
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CA-3 INFORMATION SYSTEM CONNECTIONS 

Control: The organization: 

a. Authorizes connections from the information system as defined by its authorization boundary, 

to other information systems through the use of Interconnection Security Agreements; 

b. Documents, for each connection, the interface characteristics, security requirements, and the 

nature of the information communicated; and 

c. Monitors the information system connections on an ongoing basis verifying enforcement of 

security requirements. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to dedicated connections between information systems 

and does not apply to transitory, user-controlled connections such as email and website browsing. 

Organizations carefully consider the risks that may be introduced when information systems are 

connected to other systems with different security requirements and security controls, both within 

organizations and external to organizations. Authorizing officials determine the risk associated 

with information system connections and the appropriate controls employed. If interconnecting 

systems have the same authorizing official, organizations do not need to develop Interconnection 

Security Agreements. Instead, organizations can describe the interface characteristics between 

interconnecting systems in the security plans for the respective systems. If interconnecting systems 

have different authorizing officials within the same organization, organizations can either develop 

Interconnection Security Agreements or describes the interface characteristics between systems in 

the security plans for the respective systems. Organizations may also incorporate Interconnection 

Security Agreement information into formal contracts, especially for interconnections established 

between federal agencies and nonfederal (i.e., private sector) organizations. Risk considerations 

also include information systems sharing the same networks. Related controls: AC-3, AC-4, AU2, AU-12, CA-7, IA-3, SA-9, SC-7, SI-4. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) INFORMATION SYSTEM CONNECTIONS | UNCLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTIONS

The organization prohibits the direct connection of an unclassified, national security system to an 

external network without the use of [Assignment: organization-defined boundary protection 

device]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations typically do not have control over external networks 

(e.g., the Internet). Approved boundary protection devices (e.g., routers, firewalls) mediate 

communications (i.e., information flows) between unclassified national security systems and 

external networks. 

(2) INFORMATION SYSTEM CONNECTIONS | CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTION 

The organization prohibits the direct connection of a classified, national security system to an 

external network without the use of [Assignment; organization-defined boundary protection 

device]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations typically do not have control over external networks 

(e.g., the Internet). Approved boundary protection devices (e.g., routers, firewalls) mediate 

communications (i.e., information flows) between classified national security systems and 

external networks. In addition, approved boundary protection devices (typically managed 

interface/cross-domain systems), provide information flow enforcement from information 

systems to external networks.

(3) INFORMATION SYSTEM CONNECTIONS | PROHIBIT CONNECTIONS TO PUBLIC NETWORKS

The organization prohibits connection to a public network from [Assignment: organization-defined 

information system components]. 

Supplemental Guidance: A public network is any network accessible to the general public 

including, for example, the Internet and organizational extranets with public access. 

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publication 800-47. 

 
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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CA-3 MOD CA-3 HIGH CA-3

CA-4 SECURITY CERTIFICATION 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CA-2]. 

CA-5 PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES 

Control: The organization: 

a. Develops a plan of action and milestones for the information system to document the 

organization’s planned remedial actions to correct weaknesses or deficiencies noted during 

the assessment of the security controls and to reduce or eliminate known vulnerabilities in the 

system; and 

b. Updates existing plan of action and milestones [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] 

based on the findings from security controls assessments, security impact analyses, and 

continuous monitoring activities. 

Supplemental Guidance: Plans of action and milestones are key documents in security authorization 

packages and are subject to federal reporting requirements established by OMB. Related controls: 

CA-2, CA-7, CM-4, PM-4. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR ACCURACY / CURRENCY 

The organization employs automated mechanisms to help ensure that the plan of action and 

milestones for the information system is accurate, up to date, and readily available.

References: OMB Memorandum 02-01; NIST Special Publication 800-37. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P3 LOW CA-5 MOD CA-5 HIGH CA-5

CA-6 SECURITY AUTHORIZATION 

Control: The organization: 

a. Assigns a senior-level executive or manager as the authorizing official for the information 

system; 

b. Ensures that the authorizing official authorizes the information system for processing before 

commencing operations; and 

c. Updates the security authorization [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Security authorizations are official management decisions, conveyed 

through authorization decision documents, by senior organizational officials or executives (i.e., 

authorizing officials) to authorize operation of information systems and to explicitly accept the 

risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation based 

on the implementation of agreed-upon security controls. Authorizing officials provide budgetary 

oversight for organizational information systems or assume responsibility for the mission/business 

operations supported by those systems. The security authorization process is an inherently federal 

responsibility and therefore, authorizing officials must be federal employees. Through the security 

authorization process, authorizing officials assume responsibility and are accountable for security 
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risks associated with the operation and use of organizational information systems. Accordingly, 

authorizing officials are in positions with levels of authority commensurate with understanding 

and accepting such information security-related risks. OMB policy requires that organizations 

conduct ongoing authorizations of information systems by implementing continuous monitoring 

programs. Continuous monitoring programs can satisfy three-year reauthorization requirements, so 

separate reauthorization processes are not necessary. Through the employment of comprehensive 

continuous monitoring processes, critical information contained in authorization packages (i.e., 

security plans, security assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones) is updated on an 

ongoing basis, providing authorizing officials and information system owners with an up-to-date 

status of the security state of organizational information systems and environments of operation. 

To reduce the administrative cost of security reauthorization, authorizing officials use the results 

of continuous monitoring processes to the maximum extent possible as the basis for rendering 

reauthorization decisions. Related controls: CA-2, CA-7, PM-9, PM-10. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: OMB Circular A-130; OMB Memorandum 11-33; NIST Special Publications 800-37, 

800-137.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P3 LOW CA-6 MOD CA-6 HIGH CA-6

CA-7 CONTINUOUS MONITORING 

Control: The organization develops a continuous monitoring strategy and implements a continuous 

monitoring program that includes: 

a. Establishment of [Assignment: organization-defined metrics] to be monitored;

b. Establishment of [Assignment: organization-defined frequencies] for monitoring and 

assessments; 

c. Ongoing security control assessments in accordance with the organizational continuous 

monitoring strategy; 

d. Ongoing security status monitoring of organization-defined metrics in accordance with the 

organizational continuous monitoring strategy; 

e. Correlation and analysis of security-related information generated by assessments and 

monitoring; 

f. Response actions to address results of the analysis of security-related information; and 

g. Reporting the security status of organization and the information system to [Assignment: 

organization-defined personnel] [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Continuous monitoring programs facilitate ongoing awareness of threats, 

vulnerabilities, and information security to support organizational risk management decisions. The 

terms continuous and ongoing imply that organizations assess/analyze security controls and 

information security-related risks at a frequency sufficient to support organizational risk-based 

decisions. The results of continuous monitoring programs generate appropriate risk response 

actions by organizations. Continuous monitoring programs also allow organizations to maintain 

the security authorizations of information systems and common controls over time in highly 

dynamic environments of operation with changing mission/business needs, threats, vulnerabilities, 

and technologies. Having access to security-related information on demand gives organizational 

officials the capability to make more effective and timely risk management decisions, including 

ongoing security authorization decisions. Automation supports more frequent updates to security 

authorization packages, hardware/software/firmware inventories, and other system information. 

Effectiveness is further enhanced when continuous monitoring outputs are formatted to provide 
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information that is specific, measurable, actionable, relevant, and timely. Continuous monitoring 

activities are scaled in accordance with the security categories of information systems. Related 

controls: CA-2, CA-5, CA-6, CM-3, CM-4, PM-6, PM-9, RA-5, SA-11, SA-12, SI-4. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) CONTINUOUS MONITORING | INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT 

The organization employs assessors or assessment teams with [Assignment: organization-defined 

level of independence] to monitor the security controls in the information system on an ongoing 

basis. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can maximize the value of ongoing assessments of 

security controls during the continuous monitoring process by requiring that such assessments 

be conducted by assessors or assessment teams with appropriate levels of independence based 

on continuous monitoring strategies.

(2) CONTINUOUS MONITORING | TYPES OF ASSESSMENTS 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CA-2.]

References: OMB Memorandum 11-33; NIST Special Publications 800-37, 800-39, 800-53A, 800-

115, 800-137; US-CERT Technical Cyber Security Alerts; DoD Information Assurance 

Vulnerability Alerts. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P3 LOW CA-7 MOD CA-7 (1) HIGH CA-7 (1)
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FAMILY: CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT

CM-1 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization develops, disseminates, and reviews/updates [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]: 

a. A formal, documented configuration management policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 

responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and 

compliance; and 

b. Formal, documented procedures to facilitate the implementation of the configuration 

management policy and associated configuration management controls. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the CM family. 

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations. The procedures 

can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if 

needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and 

procedures. Related control: PM-9. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CM-1 MOD CM-1 HIGH CM-1

CM-2 BASELINE CONFIGURATION 

Control: The organization develops, documents, and maintains under configuration control, a 

current baseline configuration of the information system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Baseline configurations are documented, formally reviewed and agreed 

upon sets of specifications for information systems or configuration items within those systems. 

Baseline configurations serve as a basis for future builds, releases, and/or changes to information 

systems. This control establishes baseline configurations for information systems and system 

components including communications and connectivity-related aspects of systems. Baseline 

configurations include information about information system components (e.g., standard software 

packages installed on workstations, notebook computers, servers, network components, or mobile 

devices; current version numbers and patch information on operating systems and applications; 

and configuration settings/parameters), network topology, and the logical placement of those 

components within the system architecture. Maintaining baseline configurations requires creating 

new baselines as organizational information systems change over time. Baseline configurations of 

information systems reflect the current enterprise architecture. Related controls: CM-3, CM-6, 

CM-8, CM-9, SA-10, PM-5, PM-7. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | REVIEWS AND UPDATES 

The organization reviews and updates the baseline configuration of the information system: 

(a) [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; 

(b) When required due to [Assignment organization-defined circumstances]; and 

(c) As an integral part of information system component installations and upgrades. 
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Supplemental Guidance: Related control: CM-5.

(2) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR ACCURACY / CURRENCY 

The organization employs automated mechanisms to maintain an up-to-date, complete, accurate, 

and readily available baseline configuration of the information system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms that help organizations maintain consistent 

baseline configurations for information systems include, for example, hardware and software 

inventory tools, configuration management tools, and network management tools. Such tools 

can be deployed and/or allocated as common controls, at the information system level, or at 

the operating system or component level (e.g., on workstations, servers, notebook computers, 

network components, or mobile devices). Tools can be used, for example, to track version 

numbers on operating system applications, types of software installed, and current patch 

levels. Related controls: CM-7, RA-5.

(3) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | RETENTION OF PREVIOUS CONFIGURATIONS

The organization retains [Assignment: organization-defined previous versions of baseline 

configurations of the information system] to support rollback. 

Supplemental Guidance: Retaining previous versions of baseline configurations to support 

rollback may include, for example, hardware, software, firmware, configuration files, and 

configuration records.

(4) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-7].

(5) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | AUTHORIZED SOFTWARE 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-7].

(6) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | DEVELOPMENT AND TEST ENVIRONMENTS 

The organization maintains a baseline configuration for information system development and test 

environments that is managed separately from the operational baseline configuration. 

Supplemental Guidance: Establishing separate baseline configurations for development, testing, 

and operational environments helps protect information systems from unplanned/unexpected 

events related to development and testing activities). Separate baseline configurations allow 

organizations to apply the configuration management that is most appropriate for each type of 

configuration. For example, management of operational configurations typically emphasizes 

the need for stability, while management of development/test configurations requires greater 

flexibility. This control enhancement requires separate configurations but not necessarily 

separate physical environments. Related control: CM-4. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-128. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CM-2 MOD CM-2 (1) (3) HIGH CM-2 (1) (2) (3) (6)

CM-3 CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL 

Control: The organization: 

a. Determines the types of changes to the information system that are configuration controlled; 

b. Reviews proposed configuration controlled changes to the information system and approves 

or disapproves such changes with explicit consideration for security impact analyses; 

c. Documents approved configuration controlled changes to the information system; 

d. Retains and reviews records of configuration controlled changes to the information system; 

e. Audits activities associated with configuration controlled changes to the information system; 

and 
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f. Coordinates and provides oversight for configuration change control activities through 

[Assignment: organization-defined configuration change control element (e.g., committee, 

board] that convenes [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; 

[Assignment: organization-defined configuration change conditions]]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Configuration change controls for organizational information systems 

involve the systematic proposal, justification, implementation, testing, review, and disposition of 

changes to the systems, including system upgrades and modifications. Configuration change 

control includes changes to baseline configurations for components and configuration items of 

information systems, changes to configuration settings for information technology products (e.g., 

operating systems, applications, firewalls, routers, and mobile devices), unscheduled/unauthorized 

changes, and changes to remediate vulnerabilities. Typical processes for managing configuration 

changes to information systems include, for example, Configuration Control Boards that approve 

proposed changes to systems. Auditing of changes includes activities before and after changes are 

made to information systems and the auditing activities required to implement such changes. 

Related controls: CM-2, CM-4, CM-5, CM-6, CM-9, SA-10, SI-2.

Control Enhancements: 

(1) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | AUTOMATED DOCUMENT / NOTIFICATION / PROHIBITION OF CHANGES

The organization employs automated mechanisms to: 

(a) Document proposed changes to the information system; 

(b) Notify [Assignment: organized-defined approval authorities]; 

(c) Highlight change approvals that have not been received by [Assignment: organization-defined 

time period]; 

(d) Prohibit changes to the information system until designated approvals are received; and 

(e) Document completed changes to the information system. 

(2) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | TEST / VALIDATE / DOCUMENT CHANGES 

The organization tests, validates, and documents changes to the information system before 

implementing the changes on the operational system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations ensure that testing does not interfere with information 

system operations. Individuals/groups conducting tests understand organizational security 

policies and procedures, information system security policies and procedures, and the specific 

health, safety, and environmental risks associated with particular facilities/processes. 

Operational systems may need to be taken off-line, or replicated to the extent feasible, before 

testing can be conducted. If information systems must be taken off-line for testing, the tests 

are scheduled to occur during planned system outages whenever possible. If testing cannot be 

conducted on operational systems, organizations employ compensating controls (e.g., testing 

on replicated systems).

(3) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | AUTOMATED CHANGE IMPLEMENTATION

The organization employs automated mechanisms to implement changes to the current 

information system baseline and deploys the updated baseline across the installed base. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: CM-2.

(4) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | SECURITY REPRESENTATIVE 

The organization requires an information security representative to be a member of the 

[Assignment: organization-defined configuration change control element (e.g., committee, board)]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information security representatives can include, for example, 

information system security officers or information system security managers. The 

configuration change control element in this control enhancement reflects the change control 

elements defined by organizations in CM-3.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-128. 

 
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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD CM-3 (2) HIGH CM-3 (1) (2)

CM-4 SECURITY IMPACT ANALYSIS 

Control: The organization analyzes changes to the information system to determine potential 

security impacts prior to change implementation. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational personnel with information security responsibilities (e.g., 

Information System Administrators, Information System Security Officers, Information System 

Security Managers, and Information System Security Engineers) conduct security impact analyses. 

Individuals conducting security impact analyses possess the necessary skills/technical expertise to 

analyze the changes to information systems and the associated security ramifications. Security 

impact analysis may include, for example, reviewing security plans to understand security control 

requirements and reviewing system design documentation to understand control implementation 

and how specific changes might affect the controls. Security impact analyses may also include 

assessments of risk to better understand the impact of the changes and to determine if additional 

security controls are required. Security impact analyses are scaled in accordance with the security 

categories of the information systems. Related controls: CA-2, CA-7, CM-3, CM-9, SA-4, SA-5, 

SA-10, SI-2. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) SECURITY IMPACT ANALYSIS | SEPARATE TEST ENVIRONMENTS 

The organization analyzes changes to the information system in a separate test environment 

before installation in an operational environment, looking for security impacts due to flaws, 

weaknesses, incompatibility, or intentional malice. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SA-11.

(2) SECURITY IMPACT ANALYSIS | VERIFICATION OF SECURITY FUNCTIONS 

The organization, after the information system is changed, checks the security functions to verify 

that the functions are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired 

outcome with regard to meeting the security requirements for the system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SA-11.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-128. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD CM-4 HIGH CM-4 (1)

CM-5 ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE 

Control: The organization defines, documents, approves, and enforces physical and logical access 

restrictions associated with changes to the information system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Any changes to the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of 

information systems can potentially have significant effects on the overall security of the systems. 

Therefore, organizations permit only qualified and authorized individuals to access information 

systems for purposes of initiating changes, including upgrades and modifications. Additionally, 

organizations maintain records of access to ensure configuration change control is implemented 

and to support after-the-fact actions should organizations discover unauthorized changes. Access 

restrictions for change also include software libraries. Access restrictions include, for example, 

physical and logical access controls (see AC-3 and PE-3), workflow automation, media libraries, 

abstract layers (e.g., changes implemented into third-party interfaces rather than directly into 
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information systems), and change windows (e.g., changes occur only during specified times, 

making unauthorized changes easy to discover). Related controls: AC-3, AC-6, PE-3. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | AUTOMATED ACCESS ENFORCEMENT / AUDITING

The organization employs automated mechanisms to enforce access restrictions and to support 

auditing of the enforcement actions. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AU-2, AU-12, CM-3, CM-5, CM-6.

(2) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | AUDIT SYSTEM CHANGES

The organization conducts audits of information system changes [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency] and [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances] to determine whether 

unauthorized changes have occurred. 

Supplemental Guidance: Indications that warrant auditing of information system changes and 

the specific circumstances justifying such audits may be obtained from activities carried out 

by organizations during the configuration change process. Related controls: AU-6, AU-7, 

CM-3, CM-5, PE-6, PE-8.

(3) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | SIGNED COMPONENTS 

The information system prevents the installation of [Assignment: organization-defined software 

and firmware components] that are not signed with a certificate that is recognized and approved by 

the organization. 

Supplemental Guidance: Software and firmware components prevented from installation unless 

signed with recognized and approved certificates include, for example, software and firmware 

version updates, patches, service packs, device drivers, and basic input output system (BIOS) 

updates. Organizations can identify applicable software and firmware components by type, by 

specific items, or a combination of both. Related controls: AU-10, SC-13.

(4) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | TWO-PERSON RULE 

The organization enforces a two-person rule for implementing changes to [Assignment: 

organization-defined information system components and system-level information]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations employ a two-person rule to ensure that any changes to 

selected information system components and information cannot occur unless two qualified 

individuals implement such changes. The two individuals possess sufficient skills/expertise to 

determine if the proposed changes are correct implementations of approved changes. Related 

controls: AC-5, CM-3. 

(5) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | LIMIT PRODUCTION / OPERATIONAL PRIVILEGES

The organization: 

(a) Limits information system developer privileges to change hardware, software, and firmware 

components and system information within a production/operational environment; and 

(b) Reviews and reevaluates information system developer privileges [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information system developers include system integrators. Related 

control: AC-2.

(6) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | LIMIT LIBRARY PRIVILEGES 

The organization limits privileges to change software resident within software libraries. 

Supplemental Guidance: Software libraries include privileged programs. Related control: AC-2.

(7) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | AUTOMATIC IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY SAFEGUARDS 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-7].

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD CM-5 HIGH CM-5 (1) (2) (3)
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CM-6 CONFIGURATION SETTINGS 

Control: The organization: 

a. Establishes and documents configuration settings for information technology products 

employed within the information system using [Assignment: organization-defined security 

configuration checklists] that reflect the most restrictive mode consistent with operational 

requirements; 

b. Implements the configuration settings; 

c. Identifies, documents, and approves exceptions from established configuration settings for 

[Assignment: organization-defined information system components] based on [Assignment: 

organization-defined operational requirements]; and 

d. Monitors and controls changes to the configuration settings in accordance with organizational 

policies and procedures. 

Supplemental Guidance: Configuration settings are the configurable security-related parameters of 

information technology products that are part of information systems, including for example, the 

hardware, software, and firmware in servers, workstations, and network devices. Products for 

which security-related configuration settings can be defined include, for example, mainframes, 

workstations, servers (e.g., database, electronic mail, authentication, web, proxy, file, domain 

name) , input/output devices (e.g., scanners, copiers, and printers), network components (e.g., 

firewalls, routers, gateways, voice and data switches, wireless access points, network appliances, 

sensors), operating systems, middleware, and applications. Security-related parameters are those 

parameters impacting the security state of information systems including the parameters required 

to satisfy other security control requirements. Security-related parameters include, for example: (i) 

registry settings; (ii) account, file, directory permission settings; and (iii) settings for functions, 

ports, protocols, services, and remote connections. Organizations establish organization-wide 

configuration settings and subsequently derive specific settings for information systems. The 

established settings become part of the systems configuration baseline. 

Common secure configurations (also referred to as security configuration checklists, lockdown 

and hardening guides, security reference guides, security technical implementation guides) provide 

recognized, standardized, and established benchmarks that stipulate secure configuration settings 

for specific information technology platforms/products and instructions for configuring those 

information system components to meet operational requirements. Common secure configurations 

can be developed by a variety of organizations including, for example, information technology 

product developers, manufacturers, vendors, consortia, academia, industry, federal agencies, and 

other organizations in the public and private sectors. Common secure configurations include the 

United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB) which affects the implementation of 

CM-6 and other controls such as AC-19 and CM-7. The Security Content Automation Protocol 

(SCAP) and the defined standards within the protocol (e.g., Common Configuration Enumeration) 

provide an effective method to uniquely identify, track, and control configuration settings. OMB 

establishes federal policy on configuration requirements for federal information systems. Related 

controls: AC-19, CM-2, CM-3, CM-7, SI-4. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | AUTOMATED CENTRAL MANAGEMENT / APPLICATION / VERIFICATION

The organization employs automated mechanisms to centrally manage, apply, and verify 

configuration settings. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CA-7, CM-4.

(2) CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | RESPOND TO UNAUTHORIZED CHANGES 

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to respond to 

unauthorized changes to [Assignment: organization-defined configuration settings]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Responses to unauthorized changes to configuration settings can 

include, for example, alerting designated organizational personnel, restoring established 
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configuration settings, or in extreme cases, halting affected information system processing. 

Related controls: IR-4, SI-7.

(3) CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | UNAUTHORIZED CHANGE DETECTION

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-7].

(4) CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | CONFORMANCE DEMONSTRATION

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CA-2 and CA-7].

References: OMB Memoranda 07-11, 07-18, 08-22; NIST Special Publications 800-70, 800-128; 

Web: NVD.NIST.GOV; WWW.NSA.GOV. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CM-6 MOD CM-6 HIGH CM-6 (1) (2)

CM-7 LEAST FUNCTIONALITY 

Control: The organization configures the information system to provide only essential capabilities 

and specifically prohibits or restricts the use of the following functions, ports, protocols, and/or 

services: [Assignment: organization-defined prohibited or restricted functions, ports, protocols, 

and/or services]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information systems can provide a wide variety of functions and services. 

Some of the functions and services, provided by default, may not be necessary to support essential 

organizational operations (e.g., key missions, functions). Additionally, it is sometimes convenient 

to provide multiple services from single information system components, but doing so increases 

risk over limiting the services provided by any one component. Where feasible, organizations limit 

component functionality to a single function per device (e.g., email servers or web servers, but not 

both). Organizations review functions and services provided by information systems or individual 

components of information systems, to determine which functions and services are candidates for 

elimination (e.g., Voice Over Internet Protocol, Instant Messaging, auto-execute, and file sharing). 

Organizations consider disabling unused or unnecessary physical and logical ports/protocols (e.g., 

Universal Serial Bus, File Transfer Protocol, and Hyper Text Transfer Protocol) on information 

systems to prevent unauthorized connection of devices, unauthorized transfer of information, or 

unauthorized tunneling. Organizations can utilize network scanning tools, intrusion detection and 

prevention systems, and end-point protections such as firewalls and host-based intrusion detection 

systems to identify and prevent the use of prohibited functions, ports, protocols, and services. 

Related controls: AC-6, CM-2, RA-5, SC-7. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | PERIODIC REVIEW 

The organization: 

(a) Reviews the information system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to identify 

unnecessary and nonsecure functions, ports, protocols, and services; and 

(b) Disables [Assignment: organization-defined functions, ports, protocols, and services within 

the information system deemed to be unnecessary or nonsecure]. 

Supplemental Guidance: The organization can either make a determination of the relative 

security of the function, port, protocol, and/or service or base the security decision on the 

assessment of other entities. Bluetooth, FTP, and peer-to-peer networking are examples of 

less than secure protocols. Related controls: AC-6, AC-18, CM-7, IA-2.

(2) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | PREVENT PROGRAM EXECUTION 

The information system employs automated mechanisms to prevent program execution in 

accordance with [Selection (one or more): authorized software programs; unauthorized software 

programs; rules authorizing the terms and conditions of software program usage]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CM-8, PM-5.
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(3) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | REGISTRATION COMPLIANCE 

The organization ensures compliance with [Assignment: organization-defined registration 

requirements for functions, ports, protocols, and services]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations use the registration process to manage, track, and 

provide oversight for information systems and implemented functions, ports, protocols, and 

services.

(4) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE 

The organization: 

(a) Identifies [Assignment: organization-defined software not authorized to execute on the 

information system]; 

(b) Employs an allow-all, deny-by-exception policy to prohibit the execution of unauthorized 

software on the information system; and 

(c) Reviews and updates the list of unauthorized software [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CM-2, CM-8, PM-5.

(5) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | AUTHORIZED SOFTWARE

The organization: 

(a) Identifies [Assignment: organization-defined software authorized to execute on the 

information system]; 

(b) Employs a deny-all, permit-by-exception policy to allow the execution of authorized software 

on the information system; and 

(c) Reviews and updates the list of authorized software [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CM-2, CM-8, PM-5.

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CM-7 MOD CM-7 (1) (4) HIGH CM-7 (1) (2) (5)

CM-8 INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY 

Control: The organization develops, documents, and maintains an inventory of information system 

components that: 

a. Accurately reflects the current information system; 

b. Is consistent with the authorization boundary of the information system; 

c. Is at the level of granularity deemed necessary for tracking and reporting; 

d. Includes [Assignment: organization-defined information deemed necessary to achieve 

effective property accountability]; and 

e. Is available for review and audit by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information deemed necessary for effective property accountability 

includes, for example, hardware inventory specifications, software license information, software 

version numbers, information system/component owners, and for networked components or 

devices, machine names and network addresses. Inventory specifications include, for example, 

manufacturer, device type, model, serial number, and physical location. Related controls: CM-2, 

CM-6, PM-5. 

 
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Control Enhancements: 

(1) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | UPDATES DURING INSTALLATIONS / REMOVALS 

The organization updates the inventory of information system components as an integral part of 

component installations, removals, and information system updates. 

(2) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | AUTOMATED MAINTENANCE 

The organization employs automated mechanisms to help maintain an up-to-date, complete, 

accurate, and readily available inventory of information system components. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations maintain information system inventories to the extent 

feasible. Virtual machines, for example, can be difficult to monitor because such machines are 

not visible to the network when not in use. In such cases, organizations maintain as up-todate, complete, and accurate an inventory as is deemed reasonable. Related control: SI-7.

(3) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | AUTOMATED UNAUTHORIZED COMPONENT DETECTION

The organization: 

(a) Employs automated mechanisms [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to detect the 

addition of unauthorized components into the information system; and 

(b) Performs [Selection (one or more): disables network access by such components; notifies

[Assignment: organization-defined personnel]]. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement is applied in addition to the monitoring for 

unauthorized remote connections and mobile devices. Monitoring for unauthorized system 

components may be accomplished on an ongoing basis or by the periodic scanning of systems 

for that purpose. Automated mechanisms can be implemented within information systems or 

in other separate devices. Related controls: AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, CA-7, CM-8, SI-4, SI-7, 

RA-5. 

(4) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | PROPERTY ACCOUNTABILITY INFORMATION 

The organization includes in property accountability information for information system 

components, a means for identifying by [Selection (one or more): name; position; role] individuals 

responsible for administering those components. 

(5) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | ALL COMPONENTS WITHIN AUTHORIZATION BOUNDARY 

The organization verifies that all components within the authorization boundary of the information 

system are either inventoried as a part of the system or recognized by another system as a 

component within that system. 

(6) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | ASSESSED CONFIGURATIONS / APPROVED DEVIATIONS 

The organization includes assessed component configurations and any approved deviations to 

current deployed configurations in the information system component inventory. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement focuses on configuration settings established 

by organizations for information system components, the specific components that have been 

assessed to determine compliance with the required configuration settings, and any approved 

deviations from established configuration settings. Related controls: CM-2, CM-6. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-128. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CM-8 MOD CM-8 (1) (5) HIGH CM-8 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

CM-9 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PLAN 

Control: The organization develops, documents, and implements a configuration management plan 

for the information system that: 

a. Addresses roles, responsibilities, and configuration management processes and procedures; 

b. Establishes a process for identifying configuration items throughout the system development 

life cycle and for managing the configuration of the configuration items; and 
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c. Defines the configuration items for the information system and places the configuration items 

under configuration management. 

Supplemental Guidance: Configuration items are the information system items (hardware, software, 

firmware, and documentation) to be configuration managed. As information systems continue 

through the system development life cycle, new configuration items may be identified and some 

existing configuration items may no longer need to be under configuration control. Configuration 

management plans satisfy the requirements in organizational configuration management policies 

while being tailored to individual information systems. Configuration management plans define 

detailed processes and procedures for how configuration management is used to support system 

development life cycle activities at the information system level. The plans describe how to move 

changes through change management processes, how to update configuration settings/baselines, 

how to maintain information system component inventories, how to control development, test, and 

operational environments, and how to develop, release, and update key documents. Configuration 

management approval processes include designation of key management stakeholders responsible 

for reviewing and approving proposed changes to information systems, and personnel that conduct 

security impact analyses prior to the implementation of changes to the systems. Related controls: 

CM-2, CM-3, CM-4, CM-5, CM-8, SA-10. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PLAN | ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY 

The organization assigns responsibility for developing the configuration management process to 

organizational personnel that are not directly involved in system development. 

Supplemental Guidance: In the absence of dedicated configuration management teams assigned 

within organizations, system developers may be tasked to develop configuration management 

processes using personnel who are not directly involved in system development or integration.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-128. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD CM-9 HIGH CM-9

CM-10 SOFTWARE USAGE RESTRICTIONS 

Control: The organization: 

a. Uses software and associated documentation in accordance with contract agreements and 

copyright laws; 

b. Employs tracking systems for software and associated documentation protected by quantity 

licenses to control copying and distribution; and 

c. Controls and documents the use of peer-to-peer file sharing technology to ensure that this 

capability is not used for the unauthorized distribution, display, performance, or reproduction 

of copyrighted work. 

Supplemental Guidance: Tracking systems can include, for example, simple spreadsheets or fully 

automated, specialized applications depending on organizational needs. Related controls: AC-17, 

CM-8, SC-7. 

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CM-10 MOD CM-10 HIGH CM-10
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CM-11 USER-INSTALLED SOFTWARE 

Control: The organization enforces explicit rules governing the installation of software by users. 

Supplemental Guidance: If provided the necessary privileges, users have the ability to install 

software in organizational information systems. To maintain control over the types of software 

installed, organizations identify permitted and prohibited software installations. Permitted 

software installations may include, for example, updates and security patches to existing software. 

Prohibited software installations may include, for example, software with unknown or suspect 

pedigrees or software that organizations consider potentially malicious. Related controls: AC-3, 

CM-2, CM-3, CM-5, CM-7, PL-4. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) USER-INSTALLED SOFTWARE | AUTOMATED ALERTS FOR UNAUTHORIZED INSTALLATIONS 

The organization employs automated mechanisms to alert [Assignment: organization-defined 

personnel] on the unauthorized installation of software. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CA-7, SI-4.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CM-11 MOD CM-11 HIGH CM-11
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FAMILY: CONTINGENCY PLANNING 

CP-1 CONTINGENCY PLANNING POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization develops, disseminates, and reviews/updates [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]: 

a. A formal, documented contingency planning policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 

responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and 

compliance; and 

b. Formal, documented procedures to facilitate the implementation of the contingency planning 

policy and associated contingency planning controls. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the CP family. 

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations. The procedures 

can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if 

needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and 

procedures. Related control: PM-9. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: Federal Continuity Directive 1; NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-34, 800-100. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CP-1 MOD CP-1 HIGH CP-1

CP-2 CONTINGENCY PLAN 

Control: The organization: 

a. Develops a contingency plan for the information system that: 

- Identifies essential missions and business functions and associated contingency 

requirements; 

- Provides recovery objectives, restoration priorities, and metrics; 

- Addresses contingency roles, responsibilities, assigned individuals with contact 

information; 

- Addresses maintaining essential missions and business functions despite an information 

system disruption, compromise, or failure; 

- Addresses eventual, full information system restoration without deterioration of the 

security safeguards originally planned and implemented; and 

- Is reviewed and approved by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel]; 

b. Distributes copies of the contingency plan to [Assignment: organization-defined key 

contingency personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements]; 

c. Coordinates contingency planning activities with incident handling activities; 

d. Reviews the contingency plan for the information system [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency]; 
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e. Revises the contingency plan to address changes to the organization, information system, or 

environment of operation and problems encountered during contingency plan implementation, 

execution, or testing; and 

f. Communicates contingency plan changes to [Assignment: organization-defined key 

contingency personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Contingency planning for information systems is part of an overall 

organizational program for achieving continuity of operations for mission/business operations. 

Contingency planning addresses both information system restoration and implementation of 

alternative mission/business processes when systems are compromised. Information system 

recovery objectives reflect applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, standards, 

regulations, and guidelines. In addition to information system availability, contingency plans also 

address other security-related events resulting in a reduction in mission/business effectiveness, 

such as malicious attacks compromising the confidentiality or integrity of information systems. 

Actions addressed in contingency plans include, for example, orderly/graceful degradation, 

information system shutdown, fall back to a manual mode, alternate information flows, and 

operating in modes reserved for when systems are under attack. Related controls: AC-14, CP-6, 

CP-7, CP-8, CP-9, CP-10, IR-4, IR-8, PM-8, PM-11. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) CONTINGENCY PLAN | COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANS 

The organization coordinates contingency plan development with organizational elements 

responsible for related plans. 

Supplemental Guidance: Plans related to contingency plans for organizational information 

systems include, for example, Business Continuity Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Continuity 

of Operations Plans, Crisis Communications Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, Cyber 

Incident Response Plans, and Occupant Emergency Plans. 

(2) CONTINGENCY PLAN | CAPACITY PLANNING

The organization conducts capacity planning so that necessary capacity for information 

processing, telecommunications, and environmental support exists during contingency 

operations. 

(3) CONTINGENCY PLAN | RESUME ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS 

The organization plans for the resumption of essential missions and business functions within 

[Assignment: organization-defined time period] of contingency plan activation. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning 

activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planning 

including, for example, as part of business impact analyses. Related controls: CP-10, PE-12.

(4) CONTINGENCY PLAN | RESUME ALL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS 

The organization plans for the resumption of all missions and business functions within 

[Assignment: organization-defined time period] of contingency plan activation. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning 

activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planning 

including, for example, as part of business impact analyses. Related controls: CP-10, PE-12.

(5) CONTINGENCY PLAN | CONTINUE ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS

The organization plans for the continuance of essential missions and business functions with little 

or no loss of operational continuity and sustains that continuity until full information system 

restoration at primary processing and/or storage sites. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning 

activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planning 

including, for example, as part of business impact analyses. Related controls: CP-10, PE-12.

(6) CONTINGENCY PLAN | ALTERNATE PROCESSING / STORAGE SITE

The organization plans for the transfer of essential missions and business functions to alternate 

processing and/or storage sites with little or no loss of operational continuity and sustains that 

continuity through restoration to primary processing and/or storage sites. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CP-10, PE-12.
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(7) CONTINGENCY PLAN | COORDINATE WITH EXTERNAL SERVICE PROVIDERS

The organization coordinates its contingency plan with the contingency plans of external service 

providers to ensure contingency requirements can be satisfied. 

(8) CONTINGENCY PLAN | IDENTIFY CRITICAL ASSETS 

The organization identifies critical information system assets supporting organizational missions 

and business functions. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning 

activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planning 

including, for example, as part of business impact analyses. Organizations identify critical 

information system assets so that additional safeguards and countermeasures can be employed 

(above and beyond those safeguards and countermeasures routinely implemented) to ensure 

organizational missions/business functions can continue to be conducted during contingency 

operations. In addition, the identification of critical assets facilitates the prioritization of 

organizational resources. Critical information system assets include technical and operational 

aspects. Technical aspects include, for example, information technology services, information 

system components, information technology products, and mechanisms. Operational aspects 

include, for example, procedures (manually executed operations) and personnel (individuals 

operating technical safeguards and/or executing manual procedures). Organizational program 

protection plans can provide assistance in identifying critical assets. 

References: Federal Continuity Directive 1; NIST Special Publication 800-34. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CP-2 MOD CP-2 (1) (3) (8) HIGH CP-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (8)

CP-3 CONTINGENCY TRAINING 

Control: The organization provides contingency training to information system users consistent 

with assigned roles and responsibilities: 

a. Before authorizing access to the information system or performing assigned duties; 

b. When required by information system changes; and 

c. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter. 

Supplemental Guidance: Contingency training provided by organizations is linked to the assigned 

roles and responsibilities of organizational personnel to ensure the appropriate content and level of 

detail is included in such training. For example, regular users may only need to know when and 

where to report for duty during contingency operations and if normal duties are affected; system 

administrators may require additional training on how to set up information systems at alternate 

processing and storage sites; and managers/senior leaders may receive more specific training on 

how to conduct mission essential functions in designated off-site locations and how to establish 

communications with other governmental entities for purposes of coordination on contingencyrelated activities. Training for contingency roles/responsibilities reflects the specific continuity 

requirements in the contingency plan. Related controls: AT-2, AT-3, CP-2, IR-2. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) CONTINGENCY TRAINING | SIMULATED EVENTS

The organization incorporates simulated events into contingency training to facilitate effective 

response by personnel in crisis situations. 

(2) CONTINGENCY TRAINING | AUTOMATED TRAINING ENVIRONMENTS

The organization employs automated mechanisms to provide a more thorough and realistic 

training environment. 

References: NIST Special Publications 800-16, 800-50. 

 
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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW CP-3 MOD CP-3 HIGH CP-3 (1)

CP-4 CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING 

Control: The organization: 

a. Tests the contingency plan for the information system [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency] using [Assignment: organization-defined tests] to determine the effectiveness of 

the plan and the organizational readiness to execute the plan; 

b. Reviews the contingency plan test results; and 

c. Initiates corrective actions. 

Supplemental Guidance: Methods for testing contingency plans to determine the effectiveness of the 

plans and to identify potential weaknesses in the plans include, for example, walk-through and 

tabletop exercises, checklists, simulations (parallel, full interrupt), and comprehensive exercises. 

Organizations conduct testing based on the continuity requirements in contingency plans and 

include a determination of the effects on organizational operations, assets, and individuals arising 

due to contingency operations. Related controls: CP-2, CP-3, IR-3. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANS 

The organization coordinates contingency plan testing with organizational elements responsible 

for related plans. 

Supplemental Guidance: Plans related to contingency plans for organizational information 

systems include, for example, Business Continuity Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Continuity 

of Operations Plans, Crisis Communications Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, Cyber 

Incident Response Plans, and Occupant Emergency Plans. Related controls: IR-8, PM-8. 

(2) CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE 

The organization tests the contingency plan at the alternate processing site: 

(a) To familiarize contingency personnel with the facility and available resources; and 

(b) To evaluate the capabilities of the alternate processing site to support contingency 

operations. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: CP-7.

(3) CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | AUTOMATED TESTING

The organization employs automated mechanisms to more thoroughly and effectively test the 

contingency plan. 

Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms provide more thorough and effective testing 

of contingency plans, for example: (i) by providing more complete coverage of contingency 

issues; (ii) by selecting more realistic test scenarios and environments; and (iii) by effectively 

stressing the information system and supported missions. 

(4) CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | FULL RECOVERY / RECONSTITUTION 

The organization includes a full recovery and reconstitution of the information system to a known 

state as part of contingency plan testing. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CP-10, SC-24.

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-34, 800-84. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW CP-4 MOD CP-4 (1) HIGH CP-4 (1) (2) (4)
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CP-5 CONTINGENCY PLAN UPDATE 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CP-2]. 

CP-6 ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE 

Control: The organization: 

a. Establishes an alternate storage site including necessary agreements to permit the storage and 

recovery of information system backup information; and 

b. Ensures that the alternate storage site provides information security safeguards equivalent to 

that of the primary site. 

Supplemental Guidance: Items covered by alternate storage site agreements include, for example, 

environmental conditions at alternate sites, access rules, physical and environmental protection 

requirements, and coordination of delivery/retrieval of backup media. Alternate storage sites 

reflect the continuity requirements in contingency plans to maintain essential missions/business 

functions despite disruption, compromise, or failure in organizational information systems. 

Related controls: CP-2, CP-7, CP-9, CP-10, MP-4. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITE 

The organization ensures that the established alternate storage site is separated from the primary 

storage site to reduce susceptibility to the same hazards. 

Supplemental Guidance: Hazards of concern to the organization are typically defined in an 

organizational assessment of risk.

(2) ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | RECOVERY TIME / POINT OBJECTIVES

The organization configures the alternate storage site to facilitate recovery operations in 

accordance with recovery time and recovery point objectives. 

(3) ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | ACCESSIBILITY 

The organization identifies potential accessibility problems to the alternate storage site in the 

event of an area-wide disruption or disaster and outlines explicit mitigation actions. 

Supplemental Guidance: Explicit mitigation actions include, for example: (i) duplicating backup 

information at other alternate storage sites if access problems occur at originally-designated 

alternate sites; or, (ii) planning for physical access to retrieve backup information if electronic 

accessibility to the alternate site is disrupted. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-34. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD CP-6 (1) (3) HIGH CP-6 (1) (2) (3)

CP-7 ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE 

Control: The organization: 

a. Establishes an alternate processing site including necessary agreements to permit the transfer 

and resumption of information system operations for essential missions/business functions 

within [Assignment: organization-defined time period consistent with recovery time and 

recovery point objectives] when the primary processing capabilities are unavailable; 

b. Ensures that equipment and supplies required to transfer and resume operations are available 

at the alternate site or contracts are in place to support delivery to the site in time to support 

the organization-defined time period for transfer/resumption; and 
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c. Ensures that the alternate processing site provides information security safeguards equivalent 

to that of the primary site. 

Supplemental Guidance: Items covered by alternate processing site agreements include, for 

example, environmental conditions at alternate sites, access rules, physical and environmental 

protection requirements, and coordination for the transfer/assignment of personnel. Alternate 

processing sites reflect the continuity requirements in contingency plans to maintain essential 

missions/business functions despite disruption, compromise, or failure in organizational 

information systems. Related controls: CP-2, CP-6, CP-8, CP-9, CP-10, MA-6. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITE 

The organization identifies an alternate processing site that is separated from the primary 

processing site to reduce susceptibility to the same hazards. 

Supplemental Guidance: Hazards that might affect the information system are typically defined 

in the organizational assessment of risk.

(2) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | ACCESSIBILITY 

The organization identifies potential accessibility problems to the alternate processing site in the 

event of an area-wide disruption or disaster and outlines explicit mitigation actions. 

(3) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | PRIORITY OF SERVICE 

The organization develops alternate processing site agreements that contain priority-of-service 

provisions in accordance with the organization’s availability requirements. 

(4) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | CONFIGURATION FOR USE

The organization configures the alternate processing site so that the site is ready to be used as the 

operational site supporting essential missions and business functions. 

(5) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | EQUIVALENT INFORMATION SECURITY SAFEGUARDS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CP-7].

(6) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | INABILITY TO RETURN TO PRIMARY SITE 

The organization plans and prepares for circumstances that preclude returning to the primary 

processing site. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-34. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD CP-7 (1) (2) (3) HIGH CP-7 (1) (2) (3) (4)

CP-8 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES 

Control: The organization establishes alternate telecommunications services including necessary 

agreements to permit the resumption of information system operations for essential missions and 

business functions within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] when the primary 

telecommunications capabilities are unavailable at either the primary or alternate processing or 

storage sites. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to telecommunications services (data and voice) for 

primary and alternate processing and storage sites. Alternate telecommunications services reflect 

the continuity requirements in contingency plans to maintain essential missions/business functions 

despite the loss of primary telecommunications services. Organizations may specify different time 

periods for primary/alternate sites. Alternate telecommunications services include, for example, 

additional organizational or commercial ground-based circuits/lines or satellites in lieu of groundbased communications. Organizations consider factors such as availability, quality of service, and 

access when entering into alternate telecommunications agreements. Related controls: CP-2, CP-6, 

CP-7. 

 
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Control Enhancements:

(1) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | PRIORITY OF SERVICE PROVISIONS 

The organization: 

(a) Develops primary and alternate telecommunications service agreements that contain priorityof-service provisions in accordance with the organization’s availability requirements; and 

(b) Requests Telecommunications Service Priority for all telecommunications services used for 

national security emergency preparedness in the event that the primary and/or alternate 

telecommunications services are provided by a common carrier. 

(2) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | SINGLE POINTS OF FAILURE 

The organization obtains alternate telecommunications services with consideration for reducing 

the likelihood of sharing a single point of failure with primary telecommunications services.

(3) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | SEPARATION OF PRIMARY / ALTERNATE PROVIDERS

The organization obtains alternate telecommunications service providers that are separated from 

primary service providers to reduce susceptibility to the same hazards. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations seek to reduce common susceptibilities by, for example, 

minimizing shared infrastructure between telecommunications service providers and 

achieving sufficient geographic separation between services. 

(4) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | PROVIDER CONTINGENCY PLAN 

The organization: 

(a) Requires primary and alternate telecommunications service providers to have contingency 

plans; 

(b) Reviews provider contingency plans to ensure that the plans meet organizational contingency 

requirements; and 

(c) Obtains evidence of contingency testing/training by providers [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]. 

(5) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | ALTERNATE TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICE TESTING 

The organization tests alternate telecommunication services [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency]. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-34; National Communications Systems Directive 3-10; 

Web: TSP.NCS.GOV. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD CP-8 (1) (2) HIGH CP-8 (1) (2) (3) (4)

CP-9 INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP 

Control: The organization: 

a. Conducts backups of user-level information contained in the information system [Assignment: 

organization-defined frequency consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives]; 

b. Conducts backups of system-level information contained in the information system 

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency consistent with recovery time and recovery 

point objectives]; 

c. Conducts backups of information system documentation including security-related 

documentation [Assignment: organization-defined frequency consistent with recovery time 

and recovery point objectives]; and 

d. Protects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of backup information at storage 

locations. 

Supplemental Guidance: System-level information includes, for example, system-state information, 

operating system and application software, and licenses. User-level information includes any 
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information other than system-level information. Mechanisms employed by organizations to 

protect the integrity of information system backups include, for example, digital signatures and 

cryptographic hashes. Protection of system backup information while in transit is beyond the 

scope of this control. Information system backups reflect the requirements in contingency plans as 

well as other organizational requirements for backing up information. Related controls: CP-2, CP6, MP-4, MP-5, SC-13. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | TESTING FOR RELIABILITY / INTEGRITY 

The organization tests backup information [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to verify 

media reliability and information integrity. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: CP-4.

(2) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | TEST RESTORATION USING SAMPLING 

The organization uses a sample of backup information in the restoration of selected information 

system functions as part of contingency plan testing. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: CP-4.

(3) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | SEPARATE STORAGE FOR CRITICAL INFORMATION 

The organization stores backup copies of [Assignment: organization-defined critical information 

system software and other security-related information] in a separate facility or in a fire-rated 

container that is not collocated with the operational system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Critical information system software includes, for example, operating 

systems, cryptographic key management systems, and intrusion detection/prevention systems. 

Security-related information includes, for example, organizational inventories of hardware, 

software, and firmware components. Related controls: CM-2, CM-8.

(4) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | PROTECTION FROM UNAUTHORIZED MODIFICATION 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CP-9].

(5) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | TRANSFER TO ALTERNATE SITE 

The organization transfers information system backup information to the alternate storage site 

[Assignment: organization-defined time period and transfer rate consistent with the recovery time 

and recovery point objectives]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: CP-7.

(6) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | REDUNDANT SECONDARY SYSTEM 

The organization accomplishes information system backup by maintaining a redundant secondary 

system that is not collocated with the primary system and that can be activated without loss of 

information or disruption to operations. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: CP-7, CP-10.

(7) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | TWO-PERSON RULE 

The organization enforces a two-person rule for the deletion or destruction of [Assignment: 

organization-defined backup information]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations employ a two-person rule to ensure that the deletion or 

destruction of backup information cannot occur unless two qualified individuals carry out the 

task. Individuals deleting/destroying backup information possess sufficient skills/expertise to 

determine if the proposed deletion/destruction of backup information reflects organizational 

policies and procedures. Related controls: AC-3, MP-2. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-34. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CP-9 MOD CP-9 (1) HIGH CP-9 (1) (2) (3) (5)
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CP-10 INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION 

Control: The organization provides for the recovery and reconstitution of the information system to 

a known state after a disruption, compromise, or failure. 

Supplemental Guidance: Recovery is executing information system contingency plan activities to 

restore organizational missions/business functions. Reconstitution takes place following recovery 

and includes activities for returning organizational information systems to fully operational states. 

Recovery and reconstitution operations reflect mission and business priorities, recovery point/time 

and reconstitution objectives, and established organizational metrics consistent with contingency 

plan requirements. Reconstitution includes the deactivation of any interim information system 

capabilities that may have been needed during recovery operations. Reconstitution also includes 

assessments of fully restored information system capabilities, reestablishment of continuous 

monitoring activities, potential information system reauthorizations, and activities to prepare the 

systems against future disruptions, compromises, or failures. Recovery/reconstitution capabilities 

employed by organizations can include both automated mechanisms and manual procedures. 

Related controls: CA-2, CA-6, CA-7, CP-2, CP-6, CP-7, CP-9, SC-24. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CP-4]. 

(2) INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | TRANSACTION RECOVERY 

The information system implements transaction recovery for systems that are transaction-based. 

Supplemental Guidance: Transaction-based information systems include, for example, database 

management systems and transaction processing systems. Mechanisms supporting transaction 

recovery include, for example, transaction rollback and transaction journaling.

(3) INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | COMPENSATING SECURITY CONTROLS 

The organization provides [Assignment: organization-defined compensating security controls] for 

[Assignment: organization-defined circumstances that can inhibit recovery and reconstitution to a 

known state]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Circumstances requiring compensating controls include, for example, 

the inability of organizational personnel to reach recovery sites, hardware failures at recovery 

sites, inability to restore organizational information systems from backup media, or inability 

of redundant systems to failover into known states. 

(4) INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | RESTORE WITHIN TIME PERIOD 

The organization provides the capability to restore information system components within 

[Assignment: organization-defined restoration time-periods] from configuration-controlled and 

integrity-protected information representing a known, operational state for the components. 

Supplemental Guidance: Restoration of information system components includes, for example, 

reimaging which, restores components to known, operational states. Related control: CM-2.

(5) INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | FAILOVER CAPABILITY 

The organization provides [Selection: real-time; near-real-time] [Assignment: organization-defined 

failover capability for the information system]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Failover capability includes, for example, incorporating mirrored 

information system operations at alternate processing sites or periodic data mirroring at 

regular intervals defined by recovery time periods of organizations.

(6) INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | COMPONENT PROTECTION 

The organization protects backup and restoration hardware, firmware, and software. 

Supplemental Guidance: Protection of backup and restoration hardware, firmware, and software 

components includes both physical and technical safeguards. Backup and restoration software 

includes, for example, router tables, compilers, and other security-relevant system software. 

Related controls: AC-3, AC-6, PE-3.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-34. 

 
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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CP-10 MOD CP-10 (2) (3) HIGH CP-10 (2) (3) (4) (5)

CP-11 PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION 

Control: The organization: 

a. Determines mean time to failure (MTTF) for [Assignment: organization-defined information 

system components] in specific environments of operation; and 

b. Provides substitute information system components and a means to exchange active and 

standby components at [Assignment: organization-defined MTTF substitution criteria]. 

Supplemental Guidance: While MTTF is primarily a reliability issue, this control addresses potential 

failures of specific information system components that provide security capability. Failure rates 

reflect installation-specific consideration, not industry-average. Organizations define criteria for 

substitution of information system components based on MTTF value with consideration for 

resulting potential harm from component failures. Transfer of responsibilities between active and 

standby components does not compromise safety, operational readiness, or security capability 

(e.g., preservation of state variables). Standby components remain available at all times except for 

maintenance issues or recovery failures in progress. Related controls: CP-2, CP-10, MA-6. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | TRANSFERRING COMPONENT RESPONSIBILITIES 

The organization takes information system components out of service by transferring component 

responsibilities to substitute components no later than [Assignment: organization-defined fraction 

or percentage] of mean time to failure. 

(2) PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | TIME LIMIT ON PROCESS EXECUTION WITHOUT SUPERVISION 

The organization does not allow processes to execute without supervision for more than 

[Assignment: organization-defined time period]. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses processes for which normal 

execution periods can be determined and situations in which organizations exceed such 

periods. Supervision includes, for example, operating system timers, automated responses, or 

manual oversight and response when information system process anomalies occur. 

(3) PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | MANUAL TRANSFER BETWEEN COMPONENTS 

The organization manually initiates transfers between active and standby information system 

components at least once per [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] if the mean time to 

failure exceeds [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. 

(4) PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | STANDBY COMPONENT INSTALLATION / NOTIFICATION 

The organization, if information system component failures are detected: 

(a) Ensures that the standby components are successfully and transparently installed within 

[Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and 

(b) [Selection (one or more): activates [Assignment: organization-defined alarm]; automatically 

shuts down the information system]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Automatic or manual transfer of components from standby to active 

mode can occur, for example, upon detection of component failures. 

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH CP-11
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CP-12 ALTERNATE COMMUNICATIONS PROTOCOLS 

Control: The information system provides the capability to employ [Assignment: organizationdefined alternative communications protocols] in support of maintaining continuity of operations. 

Supplemental Guidance: Contingency plans and the associated training and testing for those plans, 

incorporate an alternate communications protocol capability as part of increasing the resilience of 

organizational information systems. Alternate communications protocols include, for example, 

switching from Transmission Control Protocol to User Datagram Protocol communications or to a 

special purpose protocol used in conjunction with the Internet Protocol. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

CP-13 SAFE MODE 

Control: The information system, when [Assignment: organization-defined conditions] are 

detected, enters a safe mode of operation with [Assignment: organization-defined restrictions of 

safe mode of operation]. 

Supplemental Guidance: For information systems supporting critical missions/business functions 

including, for example, military operations and weapons systems, civilian space operations, 

nuclear power plant operations, and air traffic control operations (especially real-time operational 

environments), organizations may choose to identify certain conditions under which those systems 

revert to a pre-defined safe mode of operation. The safe mode of operation, which can be activated 

automatically or manually, restricts the types of activities or operations information systems could 

execute when those conditions are encountered. Restriction include, for example, allowing only 

certain functions that could be carried out under limited power or with reduced communications 

bandwidth. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected
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FAMILY: IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION 

IA-1 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY AND PROCEDURES 

Control: The organization develops, disseminates, and reviews/updates [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]: 

a. A formal, documented identification and authentication policy that addresses purpose, scope, 

roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, 

and compliance; and 

b. Formal, documented procedures to facilitate the implementation of the identification and 

authentication policy and associated identification and authentication controls. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the IA family. 

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations. The procedures 

can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if 

needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and 

procedures. Related control: PM-9. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: FIPS Publication 201; NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-63, 800-73, 800-76, 

800-78, 800-100. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW IA-1 MOD IA-1 HIGH IA-1

IA-2 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) 

Control: The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates organizational users (or 

processes acting on behalf of organizational users). 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational users include employees or individuals that organizations 

deem to have equivalent status of employees (e.g., contractors, guest researchers). This control 

applies to all accesses other than: (i) accesses that are explicitly identified and documented in AC14; and (ii) accesses that occur through authorized use of group authenticators without individual 

authentication. Organizations may require unique identification of individuals in group accounts 

(e.g., shared privilege accounts) or for detailed accountability of individual activity. Organizations 

employ passwords, tokens, or biometrics to authenticate user identities, or in the case multifactor 

authentication, some combination thereof. Access to organizational information systems is defined 

as either local access or network access. Local access is any access to organizational information 

systems by users (or processes acting on behalf of users) where such access is obtained by direct 

connections without the use of networks. Network access is access to organizational information 

systems by users (or processes acting on behalf of users) where such access is obtained through 

network connections (i.e., non-local accesses). Remote access is a type of network access which 

involves communication through external networks (e.g., the Internet). Internal networks include 

local area networks, wide area networks, and virtual private networks (VPNs) under organizational 

control. The VPN is considered internal if organizations establish the network connection between 

organization-controlled endpoints in a manner that does not depend on external networks across 

which the VPN transits to protect the confidentiality and integrity of information transmitted. 

Identification and authentication requirements by other than organizational users are described in 

IA-8. 
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Organizations can satisfy the identification and authentication requirements in this control by 

complying with the requirements in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 consistent with 

the specific organizational implementation plans. In addition to identifying and authenticating 

users at the information-system level (i.e., at logon), organizations also employ identification and 

authentication mechanisms at the application level, when necessary, to provide increased 

information security. Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-14, AC-17, AC-18, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS 

The information system employs multifactor authentication for network access to privileged 

accounts.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: AC-6. 

(2) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

The information system employs multifactor authentication for network access to non-privileged 

accounts.

(3) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | LOCAL ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

The information system employs multifactor authentication for local access to privileged accounts.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: AC-6. 

(4) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | LOCAL ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

The information system employs multifactor authentication for local access to non-privileged 

accounts.

(5) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP AUTHENTICATORS 

The organization requires individuals to be authenticated with an individual authenticator in 

conjunction with using a group authenticator. 

(6) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - SEPARATE DEVICE 

The information system employs multifactor authentication for network access to privileged 

accounts such that one of the factors is provided by a device separate from the system and the 

device meets [Assignment: organization-defined strength of mechanism requirements]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Devices separate from information systems include, for example, 

hardware tokens providing time-based or challenge-response authenticators and smart cards 

such as the U.S. Government personal identity verification card and the Department of 

Defense common access card. Organizations employ separate authentication devices so that 

even if the information system that the user is using to remotely gain access is compromised, 

that compromise will not affect the device. Related control: AC-6.

(7) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - SEPARATE DEVICE 

The information system employs multifactor authentication for network access to non-privileged 

accounts such that one of the factors is provided by a device separate from the system and the 

device meets [Assignment: organization-defined strength of mechanism requirements].. 

Supplemental Guidance: Devices separate from information systems include, for example, 

hardware tokens providing time-based or challenge-response authenticators and smart cards 

such as the U.S. Government personal identity verification card and the Department of 

Defense common access card. Organizations employ separate authentication devices so that 

even if the information system that the user is using to remotely gain access is compromised, 

that compromise will not affect the device.

(8) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - REPLAY RESISTANT 

The information system employs [Assignment: organization-defined replay-resistant authentication 

mechanisms] for network access to privileged accounts. 

Supplemental Guidance: Authentication processes resist replay attacks if it is impractical to 

achieve successful authentications by replaying previous authentication messages. Replayresistant techniques include, for example, protocols that use nonces or challenges such as 

Transport Layer Security (TLS) and time synchronous or challenge-response one-time 

authenticators.

 
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(9) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - REPLAY RESISTANT 

The information system employs [Assignment: organization-defined replay-resistant authentication 

mechanisms] for network access to non-privileged accounts. 

Supplemental Guidance: Authentication processes resist replay attacks if it is impractical to 

achieve successful authentications by recording/replaying previous authentication messages. 

Replay-resistant techniques include, for example, protocols that use nonces or challenges such 

as Transport Layer Security (TLS) and time synchronous or challenge-response one-time 

authenticators.

(10) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | SINGLE SIGN-ON 

The information system provides a single sign-on capability (or equivalent) for [Assignment: 

organization-defined list of information system accounts and services]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Single sign-on enables users to log in once and gain access to multiple 

information system resources without additional interactive logins. Organizations balance the 

operational efficiencies provided by single sign-on capabilities with the increased risk from 

disclosures of single authenticators providing access to multiple system resources. 

References: HSPD 12; OMB Memorandum 04-04; FIPS Publication 201; NIST Special 

Publications 800-63, 800-73, 800-76, 800-78.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW IA-2 (1) MOD IA-2 (1) (2) (3) (8) HIGH IA-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (8) (9)

IA-3 DEVICE-TO-DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION 

Control: The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates [Assignment: organizationdefined specific and/or types of devices] before establishing a [Selection (one or more): local; 

remote; network] connection. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational devices requiring unique device-to-device identification and 

authentication may be defined by type, by device, or by a combination of type/device. Information 

systems typically use either shared known information (e.g., Media Access Control [MAC] or 

Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol [TCP/IP] addresses) for device identification or 

organizational authentication solutions (e.g., IEEE 802.1x and Extensible Authentication Protocol 

[EAP], Radius server with EAP-Transport Layer Security [TLS] authentication, Kerberos) to 

identify/authenticate devices on local and/or wide area networks. Organizations determine the 

required strength of authentication mechanisms by the security categories of information systems. 

Related controls: AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, CA-3, IA-4, IA-5. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) DEVICE-TO-DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | CRYPTOGRAPHIC BIDIRECTIONAL AUTHENTICATION 

The information system authenticates [Assignment: organization-defined specific devices and/or 

types of devices] before establishing [Selection (one or more): local; remote; network] connection 

using bidirectional authentication that is cryptographically based. 

Supplemental Guidance: A local connection is any connection with a device communicating 

without the use of a network. A network connection is any connection with a device that 

communicates through a network (e.g., local area or wide area network, Internet). A remote 

connection is any connection with a device communicating through an external network (e.g., 

the Internet). Bidirectional authentication provides stronger safeguards to validate the identity 

of other devices for connections that are of greater risk (e.g., remote connections). Related 

controls: SC-8, SC-9, SC-12, SC-13. 

(2) DEVICE-TO-DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | CRYPTOGRAPHIC BIDIRECTIONAL AUTHENTICATION 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into IA-3].

 
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(3) DEVICE-TO-DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | DYNAMIC ADDRESS ALLOCATION 

The organization: 

(a) Standardizes dynamic address allocation lease information and the lease duration assigned to 

devices in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined lease information and lease 

duration]; and 

(b) Audits lease information when assigned to a device. 

Supplemental Guidance: DHCP-enabled clients obtaining leases for IP addresses from DHCP 

servers, is a typical example of dynamic address allocation for devices. Related controls: AU2, AU-3, AU-12. 

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD IA-3 HIGH IA-3

IA-4 IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT 

Control: The organization manages information system identifiers by: 

a. Receiving authorization from [Assignment: organization-defined personnel] to assign an 

individual, group, role, or device identifier; 

b. Selecting an identifier that identifies an individual, group, role, or device; 

c. Assigning the identifier to the intended individual, group, role, or device; 

d. Preventing reuse of identifiers for [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and 

e. Disabling the identifier after [Assignment: organization-defined time period of inactivity]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Common device identifiers include, for example, media access control 

(MAC), Internet protocol (IP) addresses, or device-unique token identifiers. Management of 

individual identifiers is not applicable to shared information system accounts (e.g., guest and 

anonymous accounts). Typically, individual identifiers are the names of the information system 

accounts associated with those individuals. In such instances, the account management activities 

of AC-2 use account names provided by AC-4. This control also addresses individual identifiers 

not necessarily associated with information system accounts (e.g., identifiers used in physical 

security control databases accessed by badge reader systems for access to information systems). 

Preventing reuse of identifiers implies preventing the assignment of previously used individual, 

group, role, or device identifiers to different individuals, groups, roles, or devices. Related 

controls: AC-2, IA-2, IA-3, IA-5, IA-8, SC-39. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | PROHIBIT ACCOUNT IDENTIFIERS AS PUBLIC IDENTIFIERS

The organization prohibits the use of information system account identifiers as public identifiers 

for individual electronic mail accounts (i.e., individual identifier portion of the electronic mail 

address).

Supplemental Guidance: The organization implements this control enhancement to the extent 

that the information system allows. Related control: AT-2.

(2) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | SUPERVISOR AUTHORIZATION

The organization requires that registration to receive an individual identifier include authorization 

by a supervisor, and be done in person before a designated registration authority.

(3) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | MULTIPLE FORMS OF CERTIFICATION 

The organization requires multiple forms of certification of individual identification such as 

documentary evidence or a combination of documents and biometrics be presented to the 

registration authority.

 
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(4) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | IDENTIFY USER STATUS 

The organization manages individual identifiers by uniquely identifying the individual as 

[Assignment: organization-defined characteristic identifying individual status].

Supplemental Guidance: Characteristics identifying the status of individuals include, for 

example, contractors and foreign nationals. Related control: AT-2.

(5) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC MANAGEMENT 

The information system dynamically manages identifiers.

Supplemental Guidance: In contrast to conventional approaches to identification which presume 

static accounts for preregistered users, many distributed information systems including, for 

example, service-oriented architectures, rely on establishing identities at run time for entities 

that were previously unknown. In these situations, organizations anticipate and provision for 

the dynamic establishment of identities. Pre-established trust relationships and mechanisms 

with appropriate authorities to validate identities and related credentials are essential. Related 

control: AC-16. 

(6) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | CROSS-ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT 

The organization coordinates with [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations] for 

cross-organization management of identifiers. 

Supplemental Guidance: Cross-organization identifier management provides the capability for 

organizations to appropriately identify individuals, groups, roles, or devices when conducting 

cross-organization activities involving the processing, storage, or transmission of information. 

References: FIPS Publication 201; NIST Special Publications 800-73, 800-76, 800-78. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW IA-4 MOD IA-4 HIGH IA-4

IA-5 AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT 

Control: The organization manages information system authenticators by: 

a. Verifying, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual, group, 

role, or device receiving the authenticator; 

b. Establishing initial authenticator content for authenticators defined by the organization; 

c. Ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended use; 

d. Establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial authenticator distribution, 

for lost/compromised or damaged authenticators, and for revoking authenticators; 

e. Changing default content of authenticators upon information system installation; 

f. Establishing minimum and maximum lifetime restrictions and reuse conditions for 

authenticators (if appropriate); 

g. Changing/refreshing authenticators [Assignment: organization-defined time period by 

authenticator type]; 

h. Protecting authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification; 

i. Requiring individuals to take, and having devices implement, specific security safeguards to 

protect authenticators; and 

j. Changing authenticators for group/role accounts when membership to those accounts changes. 

Supplemental Guidance: Individual authenticators include, for example, passwords, tokens, 

biometrics, PKI certificates, and key cards. Initial authenticator content is the actual content (e.g., 

the initial password) as opposed to requirements about authenticator content (e.g., minimum 
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password length). In many cases, developers ship information system components with factory 

default authentication credentials to allow for initial installation and configuration. Default 

authentication credentials are often well known, easily discoverable, and present a significant 

security risk. The requirement to protect individual authenticators may be implemented via control 

PL-4 or PS-6 for authenticators in the possession of individuals and by controls AC-3, AC-6, and 

SC-28 for authenticators stored within organizational information systems (e.g., passwords stored 

in hashed or encrypted formats, files containing encrypted or hashed passwords accessible with 

administrator privileges). Information systems support individual authenticator management by 

organization-defined settings and restrictions for various authenticator characteristics including, 

for example, minimum password length, password composition, validation time window for time 

synchronous one time tokens, and number of allowed rejections during verification stage of 

biometric authentication. Specific actions to safeguard authenticators include, for example, 

maintaining possession of individual authenticators, not loaning or sharing authenticators with 

others, and reporting lost or compromised authenticators immediately. Authenticator management 

includes issuing and revoking, when no longer needed, authenticators for temporary access such as 

that required for remote maintenance. Device authenticators include, for example, certificates and 

passwords. Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-6, CM-6, IA-2, IA-4, IA-8, PL-4, PS-5, PS-6, SC12, SC-13, SC-17, SC-28. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PASSWORD-BASED AUTHENTICATION

The information system, for password-based authentication: 

(a) Enforces minimum password complexity of [Assignment: organization-defined requirements 

for case sensitivity, number of characters, mix of upper-case letters, lower-case letters, 

numbers, and special characters, including minimum requirements for each type]; 

(b) Enforces at least [Assignment: organization-defined number of changed characters] when 

new passwords are created; 

(c) Stores and transmits only encrypted representations of passwords; 

(d) Enforces password minimum and maximum lifetime restrictions of [Assignment: organizationdefined numbers for lifetime minimum, lifetime maximum]; and 

(e) Prohibits password reuse for [Assignment: organization-defined number] generations. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to single factor authentication of 

individuals using passwords and in a similar manner, when passwords are part of multifactor 

authenticators. This control enhancement typically does not apply when passwords are used to 

unlock hardware authenticators. The implementation of such password mechanisms may not 

meet all of the requirements in the enhancement. Encrypted representations of passwords 

include, for example, encrypted versions of passwords and one-way cryptographic hashes of 

passwords. Related control: IA-6. 

(2) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PKI-BASED AUTHENTICATION 

The information system, for PKI-based authentication: 

(a) Validates certificates by constructing a certification path with status information to an 

accepted trust anchor; 

(b) Enforces authorized access to the corresponding private key; and 

(c) Maps the authenticated identity to the account of the individual. 

Supplemental Guidance: Status information for certification paths includes, for example, 

certificate revocation lists or certificate status protocol responses. Related control: IA-6.

(3) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | IN PERSON REGISTRATION 

The organization requires that the registration process to receive [Assignment: organizationdefined types of and/or specific authenticators] be carried out in person before [Assignment: 

organization-defined registration authority] with authorization by [Assignment: organizationdefined personnel]. 

(4) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED TOOLS FOR STRENGTH DETERMINATION

The organization employs automated tools to determine if authenticators are sufficiently strong to 

resist attacks intended to discover or otherwise compromise the authenticators. 
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Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CA-2, CA-7, RA-5.

(5) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | CHANGE AUTHENTICATORS PRIOR TO DELIVERY 

The organization requires developers of information system components to provide unique 

authenticators or change default authenticators prior to delivery. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement extends the requirement for organizations to 

change default authenticators upon information system installation, by requiring developers to 

provide unique authenticators or change default authenticators for system components prior to 

delivery. Developers assign unique authenticators to specific information system components 

(i.e., delivered information technology products) with distinct serial numbers. Requirements 

for unique authenticators can be included in acquisition documents prepared by organizations 

when procuring information systems or information system components. Related control: 

CM-6.

(6) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PROTECTION OF AUTHENTICATORS 

The organization protects authenticators commensurate with the security category of the 

information to which use of the authenticator permits access. 

Supplemental Guidance: For information systems containing multiple security categories of 

information without reliable physical or logical separation between categories, authenticators 

used to grant access to the systems are protected commensurate with the highest security 

category of information on the systems. 

(7) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | NO EMBEDDED UNENCRYPTED STATIC AUTHENTICATORS 

The organization ensures that unencrypted static authenticators are not embedded in applications 

or access scripts or stored on function keys. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations exercise caution in determining whether embedded or 

stored authenticators are in encrypted or unencrypted form. If authenticators are used in the 

manner stored, then those representations are considered unencrypted authenticators. This is 

irrespective of whether that representation is perhaps an encrypted version of something else 

(e.g., a password).

(8) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | MULTIPLE INFORMATION SYSTEM ACCOUNTS 

The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to manage 

the risk of compromise due to individuals having accounts on multiple information systems. 

Supplemental Guidance: When individuals have accounts on multiple information systems, 

there is the risk that the compromise of one account may lead to the compromise of other 

accounts if individuals use the same authenticators. Possible alternatives include, for example: 

(i) having different authenticators on all systems; (ii) employing some form of single sign-on 

mechanism; or (iii) including some form of one-time passwords on all systems.

(9) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | CROSS-ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT 

The organization coordinates with [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations] for 

cross-organization management of authenticators. 

Supplemental Guidance: Cross-organization authenticator management provides the capability 

for organizations to appropriately authenticate individuals, groups, roles, or devices when 

conducting cross-organization activities involving the processing, storage, or transmission of 

information.

(10) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC AUTHENTICATOR ASSOCIATION

The information system dynamically associates authenticators with identifiers. 

Supplemental Guidance: In contrast to conventional approaches to identification which presume 

static accounts for preregistered users, many distributed information systems including, for 

example, service-oriented architectures, rely on establishing identities at run time for entities 

that were previously unknown. In these situations, organizations anticipate and provision for 

the dynamic association of authenticators with identities. Pre-established trust relationships 

and mechanisms with appropriate authorities to validate identities and related credentials are 

essential.

 
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(11) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | HARDWARE TOKEN-BASED AUTHENTICATION 

The information system, for token-based authentication, employs mechanisms that satisfy 

[Assignment: organization-defined token quality requirements]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Hardware token-based authentication typically refers to the use of 

PKI-based tokens, such as the US Government Personal Identity Verification (PIV) card. 

Organizations define specific requirements for tokens, such as working with a particular PKI.

(12) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION 

The information system, for biometric-based authentication, employs mechanisms that satisfy 

[Assignment: organization-defined biometric quality requirements]. 

References: OMB Memorandum 04-04; FIPS Publication 201; NIST Special Publications 800-73, 

800-63, 800-76, 800-78. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW IA-5 (1) MOD IA-5 (1) (2) (3) HIGH IA-5 (1) (2) (3)

IA-6 AUTHENTICATOR FEEDBACK 

Control: The information system obscures feedback of authentication information during the 

authentication process to protect the information from possible exploitation/use by unauthorized 

individuals. 

Supplemental Guidance: The feedback from information systems does not provide information that 

would allow unauthorized individuals to compromise authentication mechanisms. Obscuring the 

feedback of authentication information includes, for example, displaying asterisks when users 

types passwords into input devices. Related control: PE-18. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW IA-6 MOD IA-6 HIGH IA-6

IA-7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE AUTHENTICATION 

Control: The information system implements mechanisms for authentication to a cryptographic 

module that meet the requirements of applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, 

policies, regulations, standards, and guidance for such authentication. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control reinforces the requirements for organizational information 

systems implementing cryptographic protections using cryptographic modules. If cryptography is 

required, information systems are required to authenticate to the associated cryptographic modules 

implementing the cryptography. Related controls: SC-12, SC-13. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: FIPS Publication 140-2; Web: CSRC.NIST.GOV/CRYPTVAL. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW IA-7 MOD IA-7 HIGH IA-7
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IA-8 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) 

Control: The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates non-organizational users (or 

processes acting on behalf of non-organizational users). 

Supplemental Guidance: Non-organizational users include information system users other than 

organizational users explicitly covered by IA-2. These individuals are uniquely identified and 

authenticated for accesses other than those accesses explicitly identified and documented in AC14. In accordance with the E-Authentication E-Government initiative, authentication of nonorganizational users accessing federal information systems may be required to protect federal, 

proprietary, or privacy-related information (with exceptions noted for national security systems). 

Organizations use risk assessments to determine authentication needs and consider scalability, 

practicality, and security in balancing the need to ensure ease of use for access to federal 

information and information systems with the need to protect and adequately mitigate risk. IA-2 

addresses identification and authentication requirements for access to information systems by 

organizational users. Related controls: AC-2, AC-14, AC-17, AC-18, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, MA-4, 

RA-3, SA-12, SC-9. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: OMB Memorandum 04-04; Web: WWW.CIO.GOV/EAUTHENTICATION; NIST Special 

Publication 800-63.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW IA-8 MOD IA-8 HIGH IA-8

IA-9 SERVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION 

Control: The organization identifies and authenticates [Assignment: organization-defined 

information system services] using [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards]. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control supports service-oriented architectures and other distributed, 

architectural approaches requiring the identification and authentication of information system 

services. In such architectures, external services often appear dynamically. Therefore, information 

systems should be able to determine in a dynamic manner, if external providers and associated 

services are authentic. Safeguards implemented by organizational information systems to validate 

provider and service authenticity include, for example, information or code signing, provenance 

graphs, and/or electronic signatures indicating or including the sources of services. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) SERVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | INFORMATION EXCHANGE 

The organization ensures that service providers receive, validate, and transmit identification and 

authentication information. 

(2) SERVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | TRANSMISSION OF DECISIONS

The organization ensures that identification and authentication decisions are transmitted between 

[Assignment: organization-defined services] consistent with organizational policies. 

Supplemental Guidance: For distributed architectures (e.g., service-oriented architectures), the 

decisions regarding the validation of identification and authentication claims may be made by 

services separate from the services acting on those decisions. In such situations, it is necessary 

to provide the identification and authentication decisions (as opposed to the actual identifiers 

and authenticators) to the services that need to act on those decisions. Related controls: SC-8, 

SC-9.

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

 
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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

IA-10 ALTERNATIVE AUTHENTICATION 

Control: The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined alternative or supplemental 

authentication techniques or mechanisms] for [Assignment: organization-defined authentication 

requirements] when the primary means of authentication is unavailable or compromised. 

Supplemental Guidance: To ensure mission/business continuity, organizations implement alternative 

or supplemental authentication techniques or mechanisms. These techniques or mechanisms may 

be less effective than the primary means of authentication (e.g., not as easy to use, not as scalable, 

or not as secure). However, having the capability to readily employ these alternative/supplemental 

authentication techniques or mechanisms enhances overall mission/business continuity that might 

otherwise be adversely impacted if organizational operations had to be curtailed until the primary 

authentication means were once again available and secure. This control applies at the discretion 

of organizations, to the authentication of individuals, groups, roles, devices, and services. Related 

controls: IA-2, IA-3, IA-8, IA-10. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

IA-11 ADAPTIVE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION 

Control: The organization requires that individuals attempting to access the system employ 

[Assignment: organization-defined supplemental authentication techniques or mechanisms] under 

specific [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances or situations]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Adversaries may compromise individual authentication mechanisms and 

subsequently attempt to impersonate legitimate users. This situation can potentially occur with any 

authentication mechanisms employed by organizations. To address this threat, organizations may 

employ specific techniques/mechanisms and establish protocols to assess suspicious behavior 

(e.g., individuals accessing information that they do not typically access as part of their normal 

duties, roles, or responsibilities, accessing greater quantities of information than the individuals 

would routinely access, or attempting to access information from suspicious network addresses). 

In these situations when certain pre-established conditions or triggers occur, information systems 

can require selected individuals to provide additional authentication information. Related controls: 

AU-6, SI-4. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected
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IA-12 REAUTHENTICATION 

Control: The organization requires users and devices to reauthenticate when [Assignment: 

organization-defined circumstances or situations requiring reauthentication]. 

Supplemental Guidance: In addition to the reauthentication requirements associated with session 

locks, organizations may require reauthentication of individuals and/or devices in other situations 

including, for example: (i) when authenticators change; (ii), when roles change; (iii) when security 

categories of information systems change; (iv), when the execution of privileged functions occurs; 

or (v) periodically. Related control: AC-11. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected
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FAMILY: INCIDENT RESPONSE 

IR-1 INCIDENT RESPONSE POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization develops, disseminates, and reviews/updates [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]: 

a. A formal, documented incident response policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 

responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and 

compliance; and 

b. Formal, documented procedures to facilitate the implementation of the incident response 

policy and associated incident response controls. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the IR family. 

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations. The procedures 

can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if 

needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and 

procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-61, 800-83, 800-100. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW IR-1 MOD IR-1 HIGH IR-1

IR-2 INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING 

Control: The organization provides incident response training to information system users 

consistent with assigned roles and responsibilities: 

a. Before authorizing access to the information system or performing assigned duties; 

b. When required by information system changes; and 

c. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter. 

Supplemental Guidance: Incident response training provided by organizations is linked to the 

assigned roles and responsibilities of organizational personnel to ensure the appropriate content 

and level of detail is included in such training. For example, regular users may only need to know 

who to call or how to recognize an incident on the information system; system administrators may 

require additional training on how to handle/remediate incidents; and incident responders may 

receive more specific training on forensics, reporting, system recovery, and restoration. Incident 

response training includes user training in the identification and reporting of suspicious activities, 

both from external and internal sources. Related controls: AT-3, CP-3, IR-8. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING | SIMULATED EVENTS 

The organization incorporates simulated events into incident response training to facilitate 

effective response by personnel in crisis situations. 

(2) INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING | AUTOMATED TRAINING ENVIRONMENTS

The organization employs automated mechanisms to provide a more thorough and realistic 

training environment. 
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References: NIST Special Publications 800-16, 800-50. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW IR-2 MOD IR-2 HIGH IR-2 (1) (2)

IR-3 INCIDENT RESPONSE TESTING 

Control: The organization tests the incident response capability for the information system 

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] using [Assignment: organization-defined tests] to 

determine the incident response effectiveness and documents the results. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations test incident response capabilities to determine the overall 

effectiveness of the capabilities and to identify potential weaknesses or deficiencies. Incident 

response testing includes, for example, the use of checklists, walk-through or tabletop exercises, 

simulations (parallel/full interrupt), and comprehensive exercises. Incident response testing can 

also include a determination of the effects on organizational operations (e.g., reduction in mission 

capabilities), organizational assets, and individuals due to incident response. Related controls: CP4, IR-8. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) INCIDENT RESPONSE TESTING | AUTOMATED TESTING

The organization employs automated mechanisms to more thoroughly and effectively test the 

incident response capability. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations use automated mechanisms to more thoroughly and 

effectively test incident response capabilities for example: (i) by providing more complete 

coverage of incident response issues; (ii) by selecting more realistic test scenarios and test 

environments; and (iii) by stressing the response capability. Related control: AT-2.

(2) INCIDENT RESPONSE TESTING | COORDINATION WITH RELATED PLANS

The organization coordinates incident response testing with organizational elements responsible 

for related plans. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational plans related to incident response testing include, for 

example, Business Continuity Plans, Contingency Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Continuity 

of Operations Plans, Crisis Communications Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, and 

Occupant Emergency Plans. 

References: NIST Special Publications 800-84, 800-115. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD IR-3 (2) HIGH IR-3 (1) (2)

IR-4 INCIDENT HANDLING 

Control: The organization: 

a. Implements an incident handling capability for security incidents that includes preparation, 

detection and analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery; 

b. Coordinates incident handling activities with contingency planning activities; and 

c. Incorporates lessons learned from ongoing incident handling activities into incident response 

procedures, training, and testing/exercises, and implements the resulting changes accordingly. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations recognize that incident response capability is dependent on 

the capabilities of organizational information systems and the mission/business processes being 

supported by those systems. Therefore, organizations consider incident response as part of the 
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definition, design, and development of mission/business processes and information systems. 

Incident-related information can be obtained from a variety of sources including, for example, 

audit monitoring, network monitoring, physical access monitoring, user/administrator reports, and 

reported supply chain events. Effective incident handling capability includes coordination among 

many organizational entities including for example, mission/business owners, information system 

owners, authorizing officials, human resources offices, physical and personnel security offices, 

legal departments, operations personnel, procurement offices, and the risk executive (function). 

Related controls: AU-6, CM-6, CP-2, CP-4, IR-2, IR-3, IR-8, PE-6, SC-5, SC-7, SI-3, SI-4, SI-7. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) INCIDENT HANDLING | AUTOMATED INCIDENT HANDLING PROCESSES

The organization employs automated mechanisms to support the incident handling process. 

Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms supporting incident handling processes 

include, for example, online incident management systems.

(2) INCIDENT HANDLING | DYNAMIC RECONFIGURATION

The organization includes dynamic reconfiguration of [Assignment: organization-defined 

information system components] as part of the incident response capability. 

Supplemental Guidance: Dynamic reconfiguration includes, for example, changes to router 

rules, access control lists, intrusion detection/prevention system parameters, and filter rules 

for firewalls and gateways. Organizations perform dynamic reconfiguration of information 

systems, for example, to stop attacks, to misdirect attackers, and to isolate portions systems, 

thus limiting the extent of the damage from breaches or compromises. Organizations include 

timeframes for achieving the reconfiguration of information systems in the definition of the 

reconfiguration capability, considering the potential need for rapid response in order to 

effectively address sophisticated cyber threats. Related controls: AC-2, AC-4, AC-16, CM-2, 

CM-3, CM-4. 

(3) INCIDENT HANDLING | CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS 

The organization identifies [Assignment: organization-defined classes of incidents] and 

[Assignment: organization-defined actions to take in response to classes of incidents] to ensure 

continuation of organizational missions and business functions. 

Supplemental Guidance: Classes of incidents include, for example, malfunctions due to 

design/implementation errors and omissions, targeted malicious attacks, and untargeted 

malicious attacks. Appropriate incident response actions include, for example, graceful 

degradation, information system shutdown, fall back to manual mode/alternative technology 

whereby the system operates differently, employing deceptive measures, alternate information 

flows, or operating in a mode that is reserved solely for when systems are under attack.

(4) INCIDENT HANDLING | INFORMATION CORRELATION

The organization correlates incident information and individual incident responses to achieve an 

organization-wide perspective on incident awareness and response. 

(5) INCIDENT HANDLING | AUTOMATIC DISABLING OF INFORMATION SYSTEM 

The organization implements a configurable capability to automatically disable the information 

system if [Assignment: organization-defined security violations] are detected. 

(6) INCIDENT HANDLING | INSIDER THREATS - SPECIFIC CAPABILITIES

The organization implements incident handling capability for insider threats. 

Supplemental Guidance: While many organizations address insider threat incidents as an 

inherent part of their organizational incident response capability, this control enhancement 

provides additional emphasis on this type of threat and the need for specific incident handling 

capabilities (as defined within organizations) to provide appropriate and timely responses.

(7) INCIDENT HANDLING | INSIDER THREATS - INTRA-ORGANIZATION COORDINATION

The organization coordinates incident handling capability for insider threats across [Assignment: 

organization-defined components or elements of the organization]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Incident handling for insider threat incidents (including preparation, 

detection and analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery) requires close coordination 

among a variety of organizational components or elements to be effective. These components 
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or elements include, for example, mission/business owners, information system owners, 

human resources offices, procurement offices, personnel/physical security offices, operations 

personnel, and risk executive (function). In addition, organizations may require external 

support from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.

(8) INCIDENT HANDLING | CORRELATION WITH EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS 

The organization coordinates with [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations] to 

correlate and share [Assignment: organization-defined incident information] to achieve a crossorganization perspective on incident awareness and more effective incident responses. 

Supplemental Guidance: The coordination of incident information with external providers 

including, for example, mission/business partners, customers, and suppliers, can provide 

significant benefits. Cross-organizational coordination with respect to incident handling can 

serve as an important risk management capability that allows organizations to leverage critical 

information from a variety of sources to effectively respond to information security-related 

incidents potentially affecting the organization’s operations, assets, and individuals.

(9) INCIDENT HANDLING | DYNAMIC RESPONSE CAPABILITY 

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined dynamic response capabilities] to 

effectively respond to security incidents. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses the deployment of replacement or 

new capabilities in a timely manner in response to security incidents (e.g., adversary actions 

during hostile cyber attacks). This includes capabilities implemented at the mission/business 

process level (e.g., activating alternative mission/business processes) and at the information 

system level. Related controls: CP-2, CP-10. 

(10) INCIDENT HANDLING | SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION 

The organization coordinates incident-handling activities involving supply chain events with other 

organizations involved in the supply chain. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations involved in supply chain activities include, for example, 

system/product developers, integrators, manufacturers, packagers, assemblers, distributors, 

vendors, and resellers. Supply chain incidents include, for example, compromises/breaches 

involving information system components, information technology products, development 

processes or personnel, and distribution processes or warehousing facilities.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-61. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW IR-4 MOD IR-4 (1) HIGH IR-4 (1) (4)

IR-5 INCIDENT MONITORING

Control: The organization tracks and documents information system security incidents. 

Supplemental Guidance: Documenting information system security incidents includes, for example, 

maintaining records about each incident, the status of the incident, and other pertinent information 

necessary for forensics, evaluating incident details, trends, and handling. Incident information can 

be obtained from a variety of sources including, for example, incident reports, incident response 

teams, audit monitoring, network monitoring, physical access monitoring, and user/administrator 

reports. Related controls: AU-6, IR-8, PE-6, SC-5, SC-7, SI-3, SI-4, SI-7. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) INCIDENT MONITORING | AUTOMATED TRACKING / DATA COLLECTION / ANALYSIS

The organization employs automated mechanisms to assist in the tracking of security incidents 

and in the collection and analysis of incident information. 

Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms for tracking security incidents and 

collecting/analyzing incident information include, for example, the Einstein network 
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monitoring device and monitoring online Computer Incident Response Centers (CIRCs) or 

other electronic databases of incidents. Related controls: AU-7, IR-4. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-61.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW IR-5 MOD IR-5 HIGH IR-5 (1)

IR-6 INCIDENT REPORTING 

 Control: The organization: 

a. Requires personnel to report suspected security incidents to the organizational incident 

response capability within [Assignment: organization-defined time-period]; and 

b. Reports security incident information to [Assignment: organization-defined authorities]. 

Supplemental Guidance: The intent of this control is to address both specific incident reporting 

requirements within an organization and the formal incident reporting requirements for federal 

agencies and their subordinate organizations. The types of security incidents reported, the content 

and timeliness of the reports, and the designated reporting authorities reflect applicable federal 

laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. Current federal 

policy requires that all federal agencies (unless specifically exempted from such requirements) 

report security incidents to the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) 

within specified time frames designated in the US-CERT Concept of Operations for Federal Cyber 

Security Incident Handling. Related controls: IR-4, IR-5, IR-8. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) INCIDENT REPORTING | AUTOMATED REPORTING

The organization employs automated mechanisms to assist in the reporting of security incidents. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: IR-7.

(2) INCIDENT REPORTING | VULNERABILITIES RELATED TO INCIDENTS 

The organization reports information system vulnerabilities associated with reported security 

incidents to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel]. 

(3) INCIDENT REPORTING | COORDINATION WITH SUPPLY CHAIN 

The organization provides security incident information to other organizations involved in the 

supply chain for information systems or information system components related to the incident. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations involved in supply chain activities include, for example, 

system/product developers, integrators, manufacturers, packagers, assemblers, distributors, 

vendors, and resellers. Supply chain incidents include, for example, compromises/breaches 

involving information system components, information technology products, development 

processes or personnel, and distribution processes or warehousing facilities. Organizations 

determine the appropriate information to share considering the value gained from support by 

external organizations with the potential for harm due to sensitive information being released 

to outside organizations of perhaps questionable trustworthiness.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-61: Web: WWW.US-CERT.GOV.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW IR-6 MOD IR-6 (1) HIGH IR-6 (1)
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IR-7 INCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE 

 Control: The organization provides an incident response support resource, integral to the 

organizational incident response capability, that offers advice and assistance to users of the 

information system for the handling and reporting of security incidents. 

Supplemental Guidance: Incident response support resources provided by organizations include, for 

example, help desks, assistance groups, and access to forensics services, when required. Related 

controls: AT-2, IR-4, IR-6, IR-8. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) INCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION / SUPPORT

The organization employs automated mechanisms to increase the availability of incident responserelated information and support. 

Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms can provide a push and/or pull capability for 

users to obtain incident response assistance. For example, individuals might have access to a 

website to query the assistance capability, or conversely, the assistance capability may have 

the ability to proactively send information to users (general distribution or targeted) as part of 

increasing understanding of current response capabilities and support. 

(2) INCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE | COORDINATION WITH EXTERNAL PROVIDERS 

The organization: 

(a) Establishes a direct, cooperative relationship between its incident response capability and 

external providers of information system protection capability; and 

(b) Identifies organizational incident response team members to the external providers. 

Supplemental Guidance: External providers of information system protection capability include, 

for example, the Computer Network Defense program within the U.S. Department of 

Defense. External providers help to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to 

unauthorized activity within organizational information systems and networks.

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P3 LOW IR-7 MOD IR-7 (1) HIGH IR-7 (1)

IR-8 INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN 

Control: The organization: 

a. Develops an incident response plan that: 

- Provides the organization with a roadmap for implementing its incident response 

capability; 

- Describes the structure and organization of the incident response capability; 

- Provides a high-level approach for how the incident response capability fits into the overall 

organization; 

- Meets the unique requirements of the organization, which relate to mission, size, structure, 

and functions; 

- Defines reportable incidents; 

- Provides metrics for measuring the incident response capability within the organization. 

- Defines the resources and management support needed to effectively maintain and mature 

an incident response capability; and 

- Is reviewed and approved by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel]; 
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b. Distributes copies of the incident response plan to [Assignment: organization-defined incident 

response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements]; 

c. Reviews the incident response plan [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; 

d. Revises the incident response plan to address system/organizational changes or problems 

encountered during plan implementation, execution, or testing; and 

e. Communicates incident response plan changes to [Assignment: organization-defined incident 

response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements]. 

Supplemental Guidance: It is important that organizations develop and implement a coordinated 

approach to incident response. Organizational missions, business functions, strategies, goals, and 

objectives for incident response help determine the structure of incident response capabilities. As 

part of a comprehensive incident response capability, organizations consider the coordination and 

sharing of information with external organizations, including, for example, external service 

providers and organizations involved in the supply chain for organizational information systems. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-61.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW IR-8 MOD IR-8 HIGH IR-8

IR-9 INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE 

 Control: The organization responds to information spills by: 

a. Identifying the specific information causing the information system contamination; 

b. Alerting [Assignment: organization-defined personnel] of the information spill using a secure 

method of communication; 

c. Isolating the contaminated information system; 

d. Eradicating the information from the contaminated information system; 

e. Identifying other information systems that may have been subsequently contaminated; and 

f. Performing other [Assignment: organization-defined actions]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information spillage refers to instances where sensitive information (e.g., 

classified information, export-controlled information) is inadvertently placed on information 

systems that are not authorized to process such information. Such information spills often occur 

when information that is initially thought to be of lower sensitivity is transmitted to an information 

system and then is subsequently determined to be of higher sensitivity. At that point, corrective 

action is required. The nature of the organizational response is generally based upon the degree of 

sensitivity of the spilled information (e.g., security category or classification level), the security 

capabilities of the information system, the specific nature of contaminated storage media, and the 

access authorizations (e.g., security clearances) of individuals with authorized access to the 

contaminated system. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | RESPONSIBLE PERSONNEL 

The organization identifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel] with responsibility for 

responding to information spills. 

(2) INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | TRAINING 

The organization provides information spillage response training [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]. 
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(3) INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | POST-SPILL OPERATIONS 

The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined procedures] to ensure that 

organizational personnel impacted by information spills can continue to carry out assigned tasks 

while contaminated systems are undergoing corrective actions. 

Supplemental Guidance: Correction actions for information systems contaminated due to 

information spillages may be very time consuming. During those periods, personnel may not 

have access to the contaminated systems, which may potentially affect their ability to conduct 

organizational business.

(4) INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | EXPOSURE TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONNEL

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] for personnel 

exposed to information not within assigned access authorizations. 

Supplemental Guidance: Security safeguards include, for example, making personnel exposed 

to spilled information aware of the federal laws, directives, policies, and/or regulations 

regarding the information and the restrictions imposed based on exposure to such information.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected
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FAMILY: MAINTENANCE

MA-1 SYSTEM MAINTENANCE POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization develops, disseminates, and reviews/updates [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]: 

a. A formal, documented information system maintenance policy that addresses purpose, scope, 

roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, 

and compliance; and 

b. Formal, documented procedures to facilitate the implementation of the information system 

maintenance policy and associated system maintenance controls. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the MA family. 

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations. The procedures 

can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if 

needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and 

procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW MA-1 MOD MA-1 HIGH MA-1

MA-2 CONTROLLED MAINTENANCE 

Control: The organization: 

a. Schedules, performs, documents, and reviews records of, maintenance and repairs on 

information system components in accordance with manufacturer or vendor specifications 

and/or organizational requirements; 

b. Approves and monitors all maintenance activities, whether performed on site or remotely and 

whether the equipment is serviced on site or removed to another location; 

c. Requires that [Assignment: organization-defined personnel] explicitly approve the removal of 

the information system or system components from organizational facilities for off-site 

maintenance or repairs; 

d. Sanitizes equipment to remove all information from associated media prior to removal from 

organizational facilities for off-site maintenance or repairs; 

e. Checks all potentially impacted security controls to verify that the controls are still 

functioning properly following maintenance or repair actions; and 

f. Includes [Assignment: organization-defined maintenance-related information] in 

organizational maintenance records. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the information security aspects of the information 

system maintenance program and applies to all types of maintenance to any system component 

(including applications) conducted by any local or non-local entity (e.g., in-contract, warranty, inhouse, software maintenance agreement). System maintenance also includes those components not 

directly associated with information processing and/or data/information retention such as scanners, 
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copiers, and printers. Information necessary for creating effective maintenance records includes, 

for example: (i) date and time of maintenance; (ii) name of individuals or group performing the 

maintenance; (iii) name of escort, if necessary; (iv) a description of the maintenance performed; 

and (v) information system components/equipment removed or replaced (including identification 

numbers, if applicable). The level of detail included in maintenance records can be informed by 

the security categories of organizational information systems. Organizations consider supply chain 

issues associated with replacement components for information systems. Related controls: CM-3, 

CM-4, MA-4, MP-6, PE-16, SA-12, SI-2. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) CONTROLLED MAINTENANCE | RECORD CONTENT 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MA-2]. 

(2) CONTROLLED MAINTENANCE | AUTOMATED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES

The organization: 

(a) Employs automated mechanisms to schedule, conduct, and document maintenance and 

repairs as required; and 

(b) Produces up-to date, accurate, complete, and available records of all maintenance and repair 

actions, needed, in process, and completed. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CA-7, MA-3.

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW MA-2 MOD MA-2 HIGH MA-2 (2)

MA-3 MAINTENANCE TOOLS 

Control: The organization approves, controls, and monitors information system maintenance tools. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses security-related issues associated with maintenance 

tools used specifically for diagnostic and repair actions on organizational information systems. 

Maintenance tools can include hardware, software, and firmware items. Maintenance tools can 

include, for example, hardware/software diagnostic test equipment and hardware/software packet 

sniffers. This control does not cover hardware/software components that may support information 

system maintenance, yet are a part of the system, for example, the software implementing “ping,” 

“ls,” “ipconfig,” or the hardware and software implementing the monitoring port of an Ethernet 

switch. Related controls: MA-2, MA-5, MP-6. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | INSPECT TOOLS 

The organization inspects all maintenance tools carried into a facility by maintenance personnel 

for obvious improper modifications. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SI-7.

(2) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | INSPECT MEDIA 

The organization checks all media containing diagnostic and test programs for malicious code 

before the media are used in the information system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SI-3.

(3) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL 

The organization prevents the unauthorized removal of maintenance equipment containing 

organizational information by: 

(a) Verifying that there is no organizational information contained on the equipment; 

(b) Sanitizing or destroying the equipment; 

(c) Retaining the equipment within the facility; or 
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(d) Obtaining an exemption from [Assignment: organization-defined personnel] explicitly 

authorizing removal of the equipment from the facility. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational information includes all information specifically owned 

by organizations and information provided to organizations in which organizations serve as 

information stewards.

(4) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | AUTOMATED RESTRICTED TOOL USE

The organization employs automated mechanisms to restrict the use of maintenance tools to 

authorized personnel only. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-88. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD MA-3 (1) (2) HIGH MA-3 (1) (2) (3)

MA-4 NON-LOCAL MAINTENANCE 

Control: The organization: 

a. Approves and monitors non-local maintenance and diagnostic activities; 

b. Allows the use of non-local maintenance and diagnostic tools only as consistent with 

organizational policy and documented in the security plan for the information system; 

c. Employs strong authenticators in the establishment of non-local maintenance and diagnostic 

sessions; 

d. Maintains records for non-local maintenance and diagnostic activities; and 

e. Terminates all sessions and network connections when non-local maintenance is completed. 

Supplemental Guidance: Non-local maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities 

conducted by individuals communicating through a network; either an external network (e.g., the 

Internet) or an internal network. Local maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities 

carried out by individuals physically present at the information system or information system 

component and not communicating across a network connection. Authentication techniques used 

in the establishment of non-local maintenance and diagnostic sessions reflect the network access 

requirements in IA-2. Typically, strong authentication requires authenticators that are resistant to 

replay attacks and employ multifactor authentication. Strong authenticators include, for example, 

PKI where certificates are stored on a token protected by a password, passphrase, or biometric. 

Enforcing requirements in MA-4 is accomplished in part, by other controls. Related controls: AC2, AC-3, AC-6, AC-17, AU-2, AU-3, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8, MA-2, MA-5, MP-6, PL-2, SC-7, 

SC-10, SC-17. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) NON-LOCAL MAINTENANCE | AUDITING AND REVIEW 

The organization audits non-local maintenance and diagnostic sessions and reviews the 

maintenance records of the sessions. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AU-6, AU-12.

(2) NON-LOCAL MAINTENANCE | DOCUMENT NON-LOCAL MAINTENANCE 

The organization documents, in the security plan for the information system, the installation and 

use of non-local maintenance and diagnostic connections. 

(3) NON-LOCAL MAINTENANCE | COMPARABLE SECURITY / SANITIZATION

The organization: 

(a) Requires that non-local maintenance and diagnostic services be performed from an 

information system that implements a security capability comparable to the capability 

implemented on the system being serviced; or 
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(b) Removes the component to be serviced from the information system and prior to non-local 

maintenance or diagnostic services, sanitizes the component (with regard to organizational 

information) before removal from organizational facilities, and after the service is performed, 

inspects and sanitizes the component (with regard to potentially malicious software) before 

reconnecting the component to the information system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Comparable security capability on information systems, diagnostic 

tools, and equipment providing maintenance services implies that the implemented security 

controls on those systems, tools, and equipment are at least as comprehensive as the controls 

on the information system being serviced. Related controls: MA-3, SA-12, SI-3, SI-7. 

(4) NON-LOCAL MAINTENANCE | AUTHENTICATION / SEPARATION OF MAINTENANCE SESSIONS

The organization protects non-local maintenance sessions by: 

(a) Employing [Assignment: organization-defined authenticators that are replay resistant]; and 

(b) Separating the maintenance sessions from other network sessions with the information 

system by either: 

- Physically separated communications paths; or 

- Logically separated communications paths based upon encryption. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SC-13. 

(5) NON-LOCAL MAINTENANCE | APPROVALS AND NOTIFICATIONS 

The organization: 

(a) Notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel] of the date and time of planned nonlocal maintenance; and 

(b) Approves each non-local maintenance session. 

Supplemental Guidance: Notification may be performed by maintenance personnel. Approval of 

non-local maintenance sessions is accomplished by organizational personnel with sufficient 

information security and information system knowledge to determine the appropriateness of 

the proposed maintenance.

(6) NON-LOCAL MAINTENANCE | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION 

The organization employs cryptographic mechanisms to protect the integrity and confidentiality of 

non-local maintenance and diagnostic communications. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: SC-8, SC-9, SC-13.

(7) NON-LOCAL MAINTENANCE | REMOTE DISCONNECT VERIFICATION 

The organization employs remote disconnect verification at the termination of non-local 

maintenance and diagnostic sessions. 

Supplemental Guidance: Remote disconnect verification ensures that remote connections from 

non-local maintenance sessions have been terminated, and are no longer available for use. 

Related control: SC-13.

References: FIPS Publications 140-2, 197, 201; NIST Special Publications 800-63, 800-88; CNSS 

Policy 15.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW MA-4 MOD MA-4 (1) (2) HIGH MA-4 (1) (2) (3)

MA-5 MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL 

Control: The organization: 

a. Establishes a process for maintenance personnel authorization and maintains a list of 

authorized maintenance organizations or personnel; 

b. Ensures that personnel performing maintenance on the information system or maintenance 

personnel in physical proximity to the system have required access authorizations; and 
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c. Designates organizational personnel with required access authorizations and technical 

competence to supervise the maintenance activities of personnel who do not possess the 

required access authorizations. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to individuals performing hardware or software 

maintenance on organizational information systems and to individuals whose maintenance duties 

place them within the physical protection perimeter of the systems. Individuals who might be 

located within the physical protection perimeter include, for example, physical plant maintenance 

personnel and janitorial staff. Technical competence of supervising individuals relates to the 

maintenance performed on the information systems while having required access authorizations 

refers to maintenance on and near the systems. Individuals not previously identified as authorized 

maintenance personnel, such as information technology manufacturers, vendors, and consultants, 

may require privileged access to organizational information systems, for example, when required 

to conduct maintenance activities with little or no notice. Based on organizational assessments of 

risk, organizations may issue temporary credentials to these individuals. Temporary credentials 

may be for one-time use or for very limited time periods. Related controls: AC-2, IA-8, MP-2, PE2, PE-3, PE-4, RA-3. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT APPROPRIATE ACCESS

The organization implements procedures for the use of maintenance personnel that lack 

appropriate security clearances or are not U.S. citizens, that include the following requirements: 

(a) Maintenance personnel who do not have needed access authorizations, clearances, or formal 

access approvals are escorted and supervised during the performance of maintenance and 

diagnostic activities on the information system by approved organizational personnel who are 

fully cleared, have appropriate access authorizations, and are technically qualified; 

(b) Prior to initiating maintenance or diagnostic activities by personnel who do not have needed 

access authorizations, clearances or formal access approvals, all volatile information storage 

components within the information system are sanitized and all nonvolatile storage media are 

removed or physically disconnected from the system and secured; and 

(c) In the event an information system component cannot be sanitized, the procedures contained 

in the security plan for the system are enforced. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement denies individuals who lack appropriate 

security clearances (i.e., individuals who do not possess security clearances or possess 

security clearances at a lower level than required) or who are not U.S. citizens, visual and 

electronic access to any classified information, Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), or 

any other sensitive information contained on organizational information systems. Procedures 

for the use of maintenance personnel can be documented in security plans for the information 

systems. Related controls: MP-6, PL-2. 

(2) MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR CLASSIFIED SYSTEMS 

The organization ensures that personnel performing maintenance and diagnostic activities on an 

information system processing, storing, or transmitting classified information possess security 

clearances and formal access approvals for at least the highest classification level and for all 

compartments of information on the system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: PS-3.

(3) MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASSIFIED SYSTEMS 

The organization ensures that personnel performing maintenance and diagnostic activities on an 

information system processing, storing, or transmitting classified information are U.S. citizens. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: PS-3.

(4) MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | FOREIGN NATIONALS 

The organization ensures that: 

(a) Cleared foreign nationals (i.e., foreign nationals with appropriate security clearances), are 

used to conduct maintenance and diagnostic activities on classified information systems only 

when the systems are jointly owned and operated by the United States and foreign allied 

governments, or owned and operated solely by foreign allied governments; and 
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(b) Approvals, consents, and detailed operational conditions regarding the use of foreign 

nationals to conduct maintenance and diagnostic activities on classified information systems 

are fully documented within Memoranda of Agreements. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: PS-3.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW MA-5 MOD MA-5 HIGH MA-5 (1)

 

MA-6 TIMELY MAINTENANCE 

Control: The organization obtains maintenance support and/or spare parts for [Assignment: 

organization-defined security-critical information system components and/or key information 

technology components] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of failure. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations specify the information system components that result in 

increased risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the 

Nation when the security functionality provided by those components is not operational. Securitycritical components include, for example, firewalls, guards, gateways, routers, intrusion detection 

and prevention systems, audit repositories, authentication servers, and intrusion prevention 

systems. Related controls: CM-8, CP-2, CP-7. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD MA-6 HIGH MA-6
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FAMILY: MEDIA PROTECTION 

MP-1 MEDIA PROTECTION POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization develops, disseminates, and reviews/updates [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]: 

a. A formal, documented media protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 

responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and 

compliance; and 

b. Formal, documented procedures to facilitate the implementation of the media protection 

policy and associated media protection controls. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the MP family. 

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations. The procedures 

can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if 

needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and 

procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW MP-1 MOD MP-1 HIGH MP-1

MP-2 MEDIA ACCESS 

Control: The organization restricts access to [Assignment: organization-defined types of digital 

and/or non-digital media] to [Assignment: organization-defined authorized individuals] using 

[Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. 

Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard drives, 

flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for example, 

paper and microfilm. For media containing information determined by organizations to be in the 

public domain, to be publicly releasable, or to have limited or no adverse impact on organizations 

or individuals if accessed by other than authorized personnel, fewer safeguards may be needed. In 

these situations, physical access controls may provide adequate protection. Related controls: AC2, AC-3, AC-19, IA-2, MP-4, PE-2, PE-3, PL-2, RA-3. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) MEDIA ACCESS | AUTOMATED RESTRICTED ACCESS 

The organization employs automated mechanisms to restrict access to media storage areas and to 

audit access attempts and access granted. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies primarily to media storage areas 

within organizations where significant volumes of media are stored and does not apply to 

every location where some media is stored (e.g., in individual offices). Related controls: AU2, AU-6.
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(2) MEDIA ACCESS | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION 

The information system employs cryptographic mechanisms to protect and restrict access to 

information on [Assignment: organization-defined portable digital media]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AC-19, MP-5, SC-13.

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publication 800-111.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW MP-2 MOD MP-2 (1) HIGH MP-2 (1)

MP-3 MEDIA MARKING 

Control: The organization: 

a. Marks, in accordance with organizational policies and procedures, information system media 

indicating the distribution limitations, handling caveats, and applicable security markings (if 

any) of the information; and 

b. Exempts [Assignment: organization-defined removable media types] from marking as long as 

the exempted items remain within [Assignment: organization-defined controlled areas]. 

Supplemental Guidance: The term security marking refers to the application/use of human-readable 

security attributes. The term security labeling refers to the application/use of security attributes 

with regard to internal data structures within information systems (see AC-16). Information 

system media includes both digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes, for example, 

diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital 

video disks. Non-digital media includes, for example, paper and microfilm. Security marking is 

generally not required for media containing information determined by organizations to be in the 

public domain or to be publicly releasable. However, some organizations may require markings 

for public information indicating that the information is publicly releasable. Marking of media 

reflects applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and 

guidance. Related controls: AC-16, PL-2, RA-3. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: FIPS Publication 199.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD MP-3 HIGH MP-3

MP-4 MEDIA STORAGE 

Control: The organization: 

a. Physically controls and securely stores [Assignment: organization-defined types of digital 

and/or non-digital media] within [Assignment: organization-defined controlled areas] using 

[Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards]; 

b. Protects information system media until the media are destroyed or sanitized using approved 

equipment, techniques, and procedures. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. 

Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard drives, 

flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for example, 

paper and microfilm. This control also applies to mobile computing and communications devices 

with information storage capability (e.g., notebook computers, personal digital assistants, cellular 
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telephones, digital cameras, and audio recording devices). Telephone systems are considered 

information systems and may have the capability to store information on internal media (e.g., on 

voicemail systems). Since telephone systems generally do not have the security controls typically 

employed in other information systems, organizational personnel use caution in the types of 

information stored on such systems. Controlled areas are areas or spaces for which organizations 

provide sufficient physical and procedural safeguards to meet the requirements established for 

protecting information and/or information systems. For media containing information determined 

by organizations to be in the public domain, to be publicly releasable, or to have limited or no 

adverse impact on organizations or individuals if accessed by other than authorized personnel, 

fewer safeguards may be needed. In these situations, physical access controls provide adequate 

protection. 

As part of a defense-in-depth strategy, organizations consider encrypting information at rest on 

selected storage devices. The employment of cryptography is at the discretion of the information 

owner/steward. Selection of appropriate cryptographic mechanisms is based on the need to protect 

the confidentiality and integrity of the information. The strength of mechanisms is commensurate 

with the security category and/or classification of the information. Related controls: AC-3, AC-19, 

CP-6, CP-9, MP-2, MP-7, PE-3, RA-3, SC-13. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) MEDIA STORAGE | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION 

The organization employs cryptographic mechanisms to protect information in storage on 

[Assignment: organization-defined digital media]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SC-28. 

(2) MEDIA STORAGE | OFF-LINE STORAGE

The organization removes from online storage and stores off-line in a secure location [Assignment: 

organization-defined user and/or system information]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Removing organizational information from online information system 

storage to off-line storage eliminates the possibility of individuals gaining unauthorized 

access to the information through a network. Therefore, organizations may choose to move 

information to off-line storage in lieu of protecting such information in online storage. 

Related control: SC-28. 

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-56, 800-57, 800-111.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD MP-4 HIGH MP-4

MP-5 MEDIA TRANSPORT 

Control: The organization: 

a. Protects and controls [Assignment: organization-defined types of digital and/or non-digital 

media] during transport outside of controlled areas using [Assignment: organization-defined 

security safeguards]; 

b. Maintains accountability for information system media during transport outside of controlled 

areas; and 

c. Restricts the activities associated with transport of such media to authorized personnel. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. 

Non-digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, removable hard drives, flash 

drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for example, paper and 

microfilm. This control also applies to mobile computing and communications devices with 

information storage capability (e.g., notebook computers, personal digital assistants, cellular 

telephones, digital cameras, and audio recording devices) that are transported outside of controlled 
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areas. Telephone systems are considered information systems and may have the capability to store 

information on internal media (e.g., on voicemail systems). Since telephone systems generally do 

not have the security controls typically employed in other information systems, organizational 

personnel use caution in the types of information stored on such systems, and in particular when 

those systems are transported outside of controlled areas. Controlled areas are areas or spaces for 

which organizations provide sufficient physical/procedural safeguards to meet the requirements 

established for protecting information and/or information systems. 

Physical and technical safeguards for media are commensurate with the security category or 

classification of the information residing on the media and reflect applicable federal laws, 

Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. Safeguards to protect 

media during transport include, for example, locked containers and cryptography. Cryptographic 

mechanisms can provide confidentiality and integrity protections depending upon the mechanisms 

used. Activities associated with transport include the actual transport as well as those activities 

such as releasing media for transport and ensuring that media enters the appropriate transport 

processes. For the actual transport, authorized transport and courier personnel may include 

individuals from outside the organization (e.g., U.S. Postal Service or a commercial transport or 

delivery service). Maintaining accountability of media during transport includes, for example, 

tracking and/or obtaining explicit records of transport activities as the media moves through the 

transportation system to prevent and detect loss, destruction, or tampering. Organizations establish 

documentation requirements for activities associated with the transport of information system 

media in accordance with organizational assessments of risk to include the flexibility to define 

different record-keeping methods for the different types of media transport as part of an overall 

system of transport-related records. Related controls: AC-19, CP-9, MP-3, MP-4, RA-3, SC-8, 

SC-9, SC-13, SC-28. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) MEDIA TRANSPORT | PROTECTION OUTSIDE OF CONTROLLED AREAS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-5].

(2) MEDIA TRANSPORT | DOCUMENTATION OF ACTIVITIES 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-5].

(3) MEDIA TRANSPORT | CUSTODIANS 

The organization employs an identified custodian throughout the transport of information system 

media outside of controlled areas. 

Supplemental Guidance: Custodial responsibilities can be transferred from one individual to 

another as long as an unambiguous custodian is identified at all times. 

(4) MEDIA TRANSPORT | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION 

The organization employs cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality and integrity of 

information stored on digital media during transport outside of controlled areas. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement also applies to mobile devices. Mobile 

devices include portable storage media (e.g., USB memory sticks, external hard disk drives) 

and portable computing and communications devices with storage capability (e.g., notebook 

computers, personal digital assistants, cellular telephones). Related controls: MP-2, MP-4, 

SC-13.

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publication 800-60.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD MP-5 (4) HIGH MP-5 (3) (4)
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MP-6 MEDIA SANITIZATION 

Control: The organization: 

a. Sanitizes [Assignment: organization-defined digital and non-digital information system 

media] prior to disposal, release out of organizational control, or release for reuse using 

[Assignment: organization-defined sanitization techniques and procedures] in accordance 

with applicable federal/organizational standards and policies; and 

b. Employs sanitization mechanisms with the strength and integrity commensurate with the 

security category or classification of the information. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to all digital and non-digital media subject to disposal 

or reuse to include media found in devices such as scanners, copiers, and printers. The sanitization 

process removes information from information system media such that the information cannot be 

retrieved or reconstructed. Sanitization techniques, including clearing, purging, and destruction, 

prevent the disclosure of information to unauthorized individuals when such media is reused or 

released for disposal. Organizations determine the appropriate sanitization methods recognizing 

that destruction is sometimes necessary when other methods cannot be applied to media requiring 

sanitization. Organizations use discretion on the employment of approved sanitization techniques 

and procedures for media containing information deemed to be in the public domain or publicly 

releasable, or deemed to have no adverse impact on organizations or individuals if released for 

reuse or disposal. Sanitization of non-digital media includes, for example, removing a classified 

appendix from an otherwise unclassified document, or redacting selected sections or words from a 

document by obscuring the redacted sections/words in a manner equivalent in effectiveness to 

removing them from the document. NSA standards and policies control the sanitization process 

for media containing classified information. Related controls: MA-2, MA-4, RA-3, SC-4. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) MEDIA SANITIZATION | TRACKING / DOCUMENTING / VERIFYING 

The organization tracks, documents, and verifies media sanitization and disposal actions. 

(2) MEDIA SANITIZATION | EQUIPMENT TESTING 

The organization tests sanitization equipment and procedures [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency] to verify that the intended sanitization is being achieved. 

(3) MEDIA SANITIZATION | NON-DESTRUCTIVE TECHNIQUES 

The organization applies non-destructive sanitization techniques to portable, removable storage 

devices prior to connecting such devices to the information system under the following 

circumstances: [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances requiring sanitization of 

portable, removable storage devices]. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to information system media 

containing classified information, Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), and other 

sensitive information. Portable, removable storage devices including, for example, flash 

drives and other external storage devices, can be the source of malicious code insertions into 

organizational information systems. Many of these devices are obtained from unknown and 

potentially untrustworthy sources and may contain various types of malicious code that can be 

readily transferred to information systems through USB ports or other entry portals. While 

scanning such devices is always recommended, sanitization provides additional assurance that 

the device is free of all malicious code to include code capable of initiating zero-day attacks. 

Organizations consider non-destructive sanitization of portable, removable storage devices 

when such devices are first purchased from the manufacturer or vendor prior to initial use or 

when organizations lose a positive chain of custody for the devices. Related control: SI-3. 

(4) MEDIA SANITIZATION | CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-6].

(5) MEDIA SANITIZATION | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-6].

(6) MEDIA SANITIZATION | MEDIA DESTRUCTION

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-6].
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(7) MEDIA SANITIZATION | TWO-PERSON RULE 

The organization enforces a two-person rule for the sanitization of [Assignment: organizationdefined information system media]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations employ a two-person rule to ensure that information 

system media sanitization cannot occur unless two qualified individuals carry out the task. 

Individuals sanitizing information system media possess sufficient skills and expertise to 

determine if the proposed sanitization reflects applicable federal/organizational standards, 

policies, and procedures. The two-person rule also helps ensure that sanitization occurs as 

intended, both protecting against errors and false claims of having performed the sanitization 

actions. Related controls: AC-3, MP-2. 

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-60, 800-88; Web: 

WWW.NSA.GOV/IA/GUIDANCE/MEDIA_DESTRUCTION_GUIDANCE/INDEX.SHTML.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW MP-6 MOD MP-6 HIGH MP-6 (1) (2) (3)

MP-7 MEDIA USE 

Control: The organization restricts the use of [Assignment: organization-defined types of digital 

and/or non-digital media] on [Assignment: organization-defined information systems or system 

components] using [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. 

Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard drives, 

flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks, Non-digital media includes, for example, 

paper and microfilm. This control also applies to mobile computing and communications devices 

with information storage capability (e.g., notebook computers, personal digital assistants, cellular 

telephones, digital cameras, and audio recording devices).Organizations document in policy and 

procedures, the media requiring restricted use, and the specific safeguards implemented to restrict 

use. Related control: AC-19. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) MEDIA USE | ORGANIZATIONAL RESTRICTIONS 

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined restrictions] on the use of 

[Assignment: organization-defined type of removable media] in organizational information 

systems. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can employ technical and non-technical safeguards 

(e.g., policies, procedures, and rules of behavior) to restrict the use of removable media. 

Organizations may restrict use of all removable media by techniques such as physical cages 

on workstations to prohibit access to removable media ports or by disabling or removing the 

ability to insert, read or write to removable media. Organizations may also restrict the use of 

removable media to only approved devices including, for example, devices provided by the 

organization, provided by approved organizations, and not personally owned. And finally, 

organizations may restrict the use of removable media based on media type, for example, 

prohibiting the use of writeable, removable media, and implementing this restriction by 

disabling or removing the capability to write to removable media. Related control: PL-4. 

(2) MEDIA USE | PROHIBITION OF USE WITHOUT OWNER 

The organization prohibits the use of removable media in organizational information systems when 

the media has no identifiable owner. 

Supplemental Guidance: Identifiable owners (e.g., individuals, organizations, or projects) for 

removable media reduce the risk of using such technologies by allowing organizations to 

assign responsibility and accountability for addressing known vulnerabilities in the media 

(e.g., malicious code insertion). Related control: PL-4.
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References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publication 800-111.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW MP-7 MOD MP-7 (1) (2) HIGH MP-7 (1) (2)

MP-8 MEDIA DOWNGRADING 

Control: The organization: 

a. Establishes [Assignment: organization-defined information system media downgrading 

process] that includes employing downgrading mechanisms with [Assignment: organizationdefined strength and integrity]; 

b. Ensures that the information system media downgrading process is commensurate with the 

security category and/or classification level of the information to be removed and the access 

authorizations of the potential recipients of the downgraded information; 

c. Identifies [Assignment: organization-defined information system media, both digital and nondigital, requiring downgrading]; and 

d. Downgrades the identified information system media using the established process. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to all digital and non-digital information system media 

subject to release outside of the organization, whether or not the media is considered removable. 

The downgrading process, when applied to information system media, removes information from 

the media, typically by security category or classification level, such that the information cannot 

be retrieved or reconstructed. Downgrading of media includes redacting information to enable 

wider release and distribution. Downgrading of media also ensures that empty space on the media 

(e.g., slack space within files) is devoid of information. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) MEDIA DOWNGRADING | TRACKING / DOCUMENTING 

The organization tracks and documents media downgrading actions. 

(2) MEDIA DOWNGRADING | EQUIPMENT TESTING 

The organization tests downgrading equipment and procedures to verify correct performance 

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. 

(3) MEDIA DOWNGRADING | CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION 

The organization downgrades information system media containing [Assignment: organizationdefined Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)] prior to public release in accordance with 

applicable federal/organizational standards and policies. 

(4) MEDIA DOWNGRADING | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

The organization downgrades information system media containing classified information prior to 

release to individuals without required access authorizations in accordance with NSA standards 

and policies. 

Supplemental Guidance: Downgrading of classified information uses approved sanitization 

tools, techniques, and procedures to transfer information confirmed to be unclassified from 

classified information systems to unclassified media.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected
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FAMILY: PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 

PE-1 PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization develops, disseminates, and reviews/updates [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]: 

a. A formal, documented physical and environmental protection policy that addresses purpose, 

scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational 

entities, and compliance; and 

b. Formal, documented procedures to facilitate the implementation of the physical and 

environmental protection policy and associated physical and environmental protection 

controls. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the PE family. 

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations. The procedures 

can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if 

needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and 

procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PE-1 MOD PE-1 HIGH PE-1

PE-2 PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS 

Control: The organization: 

a. Develops and maintains a list of individuals with authorized access to the facility where the 

information system resides; 

b. Issues authorization credentials; 

c. Reviews and approves the access list and authorization credentials [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]; and 

d. Removes individuals from the access list when access is no longer required. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to organizational employees and visitors. Individuals 

(e.g., employees, contractors, and others) with permanent physical access authorization credentials 

are not considered visitors. Authorization credentials include, for example, badges, identification 

cards, and smart cards. Organizations determine the strength of authorization credentials needed 

(including level of forge-proof badges, smart cards, or identification cards) consistent with federal 

standards, policies, and procedures. This control only applies to areas within facilities that have 

not been designated as publicly accessible. Related controls: PE-3, PE-4, PS-3. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS | ACCESS BY POSITION / ROLE 

The organization authorizes physical access to the facility where the information system resides 

based on position or role. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-6.
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(2) PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS | TWO FORMS OF IDENTIFICATION 

The organization requires two forms of identification from [Assignment: organization-defined list of 

acceptable forms of identification] for visitor access to the facility where the information system 

resides. 

Supplemental Guidance: Acceptable forms of government photo identification include, for 

example, passports, personal identity verification (PIV) cards, and drivers’ licenses. In the 

case of gaining access to facilities using automated mechanisms, organizations may use 

personal identity verification cards, key cards, PINs, and biometrics. Related controls: IA-2, 

IA-4, IA-5.

(3) PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS | RESTRICT UNESCORTED ACCESS 

The organization restricts unescorted access to the facility where the information system resides 

to personnel with required security clearances, formal access authorizations, and validated need 

for access. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: PS-2, PS-6.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PE-2 MOD PE-2 HIGH PE-2

PE-3 PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL 

Control: The organization: 

a. Enforces physical access authorizations at designated entry/exit points to the facility where 

the information system resides; 

b. Verifies individual access authorizations before granting access to the facility; 

c. Controls ingress/egress to the facility using [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: 

organization-defined physical access devices]; guards]; 

d. Provides [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to control access to areas 

within the facility officially designated as publicly accessible; 

e. Escorts visitors and monitors visitor activity [Assignment: organization-defined 

circumstances requiring visitor escorts and monitoring]; 

f. Secures keys, combinations, and other physical access devices; 

g. Inventories [Assignment: organization-defined physical access devices] every [Assignment: 

organization-defined frequency]; and 

h. Changes combinations and keys [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and/or when 

keys are lost, combinations are compromised, or individuals are transferred or terminated. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to organizational employees and visitors. Individuals 

(e.g., employees, contractors, and others) with permanent physical access authorization credentials 

are not considered visitors. Organizations determine the types of facility guards needed including, 

for example, professional physical security staff or other personnel such as administrative staff or 

information system users. Physical access devices include, for example, keys, locks, combinations, 

and card readers. Safeguards for publicly accessible areas within organizational facilities, include 

for example, cameras, monitoring by guards, isolating selected information systems/components 

in secured areas. Components of information systems (e.g., workstations, computer terminals) 

may be located in areas designated as publicly accessible with organizations safeguarding access 

to such devices. Related controls: MP-2, MP-4, PE-2, PE-4, PE-5, PS-3, RA-3. 

 
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Control Enhancements:

(1) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | INFORMATION SYSTEM ACCESS 

The organization enforces physical access authorizations to the information system independent 

of the physical access controls for the facility at [Assignment: organization-defined physical 

spaces containing one or more components of the information system]. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement provides additional physical security for 

those areas within facilities where there is a concentration of information system components 

(e.g., server rooms, media storage areas, communications centers). Security requirements for 

facilities containing information systems that process, store, or transmit federal information 

reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, 

and guidance. Related controls: PS-2, PS-3. 

(2) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | FACILITY / INFORMATION SYSTEM BOUNDARIES 

The organization performs security checks at the physical boundary of the facility or information 

system for unauthorized exfiltration of information or information system components. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations determine the extent, frequency, and/or randomness of 

security checks to adequately mitigate risk associated with exfiltration. Related controls: AC4, SC-7. 

(3) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | CONTINUOUS GUARDS / ALARMS / MONITORING 

The organization guards, alarms, and monitors every physical access point to the facility where the 

information system resides 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CP-6, CP-7.

(4) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | LOCKABLE CASINGS 

The organization uses lockable physical casings to protect [Assignment: organization-defined 

information system components] from unauthorized physical access. 

(5) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | TAMPER PROTECTION 

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to [Selection 

(one or more): detect; prevent] physical tampering or alteration of [Assignment: organizationdefined hardware components] within the information system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may implement tamper detection/prevention at selected 

hardware components or tamper detection at some components and tamper prevention at other 

components. Tamper detection/prevention activities can employ many types of anti-tamper 

technologies including, for example, tamper-detection seals and anti-tamper coatings. Antitamper programs help to detect hardware alterations through counterfeiting and other supply 

chain-related risks. Related control: SA-12. 

(6) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | PENETRATION TESTING 

The organization employs a penetration testing process that includes [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency], unannounced attempts to bypass or circumvent security controls associated 

with physical access points to the facility. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CA-2, CA-7.

References: FIPS Publication 201; NIST Special Publications 800-73, 800-76, 800-78; ICD 704; 

DCID 6/9.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PE-3 MOD PE-3 HIGH PE-3 (1)

PE-4 ACCESS CONTROL FOR TRANSMISSION MEDIUM 

Control: The organization controls physical access to [Assignment: organization-defined 

information system distribution and transmission lines] within organizational facilities using 

[Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards]. 
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Supplemental Guidance: Physical security safeguards applied to information system distribution and 

transmission lines help prevent accidental damage, disruption, and physical tampering. In addition, 

physical safeguards may be necessary to help prevent eavesdropping or in transit modification of 

unencrypted transmissions. Security safeguards to control physical access to system distribution 

and transmission lines include, for example: (i) locked wiring closets; (ii) disconnected or locked 

spare jacks; and/or (iii) protection of cabling by conduit or cable trays. Related controls: MP-2, 

MP-4, PE-2, PE-3, PE-5, SC-7, SC-8, SC-9. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NSTISSI No. 7003.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD PE-4 HIGH PE-4

PE-5 ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTPUT DEVICES 

Control: The organization controls physical access to information system output devices to prevent 

unauthorized individuals from obtaining the output. 

Supplemental Guidance: Controlling physical access to output devices includes, for example, 

placing output devices in locked rooms or other secured areas and allowing access to authorized 

individuals only; and placing output devices in locations that can be monitored by organizational 

personnel. Monitors, printers, and audio devices are examples of information system output 

devices. Related controls: PE-2, PE-3, PE-4, PE-18. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTPUT DEVICES | AUTOMATED ACCESS CONTROL / IDENTITY LINKAGE 

The organization employs automated mechanisms to: 

(a) Control access to information system output from [Assignment: organization-defined output 

devices]; and 

(b) Link individual identity to receipt of the output. 

Supplemental Guidance: Controlling physical access to selected output devices using automated 

mechanisms includes, for example, installing security functionality on printers, copiers, and 

facsimile machines that allows organizations to implement authentication (e.g., using a PIN or 

hardware token) on output devices prior to the release of output to individuals. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD PE-5 HIGH PE-5

PE-6 MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS 

Control: The organization: 

a. Monitors physical access to the information system to detect and respond to physical security 

incidents; 

b. Reviews physical access logs [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and, upon 

occurrence of [Assignment: organization-defined events or potential indications of events]; 

and 

c. Coordinates results of reviews and investigations with the organizational incident response 

capability. 
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Supplemental Guidance: Organizational incident response capabilities include investigations of and 

responses to detected physical security incidents. Security incidents include, for example, apparent 

security violations or suspicious physical access activities. Suspicious physical access activities 

include, for example: (i) accesses outside of normal work hours; (ii) repeated accesses to areas not 

normally accessed; (iii) accesses for unusual lengths of time; and (iv) out-of-sequence accesses. 

Related controls: CA-7, IR-4, IR-8. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | INTRUSION ALARMS / SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT 

The organization monitors real-time physical intrusion alarms and surveillance equipment. 

(2) MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | AUTOMATED INTRUSION RECOGNITION / RESPONSES 

The organization employs automated mechanisms to recognize [Assignment: organization-defined 

classes/types of intrusions] and initiate [Assignment: organization-defined response actions]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SI-4.

(3) MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | VIDEO SURVEILLANCE 

The organization employs video surveillance of [Assignment: organization-defined operational 

areas]. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PE-6 MOD PE-6 (1) HIGH PE-6 (1) (2)

PE-7 VISITOR CONTROL 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PE-2 and PE-3].

PE-8 VISITOR ACCESS RECORDS 

Control: The organization: 

a. Maintains visitor access records to the facility where the information system resides; and 

b. Reviews visitor access records [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Visitor access records include, for example, names and organizations of 

persons visiting, visitor signatures, forms of identification, dates of access, entry and departure 

times, purposes of visits, and names and organizations of persons visited. Visitor access records 

are not required for publicly accessible areas. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) VISITOR ACCESS RECORDS | AUTOMATED RECORDS MAINTENANCE / REVIEW 

The organization employs automated mechanisms to facilitate the maintenance and review of 

visitor access records. 

(2) VISITOR ACCESS RECORDS | PHYSICAL ACCESS RECORDS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PE-2].

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P3 LOW PE-8 MOD PE-8 HIGH PE-8 (1)
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PE-9 POWER EQUIPMENT AND CABLING 

Control: The organization protects power equipment and power cabling for the information system 

from damage and destruction. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: PE-4. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) POWER EQUIPMENT AND CABLING | REDUNDANT CABLING 

The organization employs redundant power cabling paths that are physically separated by 

[Assignment: organization-defined distance]. 

(2) POWER EQUIPMENT AND CABLING | AUTOMATIC VOLTAGE CONTROLS 

The organization employs automatic voltage controls for [Assignment: organization-defined critical 

information system components]. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD PE-9 HIGH PE-9

PE-10 EMERGENCY SHUTOFF 

Control: The organization: 

a. Provides the capability of shutting off power to the information system or individual system 

components in emergency situations; 

b. Places emergency shutoff switches or devices in [Assignment: organization-defined location 

by information system or system component] to facilitate safe and easy access for personnel; 

and 

c. Protects emergency power shutoff capability from unauthorized activation. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to facilities containing concentrations of information 

system resources including, for example, data centers, server rooms, and mainframe computer 

rooms. Related control: PE-15. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) EMERGENCY SHUTOFF | ACCIDENTAL / UNAUTHORIZED ACTIVATION

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PE-10]. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD PE-10 HIGH PE-10

PE-11 EMERGENCY POWER 

Control: The organization provides a short-term uninterruptible power supply to facilitate 

[Selection (one or more): an orderly shutdown of the information system; transition of the 

information system to long-term alternate power] in the event of a primary power source loss. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AT-3, CP-2, CP-7. 

 
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Control Enhancements:

(1) EMERGENCY POWER | LONG-TERM ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY - MINIMAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY 

The organization provides a long-term alternate power supply for the information system that is 

capable of maintaining minimally required operational capability in the event of an extended loss of 

the primary power source. 

Supplemental Guidance: Long-term alternate power supplies for the information system can be 

either manually or automatically activated.

(2) EMERGENCY POWER | LONG-TERM ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY - SELF-CONTAINED

The organization provides a long-term alternate power supply for the information system that is: 

(a) Self-contained; 

(b) Not reliant on external power generation; and 

(c) Capable of maintaining [Selection: minimally required operational capability; full operational 

capability] in the event of an extended loss of the primary power source. 

Supplemental Guidance: Long-term alternate power supplies for organizational information 

systems are either manually or automatically activated.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD PE-11 HIGH PE-11 (1)

PE-12 EMERGENCY LIGHTING 

Control: The organization employs and maintains automatic emergency lighting for the 

information system that activates in the event of a power outage or disruption and that covers 

emergency exits and evacuation routes within the facility. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CP-2, CP-7. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) EMERGENCY LIGHTING | ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS

The organization provides emergency lighting for all areas within the facility supporting essential 

missions and business functions.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PE-12 MOD PE-12 HIGH PE-12

PE-13 FIRE PROTECTION 

Control: The organization employs and maintains fire suppression and detection devices/systems 

for the information system that are supported by an independent energy source. 

Supplemental Guidance: Fire suppression and detection devices/systems include, for example, 

sprinkler systems, handheld fire extinguishers, fixed fire hoses, and smoke detectors. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) FIRE PROTECTION | DETECTION DEVICES / SYSTEMS 

The organization employs fire detection devices/systems for the information system that activate 

automatically and notify the organization and emergency responders in the event of a fire. 

 
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(2) FIRE PROTECTION | SUPPRESSION DEVICES / SYSTEMS 

The organization employs fire suppression devices/systems for the information system that 

provide automatic notification of any activation to the organization and emergency responders. 

(3) FIRE PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC FIRE SUPPRESSION 

The organization employs an automatic fire suppression capability for the information system 

when the facility is not staffed on a continuous basis. 

(4) FIRE PROTECTION | INSPECTIONS 

The organization ensures that the facility undergoes [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] 

inspections by authorized and qualified inspectors and resolves identified deficiencies within 

[Assignment: organization-defined time period]. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PE-13 MOD PE-13 (1) (2) (3) HIGH PE-13 (1) (2) (3)

PE-14 TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY CONTROLS 

Control: The organization: 

a. Maintains temperature and humidity levels within the facility where the information system 

resides at [Assignment: organization-defined acceptable levels]; and 

b. Monitors temperature and humidity levels [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Temperature and humidity controls typically apply to facilities containing 

concentrations of information system resources, for example, data centers, server rooms, and 

mainframe computer rooms. Related control: AT-3. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY CONTROLS | AUTOMATIC CONTROLS 

The organization employs automatic temperature and humidity controls in the facility to prevent 

fluctuations potentially harmful to the information system.

(2) TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY CONTROLS | MONITORING WITH ALARMS / NOTIFICATIONS 

The organization employs temperature and humidity monitoring that provides an alarm or 

notification of changes potentially harmful to personnel or equipment.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PE-14 MOD PE-14 HIGH PE-14

PE-15 WATER DAMAGE PROTECTION 

Control: The organization protects the information system from damage resulting from water 

leakage by providing master shutoff or isolation valves that are accessible, working properly, and 

known to key personnel. 

Supplemental Guidance: Isolation values can be employed in lieu of master shutoff values to shut 

off water supplies in specific areas of concern, without affecting entire organizations. Related 

control: AT-3. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) WATER DAMAGE PROTECTION | AUTOMATION SUPPORT 

The organization employs automated mechanisms to protect the information system from water 

damage. 
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References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PE-15 MOD PE-15 HIGH PE-15 (1)

PE-16 DELIVERY AND REMOVAL 

Control: The organization authorizes, monitors, and controls [Assignment: organization-defined 

types of information system components] entering and exiting the facility and maintains records of 

those items. 

Supplemental Guidance: Effectively enforcing authorizations for entry and exit of information 

system components may require restricting access to delivery areas and possibly isolating the 

areas from the information system and media libraries. Related controls: CM-3, MA-2, MA-3, 

MP-5, SA-12. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PE-16 MOD PE-16 HIGH PE-16

PE-17 ALTERNATE WORK SITE 

Control: The organization: 

a. Employs [Assignment: organization-defined security controls] at alternate work sites; 

b. Assesses as feasible, the effectiveness of security controls at alternate work sites; and 

c. Provides a means for employees to communicate with information security personnel in case 

of security incidents or problems. 

Supplemental Guidance: Alternate work sites may include, for example, government facilities or 

private residences of employees. While commonly distinct from alternative processing sites, 

alternate work sites may provide readily available alternate locations as part of contingency 

operations. Organizations may define different sets of security controls for specific alternate work 

sites or types of sites depending on the work-related activities conducted at those sites. This 

control supports the contingency planning activities of organizations and the federal telework 

initiative. Related controls: AC-17, CP-7. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-46.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD PE-17 HIGH PE-17

PE-18 LOCATION OF INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS 

Control: The organization positions information system components within the facility to minimize 

potential damage from physical and environmental hazards and to minimize the opportunity for 

unauthorized access. 
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Supplemental Guidance: Physical and environmental hazards include, for example, flooding, fire, 

tornados, earthquakes, hurricanes, acts of terrorism, vandalism, electromagnetic pulse, electrical 

interference, and other forms of incoming electromagnetic radiation. In addition, organizations 

consider the location of physical entry points where unauthorized individuals, while not being 

granted access, might nonetheless be in close proximity to information systems and therefore, 

increase the potential for unauthorized access to organizational communications (e.g., through the 

use of wireless sniffers or microphones). Related controls: CP-2, PE-19, RA-3. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) LOCATION OF INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS | FACILITY SITE

The organization plans the location or site of the facility where the information system resides with 

regard to physical and environmental hazards and for existing facilities, considers the physical and 

environmental hazards in its risk mitigation strategy. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: PM-8.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD PE-18 (1) HIGH PE-18 (1)

PE-19 INFORMATION LEAKAGE 

Control: The organization protects the information system from information leakage due to 

electromagnetic signals emanations. 

Supplemental Guidance: Security categories or classifications of information systems (with respect 

to confidentiality) and organizational security policies guide the selection of security controls 

employed to protect systems against information leakage due to electromagnetic signals 

emanations. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) INFORMATION LEAKAGE | NATIONAL EMISSIONS / TEMPEST POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 

The organization ensures that information system components, associated data communications, 

and networks are protected in accordance with national emissions and TEMPEST policies and 

procedures based on the security category or classification of the information. 

References: FIPS Publication 199.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

PE-20 PORT AND I/O DEVICE ACCESS 

Control: The organization physically disables or removes [Assignment: organization-defined 

connection ports or input/output devices] on [Assignment: organization-defined information 

systems or information system components]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Connection ports include, for example, Universal Serial Bus (USB) and 

Firewire (IEEE 1394). Input/output (I/O) devices include, for example, Compact Disk (CD) and 

Digital Video Disk (DVD) drives. Physically disabling or removing such connection ports and I/O 

devices helps prevent exfiltration of information from information systems and the introduction of 

malware into systems from those ports/devices.

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.
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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected
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FAMILY: PLANNING 

PL-1 SECURITY PLANNING POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization develops, disseminates, and reviews/updates [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]: 

a. A formal, documented security planning policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 

responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and 

compliance; and 

b. Formal, documented procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security planning 

policy and associated security planning controls. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the PL family. 

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations. The procedures 

can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if 

needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and 

procedures. Related control: PM-9. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-18, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PL-1 MOD PL-1 HIGH PL-1

PL-2 SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN 

Control: The organization: 

a. Develops a security plan for the information system that: 

- Is consistent with the organization’s enterprise architecture; 

- Explicitly defines the authorization boundary for the system; 

- Describes the operational context of the information system in terms of missions and 

business processes; 

- Provides the security categorization of the information system including supporting 

rationale; 

- Describes the operational environment for the information system; 

- Describes relationships with or connections to other information systems; 

- Provides an overview of the security requirements for the system; 

- Describes the security controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements 

including a rationale for the tailoring and supplementation decisions; and 

- Is reviewed and approved by the authorizing official or designated representative prior to 

plan implementation; 

b. Distributes copies of the security plan to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel 

(identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements]; 
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c. Reviews the security plan for the information system [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency]; 

d. Updates the plan to address changes to the information system/environment of operation or 

problems identified during plan implementation or security control assessments; and 

e. Communicates security plan changes to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel 

(identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Security plans relate security requirements to a set of security controls and 

control enhancements. Security plans also define the intent of the security controls and control 

enhancements with regard to meeting those security requirements but do not provide descriptions 

of the specific design or implementation of the controls/enhancements. Security plans contain 

sufficient information (including the specification of parameter values for assignment/selection 

statements in security controls and control enhancements either explicitly or by reference) to 

enable a design and implementation that is unambiguously compliant with the intent of the plans 

and subsequent determinations of risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other 

organizations, and the Nation if the plan is implemented as intended. Effective security plans make 

extensive use of references (i.e., pointers) to policies, procedures, and additional documents (e.g., 

design and implementation specifications) where more detailed information is contained. This 

reduces the documentation requirements associated with security programs and maintains securityrelated information in other management and operational areas related to enterprise architecture 

and system development life cycle activities. For example, security plans typically do not contain 

detailed contingency/incident response plan information but instead provide explicitly or by 

reference, sufficient information in order to define what needs to be accomplished by those plans. 

Related controls: AC-2, AC-6, AC-14, AC-17, AC-20, CA-2, CA-3, CA-7, CM-9, CP-2, IR-8, 

MA-4, MA-5, PL-7, PM-1, PM-7, PM-8, PM-9, PM-11, SA-5. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN | CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-7].

(2) SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN | FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-8].

(3) SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN | PLAN / COORDINATE WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITIES 

The organization plans and coordinates security-related activities affecting the information system 

before conducting such activities in order to reduce the impact on other organizational entities. 

Supplemental Guidance: Security-related activities include, for example, security assessments, 

audits, information system hardware and software maintenance, and contingency plan testing. 

Advance planning and coordination includes emergency and nonemergency (i.e., planned or 

nonurgent unplanned) situations. Related controls: CP-4, IR-4. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-18.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PL-2 MOD PL-2 (3) HIGH PL-2 (3)

PL-3 SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN UPDATE 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-2].
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PL-4 RULES OF BEHAVIOR 

Control: The organization: 

a. Establishes and makes readily available to all individuals using the information system, the 

rules that describe their responsibilities and expected behavior with regard to information and 

information system usage; and 

b. Receives signed acknowledgment from users indicating that they have read, understand, and 

agree to abide by the rules of behavior, before authorizing access to information and the 

information system. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to organizational users. Organizational 

users are employees or individuals deemed to have equivalent status of employees including, for 

example, contractors, guest researchers, individuals detailed from other organizations, and/or 

individuals from allied nations. Organizations consider rules of behavior based on user roles and 

responsibilities, differentiating, for example, between rules that apply to privileged users and rules 

that apply to general users. Establishing rules of behavior for some types of non-organizational 

users including, for example, individuals who simply receive data/information from federal 

information systems, is often not feasible given the large number of such users and the limited 

nature of their interactions with the systems. Rules of behavior for both organizational and nonorganizational users can also be established in AC-8, System Use Notification. Organizations can 

use electronic signatures for acknowledging rules of behavior. Related controls: AC-8, IA-2, IA-4, 

PS-6. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) RULES OF BEHAVIOR | SOCIAL MEDIA AND NETWORKING RESTRICTIONS 

The organization includes in the rules of behavior, explicit restrictions on the use of social media 

and networking sites, posting information on commercial websites, and sharing information 

system account information. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses rules of behavior related to use of 

social media and networking sites: (i) when using such media and sites for official duties; (ii) 

when organizational information is involved in the social media/networking transactions; and 

(iii) when accessing social media /networking sites from organizational information systems. 

Organizations also address specific rules that prevent the ability to obtain, or infer, non-public 

organizational information from such sites.

References: NIST Publication 800-18.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PL-4 MOD PL-4 (1) HIGH PL-4 (1)

PL-5 PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into Appendix J, AR-2]. 

PL-6 SECURITY-RELATED ACTIVITY PLANNING 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-2]. 
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PL-7 SECURITY CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 

Control: The organization: 

a. Develops a security Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the information system containing 

at a minimum, how the organization intends to operate the system from the perspective of 

information security; and 

b. Reviews and updates the CONOPS [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. 

Supplemental Guidance: The security CONOPS may be included in the security plan for the 

information system or in other system development life cycle-related documents, as appropriate. 

Related control: PL-2. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

PL-8 SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 

Control: The organization develops an information security architecture for the information system 

that: 

a. Describes the overall philosophy and approach to be taken with regard to protecting the 

confidentiality, integrity, and availability of organizational information; and 

b. Describes how the security architecture is integrated into and supports the enterprise 

architecture. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses actions taken by organizations in the design and 

development of information systems. The information security architecture at the individual 

information system level is consistent with and complements the more global, organization-wide 

information security architecture described in PM-7 that is integral to and developed as part of the 

enterprise architecture. The information security architecture includes an architectural description, 

the placement/allocation of security functionality, security-related information for external 

interfaces, information being exchanged across the interfaces, and the protection mechanisms 

associated with each interface. Establishing, developing, documenting, and maintaining under 

strict configuration control, a baseline configuration for organizational information systems is 

critical to implementing and maintaining an effective information security architecture. The 

information security architecture development is coordinated with the Senior Agency Official for 

Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) to ensure that security controls needed to support 

privacy requirements are identified and effectively implemented. PL-8 is primarily directed at 

organizations (i.e., internally focused) to help ensure that organizations develop an information 

security architecture for the information system and that the security architecture is integrated with 

or tightly coupled to the enterprise architecture through the organization-wide information security 

architecture. In contrast, SA-17 is primarily directed at external information system or information 

technology product developers (although SA-17 could be used internally within organizations for 

in-house development). SA-17, which is complementary to PL-8, is selected when organizations 

outsource the development of information systems or information system components to external 

entities and there is a need to demonstrate/show consistency with the organization’s enterprise 

architecture and information security architecture. Related controls: CM-2, CM-6, PM-7, SA-5, 

SA-17, Appendix J. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

 
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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected
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FAMILY: PERSONNEL SECURITY

PS-1 PERSONNEL SECURITY POLICY AND PROCEDURES 

Control: The organization develops, disseminates, and reviews/updates [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]: 

a. A formal, documented personnel security policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 

responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and 

compliance; and 

b. Formal, documented procedures to facilitate the implementation of the personnel security 

policy and associated personnel security controls. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the PS family. 

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations. The procedures 

can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if 

needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and 

procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PS-1 MOD PS-1 HIGH PS-1

PS-2 POSITION CATEGORIZATION 

Control: The organization: 

a. Assigns a risk designation to all positions;

b. Establishes screening criteria for individuals filling those positions; and

c. Reviews and revises position risk designations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: Position risk designations reflect Office of Personnel Management policy 

and guidance. Position screening criteria include explicit information security role appointment 

requirements (e.g., training, security clearances). Related controls: AT-3, PL-2, PS-3. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: 5 C.F.R. 731.106(a).

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PS-2 MOD PS-2 HIGH PS-2

PS-3 PERSONNEL SCREENING 

Control: The organization: 

a. Screens individuals prior to authorizing access to the information system; and 
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b. Rescreens individuals according to [Assignment: organization-defined conditions requiring 

rescreening and, where re-screening is so indicated, the frequency of such rescreening]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Personnel screening and rescreening activities reflect applicable federal 

laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, guidance, and specific criteria 

established for the risk designations of assigned positions. Organizations may define different 

rescreening conditions and frequencies for personnel accessing information systems based on 

types of information processed, stored, or transmitted by the systems. Related controls: AC-2, IA4, PE-2, PS-2. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) PERSONNEL SCREENING | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 

The organization ensures that every individual accessing an information system processing, 

storing, or transmitting classified information is cleared and indoctrinated to the highest 

classification level of the information on the system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AC-3, AC-4.

(2) PERSONNEL SCREENING | FORMAL INDOCTRINATION 

The organization ensures that every individual accessing an information system processing, 

storing, or transmitting types of classified information which require formal indoctrination, is 

formally indoctrinated for all of the relevant types of information on the system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Types of classified information requiring formal indoctrination 

include, for example, Special Access Program (SAP), Restricted Data (RD), and Sensitive 

Compartment Information (SCI). Related controls: AC-3, AC-4.

(3) PERSONNEL SCREENING | ADDITIONAL SCREENING CRITERIA 

The organization establishes and employs [Assignment: organization-defined additional screening 

criteria and processes] for individuals who have access to [Assignment: organization-defined 

information and information systems that process, store or transmit that information]. 

(4) PERSONNEL SCREENING | INFORMATION WITH SPECIAL PROTECTION MEASURES 

The organization ensures that access to information requiring special protection is granted only to 

individuals who: 

(a) Have a valid access authorization that is demonstrated by assigned official government 

duties; and 

(b) Satisfy associated personnel security criteria. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational information requiring special protection includes, for 

example, privacy information, proprietary information, and Sources and Methods Information 

(SAMI). Personnel security criteria include, for example, position sensitivity background 

screening requirements.

References: 5 C.F.R. 731.106; FIPS Publications 199, 201; NIST Special Publications 800-73, 

800-76, 800-78; ICD 704.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PS-3 MOD PS-3 HIGH PS-3

PS-4 PERSONNEL TERMINATION 

Control: The organization, upon termination of individual employment: 

a. Terminates information system access [Assignment: organization-defined time period] 

following the termination action; 

b. Includes [Assignment: organization-defined information security items] in exit interviews; 

c. Retrieves all security-related organizational information system-related property; and 
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d. Retains access to organizational information and information systems formerly controlled by 

terminated individual. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information system-related property includes, for example, hardware 

authentication tokens, system administration technical manuals, keys, identification cards, and 

building passes. Exit interviews ensure that individuals understand any security constraints 

imposed by being former employees and that proper accountability is achieved for information 

system-related property. Exit interviews may not be possible for some employees (e.g., in cases 

related to job abandonment, illnesses, and nonavailability of supervisors). Exit interviews are 

important for individuals with security clearances. Timely execution of termination actions is 

essential for employees or contractors terminated for cause. Related controls: AC-2, IA-4, PE-2, 

PS-5. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) PERSONNEL TERMINATION | POST-EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS

The organization: 

(a) Notifies employees of applicable, legally-binding post-employment requirements for 

protection of organizational information; 

(b) Requires employees to sign an acknowledgment of these requirements as part of granting 

initial access to covered information; 

(c) Requires employees to re-sign the acknowledgment [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency]; and 

(d) Requires terminated employees to re-sign the acknowledgment as part of the organizational 

termination process. 

(2) PERSONNEL TERMINATION | AUTOMATED NOTIFICATION

The organization employs automated mechanisms to notify [Assignment: organization-defined 

personnel, positions, and/or roles] upon termination of an employee. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW PS-4 MOD PS-4 HIGH PS-4 (1) (2)

PS-5 PERSONNEL TRANSFER 

Control: The organization: 

a. Reviews logical and physical access authorizations to information systems/facilities when 

individuals are reassigned or transferred to other positions within the organization; 

b. Initiates [Assignment: organization-defined transfer or reassignment actions] within 

[Assignment: organization-defined time period following the formal transfer action]; 

c. Confirms on-going operational need for current access authorizations; and 

d. Modifies access authorization as needed to correspond with any changes in operational need 

due to reassignment or transfer. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies when reassignments or transfers of employees are 

permanent or of such extended durations as to make the actions warranted. Organizations define 

actions appropriate for the types of reassignments or transfers, whether permanent or extended. 

Actions that may be required for personnel transfers or reassignments to other positions within 

organizations include, for example: (i) returning old and issuing new keys, identification cards, 

and building passes; (ii) closing information system accounts and establishing new accounts; (iii) 

changing information system access authorizations (i.e., privileges); and (iv) providing for access 

to official records to which employees had access at previous work locations and in previous 

information system accounts. Related controls: AC-2, IA-4, PE-2, PS-4. 
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Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW PS-5 MOD PS-5 HIGH PS-5

PS-6 ACCESS AGREEMENTS 

Control: The organization: 

a. Ensures that individuals requiring access to organizational information and information 

systems sign appropriate access agreements prior to being granted access; and 

b. Reviews/updates the access agreements [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Access agreements include, for example, nondisclosure agreements, 

acceptable use agreements, rules of behavior, and conflict-of-interest agreements. Signed access 

agreements include an acknowledgement that individuals have read, understand, and agree to 

abide by the constraints associated with organizational information systems to which access is 

authorized. Organizations can use electronic signatures to acknowledge access agreements unless 

specifically prohibited by organizational policy. Related control: PL-4, PS-2, PS-3, PS-8. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) ACCESS AGREEMENTS | INFORMATION REQUIRING SPECIAL PROTECTION 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PS-3].

(2) ACCESS AGREEMENTS | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REQUIRING SPECIAL PROTECTION 

The organization ensures that access to classified information requiring special protection is 

granted only to individuals who: 

(a) Have a valid access authorization that is demonstrated by assigned official government 

duties; 

(b) Satisfy associated personnel security criteria; and 

(c) Have read, understand, and signed a nondisclosure agreement. 

Supplemental Guidance: Classified information requiring special protection includes, for 

example, collateral information, Special Access Program (SAP) information, and Sensitive 

Compartmented Information (SCI). Personnel security criteria reflect applicable federal laws, 

Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Related control: 

PS-3.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P3 LOW PS-6 MOD PS-6 HIGH PS-6

PS-7 THIRD-PARTY PERSONNEL SECURITY 

Control: The organization: 

a. Establishes personnel security requirements including security roles and responsibilities for 

third-party providers; 

b. Requires third-party providers to comply with personnel security policies and procedures of 

the organization; 

c. Documents personnel security requirements; and 
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d. Monitors provider compliance. 

Supplemental Guidance: Third-party providers include, for example, service bureaus, contractors, 

and other organizations providing information system development, information technology 

services, outsourced applications, and network and security management. Organizations explicitly 

include personnel security requirements in acquisition-related documents. Related controls: PS-2, 

PS-3, PS-6, SA-9. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) THIRD-PARTY PERSONNEL SECURITY | NOTIFICATIONS

The organization requires third-party providers to notify [Assignment: organization-defined 

personnel] of any personnel transfers or terminations of third-party personnel working at 

organizational facilities with organizational credentials, badges, or information system privileges 

within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Third-party providers may have personnel working at organizational 

facilities with credentials, badges, or information system privileges issued by organizations. 

Third-party notifications of personnel changes ensure appropriate termination of privileges 

and credentials. Organizations define the transfers and terminations deemed reportable by 

security-related characteristics that include, for example, functions, roles, and nature of 

credentials/privileges associated with individuals transferred or terminated. Related controls: 

PS-4, PS-5, SA-9.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-35.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PS-7 MOD PS-7 (1) HIGH PS-7 (1)

PS-8 PERSONNEL SANCTIONS 

Control: The organization employs a formal sanctions process for personnel failing to comply with 

established information security policies and procedures. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational sanctions processes reflect applicable federal laws, 

Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Sanctions processes 

are described in access agreements and can be included as part of general personnel policies and 

procedures for organizations. Related controls: PL-4, PS-6. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

(1) PERSONNEL SANCTIONS | NOTIFICATIONS

The organization notifies [Assignment: organization-defined individuals, functions, and/or roles] of 

the application of a formal employee sanctions process, identifying the individual sanctioned and 

the reason for the sanction. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P3 LOW PS-8 MOD PS-8 (1) HIGH PS-8 (1)
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FAMILY: RISK ASSESSMENT 

RA-1 RISK ASSESSMENT POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization develops, disseminates, and reviews/updates [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]: 

a. A formal, documented risk assessment policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 

responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and 

compliance; and 

b. Formal, documented procedures to facilitate the implementation of the risk assessment policy 

and associated risk assessment controls. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the RA family. 

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations. The procedures 

can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if 

needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and 

procedures. Related control: PM-9. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-30,800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW RA-1 MOD RA-1 HIGH RA-1

RA-2 SECURITY CATEGORIZATION 

Control: The organization: 

a. Categorizes information and the information system in accordance with applicable federal 

laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance; 

b. Documents the security categorization results (including supporting rationale) in the security 

plan for the information system; and 

c. Ensures the security categorization decision is reviewed and approved by the authorizing 

official or authorizing official designated representative. 

Supplemental Guidance: Clearly defined authorization boundaries are a prerequisite for effective 

security categorization decisions. Security categories describe the potential adverse impacts to 

organizational operations, organizational assets, and individuals if organizational information and 

information systems are comprised through a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability. 

Organizations conduct the security categorization process as an organization-wide activity with 

the involvement of chief information officers, senior information security officers, information 

system owners, mission/business owners, and information owners/stewards. Organizations also 

consider the potential adverse impacts to other organizations and, in accordance with the USA 

PATRIOT Act of 2001 and Homeland Security Presidential Directives, potential national-level 

adverse impacts. Security categorization processes carried out by organizations, facilitate the 

development of inventories of information assets, and along with CM-8, mappings to specific 

information system components where information is processed, stored, or transmitted. Related 

controls: CM-8, MP-4, RA-3, SC-7. 

Control Enhancements: None. 
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 References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-30, 800-39, 800-60.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW RA-2 MOD RA-2 HIGH RA-2

RA-3 RISK ASSESSMENT 

Control: The organization: 

a. Conducts an assessment of risk, including the likelihood and magnitude of harm, from the 

unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of the 

information system and the information it processes, stores, or transmits; 

b. Documents risk assessment results in [Selection: security plan; risk assessment report;

[Assignment: organization-defined document]]; 

c. Reviews risk assessment results [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and 

d. Updates the risk assessment [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] or whenever there 

are significant changes to the information system or environment of operation (including the 

identification of new threats and vulnerabilities), or other conditions that may impact the 

security state of the system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Clearly defined authorization boundaries are a prerequisite for effective 

risk assessments. Risk assessments take into account threats, vulnerabilities, likelihood, and 

impact to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation 

based on the operation and use of information systems. Risk assessments also take into account 

risk from external parties (e.g., service providers, contractors operating information systems on 

behalf of the organization, individuals accessing organizational information systems, outsourcing 

entities). In accordance with OMB policy and related E-authentication initiatives, authentication of 

public users accessing federal information systems may also be required to protect nonpublic or 

privacy-related information. As such, organizational assessments of risk also address public access 

to federal information systems. 

Risk assessments (formal or informal) can be conducted at all three tiers in the risk management 

hierarchy (i.e., organization level, mission/business process level, or information system level). 

Risk assessments can also be conducted at various steps in the Risk Management Framework, 

including, security categorization, security control selection, security control implementation, 

security control assessment, information system authorization, and security control monitoring. 

RA-3 is noteworthy in that the control must be partially implemented prior to the implementation 

of other controls in order to complete the first two steps in the Risk Management Framework. 

Risk assessments can play an important role in security control selection processes particularly 

during the application of tailoring guidance, which includes security control supplementation. 

Related controls: RA-2, PM-9. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-30, 800-39.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW RA-3 MOD RA-3 HIGH RA-3
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RA-4 RISK ASSESSMENT UPDATE 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into RA-3]. 

RA-5 VULNERABILITY SCANNING 

Control: The organization: 

a. Scans for vulnerabilities in the information system and hosted applications [Assignment: 

organization-defined frequency and/or randomly in accordance with organization-defined 

process] and when new vulnerabilities potentially affecting the system/applications are 

identified and reported; 

b. Employs vulnerability scanning tools and techniques that promote interoperability among 

tools and automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using standards for: 

- Enumerating platforms, software flaws, and improper configurations; 

- Formatting and making transparent, checklists and test procedures; and 

- Measuring vulnerability impact; 

c. Analyzes vulnerability scan reports and results from security control assessments; 

d. Remediates legitimate vulnerabilities [Assignment: organization-defined response times] in 

accordance with an organizational assessment of risk; and 

e. Shares information obtained from the vulnerability scanning process and security control 

assessments with [Assignment: organization-defined personnel] to help eliminate similar 

vulnerabilities in other information systems (i.e., systemic weaknesses or deficiencies). 

Supplemental Guidance: Security categorization of information systems guides the frequency and 

comprehensiveness of vulnerability scans. Organization determine the required vulnerability 

scanning for all information system components, ensuring that potential sources of vulnerabilities 

such as networked printers, scanners, and copiers are not overlooked. Vulnerability analyses for 

custom software applications may require additional approaches such as static analysis, dynamic 

analysis, binary analysis, or hybrid of the three approaches. Organizations can employ these 

analysis approaches in a variety of tools (e.g., web-based application scanners, static analysis 

tools, binary analyzers) and in source code reviews. Vulnerability scanning includes, for example: 

(i) scanning for patch levels; (ii) scanning for functions, ports, protocols, and services that should 

not be accessible to users or devices; and (iii) scanning for improperly configured or incorrectly 

operating information flow control mechanisms. Organizations consider using tools that express 

vulnerabilities in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) naming convention and that 

use the Open Vulnerability Assessment Language (OVAL) to determine/test for the presence of 

vulnerabilities. Suggested sources for vulnerability information include the Common Weakness 

Enumeration (CWE) listing and the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). In addition, security 

control assessments such as red team exercises provide other sources of potential vulnerabilities 

for which to scan. Organizations also consider using tools that express vulnerability impact by the 

Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). Related controls: CA-2, CA-7, CM-4, CM-6, 

RA-2, RA-3, SA-11, SI-2. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | UPDATE TOOL CAPABILITY

The organization employs vulnerability scanning tools that include the capability to readily update 

the information system vulnerabilities to be scanned. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: SI-3, SI-7.

(2) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | UPDATE BY FREQUENCY / WHEN IDENTIFIED

The organization updates the information system vulnerabilities scanned [Assignment: 

organization-defined frequency] or when new vulnerabilities are identified and reported. 
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Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: SI-3, SI-5.

(3) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | BREADTH /DEPTH OF COVERAGE 

The organization employs vulnerability scanning procedures that can demonstrate the breadth and 

depth of coverage (i.e., information system components scanned and vulnerabilities checked). 

(4) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | DISCOVERABLE INFORMATION 

The organization attempts to discern what information about the information system is 

discoverable by adversaries. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: AU-13.

(5) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | PRIVILEGED ACCESS 

The organization includes privileged access authorization to [Assignment: organization-identified 

information system components] for selected [Assignment: organization-defined vulnerability 

scanning activities] to facilitate more thorough scanning. 

(6) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | AUTOMATED TREND ANALYSES 

The organization employs automated mechanisms to compare the results of vulnerability scans 

over time to determine trends in information system vulnerabilities. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: IR-4, IR-5, SI-4.

(7) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | AUTOMATED DETECTION AND NOTIFICATION OF UNAUTHORIZED COMPONENTS

The organization employs automated mechanisms [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] 

to detect the presence of unauthorized hardware, software, and firmware on organizational 

information systems and notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CM-2, CM-8, SI-3, SI-7.

(8) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | REVIEW HISTORIC AUDIT LOGS

The organization reviews historic audit logs to determine if a vulnerability identified in the 

information system has been previously exploited. 

(9) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | PENETRATION TESTING AND ANALYSES 

The organization employs an independent penetration agent or penetration team to: 

(a) Conduct a vulnerability analysis on the information system; and 

(b) Perform penetration testing on the information system based on the vulnerability analysis to 

determine the exploitability of identified vulnerabilities. 

Supplemental Guidance: A standard method for penetration testing includes: (i) pre-test analysis 

based on full knowledge of the target information system; (ii) pre-test identification of 

potential vulnerabilities based on pre-test analysis; and (iii) testing designed to determine 

exploitability of identified vulnerabilities. Detailed rules of engagement are agreed upon by 

all parties before the commencement of any penetration testing scenarios. Related control: 

SA-12.

(10) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | CORRELATE SCANNING INFORMATION 

The organization correlates the output from vulnerability scanning tools to determine the presence 

of multi-vulnerability/multi-hop attack vectors. 

References: NIST Special Publications 800-40, 800-70, 800-115; Web: CWE.MITRE.ORG; 

NVD.NIST.GOV.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW RA-5 MOD RA-5 (1) HIGH RA-5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7)
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FAMILY: SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION 

SA-1 SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization develops, disseminates, and reviews/updates [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]: 

a. A formal, documented system and services acquisition policy that includes information 

security considerations and that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management 

commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and 

b. Formal, documented procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and services 

acquisition policy and associated system and services acquisition controls. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the SA family. 

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations. The procedures 

can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if 

needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and 

procedures. Related control: PM-9. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SA-1 MOD SA-1 HIGH SA-1

SA-2 ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES 

Control: The organization: 

a. Determines information security requirements for the information system in mission/business 

process planning; 

b. Determines, documents, and allocates the resources required to protect the information system 

as part of its capital planning and investment control process; and 

c. Establishes a discrete line item for information security in organizational programming and 

budgeting documentation. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: PM-3, PM-11. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-65.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SA-2 MOD SA-2 HIGH SA-2
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SA-3 SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE 

Control: The organization: 

a. Manages the information system using a documented system development life cycle 

methodology that incorporates information security considerations; 

b. Defines and documents information security roles and responsibilities throughout the system 

development life cycle; 

c. Identifies individuals having information security roles and responsibilities; and 

d. Integrates the organizational information security risk management process into the system 

development life cycle activities. 

Supplemental Guidance: To apply needed security controls within the system development life cycle 

(including the acquisition process) requires a basic understanding of information security, threats, 

vulnerabilities, and risk to critical missions/business functions. The security engineering principles 

described in SA-8 cannot be properly applied if individuals that design, code, and test information 

systems and system components (including information technology products that are used to build 

those systems/components) do not understand security. Therefore, organizations include qualified 

personnel, for example, chief information security officers, security architects, security engineers, 

and information system security officers in system development life cycle activities to ensure that 

security requirements are incorporated into organizational information systems. It is also equally 

important that developers include individuals on the development team that possess the requisite 

security expertise and skills to ensure needed security capabilities are effectively integrated into 

the information system. Security awareness and training programs can help ensure that individuals 

having key security roles and responsibilities have the appropriate experience, skills, and expertise 

to conduct assigned system development life cycle activities. The effective integration of security 

requirements into the enterprise architecture helps to ensure that important security considerations 

are addressed early in the system development life cycle—and those considerations are directly 

related to the mission/business processes defined by organizations. This requirements integration 

process also facilitates the integration of the information security architecture into the enterprise 

architecture, consistent with organizational risk management and information security strategies. 

Related controls: AT-3, PM-7, SA-8. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-64.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SA-3 MOD SA-3 HIGH SA-3

SA-4 ACQUISITION PROCESS 

Control: The organization includes the following requirements, descriptions, and criteria, either 

explicitly or by reference, in information system acquisition contracts based on applicable federal 

laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, guidelines, and organizational 

mission/business needs: 

a. Security functional requirements; 

b. Security strength requirements; 

c. Security assurance requirements; 

d. Security-related documentation requirements; 

e. Description of the information system development environment and environment in which 

the system is intended to operate; and 
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f. Acceptance criteria. 

Supplemental Guidance: Security functional requirements include security capabilities, security 

functions, and security mechanisms. Security strength requirements with regard to capabilities, 

functions, and mechanisms include degree of correctness, completeness, resistance to direct attack, 

and resistance to tampering or bypass. Security-related documentation requirements address all 

phases of the system development life cycle including design, development, implementation, 

operation, and disposal. Security assurance requirements include: (i) development processes, 

procedures, practices, methodologies, and techniques supporting achievement of requirements for 

security functionality and security strength; and (ii) supporting evidence from development and 

assessment activities providing grounds for confidence that required security functionality has 

been implemented and required security strength has been achieved). Information systems include 

the information technology products (i.e., hardware, software, and firmware) that compose those 

systems. Information system developer is a general term that includes developers or manufacturers 

of information technology products (including hardware, software, firmware), systems integrators, 

vendors, and product resellers. Security functionality, assurance, and documentation requirements 

are expressed as security controls. Requirements in acquisition documents permit the updating of 

security controls as new threats and vulnerabilities are identified and as new technologies are 

implemented. Information system documentation provides user and administrator guidance 

regarding the effective implementation/operation of security controls. The level of detail required 

in security-related documentation is based on the security category or classification level of the 

information system and the degree to which organizations depend on the stated security capability 

to meet overall risk response expectations (as defined in the organizational risk management 

strategy). Security requirements also include organizationally mandated configuration settings 

specifying allowed functions, ports, protocols, and services. Related controls: CM-6, PL-2, PS-7, 

SA-3, SA-5, SA-8, SA-11. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) ACQUISITION PROCESS | FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIES OF SECURITY CONTROLS 

The organization requires that developers provide a description of the functional properties of the 

security controls to be employed within the information system, information system components, 

or information system services. 

Supplemental Guidance: Functional properties of security controls describe the functionality 

(i.e., security capability, functions, mechanisms) visible at the interfaces of the controls and 

specifically exclude functionality and structures internal to the operation of the controls. The 

purpose of this control enhancement is to ensure that development processes produce design 

that increases the likelihood of greater security strength. In contrast, the purpose of SA-5 is to 

ensure that documentation is available to facilitate organizational understanding of testing, 

implementation, and/or operational issues associated with deployed security controls. Related 

control: SA-5. 

(2) ACQUISITION PROCESS | DESIGN / IMPLEMENTATION INFORMATION FOR SECURITY CONTROLS 

The organization requires that developers provide design and implementation information for the 

security controls to be employed within the information system, information system components, 

or information system services at the following level of detail: [Selection (one or more): high-level 

design in terms of subsystems; low-level design in terms of modules; source-code/hardware 

schematics; [Assignment: organization-defined level of detail]]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may require different levels of detail in design and 

implementation documentation for security controls employed in organizational information 

systems, system components, and/or system services based on mission/business requirements, 

requirements for trustworthiness and resiliency, and requirements for analysis and testing. The 

purpose of this control enhancement is to ensure that development processes produce design 

that increases the likelihood of greater security strength. In contrast, the purpose of SA-5 is to 

ensure that documentation is available to facilitate organizational understanding of testing, 

implementation, and/or operational issues associated with deployed security controls. Related 

control: SA-5.

 
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(3) ACQUISITION PROCESS | DEVELOPMENT METHODS / TECHNIQUES / PRACTICES 

The organization requires that developers demonstrate that their development processes follow a 

system development life cycle approach that employs [Assignment: organization-defined state-ofthe-practice system and security engineering methods, software development methods, quality 

control processes, and validation techniques] to reduce vulnerabilities in hardware, software, or 

firmware components within the information system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SA-12.

(4) ACQUISITION PROCESS | ASSIGNMENT OF COMPONENTS TO SYSTEMS 

The organization ensures that [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] 

acquired are explicitly assigned to an information system, and that the owner of the system 

acknowledges this assignment. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations determine the types of information system components 

(e.g., microprocessors, motherboards, software, programmable logic controllers, network 

devices) that are subject to assignment to information systems, and therefore, covered by this 

control enhancement. Related control: CM-8.

(5) ACQUISITION PROCESS | COMPONENT CONFIGURATIONS 

The organization requires that information system components are delivered with [Assignment; 

organization-defined security configurations] implemented and that the configurations are the 

default for any component reinstalls or upgrades. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information system components can include hardware, software, and 

firmware. Security configurations include, for example, the U.S. Government Configuration 

Baseline (USGCB), and any limitations on functions, ports, protocols, and services. Security 

characteristics include, for example, requiring that all default passwords have been changed. 

Related control: CM-8.

(6) ACQUISITION PROCESS | USE OF INFORMATION ASSURANCE PRODUCTS 

The organization: 

(a) Employs only government off-the-shelf (GOTS) or commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 

information assurance (IA) and IA-enabled information technology products that compose an 

NSA-approved solution to protect classified information when the networks used to transmit 

the information are at a lower classification level than the information being transmitted; and 

(b) Ensures that these products have been evaluated and/or validated by the NSA or in 

accordance with NSA-approved procedures. 

Supplemental Guidance: COTS IA or IA-enabled information technology products used to 

protect classified information by cryptographic means may be required to use NSA-approved 

key management. Related controls: SC-8, SC-9, SC-12, SC-13. 

(7) ACQUISITION PROCESS | U.S. GOVERNMENT PROTECTION PROFILES 

The organization: 

(a) Limits the use of commercially provided information technology products to those products 

that have been successfully evaluated against a validated U.S. Government Protection Profile 

for a specific technology type, if such a profile exists; and 

(b) Requires, if no U.S. Government Protection Profile exists for a specific technology type but a 

commercially provided information technology product relies on cryptographic functionality 

to enforce its security policy, then the cryptographic module is FIPS-validated. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: SC-12, SC-13.

(8) ACQUISITION PROCESS | CONTINUOUS MONITORING PLAN 

The organization requires that developers produce a plan for continuous monitoring of security 

control effectiveness in the information system. 

Supplemental Guidance: The objective of continuous monitoring plans is to determine if the 

complete set of planned, required, and deployed security controls within information systems 

continue to be effective over time based on the inevitable changes that occur. Developer 

continuous monitoring plans can be incorporated into the continuous monitoring strategies 

and programs implemented by organizations. Related control: CA-7.

References: ISO/IEC 15408; FIPS 140-2; NIST Special Publications 800-23, 800-35, 800-36, 800-

64, 800-70; Web: WWW.NIAP-CCEVS.ORG.
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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SA-4 MOD SA-4 (1) (4) HIGH SA-4 (1) (2) (4)

SA-5 INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION 

Control: The organization: 

a. Obtains administrator documentation for the information system that describes: 

- Secure configuration, installation, and operation of the information system; 

- Effective use and maintenance of security functions/mechanisms; and 

- Known vulnerabilities regarding configuration and use of administrative (i.e., privileged) 

functions; 

b. Obtains user documentation for the information system that describes: 

- User-accessible security functions/mechanisms and how to effectively use those security 

functions/mechanisms; 

- Methods for user interaction with the information system, which enables individuals to 

use the system in a more secure manner; and 

- User responsibilities in maintaining the security of the information and information 

system; 

c. Documents attempts to obtain information system documentation when such documentation is 

either unavailable or nonexistent and takes [Assignment: organization-defined actions] in 

response; 

d. Protects documentation as required, in accordance with the risk management strategy; and 

e. Distributes documentation to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel]. 

Supplemental Guidance: The purpose of this control is to help organizational personnel understand 

the implementation and operation of security controls associated with organizational information 

systems. In contrast, documentation requirements in SA-4 help to ensure that information system 

developers implement development processes that routinely produce such documentation and/or 

artifacts as inherent, essential parts of those processes. Organizations consider establishing 

specific measures to determine the quality and completeness of the content provided. Information 

systems can include hardware, software, and firmware components. Information system developer 

is a general term that includes developers or manufacturers of information technology products 

(including hardware, software, firmware), systems integrators, vendors, and product resellers. The 

inability to obtain needed information system documentation may occur, for example, due to the 

age of the systems or lack of support from developers and contractors. In those situations, 

organizations may need to recreate selected system documentation if such documentation is 

essential to the effective implementation and/or operation of security controls. The level of 

protection provided for selected information system documentation is commensurate with the 

security category of the system. For example, documentation associated with a key DoD weapons 

system or command and control system would typically require stronger safeguards than a routine 

administrative information system. Related controls: CM-6, CM-8, PL-2, PL-4, PS-2, SA-3, SA-4. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIES OF SECURITY CONTROLS 

The organization obtains developer documentation that describes the functional properties of the 

security controls employed within the information system. 
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Supplemental Guidance: Functional properties of security controls describe the functionality 

(i.e., security functions, mechanisms) visible at the interfaces of the controls and specifically 

exclude functionality and structures internal to the operation of the controls.

(2) INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | SECURITY-RELEVANT EXTERNAL SYSTEM INTERFACES 

The organization obtains developer documentation that describes the security-relevant external 

interfaces to the information system. 

(3) INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | HIGH-LEVEL DESIGN 

The organization obtains developer documentation that describes the high-level design of the 

information system in terms of subsystems. 

Supplemental Guidance: An information system can be partitioned into multiple subsystems.

(4) INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | LOW-LEVEL DESIGN 

The organization obtains developer documentation that describes the low-level design of the 

information system in terms of modules. 

Supplemental Guidance: Each subsystem within an information system can contain one or more 

modules.

(5) INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | SOURCE CODE

The organization obtains the source code for the information system. 

(6) INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | FUNCTIONS / PORTS / PROTOCOLS / SERVICES IN USE 

The organization requires developers of information systems, components, and services to identify 

early in the system development life cycle, the functions, ports, protocols, and services intended 

for organizational use. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement enables organizations to maintain on-going 

situational awareness of the functions, ports, protocols, and services that are being employed 

in the information system. This includes functions, ports, protocols, and services that are part 

of distributed information systems, for example, service-oriented architectures or cloud-based 

information systems. Such information can be useful to organizations when the need arises to 

understand the tradeoffs involved in blocking specific ports, protocols, or services or when 

requiring external service providers to do so. SA-9 describes requirements for external system 

services with organizations noting which functions, ports, protocols, and services are provided 

from external sources. Related controls: CM-7, SA-9.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW SA-5 MOD SA-5 (1) (3) (6) HIGH SA-5 (1) (2) (3) (6)

SA-6 SOFTWARE USAGE RESTRICTIONS 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-10 and SI-7].

SA-7 USER-INSTALLED SOFTWARE 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-11 and SI-7].

SA-8 SECURITY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES 

Control: The organization applies information system security engineering principles in the 

specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the information system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations apply security engineering principles primarily to new 

development information systems or systems undergoing major upgrades. For legacy systems, 
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organizations apply security engineering principles to system upgrades and modifications to the 

extent feasible, given the current state of hardware, software, and firmware within those systems. 

Security engineering principles include, for example: (i) developing layered protections; (ii) 

establishing sound security policy, architecture, and controls as the foundation for design; (iii) 

incorporating security requirements into the system development life cycle; (iv) delineating 

physical and logical security boundaries; (v) ensuring system developers are trained on how to 

build secure software; (vi) tailoring security controls to meet organizational and operational needs; 

(vii) performing threat modeling to identify use cases, threat agents, attack vectors, and attack 

patterns as well as compensating controls and design patterns needed to mitigate risk; and (viii) 

reducing risk to acceptable levels, thus enabling informed risk management decisions. Related 

controls: PM-7, SA-3, SA-4, SA-17, SC-2, SC-3. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-27.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SA-8 HIGH SA-8

SA-9 EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEM SERVICES 

Control: The organization: 

a. Requires that providers of external information system services comply with organizational 

information security requirements and employ [Assignment: organization-defined security 

controls] in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, 

regulations, standards, and guidance; 

b. Defines and documents government oversight and user roles and responsibilities with regard 

to external information system services; and 

c. Employs [Assignment: organization-defined processes, methods, and techniques] to monitor 

security control compliance by external service providers on an ongoing basis. 

Supplemental Guidance: External information system services are services that are implemented 

outside of the authorization boundaries of organizational information systems. This includes 

services that are used by, but not a part of, organizational information systems. Organizations 

establish relationships with external service providers in a variety of ways, including, for example, 

through joint ventures, business partnerships, contracts, interagency agreements, lines of business 

arrangements, licensing agreements, and supply chain exchanges. The responsibility for managing 

risks from the use of external information system services remains with authorizing officials. For 

services external to organizations, a chain of trust requires that organizations establish and retain a 

level of confidence that each participating provider in the potentially complex consumer-provider 

relationship provides adequate protection for the services rendered. The extent and nature of this 

chain of trust varies based on the relationships between organizations and the external providers. 

Organizations document the basis for trust relationships so the relationships can be monitored over 

time. External information system services documentation includes government, service providers, 

end user security roles and responsibilities, and service-level agreements. Service-level 

agreements define expectations of performance for security controls, describe measurable 

outcomes, and identify remedies and response requirements for identified instances of 

noncompliance. Related control: CA-3, PS-7. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | RISK ASSESSMENTS / ORGANIZATIONAL APPROVALS 

The organization: 

(a) Conducts an organizational assessment of risk prior to the acquisition or outsourcing of 

dedicated information security services; and 
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(b) Ensures that the acquisition or outsourcing of dedicated information security services is 

approved by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Dedicated information security services include, for example, incident 

monitoring, analysis and response, operation of information security-related devices such as 

firewalls, or key management services. Related controls: CA-6, RA-3. 

(2) EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | IDENTIFICATION OF FUNCTIONS / PORTS / PROTOCOLS / SERVICES 

The organization requires providers of [Assignment: organization-defined external information 

system services] to identify the functions, ports, protocols, and other services required for the use 

of such services. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information from external service providers regarding the specific 

functions, ports, protocols, and services used in the provision of such services can be 

particularly useful when the need arises to understand the tradeoffs involved in restricting 

certain functions/services or blocking certain ports/protocols. Related control: CM-7.

(3) EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | ESTABLISH / MAINTAIN CHAIN OF TRUST WITH PROVIDERS 

The organization establishes and maintains a chain of trust with external service providers based 

on [Assignment: organization-defined requirements, properties, factors, or conditions defining 

acceptable chain of trust]. 

(4) EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | CONSISTENT INTERESTS OF CONSUMERS AND PROVIDERS 

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to ensure that 

the interests of [Assignment: organization-defined external service providers] reflect 

organizational interests. 

Supplemental Guidance: As organizations increasingly use external service providers, the 

possibility exists that the interests of the service providers may diverge from organizational 

interests. In such situations, simply having the correct technical, procedural, or operational 

safeguards in place may not be sufficient if the service providers that implement and control 

those safeguards are not operating in a manner consistent with the interests of the consuming 

organizations. Possible actions that organizations might take to address such concerns include, 

for example, requiring background checks for selected service provider personnel, examining 

ownership records, employing only trustworthy service providers (i.e., providers with which 

organizations have had positive experiences), and conducting periodic/unscheduled visits to 

service provider facilities.

(5) EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | PROCESSING, STORAGE, AND SERVICE LOCATION 

The organization restricts the location of [Selection (one or more): information processing; 

information/data; information system services] based on [Assignment: organization-defined 

requirements or conditions]. 

Supplemental Guidance: The location of information processing, information/data storage, or 

information system services that are critical to organizations can have a direct impact on the 

ability of those organizations to successfully execute their missions/business functions. This 

situation exists when external providers control the location of processing, storage or services. 

The criteria external providers use for the selection of processing, storage, or service locations 

may be different from organizational criteria. For example, organizations may want to ensure 

that data/information storage locations are restricted to certain locations to facilitate incident 

response activities (e.g., forensic analyses, after-the-fact investigations) in case of information 

security breaches/compromises. Such incident response activities may be adversely affected 

by the governing laws or protocols in the locations where processing and storage occur and/or 

the locations from which information system services emanate. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-35.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SA-9 MOD SA-9 (2) HIGH SA-9 (2) (3)
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SA-10 DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT 

Control: The organization requires that information system developers: 

a. Perform configuration management during information system design, development, 

implementation, and operation; 

b. Manage and control changes to the information system at [Assignment: organization-defined 

configuration items that have been placed under configuration management]; 

c. Implement only organization-approved changes to the information system; 

d. Document approved changes to the information system; and 

e. Track security flaws and flaw resolution within the information system. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control also applies to organizations conducting internal systems 

development and integration. Organizations consider the quality and completeness of the 

configuration management activities conducted by developers as evidence of applying effective 

security safeguards. Information system developer is a general term that includes developers or 

manufacturers of information technology products (including hardware, software, firmware), 

systems integrators, vendors, and product resellers. Related controls: CM-3, CM-4, CM-9, SA-12, 

SI-2. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | SOFTWARE / FIRMWARE INTEGRITY VERIFICATION 

The organization requires that information system developers enable integrity verification of 

delivered software and firmware. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement enables organizations to detect unauthorized 

changes to delivered software and firmware components. Integrity checking mechanisms can 

also address counterfeiting of software and firmware components. Organizations verify the 

integrity of software and firmware components, for example, through secure one-way hashes 

provided by developers. Related control: SI-7. 

(2) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | ALTERNATIVE CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PROCESSES 

The organization provides an alternate configuration management process using organizational 

personnel in the absence of a dedicated developer configuration management team. 

Supplemental Guidance: Alternate configuration management processes include organizational 

personnel that are responsible for reviewing and approving proposed changes to information 

systems, and security personnel that conduct impact analyses prior to the implementation of 

any changes to systems. 

(3) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | HARDWARE INTEGRITY VERIFICATION 

The organization requires that information system developers enable integrity verification of 

delivered hardware. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SA-10 HIGH SA-10

SA-11 DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING 

Control: The organization requires that information system developers: 

a. Create and implement a security test and evaluation plan that provides for testing/evaluation: 

- At the depth of [Selection (one or more): security-related functional properties; securityrelated externally visible interfaces; high-level design; low-level design; implementation 

representation (source code/hardware schematics)]; 
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- At the rigor of [Selection: showing; demonstrating; rigorously demonstrating]; 

b. Include testing/evaluation at [Selection (one or more): unit; integration; system; regression]; 

and 

c. Produce evidence of the execution of security testing/evaluation plan and the results of the 

testing/evaluation. 

Supplemental Guidance: Developmental security testing occurs at all post‐design phases of the 

system development life cycle. Information systems include information technology products (i.e., 

hardware, software, and firmware components) that compose those systems. Information system 

developer is a general term that includes developers or manufacturers of information technology 

products (including hardware, software, firmware), systems integrators, vendors, and product 

resellers. Developer testing confirms that: (i) the required security controls are implemented 

correctly and operating as intended; and (ii) the information system meets the established security 

requirements. Security test and evaluation plans provide the specific activities that developers plan 

to carry out including the types of analyses, testing, and reviews of software and firmware 

components, the degree of rigor to be applied in the analyses, tests, and reviews, and the types of 

artifacts produced during those processes. Contracts specify the acceptance criteria for security 

test and evaluation plans, flaw remediation processes, and evidence that plans and processes have 

been diligently applied. This control also applies to organizations conducting internal systems 

development and integration. Related controls: CA-2, CM-4, SA-3, SA-4, SA-5, SI-2. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING | CODE ANALYSIS TOOLS 

The organization requires that information system developers employ [Selection (one or more): 

static; dynamic] code analysis tools to examine the information system for common flaws and 

document the results of the analysis. 

Supplemental Guidance: Static code analysis provides a methodology for security reviews and 

can be used to enforce security coding practices. Developers consider both the strengths and 

weaknesses of static analysis tools and can employ additional supporting tools and human 

reviews, when necessary. Dynamic code analysis provides run-time verification of software 

programs, using tools capable of monitoring programs for memory corruption, user privilege 

issues, and other potential security problems. Dynamic code analysis employs run-time tools 

to help to ensure that security functionality performs in the manner in which it was designed. 

A specialized type of dynamic analysis, known as fuzz testing, induces program failures by 

deliberately introducing malformed or random data into software programs. Fuzz testing 

strategies derive from the intended use of applications and the functional and design 

specifications for the applications.

(2) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING | THREAT AND VULNERABILITY ANALYSES / FLAW REMEDIATION 

The organization requires that information system developers: 

(a) Perform threat and vulnerability analyses and subsequent testing of the as-built information 

system; and 

(b) Remediate security flaws or identify and document such flaws. 

Supplemental Guidance: Applications may deviate significantly from the functional and design 

specifications created during the requirements and design phases of the system development 

life cycle. Therefore, threat and vulnerability analyses of information technology products and 

information systems prior to delivery are critical to the effective operation of those products 

and systems. Threat and vulnerability analyses at this phase of the life cycle help ensure that 

design or implementation changes have been accounted for, and that any new vulnerabilities 

created as a result of those changes have been reviewed and mitigated. Related controls: AT5, RA-5. 

(3) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING | INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF TESTING / RESULTS 

The organization requires that an independent agent satisfying [Assignment: organization-defined 

independence criteria] verify the implementation of the developer security test and evaluation plan 

and the evidence produced. 
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Supplemental Guidance: Independent agents have the necessary qualifications (including skills, 

expertise, training, and experience) to verify the implementation of developer security test and 

evaluation plans. Related controls: AT-3, CA-2, CA-7, RA-5, SA-12. 

(4) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING | MANUAL CODE REVIEWS 

The organization requires that information system developers perform manual code reviews of the 

information technology product or information system using [Assignment: organization-defined 

processes and/or techniques]. 

Supplemental Guidance: While software code analysis tools can do much of the work of finding 

and flagging vulnerabilities, such tools are not perfect. As a result, manual code reviews are 

usually reserved for the critical software and firmware components of information systems. 

(5) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING | PENETRATION TESTING 

The organization requires that information system developers perform penetration testing of the 

information system at [Assignment: organization-defined breadth/depth] and with [Assignment: 

organization-defined constraints]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Penetration testing is an assessment methodology in which assessors, 

using all available information technology product and/or information system documentation 

(e.g., product/system design specifications, source code, and administrator/operator manuals) 

and working under specific constraints, attempt to circumvent implemented security features 

of information technology products and information systems. Penetration testing can include, 

for example, white, gray, or black box testing with analyses performed by skilled security 

professionals simulating adversary actions. The objective of penetration testing is to uncover 

potential vulnerabilities in information technology products and information systems resulting 

from implementation errors, configuration faults, or other operational deployment weaknesses 

or deficiencies. Penetration tests can be performed in conjunction with automated and manual 

code reviews to provide greater levels of analysis than would ordinarily be possible. 

(6) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING | UNIT / INTEGRATION / REGRESSION TESTING 

The organization requires that information system developers perform [Selection (one or more): 

unit; integration; system; regression] testing of the information system at [Assignment: 

organization-defined breadth/depth]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Security properties of information systems may be affected by the 

interconnection of system components or changes to those components. Such interconnections 

or changes (e.g., upgrading or replacing operating systems) may adversely affect previously 

implemented security controls. This control enhancement provides additional types of security 

testing that developers can conduct to reduce or eliminate potential flaws introduced by the 

interconnection of components or changes to information systems. 

(7) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING | ATTACK SURFACE REVIEWS 

The organization requires that information system developers perform attack surface reviews and 

correct identified flaws in the information system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Attack surfaces of information systems are exposed areas that make 

those systems more vulnerable to cyber attacks. This includes any accessible areas where 

weaknesses or deficiencies in information systems (including the hardware, software, and 

firmware components) provide opportunities for adversaries to exploit vulnerabilities. Attack 

surface reviews ensure that developers: (i) analyze both design and implementation changes 

to information systems; and (ii) mitigate attack vectors generated as a result of the changes.

(8) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING | VERIFY SCOPE OF TESTING 

The organization requires that information system developers verify the scope of security testing, 

evaluation, and analyses [Selection: showing; demonstrating; rigorously demonstrating complete] 

coverage of required security controls for the information system. 

References: None.

 
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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD SA-11 HIGH SA-11

SA-12 SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION 

Control: The organization protects against supply chain threats by employing [Assignment: 

organization-defined security safeguards] as part of a comprehensive, defense-in-breadth 

information security strategy. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information systems (including system components that compose those 

systems) need to be protected throughout the system development life cycle (i.e., during design, 

development, manufacturing, packaging, assembly, distribution, system integration, operations, 

maintenance, and retirement). Protection of organizational information systems is accomplished 

through threat awareness, by the identification, management, and reduction of vulnerabilities at 

each phase of the life cycle and the use of complementary, mutually reinforcing strategies to 

respond to risk. Organizations consider implementing a standardized process to address supply 

chain risk with respect to information systems and to educate the acquisition workforce on threats, 

risk, and required security controls. Organizations use the acquisition/procurement processes to 

require supply chain entities to implement necessary safeguards and countermeasures to protect 

information systems including system components and services, prior to taking delivery of those 

systems/components or using those services. Related controls: CM-8, PE-16, SA-3, SA-4, SA-8, SA10, SA-14, SC-29, SC-30, SI-7.

Control Enhancements:

(1) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | ACQUISITION STRATEGIES / TOOLS / METHODS 

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined tailored acquisition strategies, 

contract tools, and procurement methods] for purchases of [Assignment: organization-defined 

information systems, system components, information technology products, or information 

system services] from suppliers. 

Supplemental Guidance: The use of acquisition and procurement processes by organizations 

early in the system development life cycle provides an important vehicle to protect the supply 

chain. Organizations consider defining supplier requirements and creating supplier incentives 

including, for example, additional vetting of critical information system component/service, 

suppliers, restrictions on purchases from specific suppliers or countries, and inclusion of 

specific contract language regarding the prohibition of tainted or counterfeit components. In 

addition, organizations consider minimizing the time between purchase decisions and required 

delivery to limit opportunities for adversaries to corrupt information system components or 

products. Finally, organizations can use controlled distribution, delivery, and warehousing 

options to reduce supply chain risk. 

(2) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | SUPPLIER REVIEWS 

The organization conducts supplier reviews prior to entering into contractual agreements to 

acquire [Assignment: organization-defined information systems, system components, information 

technology products, or information system services]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information systems, system components, and information technology 

products include hardware, software, and firmware. Supplier reviews include, for example: (i) 

analysis of supplier processes used to design, develop, test, implement, verify, deliver, and 

support information systems, products, and services; and (ii) assessment of supplier training 

and experience in developing information systems, components, products, or services with the 

required security capability. These reviews provide organizations with increased levels of 

visibility into supplier activities during the system development life cycle to promote more 

effective supply chain risk management. Supplier reviews can also help determine whether 

primary suppliers have security safeguards in place and in practice for vetting second and 

third tier providers, and any other subcontractors. 

 
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(3) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | TRUSTED SHIPPING AND WAREHOUSING 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-12].

(4) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | DIVERSITY OF SUPPLIERS 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-12]. 

(5) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | LIMITATION OF HARM 

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to limit harm 

from potential adversaries identifying and targeting the organizational supply chain. 

Supplemental Guidance: Supply chain risk is part of the advanced persistent threat. Security 

safeguards to reduce the probability of adversaries successfully identifying and targeting the 

supply chain include, for example: (i) avoiding the purchase of custom configurations to 

reduce the risk of acquiring information systems, components, or products that have been 

corrupted via supply chain actions targeted at specific organizations; (ii) employing a diverse 

set of suppliers to limit the potential harm from any given supplier in the supply chain; and 

(iii) using procurement carve outs. 

(6) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | MINIMIZING PROCUREMENT TIME

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-12].

(7) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | ASSESSMENTS PRIOR TO SELECTION / ACCEPTANCE / UPDATE

The organization conducts assessments of [Assignment: organization-defined information 

systems, system components, information technology products, or information system services] 

prior to selection, acceptance, or update. 

Supplemental Guidance: Assessments include, for example, testing, evaluations, reviews, and 

analyses. Independent, third-party entities or organizational personnel conduct assessments of 

systems, components, products, and services. Organizations conduct assessments to uncover 

unintentional vulnerabilities and intentional vulnerabilities including, for example, malware, 

malicious processes, and counterfeits. Assessments can include, for example, static analyses, 

dynamic analyses, simulations, white, gray, and black box testing, fuzz testing, penetration 

testing, and ensuring that components or services are genuine (e.g., using tags, cryptographic 

hash verifications, or digital signatures). Evidence generated during security assessments is 

documented for follow-on actions carried out by organizations. Related controls: CA-2, SA11. 

(8) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | USE OF ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE 

The organization uses all-source intelligence to analyze potential suppliers of [Assignment: 

organization-defined information systems, system components, information technology products, 

or information system services]. 

Supplemental Guidance: All-source intelligence consists of intelligence products and/or 

organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information, most frequently 

including human intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, 

signals intelligence, and open source data in the production of finished intelligence. 

(9) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | OPERATIONS SECURITY 

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined Operations Security (OPSEC) 

safeguards] in accordance with classification guides to protect supply chain-related information. 

Supplemental Guidance: Supply chain information potentially critical to mission/business 

success includes, for example, user identities, uses for information system components, 

suppliers, supplier processes, requirements, design specifications, testing and evaluation 

results, and configurations. This control enhancement expands the scope of OPSEC to include 

suppliers and potential suppliers. OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and 

subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to operations and other activities to: (i) 

identify those actions that can be observed by potential adversaries; (ii) determine indicators 

that adversaries might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical 

information in sufficient time to cause harm to organizations; (iii) implement safeguards to 

eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level, exploitable vulnerabilities; and (iv) consider how 

aggregated information may compromise the confidentiality of users or uses of the supply 

chain elements. Related control: PE-21.

 
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(10) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | UNAUTHORIZED MODIFICATIONS 

The organization requires that suppliers of [Assignment: organization-defined information 

systems, system components, information technology products, or information system services] 

implement [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to reduce the likelihood of 

unauthorized modifications at each stage in the supply chain. 

Supplemental Guidance: Security safeguards include, for example: (i) security controls for 

development facilities, development systems, and external connections to development 

systems; (ii) vetting development personnel; and (iii) use of tamper evident packaging during 

shipping and warehousing.

(11) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | VALIDATE AS GENUINE AND NOT ALTERED 

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to validate that 

the [Assignment: organization-defined information systems, system components, or information 

technology products] received are genuine and have not been altered. 

Supplemental Guidance: For some information system components, especially hardware, there 

are technical means to help determine if the components are genuine or have been altered. 

Security safeguards used to validate the authenticity of information systems, components, and 

products include, for example, optical/nanotechnology tagging and side-channel analysis. 

(12) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | PENETRATION TESTING / ANALYSIS OF SUPPLY CHAIN ELEMENTS

The organization employs [Selection (one or more): organizational analysis, independent thirdparty analysis, organizational penetration testing, independent third-party penetration testing] of 

[Assignment: organization-defined supply chain elements]. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses analysis and/or testing of the 

supply chain, not just delivered items. Supply chain elements include, for example, supplier 

development processes, shipping and handling procedures, personnel and physical security 

programs, or any other programs, processes, procedures, or practices associated with the 

production and distribution of information systems, components, products, and/or services. 

Evidence generated during analyses and testing of supply chain elements is documented for 

follow-on actions carried out by organizations. Related control: RA-5. 

(13) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL AGREEMENTS 

The organization establishes inter-organizational agreements and procedures with entities 

involved in the supply chain for [Assignment: organization-defined information systems] to 

provide notification of supply chain compromises. 

Supplemental Guidance: Early notification of supply chain compromises that can potentially 

adversely affect or have adversely affected organizational information systems, including 

critical system components, is essential in order for organizations to provide appropriate 

responses to such incidents.

(14) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | CRITICAL INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS 

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to ensure an 

adequate supply of [Assignment: organization-defined critical information system components]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Adversaries can attempt to impede organizational operations by 

disrupting the supply of critical information system components or corrupting supplier 

operations. Safeguards to ensure adequate supplies of critical information system components 

include, for example: (i) the use of multiple suppliers for the identified critical components; 

and (ii) stockpiling a sufficient number of spare components/parts to ensure operation during 

mission critical times. 

(15) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | PROCESSES TO ADDRESS WEAKNESSES OR DEFICIENCIES 

The organization establishes a process to address weaknesses or deficiencies in supply chain 

elements identified during independent or organizational assessments of such elements. 

Supplemental Guidance: Evidence generated during independent or organizational assessments 

of supply chain elements (e.g., penetration testing, audits, verification/validation activities) is 

documented and used in follow-on processes implemented by organizations to respond to the 

risks related to the identified weaknesses and deficiencies. Supply chain elements include, for 

example, supplier development processes and supplier distribution systems.

References: None.
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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH SA-12

SA-13 TRUSTWORTHINESS 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into multiple security controls as described in Appendix E]. 

SA-14 CRITICAL INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS 

Control: The organization: 

a. Identifies critical information system components; and 

b. Re-implements or custom develops [Assignment: organization-defined critical information 

system components that require re-implementation or custom development]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations determine that certain information system components likely 

cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components and for which 

there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate the resulting risk. Re-implementation 

or custom development of such components helps to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. 

This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, 

and firmware) such that the standard attacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. Related 

controls: CP-2, SA-8, SA-12. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

(1) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | NO ALTERNATIVE SOURCING 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-12]. 

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SA-15 DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS 

Control: The organization: 

a. Requires that information system developers follow a documented development process that: 

- Explicitly addresses security requirements; 

- Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process; and 

- Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development of 

the information system; and 

b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations to ensure 

that the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed will 

lead to satisfying organizational security requirements. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information systems include the information technology products (i.e., 

hardware, software, and firmware components) that compose those systems. Information system 

developer is a general term that includes developers and manufacturers of information technology 

products (including hardware, software, firmware), systems integrators, vendors, and product 

resellers. Development tools include, for example, programming languages and computer aided 
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design (CAD) systems. This control also applies to organizations conducting internal systems 

development and integration. Related controls: SA-3, SA-8. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | QUALITY METRICS 

The organization requires that information system developers: 

(a) Define quality metrics at the beginning of the development process for the information 

system; and 

(b) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: 

organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined program review 

milestones]; upon delivery of the information system]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable 

levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections 

of completion criteria or sufficiency standards representing the satisfactory execution of 

particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require 

the elimination of all compiler warnings or an explicit determination that the warnings have 

no impact on the effectiveness of required security capabilities. During the execution phases 

of development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. 

Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics can include defining the 

severity thresholds of vulnerabilities, for example, requiring no known vulnerabilities in the 

delivered information system with a Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) severity 

of Medium or High. 

(2) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | SECURITY TRACKING TOOLS 

The organization requires that information system developers select and employ a security 

tracking tool for use during the development of the information system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information system development teams select and deploy security 

vulnerability/work item tracking systems that facilitate assignment, sorting, filtering, and 

tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with system development processes.

(3) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | CRITICALITY ANALYSIS 

The organization requires that information system developers perform a criticality analysis for the 

information system at [Assignment: organization-defined breadth/depth] and at [Assignment: 

organization-defined decision points in the system development life cycle]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Developers use criticality analyses as the primary method to identify 

and prioritize mission-critical functions and information system components. An end-to-end 

functional decomposition of information systems requires identifying and prioritizing mission 

threads, decomposing the mission threads into mission-critical functions, and identifying the 

information system components (i.e., hardware, software, and firmware) that implement those 

functions (i.e., system components that are critical to the mission effectiveness of information 

systems or system-of-systems through network connections). Identified functions/components 

are subsequently assigned levels of criticality commensurate with the consequences of failure 

or compromises on the ability of the information systems to support assigned missions and/or 

business functions. Decision points for criticality analyses conducted by developers include, 

for example, milestone reviews. In sharp contrast, software engineering disciplines use objectoriented structures that do not necessarily provide visibility of interactions. Mission threads 

and workflow analysis mapped to the technical resources being used are required to identify 

critical information system elements that become high security risks because of their breadth 

of interaction. Relying solely on functional decomposition can inadvertently lead to missing a 

mission-critical function because the function is assigned to a particular system component 

but shared in actuality by many other components. 

(4) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | THREAT MODELING / VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 

The organization requires that developers perform threat modeling and a vulnerability analysis for 

the information system at [Assignment: organization-defined breadth/depth] that: 

(a) Uses [Assignment: organization-defined information concerning impact, environment of 

operations, known or assumed threats, and acceptable risk levels]; 

(b) Employs [Assignment: organization-defined tools and methods]; and 
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(c) Produces evidence that meets [Assignment: organization-defined acceptance criteria]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SA-4.

(5) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | ATTACK SURFACE REDUCTION 

The organization requires that information system developers reduce the attack surface of the 

information system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Attack surface reduction is closely aligned with developer threat and 

vulnerability analyses and information system architecture and design, although it addresses 

security issues from a slightly different perspective. Attack surface reduction is a means of 

reducing risk by giving attackers less opportunity to exploit weaknesses or deficiencies (i.e., 

potential vulnerabilities) within information systems. Attack surface reduction includes, for 

example, applying the principle of least privilege, employing layered defenses, applying the 

principle of least functionality (i.e., restricting ports, protocols, functions, and services), and 

eliminating application programming interfaces (APIs) that are vulnerable to cyber attacks. 

Related control: CM-7.

(6) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT 

The organization requires that information system developers implement an explicit process to 

continuously improve the system development process. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information system developers consider the effectiveness/efficiency of 

current development processes for meeting quality goals and addressing security capabilities 

in current threat environments. 

(7) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | AUTOMATED VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 

The organization requires that information system developers: 

(a) Perform an automated vulnerability analysis using [Assignment: organization-defined tools] to 

discover vulnerabilities in the information system; 

(b) Determine the exploitation potential for discovered vulnerabilities; 

(c) Determine potential risk mitigations for delivered vulnerabilities; and 

(d) Deliver the outputs of the tools and results of the analysis. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: RA-5.

(8) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | REUSE OF THREAT / VULNERABILITY INFORMATION 

The organization requires that information system developers use threat modeling and 

vulnerability analyses from similar information systems to inform the current development 

process. 

Supplemental Guidance: Analysis of vulnerabilities found in similar software applications can 

inform potential design or implementation issues for information systems under development. 

Similar information systems or system components may exist within developer organizations. 

Authoritative vulnerability information is available from a variety of public and private sector 

sources including, for example, the National Vulnerability Database.

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH SA-15

SA-16 DEVELOPER-PROVIDED TRAINING 

Control: The organization requires that information system developers provide [Assignment: 

organization-defined training] on the correct use and operation of the security functions, controls, 

and/or mechanisms implemented in the system. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to external and internal (in-house) information system 

developers. Training of personnel is an essential element to ensure the effectiveness of security 

controls implemented within organizational information systems. Training options include, for 
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example, classroom-style training, web-based/computer-based training, and hands-on training. 

Organizations can also request sufficient training materials from developers to conduct in-house 

training or offer self-training to organizational personnel. Organizations determine the type of 

training necessary and may require different types of training for different security functions, 

controls, or mechanisms. 

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH SA-16

SA-17 DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN 

Control: The organization requires that information system developers produce a design 

specification and security architecture for the system that: 

a. Is created as an integral part of the system development process; 

b. Is consistent with and supportive of the security architecture within the enterprise 

architecture; 

c. Accurately and completely describes the required security functionality, and the allocation of 

security controls among physical and logical components; and 

d. Expresses how individual security functions, mechanisms, and services work together to 

provide required security capabilities and a unified approach to protection. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information systems include the information technology products (i.e., 

hardware, software, and firmware components) that compose those systems. Information system 

developer is a general term that includes developers or manufacturers of information technology 

products (including hardware, software, firmware), systems integrators, vendors, and product 

resellers. SA-17 is primarily directed at external information system (and information technology 

product) developers although it could be used internally as well for in-house development. In 

contrast, PL-8 is primarily directed at organizations (i.e., internally focused) to help ensure that 

organizations develop an information security architecture and such security architecture is 

integrated or tightly coupled to the enterprise architecture. This distinction is important if/when 

organizations outsource the development of information systems or information system 

components to external entities and there is a need to demonstrate consistency with the 

organization’s enterprise architecture and information security architecture. Related controls: PL8, PM-7, SA-3, SA-8. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | FORMAL POLICY MODEL 

The organization requires that information system developers: 

(a) Produce, as an integral part of the development, a formal policy model describing the 

[Assignment: organization-defined elements of organizational security policy] to be enforced 

by the information system; and 

(b) Prove that the formal policy model is internally consistent and sufficient to enforce the 

defined elements of the organizational security policy when implemented by the information 

system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Formal models describe specific behaviors or security policies using 

formal languages, thus enabling the correctness of those behaviors/policies to be formally 

proven. Not all components of information systems can be modeled, and generally, formal 

specifications are scoped to specific behaviors or policies of interest (e.g., non discretionary 

access control policies). Organizations choose the particular formal modeling language and 

approach based on the nature of the behaviors/policies to be described and the available tools. 

Formal modeling tools include, for example, Gypsy and Zed. 
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(2) DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | SECURITY-RELEVANT COMPONENTS

The organization requires that information system developers: 

(a) Define the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware components of the information 

system; 

(b) Provide a convincing rationale that the definition for security-relevant hardware, software, and 

firmware components is complete; 

Supplemental Guidance: Security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware components 

represent the portion of information systems that must be trusted to perform correctly in order 

for the systems to maintain required security properties. Related control: SA-5. 

(3) DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | FORMAL CORRESPONDENCE 

The organization requires that information system developers: 

(a) Produce, as an integral part of the development, a formal top level specification (FTLS) that 

specifies the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware components in 

terms of exceptions, error messages, and effects; 

(b) Show via proof to the extent feasible with additional informal demonstration as necessary, 

that the FTLS is consistent with the formal policy model; 

(c) Show via informal demonstration, that the FTLS completely covers the interfaces to securityrelevant hardware, software, and firmware components; and 

(d) Show that the FTLS is an accurate description of the implemented security-relevant hardware, 

software, and firmware components. 

Supplemental Guidance: Correspondence is a important part of the assurance gained through 

modeling. It demonstrates that the implementation is an accurate transformation of the model, 

and that any additional code or implementation details present has no impact on the behaviors 

or policies being modeled. Formal methods can be used to show that the high-level security 

properties are satisfied by the formal information system description, and that the formal 

system description is correctly implemented by a description of some lower level, for example 

a hardware description. Consistency between FTLS and formal policy models is generally not 

amenable to being fully proven. Therefore, a combination of formal/informal methods may be 

needed to show such consistency. Consistency between the FTLS and implementation may 

require the use of an informal demonstration due to limitations in the applicability of formal 

methods to prove that the FTLS accurately reflects the implementation. Related control: SA5. 

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH SA-17 

SA-18 TAMPER RESISTANCE AND DETECTION 

Control: The organization implements a tamper protection program for [Assignment: organizationdefined information systems, system components, and information technology products]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Anti-tamper technologies and techniques provide a level of protection for 

critical information systems, system components, and information technology products, against a 

number of related threats including modification, reverse engineering, and substitution. Strong 

identification combined with tamper resistance and/or tamper detection is essential to protecting 

information systems, components, and products during distribution and when in use. Related 

controls: PE-3, SA-12, SI-7. 

 
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Control Enhancements:

(1) TAMPER RESISTANCE AND DETECTION | MULTIPLE PHASES OF SDLC 

The organization employs anti-tamper technologies and techniques during multiple phases in the 

system development life cycle including design, development, integration, operations, and 

maintenance. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations use a combination of hardware and software techniques 

for tamper resistance and detection. Organizations employ obfuscation and self-checking, for 

example, to make reverse engineering and modifications more difficult, time-consuming, and 

expensive for adversaries. Customization of information systems and system components can 

make substitutions easier to detect and therefore, limit damage. Related control: SA-3.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SA-19 ANTI-COUNTERFEIT 

Control: The organization: 

a. Develops and implements anti-counterfeit policy and procedures that include the means to 

detect and prevent counterfeit parts from entering the information system; 

b. Trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel] to detect counterfeit information system 

components (including hardware, software, and firmware); 

c. Maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined information system 

components] awaiting service/repair and serviced/repaired components awaiting return to 

service; 

d. Disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organization-defined 

techniques and methods] to prevent entry into the gray market; and 

e. Reports counterfeit information system components to developers/manufacturers/vendors, 

contractors, and [Assignment: organization-defined external reporting organizations]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Anti-counterfeiting policy and procedures support tamper resistance and 

provide a level of protection against the introduction of malware. External reporting organizations 

include, for example, US-CERT. Related controls: PE-3, SA-12, SI-7. 

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

 
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FAMILY: SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION 

SC-1 SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization develops, disseminates, and reviews/updates [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]: 

a. A formal, documented system and communications protection policy that addresses purpose, 

scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational 

entities, and compliance; and 

b. Formal, documented procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and 

communications protection policy and associated system and communications protection 

controls. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the SC family. 

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations. The procedures 

can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if 

needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and 

procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SC-1 MOD SC-1 HIGH SC-1

SC-2 APPLICATION PARTITIONING

Control: The information system separates user functionality (including user interface services) 

from information system management functionality. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information system management functionality includes, for example, 

functions necessary to administer databases, network components, workstations, or servers, and 

typically requires privileged user access. The separation of user functionality from information 

system management functionality is either physical or logical. Organizations implement separation 

of system management-related functionality from user functionality by using different computers, 

different central processing units, different instances of operating systems, different network 

addresses, virtualization techniques, or combinations of these or other methods, as appropriate. 

This type of separation includes, for example, web administrative interfaces that use separate 

authentication methods for users of any other information system resources. Separation of system 

and user functionality may include isolating administrative interfaces on different domains and 

with additional access controls. Related controls: SA-4, SA-8, SC-3. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) APPLICATION PARTITIONING | INTERFACES FOR NON-PRIVILEGED USERS 

The information system prevents the presentation of information system management-related 

functionality at an interface for non-privileged users.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement ensures that administration options (e.g., 

administrator privileges) are not available to general users (including prohibiting the use of 

the grey-out option commonly used to eliminate accessibility to such information). Such 
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restrictions include, for example, not presenting administration options until users establish 

sessions with administrator privileges. Related control: AC-3. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SC-2 HIGH SC-2

SC-3 SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION

Control: The information system isolates security functions from nonsecurity functions. 

Supplemental Guidance: The information system isolates security functions from nonsecurity 

functions by means of an isolation boundary (implemented via partitions and domains) that 

controls access to and protects the integrity of the hardware, software, and firmware that perform 

those security functions. Information systems implement code separation (i.e., separation of 

security functions from non-security functions) in a number of ways, including, for example, 

through the provision of security kernels via processor rings or processor modes. For non-kernel 

code, security function isolation is often achieved through file system protections that serve to 

protect the code on disk, and address space protections that protect executing code. Information 

systems restrict access to security functions through the use of access control mechanisms and by 

implementing least privilege capabilities. Related controls: AC-3, AC-6, SA-4, SA-5, SA-8, SC-2, 

SC-41. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | HARDWARE SEPARATION 

The information system implements underlying hardware separation mechanisms to facilitate 

security function isolation. 

Supplemental Guidance: The hardware ring architecture, commonly implemented within 

microprocessors, is an example of an underlying hardware separation mechanism.

(2) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | ACCESS / FLOW CONTROL FUNCTIONS 

The information system isolates security functions enforcing access and information flow control 

from both nonsecurity functions and from other security functions. 

Supplemental Guidance: Security functions that are potentially isolated from access and flow 

control enforcement functions include, for example, auditing, intrusion detection, and antivirus functions.

(3) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | MINIMIZE NONSECURITY FUNCTIONALITY

The organization minimizes the number of nonsecurity functions included within the isolation 

boundary containing security functions. 

Supplemental Guidance: Nonsecurity functions contained within the isolation boundary are 

considered security-relevant because errors or maliciousness in such software, by virtue of 

being within the boundary, can impact the security functions of organizational information 

systems. The design objective is that the specific portions of information systems providing 

information security are of minimal size/complexity. Minimizing the number of nonsecurity 

functions in the security-relevant components of information systems allows designers and 

implementers to focus only on those functions which are necessary to provide the desired 

security capability (typically access enforcement). By minimizing nonsecurity functions 

within the isolation boundaries, the amount of code that must be trusted to enforce security 

policies is reduced, thus contributing to understandability. 

(4) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | MODULE COUPLING 

The organization implements security functions as largely independent modules that avoid 

unnecessary interactions between modules by limiting module coupling to [Assignment: 

organization-defined level]. 
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Supplemental Guidance: The reduction in inter-module interactions helps to constrain security 

functions and to manage complexity. The concepts of coupling and cohesion are important 

with respect to modularity in software design. Coupling refers to the dependencies that one 

module has on other modules. Cohesion refers to the relationship between the different 

functions within a particular module. Good software engineering practices rely on modular 

decomposition, layering, minimization to reduce and manage complexity, thus producing 

software modules that are highly cohesive and loosely coupled. 

(5) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | LAYERED STRUCTURES 

The organization implements security functions as a layered structure minimizing interactions 

between layers of the design and avoiding any dependence by lower layers on the functionality or 

correctness of higher layers. 

Supplemental Guidance: The implementation of layered structures with minimized interactions 

among security functions and non-looping layers (i.e., lower-layer functions do not depend on 

higher-layer functions) further enables the isolation of security functions and management of 

complexity.

(6) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | BOUNDARY PROTECTION MECHANISMS 

The organization employs boundary protection mechanisms to separate [Assignment: 

organization-defined information system components] directly supporting [Assignment: 

organization-defined missions and/or business functions]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can isolate information system components performing 

different missions and/or business functions. Such isolation limits unauthorized information 

flows among system components and also provides the opportunity to deploy greater levels of 

protection for selected components. Separating system components with boundary protection 

mechanisms provides the capability for increased protection of individual components and to 

more effectively control information flows between those components. This type of enhanced 

protection limits the potential harm from cyber attacks and errors. The degree of separation 

provided varies depending upon the mechanisms chosen. Boundary protection mechanisms 

include, for example, routers, gateways, and firewalls separating system components into 

physically separate networks or sub-networks, cross-domain devices separating sub-networks, 

and encrypting information flows among system components using distinct encryption keys. 

(7) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | MODULE COHESION 

The organization implements security functions as cohesive modules with [Assignment: 

organization-defined level of cohesiveness]. 

Supplemental Guidance: The concepts of coupling and cohesion are important with respect to 

modularity in software design. Coupling refers to the dependencies that one module has on 

other modules. Cohesion refers to the relationship between the different functions within a 

particular module. Good software engineering practices rely on modular decomposition, 

layering, minimization to reduce and manage complexity, thus producing software modules 

that are highly cohesive and loosely coupled. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH SC-3 (6)

SC-4 INFORMATION IN SHARED RESOURCES

Control: The information system prevents unauthorized and unintended information transfer via 

shared system resources. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control prevents information, including encrypted representations of 

information, produced by the actions of prior users/roles (or the actions of processes acting on 

behalf of prior users/roles) from being available to any current users/roles (or current processes) 

that obtain access to shared system resources (e.g., registers, main memory, hard disks) after those 
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resource have been released back to information systems. The control of information in shared 

information system resources is also referred to as object reuse. This control does not address: (i) 

information remanence which refers to residual representation of data that has been nominally 

erased or removed; (ii) covert channels (including storage or timing channels) where shared 

resources are manipulated to violate information flow restrictions; or (iii) components within 

information systems for which there are only single users/roles. Related controls: AC-3, AC-4, 

MP-6. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) INFORMATION IN SHARED RESOURCES | SECURITY LEVELS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-4]. 

(2) INFORMATION IN SHARED RESOURCES | CLASSIFICATION LEVELS / SECURITY CATEGORIES 

The information system prevents unauthorized information transfer via shared resources in 

accordance with organization-defined procedures when system processing explicitly switches 

between different information classification levels or security categories. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies when there are explicit changes in 

information processing levels during information system operations, for example, during 

multi-level processing and periods processing with information at different classification 

levels or security categories. Organization-defined procedures may include, for example, 

approved sanitization processes for electronically stored information. Related control: MP-6. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation: 

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SC-4 HIGH SC-4

SC-5 DENIAL OF SERVICE PROTECTION

Control: The information system protects against or limits the effects of the following types of 

denial of service attacks: [Assignment: organization-defined types of denial of service attacks or 

reference to source for such information] by employing [Assignment: organization-defined 

security safeguards]. 

Supplemental Guidance: A variety of technologies exist to limit, or in some cases, eliminate the 

effects of denial of service attacks. For example, boundary protection devices can filter certain 

types of packets to protect information system components on internal organizational networks 

from being directly affected by denial of service attacks. Employing increased capacity and 

bandwidth combined with service redundancy may also reduce the susceptibility to denial of 

service attacks. Related controls: SC-6, SC-7. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) DENIAL OF SERVICE PROTECTION | RESTRICT INTERNAL USERS 

The information system restricts the ability of individuals to launch [Assignment: organizationdefined denial of service attacks] against other information systems. 

Supplemental Guidance: Restricting the ability of individuals to launch denial of service attacks 

requires that the mechanisms used for such attacks are unavailable. Individuals of concern can 

include, for example, hostile insiders or external adversaries that have successfully breached 

the information system and are using the system as a platform to launch cyber attacks on third 

parties. Organizations can restrict the ability of individuals to connect and transmit arbitrary 

information on the transport medium (i.e., network, wireless spectrum). Organizations can 

also limit the ability of individuals to use excessive information system resources. Protection 

against individuals having the ability to launch denial of service attacks may be implemented 

on specific information systems or on boundary devices prohibiting egress to potential target 

systems. 

 
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(2) DENIAL OF SERVICE PROTECTION | EXCESS CAPACITY / BANDWIDTH / REDUNDANCY 

The information system manages excess capacity, bandwidth, or other redundancy to limit the 

effects of information flooding denial of service attacks. 

Supplemental Guidance: Managing excess capacity ensures that sufficient capacity is available 

to counter flooding attacks. Managing excess capacity may include, for example, establishing 

selected usage priorities, quotas, or partitioning. 

(3) DENIAL OF SERVICE PROTECTION | DETECTION / MONITORING 

The organization: 

(a) Employs [Assignment: organization-defined monitoring tools] to detect indicators of denial of 

service attacks against the information system; and 

(b) Monitors [Assignment: organization-defined information system resources] to determine if 

sufficient resources exist to prevent effective denial of service attacks. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations consider utilization and capacity of information system 

resources when managing risk from denial of service due to malicious attacks. Denial of 

service attacks can originate from external or internal sources. Information system resources 

sensitive to denial of service include, for example, physical disk storage, memory, and CPU 

cycles. Common safeguards to prevent denial of service attacks related to storage utilization 

and capacity include, for example, instituting disk quotas, configuring information systems to 

automatically alert administrators when specific storage capacity thresholds are reached, using 

file compression technologies to maximize available storage space, and imposing separate 

partitions for system and user data. Related controls: CA-7, SI-4. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SC-5 MOD SC-5 HIGH SC-5

SC-6 RESOURCE AVAILABILITY

Control: The information system protects the availability of resources by allocating [Assignment: 

organization-defined resources] by [Selection (one or more); priority; quota; [Assignment: 

organization-defined security safeguards]]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Priority protection helps prevent lower-priority processes from delaying or 

interfering with the information system servicing any higher-priority processes. Quotas prevent 

users or processes from obtaining more than predetermined amounts of resources. This control 

does not apply to information system components for which there are only single users/roles. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-7 BOUNDARY PROTECTION

Control: The information system: 

a. Monitors and controls communications at the external boundary of the system and at key 

internal boundaries within the system; and 
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b. Connects to external networks or information systems only through managed interfaces 

consisting of boundary protection devices arranged in accordance with an organizational 

security architecture. 

Supplemental Guidance: Managed interfaces implemented by organizations provide boundary 

protection capability using automated mechanisms or devices. Managed interfaces include, for 

example, gateways, routers, firewalls, guards, or encrypted tunnels implemented within a security 

architecture (e.g., routers protecting firewalls or application gateways residing on protected 

subnetworks). Subnetworks that are physically separated from and external to internal networks 

are commonly referred to as demilitarized zones or DMZs. Restricting and prohibiting interfaces 

within organizational information systems includes, for example, restricting external web traffic to 

web servers within managed interfaces and prohibiting external traffic that appears to be spoofing 

internal addresses. Organizations consider the shared nature of commercial telecommunications 

services in the implementation of security controls associated with the use of such services. 

Commercial telecommunications services are commonly based on network components and 

consolidated management systems shared by all attached commercial customers, and may also 

include third-party provided access lines and other service elements. Such transmission services 

may represent sources of increased risk despite contract security provisions. Related controls: AC4, AC-17, CA-3, CM-7, IR-4, RA-3, SC-5, SC-13. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PHYSICALLY SEPARATED SUBNETWORKS 

The organization physically allocates publicly accessible information system components to 

subnetworks that are physically separated from and external to internal organizational networks. 

Supplemental Guidance: Publicly accessible information system components include, for 

example, public web servers.

(2) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PUBLIC ACCESS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-7].

(3) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ACCESS POINTS 

The organization limits the number of access points to the information system to allow for more 

comprehensive monitoring of inbound and outbound communications and network traffic. 

Supplemental Guidance: The Trusted Internet Connection (TIC) initiative is an example of 

limiting the number of managed network access points.

(4) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | EXTERNAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES 

The organization: 

(a) Implements a managed interface for each external telecommunication service; 

(b) Establishes a traffic flow policy for each managed interface; 

(c) Protects the confidentiality and integrity of the information being transmitted; 

(d) Documents each exception to the traffic flow policy with a supporting mission/business need 

and duration of that need; 

(e) Reviews exceptions to the traffic flow policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; 

and 

(f) Removes traffic flow policy exceptions that are no longer supported by an explicit 

mission/business need. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: SC-8, SC-9, SC-13.

(5) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | DENY BY DEFAULT / ALLOW BY EXCEPTION 

The information system at managed interfaces, denies network traffic by default and allows 

network traffic by exception (i.e., deny all, permit by exception). 

(6) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | RESPONSE TO RECOGNIZED FAILURES 

The organization prevents the unauthorized release of information outside of the information 

system boundary or any unauthorized communication through the information system boundary 

when there is a recognized operational failure of one or more boundary protection mechanisms at 

the managed interface. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CP-2, SC-24.
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(7) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | REMOTE DEVICES 

The information system prevents remote devices that have established a non-remote connection 

with the system from communicating outside of that communications path with resources in 

external networks. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement is implemented within remote devices (e.g., 

notebook computers) through configuration settings that are not configurable by users of 

those devices. Non-remote communications paths from remote devices include, for example, 

virtual private networks. When non-remote connections are established using virtual private 

networks, configuration settings prevent split-tunneling. Split tunneling might otherwise be 

used by remote users to communicate with organizational information systems as extensions 

of those systems and to communicate with local resources such as printers/file servers. Since 

remote devices, when connected through non-remote connections, become extensions of the 

information systems, allowing dual communications paths such as split-tunneling would be, 

in effect, allowing unauthorized external connections into the systems.

(8) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ROUTE TRAFFIC TO AUTHENTICATED PROXY SERVERS 

The information system routes [Assignment: organization-defined internal communications traffic]

to [Assignment: organization-defined external networks] through authenticated proxy servers at 

managed interfaces. 

Supplemental Guidance: External networks are networks outside the control of organizations. 

Proxy servers support logging individual Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) sessions and 

blocking specific Uniform Resource Locators (URLs), domain names, and Internet Protocol 

(IP) addresses. Proxy servers can be configured with organization-defined lists of authorized 

and unauthorized websites. Related controls: AC-3, AU-2.

(9) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | RESTRICT OUTGOING COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC 

The information system: 

(a) Detects and denies outgoing communications traffic posing a threat to external information 

systems; and 

(b) Audits the identity of internal users associated with denied communications. 

Supplemental Guidance: Detecting outgoing communications traffic from internal actions that 

may pose threats to external information systems is sometimes termed extrusion detection. 

Extrusion detection at information system boundaries as part of managed interfaces includes 

the analysis of incoming and outgoing network traffic looking for indications of internal 

threats to the security of external systems. Such threats include, for example, traffic indicative 

of denial of service attacks and traffic containing malware. Related controls: AU-2, SI-4. 

(10) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | UNAUTHORIZED EXFILTRATION 

The organization prevents the unauthorized exfiltration of information across managed interfaces. 

Supplemental Guidance: Safeguards implemented by organizations to prevent unauthorized 

exfiltration of information from information systems include, for example: (i) strict adherence 

to protocol formats; (ii) monitoring for beaconing from information systems; (iii) monitoring 

for steganography; (iv) disconnecting external network interfaces except when explicitly 

needed; (v) disassembling and reassembling packet headers; and (vi) employing traffic profile 

analysis to detect deviations from the volume/types of traffic expected within organizations. 

Devices enforcing strict adherence to protocol formats include, for example, deep packet 

inspection firewalls and XML gateways. These devices verify adherence to protocol formats 

and specification at the application layer and serve to identify vulnerabilities that cannot be 

detected by devices operating at the network or transport layers.

(11) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | RESTRICT INCOMING COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC 

The information system only allows incoming communications from [Assignment: organizationdefined authorized sources] routed to [Assignment: organization-defined authorized destinations]. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement provides determinations that source and 

destination address pairs represent authorized/allowed communications. Such determinations 

can be based on several factors including, for example, the presence of source/destination 

address pairs in lists of authorized/allowed communications, the absence of address pairs in 
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lists of unauthorized/disallowed pairs, or meeting more general rules for authorized/allowed 

source/destination pairs. Related control: AC-3. 

(12) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | HOST-BASED PROTECTION 

The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined host-based boundary protection 

mechanisms] at [Assignment: organization-defined information system components]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Host-based boundary protection mechanisms include, for example, 

host-based firewalls. Information system components employing host-based boundary 

protection mechanisms include, for example, servers, workstations, and mobile devices.

(13) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ISOLATION OF SECURITY TOOLS / MECHANISMS / SUPPORT COMPONENTS 

The organization isolates [Assignment: organization-defined information security tools, 

mechanisms, and support components] from other internal information system components by 

implementing physically separate subnetworks with managed interfaces to other components of 

the system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Such techniques could prove useful, for example, in ensuring the 

isolation of computer network defenses from critical operational processing networks to 

prevent adversaries from discovering the analysis and forensics techniques of organizations. 

Related controls: SA-8, SC-2, SC-3. 

(14) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | UNAUTHORIZED PHYSICAL CONNECTIONS 

The organization protects against unauthorized physical connections at [Assignment: 

organization-defined managed interfaces]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information systems operating at different security categories or 

classification levels may share common physical and environmental controls, since the 

systems may share space within organizational facilities. In practice, it is possible that these 

separate information systems may share common equipment rooms, wiring closets, and cable 

distribution paths. Protection against unauthorized physical connections can be achieved, for 

example, by employing clearly identified and physically separated cable trays, connection 

frames, and patch panels for each side of managed interfaces with physical access controls 

enforcing limited authorized access to these items. Related controls: PE-4, PE-19.

(15) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ROUTE PRIVILEGED NETWORK ACCESSES 

The information system routes all networked, privileged accesses through a dedicated, managed 

interface for purposes of access control and auditing. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-4, AU-2, SI-4. 

(16) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PREVENT DISCOVERY OF COMPONENTS / DEVICES 

The information system prevents discovery of specific system components (or devices) 

composing a managed interface. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement protects network addresses of information 

system components that are part of managed interfaces from discovery through common tools 

and techniques used to identify devices on networks. Network addresses are not available for 

discovery (e.g., network address not published or entered in domain name systems), requiring 

prior knowledge for access. Another obfuscation technique is to periodically change network 

addresses.

(17) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | AUTOMATED ENFORCEMENT OF PROTOCOL FORMATS 

The organization employs automated mechanisms to enforce adherence to protocol formats. 

Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms that enforce protocol formats include, for 

example, deep packet inspection firewalls and XML gateways. Such devices verify adherence 

to protocol formats/specifications (e.g., IEEE) at the application layer and identify significant 

vulnerabilities that cannot be detected by devices operating at the network or transport layers. 

Related controls: AC-4, SC-4.

(18) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | FAIL SECURE 

The information system fails securely in the event of an operational failure of a boundary 

protection device. 

Supplemental Guidance: Fail secure is a condition achieved by employing information system 

mechanisms to ensure that in the event of operational failures of boundary protection devices 
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at managed interfaces (e.g., routers, firewalls, guards, and application gateways residing on 

protected subnetworks commonly referred to as demilitarized zones), information systems do 

not enter into unsecure states where intended security properties no longer hold. Failures of 

boundary protection devices cannot lead to, or cause information external to the devices to 

enter the devices, nor can failures permit unauthorized information releases. Related controls: 

CP-2, SC-24. 

(19) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | BLOCKING INBOUND / OUTBOUND COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC 

The information system blocks both inbound and outbound communications traffic between 

[Assignment: organization-defined communication clients] that are independently configured by 

end users and external service providers. 

Supplemental Guidance: Communication clients independently configured by end users and 

external service providers include, for example, instant messaging clients. Traffic blocking 

does not apply to communication clients that are configured by organizations to perform 

authorized functions.

(20) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | DYNAMIC ISOLATION / SEGREGATION 

The information system provides the capability to dynamically isolate/segregate [Assignment: 

organization-defined information system components] from other components of the system. 

Supplemental Guidance: The capability to dynamically isolate or segregate certain internal 

components of organizational information systems is useful when it is necessary to partition 

or separate certain components of dubious origin from those components possessing greater 

trustworthiness. Component isolation reduces the attack surface of organizational information 

systems. Isolation of selected information system components is also a means of limiting the 

damage from successful cyber attacks when those attacks occur. 

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-41, 800-77.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SC-7 MOD SC-7 (1) (3) (4) (5) (7) HIGH SC-7 (1) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

SC-8 TRANSMISSION INTEGRITY

Control: The information system protects the integrity of transmitted information. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to both internal and external networks. For distributed 

systems including, for example, service-oriented architectures, this control applies to end-to-end 

integrity between the system components/services originating the transmitted information and the 

system components/services receiving the transmitted information. Organizations relying on 

commercial service providers offering transmission services as commodity items rather than as 

fully dedicated services, may find it difficult to obtain the necessary assurances regarding the 

implementation of needed security controls for transmission integrity. When it is infeasible or 

impractical to obtain the necessary security controls and assurances of control effectiveness 

through appropriate contracting vehicles, organizations implement appropriate compensating 

security controls or explicitly accept the additional risk. Related controls: AC-17, PE-4. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) TRANSMISSION INTEGRITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC OR ALTERNATE PHYSICAL PROTECTION 

The organization employs cryptographic mechanisms implementing [Selection: FIPS-validated 

cryptography; NSA-approved cryptography] to detect changes to information during transmission 

unless otherwise protected by [Assignment: organization-defined alternative physical safeguards]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Encrypting information for transmission protects information from 

unauthorized modification. Alternative physical security safeguards include, for example, 

protected distribution systems. Related control: SC-13.

 
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(2) TRANSMISSION INTEGRITY | INTEGRITY PRIOR TO TRANSMISSION 

The information system maintains the integrity of information during preparation for transmission 

and during reception. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information can be unintentionally and/or maliciously modified during 

preparation for transmission or during reception including, for example, during aggregation, 

protocol transformation points, and packing/unpacking. These unauthorized modifications 

compromise the integrity of the information. Related control: AU-10.

References: FIPS Publications 140-2, 197; NIST Special Publications 800-52, 800-77, 800-81, 

800-113; NSTISSI No. 7003.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SC-8 (1) HIGH SC-8 (1)

SC-9 TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY

Control: The information system protects the confidentiality of transmitted information. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to both internal and external networks. For distributed 

systems including, for example, service-oriented architectures, this control applies to end-to-end 

confidentiality between the system components/services originating the transmitted information 

and the system components/services receiving the transmitted information. Organizations relying 

on commercial service providers offering transmission services as commodity items rather than as 

fully dedicated services may find it difficult to obtain the necessary assurances regarding the 

implementation of needed security controls for transmission confidentiality. When it is infeasible 

or impractical to obtain the necessary security controls and assurances of control effectiveness 

through appropriate contracting vehicles, organizations implement appropriate compensating 

security controls or explicitly accept the additional risk. Related controls: AC-17, PE-4. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC OR ALTERNATE PHYSICAL PROTECTION 

The organization employs cryptographic mechanisms implementing [Selection: FIPS-validated 

cryptography; NSA-approved cryptography] to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information 

during transmission unless otherwise protected by [Assignment: organization-defined alternative 

physical safeguards]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Encrypting information for transmission protects information (e.g., 

controlled unclassified information) from individuals without authorization or need to know. 

Alternative physical safeguards include, for example, protected distribution systems. Related 

control: SC-13.

(2) TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY | PRIOR TO TRANSMISSION 

The information system maintains the confidentiality of information during preparation for 

transmission and during reception. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information can be unintentionally and/or maliciously disclosed during 

preparation for transmission or during reception including, for example, during data 

aggregation, protocol transformation points, and packing/unpacking. These unauthorized 

disclosures compromise the confidentiality of the information. 

(3) TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC OR ALTERNATIVE PROTECTION FOR MESSAGE EXTERNALS 

The information system encrypts message externals using [Selection: FIPS-validated 

cryptography; NSA-approved cryptography] unless otherwise protected by [Assignment: 

organization-defined alternative physical safeguards]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Message externals include, for example, message headers/routing 

information. This control enhancement prevents the exploitation of message externals and 

applies to both internal and external networks or links that may be visible to individuals who 

are not authorized users. Header/routing information is sometimes transmitted unencrypted 

because the information is not properly identified by organizations as having significant value 
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or because encrypting the information can result in lower network performance and/or higher 

costs. Alternative physical safeguards include, for example, protected distribution systems. 

Related controls: SC-12, SC-13. 

(4) TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY | CONCEAL / RANDOMIZE COMMUNICATIONS

The information system conceals or randomizes communications patterns using [Selection: FIPSvalidated cryptography; NSA-approved cryptography] unless otherwise protected by [Assignment: 

organization-defined alternative physical safeguards]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Communication patterns include, for example, frequency, periods, 

amount, and predictability. Changes to communications patterns can reveal information 

having intelligence value especially when combined with other available information related 

to missions/business functions supported by organizational information systems. This control 

enhancement prevents the derivation of intelligence based on communications patterns and 

applies to both internal and external networks or links that may be visible to individuals who 

are not authorized users. Encrypting the links and transmitting in continuous, fixed, or random 

patterns, prevents the derivation of intelligence from the system communications patterns. 

Alternative physical safeguards include, for example, protected distribution systems. Related 

controls: SC-12, SC-13. 

References: FIPS Publications 140-2, 197; NIST Special Publications 800-52, 800-77, 800-113; 

CNSS Policy 15; NSTISSI No. 7003.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SC-9 (1) HIGH SC-9 (1)

SC-10 NETWORK DISCONNECT

Control: The information system terminates the network connection associated with a 

communications session at the end of the session or after [Assignment: organization-defined time 

period] of inactivity.

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to both internal and external networks and local and 

remote connections. Terminating network connections associated with communications sessions 

include, for example, de-allocating associated TCP/IP address/port pairs at the operating-system 

level, or de-allocating networking assignments at the application level if multiple application 

sessions are using a single, operating system-level network connection. Time periods of inactivity 

may be established by organizations and include, for example, time periods by type of network 

access or for specific network accesses. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD SC-10 HIGH SC-10

SC-11 TRUSTED PATH

Control: The information system establishes a trusted communications path between the user and 

the following security functions of the system: [Assignment: organization-defined security 

functions to include at a minimum, information system authentication and reauthentication]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Trusted paths are mechanisms by which users (through input devices) can 

communicate directly with security functions of information systems with the requisite assurance 

to support information security policies. The mechanisms can only be activated by users or the 
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APPENDIX F-SC PAGE F-164

security functions of organizational information systems. User responses via trusted paths are 

protected from modifications by or disclosure to untrusted applications. Organizations employ 

trusted paths for high-assurance connections between security functions of information systems 

and users (e.g., during system logons). 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-12 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT

Control: The organization establishes and manages cryptographic keys for required cryptography 

employed within the information system in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined 

requirements for key generation, distribution, storage, access, and destruction]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Cryptographic key management and establishment can be performed using 

manual procedures or automated mechanisms with supporting manual procedures. Organizations 

define key management requirements in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive 

Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance, specifying appropriate options, 

levels, and parameters. Related controls: SC-13, SC-17. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | AVAILABILITY 

The organization maintains availability of information in the event of the loss of cryptographic keys 

by users. 

Supplemental Guidance: Escrowing of encryption keys is a common practice for ensuring 

availability in the event of loss of keys (e.g., due to forgotten passphrase).

(2) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | SYMMETRIC KEYS 

The organization produces, controls, and distributes symmetric cryptographic keys using 

[Selection: NIST FIPS-compliant; NSA-approved] key management technology and processes. 

(3) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | ASYMMETRIC KEYS 

The organization produces, controls, and distributes asymmetric cryptographic keys using 

[Selection: NSA-approved key management technology and processes; approved PKI Class 3 

certificates or prepositioned keying material; approved PKI Class 3 or Class 4 certificates and 

hardware security tokens that protect the user’s private key]. 

(4) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | PKI CERTIFICATES 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-12].

(5) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | PKI CERTIFICATES / HARDWARE TOKENS 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-12].

References: NIST Special Publications 800-56, 800-57. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SC-12 MOD SC-12 HIGH SC-12 (1)

SC-13 CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

Control: The information system implements required cryptographic protections using 

cryptographic modules that comply with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, 

policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. 
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Supplemental Guidance: This control does not impose any requirements on organizations to use 

cryptography. Rather, if cryptography is required based on the selection of other controls and 

subsequently implemented by organizational information systems, the cryptographic modules 

comply with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, 

and guidance. Generally applicable cryptographic standards include, for example, FIPS-validated 

cryptography to protect unclassified information and NSA-approved cryptography to protect 

classified information. Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-7, AC-17, AC-18, AU-9, AU-10, CM11, CP-9, IA-3, IA-7, MA-4, MP-2, MP-4, MP-5, SA-4, SC-8, SC-9, SC-12, SC-28, SI-7. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | FIPS-VALIDATED CRYPTOGRAPHY 

The information system implements, at a minimum, FIPS-validated cryptography to protect 

unclassified information. 

(2) CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | NSA-APPROVED CRYPTOGRAPHY

The information system implements NSA-approved cryptography to protect classified information. 

(3) CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT FORMAL ACCESS APPROVALS 

The information system implements, at a minimum, FIPS-validated cryptography to protect 

information when such information must be separated from individuals who have the necessary 

clearances yet lack the necessary formal access approvals. 

(4) CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | DIGITAL SIGNATURES 

The information system implements [Selection: FIPS-validated; NSA-approved] cryptography to 

provide digital signatures. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SC-17.

References: FIPS Publication 140-2; Web: CSRC.NIST.GOV/CRYPTVAL, WWW.CNSS.GOV.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SC-13 MOD SC-13 HIGH SC-13

SC-14 PUBLIC ACCESS PROTECTIONS

Control: The information system protects the integrity and availability of publicly available 

information and applications. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the protection needs for public information and 

applications with such protection likely being implemented as part of other security controls. 

Related controls: AC-3, SI-3, SI-4, SI-5, SI-7, SI-9, SI-10. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SC-14 MOD SC-14 HIGH SC-14

SC-15 COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES

Control: The information system: 

a. Prohibits remote activation of collaborative computing devices with the following exceptions: 

[Assignment: organization-defined exceptions where remote activation is to be allowed]; and 

b. Provides an explicit indication of use to users physically present at the devices. 
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Supplemental Guidance: Collaborative computing devices include, for example, networked white 

boards, cameras, and microphones. Explicit indication of use includes, for example, signals to 

users when collaborative computing devices are activated. Related control: AC-21. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | PHYSICAL DISCONNECT 

The information system provides physical disconnect of collaborative computing devices in a 

manner that supports ease of use. 

(2) COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | BLOCKING INBOUND / OUTBOUND COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-7].

(3) COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | DISABLING / REMOVAL IN SECURE WORK AREAS 

The organization disables or removes collaborative computing devices from [Assignment: 

organization-defined information systems or information system components] in [Assignment: 

organization-defined secure work areas]. 

(4) COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | EXPLICITLY INDICATE CURRENT PARTICIPANTS

The information system provides an explicit indication of current participants in [Assignment: 

organization-defined online meetings and teleconferences]. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SC-15 MOD SC-15 HIGH SC-15

SC-16 TRANSMISSION OF SECURITY ATTRIBUTES

Control: The information system associates [Assignment: organization-defined security attributes] 

with information exchanged between information systems and between system components. 

Supplemental Guidance: Security attributes can be explicitly or implicitly associated with the 

information contained in organizational information systems or system components. Related 

controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-16. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) TRANSMISSION OF SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | INTEGRITY VALIDATION 

The information system validates the integrity of transmitted security attributes. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement ensures that the verification of integrity of 

transmitted information includes security attributes. Related controls: AU-10, SC-8. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-17 PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE CERTIFICATES

Control: The organization issues public key certificates under an [Assignment: organizationdefined certificate policy] or obtains public key certificates from an approved service provider. 

Supplemental Guidance: For user certificates, organizations obtain certificates from approved, 

shared service providers, as required by OMB policy. For organizations operating legacy public 

key infrastructures cross-certified with the Federal Bridge Certification Authority at medium 

assurance or higher, this Certification Authority suffices. This control addresses certificates with 

visibility external to organizational information systems and does not address certificates related to 
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the internal operations of systems, for example, application-specific time services. Related control: 

SC-12. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: OMB Memorandum 05-24; NIST Special Publications 800-32, 800-63.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SC-17 HIGH SC-17

SC-18 MOBILE CODE

Control: The organization: 

a. Defines acceptable and unacceptable mobile code and mobile code technologies; 

b. Establishes usage restrictions and implementation guidance for acceptable mobile code and 

mobile code technologies; and 

c. Authorizes, monitors, and controls the use of mobile code within the information system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Decisions regarding the employment of mobile code within organizational 

information systems are based on the potential for the code to cause damage to the systems if used 

maliciously. Mobile code technologies include, for example, Java, JavaScript, ActiveX, Postscript, 

PDF, Shockwave movies, Flash animations, and VBScript. Usage restrictions and implementation 

guidance apply to both the selection and use of mobile code installed on servers and mobile code 

downloaded and executed on individual workstations and devices (e.g., smart phones). Mobile 

code policy and procedures address preventing the development, acquisition, or introduction of 

unacceptable mobile code within organizational information systems. Related controls: AU-2, 

AU-12, CM-2, CM-6, SI-3. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) MOBILE CODE | IDENTIFY UNACCEPTABLE CODE / TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 

The information system identifies [Assignment: organization-defined unacceptable mobile code] 

and takes [Assignment: organization-defined corrective actions]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Corrective actions when unacceptable mobile code is detected include, 

for example, blocking, quarantine, or alerting administrators. Blocking includes, for example, 

preventing transmission of word processing files with embedded macros when such macros 

have been defined to be unacceptable mobile code. 

(2) MOBILE CODE | ACQUISITION / DEVELOPMENT / USE 

The organization ensures the acquisition, development, and use of mobile code to be deployed in 

the information system meets [Assignment: organization-defined mobile code requirements]. 

(3) MOBILE CODE | PREVENT DOWNLOADING / EXECUTION 

The information system prevents the download and execution of [Assignment: organizationdefined unacceptable mobile code]. 

(4) MOBILE CODE | PREVENT AUTOMATIC EXECUTION 

The information system prevents the automatic execution of mobile code in [Assignment: 

organization-defined software applications] and enforces [Assignment: organization-defined 

actions] prior to executing the code. 

Supplemental Guidance: Actions enforced before executing mobile code, include, for example, 

prompting users prior to opening electronic mail attachments. Preventing automatic execution 

of mobile code includes, for example, disabling auto execute features on information system 

components employing removable media such as Compact Disks (CDs), Digital Video Disks 

(DVDs), and Universal Serial Bus (USB) devices. 

 
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(5) MOBILE CODE | ALLOW EXECUTION IN ONLY IN CONFINED ENVIRONMENTS 

The organization allows execution of permitted mobile code only in confined virtual machine 

environments. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-28; DoD Instruction 8552.01.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SC-18 HIGH SC-18

SC-19 VOICE OVER INTERNET PROTOCOL

Control: The organization: 

a. Establishes usage restrictions and implementation guidance for Voice over Internet Protocol 

(VoIP) technologies based on the potential to cause damage to the information system if used 

maliciously; and 

b. Authorizes, monitors, and controls the use of VoIP within the information system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CM-6, SC-7, SC-15.

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-58.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SC-19 HIGH SC-19

SC-20 SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE)

Control: The information system: 

a. Provides additional data origin and integrity artifacts along with the authoritative name 

resolution data the system returns in response to external name/address resolution queries; and 

b. Provides the means to indicate the security status of child subspaces and (if the child supports 

secure resolution services) to enable verification of a chain of trust among parent and child 

domains, when operating as part of a distributed, hierarchical namespace. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enables external clients including, for example, remote 

Internet clients, to obtain origin authentication and integrity verification assurances for the 

host/service name to network address resolution information obtained through the service. 

Information systems that provide name and address resolution services include, for example, 

domain name system (DNS) servers. Additional artifacts include, for example, DNS Security 

(DNSSEC) digital signatures and cryptographic keys. DNS resource records are examples of 

authoritative data. The means to indicate the security status of child subspaces includes, for 

example, the use of delegation signer resource records in the DNS. The DNS security controls 

reflect (and are referenced from) OMB Memorandum 08-23. Information systems that use 

technologies other than the DNS to map between host/service names and network addresses 

provide other means to assure the authenticity and integrity of response data. Related controls: 

AU-10, SC-13, SC-17, SC-21, SC-22. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE) | CHILD SUBSPACES 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-20].

 
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(2) SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE) | DATA ORIGIN / INTEGRITY 

The information system provides data origin and integrity protection artifacts for internal 

name/address resolution queries. 

References: OMB Memorandum 08-23; NIST Special Publication 800-81.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SC-20 MOD SC-20 HIGH SC-20

SC-21 SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (RECURSIVE OR CACHING RESOLVER)

Control: The information system requests and performs data origin authentication and data 

integrity verification on the name/address resolution responses the system receives from 

authoritative sources. 

Supplemental Guidance: Each client of name resolution services either performs this validation on 

its own, or has authenticated channels to trusted validation providers. Information systems that 

provide name and address resolution services for local clients include, for example, recursive 

resolving or caching domain name system (DNS) servers. DNS client resolvers either perform 

validation of DNSSEC signatures or clients use authenticated channels to recursive resolvers that 

perform such validations. Information systems that use technologies other than the DNS to map 

between host/service names and network addresses provide other means to enable clients to verify 

the authenticity and integrity of response data. Related controls: SC-20, SC-22. 

Control Enhancements: None.

(1) SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (RECURSIVE OR CACHING RESOLVER) | DATA ORIGIN / INTEGRITY

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-21]. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-81.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SC-21 MOD SC-21 HIGH SC-21

SC-22 ARCHITECTURE AND PROVISIONING FOR NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE 

Control: The information systems that collectively provide name/address resolution service for an 

organization are fault-tolerant and implement internal/external role separation. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information systems that provide name and address resolution services 

include, for example, domain name system (DNS) servers. To eliminate single points of failure 

and to enhance redundancy, organizations employ at least two authoritative domain name system 

servers, one configured as the primary server and the other configured as the secondary server. 

Additionally, organizations typically deploy the servers in two geographically-separated network 

subnetworks (i.e., not located in the same physical facility). For role separation, DNS servers with 

internal roles, only process name and address resolution requests from within organizations (i.e., 

from internal clients). DNS servers with external roles only process name and address resolution 

information requests from clients external to organizations (i.e., on external networks including 

the Internet). Organizations specify clients that can access authoritative DNS servers in particular 

roles (e.g., by address ranges, explicit lists). Related controls: SC-2, SC-20, SC-21, SC-24. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-81.

 
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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SC-22 MOD SC-22 HIGH SC-22

SC-23 SESSION AUTHENTICITY

Control: The information system protects the authenticity of communications sessions. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses communications protection at the session, versus 

packet level (e.g., sessions in service-oriented architectures providing web-based services) and 

establishes grounds for confidence at both ends of communications sessions in ongoing identities 

of other parties and in the validity of information transmitted. Authenticity protection includes, for 

example, protecting against man-in-the-middle attacks/session hijacking and the insertion of false 

information into sessions. Related controls: SC-8, SC-9, SC-10, SC-11. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | INVALIDATE SESSION IDENTIFIERS AT LOGOUT 

The information system invalidates session identifiers upon user logout or other session 

termination. 

(2) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | USER-INITIATED LOGOUTS / MESSAGE DISPLAYS 

The information system: 

(a) Provides a logout capability for user-initiated communications sessions whenever 

authentication is used to gain access to [Assignment: organization-defined information 

resources]; and 

(b) Displays an explicit logout message to users indicating the reliable termination of 

authenticated communications sessions. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information resources to which users gain access via authentication 

include, for example, password-protected websites and web-based services. Logout messages 

for web page access, for example, can be displayed after authenticated sessions have been 

terminated. However, for some types of interactive sessions, including, for example, file 

transfer protocol (FTP) sessions, information systems typically send logout messages as final 

messages prior to terminating sessions. 

(3) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | UNIQUE SESSION IDENTIFIERS 

The information system generates a unique session identifier for each session and recognizes only 

session identifiers that are system-generated. 

(4) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | UNIQUE SESSION IDENTIFIERS WITH RANDOMIZATION 

The information system generates unique session identifiers with [Assignment: organizationdefined randomness requirements]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Employing the concept of randomness in the generation of unique 

session identifiers helps to protect against brute-force attacks to determine future session 

identifiers.

(5) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | ALLOWED CERTIFICATE AUTHORITIES 

The information system only allows the installation of [Assignment: organization-defined 

certificate authorities] for verification of the establishment of protected sessions. 

Supplemental Guidance: Reliance on certificate authorities (CA) for the establishment of secure 

sessions includes, for example, the use of Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and/or Transport Layer 

Security (TLS) certificates. These certificates, after verification by the respective certificate 

authorities, facilitate the establishment of protected sessions between web clients and web 

servers. 

References: NIST Special Publications 800-52, 800-77, 800-95.

 
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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SC-23 HIGH SC-23

SC-24 FAIL IN KNOWN STATE

Control: The information system fails to a [Assignment: organization-defined known-state] for 

[Assignment: organization-defined types of failures] preserving [Assignment: organization-defined 

system state information] in failure. 

Supplemental Guidance: Failure in a known state addresses security concerns in accordance with the 

mission/business needs of organizations. Failure in a known secure state helps prevents the loss of 

confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information in the event of failures of organizational 

information systems or system components. Failure in a known safe state helps prevent systems 

from failing to a state that may cause injury to individuals or destruction to property. Preserving 

information system state information facilitates system restart and return to the operational mode 

of organizations with less disruption of mission/business processes. Related controls: CP-2, CP10, SC-7, SC-22. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH SC-24

SC-25 THIN NODES

Control: The organization employs processing components that have minimal functionality and 

information storage. 

Supplemental Guidance: The deployment of information system components with reduced/minimal 

functionality (e.g., diskless nodes and thin client technologies) reduces the need to secure every 

user endpoint, and may reduce the exposure of information, information systems, and services to 

cyber attacks. Related control: SC-30. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-26 HONEYPOTS

Control: The information system includes components specifically designed to be the target of 

malicious attacks for the purpose of detecting, deflecting, and analyzing such attacks. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SI-3. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

(1) HONEYPOTS | DETECTION OF MALICIOUS CODE 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-36]. 
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References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-27 OPERATING SYSTEM-INDEPENDENT APPLICATIONS

Control: The information system includes: [Assignment: organization-defined operating systemindependent applications]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Operating system-independent applications are applications that can run on 

multiple operating systems. Such applications promote portability and reconstitution on different 

platform architectures, increasing the availability of critical functions within organizations while 

information systems with specific operating systems are under attack. Related control: SC-29. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-28 PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AT REST

Control: The information system protects the confidentiality and integrity of [Assignment: 

organization-defined information at rest]. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the confidentiality and integrity of information at 

rest and covers user information and system information. Information at rest refers to the state of 

information when it is located on storage devices as specific components of information systems. 

System-related information requiring protection includes, for example, configurations or rule sets 

for firewalls, gateways, intrusion detection/prevention systems, filtering routers, and authenticator 

content. Organizations may employ different mechanisms to achieve confidentiality and integrity 

protections. Organizations may also employ other security controls including for example, secure 

off-line storage in lieu of online storage when adequate protection of information at rest cannot 

otherwise be achieved. Related controls: AC-3, AC-6, CM-3, CM-5, CM-6, MP-4, MP-5, PE-3, 

SC-8, SC-9, SC-13, SI-3, SI-7. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AT REST | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION 

The organization employs cryptographic mechanisms implementing [Selection: FIPS-validated 

cryptography; NSA-approved cryptography] to prevent unauthorized disclosure and modification 

of [Assignment: organization-defined information at rest]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SC-13.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-56, 800-57, 800-111. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SC-28 HIGH SC-28
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SC-29 HETEROGENEITY 

Control: The organization employs a diverse set of information technologies for [Assignment: 

organization-defined information system components] in the implementation of the information 

system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Increasing the diversity of information technologies within organizational 

information systems reduces the impact of potential exploitations of specific technologies and also 

defends against common mode failures, including those failures induced by supply chain attacks. 

An increase in diversity may add complexity and management overhead which could ultimately 

lead to mistakes and unauthorized configurations. Related controls: SA-12, SA-14, SC-27. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) HETEROGENEITY | VIRTUALIZATION TECHNIQUES 

The organization employs virtualization techniques to support the deployment of a diversity of 

operating systems and applications that are changed [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency]. 

Supplemental Guidance: While frequent changes to operating systems and applications pose 

configuration management challenges, the changes can result in an increased work factor for 

adversaries in order to carry out successful cyber attacks. Changing virtual operating systems 

or applications, as opposed to changing actual operating systems/applications, provide virtual 

changes that impede attacker success while reducing configuration management efforts. In 

addition, virtualization techniques can assist organizations in isolating untrustworthy software 

and/or software of dubious provenance into confined execution environments.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-30 CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION 

Control: The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined concealment and 

misdirection techniques] for [Assignment: organization-defined information systems] at 

[Assignment: organization-defined time periods] to confuse and mislead adversaries. 

Supplemental Guidance: Concealment and misdirection techniques can significantly reduce the 

targeting capability of adversaries (i.e., window of opportunity and available attack surface) to 

initiate and complete cyber attacks. For example, virtualization techniques provide organizations 

with the ability to disguise information systems, potentially reducing the likelihood of successful 

attacks without the cost of having multiple platforms. Increased use of concealment/misdirection 

techniques including, for example, randomness, uncertainty, and virtualization, may sufficiently 

confuse and mislead adversaries and subsequently increase the risk of discovery and/or exposing 

tradecraft. Concealment/misdirection techniques may also provide organizations additional time to 

successfully perform core missions and business functions. Because of the time and effort required 

to support concealment/misdirection techniques, it is anticipated that such techniques would be 

used by organizations on a very limited basis. Related controls: SC-26, SC-29, SI-14. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | VIRTUALIZATION TECHNIQUES 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-29]. 

(2) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | RANDOMNESS 

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined techniques] to introduce 

randomness into organizational operations and assets. 

Supplemental Guidance: Randomness introduces increased levels of uncertainty for adversaries 

regarding the actions organizations take in defending against cyber attacks. Such actions may 
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impede the ability of adversaries to correctly target information resources of organizations 

supporting critical missions/business functions. Uncertainty may also cause adversaries to 

hesitate before initiating or continuing attacks. Misdirection techniques involving randomness 

include, for example, performing certain routine actions at different times of day, employing 

different information technologies (e.g., browsers, search engines), using different suppliers, 

and rotating roles and responsibilities of organizational personnel. 

(3) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | CHANGE PROCESSING / STORAGE LOCATIONS 

The organization changes the location of [Assignment: organization-defined processing and/or 

storage] at [Selection: [Assignment: organization-defined time intervals]; random time intervals]]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Adversaries target critical organizational missions/business functions 

and the information resources supporting those missions and functions while at the same time, 

trying to minimize exposure of their existence and tradecraft. The static, homogeneous, and 

deterministic nature of organizational information systems targeted by adversaries, make such 

systems more susceptible to cyber attacks with less adversary cost and effort to be successful. 

Changing organizational processing and storage locations (sometimes referred to as moving 

target defense), addresses advanced persistent threats using techniques such as virtualization, 

distributed processing, and replication. This enables organizations to relocate the information 

resources (i.e., processing and/or storage) supporting critical missions and business functions. 

Changing locations of processing activities and/or storage sites introduces uncertainty into the 

targeting activities by adversaries. This uncertainty increases the work factor of adversaries 

making compromises and breaches to organizational information systems more difficult and 

time-consuming, and increasing the chances that adversaries may inadvertently disclose 

aspects of tradecraft while attempting locate critical organizational resources. 

(4) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | MISLEADING INFORMATION 

The organization employs realistic, but misleading information in [Assignment: organizationdefined information system components] with regard to its security state or posture. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement misleads potential adversaries regarding the 

nature and extent of security safeguards deployed by organizations. As a result, adversaries 

may employ incorrect (and as a result ineffective) attack techniques. One way of misleading 

adversaries is for organizations to place misleading information regarding the specific security 

controls deployed in external information systems that are known to be accessed or targeted 

by adversaries. Another technique is the use of deception nets (e.g., honey nets, virtualized 

environments) that mimic actual aspects of organizational information systems but use, for 

example, out-of-date software configurations. 

(5) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | CONCEALMENT OF SYSTEM COMPONENTS 

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined techniques] to hide or conceal 

[Assignment: organization-defined information system components]. 

Supplemental Guidance: By hiding, disguising, or otherwise concealing critical information 

system components, organizations may be able to decrease the probability that adversaries 

target and successfully compromise those assets. Potential means for organizations to hide 

and/or conceal information system components include, for example, configuration of routers 

or the use of honeynets or virtualization techniques. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-31 COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS

Control: The organization requires that information system developers identify exploitable covert 

[Selection (one or more): storage; timing] channels within the system and estimate the maximum 

bandwidth of those channels. 
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Supplemental Guidance: Information system developers are in the best position to identify potential 

areas within systems that might lead to covert channels. Covert channel analysis is a meaningful 

activity when there is the potential for unauthorized information flows across security domains, 

for example, in the case of information systems containing export-controlled information and 

having connections to external networks (i.e., networks not controlled by organizations). Covert 

channel analysis is also meaningful in the case of multilevel secure (MLS) information systems, 

multiple security level (MSL) systems, and cross-domain systems. Related controls: AC-4, PL-2. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS | TESTING OF DEVELOPER-IDENTIFIED COVERT CHANNELS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-31].

(2) COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS | MAXIMUM BANDWIDTH 

The organization requires that information system developers reduce the maximum bandwidth for 

identified covert [Selection (one or more); storage; timing] channels to [Assignment: organizationdefined values]. 

(3) COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS | MEASURE BANDWIDTH IN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS 

The organization measures the bandwidth of [Assignment: organization-defined subset of 

identified covert channels] in the operational environment of the information system. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-32 INFORMATION SYSTEM PARTITIONING 

Control: The organization partitions the information system into components residing in separate 

physical domains (or environments) based on [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances 

for physical separation of components]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information system partitioning is a part of a defense-in-depth protection 

strategy. Organizations determine the degree of physical separation of system components from 

physically distinct components in separate racks in the same room, to components in separate 

rooms for the more critical components, to more significant geographical separation of the most 

critical components. Security categorization can guide the selection of appropriate candidates for 

domain partitioning. Managed interfaces restrict or prohibit network access and information flow 

among partitioned information system components. Related controls: AC-4, SA-8, SC-2, SC-3, 

SC-7. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: FIPS Publication 199. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SC-32 HIGH SC-32

SC-33 TRANSMISSION PREPARATION INTEGRITY 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-8]. 
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SC-34 NON-MODIFIABLE EXECUTABLE PROGRAMS 

Control: The information system at [Assignment: organization-defined information system 

components]: 

a. Loads and executes the operating environment from hardware-enforced, read-only media; 

and 

b. Loads and executes [Assignment: organization-defined applications] from hardwareenforced, read-only media. 

Supplemental Guidance: The term operating environment is defined as the specific code that hosts 

applications, for example, operating systems, executives, or monitors including virtual machine 

monitors (i.e., hypervisors). It can also include certain applications running directly on hardware 

platforms. Hardware-enforced, read-only media include, for example, Compact Disk-Recordable 

(CD-R)/Digital Video Disk-Recordable (DVD-R) disk drives and one-time programmable read 

only memory. The use of non-modifiable storage ensures the integrity of software from the point 

of creation of the read-only image. The use of reprogrammable read-only memory can be accepted 

as read-only media provided: (i) integrity can be adequately protected from point of initial writing 

to the insertion of the memory into the information system; and (ii) there are reliable hardware 

protections against reprogramming the memory while installed in organizational information 

systems. Related controls: AC-3, SI-7. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) NON-MODIFIABLE EXECUTABLE PROGRAMS | NO WRITABLE STORAGE 

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] 

with no writeable storage that is persistent across component restart or power on/off. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement: (i) eliminates the possibility of malicious 

code insertion via persistent, writeable storage within the designated information system 

components; and (ii) applies to both fixed and removable storage, with the latter being 

addressed directly or as specific restrictions imposed through access controls for mobile 

devices. Related controls: AC-19, MP-7.

(2) NON-MODIFIABLE EXECUTABLE PROGRAMS | INTEGRITY PROTECTION / READ-ONLY MEDIA 

The organization protects the integrity of the information when using read-only media. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement protects the integrity of information to be 

placed onto read-only media and controls the media after information has been recorded onto 

the media. Security safeguards prevent the substitution of media into information systems or 

the reprogramming of programmable read-only media prior to installation into the systems. 

Security safeguards may include a combination of prevention and detection/response. Related 

controls: AC-3, AC-5, CM-3, CM-5, CM-9, MP-2, MP-4, MP-5, SA-12, SC-28, SI-3, and SI7. 

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-35 TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES SURVEY 

Control: The organization employs a technical surveillance countermeasures survey at 

[Assignment: organization-defined locations] [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: 

organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined events or indicators occur]]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Technical surveillance countermeasures surveys are performed by qualified 

personnel to detect the presence of technical surveillance devices/hazards and to identify technical 

security weaknesses that could aid in the conduct of technical penetrations of surveyed facilities. 

Such surveys provide evaluations of the technical security postures of organizations and facilities 
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APPENDIX F-SC PAGE F-177

and typically include thorough visual, electronic, and physical examinations in and about surveyed 

facilities. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-36 HONEYCLIENTS

Control: The information system includes components that proactively seek to identify malicious 

websites and/or web-based malicious code. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SI-3. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-37 DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING AND STORAGE

Control: The organization distributes [Assignment: organization-defined processing and storage] 

across multiple physical locations. 

Supplemental Guidance: Distributing processing and storage across multiple physical locations 

provides some degree of redundancy or overlap for organizations, and therefore, increases the 

work factor of adversaries to adversely impact organizational operations, assets, and individuals. 

This control does not assume a single primary processing or storage location, and thus allows for 

parallel processing and storage. Related controls: CP-6, CP-7. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING AND STORAGE | DIVERSITY OF IMPLEMENTATION 

The organization employs diversity of implementation in the distribution of [Assignment: 

organization-defined processing and storage components]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Diversity in the implementation of distributed processing and storage 

components that compose organizational information systems reduces the likelihood that the 

means adversaries use to compromise one component will be equally effective against other 

components, thus further increasing the work factor to successfully complete planned cyber 

attacks.

(2) DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING AND STORAGE | POLLING TECHNIQUES 

The organization employs polling techniques to identify potential faults, errors, or compromises to 

[Assignment: organization-defined distributed processing and storage components]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Distributed processing and/or storage may be employed to reduce 

opportunities for adversaries to successfully compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or 

availability of information and information systems. However, distribution of processing 

and/or storage components does not prevent adversaries from compromising one (or more) of 

the distributed components. Polling compares the processing results and/or storage content 

from the various distributed components and subsequently voting on the outcomes. Polling 

identifies potential faults, errors, or compromises in distributed processing and/or storage 

components. 

References: None.
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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-38 MALWARE ANALYSIS 

Control: The organization: 

a. Employs [Assignment: organization-defined tools and techniques] to analyze the behavior of 

malware; and 

b. Incorporates the results from malware analysis into organizational incident response and flaw 

remediation processes. 

Supplemental Guidance: The application of selected malware analysis tools and techniques provides 

organizations with a more in-depth understanding of adversary tradecraft (i.e., tactics, techniques, 

and procedures) and the functionality and purpose of specific instances of malware. Understanding 

malware facilitates more effective organizational responses to current threats and more effective 

responses to future threats. Organizations can conduct malware analyses either statically (without 

executing code) or dynamically (by monitoring the behavior of executing code). 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-39 OUT-OF-BAND CHANNELS

Control: The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined out-of-band channels] for 

the physical delivery or electronic transmission of [Assignment: organization-defined information, 

information system components, or devices] to [Assignment: organization-defined individuals or 

information systems]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Out-of-band channels include, for example, local (non-network) accesses to 

information systems, network paths physically separate from network paths used for operational 

traffic, or non-electronic paths such as the US Postal Service. This is in contrast with using the 

same channels (i.e., in-band channels) that carry routine operational traffic. Out-of-band channels 

do not have the same vulnerability and exposure as in-band channels and hence the confidentiality, 

integrity, or availability compromises of in-band channels will not compromise the out-of-band 

channels. Organizations may employ out-of-band channels in the delivery or transmission of many 

organizational items including, for example, identifiers/authenticators, configuration management 

changes for hardware, firmware, or software, cryptographic key management information, security 

updates, maintenance information, and malicious code protection updates. Related controls: AC-2, 

CM-3, CM-5, CM-7, IA-4, IA-5, MA-4, SC-12, SI-3, SI-4, and SI-7. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) OUT-OF-BAND CHANNELS | ENSURE DELIVERY / TRANSMISSION 

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to ensure that 

only [Assignment: organization-defined individuals or information systems] receive the 

[Assignment: organization-defined information, information system components, or devices]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Techniques and/or methods employed by organizations to ensure that 

only designated information systems or individuals receive particular information, system 

components, or devices include, for example, sending authenticators via courier service but 
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APPENDIX F-SC PAGE F-179

requiring recipients to show some form of government-issued photographic identification as a 

condition of receipt.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-40 OPERATIONS SECURITY 

Control: The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined operations security 

safeguards] to protect key organizational information throughout the system development life 

cycle. 

Supplemental Guidance: Operations security (OPSEC) is a systematic process by which potential 

adversaries can be denied information about the capabilities and intentions of organizations by 

identifying, controlling, and protecting generally unclassified information that specifically relates 

to the planning and execution of sensitive organizational activities. The OPSEC process involves 

five steps: (i) identification of critical information (e.g., the security categorization process); (ii) 

analysis of threats; (iii) analysis of vulnerabilities; (iv) assessment of risks; and (v) the application 

of appropriate countermeasures. OPSEC safeguards are applied to both organizational information 

systems and the environments in which those systems operate. OPSEC safeguards help protect the 

confidentiality of key information including, for example, limiting the sharing of information with 

suppliers and potential suppliers of information system components, information technology 

products and services, and with other non-organizational elements and individuals. Information 

critical to mission/business success includes, for example, user identities, element uses, suppliers, 

supply chain processes, functional and security requirements, system design specifications, testing 

protocols, and security control implementation details. Related control: PM-14. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-41 PROCESS ISOLATION

Control: The information system maintains a separate execution domain for each executing 

process. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information systems can maintain separate execution domains for each 

executing process by assigning each process a separate address space. Each information system 

process has a distinct address space so that communication between processes is performed in a 

manner controlled through the security functions, and one process cannot modify the executing 

code of another process. Maintaining separate execution domains for executing processes can be 

achieved, for example, by implementing separate address spaces. This capability is available in 

most commercial operating systems that employ multi-state processor technologies. Related 

controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-6, SA-4, SA-5, SA-8, SC-2, SC-3. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) PROCESS ISOLATION | HARDWARE SEPARATION 

The information system implements underlying hardware separation mechanisms to facilitate 

process separation. 
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Supplemental Guidance: Hardware memory management is an example of an underlying 

hardware separation mechanism. 

(2) PROCESS ISOLATION | THREAD ISOLATION 

The information system maintains a separate execution domain for each thread in [Assignment: 

organization-defined multi-threaded processing]. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SC-41 MOD SC-41 HIGH SC-41

SC-42 WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION

Control: The information system protects its external and internal wireless links [Assignment: 

organization-defined wireless links] from [Assignment: organization-defined types of signal 

parameter attacks or references to sources for attacks] that are based upon exploiting the signal 

parameters of these links. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to internal and external wireless communication links 

that may be visible to individuals who are not authorized information system users. There are 

various ways to exploit the signal parameters of wireless links to gain intelligence, deny service, 

or to spoof users of organizational information systems. This control reduces the impact of attacks 

that are unique to wireless systems. If organizations rely on commercial service providers for 

transmission services as commodity items rather than as fully dedicated services, it may not be 

possible to implement this control. Related control: SC-5. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE 

The information system employs [Selection: FIPS-validated cryptography and key management 

system; NSA-approved cryptography and key management] that achieves [Assignment: 

organization-defined level of protection] against the effects of intentional electromagnetic 

interference. 

Supplemental Guidance: The control enhancement protects against intentional jamming that 

might deny or impair communications by ensuring that wireless, spread spectrum waveforms 

used to provide anti-jam protection are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. The 

control enhancement may also coincidentally help to mitigate the effects of unintentional 

jamming due to interference from legitimate transmitters sharing the same spectrum. Mission 

requirements, projected threats, concept of operations, and applicable legislation, directives, 

regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines determine levels of wireless link availability 

and performance/cryptography needed. Related controls: SC-12, SC-13. 

(2) WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | REDUCE DETECTION POTENTIAL 

The information system employs [Selection: FIPS-validated cryptography and key management 

system; NSA-approved cryptography and key management] to reduce the detection potential of its 

wireless links to [Assignment: organization-defined level of reduction]. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement is needed for covert communications and 

protecting wireless transmitters from being geo-located by their transmissions. The control 

enhancement ensures that spread spectrum waveforms used to achieve low probability of 

detection are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. Mission requirements, projected 

threats, concept of operations, and applicable legislation, directives, regulations, policies, 

standards, and guidelines determine the levels to which wireless links should be undetectable. 

Related controls: SC-12, SC-13. 

 
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(3) WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | IMITATIVE OR MANIPULATIVE COMMUNICATIONS DECEPTION 

The information system employs [Selection: FIPS-validated cryptography and key management 

system; NSA-approved cryptography and key management] to identify and reject wireless 

transmissions that are deliberate attempts to achieve imitative or manipulative communications 

deception based on signal parameters. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement ensures that the signal parameters of 

wireless transmissions are not predictable by unauthorized individuals which reduces the 

probability of imitative or manipulative communications deception based upon signal 

parameters alone. Related controls: SC-12, SC-13. 

(4) WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | SIGNAL PARAMETER IDENTIFICATION 

The information system employs [Selection: FIPS-validated cryptography and key management 

system; NSA-approved cryptography and key management] to ensure that [Assignment: 

organization-defined wireless transmitters] cannot be identified by their signal parameters. 

Supplemental Guidance: Radio fingerprinting techniques identify the unique signal parameters 

of transmitters to fingerprint such transmitters for purposes of tracking and mission/user 

identification. This control enhancement protects against the unique identification of wireless 

transmitters for purposes of intelligence exploitation by ensuring that anti-fingerprinting 

alterations to signal parameters are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. This control 

enhancement helps assure mission success when anonymity is required. Related controls: SC12, SC-13. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected
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FAMILY: SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY

SI-1 SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization develops, disseminates, and reviews/updates [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]: 

a. A formal, documented system and information integrity policy that addresses purpose, scope, 

roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, 

and compliance; and 

b. Formal, documented procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and 

information integrity policy and associated system and information integrity controls. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the SI family. 

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations. The procedures 

can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if 

needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and 

procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SI-1 MOD SI-1 HIGH SI-1

SI-2 FLAW REMEDIATION 

Control: The organization: 

a. Identifies, reports, and corrects information system flaws; 

b. Installs security-relevant software and firmware updates; 

c. Tests software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness and 

potential side effects on organizational information systems before installation; and 

d. Incorporates flaw remediation into the organizational configuration management process. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations identify information systems affected by announced 

software flaws including potential vulnerabilities resulting from those flaws, and report this 

information to designated organizational personnel with information security responsibilities. 

Security-relevant software updates include, for example, patches, service packs, hot fixes, and 

anti-virus signatures. Organizations also address flaws discovered during security assessments, 

continuous monitoring, incident response activities, and system error handling. Organizations take 

advantage of available resources such as the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) or Common 

Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) databases in remediating flaws discovered in organizational 

information systems. By incorporating flaw remediation into ongoing configuration management 

processes, required/anticipated remediation actions can be tracked and verified. Flaw remediation 

actions that can be tracked and verified include, for example, determining whether organizations 

follow US-CERT guidance and Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts. Related controls: CA2, CA-7, CM-3, CM-5, CM-8, MA-2, IR-4, RA-5, SA-10, SA-11, SI-11. 

 
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APPENDIX F-SI PAGE F-183

Control Enhancements:

(1) FLAW REMEDIATION | CENTRAL MANAGEMENT AND AUTOMATIC SOFTWARE / FIRMWARE UPDATES 

The organization: 

(a) Centrally manages the flaw remediation process; and 

(b) Installs [Assignment: organization-defined software and firmware updates] automatically to 

[Assignment: organization-defined information system components]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Due to information system integrity and availability concerns, 

organizations give careful consideration to the methodology used to carry out automatic 

updates.

(2) FLAW REMEDIATION | AUTOMATED FLAW REMEDIATION STATUS 

The organization employs automated mechanisms [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] 

to determine the state of information system components with regard to flaw remediation. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: CM-6.

(3) FLAW REMEDIATION | TIME TO REMEDIATE FLAWS / CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 

The organization: 

(a) Measures the time between flaw identification and flaw remediation; and 

(b) Takes corrective actions when the time exceeds [Assignment: organization-defined 

benchmarks]. 

(4) FLAW REMEDIATION | AUTOMATED PATCH MANAGEMENT TOOLS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-2].

References: NIST Special Publication 800-40.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SI-2 MOD SI-2 (2) HIGH SI-2 (1) (2)

SI-3 MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION 

Control: The organization: 

a. Employs malicious code protection mechanisms at information system entry and exit points 

and at workstations, servers, or mobile computing devices on the network to detect and 

eradicate malicious code: 

- Transported by electronic mail, electronic mail attachments, web accesses, removable 

media, or other common means; or 

- Inserted through the exploitation of information system vulnerabilities; 

b. Updates malicious code protection mechanisms (including signature definitions) whenever 

new releases are available in accordance with organizational configuration management 

policy and procedures; 

c. Configures malicious code protection mechanisms to: 

- Perform periodic scans of the information system [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency] and real-time scans of files from external sources at [Selection (one or more); 

endpoint; network entry/exit points] as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed in 

accordance with organizational security policy; and 

- [Selection (one or more): block malicious code; quarantine malicious code; send alert to 

administrator; [Assignment: organization-defined action]] in response to malicious code 

detection; and 

d. Addresses the receipt of false positives during malicious code detection and eradication and 

the resulting potential impact on the availability of the information system. 
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Supplemental Guidance: Information system entry and exit points include, for example, firewalls, 

electronic mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, and remote-access servers. Malicious code 

includes, for example, viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and spyware. Malicious code can also be 

encoded in various formats (e.g., UUENCODE, Unicode), contained within compressed files, or 

hidden in files using steganography. Removable media includes, for example, USB devices, 

diskettes, or compact disks. A variety of technologies and methods exist to limit or eliminate the 

effects of malicious code. Pervasive configuration management and comprehensive software 

integrity controls may be effective in preventing execution of unauthorized code. In addition to 

commercial off-the-shelf software, malicious code may also be present in custom-built software. 

This could include, for example, logic bombs, back doors, and other types of cyber attacks that 

could affect organizational missions/business functions. Traditional malicious code protection 

mechanisms cannot always detect such code. In these situations, organizations rely instead on 

other safeguards including, for example, secure coding practices, configuration management and 

control, trusted procurement processes, and monitoring practices to help ensure that software does 

not perform functions other than those functions intended. Organizations may determine that in 

response to malicious code detection, different actions may be warranted for different situations. 

Organizations can define, for example, actions in response to malicious code detection during 

periodic scans, actions in response to detection of malicious downloads, and actions in response to 

detection of maliciousness when attempting to open or execute files. Related controls: CM-3, MP2, SA-4, SA-8, SA-12, SI-2, SI-4, SI-7. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | CENTRAL MANAGEMENT 

The organization centrally manages malicious code protection mechanisms. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AU-2, SI-8.

(2) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC UPDATES 

The information system automatically updates malicious code protection mechanisms (including 

signature definitions). 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SI-8.

(3) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | NON-PRIVILEGED USERS 

The information system prevents non-privileged users from circumventing malicious code 

protection capabilities. 

(4) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | UPDATES ONLY BY PRIVILEGED USERS 

The information system updates malicious code protection mechanisms only when directed by a 

privileged user. 

(5) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | REMOVABLE MEDIA 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-7].

(6) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | TESTING / VERIFICATION 

The organization: 

(a) Tests malicious code protection mechanisms [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] 

by introducing a known benign, non-spreading test case into the information system; and 

(b) Verifies that both detection of the test case and associated incident reporting occur. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CA-2, CA-7, RA-5.

(7) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | NON SIGNATURE-BASED DETECTION 

The information system employs non signature-based malicious code detection mechanisms. 

Supplemental Guidance: Non signature-based detection mechanisms include, for example, the 

use of heuristics to provide safeguards against malware for which signatures do not yet exist 

or for which existing signatures may not be effective. This control enhancement does not 

preclude the use of signature-based detection mechanisms.

(8) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | DETECT UNAUTHORIZED COMMANDS 

The information system detects [Assignment: organization-defined unauthorized operating system 

commands] through the kernel application programming interface at [Assignment: organizationdefined information system hardware components] and [Selection (one or more): issues a warning; 

audits the command execution; prevents the execution of the command]. 
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Supplemental Guidance: Unauthorized operating system commands include, for example, 

commands for kernel functions from information system processes that are not trusted to 

initiate such commands, or commands for kernel functions that are suspicious even though 

commands of that type are reasonable for processes to initiate. Organizations define the 

malicious commands to be detected by a combination of command types, command classes, 

or specific instances of commands. Organizations define hardware components by specific 

component, component type, location in the network, or combination therein. Organizations 

may select different actions for different types/classes/specific instances of potentially 

malicious commands. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-83.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SI-3 MOD SI-3 (1) (2) (3) HIGH SI-3 (1) (2) (3)

SI-4 INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING 

Control: The organization: 

a. Monitors the information system to detect attacks and indicators of potential attacks in 

accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined monitoring objectives]; 

b. Identifies unauthorized use of the information system; 

c. Deploys monitoring devices: (i) strategically within the information system to collect 

organization-determined essential information; and (ii) at ad hoc locations within the system 

to track specific types of transactions of interest to the organization; 

d. Heightens the level of information system monitoring activity whenever there is an indication 

of increased risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or 

the Nation based on law enforcement information, intelligence information, or other credible 

sources of information; and 

e. Obtains legal opinion with regard to information system monitoring activities in accordance 

with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, or regulations. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information system monitoring includes external and internal monitoring. 

External monitoring includes the observation of events occurring at the information system 

boundary (i.e., part of perimeter defense and boundary protection). Internal monitoring includes 

the observation of events occurring within the information system. Organizations can monitor 

information systems, for example, by observing audit activities in real time or by observing other 

system aspects such as access patterns, characteristics of access, and other actions. The monitoring 

objectives may guide determination of the events. Information system monitoring capability is 

achieved through a variety of tools and techniques (e.g., intrusion detection systems, intrusion 

prevention systems, malicious code protection software, audit record monitoring software, 

network monitoring software). Strategic locations for monitoring devices include, for example, 

selected perimeter locations and near server farms supporting critical applications, with such 

devices typically being employed at the managed interfaces associated with controls SC-7 and 

AC-17. Einstein network monitoring devices from the Department of Homeland Security can also 

be included as monitoring devices. The granularity of monitoring information collected is based 

on organizational monitoring objectives and the capability of information systems to support such 

objectives. Specific types of transactions of interest include, for example, Hyper Text Transfer 

Protocol (HTTP) traffic that bypasses HTTP proxies. Information system monitoring is an integral 

part of organizational continuous monitoring and incident response programs. Output from system 

monitoring serves as input to continuous monitoring and incident response programs. Related 

controls: AC-4, AC-8, AC-17, AU-2, AU-6, AU-7, AU-12, CA-7, IR-4, PE-3, RA-5, SC-7, SI-3, 

SI-7.
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Control Enhancements:

(1) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | SYSTEM-WIDE INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM

The organization connects and configures individual intrusion detection tools into an information 

system-wide intrusion detection system using common protocols. 

(2) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED TOOLS FOR REAL-TIME ANALYSIS

The organization employs automated tools to support near real-time analysis of events. 

(3) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED TOOL INTEGRATION

The organization employs automated tools to integrate intrusion detection tools into access 

control and flow control mechanisms for rapid response to attacks by enabling reconfiguration of 

these mechanisms in support of attack isolation and elimination. 

(4) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | INBOUND AND OUTBOUND COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC

The information system monitors inbound and outbound communications traffic for unusual or 

unauthorized activities or conditions. 

Supplemental Guidance: Unusual/unauthorized activities or conditions related to information 

system inbound and outbound communications traffic include, for example, internal traffic 

that indicates the presence of malicious code within organizational information systems or 

propagating among system components, the unauthorized exporting of information, or 

signaling to external information systems. Evidence of malicious code is used to identify 

potentially compromised information systems or information system components.

(5) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | NEAR REAL-TIME ALERTS

The information system provides near real-time alerts when the following indications of 

compromise or potential compromise occur: [Assignment: organization-defined compromise 

indicators]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Alerts may be generated from a variety of sources, including, for 

example, audit records or inputs from malicious code protection mechanisms, intrusion 

detection or prevention mechanisms, or boundary protection devices such as firewalls, 

gateways, and routers. Related controls: AU-5, PE-6. 

(6) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | RESTRICT NON-PRIVILEGED USERS

The information system prevents non-privileged users from circumventing intrusion detection and 

prevention capabilities. 

(7) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED RESPONSE TO SUSPICIOUS EVENTS

The information system notifies [Assignment: organization-defined incident response personnel 

(identified by name and/or by role)] of detected suspicious events and takes [Assignment: 

organization-defined least-disruptive actions to terminate suspicious events]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Least-disruptive actions may include, for example, initiating requests 

for human responses. 

(8) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | PROTECTION OF MONITORING INFORMATION

The organization protects information obtained from intrusion-monitoring tools from unauthorized 

access, modification, and deletion. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AC-3, AU-9.

(9) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | TESTING OF MONITORING TOOLS

The organization tests intrusion-monitoring tools [Assignment: organization-defined time-period]. 

Supplemental Guidance: The frequency of intrusion-monitoring tool testing depends on the 

types of tools used by organizations and methods of deployment. Related control: CP-9. 

(10) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | VISIBILITY OF ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATIONS

The organization makes provisions so that [Assignment: organization-defined encrypted 

communications traffic] is visible to [Assignment: organization-defined information system 

monitoring tools]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations balance the potentially conflicting needs for encrypting 

communications traffic and for having insight into such traffic from a monitoring perspective. 

For some organizations, the need to ensure the confidentiality of communications traffic is 

paramount; for others, mission-assurance is of greater concern. Organizations determine 
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whether the visibility requirement applies to internal encrypted traffic, encrypted traffic 

intended for external destinations, or a subset of the traffic types.

(11) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | ANALYZE COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC ANOMALIES

The organization analyzes outbound communications traffic at the external boundary of the 

information system and selected [Assignment: organization-defined interior points within the 

system (e.g., subnetworks, subsystems)] to discover anomalies. 

Supplemental Guidance: Anomalies within organizational information systems include, for 

example, large file transfers, long-time persistent connections, unusual protocols and ports in 

use, and attempted communications with suspected malicious external addresses.

(12) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED ALERTS

The organization employs automated mechanisms to alert security personnel of the following 

inappropriate or unusual activities with security implications: [Assignment: organization-defined 

inappropriate or unusual activities that trigger alerts]. 

(13) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | ANALYZE TRAFFIC / EVENT PATTERNS

The organization: 

(a) Analyzes communications traffic/event patterns for the information system; 

(b) Develops profiles representing common traffic patterns and/or events; and 

(c) Uses the traffic/event profiles in tuning system-monitoring devices to reduce the number of 

false positives to [Assignment: organization-defined measure of false positives] and the 

number of false negatives to [Assignment: organization-defined measure of false negatives]. 

(14) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | WIRELESS INTRUSION DETECTION

The organization employs a wireless intrusion detection system to identify rogue wireless devices 

and to detect attack attempts and potential compromises/breaches to the information system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AC-18, IA-3.

(15) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | WIRELESS TO WIRELINE COMMUNICATIONS

The organization employs an intrusion detection system to monitor wireless communications 

traffic as the traffic passes from wireless to wireline networks. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: AC-18.

(16) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | CORRELATE MONITORING INFORMATION

The organization correlates information from monitoring tools employed throughout the 

information system with other information to achieve organization-wide situational awareness. 

(17) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | INTEGRATED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

The organization correlates results from monitoring physical, cyber, and supply chain activities to 

achieve integrated situational awareness. 

Supplemental Guidance: Integrated situational awareness from physical, cyber, and supply 

chain monitoring activities enhances the capability of organizations to more quickly detect 

sophisticated cyber attacks and investigate the methods and techniques employed to carry out 

such attacks. Related control: SA-12.

(18) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | ANALYZE TRAFFIC / COVERT EXFILTRATION

The organization analyzes outbound communications traffic at the external boundary of the 

information system (i.e., system perimeter) and at [Assignment: organization-defined interior 

points within the system (e.g., subsystems, subnetworks)] to detect covert exfiltration of 

information. 

Supplemental Guidance: Covert means that can be used for the unauthorized exfiltration of 

organizational information include, for example, steganography.

(19) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | INDIVIDUALS POSING GREATER RISK

The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined additional monitoring] of 

individuals who have been identified by [Assignment: organization-defined sources] as posing an 

increased level of risk. 

Supplemental Guidance: Indications of increased risk from individuals can be obtained from a 

variety of sources including, for example, human resource records, intelligence agencies, law 

enforcement organizations, and/or other credible sources. 

 
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(20) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | PRIVILEGED USER

The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined additional monitoring] of 

privileged users. 

(21) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | PROBATIONARY PERIODS

The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined additional monitoring] of 

individuals during [Assignment: organization-defined probationary period]. 

(22) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | UNAUTHORIZED NETWORK SERVICES

The information system detects network services that have not been authorized or approved by 

[Assignment: organization-defined authorization or approval processes] and [Selection (one or 

more): audits; alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel and/or roles]]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Unauthorized or unapproved network services include, for example, 

services in service-oriented architectures that lack organizational verification or validation 

and therefore, may be unreliable or malicious rogues for valid services. 

(23) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | HOST-BASED DEVICES

The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined host-based monitoring 

mechanisms] at [Assignment: organization-defined information system components]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information system components where host-based monitoring can be 

implemented include, for example, servers, workstations, and mobile devices. Organizations 

consider employing host-based monitoring mechanisms from multiple information technology 

product developers.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-61, 800-83, 800-92, 800-94, 800-137.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SI-4 MOD SI-4 (2) (4) (5) (6) HIGH SI-4 (2) (4) (5) (6)

SI-5 SECURITY ALERTS, ADVISORIES, AND DIRECTIVES 

 Control: The organization: 

a. Receives information system security alerts, advisories, and directives from [Assignment: 

organization-defined external organizations] on an ongoing basis; 

b. Generates internal security alerts, advisories, and directives as deemed necessary; 

c. Disseminates security alerts, advisories, and directives to: [Selection (one or more):

[Assignment: organization-defined personnel (identified by name and/or by role)]; 

[Assignment: organization-defined elements within the organization]; [Assignment: 

organization-defined external organizations]]; and 

d. Implements security directives in accordance with established time frames, or notifies the 

issuing organization of the degree of noncompliance. 

Supplemental Guidance: The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) 

generates security alerts and advisories to maintain situational awareness across the federal 

government. Security directives are issued by OMB or other designated organizations with the 

responsibility and authority to issue such directives. Compliance to security directives is essential 

due to the critical nature of many of these directives and the potential immediate adverse effects 

on organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation should the 

directives not be implemented in a timely manner. External organizations include, for example, 

external mission/business partners, supply chain partners, external service providers, and other 

peer/supporting organizations. Related control: SI-2. 

 
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Control Enhancements: 

(1) SECURITY ALERTS, ADVISORIES, AND DIRECTIVES | AUTOMATED ALERTS AND ADVISORIES

The organization employs automated mechanisms to make security alert and advisory information 

available throughout the organization as needed. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-40.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SI-5 MOD SI-5 HIGH SI-5 (1)

SI-6 SECURITY FUNCTION VERIFICATION 

Control: The information system: 

a. Verifies the correct operation of [Assignment: organization-defined security functions]; 

b. Performs this verification [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined system 

transitional states]; upon command by user with appropriate privilege; periodically every

[Assignment: organization-defined time-period]]; 

c. Provides notification of failed automated security tests; and 

d. [Selection (one or more): notifies system administrator; shuts the system down; restarts the 

system; [Assignment: organization-defined alternative action(s)]] when anomalies are 

discovered. 

Supplemental Guidance: Transitional states for information systems include, for example, system 

startup, restart, shutdown, and abort. Notifications provided by information systems include, for 

example, electronic alerts to system administrators, messages to local computer consoles, and/or 

hardware indications such as lights. Related control: CM-6. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) SECURITY FUNCTION VERIFICATION | NOTIFICATION OF FAILED SECURITY TESTS 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-6].

(2) SECURITY FUNCTION VERIFICATION | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR DISTRIBUTED TESTING 

The information system provides automation support for the management of distributed security 

testing. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SI-2.

(3) SECURITY FUNCTION VERIFICATION | REPORT VERIFICATION RESULTS 

The organization reports the result of security function verification to [Assignment: organizationdefined personnel with information security responsibilities]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational personnel with information security responsibilities 

include, for example, senior information security officers, information system security 

managers, and information systems security officers. Related controls: SA-12, SI-4, SI-5.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH SI-6

SI-7 SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY 

Control: The organization employs integrity verification tools to detect unauthorized changes to 

[Assignment: organization-defined software, firmware, and information]. 
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Supplemental Guidance: Unauthorized changes to software, firmware, and information can occur 

due to errors or malicious activity (e.g., tampering). Software includes, for example, operating 

systems (with key internal components such as kernels, drivers), middleware, and applications. 

Firmware includes, for example, the Basic Input Output System (BIOS). Information includes 

metadata such as security attributes associated with information. State-of-the-practice integritychecking mechanisms (e.g., parity checks, cyclical redundancy checks, cryptographic hashes) and 

associated tools can automatically monitor the integrity of information systems and hosted 

applications. Related controls: SA-12, SC-8, SC-13, SI-3. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | INTEGRITY SCANS 

The organization assesses the integrity of [Assignment: organization-defined software, firmware, 

and information] by performing integrity scans of the information system [Selection (one or more):

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined securityrelevant events]]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Security-relevant events triggering integrity scans may include, for 

example, transitional events such as system startup, restart, shutdown, and abort.

(2) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | AUTOMATED NOTIFICATIONS 

The organization employs automated tools that provide notification to [Assignment: organizationdefined personnel] upon discovering discrepancies during integrity verification. 

(3) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CENTRALLY-MANAGED INTEGRITY TOOLS 

The organization employs centrally managed integrity verification tools. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AU-3, SI-2, SI-8.

(4) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | TAMPER-EVIDENT PACKAGING

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-12].

(5) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | AUTOMATED RESPONSE TO INTEGRITY VIOLATIONS 

The information system: 

(a) Performs an integrity check of [Assignment: organization-defined firmware, software, 

information] at [Selection (one or more): startup; [Assignment: organization-defined 

transitional states or events]; [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]]; and 

(b) Automatically [Selection (one or more): notifies information system administrator; shuts the 

information system down; restarts the information system; implements [Assignment: 

organization-defined security safeguards]] when integrity violations are discovered. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may define different integrity checking and anomaly 

responses: (i) by type of information (e.g., firmware, software, user data); (ii) by specific 

information (e.g., boot firmware, boot firmware for a specific types of machines); or (iii) a 

combination of both. Automatic implementation of specific safeguards within organizational 

information systems includes, for example, reversing the changes, halting the information 

system, or triggering audit alerts when unauthorized modifications to critical security files 

occur. 

(6) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION 

The information system employs cryptographic mechanisms to detect unauthorized changes to 

software, firmware, and information. 

Supplemental Guidance: Cryptographic mechanisms used for the protection of integrity include, 

for example, digital signatures and the computation and application of signed hashes using 

asymmetric cryptography, protecting the confidentiality of the key used to generate the hash, 

and using the public key to verify the hash information. Related control: SC-13.

(7) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | HARDWARE-BASED PROTECTION 

The organization: 

(a) Employs hardware-based, write-protect for [Assignment: organization-defined information 

system firmware components]; and 

(b) Implements specific procedures for [Assignment: organization-defined authorized individuals] 

to manually disable hardware write protect for firmware modifications and re-enable the write 

protect prior to returning to operational mode. 
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(8) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | INTEGRATION OF DETECTION AND RESPONSE 

The organization incorporates the detection of unauthorized [Assignment: organization-defined 

security-relevant changes to the information system] into the organizational incident response 

capability to ensure that such detected events are tracked, monitored, corrected, and available for 

historical purposes. 

Supplemental Guidance: Security relevant changes include, for example, unauthorized changes 

to established configuration settings. Related controls: IR-4, IR-5, SI-4. 

(9) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | AUDITING CAPABILITY FOR SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 

The information system, upon detection of a potential integrity violation, provides the capability to 

audit the event and initiates the following actions: [Selection (one or more): generates an audit 

record; alerts current user; alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel]; [Assignment: 

organization-defined other actions]]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations select response actions based on types of software, 

specific software, or information for which there are potential integrity violations. 

(10) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | VERIFY BOOT PROCESS 

The information system verifies the integrity of the boot process of [Assignment: organizationdefined devices]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Ensuring the integrity of boot processes is critical to starting devices in 

known/trustworthy states. Integrity verification mechanisms provide organizational personnel 

with assurance that only trusted code is executed during boot processes. 

(11) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | PROTECTION OF BOOT FIRMWARE 

The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to 

protect the integrity of boot firmware in [Assignment: organization-defined devices]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Unauthorized modifications to boot firmware may be indicative of a 

sophisticated, targeted cyber attack. These types of cyber attacks can result in a permanent 

denial of service (e.g., if the firmware is corrupted) or a persistent malware presence (e.g., if 

the malware is embedded within the firmware). Devices can protect the integrity of the boot 

firmware in organizational information systems: (i) by verifying the integrity and authenticity 

of all updates to the boot firmware prior to applying changes to the boot devices; and (ii) by 

preventing unauthorized processes from modifying the boot firmware. 

(12) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CONFINED ENVIRONMENTS WITH LIMITED PRIVILEGES 

The organization requires that [Assignment: organization-defined user-installed software] execute 

in a confined physical or virtual machine environment with limited privileges. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations identify software that may be of greater concern with 

regard to origin or potential for containing malicious code. For this type of software, user 

installations occur in confined environments of operation to limit or contain damage from 

malicious code that may be executed.

(13) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | INTEGRITY VERIFICATION 

The organization requires that the integrity of [Assignment: organization-defined user-installed 

software] be verified prior to execution. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations verify the integrity of user-installed software prior to 

execution to reduce the likelihood of executing malicious code or code that contains errors 

from unauthorized modifications. Organizations consider the practicality of approaches to 

verifying software integrity, including, for example, availability of checksums of adequate 

trustworthiness from software developers or vendors. 

(14) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CODE EXECUTION IN PROTECTED ENVIRONMENTS 

The organization allows execution of binary or machine executable code obtained from sources 

with limited or no warranty and without the provision of source code only in confined physical or 

virtual machine environments. 

(15) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | BINARY OR MACHINE EXECUTABLE CODE

The organization: 

(a) Prohibits the use of binary or machine executable code from sources with limited or no 

warranty and without the provision of source code; and 
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(b) Provides exceptions to the source code requirement only for compelling mission/operational 

requirements and with the approval of the authorizing official. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations assess software products without accompanying source 

code from sources with limited or no warranty for potential security impacts. The assessments 

address the fact that these types of software products may be very difficult to review, repair, 

or extend, given that organizations likely do not have access to the original source code and 

there may be no owners who could make such repairs on behalf of organizations. Related 

control: SA-5.

References: None.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-147, 800-155.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SI-7 (1) (8) HIGH SI-7 (1) (2) (5) (8) (15)

SI-8 SPAM PROTECTION 

Control: The organization: 

a. Employs spam protection mechanisms at information system entry and exit points and at 

workstations, servers, or mobile computing devices on the network to detect and take action 

on unsolicited messages transported by electronic mail, electronic mail attachments, web 

accesses, or other common means; and 

b. Updates spam protection mechanisms (including signature definitions) when new releases are 

available in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information system entry and exit points include, for example, firewalls, 

electronic mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, and remote-access servers. Related controls: 

AT-2, AT-3, SC-5, SC-7, SI-3. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) SPAM PROTECTION | CENTRAL MANAGEMENT OF PROTECTION MECHANISMS 

The organization centrally manages spam protection mechanisms. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AU-3, SI-2, SI-7.

(2) SPAM PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC UPDATES 

The information system automatically updates spam protection mechanisms. 

(3) SPAM PROTECTION | CONTINUOUS LEARNING CAPABILITY 

The organization employs spam protection mechanisms with a learning capability to more 

effectively identify legitimate communications traffic. 

Supplemental Guidance: Learning mechanisms include, for example, Bayesian filters that 

respond to user inputs identifying specific traffic as spam or legitimate by updating algorithm 

parameters and thereby more accurately separating types of traffic. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-45. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SI-8 (1) (2) HIGH SI-8 (1) (2)

SI-9 INFORMATION INPUT RESTRICTIONS 

Control: The organization restricts the authorization to input information to the information system 

to [Assignment: organization-defined authorized personnel]. 
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Supplemental Guidance: Restrictions on organizational personnel authorized to input information to 

organizational information systems may extend beyond the typical access authorizations in place 

for those systems and include limitations based on specific operational/project responsibilities. 

Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) INFORMATION INPUT RESTRICTIONS | PROTECT REMOTE COMMANDS

The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to 

authenticate [Assignment: organization-defined remote commands]. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement protects against unauthorized commands 

and replay of authorized commands. This capability is important for those remote information 

systems whose loss, malfunction, misdirection or exploitation would have immediate and/or 

serious consequences (e.g., injury or death, property damage, loss of high-valued assets or 

sensitive information, or failure of important missions/business functions). Authentication 

safeguards for remote commands help ensure that information systems accept and execute in 

the order intended, only authorized commands, and that unauthorized commands are rejected. 

Cryptographic mechanisms can be employed, for example, to authenticate remote commands. 

Related controls: SC-12, SC-13, and SC-23. 

(2) INFORMATION INPUT RESTRICTIONS | DETECT UNAUTHORIZED COMMANDS 

The information system detects [Assignment: organization-defined unauthorized operating system 

commands] through the kernel application programming interface at [Assignment: organizationdefined information system hardware components] and [Selection (one or more): warns; audits; 

prevents the execution of the command]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Unauthorized operating system commands include, for example, 

commands for kernel functions from information system processes that are not trusted to 

initiate such commands, or commands for kernel functions that are suspicious even though 

commands of that type are reasonable for processes to initiate. Organizations define the 

malicious commands to be detected by a combination of command types, command classes, 

or specific instances of commands. Organizations define hardware components by specific 

component, component type, location in the network, or combination therein. Organizations 

may select different actions for different types/classes/specific instances of potentially 

malicious commands.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD SI-9 HIGH SI-9

SI-10 INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION 

Control: The information system checks the validity of [Assignment: organization-defined 

information inputs]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Checking the valid syntax and semantics of information system inputs 

(e.g., character set, length, numerical range, and acceptable values) verifies that inputs match 

specified definitions for format and content. Prescreening inputs prior to passing to interpreters 

prevent the content from being unintentionally interpreted as commands. Input validation helps 

ensure accurate and correct inputs and prevent attacks such as cross-site scripting and a variety of 

injection attacks. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | MANUAL OVERRIDE CAPABILITY 

The information system: 

(a) Provides a manual override capability for input validation of [Assignment: organizationdefined inputs]; 
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(b) Restricts the use of the manual override capability to only [Assignment: organization-defined 

authorized individuals]; and 

(c) Audits the use of the manual override capability. 

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CM-3, CM-5. 

(2) INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | REVIEW / RESOLUTION OF ERRORS 

The organization ensures that input validation errors are reviewed and resolved within 

[Assignment: organization-defined time period]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Resolution of input validation errors includes, for example, correcting 

systemic causes of errors and resubmitting transactions with corrected input. 

(3) INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | PREDICTABLE BEHAVIOR 

The information system behaves in a predictable and documented manner that reflects 

organizational and system objectives when invalid inputs are received. 

Supplemental Guidance: A common vulnerability in organizational information systems is 

unpredictable behavior when invalid inputs are received. This control enhancement ensures 

that there is predictable behavior in the face of invalid inputs by specifying information 

system responses that facilitate transitioning the system to known states without adverse, 

unintended side effects. 

(4) INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | REVIEW / TIMING INTERACTIONS 

The organization accounts for timing interactions among information system components in 

determining appropriate responses for invalid inputs. 

Supplemental Guidance: In addressing invalid information system inputs received across 

protocol interfaces, timing interfaces become relevant, where one protocol needs to consider 

the impact of the error response on other protocols within the protocol stack. For example, 

802.11 standard wireless network protocols do not interact well with Transmission Control 

Protocols (TCP) when packets are dropped (which could be due to invalid packet input). TCP 

assumes packet losses are due to congestion, while packets lost over 802.11 links are typically 

dropped due to collisions or noise on the link. If TCP makes a congestion response, it takes 

precisely the wrong action in response to a collision event. Adversaries may be able to use 

apparently acceptable individual behaviors of the protocols in concert to achieve adverse 

effects through suitable construction of invalid input. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SI-10 HIGH SI-10

SI-11 ERROR HANDLING 

Control: The information system: 

a. Identifies potentially security-relevant error conditions; 

b. Generates error messages that provide information necessary for corrective actions without 

revealing [Assignment: organization-defined sensitive or potentially harmful information] in 

error logs and administrative messages that could be exploited by adversaries; and 

c. Reveals error messages only to authorized personnel. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations carefully consider the structure/content of error messages. 

The extent to which information systems are able to identify and handle error conditions is guided 

by organizational policy and operational requirements. Sensitive information may include, for 

example, erroneous login attempts with passwords entered by mistake as the username, mission or 

business information that can be derived from (if not stated explicitly by) information recorded, 

and personal information such as account numbers, social security numbers, and credit card 
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numbers. In addition, error messages may provide a covert channel for transmitting information. 

Related controls: AU-3, SC-31. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD SI-11 HIGH SI-11

SI-12 INFORMATION OUTPUT HANDLING AND RETENTION 

Control: The organization handles and retains both information within and output from the 

information system in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, 

policies, regulations, standards, and operational requirements. 

Supplemental Guidance: The output handling and retention requirements cover the full life cycle of 

information, in some cases extending beyond the disposal of information systems. The National 

Archives and Records Administration provides guidance on records retention. Related controls: 

AC-16, AU-5, AU-11, MP-2, MP-4. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW SI-12 MOD SI-12 HIGH SI-12

SI-13 PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CP-11].

SI-14 NON-PERSISTENCE 

Control: The organization implements non-persistent [Assignment: organization-defined 

information system components and services] that are initiated in a known state and terminated 

[Selection (one or more): upon end of session of use; periodically at [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]]. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control mitigates risk from advanced persistent threats by significantly 

reducing the targeting capability of adversaries (i.e., window of opportunity and available attack 

surface) to initiate and complete cyber attacks. By implementing the concept of non-persistence 

for selected information system components, organizations can provide a known state computing 

resource for a specific period of time that does not give adversaries sufficient time on target to 

exploit vulnerabilities in organizational information systems and the environments in which those 

systems operate. Since the advanced persistent threat is a high-end threat with regard to capability, 

intent, and targeting, organizations assume that over an extended period of time, a percentage of 

cyber attacks will be successful. Non-persistent information system components and services are 

activated as required using protected information and terminated periodically or upon the end of 

sessions. Non-persistence increases the work factor of adversaries in attempting to compromise or 

breach organizational information systems. 
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Non-persistent system components can be implemented for example, by periodically re-imaging 

components or by using a variety of common virtualization techniques. Non-persistent services 

can be implemented using virtualization techniques as part of virtual machines or as new instances 

of processes on physical machines (either persistent or non-persistent).The benefit of periodic 

refreshes of information system components/services is that it does not require organizations to 

first determine whether compromises of components or services have occurred (something that 

may often be difficult for organizations to determine). The refresh of selected information system 

components and services occurs with sufficient frequency to prevent the spread or intended impact 

of attacks, but not with such frequency that it makes the information system unstable. In some 

instances, refreshes of critical components and services may be done a periodically in order to 

hinder the ability of adversaries to exploit optimum windows of vulnerabilities. The software and 

data employed during refreshes is obtained from known trusted sources (e.g., software/data from 

write-once read only media or from selected off-line, secure storage facilities). Related controls: 

SC-30, SC-34. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected 
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APPENDIX G

INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAMS

ORGANIZATION-WIDE INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CONTROLS 

he Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) requires organizations to 

develop and implement an organization-wide information security program to address 

information security for the information and information systems that support the 

operations and assets of the organization, including those provided or managed by another 

organization, contractor, or other source. The information security program management (PM) 

controls described in this appendix complement the security controls in Appendix F and focus on 

the organization-wide information security requirements that are independent of any particular 

information system and are essential for managing information security programs. Tailoring 

guidance can be applied to the program management controls in a manner similar to how the 

guidance is applied to security controls in Appendix F. Organizations specify the individuals 

responsible for the development, implementation, assessment, authorization, and monitoring of 

the program management controls. Organizations document program management controls in the 

information security program plan. The organization-wide information security program plan 

supplements the individual security plans developed for each organizational information system. 

Together, the security plans for the individual information systems and the information security 

program cover the totality of security controls employed by the organization. 

In addition to documenting the information security program management controls, the security 

program plan provides a vehicle for the organization, in a central repository, to document all 

security controls from Appendix F that have been designated as common controls (i.e., security 

controls inherited by organizational information systems). The information security program 

management controls and common controls contained in the information security program plan 

are implemented, assessed for effectiveness,97 and authorized by a senior organizational official, 

with the same or similar authority and responsibility for managing risk as the authorization 

officials for information systems.98 Plans of action and milestones are developed and maintained 

for the program management and common controls that are deemed through assessment to be less 

than effective. Information security program management and common controls are also subject 

to the same continuous monitoring requirements as security controls employed in individual 

organizational information systems. 

 

97 Assessment procedures for program management controls and common controls can be found in NIST Special 

Publication 800-53A. 

98 Tailoring guidance can be applied to organizational program management controls in a manner similar to how the 

guidance is applied to security controls in Appendix F. 

T

Cautionary Note 

Organizations are required to implement security program management controls to provide a foundation 

for the organizational information security program. The successful implementation of security controls 

for organizational information systems depends on the successful implementation of organization-wide 

program management controls. However, the manner in which organizations implement the program 

management controls depends on specific organizational characteristics including, for example, the size, 

complexity, and mission/business requirements of the respective organizations. 
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PM-1 INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM PLAN 

Control: The organization: 

a. Develops and disseminates an organization-wide information security program plan that: 

- Provides an overview of the requirements for the security program and a description of the 

security program management controls and common controls in place or planned for 

meeting those requirements; 

- Includes roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among 

organizational entities, and compliance; and 

- Is approved by a senior official with responsibility and accountability for the risk being 

incurred to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, and reputation), 

organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation; 

b. Reviews the organization-wide information security program plan [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]; and 

c. Revises the plan to address organizational changes and problems identified during plan 

implementation or security control assessments. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information security program plans can be represented in single documents 

or compilations of documents at the discretion of organizations. The plans document the program 

management controls and organization-defined common controls. Information security program 

plans provide sufficient information about the program management controls/common controls 

(including specification of parameters for any assignment and selection statements either explicitly 

or by reference) to enable implementations that are unambiguously compliant with the intent of 

the plans and a determination of the risk to be incurred if the plans are implemented as intended. 

The security plans for individual information systems and the organization-wide information 

security program plan together, provide complete coverage for all security controls employed 

within the organization. Common controls are documented in an appendix to the organization’s 

information security program plan unless the controls are included in a separate security plan for 

an information system (e.g., security controls employed as part of an intrusion detection system 

providing organization-wide boundary protection inherited by one or more organizational 

information systems). The organization-wide information security program plan will indicate 

which separate security plans contain descriptions of common controls. 

Organizations have the flexibility to describe common controls in a single document or in multiple 

documents. In the case of multiple documents, the documents describing common controls are 

included as attachments to the information security program plan. If the information security 

program plan contains multiple documents, the organization specifies in each document the 

organizational official or officials responsible for the development, implementation, assessment, 

authorization, and monitoring of the respective common controls. For example, the organization 

may require that the Facilities Management Office develop, implement, assess, authorize, and 

continuously monitor common physical and environmental protection controls from the PE family 

when such controls are not associated with a particular information system but instead, support 

multiple information systems. Related control: PM-8. 

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None. 

PM-2 SENIOR INFORMATION SECURITY OFFICER 

Control: The organization appoints a senior information security officer with the mission and 

resources to coordinate, develop, implement, and maintain an organization-wide information 

security program. 
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Supplemental Guidance: The security officer described in this control is an organizational official. 

For a federal agency (as defined in applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, 

or regulations) this official is the Senior Agency Information Security Officer. Organizations may 

also refer to this organizational official as the Senior Information Security Officer or Chief 

Information Security Officer. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None. 

PM-3 INFORMATION SECURITY RESOURCES 

Control: The organization: 

a. Ensures that all capital planning and investment requests include the resources needed to 

implement the information security program and documents all exceptions to this 

requirement; 

b. Employs a business case/Exhibit 300/Exhibit 53 to record the resources required; and 

c. Ensures that information security resources are available for expenditure as planned. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations consider establishing champions for information security 

efforts and as part of including the necessary resources, assign specialized expertise and resources 

as needed. Organizations may designate and empower an Investment Review Board (or similar 

group) to manage and provide oversight for the information security-related aspects of the capital 

planning and investment control process. Related controls: PM-4, SA-2. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-65. 

PM-4 PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES PROCESS 

Control: The organization: 

a. Implements a process for ensuring that plans of action and milestones for the security 

program and associated organizational information systems: 

- Are developed and maintained; and 

- Document the remedial information security actions to adequately respond to risk to 

organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation; 

b. Reviews plans of action and milestones for consistency with the organizational risk 

management strategy and organization-wide priorities for risk response actions. 

Supplemental Guidance: The plan of action and milestones is a key document in the information 

security program and is subject to federal reporting requirements established by OMB. With the 

increasing emphasis on organization-wide risk management across all three tiers in the risk 

management hierarchy (i.e., organization, mission/business process, and information system), 

organizations view plans of action and milestones from an organizational perspective, prioritizing 

risk response actions and ensuring consistency with the goals and objectives of the organization. 

Plan of action and milestones updates are based on findings from security control assessments and 

continuous monitoring activities. OMB FISMA reporting guidance contains instructions regarding 

organizational plans of action and milestones. Related control: CA-5. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: OMB Memorandum 02-01; NIST Special Publication 800-37. 
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PM-5 INFORMATION SYSTEM INVENTORY 

Control: The organization develops and maintains an inventory of its information systems. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the inventory requirements in FISMA. OMB 

provides guidance on developing information systems inventories and associated reporting 

requirements.

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

PM-6 INFORMATION SECURITY MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE 

Control: The organization develops, monitors, and reports on the results of information security 

measures of performance. 

Supplemental Guidance: Measures of performance are outcome-based metrics used by an 

organization to measure the effectiveness or efficiency of the information security program and 

the security controls employed in support of the program. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-55.

PM-7 ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE 

Control: The organization develops an enterprise architecture with consideration for information 

security and the resulting risk to organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other 

organizations, and the Nation. 

Supplemental Guidance: The enterprise architecture developed by the organization is aligned with 

the Federal Enterprise Architecture. The integration of information security requirements and 

associated security controls into the organization’s enterprise architecture helps to ensure that 

security considerations are addressed by organizations early in the system development life cycle 

and are directly and explicitly related to the organization’s mission/business processes. This also 

embeds into and links with the enterprise architecture, an integral information security architecture 

consistent with organizational risk management and information security strategies. For PM-7, the 

information security architecture is developed at a system-of-systems level (organization-wide), 

representing all of the organizational information systems. For PL-8, the security architecture is 

developed at a level representing an individual information system. Security requirements and 

security control integration are most effectively accomplished through the application of the Risk 

Management Framework and supporting security standards and guidelines. The Federal Segment 

Architecture Methodology provides guidance on integrating information security requirements and 

security controls into enterprise architectures. Related controls: PL-2, PL-8, PM-11, RA-2. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-39; Web: WWW.FSAM.GOV.

PM-8 CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN 

Control: The organization addresses information security issues in the development, 

documentation, and updating of a critical infrastructure and key resources protection plan. 

Supplemental Guidance: The requirement and guidance for defining critical infrastructure and key 

resources and for preparing an associated critical infrastructure protection plan are found in 

applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and 

guidance. Related controls: PM-1, PM-9, PM-11, RA-3. 

Control Enhancements: None. 
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References: HSPD 7; National Infrastructure Protection Plan.

PM-9 RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 

Control: The organization: 

a. Develops a comprehensive strategy to manage risk to organizational operations and assets, 

individuals, other organizations, and the Nation associated with the operation and use of 

information systems; and 

b. Implements that strategy consistently across the organization. 

Supplemental Guidance: An organization-wide risk management strategy includes, for example, an 

unambiguous expression of the risk tolerance for the organization, acceptable risk assessment 

methodologies, risk mitigation strategies, a process for consistently evaluating risk across the 

organization with respect to the organization’s risk tolerance, and approaches for monitoring risk 

over time. The use of a risk executive function can facilitate consistent, organization-wide 

application of the risk management strategy. The organization-wide risk management strategy can 

be informed by risk-related inputs from other sources both internal and external to the organization 

to ensure the strategy is both broad-based and comprehensive. Related control: RA-3. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publications 800-30, 800-39.

PM-10 SECURITY AUTHORIZATION PROCESS 

Control: The organization: 

a. Manages (i.e., documents, tracks, and reports) the security state of organizational information 

systems and the environments in which those systems operate through security authorization 

processes; 

b. Designates individuals to fulfill specific roles and responsibilities within the organizational 

risk management process; and 

c. Fully integrates the security authorization processes into an organization-wide risk 

management program. 

Supplemental Guidance: Security authorization processes for information systems and environments 

of operation require the implementation of an organization-wide risk management process, a Risk 

Management Framework, and associated security standards and guidelines. Specific roles within 

the risk management process include an organizational risk executive (function) and designated 

authorizing officials for each organizational information system and common control provider. 

Security authorization processes are integrated with organizational continuous monitoring 

processes to facilitate ongoing understanding and acceptance of risk to organizational operations 

and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. Related control: CA-6. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publications 800-37, 800-39.

PM-11 MISSION/BUSINESS PROCESS DEFINITION 

Control: The organization: 

a. Defines mission/business processes with consideration for information security and the 

resulting risk to organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other 

organizations, and the Nation; and 
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b. Determines information protection needs arising from the defined mission/business processes 

and revises the processes as necessary, until achievable protection needs are obtained. 

Supplemental Guidance: Information protection needs are technology-independent, required 

capabilities to counter threats to organizations, individuals, or the Nation through the compromise 

of information (i.e., loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability). Information protection needs 

are derived from the mission/business needs defined by the organization, the mission/business 

processes selected to meet the stated needs, and the organizational risk management strategy. 

Information protection needs determine the required security controls for the organization and the 

associated information systems supporting the mission/business processes. Inherent in defining an 

organization’s information protection needs is an understanding of the level of adverse impact that 

could result if a compromise of information occurs. The security categorization process is used to 

make such potential impact determinations. Mission/business process definitions and associated 

information protection requirements are documented by the organization in accordance with 

organizational policy and procedure. Related controls: PM-7, PM-8, RA-2. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publication 800-60. 

PM-12 INSIDER THREAT PROGRAM 

Control: The organization implements an insider threat program that includes a cross-discipline 

insider threat incident handling team. 

Supplemental Guidance: Insider threat programs can leverage the existence of incident handling 

teams organizations may already have in place, such as computer security incident response teams. 

The cross-discipline insider threat incident handling team includes representation from major 

departments across the organization (e.g., human resources, legal, physical security, personnel 

security, information technology, and information system security). This cross-discipline team 

meets on a regular basis to discuss the current level of organizational preparedness in addressing 

insider threat. The insider threat program includes controls to detect malicious insider activity and 

the correlation of both technical and non-technical information. Human resources records are 

especially important in this effort, as there is compelling evidence to show that some types of 

insider crimes are often preceded by non-technical behaviors in the workplace (e.g., ongoing 

patterns of disgruntled behavior and conflicts with coworkers and other colleagues). These 

precursors can better inform and guide organizational officials in more focused, targeted 

monitoring efforts. The participation of a legal team is important to ensure that all monitoring 

activities are performed in accordance with appropriate legislation, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidelines. Insider threat programs have clearly defined policies and 

consistent enforcement to achieve maximum effectiveness. Related controls: AU-6, IR-4, SI-4. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

PM-13 INFORMATION SECURITY WORKFORCE 

Control: The organization establishes an information security workforce development and 

improvement program.

Supplemental Guidance: Information security workforce development and improvement programs 

include, for example, defining the appropriate knowledge and skill levels needed to perform 

information security duties and tasks, and standards for measuring and building individual 

qualifications for both incumbents and applicants for organizational information security-related 

positions. Such workforce programs can also include associated information security career paths 

to encourage: (i) information security professionals to advance in the field and fill positions with 

greater responsibility; and (ii) organizations to fill information security-related positions with 
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qualified personnel. Information security workforce development and improvement programs are 

complementary to organizational security awareness and training programs. Information security 

workforce development and improvement programs focus on developing and institutionalizing 

core information security capabilities of selected personnel needed to protect organizational 

operations, assets, and individuals. Related controls: AT-2, AT-3. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

PM-14 OPERATIONS SECURITY PROGRAM 

Control: The organization establishes and implements an Operations Security (OPSEC) program.

Supplemental Guidance: Operations security (OPSEC) is a systematic process by which potential 

adversaries can be denied information about capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, 

and protecting generally unclassified information related to the planning and execution of sensitive 

activities. The process involves five steps: identification of critical information, analysis of threats, 

analysis of vulnerabilities, assessment of risks, and application of appropriate countermeasures. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: None.

PM-15 TESTING, TRAINING, AND MONITORING 

Control: The organization: 

a. Implements a process for ensuring that organizational plans for conducting security testing, 

training, and monitoring activities associated with organizational information systems: 

- Are developed and maintained; and 

- Continue to be executed in a timely manner; 

b. Reviews testing, training, and monitoring plans for consistency with the organizational risk 

management strategy and organization-wide priorities for risk response actions. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control ensures that organizations provide oversight for the security 

testing, training, and monitoring activities conducted organization-wide and that those activities 

are coordinated. With the increasing importance of continuous monitoring programs, the selection 

and implementation of security across the three tiers of the risk management hierarchy, and the 

widespread use of common controls, organizations need to coordinate and consolidate the host of 

testing and monitoring activities that are routinely conducted as part of ongoing organizational 

assessments supporting a variety of security controls. Security training activities, while typically 

focused on individual information systems and specific roles, also necessitate coordination across 

all organizational elements. Testing, training, and monitoring plans and activities are informed by 

current threat and vulnerability assessments. Related controls: AT-3, CA-7, CP-4, IR-3, SI-4. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: NIST Special Publications 800-16, 800-37, 800-53A, 800-137. 
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APPENDIX H

INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION SECURITY STANDARDS 

SECURITY CONTROL MAPPINGS FOR ISO/IEC 27001 

he mapping tables in this appendix provide organizations with a general indication of 

security control coverage with respect to ISO/IEC 27001, Information technology–Security 

techniques–Information security management systems–Requirements.

99 This standard 

 applies to all types of organizations and specifies requirements for establishing, implementing, 

operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining, and improving a documented information security 

management system (ISMS) within the context of business risks. While the risk management 

approach established by NIST originally focused on managing information security risk from the 

information system perspective, the approach has been expanded significantly with NIST Special 

Publication 800-39 to include risk management at the organizational level, mission/business 

process level, and information system level. Thus, the NIST security standards and guidelines 

developed in response to FISMA are consistent with ISO/IEC 27001 and provide additional 

implementation detail for the federal government and its contractors. 

Table H-1 provides a forward mapping from the security controls in NIST Special Publication 

800-53 to the controls in ISO/IEC 27001 (Annex A). The mappings are created by using the 

primary security topic identified in each of the Special Publication 800-53 security controls and 

associated control enhancements (if any) and searching for a similar security topic in ISO/IEC 

27001 (Annex A). Security controls with similar functional meaning are included in the mapping 

table. For example, Special Publication 800-53 contingency planning and ISO/IEC 27001 (Annex 

A) business continuity were deemed to have similar, but not the same, functionality. In some 

cases, similar topics are addressed in the security control sets but provide a different context, 

perspective, or scope. For example, Special Publication 800-53 addresses information flow 

control broadly in terms of approved authorizations for controlling access between source and 

destination objects, whereas ISO/IEC 27001 (Annex A) addresses the information flow more 

narrowly as it applies to interconnected network domains. Table H-2 provides a reverse mapping 

from the security controls in ISO/IEC 27001 (Annex A) to the security controls in NIST Special 

Publication 800-53.100

 

99 ISO/IEC 27001 was published in October 2005 by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the 

International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). 

100 The use of the term XX-1 controls in mapping Table H-2 refers to the set of security controls represented by the first 

control in each family in Appendix F, where XX is a placeholder for the two-letter family identifier. 

T 
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TABLE H-1: MAPPING NIST SP 800-53 TO ISO/IEC 27001 (ANNEX A) 

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS ISO/IEC 27001 (Annex A) CONTROLS 

AC-1 Access Control Policy and Procedures A5.1.1, A5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.6.1.3, A.8.1.1, A10.1.1, A.10.8.1, 

A.11.1.1, A.11.2.1, A11.2.2, A11.4.1, A.11.7.1, A.11.7.2, 

A.15.1.1, A.15.2.1 

AC-2 Account Management A.8.3.3, A.11.2.1, A.11.2.2, A.11.2.4, A 11.5.6, A15.2.1 

AC-3 Access Enforcement A.10.8.1 A.11.4.4, A.11.4.6, A.11.5.4, A.11.6.1, A.12.4.2 

AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement A.10.6.1, A.10.8.1, A.11.4.5, A.11.4.7, A.11.7.2, A.12.4.2, 

A.12.5.4 

AC-5 Separation of Duties A.6.1.3, A.8.1.1, A.10.1.3, A.11.1.1, A.11.4.1 

AC-6 Least Privilege A.6.1.3, A.8.1.1, A.11.1.1, A.11.2.2, A.11.4.1, A.11.4.4, 

A.11.4.6, A.11.5.4, A.11.6.1, A.12.4.3 

AC-7 Unsuccessful Login Attempts A.11.5.1 

AC-8 System Use Notification A.6.2.2, A.8.1.1, A.11.5.1, A.15.1.5 

AC-9 Previous Logon (Access) Notification A.11.5.1 

AC-10 Concurrent Session Control A.11.5.1 

AC-11 Session Lock A.11.3.2, A.11.3.3, A.11.5.5 

AC-12 Withdrawn --- 

AC-13 Withdrawn --- 

AC-14 Permitted Actions without Identification or 

Authentication 

A.11.6.1 

AC-15 Withdrawn --- 

AC-16 Security Attributes A.7.2.2 

AC-17 Remote Access A.10.6.1, A.10.8.1, A.11.1.1, A.11.4.1, A.11.4.2, A.11.4.4, 

A.11.4.6, A.11.4.7, A.11.7.1, A.11.7.2 

AC-18 Wireless Access A.10.6.1, A.10.8.1, A.11.1.1, A.11.4.1, A.11.4.2, A.11.4.4, 

A.11.4.6, A.11.4.7, A.11.7.1, A.11.7.2 

AC-19 Access Control for Mobile Devices A.10.4.1, A.11.1.1, A.11.4.3, A.11.7.1 

AC-20 Use of External Information Systems A.7.1.3, A.8.1.1, A.8.1.3, A.10.6.1, A.10.8.1, A.11.4.1, 

A.11.4.2 

AC-21 Collaboration and Information Sharing A.11.2.1, A.11.2.2 

AC-22 Publicly Accessible Content None 

AC-23 Data Mining Protection None 

AC-24 Access Control Decisions None 

AC-25 Reference Monitor Function None 

AT-1 Security Awareness and Training Policy 

and Procedures 

A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.6.1.3, A.8.1.1, A.10.1.1, A.15.1.1, 

A.15.2.1 

AT-2 Security Awareness A.6.2.2, A.8.1.1, A.8.2.2, A.9.1.5, A.10.4.1 

AT-3 Security Training A.8.1.1, A.8.2.2, A.9.1.5 

AT-4 Security Training Records None 

AT-5 Contacts with Security Groups and 

Associations 

A.6.1.7 

AU-1 Audit and Accountability Policy and 

Procedures 

A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.6.1.3, A.8.1.1, A.10.1.1, A.10.10.2, 

A.15.1.1, A.15.2.1, A.15.3.1 

AU-2 Auditable Events A.10.10.1, A.10.10.4, A.10.10.5, A.15.3.1 

AU-3 Content of Audit Records A.10.10.1 

AU-4 Audit Storage Capacity A.10.10.1, A.10.3.1 

AU-5 Response to Audit Processing Failures A.10.3.1, A.10.10.1 

AU-6 Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting A.10.10.2, A.10.10.5, A.13.1.1, A.15.1.5 

AU-7 Audit Reduction and Report Generation A.10.10.2 

AU-8 Time Stamps A.10.10.1, A.10.10.6 

AU-9 Protection of Audit Information A.10.10.3, A.13.2.3, A.15.1.3, A.15.3.2 

AU-10 Non-repudiation A.10.9.1, A.12.2.3 

AU-11 Audit Record Retention A.10.10.1, A.10.10.2, A.15.1.3 

AU-12 Audit Generation A.10.10.1, A.10.10.4, A.10.10.5 

AU-13 Monitoring for Information Disclosure None 

AU-14 Session Audit None 

AU-15 Alternate Audit Capability None 

AU-16 Cross-Organizational Auditing A.6.2.3 
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APPENDIX H PAGE H-3

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS ISO/IEC 27001 (Annex A) CONTROLS 

CA-1 Security Assessment and Authorization 

Policies and Procedures 

A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.6.1.3 A.6.1.4, A.8.1.1, A.10.1.1, 

A.15.1.1, A.15.2.1 

CA-2 Security Assessments A.6.1.8, A.6.2.3, A.10.3.2, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2 

CA-3 Information System Connections A.6.2.1, A.6.2.3, A.10.6.1, A.10.6.2, A.10.8.1, A.10.8.2, 

A.10.8.5, A.11.4.2 

CA-4 Withdrawn --- 

CA-5 Plan of Action and Milestones None 

CA-6 Security Authorization A.6.1.4, A.10.3.2 

CA-7 Continuous Monitoring A.6.1.8, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2 

CM-1 Configuration Management Policy and 

Procedures 

A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.6.1.3, A.8.1.1, A.10.1.1, A.10.1.2, 

A.12.4.1, A.12.5.1, A.15.1.1, A.15.2.1 

CM-2 Baseline Configuration A.12.4.1, A.10.1.4 

CM-3 Configuration Change Control A.10.1.1, A.10.1.2, A.10.3.2, A.12.4.1, A.12.5.1, A.12.5.2, 

A.12.5.3 

CM-4 Security Impact Analysis A.10.1.2, A.10.3.2, A.12.4.1, A.12.5.2, A.12.5.3 

CM-5 Access Restrictions for Change A.10.1.2, A.11.1.1, A.11.6.1, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.3, A.12.5.3 

CM-6 Configuration Settings None 

CM-7 Least Functionality None 

CM-8 Information System Component Inventory A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2 

CM-9 Configuration Management Plan A.6.1.3. A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.8.1.1, A.10.1.1, A.10.1.2, A.10.3.2, 

A.12.4.1, A.12.4.3, A.12.5.1, A.12.5.2, A.12.5.3 

CM-10 Software Usage Restrictions A.12.4.1, A.12.5.5, A.15.1.2 

CM-11 User-Installed Software A.12.4.1, A.12.5.5, A.15.1.5 

CP-1 Contingency Planning Policy and 

Procedures 

A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.6.1.3, A.8.1.1, A.9.1.4, A.10.1.1, 

A.10.1.2, A.14.1.1, A.14.1.3, A.15.1.1, A.15.2.1 

CP-2 Contingency Plan A.6.1.2, A.9.1.4, A.10.3.1, A.14.1.1, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, 

A.14.1.4, A.14.1.5 

CP-3 Contingency Training A.8.2.2, A.9.1.4, A.14.1.3 

CP-4 Contingency Plan Testing A.6.1.2, A.9.1.4, A.14.1.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.1.4, A.14.1.5 

CP-5 Withdrawn --- 

CP-6 Alternate Storage Site A.9.1.4, A.14.1.3 

CP-7 Alternate Processing Site A.9.1.4, A.14.1.3 

CP-8 Telecommunications Services A.9.1.4, A.10.6.1, A.14.1.3 

CP-9 Information System Backup A.9.1.4, A.10.5.1, A.14.1.3, A.15.1.3 

CP-10 Information System Recovery and 

Reconstitution 

A.9.1.4, A.14.1.3 

CP-11 Predictable Failure Prevention None 

CP-12 Alternate Communications Protocols None 

CP-13 Safe Mode None 

IA-1 Identification and Authentication Policy 

and Procedures 

A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.6.1.3, A.8.1.1, A.10.1.1, A.11.2.1, 

A.15.1.1, A.15.2.1 

IA-2 Identification and Authentication 

(Organizational Users) 

A.11.3.2, A.11.5.1, A.11.5.2, A.11.5.3 

IA-3 Device-to-Device Identification and 

Authentication 

A.11.4.3 

IA-4 Identifier Management A.11.5.2 

IA-5 Authenticator Management A.11.2.1, A.11.2.3, A.11.3.1, A.11.5.2, A.11.5.3 

IA-6 Authenticator Feedback A.11.5.1 

IA-7 Cryptographic Module Authentication A.12.3.1, A.15.1.1, A.15.1.6, A.15.2.1 

IA-8 Identification and Authentication (NonOrganizational Users) A.10.9.1, A.11.4.2, A.11.5.1, A.11.5.2 

IA-9 Service Identification and Authentication None 

IA-10 Alternative Authentication None 

IA-11 Adaptive Identification and Authentication None 

IA-12 Reauthentication None 

IR-1 Incident Response Policy and Procedures A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.6.1.3, A.8.1.1, A.10.1.1, A.13.1.1, 

A.13.2.1, A.15.1.1, A.15.2.1 

IR-2 Incident Response Training A.8.2.2 

IR-3 Incident Response Testing None 

IR-4 Incident Handling A.6.1.2, A.13.2.2, A.13.2.3 
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APPENDIX H PAGE H-4

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS ISO/IEC 27001 (Annex A) CONTROLS 

IR-5 Incident Monitoring None 

IR-6 Incident Reporting A.6.1.6, A.13.1.1 

IR-7 Incident Response Assistance None 

IR-8 Incident Response Plan None 

IR-9 Information Spillage Response A.12.5.4 

MA-1 System Maintenance Policy and 

Procedures 

A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.6.1.3, A.8.1.1, A.9.2.4, A.10.1.1, 

A.15.1.1, A.15.2.1 

MA-2 Controlled Maintenance A.9.2.4 

MA-3 Maintenance Tools A.9.2.4, A.11.4.4 

MA-4 Non-Local Maintenance A.9.2.4, A.11.4.4 

MA-5 Maintenance Personnel A.9.2.4, A.12.4.3 

MA-6 Timely Maintenance A.9.2.4 

MP-1 Media Protection Policy and Procedures A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.6.1.3, A.8.1.1, A.10.1.1, A.10.7.1, 

A.10.7.2, A.10.7.3, A.11.1.1, A.15.1.1, A.15.1.3, A.15.2.1 

MP-2 Media Access A.7.2.2, A.10.7.1, A.10.7.3 

MP-3 Media Marking A.7.2.2, A.10.7.1, A.10.7.3 

MP-4 Media Storage A.10.7.1, A.10.7.3, A.10.7.4, A.11.3.3, A.15.1.3 

MP-5 Media Transport A.9.2.5, A.9.2.7, A.10.7.1, A.10.7.3, A.10.8.3 

MP-6 Media Sanitization A.9.2.6, A.10.7.1, A.10.7.2, A.10.7.3 

MP-7 Media Use None 

MP-8 Media Downgrading None 

PE-1 Physical and Environmental Protection 

Policy and Procedures 

A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.6.1.3, A.8.1.1, A.9.1.4, A.9.2.1, 

A.9.2.2, A.10.1.1, A.11.1.1, A.11.2.1, A.11.2.2, A.15.1.1, 

A.15.2.1 

PE-2 Physical Access Authorizations A.9.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.11.2.2, A.11.2.4 

PE-3 Physical Access Control A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.1.3, A.9.1.5, A.9.1.6, A.11.3.2, A.11.4.4 

PE-4 Access Control for Transmission Medium A.9.1.3, A.9.1.5, A.9.2.3 

PE-5 Access Control for Output Devices A.9.1.2, A.9.1.3, A.10.6.1, A.11.3.2 

PE-6 Monitoring Physical Access A.9.1.2, A.9.1.5, A.10.10.2 

PE-7 Withdrawn --- 

PE-8 Visitor Access Records A.9.1.5, A.10.10.2, A.15.2.1 

PE-9 Power Equipment and Cabling A.9.1.4, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3 

PE-10 Emergency Shutoff A.9.1.4 

PE-11 Emergency Power A.9.1.4, A.9.2.2 

PE-12 Emergency Lighting A.9.2.2 

PE-13 Fire Protection A.9.1.4 

PE-14 Temperature and Humidity Controls A.9.2.2 

PE-15 Water Damage Protection A.9.1.4 

PE-16 Delivery and Removal A.9.1.6, A.9.2.7, A.10.7.1 

PE-17 Alternate Work Site A.9.2.5, A.11.7.2 

PE-18 Location of Information System 

Components 

A.9.2.1, A.11.3.2 

PE-19 Information Leakage A.12.5.4 

PE-20 Port and I/O Device Access A 10.4.1 

PL-1 Security Planning Policy and Procedures A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.6.1.2, A.6.1.3, A.8.1.1, A.10.1.1, 

A.15.1.1, A.15.2.1 

PL-2 System Security Plan A.6.1.2, A.15.3.1 

PL-3 Withdrawn --- 

PL-4 Rules of Behavior A.6.1.5, A.6.2.2, A.7.1.3. A.8.1.1, A.8.1.3, A.8.2.1, A.9.1.5, 

A.10.8.1, A.11.7.1, A.11.7.2, A.12.4.1, A.13.1.2, A.15.1.5 

PL-5 Withdrawn --- 

PL-6 Withdrawn --- 

PL-7 Security Concept of Operations A.12.1.1 

PL-8 Security Architecture A.12.1.1 

PS-1 Personnel Security Policy and Procedures A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.6.1.3, A.8.1.1, A.10.1.1, A.15.1.1, 

A.15.2.1 

PS-2 Position Categorization A.8.1.1 

PS-3 Personnel Screening A.8.1.2 

PS-4 Personnel Termination A.8.3.1, A.8.3.2, A.8.3.3 
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NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS ISO/IEC 27001 (Annex A) CONTROLS 

PS-5 Personnel Transfer A.8.3.1, A.8.3.2, A.8.3.3 

PS-6 Access Agreements A.6.1.5, A.8.1.1, A.8.1.3, A.8.2.1, A.9.1.5, A.10.8.1, A.11.7.1, 

A.11.7.2, A.15.1.5 

PS-7 Third-Party Personnel Security A.6.2.3, A.8.1.1, A.8.2.1, A.8.1.3 

PS-8 Personnel Sanctions A.8.2.3, A.15.1.5 

RA-1 Risk Assessment Policy and Procedures A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.6.1.3, A.8.1.1, A.10.1.1, A.14.1.2, 

A.15.1.1, A.15.2.1 

RA-2 Security Categorization A.7.2.1, A.14.1.2 

RA-3 Risk Assessment A.6.2.1, A.10.2.3, A.12.6.1, A.14.1.2 

RA-4 Withdrawn --- 

RA-5 Vulnerability Scanning A.12.6.1, A.15.2.2 

SA-1 System and Services Acquisition Policy 

and Procedures 

A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.6.1.3, A.6.2.1, A.8.1.1, A.10.1.1, 

A.12.1.1, A.12.5.5, A.15.1.1, A.15.2.1 

SA-2 Allocation of Resources A.6.1.2, A.10.3.1 

SA-3 System Development Life Cycle A.12.1.1 

SA-4 Acquisition Process A.12.1.1, A.12.5.5 

SA-5 Information System Documentation A.10.7.4, A.15.1.3 

SA-6 Withdrawn --- 

SA-7 Withdrawn --- 

SA-8 Security Engineering Principles A.10.4.1, A.10.4.2, A.11.4.5, A.12.5.5 

SA-9 External Information System Services A.6.1.5, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.3, A.8.1.1, A.8.2.1, A.10.2.1, A.10.2.2, 

A.10.2.3, A.10.6.2, A.10.8.2, A.12.5.5 

SA-10 Developer Configuration Management A.10.2.3, A.12.4.3, A.12.5.1, A.12.5.5 

SA-11 Developer Security Testing A.10.3.2, A.12.5.5 

SA-12 Supply Chain Protections A.12.5.5 

SA-13 Withdrawn --- 

SA-14 Critical Information System Components None 

SA-15 Development Process, Standards, and 

Tools 

A.10.3.2, A.12.5.5 

SA-16 Developer-Provided Training None 

SA-17 Developer Security Architecture and 

Design 

A.10.3.2, A.12.5.5 

SA-18 Tamper Resistance and Detection None 

SA-19 Anti-Counterfeit None 

SC-1 System and Communications Protection 

Policy and Procedures 

A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.6.1.3, A.8.1.1, A.10.1.1, A.15.1.1, 

A.15.2.1 

SC-2 Application Partitioning A.10.4.1, A.10.4.2 

SC-3 Security Function Isolation A.10.4.1, A.10.4.2, A.10.9.1, A.10.9.2 

SC-4 Information In Shared Resources None 

SC-5 Denial of Service Protection A.10.3.1 

SC-6 Resource Availability None 

SC-7 Boundary Protection A.6.2.1, A.10.4.1, A.10.4.2, A.10.6.1, A.10.8.1, A.10.9.1, 

A.10.9.2, A.10.10.2, A.11.4.5, A.11.4.6, A 11.6.2 

SC-8 Transmission Integrity A.10.4.2, A.10.6.1, A.10.6.2, A.10.9.1, A.10.9.2, A.12.2.3, 

A.12.3.1 

SC-9 Transmission Confidentiality A.10.6.1, A.10.6.2, A.10.9.1, A.10.9.2, A.12.3.1 

SC-10 Network Disconnect A.10.6.1, A.11.3.2, A.11.5.1, A.11.5.5 

SC-11 Trusted Path None 

SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and 

Management 

A.12.3.2 

SC-13 Cryptographic Protection A.12.3.1, A.15.1.6 

SC-14 Public Access Protections A.10.4.1, A.10.4.2, A.10.9.1, A.10.9.2, A.10.9.3 

SC-15 Collaborative Computing Devices None 

SC-16 Transmission of Security Attributes A.7.2.2, A.10.8.1 

SC-17 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates A.12.3.2 

SC-18 Mobile Code A.10.4.2 

SC-19 Voice Over Internet Protocol A.10.6.1 

SC-20 Secure Name/Address Resolution Service 

(Authoritative Source) 

A.10.6.1 
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NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS ISO/IEC 27001 (Annex A) CONTROLS 

SC-21 Secure Name/Address Resolution Service 

(Recursive or Caching Resolver) 

A.10.6.1 

SC-22 Architecture and Provisioning for 

Name/Address Resolution Service 

A.10.6.1 

SC-23 Session Authenticity A.10.6.1, A.12.2.3 

SC-24 Fail in Known State None 

SC-25 Thin Nodes None 

SC-26 Honeypots None 

SC-27 Operating System-Independent 

Applications 

None 

SC-28 Protection of Information at Rest None 

SC-29 Heterogeneity None 

SC-30 Concealment and Misdirection None 

SC-31 Covert Channel Analysis None 

SC-32 Information System Partitioning None 

SC-33 Withdrawn --- 

SC-34 Non-Modifiable Executable Programs None 

SC-35 Technical Surveillance Countermeasures 

Survey 

None 

SC-36 Honeyclients None 

SC-37 Distributed Processing and Storage None 

SC-38 Malware Analysis A.10.4.1 

SC-39 Out-of-Band Channels None 

SC-40 Operations Security None 

SC-41 Process Isolation None 

SC-42 Wireless Link Protection None 

SI-1 System and Information Integrity Policy 

and Procedures 

A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.6.1.3, A.8.1.1, A.10.1.1, A.15.1.1, 

A.15.2.1 

SI-2 Flaw Remediation A.10.10.5, A.12.5.2, A.12.6.1, A.13.1.2 

SI-3 Malicious Code Protection A.10.4.1 

SI-4 Information System Monitoring A.10.10.2, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.2 

SI-5 Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives A.6.1.6, A 6.1.7, A.12.6.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.2 

SI-6 Security Function Verification None 

SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity 

A.10.4.1, A.12.2.2, A.12.2.3, A.12.2.4 

SI-8 Spam Protection None 

SI-9 Information Input Restrictions A.10.8.1, A.11.1.1, A.11.2.2, A.12.2.2 

SI-10 Information Input Validation A.12.2.1, A.12.2.2 

SI-11 Error Handling None 

SI-12 Information Output Handling and 

Retention 

A.10.7.3, A.15.1.3, A.15.1.4, A.15.2.1 

SI-13 Withdrawn --- 

SI-14 Non-Persistence None 

PM-1 Information Security Program Plan A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.6.1.3 A.8.1.1, A.15.1.1, A.15.2.1 

PM-2 Senior Information Security Officer A.6.1.1, A.6.1.2, A.6.1.3 

PM-3 Information Security Resources A.6.1.1 

PM-4 Plan of Action and Milestones Process None 

PM-5 Information System Inventory A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2 

PM-6 Information Security Measures of 

Performance 

None 

PM-7 Enterprise Architecture None 

PM-8 Critical Infrastructure Plan None 

PM-9 Risk Management Strategy A.6.1.1, A.6.2.1, A.14.1.2 

PM-10 Security Authorization Process A.6.1.4 

PM-11 Mission/Business Process Definition None 

PM-12 Insider Threat Program None 

PM-13 Information Security Workforce A.8.2.1 

PM-14 Operations Security Program None 

PM-15 Testing, Training, and Monitoring A.8.2.1 
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APPENDIX H PAGE H-7

TABLE H-2: MAPPING ISO/IEC 27001 (ANNEX A) TO NIST SP 800-53 

ISO/IEC 27001 (Annex A) CONTROLS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS 

A.5 Security Policy

A.5.1 Information security policy 

A.5.1.1 Information security policy document XX-1 controls 

A.5.1.2 Review of the information security policy XX-1 controls 

A.6 Organization of information security

A.6.1 Internal 

A.6.1.1 Management commitment to information security XX-1 controls, PM-2, PM-3, PM-9; SP 800-39, 

SP 800-37 

A.6.1.2 Information security coordination CP-2, CP-4, IR-4, PL-1, PL-2, PM-2, SA-2; 

SP 800-39, SP 800-37 

A.6.1.3 Allocation of information security responsibilities XX-1 controls, AC-5, AC-6, CM-9, PM-2; SP 

800-39, SP 800-37 

A.6.1.4 Authorization process for information processing facilities CA-1, CA-6, PM-10; SP 800-37 

A.6.1.5 Confidentiality agreements PL-4, PS-6, SA-9 

A.6.1.6 Contact with authorities Multiple controls with contact reference (e.g., 

IR-6, SI-5); SP 800-39; SP 800-37 

A.6.1.7 Contact with special interest groups AT-5, SI-5 

A.6.1.8 Independent review of information security CA-2, CA-7; SP 800-39, SP 800-37 

A.6.2 External Parties 

A.6.2.1 Identification of risks related to external parties CA-3, PM-9, RA-3, SA-1, SA-9, SC-7 

A.6.2.2 Addressing security when dealing with customers AC-8 , AT-2, PL-4 

A.6.2.3 Addressing security in third party agreements AU-16, CA-2, CA-3, PS-7, SA-9 

A.7 Asset Management 

A.7.1 Responsibility for assets 

A.7.1.1 Inventory of assets CM-8, CM-9, PM-5 

A.7.1.2 Ownership of assets CM-8, CM-9, PM-5 

A.7.1.3 Acceptable use of assets AC-20, PL-4 

A.7.2 Information Classification 

A.7.2.1 Classification Guidelines RA-2 

A.7.2.2 Information labeling and handling AC-16, MP-2, MP-3, SC-16 

A.8 Human Resources Security 

A.8.1 Prior to Employment 

A.8.1.1 Roles and Responsibilities XX-1 controls, AC-5, AC-6, AC-8, AC-20, AT-2, 

AT-3, CM-9, PL-4, PS-2, PS-6, PS-7, SA-9 

A.8.1.2 Screening PS-3 

A.8.1.3 Terms and conditions of employment AC-20, PL-4, PS-6, PS-7 

A.8.2 During employment 

A.8.2.1 Management responsibilities PL-4, PM-13, PM-15, PS-6, PS-7, SA-9 

A.8.2.2 Awareness, education, and training AT-2, AT-3, IR-2 

A.8.2.3 Disciplinary process PS-8 

A.8.3 Termination or change of employment 

A.8.3.1 Termination responsibilities PS-4, PS-5 

A.8.3.2 Return of assets PS-4, PS-5 

A.8.3.3 Removal of access rights AC-2, PS-4, PS-5 

A.9 Physical and environmental security 

A.9.1 Secure areas 

A.9.1.1 Physical security perimeter PE-3 

A.9.1.2 Physical entry controls PE-3, PE-5, PE-6 

A.9.1.3 Securing offices, rooms, facilities PE-3, PE-4, PE-5 

A.9.1.4 Protecting against external and environmental threats CP Family; PE-1, PE-9, PE-10, PE-11, PE-13, 

PE-15 

A.9.1.5 Working in secure areas AT-2, AT-3 , PL-4, PS-6, PE-2, PE-3, PE-4, 

PE-6, PE-8 

A.9.1.6 Public access, delivery and loading areas PE-3 , PE-16 

A.9.2 Equipment security 

A.9.2.1 Equipment siting and protection PE-1, PE-18 

A.9.2.2 Supporting utilities PE-1, PE-9, PE-11, PE-12, PE-14 

A.9.2.3 Cabling security PE-4, PE-9 
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A.9.2.4 Equipment maintenance MA Family 

A.9.2.5 Security of equipment off-premises MP-5, PE-17 

A.9.2.6 Secure disposal or reuse of equipment MP-6 

A.9.2.7 Removal of property MP-5, PE-16 

A.10 Communications and operations management 

A.10.1 Operational procedures and responsibilities 

A.10.1.1 Documented operating procedures XX-1 controls, CM-9 

A.10.1.2 Change management CM-1, CM-3, CM-4, CM-5, CM-9 

A.10.1.3 Segregation of duties AC-5 

A.10.1.4 Separation of development, test and operational facilities CM-2 

A.10.2 Third-party service delivery management 

A.10.2.1 Service delivery SA-9 

A.10.2.2 Monitoring and review of third-party services SA-9 

A.10.2.3 Managing changes to third-party services RA-3, SA-9, SA-10 

A.10.3 System planning and acceptance 

A.10.3.1 Capacity management AU-4, AU-5, CP-2, SA-2, SC-5 

A.10.3.2 System acceptance CA-2, CA-6, CM-3, CM-4, CM-9, SA-11, SA-15, 

SA-17 

A.10.4 Protection against malicious and mobile code 

A.10.4.1 Controls against malicious code AC-19, AT-2, PE-20, SA-8, SC-2, SC-3, SC-7, 

SC-14, SC-38, SI-3, SI-7 

A.10.4.2 Controls against mobile code SA-8, SC-2, SC-3, SC-7, SC-14, SC-8, SC-18 

A.10.5 Backup 

A.10.5.1 Information backup CP-9 

A.10.6 Network security management 

A.10.6.1 Network controls AC-4, AC-17, AC-18, AC-20, CA-3, CP-8, PE-5, 

SC-7, SC-8, SC-9, SC-10, SC-19, SC-20, 

SC-21, SC-22, SC-23 

A.10.6.2 Security of network services CA-3, SA-9, SC-8, SC-9 

A.10.7 Media handling 

A.10.7.1 Management of removable media MP Family, PE-16 

A.10.7.2 Disposal of media MP-6 

A.10.7.3 Information handling procedures MP Family, SI-12 

A.10.7.4 Security of system documentation MP-4, SA-5 

A.10.8 Exchange of information 

A.10.8.1 Information exchange policies and procedures AC-1, AC-3, AC-4, AC-17, AC-18, AC-20, CA-3, 

PL-4, PS-6, SC-7, SC-16, SI-9 

A.10.8.2 Exchange agreements CA-3, SA-9 

A.10.8.3 Physical media in transit MP-5 

A.10.8.4 Electronic messaging Multiple controls; electronic messaging not 

addressed separately in SP 800-53 

A.10.8.5 Business information systems CA-1, CA-3 

A.10.9 Electronic commerce services 

A.10.9.1 Electronic commerce AU-10, IA-8, SC-7, SC-8, SC-9, SC-3, SC-14 

A.10.9.2 Online transactions SC-3, SC-7, SC-8, SC-9, SC-14 

A.10.9.3 Publicly available information SC-14 

A.10.10 Monitoring 

A.10.10.1 Audit logging AU-1, AU-2, AU-3, AU-4, AU-5, AU-8, AU-11, 

AU-12 

A.10.10.2 Monitoring system use AU-1, AU-6, AU-7, PE-6, PE-8, SC-7, SI-4 

A.10.10.3 Protection of log information AU-9 

A.10.10.4 Administrator and operator logs AU-2, AU-12 

A.10.10.5 Fault logging AU-2, AU-6, AU-12, SI-2 

A.10.10.6 Clock synchronization AU-8 

A.11 Access Control 

A.11.1 Business requirement for access control 

A.11.1.1 Access control policy AC-1, AC-5, AC-6, AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, CM-5, 

MP-1, SI-9 

A.11.2 User access management 

A.11.2.1 User registration AC-1, AC-2, AC-21, IA-5, PE-1, PE-2 
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A.11.2.2 Privilege management AC-1, AC-2, AC-6, AC-21, PE-1, PE-2, SI-9 

A.11.2.3 User password management IA-5 

A.11.2.4 Review of user access rights AC-2, PE-2 

A 11.3 User responsibilities 

A.11.3.1 Password use IA-2, IA-5 

A.11.3.2 Unattended user equipment AC-11, IA-2, PE-3, PE-5, PE-18, SC-10 

A.11.3.3 Clear desk and clear screen policy AC-11, MP-4 

A.11.4 Network access control 

A.11.4.1 Policy on use of network services AC-1, AC-5, AC-6, AC-17, AC-18, AC-20 

A.11.4.2 User authentication for external connections AC-17, AC-18, AC-20, CA-3, IA-2, IA-8 

A.11.4.3 Equipment identification in networks AC-19, IA-3 

A.11.4.4 Remote diagnostic and configuration port protection AC-3, AC-6, AC-17, AC-18, PE-3, MA-3, MA-4 

A.11.4.5 Segregation in networks AC-4, SA-8, SC-7 

A.11.4.6 Network connection control AC-3, AC-6, AC-17, AC-18, SC-7 

A.11.4.7 Network routing control AC-4, AC-17, AC-18 

A 11.5 Operating system access control 

A.11.5.1 Secure log-on procedures AC-7, AC-8, AC-9, AC-10, IA-2, IA-6, IA-8, SC10 

A.11.5.2 User identification and authentication IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8 

A.11.5.3 Password management system IA-2, IA-5 

A.11.5.4 Use of system utilities AC-3, AC-6 

A.11.5.5 Session time-out AC-11, SC-10 

A.11.5.6 Limitation of connection time AC-2 

A.11.6 Application and information access control 

A.11.6.1 Information access restriction AC-3, AC-6, AC-14, CM-5 

A.11.6.2 Sensitive system isolation SC-7; SP 800-39 

A.11.7 Mobile computing and teleworking 

A.11.7.1 Mobile computing and communications AC-1, AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, PL-4, PS-6 

A.11.7.2 Teleworking AC-1, AC-4, AC-17, AC-18, PE-17, PL-4, PS-6 

A.12 Information systems acquisition, development and 

maintenance 

A.12.1 Security requirements of information systems 

A.12.1.1 Security requirements analysis and specification PL-7, PL-8, SA-1, SA-3, SA-4 

A.12.2 Correct processing in applications 

A.12.2.1 Input data validation SI-10 

A.12.2.2 Control of internal processing SI-7, SI-9, SI-10 

A.12.2.3 Message integrity AU-10, SC-8, SC-23, SI-7 

A.12.2.4 Output data validation SI-7 

A.12.3 Cryptographic controls 

A.12.3.1 Policy on the use of cryptographic controls Multiple controls address cryptography (e.g., 

IA-7, SC-8, SC-9, SC-12, SC-13) 

A.12.3.2 Key management SC-12, SC-17 

A.12.4 Security of system files 

A.12.4.1 Control of operational software CM-1, CM-2, CM-3, CM-4, CM-5, CM-9, CM-10, 

CM-11, PL-4 

A.12.4.2 Protection of system test data Multiple controls; protection of test data not 

addressed separately in SP 800-53 (e.g., AC-3, 

AC-4) 

A.12.4.3 Access control to program source code AC-3, AC-6, CM-5, CM-9, MA-5, SA-10 

A.12.5 Security in development and support processes 

A.12.5.1 Change control procedures CM-1, CM-3, CM-9, SA-10 

A.12.5.2 Technical review of applications after operating system 

changes 

CM-3, CM-4, CM-9, SI-2 

A.12.5.3 Restrictions on changes to software packages CM-3, CM-4, CM-5, CM-9 

A.12.5.4 Information leakage AC-4, IR-9, PE-19 

A.12.5.5 Outsourced software development CM-10, CM-11, SA-1, SA-4, SA-8, SA-9, SA-11, 

SA-12, SA-15, SA-17 

A.12.6 Technical Vulnerability Management 

A.12.6.1 Control of technical vulnerabilities RA-3, RA-5, SI-2, SI-5 

A.13 Information security incident management 
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A.13.1 Reporting information security events and weaknesses 

A.13.1.1 Reporting information security events AU-6, IR-1, IR-6, SI-4, SI-5 

A.13.1.2 Reporting security weaknesses PL-4, SI-2, SI-4, SI-5 

A.13.2 Management of information security incidents and 

improvements 

A.13.2.1 Responsibilities and procedures IR-1 

A.13.2.2 Learning from information security incidents IR-4 

A.13.2.3 Collection of evidence AU-7, AU-9, IR-4 

A.14 Business continuity management 

A.14.1 Information security aspects of business continuity 

management 

A.14.1.1 Including information security in the business continuity 

management process 

CP-1, CP-2, CP-4 

A.14.1.2 Business continuity and risk assessment CP-2, PM-9, RA Family 

A.14.1.3 Developing and implementing continuity plans including 

information security 

CP Family 

A.14.1.4 Business continuity planning framework CP-2, CP-4 

A.14.1.5 Testing, maintaining and reassessing business continuity 

plans 

CP-2, CP-4 

A.15 Compliance 

A.15.1 Compliance with legal requirements 

A.15.1.1 Identification of applicable legislation XX-1 controls, IA-7 

A.15.1.2 Intellectual property rights (IPR) CM-10 

A.15.1.3 Protection of organizational records AU-9, AU-11, CP-9, MP-1, MP-4, SA-5, SI-12 

A.15.1.4 Data protection and privacy of personal information Appendix J; SI-12 

A.15.1.5 Prevention of misuse of information processing facilities AC-8, AU-6, CM-11, PL-4, PS-6, PS-8 

A.15.1.6 Regulation of cryptographic controls IA-7, SC-13 

A.15.2 Compliance with security policies and standards, and 

technical compliance 

A.15.2.1 Compliance with security policies and standards XX-1 controls, AC-2, CA-2, CA-7, IA-7, PE-8, 

SI-12 

A.15.2.2 Technical compliance checking CA-2, CA-7, RA-5 

A.15.3 Information systems audit considerations 

A.15.3.1 Information systems audit controls AU-1, AU-2 

A.15.3.2 Protection of information systems audit tools AU-9 
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APPENDIX I

OVERLAY TEMPLATE

APPLYING TAILORING GUIDANCE FOR SPECIAL CONDITIONS OR COMMUNITY-WIDE USE101

rganizations may use the following template when developing tailored baselines using the 

concept of overlays.102 The template is provided an as exemplar only—organizations may 

choose to use other formats or modify the format in this appendix based on organizational 

needs and the type of overlay being developed. The level of detail included in the overlay is at the 

discretion of the organization initiating the effort but should be of sufficient breadth and depth to 

provide an appropriate rationale and justification for the resulting tailored baseline developed and 

any risk-based decisions taken during the development process. The template consists of eight 

sections including: 

• Characteristics and assumptions; 

• Applicability; 

• Implementation; 

• Table of security controls; 

• Supplemental guidance; 

• Tailoring considerations; 

• Duration; and 

• Definitions. 

Characteristics and Assumptions 

Organizations describe the characteristics and assumptions that define the required use of the 

overlay. This includes a description of the environment in which the overlay will be used (e.g., 

inside a guarded building within the continental United States, while traveling for business to a 

foreign country that is known for attempting to gain access to sensitive or classified information, 

or in a mobile vehicle in close proximity to hostile entities). The characteristics and assumptions 

section may also include a description of the type of information that will be processed, stored, or 

transmitted (e.g., an information system that contains personally identifiable information (PII), 

sensitive financial information, or health records). Another characteristic of overlays describes 

the type of information system (e.g., standalone system, type of platform IT, industrial/process 

control system, or cross-domain system). An overlay may be required to protect organizations, 

mission/business processes, information systems, information, or individuals from a different set 

of threats and vulnerabilities than are typically addressed by the existing baselines with some 

level of tailoring as described in Chapter Three. If an overlay is designed to address such threats 

and vulnerabilities, they should be identified and documented in this section. 

 

101 Tailored baselines produced using the concept of overlays can be published independently in a variety of venues and 

publications including, for example, OMB policies, CNSS Instructions, NIST Special Publications, industry standards, 

and sector-specific guidance. As part of the overlay initiative at the federal level, the previous guidance in this appendix 

regarding industrial and process control system security will be transferred to NIST Special Publication 800-82. 

102 While organizations are encouraged to use the overlay concept to tailor security control baselines, generating widely 

divergent overlays on the same topic may prove to be counterproductive. The overlay concept is most effective when 

communities of interest work together to create consensus-based overlays that are not duplicative. 

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Applicability 

Organizations provide a series of questions that are used to determine whether or not the overlay 

applies to a particular information system. The questions and possible answers are supported by 

the overlay characteristics and assumptions and lead organizations to a final decision on whether 

or not the overlay applies to a specific information system. 

 

Example 

Tactical overlays apply to organizational information systems that are being developed for use in or that 

will be deployed to tactical environments. Examples of tactical environments include, for example: 

mobile command centers such as command and control aircraft and large deck ships; mobile platforms 

such as tanks and fighter jets; and dismounted environments such as military personnel on foot in war 

zones. Some distinguishing characteristics of tactical environments include, for example: significant size, 

weight, and power constraints; network bandwidth and connectivity constraints; processing and storage 

limitations; high operational tempo; harsh environmental conditions; frequent personnel turnover; data 

with high refresh rates and low persistent value; and close physical proximity to adversaries and the 

associated non-cyber threats. 

While many of the security controls from the initial baselines continue to apply in tactical environments, 

how the controls are implemented varies. Implementation varies because of differences in risk and in 

both technical and operational constraints. For example, because ships have little bandwidth it is not 

practical to automatically push all necessary security updates over the network. Instead, helicopters 

deliver CDs with the updates to the ships when necessary. Similarly, automatic updates in a tactical 

environment could be dangerous if the updates resulted in the system becoming inoperable or disruption 

of an ongoing mission, thereby compromising the success of the mission and the safety of the troops. 

In this case, updates are delayed until after active operational missions have been completed. Other 

security controls such as auditing must be carefully tailored to be sensitive to the limited storage and 

processing capacity of some tactical systems—resources that must be shared with critical mission 

functionality. 

Example 

The following questions are used to determine whether or not this overlay applies to a particular 

information system: 

• Will the information system be deployed to a tactical environment (e.g., war zone, peacekeeping 

activity, disaster relief, humanitarian aid)? 

• Will the size and weight of the information system have to be limited due to constraints of the 

operational environment (e.g., it must fit within a small area on a command and control aircraft, 

must be carried by a soldier)? 

• Will the power supply for the information system be limited because it will not be possible to connect 

to a power grid (e.g., it will rely on a generator or batteries)? 

• Will the network connectivity for the information system be limited and the bandwidth low due to 

constraints of the operational environment? 

• Will the network connectivity be intermittent or unreliable? 

• How persistent is the data (e.g., length of time data is relevant or requires protection)? 

• Will the operational tempo be high (e.g., require 24-7 use of the information system)? 

• Will the information system be required to operate in extreme environmental conditions (e.g., heat, 

salt, humidity, altitude, vibration)? 
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Implementation 

Organizations describe which baseline is used as the foundation for the overlay (e.g., the lowimpact, moderate-impact, or high-impact baselines from Appendix D or alternative baselines 

established for national security systems). Organizations also define any requirements related to 

implementation such as any additional overlays that are expected to be used in conjunction with 

this overlay and provide any guidance that should be considered when tailoring the resulting set 

of security controls developed from the selected baseline and applicable overlays. The security 

controls specified through the use of overlays can be implemented as a common, system-specific, 

or hybrid controls based on organization-specific guidance. 

Table of Overlay Controls 

Organizations list the set of security controls and control enhancements that apply to this overlay, 

indicating which controls/enhancements have been added to or removed from the initial baseline 

based on the tailoring guidance provided in Section 3.2 or any organization-specific guidance. It 

is possible to have an overlay without adding or removing security controls—that is, the overlay 

may only include new supplemental guidance, parameter values, or statutory/regulatory controls. 

Supplemental Guidance 

Organizations provide supplemental guidance for the security controls and control enhancements 

in the overlay. In some cases, the supplemental guidance for the selected controls/enhancements 

is modified to address the characteristics and assumptions of the overlays and the environments in 

which the overlays are intended to operate. Supplemental guidance can also provide information 

as to why a particular control/enhancement may not be applicable in some environments and offer 

suggestions for compensating controls, as appropriate. The use of particular overlays may limit 

implementation options for some security controls. Therefore, the supplemental guidance may 

include implementation guidance for those controls. The overlay supplemental guidance follows 

the format of security controls in Appendix F. 

Example 

The following examples illustrate additional supplemental guidance for industrial control systems. 

AC-5 SEPARATION OF DUTIES 

ICS Supplemental Guidance: In situations where the ICS cannot support the differentiation of 

roles, the organization employs appropriate compensating controls (e.g., providing increased 

personnel security and auditing). The organization carefully considers the appropriateness of a 

single individual performing multiple critical roles. 

SC-13 CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION 

ICS Supplemental Guidance: The use of cryptography is determined after careful consideration 

of the security needs and the potential ramifications on system performance. For example, the 

organization considers whether latency induced from the use of cryptography would adversely 

impact the operational performance of the ICS. 

SC-10 NETWORK DISCONNECT 

ICS Supplemental Guidance: In situations where the ICS cannot terminate a network connection 

at the end of a session or after an organization-defined time period of inactivity, or the ICS 

cannot terminate a network connection due to significant adverse impact on performance, 

safety, or reliability, the organization employs appropriate compensating controls (e.g., 

providing increased auditing measures or limiting remote access privileges to key personnel). 
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Statutory/Regulatory Controls 

Organizations list security controls that are required on the basis of specific statutory/regulatory 

requirements (above and beyond FISMA), if applicable, including an identification of the specific 

statutory/regulatory requirements. If none of the security controls are statutory/regulatory, this is 

indicated in the overlay. 

Tailoring Guidance 

Organizations provide any tailoring guidance related to the use of the overlay. Tailoring guidance 

is contained in Section 3.2. If no additional tailoring guidance is needed, state that in this section. 

An information system owner may need to tailor the set of security controls established by simply 

combining the baseline and all appropriate overlays. In some cases, the use of multiple overlays 

may provide conflicting guidance. Authorizing officials have the authority to approve tailoring 

decisions and the resulting set of security controls in the tailored baseline. While information 

system owners, in conjunction with authorizing officials, determine the appropriate set of security 

controls for an information system, overlay developers may want to include information that will 

help guide those tailoring decisions. Organizations also establish any unique parameter values for 

the security control selections in the overlay. 

Duration 

Organizations define how long the overlay is to be in effect and any the events that trigger an 

update to the overlay other than changes to NIST Special Publication 800-53, CNSS Instruction 

1253, or organization-specific security guidance. If there are no unique events that can trigger an 

update for this overlay, state that in this section.103

Definitions 

Organizations provide any terms and associated definitions that are unique and relevant to this 

overlay. The terms and definitions are listed in alphabetical order. If there are no unique terms 

and definitions for this overlay, state that in this section.

 

103 In addition to describing which version of NIST Special Publication 800-53 or CNSS Instruction 1253 is used to 

create overlays, organizations also consider updating overlays when modifications to baselines occur. Organizations 

should attempt to minimize the lag time in updating overlays with the latest baseline information provided by NIST or 

CNSS. 
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APPENDIX J

PRIVACY CONTROL CATALOG 

PRIVACY CONTROLS, ENHANCEMENTS, AND SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE 

ith increasing dependency on information systems, dramatic advances in information 

technologies, and significant growth in new applications of those technologies in such 

areas as cloud computing, Smart Grid, and mobile computing, information security and 

privacy are taking on new levels of importance in the public and private sectors. Privacy, with 

respect to personally identifiable information (PII),104 is a core value that can be obtained only 

with appropriate legislation, policies, procedures, and associated controls to ensure compliance 

with requirements. Protecting the privacy of PII collected, used, maintained, shared, and disposed 

of by programs and information systems, is a fundamental responsibility of federal organizations. 

In today’s digital world, effective privacy for individuals depends on the safeguards employed 

within the information systems that are processing, storing, and transmitting PII. Organizations 

cannot have effective privacy without a foundation of information security. However, privacy is 

more than security and includes, for example, the principles of transparency, notice, and choice. 

This appendix provides a structured set of controls for protecting privacy.105 It also serves as a 

roadmap for organizations to use in identifying and implementing privacy controls concerning the 

entire life cycle of PII, whether in paper or electronic form.106 The controls focus on information 

privacy as a value distinct from, but highly interrelated with, information security. The privacy 

controls are based on the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs)107 embodied in the Privacy 

Act of 1974, Section 208 of the E-Government Act of 2002, and related Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) guidance. The FIPPs are designed to build public trust in an organization’s 

privacy practices and to help organizations avoid tangible costs and intangible damages stemming 

from privacy incidents. 

 

104 OMB Memorandum 07-16 defines PII as information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s 

identity such as their name, social security number, biometric records, etc., alone, or when combined with other 

personal or identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date and place of birth, 

mother’s maiden name, etc. OMB Memorandum 10-22 reaffirmed this definition. NIST Special Publication 800-122 

defines PII as any information about an individual that is maintained by an agency, including: (i) any information that 

can be used to distinguish or trace an individual‘s identity, such as name, social security number, date and place of 

birth, mother’s maiden name, or biometric records; and (ii) any other information that is linked or linkable to an 

individual, such as medical, educational, financial, and employment information. Special Publication 800-122 differs 

from this appendix because it was focused on the security objective of confidentiality and not privacy in the broad 

sense. Definitions of PII established by organizations may vary based on the consideration of additional regulatory 

requirements. The privacy controls in this appendix apply regardless of the definition of PII by organizations. 

105 In 2010, the Federal CIO Council Privacy Committee issued a framework for designing and implementing a privacy 

program entitled Best Practices: Elements of a Federal Privacy Program (Elements White Paper). The privacy controls 

in this appendix mirror a number of the elements included in the paper. Organizations can use the privacy controls and 

the guidance in the paper to develop an organization-wide privacy program or enhance an already existing program. 

106 Although NIST Special Publication 800-53 is primarily about protecting information, organizations may also 

engage in activities that do not involve the collection and use of PII, but may nevertheless raise privacy risks or 

concerns. The privacy controls are equally applicable to those activities and can be used to analyze the privacy risk and 

mitigate such risk when necessary. 

107 The FIPPs are widely accepted in the United States and internationally as a general framework for privacy and are 

reflected in other federal and international laws and policies. In a number of organizations, FIPPs serve as the basis for 

analyzing privacy risks and determining appropriate mitigation strategies. The Federal Enterprise Architecture Security 

and Privacy Profile (FEA-SPP) also provided information and materials in development of the privacy controls. 

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Privacy controls are the administrative, technical, and physical safeguards employed within 

organizations to protect and ensure the proper handling of PII. There are eight privacy control 

families with each family aligning with one of the FIPPs. The privacy control families can be 

implemented at the organization, department, agency, component, office, program, or information 

system level, under the leadership of the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief 

Privacy Officer (CPO)108 and in coordination with the Chief Information Security Officer, Chief 

Information Officer, program officials, and legal counsel. Table J-1 provides a summary of the 

privacy controls by family in the privacy control catalog. 

TABLE J-1: SUMMARY OF PRIVACY CONTROLS BY FAMILY 

ID PRIVACY CONTROLS

AP Authority and Purpose 

AP-1 Authority to Collect 

AP-2 Purpose Specification 

AR Accountability, Audit, and Risk Management 

AR-1 Governance and Privacy Program 

AR-2 Privacy Impact and Risk Assessment 

AR-3 Privacy Requirements for Contractors and Service Providers 

AR-4 Privacy Monitoring and Auditing 

AR-5 Privacy Awareness and Training 

AR-6 Privacy Reporting 

AR-7 Privacy-Enhanced System Design and Development 

AR-8 Accounting of Disclosures 

DI Data Quality and Integrity 

DI-1 Data Quality 

DI-2 Data Integrity and Data Integrity Board 

DM Data Minimization and Retention 

DM-1 Minimization of Personally Identifiable Information 

DM-2 Data Retention and Disposal 

DM-3 Minimization of PII Used in Testing, Training, and Research 

IP Individual Participation and Redress 

IP-1 Consent 

IP-2 Individual Access 

IP-3 Redress 

IP-4 Complaint Management 

SE Security 

SE-1 Inventory of Personally Identifiable Information 

SE-2 Privacy Incident Response 

TR Transparency 

TR-1 Privacy Notice 

TR-2 System of Records Notices and Privacy Act Statements 

TR-3 Dissemination of Privacy Program Information 

UL Use Limitation 

UL-1 Internal Use 

UL-2 Information Sharing with Third Parties 

 

108 All federal agencies and departments designate an SAOP/CPO as the senior organizational official with the overall 

organization-wide responsibility for information privacy issues. OMB Memorandum 05-08 provides guidance for the 

designation of SAOPs/CPOs. The term SAOP/CPO as used in this appendix means an organization’s senior privacy 

leader, whose job title may vary from organization to organization. 
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There is a strong similarity in the structure of the privacy controls in this appendix and the 

security controls in Appendix F.109 Moreover, the use of privacy plans in conjunction with 

security plans can provide an opportunity for organizations to select the appropriate set of 

security and privacy controls in accordance with organizational mission/business requirements 

and the environments in which the organizations operate. Incorporating the fundamental concepts 

associated with managing information security risk helps to ensure that the employment of 

privacy controls is carried out in a cost-effective and risk-based manner while simultaneously 

meeting compliance requirements. In addition to the basic privacy controls described in this 

appendix, NIST plans to develop assessment procedures to allow organizations to evaluate the 

effectiveness of the controls. Standardized privacy controls and assessment procedures will 

provide a more disciplined and structured approach for satisfying federal privacy requirements 

and demonstrating compliance with those requirements. 

In summary, the Privacy Appendix achieves several important objectives. The appendix: 

• Provides a structured set of privacy controls, based on international standards and best practices, 

that help organizations enforce requirements derived from federal privacy legislation, policies, 

regulations, directives, standards, and guidance; 

• Establishes a linkage and relationship between privacy and security controls for purposes of 

enforcing respective privacy and security requirements that may overlap in concept and in 

implementation within federal information systems, programs, and organizations; 

• Demonstrates the applicability of the NIST Risk Management Framework in the selection, 

implementation, assessment, and monitoring of privacy controls deployed in federal information 

systems, programs, and organizations; and 

• Promotes closer cooperation between privacy and security officials within the federal government 

to help achieve the objectives of senior leaders/executives in enforcing the requirements in federal 

privacy legislation, policies, regulations, directives, standards, and guidance. 

 

 

109 While the security controls in Appendix F are allocated to the low, moderate, and high baselines in Appendix D, 

privacy controls are selected and implemented irrespective of the security control baselines—that is, the privacy 

controls are selected and implemented based on the privacy requirements of organizations and the need to protect the 

PII of individuals collected and maintained by systems and programs, in accordance with federal privacy legislation, 

policies, directives, regulations, guidelines, and best practices. However, it is understood that information systems rated 

moderate or high will trigger the need for several of the privacy controls outlined in this appendix as such systems may 

contain sensitive PII. 
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HOW TO USE THIS APPENDIX 

The privacy controls outlined in this publication are primarily for use by an organization’s 

Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) when working with 

program managers, information system developers, and information security personnel to 

determine how best to incorporate effective privacy protections and practices (i.e., privacy 

controls) within those programs and/or systems. These controls facilitate the organization’s 

efforts to comply with privacy requirements affecting those programs and/or systems that 

collect, use, maintain, share, or dispose of personally identifiable information (PII). 

Organizations can use the Risk Management Framework and its inherent flexibility, to assist 

in privacy control selection, implementation, assessment, and monitoring. Organizations 

analyze and apply each privacy control with respect to their distinct mission and operational 

needs based on their legal authorities and obligations. Implementation of the privacy controls 

may vary based upon this analysis (for example, organizations that are defined as covered 

entities pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act [HIPAA] may have 

additional requirements that are not specifically enumerated in this publication). This enables 

organizations to determine the information practices that are compliant with law and policy 

and those that may need review. It also enables organizations to tailor the privacy controls to 

meet their defined and specific needs at the organization level, mission/business process 

level, and information system level. Organizations with national security or law enforcement 

authorities take those authorities as well as privacy interests into account in determining how 

to apply the privacy controls in their operational environments. 

Control enhancements described in Appendix J reflect best practices which organizations 

should strive to achieve, but are not mandatory. Organizations should decide when to apply 

control enhancements to support their particular missions and business functions. Specific 

overlays for privacy, developed in accordance with the guidance in Section 3.2 and Appendix 

I, can also be considered to facilitate the tailoring of the security control baselines in Appendix 

D with the requisite privacy controls to ensure that both security and privacy requirements can 

be satisfied by organizations. Many of the security controls in Appendix F that are allocated to 

security control baselines provide the fundamental information protection for confidentiality 

(i.e., nondisclosure) within organizational information systems—protection that is essential for 

strong and effective privacy. 
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FAMILY: AUTHORITY AND PURPOSE 

This family furthers compliance with the Privacy Act by ensuring that organizations: (i) identify the 

legal bases that authorize a particular PII collection or activity that impacts privacy; and (ii) specify in 

their notices, the purpose(s) for which PII is collected. 

AP-1 AUTHORITY TO COLLECT 

Control: The organization determines the legal authority that permits the collection, use, 

maintenance, and sharing of personally identifiable information (PII), either generally or in 

support of a specific program or information system need. 

Supplemental Guidance: Before collecting PII in connection with an information system or program, 

the organization determines whether the contemplated collection of PII is legally authorized. 

Program officials consult with the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy 

Officer (CPO) and legal counsel regarding the authority of any program or activity to collect PII. 

The authority to collect PII is documented in the System of Records Notice (SORN) and/or 

Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA). Related controls: AR-2, DM-1, TR-1, TR-2. 

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e)(3)(A); Section 208(c), E-Government 

Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347). 

AP-2 PURPOSE SPECIFICATION 

Control: The organization describes the purpose(s) for which personally identifiable information 

(PII) is collected, used, maintained, and shared in its privacy notices. 

Supplemental Guidance: Often, statutory language expressly authorizes specific collections and uses 

of PII. When statutory language is written broadly and thus subject to interpretation, organizations 

ensure, in consultation with the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer 

(CPO) and legal counsel, that there is a close nexus between the general authorization and any 

specific collection of PII. Once the specific purposes have been identified, the purposes are clearly 

described in the related privacy compliance documentation, including but not limited to Privacy 

Impact Assessments (PIAs), System of Records Notices (SORNs), and Privacy Act Statements on 

forms organizations use to collect PII. Further, in order to avoid unauthorized collections or uses 

of PII, personnel who handle PII receive training on the organizational authorities for collecting 

PII and on the contents of the notice. Related controls: AR-4, AR-5, TR-1, UL-1, UL-2. 

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e)(3)(A)-(B); Sections 208(b), (c), EGovernment Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347). 

 
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FAMILY: ACCOUNTABILITY, AUDIT, AND RISK MANAGEMENT 

This family enhances public confidence through effective controls for governance, monitoring, risk 

management, and assessment to demonstrate that organizations are complying with applicable privacy 

protection requirements and minimizing overall privacy risk.

AR-1 GOVERNANCE AND PRIVACY PROGRAM 

Control: The organization: 

a. Appoints a Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) 

accountable for developing, implementing, and maintaining an organization-wide governance 

and privacy program to ensure compliance with all applicable laws and regulations regarding 

the collection, use, maintenance, sharing, and disposal of personally identifiable information 

(PII) by programs and information systems; 

b. Monitors federal privacy laws and policy for changes that affect the privacy program; 

c. Allocates [Assignment: organization-defined allocation of budget and staffing resources] to 

implement and operate the organization-wide privacy program; 

d. Develops a strategic organizational privacy plan for implementing applicable privacy 

controls, policies, and procedures; 

e. Develops, disseminates, and implements operational privacy policies and procedures that 

govern the appropriate privacy and security controls for programs, information systems, or 

technologies involving PII; and 

f. Updates privacy plan, policies, and procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency, 

at least biennially]. 

Supplemental Guidance: The development and implementation of a comprehensive governance and 

privacy program demonstrates organizational accountability for and commitment to the protection 

of individual privacy. Accountability begins with the appointment of an SAOP/CPO with the 

authority, mission, resources, and responsibility to develop and implement a multifaceted privacy 

program. The SAOP/CPO, in consultation with legal counsel and information security officials: (i) 

ensures the development, implementation, and enforcement of privacy policies and procedures; 

(ii) defines roles and responsibilities for protecting PII; (iii) determines the level of information 

sensitivity with regard to PII holdings; (iv) identifies the laws, regulations, and internal policies 

that apply to the PII; (v) monitors privacy best practices; and (vi) monitors/audits compliance with 

identified privacy controls. 

To further accountability, the SAOP/CPO develops privacy plans to document the privacy 

requirements of organizations and the privacy and security controls in place or planned for 

meeting those requirements. The plan serves as evidence of organizational privacy operations and 

supports resource requests by the SAOP/CPO. A single plan or multiple plans may be necessary 

depending upon the organizational structures, requirements, and resources, and the plan(s) may 

vary in comprehensiveness. For example, a one-page privacy plan may cover privacy policies, 

documentation, and controls already in place, such as Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) and 

System of Records Notices (SORNs). A comprehensive plan may include a baseline of privacy 

controls selected from this appendix and include: (i) processes for conducting privacy risk 

assessments; (ii) templates and guidance for completing PIAs and SORNs; (iii) privacy training 

and awareness requirements; (iv) requirements for contractors processing PII; (v) plans for 

eliminating unnecessary PII holdings; and (vi) a framework for measuring annual performance 

goals and objectives for implementing identified privacy controls. 

 
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Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; E-Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-

347); Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA), 44 U.S.C. § 3541; OMB 

Memoranda 03-22, 05-08, 07-16; OMB Circular A-130; Federal Enterprise Architecture Security 

and Privacy Profile.

AR-2 PRIVACY IMPACT AND RISK ASSESSMENT 

Control: The organization: 

a. Establishes a privacy risk assessment process that assesses privacy risk to individuals 

resulting from the collection, sharing, storing, transmitting, and use of personally identifiable 

information (PII); 

b. Conducts a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for information systems and programs in 

accordance with applicable law, OMB policy, and any existing organizational policies and 

procedures; and 

c. Follows a documented, repeatable process for conducting, reviewing, and approving PIAs. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational privacy risk assessment processes operate across the life 

cycles of all mission/business processes that collect, use, maintain, share, or dispose of PII. OMB 

Memorandum 03-22 provides guidance to organizations for implementing the privacy provisions 

of the E-Government Act of 2002, including guidance on when PIAs are required for information 

systems. Some organizations may be required by law or policy to extend the PIA requirement to 

other activities involving PII or otherwise impacting privacy, for example, programs, projects, or 

regulations. PIAs are conducted to identify privacy risks and identify methods to mitigate those 

risks. PIAs are also conducted to ensure that programs or information systems comply with legal, 

regulatory, and policy requirements. PIAs also serve as notice to the public of privacy practices. 

PIAs are performed before developing or procuring information systems, or initiating programs or 

projects, that collect, use, maintain, or share PII and are updated when changes create new privacy 

risks. 

Control Enhancements: None.

References: Section 208, E-Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347); Federal Information Security 

Management Act of 2002 (FISMA), 44 U.S.C. § 3541; OMB Memoranda 03-22, 05-08. 

AR-3 PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTRACTORS AND SERVICE PROVIDERS 

Control: The organization: 

a. Establishes privacy roles and responsibilities for contractors and service providers; and 

b. Includes privacy requirements in contracts and other acquisition-related documents. 

Supplemental Guidance: Contractors and service providers include, but are not limited to, service 

bureaus, information providers, information processors, and other organizations providing 

information system development, information technology services, and other outsourced 

applications. Organizations consult with legal counsel, the Senior Agency Official for Privacy 

(SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO), and contracting officers about applicable laws, directives, 

policies, or regulations that may impact implementation of this control. Related control: SA-4. 

Control Enhancements: None.

References: OMB Circular A-130. 
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AR-4 PRIVACY MONITORING AND AUDITING 

Control: The organization monitors and audits privacy controls and internal privacy policy 

[Assignment: organization defined frequency] to ensure effective implementation. 

Supplemental Guidance: To promote accountability, organizations identify and address gaps in 

privacy compliance, management, operational, and technical controls by conducting regular 

assessments (e.g., internal risk assessments). These assessments can be self-assessments or thirdparty audits that result in reports on compliance gaps identified in programs, projects, and 

information systems. In addition to auditing for effective implementation of all privacy controls 

identified in this Appendix, organizations assess whether they: (i) implement a process to embed 

privacy considerations into the life cycle of programs, information systems, mission/business 

processes, and technology; (ii) monitor for changes to applicable privacy laws, regulations, and 

policies; (iii) track programs, information systems, and applications that collect and maintain 

personally identifiable information (PII) to ensure compliance; (iv) ensure access to PII is only on 

a need-to-know basis; and (v) ensure PII is being maintained and used only for the legally 

authorized purposes identified in the public notice(s). 

Organizations also: (i) implement technology to audit for the security, appropriate use, and loss of 

PII; (ii) perform reviews to ensure physical security of documents containing PII; and (iii) assess 

contractor compliance with privacy requirements. The organization Senior Agency Official for 

Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) coordinates monitoring and auditing efforts with 

information security officials and ensures that the results are provided to senior managers and 

oversight officials. Related controls: AR-6, AU-1, AU-2, AU-3, AU-6, AU-12, CA-7, TR-1, UL2. 

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; Section 208, E-Government Act of 2002 

(P.L. 107-347); OMB Memoranda 03-22, 05-08, 07-16. 

AR-5 PRIVACY AWARENESS AND TRAINING 

Control: The organization: 

a. Develops, implements, and updates a comprehensive training and awareness strategy aimed at 

ensuring that personnel understand privacy responsibilities and procedures; 

b. Administers basic privacy training [Assignment: organization-defined frequency, at least 

annually] and targeted, role-based privacy training for personnel having responsibility for 

personally identifiable information (PII) or for activities that involve PII [Assignment: 

organization-defined frequency, at least annually]; and 

c. Ensures that personnel certify (manually or electronically) acceptance of responsibilities for 

privacy requirements [Assignment: organization-defined frequency, at least annually]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Through implementation of a privacy training and awareness strategy, the 

organization promotes a culture of privacy. Privacy training and awareness programs typically 

focus on broad topics, such as responsibilities under the Privacy Act of 1974 and E-Government 

Act of 2002 and the consequences of failing to carry out those responsibilities, how to identify 

new privacy risks, how to mitigate privacy risks, and how and when to report privacy incidents. 

Privacy training may also target data collection and use requirements identified in public notices, 

such as Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) or System of Records Notices (SORNs) for a program 

or information system. Specific training methods may include: (i) mandatory annual privacy 

awareness training; (ii) targeted, role-based training; (iii) internal privacy program websites; (iv) 

manuals, guides, and handbooks; (v) slide presentations; (vi) events (e.g., privacy awareness week, 

privacy clean-up day); (vii) posters and brochures; and (viii) email messages to all employees and 

contractors. Organizations update training based on changing statutory, regulatory, mission, 

program, business process, and information system requirements, or on the results of compliance 
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monitoring and auditing. Where appropriate, organizations may provide privacy training as part of 

existing information security training. Related controls: AT-2, AT-3, TR-1. 

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; Section 208, E-Government Act of 2002 

(P.L. 107-347); OMB Memoranda 03-22, 07-16. 

AR-6 PRIVACY REPORTING 

Control: The organization develops, disseminates, and updates reports to the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) and Congress to demonstrate accountability with specific 

statutory and regulatory privacy program mandates, and to senior management and other 

personnel with responsibility for monitoring privacy program progress and compliance. 

Supplemental Guidance: Through external and internal privacy reporting, organizations promote 

accountability and transparency in organizational privacy operations. Reporting also helps 

organizations determine progress in meeting privacy compliance requirements and privacy 

controls, compare performance across the federal government, identify vulnerabilities and gaps in 

policy and implementation, and identify success models. Types of privacy reports include: (i) 

annual Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP) reports to OMB; (ii) reports to Congress 

required by the Implementing Regulations of the 9/11 Commission Act; or (iii) other public reports 

required by specific statutory mandates or internal policies of organizations. The organization 

Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) consults with legal 

counsel, where appropriate, to ensure that organizations meet all applicable privacy reporting 

requirements. 

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; Section 208, E-Government Act of 2002 

(P.L. 107-347); Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA), 44 U.S.C. § 

3541; Section 803, 9/11 Commission Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1; Section 804, 9/11 Commission 

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-3; Section 522, Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 (P.L. 108-447); 

OMB Memoranda 03-22; OMB Circular A-130. 

AR-7 PRIVACY-ENHANCED SYSTEM DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT 

Control: The organization designs information systems to enhance privacy by automating privacy 

controls. 

Supplemental Guidance: To the extent feasible when designing organizational information systems, 

organizations employ technologies that automate privacy controls on the collection, use, and 

disclosure of personally identifiable information (PII). By building privacy controls into system 

design, organizations mitigate privacy risks to PII, thereby reducing the likelihood of information 

system breaches and other privacy-related incidents.110 Organizations also conduct periodic 

reviews of systems’ collection, use, and disclosure of PII to assess compliance with the Privacy 

Act and the organization’s privacy policy. Regardless of whether automated privacy controls are 

employed, organizations regularly monitor information system use and sharing of PII to ensure 

that the use/sharing is consistent with the authorized purposes identified in the Privacy Act and/or 

in the public notice of organizations, or in a manner compatible with those purposes. Related 

controls: AC-6, AR-4, AR-5, DM-2, TR-1. 

 

 

110 The Information Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Canada’s Privacy by Design approach is consistent with this 

guidance (See www.privacybydesign.ca). 
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Control Enhancements: None. 

References: Sections 208(b) and(c), E-Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347); OMB 

Memorandum 03-22.

AR-8 ACCOUNTING OF DISCLOSURES 

Control: The organization, consistent with, and subject to exceptions in, the Privacy Act: 

a. Keeps an accurate accounting of disclosures of information held in each system of records 

under its control, including: 

- Date, nature, and purpose of each disclosure of a record; and 

- Name and address of the person or agency to which the disclosure was made; 

b. Retains the accounting of disclosures for the life of the record or five years after the 

disclosure is made, whichever is longer; and 

c. Makes the accounting of disclosures available to the person named in the record upon request. 

Supplemental Guidance: The Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer 

(CPO) periodically consults with managers of organization systems of record to ensure that the 

required accountings of disclosures of records are being properly maintained and provided to 

persons named in those records consistent with the dictates of the Privacy Act. 

Control Enhancements: None. 

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (c). 

 
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FAMILY: DATA QUALITY AND INTEGRITY 

This family ensures compliance with Section 552a (e)(2) of the Privacy Act of 1974 and enhances public 

confidence that any PII collected and maintained by organizations is accurate, relevant, timely, and 

complete for the purpose for which it is to be used, as specified in public notices. 

DI-1 DATA QUALITY 

Control: The organization: 

a. Confirms to the greatest extent practicable upon collection or creation of personally 

identifiable information (PII), the accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness of that 

information; 

b. Collects PII directly from the individual to the greatest extent practicable; 

c. Checks for, and corrects as necessary, any inaccurate or outdated PII used by its programs or 

systems [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and 

d. Issues guidelines ensuring and maximizing the quality, utility, objectivity, and integrity of 

disseminated information. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations take reasonable steps to confirm the accuracy of PII. Such 

steps may include, for example, editing and validating addresses as they are collected or entered 

into information systems using automated address verification look-up application programming 

interfaces (APIs). The types of measures taken to protect data quality may be based on the nature 

and context of the PII, how it is to be used, and how it was obtained. Measures taken to validate 

the accuracy of PII that is used to make determinations about the rights, benefits, or privileges of 

individuals under federal programs may be more comprehensive than those used to validate less 

sensitive PII. Additional steps may be necessary to validate PII that is obtained from sources other 

than individuals or the authorized representatives of individuals. 

When PII is of a sufficiently sensitive nature (e.g., when it is used for annual reconfirmation of a 

taxpayer’s income for a recurring benefit), organizations incorporate mechanisms into information 

systems and develop corresponding procedures for how frequently, and by what method, the 

information is to be updated. Related controls: IP-3, SI-10. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) DATA QUALITY | VALIDATE PII 

The organization requests that the individual or individual’s authorized representative validate PII 

during the collection process. 

(2) DATA QUALITY | RE-VALIDATE PII 

The organization requests that the individual or individual’s authorized representative revalidate PII 

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. 

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e)(5); Treasury and General Government 

Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (P.L. 106-554), app C § 515, 114 Stat. 2763A-153-4; 

Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3501; OMB Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the 

Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies 

(October 2001); OMB Memorandum 07-16.

DI-2 DATA INTEGRITY AND DATA INTEGRITY BOARD 

Control: The organization: 

a. Documents processes to ensure the integrity of personally identifiable information (PII) 

through existing security controls; and 
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b. Establishes a Data Integrity Board when appropriate to oversee organizational Computer 

Matching Agreements111 and to ensure that those agreements comply with the computer 

matching provisions of the Privacy Act. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations conducting or participating in Computer Matching 

Agreements with other organizations regarding applicants for and recipients of financial assistance 

or payments under federal benefit programs, and applicants for and holders of positions as federal 

personnel, establish a Data Integrity Board to oversee and coordinate their implementation of such 

matching agreements. In many organizations, the Data Integrity Board is led by the Senior Agency 

Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO). The Data Integrity Board ensures that 

controls are in place to maintain both the quality and the integrity of data shared under Computer 

Matching Agreements. Related controls: AC-1, AC-3, AC-4, AC-6, AC-17, AC-22, AU-2, AU-3, 

AU-6, AU-10, AU-11, DI-1, SC-8, SC-9, SC-14, SC-28, SI-9, UL-2. 

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (u); OMB Circular A-130, Appendix I.

 

 

111 Organizations enter into Computer Matching Agreements in connection with computer matching programs to which 

they are a party. With certain exceptions, a computer matching program is any computerized comparison of two or 

more automated systems of records or a system of records with nonfederal records for the purpose of establishing or 

verifying the eligibility of, or continuing compliance with, statutory and regulatory requirements by, applicants for, 

recipients or beneficiaries of, participants in, or providers of services with respect to cash or in-kind assistance or 

payments under federal benefit programs. Reference the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5 

U.S.C. § 552a (a)(8)(A). 
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FAMILY: DATA MINIMIZATION AND RETENTION 

This family helps organizations implement the data minimization and retention elements of the Privacy 

Act, which requires organizations to collect, use, and retain only PII that is relevant and necessary for the 

specified purpose for which it was originally collected. Organizations retain PII for only as long as 

necessary to fulfill the specified purpose(s) and in accordance with a National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA)-approved record retention schedule. 

DM-1 MINIMIZATION OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION 

Control: The organization: 

a. Identifies the minimum personally identifiable information (PII) elements (e.g., name, 

address, date of birth) that are relevant and necessary to accomplish the legally authorized 

purpose of collection;

b. Limits the collection and retention of PII to the minimum elements identified for the purposes 

described in the notice and for which the individual has provided consent; and 

c. Conducts an initial evaluation of PII holdings and establishes and follows a schedule for 

regularly reviewing those holdings [Assignment: organization-defined frequency, at least 

annually] to ensure that only PII identified in the notice is collected and retained, and that the 

PII continues to be necessary to accomplish the legally authorized purpose. 

Supplemental Guidance: The collection of PII is consistent with a purpose authorized by law or 

regulation. The minimum set of PII elements required to support a specific organization business 

process may be a subset of the PII the organization is authorized to collect. Program officials 

consult with the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) and 

legal counsel to identify the minimum PII elements required by the information system or activity 

to accomplish the legally authorized purpose. 

Organizations can further reduce their privacy and security risks by also reducing their inventory 

of PII, where appropriate. OMB Memorandum 07-16 requires organizations to conduct both an 

initial review and subsequent reviews of their holdings of all PII and ensure, to the maximum 

extent practicable, that such holdings are accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. Organizations 

are also directed by OMB to reduce their holdings to the minimum necessary for the proper 

performance of a documented organizational business purpose. OMB Memorandum 07-16 

requires organizations to develop and publicize, either through a notice in the Federal Register or 

on their websites, a schedule for periodic reviews of their holdings to supplement the initial 

review. Reductions in organizational holdings of PII are consistent with NARA retention 

schedules. 

By performing periodic evaluations, organizations reduce risk, ensure that they are collecting only 

the data specified in the notice, and ensure that the data collected is still relevant and necessary for 

the purpose(s) specified in the notice. Related controls: AP-2, AR-4, IP-1, SE-1, SI-12, TR-1. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) MINIMIZATION OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION | LOCATE / REMOVE / REDACT / ANONYMIZE PII 

The organization, where feasible and within the limits of technology, locates and removes/redacts 

specified PII and/or uses anonymization and de-identification techniques to permit use of the 

retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure. 

Supplemental Guidance: NIST Special Publication 800-122 provides guidance on 

anonymization. 

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §552a (e)(1), (e)(2); Section 208(b), E-Government 

Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347); OMB Memoranda 03-22, 07-16. 
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DM-2 DATA RETENTION AND DISPOSAL 

Control: The organization: 

a. Retains personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: organization-defined time 

period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; 

b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage 

in accordance with a NARA-approved record retention schedule and in a manner that prevents 

loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access; and 

c. Uses [Assignment: organization-defined techniques or methods] to ensure secure deletion or 

destruction of PII (including originals, copies, and archived records). 

Supplemental Guidance: NARA provides retention schedules that govern the disposition of federal 

records containing PII. Program officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to 

identify appropriate retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to 

retain PII longer than is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such 

requirements in the notice. Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or 

paper. 

Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of PII held (e.g., 

delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period 

for PII that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep PII for long periods of time (this 

effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization’s records officer to receive NARA 

approval). In both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an updated System of Records 

Notice) to inform the public of any changes in holdings of PII. 

Certain read-only archiving techniques, such as DVDs, CDs, microfilm, or microfiche may not 

permit the removal of individual records without the destruction of the entire database contained 

on such media. Related controls: AR-4, AU-11, DM-1, MP-6, SI-12, TR-1. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) DATA RETENTION AND DISPOSAL | SYSTEM CONFIGURATION 

The organization, where feasible, configures its information systems to record the date PII is 

collected, created, or updated and when PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record 

retention schedule. 

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e)(1); Section 208 (e), E-Government Act 

of 2002 (P.L. 107-347); 44 U.S.C. Chapters 29, 31, 33; OMB Memorandum 07-16; OMB Circular 

A-130; NIST Special Publication 800-88. 

DM-3 MINIMIZATION OF PII USED IN TESTING, TRAINING, AND RESEARCH 

Control: The organization: 

a. Develops policies and procedures for the use of personally identifiable information (PII) for 

testing, training, and research; and

b. Implements controls to protect PII used for testing, training, and research.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations often use PII for testing new applications or information 

systems prior to deployment. Organizations also use PII for research purposes, such as statistical 

analysis, and for training. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) MINIMIZATION OF PII USED IN TESTING, TRAINING, AND RESEARCH | RISK MINIMIZATION TECHNIQUES 

The organization, where feasible, uses techniques to minimize the risk to privacy of using PII for 

research, testing, or training. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can minimize risk to privacy of PII by using techniques 

such as de-identification. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-122. 
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FAMILY: INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION AND REDRESS 

This family addresses the need to make individuals active participants in the decision-making process 

regarding the collection and use of their PII, as required by the Privacy Act. By providing individuals 

with access to PII and the ability to have their PII corrected or amended, as appropriate, the controls in 

this family enhance public confidence in organizational decisions made based on the PII. 

IP-1 CONSENT 

Control: The organization: 

a. Provides means, where feasible and appropriate, for individuals to authorize the collection, 

use, maintaining, and sharing of personally identifiable information (PII) prior to its 

collection;

b. Provides appropriate means for individuals to understand the consequences of decisions to 

approve or decline the authorization of the collection, use, dissemination, and retention of PII;

c. Obtains consent, where feasible and appropriate, from individuals prior to any new uses or 

disclosure of previously collected PII; and

d. Ensures that individuals are aware of and, where feasible, consent to all uses of PII not 

initially described in the public notice that was in effect at the time the organization collected 

the PII. 

Supplemental Guidance: Consent is fundamental to the participation of individuals in the decisionmaking process regarding the collection and use of their PII and the use of technologies that may 

increase risk to personal privacy. To obtain consent, organizations provide individuals appropriate 

notice of the purposes of the PII collection or technology use and a means for individuals to 

consent to the activity. Organizations tailor the public notice and consent mechanisms to meet 

operational needs. Organizations achieve awareness and consent, for example, through updated 

public notices. 

Organizations may obtain consent through opt-in, opt-out, or implied consent. Opt-in consent is 

the preferred method, but it is not always feasible. Opt-in requires that individuals take affirmative 

action to allow organizations to collect or use PII. For example, opt-in consent may require an 

individual to sign a document providing consent. In contrast, opt-out requires individuals to take 

action to prevent the collection or use of such PII. For example, the Federal Trade Commission’s 

Do-Not-Call Registry allows individuals to opt-out of receiving unsolicited telemarketing calls by 

requesting to be added to a list. Implied consent is the least preferred method and should be used 

in limited circumstances. Implied consent occurs where individuals’ behavior or failure to object 

indicates agreement with the collection or use of PII (e.g., by entering and remaining in a building 

where notice has been posted that security cameras are in use, the individual implies consent to the 

video recording). Depending upon the nature of the program or information system, it may be 

appropriate to allow individuals to limit the types of PII they provide and subsequent uses of that 

PII. Organizational consent mechanisms include a discussion of the consequences to individuals 

for failure to provide PII. Consequences can vary from organization to organization. Related 

controls: AC-2, AP-1, TR-1. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) CONSENT | MECHANISMS SUPPORTING ITEMIZED OR TIERED CONSENT 

The organization implements mechanisms to support itemized or tiered consent for specific uses 

of data. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can provide, for example, individuals’ itemized choices 

as to whether they wish to be contacted for any of a variety of purposes. In this situation, 

organizations construct consent mechanisms to ensure that the organizational operations 

comply with individual choices. 
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References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (b); Section 208(c), E-Government Act of 

2002 (P.L. 107-347); OMB Memoranda 03-22, 10-22. 

IP-2 INDIVIDUAL ACCESS 

Control: The organization, consistent with, and subject to exceptions in, the Privacy Act: 

a. Provides individuals the ability to have access to their personally identifiable information 

(PII) maintained in its system(s) of records in order to determine whether to have the PII 

corrected or amended, as appropriate;

b. Publishes rules and regulations governing how individuals may request access to records 

maintained in a Privacy Act system of records;

c. Publishes access procedures in System of Records Notices (SORNs); and

d. Adheres to Privacy Act requirements and OMB policies and guidance for the proper 

processing of Privacy Act requests.

Supplemental Guidance: Access affords individuals the ability to review PII about them held within 

organizational systems of records. Access includes timely, simplified, and inexpensive access to 

data. Organizational processes for allowing access to records may differ based on resources, legal 

requirements, or other factors. The organization Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief 

Privacy Officer (CPO) is responsible for the content of Privacy Act regulations and record request 

processing, in consultation with legal counsel. Related controls: IP-3, TR-1. 

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (d); OMB Circular A-130. 

IP-3 REDRESS 

Control: The organization: 

a. Provides a process for individuals to have inaccurate personally identifiable information (PII) 

maintained by the organization corrected or amended, as appropriate; and

b. Establishes a process for disseminating corrections or amendments of the PII to other 

authorized users of the PII, such as external information sharing partners and, where feasible 

and appropriate, notifies affected individuals that their information has been corrected or 

amended.

Supplemental Guidance: Redress supports the ability of individuals to ensure the accuracy of PII 

held by organizations. Effective redress processes demonstrate organizational commitment to data 

quality especially in those business functions where inaccurate data may result in inappropriate 

decisions or denial of benefits and services to individuals. Organizations apply discretion in 

determining if records are to be corrected or amended, based on the scope of redress requests, the 

changes sought, and the impact of the changes. Individuals may appeal an adverse decision and 

have incorrect information amended, where appropriate. 

To provide effective redress, organizations: (i) provide effective notice of the existence of a PII 

collection; (ii) provide plain language explanations of the processes and mechanisms for 

requesting access to records; (iii) establish criteria for submitting requests for correction or 

amendment; (iv) implement resources to analyze and adjudicate requests; (v) implement means of 

correcting or amending data collections; and (vi) review any decisions that may have been the 

result of inaccurate information. 

Organizational redress processes provide responses to individuals of decisions to deny requests for 

correction or amendment, including the reasons for those decisions, a means to record individual 

objections to the organizational decisions, and a means of requesting organizational reviews of the 

initial determinations. Where PII is corrected or amended, organizations take steps to ensure that 
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all authorized recipients of that PII are informed of the corrected or amended information. In 

instances where redress involves information obtained from other organizations, redress processes 

include coordination with organizations that originally collected the information. Related controls: 

IP-2, TR-1, UL-2. 

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (d); OMB Circular A-130. 

IP-4 COMPLAINT MANAGEMENT 

Control: The organization implements a process for receiving and responding to complaints, 

concerns, or questions from individuals about the organizational privacy practices. 

Supplemental Guidance: Complaints, concerns, and questions from individuals can serve as a 

valuable source of external input that ultimately improves operational models, uses of technology, 

data collection practices, and privacy and security safeguards. Organizations provide complaint 

mechanisms that are readily accessible by the public, include all information necessary for 

successfully filing complaints (including contact information for the Senior Agency Official for 

Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) or other official designated to receive complaints), 

and are easy to use. Organizational complaint management processes include tracking mechanisms 

to ensure that all complaints received are reviewed and appropriately addressed in a timely 

manner. Related controls: AR-6, IP-3. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) COMPLAINT MANAGEMENT | RESPONSE TIMES 

The organization responds to complaints, concerns, or questions from individuals within 

[Assignment: organization-defined time period]. 

References: OMB Circular A-130; OMB Memoranda 07-16, 08-09. 

 
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FAMILY: SECURITY 

This family supplements the security controls in Appendix F to ensure administrative, technical, and 

physical safeguards are in place to protect PII collected or maintained by organizations against loss, 

unauthorized access, or disclosure, as required by the Privacy Act, and to ensure that organizational 

planning and responses to privacy incidents comply with OMB policies and guidance. The controls in 

this family are implemented in coordination with information security personnel and in accordance with 

the existing NIST Risk Management Framework. 

SE-1 INVENTORY OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION 

Control: The organization: 

c. Establishes, maintains, and updates [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] an 

inventory that contains a listing of all programs and information systems identified as 

collecting, using, maintaining, or sharing personally identifiable information (PII); and 

d. Provides each update of the PII inventory to the CIO or information security official 

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to support the establishment of information 

security requirements for all new or modified information systems containing PII. 

Supplemental Guidance: The PII inventory enables organizations to implement effective 

administrative, technical, and physical security policies and procedures to protect PII consistent 

with Appendix F, and to mitigate risks of PII exposure. As one method of gathering information 

for its PII inventory, organizations may extract the following information elements from Privacy 

Impact Assessments (PIAs) of information systems containing PII: (i) the name and acronym for 

each system identified; (ii) the types of PII contained in that system; (iii) classification of level of 

sensitivity of all types of PII, as combined in that information system; and (iv) classification of 

level of potential risk of substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to affected 

individuals, as well as the financial or reputational risks to organizations, if PII is exposed. 

Organizations take due care in updating the inventories by identifying linkable data that could 

create PII. Related controls: AR-1, AR-4, AR-5, AT-1, DM-1, PM-5, UL-3. 

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e) (10); Section 208(b)(2), E-Government 

Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347); OMB Memorandum 03-22; OMB Circular A-130, Appendix I; FIPS 

Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-37, 800-122. 

SE-2 PRIVACY INCIDENT RESPONSE 

Control: The organization: 

a. Develops and implements a Privacy Incident Response Plan; and 

b. Provides an organized and effective response to privacy incidents in accordance with the 

organizational Privacy Incident Response Plan. 

Supplemental Guidance: In contrast to the Incident Response (IR) family in Appendix F, which 

concerns a broader range of incidents affecting information security, this control uses the term 

Privacy Incident to describe only those incidents that relate to personally identifiable information 

(PII). An organizational Privacy Incident Response Plan includes: (i) the establishment of a crossfunctional Privacy Incident Response Team that reviews, approves, and participates in the 

execution of the Privacy Incident Response Plan; (ii) a process to determine whether notice to 

affected individuals is required and, where appropriate, to provide that notice; (iii) a privacy risk 

assessment process to determine the extent of harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness 

to affected individuals and, where appropriate, to take steps to mitigate any such risks; and (iv) 

internal procedures to ensure prompt reporting by employees and contractors of any privacy 
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incident to information security officials and the Senior Agency Official for Privacy 

(SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO), consistent with organizational incident management 

structures. Organizations may choose to integrate Privacy Incident Response Plans with Security 

Incident Response Plans, or keep the plans separate. Related controls: AR-1, AR-4, AR-5, AR-6, 

AU-1 through 14, IR-1 through IR-8, RA-1. 

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e), (i)(1), and (m); Federal Information 

Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) 44 U.S.C. § 3541; OMB Memoranda 06-19, 07-16; 

NIST Special Publication 800-37. 

 
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FAMILY: TRANSPARENCY 

This family implements Sections 552a (e)(3) and (e)(4) of the Privacy Act and Section 208 of the EGovernment Act, which require public notice of an organization’s information practices and the privacy 

impact of government programs and activities. 

TR-1 PRIVACY NOTICE 

Control: The organization: 

a. Provides effective notice to the public and to individuals regarding: (i) its activities that 

impact privacy, including its collection, use, sharing, safeguarding, maintenance, and disposal 

of personally identifiable information (PII); (ii) authority for collecting PII; (iii) the choices, if 

any, individuals may have regarding how the organization uses PII and the consequences of 

exercising or not exercising those choices; and (iv) the ability to access and have PII amended 

or corrected if necessary; 

b. Describes: (i) the PII the organization collects and the purpose(s) for which it collects that 

information; (ii) how the organization uses PII internally; (iii) whether the organization shares 

PII with external entities, the categories of those entities, and the purposes for such sharing; 

(iv) whether individuals have the ability to consent to specific uses or sharing of PII and how 

to exercise any such consent; (v) how individuals may obtain access to PII for the purpose of 

having it amended or corrected, where appropriate; and (vi) how the PII will be protected; and 

c. Revises its public notices to reflect changes in practice or policy that affect PII or changes in 

its activities that impact privacy, before or as soon as practicable after the change. 

Supplemental Guidance: Effective notice, by virtue of its clarity, readability, and comprehensiveness, 

enables individuals to understand how an organization uses PII generally and, where appropriate, 

to make an informed decision prior to providing PII to an organization. Effective notice also 

demonstrates the privacy considerations that the organization has addressed in implementing its 

information practices. The organization may provide general public notice through a variety of 

means, as required by law or policy, including System of Records Notices (SORNs), Privacy 

Impact Assessments (PIAs), in a website privacy policy, or in an Information Sharing Privacy 

Policy. As required by the Privacy Act, the organization also provides direct notice to individuals 

via Privacy Act Statements on the paper and electronic forms it uses to collect PII. 

The organization Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) is 

responsible for the content of the organization’s public notices, in consultation with legal counsel 

and relevant program managers. The public notice requirement in this control is satisfied by an 

organization’s compliance with the public notice provisions of the Privacy Act, the E-Government 

Act’s PIA requirement, with OMB guidance related to federal agency privacy notices, and, where 

applicable, with policy pertaining to participation in the Information Sharing Environment 

(ISE).112 Related controls: AP-1, AP-2, AR-1, IP-1, IP-2, IP-3, UL-1, UL-2. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) PRIVACY NOTICE | REAL-TIME OR LAYERED NOTICE 

The organization provides real-time and/or layered notice when it collects PII. 

Supplemental Guidance: Real-time notice is defined as notice at the point of collection. A 

layered notice approach involves providing individuals with a summary of key points in the 

organization’s privacy policy. A second notice provides more detailed/specific information.

 

112 The term Information Sharing Environment is an approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism and homeland 

security information. The ISE was established by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 

Public Law 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638. See the ISE website at: www.ise.gov. 
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References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e)(3), (e)(4); Section 208(b), EGovernment Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347); OMB Memoranda 03-22, 07-16, 10-22, 10-23; ISE 

Privacy Guidelines. 

TR-2 SYSTEM OF RECORDS NOTICES AND PRIVACY ACT STATEMENTS 

Control: The organization, consistent with the Privacy Act: 

a. Publishes in the Federal Register, System of Records Notices (SORNs) for information 

systems containing personally identifiable information (PII); 

b. Keeps SORNs current; and 

c. Includes Privacy Act Statements on its forms that collect PII, or on separate forms that can be 

retained by individuals, to provide additional formal notice to individuals from whom the 

information is being collected. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations issue SORNs to provide the public notice regarding PII 

collected in a system of records, which the Privacy Act defines as “a group of any records under 

the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the name of an individual or by 

some identifying number, symbol, or other identifier.” SORNs explain how the information is 

used, retained, and may be corrected, and whether certain portions of the system are subject to 

Privacy Act exemptions for law enforcement or national security reasons. Privacy Act Statements 

provide notice of: (i) the authority of organizations to collect PII; (ii) whether providing PII is 

mandatory or optional; (iii) the principal purpose(s) for which the PII is to be used; (iv) the 

intended disclosures (routine uses) of the information; and (v) the consequences of not providing 

all or some portion of the information requested. 

Control Enhancements: 

(1) SYSTEM OF RECORDS NOTICES AND PRIVACY ACT STATEMENTS | PUBLIC WEB SITE PUBLICATION 

The organization publishes SORNs on its public website. 

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § e(3); OMB Circular A-130. 

TR-3 DISSEMINATION OF PRIVACY PROGRAM INFORMATION 

Control: The organization: 

a. Ensures that the public has access to information about its privacy activities and is able to 

communicate with its Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer 

(CPO); and 

b. Ensures that its privacy practices are publicly available through organizational websites or 

otherwise. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations employ different mechanisms for informing the public about 

their privacy practices including, but not limited to, Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs), System 

of Records Notices (SORNs), privacy reports, publicly available web pages, email distributions, 

blogs, and periodic publications (e.g., quarterly newsletters). Organizations also employ publicly 

facing email addresses and/or phone lines that enable the public to provide feedback and/or direct 

questions to privacy offices regarding privacy practices. Related control: AR-6. 

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; Section 208, E-Government Act of 2002 

(P.L. 107-347); OMB Memorandum 03-22. 

 
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FAMILY: USE LIMITATION 

This family helps organizations comply with the Privacy Act, which prohibits the use of PII that is either 

not specified in notices, incompatible with the specified purposes, or not otherwise permitted by law. 

Implementation of the controls in this family will ensure that the scope of PII use is limited accordingly. 

UL-1 INTERNAL USE 

Control: The organization uses personally identifiable information (PII) internally only for the 

authorized purpose(s) identified in the Privacy Act and/or in public notices. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations take steps to ensure that they use PII only for legally 

authorized purposes and in a manner compatible with uses identified in the Privacy Act and/or in 

public notices. These steps include monitoring and auditing organizational use of PII and training 

organizational personnel on the authorized uses of PII. With guidance from the Senior Agency 

Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) and where appropriate, legal counsel, 

organizations document processes and procedures for evaluating any proposed new uses of PII to 

assess whether they fall within the scope of the organizational authorities. Where appropriate, 

organizations obtain consent from individuals for the new use(s) of PII. Related controls: AP-2, 

AR-4, AR-5, IP-1, TR-1. 

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (a)(7), (b)(1). 

UL-2 INFORMATION SHARING WITH THIRD PARTIES 

Control: The organization: 

a. Shares personally identifiable information (PII) externally, only for the authorized purposes 

identified in the Privacy Act and/or described in its notice(s) or in a manner compatible with 

those purposes; 

b. Where appropriate, enters into Memoranda of Understanding, Memoranda of Agreement, 

Letters of Intent, Computer Matching Agreements, or similar agreements, with third parties 

that specifically describe the PII covered and specifically enumerate the purposes for which 

the PII may be used; 

c. Monitors, audits, and trains its staff on the authorized uses and sharing of PII with third 

parties and on the consequences of unauthorized use or sharing of PII; and 

d. Evaluates any proposed new instances of sharing PII with third parties to assess whether they 

are authorized and whether additional or new public notice is required. 

Supplemental Guidance: The organization Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief 

Privacy Officer (CPO) and, where appropriate, legal counsel review and approve any proposed 

external sharing of PII, including with other public and private sector entities, for consistency with 

uses described in the existing organizational public notice(s). Where a new instance of external 

sharing of PII is authorized but not compatible with the purpose(s) specified in existing public 

notices, or as otherwise permitted by the Privacy Act, organizations review, update, and republish 

their Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs), System of Records Notices (SORNs), website privacy 

policies, and other public notices, if any, to include specific descriptions of the new uses(s) and 

obtain consent where appropriate and feasible. Information-sharing agreements also include 

security protections consistent with the sensitivity of the information being shared. Related 

controls: AR-3, AR-4, AR-5, AP-2, DI-2, IP-1, TR-1. 

 
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Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (a)(7), (b), (c), (e)(3)(C), (o); ISE 

Privacy Guidelines. 
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Acknowledgements

This appendix was developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the 

Privacy Committee of the Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) Council. In particular, we 

wish to thank the members of the Privacy Committee's Best Practices Subcommittee and its 

Privacy Controls Appendix Working Group—Claire Barrett, Chris Brannigan, Pamela Carcirieri, 

Debra Diener, Deborah Kendall, Martha Landesberg, Steven Lott, Lewis Oleinick, and Roanne 

Shaddox—for their valuable insights, subject matter expertise, and overall contributions in 

helping to develop the content for this appendix to Special Publication 800-53. We also wish to 

recognize and thank Erika McCallister, Toby Levin, James McKenzie, Julie McEwen, and 

Richard Graubart for their significant contributions to this project. A special note of thanks goes 

to Peggy Himes and Elizabeth Lennon for their superb administrative support. The authors also 

gratefully acknowledge and appreciate the significant contributions from individuals, groups, and 

organizations in the public and private sectors, whose thoughtful and constructive comments 

improved the overall quality, thoroughness, and usefulness of this publication.