### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE O ct obe r 29, 200 4 S es sio n
GRET HY HI RT v. E RNST H. HI RT
Appeal f romthe G eneral Sessions Court for Loud on Coun ty No. 8450 William H. Russell, Judge

No. E2004-00354-COA- R3-CV - F ILED FEBRUARY 8, 2005

Gre thy Hirt (“Wife” ) filed f

or divorce from Ernst H. Hirt (“H usband”) afte r t wenty -seve n y ear s of marria g e. The parties ha d five fina ncial ac counts. Two of the se ac counts clea rly wer e marital property , wer e divided eve nly by the Trial Court, and a

re not at issue on appea l. As t o the three
rema ining a ccounts, the Trial Court conclude d two wer e marital property with the third being Wife’s
se pa rate pr op e rt y . A ft e r m akin g the se fi nd ing s, the Tria l Co urt di stribu te d t he pro pe rt y wi th Husband rec eiving 54% of the marital property , and Wife rec eiving the re maining 46% . Husband appea ls claiming the Trial Court er red w hen it classified two of the accounts as marital property and the t hird as Wife’s sepa

rate property . Both pa

rties claim the Trial Court’s overa ll dist ribution of the
mari ta l pr op e rt y

wa s in e qu ita

ble

. We c on c lud e the Tria l Cou rt pr op e rl y c la ssi fi e d th e thr e e a c c ou nts at issue and did not abuse its discr etion when distributing the marital property . The judg ment of the Trial Court is, theref

ore, a ffirme d.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ge neral Sessions Cou rt A ff irm ed; Case R em anded

D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., and C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., joined.

Rob e rt G. Hi nto n, L e no ir

City , T e nn e sse e , f

or the Ap pe lla nt E rn st H . H irt.

L or e n E . Pl e mmo ns , L e no ir City , T e nn e sse e , f

or the Ap pe lle e Gr e thy

Hi rt

.Am ong ot her t hi ng s t hi s s t at ut e per mi t s a t r i al co urt, u p o n st i p ul at i on, t o decl ar e t he part i es di vor ced as 1

o p p o se d to a w a rd ing a d ivo rc e to o n ly o n e o f t h e p a rtie s.
-2- OP IN ION

Bac kgr ound

This is a divorce case with the primary issues on appea l involving the Tria l Court’s
c la ss if ica ti on of tw o f inanc ia l a c c ou nts a s ma

ri ta l pr op e rt y

a nda thi rda c c ou nt a s Wif

e ’s se pa rate p r o p e r t y. T h e p ar t i e s a l s o c h a l l e n g e t h e T r i a l C o u r t ’ s o v e r a l l d i s tr i b u t i o n o f t h e m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y, with both sides claiming the distribution was inequitable

.

Wif e fi le d a c omp la int fo r div or c e a lle g ing Hu sb a nd wa s g uil ty of in app rop ri a te
mari ta l c on du c t or , in the a lte rn a tiv e , that ir re c on c ila ble dif fe re nc e s ha d ari se n b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s. When the complaint for divorce was filed i n September of 2001, Husband wa s 73 y ear s of ag e, Wife was 62, a nd the parties had bee n marrie d for ove r 27 y ear s. Husband filed an answer de ny ing he was g uiltyof any

inappropriate marital c onduct, althoug h he did admit that irreconc ilable diffe renc es had arisen be tween the parties. Husba nd also filed a counter- complaint for divorc e alleg ing Wife w as g uil ty of c ru e l a ndinh uman tr e a tme nt a s w e ll a s in app ro pria te mari ta l c on du c t.

Th is w a s th e se c on d marriag e fo r b othpa rt ie s. Th e re are no c hil dr e n b orn o f this marria g e. Husba nd maintains citiz enship in the United States and Switzerland, and W ife is a Dutch citizen. Husband retire d in 1997 and was the sole wa g e ea rner while the parties were marrie d. The parties we re living in Tellico Villag e, L oudon County , T ennesse e, whe n Wife filed for divor ce. Wife ha s si nc e mov e d to Ge or g ia a ndHu sb a ndha s mo ve d to Mis sis sip pi. Hu sb a nd is in ve ry po or he a lth and has a history of serious c o ro n ar y ar t ery disease and intermittent atrial fibrillation. Husband underw ent quadr

uple by pass in 2000 and his ca

rdiolog ist has opined that only 20% of Husband’s heart curre ntly

is functioning.

Soon after the complaint was filed, an ag ree d order was e ntere d disburs ing $139,844.98 contained in a First Centra l Ba nk money marke t acc ount which was ope ned using the proce eds fr om the sale of the marital re sidence

. These funds, which a re not at issue on appea l, were divided evenly

betwee n Husband a nd Wife and consider ed an a dvance on any fin al awa

rd by the Trial Court when distributing the marital prope rty

.

After a trial, the parties stipulated to and wer e dec lare d divorce d pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-129. The Trial Court then classified pr operty as either marital or se parate and 1 dis tr ibu te d the pr op e rt y a c c or din g to the se fi nd ing s. Th e pa rt ie s h a d f ive se pa rate fi na nc ia l a c c ou nts

. Two of these wer e joint ac co u n t s m aint ained in the na mes of both Husband and Wife and we re va lue d at $3 08 ,0 80 a nd$2 19 ,2 62 . T he Tria l Cou rt c la ssi fi e d th e se tw o a c c ou nts a s ma ri ta l pr op e rt yO n e a c c o u n t c o n ta ine d 2 5 3 ,3 7 3 .5 1 E u ro s. A c c o rd ing to H u sb a n d , a c o rr e c t co n v e rs io n to U .S . d o llar s w o u ld 2

r es u l t i n t h i s a cc ou n t be i n g w or t h a ppr ox i mat el y $296, 000, not $219, 262. W h et h er t h i s a cc ou n t i s v al u ed at $219, 262 or $296 , 00 0 wi l l not si gn i f i can t l y i mp act t he over al l p r op er t y di s t r i but i on s i nce t hi s ac count was di vi ded even l y bet ween t he p arti es.
-3- and divided them eve nly , with eac h p ar ty rec eiving $263,671. Neither party challeng es the Trial 2 Cou rt ’s c la ssi fi c ati on of the se tw o a c c ou nts a s ma ri ta l pr op e rt y

or the ma nn e r i n w hic h th e se a c c ou nts we re div ide d. I t is the re ma ini ng thr e e a c c ou nts wh ic h fo rm the prima ry dis pu te on app e a l. These thr ee a ccounts a

re:
1. Sa lom on Smith B arn e y a c c ou nt # 4 23 -6 23 48 -1 3, wh ic h is a n I RA he ld s ole ly in Husban d ’s n ame and valued at $261,486. The Tria l Court concluded this ac count was marital prope rty

and divided it 60% or $156,891 to H usband, and 40% or $104,595 to Wi fe;

2

. Salomon S m i t h Barn eyac co u n t#4 2 3 -2 7 6 7 1 -1 3 , wh i ch was held in the names of Husband and his da u gh t er , Heidi Kropta vich, as joint tenants with the rig ht of survivorship. This acc ount was value d at $182,723, and the T rial Court conc l u d ed i t was marital prope rty

and divided it 60% or $109,634 to Husba nd, and 40% or $73,089 to Wi fe; and

3. Salomon Sm ith Barney acc ount #572-00759-19-096, which wa s held in the
names o f Wi f

e a n d h e r d a u g h te r , Co ll e tt e H u ts o n , a s jo in t te n a n ts w ith th e r ig h t of survivorship. This a ccount was va lued at $313,000, and the Trial Court awa rded the entire
acc ount to Wife as her separ ate property afte r expressly

finding “that [Husband] has failed to c arry his bu rd e n o f p ro of

that he ma de a su bs ta nti a l con tr ibu tio n to the e xistin g se pa rate
acc ount of [W ife].”

The Trial Court’s classification and d i s t ribution of the re maining pr operty is not direc tly in dispute. As noted previously , the m arital re sidence was sold af ter the divorc e ac tion was filed. Wife moved to Geor g ia and Husband moved to Mississ ippi. The parties used the proc eeds f r o mt h e s a l e o f

t h e m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e t o w ar d t h e p u r c h a s e o f n e w h o m e s o n c e t h e y

r e l o c a t e d

. In addition to the property

distribution s et forth a

bove, Wife wa s awa

rded as her se parate prope rty her ho us e in G e or g ia , 14. 5 ac re s of la nd loc a te d in Ark a ns a s, a nda ny fu nd s sh e he ld i n b a nk

a c c ou nts in Georg ia. Husband w as aw arde d as his separ ate property his Mississippi residence and any funds he he ld i n ba nk a c c ou nts in Mis sis sip pi. Ea c h part y wa s aw ard e d the pe rs on a l pr op e rt y c ur re ntl y in their possession and the Trial Court divided the fe w re maining items of pe rsonal prope rty which then
wer e in dispute but which ar e not at issue on appe al.

Husband c laims the Trial C ourt err ed whe n it classified as marital property Salomon Smit h Ba rney acc ounts #423-62348-13 and #423-27671-13. Husband a lso claims the Trial Court
e rr e d w he n it

c la ssi fi e d S alom on Smith B arn e y a c c ou nt # 57 2- 00 75 9- 19 -0 96 a s Wif e ’s se pa rate property

. Husband’s final issue is his claim that the Trial Court did not consider a ll releva nt fac tors when dist ributing the marital property , there by resulting in an inequitable distribution. Whi le Wife-4-

ag ree s with the Trial Court’s classification of the three acc ounts, she also claims that the distribution of the ma ri ta l pr op e rty

wa s in e qu ita

ble wh e n c on sid e ri ng the re le va nt f a c tor s.
Discussion

The fa ctual finding s of the Tria l Court are a ccor ded a pr esumption of corr ectne ss, and we will not overturn those fac tual finding s unless the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ains t them. See Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Bogan v. Bogan , 60 S.W .3d 721, 727 (Tenn. 2001). Wit h respe ct to leg al issues, our revie w is conducted “ under a pure de novo standard of revie w, ac cording no defe renc e to the conclusions of law made by the lower courts.” So uth e rn Con str uc tor s, In c . v . Lo ud

on Cou nty Bd. Of Educ. , 58 S.W .3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001)

.

Be f o r e w e d is c u s s th e T r ia l Co u r t’ s c la s s if ic a ti o n a n d d is trib u ti o n o f the three
acc ounts at issue, we note the parties’ fac tual ag ree ment that Husband wa s t h e s o l e wag e ea rner during the marriag e, Wife ser ved as home maker , and neither party expected Wife to work outside of the home. Pursua nt to T en n

. Code Ann. § 36-4- 121(c) (5), whe n equitably distributing marital pr op e rt y a tr ia l cou rt

sh ou ld c on sid e r a s o ne of theva ri ou s f a c tor s th e c on tr ibu tio ns of e a c h p art y

to t h e a c q u i s i t i o n , ap p r e c i a t i o n , d i s s i p a t i o n o r d e p r e c i a t i o n o f

t h e m ar i t a l o r

s e p ar a t e p r o p e r t y, “including the contribution of a pa rty to the m arriag e as homemaker , wag e ea rner or par ent, with the contribution of a pa

rty as hom emake r or wag e earne r to be g iven the same weig ht if eac h party has fulfilled its role .” On appe al neither party arg ues that the other

did not fulfill his or her

respe ctive
ro le , a ndthe re c or d c e rt a inl y su pp orts the c on c lus ionthat th e y bo th d id j us t tha t. Th e re fo re , w e wi ll d i s cu s s n ei t h ert h e t es t i m o n y i n t h e r ec o rd p er t ai n i n g t o t h e p ar t i es f u l f i l l i n g t h ei r w age e ar n e r /h o m e m ak e r

r o l e s i n t h e m arr i a g e n o r

t h e t e s t i m o n y r e l e v a n to n l y t o W i f e ’ s c l a i mf

o r a l i m o n y, a cla im denied by

the Trial Court and a

decision not appe aled by Wife.

We f ir st m us t d e c i d ew h e th e r

th eT ri a l C o urt c or

re c tly c la ssi fi e d th e dis pu te d p ro pe rt y as either marital or se parate prope rty befor e we can de termine whe ther the over all distribution of the marital prope rty

was e quitable. As re levant to this a ppeal, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4- 121(b) pr ovides t h e f o l l o w i n g d e f

i n i t i o n s o f

m ar i t a l a n d s e p ar a t e p r o p e r t y: (1 )( A) " Ma

ri ta l pr op e rt y " me a ns a ll re a l a nd pe rs on a l pr op e rt y , b oth tang ible and intang ible, acquir ed by either or both spouses during the
course of the marriag e up to the date of the fina l divorce he aring and owned by either or both spouses as of the date of fili ng of a c omplaint fo r d ivor ce, e xce pt i n th e c a se of fr a ud ule nt c on ve y a nc e in anticipation of filing , and including any property to which a right wa s acquir ed up to the date of t he final divorce he aring , and value d as of a date as nea

r as r easona

bly possible to th e fi n al divorce hearing date.... All marital property shall be v al u ed as of a

date a s near

as possible to the date of

entry of the orde r finally

dividing the marital p r o p e r t y.-5- (B ) " Ma ri ta l pr op e rt y " inc lud e s inc ome fr om, a nd a ny inc re ase in
va lue du ri ng the marria g e of , pro pertyde te rm ine d to be se pa rate pr op e rt y in a c c or da nc e wi th s ubdi vis ion(b )( 2) if e a c h p art y substantially contributed to its prese rvation and a pprec iation, and the value of vested a nd unvested pe nsion , v ested a nd unvested stock op tio n rig hts , r e tir e me nt o r o the r f ri ng e be ne fi t r ig hts re la tin g to employ ment that acc rued during the period of the marria g e.

* * *
(D) A s used in this subsection, "substantial contribution" may include, but not be limit ed to, the direc t or indirect c ontribution of a spouse as ho m emaker, wa g e ea rner , pare nt or family

financ ial manag er, tog et h er w ith such other fa ctors as the court ha ving jurisdiction thereof may

determine.

* * *
(2 ) " Se pa rate pr op e rt y " me a ns : (A) A ll r e a l an d p e r s o n a l p r o p e r ty o w n e d b y

a s p o u s e befor e marria g e, including, but not limi ted to, assets held in individual reti re m ent accounts (I RAs) as that term is defined in the I nterna l Revenue Code of 1986, as amended;
(B ) Property

acquir ed in exchang e for property acquir ed bef

ore the marria g e; (C ) Inc ome fr om andapp re c ia tio n o f p ro pe rt y ow ne d b y

a sp ou se befor e mar

riag e except whe n char acte rized as marital property under subdivision (b)(1);
(D ) P ro pe rt y

a c qu ir e d b y

a sp ou se a t a ny

tim e by g if t, b e qu e st, de vis e or desc ent ....
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 4-121(b)

.

Our Supreme Court had occ asion to discuss the conce pts of marital prope rty and separ ate property in the rec ent ca se of Langschmidt v. Langschmidt , 81 S.W .3d 741 (Tenn. 2002)

. I n Langschmidt , th e Sup re me Cou rt no te d th a t in a dd iti on to the statut ory pr ov isi on s c on ta ine d in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 4-121(b) , Tenne ssee intermediate a ppellate c ourts have re cognized two methods by which separ ate proper ty may be converted into marital property

. Id . at 747. These two-6-

methods are commingling and transmutation, which the Supreme Court noted have been de scribed by thi s Co urt a s f

oll ow s: [S]ep arate pr op e rt y

be c ome s ma

ri ta l pr op e rt y

[by com ming lin g ] if ine xtri c ably

min g le d w ith mari ta l pro pe rt y or wi th the se pa

rate property of the other spouse. I f the separ ate pr operty continues to be seg reg ated or

can be trac ed in t o its product, commingling does not
oc c ur

.. .. [Tr a ns mut a tio n] oc c ur s wh e n se pa rate pr op e rt y is t

re a te d in such a w ay

as to g ive evidenc e of an intention that it become marital property .... The ra t i o n ale unde rly ing the se doctrine s is that dealing with property

in these way s cre ates a rebuttable presumption of a g ift to the marital estate . This presumption is b ased also upon the provision i n m an ymarital prope rty statutes that property

acquir ed during the m arriag e is presumed to be marital. The pre sumption can be re bu tte d b y

e vid e nc e of

c ir c ums ta nc e s o r c ommun ic a tio ns c le arl y indicating an intent that the prope rty rema in separate. Langschmidt , 81 S.W .3d at 747 (c itations omi tted).

One of the issues in Langschmidt was whe ther the husba nd’s I RAs which had be en establi s h ed prior to the ma rriag e we re ma

rital or sepa

rate property

when the husband made absolutely

no contributions to those I RAs during the marriag e. The Supreme Court’s re solution of th is is s u e w a s s u mm ar iz e d b y th is Co urt in Sm ith v . S mi th , 93 S.W .3d 871 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)
a s f oll ow s: The supre me court ... beg an its anal y s i s by stating that "[r]etirement bene fits acc rued during the marriag e cle arly are marital pro pert y un der T enn ess ee l a w ." [ Langschmidt , 81 S.W .3d] at 749. (c iti ng Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 4- 121(b )(1 )(B ); Gragg v. Gragg , 12 S.W. 3d41 2 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; Co h e n v
. Co hen , 937 S.W .2d 823 (Tenn.1996) ). The c ourt t h en stated that the issue wa s "w hether a prema rital I RA is a retire ment ben ef i t under Te nn. Code Ann. § 3 6-4 -12 1(b )(1 )(B). " Id. at 749. Be cause the prema rital I R As at issue wer e funde d with p remarital assets and did not re prese nt defe rre d compensation during the marriag e, the c ourt conc luded that "H usband' s prema

rital I RAs are not retireme nt benef its under Tenn. Co de A nn . § 36 -4- 12 1(b )(1 )(B). " Id. at 749.

After concluding that Husba nd' s I RAs were not retireme nt be ne fi ts, th e c ou rt

de te rm ine d th a t H us ba nd ' s I RA s r e ma ine d h is
s epar ate pr operty

acc ording to section 36-4-121( b)(2) (A) of the Tenne ssee Code. Id. at 749. This w as due to f act that Hu sband owned the IRAs and fu n d ed them prior to the pa rties' marria g e. Id.W i fe’ s ref erence t o t hese acco unt s as her “ p ers o nal ” acco unt s cert ai nl y i s no t de t erm i nat i ve o f whet her t he 3

a c c o u n ts w e re he r se p a ra te p ro p e rty. W e us e W ife’s re fer e n c e to the se a c c o u n ts a s h e r p e rs o n a l ac c o u n ts p rim a r ily becau s e i t as s i s t s i n di s t i ng ui s hi ng bet ween t he s eve r al ac count s at i s s ue.
-7- The c ourt then stated that the a pprec iation of the I RAs during the
ma rr i a g e c o u l d p r o p e r l y b e c o n s i d e r e d m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y i f " bo th parties ' substantia l l y contribut ed to [the I RA' s] preservation and app re cia ti on .'" Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 4-121(b) (1)( B) , - 121(b)( 2)(C)) . I n order to s upport a finding of substantial contribution, the court r equire d some connec tion be tween the marital eff orts of a spouse and the appre ciation of the s epar ate property

. Id. at 746, 750. The c ourt determined that the evidenc e failed to support a finding t hat "Wife substantiallycontributed to the pre servation and app reci ati on of Hus ban d's I RA ass ets ." Id. at 750. According ly , the court he ld that "these I RA assets, including their appr eciation during the marriag e, are Husband' s separ ate pr operty under se ctions 36-4-121( b)(2) (A) and 36-4-121( b)(1) (B )" of the Te nnessee Code. Id. at 750-51.

Sm ith , 93 S.W .3d at 877.

Kee ping the se principles in mind, we now turn to the Trial Court’s classification of the three acc ounts at i s s u e i n t his appea l. Much of the pe rtinent testimony at trial foc used on the parties’ financ es and these three acc ounts. Wife was the first witness, and she testified that she and he r f ir st h us ba ndow ne d a

su bd ivi sio n, a

du ple x, the ho us e in wh ic h the y liv e d, a nd la nd in A rk a ns a s. Wife rec eived some of

this property

when she divorce d her f

irst husband. Most of t hese a ssets were
so ldo v e r ti me w ith th e p r o c e e d s b e in g d e p o s it e d in to a b a n k a c c o u n t i n H o ll a n d , w h ic h is wher e Wife moved afte r her

first divorce

. Wife orig inally opened this acc ount in her name and he r sister’s name be cause Wife’s daug hter wa s a minor at that time. Once Wife’s daug hter was n o l o n ger a min or , h e r d a ug hte r e ve ntu a lly wa s a dd e d to the a c c ou nt a nd Wif e ’s sis te r wa s r e mov e d. Wif e a lso op e ne d a n a c c ou nt i n A rk a ns a s w ith Sa lom on Smith B arn e y (“ SSB ” ) u sin g fu nd s f

ro m he r f ir st marria g e. This ac count also wa s in the names of Wife a nd her daug hter. W ife stated that Husband did not c o n t ribute any

money to these two ac counts which Wife re fer red to a s her “ persona l
acc ounts.” 3

Acc ording to Wi fe, the parties’ normal monthly bills were pa id from a joint checking
acc ount f unded entirely with H usband’s earnings. Wife did not contribute any money from her two pe rs on a l a c c ou nts tow ardop e ratin g the ho us e ho ld, wi th the e xce pti on of tw o “lo a ns ” sh e ma de to Husband in the 1970' s. Acc ording to Wife, she l oaned Husband $10,000 from her per sonal ac count in Arkansa s in January of 1974. Wife had Husband sign a promissory

note evidenc ing this loan a nd the note wa s admitted into evidence at trial. Wife testified that Husba nd wanted to bor row a nother $10,000 in 1976. Wi fe c laims Husband ac companied he r t o t h e b ank and discovere d that she-8-

actua lly had $18,000 in the acc ount. Husband then informed Wife that he wanted to borro w t he entire a mount, and she ac quiesce d.

Wife claimed Husba nd was upset be cause she would not g ive him all of the money contained in he r “pe rsonal” a ccounts. Wife explained the re ason she did not do this was to protec t her daug hter fina ncially , ev en if it made Husband ang ry . Wife used the money in her pe rsonal
acc ounts f

or taking car e of her daug hter, who lived for some time w ith Wife’s siste r i n Ho l l and. Wife used this money

to pay for her daug hter’s sc hooling, medic al bills, etc. Husband c ontributed nothing towa

rd these e x penses pe rtaining to Wi fe’ s daug hter.

Husband ha d worke d approximately ten or e leven y ear s for a Dutch compa ny

called Uiterwoy k befor e the parties wer e marrie d. Wife acknow ledg ed that shortly afte r they wer e mar ried, Husband told her that he had $40,000 in a pension acc ount with Uiterwoy k. Wife went on to add, howeve r, that she never saw any documentation verify ing H usband’s stateme nt that he had $40,000 in that acc ount prior to their marriag e.

Approxim ately

ten y ear s after

Husband a nd Wife were marrie d, Wi fe assisted her mother in buy ing a

house. Wife testified that i t was decided he r mother would pay 1/3 of the purcha se price , and “I

would pay

1/3, and my

husband and I would pay 1/3.” When the house wa s sold te n y ear s later a fter Wife’ s mother passed a way , Wife paid off a loan that Husband ha d made on the house with 1/3 of the r emaining proce eds being deposited i nto a joi nt acc ount of Husband and Wife, and the re maining 2/3 be ing de posited into W ife’s pe rsonal ac count in Holland.

Wife testified that she had a stockbroker who assisted her with inve sting the money in the acc ounts she held with he r daug hter, althoug h she sometimes w ould ask Husband whe ther he ag ree d with the stockbroker ’s a d v ic e

. Wi f ec la imed Husband made no financ ials decisions reg arding her pe rsonal ac counts, “e x cept insofa r as he would ag ree ” with t he stockbroke r. Afte r Wife filed for divorce , she m oved to Geor g ia t o be with her daug hter. Whil e in Geor g ia, W ife closed both of her persona l acc ounts and combined them into one new acc ount with SS B in Atlanta . The c urre nt value of thi s ac c ou nt is $31 3, 00 0 an d is the thi rd a c c ou nt stil l a t is su e on app e a l. Wi fe re c e ive s in te re st inc ome on thi s a c c ou nt r a ng ing fr om $ 50 0 to $ 1, 50 0 p e r m on th. She a lso re c e ive s $ 55 4 p e r m on th in s oc ia l se c urity

be ne fi ts.

Wit h reg ard to the a ccount he ld in the nam es of Husband and his daug hter, Wife stated Husband a dded his daug hter to that ac co u n t s hortly befor e Wife filed f

or divorce . Wife admitted she did not contribute any funds to any

of the fina ncial ac counts except her two pe rsonal
acc ounts. W ife further stated tha t Hu s b an d made no f inancial c ontributions to her two persona l
a c c ou nts . Wif

e ne ve r t rans fe rr e d mone y

fr om h e r p e rs on a l a c c ou nts int o a ny of the oth e r a c c ou nts

.
T h e n e x tw i t n e s s w a s H u s b a n d w h o t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e h a d w o rk e d f o r U i t e r w o yk Corporation for

eleve n y ear s befor e he ma rried Wife. H usband continued to work for that company for approxi mately nine m ore y ear s. When questioned about his I RA acc ount, SSB acc ount #423- 62 34 8- 13 , H us ba ndte sti fi e d this a c c ou nt ini tia lly wa s fun de d with “ abo ut $67 ,0 17 ... w hic h w a s aH usband al so had an annui t y wi t h U i t erwo y k. W hen asked i f he had any do cum ent at i o n s ho wi ng t he val ue 4

o f t he annui t y at t he t i m e o f t he m arri age, H usband s t at ed he was unable t o o b t ai n t hat t y p e o f i nfo rma t i o n be cause t he

c o m p a n y is n o w “ b ro k e” and “ o ut of b usi ness

. ” W e ass um e t he same reason ho l d s t rue as t o why H usband had no d o c u m e n ta tio n fro m U iter w o yk re g a rd ing the p re -m a rita l va lue o f his p e n sio n

. -9- pension plan fr om Uiterwoy k Corporation prior to my

marria g e.” In other wor ds, Husband appe are d to cla im that th e e nti re pe ns ion wa s e arn e d p ri or to h is m arria g e to Wi fe . H ow e ve r, on c ro ssexamination Husband was questioned f urther r eg arding whether he continued to acc rue pe nsion benef its during the last nine or ten y ear s of his employ ment with Uiterwoy k, during which time he
wa s ma rrie d to Wif

e . T his qu e sti on ing wa s a s f oll ow s: Q. So, y ou are say ing that y ou didn’t earn any of the Uiterwoy k pension during the last ten y ear s that y ou wer e employ ed there ?

A. No. I

said – What I ’m saying is that I worke d for Uiterwoy k, had a pension plan. A nd when Uiter woy k sold out, Itook the pension plan, reinvested it and then rolled i t over in 1984 into the I RA plan.
Q. Right. And during half of t he time that y ou worke d for Ui te rw oy k, y ou we re marrie d to Mr s. Hi rt , w e re y ou no t?

A. That is corr ect.

Ba sed on this testimony , it seems clea r that Husband e arne d pension benef its during his entire tenur e wi th U ite rw oy

k, wh ic h w ou ld i nc lud e the fi rs t ni ne or te n y e ars he wa s marrie d to Wif e . We no te there was no doc umentary evidenc e fr om Uiterwoy

k or any other source int roduce d at trial showing the value of

the pension at the time of the marria g e, and this may be because such evidence no longe r exis ts. Howeve r, over

the cour se of the y ear s Husband maintained a handwritten ledg er w hich listed 4 the parties’ various assets and liabilities. I n 1981, approximately seven y ear s after the parties were marrie d, Husband indicated in the ledg er that his pension was worth $22,945. I n 1986, the ledg er has an e ntry

for “ Pension Pl an I RA” and indicates a va lue of $55,785.

After leaving Uiterwoy

k’s employ ment, Husband worked for a compa ny called Ry an Wal sh . H us ba ndwo rk e d f or Ry a n Wa lsh fr om 19 84 un til 19 96 a nd wa s marrie d to Wi fe du ri ng thi s entire pe riod o f t i m e. Husband testified he had a life annuity ag ree ment with Ry an Walsh which eventua lly was worth $82,000. Husband stated he converted the annuity into cash and the se funds
wer e deposited into his I RA acc ount. Husband also had $65,000 in a sa vings pla n with Ry an Walsh, wh ic h h e lik e wi se de po sit e d in to h is IRA a c c ou nt.

With re g a rdt o t h e a c c o u n th e l d i n t h e n a m e s o f H u s b a n d a n d h i s d a u g h t e r , S SB
a c c ou nt #42 3- 02 76 71 -1 3, Hu sb a ndte sti fi e d o n d ir e c t exam inatio n th a t th is a c c ou nt c on ta ine d o nly-10-

prema rital funds. Ac cording to Husband, he r ece ived $50,000 in U.S. dollars upon his divorce f rom his first wife. Husband claims he invested this money into long term certificates of deposit (“CD’s” ) with the Rabo Bank in Holland in 1974 or 1975. Husband then c laims that many y ear s later a nd afte r the CD ’s ha d matur e d, he tr a ns fe rr e d th e se fu nds int o SSB a c c ou nt #42 3- 27 67 1- 13 , w hic h is
curr ently held in his and his daug hter’s names.
Th e orig in o f the fu nd s in S S B a c c ou nt #42 3- 27 67 1- 13 se e me d r a the r s tr a ig htfo rw ardba se d o n H us ba nd ’s te sti mon y on dir e c t e xami nat io n. Th is re su lt c ha ng e d d uring c ro ssexamination whe n Husband was questioned about his handwritten ledg ers r efe renc ed above . The le dg e r fo r 19 80 do e s n ot s ho w a n e ntry fo r the Ra

bo B a nk , a lth ou g h b y

thi s ti me Hu sb a ndc la ims to have ha d over $50,000 in CD d ep osits with t hat bank. How ever , the 1980 ledg er doe s list t wo CD’s with a t otal value of $42,104. The 1981 ledg er e ntry no longe r has a ny

CD’s listed, but does contain the f

irst entry for the Ra

bo Ba nk and lists the amount of money being held there as $15,000. Suffice it to say , Husband’s le dg er e ntries do not square with his testim ony on direc t examination.

Do c ume ntation p ro vid e d b y SSB on a c c ou nt #42 3- 27 67 1- 13 wa s e nte re d in to evidenc e at tria l. T his documentation is far f rom complete and details sporadic transac tions for very limit ed periods of time betwee n Aug ust of 1998 and F ebrua ry of 2003. Husband te stified that every y ear he is requir ed to take ma ndatory distributions from his I RA, SS B acc ount # 423-62348-13. H u s b a n d t e s t i f

i e d t h a tth e s e m a n d a t o r y d i s tr i b u t i o n s a v e r a g e b e t w e e n $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 t o $ 1 2 , 0 0 0 a n n u a l l y. Re turnin g to the do c ume ntatio n p ro vid e d b y SSB on a c c ou nt #4 23 -2 76 71 -1 3, the re c or ds ind ic a te that on Dec ember

14, 1999, there was a $15,000 deposit from Husband’s I RA acc ount which was described as the “ normal distribution.” Sim ilarly , on September 25, 2001, there wa s a $9,600 deposit from Husband’ s I RA into a ccount #423-27671-13, which also was described as the “normal distribution.”

Wit h reg ard to Wife’s “ persona l acc ounts,” Husband testified that for seve ral y ear s he advised Wife reg arding which st ocks t o purcha se and how to invest that money . Wife listened to Husband for

a time, but in 1999 she ref used to se ll some stock and we nt ag ainst Husband’s a dvice. H u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a ts o o n t h e r e a f t e r , t h e v a l u e o f

t h e s t o c k d e c l i n e d s i g n i f

i c a n t l y.
Husb a n d r e c e iv e s s o c ia l s e c u r it y r e ti r e me n t b e n e f it s in th e a mo u n t o f $ 1 ,575 per month and also rec eives a pension from his last em p l o y er i n the amount of $240 pe r month. As noted, Husband a lso rece ives mandatory I RA distributions aver ag ing somewhere betwee n $10,000 to $ 12 ,0 00 e a c h y e ar. Hu sb a ndte sti fi e d th a t he is s e lli ng hi s ho us e in M iss iss ipp i be c a us e of his poor hea lth a nd intends to move into a n assisted living cente r. Husband has investigated the cost of various assi s te d li v in g c e n te r s in th e ar e a w h e r e h e li v e s , a n d th e y c o s t a mi n imu m o f

b e tw een $3,000 to $4,500 per month.

The Trial Court c oncluded Husband’s I RA acc ount va lued at $261,486 was marital property

. Langschmidt

and Sm ith , su

pr a , make c lear

that an ac count s uch as an I RA which is funded entirely with pr e-ma

rital assets re mains separ ate pr operty . I n addition, when the a pprec iation in theT he S m ith C o urt quickl y co ncl ud ed t hat t he fo ur I R A s whi ch had b een f und ed ent i rel y wi t h prem ari t al do l l ars 5

w e r e t h e h u sb a n d ’s se p a ra te p ro p e rty, a s w a s the ir a p p re c ia tio n in v a lue d u rin g the m a rr ia g e w h ic h w a s d u e so le ly t o

“ mark et f act ors an d t he com po un di ng of t he i nt er es t

. ” S m ith , 93 S. W

. 3d a t 878.

-11- va lue of the a c c ou nt i s e nti re ly

mark e t drive n, the n th e app re c ia tio n li ke wi se re ma ins se pa rate property

. See Langschmidt , 8 1 S. W.3 d at 74 5- 74 7; Sm ith , 93 S.W .3d at 877.

When marital funds ar e mix ed with sepa rate property , matters can g et more
co m p l i ca t ed . I n Sm ith , th e hu sb a ndha d s ix I RA s, tw o o f w hic h h a d b e e n p art ia lly fu nd e d w ith
mari ta l do lla

rs

. Th e pr e mari ta l f

un ds in the se tw o ac c ou nts c on sis te d o f b on ds wi th f ixedint e re st 5

rate s a ndthi s a llo we d h us ba nd ’s a c c ou ntant to de te rm ine the va lue of the a c c ou nts a ttribu ta

ble to prema rital funds, and the amount properly attributabl e to the marital funds. As a result, the pr e ma ri ta l f un ds did no t be c ome “ ine xtri c ably ” c omm ing le d wi th the mari ta l fu nd s a ndthe “ se pa rate property in the acc ounts did not become marital pr operty by virtue of the doc trine of c ommingling .” Sm ith , 93 S.W .3d at 879.

I n Lan gs c hm idt

, s up ra , t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t r e m a n d e d th e c a s e t o t h e tr i a l c ou rtto consider w hether

the husband’s c ommingling of marital e arning s with his separate money marke t
a c c ou nt w a s su c h th a t th e “ mari ta l e arn ing s b e c a me inextricably m ingled with the rema ining f unds in the money

marke t acc ount.” Langschmidt , 8 1 S. W.3 d a t 74 8 (e mph a sis in orig ina l)

. Th e Sup re me Cou rt the n a dd e d:
[I ]f the tr ia l c ou rt

fi nd s th a t H us ba nd c omm ing le d his m ari ta l in c ome with his separ ate acc ount, the n the entire value of the money marke t
acc ount and the entire value of as s ets purcha sed or transactions funded f rom the money

marke t acc ount after

the first deposit of marital ea rning s would also be marital property

. I f, howe ver, the trial
c ou rt fi nd s th a t H us ba nddidno t c omm ing le his mari ta l e arn ing s w ith his money

marke t funds, then t h e m oney marke t acc ount and any pu rc ha se s o f a sse ts f

ro m mo ne y

mark e t f un ds are Hu sb a nd ' s se pa

rate p r o p e r t y. Langschmidt , 81 S.W .3d at 748 (footnote omitted).

Husband testified that his I RA acc ount beg an whe n he deposited his pension fr om Uiterwoy k in the amount of $67,017. Husband’s pension with U iterwoy k was e arne d over a

period of twenty y ear s and Husband w as married to Wife for almost one-ha lf of t hat t ime. I f this had bee n the on ly a sse t de po sit e d into the I RA a c c ou nt, the n trying to de te rm ine ho w muc h w a s a ttribu ta ble to premarital earnings ve rsus post-marital ea rning s might be a ccomplis h ed gi v en the f act that the p ar ti e s w e r e ma

rr ie d c lo s e to o n e

- h a lf

o f th e ti me H u s b a n d w o rk e d a t U it e r w o yk

. H u s band, ho we ve r, de po sit e d in to the I RA a c c ou nt a pp ro xima te ly $1 47,0 00 in f un ds e arn e d th ro ug h h is employ ment with Ry an Walsh, and these funds clea rly wer e earned in their e ntirety while the parties
we re ma rrie d. Hu sb a ndsu bmi tte d n o p ro of a t t ri al whi ch w ou ld h a ve e na ble d th e Tria l Co urt to-12-

determine the value of

his premarital pension earnings. Husband even admit ted t hat he did not know how much was earned prior to the marria g e. Unlike the situation in Sm ith , no acc ountant was c alled
a s a n e xpe rt

wi tne ss t o te sti fy

re g ard ing the a mou nt i n th e I RA a c c ou nt w hich w a s a ttribu ta ble to prema rital earnings and the appre ciation of those e arning s. Given all of these fac tors, we be lieve the Trial Court had no c hoice but to dec lar e t h e entire I RA as marital prope rty beca use Husband inext rica bly commingle d marital prope rty with his separ ate property

. There fore , we affirm the Trial Court’s conclusion that Husband’ s entire IRA acc ount is marital property

.

Th e sa me ho lds true fo r the acc ou nt h e ld i n H us ba nd ’s a ndhis daug hte r’ s n a me s. Whil e Husband testified t his acc ount initi ally beg an with a $50,000 de posit from premarital funds
o b t a i n e d a f

t e r h i s f i r s td i v o r c e , H u s b a n d ’ s l e d g e r s d o n o ts u p p o rtt h i s t e s t i m o n y. M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y, in Dece mber of 1999 and September of 2001, there was a

total of $24,600 deposited into this account fr om H us ba nd ’s I RA a c c ou nt, a n a c c ou nt w hic h w e ha ve de te rm ine d w a s ma ri ta l pr op e rt y . T he se de po sit s fr om the I RA a c c ou nt w e re c ha ra c te ri zedby

SSB a s “ no rm a l di stribu tio ns .” Th is w ou ld le a d o ne to b e lie ve that th e se “ no rm a l dis tr ibu tio ns ” fr om H us ba nd ’s I RA a c c ou nt o c c ur re d at le a st
once a y ear and on a r eg ular b as i s , b u t we cannot determine how much more ma rital money

from Hu sb a nd ’s I RA wa s d e po sit e d in to this a c c ou nt w i th o u t c o mpl e te do c ume ntatio n f ro m SSB . A s w ith the I RA acc ount, there w as absolutely no proof offe red at trial establishing how much of the money in this account was prema rital money versus post-marital money

. Even a ssuming that this acc ount did be g in w ith a $50,000 deposit from Husband’s first marria g e, we have no c hoice but to conc lude Hu sb a ndc omm ing le d th e se se para te funds w ith mari ta l f un ds to the po int

that th e y ha ve be c ome inext rica bly commingle d and the entire acc ount must, there fore , be deeme d marital prope rty . The Tria l Co urt’ s c on c lus ion that a ll o f the mon e y c on tai ned in thi s a c c ou nt w a s ma ri ta l pr op e rt y

is likewise af

firmed.

As to the ac count the Tria l Court c oncluded was Wife’s se parate prope rty , there was some fac tual disag ree ment over how much of a contribution, if an y , Husband made to the appre ciation of this a ccount. For example, H usband’s and Wife’s testimony differ s about the deg ree of his assistance with her investment dec isions. There also was some dispute over the funds used to p ur c ha se Wif

e ’s mothe r’ s h ou se , w ithHu sb a ndc la imi ng Wif e de po sit e d s ome mari ta l f un ds int o her “ persona l” ac count af ter the house was sold. The Trial Court obviouslyresolved the se fa ctual issues in W ife’s favor. The Trial Court's decision to cre dit W ife’s te stimonyover H usband’s wa s nothing more than a c redibility determination. "Unlike this Court, the tria l court obser ved the manne r and d e m e a n o r o f

th e wi tn ess es an d wa s i n t he b est po si ti on to eval uat e th eircred ib il it y ." Union Planters Nat' l Bank v. Island Mgmt. Auth., Inc

. , 43 S.W .3d 498, 502 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Atrial court' s determinations re g arding cre dibilit y are accorde d defe renc e by this Court. Id. ; Davis v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. , 38 S.W .3d 560, 563 (Tenn. 2001). W e ar e u n ab le to conclude that the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e we ighs a g ainst the Trial Court's f indings that the f

unds in this account
orig inate d s ole ly

wi th Wi fe ’s pr e mari ta l f

un ds a ndthat H us ba nddidno t su bs ta nti a lly c on tr ibu te to their appr eciation during the course of the mar riag e. Ac cording ly , t h e finding s and re sulting conclusions of the Trial Court reg arding the funds in this acc ount are aff irmed.-13- Having aff

irmed the Trial Court’s classification of t he various acc ounts at issue, we now turn to the Trial Court’s distribution of the marital property . As noted, both parties c laim they
rec eived an inequitable distribution. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121( c) require s a trial court to consider
a ll r e le va nt f

a c tor s w he n ma

kin g a n e qu ita

ble dis tr ibu tio n o f m ari ta l pr op e rt y , in c lud ing : (1) The duration of the ma rriag e; (2 ) T h e a g e , p h y s i c a l a n d m e n t a l h e a l t h , v o c a t i o n a l s k i lls , empl oy ability , earning c apac ity , estate, f inancial liabilities and fi na nc ia l ne e ds of

e a c h o f the pa

rt ie s; (3) The t an gi ble or intang ible contribution by one (1) party

to the
e d u c a t i o n , tr a i n i n g o r

i n c r e a s e d e ar n i n g p o w e r

o f t h e o t h e r p ar t y; (4) The relative ability

of each pa

rty for f uture a cquisitions of capital assets and inc ome; (5) The contribution of ea ch party to the acquisition, preservation,
app re c iat ion , d e pr e c ia tio n o r d iss ipa tio n o f the mari ta l or

se pa rate property , including the contribution of a pa rt y t o the marriag e as ho me make r, wa g e e arn e r o r p are nt , w ith the c on tr ibu tio n o f a pa rt y as homemake r or wa g e ea rner to be g iven the same weig ht if eac h party has fulfilled its role;
( 6 ) T h e v a l u e o f

t h e s e p ar a t e p r o p e r t y o f

e a c h p ar t y; (7) The estate of

eac h party

at the time of the ma

rriag e; (8) The economic c ircums t an ce s of ea ch party at the time the division of property

is to become e ffe ctive;
(9) T h e t ax conseque nces to e ach pa rty , costs associate d with the
re a so na bly fo re se e able sa le of th e a sse t, andoth e r r e a so na bly fo re se e able e xpe ns e s a sso c ia te d w ith the a sse t;
(10) The amount of social security benef its available to ea ch spouse; and
(11) Such other

fac tors as ar e nec ess ary to consider the e quities be tw e e n th e pa

rt ie s.-14- A trial court has wide discr etion i n d i v iding the inter est of the pa rties in marital property

. Ba rn hil l v . B ar

nh ill , 826 S.W .2d 443, 449 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). A s noted by this Court in King v. King , w h e n d i v i d i n g m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y:

Th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s goa l in e ve ry div or c e c a se is t o d ivi de the pa rt ie s’ marital es t at e in a just and equitable ma nner. The division of the estate i s not render ed inequitable simply beca use it is not mathematica lly

equal, Cohen v. Cohen , 937 S.W .2d 823, 832 (Tenn. 19 96 ); El lis v . E lli s , 748 S.W. 2d 42 4, 42 7 ( Te nn . 1 98 8) , o r b e c a us e e a c h p ar t y d i d n o t r e c e i v e a s h ar e o f e v e r y i t e m o f m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y. Br own v . B ro wn , 9 13 S.W. 2d[163 ] at 16 8. . . . In th e fi na l a na ly sis , the just n ess of a

particula r division of the marital prope rty and allocation of ma

rital debt depe nds on its final results. See Thompson v. Thompson , 797 S.W .2d 599, 604 (Tenn. A pp. 1990).
King v. King , 9 8 6 S

. W

. 2 d 2 1 6 , 2 1 9 ( T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 8 ) ( q u o t i n g Ro se be rryv . R os e be rry , No. 03A01-9706-CH- 00237, 1998 Tenn. App. L EXI S 100, at *11-12 (T enn. Ct. App. Fe b. 9, 1998), no appl. perm. appeal filed

).
When considering the proc eeds f rom the sale of t he marital residenc e as w ell as the value of the financ ial acc ounts deemed to c onstitut e mar i t al p ro perty , Husband wa s awa rded $600,118.49 in assets, which c onstitut es 54% of the marital prope rty . Wife was aw arde d the
rema ining 46% which totaled $511,277.49. How ever , Wife also was a war ded all of the $313,000 in f un ds c on ta ine d in he r se pa rate a c c ou nt. Whil e de te rm ini ng the pe rc e nta g e of the mari ta l pr op e rt y eac h party

was a war ded is ce rtainly helpful in understa nding the over al l property distribution, t he fa c t th a t on e pa

rt y wa s n ot a wa

rd e d e xac tly

50 % o f the mari ta l pr op e rt y , s ta nd ing a lon e , w ill ra re ly if eve r constitute an abuse of discretion and a basis for reve rsal. There is no doubt that some of the fa c tor s c on ta ine d in Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 4- 12 1( c ) w e ig h e qu a lly for Hus ban d a ndWif e , w hil e oth e rs te nd to fa vo r Wif

e a nd y e t oth e rs te nd to fa vo r Hu sb a nd

. Ou r re vie w of the e nti re re c or d in this case c onvinces this Court that the Trial Court prope rly co n s i d er ed all re levant fa ctors whe n distributin g th e ma

r it a l p r o p e r ty

. We h o ldth e T r ia l C o u r t d idn o t a b u s e it s d is c r e ti o n w h en dis tr ib uti ng the mari ta l pr op e rt y . T he Tria l Co urt’ s o ve ra ll d ist ri bu tio n o f the mari ta l pr op e rt y is equitable, a nd, there fore , is affirme d.-15- Conclusion

The judgme nt of the Trial Court is aff irmed and this cause is remande d to the Trial Co urt f or c oll e c tio n o f the c os ts b e low . Co sts on app e a l are a sse sse d e qu a lly a g a ins t A pp e lla nt, Ernst H. Hirt, and his sure ty , and Appe llee, Gr ethy Hirt.

____________________________________ D. MI CHAEL

SW I NEY, JUDGE