[Cite as State v. Howard, 2016-Ohio-426.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 CLARK COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee

v. 

DERON HOWARD 

Defendant-Appellant 

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Appellate Case No. 2015-CA-3 

Trial Court Case No. 2014-CR-418 

(Criminal Appeal from 

Common Pleas Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 5th day of February, 2016. 

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RYAN A. SAUNDERS, Atty. Reg. No. 0091678, Assistant Clark County Prosecuting 

Attorney, 50 East Columbia Street, Fourth Floor, Springfield, Ohio 45502 

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

RICHARD KAPLAN, Atty. Reg. No. 0029406, P.O. Box 751192, Dayton, Ohio 45475 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

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WELBAUM, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Deron Howard, appeals from his conviction in the Clark 

County Court of Common Pleas after he pled guilty to one count of breaking and entering. 
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Howard contends that his guilty plea is invalid because the trial court failed to properly 

advise him of his right to a jury trial as required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). He also claims 

that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered because the trial 

court failed to inquire about his ability to read and write. For the reasons outlined below, 

we conclude that the trial court sufficiently explained Howard’s rights during his plea 

hearing and that his plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Therefore, the 

judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. 

Facts and Course of Proceedings 

{¶ 2} On June 23, 2014, the Clark County Grand Jury returned an indictment 

charging Howard with one count of breaking and entering in violation of R.C. 2911.13(A), 

a felony of the fifth degree. Although Howard initially pled not guilty to the charge, on 

December 9, 2014, he appeared in court and pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. 

In exchange for Howard’s guilty plea, the State agreed to recommend a nine-month prison 

term. The State also agreed not to seek more than a 27-month prison term for two 

separate charges of burglary pending against Howard in Case No. 2014-CR-668. 

{¶ 3} At the plea hearing, the trial court determined that Howard had signed the 

written plea agreement, reviewed the plea agreement with his attorney, and understood 

everything in the agreement, which was filed with the court on December 10, 2014. The 

trial court also engaged in a plea colloquy with Howard, part of which included the 

following discussion: 

THE COURT: Do you understand that you do have the right to a trial 

in this case? 
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THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: At that trial you would have several rights. You would 

have the right to require the State to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt each and every element of the 

offense to which you’re pleading guilty, and you could 

only be convicted upon the unanimous verdict of a jury. 

You would have the right to confront witness who testify 

against you, and your attorney could cross-examine 

those witnesses. You would have the right to use the 

Court’s subpoena power to compel the attendance of 

witnesses on your behalf, and you would also have the 

right to testify, but you could not be forced to do so. 

Do you understand all of those rights? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 

Trans. of Plea Hearing and Disposition (Dec. 9, 2014), p. 11. 

{¶ 4} Following the plea colloquy, the trial court found that Howard had knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights and entered a plea of guilty. 

Based on Howard’s plea, the trial court found him guilty as charged and sentenced him 

to the agreed upon prison term of nine months. Howard now appeals from his conviction, 

raising one assignment of error for review. 

Assignment of Error 

{¶ 5} Howard’s sole assignment of error is as follows: 
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THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR TO THE 

PREJUDICE OF MR. HOWARD WHEN IT FAILED TO PROPERLY 

ADVISE HIM OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND FOUND THAT HE 

KNOWINGLY[,] VOLUNTARILY AND INTELLIGENTLY WAIVED HIS 

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AS SET FORTH IN CRIMINAL RULE 11. 

{¶ 6} Under his single assignment of error, Howard contends that his guilty plea is 

invalid because the trial court did not strictly comply with the requirements of 

Crim.R.11(C)(2)(c). In support of this claim, Howard argues that the trial court did not 

properly advise him of his right to a jury trial, because during the plea colloquy, the court 

informed him that he had the right to a “trial” as opposed to a “jury trial.” Howard also 

claims that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered because the 

trial court did not inquire about his ability to read and write at the plea hearing. We find 

no merit to either of Howard’s claims. 

1. Right to Jury Trial 

{¶ 7} As noted above, Howard claims that the trial court failed to properly inform 

him of his right to a jury trial as required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). “Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) 

requires that the defendant be advised of the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one’s 

accusers, the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to compulsory 

process to obtain witnesses, and the right to require the state to prove guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 

62, ¶ 19. A trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11 as it pertains to the waiver of 

these constitutional rights. State v. Barker, 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 2011-Ohio-4130, 953 
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N.E.2d 826, ¶ 15, citing Veney at ¶ 18. “A guilty plea is constitutionally infirm when the 

defendant is not informed in a reasonable manner that his plea waives those rights.” 

State v. Eggers, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2011-CA-48, 2013-Ohio-3174, ¶ 11, citing State v. 

Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981). 

{¶ 8} “Failure to use the exact language contained in Crim.R. 11(C), in informing a 

criminal defendant of his constitutional right to a trial and the constitutional rights related 

to such trial, including the right to trial by jury, is not grounds for vacating a plea as long 

as the record shows that the trial court explained these rights in a manner reasonably 

intelligible to that defendant.” (Citation omitted.) Ballard at paragraph two of the 

syllabus. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Ohio has “recognized that a trial court can 

still convey the requisite information on constitutional rights to the defendant even when 

the court does not provide a word-for-word recitation of the criminal rule, so long as the 

trial court actually explains the rights to the defendant.” Veney at ¶ 27. Moreover, “an 

alleged ambiguity during a Crim.R. 11 oral plea colloquy may be clarified by reference to 

other portions of the record, including the written plea, in determining whether the 

defendant was fully informed of the right in question.” Barker at ¶ 25. 

{¶ 9} In Ballard, the Supreme Court upheld an appellant’s guilty plea even though 

the court failed to specifically mention the right to a jury trial by name, but rather informed 

the appellant that “neither judge nor jury could draw any inference if the appellant refused 

to testify” and then stated that appellant “was entitled to a fair and impartial trial under 

law.” Ballard at 481. The Supreme Court concluded that, taken together, these 

advisements were sufficient to inform the appellant of his right to a jury trial. Id. 

{¶ 10} Similarly, in State v. Courtney, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2013-CA-73, 2014-Ohio-
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1659, this court held that a trial court sufficiently explained the defendant’s right to a jury 

trial during its plea colloquy when it stated that the defendant had “the right to a trial” and 

explained that: “At that trial you would have the right to require the State to prove beyond 

a reasonable doubt each and every element of the offense to which you are pleading 

guilty, and you could only be convicted upon the unanimous verdict of a jury.” (Emphasis 

sic.) Id. at ¶ 9. In so holding, we explained that “an average person of Courtney’s age 

and intelligence would know that a trial requiring a ‘unanimous verdict of a jury’ to convict 

necessitates a jury trial[.]” Id. Accord State v. Smiddy, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2014-CA-148, 

2015-Ohio-4200. 

{¶ 11} In this case, Howard is challenging his plea on the same grounds as the 

defendant in Courtney under nearly identical circumstances. Like Courtney, Howard 

claims the trial court did not properly advise him of his right to a jury trial because the 

court only stated that he had the right to a “trial” as opposed to a “jury trial.” However, 

as in Courtney, the trial court also stated that Howard “could only be convicted upon the 

unanimous verdict of a jury.” We find that these statements reasonably explained 

Howard’s right to a jury trial in a manner that Howard could understand. Howard was 30 

years old at the time of the plea and there is no indication in the record that he lacked the 

intelligence to understand the court’s explanation. Therefore, in following our holding in 

Courtney, we find that the trial court’s plea colloquy conveyed the requisite information 

regarding Howard’s right to a jury trial. 

{¶ 12} Regardless, even if the court’s explanation was ambiguous, which it is not, 

the written plea form signed by Howard specifically referenced his right to a jury trial. 

Specifically, the written plea form states: “I understand by pleading guilty I give up my 
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right to a jury trial * * *.” Plea Agreement (Dec. 10, 2014), Clark County Court of Common 

Pleas Case No. 2014-CR-418, Docket No. 17, p. 3. Howard advised the trial court that 

he reviewed the plea form with his attorney and that he understood everything contained 

therein. Accordingly, the record reveals that Howard was fully informed of his right to a 

jury trial. 

{¶ 13} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court strictly complied 

with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) when it advised Howard of his right to a jury trial. Therefore, 

Howard’s claim to the contrary is overruled. 

2. Ability to Read and Write 

{¶ 14} Howard also contends that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 

plead guilty because the trial court did not inquire about his ability to read and write at the 

plea hearing. “By following [Crim.R.11(C)], a court ensures that the plea is knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary.” State v. Cole, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26122, 2015-Ohio3793, ¶ 12, citing State v. Redavide, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26070, 2015-Ohio-3056, 

¶ 12. In addition to the constitutional rights previously discussed, Crim.R. 11(C) provides 

that, before accepting a guilty or no-contest plea, a court must determine that the 

defendant understands certain nonconstitutional rights, including “the nature of the 

charges and of the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not 

eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions,” Crim.R. 

11(C)(2)(a), and “the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, upon 

acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence,” Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b). 

{¶ 15} “Crim.R. 11 does not require the courts to determine the defendant’s 
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individual background, reading skills, or writing skills.” State v. Pardon, 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 96APA08-1118, 1997 WL 170295, *1 (Apr. 10, 1997), citing State v. McKee, 

50 Ohio App.2d 313, 362 N.E.2d 1252 (9th Dist.1976). In fact, “a person need not be 

able to read to enter a plea.” State v. Beach, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 03 MA 2, 2003-

Ohio-6546, ¶ 13, citing Pardon and McKee. Nevertheless, “[a] trial court has the duty to 

ensure a defendant understands the plea whether or not his mental acumen is 

questionable.” Id. 

{¶ 16} In this case, the trial court satisfied the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C) 

through the plea colloquy and the written plea form. Howard indicated on the record that 

he understood everything the trial court said during the plea colloquy. He also signed 

and reviewed the written plea form with his attorney and advised the trial court that he 

understood the contents of the plea form, which included the necessary Crim.R. 11(C) 

information. Therefore, the fact that the trial court did not inquire about Howard’s reading 

and writing ability is of no consequence since that is not a requirement under 

Crim.R.11(C). Accordingly, the record supports the trial court’s finding that Howard’s 

plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; therefore, Howard’s claim to the contrary is 

overruled. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 17} Howard’s sole assignment of error is overruled and the judgment of the trial 

court is affirmed. 

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FAIN, J. and HALL, J., concur. 

Copies mailed to: 

Ryan A. Saunders 

Richard Kaplan 

Hon. Douglas M. Rastatter