17 March 2009

Foreign

Humanitarian Assistance

Joint Publication 3-29
PREFACE 

i 

1. Scope 

This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing 

foreign humanitarian assistance operations. 

2. Purpose 

 This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for 

interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It 

provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and 

other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, 

education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in 

preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the 

authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the 

JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the 

overall objective. 

3. Application 

 a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, commanders 

of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate 

components of these commands, and the Services. 

 b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances 

dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the 

contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. 

Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military 

command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United 

States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should 

evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where 

applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine. 

 For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

STANLEY A. MCCHRYSTAL 

Lieutenant General, USA 

Director, Joint Staff 
Preface 

ii JP 3-29 

Intentionally Blank 
SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

JP 3-29 REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-07.6 

DATED 15 AUGUST 2001

iii 

Overview: This document is a substantial transition from the previous edition of 

Joint Publication (JP) 3-29. With advances and changes in how the Department of 

Defense engages in foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations, additional 

tools are now available to the joint warfighter. These tools in the form of multiple 

referenced handbooks, manuals, articles and websites are published and utilized by 

a multitude of US interagency and multinational partners and has brought 

additional validity to the planning and execution of FHA operations. The new JP 3-

29 recognizes these tools as they aid in the success of the US’s World Wide FHA 

Engagement Strategy. Changes include: 

• Identifies the United States Agency for International Development 

(USAID) as the principal agency for US bilateral development and humanitarian 

assistance. 

• Establishes reference to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination 

During Joint Operations.

• Establishes the use of and reference to the terms and definitions of 

developmental assistance and security assistance. 

• Establishes reference to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Instruction 3214.01C, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management 

Operations for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents.

• Establishes the reference to JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations, and identifies 

changes to the definition of peace operations. 

• Provides figures/tables depicting the interagency coordination flow for 

FHA operations. 

• Identifies and recognizes the key roles of non-US Government 

participants and organizations. 

• Provides figures/tables depicting the civil-military operations center 

composition and functions. 

• Establishes entirely new/revised sections on strategic communications 

and civil affairs and removes these sections from Chapter II, “Organization and 

Interagency Coordination,” and places them in Chapter IV, “Execution and 

Assessment.”

• Provides figures/tables depicting the overarching relief process.
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 3-29 

• Provides figures/tables depicting the three FHA operational 

environments of: permissive, uncertain, and hostile.

• Provides figures/tables depicting the sources of information on the 

current situation in crisis area, providing political, cultural, economic, military, 

geographic and topographic, climatic, infrastructure and engineering, health 

and other essential information. 

• Removes the section on manpower and personnel services support from 

within Chapter IV, “Execution and Assessment,” and disperses significant 

segments through the rest of the publication. 

• Provides a significant revision to the legal principles section of Annex 

A, “Humanitarian Principles in the Law of War,” to Appendix A, “Legal 

Issues.”

• Provides a significant revision to the Pacific Disaster Center section in 

Appendix B, “Department of Defense Foreign Disaster Assistance Tasking and 

Funding Procedures and Humanitarian Assistance Programs.”

• Provides a significant revision to the USAID information in Appendix 

C, “Department of State and United States Agency for International 

Development Organizations.” 

• Provides a significant revision to the International Committee of the 

Red Cross information in Appendix D, “Humanitarian Nongovernmental and 

Intergovernmental Organizations.” 

• Provides a significant revision to the Services capabilities: US Navy 

section of Appendix E, “Health Service Support in Foreign Humanitarian 

Assistance Operations.” 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...................................................................................................... ix 

CHAPTER I 

 OVERVIEW 

 General................................................................................................................. I-1 

 Legal Authority and Policy.................................................................................. I-4 

 Types of Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Missions ......................................... I-6 

 Related Operations............................................................................................... I-8 

 Operational Context .......................................................................................... I-10 

 Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations .................................... I-11 

 Operational Environment .................................................................................. I-11 

 Mission Transition or Termination ................................................................... I-12 

 Funding ............................................................................................................. I-13 

CHAPTER II 

ORGANIZATION AND INTERAGENCY COORDINATION 

 Introduction ....................................................................................................... II-1 

 Overview ........................................................................................................... II-1 

 Roles and Responsibilities ................................................................................ II-2 

 Key Non-US Government Participants and Organizations ............................. II-15 

 Joint Task Force Organization......................................................................... II-17 

 Civil-Military Operations Center...................................................................... II-21 

 Humanitarian Operations Center ...................................................................... II-25 

 Nongovernmental Organizations, Intergovernmental Organizations, and Private 

Sector Parties .................................................................................................... II-28 

 Other Joint Task Forces ................................................................................... II-31 

CHAPTER III 

 PLANNING 

 Introduction ...................................................................................................... III-1 

 Understanding the Operational Environment ................................................... III-3 

 Mission Analysis............................................................................................... III-8 

 Concept of Operations .................................................................................... III-11 

 Force Planning ................................................................................................ III-13 

 Predeployment and Deployment..................................................................... III-18 

 Other Planning Considerations ....................................................................... III-19 

v 
Table of Contents 

CHAPTER IV 

 EXECUTION AND ASSESSMENT 

 Introduction ...................................................................................................... IV-1 

 Deployment....................................................................................................... IV-1 

 Sustainment....................................................................................................... IV-1 

 Command and Control ..................................................................................... IV-4 

 Assessment........................................................................................................ IV-6 

 Intelligence ..................................................................................................... IV-10 

 Information Sharing........................................................................................ IV-11 

 Protection ........................................................................................................ IV-12 

 Engineer Operations........................................................................................ IV-13 

 Rules of Engagement ..................................................................................... IV-15 

 Legal Considerations ..................................................................................... IV-15 

 Liaison ............................................................................................................ IV-15 

 Strategic Communication.................................................................................IV-16 

 Public Affairs.................................................................................................. IV-17 

 Dislocated Civilians ....................................................................................... IV-19 

 Health Service Support .................................................................................. IV-23 

 Mortuary Affairs ............................................................................................. IV-25 

 Religious Support ........................................................................................... IV-27 

 Environmental Considerations........................................................................ IV-28 

 Foreign Consequence Management................................................................ IV-29 

 Change of Mission ......................................................................................... IV-32 

 Transition or Termination .............................................................................. IV-33 

 Redeployment ................................................................................................ IV-37 

APPENDIX 

A Legal Issues ............................................................................................................... A-1 

B Department of Defense Foreign Disaster Assistance Tasking and Funding 

 Procedures and Humanitarian Assistance Programs ....................................... B-1 

C Department of State and United States Agency for International Development 

 Organizations ...................................................................................................... C-1 

D Humanitarian Nongovernmental and Intergovernmental Organizations ............. D-1 

E Health Service Support in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations............... E-1 

F Planning Factors for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations........................ F-1 

G References ................................................................................................................. G-1 

H Administrative Instructions....................................................................................... H-1 

vi JP 3-29 
Table of Contents 

GLOSSARY 

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms............................................................................GL-1 

Part II Terms and Definitions .......................................................................................GL-7 

FIGURE 

I-1 Foreign Disaster Relief......................................................................................... I-5 

II-1 Interagency Coordination for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance..................... II-3 

II-2 Interagency Coordination Flow.......................................................................... II-6 

II-3 Coordination at the Joint Task Force Level..................................................... II-20 

II-4 Civil-Military Operations Center Functions.................................................... II-22 

II-5 Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center........................ II-24 

II-6 Comparison Between Humanitarian Operations Center, Humanitarian 

Assistance Coordination Center, and Civil-Military Operations Center .... II-27 

III-1 Overarching Relief Process .............................................................................. III-2 

III-2 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operational Environments .........................III-5 

III-3 Sources of Information ..................................................................................... III-9 

A-1 Sample Rules of Engagement Card .................................................................. A-9 

D-1 Sector and Cluster Leads................................................................................... D-15 

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Intentionally Blank 
ix 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW 

• Provides an Overview of Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations 

• Discusses Interagency Coordination, Roles and Responsibilities, and Principal 

Organizations Related to Foreign Humanitarian Assistance 

• Describes Planning for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations 

• Addresses the Execution and Assessment of All Aspects of Foreign 

Humanitarian Assistance Operations 

Overview 

Foreign humanitarian 

assistance (FHA) provided by 

US forces is limited in scope 

and duration, and is 

conducted to relieve or 

reduce the results of natural 

or man-made disasters or 

endemic conditions. 

Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) consists of 

Department of Defense (DOD) activities, normally in 

support of the United States Agency for International 

Development (USAID) or Department of State (DOS), 

conducted outside the United States, its territories, and 

possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, 

hunger, or privation. While, US military forces are not the 

primary US Government (USG) means of providing FHA, 

the foreign assistance they are tasked to provide is 

designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the 

host nation (HN) civil authorities or agencies that may 

have the primary responsibility for providing that 

assistance. 

DOD has unique assets for effective response and can play 

a key role in foreign humanitarian crises. For example, the 

US military possesses exceptional operational reach that 

can be employed to enhance an initial response. 

Additionally, the US military augments private sector 

capability and thus limits threats to regional stability. 

Furthermore, the US military’s unmatched capabilities in 

logistics, command and control (C2), communications, and 

mobility are able to provide rapid and robust response to 

dynamic and evolving situations among vastly different 

military, civilian, and government entities.

Unity of effort in an 

operation ensures all means 

are directed to a common 

purpose.

FHA operations require coordination and collaboration 

among many agencies, both governmental and 

nongovernmental, with US military forces when tasked in 

a supporting role. Because DOD will normally be in a 
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 supporting role during FHA, the joint force commander 

(JFC) may not be responsible for determining the mission 

or specifying the participating agencies. During FHA 

operations unity of command may not be possible, but the 

requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount.

Legal authority and policy. Statutory authority for USG agencies to provide FHA is 

contained in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 

amended, in Title 22, US Code. This legislation provides a 

blueprint for USG engagement with friendly nations. 

DOD Directive 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief,

establishes policy and provides for component 

participation in foreign disaster relief operations only after 

a determination is made by DOS that foreign disaster relief 

shall be provided. 

The following missions are 

common in FHA operations:

Relief missions. Relief missions include prompt aid that can be used to 

alleviate the suffering of disaster victims. Potential relief 

roles for US forces include immediate response to prevent 

loss of life and destruction of property, construction of 

basic sanitation facilities and shelters, and provision of 

food and medical care. 

Dislocated civilian support 

missions.

Dislocated civilian support missions are specifically 

designed to support the assistance and protection for 

dislocated civilians. Support missions may include 

camp organization (basic construction and 

administration); provision of care (food, supplies, 

medical attention, and protection); and placement 

(movement or relocation to other countries, camps, and 

locations).

Security missions. Security missions may include establishing and 

maintaining conditions for the provision of FHA by 

organizations of the world relief community. In some 

cases, the affected country will not be able to meet the 

required conditions and may request assistance from US 

military forces to secure areas for storage of relief 

material until it can be distributed to the affected 

population. Other tasks may involve providing 

protection and armed escorts for convoys and personnel 

delivering emergency aid, protection of shelters for 

dislocated civilians, and security for multinational forces, 
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xi 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and 

intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).

Technical assistance and 

support functions.

Technical assistance and support functions may take the 

form of advice and selected training, assessments, 

manpower, and equipment. Based upon Secretary of 

Defense (SecDef) and combatant commander (CCDR) 

guidance, the FHA force commander (CDR) should

establish operational procedures regarding technical 

advice and assistance to the affected country, NGOs, and 

IGOs as soon as possible.

Foreign consequence 

management. 

Foreign consequence management (FCM) is DOD 

assistance provided by the USG to a HN to mitigate the 

effects of a deliberate or inadvertent chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives attack or event 

and to restore essential government services. When requested 

by the lead federal agency (LFA) and directed by 

SecDef, DOD will support USG FCM operations to the 

extent allowed by law and subject to the availability of 

forces.

Military commanders must 

be cautious not to commit 

their forces to projects and 

tasks that go beyond the FHA 

mission.

Although FHA operations may be executed simultaneously 

with other types of operations, each type has unique 

characteristics. Military CDRs conducting FHA 

simultaneously with other operations must develop end 

state, transition, and termination objectives as well as 

measures of effectiveness (MOEs) complementary to 

simultaneous military operations. Such operations may 

include stability operations, nation assistance operations 

(humanitarian and civic assistance, security assistance, and 

foreign internal defense), peace operations, and 

noncombatant evacuation operations. 

The operational context that US military forces conduct 

coordinated responses in FHA operations is unilateral, 

where the USG provides FHA without direct involvement 

by other nations other than the HN, or multinational, 

where operations are usually undertaken within the 

structure of a coalition or alliance.

Understanding the operational environment, which 

encompasses physical areas and factors (the air, land, 

maritime, and space domains) and the information 

environment, requires a broad perspective, particularly 

during FHA operations where there are normally no overt 

adversary military forces, but forces of nature, possibly 
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xii JP 3-29 

covert adversary forces, and nonmilitary personnel, 

organizations, and systems that combine to complicate 

joint force operations and influence the application of force 

choices.

Based on the supported geographic combatant 

commander’s (GCC’s) intent, JFCs determine the phased 

arrangement of simultaneous and sequential actions and 

activities to create desired effects and accomplish the 

assigned mission. Phases are distinct in time, space, and/or 

purpose from one another, but must be planned in support 

of each other and should represent a natural progression 

and subdivision of the campaign or operation. Transitions 

between operational phases are designed to be distinct 

shifts in focus by the joint force, often accompanied by 

changes in command relationships. This challenging 

environment demands an agile shift in joint force skill sets, 

actions, organizational behaviors, and mental outlooks as 

well as coordination and collaboration with a wider range 

of other organizations — other government agencies 

(OGAs), multinational partners, IGOs, and NGOs — to 

provide those capabilities necessary to address the missionspecific factors.

Interagency Coordination, Roles and Responsibilities, and Principal Organizations 

In an FHA operation, 

interagency coordination is 

essential for effective policy 

development and 

implementation.

Because of the number of civilian and non-USG actors 

involved in a crisis, command relationships outside DOD 

command structures may not be clearly defined and 

success will depend heavily on effective, timely 

coordination. Difficulties arise from the fact that many 

USG agencies, civil and military authorities, foreign 

governments, the United Nations (UN), NGOs, and IGOs 

may be conducting assistance activities within the same 

operational area prior to, during, and after departure of the 

joint force. Coordination and collaboration are 

essential in dealing with these organizations.

Accordingly, key considerations for JFCs in developing 

the mission statement include the military role in assisting 

the UN, NGOs, IGOs, and OGAs as well as security 

practices and policies. 

Roles and Responsibilities of USG Organizations 

When a disaster strikes, the chief of mission (COM) may 

send a disaster declaration cable outlining the extent of the 
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damage, possible needs, and may recommend assistance in 

the form of funding, material, or technical assistance. 

When the President, SecDef, and the Secretary of State

have determined that a US humanitarian response to a 

foreign disaster or crisis is required, the National Security 

Council (NSC) normally directs the Special Coordinator 

for International Disaster Assistance to convene an

International Development and Humanitarian 

Assistance NSC Policy Coordination Committee (PCC)

to review all pertinent information and recommend policy 

and specific actions. The PCC; which consists of senior 

DOS and DOD representatives, the COM, USAID 

representatives, and heads of other concerned agencies; 

concurrently develops a comprehensive strategy for 

emergency response and develops tasks for each key 

participant.

Department of State. The COM, or assistant 

secretary of state responsible for the particular area can 

declare a disaster, providing the event meets three 

criteria: the disaster exceeds the HN’s ability to 

respond; the affected country’s government either 

requests or is willing to receive US assistance; and a 

response to the disaster is in the US national interest. 

This declaration is transmitted to the Office of US 

Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and DOS to 

begin possible USG assistance. When a disaster is 

declared, the DOS geographic bureau of the affected 

area becomes the key participating bureau. The 

functional bureau, Political-Military Affairs, is the 

primary link between DOD and DOS and works with 

the DOD to provide assistance in the event of natural 

disasters and other crises abroad.

US Agency for International Development.

Although a separate agency from DOS, USAID shares 

certain administrative functions with DOS and reports 

to and receives overall foreign policy guidance from 

the Secretary of State. Accordingly, it plays a major 

role in US foreign assistance policy and a principal role 

in interagency coordination. USAID administers and 

directs the US foreign economic assistance program 

and acts as the LFA for USG FHA. 

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian 

Assistance (DCHA) coordinates USAID's democracy 
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xiv JP 3-29 

programs, international disaster assistance, emergency 

and developmental food aid, aid to manage and 

mitigate conflict, and volunteer programs. Within 

DCHA, OFDA and the Office of Military Affairs 

(OMA) are key organizations that will interact with 

DOD during FHA operations. OFDA is the lead office 

in the USG for facilitating and coordinating USG 

emergency assistance overseas. It coordinates with 

USAID offices and others to provide relief supplies 

and humanitarian assistance (HA), and develops and 

manages logistic, operational, and technical support for 

disaster responses. OMA, the focal point for USAID 

interaction with DOD, addresses areas of common 

interests between defense and development, with a 

focus on improving civilian-military field readiness, 

programs, and coordination.

Secretary of Defense. SecDef, working under the 

guidance of the President, and with the concurrence of 

the Secretary of State, directs DOD support to USG 

humanitarian operations and establishes appropriate 

command relationships.

The Joint Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff (CJCS) is responsible for recommending military 

capabilities and appropriate relationships for FHA 

operations to SecDef. Once these relationships have 

been established, the Joint Staff coordinates detailed 

staff planning under the cognizance of the CJCS. 

Combatant Commander. The GCCs direct military 

operations, including FHA, within their areas of 

responsibility (AORs). Ideally, this should be done 

with the concurrence of the COM. In response to a 

disaster, the supported GCC structures the force 

necessary to conduct and sustain the FHA operation, 

typically forming a joint task force (JTF). Two notable 

advisors to the GCC are the GCC’s DOS foreign policy 

advisor and USAID senior development officer, who 

can provide nonmilitary insights, enhancing direct 

communications and coordination with the affected 

embassy and country team. Each CCDR has a crisis 

action or rapid deployment team initially deployed as 

the immediate responder/assessor for the CCDR. The 

exact composition of this team and the subsequent 

follow-on assets will vary depending on the type and 
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xv 

severity of the incident and in some cases, restrictions 

placed on the COM by the HN. 

The supported CCDR may also organize and deploy a 

humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST) to 

acquire information required for planning. Once 

deployed, the HAST, working with the country team, 

can assess the capability and capacity of the HN 

government to respond to the disaster; identify primary 

points of contact for coordination and collaboration, 

determine the threat environment and survey facilities 

that may be used for force protection purposes, and 

coordinate specific support arrangements for the 

delivery of food and medical supplies. The supported 

CCDR may establish and/or be supported by other 

groups and/or centers depending on the CCDR’s 

assessment of the situation. These may include: a 

humanitarian assistance coordination center, 

established by the CCDR to assist with interagency 

coordination and planning; a joint interagency 

coordination group, to collaborate at the operational 

level with other USG civilian agencies and 

departments; a joint logistics operations center, to 

receive reports from supporting commands, Service 

components, and external sources and distill 

information for decisions and briefings, and responds 

to questions; and/or the Deployment and Distribution 

Operations Center, which tracks the movement 

requirement from lift allocation and initial execution 

through closure at final destination and collaborates 

with joint deployment distribution operations 

centers to link strategic deployment and distribution 

processes to operational and tactical functions. 

Further, support to the GCC may be provided by a 

standing joint force headquarters (core element),

upon which to build the joint C2 capability for an FHA 

operation through augmentation, and the joint public 

affairs support element, which provides a ready, 

scaleable, equipped, and trained joint capability to 

augment existing public affairs or serve as a standalone capability to support emergent requirements.

Defense Security Cooperation Agency is responsible 

to lead, direct, and manage security cooperation 

programs to support US national security objectives 

that strengthen America's alliances and partnerships 

through transfer of defense capabilities; international 
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xvi JP 3-29 

military education; and HA and humanitarian demining 

assistance.

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency provides 

direct analytical support for FHA through the LFAs 

and combatant commands primarily through the 

deployment of team specialists in response to natural 

disasters, to include earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, 

and wildfires.

Consequence Management Advisory Team and 

Joint Technical Advisory Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Element. 

During a crisis involving CBRN materials, at the 

request of a CCDR, and in coordination with the 

Joint Staff, the Director of the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency may direct the immediate 

deployment of a supporting consequence 

management advisory team (CMAT). The CMAT 

provides task-organized, deployable, doctrinal, and 

technical consequence management expertise, 

support, advice, and hazard prediction modeling 

assistance for DOD and other federal agencies during 

all phases of CBRN accidents or incidents. 

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management 

and Humanitarian Assistance (COEDMHA) is 

congressionally mandated and assigned to United 

States Pacific Command (USPACOM). The Director 

of COEDMHA reports to the USPACOM Deputy 

CDR. COEDMHA educates, trains, provides 

consultation, supports military exercises, and 

produces information for responders. 

Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance 

Medicine within the Department of Military and 

Emergency Medicine at the Uniformed Services 

University of Health Sciences, is a university-based 

venture whose mission is to advance the understanding 

and delivery of disaster medical care and HA 

worldwide.

The Pacific Disaster Center is an applied science, 

information, and technology center, working to reduce 

disaster risks and impacts to peoples’ lives and 

property.
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xvii 

Key Non-USG Participants and Organizations 

Host Nation. The HN is the nation receiving the 

assistance, in whose territory the forces and/or supplies 

of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO 

organizations transit or operate. The HN will 

coordinate all relief efforts within its territory. US 

forces conducting FHA do so with the permission of 

the HN under the guidance of formal and informal 

agreements.

United Nations. The UN coordinates its response to 

humanitarian crises through a committee of all the key 

humanitarian bodies, chaired by the UN Emergency 

Relief Coordinator. Today, the UN is a major provider 

of emergency relief and longer-term assistance, a 

catalyst for action by governments and relief agencies, 

and an advocate on behalf of people struck by 

emergencies. 

Nongovernmental Organizations. Where long-term 

problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs are 

frequently on scene before the US military and are 

willing to operate in high-risk areas. Because of their 

capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, 

they can lessen the civil-military resources that a CDR 

would otherwise have to devote to an operation. 

Working alone, alongside the US military, or with 

other US agencies, NGOs assist in all the world’s 

trouble spots where humanitarian or other assistance is 

needed.

Private Sector. Increasingly, the resources of the 

international business community are being utilized to 

mitigate human suffering associated with disasters. 

Businesses donate talent or in-kind goods and services 

to disaster relief and recovery operations in developing 

countries and wish to ensure that their help is delivered 

in a coordinated and effective manner. Private/nongovernment sectors often perform certain functions 

more efficiently and effectively than government 

because of the expertise and experience in applying 

successful business models.

Private Contractors. CDRs should be aware that 

private contractors are employed by a wide range of 

actors, inside and outside the USG. They are often 
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xviii JP 3-29 

employed to provide security, training, technical 

expertise, and logistical support. 

Joint Task Force Organization 

While the JTF is the most common type of organizational 

structure used for FHA, a JFC may also opt to create a 

joint special operations task force, joint civil-military 

operations task force, or a joint psychological operations 

task force to assist in operations. The JFC organizes the 

JTF staff to provide the appropriate expertise required 

to carry out the specific FHA mission. In order to effect 

close coordination, synchronization, and information 

sharing across the staff directorates, cross-functional 

collaboration is most commonly achieved by the JFC 

through the formation of centers, groups, bureaus, cells, 

offices, elements, boards, working groups and planning 

teams, and other enduring or temporary organizations that 

manage specific processes and accomplish tasks in support 

of mission accomplishment. Examples of such 

organizations are joint facilities utilization boards, coalition 

forces support teams, joint network operations control 

centers, joint intelligence support elements, joint 

information bureaus, and joint movement centers. 

Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). The 

CMOC is a civil-military operation (CMO) 

organization that provides operational level 

coordination between the JFC and other stakeholders. 

The structure and responsibilities of the CMOC need to 

be established as quickly as possible during joint 

operation planning. While sharing many general 

characteristics, each FHA operation is unique, and the 

CMOC structure must be tailored for each emergency. 

The CMOC serves as the central clearing organization 

for information and coordination relevant to the JTF 

operation in support of a FHA mission. It is designed 

to coordinate military efforts and resources with 

requirements of the international relief community to 

achieve overall efficiency and effectiveness. 

Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC). The 

HOC is a senior level international and interagency 

coordinating body that coordinates the overall relief 

strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a 

large FHA operation. It normally is established under 

the direction of the government of the affected country 
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xix 

or the UN, or a USG agency during a US unilateral 

operation. 

There is a significant difference between the HOC and 

CMOC. The CMOC is established by and works for the 

JFC. The HOC is normally established under the direction 

of the HN government or the UN, or possibly OFDA 

during a US unilateral operation. Additionally, the HOC 

operates at senior, national level to coordinate strategic and 

operational unity of effort, while the CMOC works at the 

local level coordinating US actions to achieve operational 

and tactical unity of effort.

Relationships with NGOs and IGOs are based on 

multiple factors some of which include a mutual 

understanding of each others’ goals and objectives, 

planned lines of operations and concept of operations 

(CONOPS), support requirements, coordination 

procedures, information sharing, capabilities and, most 

importantly, missions. Relationships with NGOs and 

IGOs are based on multiple factors some of which include 

a mutual understanding of each others’ goals and 

objectives, planned lines of operations and CONOPS, 

support requirements, coordination procedures, 

information sharing, capabilities and, most importantly, 

missions. 

Planning Considerations 

 The time available to plan responses to real-time events is 

short, particularly in the case of disasters requiring an FHA 

response. In as little as a few days, the supported GCC 

and the JFCs and their staffs must develop and 

approve a feasible course of action (COA), publish the 

plan or order, prepare forces, ensure sufficient support, 

and arrange sustainment for the employment of US 

military forces. Accordingly, considerations for crisis 

action planning are emphasized when planning FHA 

operations 

The nature of the operational 

environment obviously 

impacts the conduct of FHA 

operations.

Important elements of the operational environment

considered during planning and executing FHA operations 

include the type of disaster involved. The determinants are 

whether the disaster and consequent emergencies occur 

suddenly or develop over a period of time, whether the 

emergency is related to conflict, and the underlying causes. 

Another factor in understanding the operational 
Executive Summary 

xx JP 3-29 

environment is the prevailing host country security 

environment. Finally, an assessment of the operational 

environment should consider the system of international 

relief already at work. 

The process of joint intelligence preparation of the 

operational environment (JIPOE) will assist the JFC in 

understanding the operational environment as it applies to 

planning and executing FHA operations. JIPOE support 

during FHA requires a different mindset and different 

techniques than a JIPOE effort that focuses on defeating an 

adversary militarily. This analysis identifies a number of 

nodes - specific physical, functional, or cultural entities 

within each system. Nodes can include people, 

transportation infrastructure, sociological and political 

structure, economic system, potential friendly, neutral, and 

adversary elements, the information environment, and 

other components of the operational environment. JIPOE 

analysts also identify links - the cultural, physical, or 

functional relationship between nodes.

The joint force’s mission is 

the task or set of tasks, 

together with the purpose, 

that clearly indicate the 

action to be taken and the 

reason for doing so. 

The primary purpose of mission analysis is to understand 

the problem and purpose of the operation and issue 

appropriate guidance to drive the rest of the planning 

process. A critical task for the CCDR is developing the 

FHA military mission statement. The mission statement 

must provide specific direction for achieving the desired 

end state via clear and attainable military objectives. 

CCDRs consider several factors in developing the mission 

statement, to include the military force’s role in assisting 

relief agencies, the operational environment, and security 

considerations.

Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets 

in Disaster Relief – “Oslo Guidelines” provide that foreign 

military assets should be requested only where there is no 

comparable civilian alternative and only when the use of 

military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The 

military asset, therefore, must be unique in capability and 

availability. Military assets should be seen as a tool 

complementing existing relief mechanisms to provide 

specific support to specific requirements, in response to the 

acknowledged "humanitarian gap" between the disaster 

needs that the relief community is being asked to satisfy 

and the resources available to meet them. 
Executive Summary 

xxi 

In developing the CONOPS, phasing assists JFCs and 

staffs to visualize and think through the entire operation 

and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, 

time, space, and purpose. The actual phases used will vary 

(compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) with the joint 

operation, as determined by the JFC. While FHA 

operations may occur during any phase of a larger joint 

operation, JFCs and component CDRs may establish 

additional phases that fit their CONOPS. These subphases, designed to focus relief assets and emphasis, 

should generally follow phase model of the larger 

operation and include transitions from one phase to the 

next.

The primary purposes of force planning are to: influence 

COA development and selection based on force 

allocations, availability, and readiness; to identify all forces 

needed to accomplish the supported CCDR’s CONOPS 

with some rigor; and effectively phase the forces into the 

operational area. 

For the conduct of FHA missions, JFCs may have plans 

and/or predesignated joint forces. The JFC has a number 

of available options, including use of a predesignated joint 

force or an ad hoc joint force, organized and tailored 

specifically to conduct FHA missions. In FHA operations, 

the joint force structure must provide for the means to 

coordinate and communicate with the numerous 

organizations that are involved in the overall FHA effort.

With regard to force sourcing, force providers review 

the readiness and deployability posture of their available 

units through the global force management process 

before deciding which units to allocate in response to the 

supported CDR’s requirements. Conventional maritime, 

air, and land forces, though not structured for FHA 

purposes, are readily adaptable to perform such missions, 

with the exception of some aspects of foreign 

consequence management. Civil affairs (CA) assets are 

capable of supporting FHA operations in a variety of 

functional areas through planned civil affairs operations 

or support to CMO. Psychological operations (PSYOP) 

units can provide analyses of perceptions and attitudes of 

the civilian population and effectiveness of ongoing 

information and FHA operations. PSYOP units can also 

provide language capability and equipment (radio 
Executive Summary 

xxii JP 3-29 

broadcasting, print, audio, and audio visual) essential to 

disseminate necessary information to the populace. In 

addition, special operations forces can deploy rapidly, 

have excellent long-range communications equipment, 

and can operate effectively in austere environments 

typical of FHA efforts. 

Deployment planning and execution considerations for 

FHA missions and other military operations are 

fundamentally the same. Joint force deployment is 

predicated on the severity of the humanitarian situation 

and the perception of US interests. It is important to 

remember that political factors drive military decisions 

and planning at every level. Mission analysis, may 

validate the need for further assessments or the 

establishment of a lodgment, and in consultation with the 

component commanders, the JFC determines the 

deployment priority for all elements of the joint force. 

Force protection is an important part of this process.

Execution and Assessment 

 In execution FHA operations, challenges regarding 

deployment and sustainment arise when the operational 

area has been severely impacted by the incident or 

disaster and US forces have had no presence or routine 

access to the operational area. Emphasis must be 

placed upon locating logistic bases as close as possible 

to the relief recipients. Should relief recipients be 

located within a major population center, all reasonable 

measures should be taken when establishing logistic 

bases that prevent migration of relief recipients from 

their economic and social areas. FHA operations are 

logistic intensive and will most likely include significant 

general engineering requirements. Therefore, the 

overall logistic concept should be closely tied into the 

operational strategy and be mutually supporting. 

This includes identifying time-phased materiel 

requirements, facilities, and other resources; identifying 

support methods and procedures required to meet air, land, 

and maritime lines of communication; and establishing 

procedures and means for coordinating and controlling 

materiel movements to and within the operational area. 

Priorities may be established using apportionment systems, 

providing the CDR with the flexibility to reinforce priority 

efforts with additional assets. 
Executive Summary 

xxiii 

Command and control. An important aspect of C2 in 

FHA operations is the necessity to delegate authority to 

speed decision making and reaction to changes in lifethreatening situations faced in many such operations. 

Although there is no command relationship between 

military forces and OGAs, UN agencies, NGOs, IGOs, 

affected country elements, and allied or coalition 

governments, clearly defined relationships may foster 

harmony and reduce friction between participating 

organizations. Communications are the central system 

that not only ties together all aspects of joint operations, 

but also allows CDRs C2 of forces. Therefore, the FHA 

plan must include procedures to provide interoperable and 

compatible communications among participants. Direct 

communications between CDRs and nonmilitary 

organizations should be established to facilitate effective 

collaboration and decision-making. 

The need for interoperability of communications 

equipment in FHA operations may also necessitate using 

unclassified communications means during the operation. 

US military forces will face great difficulty and challenges 

in conducting an operation via unclassified means and still 

keep multinational forces, OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs in the 

loop.

The joint force staff will encounter numerous OGAs, 

NGOs, and IGOs that produce reports on the operating 

environment and joint force actions. Despite efforts to 

maintain accuracy, the proliferation of reports may result in 

conflicting information. One approach to deconflicting 

reports is to develop a consolidated report between the 

joint force and the country team.

Measures of effectiveness 

assess changes in system 

behavior, capability, or 

operational environment and 

assist commanders in 

determining when the 

situation has been returned 

to pre-disaster conditions.

The JFC should use the assessment process to evaluate 

task performance and to measure effects and determine the 

progress of operations toward achieving objectives. MOEs 

in FHA operations should be based on impact indicators 

that measure the change in the lives of the people on the 

ground, rather than process indicators that calculate USG 

efforts and their immediate outputs. MOEs may be 

difficult to develop; the assessment process and related 

measures should be relevant, measurable, responsive, and 

resourced so there is no false impression of 

accomplishment. MOEs should also be based upon the US 

military objectives and end states to ensure that the JFC is 
Executive Summary 

xxiv JP 3-29 

measuring those effects within the joint force's control. 

The primary intelligence effort must focus on answering 

the CDR’s priority intelligence requirements assisting in 

the accomplishment of the mission. While normally this 

will involve assessing potential threats to the FHA mission 

(from forces external and internal to the affected 

population), the unique aspects of FHA operations may 

result in significant or even primary emphasis being placed 

upon logistic, health service support (HSS), or political 

intelligence and intelligence support to CA and PSYOP. 

Protecting the force will remain a high priority for 

intelligence collection. A comprehensive intelligence 

analysis can help CDRs avoid hostilities during the 

conduct of FHA missions. 

Information sharing is 

critical to the efficient pursuit 

of a common humanitarian 

purpose.

Although many different groups and authorities can (and 

should) work in parallel, a collaborative information 

environment (CIE) facilitates information sharing. 

Constructing a CIE is not an issue technologically. Rather, 

the challenges are largely social, institutional, cultural, and 

organizational. These impediments can limit and shape the 

willingness of civilian and military personnel and 

organizations to openly cooperate and share information 

and capabilities. 

For the joint force, force 

protection is a high priority.

Even in a permissive environment, the joint force can 

expect to encounter banditry, vandalism, and various levels 

of violent activities from criminals or unruly crowds. It is 

imperative that the joint force be trained and equipped to 

mitigate threats to US personnel, resources, facilities, and 

critical information. As in any operation, force protection

in FHA is enhanced by establishing effective 

counterintelligence support and by practicing strict 

operations security. In addition to force protection, the 

joint force may also be tasked to provide protection for 

other personnel and assets. Regardless of the environment, 

security must be factored into force requirements and 

support capability. In FHA operations, forces will require 

a substantial amount of their troops to protect unit and 

individual property. 

Other operations and mission areas have specific 

considerations in terms of execution and assessment. 

Among these areas are engineering operations, rules of 

engagement, legal considerations, liaison requirements, 
Executive Summary 

xxv 

strategic communications, public affairs, dislocated 

civilians, health service support, mortuary affairs, religious 

support, environmental considerations, foreign 

consequence management, change of mission, transition or 

termination, and redeployment. 

Engineer operations. FHA operations can be extremely engineer-intensive. In 

such cases, the JFC may opt to establish a subordinate JTF 

to control extensive engineer operations and missions. 

Such a JTF may be formed around an existing engineer 

command or naval construction regiment. 

Rules of engagement. Rules of engagement (ROE) define when and how force 

may be used. For each specific operation the JFC, in 

conjunction with the operations directorate of a joint staff 

and the staff judge advocate, develops ROE (as soon as 

possible after notification of the deployment) within the 

framework of the standing rules of engagement. When 

multinational forces are under US control, US CDRs need 

to ensure that those forces interpret the ROE in the same 

manner as US forces. 

Liaison Direct, early liaison with UN and other humanitarian relief 

agencies is a valuable source of accurate, timely 

information on many aspects of the crisis area. A key 

additional benefit is an opportunity to build working 

relationships based upon trust and open communications 

among all organizations. For that reason, ongoing liaison 

with other multinational forces participating in the 

operation is equally important. 

Strategic communication. The USG uses strategic communication (SC) to provide 

top-down guidance relative to using the informational 

instrument of national power in specific situations. 

Demonstrating US involvement in FHA operations can be 

extremely valuable to the image of the US supporting the 

achievement of SC goals as well as those of the GCC’s 

security cooperation plan.

Public affairs should be 

involved at the first 

indication of potential FHA 

operations.

The ability to disseminate public information via the 

news media during FHA effectively can be critical to 

operational success. Coordination with the HN via the 

country team is critical to ensure public information 

activities do not undermine or conflict with the efforts of 

the HN. 
Executive Summary 

xxvi JP 3-29 

FHA operations generate substantial media interest for 

which the JFC, public affairs officer, and staff must be 

prepared. Mass distribution of information via the media is 

critical to creating public awareness of US, allied, 

coalition, and partner nations’ policies and objectives. 

Media should have as much access as possible throughout 

the operation. Information shall be made fully and readily 

available and shall be withheld only when disclosure 

would adversely affect national security or threaten the 

safety or privacy of the members of the Armed Forces. 

The establishment of a joint information bureau at the 

outset of operations serves as a logistics and information 

base for the press and facilitates media coverage. 

Dislocated civilians. An FHA operation will often involve dislocated 

civilians and refugees in particular. Dislocated 

civilian support missions are specific humanitarian 

missions designed to support the repatriation or 

resettlement of these persons. The joint force role in 

providing for and protecting these groups will depend on 

the mission. In rare instances, joint forces may be called 

upon to establish dislocated civilian camps in a HN. In 

these cases, the JTF must take into account: legal 

considerations regarding availability and ownership of 

land for camps; coordination with the HN, OGAs, UN, 

NGOs, and IGOs; logistic factors connected with shelter, 

food, sanitation, and medical care; and possible 

contracting requirements for construction.

Health service support forces 

typically have three missions 

in FHA operations:

force health protection; JFCs have overall responsibility for HSS and force 

health protection for forces assigned or attached to their 

command. This requires that the JTF have robust 

preventive medicine assets to perform medical and 

environmental health risk assessments and identify 

effective preventive medicine measures to counter the 

threat to US forces. 

care for disaster victims; Specific to humanitarian missions, medical forces are 

usually asked to support local military and civilian 

health systems and often provide direct public health care 

to include primary medical, dental, veterinary, and other 

needed care. These missions must always be coordinated 
Executive Summary 

xxvii 

closely with the HN medical authorities, NGOs and IGOs.

and assisting in 

reestablishing indigenous 

public health resources and 

institutions affected by the 

disaster.

Medical personnel may be called on to assist in 

reestablishing and supporting indigenous medical 

infrastructure, particularly those affected by disaster. 

Improving the medical systems near US and multinational 

forces fosters self-sufficiency and may contribute to 

accomplishing the US military mission sooner.

Mortuary affairs. GCCs are responsible for giving authoritative direction and 

guidance on providing mortuary affairs (MA) support to all 

assigned and attached forces within their AORs. Upon 

notification of a FHA mission, the responsible GCC should 

task the logistics directorate to develop a staff estimate and 

provide planning guidance for MA operations based on the 

overall mission analysis and COAs. In general terms, legal 

obligations depend on whether the JTF is dealing with a 

deceased that was simply found within the operational area 

or if the death was associated with JTF actions. The JTF’s 

obligations concerning dead or buried bodies found in the 

operational area derive from the CDR’s responsibility for 

health and public hygiene of US forces.

Religious support. Religious support in joint operations includes the entire 

range of professional duties a joint force chaplain 

performs in the dual role of religious leader and staff 

officer. Religion may play a pivotal role in 

understanding the culture, requirements, attitude, and 

desires of a population and its government and may have 

a significant impact on the goals, objectives, nature of 

support, and CONOPS for the FHA operation. By 

recognizing the significance of religion, cultural 

sensitivities and ideology held by the local population, 

allies, coalition partners, and potential adversaries, CDRs 

may avoid unintentionally alienating friendly military 

forces or civilian populations which could hamper 

military operations. When appropriate, and in 

coordination with the CMOC, chaplains may serve as 

liaison to NGOs that have a religious affiliation. 

Additionally, chaplains may accompany elements of the 

joint force as they distribute relief supplies or have other 

interactions (e.g., security patrols) with the local 

populace. This experience will be useful when advising 

the CDR and counseling those members of the joint force 

that may seek the chaplain’s advice.
Executive Summary 

xxviii JP 3-29 

Environmental 

considerations.

Environmental issues can have strategic, operational, or 

tactical implications and thus should be incorporated into 

planning and operations. If not appropriately addressed, 

environmental issues have the potential to impact 

negatively local community relations, affect insurgent 

activities, and create diplomatic problems for the JTF.

Foreign consequence 

management.

FCM is assistance provided by the USG to a HN to assist 

friends and allies to assess and respond to a CBRN 

incident in order to mitigate human casualties and to 

provide temporary associated essential services. Primary 

responsibility for FCM rests with the HN, unless 

otherwise stipulated under relevant international 

agreements or arrangements. Unless otherwise directed 

by the President, the DOS is the LFA for USG FCM 

operations and is responsible for coordinating the overall 

USG FCM response. When requested by the LFA and 

directed by SecDef, DOD will support USG FCM 

operations as appropriate.

Generally, FCM operations will not be conducted during 

hostile action; however, situations may arise where FCM 

may be required at the request and in support of the HN. 

When conditions resulting from any emergency or attack 

require immediate action, local military CDRs may take 

such actions as necessary to save lives. When such 

compelling conditions exist and time does not permit 

prior approval from higher headquarters, CDRs or 

officials acting under the “immediate response authority” 

may take necessary action to respond to requests from 

local HN authorities or the COM.

Change of mission. Periodic review of the mission statement will determine 

whether the force’s actions still support SecDef and 

supported GCC’s intent. The JFC must also guard against 

an unintentional change of mission, sometimes referred to 

as “mission creep.” A clearly articulated end state and 

appropriate MOEs help the JFC protect against this 

phenomenon.

Transition or termination. The termination of military FHA operations will normally 

involve a transition of relief activities to US, 

intergovernmental, or HN relief organizations. 

Termination occurs when the relief efforts have been 

successfully transitioned or when the SecDef directs. 

Criteria for transition may be based on events, MOEs, 
Executive Summary 

xxix 

availability of resources, or a specific date. A 

comprehensive transition plan includes specific 

requirements for all elements involved in the transition, 

summarizes capabilities and assets, and assigns specific 

responsibilities. The joint force staff should periodically 

review the transition plan with all organizations that have a 

part in it. This will help ensure that planning assumptions 

are still valid, and determine if changes in the situation 

require changes in the transition plan.

Redeployment. Redeployment planning should be conducted 

simultaneously with joint force deployment. 

Redeployment considerations depend upon mission 

accomplishment and diminished requirements for military 

support. FHA functions conducted by the joint force 

should be transferred to the HN, UN, NGOs, or IGOs 

when the capability exists for transition without support 

degradation. Redeployment by function is efficient and 

ensures that each FHA requirement is met or responsibility 

is assumed by other entities (HN, UN, NGOs, or IGOs).

CONCLUSION 

 This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, 

executing, and assessing foreign humanitarian assistance 

operations. 
Executive Summary 

xxx JP 3-29 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER I

OVERVIEW

“The earthquake relief effort in Pakistan created a remarkable construct: a 

relationship between states and peoples significantly improved at every level of 

society. Flexibility and the ability to quickly build a team from vastly different 

organizations were the characteristics that enabled mission success. The “soft 

infrastructure” composed of interpersonal relationships and in-country 

connections was invaluable. The humanitarian assistance to the people of 

northern Pakistan set the example for interagency and international cooperation 

in the face of a complex humanitarian disaster and furthered US goals in the 

area of operations by facilitating favorable interactions between US personnel 

and the inhabitants of the region.” 

US Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief 

Keys to Success in Pakistan 

Joint Forces Quarterly, 1st quarter 2007 

1. General 

a. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA). FHA consists of Department of 

Defense (DOD) activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for 

International Development (USAID) or Department of State (DOS), conducted outside 

the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, 

disease, hunger, or privation. FHA is conducted to relieve or reduce the results of 

natural or man-made disasters or endemic conditions that might present a serious 

threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA provided by 

US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed 

to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation (HN) civil authorities or 

agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing that assistance. Although 

US military forces are primarily designed and structured to defend and protect US 

national interests, they may be readily adapted to FHA requirements. Military 

organization, structure, and readiness enable commanders (CDRs) to respond rapidly and 

effectively when time is of the essence. However, US military forces are not the primary 

US Government (USG) means of providing FHA. They normally supplement the 

activities of US and foreign government authorities, nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs), and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). USAID is the principal agency for 

US bilateral development and humanitarian assistance (HA) to foreign countries. The 

National Security Council (NSC) coordinates foreign assistance policies and programs 

among all USG agencies. 

b. Historical Perspective. The US military has played a major role in providing 

FHA. Some notable examples of military support to FHA include: assistance to the 

islands of Martinique and St. Vincent after a series of devastating volcanic eruptions 

(1902); the Berlin Airlift (1948); assistance to Iran following a series of earthquakes in 

northwestern Iran (Operation IDA, 1962); assistance to Bangladesh following a typhoon 

that killed 139,000 people (Operation SEA ANGEL, 1991); construction and operation of 

refugee camps and feeding of Kurds in Iraq (Operations PROVIDE COMFORT I and II, 

1991-1996); delivery of relief supplies to states in Central and Eastern Europe and the 

I-1 
Chapter I 

former Soviet republics, including Russia; medical support in Bosnia; delivery and 

security of relief supplies to Somalia, Ethiopia, and the former Yugoslavia; support to the 

humanitarian crisis in Rwanda (Operation SUPPORT HOPE, 1994); support to FHA 

efforts in a number of Central American countries during Hurricane Mitch (Operation 

FUERTO APOYO, 1998); support during the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo and Albania 

(Operation SHINING HOPE, 1999); flood relief and medical assistance in Maputo, 

Mozambique (Operation ATLAS RESPONSE, 2000); tsunami relief in Indonesia, 

Thailand, and Sri Lanka (Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE 2005); earthquake relief in 

Pakistan (2005); and relief to the Republic of Georgia following the Russian invasion 

(Operation ASSURED DELIVERY 2008). 

c. US Military Role in FHA. With the exception of immediate response to prevent 

loss of life, military forces normally conduct FHA only upon the request of DOS and in 

coordination with the chief of mission (COM) and USAID. The military normally plays 

a supporting role in FHA. Typical supporting roles include: providing prompt aid that 

can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims; making available, 

preparing, and transporting nonlethal excess property to foreign countries; transferring 

on-hand DOD stocks to respond to unforeseen emergencies; providing funded and space 

available transportation of humanitarian and relief supplies; conducting some DOD 

humanitarian demining assistance activities; and conducting foreign consequence 

management (FCM). DOD has unique assets for effective response and can play a key 

role in foreign humanitarian crises, for example: 

(1) The US military possesses exceptional operational reach that can be 

employed to enhance an initial response. 

(2) The US military augments private sector capability and thus limits threats to 

regional stability. 

(3) The US military’s unmatched capabilities in logistics, command and control 

(C2), communications, and mobility are able to provide rapid and robust response to 

dynamic and evolving situations among vastly different military, civilian, and 

government entities. 

d. Unified Action 

(1) FHA operations require coordination and collaboration among many 

agencies, both governmental and nongovernmental, with US military forces when tasked 

in a supporting role. The term “unified action” in military usage is a broad term referring 

to the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental 

and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve coordination and 

cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part 

of the same command or organization. Unity of effort in an operation ensures all means 

are directed to a common purpose. During FHA operations unity of command may not 

be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. 

I-2 JP 3-29 
Overview 

(2) Because DOD will normally be in a supporting role during FHA, the joint 

force commander (JFC) may not be responsible for determining the mission or specifying 

the participating agencies. Obstacles to unified action include: discord, inadequate 

structure and procedures, incompatible communications, cultural differences, and 

bureaucratic and personnel limitations. Appropriate organization, C2, and most 

importantly an understanding of the objectives of the organizations involved are all 

means to build consensus and achieve unity of effort, regardless of role. The reciprocal 

exchange of information, including the establishment of liaison officers (LNOs), is also a 

critical enabler in ensuring unity of effort. 

(3) The joint force will work not only with interagency partners during FHA 

operations, but also with multinational organizations including the HN, IGOs, NGOs, 

partner nations, and the private sector. The tenets of multinational unity of effort (i.e., 

respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, and coordination) applied during an 

FHA mission cannot guarantee success; however, ignoring them may lead to mission 

failure. 

For further details on unified action, refer to Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the 

Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During 

Joint Operations. 

e. Related Terminology. The following terms and descriptions are important to 

form a basis for understanding FHA operations: 

(1) Developmental assistance is a USAID function primarily designed to 

promote economic growth and the equitable distribution of its benefits. 

(2) Foreign assistance is assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of 

military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural 

and man-made disasters. US assistance takes three forms - developmental assistance, 

HA, and security assistance. 

(3) Foreign disaster is an act of nature (such as a flood, drought, fire, 

hurricane, earthquake, volcanic eruption, or epidemic), or an act of man (such as a riot, 

violence, civil strife, explosion, fire, or epidemic), which is or threatens to be of sufficient 

severity and magnitude to warrant US foreign disaster relief to a foreign country, foreign 

persons, or to an IGO. 

(4) Foreign disaster relief is prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the 

suffering of foreign disaster victims. Normally it includes humanitarian services and 

transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds and bedding; temporary 

shelter and housing; the furnishing of medical materiel and medical and technical 

personnel; and making repairs to essential services. 

I-3 
Chapter I 

(5) Security assistance is a group of programs by which the United States 

provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, 

loan, credit, or cash sales to further national policies and objectives. 

(6) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Terminology. US forces 

conducting FHA as part of a NATO operation should be cognizant of the following 

NATO terms. 

(a) HA, as part of an operation, is the use of available military resources to 

assist or complement the efforts of responsible civil actors in the operational area or 

specialized civil humanitarian organizations in fulfilling their primary responsibility to 

alleviate human suffering. 

(b) Humanitarian operation is an operation specifically mounted to 

alleviate human suffering where responsible civil actors in an area are unable or 

unwilling to support a population adequately. It may precede, parallel, or complement 

the activity of specialized civil humanitarian organizations. 

2. Legal Authority and Policy 

a. A basic tenet of fiscal law is that expenditure of public funds may be made only 

when expressly authorized by Congress. The law surrounding FHA is a web of statutes, 

annual appropriations, policies, regulations, and directives that may be confusing. The 

staff judge advocate (SJA) should be involved in planning for FHA operations as early as 

possible. 

b. United States Code (USC). Statutory authority for USG agencies to provide 

FHA is contained in the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, in Title 22, 

USC. This legislation provides a blueprint for USG engagement with friendly nations. 

The FAA designated DOS to provide policy guidance and supervision of programs 

created within the FAA. These programs are loosely divided into security assistance and 

development assistance. The joint force has a relatively small supporting role in FHA, 

which, in this policy, falls under developmental assistance. Various sections of Title 10, 

USC and Title 22, USC give specific authorizations for various types of military 

assistance. In addition, the annual DOD appropriations acts provide funding levels for 

various authorizations. Taken together these provisions are very narrow in scope and 

generally still require prior coordination with DOS. Other sections of the FAA may 

provide authorization for expenditures by other government agencies (OGAs) that may 

involve joint force distribution or coordination. One example is international 

development accounts, which permit donations of foodstuffs by the US Department of 

Agriculture on an emergency basis. 

c. DOD Directive (DODD) 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, establishes policy 

guidance for foreign disaster relief operations. Foreign disaster relief is prompt aid 

that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. Figure I-1 

I-4 JP 3-29 
Overview 

depicts causes of foreign disasters and various types of foreign disaster relief. DOD 

policy provides for component participation in foreign disaster relief operations only after 

a determination is made by DOS that foreign disaster relief shall be provided. This 

policy does not prevent a local military CDR at the immediate scene of a foreign disaster 

from undertaking prompt relief operations in response to requests from the local HN 

authorities or COM when time is of the essence and when, in the estimate of the CDR, 

humanitarian considerations make it advisable to do so. 

Humanitarian Services and Transportation

Acts of Nature

Flood,

Drought, Fire,

Hurricane,

Earthquake,

Volcanic Eruption,

Epidemic

Riot, Violence,

Civil Strife,

Explosion, Fire,

Epidemic

Acts of Man

Beds

&

Bedding

Food

&

Water

Clothing

Medicine

&

Materiel

Medical &

Technical

Personnel

Repairs

to 

Essential

Temporary

Shelter &

Housing

In Response to:

FOREIGN

DISASTERS

FOREIGN DISASTER RELIEF

Figure I-1. Foreign Disaster Relief 

d. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3214.01C, Military 

Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations for Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents, establishes guidance for FCM operations. This 

instruction applies to DOD support to FCM operations as part of the USG response to 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incidents abroad. The HN retains 

primary responsibility for response to CBRN incidents. DOS is the lead federal agency 

(LFA) for USG FCM operations, unless otherwise directed by the President. The DOD 

will support the LFA in FCM operations. DOS-led FCM operations may occur in a 

I-5 
Chapter I 

permissive environment, but the combatant commander (CCDR) is responsible for force 

protection and requirements for US DOD personnel. This instruction does not apply to 

the following actions: 

(1) Other DOD incident response operations that may occur prior to, 

concurrently with, or following FCM operations. 

(2) Planning and conducting domestic consequence management (CM) 

operations. 

(3) Acts of nature or acts of man that do not involve CBRN materials 

(including toxic industrial materials). 

(4) CBRN incidents that are a direct result of US military operations in a 

foreign country where DOS does not have an established presence. 

 e. The US has a responsibility to respond to CBRN events involving US facilities or 

installations. The DOD retains primary responsibility for response to CBRN incidents 

that occur and the effects of which are contained on US military installations abroad, 

unless specifically stated otherwise in applicable international agreements. The 

Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 2000.18, Department of Defense Installation 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Response 

Guidelines applies to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 

explosives (CBRNE) incidents on DOD installations. 

See Appendix A, “Legal Issues,” for detailed legal considerations and information.

3. Types of Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Missions 

FHA missions conducted by US military forces span the entire range of military 

operations but are most often crisis response and limited contingency operations. The 

following missions are common in FHA operations: (A single FHA operation may well 

contain more than one of these missions.) 

a. Relief Missions. These missions include prompt aid that can be used to alleviate 

the suffering of disaster victims. Distribution of relief supplies has traditionally been 

the domain of NGOs and IGOs, because of their charters, expertise, and experience. 

However, if the relief community is overwhelmed, or the security situation precludes it, 

US military forces may be tasked to distribute these supplies. Potential relief roles for 

US forces include immediate response to prevent loss of life and destruction of property, 

construction of basic sanitation facilities and shelters, and provision of food and medical 

care. 

b. Dislocated Civilian Support Missions. These missions are specifically designed 

to support the assistance and protection for dislocated civilians. A “dislocated civilian” is 

a broad term primarily used by DOD that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an 

I-6 JP 3-29 
Overview 

internally displaced person (IDP), a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. These 

persons may be victims of conflict, natural, or man-made disaster. Typically, the United 

Nations (UN) or other IGOs and NGOs will build and administer camps, if needed, and 

provide basic assistance and services to the population. However, when the US military 

is requested to provide support, dislocated civilian support missions may include camp 

organization (basic construction and administration); provision of care (food, supplies, 

medical attention, and protection); and placement (movement or relocation to other 

countries, camps, and locations). An important priority for the management of dislocated 

civilians should be to utilize the services and facilities of non-DOD agencies when 

coordination can be accomplished as dislocated civilian operations are often long-term 

and require enormous resourcing normally not immediately available through DOD 

sources. 

c. Security Missions. These missions may include establishing and maintaining 

conditions for the provision of FHA by organizations of the world relief community. 

The delivery of humanitarian relief supplies often depends on the affected country having 

secure serviceable ports, air terminals, roads, and railways. In some cases, however, the 

affected country will not be able to meet this condition, and may request assistance from 

US military forces. Once the movement of supplies commences, secure areas will be 

needed for storage of relief material until it can be distributed to the affected 

population. Other tasks may involve providing protection and armed escorts for convoys 

and personnel delivering emergency aid, protection of shelters for dislocated civilians, 

and security for multinational forces, NGOs, and IGOs. 

d. Technical Assistance and Support Functions. An FHA force may, for a short 

term, support tasks such as communications restoration, relief supply distribution 

management and delivery, port operations, base operating support, emergency medical 

care, search and rescue (SAR), and humanitarian de-mining assistance. This technical 

assistance may take the form of advice and selected training, assessments, manpower, 

and equipment. Based upon Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and CCDR guidance, the 

FHA force CDR should establish operational procedures regarding technical advice 

and assistance to the affected country, NGOs, and IGOs as soon as possible. The 

technical assistance procedures should clarify what assistance may be provided as well as 

the source of authority for assistance. Humanitarian demining assistance includes 

activities related to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with 

respect to the detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war. 

No member of the Armed Forces of the United States, while providing humanitarian 

demining assistance, will engage in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of land 

mines or other explosive remnants of war (unless the member does so for the concurrent 

purpose of supporting a US military operation); or provide such assistance as part of a 

military operation that does not involve the Armed Forces of the United States. 

For further information regarding humanitarian demining assistance, see Appendix B, 

“Department of Defense Foreign Disaster Assistance Tasking and Funding Procedures 

and Humanitarian Assistance Programs.” 

I-7 
Chapter I 

e. Foreign Consequence Management. FCM is DOD assistance provided by the 

USG to a HN to mitigate the effects of a deliberate or inadvertent CBRNE attack or event 

and to restore essential government services. Primary responsibility for FCM rests with 

the HN, unless stipulated under relevant international agreements or arrangements. 

Unless otherwise directed by the President, DOS is the LFA for USG FCM operations 

and is responsible for coordinating the overall USG FCM response. When requested by 

the LFA and directed by SecDef, DOD will support USG FCM operations to the extent 

allowed by law and subject to the availability of forces. The response may include a 

number of agencies with specialized capabilities, in addition to forces provided by DOD. 

The ability of the USG to assist a HN government and its affected population is 

determined by the nature of the CBRN event, the forces available to provide assistance, 

and the time required to deploy to the vicinity of the incident. The more rapidly FCM 

assistance is coordinated and applied, the better the chances of success in mitigating the 

effects of the CBRN incident. 

For further information regarding FCM, see JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management. 

4. Related Operations 

a. Although FHA operations may be executed simultaneously with other types of 

operations, each type has unique characteristics. For example, FHA operations may be 

simultaneously conducted with peace operations (PO), but each has its own strategic end 

state. Military CDRs must be cautious not to commit their forces to projects and 

tasks that go beyond the FHA mission. Military CDRs conducting FHA 

simultaneously with other operations must develop end state, transition, and termination 

objectives as well as measures of effectiveness (MOEs) complementary to simultaneous 

military operations. 

b. Stability Operations. These missions, tasks, and activities seek to maintain or 

reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, 

emergency infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitarian relief. Many of these missions 

and tasks are the essence of civil-military operations (CMO). Joint operations must 

feature an appropriate balance between offensive and defensive operations and stability 

operations in all phases. Although offensive and defensive operations may be required 

during an FHA operation, the preponderance of missions, tasks, and activities will be 

stability operations. Likewise, FHA may be executed to provide humanitarian relief 

following combat (whether or not US forces were involved in the combat) for example in 

conjunction with a PO or during the stabilize phase of a major campaign or operation. 

For further guidance on stability operations, refer to DODD 3000.05, Military Support 

for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, and JP 3-0, 

Joint Operations. 

c. Nation assistance (NA) operations are often connected with FHA operations, 

but there are very distinct differences. NA refers to civil and/or military assistance 

I-8 JP 3-29 
Overview 

rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, 

crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. 

NA programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense 

(FID), other Title 10, USC programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by 

federal agencies or IGOs. NA generally refers to a long-term commitment to promote 

sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. Most often, NA will be 

an important part of rebuilding after the completion of a disaster relief FHA mission. 

(1) Humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA). HCA is assistance to the local 

populace provided in conjunction with authorized military operations. This assistance is 

specifically authorized by Title 10, USC, Section 401, and funded under separate 

authorities. 

(a) Assistance provided under these provisions must promote the security 

interests of both the US and the HN and the specific operational readiness skills of the 

members of the armed forces who participate in the activities. Assistance is limited to: 

1. Medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in areas of a 

country that are rural or are underserved by medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary 

professionals, respectively, including education, training, and technical assistance related 

to the care provided. 

2. Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems. 

3. Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities. 

4. Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. 

(b) It is important to understand the difference between HCA and FHA. 

FHA, as discussed above, focuses on the use of DOD support as necessary to alleviate 

urgent needs in a HN caused by some type of disaster or catastrophe. By contrast, HCA 

programs are typically preplanned military exercises designed to provide assistance to the 

HN populace while also meeting the above requirements to promote operational 

readiness skills and mutual security. Usually these are planned well in advance and are 

usually not in response to disasters, although HCA activities have been executed 

following disasters. When at all possible, the assistance provided in HCA should be 

designed to increase the long-term capacity of the HN to provide for the health and wellbeing of its populace. 

(c) To avoid possible overlap or duplication and ensure sustainability, HCA 

projects should be coordinated with the country team (especially USAID) and the HN. 

For example, school construction should not be undertaken if there is not a sustainable 

plan by partners to provide teachers and administration, salaries, equipment, and books. 

(2) Security assistance refers to a group of programs by which the US provides 

defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by 

I-9 
Chapter I 

grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of US national policies and objectives 

(e.g., foreign military sales). 

(3) FID involves participation by civilian and military agencies of a 

government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other 

designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and 

insurgency. 

For further detail with regard to FID, refer to JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense. 

d. PO encompass multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited 

contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military 

missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support 

reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. PO 

include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict 

prevention efforts. 

For further information on PO, refer to JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations. 

e. Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are conducted to assist DOS in 

evacuating US citizens, DOD civilian personnel, and designated HN and third country 

nationals whose lives are in danger from locations in a foreign nation to an appropriate 

safe haven. Although normally considered in connection with hostile action, evacuation 

may also be conducted in anticipation of, or in response to, a natural or man-made 

disaster. 

For further information on NEO, refer to JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. 

5. Operational Context 

a. US military forces participate in unilateral or multinational coordinated 

responses. Multinational responses may or may not involve the UN. 

b. Unilateral. In this type of operation, the USG provides FHA without direct 

involvement by other nations other than the HN. A unilateral response would 

normally occur when expediency is essential, such as when a humanitarian crisis or 

disaster demands an immediate response. A unilateral effort may transition to a 

multinational operation. 

c. Multinational. Multinational operations are usually undertaken within the 

structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible arrangements include supervision by 

an IGO such as the UN or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

(OSCE). An alliance is a relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) 

between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common 

interests of the members. A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more 

nations for common action. Coalitions are formed by different nations with different 

I-10 JP 3-29 
Overview 

objectives, usually for a single occasion or for longer cooperation in a narrow sector of 

common interest. Operations conducted with units from two or more coalition members 

are referred to as coalition operations. 

For further information on multinational operations, refer to JP 3-16, Multinational 

Operations.

6. Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations 

Crisis response and limited contingency operations are typically limited in scope and 

scale and conducted to achieve a very specific objective in an operational area. They 

may be conducted as stand-alone operations in response to a crisis or executed as an 

element of a larger, more complex joint campaign or operation. A limited contingency 

operation in response to a crisis includes all of those operations for which the joint 

operation planning process (JOPP) is required and a contingency or crisis action plan is 

developed. The level of complexity, duration, and resources depends on the 

circumstances. Included are operations to maintain and improve US ability to operate 

with multinational partners to deter the hostile ambitions of potential aggressors (e.g., 

Joint Task Force [JTF] SHINING HOPE in the spring of 1999 to support refugee 

humanitarian relief for hundreds of thousands of Albanians fleeing their homes in 

Kosovo). Many such operations involve a combination of military forces and capabilities 

in close cooperation with OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. The ability of the US to respond 

rapidly with appropriate options to potential or actual crises contributes to regional 

stability. Thus, joint operations often may be planned and executed as a crisis response 

or limited contingency. As soon as practical after it is determined that a crisis may 

develop or a contingency is declared, JFCs and their staffs begin a systems analysis and 

determine the intelligence requirements needed to support the anticipated operation. 

Human intelligence often may provide the most useful source of information. 

For further information on the range of military operations, refer to JP 3-0, Joint 

Operations. 

7. Operational Environment 

The operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and 

influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the CDR’s decisions. It 

encompasses physical areas and factors (the air, land, maritime, and space domains) 

and the information environment. Included within these are the adversary, friendly, 

and neutral systems (political, military, economic, social, informational, infrastructure, 

legal, and others), which are relevant to a specific joint operation. Understanding this 

environment requires a broad perspective during any operation; however, this holistic 

view is particularly important during FHA operations, where there are normally no overt 

adversary military forces, but forces of nature, possibly covert adversary forces, and 

nonmilitary personnel, organizations, and systems that combine to complicate joint force 

operations and influence the application of force choices. 

I-11 
Chapter I 

For further details on the operational environment, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

8. Mission Transition or Termination 

a. Based on the supported geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) intent, the 

JFC determines the best arrangement of simultaneous and sequential actions and 

activities to create desired effects to support achievement of objectives to accomplish the 

assigned mission. This arrangement is broken into phases. A phase can be characterized 

by the focus that is placed on it. Phases are distinct in time, space, and/or purpose from 

one another, but must be planned in support of each other and should represent a natural 

progression and subdivision of the campaign or operation. 

b. Transitions between operational phases are designed to be distinct shifts in focus 

by the joint force, often accompanied by changes in command relationships. The need to 

move into another phase normally is identified by assessing that a set of objectives are 

achieved or that the situation has evolved in a manner that requires a major change in 

focus for the joint force and is therefore usually event driven, not time driven. Changing 

the focus of the operation takes time and may require changing priorities, command 

relationships, force allocation, or even the design of the operational area. This challenge 

demands an agile shift in joint force skill sets, actions, organizational behaviors, and 

mental outlooks; and coordination and collaboration with a wider range of other 

organizations — OGAs, multinational partners, IGOs, and NGOs — to provide those 

capabilities necessary to address the mission-specific factors. 

c. Termination of operations must be considered from the outset of planning and 

should be a coordinated OGA, IGO, NGO, and multinational effort. Properly conceived 

termination criteria are key to ensuring that achieved military objectives endure. Further, 

development of a military end state is complementary to and supports attaining the 

specified termination criteria and national strategic end state. CDRs are cautioned that 

the end state conditions could change during the operations and that the end state 

envisioned by other participating organizations may differ. 

d. Because FHA is largely a civilian endeavor, with the military in a supporting role, 

the termination of US or multinational military FHA operations will not necessarily 

coincide with the termination of international efforts. Normally, military forces operate 

in the initial stages of disaster relief to fill immediate gaps in assistance; military 

objectives will be to enable civilian control of disaster relief efforts (HN, international, or 

USG agency). 

e. The transition of humanitarian efforts to HN authorities will not occur by default. 

Planning of FHA must involve extensive international and interagency coordination from 

the very beginning in order to ensure a successful transition. FHA efforts by the joint 

force should focus on restoring the capacity of the HN, as well as enabling the OGAs and 

IGOs. The goal is to transition all efforts to HN, OGA, IGO, or NGO ownership to 

permit an orderly reduction of the joint force’s involvement and presence. All MOEs, 

end state, transition, and termination planning should reflect this goal. 

I-12 JP 3-29 
Overview 

9. Funding 

The financial impacts of an FHA operation are a major concern of the JFC. 

Planning for FHA operations must take into account the legal authority, authority limits, 

and mechanisms that allow US forces to dispense supplies and services. It is important 

that the JFC coordinate expenditures with the appropriate agency prior to funds being 

expended, or reimbursement may be denied. Detailed records of expenditures are critical 

to the reimbursement process. 

Appendix B, “Department of Defense Foreign Disaster Assistance Tasking and Funding 

Procedures and Humanitarian Assistance Programs,” provides more information 

regarding DOD foreign disaster tasking and funding procedures, and record keeping 

requirements. 

I-13 
Chapter I 

I-14 JP 3-29 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER II

ORGANIZATION AND INTERAGENCY COORDINATION 

“The necessary first step in shaping effective interagency groups is making known 

what skills and resources one brings to the table.” 

Admiral P.D. Miller, US Navy 

Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command 

1 Oct 1993 - 31 Oct 1994

1. Introduction 

US military forces should plan and execute FHA operations at the strategic, 

operational, and tactical levels in accordance with the CCDRs’ mission. The President 

and SecDef provide guidance and objectives, tasking a CCDR to respond to the crisis. 

This CCDR is identified as the supported CDR for DOD actions at the strategic level; 

provides strategic direction and operational focus to subordinates at the operational level; 

and synchronizes the military instrument of national power in time, space, and purpose 

with the actions of other military forces, OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs toward theater strategic 

objectives. In an FHA operation, interagency coordination is essential for effective 

policy development and implementation. This coordination is often highly complex. 

Within the context of DOD involvement, interagency coordination occurs between 

elements of DOD and engaged USG agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. 

This chapter provides information regarding interagency coordination, roles and 

responsibilities, and principal organizations. This information will assist JFCs and 

their staffs to understand these organizations and their responsibilities and relationships 

in FHA operations. 

2. Overview 

Because of the number of civilian and non-USG actors involved in a crisis, 

command relationships outside DOD command structures may not be clearly defined and 

success will depend heavily on effective, timely coordination. The challenge for CCDRs 

and their staffs is to determine the right place and time to access interagency and other 

coordination networks. Difficulties arise from the fact that many USG agencies, civil and 

military authorities, foreign governments, the UN, NGOs, and IGOs may be conducting 

assistance activities within the same operational area prior to, during, and after departure 

of the joint force. US military FHA planners must remain cognizant that these various 

agencies fall outside the military C2 system. Coordination and collaboration are 

essential in dealing with these organizations. The strategic goals or operating 

procedures of all concerned may not be identical, or even compatible; however, thorough 

collaboration and planning with concerned entities everyone can contribute to successful 

operations in this complex and challenging environment. Presidential and 

interdepartmental policy and guidance impact mission statements, implied tasks, 

and plans. The JFC has the critical task of developing the mission statement and intent. 

These should be clear and identify results that are achievable in a short duration 

operation. Key considerations in developing the mission statement include the military 

role in assisting the UN, NGOs, IGOs, and OGAs as well as security practices and 

policies. Interagency cooperation, coordination, and connectivity at all levels will 

II-1 
Chapter II 

better enable key organizations to orchestrate the total FHA effort. Key 

organizations or elements may include the government of the affected country, DOS, 

country team, CCDR, multinational forces, NGOs, IGOs, and OGAs, particularly the 

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) within USAID. 

3. Roles and Responsibilities 

a. Interagency Process. Immediately after a disaster strikes, the COM may send a 

disaster declaration cable. The disaster declaration is required for the legal authority to 

expend funds for FHA. With input from USAID and others at post, this cable outlines 

the extent of the damage, possible needs, and may recommend assistance in the form of 

funding, material, or technical assistance. 

(1) When the President, SecDef, and the Secretary of State determine that a US 

humanitarian response to a foreign disaster or crisis is required, the NSC normally 

directs the Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance (who is also the 

USAID Administrator) to convene an International Development and Humanitarian 

Assistance NSC Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) to review all pertinent 

information and recommend policy and specific actions. The International Development 

and Humanitarian Assistance NSC PCC participation will generally include: 

(a) Senior DOS and DOD representatives. 

(b) COM. 

(c) USAID representative. 

(d) Heads of other concerned agencies. 

(2) The International Development and Humanitarian Assistance NSC 

PCC concurrently develops a comprehensive strategy for emergency response and 

develops tasks for each key participant. Consideration of other elements or 

organizations that may be involved in the crisis is crucial to the development of sound 

recommendations. For example, the International Development and Humanitarian 

Assistance NSC PCC should consider the involvement of UN organizations, other 

responding nations, NGOs, and IGOs that may already be operating in the crisis area. 

Interagency coordination (Figure II-1) continues throughout the mission. Successful 

interagency coordination requires effective interaction among all organizational and 

functional elements. The NSC may designate another USG agency other than USAID to 

lead FHA based on multiple sets of conditions and security issues. 

(3) The interagency process often is described as “more art than science,” while 

military operations tend to depend more on structure and doctrine. However, some of the 

techniques, procedures, and systems of military C2 can facilitate unity of effort if they are 

adjusted to the dynamic world of interagency coordination and different organizational 

cultures. 

II-2 JP 3-29 
Organization and Interagency Coordination 

Chain of Command

Coordination

CJCS

DART

GCC

HACC

HAST

JLOC

JTF

DCHA

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Disaster Assistance Response Team

Geographic Combatant Commander

Humanitarian Assistance 

Coordination Center

Humanitarian Assistance Survey 

Team

Joint Logistics Operations Center

Joint Task Force

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and

Humanitarian Assistance

National Security Council

Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Policy Coordination Committee

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 

Migration

Secretary of Defense

Secretary of State

US Agency for International 

Development

NSC

OFDA

OSD

PCC

PM

PRM

SecDef

SECSTATE

USAID

SECSTATE

USAID

DCHA

OFDA/DART

PM PRM

President

NSC

PCC

Chief of 

Mission

SecDef

OSD

GCC

Crisis Action Team

HACC HAST JLOC

CJCS

Joint Staff

JTF

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION FOR FOREIGN 

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

LEGEND

Figure II-1. Interagency Coordination for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

For more information on the NSC, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During 

Joint Operations, Volume I. 

b. Department of State. Within the Executive Branch, DOS is the lead US foreign 

affairs agency. DOS advances US objectives and interests in the world through its 

primary role in developing and implementing the President's foreign policy. DOS also 

supports the foreign affairs activities of other USG entities (e.g., USAID, DOD,

Department of Commerce); simultaneously, the foreign affairs activities of other 

executive agencies support the DOS foreign affairs strategies. The primary purposes of 

DOS include protecting and assisting US citizens living or traveling abroad; promoting 

US foreign policy objectives to other nations and the US public; assisting US businesses

II-3 
Chapter II 

in the international marketplace; and coordinating and providing support for international 

activities of other US agencies. DOS is organized into functional and regional bureaus. 

When a disaster is declared, the geographic bureau of the affected area becomes the key 

participating bureau. The functional bureaus of Population, Refugees, and Migration 

(PRM); International Organization Affairs; Political-Military Affairs (PM); Democracy, 

Human Rights, and Labor; Public Affairs (PA); Intelligence and Research; International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the Office of the Coordinator for 

Reconstruction and Stabilization (CRS) may also be involved. 

(1) When an emergency arises, the COM, or assistant secretary of state 

responsible for the particular area can declare a disaster, providing the event meets three 

criteria: the disaster exceeds the HN’s ability to respond; the affected country’s 

government either requests or is willing to receive US assistance; and a response to the 

disaster is in the US national interest. This declaration is transmitted to the Office of US 

Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and DOS to begin possible USG assistance. Each 

embassy or USAID mission has a mission disaster response officer (MDRO), normally a 

collateral duty officer responsible for disaster planning and management as well as 

maintenance of the mission disaster response plan. The MDRO educates, trains, and 

exercises mission personnel on the disaster response plan; liaises with government 

disaster authorities on an ongoing basis to ensure familiarity with disaster risks and 

organizational response arrangements; serves as the chief operating officer for the 

embassy’s emergency action committee during all phases of the disaster; and acts as the 

COM’s coordinator of USG disaster relief operations in country. 

NOTE: The composition of a country team varies widely, depending on the desires of 

the COM, the in-country situation, and the number and levels of US departments and 

agencies present. The COM is the head of the country team. Other members may 

include a defense attaché, security assistance officer, political counselor, PA counselor, 

economic counselor, representatives from USAID, and the Peace Corps. The COM has 

responsibility for all USG personnel in country and may limit the number and mix of 

people entering based on current or anticipated conditions. At the initiation of an FHA 

operation, the GCC should coordinate directly with the country team and offer to send a 

LNO for coordination purposes. 

For more detailed information on the US country team concept, see JP 3-22, Foreign 

Internal Defense. 

(2) PM is the primary link between DOD and DOS. Among other coordinating 

functions, the bureau manages humanitarian mine action programs around the world, 

promotes public-private mine action partnerships, and works with the DOD to provide 

assistance in the event of natural disasters and other crises abroad. 

(3) PRM has primary responsibility for formulating policies on population, 

refugees, and migration, and for administering US refugee assistance and admissions 

programs. This bureau will have a lead policy role in refugee crises. PRM has officers 

overseas in Geneva and Brussels, and regional refugee coordinators in Abidjan, Accra, 

II-4 JP 3-29 
Organization and Interagency Coordination 

Addis Ababa, Amman, Baghdad, Bangkok, Belgrade, Bogota, Cairo, Havana, Ho Chi 

Minh City, Islamabad, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kampala, Kathmandu, Moscow, and Nairobi. 

(4) The Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is assigned the 

responsibility to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize USG civilian capacity to prevent or 

prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in 

transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, 

democracy, and a market economy. 

(5) The Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU) is an office within the Bureau of 

Intelligence and Research with the mission to identify, collect, analyze, and disseminate 

unclassified information critical to USG decision-makers and partners in preparation for 

and response to humanitarian emergencies worldwide, and to promote best practices for 

humanitarian information management. 

c. United States Agency for International Development. USAID is an 

independent agency that provides economic, development, and HA around the world in 

support of the foreign policy goals of the United States. Although a separate agency from 

DOS, it shares certain administrative functions with DOS, and reports to and receives 

overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. The USAID administrator 

concurrently serves as the DOS Director of Foreign Assistance. USAID plays a major 

role in US foreign assistance policy and a principal role in interagency coordination. 

This agency administers and directs the US foreign economic assistance program and 

acts as the LFA for USG FHA.

(1) DCHA coordinates USAID's democracy programs, international disaster 

assistance, emergency and developmental food aid, aid to manage and mitigate conflict, 

and volunteer programs. Within DCHA, OFDA and the Office of Military Affairs 

(OMA) are key organizations that will interact with DOD during FHA operations. 

(2) The OFDA. OFDA is the lead office in the USG for facilitating and 

coordinating USG emergency assistance overseas. As part of DCHA, OFDA provides 

HA to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and reduce the social and economic impact 

of humanitarian emergencies worldwide. OFDA provides technical support to the 

Administrator, who serves as the President's Special Coordinator for International 

Disaster Assistance. The office formulates US foreign disaster assistance policy in 

coordination with OGAs. It coordinates with USAID offices and others to provide relief 

supplies and HA, and develops and manages logistic, operational, and technical support 

for disaster responses. OFDA’s criteria for providing assistance in a disaster are: the 

disaster exceeds the ability of the HN to respond; the US is invited by the HN to respond; 

and it is in the US interest to respond. 

II-5 
Chapter II 

(a) OFDA may deploy a disaster assistance response team (DART) into the 

crisis area to assist coordination of the FHA effort, and activate an on-call Washingtonbased response management team. A DART provides specialists, trained in a variety of 

disaster relief skills, to assist US embassies and USAID missions with the management of 

the USG response to a foreign disaster. The DART will also work closely with the US 

military when it is participating in FHA operations. DARTs assess and report on the 

disaster situation and recommend follow up actions. Figure II-2 provides a visualization 

of the coordination flow between DCHA/OFDA and DOD when both respond to a 

disaster relief event. 

For more discussion of DART, see paragraph 13 of Appendix C, “Department of State 

and United States Agency for International Development Organizations.” 

(b) OFDA’s Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION FLOW

DART

DCHA

DOD

DOS

EXECSEC

JTF

OFDA

RMT

USAID

disaster assistance response team

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and 

Humanitarian Assistance 

Department of Defense

Department of State

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Executive Secretary

joint task force

response management team

United States Agency for International 

Development

Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance

(WHEN DCHA/OFDA AND DOD RESPOND) 

HOST NATION

GOVERNMENT

US 

EMBASSY DOS DOD

COMBATANT 

COMMANDER

DART JTF

USAID &

DCHA/OFDA

RMT

Must request

(or willing to accept)

US assistance

Issues disaster

declaration cable

DOD support

request via

EXECSEC memo

Ambassador evaluates

whether disaster is

beyond country’s

ability to respond and

if in US national

interest

Coordination for most 

effective and 

appropriate DOD 

response

LEGEND

Figure II-2. Interagency Coordination Flow 

II-6 JP 3-29 
Organization and Interagency Coordination 

(FOG) is an important reference tool for personnel that may be involved in FHA 

operations. It explains the roles and responsibilities of individuals sent to disaster sites to 

undertake initial assessments or to participate as members of an OFDA DART. The FOG 

contains information on general responsibilities for disaster responders, formats and 

reference material for assessing and reporting on populations at risk, DART position 

descriptions and duty checklists, descriptions of OFDA stockpile commodities, general 

information related to disaster activities, information on working with the military in the 

field, and a glossary of acronyms and terms used by OFDA and other organizations with 

which OFDA works. 

(3) OMA. OMA provides the focal point for USAID interaction with DOD. It 

addresses areas of common interests between defense and development, with a focus on 

improving civilian-military field readiness, programs, and coordination. OMA serves as 

the agency-wide unit for managing the day-to-day aspects of the USAID-military 

relationship. OMA has assigned senior development officers to each GCC and has 

received LNOs in return. 

d. Secretary of Defense. SecDef, working under the guidance of the President, and 

with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, directs DOD support to USG humanitarian 

operations and establishes appropriate command relationships. Within DOD, the Office 

of the SecDef coordinates FHA policy and funding. The Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy (USD[P]) has the overall responsibility for developing military policy for FHA 

operations. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Global Security Affairs) is responsible 

for foreign disaster relief policy and statutory programs within DOD; policy oversight is 

executed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Coalition, 

Peacekeeping, and Multinational Operations; program management and funding of 

these programs is the responsibility of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency 

(DSCA). 

e. The Joint Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is 

responsible for recommending military capabilities and appropriate relationships for FHA 

operations to SecDef. Once these relationships have been established, the Joint Staff 

coordinates detailed staff planning under the cognizance of the CJCS. The Joint 

Staff Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development has the primary 

responsibility for the concept review of operation plans (OPLANs) in support of FHA. 

Through the Logistics Readiness Center, the Logistics Directorate of the Joint Staff (J4), oversees joint logistic support for FHA operations. The Strategic Plans and Policy 

Directorate coordinates policy and represents CJCS in interagency forums related to 

FHA. The Operations Directorate of the Joint Staff (J-3) will also be involved when a 

military force is deployed to a foreign country as part of a US FHA operation. 

f. Combatant Commander. The GCCs direct military operations, including FHA, 

within their areas of responsibility (AORs). Ideally, this should be done with the 

concurrence of the COM. GCCs develop and maintain CDR’s estimates, base plans, 

concept plans (CONPLANs), or OPLANs for FHA operations, including disaster relief, 

and FCM missions. In response to a disaster, the supported GCC structures the force 

II-7 
Chapter II 

necessary to conduct and sustain the FHA operation, typically forming a JTF. Advisors 

on the GCC’s staff will be in close communications with various advisors and 

counterparts on the JTF staff. Two notable examples are the GCC’s DOS foreign policy 

advisor (POLAD), and USAID senior development officer, who can provide nonmilitary 

insights, enhancing direct communications and coordination with the affected embassy 

and country team. Additionally, supporting CCDRs may provide necessary support, 

including transportation, forces, and communications capabilities, as required. 

(1) Crisis Action Team. Each CCDR has an organization designed to respond 

to immediate requirements, often called a crisis action or rapid deployment team. The 

initially deployed team serves as the immediate responder/assessor for the CCDR. The 

exact composition of this team and the subsequent follow-on assets will vary depending 

on the type and severity of the incident and in some cases, restrictions placed on the 

COM by the HN (through a status-of-forces agreement [SOFA], treaties, or informal 

agreements) in limiting the number of foreign military permitted in country. In all cases, 

the team must coordinate with the COM and country team prior to deploying. When an 

FHA operation has been or will likely be directed, the crisis action team can recommend 

to the CCDR priority issues (water, food, equipment, etc.) as well as how to organize for 

the most effective response. The crisis action team may form the nucleus of the FHA 

force headquarters (HQ) or the JTF command element. 

(2) Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST). The supported CCDR 

may also organize and deploy a HAST to acquire information required for planning. This 

information may include an assessment of existing conditions and requirements for FHA 

force structure. Before deploying, the HAST should be provided the current threat 

assessment and relevant intelligence; geospatial information and services support; and 

embassy, DOS, and USAID points of contact. Due to the possibly dangerous nature of 

the environment at the site of a disaster, the HAST should include medical personnel who 

can conduct both a vulnerability assessment and an occupational and environmental 

health site assessment, documenting conditions in the operational area. The DART and 

USAID mission can provide a great deal of this information to the HAST. Once 

deployed, the HAST, working with the country team, can assess the capability and 

capacity of the HN government to respond to the disaster; identify primary points of 

contact for coordination and collaboration; determine the threat environment and survey 

facilities that may be used for force protection purposes; and coordinate specific support 

arrangements for the delivery of food and medical supplies. The HAST works closely 

with the DART to prevent duplication of effort. The HAST can assist with the following 

tasks. 

(a) Assess the nature and extent of: 

1. available food, water, sanitation, and shelter. 

2. casualties and loss of life. 

3. injury, illness, outbreak of disease, and access to health services. 

II-8 JP 3-29 
Organization and Interagency Coordination 

4. dislocated civilian population and location (to include security 

requirements of the population). 

5. HN capabilities and capacities to include medical facilities. 

6. degree of destruction to property and infrastructure. 

7. available logistic facilities for air- and sealift, roads, rail, and 

bridges. 

8. significant actors; the span and depth of their control over territory, 

resources, and individuals; and their objectives. 

9. overall telecommunications infrastructure (ability/capability of the 

HN and global leadership to receive information from the populous). 

10. overall public information infrastructure (ability/capability of the 

HN and global leadership to transmit HA information to the populous and global 

responders). 

(b) Formulate recommendations for provision of DOD funding, equipment, 

supplies, and personnel. 

(c) Establish liaison, identify information sharing procedures, and 

coordinate assessment with agencies of the affected country; supported CDRs or their 

representatives; US diplomatic personnel and USAID, especially the DART; and other 

relief agencies operating within the crisis area. 

(d) In conjunction with US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), 

arrange for the reception of US personnel, supplies, and equipment. 

(e) Be prepared to begin coordinating FHA to relieve suffering and avoid 

further loss of life, as directed by the GCC. 

(f) Determine the threat environment and survey facilities that may be 

required for self-defense of forces. 

(g) Determine the COM’s desires and capacity to support the media in 

FHA operations and the JTF’s role in media support. 

(3) Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC). The supported 

CCDR may establish a HACC to assist with interagency coordination and planning. The 

HACC provides the critical link between the CCDR and OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs that 

may participate in the FHA operation at the theater strategic level. Normally, the HACC 

is a temporary organization that operates during the early planning and coordination 

II-9 
Chapter II 

stages of the operation. Once a civil-military operations center (CMOC) or humanitarian 

operations center (HOC) has been established, the role of the HACC diminishes, and its 

functions are accomplished through the normal organization of the CCDR’s staff and 

crisis action organization for establishing authority. Staffing for the HACC should 

include a director appointed by the supported GCC, a CMO planner, an OFDA advisor or 

liaison if available, a public affairs officer (PAO), an NGO advisor, and other 

augmentation (e.g., legal advisor, a preventive medicine physician) when required. 

Liaisons from OGAs, US Army Corps of Engineers, key NGOs, IGOs, and HN agencies 

also may be members of the HACC in large scale FHA operations. 

(4) Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). The JIACG is an 

interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working 

relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG 

civilian and military experts accredited to the CCDR and tailored in staff location and/or 

title to meet the requirements of a supported CCDR, the JIACG provides the CCDR with 

the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and 

departments. The primary role of the JIACG is to enhance interagency coordination. 

The JIACG complements the interagency coordination that takes place at the national 

level through DOD and the NSC. JIACG members participate in contingency, crisis 

action, security cooperation, and other operational planning. They provide a conduit 

back to their parent organizations to help synchronize joint operations with the efforts of 

OGAs. The JIACG may play an important role in contingency planning for FHA and in 

initial interagency coordination prior to establishment of a HACC or other coordination 

body. 

For more information on the JIACG, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination 

During Joint Operations, Volume I, and The Commander’s Handbook for the Joint 

Interagency Coordination Group. 

 

(5) Joint Logistics Operations Center (JLOC). The JLOC is a current 

operations directorate within the Joint Staff J-4. The JLOC receives reports from 

supporting commands, Service components, and external sources, distills information for 

decision/briefings, and responds to questions. The JLOC coordinates and synchronizes 

the planning and execution of ongoing combatant command operations, interagency 

support requirements, and assigns priority movement for selected senior officials. 

For further details on the JLOC, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

(6) Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (DDOC). The DDOC 

located at USTRANSCOM directs the global air, land, and sea transportation capabilities 

of the Defense Transportation System to meet national security objectives provided by 

DOD. The DDOC fuses capabilities of multimodal deployment and distribution 

operations, intelligence, force protection, capacity acquisition, resource management and 

other staff functions to collaboratively provide distribution options to the warfighter. C2 

of the majority of intertheater lift forces and logistic infrastructure is accomplished 

II-10 JP 3-29 
Organization and Interagency Coordination 

through the DDOC, which tracks the movement requirement from lift allocation and 

initial execution through closure at final destination. 

For additional information concerning the DDOC refer to JP 3-35, Deployment and 

Redeployment Operations. 

(7) Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (JDDOC). 

USTRANSCOM, as the DPO, through its DDOC, collaborates with JDDOCs to link 

strategic deployment and distribution processes to operational and tactical functions in 

support of the warfighter. The geographic CCDRs are responsible for implementing their 

JDDOC core structure. The JDDOC is an integral organization of the GCC’s staff, 

normally under the direction of the J-4 and collocated with the JLOC during operations. 

However, the GCC can place the JDDOC at any location required or under the 

operational control (OPCON) of other command or staff organizations. The JDDOC can 

reach back to the national partners to address and solve deployment and distribution 

issues for the CCDR and can have the capability to develop deployment and distribution 

plans, integrate multinational and/or interagency deployment and distribution, and 

coordinate and synchronize the movement of sustainment in support of the CCDR’s 

priorities. 

(8) Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element) (SJFHQ[CE]). The 

GCC’s SJFHQ(CE) is a foundation on which to build the joint C2 capability for an FHA 

operation through augmentation, or it may be used to augment another HQ staff 

designated as the JTF for the FHA operation. 

For further details on the SJFHQ(CE), refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

(9) Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE). The JPASE provides a 

ready, scaleable, equipped, and trained joint PA capability to augment existing PA 

personnel or serve as a stand-alone PA capability to support emergent requirements for 

CCDRs and JTF HQ. The criticality of PA during FHA will place considerable strain on 

existing PA staffs; use of JPASE may alleviate this strain during planning and execution 

of an FHA mission. JPASE can deploy within 48 hours of notification to support a 

variety of operational requirements including FHA. 

g. Defense Security Cooperation Agency. DSCA is responsible to lead, direct, and 

manage security cooperation programs to support US national security objectives that 

strengthen America's alliances and partnerships through transfer of defense capabilities; 

international military education; and HA and humanitarian demining assistance. 

(1) The Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action 

(OHDM) provides direction, supervision, and oversight of DOD HA and humanitarian 

demining assistance programs. OHDM HA programs provide CCDRs with unobtrusive, 

low cost, but highly effective instruments to carry out their theater security cooperation 

strategies. OHDM manages the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid 

(OHDACA) appropriation and its sub-activities: HA (including the provision and 

II-11 
Chapter II 

transportation of nonlethal excess property), humanitarian demining assistance, and 

foreign disaster relief and emergency response. Additionally, OHDM provides oversight 

for the GCC’s HCA projects; manages the Denton Program, the space available 

transportation program for donor’s humanitarian relief supplies and material; and the 

Funded Transportation Program, the contract transportation program for both privately 

donated supplies and DOD nonlethal excess property donations. 

(2) DOD Humanitarian Demining Training Center (HDTC). The HDTC 

prepares US military forces for humanitarian missions in mine-affected countries 

throughout the world. The HDTC directly supports US policy in humanitarian demining 

assistance through a “train-the-trainer” methodology of engagement. It serves as the 

USG training and information center for humanitarian demining assistance; researches 

current worldwide tactics on land mine use and demining techniques employed by both 

military and civilian organizations; and provides innovative and realistic training tailored 

to meet DOD and DOS requirements. 

h. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). The NGA provides direct 

analytical support for FHA through the LFAs and combatant commands primarily 

through the deployment of team specialists in response to natural disasters, to include 

earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and wildfires. The standard production includes initial 

damage or recovery mitigation assessment derived from imagery and analytical imagery 

assessments, analytical reporting through NGA intelligence briefs, and geospatial 

situational awareness products. 

j. Consequence Management Advisory Team and Joint Technical Advisory 

CBRN Element. During a crisis involving CBRN materials, at the request of a CCDR, 

and in coordination with the Joint Staff, the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency (DTRA) may direct the immediate deployment of a supporting consequence 

management advisory team (CMAT). 

(1) The CMAT provides task-organized, deployable, doctrinal, and technical 

CM expertise, support, advice, and hazard prediction modeling assistance for DOD and 

other federal agencies during all phases of CBRN accidents or incidents. The CMAT 

may be augmented with specialists in PA, legal counsel, radiobiology, and other fields 

pertinent to the mission. The CMAT will leverage DTRA's reachback capability across 

DOD, the federal government, and academia to provide mission critical information to 

the supported organization. The CMAT can be deployed to support CM events in the 

homeland and in foreign nations. 

(2) When requested by combatant commands, and directed by the SecDef, US 

Strategic Command can deploy a CBRN CM technical advice and assistance element 

(known as joint technical advisory chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear element 

[JTACE]). The DTRA CMAT leads the JTACE and serves as the core element. The 

JTACE provides technical FCM advice and support to the combatant command HQ or a 

designated JTF. The JTACE task organizes subject matter experts from across DOD and 

II-12 JP 3-29 
Organization and Interagency Coordination 

leverages DTRA reachback capability, based on the nature of the event and the needs of 

the CCDR. The JTACE is only used to support FCM events. 

j. The Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian 

Assistance (COEDMHA) mission is to promote effective civil-military management in 

international HA, disaster response, and peacekeeping through education, training, 

research, and information programs. COEDMHA is congressionally mandated and 

assigned to United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). The Director of COEDMHA 

reports to the USPACOM Deputy CDR. COEDMHA educates, trains, provides 

consultation, supports military exercises, and produces information for responders. 

COEDMHA helps the military and other organizations that are active in the provision of 

relief or security, to coordinate better, and to learn about the role of the other actors in the 

humanitarian field so that they may perform their own roles better. 

k. The Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine (CDHAM)

is a DOD organization within the Department of Military and Emergency Medicine at the 

Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences. CDHAM is a university-based 

venture whose mission is to advance the understanding and delivery of disaster medical 

care and HA worldwide. The uniquely positioned academic center is actively developing 

relationships between governmental agencies, NGOs, and IGOs as a means of improving 

relief efforts. It is the focal point for medical aspects of disaster relief and HA. 

l. The Pacific Disaster Center (PDC) is an applied science, information, and 

technology center, working to reduce disaster risks and impacts to peoples’ lives and 

property. Established by the USG in 1996, the PDC is congressionally mandated and 

funded (sponsored through the office of the USD[P]) and is currently managed by the 

University of Hawaii. PDC also augments its congressional budget by undertaking paid 

risk reduction projects and consultancies in the Asia Pacific region and around the world. 

PDC’s mission is to provide applied information research and analysis to support the 

development of more effective policies, institutions, programs, and information products 

for the disaster management and HA communities. PDC creates new information 

products, and supports and facilitates the innovative use of information, technology, and 

applied research to increase efficiency of operational organizations by introducing novel 

and appropriately scaled, information resources, tools, and analyses. Central to achieving 

these objectives is providing unique and valuable geospatial and disaster-related 

information through web-based data systems for international, regional, national, and 

local information access and dissemination. Through the use of PDC-developed and 

PDC-hosted, web-based information systems, disaster managers can develop both 

situational awareness and appropriate responses before, during, and after disaster events. 

PDC information technology and communications products and systems support the full 

range of disaster management needs from the assessment of hazards and risk, to 

managing risk through mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery, and reconstruction. 

II-13 
Chapter II 

OPERATION IDA 

On 1 September 1962, a series of earthquakes struck northwestern 

Iran. [The Iranian government requested US assistance,] and on the 

3rd of the month the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed United States Army, 

Europe, to send aid to the victims. Early the next morning the airlift of 

the 8th Evacuation Hospital with a professional staff drawn from 

several hospitals in Europe began at Ramstein Air Force Base. With 

the 8th Evacuation Hospital went helicopter elements of the 421st 

Medical Company (Air Ambulance), a field maintenance detachment 

from the 29th Transportation Company, a preventive medicine 

detachment from the 485th Laboratory (Preventive Medicine), and a 

water purification unit from the 299th Engineer Battalion. Lt Col. 

Alexander M. Boysen, 8th Evacuation Hospital commander, assumed 

command of the entire relief force. 

When the Americans arrived in Tehran, Iranian officials instructed them 

to locate their hospital on the plain of Kazvin, a site near the worst area 

of destruction but adjacent to a rail line and a hard surface road. Iranian 

drivers transported the unit, and the Americans worked through the night 

to become operational by early the next morning. During the day, the 

Americans established a base camp near Buin, further into the disaster 

area, to serve both as a first aid station and as a helicopter base. From it, 

crews flew medical teams into the distressed area and evacuated 

seriously injured victims to the hospital. On the flight back into the area 

to pick up the teams, the helicopters brought in food, tents, and other 

essentials. In all, the choppers flew 404 sorties, delivered 45,000 pounds 

of supplies, and evacuated 66 patients. 

Operations at the 8th Evacuation Hospital where the helicopters brought 

the casualties did not proceed without difficulties. High winds wreaked 

havoc on the unit’s tents because pegs did not hold in the sandy soil. 

After two days’ service, the laundry exploded, badly burning three 

enlisted men. Supply shortages developed, particularly of items not 

ordinarily required by a fighting unit — catheters for small children, for 

example. Finally, the professional staff, drawn from various facilities in 

Europe, had never trained with the hospital and the resulting confusion 

hindered operations. 

Another difficulty, the suspicion and hostility of the local population, was 

only overcome through Iranian cooperation and American flexibility. 

Local government officials and the Shah himself during a visit, urged the 

people to cooperate. Even with a royal endorsement, however, the 8th 

Evacuation Hospital’s staff had to make minor adjustments [to 

accommodate] local customs. Its commander reported: “Many decisions 

that...were strange to Americans were made because they were not 

strange to Iranians...When one helps a foreign nation you accept their 

philosophy in many things, if by doing this it means you eventually gain 

your objective.” 

II-14 JP 3-29 
Organization and Interagency Coordination 

As it solved its organizational problems and slowly secured the 

cooperation of the Iranians, the 8th Evacuation Hospital gained its 

objective in becoming an efficient emergency hospital. Then, by October, 

the medical and sanitary situation in the area had stabilized and the 

United States Ambassador approved their withdrawal. When they 

departed, the Americans left the equipped hospital for the Iranians. 

SOURCE: Gaines M. Foster 

The Demands of Humanity: Army Medical Disaster Relief

US Army Center of Military History, 1983 

4. Key Non-US Government Participants and Organizations 

a. Host Nation. The HN is the nation receiving the assistance, in whose territory 

the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO 

organizations transit or operate. The HN will coordinate all relief efforts within its 

territory. US forces conducting FHA do so with the permission of the HN under the 

guidance of formal and informal agreements. JFCs should become knowledgeable of all 

bilateral agreements for mutual support, and exercise these agreements to the maximum 

extent possible. If the necessary agreements are not in place, CCDRs must obtain 

authority to negotiate (through the Joint Staff) and then actively seek bilateral agreements 

to support the joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) of 

forces, equipment, and supplies. The country team will be critical to this effort. The US 

embassy is the primary liaison with the HN government. 

b. United Nations. The purposes of the UN, as set forth in the charter, are to 

maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly relations among nations; to 

cooperate in solving international economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems 

and in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and to be a center 

for harmonizing the actions of nations in attaining these ends. 

(1) The UN coordinates its response to humanitarian crises through a committee 

of all the key humanitarian bodies, chaired by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator. 

The UN has been relied on by the international community to respond to natural and 

man-made disasters that are beyond the capacity of national authorities alone. Today, the 

UN is a major provider of emergency relief and longer-term assistance, a catalyst for 

action by governments and relief agencies, and an advocate on behalf of people struck by 

emergencies. 

(2) During HA operations in which the UN is involved, the UN will likely form 

a combination of either a United Nations disaster assessment and coordination (UNDAC) 

team, an on-site operations coordination center (OSOCC), or a humanitarian operations 

coordination center (HOCC). These operations centers assist the local emergency 

management authority of the HN to coordinate international relief efforts. The UN 

humanitarian coordinator is responsible for establishing and maintaining comprehensive 

coordination mechanisms based on facilitation and consensus building among actors 

II-15 
Chapter II 

involved at the country level in the provision of HA and protection, including cluster 

leads. 

c. Other IGOs. An IGO is an organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a 

treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or 

functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. It is formed to protect 

and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the UN, 

NATO, OSCE, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the African Union. 

NATO and OSCE are regional security organizations, while the African Union and the 

OAS are general regional organizations. A new trend toward subregional organizations 

is also evident, particularly in Africa where, for example, the Economic Community of 

West African States has taken on some security functions. These organizations have 

defined structures, roles, and responsibilities, and may be equipped with the resources 

and expertise to participate in complex interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination and 

collaboration. The US maintains formal or informal ties with some of the largest of these 

IGOs. 

d. Nongovernmental Organizations. An NGO is a private, self-governing, not-forprofit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, 

health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict 

resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil 

society. Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs are frequently on 

scene before the US military and are willing to operate in high-risk areas. They may 

have a long term established presence in the crisis area. They will most likely remain 

long after military forces have departed. Because of their capability to respond quickly 

and effectively to crises, they can lessen the civil-military resources that a CDR would 

otherwise have to devote to an operation. Working alone, alongside the US military, or 

with other US agencies, NGOs assist in all the world’s trouble spots where humanitarian 

or other assistance is needed. NGOs may range in size and experience from those with 

multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and 

humanitarian relief to newly created small organizations dedicated to a particular 

emergency or disaster. Whereas the military’s initial objective is stabilization and 

security for its own forces, NGOs seek to address humanitarian needs first and are often 

unwilling to subordinate their objectives to achievement of an end state, which they had 

no part in determining. In areas of conflict, NGOs security is derived only by their 

absolute neutrality and humanitarian focus. The extent to which specific NGOs are 

willing to cooperate with the military can thus vary considerably. 

e. Multinational Units. Other nations may deploy military forces to support the 

FHA effort. These forces may provide LNOs to the combatant command, the JTF, and 

the CMOC. 

f. Private Sector. Increasingly, the resources of the international business 

community are being utilized to mitigate human suffering associated with disasters. 

Businesses donate talent or in-kind goods and services to disaster relief and recovery 

operations in developing countries and wish to ensure that their help is delivered in a 

II-16 JP 3-29 
Organization and Interagency Coordination 

coordinated and effective manner. Private/nongovernment sectors often perform certain 

functions more efficiently and effectively than government because of the expertise and 

experience in applying successful business models. The same is true for foreign disaster 

response. Many large private sector companies maintain disaster/crisis response teams 

that can respond and add value to USG operations by providing infrastructure and other 

supporting services. DOD mechanisms that plan for, train and implement emergency 

responses to disasters should include the private sector. This should be done through 

USAID OFDA, which maintains communication with UN agencies and other 

international organizations and private sector donors to ensure the USG complements 

rather than duplicates existing assistance programs. In addition to large trans-national 

corporations, the 'private sector' also includes the local, national, and other companies 

and organizations which should be considered and engaged through the country team, 

USAID, or other existing USG channels. 

g. Private Contractors. While US military contractors are addressed in other 

sections, CDRs should be aware that private contractors are employed by a wide range of 

actors, inside and outside the USG. They are often employed to provide security, 

training, technical expertise, and logistical support. CDRs should be cognizant that 

contractors are often viewed by the local population as USG representatives and any 

negative behavior or interaction with the local population on the part of contractors can 

have an adverse impact on US efforts. CDRs should consider developing guidance for 

the contractors in the humanitarian zone, and should consider the need to develop PA 

guidance which takes into account potential issues with private contractors, should they 

arise. 

5. Joint Task Force Organization 

a. A JTF is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the SecDef, a 

CCDR, a subordinate unified CDR, or an existing commander, joint task force (CJTF). 

The authority establishing the JTF determines the command relationships for the 

JTF and assigns the missions and forces. The adaptive nature of the C2 structure, the 

unique component capabilities, and their ability to deploy quickly to execute a variety of 

FHA missions makes a JTF ideally suited to perform FHA. A JTF is normally assigned a 

joint operations area (JOA) in the GCC’s AOR. The JTF normally operates at the 

operational level; however, there may be instances requiring the CJTF to focus at the 

tactical level. While the JTF is the most common type of organizational structure 

used for FHA, a JFC may also opt to create a joint special operations task force 

(JSOTF), joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF), or a joint 

psychological operations task force (JPOTF) to assist in operations.

b. The JTF organization for FHA is similar to traditional military organizations

with a CDR, command element, and mission tailored forces. However, the nature of 

FHA usually results in combat support and combat service support forces (e.g., engineers, 

military police/security forces, logistics, transportation, legal, chaplain, civil affairs (CA), 

PA, and medical) serving more significant roles than combat elements. The unique 

aspects of interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination and collaboration require the JFC to 

II-17 
Chapter II 

be especially flexible, responsive, and cognizant of the capabilities of US agencies, IGOs, 

NGOs, affected en route and participating HNs, and multinational partners. The JFC 

establishes organizational structures, processes, and procedures to consider interagency, 

IGO, and NGO perspectives and positions into its planning, execution, and assessment 

process. Depending on the type of contingency operation, the extent of military 

operations, and degree of interagency involvement, the focal point for operational and 

tactical level coordination with civilian agencies may occur at the embassy, the JTF HQ, 

the CMOC, or the HOC. 

For further details on JTF organization, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

c. JTF Staff Organization. The JFC organizes the JTF staff to provide the 

appropriate expertise required to carry out the specific FHA mission. Some staff 

functions that may require increased support and manning include legal services, 

security, engineers, PA, health services, psychological operations (PSYOP), CA, 

financial management, and logistics. Additional staff sections may also be established to 

complement and emphasize critical functions. JTFs conducting FHA operations may be 

designated by unique titles. For example, during operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE 

2005, the JTF was designated Combined Support Force 536; and for the Pakistan 

earthquake response in 2005, the JTF was referred to as the Disaster Assistance Center 

Pakistan. 

d. Cross-functional Collaboration. Effective joint operations require close 

coordination, synchronization, and information sharing across the staff directorates. The 

most common technique for promoting this cross-functional collaboration is the 

formation of centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, working groups, 

and planning teams and other enduring or temporary organizations that manage specific 

processes and accomplish tasks in support of mission accomplishment. They facilitate 

planning by the staff, decision-making by the CDR, and execution by the HQ. They 

mostly fall under the principal oversight of the staff directorates. This arrangement 

strengthens the staff effort in ways that benefit the JTF and its CDR in mission execution. 

The following are typical organizations formed by JTFs, during FHA operations, and 

some of their unique considerations: 

(1) Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB). The JFUB is formed under JTF 

engineer supervision. When large numbers of US and multinational forces operate within 

the same geographic area, facility allocation to accommodate requirements is necessary. 

The JFUB serves as the lead agent to deconflict issues arising from multiple-user 

demands on limited facilities and recommended courses of action (COAs) to resolve 

issues. The JFUB addresses multinational force accommodation, ammunition storage 

points, joint visitors bureau, postal facilities, transit facilities, and other related areas. 

JFCs can establish a joint civil-military engineer board to execute JFUB decisions and 

collaborations as required. 

For further details on the JFUB, refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations. 

II-18 JP 3-29 
Organization and Interagency Coordination 

(2) Coalition Forces Support Team (CFST). The CFST is organized to 

coordinate activities between participating multinational forces. The CFST focuses on 

controlling all support and coordination tasks. CFST duties include: 

(a) Welcome and orient newly arrived FHA forces. 

(b) Designate initial staging areas, provide water, rations, and other support. 

(c) Identify sensitivities (historic animosity or religious differences) among 

multinational forces and the affected populace. 

(d) Receive, process, and provide situation update to arriving multinational 

forces, including a briefing on the legal limits of US support. 

(e) Brief rules of engagement (ROE) to arriving multinational forces. 

(f) Brief C2 and relief agency relationships. 

(3) Joint Network Operations (NETOPS) Control Center (JNCC). The JTF 

communications directorate may establish a JNCC to plan, manage, and operate all JTF 

communications systems. The JNCC exercises technical management over 

communications control centers belonging to deployed components and subordinate 

commands. It serves as the single control agency for management and operational 

direction of the joint communications networks and infrastructure. It performs planning, 

execution, technical, and management functions. The JNCC develops and/or 

disseminates standards and/or procedures and collects and/or presents communications 

system management statistical data. The JNCC must be prepared to integrate the 

communications systems of foreign militaries, IGOs, and NGOs as appropriate, to 

facilitate collaboration and cooperation. 

For further details on the JNCC, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System. 

(4) Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE). The JTF will usually be 

augmented with theater intelligence production resources, which are organized into a 

JISE or joint intelligence operations center (JIOC) under the supervision of the JTF 

intelligence directorate. The structure and functions of a JISE or JIOC may differ in an 

FHA from those of another type of operation. 

For further details on the JISE and JIOC, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence and JP 3-33, 

Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

(5) Joint Information Bureau (JIB). The JIB is the focal point for the 

interface between the JTF and the media covering the operation. The JIB provides the 

news media with timely and accurate information about military support to FHA and 

facilitates media coverage of operations. When operated in support of multinational 

operations, a JIB may be called a “combined information bureau” or an “allied press 

II-19 
Chapter II 

information center.” For longer-term FHA operations, the JIB may also conduct a 

command information program. 

For further details on the JIB, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs. 

(6) Joint Movement Center (JMC). The JMC coordinates the employment of 

all means of transportation (including that provided by allies or HNs) to support the 

concept of operations (CONOPS). This coordination is accomplished through 

establishment of transportation policies within the assigned operational areas, consistent 

with relative urgency of need, port and terminal capabilities, transportation asset 

availability, and priorities set by the CJTF. When required, the JMC coordinates with the 

UN Joint Logistic Centre (UNJLC), which is the logistic hub for the UN and many NGOs 

and IGOs, and with the JDDOC. Coordination at the JTF level is illustrated in Figure 

II-3. 

Crisis Action Team

HACC HAST JLOC

Optional

Not a Formal Grouping

Chain of Command

Coordination

Collaboration

HOC

NGOs

UN 

Agencies

IGOs

CMOC

DART

GCC

HACC

HAST

HOC

IGO

Civil-Military Operations Center

Disaster Assistance Response Team

Geographic Combatant Commander

Humanitarian Assistance Coordination 

Center

Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team

Humanitarian Operations Center

Intergovernmental Organization

JTF

JLOC

NGO

OFDA

UN

USAID

Joint Task Force

Joint Logistics Operations Center

Nongovernmental Organization

Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance

United Nations

United States Agency for International 

Development

Chief of Mission

JTF

CMOC

GCC

OFDA DART

USAID 

Mission

Refugee 

Coordinator

COORDINATION AT THE JOINT TASK FORCE LEVEL

LEGEND

Figure II-3. Coordination at the Joint Task Force Level 

II-20 JP 3-29 
Organization and Interagency Coordination 

For detailed information on movement control, see JP 4-09, Global Distribution.

6. Civil-Military Operations Center 

The CMOC is a CMO organization that provides operational level coordination 

between the JFC and other stakeholders. The JFC may establish a CMOC to coordinate 

and facilitate US and multinational forces’ humanitarian operations with those of 

international and local relief agencies and HN agencies and authorities. The CMOC, 

working closely with the OFDA DART, serves as the primary collaboration interface 

for the joint force among indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), IGOs, 

NGOs, multinational military forces, the private sector, and OGAs. Despite its 

name, the CMOC generally does not set policy or direct operations. Conceptually, the 

CMOC is the meeting place of stakeholders. In reality, the CMOC may be physical or 

virtual. The organization of the CMOC is theater- and mission-dependent — flexible in 

size and composition. A CDR at any echelon may establish a CMOC. In fact, more than 

one CMOC may be established in an operational area, and each is task-organized based 

on the mission. 

For further details on CMOC operations, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 

a. The CMOC monitors military support throughout the operational area and screens 

and coordinates logistic, security, medical and technical support requests from relevant 

civilian and coalition stakeholders. The CMOC works with the JTF staff components to 

identify support capabilities and resources and forwards validated requests to the 

appropriate CDR for decision. The CMOC will inform the requestor of the decision and its 

details. Requests for support are normally prioritized by the HN representatives or the 

lead US agency for the operation. Only in rare instances will the US military prioritize 

distribution of requested resources. Figure II-4 summarizes CMOC functions. 

b. CMOC Tasks. The following tasks may fall under CMOC auspices: 

(1) Screen, validate, and prioritize (based on DART or HN advice) NGO, UN, 

and IGO military support requests. 

(2) Coordinate NGO, UN, and IGO military support requests with military 

components. 

(3) Act as an intermediary, facilitator, and coordinator between JTF elements 

and NGOs, UN, and IGOs. 

(4) Explain JTF (military) policies, capabilities, skills, and resources to NGOs, 

UN, and IGOs and, conversely, explain NGO, UN, and IGO policies to the JTF. 

(5) Respond to NGO, UN, and IGO emergency requests. 

II-21 
Chapter II 





















Providing nonmilitary agencies with a focal point for activities and 

matters that are civilian related

Coordinating relief efforts with US or multinational commands, United 

Nations, host nation, and other nonmilitary agencies

Assisting in the transfer of humanitarian responsibility to nonmilitary 

agencies

Facilitating and coordinating activities of the joint force, other on-scene 

agencies, and higher echelons in the military chain of command

Receive, validate clarity, coordinate, and monitor requests from 

humanitarian organizations for routine and emergency military support

Coordinating the response to requests for military support with Service 

components

Coordinating requests to nonmilitary agencies for their support

Coordinating with disaster assistance response team deployed by 

USAID/Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance

Convening ad hoc mission planning groups to address complex military 

missions that support nonmilitary requirements, such as convoy escort, 

and management and security of refugee camps and feeding centers

Convening follow-on assessment groups

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS 

CENTER FUNCTIONS

Figure II-4. Civil-Military Operations Center Functions

(6) Screen and validate NGO, UN, and IGO requests for space available 

passenger airlift (see Joint Travel Regulations for restrictions). 

(7) Administer and issue NGO, UN, and IGO identification cards (for access 

into military controlled areas). 

(8) Convene ad hoc mission planning groups when complex military support or 

numerous military units and NGOs, UN, and IGOs are involved. 

(9) Exchange JTF operations and general security information with NGOs, UN, 

and IGOs as required. 

(10) Chair port and airfield committee meetings involving space and accessrelated issues. 

(11) Assist in the creation and organization of food logistic systems, when 

requested. 

II-22 JP 3-29 
Organization and Interagency Coordination 

(l2) Provide liaison between the JTF and HOC. 

(13) Explain overall interagency policies and guidelines to the JFC and NGOs. 

c. CMOC Structure. The structure and responsibilities of the CMOC need to be 

established as quickly as possible during joint operation planning. While sharing many 

general characteristics, each FHA operation is unique, and the CMOC structure must be 

tailored for each emergency. It is usually formed as a standing capability by all CA units 

from the company level to the CA command levels. CA personnel are routinely trained 

in skills that make them an optimal choice to form the core of a CMOC team, into which 

other functional specialists integrate. (NOTE: US Army CA units are organized to 

provide the JFC the manpower and equipment, to include a communications package, as 

the standing capability to form the nucleus of the CMOC.) Variables in establishing a 

CMOC include: the number and expertise of CMOC personnel; the degree of decisionmaking authority vested in the CMOC director; and the relationship between the CMOC 

and the rest of the JTF staff. The COM or designated representative will likely play a 

guiding role in the CMOC structure and operations. The NATO counterpart to the 

CMOC is the civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) center. If NATO conducts an FHA 

operation, a CIMIC center may be formed and may include US participation. During 

multinational operations, alliance and coalition partners should be encouraged to help 

man the CMOC or to provide LNOs. Depending on the size and scope of the operations, 

the CMOC may establish field teams to interact with the HN populace, NGOs, and IGOs 

on a geographic basis. Figure II-5 depicts a notional CMOC organization. 

d. The CMOC director may work for the operations directorate, the CMO staff 

element, or directly for the JTF (or JCMOTF) chief of staff, deputy CDR, or CJTF. Even 

if the FHA mission is the primary or only mission for the JTF, the CMOC should 

normally not serve concurrently as the joint operations center (JOC) for the JTF. 

Particularly in the case of an FHA operation, CMOC personnel will usually be fully 

engaged with the relevant stakeholders and other concerns; a separate JOC permits a 

dedicated staff element to direct JTF operations allowing the CMOC to focus on 

collaboration with outside entities. 

e. Special consideration should also be given to the relationship between the CMOC 

and the intelligence staff. CMOC staff must be prepared to address the sensitivity of 

communications between intelligence personnel and non-USG organizations and 

individuals. Information gathering to assist the mission is normally acceptable; however, 

any perception on the part of IGOs or NGOs that the military is using them for 

intelligence purposes could prove devastating to the FHA mission, and will likely result 

in immediate cessation of communications with those organizations. NGOs and IGOs 

frequently request information about the security conditions in an area from the military. 

Providing this information in an unclassified format and in a timely manner facilitates 

security and enhances information sharing with NGOs and IGOs. 

II-23 
Chapter II 

CARE

CIA

CMOC

DART

DOS

IGO

LNO

NGO

OGA

OFDA

PRT

UNICEF

USDA

USG

Cooperative for Assistance and Relief 

Everywhere

Central Intelligence Agency

Civil-Military Operations Center

Disaster Assistance Response Team

Department of State

Intergovernmental Organization

LEGEND

Liaison officer

Nongovernmental Organization

Other Government Agency

Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance

Provincial Reconstruction Team

United Nations Children’s Fund

United States Department of Agriculture

United States Government

UNICEF

United Nations

CARE

United Nations

World Food

Programme

Doctors of 

the World

Save the

Children

United Nations High 

Commissioner

for Refugees

International

Rescue

Committee

Other Relief &

Benefit

Organizations CIA, 

OFDA/DART

USDA, DOS

Civil Affairs 

Team, LNOs

CMOC

MILITARY

NGOs

OGAs PRT

IGOs

NOTIONAL COMPOSITION OF A

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER

Figure II-5. Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center

f. Civil affairs brigades provide civil liaison teams (CLTs) as supporting elements to 

CMOCs. A CLT provides a limited civil-military interface capability as a spoke for the 

exchange of information among NGOs and IGOs and has limited capability to link 

resources to prioritized requirements. The CLT operates as a team and does not merge 

into other CMOC elements. 

g. An OFDA DART representative should coordinate with the CMOC director. 

DART representatives provide advice to the CMOC and assist in screening and validating 

requests for military support from the relief community. The CMOC serves as the central 

clearing organization for information and coordination relevant to the JTF operation in 

support of a FHA mission. It is designed to coordinate military efforts and resources with 

II-24 JP 3-29 
Organization and Interagency Coordination 

requirements of the international relief community to achieve overall efficiency and 

effectiveness. 

h. Because of the nature of FHA, representation from and continual coordination 

with the JTF operations and logistics staff and organizations is critical. 

For further details on CMOCs, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 

7. Humanitarian Operations Center 

a. The HOC is a senior level international and interagency coordinating body that 

coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large 

FHA operation. It normally is established under the direction of the government of the 

affected country or the UN, or a USG agency during a US unilateral operation. Because 

the HOC operates at the national level, it will normally consist of senior representatives 

from the affected country, assisting countries, the UN, NGOs, IGOs, and other major 

organizations in the operation. US participation should include the COM (leading the US 

representation), USAID representatives, and representatives from the joint force. The 

HOC is horizontally structured with no C2 authority and all members are ultimately 

responsible to their own organizations or countries. There is a significant difference 

between the HOC and CMOC. The CMOC is established by and works for the JFC. 

The HOC is normally established under the direction of the HN government or the UN, 

or possibly OFDA during a US unilateral operation. Additionally, the HOC operates at 

senior, national level to coordinate strategic and operational unity of effort, while the 

CMOC works at the local level coordinating US actions to achieve operational and 

tactical unity of effort. 

b. Close JTF collaboration with the affected country, UN, and other key members of 

the humanitarian relief community forms the core of FHA operations. Effective 

collaboration is the key to successful turnover of FHA responsibilities to the affected 

country or IGOs. The HOC coordinates the overall relief strategy; identifies logistic 

requirements for NGOs, UN, and IGOs; and identifies, prioritizes, and submits requests 

for military support to the JTF. The NSC PCC may designate another USG agency other 

than USAID to lead FHA based on multiple sets of conditions and security issues and this 

decision will be identified through the PCC and Interagency Management System (IMS). 

(1) During large scale FHA operations, the country affected by a disaster and 

in need of HA will normally have a ministry designated as the senior point of 

coordination for all HA activities. In more developed countries, there may be an 

organization similar to the US Federal Emergency Management Agency. Ministries 

involved could include the ministry of health, ministry of transportation, ministry of 

defense, or an emergency management office within a ministry. These ministries will 

establish the priority needs for their country and solicit international assistance from 

donor countries and relief organizations, either bilaterally or through the UN. 

II-25 
Chapter II 

(2) In a failed state situation where no HN government is capable of 

coordinating the HA effort, the UN will normally establish overall coordination of the 

HA effort. A greater representation of the various relief agencies and donor 

countries at the HOC results in more coordinated HA efforts. The structure of a 

HOC can be formal or informal. HOCs may have political significance and authority 

when directed by the affected country, or may be less formal if established by the UN. 

The HOC is normally collocated with the appropriate lead or UN HQ conducting the 

operation. 

c. HOCs may establish working groups and committees. These groups and 

committees discuss and resolve issues including relief material prioritization, medical, 

sanitation, health, and other related areas. 

d. The CMOC, HACC, and HOC are distinct but interrelated organizations. The 

relationship among these organizations and interagency, international, and HN structures 

can be complex and challenging. It should not be assumed that the CMOC will be the 

coordinating center for the operation. For example during 2005, in East Timor the UN 

ran the coordination center and the CMOC representative was a participant in the larger 

center. Figure II-6 contrasts the differences among the HOC, HACC, and CMOC. 

e. During HA operations in which the UN is involved, the UN may deploy a 

UNDAC team under the leadership of the in-country resident coordinator of the United 

Nations Development Programme (UNDP) office. That group will accomplish UN 

coordination and liaison in-country at the national and ambassadorial level. At the site of 

a natural disaster, the UN will establish an OSOCC. In complex emergencies, the UN 

establishes a HOCC. Either of these operations centers assists the local emergency 

management authority of the HN to coordinate international relief efforts. The OSOCC 

or HOCC normally reports to the humanitarian coordinator, who renders a field situation 

report with worldwide distribution. The humanitarian coordinator position is generally 

held by the UNDP resident representative or until another coordinator is designated. The 

CMOC and the OSOCC or HOCC should be closely located to synchronize US 

contributions to the overall international effort. The humanitarian coordinator can be 

designated in one of four ways: 

(1) The functions of the humanitarian coordinator are assigned to the resident 

coordinator for that country, who, therefore, becomes the resident and humanitarian 

coordinator. This is the normal practice. 

(2) Appoint a separate humanitarian coordinator. 

(3) Designate a lead agency for the provision of HA, with the in-country agency 

head also serving as humanitarian coordinator. 

(4) Appoint a regional humanitarian coordinator, when an emergency occurs 

that involves more than one country at the same time. 

II-26 JP 3-29 
Organization and Interagency Coordination 

COMPARISON BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS 

CENTER, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

COORDINATION CENTER,

 AND CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER

LEGEND

CMOC

HACC

 Civil-Military Operations Center

 Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center

HOC 

US 

 Humanitarian Operations Center

 United States

Designated 

Individual of 

Affected Country, 

United Nations, or 

US Government 

Agency

Combatant

Commander

Joint Task Force or 

Component 

Commander

Coordinates Overall 

Relief Strategy at the 

National (Country) Level

Assists with Interagency 

Coordination and 

Planning at the Strategic 

Level. Normally is 

disestablished once a 

HOC or CMOC is 

established

Assists in Collaboration at 

the Operational Level with 

Military Forces, US 

Government Agencies, 

Nongovernmental and 

Intergovernmental 

Organizations, and 

Regional Organizations

Representatives from:

 Affected Country

 United nations

 US Embassy or Consulate

 Joint Task Force

 Other Nonmilitary Agencies

 Concerned Parties (Private Sector)

Representatives from:

 Combatant Command

 Nongovernmental Organizations

 Intergovernmental Organizations

 Regional Organizations

 Concerned Parties (Private Sector)

Representatives from:

 Joint Task Force

 Nongovernmental Organizations

 Intergovernmental Organizations

 Regional Organizations

 US Government Agencies

 Local Government (Host Country)

 Multinational Forces

 Other Concerned Parties (Private Sector)

Coordination

Coordination

Coordination

ESTABLISHING 

AUTHORITY FUNCTION COMPOSITION AUTHORITY

HOC

HACC

CMOC

Figure II-6. Comparison Between Humanitarian Operations Center, Humanitarian 

Assistance Coordination Center, and Civil-Military Operations Center 

f. The humanitarian coordinator coordinates the UN humanitarian agencies in the 

country and overall management of the OSOCC or HOCC, advocates for the application 

of humanitarian principles on behalf of the victims and of the humanitarian community, 

and oversees all in-country aspects of the strategic planning process, including the 

development and update of a comprehensive contingency plan. The humanitarian 

coordinator facilitates humanitarian accountability, through the promotion and 

monitoring of implementation of relevant policies and guidelines and establishes and 

maintains comprehensive coordination mechanisms to support the work of the UN 

humanitarian agencies in the country (sometimes referred to as the UN humanitarian 

country team). Additionally, the humanitarian coordinator develops a comprehensive 

II-27 
Chapter II 

strategic plan for responding to the assistance and protection needs of dislocated civilians 

and facilitates the provision of common services. 

g. The humanitarian coordinator retains overall responsibility for ensuring the 

effectiveness of the humanitarian response. To the extent possible, cluster leads are 

accountable to the humanitarian coordinator for ensuring the establishment of adequate 

coordination mechanisms for the sector or area of activity concerned, adequate 

preparedness, as well as adequate strategic planning for an effective operational response. 

The cluster approach demands high standards of predictability, accountability, and 

partnership in all sectors or areas of activity. The humanitarian coordinator ensures: 

(1) Cluster leads, together with other leaders of the UN humanitarian agencies 

in the country, are consulted closely in developing the overall strategic direction of the 

humanitarian operation. 

(2) Effective coordination and information sharing takes place among the 

different clusters takes place, and the work of the different clusters is integrated into a 

coherent, overall response. 

(3) Unnecessary duplication and overlap among sectors is avoided. 

(4) Cross-cutting issues are effectively addressed in all sectors. 

(5) Strategic planning is coherent throughout the country. 

(6) Clusters are provided with the necessary common services and tools for 

effective cross-cluster collaboration. 

(7) Cluster meetings are streamlined and supplement, rather than replace, 

general interagency coordination meetings, to prevent a fragmentation of the 

humanitarian response. 

(8) Support is provided to clusters in advocacy and resource-mobilization 

efforts to ensure a balanced, comprehensive, and well-prioritized humanitarian response. 

8. Nongovernmental Organizations, Intergovernmental Organizations, and 

Private Sector Partners 

 Relationships with NGOs and IGOs are based on multiple factors some of 

which include a mutual understanding of each others’ goals and objectives, planned 

lines of operations and CONOPS, support requirements, coordination procedures, 

information sharing, capabilities and, most importantly, missions. Several organizations 

can facilitate coordination. Although not field based, the American Council for 

Voluntary International Action (InterAction) is the largest coalition of US based 

NGOs with more than 165 members. The United Nations Office for Coordination of 

Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) is another valuable resource for coordination of 

II-28 JP 3-29 
Organization and Interagency Coordination 

efforts. Due to its regular interaction with NGOs and IGOs, OFDA will be a critical 

source of help in establishing relationships with these organizations. The following may 

assist in building unity of effort among these various organizations and the joint force 

commands. 

a. Increase awareness and encourage contact between the military and NGOs and 

IGOs through symposia, meetings, briefings, and joint planning sessions. 

b. Incorporate selected NGO and IGO training into Service and joint training and 

exercise programs; and conversely, incorporate interaction with military units and 

personnel into NGO and IGO training. 

c. Review lessons learned as recorded in both the joint and Services’ lessons 

learned databases. 

d. Clearly articulate the role of the military to the NGOs and IGOs. It is 

imperative that these organizations understand the military mission, the level of support it 

can provide, and the process to receive support. Explain what service and/or supplies

NGOs and IGOs are entitled to from DOD forces (e.g., medical care, force protection, 

transportation). Explain who determines what priority NGO personnel and equipment 

will be moved. NGOs desire transparency; which implies openness, communication, and 

accountability; when dealing with the military. Assets such as the crisis action team, 

HOC, HACC, CMOC, and LNOs can be used to provide such information. 

e. Ensure the joint force understands its support role. While UN and NGO 

guidelines provide that requesting assistance from the military is a last resort, some 

NGOs and IGOs may assume the military has an inexhaustible resource reservoir and 

inundate the FHA force with requests for various types of support. Members of the joint 

force must have a clear understanding of the nature and amount of support they will be 

authorized to provide. Normally, requests from IGOs and NGOs should come to DOD 

through DOS at the Executive Secretary level. When the JFC has been delegated the 

authority to fill certain types of requests from these organizations, the granting of that 

authority, and guidance on its use, are reflected in appropriate orders. Keep in mind that 

equivocal responses, such as “we’ll try,” can be misinterpreted as an affirmative 

response and establish unrealistic expectations. Failure to meet expectations (real or not) 

can adversely affect relationships in both current and future operations. 

f. Be aware that not all NGOs and IGOs appreciate military assistance or 

intervention into HA operations. Some NGO and IGO charters do not allow them to 

collaborate with armed forces based on political mandate, neutrality, religious, or 

impartiality concerns. CDRs need to honor this fact, while still striving for unity of 

effort. 

(1) Most NGOs follow humanitarian principles (i.e., impartiality, independence, 

humanitarianism, and neutrality) when giving aid; and therefore base aid on need alone. 

Some NGOs perceive military aid as politically motivated and conditional. 

II-29 
Chapter II 

(2) The USG, NGOs, and IGOs may not share common objectives. 

(3) CDRs may find it beneficial to use a third party to establish liaison with 

NGOs and IGOs reluctant to establish direct contact with military organizations. USAID 

is critical to this effort. 

g. Be cognizant of legal requirements and regulations that apply to relationships 

between the military, NGOs, and IGOs. 

h. Ensure that agreements and memoranda of understanding fully address funding 

considerations, delineate authority, and define negotiation channels. Agreements 

may include air and surface transportation, petroleum products, telecommunications, 

labor, security, facilities, contracting, engineer support, supplies, services, and medical 

support. 

i. Exchange NGO, IGO, and military unit operating procedures and capabilities. 

j. Exercise due diligence in dealing with NGOs that do not adhere to accepted 

professional standards. Most NGOs follow the UN Principles of Humanitarian 

Assistance and the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 

Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief. Disaster-affected communities have a right to 

expect those who seek to assist them to measure up to these standards. In maintaining 

these standards, CMOC officers and all other members of the joint force should not be 

perceived as favoring a particular relief organization, particularly at the expense of other 

organizations. 

k. Seek the assistance of an individual from the NGO or IGO community to locate 

with the US force staff and function as an LNO to the NGO/IGO community. This LNO 

can perform duties such as initial collaboration activities with the humanitarian relief 

community prior to deployment, representation of the humanitarian relief perspective 

during planning, and advice to the joint force through membership in the CMOC or other 

coordinating mechanisms during operations. 

l. Provide information for posting on the UN’s ReliefWeb Internet site and other 

applicable sites. ReliefWeb is a global hub for humanitarian information on complex 

emergencies and natural disasters. ReliefWeb is widely used by NGOs, IGOs, and other 

participants in HA operations to share and coordinate information. If established, the 

humanitarian information center (HIC), is also a site for information as are the bulletin 

boards at the OSOCC or HOCC location and the NGO websites themselves. 

m. Share information with NGOs and IGOs to the greatest extent possible, 

especially regarding the security environment. Using information and communications 

technology will allow IGOs and NGOs to plan their response with up to date and accurate 

information and to integrate into the overall response more efficiently. 

II-30 JP 3-29 
Organization and Interagency Coordination 

n. When working with NGOs in an uncertain or hostile operational environment, the 

guidelines found in the United States Institute of Peace Guidelines for Relations Between 

US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or 

Potentially Hostile Environments, will help mitigate friction between military and NGO 

personnel. 

o. Identify and collaborate with the first responders to a disaster. While the US 

military may be the largest organization on the ground in a disaster area, it is critical to 

understand that the US military will not be the first one on the ground. The NGOs and 

IGOs that normally operate in the disaster region or those that can respond quickly to a 

disaster may be there prior to the US military arrival on the ground. 

For further details on coordination and relationships with NGOs and IGOs, refer to JP 

3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I. 

9. Other Joint Task Forces 

a. Joint Special Operations Task Force. Due to their language proficiency, 

cultural awareness, familiarity with the operational area, small footprint, and ability to 

work in an austere environment special operations forces (SOF) may be able to make a 

significant contribution to the FHA operation. Their ability to liaison with the local 

populace and assistance organizations and provide timely assessments of conditions in 

remote locations via their long range communications capabilities provides the JFC with 

timely information for decision making and additional, viable COAs. 

For further details on JSOTFs, refer to JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force 

Operations. 

b. Joint Psychological Operations Task Force. PSYOP forces, organized as a 

JPOTF, normally serve as a subordinate joint command of a joint force. The JPOTF’s 

capabilities and products can be tailored to meet specific needs of the joint forces’ FHA 

efforts. For example, working with the country team, OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs messages 

can be developed and broadcast and pamphlets produced and distributed that provide 

information on how the local population can obtain aid. 

For further details on JPOTFs, refer to JP 3-13.2, Psychological Operations. 

c. Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force. A JCMOTF is composed of units 

from more than one Service, and is formed to carry out CMO in support of a theater 

campaign or other operations. Although the JCMOTF is not a CA organization, there 

should be a strong representation of CA trained personnel. Because of their expertise in 

dealing with NGOs, IGOs, and OGA, they will greatly enhance the opportunity for 

success. The JCMOTF may be established to carry out missions of limited or extended 

duration involving military forces’ interface with local civilian populations, resources, or 

agencies; and military forces’ coordination with OGA, multinational and affected country 

forces, UN agencies, NGOs, and IGOs. JFCs are responsible to conduct CMO but they 

II-31 
Chapter II 

II-32 JP 3-29 

may establish a JCMOTF when the scope of CMO requires coordination and activities 

beyond the capabilities of a CA representative on the staff could accomplish. 

For further details on JCMOTFs, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 
CHAPTER III 

PLANNING 

“We are in fact minimizing the loss of life and mitigating the incredible human 

suffering that we see across the region. This has been a unique military 

operation from that perspective, in that we have been planning, assessing, 

deploying, and executing concurrently. It would be like, I guess, if you were 

taking a family vacation and you were trying to pack the car and decide where 

you were going while you were driving down the road. But we are being 

successful in doing just that.” 

Lieutenant General Robert R. Blackman, US Marine Corps 

Commander, Combined Support Force 536 

Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE 

Utapao, Thailand 

January 7, 2005 

1. Introduction 

a. This chapter highlights aspects of joint operations planning specific to FHA 

operations. Joint operations planning encompasses the full range of activities required to 

conduct joint operations. These activities include planning for the mobilization, 

deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of forces. 

b. Crisis action planning (CAP) is the Joint Operation Planning and Execution 

System (JOPES) process involving the time-sensitive development of joint OPLANs and 

operation orders (OPORDs) for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of 

assigned and allocated forces and resources in response to a crisis. CAP is based on the 

actual circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. The time available to plan 

responses to real-time events is short, particularly in the case of disasters requiring an FHA 

response. In as little as a few days, the supported GCC and the JFCs and their staffs 

must develop and approve a feasible COA, publish the plan or order, prepare forces, 

ensure sufficient support, and arrange sustainment for the employment of US military 

forces. Accordingly, considerations for CAP are emphasized throughout this chapter, 

although much of the information is also applicable during contingency planning. 

c. The supported GCC begins CAP when the CJCS planning order, alert order, or 

warning order is received. In urgent situations, CAP may begin even before an order is 

formally issued. In areas where natural disasters are prevalent or FHA exercises are a key 

part of the GCC’s security cooperation plan (SCP), CCDRs should have a CDR’s estimate, 

base plan, CONPLAN, or OPLAN for the affected area for an FHA mission. Multinational 

planning or exercise results may also be available. Although an existing JOPES product 

almost never completely aligns with an emerging crisis, it can be used to facilitate rapid 

COA development. Planning factors found in Appendix F, “Planning Factors for Foreign 

Humanitarian Assistance Operations,” incorporate and elaborate many of the topics 

discussed in this chapter. 

d. The CDR should understand the relief process used by the HN and IGOs, as 

depicted in Figure III-1. This model captures the continuous, cyclic nature of the 

III-1 
Chapter III 

LEGEND

OVERARCHING RELIEF PROCESS

Needs Analysis

Appeals,

RFAs & RFPs

Needs

Relief / Donor Action

Crisis

Needs

Assessment

(Identify Needs and 

Available

Capabilities & Resources)

Basis Needs

Available Resources

Outstanding Requirements

Outstanding 

Requirements

Aid /Resource Delivery

Information

Sharing

RFA request for assistance RFP request for proposal

Figure III-1. Overarching Relief Process

overarching relief process. Critical to this process is information sharing among all the 

parties. The relief cycle is repeated as needs assessments are updated, requirements refined, 

additional requests for assistance (RFAs) made, and FHA operations continue. While this 

model conveys the impression of an orderly process, in reality the process is chaotic due to 

the large number of different organizations with their own missions and sometimes 

competing agendas. 

 (1) Needs Assessments. HN/affected state agencies and various HN organizations 

conduct needs assessments on the extent of the disaster/emergency and the 

III-2 JP 3-29 
Planning

needs/requirements. Assessments also include determining the capabilities and resources of 

various relief organizations, including military, if they are part of the FHA effort. 

 (2) Needs Analysis. Analysis is an essential component of the relief process. 

Needs assessments and capabilities are analyzed to update and resolve differences, 

determine outstanding needs/requirements and reasonably anticipated future needs. 

 (3) Outstanding needs/requirements are then converted into appeals to the 

international community and donors, and to specific RFAs. The military may receive 

RFAs to provide immediate life saving supplies, transportation, or security which are 

subject to the policies of the US Government. 

(4) Relief/Donor Action. Humanitarian agencies, donors, and foreign military 

commands provide relief based on their ability to respond to appeals and RFAs. Foreign 

government, regional organizations and the UN may make available immediate funds and 

other resources very early in the relief cycle. UNOCHA administers a Central 

Emergency Revolving Fund to provide immediate assistance. 

Procedures for both contingency planning and CAP are described in Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution 

System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures and JOPP is described in 

JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

2. Understanding the Operational Environment 

a. The nature of the operational environment obviously impacts the conduct of FHA 

operations. Important elements of the operational environment considered during planning 

and executing FHA operations include the type of disaster involved (including underlying 

causes), the prevailing security environment, and the system of international relief at work. 

The process of joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) will 

assist the JFC in developing this understanding and applying it to planning and execution. 

b. Types of Disasters. Disasters and consequent emergencies may occur suddenly or 

develop over a period of time. Speed of onset has important consequences for action that 

can be taken. Prevention, preparedness, and early warning measures are much less 

developed for sudden onset disasters. 

(1) Slow Onset. Slow onset emergencies include those resulting from crop 

failure due to drought, the spread of an agricultural pest or disease, or a gradually 

deteriorating political situation leading to conflict. 

(2) Rapid Onset. Rapid onset emergencies are usually the result of sudden, 

natural events such as wind storms, hurricanes, typhoons, floods, tsunamis, wild fires, 

landslides, avalanches, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. They also may be caused by 

accidental or human-caused catastrophes such as civil conflict, acts of terrorism, 

sabotage, or industrial accidents. 

III-3 
Chapter III 

(3) Complex. An increasing number of emergencies are related to conflict and 

have come to be known as “complex emergencies.” The UN defines a “complex 

emergency” as: “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is a 

total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict 

and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of 

any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country program.” USAID defines it as 

“natural or man-made disaster with economic, social and political dimensions. The result 

is a profound social crisis in which a large number of people die and suffer from war, 

disease, hunger, and displacement owing to man-made and natural disasters, while some 

others may benefit from it. Four factors can be measured: the fatalities from violence; the 

mortality of children under five years of age; the percentage of underweight children 

under five; and the number of external refugees and IDPs.” Common characteristics 

include: 

(a) Many civilian casualties and populations besieged or displaced. 

(b) Serious political or conflict-related impediments to delivery of 

assistance. 

(c) Inability of people to pursue normal social, political, or economic 

activities. 

(d) High security risks for relief workers. 

(e) International and cross-border operations affected by political 

differences. 

(4) Underlying Causes. Most disasters have underlying causes that may 

demand changes in human systems and processes (e.g., tsunami alert systems, better food 

management, weak or failing HN infrastructure or processes, or even civil war). 

Normally, forces conducting FHA following a disaster are tasked to focus on the event at 

hand rather than the underlying causes; however, understanding these causes can enhance 

mission accomplishment and force protection. 

c. The operational environment can be characterized by the degree of control HN 

forces have to support and assist in the operation. As shown in Figure III-2, military forces 

and OGA may encounter three types of operational environments when providing FHA: 

permissive, uncertain, and hostile. The type of operational environment will have direct 

impact on the decision to conduct the FHA operation, as well as many planning aspects. 

Regardless of the operational environment, force protection will remain of paramount 

concern to the JFC. 

III-4 JP 3-29 
Planning

PERMISSIVE

Hostile forces have control and the intent and capability to

effectively oppose or react to FHA operations.

Host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to 

FHA operations, do not have totally effective control of the 

territory and population within the intended operational area.

Host country military and law enforcement agencies have 

control and the intent and capability to assist foreign 

humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations.

UNCERTAIN

HOSTILE

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

Figure III-2. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operational Environments

(1) Permissive environment is an operational environment in which host country 

military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to 

assist FHA operations. This is most likely to be found in more developed countries 

following rapid onset disasters. 

(2) Uncertain environment is an operational environment in which host 

government forces, whether opposed or receptive to FHA operations, do not have totally 

effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area. An 

uncertain environment is most likely to be found in less developed countries that have lost 

government control of an area following disaster, or in areas that traditionally harbor 

insurgents or terrorist elements that may oppose US presence regardless of the humanitarian 

mission. 

(3) Hostile environment is an operational environment in which hostile forces 

have control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose, or react to the FHA 

III-5 
Chapter III 

operations. Forces assigned to FHA missions must be prepared to engage a full range of 

protection issues. A hostile environment is most likely to be found during complex disasters 

or following a complete breakdown of infrastructure. Hostile factions may use violence in 

an attempt to stop the FHA effort or banditry may be expected. Lack of an infrastructure in 

the crisis area, possibly due to natural disaster, civil strife, insurgency, terrorism, or combat 

between nations, can impede the mission. 

(a) The United States Institute of Peace Guidelines for Relations between US 

Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or 

Potentially Hostile Environments serve as "rules of the road" for how the two entities should 

operate in hostile environments. They were developed by the working group on CivilMilitary Relations in Nonpermissive Environments, which includes InterAction, DOD, 

DOS, and USAID, and facilitated by the US Institute of Peace. 

(b) The guidelines seek to mitigate frictions between military and NGO 

personnel over access and freedom for humanitarian organizations to assess and meet 

humanitarian needs. DOD intends to observe these guidelines in its dealings with the 

broader HA community. These guidelines are not intended to constitute advance 

endorsement or approval by either party of particular missions of the other but are 

premised on a de facto recognition that Armed Forces of the United States and NGOs 

have often occupied the same operational space in the past and will undoubtedly do so in 

the future. When this does occur, both sides will make best efforts to observe these 

guidelines, recognizing that operational necessity may require deviation from them. 

When breaks with the guidelines occur, every effort should be made to explain what 

prompted the deviation to promote transparency and avoid distraction from the critical 

task of providing essential relief to a population in need. 

d. Relief System. An assessment of the situation should include a description of the 

relief organizations (NGOs, IGOs, HN, and private sector), foreign governments and 

military forces, UN agencies, or any other pertinent element already involved in the 

FHA effort, what relationship exists among them, and the effectiveness of the organizations 

in place. USAID will be critical in mapping this system and identifying key players in 

multiple organizations. The range of civilian actors and programs is mostly determined by 

security factors, i.e., whether it is a permissive or non-permissive environment. For 

example, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies typically 

work in permissive natural disasters, while the International Committee of the Red Cross 

(ICRC) works in nonpermissive environments. 

e. JIPOE. During the JIPOE process, the JFC’s intelligence staff element manages the 

analysis and development of products that provide a systems understanding of the 

environment in which the joint force must operate. JIPOE follows a multi-step process to 

define the operational environment, describe the effects of the environment, evaluate the 

enemy, and determine enemy courses of action. JIPOE support during FHA requires a 

different mindset and different techniques than a JIPOE effort that focuses on defeating 

an adversary militarily. This analysis identifies a number of nodes - specific physical, 

functional, or cultural entities within each system. Nodes can include people, transportation 

III-6 JP 3-29 
Planning

infrastructure, sociological and political structure, economic system, potential friendly, 

neutral, and adversary elements, the information environment, and other components of 

the operational environment. JIPOE analysts also identify links - the cultural, physical, or 

functional relationship between nodes. As with many aspects of CAP, JIPOE will be 

continuous throughout the planning and execution process. Due to the complexity of the 

JIPOE process during FHA, the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) within a JTF 

may or may not have the requisite support on hand to perform a detailed JIPOE analysis. 

Therefore, the JTF J-2 should consider requesting support from the theater JIOC. 

For further details on JIPOE, refer to JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the 

Operational Environment. 

f. Assessment Factors. Assessment factors that may assist in the JIPOE process are 

found in USAID’s Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response, the 

Sphere Project Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, the 

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Handbook for 

Emergencies, and the DOS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks. The following 

are examples of factors that can aid in assessing the situation: 

(1) What is the status and intent of military or paramilitary forces? 

(2) Who are the relevant governmental and nongovernmental actors in the 

operational area? What are their objectives? Are their objectives at odds or compatible 

with the JFC’s objectives? 

(3) What resources exist locally (e.g., government, private sector, and resources 

that can be procured or rehabilitated)? 

(4) Who are the key communicators (persons who hold the ear of the populace, 

e.g., mayors, village elders, teachers) within the operational area? 

(5) What is the status of essential public services (water, electricity, 

communication, sanitation, and transportation, including road, rail, bridge, and seaport 

and airport conditions and capabilities)? How does the current status compare to 

predisaster status? 

(6) What is the status of health care providers, firefighters, police, and court 

systems? Include availability, level of expertise (skilled laborers), equipment, and 

supplies. 

(7) What relief agencies are in place, what are their roles and capabilities, and 

what resources do they have? 

(8) What is the physical condition of the civilian populace? 

III-7 
Chapter III 

(9) Where are the locations of medical facilities; are they operational, and to 

what level? 

(10) What are the unique shelter, food, and security needs of the people and to 

what extent is support available from within the affected country? 

(11) What facilities and support are available to FHA forces from the affected 

country? 

(12) What unique social, ethnic, or religious concerns affect the conduct of the 

operation? 

(13) What are the legal limitations to US assistance in this case? 

(14) What is the local population’s attitude toward who or what is causing their 

plight? 

(15) What is the local population’s attitude toward the presence of US forces? 

(16) What are the force requirements to protect the force? 

(17) What is the status of the host strategic transportation infrastructure? Are 

available seaports and airfields in usable condition? What is the status of materials 

handling equipment? Are connecting roads and railroads usable? 

g. Sources of Information. Intelligence estimates, area assessments, and surveys

are sources of information on the situation in the crisis area, providing political, cultural, 

economic, military, geographic and topographic, climatic, infrastructure and engineering, 

health, and other essential information. Other sources for an initial assessment include the 

US country team, CCDR country books, recent OFDA situation reports, UN Secretariat 

assessments, the UN’s ReliefWeb Internet site, PDC’s Asia Pacific Natural Hazards and 

Vulnerabilities Atlas (http://atlas.pdc.org) and other PDC resources, relief organizations 

already operating in the area, and SOF personnel (see Figure III-3). A GCC may also 

choose to deploy a HAST to assess the situation.

3. Mission Analysis 

a. The joint force’s mission is the task or set of tasks, together with the purpose, that 

clearly indicate the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The primary purpose of 

mission analysis is to understand the problem and purpose of the operation and issue 

appropriate guidance to drive the rest of the planning process. Although some steps occur 

before others, mission analysis typically involves substantial parallel processing of 

information by the CDR and staff, particularly in a CAP situation. 

III-8 JP 3-29 
Planning

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

S

O

U

R

C

E

S

Intelligence Estimates

Area Assessments

Surveys

US Country Team

Combatant Commander

Country Books

United Nations

Secretariat Assessments

Relief Organizations

Operating in the Area

Special Operations

Forces Personnel

United Nations Relief

Web Internet Site

Recent US Agency for

International Development,

Office of US Foreign Disaster

Assistance Situation Reports

Political

Geographic and Topographic

Cultural

Climatic

Economic

Infrastructure and Engineering

Military

Health

AREAS OF INFORMATION

Figure III-3. Sources of Information

For further details on mission analysis, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

b. The Military Role. The aim of the Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil 

Defence Assets in Disaster Relief – “Oslo Guidelines” is to establish the basic framework 

for formalizing and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the use of foreign military 

and civil defense assets in international disaster relief operations. 

III-9 
Chapter III 

(1) The USG participated in the development of the guidelines and endorsed their 

use; however, they are not binding. The USG recognizes that the Oslo Guidelines outline 

the process for making military or civil-military requests through UNOCHA. NATO 

military forces may be requested to assist in disaster relief in accordance with the Oslo 

Guidelines. 

(2) The Oslo Guidelines provide that foreign military assets should be requested 

only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only when the use of military 

assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset, therefore, must be unique 

in capability and availability. Military assets should be seen as a tool complementing 

existing relief mechanisms to provide specific support to specific requirements, in response 

to the acknowledged "humanitarian gap" between the disaster needs that the relief 

community is being asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet them. At the onset, 

any use of military assets should be limited in time and scale and present an exit strategy 

that defines clearly how the function it undertakes could, in the future, be undertaken by 

civilian personnel. Assistance can be divided into three categories based on the degree of 

contact with the affected population. These categories are important because they help 

define which types of humanitarian activities might be appropriate to support with 

international military resources under different conditions, given that ample consultation has 

been conducted with all concerned parties to explain the nature and necessity of the 

assistance. 

(a) Direct assistance is the face-to-face distribution of goods and services. 

(b) Indirect assistance is at least one step removed from the population and 

involves such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel. 

(c) Infrastructure support involves providing general services, such as road 

repair, airspace management, and power generation that facilitate relief, but are not 

necessarily visible to or solely for the benefit of the affected population. 

c. National Strategic End State and the Military End State. For specific situations 

that require the employment of military capabilities, the President, Secretary of State, and 

SecDef typically will establish a set of national strategic objectives. Achievement of these 

objectives should result in attainment of the national strategic end state — the broadly 

expressed conditions that should exist after the conclusion of an operation. Based on the 

strategic guidance, the CCDR will determine the military end state and strategic military 

objectives, which define the role of military forces. Due to the crisis nature of FHA 

operations, initial planning may proceed without a formal set of national or theater strategic 

objectives specific to the operation, using assumed objectives based on existing strategic 

plans. These objectives are the basis for operational design. 

For further details on end state and strategic objectives, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the 

Armed Forces of the United States. 

III-10 JP 3-29 
Planning

d. United Nations Mandate. The UN normally conducts FHA under the provisions of 

a resolution or mandate from the Security Council or the General Assembly. Mandates are 

developed through a political process which generally requires compromise, and sometimes 

results in ambiguity. The JFC should be cognizant of the provisions of the mandate or 

resolution; however, as with all military operations, UN mandates are implemented by US 

forces through orders issued by the SecDef through the CJCS. During such implementation, 

the political mandates are converted to workable military orders. 

e. Risk Assessment. CDRs must identify the specific hazards that the joint force may 

encounter during the mission, and determine the probability and severity of loss linked to 

those hazards. After assessing these hazards, the staff must develop risk mitigation 

measures. To assist in risk management, CDRs and their staffs may develop or institute a 

risk management process tailored to their particular mission or operational area. 

f. Mission Statement Development. A critical task for the CCDR is developing the 

FHA military mission statement. The mission statement must provide specific direction 

for achieving the desired end state via clear and attainable military objectives. The 

CCDR normally coordinates the mission statement with the LFA. CCDRs consider 

several factors in developing the mission statement, to include the military force’s role in 

assisting relief agencies, the operational environment, and security considerations. The 

mission statement for the USPACOM Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE (2004-2005) 

is an example: “USPACOM provides assistance to the governments of Indonesia, Sri 

Lanka, Thailand and other affected nations to mitigate the effects of the recent earthquake 

and tsunami in the Indian Ocean. Conduct of operation is in support of USG lead agency, 

and in coordination with IGOs, nongovernmental organizations, and partner nations.” 

4. Concept of Operations 

a. The CONOPS is a verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses 

what the JFC intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. It 

describes how the actions of the joint force components and supporting organizations will be 

integrated, synchronized, and phased to accomplish the mission, including potential 

branches and sequels. 

For further details on CONOPS development, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

b. Phasing of the Operation. Phasing assists JFCs and staffs to visualize and think 

through the entire operation and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, 

space, and purpose. The actual phases used will vary (compressed, expanded, or omitted 

entirely) with the joint operation, as determined by the JFC. Plan phases should not be 

“locked into concrete” and phase timing may be shifted as the situation dictates. 

(1) While FHA operations may occur during any phase of a larger joint operation, 

they will most often occur in the “shaping” phase of the GCC’s strategic engagement 

operations, or during the “stabilize” and “enable civil authority” phase of a major operation. 

III-11 
Chapter III 

(2) Within the context of a larger operation, JFCs and component CDRs may 

establish additional phases that fit their CONOPS. These sub-phases, designed to focus 

relief assets and emphasis, should generally follow the six phase model and include 

transitions from one phase to the next. 

(3) The five phases of a civil support operation (i.e., shaping, staging, deployment, 

civil support operations, and transition) for a FCM operation (i.e., situational awareness and 

preparation, deploy, assist host nation, transition, and redeploy) may be an appropriate 

framework for a foreign disaster relief operation. Another useful example is the phases used 

during Operation SUPPORT HOPE 1994. 

OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE PHASES 

Phase I, Stabilize the Situation in Goma. “Stop The Dying.” Support lifesaving efforts (primarily water production, distribution, and sanitation) in 

the Goma, Zaire refugee camps. Phase I was to be declared complete 

when the death rate and refugee deprivation reached predesignated levels 

and when distribution began to function at an acceptable rate. 

Phase II, Move Refugees Back Toward Rwanda. Assist in establishing a 

waystation network from the major refugee centers toward the Rwandan 

interior. The objective was to assist relief agencies to develop a 

sustainment infrastructure and distribution system to help return refugees 

to their homes. Phase II completion criteria required establishment of the 

waystation support infrastructure and distribution network. 

Phase III, Stabilize the Refugee Situation and Begin Reconstruction in 

Rwanda. This phase supported ongoing relief efforts and established 

preconditions for operational transition to the United Nations High 

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Phase III was to be declared 

complete upon initial operational capability of a viable transportation, 

distribution, and storage infrastructure capable of meeting basic Rwandan 

needs. 

Phase IV, Turnover Operations to the UNHCR. This phase begins as 

UNHCR, third country forces, and various relief agencies developed 

adequate water production as well as food and medical distribution to 

sustain recovery. During this phase, joint force operations begin 

transition to a US liaison element to work closely with the UNHCR. Phase 

completion involved seamless transfer of ongoing relief operations to 

UNHCR and other agencies capable of sustained operations. 

Phase V, Redeploy the Force. The redeployment phase consists of relief 

operations control transfer to the UNHCR or redeployment of nonessential 

personnel and equipment. 

VARIOUS SOURCES 

III-12 JP 3-29 
Planning

For further details on phasing, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation 

Planning. 

5. Force Planning 

a. The primary purposes of force planning are to: influence COA development and 

selection based on force allocations, availability, and readiness; to identify all forces needed 

to accomplish the supported CCDR’s CONOPS with some rigor; and effectively phase the 

forces into the operational area. JFCs may have plans and/or predesignated joint forces for 

the conduct of FHA missions. The JFC has a number of available options, including use of 

a predesignated joint force or an ad hoc joint force, organized and tailored specifically to 

conduct FHA missions. In FHA operations, the joint force structure must provide for 

the means to coordinate and communicate with the numerous military/civilian, 

US/foreign organizations, that are involved in the overall FHA effort. Effective liaison 

among these organizations will help reduce organizational conflicts and redundant relief 

efforts. Personnel trained in political-military skills are valuable in establishing necessary 

liaison with policymakers and the diplomatic community. Additionally, personnel skilled in 

multifunctional logistics and security assistance operations should be part of the joint 

force organization, since FHA operations tend to be logistics’ intensive. There is a high 

probability that the joint force will be a multinational force, and that some of the 

multinational forces may require and have received USG approval to be supported with US 

equipment and sustained by US forces throughout the duration of the operation. This 

support may include the activation and deployment of Reserve Component (RC) 

personnel or units to support specific mission requirements, such as CA. 

b. Defining capabilities requirements. The supported CDR identifies force 

requirements as operational capabilities in the form of force packages to facilitate sourcing 

by the Services, US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), United States Special Operations 

Command (USSOCOM), USTRANSCOM, and other force providers’ supporting 

commands. A force package is a list (group of force capabilities) of the various forces 

(force requirements) that the supported CDR requires to conduct the operation described in 

the CONOPS. The supported CDR typically describes force requirements in the form of 

broad capability descriptions or unit type codes, depending on the circumstances. 

c. Force Sourcing

(1) Request for Forces and Capabilities. The supported CDR submits the 

required force packages through the Joint Staff to the force providers for sourcing. Force 

providers review the readiness and deployability posture of their available units before 

deciding which units to allocate to the supported CDR’s force requirements. Services and 

their component commands also determine mobilization requirements and plan for the 

provision of non-unit sustainment. 

(2) Global Force Management (GFM). The supported CDR will review the 

sourcing recommendations through the GFM process to ensure compatibility with capability 

requirements and CONOPS. GFM allows USJFCOM to identify full range support 

III-13 
Chapter III 

capabilities and forces, identify the right mix, and bring that mix in to a streamlined and 

integrated process designed to support combatant command requirements. GFM allows a 

global view of the requirements and a global view of the availability of the forces to meet 

those requirements using a collaborative and open environment. The process allows 

planners to shift their focus of preparation to the most important areas. 

d. Service Capabilities for FHA

(1) Conventional forces, though not structured for this purpose, are readily 

adaptable to perform FHA missions, except for some aspects of FCM which require 

specialized capabilities. 

(a) Maritime Forces. Maritime forces can provide operational maneuver and 

assured access while significantly reducing the footprint ashore and minimizing the 

permissions required to operate from the HN. 

1. Forward deployed expeditionary strike groups, with an embarked 

Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) provide immediate national response in support of 

humanitarian and natural-disaster relief operations. This includes MAGTF CM teams, 

platoon-sized elements capable of detecting a wide range of CBRN hazards. 

2. Other forward deployed maritime units, including carrier strike 

groups, individual ships or cutters, and deployed US Naval Construction Force units may 

provide more limited immediate relief support, including airlift support, personnel recovery, 

engineering services such as bridging and debris removal, and providing a secure platform 

for staging or rest and recuperation until a larger force arrives. 

3. US Navy ships can provide a safe and accessible location for the 

JFC HQ, provide seabasing support to the joint force, and have a limited ability to 

produce and distribute electrical power and clean water. Riverine forces, expeditionary 

training teams, hospital ships, fleet hospitals (FHs), expeditionary medical facilities 

(EMFs) and forward deployable preventive medicine units (FDPMUs) are other US Navy 

assets that can be tailored to support FHA missions. 

4. The Marine Corps maritime pre-positioning force (MPF) is a strategic 

power-projection capability that combines the lift capacity, flexibility, and responsiveness of 

surface ships with the speed of strategic airlift. Pre-positioned strategically around the 

world, these ships move to a crisis when needed and offload either in port or underway. 

Offloaded equipment and supplies are then linked up with Marines and Navy Seabees 

arriving at nearby airfields. MPF is especially responsive to regional crises that involve HA 

and disaster relief. These ships also have the capability to purify water and transfer it 

ashore. Bulk petroleum, oils, and lubricants transfer capability is also available. The 

Army’s afloat pre-positioning ships provide a similar capability to the US Army, but these 

ships require port facilities. 

III-14 JP 3-29 
Planning

(b) Air Forces

1. Airlift is an important method of moving relief supplies and rapidly 

moving personnel and equipment such as hospitals and water purification units to support 

FHA operations. 

2. Airfields can quickly be overwhelmed with aircraft transporting relief 

supplies. Aviation C2 elements, air traffic control elements, and aerial port units can 

facilitate the effective movement of supplies transported by aircraft. Civil engineering units 

have the capability to repair damaged runways rapidly. 

3. In addition to the major functions of airlift and airfield development, 

air forces may also support FHA through personnel recovery, airspace control, and 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). 

4. Helicopters have become a critical asset during FHA operations. 

When roads, bridges, and railroads have been damaged by a disaster, helicopters may be the 

only method to deliver relief supplies and transport relief workers to the operational area. 

(c) Ground Forces

1. Ground forces can provide surface transportation, engineering 

capabilities, supply, distribution, base camp support, material handling, water purification, 

inspection of facilities, and personnel recovery to fill critical gaps in the humanitarian 

response. 

2. Ground forces will also be instrumental for providing protection for 

the joint force and security for civilians, both victims and relief workers, as well as for 

OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. 

(2) Civil Affairs. CA assets are capable of supporting FHA operations in a 

variety of functional areas through planned civil affairs operations (CAO) or support to 

CMO. CDRs and their staffs assess the type and nature of CMO and CA support required 

by the CONOPS. This support includes six broad categories of CA functional specialty 

areas — rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, 

infrastructure, and public education and information. CA core tasks include support to civil 

administration, populace and resources control (PRC), FHA, NA, and civil information 

management. CA assets can prove extremely valuable as the JFC’s advisor on the impact of 

military activities on the civilian sector. CA assets assess infrastructure damage, assist in 

developing and managing temporary shelters, and are trained to operate within and 

coordinate activities with the CMOC. In the CMOC, CA personnel serve as liaison between 

military, diplomatic, and NGO participants in FHA operations. 

(a) Selection of CA Forces. The functional composition of CA varies with 

mission, availability, and qualifications of CA. Active Component (AC) Army CA are 

considered SOF and as such are provided by USSOCOM. RC Army and Marine Corps CA 

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Chapter III 

forces and US Navy (both AC and RC) CA forces are considered conventional forces and 

are provided by USJFCOM. C2 for CA forces should be clearly established in the 

deployment order and/or execute order. 

(b) The early deployment of CA in the operational area can be a force 

multiplier, setting the stage for the introduction of follow-on forces into an environment that 

has benefited from specialized interaction with the local population. 

(c) CA should be assigned as a JTF staff element. Additionally, CA should 

be assigned to support the CMOC, the J-3, or JTF subordinate units, including a JCMOTF, 

if established. 

(d) As the majority of CA are provided by the RC, mobilization of RC CA 

must be a consideration during predeployment planning. 

(e) Following the rapid deployment of active duty CA and initial CA 

assessments that either validate or invalidate the original CMO estimate, a plan is developed 

that articulates the specific functional skills required to support the mission. The results of 

this assessment and recommended task organization flow from the supported CCDR to the 

Joint Staff for validation, feasibility assessment, and eventual resourcing. Resourcing will 

generally be provided by the regionally aligned CA commands found in the US Army 

Reserve, if available and the mission so dictates. Concurrently, requests for the Presidential 

Reserve Call-up (if required) or other authorities for mobilization are initiated through the 

Joint Staff and DOD. When authorized, reserve CA elements are mobilized and deployed. 

(f) As with all aspects of a FHA operation, JFCs should make every effort to 

transition operations to civil control through the interagency community, the HN, and NGOs 

and IGOs. Early transition will support the possible reduction of the US forces committed 

to the FHA operation and allow those forces to be employed, if necessary, in support of 

other emerging contingencies. 

(g) Civil reconnaissance is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation 

and evaluation of those specific civil aspects of the environment. CA or other assets (e.g., 

engineer, medical, military police/security forces, HN or multinational organizations, 

unmanned aircraft systems, interagency partners, or intelligence systems) can conduct civil 

reconnaissance. The focus of collection in the JFC’s operational area is the daily interaction 

between civilians and US forces. This results in capturing contacts and data points. In 

coordination with the CMOC, CAO, and CMO planners integrate civil reconnaissance into 

the overall supported CDR’s plans and orders. 

See JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, which provides specific guidance on planning and 

executing CAO.

(3) Psychological Operations. PSYOP constitute a systematic process of 

conveying messages and themes intended to have an impact on selected target audiences. 

The objective is to influence behavior and attitudes favorable to the United States and its 

III-16 JP 3-29 
Planning

allies, as well as to constrain undesired actions. PSYOP units can provide the CJTF with 

analysis of perceptions and attitudes of the civilian population and effectiveness of 

ongoing information and FHA operations. PSYOP units provide language capability and 

equipment (radio broadcasting, print, audio, and audio visual) essential to disseminate 

necessary information to the populace. For example, during Operation PROVIDE 

COMFORT (April-July 1991 multinational relief effort in Eastern Turkey and Northern 

Iraq), PSYOP units disseminated information on relief camp procedures, organization, and 

food preparation. Tactical PSYOP teams were considered the best force to control crowds 

and disseminate information. Videos informed distant population groups of camp existence 

and assistance resource locations. 

(a) During FHA operations, PSYOP units assist in managing dislocated 

civilians. PSYOP units can provide health and safety messages, disseminate locations of 

shelter and food distribution points, warn of restricted or danger areas, and disseminate 

security information. For example, PSYOP units were employed successfully during 

Operation SAFE HAVEN (September 1994-March 1995 migrant camp operation in 

Panama). PSYOP units provided a critical capability in disseminating information 

throughout the migrant camps established during that operation. 

(b) The following considerations are provided for use of PSYOP in FHA 

operations.

1. PSYOP must be coordinated with information operations (IO) 

core, supporting, and related capabilities to ensure that their complementary capabilities 

are integrated into synergistic plans that are fully coordinated and executed, and that 

consistent themes and messages are communicated. PSYOP and PA staffs should 

coordinate and deconflict activities to preclude any possible negative impact of one 

operation on the other, including information being disseminated by civilian HA 

organizations. The PA and CMO staffs must work in close coordination with the IO 

planning staff, typically through IO cell meetings, to ensure a consistent message while 

maintaining operations security (OPSEC). Although messages that support PA, IO, CA, 

and PSYOP are different, they must not contradict one another or credibility may be lost. 

PSYOP information delivery capabilities can be used to disseminate public information 

products produced by PA in addition to messages developed by PSYOP. Similarly, PA can 

highlight PSYOP efforts, when appropriate through PA efforts such as facilitating media 

coverage of successful PSYOP programs and actions (preventive medicine programs, 

reconciliation programs, show of force, rebuilding of symbolic infrastructure, public 

address by spokesperson, etc). As open sources to foreign countries and the United States, 

PA channels can be used to disseminate international information of a truthful nature and to 

counter propaganda directed against the operation and the United States. 

2. PSYOP units should either deploy with organic transportation or be 

provided adequate, dedicated vehicles for necessary mobility. 

3. PSYOP staff positions should be integrated into the JTF joint 

manning document to insure integration into JTF planning from its onset. PSYOP 

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staff ensure the entire staff understands the importance of integrating psychological 

operations into the overall plan to achieve the mission. An important aspect in early 

PSYOP planning is establishing the proper priority for PSYOP capability to flow into the 

operational area. 

4. DOD humanitarian daily rations (HDRs) are printed with “A Food 

Gift from the People of the United States of America” on the packaging. There is 

intrinsic value in distributing goods unilaterally or with coalition partners. Cultural 

expectations, inferences, and taboos are considered prior to deciding on whether or not to 

include written PSYOP messages on relief products. PSYOP planners balance any 

written message against the value of distributing useful or essential goods with implicit 

rather than explicit messages. The marking of aid packages should be consistent with 

USAID branding and marking guidelines. 

JP 3-13.2, Psychological Operations, provides specific guidance on planning and 

executing PSYOP and JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, provides guidance 

on SOF employment. 

(4) SOF. There are several reasons why SOF are well-suited to FHA operations. 

They are adaptable, can deploy rapidly, have excellent long-range communications 

equipment, and can operate effectively in austere environments typical of FHA efforts. 

Perhaps the most important capabilities found within SOF for FHA are their geographic 

orientation, cultural knowledge, language capabilities, and the ability to work with local, 

ethnic groups and civilian populations to provide initial and ongoing assessments. 

For further details on SOF employment, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special 

Operations. 

6. Predeployment and Deployment 

a. Supported and supporting GCCs are responsible for coordinating with US 

embassies within their AORs to ensure that necessary overflight and transit en route 

agreements/arrangements are negotiated to permit transit to operational areas for forces 

necessary to conduct and sustain FHA operations to reach their operational areas. DOS 

coordinates overflight and landing rights, diplomatic clearances, and visa and passport 

requirements for all deployment operations. Supporting GCCs are responsible to ensure 

appropriate overflight, transit, and staging agreements/arrangements are in place to 

support operations in other AORs, when appropriate. 

For more information on current overflight/transit requirements, see the DOD Electronic 

Foreign Clearance Guide (https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil); and for guidance on 

negotiating agreements, see DODD 5530.3, International Agreements.

b. Deployment. Deployment planning and execution considerations for FHA 

missions and other military operations are fundamentally the same. Joint force 

deployment is predicated on the severity of the humanitarian situation and the perception of 

III-18 JP 3-29 
Planning

US interests. It is important to remember that political factors drive military decisions and 

planning at every level. Mission analysis, may validate the need for further assessments or 

the establishment of a lodgment, and in consultation with the component commanders, 

the JFC determines the deployment priority for all elements of the joint force. Force 

protection is an important part of this process. 

(1) Movement. The joint force will obtain strategic lift allocations and 

constraints from USTRANSCOM via the CCDR. The time-phased force and 

deployment data for the operations must be developed to remain within these guidelines. 

USTRANSCOM provides movement schedules for deployment requirements in the 

sequence, or as near as possible to that requested by the joint force. The joint force staff 

should continually update all subordinate commands on deployment scheduling, situation, 

or mission changes. Such changes may require significant shifts in force deployment. 

Consideration should also be given to any deployment support requested by OFDA DART 

and OGA, the UN, NGOs, and IGOs. 

(2) Priority of Deployment. Initial deployment for an FHA operation 

generally requires only critical C2, communications systems; security; CMOC(s); PA, 

and logistic capabilities (e.g., initial theater opening capability). Follow-on forces 

deploy as capabilities expand and requirements are better defined. However, US forces 

often conduct FHA operations in austere locations where airport and seaport facilities 

may be limited or inadequate. If the affected country has insufficient port offloading 

facilities, US personnel and equipment needed to establish or augment this capability, 

should arrive prior to the primary force packages. In some cases, it may be necessary to 

expand existing facilities or construct new facilities to accommodate essential 

transshipment or the flow of forces into the country. 

For more information see JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations. 

7. Other Planning Considerations 

a. Simultaneous Operations. The US military often will be engaged in several 

types of joint operations with different end states, simultaneously across the range of 

military operations. Some military operations may be conducted for one purpose, such as 

disaster relief; however, others will have multiple purposes and will be influenced by a 

fluid and changing situation. Branch and sequel events may require additional tasks by 

the joint force (e.g., Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE, 1992-1993, 

peace enforcement operations evolved from FHA efforts, which challenged the command 

with multiple missions). Furthermore, a crisis response or limited contingency operation 

may be initiated separately or as part of a campaign or major operation (e.g., the 1991 

NEO in Somalia during Operation DESERT SHIELD). Foreign CBRN incidents may 

require the CCDR or JFC to plan for multiple, concurrent operations including, FHA, 

FCM, NEO, and forensics that will require coordination with different elements of the 

foreign emergency support team (FEST), US embassy, and HN. Joint forces must strive 

to meet such challenges with clearly defined objectives addressing diverse purposes. 

III-19 
Chapter III 

b. Interagency Planning. Integrating the interagency community effectively can be 

vital to successful military operations, especially during the stabilize and enable civil 

authority phases of an operation when JFCs may also operate in support of OGAs. JFCs 

and their staffs must consider how the capabilities of the joint force can be leveraged to 

accomplish the broader national strategic objectives by assisting the LFA. During 

planning, JFCs should coordinate directly with interagency representatives within their 

operational areas to ensure appropriate agreements exist that support their plans (such as 

working with US embassies to secure overflight rights with other nations). While 

supported CCDRs are the focal points for interagency coordination in support of 

operations in their AORs, interagency coordination with supporting CDRs is just as 

important. At the operational level, subordinate CDRs should consider and integrate 

interagency and international capabilities into their estimates, plans, and operations. A 

supported CDR is responsible for developing annex V, (Interagency Coordination), for 

each OPLAN. For interagency partners, annex V should specify not only the capabilities 

that military planners have determined the military may need, but also the shared 

understanding of the situation, and common objectives required to resolve the situation. 

Care should be taken to effectively communicate the contents of annex V with the nonDOD agencies, preferably in a collaborative process, recognizing that the CCDR does not 

have any tasking authority over any non-DOD entity, and that the information is provided 

to the other agencies to assist them in their planning to achieve greater unity of effort. 

This would enable interagency planners to plan their efforts in concert with the military 

more rigorously, to suggest other activities or partners that could contribute to the 

operation, and to identify any support requirements they may request from the military. 

c. Multinational planning. Joint forces should be prepared for operations with 

forces from other nations within the framework of an alliance or coalition under US or 

multinational leadership. Planning for multinational operations is accomplished in 

multinational and national channels. Coordination of these separate planning channels 

occurs at the national level by established multinational bodies or coalition member 

nations and at the theater-strategic and operational levels by JFCs, who are responsible 

within both channels for operation planning matters. US doctrine and procedures for 

JOPP also are conceptually applicable to multinational problems. The fundamental 

issues are much the same for both situations. For more specific guidance on NATO 

planning and execution see appropriate publications within the doctrine hierarchy. 

d. Canada-US Civil Assistance Plan. The Canada-US Civil Assistance Plan is a fivephase plan enabling US military forces to support Canadian military forces engaged in civil 

support operations. It provides collaborative planning for the deployment of US forces to 

support Canadian military forces, establishes a C2 construct for placing US forces under 

tactical control (TACON) of Canada Command, and provides that operations will be 

conducted in accordance with the HN’s civil support plans (i.e., Canada Command 

Direction for Domestic Operations). 

e. Global Area Reference System (GARS). GARS is an area referencing system 

which reaches all areas of the globe and can be used as a tool in synchronizing operations 

III-20 JP 3-29 
Planning

across multiple applications. Establishing a common reference system early in planning will 

enhance operational execution by mitigating confusion in geographic coordination. 

For further information, refer to JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint 

Operations. 

III-21 
Chapter III 

III-22 JP 3-29 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER IV

EXECUTION AND ASSESSMENT

“SEA SIGNAL quickly became a chameleon-like operation whose character 

changed constantly. Political and international dynamics, US policy 

changes, and issues of local concern required a constant re-evaluation of 

the situation, often producing considerable change to the nature and scope 

of the mission.” 

Operation SEA SIGNAL 

After Action Report 

Joint Task Force 160 

2 February 1996 

1. Introduction 

This chapter highlights aspects of joint force execution and assessment related to 

FHA operations. 

2. Deployment 

The capability to deploy forces to the operational area and rapidly integrate them into 

the joint force as directed by the JFC is essential. The joint deployment process consists 

of four phases: planning; predeployment activities; movement; and JRSOI. JRSOI can be 

the most challenging phase in FHA operations. Supported GCCs are responsible for 

JRSOI within their AORs. This includes all actions required to make arriving units 

operationally ready and integrated into the joint force. Challenges arise when the 

operational area has been severely impacted by the incident or disaster and US forces 

have had no presence or routine access to the operational area. HN, multinational, and 

contractor support may not be feasible during the initial stages of an FHA operation but 

they normally are available to support JRSOI. 

More detailed information may be found in JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment 

Operations. 

3. Sustainment 

a. Logistic and health service support (HSS) planners estimate assistance 

requirements and assess organic, theater support, and affected country capabilities to 

meet the forecasted need. Inherent risks and logistic objectives should also be identified. 

Emphasis must be placed upon locating logistic bases as close as possible to the 

relief recipients. Should relief recipients be located within a major population center, all 

reasonable measures should be taken when establishing logistic bases that prevent 

migration of relief recipients from their economic and social areas. All potential supply 

sources should be considered, including affected country, commercial, multinational, 

and pre-positioned supplies. Lessons-learned indicate that logistics and the associated 

support facilities and infrastructure necessary to sustain an FHA operation are frequently 

underestimated. FHA operations are logistic intensive and will most likely include 

IV-1 
Chapter IV 

significant general engineering requirements. Therefore, the overall logistic concept 

should be closely tied into the operational strategy and be mutually supporting. 

This includes the following: 

(1) Identifying time-phased materiel requirements, facilities, and other 

resources. Remote and austere locations may require deployment of materials handling 

equipment and pre-positioned stocks. 

(2) Identifying support methods and procedures required to meet air, land, and 

maritime LOCs. 

(3) Establishing procedures and means for coordinating and controlling materiel 

movements to and within the operational area. Priorities may be established using 

apportionment systems, providing the CDR with the flexibility to reinforce priority 

efforts with additional assets. 

b. For the FHA operation to succeed, the CDR must be able to fulfill priorities 

through adequate resource control. Logisticians, in conjunction with operational 

planners, must consider which equipment and supplies may be left behind at the 

completion of the mission. Supplies and equipment cannot be arbitrarily left behind and 

donated to the HN. Supplies and equipment left behind as a result of HA support 

operations must be in accordance with all applicable Federal laws and statues relating to 

the donation or transfer of military articles and supplies. Consult legal counsel prior to 

any release of supplies and equipment. It should also be noted that planning for security 

of materials and supplies is imperative. 

c. Logistic Database Information. Commodity tracking systems (CTSs) used in 

FHA include the following: 

(1) Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System (DALIS). DALIS was 

designed by the US Army to enhance the operations of one or more logistic coordination 

centers supporting multiple worldwide FHA operations. 

(2) Commodity Tracking System. CTS is a computer program developed by 

the UNHCR as a warehouse and logistic management tool. CTS uses DALIS for its basic 

design. 

(3) Global Transportation Network (GTN). GTN is a standardized DOD 

system that provides access to transportation data inputs from a wide variety of in-transit 

visibility systems. Users can query the GTN database to track cargo and passengers from 

origin to destination, anywhere in the Defense Transportation System. 

d. Contracting Support. Integrating contracting and contractor management 

functions into military planning and operations is a complex and very challenging 

process. Multiple joint and Service component organizations are involved in this process 

including CDRs and the primary and special staffs at the CCDR through major tactical 

IV-2 JP 3-29 
Execution and Assessment

force levels. Additionally, numerous contracting organizations from inside and outside 

the operational area play a vital role in contracting and contractor management planning 

and contract execution. Finally, developing the contracting support plans and conducting 

the associated contractor integration planning, crosses most joint force and Service 

component primary and special staff lanes; yet most of these staffs are very unfamiliar 

with the contracting process and associated contractor integration challenges. 

Contracting support may be obtained from within or outside the affected country. 

Military forces should not compete for scarce civilian resources. To avoid competition 

for similar support and to promote economy of contracting effort, contracts for logistic 

support must be coordinated through the designated J-4 or lead agent for logistics joint 

contracting support board or center. Logisticians should be thoroughly familiar with 

contracting options available through the Navy’s global contingency construction and 

Services contracts, the Army’s logistics civil augmentation program, and the Air 

Force contract augmentation program. All three of these contracting options are 

designed to be flexible in order to address emergent requirements worldwide which can 

aid the economy of the affected country and facilitate the subsequent transfer of 

responsibility to the affected country, NGOs, or IGOs. 

DODI 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces

provides comprehensive DOD policy on the subject of contractor personnel management 

in contingency operations and JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support, provides common 

contracting and contractor management doctrine principles.

e. Cluster Management and Support. A cluster is a group comprising 

organizations and other stakeholders, with a designated lead, working in an area of 

humanitarian response in which gaps have been identified. These areas include some 

traditional relief and assistance sectors (i.e., water and sanitation, nutrition, health, 

emergency shelter); service provision (i.e., emergency telecommunications, logistics); 

and cross-cutting issues (i.e., camp coordination, early recovery, protection). Clusters are 

organized at both field and global level. In more traditional terminology, clusters may be 

termed as "sectors," "sectoral groups," and "sector leads" (or in some cases, "working 

groups," or "thematic groups"). Clusters provide a framework for organizing the 

humanitarian response in a similar manner as lines of operations define the orientation of 

the joint force in time and space or purpose in relation to an objective. 

Appendix D, “Humanitarian Nongovernmental and Intergovernmental Organizations,”

contains more information on the cluster approach.

f. The World Economic Forum advocates that as global corporate citizens, the 

private sector must do more than simply fund relief organizations and that business 

should proactively participate in a multi-sector effort to prevent and mitigate the effects 

of disasters. The World Economic Forum established the Disaster Response Network 

(DRN) – a point of contact and coordination for companies that want to provide support 

to disaster management efforts in developing countries. 

IV-3 
Chapter IV 

(1) The DRN is a network of engineering and transportation companies who are 

committed to assist humanitarian organizations with their disaster relief efforts by 

providing infrastructure-related and transportation services. The mission of the DRN is 

to leverage the resources of the international business community to mitigate human 

suffering associated with disasters. The vision of the DRN is to make it easier for 

businesses to offer talent or in-kind donations of a good or service for the emergency 

response phase of disaster relief and to ensure that corporate donations are delivered in a 

coordinated and effective manner. 

(2) Airport Emergency Team (AET). When disasters occur, it is critical to 

transport relief supplies to the affected area quickly and effectively. Airports soon 

become overrun with shipments of emergency equipment, staff and supplies. 

Inexperience and lack of coordination on the ground can create unnecessary delays. To 

help remedy this, the DRN assembled a team of 60 volunteer logistics experts and heavy 

equipment operators. Based in Dubai, the AET is positioned to deploy immediately to 

any disaster site in the region. Equipped with two all-terrain forklifts and subsistence 

supplies (food, clothing, water, tents, cooking equipment) for seven to ten days, the AET 

offers essential services to relief workers on the ground. The AET will be deployed at 

the request of the UNDAC team through its joint logistics centre. 

4. Command and Control 

a. FHA operations must include responsibility for air, land, maritime, space, 

and special operations. It is especially necessary to delegate authority to establish 

supply or transportation priorities. Delegation speeds decision making and reaction to 

changes in life-threatening situations faced in many FHA operations. Although there is 

no command relationship between military forces and OGAs, UN agencies, NGOs, IGOs, 

affected country elements, and allied or coalition governments, clearly defined 

relationships may foster harmony and reduce friction between participating 

organizations. 

b. Communications. Effective communications systems are vital to planning, 

conducting, and sustaining successful FHA operations. Operations, logistic, and 

intelligence functions depend on responsive communications. Communications are the 

central system that not only ties together all aspects of joint operations, but also 

allows CDRs C2 of forces. Therefore, the FHA plan must include procedures to provide 

interoperable and compatible communications among participants. Commercial 

telephone networks, military satellite channels, and conventional military C2 systems will 

support communication of directions, orders, and information. Commercial 

communications systems can be used to coordinate with other US agencies, disseminate 

meeting schedules, deconflict resource movement, and track logistic flow. Direct 

communications between CDRs and nonmilitary organizations should be 

established to facilitate effective collaboration and decision-making. Peer to peer 

networks - desktop software designed to facilitate collaboration and communication 

among small groups - are also used by NGOs. Information protection for nonsecured 

communications must be implemented. Additionally, communications systems planning 

IV-4 JP 3-29 
Execution and Assessment

must consider the termination or transition of US involvement and the transfer of 

responsibility to other agencies such as the UN or NGOs. Frequency management will 

help allocate finite frequency availability. The HN government (if functioning) may 

control frequency management. FHA forces may not have exclusive use of frequencies. 

c. Interoperability. Identify communications equipment interoperability 

among all participants. It is likely that civilian USG agencies, HN agencies, and 

multinational forces will have their own communications networks. These may include 

commercial leased circuits and satellite services as well as high frequency radio 

equipment. It is also critical that CMOCs are equipped with communication equipment 

that facilitates collaboration with all participants. The need for interoperability of 

communications equipment in FHA operations may also necessitate using unclassified 

communications means during the operation. US military forces will face great difficulty 

and challenges in conducting an operation via unclassified means and still keep multinational forces, OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs in the loop. US military forces will receive 

correspondence by different classified modes that have to be further transmitted in one 

form or another. The use of classified and unclassified modes of communication are both 

necessary, as classified modes are routinely used for operational information. Write for 

release should be used to the greatest extent possible at all levels. Write for release 

techniques include portion marking, the use of "tearlines," and sanitizing sensitive text. 

Some of the communications lessons learned from 

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT: 

 Obtain adequate communications equipment to provide basic 

mission essential service;

 Employ additional equipment and reconfigure connectivity to 

provide direct routing to principal destinations;

 Add equipment to provide multiple routes to prevent site isolation;

 Have sufficient equipment to support airborne capabilities, 

respond to new missions, and avoid critical shortages; and 

 Build in redundancy.

d. Reporting. USG agency reports will be consolidated into normal country team 

reporting procedures and structures with increased frequency as directed. In more 

complex situations, DOS will activate a ‘crisis action task force’ which will establish 

reporting procedures that will likely be via a share point portal so that all USG reports are 

consolidated in one location. The JFC should expect to coordinate on reports on in 

country activities with the country team. This is in addition to any DOD or GCC directed 

reporting requirements. The joint force staff will encounter numerous OGAs, NGOs, and 

IGOs that produce reports on the operating environment and joint force actions. The 

COM’s cable, the USAID representative’s reports, and OFDA DART reports are 

IV-5 
Chapter IV 

reviewed by the DOS and OGAs. Additionally, other elements of the country team 

produce reports on the same issues about which the joint force staff reports. Despite 

efforts to maintain accuracy, the proliferation of reports may result in conflicting 

information. One approach to deconflicting reports is to develop a consolidated report 

between the joint force and the country team. Such consolidated reporting will also 

serve to reduce administrative overhead while reducing opportunities for conflicting 

information to surface. As an additional consideration, information provided by NGOs 

and IGOs should not be identified by organization on reports that may be seen outside the 

USG. To do otherwise would jeopardize the organization’s standing and possibly their 

staff’s safety. 

e. Operational Areas. Particularly when the JOA is large, the JFC may organize 

the FHA JOA into areas of operations in consultation with NGOs, IGOs, OGAs, and in 

consideration of the organization already established by the affected country. In 

establishing boundaries, planners should consider existing political subdivisions, ethnic 

or traditional tribal boundaries, political affiliations, relief agency areas, political and 

cultural acceptance of other nations’ forces, and contiguous areas with forces assigned. If 

possible, a CMOC should be established within each operational area capable of working 

with agencies in the area as well as the HOC (through the joint force HQ). The JFC will 

also normally designate an area of influence and an area of interest (AOI). 

More detailed information on operational areas may be found in JP 3-0, Joint 

Operations. 

5. Assessment 

a. The JFC should use the assessment process to evaluate task performance and to 

measure effects and determine the progress of operations toward achieving objectives. 

MOEs assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment. MOEs 

in FHA operations should be based on impact indicators that measure the change in the 

lives of the people on the ground, rather than process indicators that calculate USG 

efforts and their immediate outputs. Measures of performance (MOPs) measure task 

performance. MOPs are generally quantitative, but also can apply qualitative attributes to 

task accomplishment. Well-devised measures can help the CDRs and staffs understand 

the causal relationship between specific tasks and desired effects. MOEs assist the CDR 

in determining when the situation has been returned to pre-disaster conditions. 

b. Developing MOEs. There is no single all-encompassing checklist for MOEs for 

FHA operations. MOEs will vary according to the mission and the effects desired by the 

JFC. However, CDRs and staffs should keep certain factors in mind when developing 

and using MOEs in FHA operations. MOEs may be difficult to develop; the assessment 

process and related measures should be relevant, measurable, responsive, and resourced 

so there is no false impression of accomplishment. MOEs should also be based upon the 

US military objectives and end states to ensure that the JFC is measuring those effects 

within the joint force's control. While the military objectives support the national 

IV-6 JP 3-29 
Execution and Assessment

objectives, tying military MOEs to tasks to be accomplished by others does not 

accurately reflect progress towards completion of the military mission. 

c. Possible MOEs. MOEs in FHA operations could include: 

(1) Drops in mortality rates in the affected population, below a specified level 

per day. 

(2) Increase in water available to each disaster victim per day to various levels 

established for human consumption, to support sanitation measures, and for livestock 

consumption. 

(3) Decrease in population of dislocated civilians in camps to a level sustainable 

by the affected country or non-US military organizations (Another aspect of this MOE is 

the increase in the number of persons per day returning to their homes). 

(4) Decrease in incidence of disease to an acceptable or manageable level. 

(5) An increase in the presence and capabilities of NGOs and IGOs. 

(6) It is normally appropriate to base MOEs for FHA on The Sphere Project 

Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. The Sphere 

Project, developed by IGOs and NGOs involved in HA, recommends key indicators for 

MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS IN OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE 

During Operation SUPPORT HOPE, the joint force tracked several specific 

measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to ascertain when it had accomplished its 

assigned mission. These MOEs included: 

 • The refugee population in Goma dropped from 1,200,000 on 26 July 

1994 to 575,000 on 26 August 1994 (Numbers of refugees were estimates 

only); 

 • The estimated mortality rate in Goma camps, based on bodies buried 

per day, dropped from 6,500 per day on 27 July 1994 to less than 500 per day 

on 1 August 1994; 

 • Cargo capacity at Kigali airfield increased from virtually zero on 30 

July 1994 to 300-600 tons per day on 26 August 1994; and 

 • The number of United Nations agencies and nongovernmental 

agencies, represented in Kigali grew from 6 on 22 July 1994 to over 60 on 26 

August 1994. This increase represented adequate nonmilitary capability to 

provide humanitarian assistance. 

VARIOUS SOURCES 

IV-7 
Chapter IV 

provision of water, sanitation, food, health, shelter, and non-food items in disasters, and 

establishes voluntary minimum standards for each sector. However, there are no 

signatories to the Sphere Project or its Charter. For more detail, see Appendix F, 

"Planning Factors for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations." 

d. The impact of FHA cannot be measured only in terms of supplies shipped; the 

ultimate test comes from judging whether lives have been saved and communities 

revived. This is a complex and long-term process, and to find answers, USAID has 

developed the following four areas for assessing performance. 

(1) First, the structure for responding to disasters and to the needs of 

countries in crisis and transition must be in place. Before crises occur, USAID — in 

close coordination with other agencies of the USG, multilateral agencies, and local 

authorities — will ascertain the following: 

(a) Have supplies been stockpiled and service providers identified? Are 

supplies secure from loss and theft? When USAID moves to deliver goods and services, 

will they go to the right place in the right amount with the intended effect? 

(b) Have the prevention, mitigation, and preparedness activities of USAID 

anticipated needs and are they effective? Have local communities and businesses been 

enlisted for planning, prevention, and response? 

(c) Do proposed shipments of supplies match and maximize local skills and 

capacities? In view of past disasters locally and regionally, are preparations 

commensurate with likely needs? 

(d) Are the partnerships and relations with the UN (including the World 

Food Programme [WFP]) understood by all? Are mechanisms in place to coordinate 

supplies, donations, and offers of skilled labor and ensure that they are delivered where 

and when they are needed? 

(2) Second, actual delivery of supplies and services must be timely and 

effective. During crises, USAID and its partners will determine the following: 

(a) Do disaster relief supplies and services reach their intended destination 

in time to make a difference? Are all forms of emergency relief supplies readily 

available and accessible to the intended beneficiaries, including women, children, the 

elderly, local peoples, refugees, and members of minorities? 

(b) Do specific programs intended to save lives or reduce malnutrition, 

such as emergency feeding programs, have the intended impact? 

(c) Are profiteering and misuse effectively controlled? Are food and other 

relief supplies distributed so as not to discourage local production or distort local prices 

and markets? 

IV-8 JP 3-29 
Execution and Assessment

(d) Do programs of disease control and emergency medical services 

(including immunizations, child survival interventions, and maternal and reproductive 

health care) have access to necessary supplies and are they coordinated with food and 

nutrition interventions? 

(3) Third, in transitional and crisis situations, assistance must target the 

institutions and needs critical to the resumption of sustained development, civil life, 

and democratic governance. USAID and its partners will determine the following: 

(a) Has the response to countries in crisis and transition been appropriate to 

their needs, political situation, and indigenous capacities? 

(b) Have national and local political institutions been strengthened? Have 

key elements of the infrastructure, such as housing, communications, basic transportation, 

and financial services been reinforced? Are the specific needs of IDPs and refugees 

being addressed? 

(c) Has food security increased throughout the country? Do farmers have 

greater access to seed, fertilizer, and appropriate technology? Has local food production 

increased significantly and are more people able to acquire the income needed to 

purchase food? 

(d) Has there been measurable progress toward national reconciliation and 

invigoration of the mechanisms of conflict resolution, as indicated by fair and open 

elections, constitutional conventions, new legal codes, reintegration of combatants, etc? 

Is there evidence of decreased disorder in cities and in the countryside? Is there 

increased respect for human rights? 

(4) Fourth, follow-on mechanisms, after relief and rehabilitation, must be 

in place to help prevent cycles of crisis and to permit countries to cope with their 

own natural disasters and political crises. After the crisis stage has passed, USAID 

and its partners will determine the following: 

(a) In conjunction with local authorities and communities, and multilayer 

institutions, is USAID developing and implementing long-term development programs 

that measurably enhance the ability of countries to anticipate and manage disasters? Are 

the economic, political, environmental, social, and institutional causes of man-made 

disasters being addressed? 

(b) Have countries in crisis and transition made measurable progress 

toward a political and economic transformation? 

(5) Ultimately, HA activities must be measured by simple, yet profound 

standards; do these activities prevent human misery that is avoidable? Do they provide 

relief for human misery that is not avoidable? Does this assistance help countries that 

IV-9 
Chapter IV 

have suffered natural or man-made disasters and crises return to the path of sustainable 

development? 

6. Intelligence 

a. Intelligence and information gathering in FHA operations should be broadly 

focused and include collection concerning political, military, paramilitary, ethnic, 

religious, economic, medical, environmental, geospatial, and criminal indicators. The 

primary intelligence effort must focus on answering the CDR’s priority intelligence 

requirements (PIRs) assisting in the accomplishment of the mission. While normally 

this will involve assessing potential threats to the FHA mission (from forces external and 

internal to the affected population), the unique aspects of FHA operations may result in 

significant or even primary emphasis being placed upon logistic, HSS, or political 

intelligence and intelligence support to CA and PSYOP. All available means of 

intelligence sourcing should be fused into tailored data useful to operational personnel for 

deployment planning, mission requirements, and other unforeseen taskings as they arise. 

As soon as practical after it is determined that a crisis may develop or a contingency is 

declared, JFCs and their staffs begin an analysis and determine the intelligence 

requirements needed to support the anticipated operation. Human intelligence 

(HUMINT) is often the primary source of information. However, crises may occur with 

little or no warning and in regions with very few or even no HUMINT sources. Airborne 

and space-based ISR sensors, though, can provide information in those regions with 

limited HUMINT presence or in cases were human assets are insufficient to satisfy 

intelligence requirements, i.e., geospatial information. 

b. Protecting the force will remain a high priority for intelligence collection. 

Collection should not be equated with hostile penetration of a country’s internal affairs; 

in fact, open sources may be an excellent means to determine agendas and patterns of 

operation and to identify factional territory. A comprehensive intelligence analysis can 

help CDRs avoid hostilities during the conduct of FHA missions. Intelligence operations 

during FHA operations are generally conducted in the same manner as in any other 

military operation. 

c. An intelligence architecture for the operation will be required to enable the 

CDR to fuse all-source intelligence in a timely manner, enhancing visualization of the 

operational environment. Normal tasking and reporting channels should also be used. 

Provisions will have to be made for working with governments for which no previously 

established intelligence agreements exist and for exchanging security-related information 

with NGOs and IGOs. Consideration must also be given to the use of, and growing 

dependency on, imagery assets to enhance information gathering and intelligence 

collection. National, theater, and tactical collection systems and related production 

agencies, such as NGA can be tasked to provide current imagery of the crisis area. 

Examples of how imagery can be used include determining the status of an area’s 

transportation network following an earthquake or flooding and locating large groups of 

dislocated civilians. 

IV-10 JP 3-29 
Execution and Assessment

d. Because of NGO and IGO sensitivities regarding negative perceptions generated 

by working with military organizations, the term “information” instead of “intelligence” 

must be used. Those organizations must not have the perception that their neutrality is 

compromised by providing intelligence to the military. Finally, consideration should also 

be given to answering the intelligence requirements of adjacent task forces as well as 

theater- and national-level requirements. Classification and releasability standards for 

intelligence and sensitive information should be determined early in the planning process 

and reviewed as the operation proceeds. 

e. Foreign disclosure procedures should be put in place and utilized to the maximum 

extent feasible. 

(1) In order to share critical intelligence information with allies and coalition 

partners efficiently, US intelligence information should be written for release at the 

lowest possible classification level and given the fewest possible dissemination 

restrictions within foreign disclosure guidelines. The J-2 must establish procedures and 

methods for separating intelligence from sources and methods. Intelligence production 

agencies often print highly classified reports in such a manner that compartmented 

information is separated from intelligence that can be widely disseminated by a “tear 

line” (the J-2 and component intelligence staff officers keep information above the tear 

line and disseminate the intelligence below). Having intelligence production agencies 

use such tear lines will greatly facilitate intelligence sharing. 

(2) The joint force J-2, or delegated representative, obtains all the necessary 

foreign disclosure authorization from Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), national 

agencies, and other originators of controlled classified information as soon as possible to 

allow for the seamless transfer of information to foreign partners engaged in joint 

operations. The efficient flow of intelligence will be enhanced by the assignment of 

formally trained personnel who are knowledgeable of foreign disclosure. 

7. Information Sharing 

a. Information sharing is critical to the efficient pursuit of a common humanitarian 

purpose. Although many different groups and authorities can (and should) work in 

parallel, a collaborative information environment (CIE) facilitates information sharing. 

Constructing a CIE is not primarily a technology issue — effective, low-cost, network 

equipment and data management systems exist today, and more are being developed. 

Rather, the challenges are largely social, institutional, cultural, and organizational. These 

impediments can limit and shape the willingness of civilian and military personnel and 

organizations to openly cooperate and share information and capabilities. 

b. The components of civil-military coordination consist of information and task 

sharing and collaborative planning — all of which depend on communications and 

management of data and information. The following issues, however, often complicate 

effective civil-military coordination: 

IV-11 
Chapter IV 

(1) lack of understanding about the information culture of the affected nation. 

(2) Suspicions regarding the balance between information sharing and 

intelligence gathering. 

(3) Tensions between military needs for classification (secrecy) of data, versus 

the civilian need for transparency. 

(4) Differences in the C2 style of military operations versus civilian activities. 

(5) The compatibility and interoperability of planning tools, processes, and 

civil-military organization cultures. 

c. The sharing of information is particularly critical because no single responding 

entity—whether it is an NGO, IGO, assisting country government or host government—

can be the source of all of the required data and information. Making critical information 

widely available to multiple responding civilian and military elements not only reduces 

duplication of effort, but also enhances coordination and collaboration and provides a 

common knowledge base so that critical information can be pooled, analyzed, compared, 

contrasted, validated, and reconciled. Civil-military collaboration networks need to be 

designed to dismantle traditional institutional stovepipes and facilitate the sharing of 

information among civilian and military organizations. 

8. Protection 

a. For the joint force, force protection is a high priority. Even in a permissive 

environment, the joint force can expect to encounter banditry, vandalism, and various 

levels of violent activities from criminals or unruly crowds. It is imperative that the joint 

force be trained and equipped to mitigate threats to US personnel, resources, facilities, 

and critical information. All deploying members should be provided with threat and 

force protection briefings prior to and throughout the duration of the operation. 

b. As in any operation, force protection in FHA is enhanced by establishing 

effective counterintelligence support and by practicing strict OPSEC. 

Counterintelligence support will be conducted in accordance with JP 2-01.2, 

Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations (classified 

document). 

c. In addition to force protection, the joint force may also be tasked to provide 

protection for other personnel and assets. If not clearly stated in the mission, the 

extent of this security should be addressed in the ROE, to include protection of: 

(1) Forces of other nations working jointly with US forces in a multinational 

force. 

IV-12 JP 3-29 
Execution and Assessment

(2) USG, NGO, and IGO personnel and equipment. 

(3) HA recipients. 

(4) Affected country personnel and assets. 

(5) Humanitarian relief convoys, supplies, and main supply routes. 

(6) Relief distribution centers. 

(7) Stocks of HA supplies. 

(8) Ports and airfields. 

(9) Hospitals and medical clinics. 

d. Nonlethal Weapons. Nonlethal weapons provide an additional tool for force 

protection that may be particularly useful during FHA operations in which the use of 

lethal force may jeopardize strategic objectives. 

e. When an FHA operation occurs in an area torn by war or civil strife, security 

operations may include removal of booby-traps, mine-clearing, and other ordnance 

disposal efforts. For example, during Operation RESTORE HOPE (Somalia), US Joint 

Forces provided explosive ordnance disposal teams to clear unexploded ordnance 

(remnants of war) and destroy captured enemy ammunition. A program instituted for a 

short period called “Food for Arms” proved to be dangerous due to locals bringing 

unexploded ordnance into aid stations to exchange for food – creating a dangerous 

environment for both the Somali people and UN forces. 

f. Regardless of the environment, security must be factored into force requirements 

and support capability. In FHA operations, sustainment forces will require a substantial 

amount of their troops to protect unit and individual property. 

9. Engineer Operations 

a. FHA operations can be extremely engineer-intensive. In such cases, the JFC may 

opt to establish a subordinate JTF to control extensive engineer operations and missions. 

Such a JTF may be formed around an existing engineer command or naval construction 

regiment. Engineer forces could be placed under OPCON, TACON, or in a supporting 

role. The engineer assets attached to the subordinate JTF will normally be made up of a 

mix of engineer assets drawn from the entire force’s engineer resources. If the 

subordinate JTF is to provide a common support capability, it will require a specific 

delegation of directive authority from the CCDR for the common support capability that 

is to be provided. 

IV-13 
Chapter IV 

b. In addition to USG agencies, the joint force engineer and staff may have to 

coordinate engineering activities with NGOs. NGOs may have unique engineering 

capabilities that can be leveraged as part of the overall operational effort. One example 

of great interest to engineers is their ability to conduct humanitarian demining operations. 

These organizations may also request extensive military engineer support for their 

activities and programs. It is critical to establish an effective engineer liaison in the 

CMOC to coordinate and execute engineering support with these organizations. 

c. Typical engineer missions for FHA include: 

(1) Training. 

(2) Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems. 

(3) Well drilling. 

(4) Clearing debris. 

(5) Construction of relief centers and camps for dislocated civilians. 

(6) Sanitation. 

(7) Potable water production and distribution. 

(8) Emergency power and lighting. 

(9) Restoring public facilities and transportation routes. 

(10) Reestablishing rudimentary utilities. 

(11) Support to urban SAR. 

(12) Construction of temporary facilities. 

(13) Specialized underwater services to include clearing of obstacles, survey of 

port facilities, and salvage of vessels. 

d. The level of assistance can vary from limited, highly specialized teams to 

complete engineer units. Limited teams are used to assess damage or estimate 

engineering repairs and can assist in specialized support such as power supply and 

distribution, utilities repair work, water purification, and well drilling operations. In large 

FHA and disaster relief operations, engineer units provide essential general engineering 

support including facility construction, structural repair, and camp construction for 

deployed forces. Initially, US military forces may be the only organization in the JOA 

capable of providing assistance, and military engineers will normally be tasked to provide 

IV-14 JP 3-29 
Execution and Assessment

extensive cleanup and construction services. Requests for military support, including 

engineering support, should be initiated and coordinated through the CMOC. 

For additional information on engineer operations, refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer 

Operations. 

10. Rules of Engagement 

ROE are the directives issued by competent, military authority that delineate the 

circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat 

engagement with other forces encountered. ROE define when and how force may be 

used. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of 

Force for US Forces (classified document), provides ROE that apply to US forces during 

all military operations, unless directed otherwise by SecDef. For each specific 

operation the JFC, in conjunction with the J-3 and the SJA, develops ROE (as soon 

as possible after notification of the deployment) within the framework of the standing 

rules of engagement (SROE). The ROE should specifically address nonlethal force 

options and employment considerations. The proposed JTF ROE must be forwarded to 

the Joint Staff for SecDef review and approval prior to promulgation. In many situations, 

the mission may require specific ROE measures in addition to the basic SROE. 

Supplemental measures in the SROE enable the CDR to obtain or grant those additional 

authorities or restraints necessary to accomplish the mission. The JFC must submit the 

changes through the appropriate approving official. When multinational forces are 

under US control, US CDRs need to ensure that those forces interpret the ROE in 

the same manner as US forces. When multinational forces not under US control are 

involved, US CDRs should request that those forces adopt or agree to ROE similar to or 

compatible with those in effect for US forces. As a minimum, US CDRs must 

understand the differences in the various participating countries’ ROE and the impact on 

operations. 

Appendix A, “Legal Issues,” further discusses ROE. 

11. Legal Considerations 

Many aspects of FHA operations require scrutiny by legal experts. Key members of 

both the planning and operations staffs and SJA should review and assist in preparing 

SOFAs, ROE, OPLANs, OPORDs, and especially any agreements or memoranda of 

understanding established between US forces and the affected country or nonmilitary 

organizations involved in FHA operations. 

12. Liaison 

Direct, early liaison with UN and other humanitarian relief agencies is a 

valuable source of accurate, timely information on many aspects of the crisis area. 

OGA, UN, NGO, or IGO involvement is likely to precede that of US or multinational 

forces and presents an opportunity to enhance early force effectiveness significantly. A 

IV-15 
Chapter IV 

key additional benefit is an opportunity to build working relationships based upon trust 

and open communications among all organizations. For that reason, ongoing liaison 

with other multinational forces participating in the operation is equally important. 

Early in the operation FHA planners should ensure that sufficient, competent linguists be 

available for translation and interpretation requirements by the HN and the multinational 

forces. Regionally aligned CA personnel are well suited for liaison tasks. 

For further details concerning LNOs, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters,

and Field Manual (FM) 5-01.12, Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 5-1B, 

Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 5-02, and Air Force Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures (Instruction) (AFTTP [I]) 3-2.21, JTF LNO Integration, 

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Task Force (JTF) Liaison 

Officer Integration. 

13. Strategic Communication 

a. The USG uses strategic communication (SC) to provide top-down guidance 

relative to using the informational instrument of national power in specific situations. 

SC’s primary communication capabilities are coupled with defense support to public 

diplomacy (DSPD) and military diplomacy activities to implement a holistic SC effort. 

b. Demonstrating US involvement in FHA operations can be extremely valuable to 

the image of the US supporting the achievement of SC goals as well as those of the 

GCC’s SCP. Activities that support SC inform affected populations about on-going 

efforts and assist in achieving JTF objectives. Communication activities are also key in 

achieving strategic objectives in the region by reinforcing themes and messages regarding 

US goodwill evidenced by ongoing FHA operations. Care must be taken not to raise 

expectations about the speed or amount of assistance that may be provided, as US 

involvement in an operation may automatically result in unrealistic expectations of 

assistance among the population. Unrealistic expectations may result in suspicion, 

resentment, and mistrust of HA providers. 

c. Effective coordination and collaboration among all the SC capabilities are 

necessary to ensure unity of effort and consistency in the information being disseminated. 

d. Information Operations. When conducting an FHA mission, generating 

goodwill for the services rendered and departing with a favorable impression of US 

activities becomes a secondary objective. Effective employment of two of the five IO 

core capabilities is important in FHA operations: 

 (1) PSYOP are a vital part of the broad range of US activities to influence 

foreign audiences directly through the use of radio, print, and other media. To be 

effective, peacetime military PSYOP are conducted in accordance with DODD S-3321.1, 

Overt Peacetime Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in 

Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War (U), and require interagency 

coordination and authorization at the national level. 

IV-16 JP 3-29 
Execution and Assessment

 (2) OPSEC. JFCs provide OPSEC guidance and identify command-critical 

information to all supporting commands, subordinate commands, other agencies, and 

appropriate PA offices. JFCs also coordinate OPSEC measures and their execution with 

other commands and agencies of those activities. 

e. Synchronization. Synchronized planning of IO, PA, and DSPD is essential for 

effective SC. Interagency efforts provide and promote international support for nations 

in the region and provide an opportunity to advance our regional and global partnerships. 

JFCs should ensure that their IO, PA, and DSPD planning is consistent with theater 

strategic objectives and overall USG SC objectives. Since PA and IO support the 

dissemination of information themes, and messages to their respective audiences, their 

activities must be closely coordinated and synchronized to ensure consistency and to 

avoid loss of credibility by the joint force and other USG PA spokespersons. 

14. Public Affairs 

"JPASE [joint public affairs support element] teams were an essential part of 

our mission in Pakistan following the earthquake that devastated that country. 

They explained our mission to both Pakistani and International audiences, 

and above all, communicated our commitment to help the people of Pakistan. 

Their ability to get our messages was a top factor in the overall success of 

the mission." 

Rear Admiral Mike LeFever 

Commander, US Navy 

US Disaster Assistance Center Pakistan 

April 2006 

a. Overview. PA should be involved at the first indication of potential FHA 

operations. The ability to disseminate public information via the news media during 

FHA effectively can be critical to operational success. Keeping domestic and 

international audiences informed of US support for FHA can also assist in SC and 

security cooperation goals; however, publicizing assistance efforts should not impede 

relief operations. Coordination with the HN via the country team is critical to ensure 

public information activities do not undermine or conflict with the efforts of the HN. The 

PA staff performs the following functions: 

(1) Provides advice to the CCDR and staff on the public implications of 

potential and actual FHA operations. 

(2) Identifies force structure, equipment and logistics requirements for PA 

support to specific operations. 

(3) Evaluates the need for JPASE support and facilitates requests. 

IV-17 
Chapter IV 

(4) Establishes liaison with PA counterparts (i.e., country team, HN, NGOs, 

IGOs) in the operational area. 

(5) Participates in planning. 

(6) Plans and synchronizes US military public information strategies and 

resources in order to communicate timely, factual, unclassified information about FHA 

operations. 

(7) Provides media support/operates the JIB. 

(8) Conducts analysis and assessment of public communication efforts. 

b. Organization. The size and organization of the PA staff for FHA will depend on 

mission and operational requirements, and the anticipated media interest. Generally, the 

PAO and staff located in the JFC HQ, while the JIB is located in a secure area that is both 

convenient to the media and has good connectivity and access to JFC HQ PA staff. 

There may be existing media centers set up by other agencies with opportunities for 

partnerships. 

c. Public Information. FHA operations generate substantial media interest for 

which the JFC, PAO and staff must be prepared. Mass distribution of information via the 

media is critical to creating public awareness of US and allied, coalition, and partner 

nations’ policies and objectives. Explaining what the US intends to achieve and why it is 

important helps gain public understanding and support for the operation and also counters 

efforts to portray US and partner activities and intentions in a negative light. 

(1) The press will endeavor to get to the scene of relief activities as soon as 

possible and cover operations. Supporting their efforts supports the JFCs public 

information mission. Media should have as much access as possible throughout the 

operation. Information shall be made fully and readily available and shall be withheld 

only when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or 

privacy of the members of the Armed Forces. If access is not available, the media will 

turn to the military for imagery of operations; therefore it is critical that the joint force 

have a robust combat camera capability. Imagery from combat camera should be shared 

throughout the country team when possible. 

(2) The establishment of a JIB at the outset of operations serves as a logistics 

and information base for the press and facilitates media coverage. The JIB staff manages 

media requirements and conducts the following functions: 

(a) Establishes ground rules for press coverage of operations. 

(b) Provides credentials to the media. 

(c) Coordinates media logistics requirements. 

IV-18 JP 3-29 
Execution and Assessment

(d) Escorts media. 

(e) Coordinate PA requirements for combat camera imagery with J-3. 

(f) Provides operational updates. 

(g) Coordinates interview requests. 

(h) Conducts press briefings. 

(i) Collaborates with HN, NGOs, and IGOs on media operations. 

(j) Disseminates news releases. 

(k) Posts information about relief operations on DOD and relief web sites 

as appropriate. 

(l) Provides media training as required. 

(3) In the interest of NGO and IGO safety, permission must be obtained to 

publish their participation. 

d. Command Information Program. Keeping military personnel informed of 

operations is key to their understanding of the mission and the value they place on their 

contribution to operations. At the outset of operations, the PA staff will provide the same 

information being disseminated publicly to the command for internal consumption. A 

more formal command information program may be established if the length of the FHA 

operation warrants and the PA staff is sufficient to support the endeavor. 

e. The JFC and staff should expect and prepare for extensive media coverage during 

FHA operations. Visual media in particular can significantly influence public opinion. 

Positive press coverage serves as a force multiplier; therefore, media coverage of 

improved conditions will help sustain public support and also increase morale. Some 

images may have negative connotations for the media if they are not used to cover FHA 

operations. For example, barbed wire used to maintain a secure area to keep groups of 

dislocated civilians segregated from each other and the local population could be 

perceived as concentration camps by media not familiar with FHA operations. Therefore, 

the reasons and problems associated with this should be explained to the media. 

Refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs, for additional information. 

15. Dislocated Civilians 

a. An FHA operation will often involve dislocated civilians and refugees in 

particular. Dislocated civilian support missions are specific humanitarian missions 

designed to support the repatriation or resettlement of these persons. International law 

IV-19 
Chapter IV 

prohibits the forcible return of refugees to their country of origin or to any country where 

life or freedom would be threatened based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a 

particular social group, or political opinion. The joint force role in providing for and 

protecting these groups will depend on the mission. In rare instances, joint forces may be 

called upon to establish dislocated civilian camps in a HN. In these cases, the JTF must 

take into account: legal considerations regarding availability and ownership of land for 

camps; coordination with the HN, OGAs, UN, NGOs, and IGOs; logistic factors 

connected with shelter, food, sanitation, and medical care; and possible contracting 

requirements for construction. If called upon to establish and operate camps, the joint 

force can refer to Air Force Handbook 10-222, Volume 22, Refugee Camp Planning and 

Construction Handbook, UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies, and Tactics, Techniques, 

and Procedures (TTP) for Migrant Camp Operations as excellent references. The 

general policy of the UN is that where refugees are present, the affected country will 

provide security, safety, assistance, and law and order. Additionally, military forces 

are not normally present in camps run by UNHCR. UNHCR will, upon government 

request, normally provide material assistance and protection to refugees. The ultimate 

goal is to return dislocated civilians to their homes. Although typically involved in the 

early response to a crisis involving dislocated civilians, US forces may be tasked to 

provide any portion of this assistance. Note: The term dislocated civilian is unique to 

DOD and not used by DOS, NGOs, or IGOs. These organizations use the term “IDPs” 

for civilians displaced within their country and “refugee” for people who flee their 

country of origin and cross an international border. See specific definitions below. 

b. The following distinctions exist among the various categories of dislocated 

civilians. 

(1) Displaced persons is a term used to refer to internally and externally 

displaced persons collectively. 

(a) Returnees are displaced persons who have returned voluntarily to their 

former place of residence. 

(b) Resettled persons are a subset of displaced persons – civilians wishing 

to return somewhere other than their previous home or land within the country or area of 

original displacement. 

(2) Evacuees are civilians who are removed from their places of residence by 

military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military 

situation. Note: The term evacuee is unique to DOD and not used by DOS (except for 

NEOs), NGOs, or IGOs. 

(3) IDPs are any persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave 

their home or place of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid 

the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human 

rights or natural or man-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally 

recognized state border. 

IV-20 JP 3-29 
Execution and Assessment

(4) Migrants are persons who, belong to a normally migratory culture who may 

cross national boundaries, or have fled their native country for economic reasons rather 

than fear of political or ethnic persecution. Migrants travel to escape economic 

stagnation and poverty. This is in contrast to refugees, who travel to escape persecution, 

conflict, and perhaps death. 

(5) Refugees are any persons who owing to a well-founded fear of being 

persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 

group or political opinion, are outside the country of their nationality and are unable or, 

owing to such fear, are unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country. It 

is important to understand the differences among refugees and other categories because 

of associated legal ramifications. Refugees are entitled to special protection because they 

can no longer avail themselves of the protection of their country of nationality. (DOS 

provides guidance as to what groups of people are classified as refugees. This 

description is provided as general guidance.) DOD personnel should request specific 

DOS guidance when involved in operations that require the classification of groups of 

displaced persons. 

(6) Stateless persons are civilians who either have been denationalized, whose 

country of origin cannot be determined, or who cannot establish their right to the 

nationality claimed. 

c. While the following are not categories of dislocated civilians, they are categories 

of civilians with whom military members may come in contact in an operational area and 

should be part of this discussion for FHA. 

(1) Trafficking victims are persons subjected to sex trafficking (i.e., 

recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for the purpose 

of a commercial sex act) in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or 

coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of 

age; or the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for 

labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of 

subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery. Simply stated, 

trafficking in persons (TIP) is modern-day slavery, involving victims who are forced, 

defrauded, or coerced into labor or sexual exploitation. 

(a) DOD opposes prostitution, forced labor, and any related activities that 

may contribute to the phenomenon of TIP as inherently harmful and dehumanizing. TIP 

is a violation of US law and internationally recognized human rights and is incompatible 

with DOD core values. 

(b) CDRs should deter activities of DOD Service members, civilian 

employees, indirect hires, contract personnel, and command-sponsored dependents that 

would facilitate or support TIP, domestically and overseas. 

IV-21 
Chapter IV 

(c) CDRs provide support to HN authorities involved in the battle against 

TIP. CDRs and military police should meet periodically with NGOs to review TIPrelated issues and prevention initiatives. 

(d) CDRs incorporate anti-TIP and TIP-protection measures for vulnerable 

populations, in particular for women and children, into post-conflict and humanitarian 

emergency assistance programs. 

(2) Vulnerable persons are persons who may not have equal access to HA 

because of physical, cultural, or social barriers, (e.g., women, children, elderly, disabled, 

ethnic minorities, and people living with an incurable virus or disease). While this is not 

a legal distinction, it is important to describe this population, as it is the most vulnerable 

with often the greatest needs. 

Appendix A, “Legal Issues,” provides additional information regarding the legal aspects 

of dislocated civilians. 

d. PRC assists HN governments in retaining control over their population centers, 

thus precluding complicating problems that may hinder mission accomplishment. PRC 

measures seek to reduce, relocate, or access population resources that may impede or 

otherwise threaten FHA operation success. 

(1) FHA operations can be disrupted by: 

(a) Uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of frightened civilians. 

(b) Uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians conducting 

legitimate activities. 

(c) Illegal or illegitimate activities such as insurgent operations or blackmarket activities. 

(d) Uncontrolled outbreak of disease among dislocated civilians. 

(2) PRC consists of two distinct, yet linked, components: populace control and 

resources control. 

(a) Populace control provides for security of the populace, mobilization of 

human resources, denial of personnel availability to the enemy, and detection and 

reduced effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures include curfews, 

movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and resettlement. Dislocated 

civilian support operations are a subset of populace control. 

(b) Resources control regulates the movement or consumption of materiel 

resources, mobilizes materiel resources, and denies materiel to the enemy. Resources 

IV-22 JP 3-29 
Execution and Assessment

control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints (e.g., 

roadblocks), ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities. 

(3) Normally these controls are a responsibility of indigenous civil 

governments. PRC measures implemented by a joint force are necessary when HN civil 

authorities or agencies are either unable or unwilling to undertake that responsibility. 

They are further defined and enforced during times of civil or military emergency. 

OPERATION SHINING HOPE 

In the spring of 1999, Serbian aggression in the Balkans forced hundreds of 

thousands of ethnic Albanians to flee their homes in Kosovo and seek refuge 

in neighboring countries. US European Command established Joint Task 

Force SHINING HOPE to support refugee humanitarian relief. Planning, 

design, and construction of three camps in southern Albania capable of 

supporting 60,000 refugees began almost immediately. US Air Forces in 

Europe civil engineers, using contractor support through the Air Force 

Contract Augmentation Program and along with US Navy Seabee forces, 

completed one 18,500-person camp in just 51 days with two additional camps 

well underway. Lessons learned from this experience stress the importance 

of early, active, and continuing involvement of the United Nations High 

Commissioner for Refugees, US Agency for International Development, and 

the nongovernmental organizations who will eventually operate the camp. 

This is essential to appropriately balance and incorporate the needs of the 

refugee population to be supported. 

VARIOUS SOURCES 

More detailed information may be found in JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, which 

provides specific guidance on PRC. 

16. Health Service Support 

a. Medical forces typically have three missions in FHA operations: force health 

protection, care for disaster victims, and assisting in reestablishing indigenous public 

health resources and institutions affected by the disaster. Medical planning should be 

integrated into overall response early and prior to deployment. 

b. JFCs have overall responsibility for HSS and force health protection for forces 

assigned or attached to their command. FHA operations may place US forces in 

situations that may substantially increase the risk of disease; food, water, blood products, 

high levels of industrial pollution, stress, fatigue, and indigenous diseases combine to 

provide a high-risk environment for all assigned personnel. This requires that the JTF 

have robust preventive medicine assets to perform medical and environmental health risk 

assessments and identify effective preventive medicine measures to counter the threat to 

US forces. 

IV-23 
Chapter IV 

c. Specific to humanitarian missions, medical forces are usually asked to support 

local military and civilian health systems and often provide direct public health care to 

include primary medical, dental, veterinary, and other needed care. These missions must 

always be coordinated closely with the HN medical authorities, NGOs and IGOs. 

Primary consideration must be given to supporting and supplementing existing medical 

infrastructure. The JFC must ensure that no operation is considered that could have 

the effect of supplanting the existing medical infrastructure. If authorized, US forces 

may also provide health care to foreign civilian populations on an urgent or emergent 

basis (within resource limitations) and return them to their national health systems at the 

earliest opportunity or when services can be provided by other agencies and 

organizations; such operations, however, pose the greatest risk for supplanting the 

existing medical infrastructure. 

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT DURING THE 2005 PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE 

During the Pakistan earthquake relief effort in 2005, two US military medical 

units treated tens of thousands of patients, conducted nearly 500 surgeries, 

and administered over 10,000 immunizations. Following the earthquake, the 

US had its first relief supplies on the ground within 24 hours of the initial 

quake. However, it took 16 days before the first medical unit was fully 

operational. Some assets were not fully operational until 40 days after the 

initial earthquake. 

With no international health specialist or medical planning guidance from 

Combined Disaster Assistance Center – Pakistan (CDAC-PAK), the standard 

of care for the theater was not determined or published until weeks into the 

operation. CDAC-PAK medical units provided a quality of care in excess of the 

pre-earthquake host nation capabilities and, unfortunately, this direct medical 

assistance negatively impacted local economies. 

Without realizing the negative impact that it would have, CDAC-PAK medical 

units continued seeing patients for almost five months after there were no 

more victims with wounds resulting from the earthquake. Free medications 

undermined local pharmacies and created a pharmaceutical black market in 

the local towns. Local physicians and pharmacists lost patients and closed 

their offices/shops and left their local communities due to the presence of the 

no-cost US medical care. 

Source: Condensed from: 

Lt Col William A. Mosier and Walter H. Orthner, 

Military Medical Support for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: 

Lessons Learned From the Pakistan Earthquake Relief Effort 

Joint Center for Operational Analysis Journal, June 2007 

d. Medical personnel may be called on to assist in reestablishing and supporting 

indigenous medical infrastructure, particularly those affected by disaster. Improving the 

medical systems near US and multinational forces fosters self-sufficiency and may 

contribute to accomplishing the US military mission sooner. Care must be taken to 

IV-24 JP 3-29 
Execution and Assessment

ensure that reestablished health care standards are appropriate for the local population 

and at a level that can be maintained by the existing HN medical infrastructure. 

e. US military medical personnel do not routinely care for dislocated civilians unless 

specifically authorized. The joint force surgeon should develop medical engagement 

protocols and standards of care prior to deployment and ensure all providers understand 

the circumstances under which urgent and non-urgent patients should be evaluated, 

evacuated, and treated in military treatment facilities. UNHCR normally coordinates the 

care of refugees by NGOs. 

f. In some FHA missions, HSS may be the primary capability employed. During an 

FHA mission, a hospital or medical command may be the principal unit deployed, and the 

CDR also may be the CJTF. 

For additional considerations for providing HSS in FHA operations, see Appendix E, 

“Health Service Support in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations.”

17. Mortuary Affairs 

a. GCCs are responsible for giving authoritative direction and guidance on providing 

mortuary affairs (MA) support to all assigned and attached forces within their AORs. 

They designate a Service component to serve as the lead Service for the theater MA 

support program at the AOR level and as necessary, designate a lead Service at selected 

subordinate JFC-levels and assign responsibilities, tasks, assets, and organize commands 

as necessary to execute the lead Service MA mission. GCCs assume lead responsibility 

and coordination for fatalities occurring within the command’s AOR and assign tasks, 

assets, and organize commands as necessary to execute the MA mission. They establish 

a joint mortuary affairs office (JMAO) to provide oversight of MA support within their 

AOR and provide MA support to other combatant commands when appropriate. It is the 

responsibility of unit CDRs sustaining losses to recover the human remains and evacuate 

them to the nearest MA collection point. Every effort will be made to identify human 

remains and account for unrecovered human remains of US military personnel, 

government employees, government contractors, their dependents, and others who die in 

military operations, training accidents, and other multiple fatality incidents. 

More detailed information may be found in JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint 

Operations. 

b. Upon notification of a FHA mission, the responsible GCC should task the J-4 to 

develop a staff estimate and provide planning guidance for MA operations based on the 

overall mission analysis and COAs. During the analysis phase, the staff officer should 

contact the J-4 of the Joint Staff to determine if any cooperation agreements exist 

between the supported foreign government and multinational partners. During this phase, 

the GCC’s J-4 logistic planners should coordinate with subordinate and supporting 

commands to determine their MA force structure and capabilities. 

IV-25 
Chapter IV 

c. Joint Task Force-Mortuary Affairs Office (JTF-MAO). If determined 

necessary, the GCC may delegate MA support authority to the subordinate JFC which 

will allow the CDR to designate a lead Service component (usually the Army) to handle 

MA for the command. Additionally, the subordinate JFC (i.e., CJTF) may direct the J-4 

to establish and operate a JTF-MAO. If established, the JTF-MAO should: 

(1) Provide guidance to facilitate the conduct of MA programs. 

(2) Maintain data pertaining to the recovery, identification, and disposition of 

all US deceased and missing in the designated operational area. 

(3) Serve as an MA liaison between the CJTF, the Service component MA 

offices, and the theater JMAO. 

(4) Serve as the central clearing point for MA-related information. 

(5) Monitor the deceased and missing personnel personal effects program. 

(6) Perform planning, execution, technical, and management functions. 

(7) Develop/disseminate standards/procedures and collect/present MA 

management statistical data. 

(8) Assist in developing appendix 3 (Mortuary Affairs) to annex D, (Logistics) 

to plans and orders, providing the overall concept of mortuary support to the operation (in 

close coordination with the combatant command JMAO). This appendix should be 

developed using the format in CJCSM 3122.03B, Joint Operation Planning and 

Execution System (JOPES) Volume II, Planning Formats. In addition to procedures for 

handling indigenous deceased, this appendix should include procedures for search, 

recovery, and evacuation of all JTF personnel. 

d. Considerations

(1) In general terms, legal obligations depend on whether the JTF is dealing 

with a deceased that was simply found within the operational area or if the death was 

associated with JTF actions. The JTF’s obligations concerning dead or buried bodies 

found in the operational area derive from the CDR’s responsibility for health and public 

hygiene of US forces. An example of this is contamination of water supplies from mass 

graves, or bodies washed from shallow graves, constituting a health hazard. In this 

consideration, reinterment should be facilitated. Reinterment of remains should be 

conducted following local religion and culture to the extent possible. Sufficient 

information must be maintained to identify burial sites and, where possible, the names of 

persons reinterred. Upon termination of reinterment operations, records should be turned 

over to the affected country government representatives. The death of a person 

associated with JTF actions requires an in-depth investigation. Processing of these 

remains will be in accordance with guidance provided by the SJA. Deaths of persons 

IV-26 JP 3-29 
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under the care of the JTF, such as dislocated civilians seeking help at a site under JTF 

control, create other obligations, such as medical certification and recording of death. In 

countries where a governmental infrastructure is in place, death records should be 

registered with that government. Where there is no government, the JTF should maintain 

appropriate records for later disposition. The JTF-MAO is responsible for maintaining 

these records. 

(2) In a FCM or nonpermissive situation, casualties may have died as a result of 

infectious or weaponized agents, or might be booby-trapped, regardless of the apparent 

cause of death. In order to prevent further casualties among those caring for the 

deceased, mortuary facilities should be designed with these possibilities taken into 

account when planning for casualty flow procedures. 

(3) The JTF should attempt to coordinate with the International Red Cross and 

Red Crescent Movement for the return of deceased local nationals to local governmental 

control. These organizations can provide invaluable assistance in locating the next of kin 

of the deceased. 

(4) Multinational partners and other non-US dead will be processed in 

accordance with international agreements or guidance from the supported CCDR. In 

cases of foreign nationals or relief organizations requesting MA support, the JTF-MAO 

will coordinate with the DOS representative through the CMOC or HOC in the affected 

area. 

18. Religious Support 

a. Religious support in joint operations includes the entire range of professional 

duties a joint force chaplain (JFCH) performs in the dual role of religious leader and staff 

officer. Religious support is dedicated to meeting the personal, free exercise of religion 

needs of members of the joint force and providing CDRs with professional advice 

regarding the dynamic influence of religion and religious beliefs. Military CDRs are 

responsible to provide opportunity for the free exercise of religion. 

b. Religion may play a pivotal role in understanding the culture, requirements, 

attitude, and desires of a population and its government and may have a significant 

impact on the goals, objectives, nature of support, and CONOPS for the FHA operation. 

c. By recognizing the significance of religion, cultural sensitivities and ideology 

held by the local population, allies, coalition partners, and potential adversaries, CDRs 

may avoid unintentionally alienating friendly military forces or civilian populations 

which could hamper military operations. CDRs and their staffs may also consider 

religion, other cultural issues, and ideology while developing schemes of maneuver and 

ROE or planning CMO, PSYOP, IO, and PA activities. CDRs must weigh the benefit of 

working with organizations that provide conditional aid vis-à-vis the risk of alienating the 

population. 

IV-27 
Chapter IV 

d. Chaplain involvement during the planning process ensures that the religious needs 

of US forces are met. The JFCHs may assist the staff in developing an engagement 

strategy by providing advice within the scope of their expertise on these organizations 

and the influence of religion in the operational area. In a religiously diverse operational 

area, the JFCHs may provide relevant information on the religions of multinational 

partners and the adversary, which includes issues of national, regional, and sect or group 

religious customs, traditions, organizations, communities, symbols, facilities, and 

sensitivities. 

e. When appropriate, and in coordination with the CMOC, chaplains may serve as 

liaison to NGOs that have a religious affiliation. The USG supports faith-based 

organizations, but USG policy strictly states that USG assistance must be distributed 

based on need, not based on religious affiliation or for the purpose of influencing the 

religious beliefs of a population. Reports of USG assistance being distributed in violation 

of this policy should be reported to the embassy, DOS, and/or USAID. Additionally, 

chaplains may accompany elements of the joint force as they distribute relief supplies or 

have other interactions (e.g., security patrols) with the local populace. This provides an 

opportunity to expand or enhance community outreach and allows the chaplain to 

evaluate and experience first hand the operational environment and its impact on the 

morale of the unit and individual service members. This experience will be useful when 

advising the CDR and counseling those members of the joint force that may seek the 

chaplain’s advice. 

f. In coordination with CA personnel, chaplains may provide pastoral support to 

dislocated civilians only when directed by the JFC after consulting the SJA. In such 

cases, it is critical to avoid any activities which may be construed as proselytizing among 

dislocated civilians for one particular faith. The chaplain pastoral mission generally is 

limited to US military and DOD civilian personnel and, if required by the circumstances, 

to fulfill any obligation the JFC may have to protected persons under international law. 

For more detailed information on religious support, refer to JP 1-05, Religious Support 

in Joint Operations. 

19. Environmental Considerations 

a. Environmental issues can have strategic, operational, or tactical implications and 

thus should be incorporated into planning and operations. Natural resources protection 

can be a key strategic mission objective, important to HN reconstruction. Failure to 

recognize environmental threats can result in significant health risks to the JTF, adversely 

impacting readiness. If not appropriately addressed, environmental issues have the 

potential to impact negatively local community relations, affect insurgent activities, and 

create diplomatic problems for the JTF. 

b. Joint Environmental Management Board (JEMB). The CCDR or subordinate 

JFC may establish a JEMB to assist in managing environmental requirements. The 

JEMB is a temporary board, chaired by the combatant command or subordinate joint 

IV-28 JP 3-29 
Execution and Assessment

force engineer, with members from the joint force staff, components, and any other 

required special activities (e.g., legal, medical, and CA). The board establishes policies, 

procedures, priorities, and the overall direction for environmental management 

requirements in a JOA. The JEMB will coordinate its activities with the combatant 

command or subordinate joint force engineering staff. The JEMB also provides guidance 

on development of annex L, (Environmental Considerations) of plans and orders, and, if 

appropriate, assumes responsibility for preparation and updates of this annex. 

c. Environmental Support Operations. The intent of environmental support 

operations is to minimize adverse environmental impact, ensure the safety and health of 

personnel, and reduce post-deployment environmental cleanup. While deployed 

engineering units may have the capability to provide environmental support, the use of 

contractors is usually required for long-term or large-scale projects. Typical 

environmental support operations include: 

(1) Initial environmental baseline surveys. 

(2) Site surveys to determine environmental and cultural conditions. 

(3) Integration of environmental considerations into plans. 

(4) Recommendations for nontoxic, environmentally benign material 

substitution. 

(5) Emergency response plans, training and initial actions. 

(6) Establishment of solid and liquid waste disposal systems. 

(7) Establishment of hazardous materials distribution centers. 

(8) Establishment of hazardous waste collection, long-term storage, and 

shipment center. 

(9) Sampling of water sources for contaminates. 

(10) Closure environmental baseline surveys and removal of wastes and excess 

supplies. 

For additional information on environmental considerations, refer to Appendix D, 

“Environmental Considerations,” in JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations. 

20. Foreign Consequence Management 

a. FCM is assistance provided by the USG to a HN to assist friends and allies to 

assess and respond to a CBRN incident in order to mitigate human casualties and to 

provide temporary associated essential services. 

IV-29 
Chapter IV 

b. The JFC responsible for FCM focuses on mitigating the consequences of the 

CBRN incident. Understanding the effects of CBRN on the populace and the 

infrastructure is essential for the JFC to apply the right resources at the right time. Even 

prior to being formally tasked to assist, the JFC should strive to develop full situational 

awareness with respect to the incident’s cause to understand the event’s impact better and 

to prevent further injury or harm to the civilian populace or the responding joint force. 

In suspected or known adversary attacks, situational awareness is especially important for 

force protection consideration and to assess possible concurrent operation requirements 

such as disaster relief. Situational awareness may be gained through the deployment of a 

survey and assessment team (SAT) to the US embassy of the affected nation. 

c. Primary responsibility for FCM rests with the HN, unless otherwise stipulated 

under relevant international agreements or arrangements. Unless otherwise directed by 

the President, the DOS is the LFA for USG FCM operations and is responsible for 

coordinating the overall USG FCM response. When requested by the LFA and directed 

by SecDef, DOD will support USG FCM operations as appropriate. The response may 

include a number of USG agencies with specialized capabilities, in addition to forces 

provided by DOD. The ability of the USG to assist a HN government and its affected 

population is determined by the nature of the CBRN event, the forces available to provide 

assistance, and the time required to deploy to the vicinity of the incident. Rapid FCM 

assistance and coordination is directly proportional to the success in mitigating the effects 

of the CBRN incident. 

d. DOD support to USG FCM operations is a series of coordinated efforts in 

response to requests from the LFA to support a HN. FCM may require specialized 

capabilities to include but not limited to hazardous materials handling, decontamination, 

urban SAR, public health and medical care, and public notification efforts beyond the 

scope or scale of traditional disaster relief efforts to manage the impacts of CBRN 

hazards. Additionally, DOD, through the supported CCDR, will provide representation 

to the DOS-led FEST/CM support team to support USG FCM operations, as requested by 

the DOS and directed by SecDef. DOD will retain C2 of all DOD assets (personnel, 

infrastructure, and equipment) supporting the LFA in USG FCM operations. 

e. Foreign Consequence Management Operations

(1) USG and national agencies, allied nations’ military and civilian agencies, 

IGOs, and NGOs perform roles in FCM operations, if requested by the HN. While each 

entity might maintain a unique capability, coordination of requested assistance and the 

overall response effort is the responsibility of the HN. The DOS retains responsibility for 

coordination among USG entities. 

(2) Generally, FCM operations will not be conducted during hostile action; 

however, situations may arise where FCM may be required at the request and in support 

of the HN. For example, insurgents commit CBRN incidents against a new government. 

The new government may request response assistance from US and multinational forces. 

IV-30 JP 3-29 
Execution and Assessment

The USG may direct the US military to secure the area around the incident to establish 

the most permissive environment possible to facilitate coordinated response efforts. 

(3) Immediate Response. When conditions resulting from any emergency or 

attack require immediate action, local military CDRs may take such actions as necessary 

to save lives. When such compelling conditions exist and time does not permit prior 

approval from higher HQ, CDRs or officials acting under the “immediate response 

authority” may take necessary action to respond to requests from local HN authorities or 

the COM. They must advise higher HQ of assistance being provided by the most 

expeditious means available, and seek approval or additional authorizations as needed. 

The GCC will notify the affected COM at the time of higher HQ notification. Activities 

conducted under immediate response authority are not considered FCM operations, 

however, the JFC responsible for the FCM operation should consider the further 

utilization of forces providing assistance under immediate response authority. 

f. Foreign Consequence Management Planning Considerations

(1) FCM plans should include support related to essential services and activities 

required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes. 

Such services may include transportation, communications, CBRN reconnaissance, 

public works, fire-fighting, information planning, care of mass casualties, resources 

support, essential and routine health and medical services, urban SAR, hazardous 

materials mitigation, food preparation and distribution, and energy generation and 

distribution. Additionally, FCM response may require specialized hazard material 

handling, and decontamination planning efforts to enhance foreign disaster relief efforts. 

(2) US forces will conduct FCM operations in support of the LFA, to mitigate 

the effects of a CBRN incident in the HN. All DOD support to the HN will be 

coordinated by DOS through the responsible COM and country team. The DOD 

recognizes that FCM operations may involve military assets and these assets may be the 

earliest USG assistance to arrive and may constitute the largest USG contribution. 

Additionally military assets deployed initially for FCM activities may be directed by the 

President or SecDef to remain in support of FHA tasks under separate authorities. 

g. Foreign Consequence Management Phases. FCM operations are composed of 

five phases and are scoped by tasks to be accomplished. The phases, while sequential, 

may overlap in execution. Prior to an FCM event and during Phase 0 (Shaping), DOD is 

organized, trained, equipped, and prepared to support USG efforts in a FCM 

environment. Engagement and interagency coordination are key tasks of this phase as 

plans development and constant monitoring for a developing crisis. The DOD will assist 

DOS in shaping the environment through theater security cooperation, IO, and support to 

DOS efforts in an effort to prevent or avert a CBRN incident. 

(1) Phase I (Situation Assessment and Preparation). Transition to Phase I 

occurs on reliable indications and warnings of a CBRN event or upon notification an 

event has occurred. Phase I includes those actions required to conduct situation 

IV-31 
Chapter IV 

assessment and preparation, including the timely and accurate assessment of the CBRN 

situation, preparation for deployment and the deployment of selected advance elements. 

This may include, but is not limited to the GCC’s SAT. Phase I ends when the nature and 

scope of the CBRN situation and initial response force requirements are defined. 

Additionally, any limited initial response to a CBRN incident conducted by DOD CDRs 

operating under immediate response authority would likely occur during Phase I. 

(2) Phase II (Deployment). Phase II begins with SecDef approved CJCS 

deployment or execute order designating the intermediate and forward staging bases and 

establishing formal command relationships (i.e., supported and supporting CDRs). The 

order serves as the formal authority for the deployment of forces. Phase II ends when all 

forces have completed movement to the designated incident location and supporting 

locations. 

(3) Phase III (Assistance to HN Authorities). Phase III begins with the arrival 

of required military assistance at the incident location and supporting locations and ends 

with the determination that DOD support is no longer required or appropriate. CDRs 

begin planning immediately for transition to HN and civilian agencies, including USG, 

other governments, donors and NGOs, and should identify the necessary or minimum 

conditions to initiate transition to other agencies. 

(4) Phase IV (Transition to HN and Other Agencies). Although planning for 

transition of FCM begins as soon as practical following the initial response, Phase IV 

begins with the formal implementation of the transition plan for those tasks and 

responsibilities being accomplished by DOD and ends when directed by SecDef or HN 

has assumed full responsibility for CM activities. 

(5) Phase V (Redeployment). Phase V begins with the redeployment of US 

military forces involved in the FCM operations, or the formal transition of those forces to 

a purely FHA mission. Phase V is complete when all forces have returned to their 

previous military posture, or other missions. 

For more detailed information on FCM, see CJCSI 3214.01C, Military Support to 

Foreign Consequence Management Operations for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

Nuclear Incidents, and JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, 

and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management, and Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency, Foreign Consequence Management Legal Deskbook: 

http://www.dtra.mil/documents/newsservices/deskbook/pdf/FCMLegalDeskbook.pdf. 

21. Change of Mission 

Periodic review of the mission statement will determine whether the force’s 

actions still support SecDef and supported GCC’s intent. The JFC must be prepared 

to react to a change of mission during an FHA operation, as directed by the chain of 

command. The JFC must also guard against an unintentional change of mission, 

sometimes referred to as “mission creep.” A clearly articulated end state and 

IV-32 JP 3-29 
Execution and Assessment

appropriate MOEs help the JFC protect against this phenomenon. Other organizations 

involved in the operation may have differing views of the end state, and request support 

from the joint force that falls outside the stated mission. Although these requests may 

seem logical and within the joint force’s capabilities, the JFC must be pragmatic when 

dealing with these organizations’ attempts to change the joint force’s mission without 

SecDef direction. 

22. Transition or Termination 

a. The termination of military FHA operations will normally involve a 

transition of relief activities to US, intergovernmental, or HN relief organizations. 

Termination occurs when the relief efforts have been successfully transitioned or 

when the SecDef directs. Planning for transition should be incorporated as early as 

possible in all aspects of operational planning for FHA. 

b. Criteria for transition may be based on events, MOEs, availability of resources, 

or a specific date. Examples of events that may be included in termination criteria 

include: restoration of critical facilities in the crisis area; an acceptable drop in mortality 

rates; or a certain percentage of dislocated civilians returned to their homes. When other 

organizations (such as OFDA, UN, NGOs, and IGOs) have marshalled the necessary 

capabilities to assume the mission, US forces may execute a transition plan. 

c. Transition may occur between the joint force and a variety of elements, such 

as the HN, the UN, or other nations’ forces. A detailed plan addressing the various FHA 

functions and to whom they will transition will greatly reduce the turmoil typically 

associated with transition. A comprehensive transition plan includes specific 

requirements for all elements involved in the transition, summarizes capabilities and 

assets, and assigns specific responsibilities. When transitioning to nonmilitary 

organizations, an unclassified transition plan written in easily understood terms, not 

loaded with military jargon, is required. Organizing the plan by specific FHA functions, 

humanitarian clusters or sectors (such as provision of food, restoration of facilities, and 

medical care) also enhance the transition. The joint force staff should periodically 

review the transition plan with all organizations that have a part in it. This will help 

ensure that planning assumptions are still valid, and determine if changes in the situation 

require changes in the transition plan. 

d. Termination plans should cover transition to post-disaster or emergency activities 

and conditions as well as disposition of military forces. Operation and termination plans 

should be prepared simultaneously and in conjunction with the deployment plan, with the 

termination plan serving as a supporting plan to the OPLAN. 

e. Mission transition planning will be continuous and will be accorded equal 

priority with execution planning. At the outset, the joint force will work in close 

cooperation with the HN and other participating agencies to define the desired end state 

of the involvement of US military forces in these FHA and disaster relief operations. 

Universally understood and accepted MOEs will be developed that indicate achievement 

IV-33 
Chapter IV 

of each element of the end state and provide the basis for timely and orderly 

redeployment of the joint force, while preserving continuity in the long-term relief 

operations. 

f. Concept of Transition. Mission transition planning will be continuous 

throughout the operation. Specifically, it identifies the functions and tasks being 

performed by the joint force and determines which functions may be terminated when 

either the requirement no longer exists or is transferred to the HN or others. The 

transition plan consists of four phases: Phase A – Assessment, Phase B – Observation 

and Orientation, Phase C – Integration and Phase D – Handover. 

g. Phasing the Transition 

(1) Phase A — Assessment

(a) Concept. The assessment phase consists of a review of the functional 

tasks being performed by the joint force and determines whether these tasks can be 

terminated or transferred. This process is conducted in conjunction with, and with the 

concurrence of, the DOS through the COM. This phase also identifies the organizations 

and agencies (e.g., HN, NGOs, IGOs), most capable and willing to assume the functional 

tasks performed by the joint force. This phase is complete when all functional tasks have 

been identified for either transfer or termination and the HN, NGOs, and IGOs have been 

identified and accept responsibility for performing that functional responsibility. 

(b) Intent. The purpose of this phase is to review the functional tasks 

performed by the joint force and determine which long-term tasks will be handled by the 

HN, NGOs, and IGOs. The method is to identify functional tasks for either transition or 

termination. Once determined for transition, the appropriate HN agency, NGO, or IGO is 

identified to assume that functional responsibility. The end state is achieved once the 

long-term transfer tasks have been identified and affiliated with the agency or 

organization willing to accept responsibility. 

(2) Phase B — Observation and Orientation

(a) Concept. This phase builds on the analysis and agreements obtained in 

Phase A. The organizations identified for transfer duties will observe the functional tasks 

that the joint force is currently performing. The objective is to accomplish a seamless 

transfer of functional tasks from the joint force to transfer organizations without any loss 

of support or international commitment. This phase is complete when transfer 

organizations have their required assets in place in accordance with the timeliness 

previously agreed upon. Care should be taken during this phase to ensure that the 

nonmilitary audiences involved do not perceive joint force efforts as a way to impose 

military procedures on their own time-tested approaches. In some cases, joint force 

elements may be performing civilian tasks because of a lack of civilian resources. 

IV-34 JP 3-29 
Execution and Assessment

(b) Intent. The purpose of this phase is to orient and familiarize transfer 

organizations with the functional tasks being performed by the joint force. When 

necessary for use, the method is to educate, orient, and train or familiarize the HN, NGO, 

and IGO leadership on the functional tasks and methods employed by the joint force. 

The end state is the alignment of the HN or appropriate NGO or IGO with the component 

of the joint force currently performing the assigned function. 

(3) Phase C — Integration

(a) Concept. Integration is defined by participation of the HN, NGOs, or 

IGOs in functional tasks supporting the HN, not by the integration of the HN, NGOs and 

IGOs into the joint force. The integration phase initiates the direct involvement of the 

HN, NGOs, IGOs in the functional tasks being performed by the joint force that will 

require long-term continuation. The objective is to increase HN, NGO, and IGO levels of 

support (within their capabilities) until they assume full responsibility for the functional 

support. Progress is quantified by the percentage of functional task support provided by 

each agency over time. This phase incrementally increases the level of involvement by 

the HN, NGOs, or IGOs while proportionately decreasing the level of involvement by the 

JTF. The use of universally understood and mutually accepted MOEs will facilitate 

integration of the HN, NGOs, and IGOs by building mutual support for the functional 

tasks. This phase ends when all functional elements performed by the joint force are 

capable of being transferred to properly trained, equipped, and capable organizations. 

(b) Intent. The purpose of this phase is to initiate and progressively 

increase the level of support provided by the HN, NGOs, and IGOs until they are capable 

of sustained operations in a designated cluster or humanitarian sector. Critical to this 

integration is the continual monitoring of the MOEs to ensure no lag or loss of support to 

the HN. The method is to progressively increase levels of HN, NGO, and IGO 

involvement in performing joint force-run functional tasks. The end state is realized 

when all functional tasks are being performed by non-joint force organizations, fully 

trained, equipped, and capable of performing sustained operations. 

(4) Phase D — Hand Over

(a) Concept. The hand over phase culminates with the end of joint force 

direct involvement in humanitarian support to the HN. The objective is a seamless 

transfer of responsibility for functional tasks from the joint force to the HN, NGOs, and 

IGOs. These organizations must also be fully trained, equipped, and capable of assuming 

their functional tasks over the long term. These organizations must also be perceived by 

the public as being credible and capable of performing their designated functional tasks. 

Progress is marked by the hand over of specified functional tasks to non-joint force 

organizations. This phase ends when all functional areas performed by the joint force 

have been successfully assumed by either the HN, NGOs, or IGOs. 

(b) Intent. The purpose of this phase is to hand over all functional tasks 

performed by the joint force to either the HN, NGOs, or IGOs. The method is to train 

IV-35 
Chapter IV 

capable HN agencies, NGOs, and IGOs, incrementally increase their involvement, then 

disengage when they reach a mission-capable state. The end state is realized when all 

functional tasks are being performed by non-joint force organizations without the 

presence of the joint force. 

h. Incremental Transition. While the four phase transition model may be 

appropriate in most FHA operations, the operational environment may drive a more 

incremental transition. A gradual transition may occur with a shrinking military footprint 

across both geographical areas and humanitarian clusters. 

OPERATION UNIFIED ASSISTANCE: TSUNAMI TRANSITIONS 

Military-to-civilian transition planning was challenging, and determining 

when military assistance was sufficient and complete was particularly 

difficult. Because of the unfamiliar operating environment, deciding when 

to transition relief efforts from military to civilian forces initially boggled 

military planners’ minds. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and 

Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) participation in the planning 

process was particularly valuable. NGO and IGO representatives were 

impressed that we were developing a transition plan early in the 

operation. Planning for transition involved two steps: mission analysis 

and course of action (COA) development. 

Mission analysis. The transition was actually a continuous operation, 

moving from military assistance to international response efforts to a final 

long-term host nation (HN) effort. The United Nations (UN) representative 

emphasized that the transition would not move from a well-defined 

military structure to a well-defined, centrally controlled civilian structure, 

but more likely flow outward from the military structure to numerous 

NGOs and IGOs and HN governments. The transition would be quite 

different from the usual battle handover familiar to military planners and 

not at all like the detailed process joint doctrine describes. The UN 

planner recommended transferring stored supplies to other organizations 

for distribution (to prevent waste) and identifying incomplete tasks to be 

handed over on transition. Two transitions occurred, one from military to 

international assets and the other from international to HN assets. The 

handovers occurred not at specific times, but in windows or periods of 

transition during which relief providers performed simultaneous, 

overlapping missions in their areas of operation. HN approval of the 

transition plan was also critical. 

COA development. While mission analysis went fairly smoothly, the 

Combined Support Force (CSF) had a difficult time formulating COAs. 

COA development for a transition that was somewhat ambiguous led 

planners to develop just one COA—a rough list of tasks for the 

subordinate elements to complete or pass on to other agencies as the 

CSF slowly shrank and eventually redeployed. The transition occurred in 

three phases: assessment, transition, and disengagement. Identifying the 

desired effects for the transition and then developing a process to 

IV-36 JP 3-29 
Execution and Assessment

measure the CSF’s progress were critical steps in determining when the 

transition could begin. CSF commanders did not develop an effects list 

because they did not want to commit the force to effects that might 

eventually prove to be unrealistic or too costly. The CSF bogged down 

in discussion because there were too many different sets of standards 

(e.g., Sphere, number of requests for assistance [RFAs]) that could be 

applied. The CSF directed that the military footprint would slowly 

shrink when RFAs for military assistance decreased or were passed to 

aid agencies. 

The end of military operations does not mean the end of relief 

operations; it only means that civilians are in control. The CSF was able 

to leverage into its transition plan the wealth of knowledge and 

experience NGO and IGO aid workers and partner nations brought to 

the operation. In the end, gaining civilian and partner-nation 

perspectives on the transition plan was key to the CSF’s successful 

transition and redeployment. 

Source: Adapted from 

Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE: Tsunami Transitions 

Lieutenant Colonel James Daniel, US Army 

January-February 2006, Military Review

23. Redeployment 

Redeployment planning should be conducted simultaneously with joint force 

deployment. Redeployment considerations depend upon mission accomplishment and 

diminished requirements for military support. FHA functions conducted by the joint 

force should be transferred to the HN, UN, NGOs, or IGOs when the capability exists for 

transition without support degradation. Redeployment by function is efficient and 

ensures that each FHA requirement is met or responsibility is assumed by other 

entities (HN, UN, NGOs, or IGOs). CDRs should continually evaluate mission 

requirements and redeploy unnecessary forces as soon as possible. Personnel rotation 

plans should also be considered for operations conducted over extended time periods. 

OPERATION UNIFIED ASSISTANCE REDEPLOYMENT 

What was noted on several occasions was also the duration of stay – military 

forces came in, performed their tasks and departed – thus fulfilling one maxim 

for perceived success - “leave whilst the audience is still applauding.” 

Source: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 

Coordination of International 

Humanitarian Assistance in TsunamiAffected Countries Evaluation 

Findings - Sri Lanka - 

IV-37 
Chapter IV 

IV-38 JP 3-29 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX A

LEGAL ISSUES 

 

Annex A Humanitarian Principles in the Law Of War 

1. General 

Significant and complex legal issues that surround FHA operations make it important 

that the JFC understand international and domestic legal principles associated with the 

mission. Issues involving international law include the law of war, the law of the sea, the 

status of persons encountered during the mission, ROE, and HN law while domestic legal 

issues include such subjects as fiscal law, military justice, claims, and intelligence 

oversight. These topics are discussed in this appendix. CDRs should consult their SJA 

on addressing these complex and interrelated issues. 

2. Law of War 

DOD policy is to apply law of war principles in every military operation, regardless 

of how that operation is characterized in accordance with DODD 2311.01E, DOD Law of 

War Program. In the context of FHA, perhaps the most important principle is the duty to 

“respect and protect” civilians and other noncombatants. Thus, responsibilities 

associated with armed conflict that may directly influence FHA operations include 

physical care for civilians and other noncombatants, property issues, and law 

enforcement responsibilities. Law of war principles for the treatment of civilians and 

other noncombatants should be considered as minimum standards, regardless of the 

nature of the operation or level of conflict. However, the laws and rules under which 

FHA forces operate may be significantly more restrictive than law of war standards, 

particularly relating to the use of force and combatant immunity for military personnel. 

Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 1-14M, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of 

Naval Operations, Operational Law Handbook, Air Force Handbook 10-222 Volume 22, 

Refugee Camp Planning and Execution Guide, and FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare,

provide detailed guidance for many of these issues. Annex A, “Humanitarian Principles 

in the Law of War,” to this appendix provides a brief synopsis of the basic concepts of the 

law of war. 

3. Laws and Jurisdictions of Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Forces and the 

Host Nation 

Members of FHA forces remain subject to national laws, policies, and regulations of 

their own nations, including military criminal codes. All US military personnel remain 

subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. JFCs are responsible for the discipline 

and administration of personnel assigned to the joint organization, and may be delegated 

courts-martial authority by the SecDef. In addition, a CCDR may prescribe procedures 

by which the senior officer of a Service assigned to the HQ element of a joint 

organization may exercise administrative and nonjudicial punishment authority over 

personnel of the same Service assigned to the same joint organization. CDRs have only 

limited administrative and disciplinary options for civilians who accompany the FHA 

A-1 
Appendix A 

force, which may result in difficult issues relating to both HN law and good order and 

discipline within the force. Absent international agreement provisions to the contrary, 

members of FHA forces both military and civilian, and activities of the FHA force, are 

most likely subject to HN law and jurisdiction. For example, the FHA force might be 

subject to HN import laws; duties and taxes; procurement laws; prohibitions or 

restrictions on carrying and use of weapons; and health, safety, and labor laws. Members 

of the FHA force are subject to actions in HN criminal and civil courts, unless a SOFA or 

other international agreement limits HN jurisdiction. 

More detailed information may be found in JP1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the 

United States, and the Manual for Courts-Martial. 

4. Status-of-Forces Agreements 

A SOFA defines the legal status of a military force when deployed in the territory of 

a friendly state. A SOFA does not itself authorize the presence or activities of those 

forces. The purpose of a SOFA during FHA operations is to define how the sending and 

receiving states will share their sovereign prerogatives. SOFAs seek to define the rights, 

immunities, and duties of the force and its members. If no treaty or SOFA exists with the 

affected country, DOD must become involved in establishing the status of US forces. 

Authority to negotiate and conclude SOFAs must be obtained from DOS under its 

Circular 175 Procedure (US Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual, Volume 11—

Political Affairs, chapter 720). These agreements/arrangements should be in place in 

each country where forces will transit and or stage in support of FHA operations. In 

cases where time or circumstances do not permit the negotiation of a full SOFA, adequate 

protection for US forces may be obtained by an exchange of diplomatic notes between 

the United States and the HN. The DOS will have the lead for this action. 

DODD 5530.3, International Agreements, provides guidance regarding the negotiation 

and conclusion of SOFAs and the DOD Electronic Foreign Clearance Guide provides 

current requirements for DOD personnel to enter and exit each nation.

5. Legal Status of United Nations Staff and Volunteers 

UN staff members are entitled to legal protection under the 1946 Convention on 

Privileges and Immunities of the UN. This provides protection from the criminal and 

civil jurisdiction of the HN, and some other HN laws. When supporting a UN mission, 

US personnel might be entitled to expert-on-mission status, with some protection under 

the convention. United Nations volunteers (UNVs) are not UN “staff” members and as 

such are not subject to UN staff rules and regulations. These are persons performing 

functions or assignments for the UN under a contract of employment and are considered 

“agents” of the UN. UNVs are immune from legal process for their official acts. The 

UNDP resident representative is responsible for all arrangements relating to the security 

and protection of UNVs under the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 

Associated Personnel. 

A-2 JP 3-29 
Legal Issues 

6. Legal Status of Nongovernmental Organizations 

No legal regime governs the status and activities of NGOs. They are generally 

subject to HN laws and jurisdiction. Except for a regionally oriented Convention of the 

Council of Europe, no international treaty grants NGOs legal personality or authority. 

NGOs may have a national, legal status corresponding to the country in which each was 

established and is recognized. Their national government may be a source of protection 

for them and their personnel. 

7. International Human Rights Law 

Human rights law is the principal source of international law that obligates 

governments to recognize and protect fundamental rights of people within the territory or 

control of the government. Customary, international law, multinational treaties such as 

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and regional treaties provide a 

broad framework of protections for individuals. This body of law guarantees a series of 

rights applicable to situations experienced by victims of natural or man-made disasters. 

These vary from negative rights (e.g., that no one shall be subjected to torture, arbitrary 

interference with family, home, or privacy, or arbitrary property deprivation) to 

affirmative rights, such as an adequate standard of living, liberty, and personal security. 

CDRs should be aware that interpretations of human rights law vary from country to 

country. For example, countries who are parties to the European Convention on Human 

Rights have a body of human rights law that may oblige its forces to react differently than 

US forces in a particular situation. 

8. Internally Displaced Persons 

In the absence of specific treaties, human rights law is the principal source of 

protection for IDPs. Unlike refugee law, which only applies when victims cross a 

country’s border, human rights law proclaims broad guarantees for the fundamental rights 

of all persons. Although human rights law provides a basis for protecting and assisting 

IDPs, it does not address some situations such as forcible displacement and lack of access 

to HA. During armed conflict, the law of war applies for protection of IDPs. The 

Geneva Conventions reaffirm that during armed conflict those not directly participating 

in the hostilities shall be treated humanely. Violence, hostage-taking, and outrages upon 

the dignity of noncombatants are prohibited. As noted previously, the United States 

applies these principles to all military operations, including FHA. Additionally, Protocol 

II to the Geneva Conventions provides that forced civilian displacement during internal 

armed conflicts may be undertaken legally only when the civilian’s safety or military 

necessity require it. If civilians have to be moved for either of these two reasons, their 

evacuations must be under protected, hygienic, and humane conditions. (Note: The 

United States is not a signatory to Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.) Relevant 

factors that may be used in classifying IDPs include external aggression, occupation, 

foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order. 

A-3 
Appendix A 

9. Refugees and Asylum Seekers 

Customary international law defines a refugee as a person who, owing to a wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of 

a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and 

is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 

country. States may be subject to legal consequences for failing to respect the principle 

of “nonrefoulment” (that no refugee should be returned to any country where he or she is 

likely to face persecution or danger to life or freedom) or for failing to return refugees to 

states under certain conditions. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 

and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees remain the principal 

international instruments benefiting refugees. The United States Refugee Act of 1980 

accepts the definition of refugees offered by the 1951 Conventions and 1967 Protocol, 

and makes provision for annual intakes of refugees from groups of specific humanitarian 

interest to the United States, DOS grants political asylum, not DOD. DOD grants 

temporary refuge status. 

DODD 2000.11, Procedures for Handling Requests for Political Asylum and Temporary 

Refuge, provides more information regarding this issue. 

10. Civilian Detainee Procedures 

The detention of civilians during FHA operations will normally be an issue only 

when HN law enforcement capabilities do not exist. In non-conflict FHA operations, 

CDRs are likely to have extremely limited authority to detain non-DOD personnel. 

When detention is authorized, CDRs must be prepared to control, maintain, protect, and 

account for all categories of detainees in accordance with applicable domestic law, 

international law, and policy. DODD 2310.01E, Department of Defense Detainee 

Program establishes the overarching DOD detainee policy and directs that all detainees, 

regardless of the status of the detainee or the characterization of the conflict, shall be 

treated humanely at all times while in the care, custody, or control of any member of the 

DOD components. Furthermore, US forces are responsible for ensuring that non-DOD 

personnel participating in detention operations with detainees under DOD control adhere 

to DOD policies, practices, and procedures. Civilian internees are civilians who are 

interned during an international armed conflict or belligerent occupation for security 

reasons, for protection, or because they have committed an offense against the detaining 

power. 

For more details concerning detainee operations, refer to JP 3-63, Detainee Operations. 

11. Eligibility for Medical Care 

A determination of eligibility for care in a US medical treatment facility (MTF) must 

be made by the CCDR’s surgeon in conjunction with the supporting SJA and in 

accordance with the law of war. This authority may be delegated to the JTF level. Each 

category of personnel who might seek emergency or routine treatment (such as DOD 

A-4 JP 3-29 
Legal Issues 

contractors, USG civilian employees, allied, coalition, or HN forces, and others) in a US 

theater MTF should be determined prior to initiation of the operation and updated as 

required. During FCM operations, the demands for military medical support to civilian 

populations may be so substantial that at the beginning of the operation the GCC must 

establish the scope of care to be rendered to civilian populations. 

12. Claims 

JTF elements should investigate and adjudicate claims according to established 

directives and regulations consistent with the terms of a SOFA or other international 

agreement that includes claims provisions. A single-Service component may be assigned 

responsibility for processing claims against the USG. Unless otherwise stated in CJTF 

guidance, unit level CDRs are responsible for investigating incidents of foreign property 

damage and personal injury or death to foreign nationals alleged to have been caused by 

JTF personnel. JTF legal personnel should be appointed to the foreign claims 

commission(s) with authority to adjudicate and pay foreign claims. Responsibility for 

adjudicating such claims is assigned to the Military Departments by DODI 5515.08, 

Assignment of Claims Responsibility. The supported CCDR may assign interim 

responsibility for resolving claims in countries where such assignment has not been made 

under the directive. 

13. Environment 

As a rule, US environmental laws have no application overseas; however, US 

personnel are to follow pollution control standards of general applicability in the HN or 

jurisdiction. Where country specific final governing standards (FGSs) apply, abide by 

them. In a foreign nation where the designated DOD environmental executive agent has 

not established FGSs, applicable, international agreements, HN standards, and the 

Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document (OEBGD) govern. Particular 

attention should be paid to the disposal of hazardous waste. However, FGSs and 

OEBGD apply only to installations and facilities. They do not apply to off-installation 

operational deployments. Such off-installation activities are governed by applicable, 

international agreements and environmental annexes to operation plans and orders. 

Executive Order 12114, Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions, and 

DODD 6050.7, Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Department of Defense Actions, 

provide policy guidance regarding environmental planning when major federal actions 

have significant effect on the environment outside the United States and its territories. 

14. Law of the Sea 

a. Customary, international law, as reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention 

on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), authorizes each nation to claim as national territory 

and airspace measuring no more than 12 nautical miles from where their land borders 

generally touch the sea. UNCLOS also confirmed each nation’s freedom of navigation 

rights through international airspace and the right to transit international straits and 

archipelagic seas without requiring an aircraft diplomatic clearance from any nation. 

A-5 
Appendix A 

While the US has not signed UNCLOS, USG policy is to adhere to the agreement, since 

it codifies what was previously considered international custom and practice. Therefore, 

USG policy is that all DOD aircraft entering the legally recognized sovereign territory of 

another nation will first receive an aircraft diplomatic clearance signifying the HN’s 

permission to enter. 

b. US embassies become involved when HN challenges USG policy that all nations 

can fly through international airspace unchallenged. Some countries claim airspace 

beyond the 12 nautical mile limit while others claim that the flight information regions 

that they have designated require both an air traffic control clearance and an aircraft 

diplomatic clearance. As long as DOD aircraft remain in international airspace, they do 

not require a diplomatic clearance. 

c. The duty to rescue those in distress at sea is firmly established in customary and 

conventional international law (Article 98, UNCLOS). Asylum seekers have been 

escaping by sea for many years. Several options are open to the state where those 

rescued arrive: it may refuse disembarkation and may require ships’ masters to remove 

them from the jurisdiction, or it may make disembarkation conditional upon satisfactory 

settlement guarantees. The state may also require care and maintenance to be provided 

by the flag country, by the asylum seekers’ country or state of registry, or by international 

organizations. A categorical refusal of disembarkation cannot be equated with a breach 

of the principle of nonrefoulment or refuge through time (because of state sovereignty) 

even though refusal results in serious consequences for asylum seekers. 

15. National Sovereignty 

a. National sovereignty issues can impact FHA mission planning from operational, 

legal, and fiscal perspectives. 

b. In addition to recognition of national sovereignty of territory under UNCLOS, the 

1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (also known as the Chicago 

Convention) codified airspace “rules of the road” for the international community and 

established the principle of international sovereignty for aircraft similar to sovereignty of 

naval vessels passing through international seas and foreign waters. Specifically, the 

Convention created the International Civil Aviation Organization to govern civil aviation 

practices and procedures; identified in Article I that each nation has sovereignty over its 

own airspace and that no other nation’s aircraft could enter that airspace without 

receiving permission; and identified in Article III that “state aircraft” were exempt from 

the provisions of the Convention. It included military aircraft in the types of aircraft that 

are considered “state aircraft” and are, therefore, exempt from the payment of certain 

fees. 

c. US military aircraft as sovereign instrumentalities are: exempt from duties and 

taxation; immune from search, seizure, and inspection; and immune from exercise of 

jurisdiction by a HN (boarding) without prior approval. US policy, consistent with 

international custom and practice, is that flights or aircraft operated by sovereign states in 

A-6 JP 3-29 
Legal Issues 

or through another state will: not be required to pay navigation or overflight fees; not be 

required to pay landing or parking fees at government airports; but will pay reasonable 

charges for services requested and received, whether at governmental or 

nongovernmental airports. The USG is willing to pay landing and parking fees at 

commercial airports, if required to do so. In many countries, bilateral agreements or 

other arrangements explicitly provide that US state aircraft are not charged fees at either 

governmental or nongovernmental airports. Every effort should be made not to disturb 

these arrangements. US embassies are directed to reject billings for overflight and 

navigation fees, charges for aircraft operating in international airspace, and parking and 

landing fees assessed at government airports. 

d. DOD often contracts commercial aircraft to perform airlift or other missions. The 

USG has consistently taken the position that DOD contracted commercial aircraft do not 

qualify as military or other state aircraft unless the USG specifically designates them as 

state aircraft. DOD contracted commercial aircraft are not subject to the same 

exemptions of sovereign instrumentalities that are provided to military aircraft. 

For additional information, see DOD Electronic Foreign Clearance Guide, and DOS 

message 011542ZAUG07, Subject: US Government Policy on Aviation-related Fees. 

16. Rules of Engagement 

a. ROE are not strictly a legal matter, but a C2 tool. They are the CDR’s rules for 

the use of force (RUF). The sensitive political and international nature of FHA 

operations requires that ROE be established and coordinated with other forces involved in 

the operation. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the 

Use of Force for US Forces, provides fundamental policies and procedures for US CDRs. 

It is US policy that ROE never limit a CDR’s inherent authority and obligation to use all 

necessary means available and to take all appropriate action in self-defense of the unit or 

other US forces. ROE for FHA operations will commonly be characterized by restraint. 

Whenever possible, all allied and coalition nations operating within a humanitarian relief 

area should do so under a commonly established ROE. This is essential to assure 

consistency of response for all participating forces. 

b. In addition to force protection concerns, ROE must address actions to be taken 

when in observance of looting, rioting, or other criminal conduct in the relief area. Such 

actions may interfere tactically and strategically with the FHA mission. Under the 

guidance of the SOFA planners must incorporate such concerns into ROE, and other 

international agreements, to ensure clarity for all personnel involved in FHA operations. 

c. Ideally, ROE should provide a quick process to request ROE amendments in 

response to FHA requirements. The use of joint fires, the ability to act in defense of nonUS persons, and the use of riot control agents (RCAs) should be specifically addressed in 

the ROE. As stated in CJCSI 3110.07C, Guidance Concerning Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear Defense and Employment of Riot Control Agents and 

Herbicides (U), the use of RCAs is restricted to US bases, posts, or US controlled 

A-7 
Appendix A 

portions of foreign installations where the authority to approve peacetime employment of 

RCAs resides with the CCDR. Use of RCAs outside of these parameters requires SecDef 

approval. Additionally, authority for the use of RCAs may be obtained pursuant to 

Enclosure I to CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the 

Use of Force for US Forces. 

d. The use of force, especially lethal force is normally a measure of last resort. 

When time and circumstances permit, forces committing hostile acts or demonstrating 

hostile intent should be warned and given the opportunity to withdraw or cease 

threatening actions. Employment of PSYOP assets and capabilities and nonlethal 

weapons should be considered toward this end. However, the availability of nonlethal 

weapons and PSYOP assets and capabilities shall not limit a CDR's inherent authority 

and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action in 

self-defense. Neither the presence nor the potential effect of nonlethal weapons shall 

constitute an obligation for their employment or a higher standard for employment of 

force than provided for by applicable law. In all cases, the United States retains the 

option for immediate use of lethal weapons, when appropriate, consistent with customary 

international law. 

e. ROE should be coordinated in detail and may change as the operation evolves. 

Early and frequent coordination between the JFC and the embassy COM will be essential 

to proper ROE development. Changes to ROE must be rapidly disseminated to all 

personnel. CDRs at all levels may request changes to the ROE through the chain of 

command. Figure A-1 is provided as a sample ROE card, which summarizes ROE 

applicable to the individual. These example ROE were established for forces conducting 

FHA operations in an uncertain or hostile environment. All personnel may carry such a 

card for reference. 

f. In limited circumstances, RUF may apply instead of ROE. RUF generally apply 

to DOD law enforcement and security duties within US territory or installations. 

However, RUF may be appropriate for FHA operations in countries with an established 

US military presence. See CJCSI 3121.01B Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing 

Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces for guidance. 

17. Intelligence Oversight and Operational Law 

Intelligence oversight regulations should be reviewed for applicability, especially 

with regard to relationships between intelligence personnel and American citizens who 

work for NGOs and IGOs. A legal review should be conducted prior to the initiation of 

intelligence operations to ensure that there is no unforeseen impact upon the mission 

from the conduct of planned intelligence or information gathering operations. 

A-8 JP 3-29 
Legal Issues 

Nothing in these rules of engagement limits your rights to take 

appropriate action to defend yourself and your unit. 

REMEMBER





















You have the right to use force to defend yourself against attacks or 

threats of attack

Hostile fire may be returned effectively and promptly to stop hostile acts

When US forces are attacked by hostile elements, mobs, and/or rioters, 

US forces should use the minimum force necessary under the 

circumstances and proportional to the threat

You may not seize the property of others to accomplish your mission

Detention of civilians is authorized for security reasons or in self-defense

The United States is not at war

Treat all persons with dignity and respect

Respect local customs and traditions of the host nation

Use minimum force to carry out the mission

Always be prepared to act in self-defense

SAMPLE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT CARD

Figure A-1. Sample Rules of Engagement Card

18. Fiscal Law 

a. The basic fiscal law principles that apply to all military operations also apply to 

FHA operations, however, the authorizations applicable to FHA missions are very 

specific with respect to purpose and are often funded at relatively low levels, often 

making the funding of FHA missions particularly problematic. 

b. It is a basic tenet of fiscal law that all expenditures in an FHA operation must be 

for an authorized purpose, must be made within applicable time periods, and authorized 

and appropriate amounts. Congress has provided authority for DOD to conduct 

OHDACA operations, but authorizations are normally narrowly focused and 

appropriations can be very limited. As a result, it can be difficult to find the correct 

authorization and appropriation from which to fund an FHA mission legally. When 

conducted at the request of DOS, all costs incurred by DOD arising from the conduct of 

FHA operations will be reimbursed by the supported federal agency. These reimbursing 

funds will not be available if US forces act prior to receiving the request. 

c. It is essential that the SJA be involved with FHA mission planning from the outset 

to ensure funding is handled correctly. 

A-9 
Appendix A 

A-10 JP 3-29 

For information on authorizations that may be applicable to FHA operations, refer to 

Appendix B, “Department Of Defense Foreign Disaster Assistance Tasking And Funding 

Procedures And Humanitarian Assistance Programs.” 

19. Terrorist and Insurgent Abuse of Charities 

a. Protecting charities from terrorist abuse is a critical component of the war on 

terrorism. Charities provide essential services, comfort, and hope to those in need around 

the world. Unfortunately, terrorists have exploited the charitable sector to raise and move 

funds, provide logistic support, encourage terrorist recruitment, or otherwise support 

terrorist organizations and operations. This abuse threatens to undermine donor 

confidence and jeopardizes the integrity of the charitable sector, whose services are 

indispensable to the world community. The charitable sector is one that has consistently 

faced a high risk of abuse from terrorists and terrorist organizations. Charities operating 

overseas in areas of high risk are especially vulnerable to this abuse. Since the terrorist 

attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has designated several charities 

worldwide as supporting terrorist activity. A list of these charities can be found at 

http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement. In addition, the United States has designated 

several foreign terrorist organizations that have operated under various names that appear 

as potential fundraising front organizations for terrorist activity. 

b. Terrorist and insurgent abuse of the charitable sector can take many forms, 

including: 

(1) establishing front organizations or using charities to raise funds in support 

of terrorist organizations. 

(2) establishing or using charities to transfer funds, other resources, and 

operatives across geographical boundaries. 

(3) defrauding charities through branch offices or aid workers to divert funds to 

support terrorist organizations. 

(4) leveraging charitable funds, resources, and services to recruit members and 

foster support for terrorist organizations and their ideology. 

c. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the 

Treasury administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on US foreign 

policy and national security goals against targeted foreign countries, terrorists, 

international narcotics traffickers, and those engaged in activities related to the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). OFAC acts under Presidential 

wartime and national emergency powers, as well as authority granted by specific 

legislation, to impose controls on transactions and freeze foreign assets under US 

jurisdiction. Many of the sanctions are based on UN and other international mandates, 

are multilateral in scope, and involve close cooperation with allied governments. 
ANNEX A TO APPENDIX A

HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES IN THE LAW OF WAR 

A-A-1 

1. General 

The international law of war regulates the conduct of states and combatants engaged in 

armed hostilities, and is often referred to as the law of armed conflict. The law of war is 

essentially inspired by the humanitarian desire of civilized nations to diminish the effects of 

conflicts. It protects both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering, and 

safeguards the fundamental rights of civilians, prisoners of war, and the wounded and sick. 

The law of war also attempts to prevent degeneration of conflicts into savagery and brutality, 

thereby facilitating the restoration of peaceful relations which must, at some point, follow the 

conclusion of hostilities. 

2. Basis 

Much of the law of war has been codified by the 1907 Hague Convention and the four 

1949 Geneva Conventions. The Hague Convention prescribes rules regarding the methods 

and means of warfare and establishes humanitarian requirements, with some exceptions, such 

as notification of civilians before bombardment. The Geneva Conventions define and 

prescribe the treatment of the wounded, sick, shipwrecked at sea, prisoners of war, and 

civilians. Some of the law of war has never been incorporated in any treaty or convention to 

which the United States is a party. Yet the United States, like other nations, is bound by the 

customary rules of international law. Evidence of customary law arises from the general 

consent and practice of states under the belief that the practice is required by law. Countries 

may disagree on the application of customary international law. For example, there are two 

1977 protocols to the Geneva Conventions that pertain to international and internal armed 

conflicts, respectively. While the United States has not ratified either of these protocols, it 

agrees with and follows those portions that are believed to reflect customary international 

law. 

3. Minimum Standards 

The law of war represents minimum standards of civilization. Humanitarian 

considerations underlie the law of war. For example, the requirements of uniforms and 

markings exist not only to assure combatants that enemy targets, and not their own, are being 

attacked, but to reinforce the protections secured to civilian populations and civilian objects. 

The law seeks to protect prisoners of war, wounded and sick, and the civilian population, to 

the maximum extent possible. The international community has sought to identify situations 

in armed conflict in which humanitarian principles can be invoked to minimize collateral 

damage while allowing appropriate attacks on military targets without sacrificing material 

military advantages. 

4. Legal Principles 

The principles of the law of war are: necessity, distinction, proportionality, and 

unnecessary suffering. The principle of military necessity provides for the right for armed 

forces to use an appropriate degree or means of force that is not specifically forbidden, 

necessary to achieve the objective sought. The principle of distinction requires that 
Annex A to Appendix A 

A-A-2 JP 3-29 

combatants be distinguished from noncombatants, and that military objectives be 

distinguished from protected property or protected places. Parties to a conflict shall direct 

their operations only against combatants and military objectives. The principle of 

proportionality requires that incidental injury or damage must not be disproportionate to the 

legitimate military advantages secured by the use of force. The principle of proportionality 

requires a balancing of the anticipated military advantage of conducting the attack (military 

necessity) with the risk of civilian casualties or damage to civilian property, as such. The law 

of war only prohibits those attacks in which the collateral damage exceeds anticipated overall 

military advantage. The principle of unnecessary suffering requires a military force to 

minimize unnecessary suffering. It is forbidden to employ arms, projectiles, or material 

calculated to cause unnecessary suffering. The prohibition of unnecessary suffering 

constitutes acknowledgement that necessary suffering to combatants is lawful, and may 

include severe injury or loss of life. 

5. Cruelties and Atrocities 

The armed forces of a state act on behalf of its government and its citizens; cruelties and 

excesses during armed conflicts may weigh heavily on the conscience of governmental 

leaders and citizens. Moreover, every nation is sensitive, to some degree, to the reaction of 

others to its policies; the good will and support of other governments and peoples are 

important in the overall conduct of foreign policy and achievement of national goals. 

Reciprocity is a critical factor. If a state fails in the first instance to ensure respect for basic 

humanitarian rights, its conduct may provoke violations by an adversary. Moreover, 

international standing to complain of violations by an adversary is seriously compromised. 

Civilian loyalties may be at stake and compromised by excesses and cruelty. History 

demonstrates also that the successful negotiation or termination of hostilities may be 

prolonged or complicated by antagonisms and alienation heightened by atrocity violations. 

6. Training 

CDRs have a responsibility to ensure that their subordinates understand the principles of 

the law of war. Even the appearance of improper behavior by US military personnel can 

have a significant impact on military operations and may cause a loss of international and 

domestic support. The command SJA should be tasked to conduct training in accordance 

with DODD 2311.01E, DOD Law of War Program and CJCSI 5810.01C, Implementation of 

the DOD Law of War Program, for all personnel within the command in order to ensure full 

compliance with the law of war. 

7. Individual Responsibility 

Every Service member is responsible for compliance with the law of war. To avoid 

violations of the law of war, CDRs must ensure that its principles and requirements are 

known and understood by all subordinate personnel. 
APPENDIX B

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE 

TASKING AND FUNDING PROCEDURES AND HUMANITARIAN 

ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 

B-1 

1. General 

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Global Security Affairs 

and DSCA execute a number of assistance programs. This appendix provides a brief 

overview of these programs and authority for their implementation in support of FHA 

operations. 

2. Approval Authority 

Except in cases of emergencies where the on-site commander (OSC) determines 

immediate response is required (see paragraph 6, “Immediate Response”), DOD 

components will participate in foreign disaster relief operations only after the affected 

country requests assistance and DOS or USAID determines that assistance will be 

provided. The Office of ASD for Global Security Affairs is the normal approval 

authority for DOD resource and services commitment to foreign disaster relief. The 

DOD lead for management of budget allocations in this area is the DSCA. The main 

point of contact for the Joint Staff is the J-4 JLOC. 

3. Responsibilities 

DOD provides supplies and services from the most expedient source, which 

normally is the CCDR. The CCDR, when directed, assumes the primary coordinating 

role for provision of DOD supplies and services. For disaster relief/medical supplies for 

use during FHA, CCDRs should first source from excess property warehouses managed 

by DSCA before purchasing from DOD/Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) stock (See 

paragraph 7, “Excess Nonlethal Supplies [Excess Property Program]”). The Joint Staff, 

USTRANSCOM, and DSCA, if excess property is transported, coordinate transportation 

requirements. The Military Departments and Joint Staff support the designated CCDR by 

coordinating interdepartmental approval and funding processes with ASD for Global 

Security Affairs, DSCA, and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 

(OUSD[C]). If items requested are not available in the combatant command, ASD for 

Global Security Affairs and DSCA will locate resources through DLA, the Services, or a 

supporting CCDR. 

4. Procedures 

Requests for DOD assistance come from USAID and are normally routed from 

OFDA through DOS to the Office of ASD for Global Security Affairs in an executive 

secretary memorandum. Upon approval, the request is routed to the Joint Staff J-4 for 

action. J-4 may activate a J-4 crisis action team (24/7) response team, which may be 

augmented by USTRANSCOM and DLA liaison elements. J-4 provides coordination 

among combatant command, Service, and defense agency response cells or teams, as 

appropriate. 
Appendix B 

5. Funding 

a. DOD activities associated with foreign disaster relief may be sourced using 

OHDACA appropriation funds, service operations and maintenance funds during 

immediate response (see paragraph 6, “Immediate Response”) or under some specific 

legal authority (e.g., drawdown authority), the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund 

(CCIF), funds from other agencies, or a combination of these, depending on the nature of 

the operation. 

b. USTRANSCOM calculates transportation system shipping costs (normally, using 

the DOD rate), and conveys that information to ASD for Global Security Affairs and 

DSCA and the Joint Staff J-4. ASD for Global Security Affairs and DSCA forward cost 

information to USAID (OFDA) and other agencies, as required. 

 c. After cost acceptance by the appropriate agencies (e.g., DOS, USAID, Office of 

ASD (Global Security Affairs), and OUSD[C]), formal approval to commit DOD 

materials and services is forwarded from the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities) 

(ASD[SO/LIC&IC]) to the Director, Joint Staff. This approval contains funding and 

billing information (including, if possible, fund cites), as well as resource disposition 

instructions. Fund cites should be provided for each DOD support item. The Joint Staff 

then forwards the fund cites and other relevant information to the affected Service(s), 

agency supplier, or USTRANSCOM for each action at the time of request. J-4 (or J-3, as 

appropriate) develops tasking messages, which should contain fund cites, funding limits, 

billing addresses, and Joint Staff points of contact, if possible, for each DOD element 

tasked. Tasking messages will require tasked units to provide clear text itemized billing 

information and the tasked unit point of contact. The messages should also advise tasked 

elements that approval must be obtained before exceeding the funding limit; that 

agencies, such as OFDA, will only reimburse for those items or services requested; and 

that all bills must be submitted in the next monthly billing cycle following completion of 

the service or activity. 

d. In the event military units and personnel are required to deploy, the Joint Staff 

Director for Force Structure, Resource and Assessment assists OUSD(C) in obtaining 

rough order of magnitude cost estimates from the CCDR or Service(s). Following receipt 

of funding approval from the Office of ASD for Global Security Affairs, the Director of 

Operations, Joint Staff prepares a CJCS deployment order for SecDef approval. 

e. Economy Act. The Economy Act provides agencies the authority to provide 

services to, or secure the services of, another Executive agency for in house performance 

or performance by contract where there is no other statutory authority. The head of an 

agency or major organizational unit within an agency may place an order with a major 

organizational unit within the same agency or another agency for goods or services if the 

agency has available funds; the order is in the best interests of the USG; the agency 

filling the order can provide, or acquire by contract, the ordered goods or services; and 

B-2 JP 3-29 
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B-3 

the ordered goods or services cannot be provided by contract as conveniently or cheaply 

(See Title 31, USC, Section 1535[a]). 

(1) The FAR [Federal Acquisition Regulation] Subpart 17.5 and the DFARS 

[Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement] Subpart 217.5 govern use of the 

Economy Act. It can be a valuable tool if used correctly; however, misuse can lead to 

criminal violations of the law. 

(2) The regulations require two primary documents. The first is a determination 

and findings that establishes the Economy Act as the authority for the transaction. The 

second document is the order constituting the agreement between the requiring and 

servicing agencies on the statement of work, payment for supplies or services, and related 

terms and conditions. 

6. Immediate Response 

A CDR in the immediate vicinity of a foreign disaster may undertake immediate 

relief operations when time is of the essence to prevent human suffering and loss of life. 

The OSC should report the action taken at once and request guidance. Reimbursement of 

funds expended under these circumstances is not assured. It is particularly important to 

avoid mission creep in this scenario. The more time that passes, the less likely that the 

assistance will be deemed immediate response. Responding elements must track 

incremental costs incurred by maintaining detailed records of expenditures, and provide 

detailed billing information to support their reimburse efforts. The DOD Financial 

Management Regulation, Volume 12, Chapter 12 and DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster 

Relief, contain guidelines for DOD elements to bill for cost reimbursement for supplies 

and/or services provided in support of foreign disaster relief.

7. Excess Nonlethal Supplies (Excess Property Program) 

This DOD program makes excess nonlethal DOD property (property that is not a 

weapon, ammunition, or other equipment or materiel designed to inflict serious bodily 

harm or death) available to foreign recipients for humanitarian relief. The property must 

be transferred to DOS, which is responsible for its distribution within the recipient 

country (Title 10, USC, Section 2557). Items such as clothing, tents, medical equipment 

and supplies, heavy equipment, and vehicles are available through this program. 

Requests for excess property are forwarded through the COM, who in turn forwards 

requests to DOD for approval and funding authorization. Excess property may also be 

provided as part of disaster relief operations. DSCA administers DOD HA excess 

property warehouse operations. 

8. Drawdown of Defense Articles and Services 

a. Increasingly, FHA is provided through the drawdown of defense articles from 

existing stocks. This drawdown authority is provided in Title 22, USC, Section 

2318(1)(a). Because drawdown authority is limited to the use of existing defense articles, 
Appendix B 

CDRs must be sensitive to the fiscal limitations involved (for example, no new contracts 

for goods or services may be made using drawdown funds). All expenditures for FHA 

operations should be subjected to legal review to ensure compliance with fiscal law. 

b. The FAA authorizes the President to direct transfers of on-hand DOD-stock 

defense articles and services (as well as articles and services from the inventory and 

resources of any agency of the USG) and military education and training to foreign 

countries and IGOs in response to unforeseen military emergencies, humanitarian 

catastrophes, peacekeeping needs, or counternarcotics requirements. Except for 

transportation and related services where new contracts would cost less than providing 

such services with DOD assets, no new procurement is authorized and no new funds may 

be placed on existing contracts unless otherwise provided by law. Drawdowns are 

usually precipitated by an emergency in a foreign country or region. In emergency 

drawdowns, DOD, DOS, and the NSC coordinate the USG response. This interagency 

process determines which existing statutory authority applies and identifies which articles 

and services should be provided. Potential contributing agencies (e.g., DOD, Department 

of the Treasury, Department of Justice) and the military services furnish valuation and 

availability (V&A) data to the DOS indicating the estimated value of the articles and 

services proposed for the drawdown. The V&A data and the scope of support form the 

basis for the Presidential determination that authorizes a specific maximum dollar value 

authority for the drawdown. Emergency drawdowns may begin execution within 24-48 

hours, but more commonly take place within 1-2 weeks. 

See DOD 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual and DSCA H-1, DSCA 

Handbook for Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) Drawdown Of Defense Articles and 

Services, for more information on drawdowns. 

9. Funded Transportation Program 

a. The Funded Transportation program is conducted under Title 10, USC, Section 

2561, which provides DOD the authority to transport HA material. The funded 

transportation program permits transportation of cargo and DOD nonlethal excess 

property worldwide for NGOs and IGOs. This authority provides for the actual cost of 

transportation and the payment of any associated administrative costs incurred. 

b. While the statutory authority permits transportation via any mode and for any 

cargo that could be defined as humanitarian, the interagency community has established 

policy that imposes limits on the program due to the austere level of funding available. 

These policies are: 

(1) transport is limited only to surface modes (much less expensive than air). 

(2) the cargo is limited only to that which addresses basic humanitarian needs 

(e.g., medical, food, shelter, clothing). 

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(3) the minimum cargo needed to use the program is one 20 foot shipping 

container, or 1,100 cubic feet. 

c. Requesting organizations submit their application to the DSCA program manager 

at http://dentonfunded.ohasis.org for processing. 

d. The DSCA OHDM staff works with the donor, DOS Bureau of Political-Military 

Affairs, and the DOD shipping agent to facilitate the process. Once the application is 

approved, DSCA arranges all inspection and transportation requirements, tracks the 

shipment to its final destination, and provides weekly updates on all shipments. OHDM 

verifies invoice data for payment of transportation costs. 

10. Space Available Transportation Program 

a. DSCA coordinates the overall execution of transportation of humanitarian relief 

supplies to foreign countries (Title 10, USC, Section 402, commonly referred to as the 

Denton Program). Under this authority, DOD transports millions of pounds of privately 

donated humanitarian cargo from the United States to destinations overseas on a space 

available basis. Donors coordinate this support through OFDA, USTRANSCOM, and 

DSCA. Supplies transported under this section may not be distributed, directly or 

indirectly, to any individual, group, or organization engaged in a military or paramilitary 

activity. Transportation of this cargo may not be conducted unless the SecDef determines 

that: 

b. The transportation of such supplies is consistent with foreign policy of the United 

States. 

c. The supplies to be transported are suitable for humanitarian purposes and are in 

stable condition. 

d. There is a legitimate humanitarian need for such supplies by the people for whom 

they are intended. 

e. Adequate arrangements have been made for the distribution of such supplies in 

the destination country. 

11. Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining Assistance 

a. Humanitarian demining assistance is the detection and clearance of land mines 

and other explosive remnants of war, including activities related to the furnishing of 

education, training, and technical assistance with respect to the detection and clearance of 

land mines and other explosive remnants of war. DOD humanitarian demining assistance 

is authorized by Title 10, USC, Section 407. The USG humanitarian mine action 

program assists countries in relieving the suffering from the adverse effects of uncleared 

land mines and other explosive remnants of war while promoting US interests. DOD 

humanitarian demining assistance is a critical component of the overall USG mine action 
Appendix B 

program. DOD humanitarian demining assistance concentrates on training HNs in the 

procedures of land mine clearance, mine risk education, and victims' assistance, as well 

providing unique training and readiness-enhancing benefits to US forces while advancing 

the GCC’s theater security cooperation strategies. DOD may also provide supplies, 

equipment, and services to participating HNs. Significant benefits accrue to DOD as 

humanitarian demining assistance provides access to geographical areas otherwise not 

easily available to US forces. It also contributes to unit and individual readiness by 

providing unique in-country training opportunities that cannot be duplicated in the US. 

For example, US military forces hone critical wartime, civil-military, language, cultural, 

and FID skills. 

b. US forces carry out humanitarian demining assistance when the assistance will 

promote either the security interests of both the United States and HN or the specific 

operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces who participate in the 

activities. Humanitarian demining assistance must be approved by DOS and shall 

complement, and may not duplicate, any other form of social or economic assistance 

which may be provided to the country concerned by any OGA. 

c. Within DOD, the Office of DASD for Stability Operations Capabilities is the 

ASD(SO/LIC&IC) lead agency for providing policy oversight of DOD humanitarian 

demining assistance. Guidance and direction are provided through CJCSI 3207.01A, 

Military Support to Humanitarian Mine Action Operations. GCCs plan, coordinate, and 

execute humanitarian demining assistance in their assigned AORs as approved by the 

SecDef. The GCC’s SCP is the planning document used to plan and prioritize 

humanitarian demining assistance efforts within the assigned AOR. 

d. No member of the Armed Forces, while providing humanitarian demining 

assistance will engage in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of land mines or 

other explosive remnants of war (unless the member does so for the concurrent purpose 

of supporting a US military operation); or provide such assistance as part of a military 

operation that does not involve the Armed Forces. 

e. A nation desiring assistance must make a formal request through the US embassy 

to the DOS. Selected members of the USG PCC Sub-group on humanitarian mine action 

conduct assessment visits to determine the HN's capabilities and needs. The PCC then 

approves/disapproves each nation to be a part of the assistance program and tasks the 

Sub-group members to formulate a program to help the country neutralize the land mine 

and explosive remnants of war problem. 

f. Expenses incurred as a direct result of providing humanitarian demining 

assistance to a foreign country only may include: 

(1) Travel, transportation, and subsistence expenses of DOD personnel 

providing such assistance. 

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(2) The cost of any equipment, services, or supplies acquired for the purpose of 

carrying out or supporting the humanitarian demining activities, including any nonlethal, 

individual, or small-team equipment or supplies for clearing land mines or other 

explosive remnants of war that are to be transferred or otherwise furnished to a foreign 

country in furtherance of the provision of assistance. Further information may be 

obtained from CJCSI 3207.01A, Military Support to Humanitarian Mine Action 

Operations, Appendix F, “Humanitarian Mine Action” in JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, 

and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations, DOD Humanitarian Demining Research and 

Development Homepage: http://www.humanitariandemining.org, and the United Nations 

Electronic Mine Information Network: http://www.mineaction.org. 

12. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program 

a. The Title 10, USC, Section 401 HCA Program is administered by the GCC 

directly, with coordination and approval authority vested in the Office of ASD for Global 

Security Affairs and DSCA. The goal of this program is to promote regional security 

objectives by providing basic HCA. In contrast to other HA programs discussed in this 

appendix, HCA activities are authorized by Title 10, USC, Section 401 in conjunction 

with authorized military operations of the Armed Forces if they serve: 

(1) The security interests of both the United States and the country in which the 

activities are to be carried out. 

(2) The specific operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces 

who participate in the activities. 

b. Any assistance provided under this program must first undergo legal review by 

the GCC. 

(1) Medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in areas of a country 

that are rural or are underserved by medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary 

professionals, respectively, including education, training, and technical assistance related 

to the care provided. 

(2) Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems. 

(3) Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities. 

(4) Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. 

See DODD 2205.2, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction with 

Military Operations, and JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, for more information on the 

HCA program.

b. HCA activities performed under this section will complement and may not 

duplicate any other form of social or economic assistance provided to the country 
Appendix B 

concerned by any other USG agency or department. HCA may not be provided under 

this section to any individual, group, or organization engaged in military or paramilitary 

activity. Under Title 10, USC, Section 401, HCA expenses must be incidental to the 

associated military operation and are paid for from funds specifically appropriated for 

such purpose (service operation and maintenance funds). 

13. Combatant Commander Initiative Fund 

The CCIF supports unforeseen contingency requirements critical to CCDR’s joint 

warfighting readiness and national security interests. The strongest candidates for 

approval are initiatives that support CCDR’s activities and functions, enhance 

interoperability, and yield high benefits at low cost. Initiatives support authorized 

activities such as: force training, contingencies, selected operations, C2, joint exercises, 

HCA (to include urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction 

assistance), military education and training, personnel expenses for bilateral or regional 

cooperation programs, force protection, and joint warfighting capabilities. CJCS may 

give priority to the provision of funds to be used for urgent and unanticipated 

humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance, particularly in a foreign country where 

the armed forces are engaged in a contingency operation. 

See CJCSI 7401.01C, Combatant Commander Initiative Fund, for more information on 

CCIF. 

14. Humanitarian Daily Rations 

HDRs provide a low cost, easily delivered, daily ration for use in foreign countries to 

alleviate hunger after disasters and to replace use of more expensive US military meal, 

ready to eat (MRE) rations in disaster situations. It was designed to provide a full day’s 

sustenance to a moderately malnourished individual. The HDR is less costly 

(approximately 80 percent) than the MRE which was used previously for disaster relief. 

The HDR’s nutritional content is tailored for people who are near starvation or fleeing 

from catastrophe and need to eat en route to a safe haven. It is culturally sensitive and 

contains no animal products, alcohol, or alcohol-based products and is adequate for the 

widest range of cultural or religious dietary restrictions. HDR will maintain the health of 

moderately malnourished recipients until conventional relief programs or targeted 

feeding can be established. If required, the HDR may be airdropped, but this requires 

significant planning. HDRs are stored in the United States, Germany, and Kuwait and 

delivered, as needed, by aircraft or ship to locations in need and are pre-positioned in a 

region in anticipation of an emergency or natural disaster. HDRs are purchased with 

OHDACA funds, managed by DSCA Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and 

Mine Action and are requested through the GCCs as needed to support FHA 

requirements. 

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15. Pacific Disaster Center 

a. PDC provides applied information research and analysis in support of the disaster 

management and HA communities and related efforts, creating new information products 

and supporting innovative applications of information and communications technologies. 

PDC’s core technical competencies center on the application of geospatial and 

geophysical information and analytical models to support hazard assessment and risk 

reduction activities. In addition to new products and services for a specific set of 

circumstances and needs, PDC might create a number of products or use mature products 

already available. 

b. While the PDC continues to play an important role in the support of disaster 

management in the Asia Pacific region, PDC is also assisting the United States and the 

international community in support of humanitarian relief activities. PDC can create a 

web-accessible, data-and-knowledge base for use by the United States and the 

international community in the planning for HA and reconstruction. Decision makers can 

utilize PDC's web site as a situational awareness capability for analysis of information on 

refugee site locations, populations at risk, transportation infrastructure, supply depot 

locations, and tracking of resources. Through this program, the PDC is enhancing 

society's ability to plan for, survive, and recover from natural and human-induced 

disasters for safer communities and sustained development in Asia, the Pacific and 

beyond. 

c. PDC’s premier web-based collaboration system for disaster management 

activities is the Disaster All-Hazard Warnings, Analysis, and Risk Evaluation system 

(DisasterAWARE). DisasterAWARE increases the capacity for disaster managers to 

synthesize multiple data streams for critical early warning and quick decision support. 

DisasterAWARE is a customizable decision support system capable of quickly 

determining whether incoming information warrants attention, and to what degree. 

Information pertinent to the user community is automatically processed and supplied 

through DisasterAWARE’s Hazard Listing and Automated Hazard Map web pages as 

maps or model output associated with hazard events. DisasterAWARE’s database stores 

information whether it triggers a hazard message or not. The system integrates data from 

a variety of sources into an enterprise geospatial application for collaboration and 

analysis. 

For more detailed information on PDC, visit www.pdc.org. 

16. Asia-Pacific Area Network 

Asian-Pacific Area Network (APAN) is a World Wide Web portal (http:// 

www.apan-info.net) offering information resources and a collaborative planning 

environment as a means to greater defense interaction, confidence-building, and 

enhanced security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region. APAN is hosted by 

USPACOM, Camp Smith, Hawaii. USPACOM maintains an unclassified web-based 

information sharing and collaboration network to enhance interoperability and 
Appendix B 

B-10 JP 3-29 

multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. APAN exploits web-based technology to 

help meet USPACOM's regional security cooperation initiatives. APAN integrates 

information to increase multilateral planning effectiveness and interoperability; links 

disaster centers and data sources to speed the flow of crisis information; strengthens best 

practices for cooperative efforts; provides technically simple means for the user to access 

and share information; and finds paths to existing information sources. 

17. HARMONIEWeb 

HARMONIEWeb is an internet web site for the exchange of unclassified 

information across the civil-military boundary associated with military support to SSTR 

or FHA operations. This site allows DOD organizations to share information with 

OGAs, multinational partners, HN, IGOs, NGOs and the private sector. 

HARMONIEWeb improves DOD's ability to exchange timely, relevant information with 

non-DOD organizations, particularly in the critical early stages of an operation, 

synchronize DOD and NGO efforts, and accelerate successful mission completion. 

For further information refer to www.harmonieweb.org. 

18. United States National Guard State Partnership Program 

The National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP) establishes partnerships 

between foreign countries and United States of America states and is an important 

contribution to the DOD’s security cooperation programs conducted by the CCDRs and 

COM programs implemented outside of DOD. 

a. The SPP mission is to build genuine state partnerships which mobilize the entire 

social fabric of American support to democracy abroad. Capitalizing on the unique role 

of the National Guard citizen-soldiers and the ability to reach into our communities, this 

program engages at home and abroad to promote stability by strengthening democracy 

and free market economies. The SPP assists in the construction of democratic institutions 

and the social infrastructure necessary to sustain countries. Partnerships will create longterm personal relationships based on openness, confidence, and trust. 

b. The SPP provides a reach-back capability not just to the GCCs but also to each 

COM for those civil aspects of our National Security Strategy. The SPP has proven to 

hasten and expedite USG response to humanitarian crisis through this reach-back 

capability. The SPP does not unilaterally implement or execute these activities but 

supports the CCDR and COM needs in a most expeditious manner. The SPP's build 

enduring military-to-military, military-to-civilian, and civil security cooperation 

relationships that enhance long-term international security while building partnership 

capacity across all levels of society. 
APPENDIX C

DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS 

C-1 

1. Department of State 

a. The mission of DOS is to create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous 

world for the benefit of the American people and the international community. 

American diplomacy in the 21st century is based on fundamental beliefs: our freedom is 

best protected by ensuring that others are free; our prosperity depends on the prosperity 

of others; and our security relies on a global effort to secure the rights of all. Millions of 

the world’s poor have not yet benefited from globalization, increasing their risk of 

alienation. Furthermore, transnational threats have emerged from globalization, 

spreading disease via the most mobile population in history. Famines and civil conflicts 

have erupted in countries steeped in poverty or constrained by autocratic rulers, creating 

waves of refugees and swelling the ranks of internally displaced populations. 

b. DOS and USAID will work with US NGOs, institutions of higher learning, and 

private sector partners who share USG objectives and help leverage our resources. By 

providing vital links to the American people and to counterpart organizations and 

institutions overseas, DOS’s US partners help represent the best in America’s technical, 

humanitarian, and management skills. 

c. In meeting their strategic objectives and goals, DOS and USAID are committed to 

protect US national interests and advance peace, security, and sustainable development. 

DOS will work with USAID and other agencies to ensure US resources support our goals 

of saving lives, safeguarding people’s health, and advancing regional stability. The 

United States is committed to find longer-term solutions to food insecurity and working 

in partnership with developing countries to address this global problem, which affects 

millions of people. Viable, early warning systems and assessments will help mitigate 

disasters and increase preparedness and response. 

2. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 

a. The core mission of CRS is to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize USG civilian 

capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and 

reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a 

sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy. Failing and postconflict states pose one of the greatest national and international security challenges of 

our day, threatening vulnerable populations, their neighbors, our allies, and ourselves. 

Struggling states can provide breeding grounds for terrorism, crime, trafficking, and 

humanitarian catastrophes, and can destabilize an entire region. Experience shows that 

managing conflict, particularly internal conflict, is not a passing phenomenon. It has 

become a mainstream part of our foreign policy. Until now, the international community 

has undertaken stabilization and reconstruction operations in an ad hoc fashion, 

recreating the tools and relationships each time a crisis arises. To ensure that countries 

are set on a sustainable path towards peace, democracy, and a market economy, new, 

institutionalized foreign policy tools are required that can influence the choices countries 
Appendix C 

C-2 JP 3-29 

and people make about the nature of their economies, their political systems, their 

security, and indeed, in some cases about the very social fabric of a nation. 

b. CRS is a DOS office, but it is interagency in both character and function. 

Representatives from agencies throughout the USG staff it to build upon and draw on 

existing skills and expertise, and more easily reach back to interagency partners. CRS 

staff is comprised of representatives from DOS, USAID, DOD, Joint Staff, Central 

Intelligence Agency, Army Corps of Engineers, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, 

USJFCOM, and the Department of the Treasury. The success of the USG in 

reconstruction/stabilization will depend heavily upon the ability to plan early and to 

develop an integrated, interagency approach to deal with the interdependent civilian and 

military responsibilities on the ground. The US Government Planning Framework for 

Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation pamphlet presents a USG 

interagency planning process for reconstruction/stabilization and conflict transformation 

operations. 

c. Post Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix. The matrix is an 

important tool describing the full spectrum of tasks that might need to be performed by 

the international community in a post-conflict environment. This analytical framework is 

available at: http://www.state.gov/s/crs/rls/52959.htm. 

d. Civilian Response Corps (CRC). The CRC is a group of civilian federal 

employees and, eventually, volunteers from the private sector and state and local 

governments, who will be trained and equipped to deploy rapidly to countries in crisis or 

emerging from conflict, in order to provide reconstruction and stabilization assistance. 

They are diplomats, development specialists, public health officials, law enforcement and 

corrections officers, engineers, economists, lawyers, public administrators, agronomists 

and others – offering the full range of skills needed to help fragile states restore stability 

and the rule of law, and achieve economic recovery and sustainable growth as quickly as 

possible. Because no single government entity has all of the relevant expertise, the CRC 

is a partnership of eight departments and agencies: DOS, USAID, Department of 

Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Health and Human Services, 

Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and Department of the 

Treasury. Pilot Active and Standby components of the CRC within DOS have deployed 

members to Sudan, Chad, Haiti, Lebanon, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan to assist with 

conflict prevention and mitigation. 

3. Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration 

PRM has primary responsibility for formulating policies on population, refugees, and 

migration, and for administering US refugee assistance and admissions programs. PRM 

coordinates US international population policy and promotes its goals through bilateral 

and multilateral cooperation. It works closely with USAID, which administers US 

international population programs. PRM also coordinates US international migration 

policy within the USG and through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. PRM 

administers and monitors US contributions to NGOs and IGOs to assist and protect 
Department of State and United States Agency for 

International Development Organizations 

C-3 

refugees abroad. PRM also oversees admissions of tens of thousands of refugees to the 

US for permanent resettlement. The USG funds protection and life-sustaining relief for 

millions of refugees and victims of conflict around the globe; PRM is central to these 

efforts. 

4. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs 

a. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is the principal link between DOS 

and DOD. PM provides policy direction in the areas of international security, security 

assistance, military operations, defense strategy and plans, and defense trade. 

b. The Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA) creates local, regional 

and international conditions conducive to peace, stability, and prosperity by curbing the 

illicit proliferation of conventional weapons of war such as light automatic weapons, 

rocket propelled grenades, and by removing and destroying others, such as persistent land 

mines and abandoned stocks of munitions, that remain and pose hazards after the 

cessation of armed conflict. 

(1) WRA develops, implements, and monitors; policy, programs, and public 

engagement efforts that further US foreign policy goals through the development and 

implementation of comprehensive solutions to the harmful humanitarian effects caused 

by the existence of public hazards from conventional weapons following cessation of 

armed conflict. WRA works closely with OGAs as well as NGOs, IGOs, and private 

enterprises. 

(2) WRA serves as the lead organization in coordinating US humanitarian mine 

action activities worldwide. 

(a) The USG humanitarian mine action program assists selected countries 

in relieving human suffering and in developing an indigenous mine action capability 

while promoting US interests. The program provides increased humanitarian mine action 

assistance to countries suffering from the presence of persistent land mines, which maim 

and kill innocents, obstruct emergency assistance activities, hamper economic 

development, and impede free movement of citizens. 

(b) WRA develops and implements country-specific humanitarian mine 

action programs and oversees the interagency strategic planning and policy development 

processes supporting US global demining activities. It directly supports the work of the 

PCC Subgroup on Humanitarian Mine Action. 

c. The Office of International Security Operations is the primary interface 

between DOS and DOD on operational military matters. Specifically, it: 

(1) Initiates and coordinates exceptional requests from DOS to DOD for the 

provision and transport of HA in the event of disasters or pressing humanitarian crises 
Appendix C 

C-4 JP 3-29 

abroad. Requests may be on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis and are normally 

conveyed through Executive Secretary channels. 

(2) Coordinates DOS review and approval of DOD excess nonlethal supplies 

donations, HCA, and certain other types of HA overseas. The Office ensures assistance 

proposals are consistent with US foreign policy and meet relevant statutory requirements 

regarding HA. 

(3) Ensures assistance proposals are consistent with US foreign policy and meet 

relevant statutory requirements regarding HA. 

(4) Coordinates DOS review of Denton Program applications to ensure that they 

are consistent with US foreign policy objectives. 

(5) Reviews applications for the Funded Transportation Program to ensure that 

they are consistent with US foreign policy. 

d. The Office of Security Negotiations and Agreements facilitates the worldwide 

deployment of US military forces and protects current or former Service members from 

surrender to the International Criminal Court (ICC) without the consent of the USG. It 

negotiates SOFAs, defense cooperation agreements, burden-sharing agreements, and 

Article 98 agreements. The first three types of agreements support the deployment of US 

forces abroad while Article 98 agreements address the ICC. Article 98 agreements are 

bilateral non-surrender agreements protecting American citizens from the ICC. 

e. Office of the POLAD Coordinator (PM/POLAD) supports the community of 

POLADs to the US Service Chiefs and principal US military CDRs in the US and 

overseas. The POLADs are senior DOS officers (flag/general office-rank equivalent) 

detailed as personal advisors to leading US military leaders/CDRs to provide policy 

support regarding the diplomatic and political aspects of the CDRs' military 

responsibilities. The Office of the POLAD Coordinator also supports DOS’ participation 

in the DOS-DOD Officer Exchange Program. In addition, PM/POLAD supports DOS 

representatives in JIACGs at select military commands. 

5. Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation 

a. The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) is responsible 

for managing a broad range of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and arms control 

functions. ISN supports efforts of foreign partners to respond to the use of WMD by 

terrorists. 

b. Within ISN, the Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism develops 

policy and plans, directs initiatives, and coordinates partner capacity building activities to 

prevent, protect against, and respond to the threat or use of WMD by terrorists. The 

office will coordinate USG support to manage and mitigate the consequences of incidents 
Department of State and United States Agency for 

International Development Organizations 

C-5 

occurring in foreign jurisdictions that involve the use of CBRN contaminants. Key 

functions include: 

(1) supporting the needs of FCM missions. 

(2) collaborating with other elements of the USG to provide diplomatic support 

for FCM responsibilities and activities. 

(3) coordinating USG engagement with foreign governments and IGOs 

regarding FCM planning and capacity building. 

(4) improving the USG's management architecture for FCM support. 

c. FCM provides a critical element in a layered defense in depth against WMD 

terrorism. The Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism is responsible for the 

security policy framework that integrates FCM activities of the USG into a strategic 

architecture for planning and response. In this capacity, the office carries out the 

following activities: 

(1) Cooperates with foreign governments in their planning, capabilities, and 

response development. 

(2) Negotiates international FCM cooperation and planning agreements with 

foreign governments. 

(3) Provides FCM expertise and support to the DOS FEST and appropriate 

DOS task forces. 

6. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 

a. The mission of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism is to develop 

and lead a worldwide effort to combat terrorism using all the instruments of statecraft: 

diplomacy, economic power, intelligence, law enforcement, and military. Within the 

Office, the Operations Directorate leads and maintains the FEST. 

b. The FEST is the USG's only interagency, on-call, short-notice team poised to 

respond to terrorist and other incidents worldwide. The FEST is a rapid-response 

interagency team sent to support the COM. 

c. The FEST’s mission is to advise, assist, assess, and coordinate. Specifically, the 

FEST provides the COM, HN leaders, and incident managers guidance concerning US 

capabilities to mitigate the consequences of an incident/attack. The FEST brings unique 

FCM assistance capabilities not normally available at an affected US mission. 
Appendix C 

C-6 JP 3-29 

7. Humanitarian Information Unit 

a. HIU serves as a USG interagency center to identify, collect, analyze, and 

disseminate unclassified information critical to USG decision-makers and partners in 

preparation for and response to humanitarian emergencies worldwide, and to promote 

best practices for humanitarian information management. 

b. To accomplish this mission, the HIU performs the following tasks: 

(1) Identifies key sources of geospatial and georeferenced data best suited to 

meet the information requirements of its consumers. 

(2) Collects timely, verifiable, and relevant data utilizing an extensive network 

of information partnerships. 

(3) Analyzes data using multi-agency expertise and applying proven 

technologies to determine significant trends and relationships. 

(4) Disseminates information of value to all levels of consumers, from nationallevel policymakers to operational field managers. 

c. The HIU is part of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and receives oversight 

from a USG interagency executive steering committee. Its staff is composed of personnel 

from DOS, USAID, DOD, and NGA. 

8. US Agency for International Development 

a. USAID plays a vital role in promoting US national security, foreign policy, and 

the war on terrorism. It does so by addressing poverty fueled by lack of economic 

opportunity, one of the root causes of violence today. As stated in the President’s 

National Security Strategy, USAID’s work in development joins diplomacy and defense 

as one of three key pieces of the nation’s foreign policy apparatus. USAID promotes 

peace and stability by fostering economic growth, protecting human health, providing 

emergency HA, and enhancing democracy in developing countries. These efforts to 

improve the lives of millions of people worldwide represent US values and advance US 

interests for peace and prosperity. 

b. USAID provides assistance in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Near East, Latin 

America and the Caribbean, and Europe and Eurasia. With HQ in Washington, D.C., 

USAID’s strength is its field offices in many regions of the world. The agency works in 

100 developing countries and in close partnership with NGOs, IGOs, IPI, universities, 

American businesses, other governments, trade and professional associations, faith-based 

organizations, and OGAs. USAID has working relationships, through contracts and grant 

agreements, with more than 3,500 companies and over 300 US-based NGOs. 

For more information on USAID, see USAID Primer. 
Department of State and United States Agency for 

International Development Organizations 

C-7 

c. Within USAID, DCHA provides technical leadership and expertise in 

coordinating USAID's democracy programs; international disaster assistance; emergency 

and developmental food aid; aid to manage and mitigate conflict; and volunteer 

programs. DCHA provides technical leadership, support, and advice in developing 

policy and programs to assist countries transitioning out of crisis and administers disaster 

assistance, preparedness, and mitigation. DCHA also provides capacity building for US 

NGOs and aid to American schools and hospitals abroad. DCHA provides technical 

advice and support to the USAID Administrator, regional bureaus, field missions, and 

other offices with regard to these programs. 

(1) OMA addresses areas of common interests between defense and 

development, with a focus on improving civilian-military field readiness programs and 

coordination. Program areas of common interest include, but may not be limited to, HA, 

counterterrorism, SC, conflict prevention and mitigation, counterinsurgency, post-conflict 

reconstruction and stabilization, and transformational development. OMA serves as the 

agency-wide unit for managing the day-to-day aspects of the USAID-military 

relationship and consists of two divisions. 

(a) The Planning Division serves as the overall coordination unit for 

managing the day-to-day aspects of the USAID-military relationship, and for planning 

and developing effective operations. This includes developing a joint information 

network; prioritizing requests for participation in events, exchanges, and exercises; and 

overseeing program planning and development for priority regions and countries. It 

coordinates USAID civilian-military planning and analysis with DOD, DOS CRS, and 

OGAs. It manages training programs for selected military and civilian audiences; 

develops guidance on USAID and NGOs for use in the civilian-military context; and 

develops and manages staff, budgets, contracts, grants, and other mechanisms required to 

perform division duties, including program development, planning, training, and 

exercises. Finally, the Planning Division serves as the base for USAID personnel trained 

in the war colleges or other DOD institutes. 

(b) The Operations Division serves as the lead unit to develop operational 

readiness, leadership and coordinated response capacity for field operations requiring 

joint USAID-military action. Its functions include developing a network of contacts in 

the military as needed for operational readiness; supporting combatant commands during 

major operations; and conducting liaison with the Planning Division to develop a joint 

planning capacity within the combatant commands. It develops and leads the 

implementation of annual work plans with geographic and functional combatant 

commands; develops and maintains at least two rapid deployment teams that manage 

emergency responses; and develops a common logistics platform with OFDA, field 

missions, and DOD for reconstruction and stabilization initiatives. It keeps USAID 

bureaus informed of pending and ongoing field operations involving the US military; 

works with NGO and military personnel and organizations to strengthen field 

coordination; and develops a leadership training program, including long-term and shortterm modules. 
Appendix C 

C-8 JP 3-29 

(2) Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) supports local partners to advance 

peace and democracy in priority conflict-prone countries. At the request of and in 

coordination with the Congress, DOS, and the appropriate in-country US ambassadors 

and USAID field missions, OTI seizes critical windows of opportunity to provide on-theground, fast, flexible, catalytic short-term assistance that promotes movement toward 

political and social stability and democracy. OTI programs in such countries should 

continue until reasonable stability is established and an effective hand-off is completed to 

longer-term institutional development efforts. 

(a) The management and program operations team enhances and 

facilitates OTI activities worldwide by contributing to OTI's strategic plan and managing 

OTI's policy formulation; monitoring and evaluation of activities; internal 

communications and public outreach; budget formulation; tracking and reconciliation; 

procurement planning and processing; and general operations support and administrative 

services. 

(b) The field operations team develops and oversees OTI country 

programs, including country strategies, program design, implementation, and donor 

coordination; and conducts liaison with USAID bureaus, field missions, and OGAs to 

ensure policy compliance and coordination. 

(3) Office of Food for Peace (FFP) provides leadership, coordination, and 

operational support for international food activities. It develops USG policy, formal 

positions, and funding levels for grants and cooperative agreements to the WFP, NGOs, 

and in selected instances governments, implementing food programs. It provides 

assistance for emergency operations and support for USAID food security and 

developmental objectives. FFP implements legislation and policies governing the 

donation of US agricultural commodities. FFP manages a budget of over a billion dollars 

annually, and also oversees the procurement and shipping of over two million metric tons 

of food annually. The Famine Early Warning System is also part of FFP. 

d. OFDA coordinates and ensures that the needs of disaster victims are met by 

providing all forms of relief and rehabilitation. OFDA provides technical support to the 

Administrator, who serves as the President's Special Coordinator for International 

Disaster Assistance. OFDA formulates US foreign disaster assistance policy in 

coordination with OGAs. OFDA works with national and international foreign affairs 

agencies, DOD, DOS, UN agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector in disaster 

prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, and rehabilitation. OFDA funds and 

procures relief supplies and administrative support for short- and long-term disaster 

situations and provides humanitarian relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction assistance 

to foreign disaster victims. There are three divisions within OFDA. 

(1) The Disaster Response and Mitigation Division coordinates with USAID 

offices and others to provide relief supplies and HA. It plans for the level of response 

needed for an emergency and implements and manages USG disaster relief and 

rehabilitation programs worldwide. It devises, coordinates, and implements program 
Department of State and United States Agency for 

International Development Organizations 

C-9 

strategies for the application of the most current science and technology to prevention, 

mitigation, and national and international preparedness for a variety of natural and manmade disaster situations. It evaluates the impact of previous disaster response 

initiatives/programs and ensures the integration of this information into future planning 

and response activities. It coordinates with other USAID geographic bureaus’ donor 

organizations, UN agencies, and NGOs. 

(2) The Operations Division develops and manages logistical, operational, and 

technical support for disaster responses. It identifies sources for procurement of relief 

supplies and manages the stockpiling and transportation of those supplies. It maintains 

readiness to respond to emergencies through several mechanisms, including managing 

SAR teams, maintaining the operational status of the ground operations team, and 

developing and maintaining the capability to field DART and response management 

teams in Washington. It develops and maintains OFDA’s relationship with the DOD, the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency, DOS, and the Department of Energy. 

(3) The Program Support Division provides programmatic and administrative 

support, including budget/financial services, procurement planning, contract/grant 

administration, general administrative support, and communication support for both 

OFDA Washington and its field offices. It supports the OFDA mission by providing 

centralized control of funds, resources, and procurement to facilitate the time-sensitive 

delivery of relief assistance. It also maintains and develops administrative and 

programmatic policy as it relates to OFDA programs. 

(4) Each fiscal year, DOS releases a cable, “Subject: USAID/DCHA Office of 

US Foreign Disaster Assistance's Guidance for Disaster Planning and Response FY 

XXXX.” This cable provides guidance to all posts concerning support from 

USAID/DCHA's OFDA before, during, and after the occurrence of natural and complex 

disasters abroad in Fiscal Year XXXX. USAID/OFDA's mission, capabilities, and 

support capacities in coordinating and managing USG assistance in response to disasters 

are also outlined. Procedures highlight the need for both continuous USAID/OFDA and 

USAID mission collaboration in the planning process for disasters as well as regular and 

sustained communication between MDROs and USAID/OFDA regional advisors and 

coordinators to ensure timely, appropriate, and effective USG emergency assistance. The 

guidance provided in the cable should be used in conjunction with Automated Directives 

System 251 on international disaster assistance. This is an important reference for 

planning FHA operations. 

9. Disaster Assistance Response Team 

a. The DART was developed by USAID’s OFDA to provide rapid response to 

foreign disasters as mandated by the FAA. A DART provides a variety of trained 

specialists to assist US embassies and USAID missions with managing the USG response 

to foreign disasters. DART activities vary according to the nature, magnitude, and 

complexity of each disaster and are staffed accordingly. 
Appendix C 

C-10 JP 3-29 

b. Immediate Action. During the initial onset of disasters, the DART focuses upon: 

(1) Coordinating needs assessments. 

(2) Recommending USG response. 

(3) Managing USG on-site relief activities, including SAR and air operations. 

(4) Managing receipt, distribution, and monitoring of USG-provided relief 

supplies. 

(5) Liaison with NGOs and IGOs. 

c. During long-term, complex disasters, the DART focuses upon: 

(1) Collecting situational and general data on the disaster. 

(2) Monitoring effectiveness of USG-funded relief activities. 

(3) Reviewing relief proposals for potential funding by OFDA. 

(4) Recommending follow-on strategies and actions to OFDA Washington. 

d. During either type of disaster response, DARTs coordinate their activities with 

the affected country, NGOs, IGOs, other assisting countries, and deployed US military 

resources, including HASTs formed by the CCDR. 

e. Structure. The DART is structured according to the size, complexity, type, and 

location of the disaster as well as the needs of the affected country. DART staffing is 

based upon personnel numbers and skills needed to carry out the strategy and meet 

mission objectives. The DART is designed as a highly flexible, mobile organization 

capable of adapting to changing disaster requirements; therefore, the DART structure will 

vary considerably from operation to operation. 

f. Functional Areas. The DART operates in five functional areas. 

(1) Management. Manages overall DART activities including liaison with the 

affected country, NGOs, IGOs, other assisting countries, and US military. Develops and 

implements plans to meet strategic objectives. 

(2) Operations. Manages DART operational activities, including SAR 

activities, technical support, medical and health response, and aerial operations 

coordination. This function is most active during the initial onset of a disaster. 

(3) Planning. Collects, evaluates, tracks, and disseminates disaster 

information. Reviews activities, recommends actions, and develops its operational plan. 
Department of State and United States Agency for 

International Development Organizations 

C-11 

(4) Logistics. Supports OFDA and DART personnel by managing supplies, 

equipment, and services. Orders, receives, distributes, and tracks personnel and USGprovided relief supplies. 

(5) Administration. Manages team fiscal activities and DART cost 

accounting, contracts, and procures OFDA DART-required goods and services. 

g. Organization. Decisions related to DART activation, composition, and mission 

are made at an OFDA disaster response planning meeting in Washington, DC, by the 

OFDA Director. An OFDA-selected team leader organizes and supervises the DART. 

The OFDA Assistant Director for Disaster Response (or designee) delegates authority to 

and supervises the team leader. The delegation lists DART objectives, priorities, 

constraints, and reporting requirements. Based on this list and in conjunction with the 

assistant Director for Disaster Response and Operations Division, the team leader 

identifies other positions needed.

h. Coordination with the USAID Representative to the Embassy. Prior to 

departure, the team leader will contact the USAID representative in the affected country 

to discuss the situation, review DART objectives and capabilities, and obtain additional 

instructions or authority. While in the affected country, the team leader advises and may 

receive directions from the USAID representative. Directions will be followed to the 

extent that they do not conflict with OFDA policies, authorities, and procedures. The 

team leader maintains direct communications with OFDA to coordinate policies, 

authorities, and procedures. The team leader maintains direct LOCs with OFDA 

Washington throughout the operation. 

i. Coordination with the JFC. Neither the DART nor JFC is subordinate to the 

other; a successful relationship is based upon close coordination and mutual 

understanding of each element’s respective mission. Both have a common purpose and, 

accordingly, have much to gain through close coordination and unity of effort. In some 

cases it will be appropriate to have a DART member attached to the JTF HQ. Although 

the DART represents OFDA, which is the lead USG agency for the FHA response, the 

CJTF should be aware that the COM is in charge of all USG activities in the disasteraffected country. 

j. Duration. The DART leader and OFDA Washington will review the disaster 

situation and DART progress in achieving mission objectives. The DART leader and 

OFDA Washington set the duration of the DART accordingly. 

For more information on the DART, see USAID Field Operations Guide for Disaster 

Assessment and Response. 
Appendix C 

C-12 JP 3-29 

10. Interagency Management System

The IMS for stabilization and reconstruction is designed to assist policymakers in 

the management of complex stabilization and reconstruction engagements by ensuring 

coordination among all USG players at the strategic, operational and tactical/field levels. 

The IMS is designed for high priority complex crises and operations, which may require 

military operations, and where multiple USG agencies will participate. Although IMS is 

primarily a system for interagency coordination in support of SSTR, parts of the system 

may be used during an FHA operation due to the interagency nature of FHA. 
APPENDIX D

HUMANITARIAN NONGOVERNMENTAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL 

ORGANIZATIONS 

D-1 

1. General 

By nature, responses to humanitarian emergencies are difficult to manage. Many 

actors - governments, NGOs and IGOs - seek to respond simultaneously to complex 

emergencies. Creating a coherent framework within which everyone can contribute 

promptly and effectively to the overall effort is a daunting task. The UN is the major 

provider and coordinator of HA around the world. The UN has strengthened cooperation 

with other organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental, and has taken actions to 

speed its emergency response capability. US military personnel will most likely operate 

with some of the primary IGOs and NGOs described in this appendix. 

More detail is provided in JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint 

Operations, Volume I and Volume II. 

2. The United Nations 

a. Since it first coordinated humanitarian relief operations in Europe following the 

devastation and massive displacement of people in the Second World War, the international 

community has relied on the UN to respond to natural and man-made disasters that are 

beyond the capacity of national authorities alone. Today, the UN is a major provider of 

emergency relief and longer-term assistance, a catalyst for action by governments and relief 

agencies, and an advocate on behalf of people struck by emergencies. The UN follows the 

principles of HA: neutrality, impartiality, and humanity. This section provides information 

regarding UN organizations and programs that have worldwide HA mandates that a CDR 

may encounter during FHA operations. 

b. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The mission of 

UNOCHA is to mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in 

partnership with national and international actors to: alleviate human suffering in disasters 

and emergencies, advocate for the rights of people in need, promote preparedness and 

prevention, and facilitate sustainable solutions. As the UN focal point for civil-military 

coordination of HA activities within UNOCHA, the Civil Military Coordination Section 

ensures the effective use of military and civil defense assets in disaster relief and HA 

operations, establishes civil-military coordination mechanisms to facilitate interaction and 

cooperation, and upholds humanitarian principles in support of humanitarian coordinators 

and UNOCHA’s mandate. 

c. UNDAC is a stand-by team of disaster management professionals who are 

nominated and funded by member governments, UNOCHA, UNDP, and operational 

humanitarian UN agencies such as WFP, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and 

World Health Organization (WHO). Upon request of a disaster-stricken country, the 

UNDAC team can be deployed within hours to carry out rapid assessment of priority needs 

and to support national authorities and the UN resident coordinator to coordinate 

international relief on-site. The team is responsible for providing first-hand information on 
Appendix D 

the disaster situation and priority needs of the victims to the international community 

through UNOCHA. 

d. The OSOCC, run by the UNDAC team, assists local authorities with coordinating 

international response teams during disasters. In addition, an internet-based virtual OSOCC 

facilitates information exchange between responding governments and organizations 

throughout the relief operation. Establishing an OSOCC is one of the functions an UNDAC 

team will frequently be asked to perform. The size and functions of the OSOCC will vary in 

each emergency. However, its basic structure is described in the UNDAC Handbook. The 

UNDAC team should modify this to suit the requirements of the situation. 

(1) An OSOCC has three main objectives: 

(a) To provide a system for coordinating and directing the activities of an 

international relief effort at the site of a disaster/emergency; this is especially the case in an 

earthquake scenario to coordinate the activities of international urban SAR teams. 

(b) To provide a framework/platform for cooperation and coordination among 

the international humanitarian entities at a disaster/emergency site. 

(c) To act as a link between such entities and the affected country’s 

authorities. 

(2) An OSOCC is designed to facilitate the coordination of the international relief 

community in a disaster/emergency. The emergency management principles behind the 

OSOCC’s scope, structure, and procedures make the OSOCC a valid tool in any suddenonset disaster involving international relief resources. The OSOCC system is designed as a 

rapid response tool. To be effective, it should be initiated in the immediate aftermath of a 

disaster/emergency and before, or simultaneously with, the arrival of international relief 

resources. It is expected that an OSOCC in some form would be operational during the 

relief phase of an emergency until the national/local authorities or the traditional UN 

structure can cope with the coordination of international resources or until the international 

relief resources meeting emergency requirements have been withdrawn. 

e. The UNDAC Handbook is a reference guide for the use of members of the UNDAC 

team undertaking an emergency mission. The handbook contains a variety of useful 

information, checklists, and a description of coordination structures in the field. It has been 

designed and written in the form of a typical UNDAC mission cycle with chapters 

commencing with the UNDAC members' preparation prior to a mission, through various 

stages of a mission until the termination of the mission and debriefing. It also attempts to 

assist UNDAC members in accomplishing any of the various tasks they may be expected to 

perform on missions. These include a range of issues such as staffing an OSOCC for urban 

SAR teams during an earthquake, to working with military contingents in humanitarian 

emergencies. It also contains useful data for everyday use on a mission such as composition 

of medical kits, security precautions, and characteristics of operating in different climatic 

D-2 JP 3-29 
Humanitarian Nongovernmental and Intergovernmental Organizations 

conditions and terrain. The handbook has been compiled utilizing information from a wide 

spectrum of acknowledged sources. 

f. ReliefWeb is the world’s leading on-line gateway to information (documents and 

maps) on humanitarian emergencies and disasters. An independent vehicle of information, 

designed specifically to assist the international humanitarian community in effective 

delivery of emergency assistance, it provides timely, reliable and relevant information as 

events unfold, while emphasizing the coverage of “forgotten emergencies” at the same time. 

ReliefWeb is administered by UNOCHA. 

g. HICs aim to ensure that individuals and organizations at field and strategic levels 

have access to the benefits of information management tools to assess, plan, implement, and 

monitor HA. HICs are an inter-organizational resource, reporting to the 

humanitarian/resident coordinator, whose products and services are available to the entire 

humanitarian community. HICs provide surge capacity to the humanitarian community, and 

particularly to the coordination function, usually (but not exclusively) in the context of 

complex emergencies. 

h. The International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) is a global 

network of more than 80 countries and disaster response organizations under the UN 

umbrella. INSARAG deals with urban SAR related issues and aims at establishing 

standards for international urban SAR teams and methodology for international coordination 

in earthquake response. The INSARAG Search and Rescue Directory provides an overview 

of INSARAG member countries and their urban SAR teams in the INSARAG regional 

groups Africa/Europe, Asia/Pacific, and the Americas. 

i. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. UNHCR is mandated to lead 

and coordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems 

worldwide. UNHCR’s primary purpose is to safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees. 

In its efforts to achieve this objective, UNHCR strives to ensure that everyone can exercise 

the right to seek asylum and find safe refuge in another State, and to return home 

voluntarily. By assisting refugees to return to their own country or to settle permanently in 

another country, UNHCR also seeks lasting solutions to their plight. As a humanitarian, 

nonpolitical organization, UNHCR has two basic and closely related aims – to protect 

refugees and to seek ways to help them restart their lives in a normal environment. 

Increasingly, UNHCR has provided assistance to some groups of IDPs. 

(1) The great majority of today's refugees would prefer to return home willingly 

once the situation stabilizes. In these circumstances, UNHCR encourages voluntary return 

by providing transportation, financial incentives, and practical help such as seeds, farming 

equipment, and building materials. 

(2) Sometimes, when it is impossible for civilians to go home, UNHCR helps 

them either to integrate in countries where they first sought asylum or to go to one of 16 

states that regularly accept refugees for permanent resettlement. 

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Appendix D 

j. World Food Programme. WFP’s objectives are to establish international 

procedures for meeting emergency food needs and emergencies inherent in chronic 

malnutrition; assist in preschool and school feeding programs; and implement food-for-work 

pilot projects in support of social and economic development. WFP’s primary task is to 

furnish food in support of economic and social development projects in developing 

countries. In addition, substantial resources may be provided to meet emergency food 

needs. WFP purchases and ships food needed in emergencies on behalf of donor 

governments, UNOCHA, or the affected countries. WFP staff may assist, when required, in 

coordinating the reception and utilization of food aid received from all sources. The WFP 

can be regarded as the de facto logistic arm of the UN in disaster situations. The WFP also 

hosts the Humanitarian Early Warning Service (HEWSweb). HEWSweb 

(www.hewsweb.org) is an interagency partnership project aimed at establishing a common 

platform for humanitarian early warnings and forecasts for natural hazards. The main 

objective of HEWSweb is to bring together and make accessible in a simple manner the 

most credible early warning information available at the global level from multiple 

specialized institutions. 

k. United Nations Joint Logistic Centre. The UNJLC is an interagency humanitarian 

common service. Its mandate is to provide logistics information management support and 

services. This involves providing an information platform for the gathering, collating, 

analysis, and dissemination of logistic information as well as commodity tracking and 

prioritization services. UNJLC operates under the custodianship of WFP which is 

responsible for the administrative and financial oversight of UNJLC. When deployed, the 

mission of the UNJLC, will be to optimize and complement the logistics capabilities of 

cooperating agencies within a well-defined crisis area for the benefit of the ongoing 

humanitarian operation. This includes the option to establish satellite joint logistics centers 

dispersed at critical locations in the theatre of operations. The UNJLC will provide logistics 

support at operational planning, coordination, and monitoring level. Unless specified 

otherwise, the UN agencies and other humanitarian bodies, which are established in the 

area, will continue to exercise their normal responsibilities. UNJLC responsibilities will be 

defined per the requirements on a case by case basis and will be specified in the terms of 

reference. In general, the main responsibilities will be: 

(1) Collectively identifying and eliminating logistic bottlenecks of common 

interest to the humanitarian community to avoid duplication and wasteful competition 

among agencies. Related to this task, the UNJLC plans, prioritizes, and deconflicts relief 

movements when available infrastructure capacity is limited. When operating air assets for 

common use, UNJLC will be in charge of the planning and prioritization. Through this 

process, the UNJLC advises on the most efficient transport modes and performs movement 

advisory functions. 

(2) Accomplishing logistic related policy issues affecting humanitarian logistic 

operations. These include the negotiation of facilitation measures with local customs to 

expedite the transit and import of relief commodities and the investigation of possible fuel 

shortages which would affect humanitarian relief operations. 

D-4 JP 3-29 
Humanitarian Nongovernmental and Intergovernmental Organizations 

(3) Coordinating and deconflicting humanitarian movements with military 

authorities. 

(4) Making detailed assessments of roads, bridges, airports, ports and other 

logistics infrastructure and recommending actions for repair and reconstruction. 

(5) Acting as a platform for gathering, collating, analyzing, and disseminating 

information required by agencies to optimize logistics planning and management. This 

involves two basic information categories: pipeline/commodity tracking, including agency 

stock positions; and logistics support information, such as humanitarian logistics 

installations and assets, status of corridors and border crossings, customs and infrastructure 

assessments. The UNJLC has geographic information system and mapping capabilities. A 

variety of dissemination mechanisms are employed, including interagency meetings, 

bulletins, and compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM). A generic website is 

maintained, housing general reference and deployment-specific materials. 

l. United Nations Children’s Fund. UNICEF is mandated to advocate for the 

protection of children's rights, to help meet their basic needs, and to expand their 

opportunities to reach their full potential. UNICEF responds in emergencies to protect the 

rights of children. In coordination with UN partners and humanitarian agencies, UNICEF 

makes its unique facilities for rapid response available to its partners to relieve the suffering 

of children and those who provide their care. UNICEF uses materials from emergency 

stockpiles in the UNICEF warehouses in Copenhagen to meet emergency requirements. 

UNICEF can also procure relief supplies on behalf of other UN agencies and relief 

organizations. In the first six to eight weeks following the outbreak of a crisis with its 

national UN and NGO partner organizations, UNICEF will work to: 

(1) Assess, monitor, report, and communicate the situation of children and 

women: conduct a rapid assessment, including determination of severe or systematic abuse, 

violence, or exploitation; and report through the appropriate mechanisms. 

(2) Provide vaccination, essential drugs, and nutritional supplements: vaccinate 

children between 6 months and 14 years of age against measles; providing vitamin A 

supplementation as required; provide essential drugs, basic and emergency health kits, oral 

rehydration, fortified nutritional products, and micronutrient supplements; provide postrape-care kits, including post-exposure prophylaxis for human immunodeficiency virus, 

where appropriate; and provide other emergency supplies such as blankets and tarpaulins. 

(3) Provide child and maternal feeding and nutritional monitoring: with the WFP 

and NGO partners, support infant and young child feeding, therapeutic, and supplementary 

feeding; introduce nutritional monitoring and surveillance. 

(4) Provide safe drinking water, sanitation, and hygiene: emergency water supply 

and purification, provision of basic family water kits, safe disposal of feces, and hygiene 

education. 

D-5 
Appendix D 

(5) Assist in preventing the separation and facilitate the identification, registration, 

and medical screening of children separated from their families: ensure family tracing 

systems are put in place and provide care and protection; and prevent sexual abuse and 

exploitation of children and women. 

(6) Initiate the resumption of schooling and other child learning opportunities: set 

up temporary learning spaces and reopen schools, start reintegrating teachers and children 

(with a focus on girls), and organize recreational activities. 

m. UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). With most communities 

dependent on agriculture and related enterprises for their food security and livelihoods, 

FAO’s expertise in farming, livestock, fisheries, and forestry is crucial in emergency 

response and rehabilitation efforts. In responding to an emergency, FAO collaborates with 

many partners, including governments, other UN organizations, and humanitarian groups. 

During these crises, assistance is required to restore local food production and reduce 

dependency on food aid, an essential part of the recovery process. This is where FAO plays 

a vital role. The Emergency Operations Division of the Technical Cooperation Department 

of the FAO, working jointly with the WFP, sends missions to the affected areas to assess the 

crop and food supply situation. During these missions, experts consult closely with the 

farmers, herders, fishers, and local authorities. Once the assessment mission is finished, 

FAO designs a relief and rehabilitation program and mobilizes funds for its implementation. 

In response to emergencies, FAO distributes material assets, such as seed and fertilizer, 

fishing equipment, livestock, and farm tools. 

n. World Health Organization. The WHO’s Emergency Response and Operations 

Group is responsible for developing health action in crisis’s operational and logistic capacity 

in support of countries in acute crises as well as for developing standard operating 

procedures for emergencies, to ensure a uniform approach across WHO to crises that 

demand an immediate response. The group is also responsible for assessing, tracking, and 

reviewing organizational performance and health outcomes in response to crises. 

(1) WHO's key functions in a crisis are to: 

(a) Promptly assess health needs of populations affected by crises and 

measure ill-health, identifying priority causes of ill-health and death. 

(b) Support member states in coordinating action for health. 

(c) Ensure that critical gaps in health response are rapidly identified and 

filled. 

(d) Support restoration of essential public health functions. 

(e) Revitalize health systems and build up their capacity for preparedness and 

response. 

D-6 JP 3-29 
Humanitarian Nongovernmental and Intergovernmental Organizations 

(2) WHO's mobile response teams bring together expertise in epidemic response, 

logistics, security coordination, and management. They are combined with mobile teams 

provided by the UN as a whole. They will empower the UN organizations in the affected 

country to better address the health aspects of crises. 

o. United Nations Development Programme. Following disasters and armed 

conflict, UNDP assists national governments and communities to lay the foundation for 

sustainable development. UNDP’s expertise and resources focus on several areas; however, 

early recovery will be the initial effort. Early recovery focuses on restoring the capacity of 

national institutions and communities after a crisis. Early recovery begins in a humanitarian 

relief setting, immediately following a natural disaster or armed conflict. Guided by 

development principles, the early recovery phase aims to generate self-sustaining, 

nationally-owned processes, to stabilize human security and address underlying risks that 

contributed to the crisis. Early recovery encompasses a wide range of areas such as 

governance, livelihoods, shelter, environment, and social dimensions, including the 

reintegration of displaced populations. 

p. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The Post-Conflict and 

Disaster Management Branch extends UNEP's work in areas of the world where the 

environment is impacted by conflicts and disasters, or where the environment is a factor 

contributing to conflicts and disaster impacts. Because conflicts and disasters are so closely 

intertwined with the environment, proper environmental management and governance is 

essential for long-term peace, stability, and security in any conflict- or disaster-prone 

country. It conducts environmental assessments in crisis affected countries and strengthens 

national environmental management capacity through institution building, promoting 

regional cooperation, technical legal assistance, environmental information management, 

and integrating environmental concerns and risk reduction measures in reconstruction 

programs. Field-based assessments are conducted to identify the impacts of a conflict or 

disaster on environmental systems and the possible, indirect impacts on human health. 

UNEP delivers technical support for environmental clean-up or to mitigate environmental 

risks caused by disasters or conflicts, including those posed by chemical contamination or 

severe environmental damage to human health or livelihoods. 

3. International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 

a. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement are made up of the ICRC, 

the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and the 185 

individual national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. The mission of the International 

Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is to prevent and alleviate human suffering 

wherever it may be found, to protect life and health and ensure respect for the human being, 

particularly in times of armed conflict and other emergencies, to work for the prevention of 

disease and for the promotion of health and social welfare, to encourage voluntary service 

and a constant readiness to give help by the members of the movement, and a universal 

sense of solidarity towards all those in need of its protection and assistance. Each 

component of the movement is independent, although all act in accordance with the 

fundamental principles of the movement for unity of effort and cooperation. The seven 

D-7 
Appendix D 

fundamental principles of the movement are: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, 

independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality. 

b. International Committee of the Red Cross. ICRC is an impartial, neutral, and 

independent organization with an exclusively humanitarian mission to protect the lives and 

dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. During 

conflicts, it directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the 

movement. It also endeavors to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening 

humanitarian principles. 

(1) Its specific tasks applicable to FHA include: 

(a) Visits and interviews, without witness, to prisoners of war and detained or 

interned civilians. 

(b) Search for missing persons. 

(c) Transmission of messages between family members separated by conflict, 

including from prisoners of war and detained civilians. 

(d) Reunification of dispersed families. 

(e) Provision of basic health care services. 

(f) Provision of urgently needed food, water, sanitation and shelter to civilians 

without access to these basic necessities. 

(g) Monitoring compliance with and contributing to the development of 

international humanitarian principles. 

(h) Spreading knowledge of international humanitarian principles. 

(2) The ICRC mandate has two sources of authority, the Geneva Conventions and 

the ICRC's statutes, which encourage it to undertake similar work in situations of internal 

violence, where the Geneva Conventions do not apply. 

(3) The ICRC receives its funding from voluntary contributions from 

governments, other IGOs, national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and private 

sources. 

c. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The 

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies is the world's largest 

humanitarian organization, providing assistance without discrimination as to nationality, 

race, religious beliefs, class, or political opinions. The International Federation comprises 

185 member Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, a Secretariat in Geneva and more than 

60 delegations strategically located to support activities around the world. The Red 

D-8 JP 3-29 
Humanitarian Nongovernmental and Intergovernmental Organizations 

Crescent is used in place of the Red Cross in many Islamic countries. The additional 

emblem of the Red Crystal now has the same status as the Red Cross and Red Crescent. 

(1) The vision of the International Federation is to strive, through voluntary action, 

for a world of empowered communities, better able to address human suffering and crises 

with hope, respect for dignity, and a concern for equity. 

(2) Its mission is to improve the lives of vulnerable people by mobilizing the 

power of humanity. Often, these are victims of natural disasters, poverty brought about by 

socio-economic crises, refugees, and victims of health emergencies. 

(3) The Federation carries out relief operations to assist victims of disasters, and 

combines this with development work to strengthen the capacities of its member national 

societies. The Federation's work focuses on four core areas: promoting humanitarian values, 

disaster response, disaster preparedness, and health and community care. 

(4) The Code of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent 

Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief represents a huge leap forward in setting standards 

for disaster response. It is being used by the International Federation to monitor its own 

standards of relief delivery and to encourage other agencies to set similar standards. The 

Code of Conduct is voluntary and applicable to any NGO; and lays down 10 points of 

principle which all NGOs should adhere to in their disaster response work, and goes on to 

describe the type relationships with donor governments that agencies working in disasters 

should seek. 

(5) Emergency response units (ERUs) are self-contained teams of specialist 

professionals and pre-packed sets of standardized equipment. The personnel guarantee to be 

available within 48 hours, and the full unit aims to be operational on site within one week. 

ERUs were developed to improve the speed and efficiency with which the Federation is able 

to respond to disasters. ERUs reduce the burden on a National Society and Federation 

delegation facing a major disaster. They can also move rapidly into a disaster area where no 

Federation delegation or national society structure is present. There are five types of ERU, 

each offering a different specialist activity: basic health care; logistics, water, and sanitation; 

referral hospital facilities (field hospitals); information technology and telecommunication; 

and relief (assessments). 

(6) The International Federation has developed the field assessment and 

coordination teams (FACTs) concept. The methodology has been developed in close 

cooperation with UNOCHA, and the assessment and coordination systems are compatible 

with UNOCHA's UNDAC system. 

(a) A core group of experienced Red Cross/Red Crescent disaster managers 

from within the Federation and from the national societies with different expertise in relief, 

logistics, health, nutrition, public health and epidemiology, water and sanitation, finance, 

administration, psychological support, as well as language capabilities, have become 

members of FACT, and are able to support national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 

D-9 
Appendix D 

in major disaster response. They are ready to participate in a FACT deployment with 12-24 

hours notice for 2-4 weeks anywhere in the world. 

(b) In the case of a humanitarian emergency, the national society in the 

affected country may request assistance from the International Federation. In this case, 

FACT members all over the world are alerted using automated systems and their availability 

within 12-24 hours is requested. The Operations Support Department, in consultation with 

the Regional Department at the Secretariat, composes a team that is deployed to the 

disaster area immediately. The FACT works with counterparts from the local national 

society, and with members of regional disaster response teams, members of the Federation 

regional or country delegation, and the ICRC. 

(c) In coordination with local authorities, UN organizations and NGOs, the 

FACT carries out an assessment of the situation and identifies the most urgent needs. The 

team compiles an assessment report, a plan of action that recommends the most appropriate 

Red Cross/Red Crescent intervention, and drafts an appeal, which is then launched by the 

Federation Secretariat in Geneva to the member national societies and other donors. 

(d) The FACT also facilitates and coordinates the start-up of relief activities. 

It may request ERUs and coordinate their deployment, advise on and request other human 

and material resources, and coordinate the assistance provided by the Red Cross Movement 

in response to the disaster. 

(e) After assisting in the implementation of the plan of action, the FACT 

hands over the relief operation to the host national society, the delegation, and the delegates 

who have been recruited to support them. 

d. National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. National Red Cross and Red 

Crescent Societies form the basic units and constitute a vital force of the International Red 

Cross and Red Crescent Movement in nearly all countries. National societies act as 

auxiliaries to the public authorities of their own countries in the humanitarian field and 

provide a range of services including disaster relief, health, and social programs. During 

wartime, national societies assist the affected civilian population and support the army 

medical services where appropriate. 

4. International Organization for Migration 

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is the principal IGO in the field of 

migration. IOM is dedicated to promoting humane and orderly migration for the benefit of 

all. As an intergovernmental body, IOM acts with its partners in the international 

community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance 

understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through 

migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants. It does so by 

providing services and advice to governments and migrants. IOM works to help ensure the 

orderly and humane management of migration, to promote international cooperation on 

migration issues, to assist in the search for practical solutions to migration problems and to 

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Humanitarian Nongovernmental and Intergovernmental Organizations 

provide HA to migrants in need, be they refugees, displaced persons or other uprooted 

people. IOM works in the four broad areas of migration management: migration and 

development, facilitating migration, regulating migration, and addressing forced migration. 

IOM works closely with governmental, IGO, and NGO partners. With offices and 

operations on every continent, IOM helps governments and civil society through: 

a. Rapid humanitarian responses to sudden migration flows. 

b. Post-emergency return and reintegration programs. 

c. Assistance to migrants on their way to new homes and lives. 

d. Facilitation of labor migration. 

e. Assisted voluntary return for irregular migrants. 

f. Recruitment of highly qualified nationals for return to their countries of origin. 

g. Aid to migrants in distress. 

h. Training and capacity-building of officials. 

i. Measures to counter TIP. 

j. Migration medical and public health programs. 

k. Mass information and education on migration. 

l. Research related to migration management and other services for migrants. 

5. Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit 

a. The Euro-Atlantic disaster response unit (EADRU) was created by NATO to 

coordinate disaster relief efforts for the member countries of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 

Council (EAPC) in case of a natural or technological disaster in the EAPC geographical 

area. 

b. EADRU is located at NATO HQ in Brussels, Belgium, and is headed by the 

Director Civil Emergency Planning with additional staff from NATO and Partner Countries. 

The EADRU is also open to representatives from the UN and the NATO Military 

Authorities. In close consultation with the UNOCHA, the EADRU is responsible for 

coordinating the response of EAPC Countries to a disaster occurring within the EAPC 

geographical area. 

c. EADRU is a non-standing, multinational mix of national civil and military elements 

(qualified personnel of rescue, medical and other units, equipment and materials, assets, and 

D-11 
Appendix D 

transport) which are volunteered by EAPC countries. The EADRU can be deployed in case of 

a major natural or technological disaster in an EAPC country upon request from the stricken 

country or in support of a relevant international organization. The composition and size of this 

multinational EADRU will be determined by the requirements based on an international 

assessment of each particular disaster. National elements will remain under national control 

while deployed in the stricken country as an asset of the local emergency management agency. 

The area of deployment of the EADRU will be limited to the EAPC member countries. In 

exceptional circumstances, should there be a RFA for a stricken non-EAPC country; political 

guidance will be obtained as a matter of urgency before initiating any disaster response via the 

EADRU. 

6. American Council for Voluntary International Action 

a. InterAction is the largest coalition of US-based international NGOs focused on the 

world’s poor and most vulnerable people. Collectively, InterAction’s more than 165 

members work in every developing country. Based in Washington, DC with a staff of 40, 

InterAction’s member agencies are large and small, faith-based and secular, and are 

headquartered across 25 states. 

b. InterAction exercises leadership in conflict prevention, the peaceful resolution of 

disputes, and peace building initiatives in post-conflict situations. InterAction members 

respond to natural disasters all around the world. 

c. InterAction leverages the impact of US private support by advocating for the 

expansion of USG investments and by insisting that policies and programs are responsive to 

the realities of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable populations. 

d. InterAction brings the values and experience of the NGO community into the 

broader development and HA community through strategic alliances with key partners 

around particular issues and objectives. 

e. InterAction’s work is guided by the following priorities: 

(1) Promote a bold agenda to focus US development and HA on improving the 

conditions of the world’s poor and most vulnerable. 

(2) Demonstrate and enhance NGO accountability and impact in development and 

humanitarian action. Focus on aggregating the contributions of the NGO community 

towards achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals, on broadening compliance with 

the Sphere Project Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, 

and on aligning with other key global frameworks that advance development efforts and 

enable humanitarian action. 

(3) Be the voice and prime representative of US international NGOs in building 

alliances and common agendas with NGO networks around the world and with other 

strategic partners. 

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7. European Community Humanitarian Aid Department 

The European Union as a whole (i.e., the Member States and the Commission) is one of 

the world's main humanitarian aid donors; the European Community Humanitarian Aid 

Department (ECHO) is the service of the European Commission responsible for this 

activity. The European Union’s mandate to ECHO is to provide emergency assistance and 

relief to the victims of natural disasters or armed conflict outside the European Union. The 

aid is intended to go directly to those in distress, irrespective of race, religion, or political 

convictions. ECHO’s task is to ensure goods and services get to crisis zones fast. Goods 

may include essential supplies, specific foodstuffs, medical equipment, medicines and fuel. 

Services may include medical teams, water purification teams and logistical support. Goods 

and services reach disaster areas via ECHO partners. 

8. Other Organizations 

a. Pan American Disaster Response Unit (PADRU). The mission of the PADRU 

is to prevent and relieve the suffering caused by natural and man-made disasters in the 

Americas, following the fundamental principles and policies of the International 

Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The PADRU is the focal point for 

response preparedness and response; its goal is to increase coherence of the International 

Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in the region through appropriate coordination 

and planning; strengthening capacities to face a crisis during a disaster. The role of the 

PADRU is to ensure high quality Red Cross assistance to vulnerable people affected by 

disasters in the Americas by reinforcing the capacity of national societies and the 

Federation Secretariat to provide timely, bold, and professional disaster response services 

before, during, and after emergencies. PADRU is designed to support the efficient and 

effective response to disasters by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red 

Crescent Societies as a whole. It provides support to national societies in coordination 

with the regional delegations through coordination, personnel, logistical support, and 

leadership, as appropriate. 

b. The Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA) serves the 

Caribbean Community. CDERA's main function is to make an immediate and coordinated 

response to any disastrous event affecting any participating state, once the state requests 

such assistance. Other functions include: 

(1) Securing, collating, and channeling comprehensive and reliable information on 

disasters affecting the region to interested governmental and NGOs. 

(2) Mitigating, or eliminating as far as possible, the consequences of disasters 

affecting participating states. 

(3) Establishing and maintaining on a sustainable basis, adequate disaster response 

capabilities among participating states. 

D-13 
Appendix D 

(4) Mobilizing and coordinating disaster relief from governmental and nongovernmental organizations for affected participating states. 

c. Reuters AlertNet (www.alertnet.org) is a humanitarian news network based around 

a popular website. It aims to keep relief professionals and the wider public up to date on 

humanitarian crises around the globe. It provides operation-critical information to relief 

charities worldwide; encourages relief charities to swap information with one another; and 

raises awareness of humanitarian emergencies among the general public. AlertNet focuses 

its resources on covering fast-moving humanitarian emergencies and on the early warning of 

future emergencies. 

9. United Nations Cluster Approach 

a. The cluster approach has created a greater "spirit" of working together – 

beginning to put in place the coordination and decision-making structures for genuine 

UN/non-UN partnership. The aim is to enhance humanitarian response capacity, 

predictability, accountability, and partnership. There are nine clusters and each cluster 

has a designated lead, responsible to the emergency relief coordinator (global) or 

humanitarian coordinator (country level). See Figure D-1. 

b. The cluster approach aims to strengthen overall response capacity as well as the 

effectiveness of the response in five key ways: 

(1) The approach aims to ensure that sufficient global capacity is built up and 

maintained in all the main sectors/areas of response, with a view to ensuring timely and 

effective responses in new crises. 

(2) The approach ensures predictable leadership in all the main sectors/areas of 

response. 

(3) The approach is designed around the concept of partnerships (i.e., clusters) 

between UN agencies, other IGOs, and NGOs. 

(4) The approach strengthens accountability. 

(5) The approach should help to improve coordination and prioritization in 

specific sectors/areas of response by placing responsibility for leadership and 

coordination of these issues with the competent, operational agency. 

c. At a global level, the aim is to strengthen preparedness and capacity to respond to 

humanitarian emergencies by ensuring leadership and accountability in all main sectors. 

d. At a country level, the aim is to ensure a more coherent and effective response by 

mobilizing groups of agencies, organizations, and NGOs to coordinate, share information, 

and respond in a strategic manner. At the country level, sectors and sectoral groups have 

always existed and they will continue to exist. In the past, however, it was usually the case 

D-14 JP 3-29 
Humanitarian Nongovernmental and Intergovernmental Organizations 

SECTOR AND CLUSTER LEADS

LEGEND

Traditional Sector Leads:









Agriculture – FAO

Education – UNICEF

Food – WFP

Refugees – UNHCR

FAO

IDP

IFRC

IOM

UN

UNDP

UNHCR

UNICEF

UNOCHA

UNOHCHR

WFP

WHO

Food and Agriculture Organization

internally displaced person

International Federation of the 

Red Cross

International Organization for 

Migration

United Nations

UN Development Programme 

UN Office of High Commission for 

Refugees

UN Children’s Fund

UN Office for the Coordination 

of Humanitarian Affairs

UN Office of High Commission 

for Humanitarian Relief

World Food Programme

World Health Organization

Technical Issues:









Emergency Shelter:

-- Conflict - UNHCR

-- Disaster- IFRC

Health - WHO

Nutrition - UNICEF

Water and Sanitation - UNICEF

Cross-cutting Issues:







Camp Coordination and 

Management:

-- Conflict - UNHCR

-- Disaster- IOM

Early Recovery - UNDP

Protection:

-- Conflict IDPs - UNHCR

-- Disasters and Non-IDP 

Civilians in Conflict – 

UNHCR/UNOHCHR/

UNICEF/UNDP





Emergency Telecommunications:

-- Owner - UNOCHA

-- Data Service - UNICEF 

-- Security - WFP

Logistics - WFP

Common Services:

Figure D-1. Sector and Cluster Leads 

that only a limited number of sectors had clearly designated lead agencies accountable to the 

humanitarian coordinator. The cluster approach aims to rectify this by ensuring that, within 

the international humanitarian response, there is a clear system of leadership and 

accountability for all the key sectors or areas of humanitarian activity. The cluster approach 

is intended, therefore, to strengthen rather than to replace sectoral coordination under the 

overall leadership of the humanitarian coordinator, with a view to improve humanitarian 

response in emergency situations. 

e. Cluster lead organizations are responsible to: 

(1) Facilitate the coordination between the cluster members. 

(2) Encourage joint working. 

D-15 
Appendix D 

D-16 JP 3-29 

(3) Ensure that responses are in line with existing guidelines and standards. 

(4) Collate and share information. 

(5) Identify gaps in the response. 

(6) Stand in as the ‘provider of last resort’ when there are no other options. 

f. The following organizations are designated as global cluster leads: 

(1) Technical areas: 

(a) Nutrition: UNICEF 

(b) Health: WHO 

(c) Water/Sanitation: UNICEF 

(d) Emergency Shelter: from conflict - UNHCR; disaster situations - 

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (Convener) 

(2) Cross-cutting areas: 

(a) Camp Coordination/Management: from conflict - UNHCR; disaster 

situations - IOM 

(b) Protection: from conflict - UNHCR; Disasters/civilians affected by 

conflict - UNHCR/OHCHR/UNICEF 

(c) Early Recovery: UNDP 

(3) Common service areas: 

(a) Logistics: WFP 

(b) Emergency Telecommunications: UNOCHA/UNICEF/WFP 

More detailed information may be found in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Guidance 

Note on Using the Cluster Approach to Strengthen Humanitarian Response. 
APPENDIX E

 HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT IN FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 

OPERATIONS 

E-1

1. General 

In addition to providing HSS for the deploying force, a CJTF may be tasked to serve 

the affected population in an FHA crisis. This appendix lists considerations for providing 

such HSS, if it is part of the mission. Essential tasks for this mission generally include 

the following: 

a. Coordinating actions to prevent or control disease outbreak. 

b. Evacuating or temporarily hospitalizing sick, wounded, and injured persons, and 

coordinating their return to civilian facilities or the parent nation. 

c. Distributing supplies and equipment. 

d. Assisting in reestablishing indigenous health sector resources and institutions. 

Primary consideration must be given to supporting and supplementing any existing 

medical infrastructure exists. No operation should be considered that may supplant 

the existing medical infrastructure.

Comprehensive guidance and information regarding the provision of HSS is provided in 

JP 4-02, Health Service Support. 

2. Medical Concept of Operations 

a. Based upon the mission requirements and medical and operational situation, the 

joint force surgeon and staff will develop a medical CONOPS that will (if possible) 

combine the efforts of the military HSS forces, NGOs, and the existing medical 

infrastructure. 

b. Following a disaster, there are generally three waves of medical assistance: 

trauma, control of disease and infection, and support to rebuilding HN medical 

capabilities. Initial responders, including forward deployed military forces that can be 

diverted, may assist in managing trauma, but most US HSS support will be involved in 

the second and third waves. The JFC must ensure US forces augment HN capabilities, 

rather than replace or supplant them. 

c. During an FHA operation, the highest priority should be given to preserving the 

health of the forces deployed in support of the operation. This is accomplished by an 

intensive medical intelligence analysis and a vigorous preventive medicine program, 

emphasizing medical surveillance activities. 

d. Consistent with the mission and the CDR’s intent, the combatant command 

surgeon, should ensure that the level of care provided meets the minimum international 

standards for HA and health care support. Once approved by the JFC, the JTF staff 

should initiate planning and action required to support the standard of care. Upon 
Appendix E 

execution, if a joint force surgeon thinks that modifications should be made to the 

standard of care, a request may be made through the supported combatant command 

surgeon. The WHO has recommended that health care support include nutrition, 

sanitation, water standards, pre- and post-natal health care, disease treatment, prevention 

and control related to locally endemic diseases, immunization, and health education. 

e. The senior deploying CDR of a HAST should ensure that a predeployment 

vulnerability assessment has been conducted. These assessments should include an HSS 

member qualified to evaluate the safety and vulnerability of local food and water sources, 

perform an epidemiological risk assessment, evaluate local medical capabilities, perform 

a vector/pest risk assessment, determine adequacy of hygiene of local billeting and public 

facilities, and perform an environmental risk assessment. Assessments provide the 

necessary background data for sizing the force protection package required, thus reducing 

the threat to DOD force personnel and assets. 

f. The HAST should include preventive medicine personnel that are trained to 

perform a detailed occupational and environmental health site assessment of the 

operational area that documents the conditions found at a site (base camp, bivouac site or 

outpost, or other permanent or semipermanent basing location) beginning at or near the 

time it is occupied initially. The assessment includes site history; environmental health 

survey results for air, water, soil, and noise; entomological surveys; occupational and 

industrial hygiene surveys; and ionizing and non-ionizing radiation hazard surveys, if 

indicated. Its purpose is to identify hazardous exposure agents with complete or 

potentially complete exposure pathways that may affect the health of deployed personnel. 

3. Planning and Execution Considerations 

a. The JTF should anticipate that the health care delivery infrastructure will be 

austere to nonexistent. NGOs and IGOs may be able to compensate for some of the 

shortfalls. The following factors merit consideration when providing health services to 

the affected population. 

b. Coordination and Collaboration. Effective coordination and collaboration is a 

key element that is central to HSS provision. 

(1) The USAID medical representative and DOS regional medical officer are 

valuable sources of regional medical information and coordination. Additional sources of 

regional medical information are UNOCHA and the WHO. 

(2) Contact OGA, HN, NGO, and IGO medical personnel before commencing 

the operation. Early identification of needs and cooperation by all or most of the parties 

involved will increase efficiency and reduce redundancy. 

(3) The JFC should establish some type of central point or organization for 

collaboration of medical requirements with nonmilitary organizations. The HOC or 

CMOC is a logical place for this collaboration to occur. The differing policies and 

E-2 JP 3-29 
Health Service Support in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations 

cultures of individual NGOs and IGOs, military capabilities and procedures, and affected 

country requirements require a dedicated collaboration element to encourage and help 

enable unity of effort among all participants. The civil medical affairs C2 should be 

established within the greater CMOC. 

c. Communications. Effective operations require a constant effort to avoid gaps in 

services and redundant services. Uninterrupted communications between military 

elements, NGOs, IGOs, and affected country personnel will help eliminate unnecessary 

suffering and apply resources to the operation more effectively. 

d. Cultural Aptitude. Health experts with foreign language, cultural competency, 

and interagency experience will be very valuable in a FHA operation. 

e. Demographics. The population mix is an important factor in the medical effort. 

Three specialties that are not typically included in a JTF deployment, but may be needed 

during an FHA operation, are: obstetrics and gynecology, geriatrics, and pediatrics. 

f. Preventive Medicine. In any FHA operation, preventive medicine is a critical 

consideration. Individual personal hygiene practices and procedures are key elements of 

a sound, preventive medicine program. The provision of adequate food service 

sanitation, potable water supplies, vector control, disease and nonbattle injury (DNBI) 

prevention, and waste disposal facilities all contribute to the maintenance of a healthy and 

fit force. FHA operations may place US forces in situations that may substantially 

increase the risk of DNBI. Exposure to foreign civilian populations potentially carrying 

endemic diseases as well as disease outbreaks as a result of a natural disaster are all 

factors increasing the DNBI risk. DODD 6490.2, Comprehensive Health Surveillance, 

and DODI 6490.3, Deployment Health, mandate that DOD monitor and identify both 

long- and short-term health effects of US forces during deployments. This requires that 

the JTF have robust preventive medicine assets to perform medical and environmental 

health risk assessments and identify effective preventive medicine measures to counter 

the threat to US forces. In addition, the significant roles that public health and 

communicable disease control play in FHA missions further support the need for robust 

preventive medicine assets. 

g. Disease Prevention. Natural and man-made disasters frequently give rise to 

substantial increases in endemic disease. While no parts of the world are immune to 

increases in diseases, some regions of the developing world are more susceptible to 

disease than others, and are impacted at devastating levels. Contributory factors in 

spreading disease to epidemic proportions during disasters include disruption of 

sanitation services, food and water contamination, and increased rodent and arthropod 

breeding habitats. 

h. Disease Control. The risk of communicable diseases is increased in a postdisaster environment due to overcrowding, poor environmental conditions, and poor 

public health. For example, there is a close association between malnutrition and the 

effects of communicable disease, particularly childhood diarrhea. Expert advice should 

E-3 
Appendix E 

be obtained for communicable disease control and management of epidemics. Some 

communicable diseases have a seasonal pattern and timely measures must be taken to 

prevent a rapid increase in cases. The following are central to disease control: 

(1) Water supply and soap. 

(2) Proper disposal of sewage and refuse. 

(3) Vector control (pest control). 

(4) General public health education and awareness. 

(5) Medical surveillance. 

i. Patient Evacuation. The combatant command J-4 should advise and assist the 

combatant command surgeon in matters pertaining to patient evacuation from the 

operational area and help develop a plan to meet patient movement requirements. 

Considerations should include, but are not limited to: 

(1) Eligibility criteria. 

(2) Sponsorship guidelines, (i.e., secretarial designation). 

(3) Available evacuation resources and routes. 

(4) Reimbursement procedures. 

(5) Capabilities of medical treatment facilities within (and adjoining) the 

operational area to receive evacuees requiring all levels of care. 

j. Immunization. There are strong reasons, both medical and practical, to resist 

pressure for an immediate mass immunization program. The most common causes of 

disease and death are generally infections, often aggravated by malnutrition, which 

cannot be prevented by immunization effectively. Immunization programs must be 

staffed with adequate numbers of workers to supervise and manage refrigerated vaccines. 

Though not difficult, these programs may not represent the best use of resources. The 

importance of specific immunizations will be dependent on the health threats and HN 

medical capabilities. The HN, WHO, UNICEF, or another NGO or IGO will implement 

the program and coordination must be made to support the implementing agency or 

organization. Immunizations may be conducted in conjunction with HCA HSS missions. 

k. Primary Care. Primary care may be provided from fixed facilities or during 

remote medical missions by multinational forces. As above, coordination with 

appropriate HN organizations and NGOs must be accomplished to avoid unnecessary 

duplication and to ensure coordinated long term capacity building is accomplished. 

Women’s and children’s care is the biggest piece of this primary care and must take 

E-4 JP 3-29 
Health Service Support in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations 

special planning to ensure the right mix of providers and medications are available 

including the gender of both providers and interpreters depending on the mission. 

Missions must involve US forces and HN providers which gives bidirectional legitimacy 

to all involved. Often during disasters, the first wave of patients is trauma care, and the 

second wave is disease control. 

l. Veterinary Support. Many societies where joint forces will operate are rural and 

their economies and personal health are often dependent on their domesticated animals. 

Capacity building exercises, public health, and direct treatment of animals can make as 

big an impact on the economy of a struggling country as the health of the animal’s 

owners. Veterinary missions must also involve local animal health providers and the 

herdsmen themselves. 

m. Health System Capacity Building. In addition to the training and improved 

government outreach within the above programs, the medical and veterinary systems 

themselves can be assisted. One of the first assistance tasks should be to help health 

systems near US and multinational forces to improve their self sufficiency and decrease 

reliance on multinational facilities and eventually contribute to redeployment of US 

forces. Assessments must be done of the training and health systems periodically to 

determine their status and effectiveness of previous joint forces and HN and NGO 

capacity building efforts. Once assessments have been made targeted improvements, 

closely coordinated with the JTF capabilities, CMO, and surgeon, must be accomplished. 

A good example of this is training physicians to use ventilators, which then permit the 

transfer of patients from MTFs to HN hospitals. Care must be taken to ensure that 

reestablished health care standards are appropriate for the local population and at a level 

that can be maintained by the existing HN medical infrastructure. 

n. Funding for Medical Humanitarian Assistance Activities. To pay for the 

above programs, resources must be managed in accordance with congressional and GCC 

guidance. 

4. Medical Intelligence 

Medical intelligence is the end product of the collection, evaluation, analysis, 

integration, and interpretation of all available general health and bioscientific information 

for a given nation or operational area. Medical intelligence addresses the medical aspects 

that are significant to military planning in general and to HSS planning in particular. In 

addition to preparing CDRs to protect their own forces from medical and environmental 

risks during an operation, medical intelligence also assesses the general health of the 

population, which is a significant factor in planning for FHA operations. Additionally, 

information related to affected country health care capabilities is important in assessing 

whether there are medical care shortfalls for which US, NGOs, IGOs, or third NA must 

compensate. Sources of this information include the Armed Forces Institute of 

Pathology, the National Center for Medical Intelligence, DIA, and established civilian 

organizations with long standing resources in the operational area. Medical intelligence 

E-5 
Appendix E 

should include awareness of cultural differences that can impact medical care such as 

hygiene and religious norms. 

5. Nongovernmental Organizations Medical Providers 

a. In emergencies, urgent outside assistance in the health sector is almost invariably 

necessary. This is because the immediate and specialized attention needed represents a 

burden that existing local structures are not designed to bear. Local health services will 

almost never have the needed reserve capacity in terms of staff at all levels, 

infrastructure, medical supplies and technical expertise. This capacity can be developed 

over time, with the support from the HN and other UN agencies. 

b. NGOs must be chosen with care and this is usually done by the HN. However, it 

is also the responsibility of the UN to advise the government on which organizations have 

proven competence in emergencies. Some agencies have experience in long-term 

situations but less in emergencies; others may be too narrow in focus, preferring to do 

purely curative work to the exclusion of public health, prevention, sanitation, etc. Small 

NGOs, especially those created in response to a specific situation, should demonstrate 

appropriate competence before being engaged in the emergency phase. 

c. During the early stages of an emergency it is essential that the numbers of NGOs 

involved should be kept to the minimum necessary, and that those chosen should be 

professional, capable of deploying experienced personnel, and with proven past 

experience in collaborating with both governments and UN in the effective management 

of an emergency. 

6. Service Capabilities 

a. US Navy

(1) Hospital Ships. Two hospital ships operated by Military Sealift Command 

are designed to provide emergency, on-site care for US forces deployed in war or tailored 

for other operations, such as FHA missions. The United States Naval Ship (USNS) 

Mercy (T-AH 19) and USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) have a maximum capacity of 12 

operating rooms, and up to 1,000 beds within the MTF that can be tailored to meet 

expected patient throughput and variable lengths of stay based on the intensity of 

required care. Capabilities include: digital radiological services, invasive angiography, a 

diagnostic and clinical laboratory, a pharmacy, an optometry lab, a computerized axial 

tomography scan, two oxygen producing plants, and a blood bank. Both vessels have a 

helicopter deck capable of landing large military helicopters, as well as side ports to take 

on patients at sea. 

(2) Some amphibious class ships have modern HSS facilities, second only to the 

Navy's hospital ships. HSS facilities include four main and two emergency medical 

operating rooms, three dental operating rooms, x-ray rooms, a blood bank, laboratories, 

and patient wards. Additionally, casualty collecting and triage areas are located on the 

E-6 JP 3-29 
Health Service Support in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations 

flight deck, medical spaces, and can be set up on the well deck. When augmented with 

additional HSS personnel and resources, they are capable of providing preventive, first 

responder, and forward resuscitative capabilities of care for up to 60 inpatients and 

numerous outpatients. They can provide sustained HSS to patients brought aboard ship 

during humanitarian missions, while still providing ongoing HSS to crewmembers and 

embarked staff at the same time. 

(3) Fleet Hospital (FH) and Expeditionary Medical Facility: FHs and EMFs 

are a standardized, modular, flexible combat HSS capability that provides HSS to an 

advanced base environment throughout the full range of military operations. While 

initially conceived and developed as war reserve facilities to provide HSS during intense 

combat operations, EMFs can also be used in protracted low-intensity conflict scenarios 

and humanitarian operations, with design changes. EMFs are transportable, modular, 

medically and surgically intensive, and employable in a variety of operational 

environments. They are prepositioned in various CONUS and OCONUS locations, or 

deployed on MPF enhanced ships. Once transported to the desired location, they can be 

assembled and operational in a minimum of 10 days provided all components have been 

delivered to the site and the operational CDR has completed site preparations by the 

EMF’s assigned staff. Time frame for assemblage varies with the size and/or capability 

of the EMF. EMFs, depending on size, can provide theater hospitalization capability and 

capabilities similar to those on a hospital ship; however, they are not light and have a 

large footprint. Due to the size associated with some EMF platforms, significant 

logistical support is required to relocate these assets once assembly and activation have 

occurred, Smaller, task-organized EMFs are easier to relocate, post-activation, with 

much less logistical support. 

 (4) The FDPMU is a level three force health protection capability with the 

primary mission of identifying and controlling health threats in a theater of operations. 

The FDPMU employs a state of the art suite of field portable analytical and diagnostic 

equipment to support health risk assessment and evidence-based health risk management. 

The FDPMU consists of 12 unit type codes. This allows FDPMU personnel and 

equipment packages to be scaled to meet to specific mission support to requirements, 

including HCA. 

b. US Air Force 

(1) The humanitarian relief operation operational capability package (HUMRO 

OCP) is an innovative, stand-alone humanitarian medical package to support contingency 

disaster-response efforts. HUMRO OCP is designed to provide immediate on-the-scene 

medical care for the local population in an area hit by a natural disaster. It is a standalone, self-sufficient “off the shelf” package designed for quick deployment (within 24 

hours) anywhere in the area of operations, regardless of the proximity of an air base. 

HUMRO OCP includes complete diagnostic and surgical capability in a 25-bed facility 

with all required base-operating support built in. Approximately 90 medical staff and 

150 support Airmen - security forces, civil engineers, base services, and other support 

personnel, are required to operate the facility. Upon arrival, medical providers can begin 

E-7 
Appendix E 

E-8 JP 3-29 

seeing some patients almost immediately. Basic capability is to be established within 12 

to 24 hours, and full operational capability within 36 hours. 

(2) The US Air Force International Health Specialist (IHS) program serves 

combatant and component command surgeons by providing medics with proficiency in a 

second language, regional and cultural expertise, medical planning, medical diplomacy, 

CA, knowledge of IGOs and NGOs. IHS personnel have specific training in HA and 

disaster response as well as other medical stability operations. IHS teams are assigned to 

combatant commands and can also serve on a joint force surgeon’s staff, work at the 

strategic and operational levels to help plan, monitor, and guide FHA operations. 

(3) The preventive and aerospace medicine (PAM) team consists of 

aerospace medicine specialists, public health, bioenvironmental engineering, flight 

medicine personnel, and independent duty medical technicians. The team oversees basic 

education and training to prevent disease and briefs CDRs on actual threats, safety issues, 

current illness, and current health trends. The PAM team leader should be considered the 

functional expert in casualty prevention. The team consists of three unit type codes, 

which can deploy both in phases and simultaneously.” 

c. US Army

(1) A combat support hospital (CSH) can rapidly deploy an 84-bed hospital in 

support of FHA operations. Additionally, another 164-bed “slice” is in reserve and may 

be deployed as required by the mission. The CSH facility is the deployable medical 

system, which consists of TEMPER (tent, extendable modular personnel) tents and 

International Organization for Standardization shelters. It is composed of an emergency 

medical treatment section with a dispensary, one operating room (with two tables), two 

intensive care units each composed of 12 beds, three intermediate care wards each 

composed of 20 beds, one central materiel services section, laboratory with limited 

testing capabilities, blood bank, radiology with portable x-ray capability and digital 

processing, and a pharmacy. 

(2) A medical deployment support command, medical command, or 

medical brigade can deploy worldwide in support of FHA operations to provide C2 of 

assigned and attached medical forces. 
APPENDIX F

PLANNING FACTORS FOR FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN 

ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS 

F-1

1. General 

a. Lessons learned during previous FHA operations can provide valuable insight for 

CDRs and staffs preparing for a similar operation. The following factors include some of 

the key lessons from FHA operations, and highlight areas that FHA forces have found to 

be extremely important. 

b. Is the mission stated in terms of working towards restoration to preemergency 

status? Is mission success stated in terms not strictly defined by US or western 

standards? Is the situation at end state sustainable by the affected country and 

organizations remaining in the operational area? 

c. What is the legal authority for the operation? Do plans include SJA personnel and 

assets? What is the legal and fiscal authority to conduct civil action projects? Is there a 

SOFA in effect? If not, should a SOFA, or some other type of international agreement, 

be negotiated or implemented? 

d. What coordination and collaboration is required with the supported CCDR, 

supporting CCDRs, subordinate joint force commands, COM and country team, 

multinational partners, NGOs, IGOs, and OGAs? What are the command, coordination, 

and collaboration relationships? 

e. Have civilian agencies involved in the operation been encouraged to contribute 

their valuable expertise and assistance? Have US forces recognized these agencies for 

their efforts in this regard? 

f. What restrictions exist regarding the sharing of information (sensitive or 

otherwise) with other agencies and organizations? 

g. What are the liaison requirements? Are LNOs positioned in both higher and 

subordinate HQs as well as OGAs, medical facilities, NGOs, and IGOs, as required? 

h. Is sea port and aerial port infrastructure, to include road and rail access to the 

ports, in place before forces begin to arrive? Has USTRANSCOM been consulted as to 

transportation feasibility? Has the use of ports been deconflicted with HN, NGOs, and 

IGOs? 

i. Are interpreters available for the JTF, GCC, and other US agencies? 

j. Is adequate communications equipment available for essential basic services? Is 

additional equipment or connectivity reconfiguration needed to provide direct 

communications routing to principal destinations? 

k. What is the communications plan for communicating with NGOs, IGOs, and 

multinational forces? Do these entities require equipment augmentation? 
Appendix F 

F-2 JP 3-29 

l. Are briefing formats appropriate for use in CMO? Do they emphasize conditions, 

activities, and population support requirements? Are other participants in the FHA effort 

(OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs) included in the briefings? 

m. What are the information gathering and dissemination requirements? Has 

PSYOP been brought into the planning process? 

n. During the planning process, has the joint force surgeon identified the CDR’s 

critical information requirements, PIRs, and named AOIs pertaining to the health threat in 

the operational area and submitted requirements to the supporting intelligence element? 

o. Have supplemental measures to the SROE been identified, approved, and 

published prior to deployment? Do multinational forces understand the ROE? Are they 

using the same or compatible ROE? 

p. Are planned actions within the budgetary limitations of the operation? 

q. Has a finance officer been identified and deployed early in the operation? 

r. Have Service contracting teams been identified and deployed early in the 

operation? 

s. What logistic requirements are needed to support the operation, and what 

mechanism is in place to continually monitor logistic resources to ensure that urgent 

needs are met? 

t. Has a PAO and necessary staff been identified and deployed early in the 

operation? 

u. Has PA guidance been developed and passed to all members of the joint force? 

v. Has a JIB been established to support the media? 

w. What means are available to provide information to the affected population about 

FHA operations? 

2. Sphere Project 

a. Sphere is based on two core beliefs: first, that all possible steps should be taken to 

alleviate human suffering arising out of calamity and conflict, and second, that those 

affected by disaster have a right to life with dignity and therefore a right to assistance. 

Sphere is three things; a handbook, a broad process of collaboration, and an expression of 

commitment to quality and accountability. 
Planning Factors for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations

 F-3 

b. The aim of Sphere is to improve the quality of assistance to people affected by 

disaster and improve the accountability of states and humanitarian agencies to their 

constituents, donors, and the affected populations. 

c. Sphere represents a unique voluntary initiative, and reflects the collective will and 

shared experience of a broad array of humanitarian actors. The community of these 

actors includes NGOs, IGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 

donor agencies, host governments, and representatives from affected populations. 

d. The Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response

handbook is designed for use in disaster response (www.sphereproject.org). While not a 

policy document, it is applicable in a range of situations where relief is required, 

including natural disasters as well as armed conflict. It is designed to be used in both 

slow- and rapid-onset situations, in both rural and urban environments, in developing and 

developed countries, anywhere in the world. The emphasis throughout is on meeting the 

urgent survival needs of people affected by disaster, while asserting their basic human 

right to life with dignity. Despite this focus, the information contained in the handbook is 

not prescriptive. Minimum standards and key indicators have been developed using 

broad networks of practitioners in each of the sectors. Most of the standards, and the 

indicators that accompany them, are not new, but consolidate and adapt existing 

knowledge and practice. 
Appendix F 

F-4 JP 3-29 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX G 

REFERENCES 

G-1

The development of JP 3-29 is based upon the following primary references. 

1. Public Law 

a. Title 10, US Code, Sections 166a, 182, 401, 402, 404, 407, 2557, and 2561. 

b. Title 22, US Code, Chapter 32. 

c. Uniform Code of Military Justice.

2. Presidential Directives 

a. Executive Order 12114, Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions. 

b. National Security Presidential Directive-1, Organization of the National Security 

Council System. 

c. National Security Presidential Directive - 44, Management of Interagency Efforts 

Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization. 

3. Department of Defense Issuances 

a. DODD 1300.22, Mortuary Affairs Policy. 

b. DODD 2000.11, Procedures for Handling Requests for Political Asylum and 

Temporary Refuge.

c. DODD 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program.

d. DODD 2000.13, Civil Affairs.

e. DODD 2010.9, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements.

f. DODD 2205.2, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Provided in 

Conjunction with Military Operations.

g. DODD 2310.01E, The Department of Defense Detainee Program.

h. DODD 2310.2, Personnel Recovery. 

i. DODD 2311.01E, DOD Law of War Program. 

j. DODD 3000.3, Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons. 

k. DODD 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and 

Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.
Appendix G 

G-2 JP 3-29 

l. DODD 3003.01, DOD Support to Civil Search and Rescue (SAR).

m. DODD 3150.5, DOD Response to Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents.

n. DODD 3150.8, DOD Response to Radiological Accidents.

o. DODD S-3321.1, Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military 

Services in Peacetime (U).

p. DODD 4715.1E, Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health.

q. DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief.

r. DODD 5525.1, Status of Forces Policies and Information. 

s. DODD 5530.3, International Agreements.

t. DODD 6050.7, Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Department of Defense 

Actions.

u. DODD 6200.04, Force Health Protection (FHP).

v. DODD 6490.02E, Comprehensive Health Surveillance.

w. DODI 2000.21, Foreign Consequence Management (FCM). 

x. DODI 2200.01, Combating Trafficking in Persons.

y. DODI 2205.3, Implementing Procedures for the Humanitarian and Civic 

Assistance (HCA) Program. 

z. DODI 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany US Armed 

Forces.

aa. DODI 5515.08, Assignment of Claims Responsibility. 

bb. DODI 6490.03, Deployment Health.

cc. DOD O-2000.12-H, DOD Antiterrorism Handbook.

dd. DOD 4715.5-G, Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document. 

ee. DOD 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual. 

ff. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement. 
References 

 G-3 

gg. Manual for Courts Martial. 

4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directives 

a. CJCSI 2120.01A, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements. 

b. CJCSI 2300.01C, International Agreements. 

c. CJCSI 3110.05C, Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint 

Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 2006. 

d. CJCSI 3110.07C, Guidance Concerning Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Defense and Employment of Riot Control Agents and Herbicides (U).

e. CJCSI 3110.16A, Military Capabilities, Assets, and Units for Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive Consequence Management 

Operations. 

f. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the use of 

Force for US Forces.

g. CJCSI 3207.01A, Military Support to Humanitarian Mine Action Operations.

h. CJCSI 3214.01B, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management 

Operations for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents.

i. CJCSI 5810.01C, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program. 

j. CJCSI 7401.01B, Combatant Commander Initiative Fund. 

k. CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) 

Volume I Planning Policies and Procedures.

l. CJCSM 3122.02C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) 

Volume III (Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and 

Deployment Execution). 

m. CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) 

Volume II Planning Formats. 

5. Joint Publications 

a. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

b. JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations.
Appendix G 

G-4 JP 3-29 

c. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

d. JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations.

e. JP 1-05, Religious Support in Joint Operations.

f. JP 1-06, Financial Management Support In Joint Operations.

g. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

h. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

i. JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint 

Operations.

j. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

k. JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.

l. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

m. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

n. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism(FOUO).

o. JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

p. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.

q. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

Environments.

r. JP 3-13, Information Operations. 

s. JP 3-13.2, Psychological Operations. 

t. JP 3-14, Space Operations. 

u. JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations. 

v. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

w. JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense (FID).

x. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.
References 

 G-5 

y. JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

z. JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

aa. JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield 

Explosives Consequence Management.

bb. JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

cc. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

dd. JP 3-61, Public Affairs. 

ee. JP 3-63, Detainee Operations.

ff. JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.

gg. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

hh. JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS).

ii. JP 4-02, Health Service Support.

jj. JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations.

kk. JP 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.

ll. JP 4-09, Global Distribution. 

mm. JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

nn. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

oo. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System. 

6. Service and Other Military Publications 

a. Air Force Handbook 10-222 Volume 22, Refugee Camp Planning and Execution 

Guide.

b. Commander’s Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group. 

c. Defense Threat reduction Agency, Foreign Consequence Management Legal 

Deskbook.
Appendix G 

G-6 JP 3-29 

d. DSCA H-1, DSCA Handbook for Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) Drawdown of 

Defense Articles and Services. 

e. FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations.

f. FM 3-05.401, Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 

g. FM 4-20.147, Airdrop of Supplies and Equipment: Humanitarian Airdrop.

h. FM 5-01.12, MCRP 5-1B, NTTP 5-02, AFTTP (I) 3-2.21 Multiservice Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Task Force (JTF) Liaison Officer Integration.

i. FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare.

j. GTA 41-01-003, Civil Affairs Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Planning Guide. 

k. GTA 41-01-006, Working with the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance.

l. Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations, Joint 

Warfighting Center. 

m. Joint Task Force Senior Medical Leader Operations Guide, US Joint Forces 

Command. 

n. NAVENVIRHLTHCEN NOTICE 3501, Concept of Operations for the Forward 

Deployable Preventive Medicine Units (FDPMU). 

o. NTTP 4-02.6, Hospital Ships. 

p. NWDC TACMEMO 3-07.6-06, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief 

Operations Planning. 

q. NWP 1-14M, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations.

r. Operational Law Handbook, The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and 

School. 

s. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) for Migrant Camp Operations, US 

Atlantic Command. 

t. US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and 

Conflict Transformation, USJFCOM J-7 Pamphlet v 1.0.

7. US Government Publications 

a. Federal Acquisition Regulation. 
References 

 G-7 

b. Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response, Version 

4.0,Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and 

Humanitarian Assistance, US Agency for International Development. 

c. Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and Nongovernmental 

Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments, US Institute 

of Peace.

d. Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks, US Department of State. 

e. US Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual, Volume 11—Political Affairs. 

f. USAID Primer. 

g. USAID'S Strategy for Sustainable Development: an Overview. 

h. US National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication. 

8. United Nations Publications 

a. Handbook for Emergencies UN High Commissioner for Refugees. 

b. Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies –an IASC Reference Paper, 

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 

c. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel. 

d. Emergency Field Handbook: a Guide for UNICEF Staff, United Nations 

Children’s Fund. 

e. General guidance for interaction between United Nations personnel and military 

and other representatives of the belligerent parties in the context of the crisis in Iraq, UN 

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

f. Guidance Note on using the Cluster Approach to Strengthen Humanitarian 

Response, Inter-Agency Standing Committee. 

g. Guidelines for Assessment in Emergencies, Inter-Agency Standing Committee 

Emergency Shelter Cluster. 

h. Guidelines for HIV/AIDS Interventions in Emergency Settings, Inter-Agency 

Standing Committee. 

i. Guidelines for Humanitarian Organisations on Interacting with Military and 

Other Security Actors in Iraq, UN Assistance Mission for Iraq. 
Appendix G 

G-8 JP 3-29 

j. Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, – 

“Oslo Guidelines”, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 

k. Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United 

Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies, UN Office for the 

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

l. Glossary of Humanitarian Terms in relation to the Protection of Civilians in 

Armed Conflict, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 

m. Essentials for Emergencies, World Health Organization. 

n. Handbook for Emergency Field Operations, World Health Organization.

o. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Orientation 

Handbook, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 

p. Operational Protection in Camps and Settlements; A Reference Guide of Good 

Practices in the Protection of Refugees and Other Persons of Concern, UN High 

Commissioner for Refugees. 

q. Partnership: an Operations Management Handbook for UNHCR’s Partners, UN 

High Commissioner for Refugees. 

r. Protecting Persons Affected by Natural Disasters; IASC Operational Guidelines 

on Human Rights and Natural Disasters, Inter-Agency Standing Committee. 

s. Relationships with Military Forces in Afghanistan - Guidelines for UNAMA Area 

Coordinators and other UN personnel, UN Assistance Mission for Afghanistan. 

t. Sanctions Assessment Handbook; Assessing the Humanitarian Implications of 

Sanctions, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 

u. United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination, (UNDAC) Handbook, UN 

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 

v. Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys (Discussion Paper 

and Non-binding Guidelines), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

9. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Publications 

a. AJP - 9, NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine. 

b. AMEDP - 15, Military Medical Support in Humanitarian and Disaster Relief. 

c. NATO Military Assistance to International Disaster Relief Operations. 
References 

 G-9 

d. Standing Operating Procedures for the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response 

Coordination Centre.

10. Other Selected Publications 

a. The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 

Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief. 

b. Humanitarian Assistance in Disaster Situations: A Guide for Effective Aid, Pan 

American Health Organization. 

c. Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, the Sphere 

Project. 

d. Humanitarian Supply Management and Logistics in the Health Sector, Pan 

American Health Organization. 

e. Worldwide Humanitarian Assistance Logistics System Handbook, Institute for 

Defense Analysis. 
Appendix G 

G-10 JP 3-29 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX H 

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

H-1 

1. User Comments 

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

CDR, USJFCOM, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Joint Force Trainer - Doctrine, 116 

Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content 

(accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance. 

 

2. Authorship 

The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor 

for this publication is the J-4. 

3. Supersession 

This publication supersedes JP 3-07.6, 15 August 2001, Joint Tactics, Techniques, 

and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. 

4. Change Recommendations 

 a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

 TO: DA WASHINGTON DC// G35-SSP// 

 INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-7-JEDD// 

 CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//DOC GP// 

Routine changes should be submitted electronically to CDR, Joint Warfighting Center, 

Joint Force Trainer – Doctrine and info the Lead Agent and the Director for Operational 

Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7), Joint Education and Doctrine Division via the 

CJCS joint electronic library (JEL) at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. 

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change 

source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a 

proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services 

and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source 

documents reflected in this publication are initiated. 

c. Record of Changes: 

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED 

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS 

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix H 

H-2 JP 3-29 

5. Distribution of Publications 

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is 

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must 

be in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program. 

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications 

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on the Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Electronic Information System 

at https://jdeis.js.mil, Unclassified but Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network and 

https://jdeis.js.smil.mil, Secret Internet Protocol Router Network; and on the JEL at 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. 

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside 

the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint 

publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the 

local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 

1E811, 7400 Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400. 

c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the 

Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications. 
GLOSSARY 

PART I ñ ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

GL-1 

AC Active Component 

AET airport emergency team 

AFTTP(I) Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures (instruction) 

AOI area of interest 

AOR area of responsibility 

APAN Asia-Pacific Area Network 

ASD assistant Secretary of Defense 

ASD(SO/LIC&IC) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low 

 Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities) 

C2 command and control 

CA civil affairs 

CAO civil affairs operations 

CAP crisis action planning 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 

 explosives 

CCDR combatant commander 

CCIF Combatant Commander Initiative Fund 

CDERA Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency 

CDHAM Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine 

CDR commander 

CD-ROM compact disc read-only memory 

CFST coalition forces support team 

CIE collaborative information environment 

CIMIC civil-military cooperation 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual 

CJTF commander, joint task force 

CLT civil liaison team 

CM consequence management 

CMAT consequence management advisory team 

CMO civil-military operations 

CMOC civil-military operations center 

COA course of action 

COEDMHA Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and 

 Humanitarian Assistance 

COM chief of mission 

CONOPS concept of operations 

CONPLAN concept plan 

CRC civil response corps 

CRS Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 

CSH combat support hospital 

CTS commodity tracking system 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-29 

DALIS Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System 

DART disaster assistance response team 

DASD deputy assistant Secretary of Defense 

DCHA Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance 

DDOC Deployment and Distribution Operations Center 

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 

DisasterAWARE Disaster All-Hazard Warnings, Analysis, and Risk Evaluation 

 System 

DLA Defense Logistics Agency 

DNBI disease and nonbattle injury 

DOD Department of Defense 

DODD Department of Defense directive 

DODI Department of Defense instruction 

DOS Department of State 

DRN Disaster Response Network 

DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency 

DSPD defense support to public diplomacy 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

EADRU Euro-Atlantic disaster response unit 

EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 

ECHO European Community Humanitarian Aid Department 

EMF expeditionary medical facility 

ERU emergency response unit 

FAA Foreign Assistance Act 

FACT field assessment and coordination team 

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization (UN) 

FCM foreign consequence management 

FEST foreign emergency support team 

FFP Food for Peace 

FGS final governing standard 

FH fleet hospital 

FHA foreign humanitarian assistance 

FID foreign internal defense 

FM field manual (Army) 

FOG Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response 

GARS global area reference system 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

GFM global force management 

GTN Global Transportation Network 

HA humanitarian assistance 

HACC humanitarian assistance coordination center 

HAST humanitarian assistance survey team 
Glossary 

GL-3 

HCA humanitarian and civic assistance 

HDR humanitarian daily ration 

HDTC Humanitarian Demining Training Center 

HEWSweb Humanitarian Early Warning Service 

HIC humanitarian information center 

HIU humanitarian information unit 

HN host nation 

HOC humanitarian operations center 

HOCC humanitarian operations coordination center 

HQ headquarters 

HSS health service support 

HUMINT human intelligence 

HUMRO OCP humanitarian relief operation operational capability package 

ICC International Criminal Court 

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 

IDP internally displaced person 

IGO intergovernmental organization 

IHS international health specialist 

IMS interagency management system 

INSARAG International Search and Rescue Advisory Group 

InterAction American Council for Voluntary International Action 

IO information operations 

IOM International Organization for Migration 

IPI indigenous populations and institutions 

ISN Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff 

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff 

J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff 

JCMOTF joint civil-military operations task force 

JDDOC joint deployment distribution operations center 

JEL Joint Electronic Library 

JEMB joint environmental management board 

JFC joint force commander 

JFCH joint force chaplain 

JFUB joint facilities utilization board 

JIACG joint interagency coordination group 

JIB joint information bureau 

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment 

JISE joint intelligence support element 

JLOC joint logistics operations center 

JMAO joint mortuary affairs office 

JMC joint movement center 

JNCC joint network operations (NETOPS) control center 
Glossary 

GL-4 JP 3-29 

JOA joint operations area 

JOC joint operations center 

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 

JOPP joint operation planning process 

JP joint publication 

JPASE joint public affairs support element 

JPOTF joint psychological operations task force 

JRSOI joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration 

JSOTF joint special operations task force 

JTACE joint technical advisory chemical, biological, radiological, and 

 nuclear element 

JTF joint task force 

JTF-MAO joint task force-mortuary affairs office 

LFA lead federal agency 

LNO liaison officer 

MA mortuary affairs 

MAGTF Marine air-ground task force 

MCRP Marine Corps reference publication 

MDRO mission disaster response officer 

MOE measure of effectiveness 

MOP measure of performance 

MPF maritime pre-positioning force 

MRE meal, ready to eat 

MTF medical treatment facility 

NA nation assistance 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NEO noncombatant evacuation operation 

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NSC National Security Council 

NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures 

NWP Navy warfare publication 

OAS Organization of American States 

OEBGD Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document 

OFAC Office of Foreign Assets Control 

OFDA Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance 

OGA other government agency 

OHDACA Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid 

OHDM Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine 

Action 

OMA Office of Military Affairs 

OPCON operational control 
Glossary 

GL-5 

OPLAN operation plan 

OPORD operation order 

OPSEC operations security 

OSC on-site commander 

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

OSOCC on-site operations coordination center 

OTI Office of Transition Initiatives 

OUSD(C) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 

PA public affairs 

PADRU Pan American Disaster Response Unit 

PAM preventive and aerospace medicine 

PAO public affairs officer 

PCC policy coordination committee 

PDC Pacific Disaster Center 

PIR priority intelligence requirement 

PM Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (DOS) 

PO peace operations 

POLAD policy advisor 

PRC populace and resources control 

PRM Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (DOS) 

PSYOP psychological operations 

RC Reserve Component 

RCA riot control agent 

RFA request for assistance 

ROE rules of engagement 

RUF rules for the use of force 

SAR search and rescue 

SAT survey and assessment team 

SC strategic communication 

SCP security cooperation plan 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SJA staff judge advocate 

SJFHQ(CE) standing joint force headquarters (core element) 

SOF special operations forces 

SOFA status-of-forces agreement 

SPP state partnership program 

SROE standing rules of engagement 

SSTR stability, security, transition, and reconstruction 

TACON tactical control 

TIP trafficking in persons 

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures 
Glossary 

GL-6 JP 3-29 

UN United Nations 

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 

UNDAC United Nations disaster assessment and coordination 

UNDP United Nations development programme 

UNEP United Nations environment programme 

UNHCR United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees 

UNJLC United Nations Joint Logistic Centre 

UNICEF United Nations Childrenís Fund 

UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 

 Affairs 

UNV United Nations volunteer 

USAID United States Agency for International Development 

USC United States Code 

USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

USG United States Government 

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command 

USNS United States Naval Ship 

USPACOM United States Pacific Command 

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command 

V&A valuation and availability 

WFP World Food Programme (UN) 

WHO World Health Organization UN) 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

WRA Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (DOS) 
PART II ñ TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

GL-7 

Unless otherwise annotated, this publication is the proponent for all terms and definitions 

found in the glossary. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 

Associated Terms, will reflect this publication as the source document for these terms and 

definitions. 

civil-military operations center. An organization normally comprised of civil affairs, 

established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the 

United States with indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, 

intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, 

and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. Also called 

CMOC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

consequence management. Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and 

manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including 

natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents. Also called CM. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-

28) 

dislocated civilian. A broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that 

includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a 

refugee, or a stateless person. Also called DC. (This term and its definition modify the 

existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

displaced person. A broad term used to refer to internally and externally displaced 

persons collectively. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its 

definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

evacuee. A civilian removed from a place of residence by military direction for reasons 

of personal security or the requirements of the military situation. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-57) 

excess property. The quantity of property in possession of any component of the 

Department of Defense that exceeds the quantity required or authorized for retention by 

that component. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-29) 

foreign assistance. Assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military 

equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and 

man-made disasters. US foreign assistance takes three forms: development assistance, 

humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. (This term and its definition modify 

the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

foreign disaster. An act of nature (such as a flood, drought, fire, hurricane, earthquake, 

volcanic eruption, or epidemic), or an act of man (such as a riot, violence, civil strife, 

explosion, fire, or epidemic), which is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and 

magnitude to warrant United States foreign disaster relief to a foreign country, foreign 

persons, or to an intergovernmental organization. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-29) 
Glossary 

GL-8 JP 3-29 

foreign disaster relief. Prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign 

disaster victims. Normally it includes humanitarian services and transportation; the 

provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds, and bedding; temporary shelter and 

housing; the furnishing of medical materiel and medical and technical personnel; and 

making repairs to essential services. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-29) 

foreign humanitarian assistance. Department of Defense activities, normally in support 

of the United States Agency for International Development or Department of State, 

conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce 

human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Also called FHA. (This term and its 

definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in 

JP 1-02.) 

humanitarian and civic assistance. Assistance to the local populace provided by 

predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This 

assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, Section 401, and 

funded under separate authorities. Also called HCA. (This term and its definition 

modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

humanitarian assistance coordination center. A temporary center established by a 

geographic combatant commander to assist with interagency coordination and planning. 

A humanitarian assistance coordination center operates during the early planning and 

coordination stages of foreign humanitarian assistance operations by providing the link 

between the geographic combatant commander and other United States Government 

agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and international and regional organizations 

at the strategic level. Also called HACC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-29) 

humanitarian demining. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

humanitarian demining assistance. The activities related to the furnishing of 

education, training, and technical assistance with respect to the detection and clearance 

of land mines and other explosive remnants of war. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-

02.) 

humanitarian mine action. Activities that strive to reduce the social, economic, and 

environmental impact of land mines, unexploded ordnance, and small arms ammunition 

- also characterized as explosive remnants of war. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

humanitarian operations center. An international and interagency body that 

coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a 

large foreign humanitarian assistance operation. It normally is established under the 

direction of the government of the affected country or the United Nations, or a US 

Government agency during a US unilateral operation. Because the humanitarian 

operations center operates at the national level, it will normally consist of senior 

representatives from the affected country, assisting countries, the United Nations, 

nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and other major 
Glossary 

GL-9 

organizations involved in the operation. (This term and its definition modify the 

existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

indigenous populations and institutions. A generic term used to describe the civilian 

construct of an operational area to include its populations (legal citizens, legal and 

illegal immigrants, and all categories of dislocated civilians), governmental, tribal, 

commercial, and private organizations and entities. Also called IPI. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

infrastructure. All building and permanent installations necessary for the support, 

redeployment, and military forces operations (e.g., barracks, headquarters, airfields, 

communications, facilities, stores, port installations, and maintenance stations). (JP 1-

02. SOURCE: JP 3-35) 

internally displaced person. Any person who has been forced or obliged to flee or to 

leave their home or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order 

to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of 

human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an 

internationally recognized state border. (This term and its definition modify the 

existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

migrant. A person who (1) belongs to a normally migratory culture who may cross 

national boundaries, or (2) has fled his or her native country for economic reasons 

rather than fear of political or ethnic persecution. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-29) 

natural disaster. An emergency situation posing significant danger to life and property 

that results from a natural cause. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-29) 

refugee. A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 

race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, 

is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 

unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country. (This term and its 

definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in 

JP 1-02.) 

resettled person. A refugee or an internally displaced person wishing to return 

somewhere other than his or her previous home or land within the country or area of 

original displacement. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

returnee. A displaced person who has returned voluntarily to his or her former place of 

residence. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

stateless person. A person who is not considered as a national by any state under the 

operation of its law. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its 

definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-10 JP 3-29 

Intentionally Blank 
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE LOGISTICS

COMMUNICATION

PLANS SYSTEMS

JP 1

JP 3-0

OPERATIONS

JOINT

DOCTRINE

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to

fill extant operational void

US Joint Forces Command

(USJFCOM) conducts front-end

analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and

releases PD to lead agent (LA)

(Service, combatant command, JS

directorate)

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram

below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Publication (JP) 3-29 Operations













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group