Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-87 | August 16, 2018 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Timothy J. O’Connor

O’Connor & Auersch

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Caryn N. Szyper

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Isaac Hicks,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

August 16, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-87

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Stanley E. Kroh, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49G03-1606-MR-23007

Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-87 | August 16, 2018 Page 2 of 9

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Isaac Hicks (“Hicks”) was convicted of Neglect of a 

Dependent Resulting in Death, a Level 1 felony.1 On appeal, Hicks argues that 

the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On April 20, 2016, Tamika Culpepper (“Culpepper”)—Hicks’s girlfriend—gave 

birth to their son, Z.H. Although Z.H. initially had a jaundice-related health 

issue, the jaundice resolved and Z.H. was generally healthy by June of 2016.

[3] In early June—when Z.H. was just over six weeks old—Hicks was living with 

his grandmother (“Grandmother”) while Culpepper lived nearby with her 

mother. Hicks and Culpepper shared parenting responsibilities, and Culpepper 

would sometimes stay overnight with Hicks and Z.H. at Grandmother’s 

residence. On June 5, 2016, Culpepper went to Grandmother’s residence after 

work for one of these overnight visits. When Culpepper arrived at some point 

after 10:00 p.m., Z.H. was in his bouncy chair, and was behaving normally. 

Z.H. later fell asleep in his bassinet. Hicks and Culpepper stayed up a bit later, 

and then went to sleep with Z.H. nearby.

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4(a)(1), (b)(3).
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[4] Overnight, Z.H. woke up twice, and Culpepper got up to feed him both times. 

Culpepper last fed Z.H. around 5:30 a.m. Later that morning, Grandmother 

left, and Hicks got up to lock the door behind her. Around 8:05 a.m., Hicks 

greeted a service technician who arrived to work on the television service. The 

technician observed Hicks preparing a bottle, and saw Z.H. moving. Culpepper 

remained asleep during the service call, which was completed around 8:45 a.m.

[5] At 9:52 a.m., Hicks downloaded a document to his cell phone. The document 

was named “SevereBrainInjury_rev7.pdf.” At 10:00 a.m., Hicks called 9-1-1 

and reported that Z.H. was not breathing. When Hicks brought Z.H. out to the 

ambulance, Z.H. was limp. Emergency responders could not find a pulse, and 

conducted CPR. After Z.H. was in the ambulance, Hicks woke Culpepper and 

told her that Z.H. was not breathing and in an ambulance. Culpepper rushed 

outside and rode in the ambulance as responders attempted to resuscitate Z.H.

[6] Meanwhile, law enforcement spoke with Hicks at the residence. Hicks—who 

was nineteen years old at the time—explained that when he discovered that 

Z.H. was not breathing, he brought Z.H. to an upstairs bathroom and changed

Z.H.’s clothes to see if that would wake him up; when Z.H. would not wake up, 

he called 9-1-1. Hicks later told a detective that he woke up knowing he needed 

to change Z.H.’s diaper; Hicks said that he brought Z.H. upstairs, realized Z.H. 

was not breathing, and called 9-1-1. At some other time, Hicks told Culpepper 

that he was making breakfast, realized Z.H. needed a diaper change, went to 

change the diaper, and called 9-1-1 when he realized Z.H. was not breathing.
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[7] When Z.H. arrived at the hospital, he had regained a pulse but was not 

breathing on his own. Z.H. was unconscious, with severe internal injuries, and 

was so cold that his temperature would not register on the thermometer. Z.H.’s 

blood had become acidic due to a prolonged lack of oxygen. It was determined 

that Z.H. had experienced hemorrhaging inside of his retinas, optic nerve, and 

both hemispheres of his brain. Due to his young age, Z.H.’s skull had not yet 

fused, and pressure from internal injuries had caused his skull to spread apart. 

Z.H. had a fresh abrasion on the back of his head, and linear abrasions. Z.H. 

also had a fractured rib, and fractures at the ends of his right wrist and left tibia. 

Z.H.’s injuries were consistent with being squeezed and violently shaken.

[8] After eight days in the hospital, Z.H. died from his internal injuries on June 14, 

2016. The next day, the State charged Hicks as follows: Count I—Murder, a 

felony;2 Count II—Neglect of a Dependent Resulting in Death, a Level 1 

felony; and Count III—Battery Resulting in Death to a Person Less Than 14 

Years of Age, a Level 2 felony.3 A jury determined that Hicks was guilty of 

Neglect of a Dependent Resulting in Death, and not guilty of Murder; the jury 

could not reach a verdict on the Battery count. The court entered judgment of 

acquittal on Count I and dismissed Count III. Following a sentencing hearing

on Count II, the trial court imposed an executed sentence of twenty-eight years.

 

2

I.C. § 35-42-1-1.

3

I.C. § 35-42-2-1(c)(1), (j)(1).
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[9] Hicks now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[10] When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence supporting a 

conviction, “we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility; 

instead we consider only the evidence and the reasonable inferences supporting 

the verdict.” Leonard v. State, 80 N.E.3d 878, 882 (Ind. 2017). We will affirm 

the conviction if there is probative evidence from which a reasonable jury could 

have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[11] Indiana Code Section 35-46-1-4(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] person 

having the care of a dependent, whether assumed voluntarily or because of a 

legal obligation, who knowingly or intentionally . . . places the dependent in a 

situation that endangers the dependent’s life or health . . . commits neglect of a 

dependent, a Level 6 felony.” The offense is elevated to a Level 1 felony “if it is 

committed . . . by a person at least eighteen (18) years of age and results in the 

death of a dependent who is less than fourteen (14) years of age.” I.C. § 35-46-

1-4(b)(3). Here, the State alleged that Hicks knowingly endangered Z.H. by

failing to seek medical attention; the charging information reads as follows:

On or about June 6, 2016, Isaac Hicks, being at least 18 years of 

age and having the care of Z.H., a dependent less than 14 years 

of age, did knowingly place said dependent in a situation that 

endangered the dependent’s life or health, to-wit: did not seek 

medical attention, which resulted in the death of Z.H.
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App. Vol. II at 30.

[12] Hicks does not dispute the sufficiency of evidence as to the age-related elements 

and as to Z.H. being a dependent in his care. Hicks focuses on whether there is

sufficient evidence (1) that he knowingly placed Z.H. in danger by delaying 

medical treatment and (2) that the delay of treatment resulted in Z.H.’s death.

Mens Rea

[13] “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, 

he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). For

the purposes of the neglect statute, “the accused must have been subjectively 

aware of a high probability that he placed the dependent in a dangerous 

situation.” Armour v. State, 479 N.E.2d 1294, 1297 (Ind. 1985).

[14] The evidence favorable to the verdict indicates that Z.H. was severely injured at 

some point on June 6, 2016, when Hicks and Culpepper were in the house. 

Hicks told Z.H.’s physician that he fed Z.H. around the time that the technician 

was present, and that Z.H. ate normally. Z.H.’s physician opined that due to 

the severity of Z.H.’s injuries, Z.H. would have exhibited symptoms right away. 

Z.H. could not have had a bottle without vomiting and likely lost consciousness 

after the trauma. The evidence, then, indicates that Z.H. became injured after

8:45 a.m., which was when the technician left. There was also evidence that 

Z.H. was injured as much as “half an hour to an hour,” Tr. Vol. III at 141,

before the ambulance arrived around 10:05 a.m. Thus, the jury could 

reasonably conclude that Z.H. suffered the injuries almost an hour before Hicks 
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called 9-1-1 at 10:00 a.m.—and long before Hicks researched severe brain 

injuries at 9:52 a.m. As to Z.H.’s injuries, there was medical testimony that the 

injuries were non-accidental, consistent with Z.H. being squeezed—fracturing

one of Z.H.’s ribs—and shaken to the point that his limbs flailed, causing

fractures at the ends of his bones. There was also evidence that Z.H. was 

wearing only a diaper when Hicks gave Z.H. to emergency responders, but that 

a bloody garment was recovered from the residence. The garment had Z.H.’s 

blood on the back collar, which corresponded to the area of an abrasion on 

Z.H.’s head. Hicks also gave several different accounts of the morning’s events.

[15] Hicks asserts that many of Z.H.’s injuries were “internal and, for that matter, 

invisible.” Appellant’s Br. at 11. Yet, the nature of the injuries was apparent 

enough for Hicks to conduct targeted research on the same type of injury that 

Z.H. had sustained. What is more, the removal of the bloody garment and 

Hicks’s differing accounts collectively evince a consciousness of guilt. Next, to 

the extent Hicks seeks to avoid culpability by suggesting the delay was brief and 

inconsequential—directing us to the period between conducting research and

calling 9-1-1—we do not reweigh the evidence, instead, the evidence supports a 

determination that Z.H. was injured well before Hicks downloaded this 

research to his phone. Furthermore, it is the role of the fact-finder to determine 

whether a particular delay amounts to neglect. See Lush v. State, 783 N.E.2d 

1191, 1198 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (declining to reweigh evidence where “[t]he 

jury found that under the facts and circumstances . . . a fifteen-minute delay was 

a deprivation of medical care.”). Ultimately, from the evidence adduced at 
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trial, a jury could reasonably conclude that Hicks was aware of a high 

probability that Z.H. needed medical care, and that Hicks knowingly 

endangered Z.H.’s life by failing to promptly seek that care.

Neglectful Act Resulting in Death

[16] Hicks also challenges the sufficiency of evidence that the alleged neglectful 

act—the failure to seek medical attention—resulted in Z.H.’s death. This Court 

has determined that “the phrase ‘results in the death of a dependent’ for 

purposes of the neglect statute . . . implicates proximate causation.” Patel v. 

State, 60 N.E.3d 1041, 1052 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Under this standard, the 

State must, at a minimum, prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the death 

would not have occurred “but for” the neglectful act. Id.

[17] At trial, the State called Doctor Tara Harris (“Dr. Harris”), one of Z.H.’s 

treating physicians. Dr. Harris opined that, had Z.H. received medical 

attention immediately after the trauma, there would have been a range of

treatment options available. Those options included putting Z.H. on a 

ventilator to keep his oxygen levels up, which would have “prevented [a]

hypoxic [e]ffect on the brain.” Tr. Vol. III at 120. There also would have been

“lots of medication interventions” available. Id. Moreover, if necessary, 

physicians could have taken the “dramatic step” of “cut[ting] off a piece of the 

bone of the skull to give the brain some room to swell.” Id. However, Dr. 

Harris explained that these options were not available because Z.H.’s “brain 

injury was already so progressed” by the time he got to the hospital. Id. By that 
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time, Z.H.’s blood had become acidic from a prolonged lack of oxygen, and he 

was so cold that his temperature would not register. According to Dr. Harris, it 

was “unusual” for an infant to be that cold, as it was not in the middle of winter 

“where he would have gotten really cold during transport.” Id. at 119.

[18] Although Dr. Harris could not definitively say if the interventions would have 

been successful, it is the role of the fact-finder to weigh evidence, evaluate 

witness credibility, and determine culpability in circumstances like these. Here, 

based upon the medical testimony and the nature of Z.H.’s injuries, the jury 

could reasonably conclude that time was of the essence—and that with every 

moment of delay, Hicks took away another treatment option. Furthermore, 

irrespective of who injured Z.H., the evidence indicates that Hicks was present

during the trauma, that Hicks appreciated the severity of the injuries, and that 

Hicks should have immediately sought treatment to preserve his child’s life. 

Ultimately, from the evidence, a jury could determine beyond a reasonable 

doubt that, but for the delay in medical treatment, Z.H. would not have died.

[19] There is sufficient evidence supporting the conviction.

[20] Affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.