NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

DALE E. KRISTOF,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,

Respondent

______________________ 

2021-2033

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. CH-0752-20-0057-I-2.

______________________ 

Decided: February 23, 2023

______________________ 

JEFFREY M. SILVERSTEIN, Freking Myers & Reul LLC, 

Dayton, OH, for petitioner.

 LIRIDONA SINANI, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by BRIAN M.

BOYNTON, TARA K. HOGAN, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, DYK, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.

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2 KRISTOF v. AIR FORCE

PER CURIAM. 

Dale E. Kristof appeals a decision of the Merit System 

Protection Board. See Kristof v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 

No. CH-0752-20-0057-I-2, 2021 WL 847879 (M.S.P.B. Mar. 

5, 2021). The Board affirmed the decision of the Department of the Air Force to indefinitely suspend Mr. Kristof 

without pay, pending a final decision regarding his eligibility for a security clearance. J.A. 1. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Mr. Kristof was employed by the Air Force as a Systems Integration Engineer. This position required access 

to classified information, which meant Mr. Kristof had to 

obtain and retain a security clearance as a condition of his 

employment. 

On February 20, 2015, Mr. Kristof’s access to classified 

information was suspended due to “alleged illegal distribution of International Traffic in Arms Regulation information to a foreign national.” J.A. 150. Mr. Kristof was 

informed that after an investigation into the alleged incident, the Department of Defense (“DoD”) Consolidated Adjudications Facility (“CAF”) would make a final 

determination regarding his security clearance eligibility.1 

Mr. Kristof was placed on administrative leave with pay, 

pending a final decision regarding his security clearance. 

Mr. Kristof remained in this status until 2019. 

1 DoD CAF has been renamed the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency Consolidated Adjudication Services. See DCSA Consolidated Adjudication 

Services (CAS), Def. Counterintel. & Sec. Agency, 

https://www.dcsa.mil/mc/pv/dcsa_cas/ (last visited Feb. 7, 

2023).

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KRISTOF v. AIR FORCE 3

On July 22, 2019, Mr. Kristof received notice that the 

Air Force was proposing to suspend him indefinitely without pay, pursuant to Air Force Instruction (“AFI”) 36-704,

Discipline and Adverse Actions of Civilian Employees (July 

3, 2018), because Mr. Kristof did not have access to classified information, a requirement of his position. The indefinite suspension would continue until Mr. Kristof was 

granted eligibility to maintain a security clearance. If DoD 

CAF, or another agency responsible for adjudicating security clearances for Air Force personnel, were to issue a final 

decision denying Mr. Kristof’s eligibility to maintain a security clearance, his indefinite suspension would continue 

until the Air Force took further action, potentially including his removal.

On October 24, 2019, the deciding officer issued a final 

written decision upholding Mr. Kristof’s indefinite suspension. Mr. Kristof’s suspension became effective that same 

day. 

Mr. Kristof appealed to the Board. He subsequently 

sought to dismiss his appeal without prejudice to “explore 

his retirement and employment options with regard to his 

security status.” J.A. 218. The Board granted this request

for a dismissal without prejudice on February 28, 2020. 

Mr. Kristof has now retired.

On August 26, 2020, Mr. Kristof requested to reopen 

his appeal, “to establish that the Agency denied [him] his 

due process rights as set forth in [5] CFR §6329(b).”2 

J.A. 237. In his close of record submission, Mr. Kristof 

2 Section 6329(b) of Title 5 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations does not exist. The administrative judge interpreted Mr. Kristof’s affirmative defense to be based on 

5 U.S.C. § 6329b, which includes provisions related to investigative leave. See J.A. 266. 

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4 KRISTOF v. AIR FORCE

challenged the delay in the conclusion of his security clearance investigation, arguing that he had not been afforded 

due process in challenging the revocation of his security 

clearance and that his decision to retire constituted a constructive discharge. In this submission, Mr. Kristof relied 

particularly on AFI 31-501, Personnel Security Program 

Management (Jan. 27, 2005), which provided that “[t]he Air 

Force goal for processing personnel security investigation 

requests at base level is 14 duty days.”

On March 5, 2021, the administrative judge issued an

initial decision affirming the indefinite suspension. Mr. 

Kristof did not petition for Board review, so that decision 

became the final decision of the Board. This petition for 

review followed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(9) and 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1).

On December 7, 2022, we ordered the government to 

file a supplemental brief addressing whether the DoD had 

violated DoD Manual 5200.02: Procedures for the DoD Personnel Security Program (PSP) § 9.4.i3 and allowed 

Mr. Kristof to respond. Both parties filed supplemental 

briefs.

DISCUSSION

We will affirm a decision by the Board unless it is: 

“(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been 

followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 

3 Section 9.4.i provides: “Suspension cases must be 

resolved as quickly as circumstances permit. Suspensions 

exceeding 180 days must be closely monitored and managed by the adjudication facility concerned so as to expeditiously reach a new national security eligibility 

determination.” J.A. 171.

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KRISTOF v. AIR FORCE 5

5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); Hornseth v. Dep’t of the Navy, 916 F.3d 

1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019).

Certain adverse employment actions can be appealed 

to the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d), which provides that 

“[a]n employee against whom an action is taken under this 

section is entitled to appeal to the [Board].” Section 7512 

defines the actions covered by § 7513(d) to include “a suspension for more than 14 days” but not the denial of a security clearance. In Department of the Navy v. Egan, the 

Supreme Court held that “[a] denial of a security clearance 

is not such an ‘adverse action’ [defined in § 7512 and appealable under § 7513(d)], and by its own force is not subject to Board review.” 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988). The Court 

explained “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Id.

at 528. Following Egan, “[w]e consistently have held that 

a federal employee does not have a liberty or property interest in access to classified information, and therefore the 

revocation of a security clearance does not implicate constitutional procedural due process concerns.” Robinson v. 

Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 498 F.3d 1361, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 

2007) (per curiam); see also Gargiulo v. Dep’t of Homeland 

Sec., 727 F.3d 1181, 1184–85 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Ryan v. Dep’t 

of Homeland Sec., 793 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

In deciding an appeal from an adverse action related to 

the denial or revocation of a security clearance, “the Board 

may determine whether a security clearance was denied, 

whether the security clearance was a requirement of the 

appellant’s position, and whether the procedures set forth 

in [5 U.S.C. § 7513(b)] were followed, but the Board may 

not examine the underlying merits of the security 

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6 KRISTOF v. AIR FORCE

clearance determination.”4 Hesse v. Dep’t of State, 217 F.3d 

1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

In addition to claiming a violation of the procedural 

protections outlined in § 7513(b), which concern notice and 

opportunity to be heard, an employee may also challenge 

an agency decision to the Board if the employee can show 

“harmful error in the application of the agency’s procedures 

in arriving at such decision.” 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A). We 

have held that, under § 7701(c)(2)(A), an employee may 

challenge an agency’s failure to comply with the agency’s 

own regulations with respect to a security clearance decision. Romero v. Dep’t of Defense, 527 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. 

Cir. 2008) (“[W]e decline to interpret Egan as having precluded such review [under § 7701(c)(2)(A)] . . . .”).

Here, the Board correctly held that the procedural requirements of § 7513(b) relating to notice and opportunity 

to be heard had been satisfied, a conclusion which

Mr. Kristof has not contested. Nor were the provisions of 

AFI 31-501 violated. AFI 31-501 § 5.6.1 only states that 

processing security clearance investigation requests within 

14 days is a “goal.” 

Mr. Kristof also raised an affirmative defense based on

5 U.S.C. § 6329b, relating to investigative leave. Under 

§ 6329b, an agency may place an employee under investigative leave, with pay, for a maximum of 130 days. 5 

4 Section 7513(b) requires: “(1) at least thirty days’ 

advance written notice stating the reasons for the proposed 

action; (2) a reasonable time to answer orally and in writing and the right to furnish affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of the answer; (3) the opportunity 

to be represented; and (4) a written decision and the reasons therefor.” Adams v. Dep’t of Def., 688 F.3d 1330, 1334 

(Fed. Cir. 2012); see 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b).

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KRISTOF v. AIR FORCE 7

U.S.C. § 6329b(b)(1)(A), (b)(3)(A), (c)(1)–(2). But the administrative judge determined that Mr. Kristof was never 

placed on investigative leave, and Mr. Kristof has not 

demonstrated this was erroneous.

In the course of this review proceeding, we noted that 

Mr. Kristof cited DoD Manual 5200.02. Subsection 9.4.i of 

that manual requires: “Suspension cases must be resolved 

as quickly as circumstances permit. Suspensions exceeding 180 days must be closely monitored and managed by 

the adjudication facility concerned so as to expeditiously 

reach a new national security eligibility determination.” 

J.A. 171. This regulation was potentially violated by the 

delay in resolving Mr. Kristof’s security clearance investigation, which the government admits was “substantial.” 

Resp’t’s Br. 27. In the government’s supplemental brief, it

argued that Mr. Kristof had not properly raised this issue; 

that subsection 9.4.i was not violated; and that this subsection does not, in any event, confer enforceable rights. In 

his response to the government’s supplemental brief, 

Mr. Kristof clarified that, while he had mentioned DoD 

Manual 5200.02 in his brief, he “did not specifically raise 

the issue of the violation of DoD Manual 5200.02.”5 Under

these circumstances, we do not reach the question of 

whether the agency’s own procedures were violated.

We have considered Mr. Kristof’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

5 Pet’r’s Resp. Agency Suppl. Br., Kristof v. Dep’t of 

the Air Force, No. 2021-2033, Docket No. 55, at 2 (Jan. 30, 

2023).

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