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i 

58–171 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–124] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 24, 2010 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, JR., Maryland 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

WILL EBBS, Professional Staff Member 

JENNESS SIMLER, Professional Staff Member 

LIZ DRUMMOND, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, February 24, 2010, Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act—Budget Request from the Department of the Navy .......................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, February 24, 2010 .............................................................................. 47 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2010 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT— 

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ A Representative From California, Ranking 

Member, Committee On Armed Services ........................................................... 3 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Conway, Gen. James T., USMC, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps ................... 8 

Mabus, Hon. Ray, Secretary of the Navy .............................................................. 4 

Roughead, Adm. Gary, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy .................. 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Conway, Gen. James T. .................................................................................... 99 

Mabus, Hon. Ray .............................................................................................. 55 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 53 

Roughead, Adm. Gary ...................................................................................... 75 

Skelton, Hon. Ike .............................................................................................. 51 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Bartlett ....................................................................................................... 121 

Mr. Skelton ....................................................................................................... 121 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Akin ............................................................................................................ 126 

Mr. Hunter ........................................................................................................ 131 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 130 

Mrs. McMorris Rodgers .................................................................................... 130 

Mr. Thornberry ................................................................................................. 125 

Ms. Tsongas ...................................................................................................... 125 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 128 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 24, 2010. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. Today the House Armed Services 

Committee meets to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2010 budget request for the United States Navy and Marine Corps. 

Appearing before the committee the Honorable Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy; Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations [CNO]; and General James T. Conway, Commandant, 

United States Marine Corps. 

Now, Mr. Secretary, we note that this is your first time testifying 

before our full committee, and we welcome you—and Admiral 

Roughead. 

General Conway, thank you for your continued service, and 

thank you for the service of those that serve with you, and under 

you. 

Today the United States Navy has 194 ships under way. Of those 

143 are deployed. These numbers equate to over 53,000 sailors deployed in support of the Navy’s missions worldwide. To support 

combat operations, the Navy has 15,600 individual augmentees deployed in the CENTCOM [United States Central Command] area 

of responsibility. 

The United States Marine Corps is almost 30,000 Marines deployed. A little over 15,000 Marines are on the ground in Afghanistan. Many of those are currently engaged in hostile combat in and 

around the town of Marjah in the Helmand Province. 

I am sure I speak for all members of our Committee when I say 

that our thoughts and prayers are with all the deployed sailors and 

Marines, with their families, and with particular concern for those 

Marines who are currently engaged in the combat operations. 

And I have said this before, but it bears repeating. Our sea services are this nation’s fast response force. The Navy power base is 

maneuvered from the sea. Marine Corps is and should remain an 

amphibious assault force and a crisis aversion force. 
2 

Current operations over the last seven years have stressed our 

Marine Corps, and fashioned them to more the medium-heavy 

ground combat force. And I am a bit concerned about that. 

We remain committed to provide our sailors and Marines with 

equipment they need to accomplish the task before them. There are 

challenges. The Navy must recapitalize the main battle fleet to 

numbers which can support the COCOM’s [Unified Combatant 

Command’s] requirements. The 30-year Shipbuilding Plan submitted with the budget request only partially accomplishes this 

task. I will repeat that, only partially accomplishes this task. From 

that plan it appears the costs associated with replacing the Ohioclass ballistic missile submarine is so high that efforts to restore 

numbers in the surface force and the attack submarine force may 

have to be sacrificed to pay for the national strategic deterrence 

mission of the ballistic missile submarine. 

Shipbuilding plans don’t address the requirement of a 38-ship 

force of amphibious assault ships. At best the shipbuilding plan 

provides a force of amphibious ships in the low 30s. And it seems 

to me that might be an unacceptable risk. And I am sure that our 

Committee will carefully review this proposed Navy shipbuilding 

plan. 

I am very concerned about the looming strike fighter shortfall in 

Navy aviation. In short, I don’t understand why the F/A–18 Strike 

Fighter program has not been extended. By any analysis, more 

Navy and Marine Corps fighters will be needed to meet validated 

inventory requirements by the middle of the decade. Delays in the 

Joint Strike Fighter Program only exacerbate the problem of a 

near-term strike fighter shortfall. 

The Navy and Marine Corps continue to be challenged in maintenance and recapitalization. I am pleased to see an increase in the 

Navy’s request for operation and maintenance funds. I note that in 

Admiral Roughead’s response to the ranking member’s request for 

the Navy unfunded priority list, the CNO lists spare parts and deferred maintenance as his three most vital shortfalls. 

Year over year deferred maintenance seems to pile up. If we cannot seem to find the funding to maintain our ships and our planes 

and our equipment, I am deeply concerned about the additional 

cost of replacing them prior to the end of their expected life service. 

Deployments have always been a part and parcel to sea service. 

That happens every day. Sea services have always lived in a reality 

of deployment. Reset, retraining, redeployment. And I have been 

very concerned that the average Navy deployment cycle has gradually increased from a traditional 6-month deployment with an 18- 

month maintenance and retraining period to deployments averaging 8 months with comparable reduction in the maintenance and 

retraining period. 

The stress on the force, frankly, is increasing. I would like to address the relocation of the Marines from Okinawa. It is essential 

that we preserve the unique strategic relationship that exists between Japan and our country. At the same time it is imperative 

that we reduce our force structure in Okinawa and retain the strategic capabilities associated with the third Marine Expeditionary 

Force. 
3 

While I understand the desire of the new government of Japan 

to review the current basing agreements, we need to move forward 

with the overall realignment that includes a replacement facility 

and the Guam relocation. 

In the end we need to ensure that the Marine Corps and the supporting communities are in a better position. 

We need to get this move right. We can’t go back and undo a 

mistake. 

And now I turn to my good friend, the ranking member, the gentleman from California, Buck McKeon. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 51.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, General Conway, good 

morning. Welcome. 

In particular, General, with your forthcoming retirement, I guess 

this is your last posture hearing. I am sure you have been looking 

forward to this with mixed emotion. 

We look forward to all of your testimony here today. And really 

appreciate your service and what you do for the country, and your 

leadership. 

The President’s Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget for the Department of the Navy requests $179.1 billion for discretionary and war 

funding. According to the Defense Department, this represents an 

increase of $5.2 billion over fiscal year 2010 enacted levels. 

From what I gather in the press, the three of you deserve a significant amount of credit for your advocacy for Navy and Marine 

Corps personnel and programs. 

However, I am concerned that the Department’s [of Defense] efforts to make balance a fixture in the QDR [Quadrennial Defense 

Review] and the out-year budget is shortsighted, and puts the Department on the wrong path for the next 20 years. 

While the QDR states that U.S. forces must be able to deter, defend against and defeat aggression in anti-access environments, 

neither the Department of the Navy’s fiscal year 2011 budget request, nor the long-term shipbuilding or aviation plans appear to 

make significant long-term investments in the capabilities that 

would be required to achieve that goal. 

We have previously received testimony that the QDR and the fiscal year 2011 budget proposed a number of new initiatives designed to provide robust capabilities for tomorrow’s force, such as 

a new SSBN [Nuclear-Powered Submersible Ship with Ballistic Capability] submarine, the F–35 ballistic missile defense, the Virginia-class attack submarine. 

While I agree that investments in these areas are necessary, 

they are neither sufficient, nor do they tell the full story. 

For example, the decision to fund the new SSBN submarine from 

within the Navy’s shipbuilding procurement account could decimate the shipbuilding program in the out-years because the new 

SSBN will cost at least $7 billion, or close to half of the Navy’s re-
4 

cent ship construction budgets. The F–35 program continues to experience developmental delays that only exacerbate the Navy and 

Marine Corps’ strike fighters’ shortfall. Yet the QDR and the budget request do nothing to rectify this situation. 

We are building two Virginia-class attack subs per year starting 

in fiscal year 2011. Yet the shipbuilding plan we just received has 

our force falling to 39 by 2030, leaving our combatant commanders 

worse off than they are now. 

The proposed regional missile defense architecture relies on the 

Navy’s surface combatants. Nevertheless, the shipbuilding plan 

proposes a smaller surface combatant fleet than the last plan did. 

I need not go on. I am hopeful that you can provide further insights 

for this committee to help us understand how the QDR and the fiscal year 2011 budget reflect a comprehensive approach to providing 

the capabilities the Navy and Marine Corps will need in the future. 

Lastly, the President has asked Congress to consider a major 

personnel policy change that could affect readiness. Therefore, Admiral Roughead, and General Conway, I will be requesting your 

views on whether the current law prohibiting the service of openly 

gay men and women should be repealed, and on the suggestion 

that a moratorium on implementing current law be put into effect 

while the Department of Defense studies and reviews the issue. 

I am disappointed that the decision has been made not to let the 

service chiefs testify before the military personnel subcommittee’s 

hearings on ‘‘don’t ask, don’t tell.’’ That decision limits the ability 

of members to fully understand and explore the concerns of the 

service chiefs about a repeal of current law. I would hope that we 

could continue that discussion. 

Once again, I thank you for being here today. I look forward to 

your testimony. I ask unanimous consent that my full opening 

statement be included in the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it will be. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 53.] 

Mr. MCKEON. I yield back my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RAY MABUS, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 

Secretary MABUS. Mr. Chairman, Congressman McKeon, members of this committee, it is a real pleasure to be here today before 

the House Armed Services Committee. The CNO, the Commandant, and I are grateful for the commitment that the members 

of this committee have shown to our men and women in uniform 

in the Navy and the Marine Corps. We are exceptionally proud to 

be here today representing our sailors, Marines, civilians, and their 

families. 

The Navy and Marine Corps remain the most formidable expeditionary fighting force in the world, capable of global operations 

across the entire spectrum of warfare. Today, as the Chairman 

noted, 40 percent of our forces are deployed and over half the fleet 

is at sea. 

In Helmand province, Afghanistan, more than 15,000 Marines 

are engaged in major combat, counterinsurgency, and engagement 
5 

operations, including the effort to clear the Taliban stronghold of 

Marjah. 

They are supported there by naval aircraft flying close air support from Eisenhower [USS Dwight D. Eisenhower], and from our 

forward-deployed expeditionary aviation assets. A total of more 

than 12,000 sailors are on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 

across the broader Middle East, and another 9,000 sailors and Marines are embarked on our ships at sea. 

Off the coast of Africa, ships are protecting international commerce off Somalia, and ships are operating as partnership stations 

with our regional allies. Off the coast of South America more ships 

are stemming the flow of illegal narcotics into the United States. 

Our ballistic missile defense forces are ready to defend against any 

threat to international peace in Europe, the Middle East, and the 

Pacific Rim. 

Our forward-deployed forces continue their role as a strategic 

buffer and deterrent against rogue regimes and potential competitors alike. And in Haiti, nine ships and 1,900 Marines from the 

22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit continue to provide humanitarian 

aid, disaster relief and medical assistance. 

The Navy and Marine Corps are flexible, responsive, and everywhere the nation’s interests are at stake. Our global presence reduces instability, deters aggression, and allows us to rapidly respond to any crisis that borders a sea. I believe that the President’s 

fiscal year 2011 budget for the Department of the Navy is a carefully considered request that gives us the resources we need to conduct effective operations and to meet all the missions we have been 

assigned. 

Our shipbuilding and aviation requests concur with the findings 

of the QDR and its objectives of prevailing in today’s wars, preventing conflict, preparing for future wars, and preserving the 

force. 

With this budget, the Navy and Marine Corps will continue to 

maintain the maritime superiority of our forces, sustain a strong 

American shipbuilding base, and ensure our capacity for rapid 

global response. 

Across the 5 years we have requested the funds to build an average of 10 ships a year, including one carrier, one big-deck amphib, 

10 Virginia-class submarines, and 17 Littoral Combat Ships. 

We will leverage the technologies captured from the canceled 

CGX [Next Generation Cruiser] program, and truncated DDG–1000 

[Zumwalt-Class Destroyer] program, into what will become the 

Flight III Burke-class DDGs. These technologies include SPY–3 

[AN/SPY–3 radar] and the air and missile defense radar. 

Through the submitted shipbuilding plan, we will increase the 

size of our fleet to approximately 320 ships by 2024. In our shipbuilding program I believe we have made the most cost-effective 

decisions to achieve the most capable force. One that achieves 

equal flexibility to confront missions across the spectrum of conflict, from the technically complex, like ballistic missile defense and 

integrated air defense, to low-intensity humanitarian response and 

regional engagement. 

In aircraft procurement, we have requested just over 1,000 aircraft across the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], including 
6 

both fixed and rotary wing. Over the next year, the Navy and Marine Corps will continue to move ahead with changes to our acquisition process in compliance with the Weapons System Acquisition 

Reform Act. We are aggressively developing our acquisition strategies to ensure that on-time and on-budget becomes standard for the 

Navy and Marine Corps. 

I am grateful for the support of this committee for the decision 

to recompete the LCS [Littoral Combat Ship] program when it 

failed to meet program standards. I can assure you that we will not 

hesitate to recompete or cancel other programs whenever substandard performance demands change. 

Change is also required to address the way in which the Navy 

and Marine Corps use and produce energy. Energy reform is an 

issue of national security, and it is essential to maintaining our 

strategic advantage, our warfighting readiness, and our tactical 

edge. 

By 2020, I have committed the Navy to generate half of all the 

energy we use from alternative sources. This is an ambitious goal. 

Nothing has ever been accomplished without taking some bold 

steps. Forty years ago I stood watch on the deck of the USS Little 

Rock as a very young junior officer. Today, I have the solemn privilege of standing watch on behalf of our Navy and Marine Corps in 

a time of war and national challenge. 

I am honored by the trust the President and the Congress have 

placed in me, and fully recognize the solemn obligation I have to 

those who defend us. I, along with the CNO and the Commandant, 

look forward to hearing your thoughts and answering your questions that you have concerning our budget requests, our programs, 

our policies. I also look forward to working closely with you as we 

move forward to sustain the Navy and Marine Corps as the most 

formidable expeditionary fighting force in the world. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Mabus can be found in the 

Appendix on page 55.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, thank you, and we think you are 

off to a great start. 

Admiral Roughead, please. 

STATEMENT OF ADM. GARY ROUGHEAD, USN, CHIEF OF 

NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY 

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD. Thank you, sir. Chairman Skelton, Congressman McKeon, members of the committee, it is indeed my 

honor to before you again representing the more than 600,000 sailors and Navy civilians. 

As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, 65,000 of them are deployed, 

12,000 on land in the Central Command Area of Operations, and 

56 percent of our fleet is underway, carrying out our maritime 

strategy, a prescient precursor to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense 

Review. 

They are projecting power into Afghanistan, building partnerships in Africa, delivering relief in Haiti, silently patrolling under 

the sea in every ocean, and providing ballistic missile defense in 

the Arabian Gulf, Western Pacific, and Eastern Mediterranean, 

with pride and determination. 
7 

They are even deployed on the first Littoral Combat Ship two 

years ahead of schedule. And in the first week of that ship’s deployment, she seized over a quarter of a ton of cocaine in the Caribbean. As our sailors and Navy civilians who make all things possible, and thanks to your support, we made important progress in 

building tomorrow’s Navy, remaining ready to fight today and supporting our sailors and Navy civilians and families last year. 

This year’s budget submission will take us even further. As the 

high demand for our Navy continues apace, we have stabilized end 

strength and the tone of the force remains positive. We will continue to aggressively improve wellness programs and medical and 

social services for our wounded warriors. Indeed, for all who serve. 

For our fleet as a continuously deployed force, we must continue 

to reset in stride, conducting regular maintenance and training so 

that our ships and aircraft reach their expected service lives. This 

year’s budget aligns our baseline budget for operations and maintenance accordingly, and reflects a significant shift away from supplemental funding. I strongly request your support for this important change. 

While we reset, we must also procure ships and aircraft to reach 

our procurement of more than 313 ships. Last year, we commissioned 9 ships, and over the next decade our plan procures an average of 10 ships per year, significant growth for the near term. 

For aviation, I remain committed to bringing new capabilities online, the Joint Strike Fighter and unmanned aircraft, and maintaining the readiness of our current Naval Air Force, all of which 

give our nation flexibility and response, unencumbered by overseas 

basing. Affordability for all our plans will remain fundamental to 

our decisions. The effectiveness of our unmanned systems, ships, 

and aircraft is a feature of the systems which connect them. 

Last year, I brought information capabilities and resources under 

a single Information Dominance Directorate within the Navy staff, 

and commissioned Fleet Cyber Command 10th Fleet, and I see the 

benefits of that change every day. 

I am proud of our Navy’s accomplishments last year, and I am 

confident we can achieve even more with this year’s budget submission. Our risk continues to trend toward significant, and achieving 

the right balance, within and across, my priorities remains critical 

to mitigating it. But I remain optimistic because of the outstanding 

sailors and Navy civilians and the spirit of our nation. 

We have seen more challenging times and emerged prosperous, 

secure, and free. I ask you to support our 2011 budget request, and 

thank you for all you do to make the United States Navy a global 

force for good, today and into the future. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Roughead can be found in 

the Appendix on page 75.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you very, very much. 

General Conway, there is a lot of hard work left between now 

and the time we bid farewell to you. Carry on in the future. Thank 

you. 
8 

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES T. CONWAY, USMC, 

COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS 

General CONWAY. Mr. Chairman, Congressman McKeon, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity 

to report to you on the posture of your Marine Corps. My pledge, 

as it has been over the years, is to provide you today a candid and 

honest assessment. 

Having recently returned from a trip to theatre, I am pleased to 

report to you on the magnificent performance of Marines and sailors in combat. If you count a full-year enlistment as a generation 

of Marines, we are now experiencing our third generation of great 

young patriots since our nation was provoked on 9/11. 

The first generation broke trail, leading the strikes into Afghanistan and Iraq. Our second generation quelled the once-volatile 

province of Anbar. Today there are less than 175 Marines in Iraq, 

but our third generation has more than 15,000 serving in Afghanistan. 

The Marines are fighting a skilled and determined enemy, but 

with the Afghan security forces, they are once again proving they 

are the strongest tribe in the Taliban stronghold of Helmand. Let 

me assure you from what SAR [Sergeant] Major and I have witnessed firsthand, the highest morale in the Corps resides in those 

units posted in Afghanistan. 

My written statement to the committee provides a snapshot of 

the Corps and describes our near-term focus, our long-term priorities, and our vision of the future. That vision matches closely the 

results of the Quadrennial Defense Review. The Secretary of Defense seeks to create a U.S. military more closely focused on hybrid 

threats, yet capable of responding to a major contingency. That 

combination essentially describes the Marine Corps that we have 

built today. 

A Corps that we call a two-fisted fighter, able to perform equally 

well in a counterinsurgency, or in a high-intensity combined arms 

fight. Our resource expenditures, moreover, reflect our dual or 

swing capacity. That is to say that 100 percent of Marine Corps 

equipment can be used in a hybrid conflict or in a major fight. 

Equivalent procurement is indeed our primary concern as we 

look at the fiscal year 2011 budget and beyond. Our requirements 

for equipment density in Afghanistan, and our resolve to reestablish our maritime pre-positions quadrants, have driven equipment 

stocks to an all-time low in our operating forces at home station. 

The ability to properly train for a deployment, and certainly the 

ability to respond to an unexpected contingency is at significant 

risk, based on this increasing shortfall. Congress has promised to 

resource us for a reset in constitution, but increasingly, we cannot 

wait for the guns to fall silent in Afghanistan for such an effort to 

begin. We ask for your help in this critical area. 

Our military construction accounts in the fiscal year 2011 budget 

and the FYDP are sufficient to help maintain the promise we have 

made to our Marines that they will have quality living spaces at 

home between deployments. One need only visit some of our major 

bases and stations to realize that we waited too long to begin this 

effort. 
9 

Similarly, we believe that even in wartime we must continue a 

heavy emphasis on education of our officers and staff NCOs [Non 

Commissioned Officers]. A strong reservoir of strategic and operational thinkers is a must on sophisticated joint and combined battlefields. Therefore, a quality Marine Corps University with facilities to match our already world-class student body, faculty, and 

curriculum is a major priority. We trust we will receive your full 

support in our MILCON [Military Construction] investments that 

will repay huge dividends in the years to come. 

Ladies and gentlemen of the committee, I must admit my own 

surprise that our Corps of Marines and their families have remained so resilient over these nine years of conflict. They have 

been incredibly determined, loyal, and courageous in an effort to 

see these two wars to a successful close. Much of the credit goes 

to you in the Congress for providing them with the finest in equipment, warrior care, quality of life for our families, and compensation. 

The number one question in the minds of our troops is always: 

Is the country behind us? The members of Congress have answered 

that question in spades, both by your apportionment of the nation’s 

precious resources, but also through personal efforts to visit troops 

in theatre, and those who are wounded at Bethesda and Walter 

Reed. 

As a result of all the above, and the natural tendency for Marines to stick around for a fight, our recruitment and retention are 

at all-time highs. I predict that for the second year in a row we will 

close out reenlistment opportunities for first-term and career force 

Marines at the halfway point of the fiscal year. Clearly, such a phenomenon would not be possible if Marines and their families were 

not happy in the service of their country. 

One day this long war with terrorists and Islamic extremists will 

be over. Your Marine Corps will cease being a second land army 

and gladly rejoin our Navy brothers aboard amphibious ships in 

order to project America’s global presence, demonstrate American 

good will, and if need be, protect America’s vital interests. 

Until that day comes, however, your Corps will continue, as we 

say, to do windows. That is, we will continue to take aboard the 

indomitable youth of America and make them Marines with the absolute conviction that as a result they will one day be better citizens. We will be trained and as equally prepared to rout Taliban 

fighters in Marjah as we are to feed beleaguered Haitians outside 

Port-au-Prince. With your continued support and that of our loyal 

countrymen, we will do whatever the nation asks us to do and do 

it exceedingly well. 

Thank you, sir, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Conway can be found in the 

Appendix on page 99.] 

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you very much. I think that all 

of us, and I know I speak for all the members of the committee, 

when I say we are immensely proud of the young men and young 

women who wear your uniforms, we are immensely proud and 

thankful for their families and the reflection of the high state of 

morale of which you gentlemen spoke. 
10 

I have been blessed to be in the Congress several years, and I 

remember very well President Ronald Reagan aiming for a 600- 

ship Navy. That was a very worthy goal at the time. Today, we 

haven’t even reached his halfway mark on that goal. We don’t even 

have 300 ships out there. 

The oceans haven’t gotten any smaller. Technology has gotten a 

lot better and one of the arguments is we don’t need as many ships. 

Nevertheless, it is imperative that we have enough presence to 

make a difference, much less an ability to fight. How do you, Mr. 

Secretary, speed up your suggested building and numbers rate? We 

need to know. 

Secretary MABUS. Mr. Chairman, we have today, as you pointed 

out, 285 ships in our battle fleet and more than half of them are 

underway today. We are very cognizant of the fact that our force 

structure requirement of 2005 said that 313 ships are a floor and 

it is a floor that both the CNO and I recognize and need to build 

to get to that level. 

We think that the 5-year shipbuilding plan and the longer 30- 

year shipbuilding plan that we have submitted on this budget, 

which builds an average of 10 ships a year, 50 ships over this 5- 

year period, drives us toward that goal. By 2020, we will have 

reached the goal of more than 313 ships in the Navy. 

We think it is important to note as you did that these ships that 

we are building today are incredibly capable, incredibly technologically advanced and crewed by the best sailors and Marines that 

we have ever had, but at some point quantity becomes a quality 

all its own. And as you pointed out, the oceans haven’t gotten any 

smaller and we do need to make sure that we are driving to increase the size of our fleet. And we believe that the budget that we 

have submitted to you and the shipbuilding plan that we have submitted to you do both of those things. 

The CHAIRMAN. One of the problems that we faced a few years 

ago and it was a surprise to my friend, Mr. Taylor, the Chairman 

of the Seapower Subcommittee, and as well to me, the retirement 

list of ships wasn’t even made known to us officially. Of course, 

that was long before anyone sitting at the table here had any say 

on it. 

But a good part of it is the possibility of reviewing the retirement 

list and maybe we can get some more work out of some of these 

ships and help with the numbers. And as you have so correctly 

noted, quantity has a quality of its very own. I charge you with 

carefully deciding what ships should be with, should be on the retirement list. 

General, let me ask you the fact that so many Marines today, the 

whole generation of Marines actually, find themselves fighting as 

Army soldiers in a desert? What will that do to the Marine culture 

of future years? 

General CONWAY. Sir, as I said in the opening statement, we consider ourselves a multicapable force and therefore available to do 

whatever the nation would ask us to do. And, of course, as you note 

correctly, over the past 8 or 9 years, we have been asked to serve 

as a second land army alongside our brothers in the United States 

Army. Our gear has begun to, has accomplished the protection that 

is required and in the process has gotten heavier. 
11 

We are a long way from salt sea air and our comfort zones as 

a naval force and yet, I would argue that we are doing it pretty 

well. That is not to say we want to continue to do it when the need 

is gone. We see the great value that we offer to the nation. We see 

our niche within the organization of the armed forces being just 

what you described in your opening statement and that is a naval 

force capable of extending America’s presence and protecting our 

vital interests overseas. 

We have distinctly in our plans thought processes that will shed 

us of some of this heavier equipment, examine in detail what the 

amphibious lift, what the STRATCOM [United States Strategic 

Command] aviation lift would look like for rapid deployment and 

that is the Marine Corps we intend to be in the future. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Roughead, what worries you the most as 

you sit there this morning? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. What worries me the most, Mr. Chairman, 

as I look to the future as is insuring, as you pointed out in your 

statement, that as we get into what I consider to be the midterm 

of our shipbuilding plan that we have taken a good look at the 

costs associated with the replacement for the Ohio-class submarine 

and then the numbers of ships that were procured in significant 

numbers by class in the 80s as they reached the end of their service lives and the recapitalization that will be required for that. 

But that is beyond the scope of this budget that we have submitted, but as I look to the future and think about the issues my 

successors will deal with, that is what I think about. 

The CHAIRMAN. Can we take that decision on the new Ohio-class 

submarine down the road in favor of additional numbers of ships, 

other types of ships? Because you don’t really need it until 10, 12, 

15 years out. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. No, sir. I think we have to be moving on 

that ship right now. The reason being is that that submarine will— 

the last submarine of the Ohio-class replacement—will come off of 

its last patrol in 2080. And the need to put in the types of systems 

and capabilities to take that ship out to that period of time requires significant thought and development and now is the time to 

start. 

It is absolutely consistent with where we have been with the 

Ohio class and I believe now is the time to be moving on that and 

I appreciate the support for that. 

The CHAIRMAN. You understand our concern about ship numbers, 

do you not? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. I deal with the 

demands that we have coming in on a daily basis and I do believe 

that what we have done in the last couple of years to get some direction and stability in what I consider to be a workhorse of the 

fleet, the Arleigh Burke class, getting that line restarted is absolutely critical to field any capabilities we need getting to the 

downselect on Littoral Combat Ship is going to allow us to build 

those in the most affordable way. 

So I believe that this program that we have put together addresses the numbers in the best way. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. Mr. McKeon. 
12 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Roughead and 

General Conway, in your personal view, should the current law 

prohibiting the service of openly gay men and women be repealed 

and what is your personal view with regard to the suggestion that 

a moratorium on implementing the current law be put into effect 

while the Department of Defense studies and reviews the issue taking place? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Mr. McKeon, my personal view is what is in 

the best interest of the United States Navy. And that is to go forward with the assessment that has been called for by the Secretary 

of Defense to allow us to assess the force that we have today. There 

are a lot of bits of information and surveys that have taken place, 

but there has never really been an assessment of the force that 

serves. And equally important to that force is the opinions of the 

families who support that force. 

That needs to be done because only with that information can we 

talk about the force that we have, not someone else’s, not another 

country’s—about the United States Navy in my case. So we need 

to proceed down that path. With regard to a moratorium, I believe 

that it would be extremely confusing to the force and I do not recommend that. 

Thank you. 

General CONWAY. Sir, our commander in chief has spoken and 

the Secretary of Defense has devised a way through a working 

group to examine the data, I think, in a way that has never been 

done and I support his efforts and we will contribute to that effort 

as it goes down range. However, I would encourage your work, 

mine and that of the working group to be focused on a central issue 

and that is the readiness of the armed forces of the United States 

to fight this nation’s wars. 

That is what our armed forces are intended to do. That is what 

they have been built to do under the current construct and I would 

argue that we have done a pretty good job bringing that to pass. 

So my concern would be if somehow that central purpose and focus 

were to become secondary to the discussion because that is what 

your armed forces is all about. 

Mr. MCKEON. And the moratorium? 

General CONWAY. Sir, in terms of the moratorium, I agree with 

the CNO. Our commanders out in the field are trying to execute 

the guidance to the absolute best of their abilities. There is an expression we have, keep it simple. I would encourage you either to 

change the law or not, but in the process half measures, I think, 

will only be confusing in the end. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thanks very much. Admiral, as I alluded to in my 

opening statement, I remain concerned that the QDR’s focus on today’s wars is precluding the department from making the investments that are required for our long-term national security interests. Let me provide a specific example. 

The committee has been briefed that the far-term planning period in the long-range shipbuilding plan is characterized from 2031 

to 2040. It is characterized by the emergence of a near-peer competitor. While one may debate whether a near-peer competitor 

could emerge sooner than that, it is reasonable to assume that the 

threat of a peer competitor, particularly one with significant anti- 
13 

access capabilities, would increase the Navy’s reliance on large surface combatants, attack and guided missile submarines and amphibious ships. 

Unfortunately, our force structure assumes the greatest risk in 

these exact platforms during this period. Large surface combatant 

force levels decrease from a high of 96 to a sustained low of 60 in 

the 60s and 70s. Attack submarines decrease from a high of 55 to 

39 with sustained low levels in the low 40s during that period. 

Cruise missile submarines, which also provide significant capabilities for special forces, disappear entirely. Amphibious ships sustained lows in the—of 29 and 30—10 percent below the limit of acceptable risk for these forces, and over 30 percent below the current requirement. 

In your professional assessment are you confident that this force 

could deter or defeat at low to moderate risk a near-peer competitor with access capability? And if not, please characterize the risk 

that you see to our national security? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. And as 

I look at the force that we have laid out—the force that exists 

today, and particularly the force that is addressed by the budget 

that is being submitted—I do believe that even though there is 

much talk and discussion about focusing on the wars that we are 

in—I will tell you that the United States Navy is all in, in Afghanistan, and in Iraq, and in that critical area. 

But at the same time I think it is noteworthy that we have increased our submarine production to two submarines a year. And 

the Virginia class is out—deployed. It is a terrific submarine. We 

are moving forward, as I said, with the ballistic missile defense— 

or the ballistic missile submarine. The advances and the investments that we are making with regard to ballistic missile defense 

in our surface combatants is exactly the type of capability that we 

are going to need in integrated air and missile defense. Not just for 

ballistic missiles, but against the cruise missile threat. 

Taking some of the technologies that we will prove in the DDG– 

1000. Coupling that with the direction that we are going with our 

ballistic missile force, and the Arleigh Burke class, and in our 

cruisers, I believe we will then be able to better inform the next 

surface combatant that will address those challenges that are out 

there in the future. 

In aviation we have to get to the Joint Strike Fighter. It is an 

incredible capability. And in this budget, I am extremely pleased 

with what we have been able to do with unmanned systems. Particularly the demonstration that we are moving forward with the 

unmanned carrier airborne system. That is also going to inform us 

about that time period that you are talking about there. That is 

going to be extremely important to us. And we need to be able to 

continue that demonstration project. 

And in the area of cyber that is not so much hardware, but the 

reorganization that we have made this past year in the Navy, and 

the stand-up of the 10th fleet, allows us to get into that battle 

space if you will. And that battle space is going to become equally 

important as that which is kinetic. 

So I do believe that we are laying in the right types of capabilities that we are going to need for the future. 
14 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you. Understanding that technological advances will benefit both our forces, and those of a potential peer 

competitor in the interim, would you be in a better position with 

those—with this proposed force structure than you are today if you 

had more cruisers, destroyers, and submarines in the force? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Mr. McKeon, we are ramping up our ballistic missile defense capability, not just in the building of the new 

DDG–51 restarts, but also going back in. And the beauty of the 

weapons system that we currently have is that it allows us to modify the current ships so that they are BMD [Ballistic Missile Defense]-capable. We are also adding to our missile inventory in that 

regard. 

With respect to submarines, we are meeting all of the critical requirements that the COCOMs have levied on us. And I see the benefit of what our submarines are doing every day around the world. 

I have the privilege of being debriefed by the young commanders 

as they come back in. And our submarine force is meeting the critical requirements of the COCOMs, and doing it exceedingly well. 

Mr. MCKEON. Well, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I 

think the three of you have done an outstanding job, given the limits of the top line for the Navy and the Marines. I am just concerned that the top line isn’t what we need. And so I think, as the 

Secretary said earlier to us, that our numbers look good for the few 

years ahead. But in the out-years it is a fantasy. Not you, Secretary, Secretary Gates. 

And I think that that is a concern that we all need to be really 

aware of. I think that there are probably areas where we can save 

money. But even in our best efforts, I think we are still not getting 

all that we need to protect us in—out into the future. So thank you 

again for all that you are doing, and I appreciate it. 

Yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Before I call Mr. Ortiz—Admiral, as we speak today, how many 

sailors do you have in either Iraq or Afghanistan doing Army type 

of work? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Right now, Mr. Chairman, we have 12,000 

sailors on the ground in Iraq and in Afghanistan. And around 

6,000 of them are doing things that are not necessarily within what 

we would consider our core or adaptive core capabilities. 

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, they are doing Army work? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. They are working as—in support of 

our ground forces. They are doing extraordinary work I might add. 

And we benefit from that experience as well. Because that time 

that they spend in the fight, on the ground with other services— 

when they come back into the Navy, they bring perspectives, they 

bring leadership experiences. And observations on ways of doing 

things that they otherwise wouldn’t have. 

And I am also very pleased that they promote at a higher rate 

than those who have not had this experience. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. And we now go to the 5-minute rule. 

Mr. Ortiz. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, General Conway, I want to 

thank you all for the great service that you have given to our coun-
15 

try. And thank you so much for joining us today. I just have a few 

questions for all of you on the subject of wind farms, and military 

readiness. 

My district in South Texas trains half of the Navy and Marine 

Corps pilots in the country. And you can imagine that I am so 

proud of these young men and women. And I want to make sure 

that I do everything within my power to provide them the best 

training facilities in the country. 

Now multiple wind farms have emerged in my district—and God 

knows we need all the energy we can get—in very close proximity 

to my two Naval air training bases. These wind farms are impacting the use of radar throughout the district, and forcing changes 

in training routes. And interfering with air defense radars. And 

this is what I hear. 

And I understand that this same issue is also impacting other 

Naval installations. My concern is not with the development of the 

wind farm energy. But rather the negative impact that these wind 

farms have on our military readiness. Now I wonder what is the 

Navy doing to ensure that these wind farms do not impact radar 

or military training? 

And I just want to know, because we have different agencies. 

And I see where some departments are granting grants for wind 

energy, solar energy. And I just wonder if the agencies are talking 

to one another to see that whatever they do does not impact on the 

training that we have. Not only in my facilities in South Texas, but 

in other facilities throughout where we conduct training. 

And maybe all of you can respond, and give me some insight to 

my question? 

Secretary MABUS. Thank you, sir. We are proud of Kingsville, 

and we do think that they train the best pilots in the world there. 

We are very aware of the wind farm issue around Kingsville. And 

of the other issues that may impact training from various directions with various other government agencies. And we are keeping 

a close eye on the wind farms around Kingsville. Thus far it is our 

belief that it, they have not interfered with the core training, the 

essential training that is necessary for the pilots. 

If proposals were made to construct wind farms that did, we 

would of course want to take some action to make sure that that 

did not happen. We work closely with other agencies to make sure 

that military readiness, national defense capabilities, are not impacted. And that they understand how our needs would be affected. 

Mr. ORTIZ. General, would you like to add to—— 

General CONWAY. Sir, we have several training aviation bases in 

Arizona, and California in addition to our training basis that we 

share with the Navy in Texas. And our concern actually is more 

with low-flying helicopters, and the potential danger that some of 

these wind farms could have if the pilots aren’t well aware of their 

presence. 

And that is the sort of extraordinary effort that we are taking 

at this point to make sure that wind farms that we might put on 

our own bases—and we have some at the Marine Corps Logistics 

Base, Barstow. But others in the vicinity of some of our training 

bases are well noted on our aviation maps. And the pilots in low 
16 

light or low-visibility conditions are certainly aware of their presence. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Admiral. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. We pay particular attention to all 

of our training space. Not just the air training space that affects 

the bases in Texas, but all around the country. And our local commanders pay particular attention to it. Here in Washington we do. 

And when we get a sense that there could be some encroachment, 

engage with the appropriate agencies, and communities. Because in 

many cases the communities are seeking this sort of development 

as well—to try to come to a solution that allows us to accommodate 

the important training needs that we have, and the needs of the 

communities. So we do pay very close attention to it. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Again thank you so much for your service, and thank 

you for joining us today. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Bartlett, please. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you all very much for your service. 

Admiral, I guess what you see depends on where you sit. My understanding is that the Navy is able to respond to little more than 

40 percent of the requests of the combatant commanders for submarines. So I guess critical depends upon where you sit. I think 

that the new Chinese anti-ship missile may be a huge game changer. I see little recognition of that in the QDR, in the budget, or in 

your testimony today. 

Admiral, you mentioned that you were aggressively pursuing unmanned aircraft in the Navy. And yet we are not aggressively pursuing unmanned ships in the Navy. I know why. It is because we 

have too few ships. They are too valuable. We have people on ships 

not because we need them there to sail the ships, but because we 

need them there for damage control. 

We need to be moving to a very much larger Navy with very 

much smaller platforms so that we can move away from manned 

platforms. Half the cost of keeping the ships at sea as you know, 

sir, is the personnel. Which means if you get rid of half the personnel, you can have 50 percent more ships. If you get rid of all 

the personnel, you have 100 percent more ships. 

We are going to be attacked where we are the weakest. I know 

that during the Clinton years we largely waived EMP [Electromagnetic Pulse] hardening on most of our new platforms. To what 

extent are you EMP-hardened? How much fighting capability 

would remain if you had an EMP lay down of 100 kilovolts per 

meter, which is but half of what the Russian generals told the 

EMP Commission the Soviets had developed, and the Russians had 

available? 

Admiral, I am very pleased to note your emphasis on—focus on 

energy. I hope that means that you are aggressively supporting the 

increased nuclearization of our major platforms. Seems to me kind 

of silly to have a carrier that is fueled for 30 years, and it is supported by ships that are fueled for a few days. 

These are my observations, my comments, my questions. Could 

you respond? Thank you. 
17 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. The—first off on the meeting of the 

40 percent of the requirements. As I mentioned, the meeting of the 

critical requirements as a former fleet commander—I was the one 

that had to fulfill those needs. And I am very comfortable with the 

fact that the critical requirements are being met for our submarine 

force. 

The survivability relative to electromagnetic pulses is—it is indeed a consideration and something that as we put our network architectures together is working through that survivability is very 

key to us. With regard to your specific question about the strength 

of the pulse and the effect on our systems, it—with that detail of 

question, Mr. Bartlett, I would like to be able to take that one for 

the record if I could and get back to you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 121.] 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. As we look at ships of the future and what 

that force must be in previous testimony and in discussions, I have 

said I do not have an aversion to nuclear power, but I think that 

there are more factors involved than simply the cost of the fuel 

itself. It is the construction cost. It is the maintenance cost. It is 

the cost of the people. And I believe all of that needs to be taken 

into the equation as we look at alternative energy systems for our 

force of the future. 

With regard to the unmanned systems, the one area that I would 

also add where we are moving forward on is an underwater unmanned systems which I think are extraordinarily important to our 

future and which they themselves have some unique power requirements and we are working on that. But all of that is on my 

scope and I look forward to working on them in the coming months 

and years. 

Mr. BARTLETT. You will address the other two questions in writing, my question about the Chinese anti-ship missile and why you 

still have people on ships? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. The one of the reasons that we 

have people on ships is that we have not gotten to the full automation that we need, but I think the LCS is a perfect example of what 

we are doing to bring people off of ships. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlemen. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all of 

you including my former governor and attorney general, Secretary 

Navy Mabus—Secretary of the Navy Mabus for being here. I thank 

all of you for what you do. 

General Conway, let me start by saying that today’s Washington 

Post had a very disturbing photograph on the front of a mine resistant vehicle that had been attacked in Afghanistan. I would like 

to take the occasion to say that it is my hunch that had that been 

an up-armored Humvee [High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle], every Marine in that vehicle probably would have died. It is 

my hunch that because of that vehicle, probably every Marine in 

that vehicle lived. 

And I want to commend your General Brogan for the job he has 

done in putting that program together on what seems to be now 

an afterthought, fairly short notice and the outstanding job he has 
18 

done and I would hope that he would be properly recognized for 

that. 

Secretary Mabus, you had the distinction, if my memory is right, 

of being the youngest attorney general and the youngest governor 

in Mississippi. I want to give you a third distinction and that is the 

fleet only grew on your watch. The bleeding started about 1990 

best of my knowledge. Last year for the first time, we actually grew 

the fleet. We went from 285, which is too small, to 287, which is 

too small, and the irony is that you and many other CNOs have 

come before this committee and said we need a 313-ship Navy, but 

your budget request would actually shrink about three ships. That 

is unacceptable. 

If administratively you can’t get us towards 313, then we are 

going to have to do it legislatively. Now, one of the ways we can 

do this is we are going to commission 7 ships this year, but you 

are asking for permission to decommission 10. That doesn’t get you 

there. That is going the wrong way. So I want to—I have had this 

conversation with our Chairman and I—and I just want to put you 

on notice as my friend and someone who I want to work with. 

Decommissioning 10 ships this year is unacceptable. It is going 

to be my intention with the support of our Chairman to introduce 

to have in this year’s bill that we are going to have legislatively 

a three-to-two ratio. For every three ships that are commissioned 

by the Navy, you will be giving commissions to decommission two. 

That is going to get us finally on the right track towards 313. 

Again, if it’s not done administratively we are going to have to do 

it legislatively. 

One of the proposals that Captain Ebbs has wisely asked the 

Navy to look into will be a SLEP [Selected Life Extension Program]–program certified fixed engine for your frigates—for about 

$3 billion, we can keep those approximately 25 frigates in the fleet 

for another 5 years. Now, that would be my first preference. If you 

have a better preference to grow the fleet, I want to hear your 

ideas, but I think that is certainly something we need to look into 

particularly for the missions you mentioned off of Latin America, 

for chasing pirates off of Somalia. 

That frigate is more than adequate. If we need to spend some 

money to get another 5 years out of those hulls, then let’s do it and 

let’s start planning on doing it. 

What I want you to look into now is, you know, we keep making 

mistakes. One of the concerns of the F–35, and I am totally in support of, the CNO’s plan to get the F–35 into the fleet. The question 

that is being asked as far as the thermal footprint of the F–35, on 

the ships we are constructing today, are we planning ahead for the 

delivery of that vessel so that the thermal footprint as far as the 

backlash shield on the carrier and the deck, the large big deck 

amphibs—that this plane is going to fly off of, are we taking the 

steps today to build them to handle that thermal footprint for when 

that plane is delivered a few years in the future. 

Secretary MABUS. And to my friend, Gene Taylor, who I served 

with in other capacities, in terms of the last question that you 

asked, the thermal footprint, we are taking the steps both with the 

blast deflector on the carriers whether it will need to be strengthened at all, but if it does, that is a very straightforward fix for that 
19 

blast deflector. We are beginning tests on the USS Wasp, a big 

deck amphib, in terms of the STOVL [Short Takeoff and Vertical 

Landing] version and the thermal footprint coming down from that 

for the Marine version. 

So yes, we are beginning to take steps to make sure that when 

the Joint Strike Fighter joins the fleet that the fleet is absolutely 

ready and capable of handling it. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Secretary, in the 8 seconds I have, take a look 

at the 10 ships you asked to decommission, narrow that down to 

two because we need to stop the bleeding this year. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlemen. Gentleman from Missouri, 

Mr. Akin. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of you 

in the panel here this morning. I had a couple of quick questions. 

I hope they are quick. The first would be Admiral Roughead and 

also General Conway. We have had some trouble with welding 

and—particularly welding, I guess, on some LPDs [Amphibious 

Transport Dock Ships] and part of that it turns out is a workforce 

problem where we don’t have enough welders sometimes with the 

timing of when we build ships. 

So my question is I understand that there could well be a serious 

workforce problem at the shipyards out in San Diego and we currently have three LPDs scheduled for 2011, 2013 and 2015. My 

first question is would you be open-minded at least if it saves 

money and if it averts some of that work—it puts the work in a 

more consistent way across the yard to consider 2011, 2012 and 

2013—excuse me, the MLPs [Marine Landing Platform]. Did I say 

LPDs? The MLPs which were the Marine landing platform ships. 

If we were to consider 2011, 2012, 2013 as opposed to 2011, 2013, 

2015, are you open-minded to at least looking at that if it saves 

money? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Thank you for the question, sir, and I would 

say that the shipbuilding plan that we have in place is one that 

balances many factors to include how that money is spread over 

time and what the needs of the Navy are and the development of 

that. As you know, the MLP is also a new class of ship and acceleration there may not be possible. So I think as we look at that, 

we have to be very mindful and very careful of how that balance 

can be affected. 

Mr. AKIN. Certainly. And obviously there is a lot of factor that 

goes into that. My second question is my understanding is that 

your intent is to meet the March 1st goal in terms of the Joint 

Strike Fighter situation to get the discount on buying F/A–18s at 

a lower price. 

First of all, is it correct that you do intend to file that paperwork 

on March 1 to allow us to get a discount on the price of the planes? 

Secretary MABUS. We received the letter of intent from the contractor on Monday. We know that the deadline is March 1st. We 

are working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense who would 

have to make that notification to meet that—to meet that deadline. 

Mr. AKIN. So the supplier did give us that 10 percent number 

that we had talked about then? 

Secretary MABUS. Yes. 
20 

Mr. AKIN. Okay. And so your intent then is to meet that deadline 

as far as you know? 

Secretary MABUS. As we are working hard to meet that deadline 

given the very limited time we have got to do it, and we are working very hard with the staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense to do that. 

Mr. AKIN. Good. Thank you. Third question is, and this is something that I have been beating this drum for a couple of years, 

and—but I am confused and I finally started to figure out why I 

am a little confused in this subject. 

In March of 2008, the department briefed the committee that the 

shortfall of fighters was 188. In January of 2009, we were told it 

was 243. In March of 2009, we were told the shortfall was 312. As 

if by magic 2 months later of 2009, we are told the shortfall was 

146. The beginning of this month, the Secretary of Defense testified 

the shortfall was 100 aircraft. Last week, the committee was told 

the shortfall was 177. And then 5 days later, my staff was told the 

shortfall was 100. 

So that is why I have been a little confused about this. We have 

gotten some different numbers. None of the numbers said zero and 

all of them said we do have a fighter shortfall. So I guess my next 

question would be in order to deal with that problem, would you 

consider purchasing more aircraft? Is that at least one option on 

the table, yes or no? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Mr. Akin, we have been working the strike 

fighter management very, very carefully and particularly in the 

case of Navy, we have made some adjustments to squadrons. So we 

have been bringing our number down and we will continue to look 

at how we manage our strike fighter force into the future. It in no 

way should detract from the imperative to get to Joint Strike 

Fighter and the foremost in my mind is—— 

Mr. AKIN. Excuse me, sir. I—my clock has only got 5 seconds. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Okay. 

Mr. AKIN. So the quick question is would you consider purchasing additional aircraft as one possibility to deal with that problem? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. My focus right now, sir, is on looking at the 

SLEP program for our A’s and D’s [F/A–18 A and D models]. That 

is where I am going to be spending most of my time looking at. 

Mr. AKIN. But you didn’t answer my question. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, would you like to answer his question 

so we can go onto the next one—questioner? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. As we go into POM [Program Objective 

Memorandum] 12, sir, we are going to look at how to best manage 

the strike fighter fleet. We have some procurements of 18s [F/A– 

18s] laid into this budget, but I also believe it is important that we 

look at the other levers as well. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Snyder, please. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mabus, you 

talk about standing on the USS Little Rock and General Conway 

was born in Arkansas. Admiral Roughead, if you told me you ever 

served on the USS Razorback, which is a retired submarine sitting 

in the Arkansas River, my Arkansas trifecta will be complete. But 
21 

General Conway, a quick question and you can give us a quick answer as you want. 

Are you satisfied that the rules of engagement in Afghanistan 

are satisfactory given the difficult challenge our men and women 

have there? 

General CONWAY. Yes, sir, I am. I ask that question every time 

I go which is about once every 4 months. My commanders are comfortable with it. We are pretty good at it and because it is who we 

are with our air ground team and they understand the rationale 

behind. So they support it. 

Dr. SNYDER. Good. Thank you. Secretary Mabus, the topic has 

come up about ‘‘don’t ask, don’t tell’’ and I had a conversation yesterday with an officer who is currently serving on active duty who 

is a lesbian who says, ‘‘Okay. We appreciate they are doing the 

study. How the hell am I going to be able to participate in that 

study?’’ 

How will somebody who is currently gay or lesbian serving in the 

military be able to share their views on the impact on readiness, 

anything else intel, without being outed under the current policy? 

Secretary MABUS. It is at least my understanding that as this 

study is being shaped by general counsel, the Department of Defense, Jay Johnson, and the head of the U.S. Army, Europe, General Ham, that they are going to try to have mechanisms for anonymous input so that there would not be the jeopardy of violating 

‘‘don’t ask, don’t tell’’ to simply respond to the survey. As I said, 

it is early in the process of developing this survey. But when—but 

Jay Johnson, the General Counsel of Defense, said that they are 

trying to structure it in that way. 

Dr. SNYDER. Yesterday I asked General Schwartz, and you may 

have heard about this. I assume, Secretary Mabus, that you and 

the Admiral and General are familiar with this split of authority 

we currently have between the circuits regarding ‘‘don’t ask, don’t 

tell’’ between the Witt case in the Ninth Circuit, and the Cook case 

in the First Circuit. And so when the question is asked, ‘‘Should 

there be a moratorium?’’ we have this—you all have a challenge 

that has been laid on you in the fact that the law has changed in 

the Ninth Circuit. 

How are you all currently responding to the fact that the Ninth 

Circuit has conferred Constitutional protections of what they are 

calling intermediate scrutiny under the due process requirements? 

How are you all responding to that in how do you process cases in 

the Ninth Circuit? 

Secretary MABUS. Again it is my understanding, Congressman, 

that we are—and we do understand the split of decisions between 

the two circuits right now. That we are proceeding to follow the law 

as written across the Navy and the Marine Corps as the—I believe 

that—— 

Dr. SNYDER. So you are going to ignore the Ninth Circuit opinion? 

Secretary MABUS. No, sir. But I believe that that opinion is being 

appealed. 

Dr. SNYDER. No, it is not. 

Secretary MABUS. Try to recognize—— 

Dr. SNYDER. It is not being appealed. 
22 

Secretary MABUS. Then I am incorrect. 

Dr. SNYDER. It is not being appealed. And that is the challenge. 

I am not harassing you all about this. I think this is a—this is one 

of the problems we are going to have when we say we can study 

this for a year, and put this off. 

We have a—we now have people that have Constitutional protection in the Ninth Circuit at some level that we expect you to respond to. The problem is when the admiral sends them to Little 

Rock, or General Conway sends them to the East Coast, they lose 

that protection. And I am not sure how this gets worked out. I suggested yesterday one way to do it would be to make the venue for 

all these cases be in the Ninth Circuit. Then you have some consistency. 

But you—General Conway, I think you appropriately said there 

is some confusion. That there would be a moratorium. You already 

have confusion. There is already legal confusion that you all didn’t 

bring on yourselves. It is being laid on you. But I think you are 

going to need to figure that out, and fairly quickly. Cause it is currently the law in the Ninth Circuit. And it is not being appealed. 

So I think this will be an ongoing discussion. By the way, the— 

recognizing the venue of the Ninth Circuit might deal with some 

of Senator Levin’s concerns. I haven’t talked to him about it. But 

it may be a way of getting at some of this transition. 

I wanted to ask have you all—the Andy Krepinevich Group put 

out this study called ‘‘Why AirSea Battle?’’ and talks about Iran, 

and China, and where we look at things going in the future. Admiral Roughead, have—are you familiar with that—his report? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. I am. And it is being reflected in 

the air-sea battle that the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine 

Corps—the air-sea battle study that we are conducting—— 

Dr. SNYDER. Its currently undergoing? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Right. Right. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Who is next? The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 

Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And General, and Mr. Secretary, and Admiral, we thank you for 

being here. You are all good men. And we appreciate your service 

to our country. But even good men can take positions some time 

that can be detrimental to I think the well-being of the country. 

And I was a little taken aback, Mr. Secretary, by your statement 

that the shipbuilding plan that was sent over is going to respond 

to the Chairman’s concern about the number of ships that we have 

in the Navy. 

And I am concerned for two reasons. One is that the number of 

ships that we have in the Navy. And I am concerned for two reasons. One is that OMB [Office of Management and Budget] disagrees with your numbers. As you know they say it is on course 

to be at 270 ships as opposed to your projections. And when Secretary Gates sat exactly where you are sitting, he said that that 

shipbuilding plan was a ‘‘fantasy.’’ 

When I look, Admiral Roughead, at your concern that what keeps 

you up at night is your worry about having the resources to have 

the ships that we need down the road. And then I look at your spe-
23 

cific decision on Mayport, which is going to spend $1 billion with 

all the other needs we have. This is the strategic dispersal plan, 

which I understand is the basis upon which at least the chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs said was the basis upon his decision to think 

a carrier should be shifted to Mayport. Have you read this plan? 

The strategic dispersal plan? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. There have been several strategic dispersal 

plans over the year, sir. And I don’t know which one that—— 

Mr. FORBES. This is the one that I understand was the one written by Admiral Robert Thomas. Have you ever read his strategic 

dispersal plan, which is the one that is always circulated as the 

basis for relocating the carriers? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. We are looking at strategic dispersal. 

Mr. FORBES. Have you read his plan? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I would have to look at that copy, sir, to see 

if I have seen it. 

Mr. FORBES. Have you ever read a copy by Admiral Thomas? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. I mean, we work on strategic dispersal, and determining where the best places for the fleet should 

be. 

Mr. FORBES. Are you familiar with Admiral Thomas? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. I am. 

Mr. FORBES. Do you have respect for Admiral Thomas, and his 

decisionmaking capabilities? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. He is a very good officer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Have you ever asked him the risk assessment that 

he placed on anything happening that would necessitate a shift to 

Mayport? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. In fact Admiral Thomas works— 

worked for me. So when we were—— 

Mr. FORBES. And did he tell you that that was a very slight risk? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The strategic dispersal plan is based on the 

consequences of what could happen in the Tidewater area should 

there be a manmade or natural disaster. 

Mr. FORBES. And it was a comparison specifically between that 

and Mayport. And did he ever tell you as he told me that the risk 

of that was very, very slight. In fact, less than 10 percent. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. And what risk is that, sir? 

Mr. FORBES. The risk that you would have a disaster that would 

create a problem that would have necessitated the move of the carrier to—— 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I think that we may be talking about two 

different types of risk—one natural, one manmade. 

Mr. FORBES. Let me focus, then, on the natural disaster risk. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Because in that program it states that there is no 

advantage between Norfolk and Florida. And yet if you look, Florida since 1900 has had 225 hurricanes. Norfolk 7. If you look at 

that channel going out of Norfolk, it is a mile wide whereas in Florida only one carrier sunk there would stop all the ships in it. 

But this is what I want to get to. Recently you have submitted 

a list of unfunded priorities to Congress. These are requirements 

your commanders say they need to fulfill their mission. General 
24 

Conway has submitted a similar list. There are some huge things 

in there. Engines that we can’t do. Planes that we can’t get. Ship 

maintenance that we can’t get. The cost of moving that carrier to 

Mayport would cover every single one of the requirements unfunded on your list, and on General Conway’s. 

So my question to you is this. Which is more important? Moving 

the carrier to Florida, or doing all the items on the unfunded priority list that you have submitted, and that General Conway has 

submitted? Second one is, how do you agree with Admiral Thomas’ 

strategic dispersal plan, but disagree with his risk assessment? 

And then thirdly, how do you explain by any objective, legitimate 

analysis that there isn’t a benefit to Norfolk over Jacksonville, or 

over Florida when you look at natural disaster situations? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. I will take the first one last, because I think you are comparing Norfolk to Florida. I think it is 

important as you look at storm tracks to compare Norfolk to the 

Jacksonville area. And they are very, very similar. In fact, as a— 

yes, sir? 

Mr. FORBES. Just ask you to look at the charts of the two. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. I have looked at them many times. 

And Mayport fares quite well in that regard. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, again for being before us. I have various areas I want to ask 

you about. Just for note, I received today a copy of the letter, Secretary, that you sent to my senator, Dianne Feinstein, with respect 

to our Marine Base, Camp Pendleton. And one of the problems that 

we have in Orange County, which is moving traffic. Oh, and of 

course the—we have this toll road that we are trying to figure out 

how to build, et cetera. 

So I would like to in the near future have a discussion with you. 

We don’t have to do it here today—about this and what we might 

do to maybe still try to find a solution with you all. 

I just want to say that on ‘‘don’t ask, don’t tell’’—obviously; Mr. 

Snyder piggybacking on many of his remarks—is a big issue for us. 

And in California in particular being in that Ninth Circuit court. 

And just want to note that it is my understanding that, for example, out of all—I do a lot of work with our NATO allies, and out 

in the European theater as you—many of you know. And just 

would like to note that I believe in speaking to most of my colleagues from other parliaments out there, that only Turkey and the 

United States as members of NATO are the only ones who have 

limited policies, or an actual ban on having gays in the military. 

So I think it is incredibly important that we address this sooner 

than later. And the parliamentarians out there—our colleagues— 

said that the—when they—when some of them went to implement 

this the quicker they went with it, the easier it was to get to it. 

So just from that standpoint—and I have said this to Mrs. Davis, 

our personnel subcommittee chairwoman, that I would like to see 

this addressed this year rather than sit around waiting for some 

more dialogue. 

I want to talk a little bit to something really positive that we 

heard the other day from the Secretary when the Department of 

Defense took a very commendable step to ban the prohibition of 
25 

women from serving on our Navy submarines. I think it is very forward-looking. I think it is time to do that. We still sometimes even 

have a discussion about whether women should be in the military 

on this committee. Thank God we haven’t had to vote on that for 

the last 5 or 7 years. 

And we all know that one of the reasons is that there is so much 

talent in that 50 percent of potential work force. My question to 

you, Mr. Secretary, is—that I understand that this is just the beginning, and there is a lot of work to get through in order to make 

this happen. I would like you to address what are the challenges 

that you are going to foresee—that you foresee with respect to this. 

And how might this Congress help you to move forward that issue 

of doing that. 

And before you answer that, let me just pose another question 

out to our commandant. And then I will be quiet. And hopefully 

you guys can answer this. And that would be with respect—commandant to the U.S. Marines undertaking the operation Marjah 

there in Afghanistan in the last few days. I am interested to know 

the role that the Afghan national army played in that. 

How many of their troops were involved? And what you think the 

assessment is there? In particular, I think given to, and I believe 

it was General Petraeus who said, ‘‘We might be at this at least 

for 12 to 18 months, and that may fly in the face of the 18-month 

limit that Mr. Obama discussed with respect to Afghanistan.’’ So 

if, Mr. Secretary, you could answer that first question. And then, 

General, get your thoughts together to answer the other? 

Secretary MABUS. We learned a lot of lessons integrating female 

sailors onto our surface ships that we can apply to integrating 

women into the submarine fleet. For starters, the two platforms 

that women would be going to first. The SSBNs, and the SSGNs 

[Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile Submarines] don’t require any 

modifications to their—to their hull structure—to their compartments or berthing or anything. 

The challenges that were faced, and faced very successfully when 

women were integrated onto our surface fleet were things like making sure that we had a critical mass of women on a ship so that 

women were not too small a group. To make sure that we had a 

senior—a more senior woman officer at first. A department head to 

be a mentor to the younger women coming in for their first tour 

at sea. 

And also to make sure that we reach out to the submarine force, 

and to the families to make sure that any concerns that they have 

are addressed. And we think that they will be. And that this will 

be a very successful integration. 

General CONWAY. Ma’am, with regard to the Afghan national 

army and police, roughly 4,000 is the answer in terms of numbers. 

They have a good fighting spirit. They are not nearly as sophisticated as we are at company and battalion level. But in terms of actual small unit tactics, they mix it up pretty good. We think that 

Marjah will be a contested area for as long as we are there, or until 

the Taliban pack it up. It is a drug center. It is an area where they 

have had a long-term presence. In some ways they have families 

there. So although we intend to secure the area and put the Afghan police in eventually to help control it, the nature of an insur-
26 

gency is that they could well be back in small numbers attempting 

to contest the area. So I think General Petraeus is probably right. 

The CHAIRMAN. Before I call on the gentleman from South Carolina, General, where are we on Guam? 

General CONWAY. Sir, at this point I think it is fair to say that 

we are awaiting the determination of the Japanese government in 

terms of how they see their part of this. In the meantime, it is fair 

to say we continue to look at what Guam means. Again, you nailed 

it in your opening statement in terms of the strategic importance, 

we believe, of armed forces in the Pacific, and of course particularly 

Marines. 

One thing that has changed somewhat since the original agreements is that we have grown the force by some 27,000 additional 

Marines, and 3,000 or 4,000 of those would be assigned to the Pacific. So we are trying to balance the numbers in our own thought 

process with regard to established agreements. 

So at this point, it is between governments and we very much 

await the next determination by the Japanese government in terms 

of how they think we should go forward. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I actually appreciate your bringing up Guam before we could begin, because I visited, and I know how strategically located it is. Also, the people of 

Guam should be appreciated. They are so patriotic. The highest 

percentage of National Guard membership of any state or territory 

of the United States is Guam. And what wonderful people. 

And General, Mr. Secretary, Admiral, thank you for being here 

today. I was very grateful to grow up in Charleston, South Carolina. And I grew up in the shadow of the Navy base, and so I have 

a great appreciation of your service and Navy and Marine personnel, and we are grateful to have the Nuclear Power School in 

the community. It is a great opportunity for young people. 

I am honored now to represent Parris Island Marine Corps Station, Beaufort, Beaufort Naval Hospital. And then, I am particularly grateful I have a son, active duty Navy, and he is following 

in the tradition of his late grandfather and uncle, who were dedicated Marines. 

So Mr. Secretary, I am concerned about the current plans for 

wounded warrior support at the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center when it opens at Bethesda in September, 

2011—it is, or 2011. 

It is not in the same level of support currently furnished by the 

Army at Walter Reed. Wounded warriors who move to the new 

medical center will experience a significant degradation of services 

and support and I believe that is unacceptable. 

As an example, I understand that there will be a shortfall of 150 

barrack spaces when the new medical center opens for the wounded warriors who are currently in the warrior transition barracks at 

Walter Reed. 

What assurances can you give that all of the wounded warrior 

support now provided at Walter Reed, including first priority for 

barracks space on the Bethesda campus, will be available when the 

new medical center opens in September, 2011? 
27 

Secretary MABUS. Congressman, there is no more important 

thing that we do than to care for those who have borne the burden 

of battle and who return as wounded warriors. All three of us on 

a very regular basis visit Bethesda, visit our wounded warriors 

that are returning. 

And we are very focused in the Department of the Navy, and I 

think it is fair to say in the Department of Defense, to making sure 

that as the transition occurs, as Walter Reed moves to the Bethesda campus, that no wounded warrior fall between the cracks. 

That there is no degradation of care. That there is absolutely 

world-class care, as you in Congress and we in the Department 

know that there have to be. 

You can be assured that our attention is focused very directly on 

this. And not just on putting Walter Reed and Bethesda together, 

but also on the myriad of other things that wounded warriors require from our Wounded Warrior Regiment with the Marines, our 

Safe Harbor Battalion with the Navy, with their non-medical care, 

with making sure that they are transitioned either back to the 

fleet, back to their Marine brethren, or into their community, is 

seamless. 

We are trying to work with the VA [Veteran’s Administration] to 

make sure that there is no gap there. And finally, one thing that 

I am particularly proud of, we just did a wounded warrior hiring 

conference to make sure that as wounded warriors recover, and as 

they transition out back to the civilian workforce, that they have 

a job waiting for them when they get there. 

Mr. WILSON. And Mr. Secretary, I want to commend you on just 

what you have cited. And even if it took up all my time, the issue 

is that important. But particularly on barrack space, that needs to 

be addressed, so I hope that as you pursue the other issues relative 

to this and the wounded warrior program, I wish the American 

people could see what has been done on behalf of the young people 

who have lost arms, legs. It is extraordinary the efforts that have 

been made, and very heartwarming. But I am very, very concerned 

about the barracks space, so I hope that will be an emphasis that 

you have. 

Secretary MABUS. Yes, sir. 

General CONWAY. Sir, if I can complement the Secretary’s answer 

for just a moment, and perhaps allay some of your concerns. We 

certainly need barracks space, especially for our Marines, and I 

would argue potentially sailors, who come for initial treatment for 

their families, for themselves, and for people who are assigned back 

to Bethesda for follow-on treatment. 

But our intent with our casualty care is as soon as possible, to 

get them out closer to home station, closer to their homes if it is 

a recovery period. And we do not want to have them at Walter 

Reed-Bethesda for any longer a period of time than is absolutely 

necessary. So I think that will mitigate some of your concern in 

this regard. 

Mr. WILSON. Excellent. Thank you very much. 

General CONWAY. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and certainly Secretary 

Mabus, and Admiral Roughead, and General Conway, thank you so 
28 

much for your extraordinary service to our country, and for worrying I think every day about the men and women who serve. I 

know you show a great deal of compassion for the mission that 

they are performing and how they are performing it. 

I wanted to actually ask several of the questions that have already been asked, but have sort of a brief follow-up to a few of 

those. On the MLP, I am wondering, once you have a better sense 

of how it is going to work together, if there is any opportunity to 

bring that schedule together so that there is more predictability on 

the part of those who are trying to build those for us? Is there any 

chance of trying to do that, rather than spreading it out once we 

get underway? 

Secretary MABUS. Well, as the CNO said, it is a new hull 

form—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. I missed your response, but I wanted to follow up. 

Secretary MABUS [continuing]. And one of things that we looked 

at was the health of our industrial base. And trying to ensure that 

there was a base of work spread out over the 5 years so that our 

shipbuilding yards would be able to maintain that critical workforce, that critical infrastructure that we need so much. 

And that was one of the factors, although not the determining 

factor, but one of the factors that went into putting those ships in 

2011, 2013, and 2015. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes. I think they would probably suggest that it is 

better for them to bring them together in terms of their workforce, 

but perhaps that could be explored further at another time. 

And women on submarines, is there any role for Congress to play 

at this point? Is there anything that you need from us? 

Secretary MABUS. I think we are well along. The Secretary of Defense has done the notification to Congress that is required by law 

that we are beginning to proceed down the track. And I think that 

the support of Congress on this is crucial, but I think that we have 

all the levers that we need to move expeditiously to do this. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. Nothing in the reauthorization language? You 

are set? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. There is a 30-day wait period, ma’am, so 

any impediment to that would not be helpful. So—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. All right. Thank you. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. And it is a good plan, I can assure you of 

that. And the submarine force is prepared to execute. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. I wanted to turn—very briefly, you may 

be aware there is a DOD-wide program called My Spouse Career 

Advancement Account that has recently been frozen. I know just 

from several weeks ago even speaking with many of the spouses, 

they count on this. I mean, this has really been so important to 

them. 

And could you enlighten us a little bit as to whether or not there 

is a possibility that, even though it has been frozen for now, that 

those spouses who are in the program can continue with their education? And do you think that there is, again, a role for Congress 

in weighing in on this right now? 

Secretary MABUS. After the question was asked yesterday, looked 

into this last evening. The information that I received, because this 

is a DOD-wide program, is that the site was frozen for software 
29 

concerns for some other types of concerns on there. But that the 

people who were receiving the payments could expect to continue 

to receive those payments. That was the information I got, as I 

said, last night from DOD. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Oh, are you saying that people in the program will 

continue? What about just trying to apply now? Or is the program 

itself going to be discontinued for some time? 

Secretary MABUS. That is an answer I cannot give you. I don’t 

know. 

General CONWAY. Ma’am, if I can help. I also researched it and 

it is my understanding that this is a temporary halt to the program, not a close-out of the program, pending the problems that 

the Secretary spoke of. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. What might be important is communicating as 

best we can, obviously, to the number of people that are very concerned about this out in the community. And I think we all agree 

on, this is an important quality-of-life issue for our service men and 

women, and some way of clarifying that is very important right 

now. 

Secretary MABUS. The only thing I would like to add right now 

is that I completely agree with the importance of this program, 

with what you said. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes, thank you. The QDR points out the need to increase key enabling agents—assets, I am sorry—for the Special Operations Forces, including logistics, communications, intelligence, 

and other critical capabilities. And the Naval Special Warfare Command depends on the Navy, of course, for certain enablers. 

Yet at the same time that they are looking to the Navy for that, 

the Navy’s end strength is coming down, as we know. And I am 

wanting to know whether there is an issue here in terms of being 

able to have out of that pool of specialists, some of our special warfare people that would be in the future? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. As far as the Special Warfare, our SEALs 

[Navy Sea, Air and Land teams], we have a great plan there. There 

are many demands for people, and we are looking at how we can 

best resource that now. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

And Mr. Conaway, the gentleman from Texas. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chief, thank you for 

being here. Mr. Secretary. Commandant, it is great to see you 

again. 

That was a great day in Fredericksburg, Texas, when you and 

your bride came down for the ribbon-cutting on the new wing of the 

Nimitz Museum. And with some training and hard work and dedication on his part, Mike Hagee might be able to MC something a 

little better than—next time. 

My issue is going to be a little bit more mundane. It is not nearly 

as glamorous as some of the other stuff, but it stretches across everything you do. And that is, the commitment by the three of you 

to audit the financial statements of the respective entities that you 

are responsible for. 

Mr. Secretary, you made the statement a while ago about bold 

steps required for the alternative energy. I appreciate the same 
30 

bold steps for the Department of the Navy to be clean, unqualified, 

audited, financial statements and everything that entails. Internal 

controls, all the other systems that we have in place. And that the 

business transpiration agency has the dubious distinction of having 

responsibility but no authority to make things happen across a lot 

of lines. 

I want to brag on the Marine Corps. Commandant, you have said 

you will get it done, and I hope there is a way to hand off that 

same commitment to the 35th commandant of the Marine Corps, 

because it doesn’t happen, period, without the three of you gentlemen saying make it happen. 

Now, I understand you got a zillion other things that might look 

more important, but the benefits are indisputable of being able to 

have good data, quick data. As I told the Air Force yesterday, if we 

ask you guys a question that stumps you, some person on the back 

bench will get into a panic mode to try to cobble together some answer out there with systems that may involve 50 different systems 

that are not integrated, they are not doing the things they do. 

So simple heading out, or at least an answer for the record, is 

that—is that commitment to get the Navy Department—Department of the Navy—audited, and the Marine Corps audited way up 

on your list of things that you need to get done? 

Secretary MABUS. Congressman, my first elected job was state 

auditor of Mississippi. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Oh, fantastic. 

Secretary MABUS. I understand the value of good audits in government. And I do want to echo what you said about the Marine 

Corps. We are way down the line on getting a fully auditable statement for the Marine Corps. And we are moving in that direction 

for the Navy. 

And in fact, we have got a Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy 

for Business Transformation that that is one of the prime jobs that 

that individual is accountable for. And I do check on that on a very 

regular basis. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. CNO, I don’t know if you have got a dog 

in that fight, but any push you could help to get the—— 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Absolutely, sir, because I think your comments are right on the money. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

General CONWAY. Sir, you know the term ‘‘wind dummy’’? We 

have volunteered to be the wind dummy on this one with some 

trepidation, but it is absolutely the right thing to do and we are 

proceeding apace. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, thanks. I mean, if the good citizens of District 11 keep sending me up here, I want to keep niggling you guys 

about this because I do think it is important. So with that, Mr. 

Chairman, thank you all for your long service to our country. 

Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman from Texas. Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank 

you for being here, General Conway and Admiral Roughead. Thank 

you both for your service to our nation. 

I would like to turn my attention, if I could, to Ballistic Missile 

Defense issues right now. And as the long-range shipbuilding plan 
31 

lays out, the President’s new Phased, Adaptive Approach to providing missile defense to Europe will have a significant impact on 

the Navy’s resources obviously in the years to come. How does the 

Navy plan to support its growing missile defense requirements 

while fulfilling its current missions including anti-ballistic missile 

ship defense? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The way that we will deploy it, sir, is in consonance with what the combatant commanders have requested. We 

have been performing the mission on the Western Pacific now for 

a few years and the demands have also been added into the Arabian Gulf and into the Mediterranean. 

So in our plan, we are taking the number of Ballistic Missile Defense ships in this FYDP from 21 to 38. We are increasing the 

number of missiles which is as important to be able to not have to 

be changing missiles around. But the fact that our ships are multimission ships allow them to do much more than missile defense 

and that is all managed by our Navy commanders in the regions 

where those ships are operating. 

So I am very, very pleased that not only are we building some 

more missile defense ships, but we are providing the back-fits and 

we are increasing the missile inventory. And we have also been 

spending quite a bit of effort and time and the coordination between commanders in different regions and I believe we have advanced our missile defense capability quite a bit. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, do you have anything 

to add? 

Secretary MABUS. Just to emphasize what the CNO said. These 

are very capable ships in a number of missions and while we are 

retrofitting and building new missile defense ships, we are not losing sight of the other duties that they perform. And also, that in 

this budget we have asked for funds to fit a good many of our existing destroyers and cruisers, DDGs [Guided Missile Destroyers] and 

CGs [Guided Missile Cruisers], with the Aegis BMD [Ballistic Missile Defense] capability and in order to reach the end strength of 

those ships that we need to respond to all the demands. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Let me ask that in a further point on anti-ballistic, anti-ship ballistic missiles. Have you had the opportunity to 

review the recent study on different possibilities for defending 

against anti-ship ballistic missiles? And as a following to that, 

what are the various technological and at what platform solutions 

to this challenge? 

Secretary MABUS. We are very focused on anti-ship ballistic and 

cruise missiles. And one of the things that the CNO has said earlier in his testimony is that we are looking at technologies from 

other ships, particularly the truncated DDG–1000, as we are going 

forward with the next generation of DDG–51s to get sensor systems, radar systems. 

In the new DDG–51s, the SPY–3, coming off the DDG–1000, the 

air and missile defense radar so that we get a full picture of the 

battle space of both from anti-air and anti-ballistic missile and 

anti-cruise missile ships and an integrated hull on each ship and 

in a group of ships for integrated air and missile defense. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. Admiral Roughead, on the DDG–1000, 

last year the administration decided to continue funding the DDG– 
32 

1000 program for three ships. How is this program progressing and 

with regards to—with regards to both the hull and the mission systems equipment? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The program is progressing on track with 

regard to the development of the systems and also, it—the DDG– 

1000 is under construction. So the issue will be one of the NunnMcCurdy breach as a result of the truncation and the departments 

working its way through the appropriate steps that have to be 

taken relative to that. 

Mr. LAMBORN. On that, let me ask you. It is my understanding 

that the Navy is pursuing a fixed price contract for the second and 

third DDG–1000. Is this accurate and what does that mean for controlling overall program costs? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. My hopes are is that it will maintain the 

cost where it needs to be and we are pursuing those contracts. 

Mr. LAMBORN. A big firm fixed price? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I would like to get back to you on that one, 

sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. We have three votes. However, let’s go as far as 

we can and we will break for those votes and then return. Mr. 

Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, General 

Conway, Admiral Roughead, thank you so much for joining us 

today. We appreciate your hard work and efforts. I wanted to direct 

a question to Admiral Roughead just as a follow-up from Congressman Forbes’ question. 

In looking at the analysis that was done, the risk analysis, about 

placing a home port facility there in Mayport and we had talked 

earlier with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen, 

about how much of a quantifiable risk assessment was done and 

then looking at that in that being very spongy as far as the—as 

a hard number on the risks that we are trying to mitigate with 

putting a carrier down there and then with the unfunded programs 

list that is out now that has about $530 million of unfunded needs 

there on that list, what that leads me to is to follow up on his question. 

And that is obviously your decisions revolve around ranking 

where your needs are. And can you tell me in relation to the unfunded needs list, would you say the unfunded needs are ranked 

higher or lower than the need to mitigate a risk to place a home 

port facility there in Mayport? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Well, I would say, sir, that the fact that 

when we built our budget and took it to the levels where it was, 

and as you know, our budget is a balance of many different needs 

that we have, that when I made the proposal on this year’s budget, 

that—what we funded with regard to O&M [Operations and Maintenance] and the risk that we were taking was where I thought it 

was prudent to be and included in the budget are the preliminary 

steps for the home port in Mayport. 

So given the fact that the steps needed to build the port in 

Mayport were in our budget and those are the unfunded programs. 

Then the Mayport project has a higher priority for me. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. I am trying to get from you where in the 

scheme of things though if you—obviously there are limited re-
33 

sources there and I know that you have—and we are still trying 

to figure out exactly where it is some of the planning dollars that 

go into beginning the process there at the location in Mayport, but 

also the unfunded needs list, you know, has, obviously, shipbuilding needs there, weapons procurement, ship maintenance and 

all of those things concern us because there are needs out there. 

What I am trying to figure is that within the finite universe of 

resources, if we are talking about a billion dollars to upgrade the 

port there in Mayport versus the $530 million in the unfunded 

needs list, would you say that the $1 billion needed in the years 

to come, and again, looking at your unfunded needs was that goes 

out in the same future, would you say that the $1 billion necessary 

to build the facility at Mayport is a higher or lower priority than 

the $530 million on the unfunded needs list? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Well, first, sir, the Mayport is not a billion 

dollar project. It is not a billion dollar project. It is just slightly 

over half of that. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. But what Mayport is, it is not a new carrier 

port. Mayport has been an aircraft carrier port since 1952 and that 

dispersion has given us some strategic flexibility on the East Coast. 

What we are doing is we are bringing that port as a carrier port 

to be able to service our carrier fleet which is now all nuclear. So 

for me, that strategic flexibility is important. That is why I made 

the recommendation to the Secretary to go forward with that and 

then that was affirmed. And so that money in the plan to enhance 

the carrier port of Mayport is a priority. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure. Well, in the decisionmaking, obviously you 

are looking at what risks you would be mitigating by having a duplicative facility there in Mayport. And I guess my question is with 

the lack of quantifiable risk assessment that is going on there, is 

that risk high enough to substantiate that being put in front of 

the—if you say $600 billion or $600 million versus the $530 million 

of the unfunded needs, tell me is there still—do you believe is the 

risk still high enough for having to move a carrier there that you 

would put the Mayport facility before the unfunded? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Sir, I believe that the risk of having all of 

our eggs in one basket for our aircraft carriers in the Tidewater 

area, and I don’t dispute the value of—but having all of our eggs 

in one basket there when we have not done that on the East Coast 

or on the West Coast is not in the best interest of the Navy or the 

nation. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlemen. We have time for one 

more member, the gentlelady from Guam, 5 minutes. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary and 

Admiral and General, thank you for your testimony. 

Mr. Secretary, I appreciated meeting with you recently to discuss 

the military buildup on Guam and working with my office and the 

government of Guam to make sure that we get this buildup done 

right as our Chairman, Mr. Skelton, has stated over and over 

again. However, there remains significant hurdles to the military 

buildup. The recent news that the Port of Guam was denied a Recovery Act Grant funding from the Department of Transportation 
34 

was deeply disappointing. Simply put, without funding for the port, 

the buildup cannot occur. 

Mr. Secretary, while I appreciate your leadership in DOD to support the port’s grant, we need to know what the Navy is doing to 

address Guam’s civilian infrastructure needs. Is the Navy working 

with the Department of Interior, the White House and OMB to develop a strategy to address the funding of civilian infrastructure requirements? 

Yesterday, I was at a meeting from 1:00 to 5:00 p.m. with the 

Department of Interior and various federal agencies to discuss the 

buildup. We concluded with this, number one, we need a funding 

plan for this buildup. And secondly, we need one coordinator to 

handle this buildup so the DOD doesn’t point to the various federal 

agencies for funding and the federal agencies go right back and 

say, ‘‘Well, this is DOD’s responsibility.’’ We are caught in the middle. 

I think it is important to note the EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] and their comments on the draft EIS [Environmental 

Impact Statement] also stated that the lack of information on infrastructure funding is one major reason for their low scoring of the 

document. Also, many of the civilian impacts are exasperated by 

the 2014 completion date. When does the Department of Navy believe it can complete construction? Given the government of Japan’s indecision, isn’t this the right time to extend the timeline to 

reflect reality? 

Secretary MABUS. I enjoyed our meeting as well, Congresswoman, and as far as the grant to Apra Harbor, you know, from 

the Department of Transportation following the meeting and following my trip to Guam to look at Apra Harbor and other things, 

I met twice with the Secretary of Transportation to urge him to 

give that grant to Guam and to Apra Harbor to fulfill that. 

In the Department of the Navy and, I think, in the Department 

of Defense, we support a government-wide approach to the Guam 

buildup. It is a very important move for us as it is for the people 

of Guam to echo what General Conway said. The strategic value 

of Guam and of moving Marines to Guam is crucial. We have in 

terms of our processes elevated Guam inside the Department of the 

Navy with the Guam Executive Council which meets on a very regular basis to make sure the decisions move quickly. 

The Department of Defense has set up the Guam Oversight 

Council along with the Deputy Secretary of Defense to do the same 

thing. We do need, I believe, to make sure that there is a whole 

of government approach to this very important issue because it is 

crucial for the Navy, and the Marine Corps to—for the strategic 

dispersal of our forces, and for the buildup on Guam that we do 

this right as the Chairman—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. All right. 

Secretary MABUS [continuing]. Said in his statement. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Mr. Secretary, my time is running out. But is 

there some way to recoup these funds for our port? Without the 

port development, the buildup just cannot continue. 

Secretary MABUS. My understanding is there may be other funds 

like this in the future that Guam can compete for. And once again, 

I will urge the Department of Transportation to fund that port in 
35 

Guam, and to fund that particular grant that Guam has applied 

for, and I believe has made a very good case for. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. This is my greatest 

concern right now. We just had news of that a couple weeks ago, 

and it was a real blow to our people. Because you know, we had 

made plans for this. And as I said, if this doesn’t go on—and, of 

course, the Japan decision also is important to us. But I would appreciate anything you could do to help us in this area. 

Secretary MABUS. Yes, Ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Secretary, is there any need or indication on where the Japanese government, is timewise? 

Ms. BORDALLO. May. 

Secretary MABUS. In terms of their re-look at this issue, my understanding is that a decision is forthcoming by May. 

Ms. BORDALLO. May. 

The CHAIRMAN. By May? 

Secretary MABUS. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. We will return. We have three votes. We 

will return and resume. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Who is next? We will resume. And thank you, 

gentlemen, for waiting for us. 

Mr. Courtney, 5 minutes. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank 

all the witnesses for their great testimony this morning. I also 

want to recognize that all three participated in a funeral last week 

at Westmont Presbyterian Church to say good-bye to just a great 

friend, and a great American, Jack Murtha. 

General Conway, I want to particularly publicly thank you for 

the tremendous eulogy. Powerful words that painted a picture that 

I just think the whole country really needed to hear about his contribution to the people who wear the uniform. So bravo. It was just 

a splendid job. 

And again I would just say that his presence is actually felt in 

this budget today. The advance procurement in 2007, which Chairman Skelton and Chairman Taylor, along with Mr. Murtha fought 

for to get a Congressional plus-up for the Virginia-class program 

today is bearing fruit with the two-a-year 2011 shipbuilding plan. 

And that would not have happened without his intervention. 

This place moves pretty fast in terms of, you know, the process 

resuming, you know, after some of the folks here leave, and pass 

on. But I think it is important again just to recognize for a moment 

the contribution he made to the Navy, and to this important program. 

Earlier, Mr. Chairman, asked Admiral Roughead the question 

about whether or not the SSBN program could maybe be sort of 

put off. Because it does present financial challenges down the road 

as you pointed out. And you responded. But I want to actually give 

you a chance to maybe expand a little bit in terms of why that is 

a priority for the country right now. You know, a question which 

I always ask you, because people ask why submarines, and again 
36 

if you could maybe enlarge on your earlier answer I would appreciate it. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. Thank you. And now is the time to 

go forward with the replacement for the Ohio-class ballistic missile 

submarine. As I have looked at this, and studied it, and considered 

several of the options as to how best to go forward. 

Given the fact that we will be taking this class of submarine out 

to 2080, we have to ensure that the technology that we put into 

that ship, that its survivability, its reliability, its operational availability enable it to operate not just for that length of time, but in 

the environments where others are going to try to negate that advantage that we have with our ballistic missile submarine fleet. 

So now is the time to begin that process. Now is the time to work 

closely with our friends in the U.K. to ensure that we go forward, 

and bring that submarine in on time. If we delay, I think you rush, 

you suboptimize. And at the end of the day you very well could end 

up spending more money on it than you otherwise would if you 

didn’t have a good, thoughtful design. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And this year’s budget, again, there is money for 

the design aspect of it, which again is consistent with the procurement reform bill that we passed last year, which is to avoid designbuild happening at the same time. But to really sort of think things 

through. 

I guess what I would want to ask just in terms of—you know, 

hopefully this is not wishful thinking. But I mean if we do think 

ahead, and use the best talent possible, and look at successful programs like Virginia class and other shipbuilding, I mean, do you 

think that there is a possibility that we could, you know, potentially get a point where the $6 billion to $7 billion projected cost— 

I mean, we might be able to do a little better than that down the 

road. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. I think we should look at every way 

that we can legitimately take cost out, but yet maintain that capability that we are going to need for the next seven decades. So I 

will be relentless in looking for those opportunities. But I emphasize that it has to legitimately be taken out. It can’t simply be well 

we will build it cheaper, and then you compromise on a lot of other 

things. 

But we owe it to you. We owe it to the taxpayer to make sure 

that every ship that we buy, that we are taking cost out of it in 

every possible way. 

Mr. COURTNEY. All right. Mr. Secretary, you wanted to comment 

at all on that? 

Secretary MABUS. One of the things we tried to do with the 30- 

year shipbuilding plan was to be absolutely realistic in terms of 

what ships would cost. Realistic in terms historically of what Congress has appropriated for ships. But also to show the impact that 

putting the new SSBN in our core budget would have on the rest 

of the fleet. And to be realistic about that so that decisions could 

be made at the appropriate time in terms of how we fund our fleet, 

and how we fund this replacement. 

Mr. COURTNEY. All right. Thank you. I mean obviously this is 

going to be an issue for decades for committees like this. But I fully 
37 

support the effort again to invest in, you know, the planning, and 

designing, because I think that will pay off long term. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. We have two members that haven’t asked questions yet. But let me ask Admiral Roughead—I was at a shipbuilding port not too long ago. And I saw a ship being built for the 

United States Coast Guard. I think it is called the National Security Cutter. And I was just wondering why that particular ship 

that we don’t have to redesign or reconfigure won’t do for the 

Navy? I have seen no request for anything like it or for that particular ship itself. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. And we have looked at a variety of 

options for the type of capabilities we need to meet our—the needs 

of the maritime strategy. And the Coast Guard and the National 

Security Cutter, that ship is optimized for their missions. And as 

we look at what we have to do, and as a Navy, and as a Navy that 

has to have versatility and agility built into our ships. 

Because I think it is important that our ships be able to provide 

for a range of missions, and not simply be focused on one. I would 

say maybe perhaps the exception to that is the ballistic missile 

submarine because of what its mission is. 

But we have to provide for a range of capabilities. For us, speed 

becomes important. And that led us to the LCS. I, since becoming 

CNO, I have looked at the speed requirements again, and I have 

reassured myself that we are in the right place. But what we are 

building now meets the requirements that we have to deliver the 

type of navy the nation needs to be able to operate in the places 

where we expect to have to operate in the future. 

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask, Admiral, for the record, ask some 

bright shipbuilder over the Navy Systems Command to give us the 

pros and cons of that particular ship, including the cost? Would you 

do that for our record? 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 121.] 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir, I will. 

The CHAIRMAN. No rush, 2 or 3 weeks, whatever. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir, I will do that. 

The CHAIRMAN. And it is easy to do, but that would—I really had 

to scratch my head when I saw that ship. You know, why can’t we 

have the plans and we wouldn’t have to start from scratch there. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir, I will do that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Would you do that then? Thank you so much. 

Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you 

again for your service to our country. 

General Conway, what do you see as the primary force protection 

challenges in Afghanistan right now? And does the Marine Corps 

have everything it needs in Afghanistan? 

General CONWAY. Yes, sir, I think it is fair to say that we do 

have everything that we need. That of course has been my number 

one priority since I have been in this job, is to make sure those 

troops, especially at the point of the spear, have everything they 

need. 
38 

That said, we push industry for more. And by that, I am talking 

about personal protective equipment in particular that is more 

lightweight and would not be as burdensome as some of the pictures you have probably seen coming out of Marjah, 80 to 100 

pounds on the backs of some our Marines carrying their 

sustainment load and the things they need to work 24/7. 

We need a helmet that will stop 762 [7.62mm ammunition]. 

Right now, the biggest threat in Marjah is not necessarily the IEDs 

[Improvised Explosive Devices] for our killed in action, it is the 

sniper that can take a long-range shot and can penetrate our protective equipment, particularly the helmet. So we continue to 

pound the table on that with hopes that one day we will have that 

piece of gear in hand. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you. General Conway, are you confident 

that the EFV [Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle] will provide adequate protection against IED threats? How has the program been 

modified to counter this threat? 

General CONWAY. Sir, it is an interesting question, because just 

in the last couple of days we have completed blast tests with the 

EFV as compared to an MRAP [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 

vehicle], an RG33, which is actually the mid-level CAT–2 MRAP. 

I was very pleasantly surprised at how well it progressed. I mean, 

about the same for underbody explosions, and for underwheel or 

undertrack explosions, but actually the EFV was markedly better 

against direct fire and indirect fire. 

I will get you a copy of that study. And by the way, I would asterisk it by saying, because the report did, this is before we apply 

modular armor that we would want to incorporate if we were in an 

IED-rich environment. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, General Conway. General Conway, 

was the decision to delay the EFV’s low-rate production in fiscal 

year 2014 to 2015 based on technology development concerns, or 

was it budget-driven? 

General CONWAY. Congressman, I would say it was probably a 

combination of both. We have seven new vehicles that are paid for 

and are going to be arriving in the test beds throughout the spring 

and summer. There are some KPs—knowledge points—that we 

have to go through with those vehicles to determine what our fullrate production needs to be, to determine if they are going to be 

passed, the reliability concerns that they have had in the past. 

And I think in fairness, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense wanted us to have some of the answers to those 

issues before we got into a full rate of buy-in procurement. 

Mr. COFFMAN. General Conway, how do you plan to integrate the 

MATV [MRAP All Terrain Vehicle] and the MRAP vehicles into 

your current tactical wheeled vehicle fleet management program? 

General CONWAY. Well, sir, we see a future value in, again, the 

smallest of the MRAPs, the CAT–1s, and now the MATVs, which 

is in some ways a replacement for the up-armored Hummer. With 

regard to our combat engineers, our road clearance depths, perhaps 

some other small units. But as was answered earlier, in some ways 

it goes against two years, as a fast and relatively light expeditionary force. 
39 

So we are going to preserve them, keep them available, so if we 

get into another static environment like this in the future, that we 

will have those vehicles available. But again, a small percentage of 

them will be incorporated I think into the TOE [Table of Equipment] of some of our support battalions. 

Mr. COFFMAN. General Conway, in looking at the shipbuilding 

plan, do you have any concerns about the forced entry requirement 

in terms of amphibious capability? 

General CONWAY. Sir, the CNO, under the observance of the Secretary of the Navy, have agreed that 38 is the requirement. We 

have said that we must be willing to accept risk down to about 33 

ships. And if you look at the 30-year shipbuilding plan, it will sort 

of run highs and lows between that 30 and I think we get as high 

as 36 in the out-years. 

But we also need other parts of the fleet to be equally strong. 

You know, we want those surface craft out there that give us the 

force protection shield. We want the support of the aircraft carriers 

if we need their aviation strike capacity. And we want the subs out 

at distance screening the whole of the effort. So we need a strong 

and balanced fleet I think. More amphibs is always better, but we 

understand the fiscal pressures that we are dealing with today. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

It looks like our last questioner is the gentleman from Virginia, 

Mr. Nye. 

Mr. NYE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I want to thank 

you all for being here and for your service to our country. 

And I want to start by saying I just returned from a trip to Afghanistan, and I am particularly impressed with the continued 

dedication of our men and women in uniform out there. Not limited 

to, but particularly including the Marines and sailors who we may 

not expect to see in the desert, but often do. They are doing terrific 

work and I really appreciate what they are doing. I hope you will 

pass our thanks on to those folks. We know we have given them 

a tough mission. 

We have difficult decisions to make here as well, and I don’t 

think anyone would suggest that any of you have an easy job. Just 

looking at an article from Inside the Navy recently, Secretary 

Mabus, you were quoted. 

‘‘Looking ahead at some of the potential future budget constraints that we might face in the coming years, having said expected future resource streams will severely constrain our choices, 

and that reducing Navy and Marine Corps programs to within 

available resources may require difficult and undesirable choices.’’ 

I couldn’t agree with you more. It is a tough position that we are 

in, having to make some decisions in a constrained environment. 

You were also quoted as saying, ‘‘We need to be prepared to 

rethink old assumptions and re-evaluate past practices.’’ Again, I 

agree with that. 

We have to make tough decisions based on scarce resources. We 

have heard a number of issues raised by many members of this 

committee about how we are going to spend our resources and our 

military dollars. And of course, we would all like to make sure that 

they are spent in the most efficient and effective way possible. 
40 

I will tell you, and I am sure it is going to be no surprise to you 

to hear me say that I was disappointed to see in the final QDR language a sentence recommending moving a carrier to Mayport, Florida, and investing a substantial amount of money in building that 

home port, which would be the fifth U.S. nuclear carrier home port. 

We have talked about it before, that is why I don’t think you are 

going to be surprised to hear from me about it today. But I will 

tell you, I was disappointed in a number of things, and one was in 

what I see as a lack of transparency in the decisionmaking process 

that led up to that. I will give you a couple of examples of why that 

troubles me. 

And we talked with the Secretary and Admiral Mullen about it 

in the past couple of weeks. We heard from Secretary Gates that 

he essentially affirmed a statement that Senator Nelson said that 

he had told him about a little over 2 months prior to the QDR 

being issued that—and I want to make sure that I get the wording 

right—but he said I think that they had nothing to worry about. 

We saw some drafts of the QDR come out around December that 

suggested that the optimal solution would be a backup port in 

Mayport, rather than a full home port. And then, different language come out in the final version a few weeks later. 

I asked Admiral Mullen about it in his testimony, and he said 

essentially that it was a judgment call. We have asked over the 

past year for some more strategic analysis of the risks that we are 

trying to mitigate in Norfolk, and I am unsatisfied with the fact 

that I don’t think we have really received that now. 

Under Secretary Flournoy said essentially they had been given 

two viable options to assess and choose between. Having a backup 

port or having a full fifth nuclear carrier home port in Mayport. 

And apparently, according to the QDR language, a decision was 

made to go with the one that costs a lot of money. 

Now, we can argue about the costs, somewhere between half a 

billion and a billion. We think it is going to be on the upper end 

of that. As I mentioned now, I was disappointed with the transparency of the process, or lack thereof. 

But I have asked for a GAO [Government Accountability Office] 

study to be conducted, which has started to lay out on the table all 

of the potential costs included in this type of decision, so we can 

make that tough decision about how we are going to allocate those 

defense dollars. 

But Admiral Roughead, I just wanted to ask you one question. 

Admiral Mullen said in his testimony when I asked him about this, 

about the strategic dispersal issue. And I think you used the words 

today, ‘‘eggs in one basket kind of idea.’’ 

And I asked Admiral Mullen if that type of thinking or philosophy would apply to every military asset or base that we have got, 

not simply nuclear home port for carriers, but every other base, including SSBNs put in Georgia, and other things like strategic 

bombers. 

And he said essentially that, yes, it does apply to anything that 

we are going to have to evaluate like that. Would you agree with 

Admiral Mullen on that? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I would agree that we have to take a good 

look at where we have the redundancies that are important. And 
41 

you cite the case of a strategic ballistic submarine. Their home port 

is in Georgia. But I can take that ship to Groton, Connecticut, and 

maintain it there. I can take that ship to Norfolk, Virginia, and 

maintain it there. So I have three options, even for ballistic missile 

submarines. 

The aircraft carrier on the east coast of the United States is the 

only ship that I have that I do not have another option to put into 

to do either routine or emergent maintenance. 

Mr. NYE. Another option on the East Coast, although there are 

three others on the West Coast, just to make sure we are clear on 

that. 

I think I am out of time. I will submit additional questions for 

the record. But I appreciate we are going to continue working going 

forward on this to find the right use of our defense dollars. And appreciate the work you have put into it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Sestak. 

Mr. SESTAK. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. You bet. 

Mr. SESTAK. Mr. Secretary, CNO, I want to first thank you very 

much for how well you have handled that Petty Officer Roach case 

on accountability of some sailor that had been accused of being gay, 

later was discharged, and you held those accountable for their mistreatment. And I very much appreciate it. If anyone doesn’t think 

that the service doesn’t care about accountability, they should 

know what you both did. Thank you very much. 

But I do have a question, Mr. Secretary, and it may I understand 

from my staff had been asked before. As in that incident we had 

been asking someone to live a lie, to quote the Chairman. It had 

to do against the greatest ideals that we have in the service, that 

is, of integrity, which you stood up and followed. 

I personally don’t understand the year it takes to study the implementation. We can ask the Marine Corps to fly in off of amphibs 

into Pakistan—or into Afghanistan—in 30 days and they can put 

the operation together and make it happen. This is something that 

has to do with our principles, our ideals. 

Why, except for your concern potentially about the legality of it, 

if really does take a year to implement, we cannot at least put out 

an executive order under stop-loss in order to prevent these good 

men and women, particularly in a time of war when we need them, 

from being discharged? 

Besides the legality question that the Defense Department may 

have, because there is obviously various opinion. If that was not 

something, would you be opposed to it, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary MABUS. Congressman, the legality argument on that 

seems to me to be the primary one. And to an earlier question, the 

CNO said that the confusion that would be inherent in something 

like that I think is an important consideration. 

Mr. SESTAK. But besides that, would you be opposed if it was determined to be legal? 

Secretary MABUS. I do think that—my understanding that the 

way the President, as our Commander in Chief, requested Congress 

to change the law, to repeal the law. But also, at the same time, 
42 

he asked the Department of Defense to take a careful look at how 

to implement this law so that—how to implement it should Congress decide to change it so that it would be implemented in a very 

smooth, very professional, very consistent—— 

Mr. SESTAK. Only because of time then—and I don’t mean to be 

rude interjecting—your support of then of that does take that long? 

But I mean you don’t have an opinion then if the legality was 

turned out to be okay. You still feel it needs that type—that length 

of implementation? 

Secretary MABUS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SESTAK. A study? Thank you. I just was curious. I have seen 

the military do things so quickly, and so well. And just—it kind of 

passes me by. But I appreciate your comment. 

Commandant, the Army has testified over the past years, and 

the Chairman agreed with this last month that it cannot meet its 

other war plans elsewhere like 2057 for South Korea—because of 

Army readiness, and because of the lack of training in combined 

arms for example. 

Is the Marine Corps in a similar state? If so, and—because I 

have one last question for the CNO—and if so, how long would it 

take it to be back to where it could respond to that breadth of war 

plans that we have, because of Iraq. 

General CONWAY. Check. We are in the same place. We have 

been focused on counterinsurgency now for a number of years, and 

our forces are very good at that. But in the process we sacrifice sort 

of our combined arms kind of skill levels. We are encouraged that 

if we can stay below 20,000 in Afghanistan we are going to extend 

our home station time to about 14 months after a 7-month deployment. 

And we are going to use a chunk of that time to get back to combined arms. To get back to amphibious types of exercises with the 

Navy—— 

Mr. SESTAK. What length of time do you think it would take if 

you had to guess if we stay below 20,000? 

General CONWAY. Sir, I don’t think it would be one for one. You 

know, we have been away from it now for six years or so. I don’t 

think we will be back in six years. I think we have got to develop 

that expertise, and get it embedded. So I am guessing probably the 

better part of a decade—— 

Mr. SESTAK. Before we can meet the breadth of war plans again? 

General CONWAY. Well, we can meet the war plans now—— 

Mr. SESTAK. On a different timeline? 

General CONWAY. To be as good as we were in 2002 I think—— 

Mr. SESTAK. Okay. 

General CONWAY [continuing]. Is probably going to take 8 to 10 

years. 

Mr. SESTAK. And since I am a sophomore I have to be quick, because Mr. Skelton will cut me right off. But—very quickly. There 

has always been this question about 315 ships. Do you really think 

as we look at how technology—particularly knowledge is so important in warfare, that when using the long metric of numbers of 

ships as far as trying to determine our prowess in the future? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I do not believe we are wrong in looking at 

the numbers of ships. I think it is how we apply those ships, and 
43 

the range of missions, and geographic areas where we are expected 

to be. And you do get to a numbers point as far as being in many 

places doing different things in large ocean areas. And that is 

where the number generates. 

I think there are many who say, you know, we are bigger than 

the next 13 Navies. But the fact of the matter is that our Navy 

really has existed not for a cataclysmic sea battle all the time. But 

rather for that presence, and the security, and the stability that it 

provides. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Before I call on Mr. Franks, I would urge and ask Mr. Secretary 

would you please provide the committee a copy of the ongoing force 

structure assessment when it is complete. We would certainly appreciate that—— 

Secretary MABUS. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Very, very much. I am sitting here 

thinking listening to your testimony how blessed we are to have 

leaders such as you heading the services that you do, and do so 

ably, and so well—people who wear the uniform and work for you— 

I hope that you will carry our appreciation back to them. And General Conway we wish you Godspeed. And we are going to work you 

hard between now and the time we say farewell to you. Admiral 

Roughead, thank you so much for your excellent testimony. And 

welcome Secretary Mabus. We expect a lot of hard work out of you. 

With that, Mr. Franks, and Mr. Taylor will assume the chair. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank all of you. Let me just echo the chairman’s remarks 

related to your service. General Conway, I guess I would single you 

out here a little bit, you know? General MacArthur once said that, 

‘‘Old soldiers don’t die, they just fade away.’’ 

And I know that Marines have a completely different perspective. 

Old Marines don’t die. They just charge in a new direction. And I 

want you to know that we are very, very grateful for your service. 

We talk about freedom in this place, and we know that it is people 

like you that—that carry it with you everywhere you go. And you 

have given your life to the cause. 

And I want you to know that I believe my children, and the children of this country even though they may not remember everything about you will live in a safer place, and walking the light of 

liberty, because you were once commandant of the Marine Corps. 

And thank you very much. 

With that, Secretary Mabus, you know how politicians are? They 

have to hit other politicians. And I don’t—do you think that you 

have a clear unimpeded latitude to speak in complete—in candor 

about the—in public about the short- and long-term resource needs 

of the Department of Navy? 

Secretary MABUS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. Okay. So I guess I have to—you know, I am stuck 

here. I have to ask given that the fleet is the smallest that it has 

been in several decades, and given the growing cost of shipbuilding 

we seem unlikely to reach Admiral Roughead’s 313-ship fleet any 

time soon? I mean, every year for the past 15 years the shipbuilding accounts have been several billion dollars short of what is 
44 

needed. And we primarily underestimate the cost of each new vessel. That kind of goes with it, I guess. 

We face a fighter gap based on of course the Navy testimony of 

upwards of 250 aircraft by 2018. And that is about one half of our 

carrier-based aircraft. And there is a widening gap in the Marine 

Corps reset funding that could approach $30 billion. I mean these 

are pretty short—serious shortfalls in my judgment. 

And of course on the threat side of the equation, the Chinese 

have launched 16 new submarines, and from 2005 and 2007. And 

they have announced that they will design and build a new class 

of destroyers that are also working on—that they are also working 

on the first of likely several carriers. Which in my opinion is it 

seems that China has developed, and is enhancing its—area-denial 

capability based on their aggressive submarine acquisition program, and their acquisition of several—and development of several 

different anti-ship cruise missiles. 

And, I mean, they are just projecting power in a lot of different 

directions. And I think it seems that they are deliberately basing 

that on our assessed vulnerabilities. At least it appears to me that 

way. So my point is—and there is a question in here somewhere— 

the best means of assuring peace in the western Pacific in my judgment is maintaining a sufficient military power in the region to 

deter aggression. It is not a new concept. 

But the QDR was eerily silent on China. And based on your recent comments—and Australia—I mean, it sounds like we maybe 

have a different perspective of that concern. So with all that said, 

do you think and believe that the Navy is programming sufficient 

funds both in fiscal year 2011, and across the future years to fully 

address China’s military expansion? 

Secretary MABUS. Yes, sir. I do. And to talk just very briefly 

about a few of the things that you said. We try to be very realistic 

in this budget, and in this 30-year shipbuilding plan about the cost 

of each of our vessels. Because frankly it doesn’t do us any good 

to come in low, and then continually to ask for more money. If we 

are going to get the size of fleet that we need, we have to be realistic about what they are going to cost. 

We are also taking some pretty aggressive actions to drive down 

the cost of ships. The downselect of the OCS is the thing that 

springs to mind. In terms of our capability in the Pacific, and particularly the western Pacific, we are very mindful of what is happening. The Chinese capabilities and the things that they are 

doing—they haven’t been nearly as transparent about as we would 

like. But we do understand the types of ships they are building. We 

understand the types of anti-access missiles, both ballistic missiles, 

and cruise missiles that they are fielding. And we understand what 

they are doing with their fleet. 

We have great confidence that the ships that we have today, and 

the ships that we are building for the future, and our total force 

concept will meet whatever challenge—and I won’t just limit it to 

the Chinese. That whatever challenge we face in the Pacific, we 

feel that—that the fleet can meet it, and that the Navy and Marine 

Corps team will be there to hedge and deter in a very effective 

way. 
45 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. Well, thank you all. And thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. TAYLOR. [Presiding.] Yes. Thanks to the gentleman. 

The Chair will recognize the gentleman from South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And General Conway, on possibly your last presentation here before the Armed Services Committee, I want to thank you for your 

service. And in the last year I have had the extraordinary opportunity to visit with your Marines at Camp Leatherneck. I was so 

impressed. And then a great honor that I cherish. My wife and I 

being the—reviewing at Parris Island in November. You should be 

so grateful for the young people that you are providing opportunity. 

And Admiral Roughead, I always want to thank you for your 

service at the Naval academy, and then commanding the USS Port 

Royal, which is named after a port in South Carolina. And thank 

you for your service, and hospitality. 

I yield, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

And I would like to take this opportunity to thank all three of 

you gentlemen for your service to our nation. Commandant, we are 

going to miss you. I know you are going to do great things no matter what you do after uniform. But we certainly value every day 

that you have served us. 

Secretary Mabus, we are very, very, lucky that you gave up your 

private sector probably cushy job for this, but we—again, we are 

lucky to have you. 

And Admiral Roughead, we always value you as the only—I believe the only commander of both the Atlantic and the Pacific fleets 

to have served the United States Navy. A very rare, and well-deserved distinction. 

Secretary Mabus, before you leave I would like to hand deliver 

to you a letter that—from myself, Senator Cochran, and Senator 

Wicker. A similar letter was delivered to Northrop Grumman last 

week. And it basically says that the Congress has authorized and 

appropriated five ships—already authorized, already appropriated. 

And yet for whatever reason Northrop and the Navy have not come 

to terms—gotten those ships started. 

The admiral has made an excellent case that he needs a bigger 

fleet. The Congress has already responded to that—appropriating 

the money. We need to get going. And so I don’t know if it is 

Northrop’s delay. I don’t know if it is the Navy’s delay. But there 

is a delay that needs to be addressed that I am going to ask you 

to take a look at that. 

But again thank all of you for your service. And with that, this 

meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 24, 2010 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 24, 2010 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

FEBRUARY 24, 2010 

(121) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The National Security Cutter (NSC) was designed to conduct 

an offshore patrol mission that is very different from Navy missions, and the NSC 

does not meet Navy requirements for speed, draft, survivability, and manpower requirements. The Navy is building the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to meet its Joint 

Staff-validated warfighting requirements. NSC would require significant and costly 

design changes to meet LCS capability requirements, which would likely result in 

the end cost of a modified NSC exceeding that of LCS. A more detailed comparison 

of LCS and NSC characteristics follows. 

In speed, LCS has a sprint speed of more than 40 knots; NSC sprint speed is 28 

knots. In draft, LCS draft is approximately 13 feet to engage threats in the 

Littorals; the NSC draft is 22.5 feet, restricting its access in shallow waters. The 

inability of NSC to meet speed and draft requirements fundamentally limit the 

areas where the NSC can effectively operate. In survivability, LCS is built to Naval 

Vessel Rules and provides Level 1 survivability, which provides for shock hardening, 

protection against chemical, biological, radiological attack, and damage control/firefighting capability against destructive fires. NSC does not provide Level I survivability as it was not designed to operate in the same threat environment as LCS. 

In manpower requirements, LCS has a core crew of 40 personnel with 35 personnel 

comprising the mission package detachment and aviation detachment; the size of 

NSC crew is 110, 35 more than LCS at full mission capability. Additionally, LCS 

is designed to employ modular mission packages that address specific naval capability gaps in mine countermeasures, surface warfare, and anti-submarine warfare. 

NSC does not have the space or ability to employ these mission packages. [See page 

37.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Navy expects all recent ship classes to survive a 100 kilovolts 

per meter (kV/m) event with some degradation to mission possible. Regarding your 

specific question about remaining warfighting capability after an electromagnetic 

pulse (EMP) laydown of 100 kV/m, the answer is classified and I will provide it to 

you via separate correspondence. [See page 17.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 24, 2010 

(125) 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS 

Ms. TSONGAS. The FY10 NDAA contained language that mandated that no funds 

could be obligated by the Navy for construction or advanced procurement of surface 

combatants to be constructed after FY11 until multiple conditions had been met:* 

Submission of an acquisition strategy for surface combatants approved by USD 

AT&L and briefed to and approved by the JROC;* Verification by an independent 

review panel that the Navy considered numerous factors including modeling and 

simulation, operational availability, life cycle costs including manning, cost and 

schedule ramifications of accommodating new sensors and weapons to counter future threats; and* Conclusions of a joint review by SECNAV and Director MDA defining additional requirements for investment in Aegis BMD beyond the number of 

ships planned to be equipped for this mission in the FY 2010 budget submittal. Further, the FY10 NDAA required an update to the Navy’s Open Architecture report 

to Congress upon submittal of the FY12 budget to reflect the Navy’s combat systems 

acquisition plans for surface combatants. It also mandated submission of an update 

to the 2006 Naval Surface Fires Support report to Congress identifying capability 

shortfalls. Finally, the language directed the Navy to develop a plan to incorporate 

new technologies from DDG–1000 and other surface combatant programs into ships 

constructed after 2011 to avoid redundant development, implement open architecture and foster competition. To date, the Navy has not satisfied these requirements. 

The FY10 NDAA contained language that mandated that no funds could be obligated by the Navy for construction or advanced procurement of surface combatants 

to be constructed after FY11 until several conditions had been met, including 

verification by an independent review panel that the Navy considered numerous factors as part of establishing their shipbuilding plan and considered new technologies 

from more recent ship classes than the DDG–51. 

Such an independent assessment of needs and options seems particularly germane 

to our hearing today. Both the FY11 President’s budget and 30-year shipbuilding 

plan you submitted this year is heavily based on DDG–51, one would assume this 

is a result of the aforementioned analyses, strategies and reviews. When would you 

expect the Navy to submit the results of this independent assessment that supports 

the plan you’ve submitted? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. On February 6, 2010, the Secretary of the Navy submitted 

to the congressional defense committees a plan for implementing the language contained in Section 125 of Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA), Public Law 111–84. 

In addition, the Navy has completed the following actions: 

• Completed the development of the Technology Roadmap for Surface Combatants 

and Fleet Modernization February 2010 in accordance with Section 125(d) of the 

FY 2010 NDAA. • The update to the Naval Surface Fire Support Report to Congress was delivered 

on March 11, 2010. 

As reported in the Navy’s implementation plan report to Congress, an independent panel, jointly established by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN(RD&A)) and the Deputy Chief of Naval 

Operations, Integration of Capabilities and Resources (OPNAV N8) reviewed the 

Navy’s future guided missile destroyer hull and radar study of 2009. This independent panel was comprised of senior subject matter experts with extensive background in policy, acquisition, research and development, radar and ship design, combat systems integration, budget and cost analysis. Results of the Navy study, along 

with the independent review panel’s report, have been briefed to the congressional 

defense committees’ staff; members of the House Armed Services Committee received a brief on March 11, 2010. The full Navy study and independent review panel 

report will be provided this Spring. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY 

Mr. THORNBERRY. General Conway, you serve as the DOD Executive Agent for 

Non-Lethal Weapons. The 2009 Marine Corps S&T Strategic Plan identifies a num-
126 

ber of capabilities required to address irregular warfare needs in the future including interim force capabilities. Yet the budget for these is stale at about $100 million 

per year and several promising programs aren’t making their way from R&D into 

the field. What needs to happen to encourage wide-spread adoption of these capabilities across all services? Would legislation empowering your Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Office be useful to you? For example, does the office need to become a joint program office? 

General CONWAY. The DOD NLW Executive Agent has an ongoing independent 

assessment by the Center for Naval Analysis that is researching this question and 

that is nearing conclusion. Additional time is needed by the DOD NLWEA to review 

the CNA report, assess its findings and make a recommendation on the way forward. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. AKIN 

Mr. AKIN. I have been briefed that the Navy requires a 5-to-1 ratio of non-deployed to deployed ships in order to support its surface combatant mission. Given 

the added requirement for afloat BMD, how many more BMD-capable ships will the 

Navy need in order to support this mission without negatively impacting the safety 

and support of the Carrier Strike Group? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. In conjunction with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), we 

adjusted the Aegis BMD Program of Record (POR) to increase the total number of 

funded Aegis BMD-capable ships across the FYDP from 21 to 38, of which 27 will 

be deployable in FY15. Increasing the inventory of Surface Combatants with BMD 

capability gives the Navy greater flexibility to meet Combatant Commander surge 

and contingency operations requirements, and to provide an organic BMD capability 

to our CSGs. 

Mr. AKIN. In your testimony you mentioned using SLEP as a primary mitigation 

strategy for the Strike Fighter Shortfall problem, yet I have been briefed by the 

Navy that Fleet OPTEMPO is the primary limiting factor for how many jets can 

undergo SLEP per year. If the Navy has already optimized the number of jets it 

is able to SLEP annually, how will this measure be able to do in the future what 

it is apparently unable to do now? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. According to the current planning schedule, the SLEP window of opportunity for F/A–18A–D does not occur until FY 2012, when modifications 

to our F/A–18A–D aircraft begin. The Navy is developing a FY 2012 budget request 

that will include SLEP requirements. 

SLEP is only one aspect of the Navy’s TACAIR inventory management initiatives 

targeted at preserving the service life of our existing legacy strike fighter aircraft 

(F/A–18A–D). The Navy will reduce the number of aircraft available in our squadrons during non-deployed phases to the minimum required. Navy expeditionary 

squadrons and those supporting the Unit Deployment Program (UDP) will be reduced from 12 aircraft to 10 aircraft per squadron on an as-required basis. These 

measures reduce the operational demand on legacy F/A–18s, making more aircraft 

available for induction into life extension events. The Navy is also evaluating depot 

level efficiency to maximize throughput and return legacy strike fighter aircraft to 

the Fleet. Collectively, these measures will extend the service life of the legacy aircraft and make the projected inventory decrease manageable. The management initiatives being implemented prudently balance operational risks and requirements 

today, while seeking to fulfill future projected capacity and capability requirements. 

Mr. AKIN. The JSF continues to be plagued by delays. Most recently, it was reported that the IOC date for the Air Force will slide roughly two years to late CY 

2015. In the past year the JSF completed only roughly 10% of its planned test 

flights. Given that the Navy has traditionally been the service with the most stringent OP/EVAL requirements prior to IOC, and given that the Navy is scheduled to 

receive the carrier variant of the JSF last, how will these delays effect the Navy’s 

IOC date? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Based on the SECDEF approved F–35 program restructure 

and delivery of FY 2011 procured aircraft, the Navy F–35C IOC has been changed 

to 2016. 

The Navy IOC is based on three items: sufficient aircraft quantities, desired capability to conduct all Operational Requirements Document missions, and completion 

of operational test of delivered capability. The Navy’s intent is to stand up squadrons as aircraft become available and declare IOC when sufficient capability is tested and delivered. 

Mr. AKIN. Will the Navy accept an inordinate risk by abandoning its long-held 

standards for thorough test and evaluation in order to IOC the JSF in accordance 
127 

with a predetermined timeframe, or will the Navy proceed with its customary diligence, thereby exacerbating the Strike Fighter Gap? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The Navy will not abandon its long-held standards. Based on 

the program and test schedule restructure and delivery of FY 2011 procured aircraft, the Navy F–35C IOC has been revised to be in 2016 based on three items: 

sufficient aircraft quantities; desired capability to conduct all Operational Requirements Document missions; and completion of operational test of delivered capability. 

F–35 test program risks will be mitigated through the continuation of a test program assessment and the support and advice of the OSD Director of Operational 

Test and Evaluation. An Integrated Test Review Team composed of experts in Developmental Test and Operational Test continues to mature test program plans to 

ensure program technical maturity is aligned with IOC dates; operational assessments are optimized; new opportunities for integrated test are matured; test schedule margins are realistic; and the proposed flow of technical data enables the 

planned operational test periods. 

To mitigate aircraft assets required during testing, the program is adding one carrier variant (CV) aircraft to the SDD program to expand developmental testing capacity; utilization of three Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) aircraft in support 

of development testing; and addition of another software development/test capability. 

The Navy, in conjunction with OSD and the USAF, is pursuing every opportunity 

to increase efficiency of test and accelerate delivery of required capability to maximize our strike fighter inventory. We will stand up squadrons as aircraft become 

available and declare IOC when sufficient capability is tested and delivered. 

Mr. AKIN. I have been briefed that the Marine Corps intends to IOC the JSF on 

time, regardless of where the F–35 stands with respect to test and evaluation. Given 

the overwhelming delays in test for the F–35, this could potentially require the Marine Corps to IOC a weapons system long before it is fully tested. Is it wise to take 

assets and resources away from our ongoing operational requirements in order to 

prematurely force the introduction of an aircraft that is not even optimized for the 

fight we are currently in today? 

General CONWAY. The Marine Corps plans to IOC with a multi-mission capable 

Block 2B aircraft as described in the JSF Operational Requirements Document 

(ORD) CN–3. A USMC IOC is projected to be 2012 for the F–35B which is based 

on operational requirements and the associated metrics that encompass capabilities, 

equipment, training, and support that will measure the progress of the program to 

meet the USMC requirements between now and December 2012 and enable the Marine Corps to ensure all the elements required for operational use of the F–35B are 

ready. An IOC declaration will be dependent upon meeting these requirements. 

No assets or resources are being taken away from operational requirements to 

IOC. The USMC transition to the F–35B is structured and scheduled to meet operational requirements throughout the process without degradation. 

Mr. AKIN. Your Harrier squadrons currently have 16 aircraft each. One of the 

‘‘Management Levers’’ the DoN has briefed to me as a means of mitigating Strike 

Fighter Shortfalls is to reduce the number of aircraft in expeditionary F/A–18 

squadrons by 2. Yet, they have also informed me that this ‘‘management lever’’ is 

not possible given existing operational requirements. Knowing that the Marine 

Corps requires its existing number of jets in order to support its current share of 

sorties, it seems reasonable to assume that the Marine Corps likewise requires its 

existing compliment of Harriers as well. Will you be replacing Harrier Squadrons 

with an equivalent number of F–35’s? If not, how will this impact current operational demand? 

Will the rate at which you plan to replace Harriers meet current operational requirements? 

General CONWAY. The key enabler the AV–8B provides is the ability to deploy as 

part of a composite Air Combat Element (ACE) within the Marine Expeditionary 

Units (MEU) as part of our basic Marine Air Ground Task Force maneuver element. 

An integrated Tactical Aviation capability at this level provides the ability to 

project, protect, and prosecute combat operations when and wherever required. The 

F–35B STOVL Joint Strike Fighter leverages off the AV–8B’s proven legacy in this 

environment and adds the multi-mission capabilities of the F/A–18 aircraft that will 

evolve our MEU’s into far more superior force in readiness. 

We have seven standing MEU’s and the requirement to continue this force in the 

future has been repeatedly vetted and validated. Replacing the AV–8B’s with a similar number F–35B’s is the plan to maintain the capabilities to meet our operational 

requirements. Our procurement plans support the transition of the Harrier squadrons with the Lightening II aircraft, same number of aircraft supporting the same 

number of MEU’s with one noted addition. When a 6 aircraft Detachment deploys 
128 

with the ACE as it does today with the Harrier, the remaining combat capability 

of the F–35B in the ten aircraft left behind has the same resident capabilities of 

our other fourteen 10 aircraft squadrons that are replacing the Hornets. With this 

construct of the F–35B squadrons, seven 16 aircraft squadrons and fourteen 10 aircraft squadrons, we take our tactical aviation capabilities into a common single type 

of aircraft with all the associated synergy and savings while increasing our MAGTF 

combat capabilities. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. Six amphibious ships will be decommissioned within the next three 

years, bringing the amphibious force to below 30. This brings the risk level to above 

what Navy and Marine Corps defines as the ‘‘limit of acceptable risk.’’ Understanding that the Navy plans to retain these vessels in the inactive fleet, rather 

than selling or dismantling them, what would be the cost of continuing to operate 

the vessels? What prevents the Navy from retaining these ships? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The cost of maintaining ships past their design life is difficult to forecast accurately; however, the table below provides Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) estimates absent specific ship studies to determine if extending the 

service lives of these ships through the FYDP is feasible. 

Navy retires ships from service when changes in mission or threat environment 

over the period of a ship’s commissioned service, or deterioration in overall seaworthiness, make the ship no longer viable or cost-effective for future service. The 

LHA 1 Class does not meet the challenges of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) integration. 

The LPD 4 Class ships have reached or exceeded their expected service lives of 40 

years, and provide limited C5I capability to support USMC current and future missions. 

Our 30-year shipbuilding plan provides a projected battle force that balances the 

anticipated risk across the FYDP with the security uncertainties of the future to 

achieve the best balance of mission capabilities, resources, and requirements. 

Ship Date of 

Commission 

Age 

in FY15 

Unfunded Costs FY11–15 ($ Millions/FY11 dollars) 

Ops and Maint Manpower* Training** Total 

USS NASSAU LHA 4 28-Jul-79 36 289 439 55 783 

USS PELELIU LHA 5 3-May-80 35 322 250 30 602 

USS CLEVELAND LPD 7 21-Apr-67 48 95 151 19 265 

USS DUBUQUE LPD 8 1-Sep-67 48 149 151 19 319 

USS DENVER LPD 9 26-Oct-68 46 176 87 10 273 

USS PONCE LPD 15 10-Jul-71 44 146 120 14 280 

TOTAL (FY11–15) 1177 1198 147 2522 

* Manpower costs programmed in the year of decommissioning are 1⁄2 of a full year requirement; reflects MPN/RPN/DHAN/R and 

OMN. ** Training reflects MPN/RPN/DHAN/R for Individuals Account for ships listed. 

All values are in $M (FY11). 

Mr. WILSON. With the projected fighter shortfall and the further sliding of the 

JSF, why is the Navy not planning on purchasing additional F/A–18EIF aircraft? 

Though the JSF will show significant stealth improvements over the E/F, the SuperHornet has significant improvements in signature improvements over the legacy 

Hornets. Do you believe that advances in air defense over the next several years 

will lead to such a tactical risk that it is worth taking the strategic risk of such 

a substantial force structure gap? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The F/A–18E/F is a highly capable aircraft designed to meet 

and defeat today’s threats with growth potential for the future; however, it cannot 

replace the F–35C. I remain committed to the JSF program because of the advanced 

sensor, precision strike, firepower, and stealth capabilities JSF will bring to our 

Fleet. We are monitoring the JSF program closely and managing our existing strike 

fighter capacity to meet power projection demands until JSF is delivered. The management initiatives being implemented prudently balance operational risks and requirements today, while seeking to fulfill future projected capacity and capability requirements. 

Mr. WILSON. The increased operational tempo of the past six years has led to 

much talk about strategies for increasing dwell times for Marines. Many units have 

been operating on a less than one-to-one dwell-to-deployed time. This has led to a 
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substantial lack of training time, and hindered readiness. Have you abandoned the 

two-to-one dwell-to-deployed ideal? What strategies are you pursuing to ensure that 

Marines will be properly trained for both their primary and contingency missions? 

General CONWAY. 

• To date, almost 75 percent of the available Marines have deployed in support 

of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM, or other operational commitments around the globe. 

• Individual Deployment Tempo. We measure individual deployment tempo on 

a two-year sliding scale—the number of days deployed out of the previous 730 

days. In the last seven years, we have seen a twentyfold increase in the individual deployment tempo of Marines in the active component. In October 2002, 

the number of Marines who deployed for at least 120 consecutive days in a twoyear period was 4,845. As of January 2010, 100,760 Marines had deployed for 

at least 120 consecutive days. 

• Unit Operational Tempo. The metric we use to measure unit operational 

tempo is the ratio of ‘‘deployment to dwell’’—months deployed to months at 

home station. We limit the duration of deployments for units and individual 

Marines to no more than seven months for battalions and squadrons. Higher 

headquarters units deploy for one year. 

• Our goal is to achieve a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio in the active component 

and a 1:5 ratio in the reserve component. Our reserve units are currently operating at a ratio that more closely approximates a ratio of 1:4, while many of 

our active component units, on average, are nearing the goal of 1:2 (see Table 

1). 

Table 1. MAGTF Unit Deployment-to-Dwell Ratios 

MAGTF Element Average Ratio 

(Months Deployed: Months Home Station) 

Command Element 1 : 1.43 

Ground Combat Element 1 : 2.08 

Aviation Combat Element 1 : 2.11 

Logistics Combat Element 1 : 1.79 

Note: As of 18 Nov 2009. The subordinate units most frequently deployed are Intelligence Battalions, 1:1.01 (Command Element); Infantry Battalions, 1:1.78 (Ground Combat Element); VMU Squadrons, 1:1.10, and Attack Helicopter Squadrons, 1:1.28 (Aviation Combat Element); and Explosive Ordnance Disposal Companies 1:1.30 (Logistics Combat Element). 

Mr. WILSON. Sustained level of combat has led to a large gap between equipment 

the Marine Corps needs fixed or replaced and what has been fixed or replaced. Additionally the Maritime Prepositioning Ships’ inventories have been greatly depleted. 

Do you have a proposed timeline for getting the Marine Corps back on track with 

the equipment they need? Is there a move to replenish the Maritime Prepositioning 

supplies? 

General CONWAY. 

Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) 

Our Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadrons (MPSRONs) will be reset with the 

most capable equipment possible. We have begun loading them with capabilities 

that support lower spectrum operations while still maintaining the ability to generate Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) capable of conducting major combat 

operations. As we modernize, apply lessons learned, and reset our MPSRONs their 

readiness will fluctuate. However, our endstate is all three MPSRONs fully reset 

by 2012 and Marine Corps Prepositioning Program–Norway (MCPP–N) reset within 

Marine Corps priorities as assets become available. 

The MPSRONs are currently rotating through Maritime Prepositioning Force 

Maintenance Cycle–9. MPSRON–1 completed MPF Maintenance Cycle–9 in September 2008 and is currently at 83 percent of its full equipment set. As has been 

addressed in previous reports, equipment from MPSRON–1 was required to outfit 

new units standing up in Fiscal Year 2007 and Fiscal Year 2008 as part of our end 

strength increase to 202,000. While the majority of combat systems are loaded, 

MPSRON–1 is short a portion of its motor transport, communications and bulk fuel/ 

water storage capability. MPSRON–1 is expected to be fully reset at the completion 

of its next maintenance cycle in 2011. 

Equipment from MPSRON–2 was offloaded to support Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II. During its rotation through MPF Maintenance Cycle–9, between August 

2008 and July 2009, the readiness of MPSRON–2 was substantially improved from 

49 percent to its current readiness of 77 percent. Upon integration of MPSRON–2’s 

fifth ship, a Large, Medium Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ship in Jan 2011 and 
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completion of its MPF Maintenance Cycle–10 rotation in fiscal year 2012, 

MPSRON–2 is expected to be fully reset. 

MPSRON–3 was reset to 100 percent of its equipment set during MPF Maintenance Cycle–8 in March 2007. MPSRON–3 is rotating through MPF Maintenance 

Cycle–9 and currently has three ships of equipment downloaded at Blount Island 

Command. Two of MPSRON–3’s ships were employed in Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE in Haiti and provided the Marine Expeditionary Units and Naval Support Elements with the additional equipment and supplies necessary to support immediate relief. The goal is, upon completion of its MPF Maintenance Cycle–9 and 

backload of all vessels, in July 2010 MPSRON–3 will return to 100 percent. 

Marine Corps Prepositioning Program: Norway 

The Marine Corps Prepositioning Program—Norway (MCPP–N) was used to 

source equipment in support of operations in Iraqi and Afghanistan, including the 

recent force increase. MCPP–N is routinely utilized to support theater security cooperation activities and exercises in the AFRICOM and EUCOM areas of responsibility. The Marine Corps continues to reset MCPP–N in accordance with our operational priorities while also exploring other locations for geographic prepositioning 

that will enable combat and theater security cooperation operations in support of 

forward deployed Naval Forces. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MCMORRIS RODGERS 

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. Like many, I am concerned about the lack of number 

of ships in the Navy. About 100 years ago, Great Britain was a world super power. 

It was also during this time that Great Britain dominated the sea. Are you concerned that if we don’t make it a priority to build ships to maintain our sea dominance that this could weaken our country’s super power standing? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. As our security and prosperity are inextricably linked with 

those of other nations, a global Fleet is essential to deterring aggression, assuring 

our allies, building partnerships, and protecting our national interests. A Fleet of 

no less than 313 ships is necessary to meet those operational requirements. Our 30– 

Year shipbuilding plan grows the capacity of our Fleet to 320 ships by 2024, with 

the naval capabilities necessary to meet the challenges the nation faces over the 

next three decades of the 21st century. On balance, I believe the force structure represented by our 30-year shipbuilding plan maintains our ability to project power 

across the spectrum of challenges we are likely to face throughout the time period 

of the report, albeit with prudent risk where appropriate. 

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. Wouldn’t you agree that spouses relying on the Military Spouse Career Advancement Account (MyCAA) program to further their academic goals should have been notified prior to the temporary stay in order to make 

the necessary arrangements with their school? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I do agree that spouses should have been afforded additional 

notice in advance of such a significant change in program policies or procedures. 

The pause was necessitated by an unforeseen, unprecedented spike in enrollments, 

which not only pushed the program to its budget threshold, but also began to overwhelm the program’s support systems. As a senior leader who recognizes the extraordinary role military spouses play in the lives and careers of our uniformed 

service members, I share the Department’s deep regret in reaching the decision to 

temporarily suspend the program on such short notice. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. The Administration’s Phased, Adaptive Approach to BMD drives 

BMD-capable ships to provide effects at three very different levels of war. First, 

they must provide theater effects for sea-base defense. They must also provide regional and cross-regional effects to areas like CENTCOM and/or PACOM. Finally 

they must be able to provide effects for homeland defense (global effects). This is 

a daunting task. Is the C3 (command, control, communications) architecture in place 

to enable BMD-capable ships to perform all of these functions? What initiatives are 

underway to connect the sensors and shooters to provide a layered missile defense 

that protects not only our forces abroad but the Homeland? Is there a cost to other 

missions when these ships are conducting their BMD mission? How would you 

quantify the risk based on this expanded tasking? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. C3 (command, control, communications) architecture is in 

place to enable BMD-capable ships to perform all three levels of war. The Navy contributes to BMD as part of a Joint and coalition family of systems. As new capabilities are added, the existing Missile Defense Agency managed C3 architecture is up-
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dated to ensure interoperability and effectiveness. The key C3 interface between 

BMD ships and the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) is in place. In most 

Combatant Commands (COCOM), the capability exists but requires further upgrades and enhancements. The Navy is currently resourcing Maritime Operations 

Centers (MOC) with access to the Command and Control Battle Management and 

Communications (C2BMC) applications to increase Command and Control 

connectivity with the Global BMDS. The Navy is addressing communication improvements to support seamless BMDS integration across Theater, Regional and 

Strategic Communications for BMD cueing and track management. A majority of 

this capability, such as Multi-TADIL–J, exists currently. 

Initiatives are being undertaken to connect the sensors and shooters in a layered 

missile defense that protects not only our forces abroad but also the Homeland. The 

spiral development of C2BMC includes continuous improvements which will enhance coordination across Navy, Joint and Coalition sensors, contributing to Homeland Defense and theater and regional missions. 

Mission prioritization is directed at the highest levels of the DOD and is based 

on Combatant Commander (CCDR) requirements. Naval operations, to include maritime BMD, are led by Maritime Component Commanders at theater Maritime Operations Centers (MOC), and effectively employ multi-mission Surface Combatants 

with BMD capability to meet CCDR requirements. Regular CCDR sponsored exercises and test events are used to benchmark and improve coordination among commanders in theater, cross-regional, and Homeland defense operations. Navy has also 

added BMD scenarios to Fleet battle experiments and exercises to identify and test 

additional enhancements. 

The BMD mission does not represent an increase in overall risk, but rather a reduction in risk to our deployed forces and interests around the globe. That said, the 

Navy has a finite number of surface combatants to conduct numerous missions. 

Combatant Commanders balance theater level requirements, forces and risk in carrying out their missions, to include BMD. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Our potential adversaries have shown the capability and willingness to deny our forces access to satellite communications either through the use 

of anti-satellite weapons or communications jamming. While anti-satellite technology is a very real threat, proven by China’s January 2007 shoot down of one of 

their aging satellites, the technology to interfere with satellite communications is 

simple and readily available worldwide from any local Radio Shack store. What specific measures has the U.S. Navy taken to ensure that it can continue to provide 

missile defense in a satellite communications denied environment? I understand if 

this requires a classified response, but I encourage you to share what you can with 

this committee in both an unclassified and classified response. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The Navy currently has a number of mitigation techniques 

to counter jamming threats available for use in a Satellite Communications 

(SATCOM) degraded environment. Use of frequency hopping, agile spot beams, and 

spread spectrum techniques provide low probability of detection and intercept of our 

SATCOM. The Department of the Navy studies SATCOM degraded environment 

mitigations through our Range of Warfare Command and Control initiative, better 

preparing our forces to meet their operational requirements despite others’ efforts 

to disrupt them. The Navy is capable of conducting its missions in this challenging 

environment, to include missile defense. Through these efforts, and in cooperation 

with the joint and interagency community on the development of other mitigations, 

like the Joint Aerial Layer Network, the Navy will be poised to operate in the most 

challenging electromagnetic environments now and in the years to come. 

If you desire further elaboration on the Navy’s mitigation techniques and initiatives, I can provide a classified response or have my staff brief you on the issue in 

more detail. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER 

Mr. HUNTER. Secretary Mabus, as you may know, in the FY10 NDAA report language was included regarding the Miramar Air Station Trap and Skeet range. The 

provision in the NDAA directs the ‘‘Secretary to submit a report to the Committee 

on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the 

House of Representatives when the PA/SI is complete. The report should include a 

description of any mitigation measures needed and timeline to complete, and plans 

and timeline to reopen the range.’’ It is my understanding that the PA/SI was completed in December 2009. Can you please tell me what the status is of your report 

to both the SASC and HASC as well as when it will be available for our review? 
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Secretary MABUS. The Preliminary Assessment report is complete. The Site Inspection report was recently revised to reflect regulatory agency comments and was 

finalized March 18, 2010. Based on the results of these studies, the Report to Congress required by the House Report 2647 of the FY10 NDAA is currently being prepared and will be provided to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees 

in the next 60 days. Copies of the Preliminary Assessment and the Site Inspection 

reports will also be made available to the Committees. 

Mr. HUNTER.. General Conway, it is my understanding that the Marine Corps has 

developed a roll-on, roll-off technology that expands the capability of the KC–130J. 

The Harvest Hawk program will enable the KC–130J to fulfill multiple missions individually or simultaneously from refueling missions, including fire support missions and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. I am encouraged by the Marine Corps’ work with Harvest Hawk and their plan to increase the 

capability of the KC–130J aircraft in order to take advantage of the extended endurance of the KC–130J. What is the status of the Harvest Hawk developmental effort 

and when do you expect to be able to field the capability? 

General CONWAY. Harvest Hawk is currently in developmental test and is expected to deploy during the summer 2010. 

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