ALD-232 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 14-1012

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KEITH MAYS,

Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 3-13-cv-00522)

District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik

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Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

May 15, 2014

Before: RENDELL, FISHER and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: May 29, 2014)

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OPINION

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PER CURIAM
2

Keith Mays, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the District 

Court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). For the reasons set forth below, we will summarily affirm.1 

I.

Keith Mays, a federal prisoner currently incarcerated at FCI Schuylkill, filed a 

complaint pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2671, seeking 

money damages from the United States for “physical injury, pain and suffering, and 

future medical expenses.” Dkt. No. 1, at 4. Mays complained of injuries received when

he slipped and fell on a wet floor in the staff dining room at FCI Schuylkill. Specifically, 

he claimed the wet floor caused him to fall on his back and hit his head. The defendant 

filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that the 

Inmate Accident Compensation Act (IAC), 18 U.S.C. § 4126, provides the exclusive 

remedy for such injuries. The District Court granted the motion and agreed that because 

Mays’s injury was work related, the IAC precluded his FTCA claims. Mays timely 

appealed. 

II.

“When reviewing an order dismissing a claim for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, we exercise plenary review over legal conclusions and review findings of 

fact for clear error.” White-Squire v. U.S. Postal Serv., 592 F.3d 453, 456 (3d Cir. 2010). 

 

1 We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We may 

summarily affirm a decision of the District Court if the appeal does not raise a substantial 

issue. 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. We may affirm on any basis supported by the 

record. Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
3

In this case, we discern no error in the District Court’s legal conclusions or factual 

findings. 

We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the IAC precludes Mays from 

bringing an FTCA claim. In the IAC, Congress created a scheme to compensate inmates 

for injuries sustained in the course of their penal employment. By statute, the Federal 

Prison Industries Fund pays “compensation to inmates or their dependents for injuries 

suffered in any industry or in any work activity in connection with the maintenance or 

operation of the institution in which the inmates are confined.” 18 U.S.C. § 4126(c)(4); 

see also 28 C.F.R. § 301.101-301.319 (regulating such claims). Federal prisoners seeking 

compensation for injuries sustained during penal employment are limited to the remedy 

provided by the IAC, 18 U.S.C. § 4126. See United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149, 151-

54 (1966) (holding that prisoners are barred from bringing FTCA claims in such 

situations, as § 4126 is their exclusive remedy). 

Mays argued that the IAC did not apply to his claim for compensation because he 

was enrolled in a vocational training (rather than work) program and because the injury 

occurred during a scheduled break time. We agree with the District Court’s conclusion 

that this program is a “work activity” that falls within the ambit of the IAC. The culinary 

vocation program at issue paid wages to inmate participants because “[i]nmates enrolled 

in this program are not allowed to enroll or participate in other courses, programs, or job 

assignments that conflict with the daily, Monday through Friday schedule” of the 

program. Dkt. No. 23-1, at 4. Furthermore, hands-on work in locations such as the 
4

Officers’ Dining Hall constituted a substantial portion of the training program. Id. 

Mays’s work was therefore connected to the “operation of the institution” as 

contemplated by § 4126(c)(4). 

We further agree that the IAC is applicable despite the fact that Mays’s injury took 

place during a scheduled break. The relevant regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 301.301(c), states 

that “compensation shall not be paid for injuries suffered away from the work location 

(e.g., while the claimant is going to or leaving work, or going to or coming from lunch 

outside of the work station or area).” Courts have found that injuries that occur inside the 

work area while an inmate was going to or from work or to or from a break are 

exclusively covered by the IAC. See, e.g., Wooten v. United States, 437 F.2d 79, 80 (5th 

Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (holding that an inmate suffered a work-related injury while 

traveling in a freight elevator while on his way to lunch and rejecting inmate’s “narrow 

construction of the words ‘activity directly related to the prisoner's work assignment’ as 

limiting compensable injuries to those which occur at the work bench.”). Mays stated in 

his complaint that he was in the Officers’ Dining Hall when he fell. As this location was 

within his work area, we agree with the District Court that the IAC is the exclusive 

remedy for Mays’s alleged injuries.

III.

There being no substantial question presented on appeal, we will summarily 

affirm.