NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PATRICK N. ANDERSON,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

DENIS MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2023-2068

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 22-4128, Judge Joseph L. Falvey, 

Jr.

______________________ 

Decided: February 13, 2024 

______________________ 

PATRICK N. ANDERSON, Mobile, AL, pro se. 

 BRYAN MICHAEL BYRD, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by 

BRIAN M. BOYNTON, WILLIAM JAMES GRIMALDI, PATRICIA M.

MCCARTHY; BENJAMIN ISAAC HERSKOVITZ, Y. KEN LEE, 

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2 ANDERSON v. MCDONOUGH

Office of General Counsel, United States Department of 

Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.

 ______________________ 

Before REYNA, MAYER, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Patrick N. Anderson appeals the judgment of the 

United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) remanding his claim for special monthly 

compensation (“SMC”) to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals 

(“board”) and affirming the denial of his claims related to 

right ankle arthritis and right hip bursitis. For the reasons 

discussed below, we dismiss his appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

Anderson has been granted service connection for a 

number of conditions, including a right ankle fracture, 

right ankle arthritis, right hip trochanter bursitis, cold injury residuals for both of his lower extremities, and depressive disorder. Appx. 11, 10–34.* In August 2014, he was 

awarded total disability based on individual unemployability (“TDIU”) benefits. Appx. 15.

On July 22, 2021, the board denied Anderson’s claims 

for: (1) an initial disability rating in excess of 10 percent for 

his service-connected right ankle arthritis; (2) an initial 

disability rating in excess of 20 percent for his service-connected right hip trochanter bursitis, limitation of flexion; 

(3) an initial disability rating in excess of 10 percent for his 

service-connected right hip trochanter bursitis, impairment of the thigh; (4) an initial compensable disability rating for his service-connected right hip trochanter bursitis, 

limitation of extension; (5) TDIU for the period on appeal 

* “Appx.” refers to the appendix filed with the government’s informal brief.

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ANDERSON v. MCDONOUGH 3

prior to October 17, 2001; and (6) SMC. See Appx. 10–12, 

33–36. On appeal, the Veterans Court affirmed all aspects 

of the board’s decision, except for the portion of the decision 

denying Anderson’s claim for SMC. In remanding the SMC 

issue, the Veterans Court noted that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs had conceded that the issue had not been adequately addressed by the board. Appx. 2–3. The court 

explained, moreover, that remand was appropriate because 

the board erred in failing to adequately assess whether any 

one of Anderson’s disabilities, considered alone, could warrant TDIU, thereby potentially satisfying the eligibility requirements for SMC. See Appx. 3; see also Guerra v. 

Shinseki, 642 F.3d 1046, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining 

that a veteran may qualify for SMC if he has “a single disability with a 100% rating”). Anderson then filed a timely 

appeal with this court.

II. DISCUSSION

Our jurisdiction over appeals from the Veterans Court 

is circumscribed by statute. See Dixon v. Shinseki, 741 

F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Wanless v. Shinseki, 618 

F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010). We are vested with authority to “decide all relevant questions of law, including 

interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions.” 38 

U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1). Absent a constitutional issue, however, we “may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as 

applied to the facts of a particular case.” Id. § 7292(d)(2).

On appeal, Anderson argues that the Veterans Court 

should have directly awarded him SMC rather than remanding the issue of his entitlement to this form of compensation to the board. See Appellant’s Inf. Br. 8–11, 33. 

As a general rule, however, this court will not review remand orders issued by the Veterans Court because they are 

not final judgments. See, e.g., Deloach v. Shinseki, 704 

F.3d 1370, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Generally, we decline 

to review remand orders of the [Veterans Court] because 

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4 ANDERSON v. MCDONOUGH

they are viewed as non-final decisions.”); Adams v. Principi, 256 F.3d 1318, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“In applying the 

statute that grants us jurisdiction over appeals from the 

Veterans Court, we have generally declined to review nonfinal orders of the Veterans Court.” (citation omitted)). 

This “requirement of finality serves to avoid ‘unnecessary 

piecemeal appellate review without precluding later appellate review of the legal issue or any other determination 

made on a complete administrative record.’” Williams v. 

Principi, 275 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting 

Cabot Corp. v. United States, 788 F.2d 1539, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 

1986)).

This court will “depart from the strict rule of finality” 

and review a remand order from the Veterans Court only if 

three conditions are satisfied:

(1) [T]here must have been a clear and final decision of a legal issue that (a) is separate from the 

remand proceedings, (b) will directly govern the remand proceedings or, (c) if reversed by this court, 

would render the remand proceedings unnecessary; (2) the resolution of the legal issues must adversely affect the party seeking review; and, (3) 

there must be a substantial risk that the decision 

would not survive a remand, i.e., that the remand 

proceeding may moot the issue.

Id. (footnotes omitted).

These prerequisites are not met here. The Veterans 

Court, in its remand order, did not decide any legal question related to Anderson’s entitlement to SMC, but instead 

remanded his case to the board for further factual development. See Appx. 2–3. Nor is there any basis to conclude 

that the remand proceedings will moot any legal issue. See

Allen v. Principi, 237 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 

(“[O]ur jurisdiction over a veteran’s case is proper ‘when 

the remand disposes of an important legal issue that would 

be effectively unreviewable at a later stage of the 

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ANDERSON v. MCDONOUGH 5

litigation.’” (quoting Grantham v. Brown, 114 F.3d 1156, 

1159 (Fed. Cir. 1997))). Accordingly, we decline to review 

the remand portion of the Veterans Court’s decision. See

Appx. 2–3.

Anderson also challenges various factual determinations made by the board, such as its determination that he 

is not entitled to a higher rating for his right ankle disabilities. Appellant’s Inf. Br. 28–33. As discussed previously, 

however, we lack jurisdiction to review the board’s factual 

determinations. See, e.g., Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 

1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Anderson further asserts that the 

Veterans Court erred in determining that he failed to raise 

before the board the issue of whether certain medical records qualified as informal claims for disability benefits. 

See Appellant’s Inf. Br. 25–33. Because this determination 

involved the application of settled law to the facts of Anderson’s case, however, we are without authority to review 

it. See Beasley v. Shinseki, 709 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 

2013) (emphasizing that this court may “not interfere with 

the [Veterans Court’s] role as the final appellate arbiter of 

the facts underlying a veteran’s claim or the application of 

veterans’ benefits law to the particular facts of a veteran’s 

case”).

In his informal brief, Anderson alleges that his due process rights have been violated because he has been denied 

a fair hearing on the question of whether he has a single 

disability which qualifies him for SMC. See Appellant’s

Inf. Br. 20–23, 25–26. Additionally, relying on Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), a criminal case, he asserts that the board improperly suppressed evidence related to his entitlement to SMC. See Appellant’s Inf. Br. 

11, 20–24.

Anderson, however, points to nothing in the record suggesting that any evidence related to his entitlement to 

SMC has been suppressed or that the board or the Veterans Court failed to afford him an opportunity to present 

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6 ANDERSON v. MCDONOUGH

arguments and evidence related to his entitlement to various forms of veterans’ disability benefits. Because the Veterans Court did not decide any constitutional issues and 

Anderson presents only bare assertions that his due process rights have been violated, we conclude that his challenges are constitutional in name only. As such, these 

challenges are not reviewable by this court. See Flores v. 

Nicholson, 476 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining 

that a veteran’s mere characterization of an issue as constitutional in nature is insufficient to establish appellate 

jurisdiction in this court); Helfer v. West, 174 F.3d 1332, 

1335 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (emphasizing that “[t]o the extent 

that [a veteran] has simply put a ‘due process’ label on his 

contention that he should have prevailed . . . his claim is 

constitutional in name only”). We have considered Anderson’s remaining arguments in support of jurisdiction but do 

not find them persuasive.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the appeal from the judgment of the 

United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is dismissed.

DISMISSED

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