River of Interests

Water Management in South Florida and the Everglades, 1948-2010

Matthew C. Godfrey and Theodore Catton, Historians

Historical Research Associates, Inc.

July 2011
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov 

Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800

Fax: (202) 512-2104 

Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001

ISBN 978-0-16-090134-8
iii

Con t e n t s

Foreword ........................................................................................ v

Preface ......................................................................................... vii

Abbreviations.................................................................................... viii

Introduction...................................................................................... ix

Chapter One 

Draining the Swamp: Development and the Beginning of Flood Control in 

South Florida, 1845-1947 ........................................................................... 1

Chapter Two 

Federal Intervention: The Central and Southern Florida 

Flood Control Project, 1948 ........................................................................ 19

Chapter Three 

Balancing Demands: Implementing the Central and Southern Florida 

Flood Control Project, 1949-1960 ................................................................... 33

Chapter Four 

Conflicting Priorities: Everglades National Park and Water Supply in the 1960s ............................. 49

Chapter Five 

Flexing the Environmental Muscle: The Cross-Florida Barge Canal, 

the Everglades Jetport, and Big Cypress Swamp........................................................ 69

Chapter Six 

The Liquid Heart of Florida: Lake Okeechobee and the Kissimmee River in the 1970s........................ 91

Chapter Seven

“Save Our Everglades”: Reagan’s New Federalism and Governor Bob Graham 

in the 1980s .................................................................................... 111

Chapter Eight

“That Damn Sewer Ditch”: Kissimmee River Restoration Efforts, 1978-1988 ............................... 127
iv

Chapter Nine

Lake Okeechobee II: Science in a Race with Politics and Nature......................................... 143

Chapter Ten

Envelopes of Protection: Land Acquisition Programs in Florida, 1980-1990 ............................... 159

Chapter Eleven

Brewing Storm: Development, Water Supply, and the East Everglades .................................... 173

Chapter Twelve

The “Ultimate Hammer”: Dexter Lehtinen’s Lawsuit ................................................... 191

Chapter Thirteen

A Broader Perspective: Ecosystem Restoration Becomes National Policy .................................. 201

Chapter Fourteen

Searching for Consensus: Sustainability and the Move Towards Everglades Restoration...................... 213

Chapter Fifteen

Preserving Their Interests: The Seminole and Miccosukee Indians ....................................... 229

Chapter Sixteen

A Laboratory for the Everglades: Kissimmee River Restoration in the 1990s ............................... 239

Chapter Seventeen

Conflicts and Difficulties: Water Distribution in the 1990s.............................................. 255

Chapter Eighteen

Getting the Water Right: The Restudy and Enactment of CERP, 1996-2000 ................................ 267

Conclusion..................................................................................... 285

Epilogue ....................................................................................... 293

Acknowledgments............................................................................... 315

Bibliography.................................................................................... 316

Biographical Information ......................................................................... 330

Index.......................................................................................... 331
Foreword v

F O R E W O R D

The destruction of America’s Everglades, a campaign to drain 

and develop “a worthless morass of venomous creatures,” as described in Marjory Stoneman Douglas’ book “The Everglades: River 

of Grass,” took decades. The good news from the campaign was that 

the Corps of Engineers was very effective and successful in achieving 

the end. The bad news, many of the well- intended actions of that 

campaign achieved unintended consequences. Some consequences 

are reversible in total, or in part, to recreate conditions similar to 

those Mother Nature intended, but never returning the system to its 

once natural state. Other consequences are irreversible, such as large 

scale urbanization. 

Having researched the Everglades intensively while at the U. S. 

Army War College in 2008-2009, I read and scoured through dozens 

of well-known resources and there is none better than Godfrey and 

Catton’s “River of Interests,” commissioned by the Corps in 2004. 

“River of Interests” is the best book I’ve found to date to provide 

the reader with a comprehensive understanding of the Everglades’ 

story and journey in a factual, clear and candid manner. What was 

missing from “River of Interests” in 2009 was the last decade of the 

Everglades’ story. The last decade was historic in that projects long 

-ago envisioned in the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan 

(CERP) and other programs, began to break ground. Groundbreakings have been held for the Tamiami Trail bridge and roadway, Site 1 

Impoundment Area, Picayune Strand Faka Union Canal Pump Station project, the Melaleuca Eradication Facility, and the Indian River 

Lagoon-South C-44 Reservoir and Stormwater Treatment Area. 

Restoration of the Everglades is a war consisting of countless 

battles, in the past, present and future, spanning decades of fighting 

for and in the Everglades. It should come as no surprise that it will 

take decades of time, thousand of warriors, billions of dollars and 

tremendous cooperation, collaboration, communication, consensus 

and compromise to win. 

The survival of the Everglades rests in the hands of the people 

who understand it, cherish it, and find ways to push through the 

battles in order to win the war.

The readability of “River of Interests” is phenomenal, providing 

readers with all they need to know about the history of the Everglades—from mankind’s initial intervention in nature to the restoration efforts conducted through 2010. Read it to understand the past, 

for the good of the future. 

Tremendous hope and optimism exists today for the Everglades. 

In November 2011, the state of Florida and the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers launched the most ambitious study ever, the Central 

Everglades Planning Project (CEPP). CEPP will no doubt contain 

the ways, means and methods to connect the heart of Everglades, 

Lake Okeechobee, to the greater southern Everglades. No effort for 

Everglades has ever been more important! Many blessings to those 

who dare to restore this gem for the greatness of our Nation and our 

world. Let it be your legacy! 

– Alfred A. Pantano, Jr.

Colonel, U. S. Army

District Commander

Preface vii

P r e f a c e

In the spring of 2004, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers commissioned Historical Research Associates, Inc. (HRA), to complete 

a study of the water resources system in South Florida (generally 

the region south of Orlando) from 1948 to 2000. This history was to 

include a discussion of all interests involved in water management—

whether federal, state, or local—rather than just focusing on the 

history of the Corps’ Central and Southern Florida Flood Control 

Project (C&SF Project), first instituted in 1948.

The years between 1948 and 2000 saw numerous changes within South Florida, including an explosion of agricultural and urban 

growth and the subsequent diminishment of ecological resources. 

Because of these factors, the Corps performed a restudy of the entire C&SF Project in the late 1990s, resulting in the authorization of 

the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP) in 2000, a 

gigantic environmental restoration program intended to enlarge the 

“water pie” for agricultural, urban, and environmental interests in 

South Florida and to ensure the health of the ecosystem. In 2010, the 

Corps commissioned HRA to provide an epilogue addressing the 

first decade of CERP’s implementation.

Water is the essential focus of this history, including its distribution, its quality, and its essentiality for life in South Florida. The 

following study highlights its importance in the region, as well as the 

problems that have developed between different interests fighting 

over the resource. Moreover, this report outlines the environmental transformation of the Corps, the events leading up to CERP, and 

the initial stages of that program. By doing so, it provides a needed 

perspective of how and why CERP was developed, and what problems, concerns, and interests informed water management in South 

Florida between 1948 and 2010.
viii United States Army Corps of Engineers

A b b r evia t ions

ASR Aquifer Storage and Recovery

BMPs Best Management Practices

C&SF Project Central and Southern Florida Flood 

Control Project

CEQ President’s Council on Environmental 

Quality

CERP Comprehensive Everglades Restoration 

Plan

CR-ENPA Central Records, Everglades National 

Park Archives, Homestead, Florida

EAA Everglades Agricultural Area

EDD Everglades Drainage District

EIS Environmental Impact Statement

EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FCD Central and Southern Florida Flood 

Control District

FRC Federal Records Center, Atlanta, 

Georgia

FSA Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, 

Florida

FWS U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

FWSVBAR U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Vero 

Beach, Florida, administrative records

GAO U.S. General Accounting Office

HQUSACE Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers

IIF Internal Improvement Fund

JDAR Jacksonville District administrative 

records

LOTAC Lake Okeechobee Technical Advisory 

Committee

NARA-SE National Archives and Records Administration Southeast Region, Atlanta, 

Georgia

NARA II National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

NEPA National Environmental Policy Act

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration

NPS National Park Service

NRDC Natural Resources Defense Council

OMB Office of Management and Budget

PPB Parts per billion

REAL Restoring the Everglades, An American 

Legacy Act

RG Record Group

SAM Spatial Analysis Methodology

SFWMD South Florida Water Management 

District

SFWMDAR South Florida Water Management 

District administrative records

STAs Stormwater treatment areas

SWIM Surface Water Improvement and 

Management

USGS U.S. Geological Survey

WRDA Water Resources Development Act
Introduction ix

I n tr o d u ct ion

In July 2004, the authors of this history arrived in South Florida, 

ready to research water management in the region since 1948. For 

the next several days, we traveled through large cities on the southeastern Florida coast, such as West Palm Beach and Miami, intrigued by the massive buildings and thronging crowds demarcating 

the area. At other times, we traversed agricultural fields lined by canals and levees (with such designations as “C-51” or “S-6”)—regions 

dominated by sugarcane and its producers. Perhaps influenced by 

popular culture depictions, we concluded that both of these areas 

constituted the real South Florida. 

Our perceptions changed on a muggy, hot day when we arrived 

at the National Audubon Society’s Corkscrew Swamp Sanctuary, 

a remnant of the historical Everglades located just west of Naples, 

Florida. There, we spent several hours engulfed in an entirely different world, one characterized by sawgrass flooded by three-inch deep 

pools of water, custard apple trees, pileated woodpeckers, alligators, 

deer, lizards, and the continual buzz of insects. For 20 minutes we 

were drenched in a thunderstorm that disgorged heavy sheets of rain 

from black clouds, causing an eerie silence to envelop the swamp. 

After the storm passed, the swamp came to life once more, resulting 

in a cacophony of frogs, birds, and insects. Truly, we commented to 

each other, this was South Florida.

In the course of our research, however, we realized that both 

worlds, the natural and the populated, made up South Florida. Each 

influenced the other, often in profound ways. Explaining the history 

of water management in South Florida, we comprehended, required 

telling the tale of the co-existence of these two disparate landscapes 

and the conflicts they engendered.

First, one had to consider how the urban and agricultural side of 

South Florida developed during the last century. Although the state 

of Florida had implemented drainage schemes and other plans in the 

late 1800s and early 1900s to stimulate settlement and development of 

the land, the major catalyst allowing urban and agricultural interests 

to dominate the landscape was the creation of the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control Project (C&SF Project) in 1948 by the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers. Ever since its establishment, this project, 

and all of the structures that it produced, has dictated how water 

would be managed in South Florida, including who would get what 

amounts (and when) and how such volumes would be distributed.

Yet the story is not so simple. Instead, it is a complex tale of how 

different interests in South Florida staked a claim in water management and vigorously defended their positions. The Corps and its local sponsor, the South Florida Water Management District (preceded by the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District), has 

had to operate the C&SF Project among a multitude of interests since 

1948, and such operation has required a balancing act between competing views. In the eyes of many environmental organizations, the 

Corps sometimes stumbled as it traversed this tightrope by placing 

urban and agricultural needs above ecological concerns. Although 

there was some legitimacy to this criticism, some of the environmental damage that occurred from water management policies also 

stemmed from the law of unintended consequences, which states 

that all human action, especially governmental, have unintended 

or unanticipated consequences. Colonel Terry Rice, former District 

Engineer of the Jacksonville District, put it another way, claiming 

that problems were caused by the Corps’ “innocent ignorance.” According to Rice, at times the Corps “really did not know what they 

were doing [to nature] by changing the hydrology, or [by] fixing the 

hydrology [for the benefit of humans].”1

Despite the perceived environmental stumbles, however, the 

Corps sometimes led the vanguard against ecological destruction, 

most notably in the late 1990s when it headed a restudy of the C&SF 

Project resulting in the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan 

(CERP), one of the most massive environmental restoration projects 

ever undertaken. But the development of CERP itself begs the question of how the Corps got from point A (the implementation of the 

C&SF Project) to point B (the undoing of much of that work) and 

especially how competing interests influenced the Corps’ trajectory. 

These latter issues form the major themes of this book.

Because the Corps’ C&SF Project is the major driver of water 

management in the region, that project—and the Corps itself—

serves as the main character of this story. The Jacksonville District 

is the branch of the Corps serving most of Florida, as well as Puerto 

Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Suwanee, Withlacoochee, and 

Alapaha river drainages in southern Georgia. The District, which 

is one of five districts within the South Atlantic Division, traces its 

roots in Florida back to 1821, although an official district office was 

not established until 1884. As the second largest civil works district 

in the nation, it has a variety of responsibilities, including beach 

erosion control and hurricane protection, emergency response and 

recovery, flood control, navigation, environmental restoration, and 

regulatory permitting. Led by a District Engineer (usually a military 

officer), the District has nearly 800 employees, most of whom are 

civilians.2
x United States Army Corps of Engineers

In addition to the Corps, other characters play an important 

role in this history. The South Florida Water Management District 

(SFWMD), for example, frequently serves as the local sponsor for 

Jacksonville District projects. The descendant of the Central and 

Southern Florida Flood Control District, formed in 1949 to operate 

and maintain the C&SF Project, the district originally had responsibility only for flood control in South Florida. In 1972, however, the 

Florida legislature passed a water resources act that allowed for the 

establishment of five water management districts in Florida in 1977, 

one of which was the SFWMD. The SFWMD thereafter assumed responsibility for other issues pertaining to water management, such 

as supply and quality. Headquartered in West Palm Beach, the district, which is led by a governor-appointed board and an executive 

director, is responsible for the operation and maintenance of approximately 1,800 miles of canals. Its jurisdiction covers all or part 

of 16 counties in South Florida, including Miami-Dade, Broward, 

Palm Beach, Collier, Hendry, Lee, Martin, Monroe, and Okeechobee 

counties.3

Together with the Corps, the SFWMD, and other federal and 

state interests, such as the National Park Service and the U.S. Fish 

and Wildlife Service, the citizens of South Florida constitute the other main players in the water management saga. These individuals are 

diverse, creating an interesting political (and regional) dichotomy. 

Throughout the 1900s, for example, the southeastern coast of Florida became more and more urbanized, centering on Miami, a booming metropolis anchoring Miami-Dade County, one of the most 

populous counties in the United States with over 2.2 million people. 

Residents in Miami-Dade County, as well as in Palm Beach and Broward counties (areas containing the cities of West Palm Beach and 

Fort Lauderdale), range from senior citizens who moved from other 

parts of the United States to large populations of immigrants from 

Latin American and Caribbean countries, especially Cuba. This urbanized and socially diverse region sustains a strong environmental 

movement. Influential environmentalists from the region have included Marjory Stoneman Douglas, Arthur Marshall, and D. Robert “Bob” Graham, U.S. Senator from and governor of Florida. Yet 

having enough water for its population was also important to east 

coast residents, and their demands for water often superseded environmental needs.

Conversely, the southwestern part of South Florida, especially 

Okeechobee, Collier, Glades, and Hendry counties, is much more 

rural and racially homogeneous. Agriculture and tourism are the 

Boundaries and areas of responsibility of Jacksonville District. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District)

Civil Works

Real Estate and Mobilization

Regulatory

District Offices

Puerto Rico

U.S. Virgin Islands

Area of Responsibility

Jacksonville District
Introduction xi

main components of the region’s economy, an area including much 

of the remaining Everglades. Property rights and the right to pursue 

activities such as hunting, fishing, and frogging are generally more 

important to southwestern residents than preservation of areas for 

environmental purposes.

The sugar industry dominates a central region of South Florida, 

directly south of Lake Okeechobee. More racially diverse than southwestern Florida, in large part because of an influx of migrants from 

the West Indies working as laborers in the sugar fields, this region is 

largely controlled by various sugar companies, such as Flo-Sun, the 

U.S. Sugar Corporation, and the Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative 

of Florida. Although sugar has been raised in the area since at least 

the 1920s, it did not become a large influence until the 1960s. At 

that time, Florida’s sugar industry became a major player in state and 

national politics because of the large sums of money it produced. 

The power of the sugar industry has led many urban environmentalists to claim that sugar unduly influences county, state, and federal 

governments on ecological issues, but sugar representatives respond 

with the same concerns about environmentalists.

The interplay of these diverse interests occurs against a unique 

geographical setting. Key to this ecosystem is its subtropical climate. 

The only area in the continental United States with a subtropical climate, South Florida has two seasons: wet and dry. The wet season, 

extending roughly from May through October, accounts for threequarters of the average annual rainfall total of 60 inches, while the 

dry season, lasting from November through April, experiences little 

precipitation. The sun shines on an average of 70 percent of the time 

during the day, although it is common in the rainy season for afternoon thunderstorms to well up on a regular basis, and daily high 

temperatures range from 76 degrees in January to 92 degrees in July. 

The subtropical climate creates a large amount of humidity, averaging 75 percent annually. Hurricanes and fires also abound, serving a 

vital role in vegetation propagation.4

The climate influences how much water flows through South 

Florida, which is characterized by two inland ridges—one along the 

east coast and one to the west—forming a shallow bowl-like valley. 

A slight tilt in the bowl means that water drains in a southwesterly 

direction, but, before the beginnings of drainage and development 

in the late 1800s, this natural receptacle retained much of the large 

amounts of rainfall that cascaded to the ground. Supplementing this 

supply was a slow-moving flow of water emanating from the upper 

chain of lakes forming the headwaters of the Kissimmee River—

Lakes Kissimmee, Tohopekaliga, Hatchineha, and Cypress, to name 

a few—located just south of present-day Orlando. Water from these 

lakes meandered down the twisting and turning Kissimmee to Lake 

Okeechobee, the second largest freshwater lake in the continental 

United States. Because the lake had no real outlet (the St. Lucie River 

began 20 miles to the east of the lake, flowing to the Atlantic Ocean, 

while the Caloosahatchee River started three miles west, running 

to the Gulf of Mexico), it would overflow its southern rim during 

Florida’s rainy season, spilling water into the South Florida valley. 

There, the liquid would begin a measured journey through a 60-mile 

wide region extending south from Lake Okeechobee to Florida Bay 

(off the southern tip of the peninsula), known as the Everglades. The 

extreme flatness of South Florida’s landscape—the elevation drops 

less than 20 feet between Lake Okeechobee and Florida Bay—meant 

that the 100-mile journey through the Everglades was unhurried 

and leisurely. The slow-moving water essentially flooded the region, 

creating a rich habitat for flora and fauna, as well as layers of fertile 

peat and muck soils built on the basin’s limestone bedrock.5

From the Everglades, water drained to the Gulf of Mexico 

through a series of open-water sloughs, including Shark River 

Slough. This channel took water southwest, dumping it in a region 

known as the Ten Thousand Islands, described by one scholar as 

“a bewildering green archipelago of mangrove keys at the edge of 

The historic drainage pattern of South Florida. (South Florida Water 

Management District)
xii United States Army Corps of Engineers

the Gulf.”6 Taylor Slough was the other major drainage, running 

southwest from a more easterly position into Florida Bay, located 

just south of Florida’s southern tip. The Miami, New, and Hillsboro 

rivers also flowed through the Everglades, taking water east to Biscayne Bay. As these waterways deposited into the estuaries of the 

Ten Thousand Islands, Florida Bay, and Biscayne Bay, fresh water 

mixed with salt water, creating a habitat where shrimp, lobsters, and 

fish thrived. 

Before Euro-American habitation of South Florida, the Everglades was thus “a complex system of plant life linked by water,” including “expansive areas of sawgrass sloughs, wet prairies, cypress 

swamps, mangrove swamps, and coastal lagoons and bays.”7

 It consisted of 2.9 million acres of land dominated by sawgrass and tree 

islands (“areas of slightly raised elevation covered by shrubs and 

woody vegetation”), housing a diversity of life, including cypress 

trees, pop ash, pines, buttonwood trees, mangroves, ferns, cabbage 

palm, orchids, sparrow hawks, red-cockaded woodpeckers, blue 

herons, egrets, roseate spoonbills, white ibises, otters, alligators, deer, 

and Florida panthers.8

 In the words of Marjory Stoneman Douglas, 

who bequeathed the term “river of grass” to the Everglades (playing 

The South Florida ecosystem, with major features. (U.S. Geological Survey)
Introduction xiii

off of pahokee, the Seminole word for the region meaning “grassy waters), “all these birds, insects, animals, reptiles, whispering, screaming, howling, croaking, fish in their kinds teeming, plants thrusting 

and struggling, life in its millions, its billion forms, the greatest concentration of living things on this continent, they made up the first 

Florida.”9

Yet by the last quarter of the twentieth century, this diversity of 

life had largely ceased to exist, and the Everglades itself had shrunk 

to half its size. These conditions led to concerns about the C&SF 

Project’s impact on the South Florida ecosystem, and, ultimately, 

to cries for dismantling the works. The following history of water 

management in South Florida since 1948 shows both the short-term 

value and the long-term pitfalls that the Corps’ engineering of the 

South Florida environment has generated. In doing so, it focuses on 

the interaction of different interest groups, all with diverse stakes 

and perspectives, and how their conflicts and compromises influenced the direction that the Corps pursued.

Endnotes

1

 Quotation in Colonel Terry Rice interview by Brian Gridley, 8 March 

2001, 3, Everglades Interview No. 4, Samuel Proctor Oral History Program, 

University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida. For more information on the law 

of unintended consequences, see Robert K. Merton, “The Unanticipated 

Consequences of Purposive Social Action,” American Sociological Review 1 

(December 1936): 894-904. 2

 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, “Who We Are” < 

http://www.saj.usace.army.mil/cco/ who.htm> (10 February 2006). 3

 South Florida Water Management District, “Agency Overview” 

<http://www.sfwmd.gov/site /index.php?id=61> (10 February 2006). 4

 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Overview: Central and Southern 

Florida Project Comprehensive Review Study, October 1998,” 4, copy in File 

Restudy Feasibility, Box 1365, JDAR. 5

 For an in-depth discussion of the geology, hydrology, and biology of 

the Everglades before the 1800s, see David McCally, The Everglades: An Environmental History (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999). Michael 

Grunwald also provides some information about the region before white 

settlement in The Swamp: The Everglades, Florida, and the Politics of Paradise

(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 9-23. 6

 Grunwald, The Swamp, 19. 7

 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Overview: Central and Southern 

Florida Project Comprehensive Review Study, October 1998,” 7, copy in File 

Restudy Feasibility, Box 1365, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville 

District administrative records, Jacksonville, Florida [hereafter referred to 

as JDAR]. 8

 Quotation in U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, 

South Florida Ecosystem Program of the U.S. Geological Survey, Fact Sheet 

FS-134-95 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Geological Survey, 1995); see also McCally, The Everglades, 58-83. 9

 As quoted in U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Overview: Central and 

Southern Florida Project Comprehensive Review Study, October 1998,” 6.

1

In the mid-1800s, the Everglades, a region of water and sawgrass 

between Lake Okeechobee and the southern edge of Florida, percolated in Floridians’ minds. What, they asked, was the purpose of 

this vast wetland? Was it destined to lay unoccupied, or were there 

measures they could take to make the area conducive to settlement? 

Unappreciative of the plethora of flora and fauna in the region, most 

Floridians could see only a wet swamp that had to be drained and 

seeded to crop before it could reach its full potential. Accordingly, 

throughout the late 1800s and the first decades of the twentieth century, Floridians, both privately and with state help, examined the 

possibility of draining the Everglades. Hamilton Disston and Napoleon Bonaparte Broward, for example, pursued drainage relentlessly, and railroads and land speculators marketed the dry land as 

an agricultural paradise. But problems appeared in the 1920s and 

1930s: storms sporadically produced devastating floods, while flora 

and fauna dwindled because of the lack of water. Such problems 

required federal action; in 1930, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

began a flood control project around Lake Okeechobee, and in the 

1930s and 1940s, conservationists were able to secure protection for 

wildlife and vegetation through the creation of Everglades National Park. The state had sponsored drainage programs for much of 

the twentieth century, but by the mid-1940s, officials realized that 

federal help was necessary so that water in South Florida could be 

managed comprehensively.

Because this period of drainage, early flood control, and conservation laid the groundwork for the establishment of the Central and 

Southern Florida (C&SF) Flood Control Project in 1948 and for the 

subsequent water supply tensions prevalent throughout the rest of 

the century, it constitutes a critical era in the history of water manChapter 1

agement in South Florida. No flood control project or water supply scheme in the second half of the twentieth century began with a 

tabula rasa; instead, the Corps and other agencies had to construct 

projects in an environment that had already been extensively modified. In the words of historian George E. Buker, the Corps was “faced 

with correcting past mistakes.”1 By the time the Corps developed the 

C&SF Project, numerous political entities, including federal interests 

(the National Park Service and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service), 

state interests (the trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund), and 

local interests (boards of county commissioners) had already staked 

out their water terrain. Thus, the Corps would not only have to work 

within a manipulated and modified ecosystem, but also with existing 

political interests, each with a different perspective as to how water 

should be managed.2

Thousands of years before Americans had made any attempts to 

alter the South Florida environment, including the Everglades, native peoples had traversed the area, discovering ways to subsist and 

flourish within the soggy marshes. By the first years of the common 

era, three groups had settled in the Everglades area: the Calusa, who 

resided in a region that began north of the Caloosahatchee River and 

extended south through the Ten Thousand Islands to Cape Sable; 

the Mayaimi, who occupied the shores of Lake Okeechobee; and the 

Tekesta, who lived on the east coast beaches from Boca Raton south 

to Biscayne Bay and the keys.3

 By the time of Spanish contact in the 

early sixteenth century, the most dominant and populous group was 

the Calusa. This tribe, like the Mayaimi and the Tekesta, had learned 

how to use the Everglades, its water, and its resources in the most 

efficient ways. The groups subsisted mainly on food obtained in 

the freshwater and saltwater of the region, including cocoplum, sea 

Draining the Swamp: Development and the Beginning of Flood 

Control in South Florida, 1845-1947
2 United States Army Corps of Engineers

grape, prickly pear, cabbage palm, and saw palmetto, as well as fish 

and game. They made clothes out of tree moss and palmetto strips, 

and employed conch shells as tools and drinking cups. They built 

houses using cabbage palm posts and palmetto, and applied fish oil 

to discourage mosquitoes and sandflies.4

Despite their knowledge of the land, the groups could not escape the problems that resulted from non-Indian settlement. In the 

early 1500s, Spanish explorers reached Florida, led by Juan Ponce 

de León in 1513. The first Spaniard to explore the region extensively 

was Pedro Menendez, who, in the 1560s, conducted investigations to 

try to find a waterway across the Florida peninsula to facilitate Spanish navigation to the Americas. By 1570, however, Spanish interest 

in South Florida had waned, mainly because no trans-peninsula waterway had been discovered. Yet non-Indians still influenced the region, and European diseases and slave raids decimated Indian populations. When Great Britain assumed authority over the area from 

1763 to 1783, only 80 Calusa families remained, and they left with 

the Spanish. By the time the United States had gained official control 

over Florida in 1821, other Indian groups, including the Seminole, 

an offshoot of the Creek in Georgia, had moved into the Everglades, 

and Americans spent a great amount of time and energy trying to 

remove them in the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s.5

The Second Seminole War (1835-1842) and the Third Seminole 

War (1854-1855), for example, represented concerted campaigns 

by the United States to extricate the Seminole from the Everglades. 

Although these battles were characterized by one scholar as “America’s first Vietnam,” in that it was “a guerilla war of attrition, fought 

on unfamiliar, unforgiving terrain, against an underestimated, 

highly motivated enemy who often retreated but never quit,” the 

expeditions provided numerous accounts and maps of the South 

Florida landscape, including the Ives map discussed below. Despite the colorful accounts of the landscape—or perhaps because 

of them, as most soldiers depicted the scenery as an “interminable, 

dreary waste of waters” infested with mosquitoes, snakes, and sawgrass—Floridians expressed little interest in the Everglades until 

the mid-1800s.6

This situation changed on 3 March 1845, when Congress allowed Florida to enter the United States as the 27th state in the 

Ken Hughes’ rendition of Pedro Menendez, the first Spaniard to explore South Florida extensively. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and 

Archives of Florida)
Chapter One | Draining the Swamp 3

Union. Thereafter, the state’s legislature, seeking new areas where 

people could settle, passed resolutions declaring that “there is a 

vast and extensive region, commonly termed the Everglades, in the 

southern section of this State, . . . which has hitherto been regarded 

as wholly valueless in consequence of being covered with water at 

stated periods of the year.” The resolution asked Florida’s representative and senators to “earnestly press upon” Congress to appoint 

“competent engineers to examine and survey the aforesaid region” 

in regard to the possibilities of drainage.7 Buckingham Smith, an attorney from St. Augustine, Florida, received this appointment, and 

he submitted a report to the secretary of the treasury on 1 June 1848. 

In this document, Smith provided a detailed description of the Everglades landscape:

The Everglades extend from the southern margin of Lake 

Okeechobee some 90 miles toward Cape Sable, the southern extremity of the peninsula of Florida, and are in width 

from 30 to 50 miles. They lie in a vast basin of lime rock. 

Their waters are entirely fresh, varying from 1 to 6 feet in 

depth. . . . As the Everglades extend southwardly from Lake 

Okeechobee they gradually decline and their waters move 

in the same course. They have their origin in the copious 

rains which fall in that latitude during the autumn and fall 

and in the overflow of Lake Okeechobee through swamps 

between it and the Everglades.8

Smith believed that in order to reclaim the Everglades, canals 

would have to be constructed from Lake Okeechobee to the Caloosahatchee and Loxahatchee rivers, thereby allowing the lake to drain 

into these rivers, lowering its water level and preventing it from 

sending water on its normal southward trek. Drains would also have 

to be placed at strategic locations “by which the waters accumulating 

from the rains may be conducted to the ocean or gulf.” If such actions were not taken, Smith claimed, “the region south of the northern end of Lake Okeechobee will remain valueless for ages to come.” 

But if drainage was implemented, the land could produce cotton, 

corn, rice, and tobacco, as well as lemons, limes, oranges, bananas, 

plantains, figs, olives, pineapple, and coconuts.9

 According to historian David McCally, Senator Westcott forwarded this report to the 

Commercial Review of the South and West, which “embraced Smith’s 

conclusions and urged Congress to deed the Everglades to the State 

of Florida so that reclamation could begin.”10

Congress listened to the Commercial Review’s recommendation. 

In the Swamp Lands Act of 1850, Congress expanded the jurisdiction of an 1849 act granting swamp areas to the state of Louisiana, 

allowing the federal government to provide swamp and overflowed 

lands unfit for cultivation to other states as well.11 Under the authority of this act, the federal government transferred title to more than 

20 million acres to the state of Florida. In 1851 and 1855, the Florida 

legislature passed acts creating an Internal Improvement Fund (IIF), 

consisting of the land and the money obtained from land sales, and 

establishing a board of trustees to oversee the fund. This board, composed in part of the governor and his cabinet, essentially had authority over all state land sales and over all reclamation matters.12

In 1856, more information about the topographical features of 

South Florida was made available when Lieutenant J. C. Ives, a topographical engineer serving in the Third Seminole War, conducted 

a survey of the area and combined his data with other records produced in the 1840s by army officers traversing the region to produce 

a map of the “comparatively unknown region” south of Tampa Bay. 

The Department of War wanted the map to inform officers fighting the Seminole, but it became, in the words of Marjory Stoneman 

Douglas, “the first fine American map of the country.”13 Ives highlighted not only the Everglades, but other areas of South Florida, 

including Big Cypress Swamp and Lake Okeechobee, and he noted 

that the land was basically “a flat expanse, where the prairie of one 

day may at another be converted into a lake and where the lakes, 

rivers, swamps and hammocks” fluctuated as much as three feet at 

a time.14

Eager for a chance to promote the settlement of South Florida, the IIF began granting deals to railroad companies in which it 

would give the corporations land in return for completed rail lines. 

In this way, the IIF hoped to “open the interior and attract settlers, 

who would buy land and replenish the fund, which could perhaps 

be used to finance drainage ditches someday in the future.”15 After 

many railroads succumbed to financial difficulties in the post-Civil 

War era, the IIF essentially faced bankruptcy. Its situation worsened 

when Francis Vose, a New York metals manufacturer who had provided iron to railroad companies in Florida in return for state bonds, 

refused to accept the state’s offer of 20 cents on the dollar for the 

bonds and sued the IIF instead. From that suit, an injunction was 

placed against the IIF’s, preventing it from distributing any more 

land for discounted prices until Vose had been paid in full. Desperate for money, the IIF, under the leadership of Governor William D. 

Bloxham, began looking for new investors interested in obtaining 

land for reclamation purposes. In 1881, it found a candidate: Hamilton Disston.16

Disston was a 34-year-old entrepreneur from Philadelphia 

whose wealthy father owned a lucrative saw and file manufacturing company. First visiting Florida in 1877 on a fishing trip, Disston had been obsessed with draining the Everglades ever since. In 

1881, Disston proposed to drain lands flooded by Kissimmee River 

and Lake Okeechobee waters by constructing a system of canals and 

ditches from Lake Okeechobee to the Caloosahatchee River, the St. 

Lucie River, and the Miami River, and by straightening and deepening the Kissimmee. This would convey water in the flooded Kissimmee basin to Lake Okeechobee, and the excess water would then 

be flushed out via the Caloosahatchee, St. Lucie, and Miami rivers, 
4 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Lieutenant J.C. Ives’ military map of South Florida, 1856. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District)
Chapter One | Draining the Swamp 5

thereby lowering Lake Okeechobee’s water level and allowing vast 

acreages of land to be cultivated. In exchange, the IIF would give 

Disston and his associates “one-half of all the reclaimed land already 

belonging to the state or later turned over by the federal government,” as well as four million more acres for $1 million.17 In September 1881, Disston’s corporation, the Atlantic Gulf Coast Canal and 

Land Sales Company, began drainage operations.

By deepening and straightening the Kissimmee River, and by 

constructing canals connecting the various lakes that formed the 

headwaters of the river, Disston was able to drain portions of the 

area and sell it to cattle operators as grazing land in the 1880s. Disston’s company also deepened the Caloosahatchee River and connected it to Lake Okeechobee through a linchpin canal. In addition, 

the corporation began a canal south of Lake Okeechobee, hoping to 

drain water into the Shark River, and started another east of the Kissimmee Valley toward the St. Johns River. To promote the reclaimed 

land, Disston produced advertising brochures, planned model cities, 

built hotels, settled families, and established agricultural enterprises 

such as sugar, rice, and peach cultivation. By the 1890s, however, 

Disston had overextended his operations, and the Panic of 1893 

dealt a devastating blow to his finances. Banks began recalling loans 

and bonds became due. Faced with an increasingly precarious situation, Disston died on 30 April 1896, either through suicide or from 

a heart attack. Although his decade-long drainage effort reclaimed 

less than 100,000 acres, he left two legacies: first, he demonstrated 

conclusively the agricultural potential of the region through his experimental farms, and second, his connection of the Caloosahatchee 

River to Lake Okeechobee was “the first significant step in draining 

the Everglades.”18

Meanwhile, the vision of canals and drainage lived on in other 

minds. John Westcott, for example, formed the Florida Coast Line 

Canal and Transportation Company in 1881 to build a canal from 

the mouth of the St. Johns River to Biscayne Bay. The enterprise received a boost in the 1890s when Henry L. Flagler, who became a 

millionaire with Standard Oil, formed the Florida East Coast Railroad to build a rail line from St. Augustine to Miami Beach. Flagler 

became interested in the canal project, perhaps because the company 

agreed to provide the railroad corporation with 270,000 acres of land 

it had obtained. However, even with Flagler’s interest and resources, 

canal construction proceeded slowly, not reaching completion until 

1912, although the construction of his railroad did precipitate South 

Florida’s first settlement boom, leading to the establishment of West 

Palm Beach, Fort Lauderdale, and Miami.19

By the close of the nineteenth century, large-scale drainage 

and agricultural development of the Everglades, although attempted by many different parties, had not reached fruition. Despite the 

granting and sale of millions of acres of land in southern Florida 

to railroads and other corporations, successful reclamation lay in 

the future. An 1891 report written by H. W. Wiley of the U.S. Department of Agriculture observed that, although “the possibilities 

of bringing into successful cultivation the swamp lands of Florida 

have occupied the minds of capitalists for several years,” large tracts 

remained inundated. Even those that had been drained were “still 

in the wild state, . . . no attempts having been made to fit them for 

cultivation.”20 Conditions were no better in 1903, leading Governor 

Hamilton Disston, the first to set up extensive drainage operations in 

South Florida. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and Archives of 

Florida)

Early settlers to South Florida. (South Florida Water Management District)
6 United States Army Corps of Engineers

William S. Jennings to compare Florida’s drainage endeavors to 

“the man who undertook to lift himself,” opining that the state was 

“almost as helpless.”21

In the early 1900s, drainage schemes gained momentum, largely 

because of changing ideas about the human use of nature. The late 

1800s and early 1900s saw the development of a conservation movement in the United States, characterized, in the words of historian 

Samuel P. Hays, by “rational planning to promote efficient development and use of all natural resources.”22 This movement expressed 

itself in several ways, including the formation of the U.S. Reclamation 

Service in 1902, and in the creation of national parks, which were 

conceived as areas to preserve pristine wilderness for the enjoyment 

of future generations. Other conservationists held that making wasteland productive was an excellent way to promote the efficient use of 

the nation’s resources. The editors of Collier’s magazine, for example, 

claimed that the terms “conservation” and “reclamation” meant not 

only the irrigation of dry land, but the draining of wetlands as well.23

In Florida, these ideas, coupled with populist notions of the necessity 

of taking land from railroads and other large corporations to benefit 

small farmers, influenced state officials to implement drainage policies vigorously so that Everglades land could be used for agriculture.24

The drainage program was facilitated in 1903 when the federal 

government provided the IIF trustees with the patent to over two 

million acres of the Everglades, thereby ending several disputes over 

whether the state, railroad interests, or corporations were entitled to 

the land.25 With this title secured, state officials actively implemented 

their own drainage program. Napoleon Bonaparte Broward, a Jacksonville jack-of-all-trades who had previously been employed as a 

steamboat captain, a sheriff, and a gunrunner, was especially active 

in promoting drainage.26 In 1904, Broward entered Florida’s race for 

governor, concerned that the state was relying too much on railroads 

and special interests to drain the land (and consequently was allowing these entities to accumulate large holdings and vast amounts of 

Florida wealth). During his campaign, Broward “carried his map of 

the Everglades from one end of the State to another, always crying in 

the hustings, ‘Save and reclaim the people’s land!’”27 He pledged that, 

if elected, he would use state money to drain the land, financing the 

endeavor by selling the dry tracts for $5 to $20 an acre.28

After winning the election, Broward began to implement his 

promises, thereby inaugurating the first official state-sponsored 

drainage program. In May 1905, Broward gave a special message to 

the state legislature dealing exclusively with draining the Everglades. 

Insisting that it was the “duty” of the IIF trustees to drain Florida 

lands, he proposed that the state build a system of canals from Lake 

Okeechobee to the St. Lucie, St. Johns, and Caloosahatchee river basins, thereby allowing the lake’s level to drop six feet. Such a 

scheme would allow large amounts of land, including three million 

acres held by private interests, to become productive. Broward also 

proposed that the state pass a constitutional amendment creating a 

drainage district that would collect taxes from private landowners 

“in proportion to benefits that the land will derive,” thereby producing more money to be used in other drainage efforts.29 The state legislature acted on Broward’s recommendation, passing an act in 1903 

that created the Everglades Drainage District (EDD) with boundaries roughly corresponding to the two million acres patented to the 

state in 1903.30

With the EDD in place, Broward ushered in an era of intensive state interest in drainage, including the construction of the New 

River Canal, running southeast from Lake Okeechobee to the New 

River near Fort Lauderdale. But in actuality, Broward accomplished 

relatively little; only 15 miles of canal were dug by the end of his 

term and the IIF fund had been depleted. Therefore, in December 

1908, only a week before his term as governor ended, Broward convinced the IIF trustees to give Richard J. Bolles, a Colorado developer, 500,000 acres of land in exchange for $1 million. The trustees 

then proposed that most of this money be used to build five major 

canals—the North New River, South New River, Miami, Hillsboro, 

and Caloosahatchee. However, no studies had been completed on 

whether or not these waterways were practicable, resulting in a sale 

that “irrevocably committed the State of Florida to a specific drainage project even before the first engineering study regarding its feasibility appeared.”31

Napoleon Bonaparte Broward. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library 

and Archives of Florida)
Chapter One | Draining the Swamp 7

For the next several years, the state commissioned numerous 

engineering reports that revised the best methods to drain the 

land. These included the Wright Report (1909), which facilitated 

land speculation in South Florida based on low cost estimates of 

drainage schemes (which turned out to be faulty at best and fraudulent at worst); an Everglades Land Sales Company examination 

(1912) which recommended that Lake Okeechobee’s water levels be 

regulated to facilitate drainage; and the Randolph Report (1913), 

which recommended the construction of a control canal from Lake 

Okeechobee to the St. Lucie River (the St. Lucie Canal) and that 

became “the master plan for all drainage work.”32 By the end of the 

1920s, the major drainage canals were largely in place, consisting 

of the Caloosahatchee Canal, which ran from the western shore of 

Lake Okeechobee to the Gulf of Mexico; the St. Lucie Canal, which 

extended from the eastern side of Lake Okeechobee to the Atlantic 

Ocean; and the West Palm Beach, Hillsboro, North New River, and 

Miami canals, which all ran from various points on the southern 

shore of Lake Okeechobee to the Atlantic Ocean.33

As these waterways were completed, agriculture developed in 

the region south of Lake Okeechobee. In the 1910s and 1920s, many 

new settlements appeared along the canals extending from Lake 

Okeechobee, including South Bay (on the North New River Canal), 

Lake Harbor (by the Miami Canal), Belle Glade (on the Hillsboro 

Canal), Pahokee (near the West Palm Beach Canal), and Moore Haven (on the southeast shore of Lake Okeechobee). By 1920, 23,000 

people resided in the EDD. These numbers increased in the 1920s, 

in part because of better information about how to make Everglades 

soil productive and in part because of a growing demand for agricultural products. Perhaps even more important was the development of the sugar industry in the Everglades, started by the Southern Sugar Company in the 1920s and continued by Charles Stewart 

Mott, who rescued Southern Sugar from bankruptcy and reorganized it as the United States Sugar Corporation in 1931. Because of 

these efforts, cane sugar quickly became one of the predominant 

crops in the region.34

Yet even with the drainage works, flooding still occurred 

periodically in the Everglades region. After excessive rainfall in 

1924, the EDD constructed a small dike around the southern end 

of Lake Okeechobee from Bascom Point to Moore Haven, the region’s largest town.35 Unfortunately, the barrier did not hold in 

1926 when a hurricane swept over Moore Haven with winds between 130 to 150 miles an hour. Over 400 people were killed, approximately 1,200 had to be evacuated, and thousands of dollars 

of property damage occurred. Because of the devastation, the IIF 

trustees appointed an Everglades Engineering Board of Review in 

1927 to examine the drainage program established by the Randolph Report, and to make additional recommendations about 

Everglades reclamation.36

The board, which consisted of Anson Marston (a prominent 

transportation engineer who had worked on the establishment of 

different highways), S. H. McCrory, and George B. Hills, spent two 

weeks examining drainage works, records, and data pertaining to 

reclamation. In its final report, published in May 1927, it stated that 

the Randolph Report’s drainage plan had several fatal flaws, especially in terms of controlling floods. To correct the problems, the 

board recommended that the EDD complete and deepen the St. Lucie Canal as soon as possible (since its operation would have aided 

flood control efforts during the 1926 storm); that it enlarge the Caloosahatchee Canal; that Lake Okeechobee be controlled to a maximum and minimum level of 17 and 14 feet above mean low water 

(Punta Rosa datum, which the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey had 

determined to be 0.88 foot below mean sea level), respectively; and 

Location of major canals in South Florida. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

Jacksonville District.)
8 United States Army Corps of Engineers

that a “greatly enlarged and highly safeguarded levee” be constructed on the south shores of Lake Okeechobee to protect the surrounding communities.37

The chances of the EDD implementing the board’s suggestions 

were slim, however, because of continued financial problems.38

Then, in 1928, another disaster struck the Lake Okeechobee region. 

In August and September, torrential rain fell in the area, causing the 

lake to reach a high level. On 16 September, another hurricane appeared, striking Florida at West Palm Beach and traveling northwest 

across Lake Okeechobee. Winds reached velocities of 135 miles per 

hour, causing wind tides and waves on the lake to exceed 29 feet in 

height on the southeastern shore. Unfortunately, the existing levees 

extended only 22 feet in elevation, causing water to pour over the 

dikes and into the streets of Belle Glade and other shore communities to depths of eight feet. The water ripped houses from their foundations and swept terrified residents to their deaths. By the time the 

hurricane moved on, it had killed over 2,000 people, most of them 

migrant black laborers.39

Emerging from the disaster, residents called for help. But because of the financial difficulties of the EDD, and because it was 

unclear whether or not the EDD could properly operate for flood 

control instead of drainage, the state could do little to provide the 

desired flood protection. To rectify the situation, the state legislature created the Okeechobee Flood Control District in 1929, with 

boundaries including all of South Florida beginning at the northern 

shore of Lake Okeechobee, and directed it to construct flood control 

structures and to regulate Lake Okeechobee and the Caloosahatchee 

River to prevent damaging floods.40

To fulfill these missions, the Okeechobee district worked closely with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which had already been 

making investigations as to what could be done to alleviate flooding 

from Lake Okeechobee. Since the early 1800s, the Corps had been 

the federal government’s leading civil works agency, but most of its 

construction involved navigation projects on rivers and lakes. Until 

the 1930s, the federal government regarded flood control mainly as 

a local responsibility; not until 1936 would Congress recognize flood 

control as a proper federal activity nationwide, although it did pass 

a flood control act in 1917, allowing the construction of works on 

the Sacramento and Mississippi rivers.41 Likewise, in 1928, Congress 

authorized the Corps to undertake an ambitious effort on the Lower 

Mississippi River, covering several states.42 In 1924, U.S. Representative Herbert Drane, a Democrat from Florida, introduced a bill into 

Congress requesting that the Corps examine the Caloosahatchee River to ascertain whether deepening the channel could relieve flooding. 

Congress passed the act and provided $40,000, but the Corps, under 

the leadership of Chief of Engineers Major General Edgar Jadwin 

did not commence any work. After the hurricane passed, the Corps 

held public hearings at Pahokee and Moore Haven and completed 

its study, but found no justification for federal action. Nevertheless, 

Congress passed another bill requiring the Corps to investigate more 

comprehensively the problem of flood control in the region. After 

holding public hearings in communities around the lake, Jadwin recommended to Congress in April 1928 that the Corps take no flood 

control action until state and local resources had been exhausted. Jadwin believed that the plans already in place by the EDD, including enlargement and completion of the St. Lucie Canal, were sufficient. “If 

carried out,” he promised, “they will provide for the control of floods 

in these areas with a reasonable factor of safety.”43

After the devastation of the 1928 hurricane, Jadwin reexamined 

flood control possibilities around Lake Okeechobee, in part because 

Florida Governor John W. Martin and his cabinet sent a resolution 

to Congress asking that the federal government construct a high 

levee around the lake’s southern shore. After considerable study 

by the Jacksonville District, Jadwin recommended that the Corps 

undertake a flood control and navigation program consisting of “a 

channel 6 feet deep and at least 80 feet wide from Lake Okeechobee 

to Fort Myers” (basically deepening the Caloosahatchee River to 

Area hit by the 1928 hurricane. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library 

and Archives of Florida)
Chapter One | Draining the Swamp 9

make it a second control canal); “the improvement of Taylor Creek 

to the extent of providing a channel 6 feet deep and 60 feet wide to 

Okeechobee [C]ity”; and the construction of levees along the south 

and north shores of the lake to heights of at least 31 feet. Jadwin 

estimated that the project would cost over $10 million, and he suggested that the state of Florida or other local interests provide 62.5 

percent of that cost, not to exceed $6.74 million.44

Because of the expense of the Corps’ proposal, the Okeechobee 

Flood Control District hired George B. Hills, one of the members 

of the 1927 Everglades Engineering Board of Review, to conduct an 

independent investigation of flood control. He recommended early in 1930 that Congress authorize a navigation and flood control 

project whereby the Corps, using the existing Caloosahatchee and 

St. Lucie canals, would build a waterway across Florida through the 

Everglades. At the same time, Congress requested that the Board of 

Engineers for Rivers and Harbors review Jadwin’s 1929 report, and 

in March 1930, the board recommended that the levees be at least 34 

feet above sea level and that instead of the $6 million contribution, 

the state provide $3.8 million and build at its own cost the north 

shore levee.45

In the spring of 1930, Congress passed a general river and harbor bill that included these provisions for flood control and navigation. Because many representatives were uneasy about the Corps 

implementing a flood control project, the House and Senate portrayed the program as primarily one that would improve navigation and provide only incidental flood protection. No matter how it 

was depicted, the plan, according to U.S. Senator Duncan Fletcher, 

would allow the Corps to make improvements to the St. Lucie Canal, to expand the levees along Lake Okeechobee’s north and south 

shores, and to complete the “canalization” of the Caloosahatchee 

River. Fletcher believed that this would provide a “complete solution 

of the problems of adequate interstate navigation facilities and floodcontrol protection.”46

Following this plan, the Corps built over 67 miles of dikes along 

Lake Okeechobee’s south shore—later named the Hoover Dike after 

President Herbert Hoover—and another 15 miles of levees along the 

north shore near the city of Okeechobee. These were all constructed 

to handle crests of 32 to 35 feet in height. The Corps also performed 

the required deepening of the Caloosahatchee River, and by March 

1938, the entire project was completed.47 The Corps then assumed 

control of regulating the water level of Lake Okeechobee, maintaining a level between 14 and 17 feet through discharges to the St. Lucie 

Canal and the Caloosahatchee River.

Interesting, however, was the fact that in the 1930s, the U.S. 

Coast and Geodetic Survey, which had originally demarcated Lake 

Okeechobee’s water levels in accordance with the Punta Rosa Datum (corresponding to the mean low water elevation of the Gulf 

of Mexico), discovered that the datum plane was not 0.88 foot below mean sea level, but was actually 1.44 feet below mean sea level. 

Therefore, the original levee construction around Lake Okeechobee, 

which was supposed to have been 31 feet, was actually only 29.56 

feet according to the National Geodetic Vertical Datum (NGVD) 

of 1929. Many continued to use the old Punta Rosa Datum plane 

for Lake Okeechobee (designating it as Lake Okeechobee Datum), 

even though the Corps had to convert the datum before designing 

any Lake Okeechobee project in order to avoid errors.48 Regardless, 

by the end of the 1930s, the drainage system in southern Florida essentially consisted of the structures that enabled the Corps to regulate Lake Okeechobee; the four major drainage canals (West Palm 

Beach, Hillsboro, North New River, and Miami); and two canals 

connecting the four waterways (the Bolles and Cross canals).49

The success of drainage and flood control efforts, coupled with 

periods of drought, had detrimental effects on flora and fauna in the 

Everglades, emphasizing that proper amounts of water were essential to preserve the unique natural resources of the area. The region 

housed, among other things, orchids, mangroves, magnolia, cypress, 

mahogany, lignum vitae, rubber trees, egrets, cranes, herons, flamingos, spoonbills, alligators, turkeys, bear, deer, fox, wildcats, panthers, 

raccoons, and opossums. However, drainage, human settlement, 

and hunting slowly destroyed this rich diversity of life.50 In the late 

1800s, a flourishing plume trade brought hunters of all kinds to the 

Everglades, where they massacred thousands of egrets by invading 

rookeries.51 The Florida state legislature passed a law in 1901 outlawing plume hunting, and the National Audubon Society, first formed 

in the 1880s, hired four game wardens to patrol the rookeries and 

enforce the law. Hunters did not welcome this supervision, and on 

8 July 1905, Guy Bradley, one of the wardens, was murdered as he 

investigated a poaching incident, becoming America’s first environmental martyr. This event led to laws “which strengthened bird protection and helped bring the significance of the Everglades to the 

American people.”52

A poster commemorating the construction of Hoover Dike. (South 

Florida Water Management District)
10 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Drainage in South Florida only compounded the poaching destruction, as it enabled settlement to encroach on the Everglades. 

Recognizing the danger that human habitation posed, James Ingraham of the Florida East Coast Drainage and Sugar Company called 

for the preservation of Paradise Key, located in the Royal Palm area 

of the current Everglades National Park, in 1905. His efforts led Mary 

Barr Munroe of the Florida Federation of Women’s Clubs to join the 

fight, and she, along with several scientists, including botanists David Fairchild and J. K. Small, advocated the creation of a Paradise 

Key reserve. Heeding these cries, the state established Royal Palm 

State Park in 1916.53

In the 1920s, Ernest Coe, a landscape architect from Connecticut who had moved to the Miami area, became the loudest voice for 

Everglades preservation. Coe had always been interested in nature, 

and he became entranced with the mangroves, the orchids, the giant royal palm trees, and other plants in the Everglades region, as 

well as the numerous bird rookeries and other wildlife. Coe claimed 

that these natural attributes justified the creation of a national park 

to preserve the unique ecology.54 In promulgating these views, Coe 

was drawing on the ideas of many conservationists in the late 1800s 

and early 1900s who believed that the nation’s natural wonders 

should be preserved as national parks for the enjoyment of future 

generations. Beginning with Yosemite and Yellowstone, Congress 

set aside vast tracts of land characterized by monumental scenery—huge mountain peaks, pristine vistas, waterfalls, canyons, and 

geysers—to protect these resources from exploitation and development, and in 1916, it created the National Park Service (NPS) to 

manage these areas.55

By the 1920s, some Americans had decided that national parks 

could also preserve plant and wildlife as well as scenery. Coe was 

one of these, and he began agitating for the creation of a national 

park to protect the ecology of the Everglades. In 1928, he formed 

the Tropic Everglades National Park Association and persuaded David Fairchild, a botanist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, to 

serve as its first president. For the next several months, Coe, with 

the aid of the association, studied and mapped the area, conducting 

surveys by plane and boat. He brought his data to U.S. Senator Duncan U. Fletcher, a Democrat from Jacksonville, and in 1929, Fletcher 

ushered a bill through Congress authorizing an investigation of the 

Everglades as a possible national park.56

In 1930, an NPS committee, consisting of Director Horace Albright, Assistant Director Arno Cammerer, and Yellowstone National Park Superintendent Roger Toll, explored the Everglades on 

a four-day tour sponsored by the Tropic Everglades National Park 

Association. At the conclusion of this inquiry, the committee made 

a favorable report on the park’s creation, and in December 1930, 

the secretary of the interior recommended that Congress establish 

a park constituting 2,000 square miles in Dade, Monroe, and Collier 

counties. However, Florida’s congressional delegation had a difficult 

time passing a bill to create the park, mainly because many members 

of Congress could not understand why preservation of the area was 

necessary or important.57

The task became easier as more evidence mounted of how 

drainage and a lack of water affected plants and wildlife in the 

Everglades. In 1929, New York botanist John Kunkel Small had 

warned of the pending “extermination” of plants and wildlife in 

the Everglades because drainage facilitated fires that destroyed the 

soil. “Florida is being drained and burned to such an extent that it 

will soon become a desert!” he exclaimed.58 Secretary of the Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur echoed these thoughts in 1933, stating that 

drainage prevented enough fresh water from reaching the Shark 

River and other waterways in South Florida, thus destroying “the 

most unique qualities” of the area.59 John O’Reilly, a reporter for 

the New York Herald Tribune, also explained how the lack of water 

affected wildlife, noting that drainage had removed “a single block 

in the foundation on which the wild beauty and natural abundance 

of such a region is built.” The evidence for this, he claimed, was “in 

the brown and dying vegetation; in the vast fires that have been eating plants and soil alike; [and] in the wholesale migration of birds 

and animals from a habitat which has been their home since before 

history.” The solution, O’Reilly believed, was “to get the overflow 

of Lake Okeechobee directed back onto the Everglades,” thereby 

reestablishing feeding grounds and allowing “thousands upon 

thousands of White Ibises and other water birds [to] return to their 

rookeries.”60

The effects of drought on the land. (The Florida Memory Project, State 

Library and Archives of Florida)
Chapter One | Draining the Swamp 11

Influenced by these arguments, Congress passed an act in 1934 

authorizing the creation of Everglades National Park. Heeding the 

report submitted by the NPS committee, this law recommended that 

an area of approximately 2,000 square miles be established as the 

Everglades National Park as soon as the state was able to transfer title 

to the lands to the United States.61 This large area included much of 

Dade, Monroe, and Collier counties, including what would become 

known as the East Everglades area and islands in Florida Bay and the 

southern Gulf of Mexico. According to NPS Director Arno Cammerer, one of the main reasons for the establishment of the park was 

“so that the wild life may in fact be protected. . . . [T]he only hope the 

wild life has of surviving is to come under the protective wings of the 

National Park Service.”62

Yet one group lost out in this effort to preserve Everglades flora 

and fauna: the Seminole Indians. The Seminole had originally been 

part of the Creek Confederacy. After the Yamasee War in the 1710s, 

a group of Creeks moved into northern Florida. After several years, 

those Creek that had not relocated began referring to the Florida 

Creek as simanó·li, meaning “wild” or “runaway.” This term eventually morphed into “Seminole,” the English term for this group. 

After a series of wars in the first half of the nineteenth century, the 

United States removed the Seminole to southern Florida, establishing a reserve for the group in 1849 in Big Cypress Swamp, and most 

Seminole took up residence in either the swamp or the Everglades. 

When the Tamiami Trail was built in 1928, some families moved to 

areas surrounding the highway in order to conduct business with 

tourists.63

In 1917, the state of Florida created a reservation for the Seminole out of 99,000 acres of land in Monroe County. Likewise, in 

the early 1930s, the federal government consolidated several small 

areas of land into tracts set aside for the Seminole: Brighton (located to the northwest of Lake Okeechobee), Big Cypress (in the 

northeastern part of Big Cypress Swamp) and Dania (later called 

Hollywood, located near the eastern coast just south of Fort Lauderdale). Most Seminole ignored these reservations and continued 

to live wherever they wanted. Yet problems resulted in 1934 because 

the state reservation lay within the proposed boundaries of Everglades National Park. To resolve the situation, the state agreed to 

provide the federal government with the Seminole land in exchange 

for 104,800 acres in Broward and Palm Beach counties. This land 

lay north of the Tamiami Trail in the eastern part of Big Cypress 

Swamp.64

White ibis. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and Archives of Florida)
12 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Everglades National Park boundaries, 1944. (Records of Everglades National Park, Record Group 79, National Archives and Records Administration II, 

College Park, Maryland)

With the Seminole situation resolved, the state of Florida turned 

to the task of acquiring additional lands for the park, and it passed 

an enabling act allowing it to convey tracts to the United States as 

soon as it acquired them. But despite the best efforts of the Everglades National Park Association and the State Everglades National 

Park Commission (which had been created in 1935 to handle the 

land purchase and transfer issues), acquisition proceeded slowly.65

One of the problems was that in the early 1940s oil was discovered 

in southern Florida, and the state began issuing oil and gas leases on 

the land it owned within the proposed park boundaries. By 1947, 

Humble Oil and Refining Company alone had produced 230,701 

barrels of oil. This caused consternation among many conservationists; an article in Natural History, for example, lamented that “liquid 

death may ooze up from the bowels of the earth to spread its polluting destruction through the fresh water” and called for immediate 

action “to make certain that the production of oil entails a minimum 

of damage to the numberless natural assets of this exotic wilderness.”66 Despite conservationists’ concerns, drilling continued, and 

the NPS reported in the early 1940s that it “saw no way of establishing a national park for some time, since the area would be constantly 

subject to pressure for exploring and drilling for oil.”67

In the meantime, wildlife and plants continued to be destroyed. 

In 1937 and 1938, Daniel Beard, a wildlife technician for the NPS, 

traversed the Everglades region and made observations about its 

flora and fauna and the effects of drainage on them.68 Beard reported 

that before drainage began, “the park got the bulk of the western 

flow and some of the eastern flow that went through the Everglade 

Keys.”69 After the construction of the drainage canals, water entered 

the park only from the east. Drainage also lowered the water table, 

leading to the destruction of gator holes and the abandonment of 

large bird rookeries. According to A. E. Demaray, acting director of 

the NPS, Beard’s main finding was that “changed water levels are in 
Chapter One | Draining the Swamp 13

all probability fundamentally responsible for the depletion of characteristic plants and animals of the proposed park area.” Based on 

these conclusions, Demaray proclaimed that “restoration of water 

levels is fundamental and must be accomplished if the area becomes 

a park. . . . Water is the basis for the unique features of southern 

Florida that make it of national park caliber.”70 The NPS therefore 

called for another extensive study of how drainage and flood control 

systems had affected the wildlife.

Meanwhile, the NPS participated in meetings in 1939 about 

saltwater intrusion and a shortage of drinking water for municipalities in South Florida. Although the conference focused on these issues, NPS representatives emphasized that state and federal interests should not deprive the Everglades of water in order to solve the 

problems. Continued inadequate water supplies, they stated, would 

“result in increasing the fire risk, decreasing soil building and destroying wildlife.”71 What was necessary, NPS officials declared, was 

the “restoration and maintenance of normal water conditions” in 

order to guarantee the “preservation and restoration of the national 

park character.”72

An inspection of the Everglades in 1939 by Clifford C. Presnall, 

assistant chief of the NPS’s Wildlife Division, reiterated the importance of water. Presnall reported that water levels were as much as 

three feet below normal and that some ditches were completely dry. 

He believed that “this lowering of the water table would not have 

been nearly so pronounced had there been no drainage canals.” He 

blamed drainage for causing bird migrations and for decimating tree 

snail populations, thereby drastically reducing the number of Everglades kites. Drainage had also caused fire to become “unnaturally 

preponderant.” Only the restoration of the “unhampered overflow 

from lake Okeechobee into the Everglades such as existed before the 

construction of dikes” would alleviate the situation, Presnall asserted, but he understood that the preponderance of agriculture south of 

Lake Okeechobee would make such a renewal difficult.73

In order to ensure that the animals and plants in the region had 

at least some form of protection, the state established a state wildlife refuge within the proposed park boundaries. Unfortunately, the 

designation did little to reduce the destruction, whether by drought 

or by poaching.74 Therefore, on 6 December 1944, Congress passed 

an act allowing the secretary of the interior to accept “submerged 

land, or interests therein, subject to such reservations of oil, gas, or 

mineral rights” within the 2,000 square mile boundary, and to protect such land until the federal government could clear the mineral 

reservations.75 The state then conveyed to the United States more 

than 850,000 acres of land within the proposed boundaries. One 

publication noted that the land consisted of three areas: Florida Bay; 

a 34-mile long and three-mile wide strip between Cape Sable and 

Lostman’s River; and 400,000 acres from the Shark River to Royal 

Palm State Park and north to Forty Mile Bend on the Tamiami Trail, 

a highway constructed in the 1910s and 1920s from Miami to Fort 

Myers and Tampa. Some of the lands not included were those in the 

Big Cypress region, those north of the Tamiami Trail, those located 

on the upper keys, and those which would become known as the East 

Everglades.76 All of the deeded land was designated as the Everglades 

Wildlife Refuge, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service was given 

administrative authority over it, with Daniel Beard as manager.77

Because of continuing difficulties with acquiring private land 

and with oil and gas rights, the state agreed in 1947 to the establishment of a “minimum” park, something that would at least get 

portions of the Everglades protected. This acreage, totaling 454,000 

acres and corresponding roughly to the third section deeded to the 

United States in 1944, became Everglades National Park on 27 June 

1947 when Secretary of the Interior J. A. Krug issued Order No. 

2338.78 Both park and state officials regarded this “minimum” park 

as only the beginning, noting that additional land to total 1,282,000 

acres would “ultimately . . . be added to the park.”79 President Harry 

Truman officially dedicated the park on 6 December 1947, making 

it the first national park to be established not for its scenery but 

solely to protect its flora and fauna.80 According to Acting Secretary 

of the Interior Warner W. Gardner, the establishment of the park 

only was a first step in its creation; more acreage would be added as 

it became available.81

August Burghard and Ernest Coe at the dedication of Everglades National Park. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and Archives of 

Florida)
14 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Everglades National Park advocates, as well as NPS personnel, 

were enthusiastic about the park’s creation, believing that it was a 

step in the right direction for the preservation of the unique flora 

and fauna of southern Florida. However, because it was, in the words 

of Marjory Stoneman Douglas, “the only national park in which the 

wild-life, the crocodiles, the trees, the orchids, will be more important than the sheer geology of the country,” it was essential that 

the flora and fauna had sufficient water.82 Just two days before the 

creation of the park, NPS officials had reiterated that “this new national park is dependent to a large degree on the conservation and 

favorable distribution of the surface waters of the lower Everglades 

drainage basin.” Therefore, “the restoration of natural conditions is 

the first requirement in any plan for bringing back many forms of 

wildlife which have been reduced to critical numbers.” The NPS expressed its interest and concern “with any plans dealing with drainage, storage, and distribution of the waters of the lower Everglades,” 

and believed that it was now an active player in any decisions involving this resource.83

In the 100 years following the state’s declaration of interest in drainage, southern Florida had undergone vast transformations. Several canals had been built, and rivers flowing out of Lake 

Okeechobee had been channelized in order to control flooding from 

the lake and to remove water from the land. Settlement and agriculture had quickly followed the desiccation of land; the lower east 

coast of Florida’s population had increased from 22,961 in 1900 to 

228,454 in 1930, while cane sugar production had doubled between 

1931 and 1941. Although the state had initiated drainage operations 

and implemented them for much of the first half of the twentieth 

century, it ultimately had to turn to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for flood control works. Yet all of these structures, whether for 

drainage or for flood control, had serious consequences for southern 

Florida’s flora and fauna, especially in the Everglades. The federal 

government created Everglades National Park in 1947 to protect 

these resources, but the problem of ensuring that the park received 

adequate water remained. Many, including John H. Baker, executive 

director of the National Audubon Society, believed that the solution 

lay in “an intelligent water-control and land-use plan, backed by adequate legislative and administrative authority” and executed by “a 

qualified hydraulic engineer.”84 Whether one could be developed remained to be seen.

Endnotes

1 George E. Buker, Sun, Sand and Water: A History of the Jacksonville 

District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1821-1975 (Fort Belvoir, Va.: U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, 1981), 104.

2 For examples of discussions of this period, see McCally, The Everglades; Nelson Manfred Blake, Land Into Water—Water Into Land: A History 

of Water Management in Florida (Tallahassee: University of Florida Presses, 

1980); Lamar Johnson, Beyond the Fourth Generation (Gainesville: The University Presses of Florida, 1974); Junius Elmore Dovell, “A History of the 

Everglades of Florida,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at 

Chapel Hill, 1947; and Christopher F. Meindl, “Past Perceptions of the Great 

American Wetland: Florida’s Everglades during the Early Twentieth Century,” Environmental History 5 (July 2000): 378-395. 

3 Marjory Stoneman Douglas, The Everglades: River of Grass, 50th anniversary edition (Sarasota, Fla.: Pineapple Press, 1997), 68.

4 Douglas, The Everglades, 68-70; McCally, The Everglades, 39-53.

5 McCally, The Everglades, 53-57, 59-60 (quotation on p. 56); see also 

Charlton W. Tebeau, A History of Florida (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of 

Miami Press, 1971), 19; Douglas, The Everglades, 185-188, 196-245; and 

Robert H. Keller and Michael F. Turek, American Indians & National Parks

(Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1998), 217.

6 Grunwald, The Swamp, 40-47.

7 “Resolution by the Legislature of Florida,” in Senate, Everglades of 

Florida, 62d Cong., 1st sess., 1911, S. Doc. 89, Serial 6108, 34-35.

8 “Report of Buckingham Smith, Esq., on His Reconnaissance of the 

Everglades, 1848,” in Senate, Everglades of Florida, 46.

9 “Report of Buckingham Smith,” 46-47, 49-50, 53.

10 McCally, The Everglades, 88.

11 Act of 28 September 1850, in Senate, Everglades of Florida, 67.

12 Quotation in McCally, The Everglades, 88; see also “Acts of Florida 

Legislatures (1851-1855) Relating to the Everglades,” in Senate, Everglades 

of Florida, 67-68; and “History of Drainage and Reclamation Work in the 

Everglades of Florida,” in Senate, Everglades of Florida, 7.

13 Douglas, The Everglades, 266.

14 Lieutenant J. C. Ives, Memoir to Accompany a Military Map of the 

Peninsula of Florida, South of Tampa Bay (New York: M. B. Wynkoop, 1856), 

5-7.

15 Grunwald, The Swamp, 67.

16 McCally, The Everglades, 89; Grunwald, The Swamp, 67-72.

17 Quotation in Blake, Land Into Water, 75; see also McCally, The Everglades, 89; Grunwald, The Swamp, 85-87.

18 Quotation in Ann Vileisis, Discovering the Unknown Landscape: A 

History of America’s Wetlands (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1997), 136; 

see also Blake, Land Into Water, 81-83; McCally, The Everglades, 89; and 

Light and Dineen, “Water Control in the Everglades: A Historical Perspective,” 53. The traditional historical accounts of Disston’s death label it as a 

suicide, but more recent publications, including works by Joe Knetsch, a 

historian with the Florida Division of State Lands, and Michael Grunwald, 

a Washington Post reporter, attribute his death to heart problems, citing the 

coroner’s report and several obituaries at the time. See Joe Knetsch, “Hamilton Disston and the Development of Florida,” Sunland Tribune 24, no. 1 

(1998): 5-19; Grunwald, The Swamp, 96.

19 Blake, Land Into Water, 84-87; Grunwald, The Swamp, 99-109.

20 “Report by Dr. H. W. Wiley, of the Bureau of Chemistry, United 

States Department of Agriculture, in 1891, on the Muck Lands of the Florida 

Peninsula,” in Senate, Everglades of Florida, 73-74.

21 “Message of Gov. W. S. Jennings to the Legislature of Florida Relative 

to Reclamation of Everglades,” in Senate, Everglades of Florida, 84.

22 Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959; reprint, New York: Atheneum, 1969), 2; references are to 

the reprint edition. Hays’ book is one of the best sources on the conservation 

movement in the late 1800s and early 1900s.
Chapter One | Draining the Swamp 15

23 Introduction to Napoleon B. Broward, “Homes for Millions: Draining the Everglades,” Collier’s 44 (22 January 1910): 19.

24 Quotation in Blake, Land Into Water, 88; see also Meindl, “Past Perceptions of the Great American Wetland,” 379; Vileisis, Discovering the Unknown Landscape, 113. For information about engineering studies and the 

Progressive influence, see Jeffrey Glenn Strickland, “The Origins of Everglades Drainage in the Progressive Era: Local, State and Federal Cooperation and Conflict,” M.A. thesis, Florida Atlantic University, 1999, 69-81.

25 Quotations in W. Turner Wallis, “The History of Everglades Drainage and Its Present Status,” Soil Science Society of Florida Proceedings, 4-A 

(1942): 31-32; see also Dovell, “A History of the Everglades of Florida,” 178; 

Strickland, “The Origins of Everglades Drainage in the Progressive Era,” 127; 

McCally, The Everglades, 88; and Blake, Land Into Water, 94.

26 For a complete biography of Broward, see Samuel Proctor, Napoleon 

Bonaparte Broward: Florida’s Fighting Democrat (Gainesville: University of 

Florida Press, 1950).

27 Quotation in S. Mays Ball, “Reclaiming the Everglades: Reversing the 

Far Western Irrigation Problem,” Putnam’s Magazine 7 (April 1910): 798; see 

also Grunwald, The Swamp, 131.

28 N. P. Broward, “Draining the Everglades,” The Independent 64 (25 

June 1908): 1448; Blake, Land Into Water, 95-96; Vileisis, Discovering the 

Unknown Landscape, 136-137.

29 “Message of Gov. N. B. Broward to the Legislature of Florida Relative 

to Reclamation of Everglades,” in Senate, Everglades of Florida, 99-109.

30 Blake, Land Into Water, 97; McCally, The Everglades, 92; Grunwald, 

The Swamp, 134-140.

31 Quotation in McCally, The Everglades, 93-94; see also Blake, Land 

Into Water, 105; Grunwald, The Swamp, 141-142. For more information 

about drainage under Broward’s administration, see Proctor, Napoleon 

Bonaparte Broward, 216-224, 240-260

32 McCally, The Everglades, 114.

33 McCally, The Everglades, 95-98, 100-102, 109-110; Blake, Land Into 

Water, 107-112, 116-117, 120-121, 127-128; Meindl, “Past Perceptions of 

the Great American Wetland,” 383-384. For information about the Wright 

Report, see “Report on the Drainage of the Everglades of Florida by J. O. 

Wright, Supervising Drainage Engineer,” in Senate, Everglades of Florida, 

140-180; and Aaron D. Purcell, “Plumb Lines, Politics, and Projections: The 

Florida Everglades and the Wright Report Controversy,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 80 (Fall 2001): 161-197. For the Everglades Land Sales Company report, see Daniel W. Mead, Allen Hazen, and Leonard Metcalf, Report 

on the Drainage of the Everglades of Florida (Chicago: Board of Consulting 

Engineers, 1912). For the Randolph Report, see Senate, Florida Everglades: 

Report of the Florida Everglades Engineering Commission to the Board of 

Commissioners of the Everglades Drainage District and the Trustees of the 

Internal Improvement Fund, State of Florida, 63d Cong., 2d sess., 1913, S. 

Doc. 379, Serial 6574.

34 Blake, Land Into Water, 130-132; McCally, The Everglades, 121-125; 

Howard Sharp, “Farming the Muck Soil of the Everglades,” The Florida 

Grower 32 (7 November 1925): 4; John A. Heitmann, “The Beginnings of 

Big Sugar in Florida, 1920-1945,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 77 (Summer 1998): 44, 50-54; J. Carlyle Sitterson, Sugar Country: The Cane Sugar 

Industry in the South, 1753-1950 (Lexington: Univeristy of Kentucky Press, 

1953; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973), 361-370 (page references are to the reprint edition).

35 Robert Mykle, Killer ‘Cane: The Deadly Hurricane of 1928 (New York: 

Cooper Square Press, 2002), 34, 36.

36 McCally, The Everglades, 135; Blake, Land Into Water, 134-136; Grunwald, The Swamp, 186-189; Okeechobee Flood Control District, A Report to 

the Board of Commissioners of Okeechobee Flood Control District on the Activities of the District and on Lake Okeechobee, copy in Library, Jacksonville 

District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, Florida.

37 Everglades Engineering Board of Review, Report of Everglades Engineering Board of Review to Board of Commissioners of Everglades Drainage 

District (Tallahassee, Fla.: T. J. Appleyard, 1927), 5-16, 52.

38 McCally, The Everglades, 139-140.

39 Blake, Land Into Water, 136; McCally, The Everglades, 139; Grunwald, 

The Swamp, 192-194; Edgar Jadwin, Major General, Chief of Engineers, to 

Hon. Wesley L. Jones, 31 January 1929, in Senate, Caloosahatchee River and 

Lake Okeechobee Drainage Areas, Florida, 70th Cong., 2d sess., 1929, S. Doc. 

213, Serial 9000, 2. For a full discussion of the hurricane and its impacts, see 

Mykle, Killer ‘Cane and Eliot Kleinberg, Black Cloud: The Great Florida Hurricane of 1928 (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003).

40 Okeechobee Flood Control District, A Report to the Board of Commissioners of Okeechobee Flood Control District on the Activities of the District and on Lake Okeechobee, 7-8; see also Senate Committee on Commerce, 

Rivers and Harbors: Hearings Before the Committee on Commerce, United 

States Senate, Part 3, 71st Cong., 2d sess., 1930, 322-323.

41 For more information on the 1917 act, see Matthew T. Pearcy, “A 

History of the Ransdell-Humphreys Flood Control Act of 1917,” Louisiana 

History 41 (Spring 2000): 133-159.

42 Joseph L. Arnold, The Evolution of the 1936 Flood Control Act (Fort 

Belvoir, Va.: Office of History, United States Army Corps of Engineers, 

1988), iii; Martin Reuss, Designing the Bayous: The Control of Water in the 

Atchafalaya Basin, 1800-1995 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 

2004), 121. Because the Flood Control Act of 1917 only applied to the lower 

Mississippi and the Sacramento river basins, Reuss contends that the 1936 

Flood Control Act was “the real beginning of comprehensive federal flood 

control work.” Martin Reuss, “Introduction,” The Flood Control Challenge: 

Past, Present, and Future, Howard Rosen and Martin Reuss, eds. (Chicago: 

Public Works Historical Society, 1988), x-xi.

43 Quotation in Edgar Jadwin, Major General, Chief of Engineers, to 

The Secretary of War, April 2, 1928, in House, Caloosahatchee River and 

Lake Okeechobee Drainage Areas, Florida, 70th Cong., 1st sess., 1928, H. 

Doc. 215, Serial 8900, 5; see also McCally, The Everglades, 138-139; Blake, 

Land Into Water, 142-143; Grunwald, The Swamp, 197-199.

44 Quotations in Jadwin to Jones, 31 January 1929, in Senate, Caloosahatchee River and Lake Okeechobee Drainage Areas, 7; see also Blake, Land 

Into Water, 143-144; McCally, The Everglades, 139. 

45 Quotation in Blake, Land Into Water, 146; see also Lytle Brown, Major General, Chief of Engineers, to Hon. Hiram W. Johnson, 15 March 1930, 

in Senate, Caloosahatchee River and Lake Okeechobee Drainage Areas, Fla., 

71st Cong., 2d sess., 1930, Serial 9219, 4-6; Okeechobee Flood Control District, A Report to the Board of Commissioners of Okeechobee Flood Control 

District, 8-9.

46 Quotation in Duncan U. Fletcher to Hon. Hiram W. Johnson, 13 

May 1930, in Senate Committee on Commerce, Rivers and Harbors: Hearings Before the Committee on Commerce, United States Senate, Seventy-First 

Congress, Second Session, Part 1, 71st Cong., 2d sess., 1930, 203-205; see also 

Johnson, Beyond the Fourth Generation, 151.

47 Untitled document beginning “Q3: Hoover Dike Design,” File Lake 

O, Box 745, JDAR; Okeechobee Flood Control District, A Report to the 

Board of Commissioners of Okeechobee Flood Control District, 22. The dike 

itself was not formally dedicated until 12 January 1961, when it was named 

after President Herbert Hoover. Kleinberg, Black Cloud, 198.

48 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Central and 

Southern Florida Project for Flood Control and Other Purposes: Rule Curves 
16 United States Army Corps of Engineers

and Key Operating Criteria, Master Regulation Manual, Volume 2, Part 1

(Jacksonville, Fla.: Department of the Army, Jacksonville District, Corps 

of Engineers, 1978), D-37A—D37B; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, and South Florida Water Management District, “Central and Southern Florida Project, Comprehensive Everglades Restoration 

Plan: Topographic Technical Memorandum, Lake Okeechobee Watershed 

Project,” Proj 01.2.6, March 2003, 1, copy at <www.evergladesplan.org> (8 

March 2006).

49 Light and Dineen, “Water Control in the Everglades: A Historical 

Perspective,” 55.

50 “Florida Fairyland,” Reader’s Digest 28 (June 1936): 32.

51 Douglas, The Everglades, 279.

52 Quotation in Cesar A. Becerra, “Birth of Everglades National Park,” 

South Florida History 25-26 (Fall 1997/Winter 1998): 12. For more information on Bradley’s death, see Stuart A. McIver, “Death of a Bird Warden,” 

South Florida History 29 (Fall 2001): 20-27; Stuart A. McIver, Death in the 

Everglades: The Murder of Guy Bradley, America’s First Martyr to Environmentalism (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003).

53 Becerra, “Birth of Everglades National Park,” 12-14; Vileisis, Discovering the Unknown Landscape, 157-158; Grunwald, The Swamp, 170-171.

54 Theodore Pratt, “Papa of the Everglades National Park,” The Saturday 

Evening Post 220 (9 August 1947): 46, 49; Grunwald, The Swamp, 206-208.

55 For more information on the development of the national park 

movement in America, see Alfred Runte, National Parks: The American Experience, 3rd edition (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997).

56 Act of 1 March 1929 (45 Stat. 1443); see also Duncan U. Fletcher 

to Dr. J. H. Paine, 10 July 1934, File Everglades H. R. 2837, Box 903, Entry 

7, Record Group [RG] 79, Records of the National Park Service, National 

Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, Maryland [hereafter 

referred to as NARA II].

57 See, for example, Fletcher to Paine, 10 July 1934; David Fairchild, 

“The Everglades National Park as an Introduction to the Tropics,” at Library 

of Congress, “Reclaiming the Everglades: South Florida’s Natural History, 

1884-1934” <http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/award98/fmuhtml/everhome.

html> (1 December 2004).

58 John Kunkel Small, From Eden to Sahara: Florida’s Tragedy (Lancaster, Penn.: The Science Press Printing Company, 1929), 7, 48.

59 As quoted in “The Proposed Everglades National Park,” Science 77 

(17 February 1933): 185.

60 John O’Reilly, “Wildlife Protection in South Florida,” Bird-Lore 41 

(May-June 1939): 130, 136, 138.

61 Act of 30 May 1934 (48 Stat. 816).

62 Quotation in Arno B. Cammerer, Director, Memorandum for Mr. 

Poole, Assistant Solicitor, 2 April 1934, File Everglades H.R. 2837, Box 903, 

Entry 7, RG 79, NARA II; see also Newton B. Drury, Director, to The Secretary, 10 May 1948, File 0-10 Laws and Legal Matters, Box 902, Entry 7, RG 

79, NARA II.

63 Buffalo Tiger and Harry A. Kersey, Jr., Buffalo Tiger: A Life in the 

Everglades (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 7; William C. 

Sturtevant and Jessica R. Cattelino, “Florida Seminole and Miccosukee,” in 

Handbook of North American Indians, ed. William Sturtevant, vol. 14, Southeast, ed. Raymond D. Fogelson (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 

2004), 429-438; Keller and Turek, American Indians and National Parks, 217. 

For more information on the early history of the Seminole in the Everglades 

and Big Cypress Swamp, see Brent Richards Weisman, Unconquered People: 

Florida’s Seminole and Miccosukee Indians (Gainesville: University Press of 

Florida, 1999), 66-89, 123-124.

64 Sturtevant and Cattelino, “Florida Seminole and Miccosukee,” 438; 

Harry A. Kersey, Jr., “The East Big Cypress Case, 1948-1987: Environmental 

Politics, Law, and Florida Seminole Tribal Sovereignty,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 69 (April 1991): 457-458; Patricia R. Wickman, “The History 

of the Seminole People of Florida,” The Seminole Tribune, copy at <http://

www.semtribe.com/tribune/40anniversary/history.shtml> (5 January 2006).

65 A. S. Houghton to Hon. Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, 15 

April 1938, File Everglades H.R. 2837, Box 903, Entry 7, RG 79, NARA II.

66 Quotation in Kenneth D. Morrison, “Oil in the Everglades,” Natural 

History 53 (June 1944): 282; see also Alfred Jackson Hanna and Kathryn 

Abbey Hanna, Lake Okeechobee: Wellspring of the Everglades (Indianapolis, 

Ind.: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1948), 345.

67 Quotation in Department of the Interior, Information Service, National Park Service, For Immediate Release, n.d., File 714 Fishes, Box 919, 

Entry 7, RG 79, NARA II; see also Ernest F. Coe, Director, Everglades National Park Assn., Inc., to Honorable Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, 21 April 1937, ibid.

68 A. E. Demaray, Acting Director, to Mr. Abel Wolman, National Resources Committee, 12 June 1939, File E. G. 660-05 Water Supply Systems 

(Gen.), Box 918, Entry 7, RG 79, NARA II.

69 Daniel Beard, “Wildlife Reconnaissance: Everglades National Park 

Project,” October 1938, 46, 50, copy provided by Nancy Russell, Museum 

Curator, Everglades and Dry Tortugas National Parks, Homestead, Florida.

70 Demaray to Wolman, 12 June 1939.

71 O. B. Taylor, Regional Wildlife Technician, Memorandum for the Regional Director, Region I, 18 July 1939, File 801-02 Floods Everglades, Box 

920, Entry 7, RG 79, NARA II.

72 J. R. White, Acting Director, National Park Service, to C. G. Paulsen, 

Acting Chairman, Departmental Committee on Water Resources, 8 August 

1939, File E. G. 660-05 Water Supply Systems (Gen.), Box 918, Entry 7, RG 

79, NARA II.

73 Clifford C. Presnall, “Wildlife Report on the Everglades National Park 

(Proposed),” 1-6, File 207 Paul Bartsch, Box 905, Entry 7, RG 79, NARA II.

74 James O. Stevenson, Assistant in Charge, Section on National Park 

Wildlife, Memorandum for Mr. Ben Thompson, National Park Service, 26 

June 1942, File 720-04 Everglades, Box 920, Entry 7, RG 79, NARA II.

75 Act of 6 December 1944 (58 Stat. 794).

76 Quotation in “The President’s Report to You,” Audubon Magazine 47 

(January-February 1945): 46-47; see also Vileisis, Discovering the Unknown 

Landscape, 190-191.

77 Newton B. Drury, Director, National Park Service, to The Secretary, 

10 May 1948, File 0-10 Laws and Legal Matters, Box 902, Entry 7, RG 79, 

NARA II.

78 United States Department of the Interior, Title 36—Parks and Forests, Chapter I—National Park Service, Department of the Interior, Order 

Establishing the Everglades National Park, Florida, in File Everglades National Park—Washington Liaison Office June 1947-July 1947, Box 900, Entry 7, RG 79, NARA II.

79 “Everglades Becomes 28th National Park,” National Park Service Advance Release, 20 June 1947, File Everglades National Park—Washington 

Liaison Office, June 1947-July 1947, Box 900, Entry 7, RG 79, NARA II.

80 J. A. Krug, Secretary of the Interior, to Hon. Millard F. Caldwell, Governor of Florida, 2 April 1947, File Everglades National Park—1947, Box Labeled Everglades National Park 1950’s, State Lands Records Vault, Division 

of State Lands, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Marjory 

Stoneman Douglas Building, Tallahassee, Florida; Runte, National Parks, 

108-109. For copies of speeches given during the dedication, see “Superintendent’s Monthly Narrative Report for the month of December 1947 for 
Chapter One | Draining the Swamp 17

Everglades National Park,” 2 January 194[8], File 207-02.3 Everglades Supt. 

Report, Box 906, Entry 7, RG 79, NARA II.

81 Warner W. Gardner, Acting Secretary of the Interior, to Senator Butler, ca. 25 June 1947, File Everglades National Park—Washington Liaison 

Office June 1947-July 1947, Box 900, Entry 7, RG 79, NARA II. The Royal 

Palm State Park was included in the 454,000 acres.

82 Douglas, The Everglades, 381.

83 “Statement of the Interests of The National Park Service, United 

States Department of the Interior in the Water Resources of the Everglades,” 

18 June 1947, File Everglades National Park—Washington Liaison Office 

June 1947-July 1947, Box 900, Entry 7, RG 79, NARA II.

84 John H. Baker, “Time Is Running Out on the Everglades,” Audubon 

Magazine 45 (May-June 1943): 177.

19

Schemes to drain the Everglades in the first half of the twentieth century had created problems that few people foresaw, including 

the destruction of plant and wildlife in South Florida, a textbook 

example of the law of unintended consequences. Other problems 

resulted from soil subsidence, saltwater intrusion into freshwater 

wells, and fires raging in times of drought. The financial difficulties 

of the state of Florida and the Everglades Drainage District (EDD) 

precluded any local solutions to these problems. In addition, two 

hurricanes in 1947 caused devastating floods, destroying millions of 

dollars of property and cropland. These problems convinced state 

officials and other Floridians that it was time for drastic action, and 

they once again turned to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for help. 

The Corps proposed a comprehensive water control plan in 1948 that 

would curb floods and supply water for urban and agricultural interests, alleviating fires, soil subsidence, saltwater intrusion, and plant 

and wildlife damage in the process. Congress approved this plan 

in 1948, thereby creating the Central and Southern Florida Flood 

Control Project. Even though this project proposed an entire water 

control plan for Central and South Florida, it still left some people 

uneasy as to how it would address Florida’s valuable fish, wildlife, 

and plant resources. Floridians generally lauded the establishment 

of the project, believing that it provided secure protection against 

future flooding, but there were fissures in this consensus that would 

eventually become gaping crevices.

By the 1930s, drainage had opened up numerous acres of land 

in South Florida to agriculture and settlement. But the removal of 

water had some unintended ecological consequences. For one thing, 

the muck soil exposed by drainage easily caught fire when it became 

too dry. These fires generally occurred underneath the surface and 

Chapter 2

produced heavy amounts of smoke, leading to rather bizarre scenes 

of trees with obliterated roots but no trunk damage sinking into the 

earth.1 Such fires became numerous in the Everglades in the 1920s 

and 1930s; one periodical reported in 1931 that “there are areas in 

the glades . . . that have been burning underground for years.”2

High rates of soil subsidence created other problems. The removal of water from the land oxidized bacteria in plant remains, 

thereby facilitating the complete decomposition of organic detritus. 

The subsequent soil loss sometimes amounted to as much as one 

inch per year. One observer claimed in 1942 that the city of Belle 

Glade was “six feet farther down than it was 25 years ago” and that 

Clewiston residents “add a new step to their front stoops every two 

or three years so they can reach the shrinking ground.”3 Drainage 

also caused saltwater from the Atlantic Ocean to intrude into freshwater wells because a loss of surface water allowed saltwater to flow 

into creeks during high tide and permeate the limestone strata underlying the banks. Because of this, by 1938, more than 1,000 wells 

moved inland by the city of Miami in the 1920s and 1930s had saltwater contamination.4

The prevalence of these problems, and the lack of state resources, led federal agencies, especially the Soil Conservation Service of 

the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Geological Survey 

(USGS), to investigate solutions. The Soil Science Society of Florida, 

an organization formed by Florida scientists in 1939, aided these 

agencies in their efforts. At the first meeting of the society in 1939, 

R. V. Allison, its president and chief of the University of Florida’s 

Everglades Agricultural Experiment Station, discussed soil and water problems. He explained that only in the last few years had scientists adequately understood “the duty of water and its relation 

Federal Intervention: The Central and Southern Florida 

Flood Control Project, 1948
20 United States Army Corps of Engineers

to the soil as well as to the plant.” Too much drainage had allowed 

subsidence to devastate soil levels, making it the most pressing soil 

problem affecting the Everglades. In order to curb subsidence, Allison proposed that a water control program be implemented that 

would flood uncultivated lands “as much of the year as possible” and 

consider the water needs of cultivated areas. Because Allison did not 

know what these needs were, he called for a “careful, exacting study” 

of “the handling of ground water” by cultivated tracts, “looking to 

economic plant response on the one hand and the best possible stabilization of the soil body on the other.”5

 He also called on federal, 

state, and local officials to recognize that the Everglades hydrologic 

unit consisted of three elements: the Kissimmee River, which served 

as the watershed; Lake Okeechobee, which operated as the storage 

basin; and the Everglades itself, which was the overflow area.

Others in the Soil Science Society agreed with Allison’s assessment. H. A. Bestor, a drainage engineer with the U.S. Sugar Corporation, stated in 1943 that an orderly plan for developing the Everglades needed to emphasize conservation of water over its disposal. 

Officials should institute “water control planning,” Bestor continued, 

to preserve wildlife, to control soil subsidence and prevent muck 

burning, to utilize land for agriculture, and to preserve municipal 

water supplies. “All present land use,” he concluded, “is challenged 

by lack of appreciation that conservation of its organic soils is vitally 

dependent on water control management.”6

Meanwhile, the USGS, the Florida Geological Survey, and the 

Florida State Board of Conservation were conducting inquiries into 

saltwater intrusion and well contamination in South Florida. In 1939, 

the cities of Miami, Miami Beach, and Coral Gables, in conjunction 

with Dade County, entered into an agreement with the USGS to examine surface and well supplies in South Florida in order to receive 

information about how to prevent “a grave municipal water-supply 

shortage.”7 USGS scientists, including geologist Garald Parker, investigated the substrata of southern Florida and found that saltwater 

was entering the Biscayne Aquifer (the only source of fresh ground 

water in the Miami region) from below. The problem was that drainage had upset the natural balance between salt water and fresh water in the aquifer by lowering the groundwater table. To restore this 

equilibrium, Parker argued, freshwater tables had to be kept at 2.5 

feet above sea level. The main way to ensure this was to build control 

dams at the mouths of canals draining Miami and its surroundings, 

and to establish a better water control plan for the region.8

Scientists, then, were well aware of the destruction that drainage 

was wreaking on natural resources, but the general public needed 

something more accessible to move them to action. Publications in 

national magazines such as Collier’s and Audubon helped, but the 

biggest boost came in 1947 when a 57-year-old journalist named 

Marjory Stoneman Douglas published a book chronicling the destruction of the Everglades. Born in Minnesota in 1890 and raised 

in Massachusetts, Douglas moved to Miami in 1915 to join the staff 

of her father’s newspaper, the Miami Herald. She quickly became involved with the Florida Federation of Women’s Clubs, which was one 

of the area’s major promoters of conservation, and focused many of 

her Miami Herald articles on creating a healthy urban environment 

through zoning, public parks, and tree planting. Douglas also championed the beauty and distinctiveness of the Everglades, and she 

joined the Tropic Everglades National Park Association soon after 

its formation. When her friend Hervey Allen, an editor at Rinehart 

Books, invited her to contribute to his series focusing on American 

rivers, she readily agreed, deciding to write about the Everglades, 

which the Seminole had called pahokee, meaning grassy waters. Using that word for her inspiration, she published The Everglades: River 

of Grass in the fall of 1947, and it soon became a bestseller.9

Using stunning and beautiful prose, Douglas painted a picture 

of the geological and ecological life of the Everglades, describing 

how, before drainage, water from Lake Okeechobee spilled over the 

lake’s south rim, combined with rainwater, and became the “river of 

grass,” flowing slowly, almost imperceptibly, southward, giving life to 

the disparate flora and fauna in the region. Douglas chronicled the 

different drainage programs that the state had instituted, as well as 

land development schemes and hurricanes that had influenced the 

area. Then, in the crowning chapter, she outlined how drainage was 

killing the Everglades:

The endless acres of saw grass, brown as an enormous shadow 

where rain and lake water had once flowed, rustled dry. The birds 

flew high above them, the ibis, the egret, the heron beating steadily southward along drying watercourses to the last brackish pools. 

Fires that one night glittered along a narrow horizon the next day, 

before a racing wind, flashed crackling and roaring across the grassy 

world and flamed up in rolling columns of yellow smoke like pillars 

of dirty clouds. . . . But in all the creatures of these solitudes where 

the Tamiami Trail and the long canals stretched their thin lines, and 

in the hearts of the Indians, there was a sense of evil abroad, a restlessness, an anxiety that one passing rainfall could not change.10

To restore the beauty and natural conditions of the Everglades, Douglas argued, “a single plan of development and 

water control for the whole area, under the direction of a 

single engineer and his board” had to be instituted.11 With 

that plan, the different water demands of disparate sections in South Florida then could be coordinated, and areas 

could be developed for water conservation. Ultimately, she 

concluded, the people of South Florida needed to cooperate 

with the federal government to develop this project.

Douglas’s declaration of the necessity of federal involvement 

rang true to many Floridians observing the financial and administrative difficulties of the EDD. She referred to the period from 1931 

to 1942 as “the era of utter confusion” in South Florida because of 
Chapter Two | Federal Intervention 21

the financial straits of the EDD and the lack of a central authority 

in drainage matters. Florida’s 1913 drainage law had authorized the 

establishment of subdrainage districts with their own taxing powers; when these districts were formed, they developed their “own 

plan of operation shaped to local desires.”12 By 1948, there were 12 

of these districts covering approximately 100,000 acres of land.13

Moreover, in 1931, the state legislature removed the governor and 

state officials from the EDD board, replacing them with five local 

members appointed by the governor. According to EDD engineer 

Lamar Johnson, this action “completely divorced” the district 

“from direct Tallahassee control,” resulting in “non-payment of 

taxes, bond litigation, and little funds with which to operate for ten 

years.”14 Meanwhile, Douglas argued, cattle ranchers and vegetable 

farmers on lands surrounding Lake Okeechobee wanted the maintenance of a low water level so that more agricultural land would 

be available, while residents of Broward and Dade counties desired 

a high level “to guard their own fields and their drying, over-used, 

city well-fields.” These conditions produced “bad feeling, wrangling 

and confusion.”15

After receiving financial help from the Reconstruction Finance 

Corporation, the EDD addressed some of the soil subsidence and 

other problems created by drainage, using studies conducted by the 

Soil Conservation Service and the Soil Science Society of Florida. In 

the early 1940s, the Soil Conservation Service had discovered that 

much of the land in southern Florida was unsuitable for agriculture 

because of an inadequate soil depth. The EDD’s board wondered 

whether these tracts could be used for water conservation and storage, and asked engineers Turner Wallis and Lamar Johnson to work 

with a Soil Science Society committee to investigate the possibilities. In May 1944, this committee suggested that the EDD use public 

Marjory Stoneman Douglas signing copies of The Everglades: River of Grass, 1947. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and Archives of Florida)
22 United States Army Corps of Engineers

lands as water conservation areas in order to improve wildlife and 

plant habitat and to stop soil subsidence and burning.16

Acting on these recommendations, Johnson, who became chief 

engineer of the EDD in 1946, drew up maps showing three possible 

water conservation areas in Palm Beach, Broward, and Dade counties, located mostly on acreage already owned by either the IIF trustees, the State Board of Education, the EDD, or the counties. The IIF 

trustees approved the plan, but the state legislature, influenced by a 

faction of landowners who wanted the land sold and the proceeds 

applied to the EDD’s debt, mandated that voters in the three counties 

would have to approve the measure before any conservation areas 

could be created. “A popular referendum was usually considered a 

kiss of death at that period of Florida’s history,” Johnson later explained. “It looked dark for the future of the conservation areas at 

that point.”17

In the meantime, settlement and economic development 

continued to increase in South Florida, especially around Lake 

Okeechobee and on the east coast. State officials noted in 1948 

that there were “great tourist and business cities” along the coastal 

ridge of southern Florida, while agricultural communities clustered 

around the lake and on the western and northern side of the Kissimmee River Basin.18 Cattle ranches and dairies proliferated in the 

Kissimmee and St. Johns basins; one estimate placed the number of 

cattle in these areas at 410,000 head. In addition, numerous farmers 

raised truck crops on the drained soil south of Lake Okeechobee, 

including beans, tomatoes, eggplant, cabbage, potatoes, and celery. 

The Corps reported that 160,000 acres in the Kissimmee River Basin and south of Lake Okeechobee were planted to truck crops in 

the 1945-1946 growing season, producing $67 million in vegetables. 

Citrus farms were also important, located from the Kissimmee Basin 

to Davie, southwest of Fort Lauderdale; approximately 268,000 acres 

of citrus groves existed in 1948. But cane sugar was the most significant crop in the Everglades. In 1934, Congress had passed the Sugar 

Act, which had divided cane sugar production into different quotas, 

thereby boosting prices. With this help, the U.S. Sugar Corporation 

and other companies planted 32,000 acres to cane, raising 873,000 

tons of sugar in 1941. According to A. G. Matthews, chief engineer 

for the State of Florida’s Division of Water Surveys and Research, the 

Everglades produced 2,330,232 tons of citrus fruits and vegetables 

from 1944 to 1946, as well as $11,764,000 worth of sugar and 120,000 

head of beef.19

The high production of agricultural crops and the rising number of people living around Lake Okeechobee and along the east 

coast meant that any kind of storm similar to the 1926 and 1928 hurricanes would have a devastating impact on South Florida. But because of the levee that the Corps had built around Lake Okeechobee, 

and because of the existing drainage works, settlers felt secure from 

flooding, a feeling reinforced after drought hit the region in 1944 

and 1945. According to Lamar Johnson, “the Everglades vegetation 

and soil burned for months and the acrid smoke over Miami did 

not inspire the same sentimental emotions that the moon over that 

city does.”20 The Corps reported that between 1943 and 1946, “cattle 

died in the pastures of the Kissimmee Valley for lack of water; smoke 

from burning muck lands of the Everglades darkened the coastal cities; and salt water moved inland along drainage canals and through 

the underlying rock.”21

But in the first months of 1947, rain began falling on the Everglades in large amounts. On 1 March, a storm dropped six inches of 

rain, while April and May also saw above average totals. The situation became severe in the summer, the apex of Florida’s traditional 

rainy season (which usually lasts from June through October). As 

September approached and the rains continued, the ground in the 

Everglades became waterlogged and lake levels reached dangerous heights. Then, on 17 September, a hurricane hit Florida on the 

southwest coast, passing Lake Okeechobee on the west and dumping large amounts of rain on the upper Everglades, flooding most 

of the agricultural land south of Lake Okeechobee.22 George Wedgworth, who would later become president of the Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida and whose parents were vegetable growers in the Everglades, related that his mother called him during the 

storm and told him, “This is the last call I’ll make from this telephone because I’m leaving. . . . [W]e’ve got an inch or two of water 

over our oak floors and they’re taking me out on a row boat.”23 Such 

conditions were prevalent throughout the region.

Before the area had a chance to recover from the devastation, 

another hurricane developed, moving into South Florida and the Atlantic Ocean by way of Fort Lauderdale. The amount of rainfall was 

Damage caused by the 1947 hurricane. (The Florida Memory Project, 

State Library and Archives of Florida)
Chapter Two | Federal Intervention 23

not as severe in the upper Everglades, but coastal cities received rain 

in large quantities, including six inches in two hours at Hialeah and 

nearly 15 inches at Fort Lauderdale in less than 24 hours. The EDD, 

under the direction of Johnson, kept its drainage canals open to discharge to the ocean as much of the floodwater in the agricultural 

area as it could, exacerbating coastal flooding. East coast residents 

charged Johnson with endangering their lives in order to please agricultural interests, but Johnson vehemently denied this, explaining 

that “the entire Everglades was flooded several feet and the flood was 

moving southward and eastward”—coastal cities would have been 

inundated regardless of the output from the drainage canals.24

Whoever was to blame, the hurricanes had devastating effects. 

Although the levee around Lake Okeechobee held, preventing the 

large numbers of deaths that occurred in 1926 and 1928, over 2,000 

square miles of land south of the lake was covered by, in the words of 

U.S. Senator Spessard Holland, “an endless sheet of water anywhere 

from 6 to 7 feet deep down to a lesser depth.” The Corps estimated 

that the storms caused $59 million in property damage throughout 

southern Florida, but Holland believed that the agency had “understated the actual figures.”25 The destruction shocked citizens of South 

Florida, both in the upper Everglades and in the coastal cities, and 

they demanded that something be done.26

Acting on these concerns were Florida’s two U.S. senators, Holland (who became a member of the Senate Public Works Committee in 1947) and Claude Pepper. Both were Democrats; Holland had served as governor of Florida from 1941 to 1945, while Pepper had 

served in the Senate since 1936. After the September and October 

hurricanes, the two were inundated with resolutions and pleas from 

residents and city and county governments requesting more stringent water control. The Soroptimist Club of the Palm Beaches, for 

example, informed Holland that “it is clearer than ever that an overall Glades water control plan must be established” in South Florida.27

The city commission of the city of Stuart was more specific, asking 

that a water plan provide not only for the control of flooding, but 

also “include conservation of fresh water.”28

At the time, Corps leaders were already investigating flood 

control measures south of Lake Okeechobee, in part because of 

the flooding that occurred during the spring rains in 1947. With 

so many South Floridians in disparate parts of the region calling for flood control, however, Pepper became convinced that the 

Corps needed to expand its efforts. “The time has come when we 

have got to deal with the flood situation in the Peninsula of Florida, as a whole,” he informed Lieutenant General R. A. Wheeler, 

Chief of Engineers, in October 1947. “It is all fundamentally one 

single problem and has got to be approached as a single problem 

with a single comprehensive program.” Pepper therefore requested 

that the Corps “take steps . . . to formulate plans for a comprehensive flood-control program for the whole flooded area.”29 Wheeler 

agreed with Pepper, explaining that he had already implemented 

measures to begin “a comprehensive study of the entire flood problem of south Florida from the headwaters of the Kissimmee River 

to points south of Miami.” The “urgent need” for a solution to the Senator Spessard Holland. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and 

Archives of Florida)

Senator Claude Pepper. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and 

Archives of Florida)
24 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Map showing the Jacksonville District’s initial comprehensive proposal, 1947. (Claude Pepper Collection, Claude Pepper Library, Florida State University, 

Tallahassee, Florida)
Chapter Two | Federal Intervention 25

flood control problems, Wheeler noted, meant that the Jacksonville 

District would devote much of its resources to complete an overall study and submit it to Congress “early in the coming calendar 

year.” Wheeler told Pepper that the Corps already had enough congressional authorizations for “examinations, surveys and reports 

on individual streams and canals” to allow it to conduct a comprehensive study without additional legislation, meaning that the 

Corps could proceed immediately.30

In its preparation of the flood control plan, the Jacksonville 

District, led by District Engineer Colonel Willis Teale, held public 

hearings where local agencies and the general public relayed their 

wants and needs. Most of the comments in these meetings echoed 

Pepper’s claims that uncoordinated local efforts in the past had failed 

to solve any of the region’s water problems and that a comprehensive 

plan was “the only possible solution.”31 Listening to these concerns, 

Teale and the Jacksonville District formulated a plan recognizing 

that flood protection, drainage, and water control were all interrelated problems in South Florida. According to a Corps press release, 

the program

contemplates the protection of 1,000 square miles of 

rich agricultural muck land immediately south of Lake 

Okeechobee, improvement of water control in large conservation areas outlined by local interests, and providing 

the coastal cities with protection from floodwaters from 

the Everglades by impounding such waters within water 

conservation areas, encircled by levees large enough to retain all of the water entering them during a period of severe 

rainfall such as has been experienced this year.

Teale explained that the Corps had developed this plan through 

ongoing field surveys and office studies, as well as through consultations with “various federal, state and local interests.”32 These included officers of the U.S. Sugar Corporation, the Palm Beach County 

Water Resources Board, Osceola Groves, and the Florida Division of 

Water Surveys and Research.33

Another important resource was the Soil Conservation Service. 

Because of the soil subsidence and muckburning problems in the 

Everglades, the Service had conducted numerous surveys, including those involving topography, subsurface rock strata, soil classification, and hydraulics. The studies, which were ongoing, had 

convinced Service officials that much of the Everglades could be 

“soundly developed for agricultural use,” although specific areas, as 

explained above, were more fitting for water conservation.34

Essentially, Teale took the Corps’ own studies of the Everglades 

and Lake Okeechobee and coupled them with the Soil Conservation 

Service’s report in order to develop a flood control and water supply program that proposed to solve all of South Florida’s flooding, 

saltwater intrusion, and soil subsidence concerns. On 2 November 

1947—only a couple of weeks after the second hurricane had hit 

Florida and only five days after Pepper had requested a comprehensive plan—the Jacksonville District issued a press release delineating 

its preliminary proposal. This included the Corps’ plan for the Everglades, as well as flood control structures within the Kissimmee and 

Upper St. Johns river basins (projects that were still tentative pending further District studies). In an innovative manner, given that the 

study of ecosystems and ecology had still not gained a wide audience 

in the United States, the District, influenced by the ideas of personnel in the Soil Conservation Service, declared that it would treat the 

whole area, from the Kissimmee headwaters to south of Miami, as 

“one watershed,” or, essentially, as one ecosystem.35

The press release left no doubt that, despite some attempts to 

control soil subsidence and saltwater intrusion, the proposal was 

primarily a flood control plan that would protect the east coast and 

allow for “a sound program of expansion of agricultural activities.” 

Yet the Corps also promised “improvement of conditions favorable 

to the propagation and maintenance of fish and wildlife within the 

conservation areas.” Accordingly, the plan provided for the construction of levees and canals protecting and draining a 1,000 square mile 

area “suitable for long-term agricultural use,” as well as structures 

discharging floodwater into water conservation areas for the protection of coastal cities such as Miami and West Palm Beach. The Corps 

still had to conduct economic studies of the plan, the press release 

explained, as well as more intensive surveys of the Central Florida 

region, but the core of the program was in place.36

Over the next several weeks, Teale, Holland, and Pepper held 

several public hearings with local interests to hear their comments 

about the plan. Although some flood control districts wanted an additional control canal to extend from Lake Okeechobee to alleviate 

high waters, few interests, if any, expressed any anxiety about the 

plan’s effects on Everglades National Park.37 Instead, most merely 

wanted something in place to safeguard South Florida from future 

floods. Pepper and Holland received numerous statements supporting the proposed program, and promised to keep in close contact 

with the Corps throughout the plan’s preparation.38

Based on this feedback, Teale revised the tentative plan and issued the Jacksonville District’s final report in December. Although 

not significantly different from the program delineated in the November press release, especially in its focus on flood prevention 

(which, of course, was what most Floridians wanted), the December 

version was more complex, delineating measures to relieve saltwater 

intrusion and water supply problems. Teale noted that the program 

would be executed over a wide area in Central and South Florida, 

including the Upper St. Johns River, the Kissimmee River Basin, 

Lake Okeechobee and its outlets, the Everglades itself (defined as 

a 40-mile-wide “grassy marsh” extending 100 miles from Lake 

Okeechobee to the South Florida coast), and coastal areas in Palm 

Beach, Broward, and Dade counties.39
26 United States Army Corps of Engineers

According to Teale, who, again, was influenced by studies conducted by the Soil Conservation Service, the general problem affecting those areas was that drainage had “altered the natural balance 

between water and soil,” causing “parched prairies and burning 

mucklands,” saltwater intrusion, and flooding. A restoration of the 

“natural balance between soil and water” was necessary, and this 

could be accomplished through three means: flood control, water 

control, and water conservation.40 Water conservation was especially 

key because the development of storage areas could prevent flooding 

and secure a more reliable supply for municipalities, agriculture, and 

the wildlife and plants within the Everglades. As later explained by 

Chief of Engineers Wheeler, the plan, which was for “flood protection, water control, and allied purposes,” would eliminate flooding 

by removing water in wet seasons and storing it for use during dry 

periods. It would also control water levels to benefit agriculture and 

municipal water supplies.41

Recognizing that Everglades National Park had only been established the year before, Teale and the Jacksonville District also proclaimed that the “preservation of fish and wildlife” was an important 

element of the plan. Teale noted that South Florida had served in the 

past as “one of the greatest natural habitats for fish, birds, and game 

on the North American Continent,” yet now, many of these species 

were “virtually extinct.” The Corps had therefore consulted with the 

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to allow “full consideration” of fish 

and wildlife objectives in the comprehensive plan.42

In fulfill the various desired objectives, Teale made recommendations for each area covered by the project. For the Kissimmee River 

Basin, Teale proposed that the Corps turn several lakes into storage 

basins for flood control, conservation, and water supply, building levees and control structures around them. The Kissimmee River itself 

would also be enlarged. Teale suggested that projects be commenced 

in the Lake Okeechobee/Everglades area, including enlarging the St. 

Lucie Canal and the Caloosahatchee River for better water control, 

and extending the levee around the lake from the St. Lucie Canal 

northward, tying it into the north shore levee. He proposed that 

another levee be built on the northwestern shore of the lake, and 

possibly another outlet canal as well. To provide flood protection to 

agricultural lands in the upper Everglades, Teale recommended the 

construction of a levee around the 1,027-square-mile region, as well 

as “a canal network connected to eight pumping stations on the perimeter of the system.”43

Following the EDD’s suggestion, Teale also proposed that large 

parts of the Everglades be held as three water conservation areas, 

totaling 1,500 square miles in Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach counties.44 As recommended by Teale, the conservation areas would be 

larger than those outlined by Johnson, but they would serve important functions. The pumping stations proposed for the agricultural 

areas, for example, could divert water into the conservation areas in 

times of excess rain, and could extract water in the same way during drought. Impounding water in the conservation areas would also 

prevent flooding in coastal cities, and the stored water could be used 

to “raise the ground-water table and improve water supply for the 

east-coast communities, ameliorate salt-water intrusion in the eastcoast water supply well fields and streams, and benefit fish and wildlife in the Everglades.” Teale proposed that the conservation areas be 

created by building levees from the West Palm Beach Canal south to 

the Tamiami Trail. The levee system would then follow the Tamiami 

Trail westward to the Collier County line, and then turn north where 

it would tie into the west rim levee blocking off the agricultural area 

south of Lake Okeechobee. Other levees would be built along the 

Hillsboro and North New River canals to divide the conservation 

areas into three sections.45

There were other features to the program, such as improving 

existing canals and building control structures on waterways within 

Dade County for flood control and to prevent saltwater intrusion, 

but these were the essential features of the Corps’ plan. Yet the proposal was vague on how it would allow for fish and wildlife preservation, even though the Corps considered this an “important feature” 

of the project. Outside of the conservation areas, which would allow 

for the protection of “large parts of the Everglades” and the “preservation of wildlife,” the plan offered no firm proposals for how the 

project could benefit fish and wildlife. Regardless, Teale estimated 

that the program would cost $208 million, with an annual operation 

and maintenance charge of $3.7 million. He recommended that local interests pay $29 million of the total cost, including 15 percent 

of all construction charges, and that the state establish an agency to 

coordinate the program locally.46

On 31 December 1947, South Atlantic Division Engineer Colonel Mason J. Young concurred with Teale’s report, although he admitted that “since construction of the comprehensive project will 

take place over an extended period, many features of the plan will 

require further detailed study prior to the initiation of construction.” 

He also emphasized that “if the coastal and Everglades sections of 

south Florida are to continue to prosper and develop, conservation of 

their water resources is as important and urgent” as flood control and 

drainage. Young foresaw increasing demands on water in South Florida, and he insisted that the Corps make adequate provision in the 

planning process to store water “to the maximum practicable limit.”47

After gaining Young’s approval, the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors reviewed the report. During its deliberations, which 

included a public hearing on the plan, the board encountered some 

opposition; a few interests, such as the U.S. Sugar Corporation and 

the EDD, criticized parts of the plan. The board of commissioners of 

the EDD, for example, complained about the size of the water conservation areas, fearing that landowners in Palm Beach, Broward, 

and Dade counties would object to the impoundment of so much 

land. However, the EDD emphasized that it endorsed the program as 

a whole, believing that it was a sound plan for water management.48
Chapter Two | Federal Intervention 27

Others voiced concern that the project would take too long to 

provide flood protection. These feelings were heightened in the first 

months of 1948 because of the continued saturation of the ground in 

South Florida and the high levels of Lake Okeechobee. To alleviate 

some of these concerns, the Board of Engineers recommended that 

initial construction begin with those structures that would protect 

the coastal cities and the agricultural area south of Lake Okeechobee, 

as well as whatever works were necessary to control the level of the 

lake. However, the board also suggested that the Jacksonville District examine the plan prior to construction “in cooperation with 

a responsible local or State agency” and make any feasible changes 

that did not “adversely [a]ffect the principal objectives of the plan.”49

With the Board of Engineers’ approval, the report went to Chief 

of Engineers Wheeler. Characterizing the plan as providing the works 

necessary “to prevent a repetition of recent destructive flooding” and 

“to stabilize the present agricultural economy of the region,” Wheeler 

endorsed the project and recommended that it be presented to Congress.50 He also suggested that Congress provide an appropriation of 

$70 million so that the Corps could begin the first phase.

Although the $208 million total cost of the project and the initial 

$70 million appropriation was a considerable sum of money, especially in the 1940s, it was not as much as the federal government had 

spent on other projects. In 1928, for example, Congress authorized 

$325 million for the Corps to conduct flood control efforts on the 

Mississippi River from Cairo, Illinois, south to the Gulf of Mexico. 

This was a much larger region than the South Florida flood control 

project would cover, but it still was a significant expense, especially 

considering that the total federal budget in 1930 only was $3.3 billion. According to historian Martin Reuss, “no other water project 

involved as great a percentage of the federal budget at the time of 

its authorization as did Mississippi valley flood control.”51 In comparison, the Corps asked Congress for less money for South Florida 

flood control, although, admittedly, the area was a great deal smaller 

and was confined to one state.

Before Congress received the report, the U.S. Department of 

the Interior submitted its comments on the plan. Assistant Secretary 

of the Interior William Warne explained that coordination with the 

Corps was essential because the project would affect the work of several Interior agencies, including the National Park Service (NPS), the 

Bureau of Indian Affairs, the USGS, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 

Service (FWS). Perhaps recognizing the plan’s vagueness regarding 

fish and wildlife propagation, Warne noted that the NPS was especially concerned about how the project would affect Everglades National 

Park and its resources because the park was formed specifically to 

preserve flora and fauna. Because the park’s dedication had occurred 

only recently, the NPS had not conducted any studies on the possible 

effects, whether beneficial or harmful, of the proposed plan. Its major 

worry, Warne explicated, was whether the Corps could guarantee an 

adequate water supply for the park, especially to prevent saltwater encroachment and “disastrous fires” in “the hazardous season between 

October and May.” In its proposal, Warne explained, the Corps never 

discussed “what definite regulations would be promulgated to insure 

the release of such waters,” nor did it outline what specific structures 

were needed to facilitate water releases to the park. Warne also recommended that park and Corps officials develop “the details of the 

plan” to guarantee that the park’s “unique” ecological resources were 

preserved in their “natural state.”52

The preliminary nature of data also tempered the FWS’s overall commendation of the project. Its main conclusion was that if the 

project truly provided “adequate restoration and control of water 

levels in a large part of the Everglades,” it would “generally improve” 

fish and wildlife conditions, especially if state or federal authorities 

Cover of House Document 643.
28 United States Army Corps of Engineers

operated the water conservation areas for fish and wildlife benefits.53

But Warne emphasized that “loss of certain unique wildlife habitats” 

would result as well. The Corps’ overall proposal “considers fish and 

wildlife as adequately as it can in light of the preliminary nature of the 

Service’s findings,” Warne explained, but the FWS still needed to coordinate closely with the Corps throughout project planning “to insure 

minimum damage to, and maximum benefits for, wildlife resources.”54

The Corps responded to these concerns by assuring the Interior 

Department that it would remain in close contact with the pertinent 

agencies. Yet many Floridians were more concerned about receiving adequate flood control than they were with fish and wildlife issues, especially because saturated land and high water conditions in 

the spring of 1948 raised the specter of more flooding. According to 

Senator Holland, these conditions forced South Florida residents “to 

look ahead to next fall with great apprehension,” leading Holland to 

place all of his efforts on getting the Corps project passed. “I shall 

continue to do everything in my power to get it enacted with the 

greatest possible speed,” he declared, “and then to get the large appropriations which are required so that work can be started.”55

Such assurances were comforting to South Florida residents, but 

some still decided to take matters into their own hands. One way that 

they tried to foster support for flood control was by putting together 

a book of photographs of the 1947 flood, a proposal first floated to 

Claude Pepper by the Atlantic and Gulf Canals Association, Inc. 

Fearing that Congress would not approve the necessary appropriations for the comprehensive program, the association recommended 

that it compile 150 photographs of flood conditions and publish “a 

booklet containing news stories from over the 11 counties with illustrations” that could be given to Florida’s congressional delegation, 

the Corps, and “each member of the Congress.”56 The Palm Beach 

County Resources Development Board, the EDD, and the counties 

of Palm Beach, Broward, and Dade brought this idea to fruition, issuing a book that included a startling front-cover picture of a crying 

cow standing shoulder deep in water. The document soon became 

known as the “Weeping Cow” book, and, according to Lamar Johnson, it was “an indication of the concerted effort of the citizens of the 

area to promote the flood control project.”57

Acting on these sentiments, and having remained in close contact with Corps officials as Teale’s report made its way through the 

necessary channels, Holland and Pepper introduced a bill into the 

U.S. Senate in May 1948 to authorize the comprehensive water control project. The bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Flood 

Control and Improvement of Rivers and Harbors of the Committee 

on Public Works, and on 12 May 1948, the subcommittee began 

hearings. In order to expedite the authorization of the project, Florida’s delegation presented a united front during the meetings, with 

Holland largely orchestrating the testimony that was presented. 

“The delegation is standing entirely together on this,” Holland related. “Even those from the districts not directly affected are familiar with the plight which is the plight of the State, and, we think, of 

the Nation.”58 Dwight L. Rogers, one of Florida’s representatives to 

Congress, agreed. “There is absolutely no dissension,” he declared. 

“We are all united, State, Federal, and everyone else down there.”59

The testimony in the hearings almost solely focused on the 

flood control and water supply benefits were of the project. Almost 

all of the witnesses discussed the devastating damage of the 1947 

flood and the necessity of preventing such a disaster from happening again. Moreover, the agricultural production of the region was 

emphasized repeatedly in order to convince senators that protection 

was necessary. There was little mention of the effects of the project 

on the South Florida ecosystem, outside of declarations that the water conservation areas would provide benefits to fish and wildlife. 

The only person in the hearings speaking solely as a representative of 

plant and wildlife interests was Eustace L. Adams, who represented 

the Dade County Conservation Council and the Florida Wildlife 

Federation; no officials from Everglades National Park, the FWS, 

or even the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission testified. It is unclear why this oversight occurred, but District Engineer 

Colonel R. W. Pearson of the Jacksonville District later claimed that 

it stemmed from the lethargy of the interested agencies. He accused 

the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, for example, of 

evincing “a considerable lack of interest in the project” during these 

formative stages.60

Regardless, the strong united front presented by Florida’s congressional delegation convinced the Senate to include the project in 

its Flood Control Act of 1948, naming it the Central and Southern 

Florida Flood Control Project (C&SF Project). After some wrangling 

Cover of the “Weeping Cow” book. (South Florida Water Management 

District)
Chapter Two | Federal Intervention 29

in the House of Representatives over the appropriation amount, the 

House passed the bill and President Truman signed it on 30 June, 

thereby authorizing $70 million to be expended on the first phase of 

the project.61 This initial segment would include building levees and 

other flood control works to protect the east coast communities from 

flooding, and constructing structures to control Lake Okeechobee 

levels and to protect agriculture south of Lake Okeechobee. With the 

legislation passed, the next step was for the state to find a way to raise 

its share of the construction cost and to determine what local agency 

would cooperate with the Corps in the building and operation of 

the project. “It certainly is a source of joy to me that we have made a 

constructive start on the flood control program,” Holland reported, 

“and I hope that we may continue to work with the complete unity 

which has manifested itself so far.”62

The cooperation between the Corps, local and state agencies, 

and the federal government throughout the preparation of the flood 

control plan was remarkable, especially when compared to the development of a $325 million flood control project in 1927 and 1928 

for the Mississippi River. That process was marked by political wrangling, jurisdictional disputes, and discord between Congress and 

President Calvin Coolidge. The development of South Florida’s plan 

was not nearly as contentious for several reasons. For one, the Florida project involved only one state, rather than the multiple entities 

crossed by the Mississippi River. Among other things, this meant 

that Florida’s plan did not receive the kind of national attention that 

the Mississippi River project garnered. For another, the overwhelming desire of most Floridians for some form of immediate flood protection necessitated that the Corps use all of the resources available 

to it in order to piece together a plan that could be passed as quickly 

as possible. Finally, Floridians were willing to pay part of the cost of 

the plan as necessitated by Congress, whereas local interests around 

the Mississippi River were more reluctant to share any costs.63

 With the authorization of the C&SF Project, the state of Florida 

finally had a program that promised to eliminate the flood and water 

supply problems of South Florida. Because of the imbalance of water that drainage created, the region faced either too much water, as 

evidenced by the flood of 1947, or too little of the resource, as shown 

by the fires, soil subsidence, and saltwater intrusion problems that 

plagued the area. To resolve these issues, the Corps developed a plan 

that would prevent flooding in coastal cities and in the agricultural 

land south of Lake Okeechobee, while also providing conservation 

areas for water storage and fish and wildlife habitat. With almost 

universal approval in Florida, the plan seemed to be the solution to 

South Florida’s water woes and the mechanism by which increased 

settlement in the area could occur.

Yet there were slight discolorations in this seemingly beautiful 

picture, blotches that in time would stain the entire canvas. It was 

clear both from the Corps’ proposal and from testimony before Congress that, although fish and wildlife preservation was regarded as an 

“important feature” of the project, flood control and water supply 

were the biggest concerns of most Floridians. The U.S. Department 

of the Interior, the NPS, and the FWS all claimed that fish and wildlife preservation had to take a prominent position in the project’s 

operation, but the vagueness of the plan on how it would aid fish and 

wildlife, coupled with the clamor for flood protection and water supply, virtually guaranteed that fish and wildlife interests would take 

a backseat. This made Interior officials nervous about the project, 

but the looming fear of flooding felt by most Floridians steamrolled 

these concerns and created a groundswell of support for the project 

that Congress could not ignore. Even Marjory Stoneman Douglas, 

who had decried the destruction of the Everglades, believed that the 

Corps was on the right track. Because of the project, she wrote, “the 

rich earth will be saved” and “the vast supply of wonderful water 

will be controlled and used to their utmost needs by the people of 

Florida and their unborn generations to come.”64 The ensuing decades would, in some fashion, fulfill her prediction, but, in the eyes 

of many critics, only by manipulating and damaging the already-imperiled and over-engineered flora and fauna of the Everglades.

Endnotes

1 McCally, The Everglades, 142.

2 John Chapman Hilder, “America’s Last Wilderness: The Florida Everglades Are Going Dry,” World’s Work 60 (February 1931): 56.

3 Robert McCormick, “Lavish Land,” Collier’s 110 (8 August 1942): 66.

4 McCally, The Everglades, 145-146.

5 Dr. R. V. Allison, “The Soil and Water Conservation Problem in the 

Everglades,” Soil Science Society of Florida Proceedings 1 (1939): 35-42; McCally, The Everglades, 147. This was not the first time that Allison had advocated these ideas. He had declared as early as 1928 that overdrainage caused 

more problems than underdrainage, and had told the Florida State Horticultural Society that year that muck fires could be stopped by storing water on 

undrained areas. Dovell, “A History of the Everglades of Florida,” 559-560.

6 H. A. Bestor, “Reclamation Problems of Sub-Drainage Districts Adjacent to Lake Okeechobee,” Soil Science Society of Florida Proceedings 5-A 

(1943): 164.

7 Florida State Board of Conservation, Fourth Biennial Report, Biennium Ending December 31, 1940 (Tallahassee: Florida State Board of Conservation, 1941), 55; see also McCally, The Everglades, 146.

8 Garald G. Parker, G. E. Ferguson, S. K. Love, et al., Water Resources of 

Southeastern Florida with Special Reference to the Geology and Ground Water 

of the Miami Area, U.S. Geological Survey Water Supply Paper 1255 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955); McCally, The Everglades, 

146; Grunwald, The Swamp, 203-204.

9 Jack E. Davis, “‘Conservation is Now a Dead Word’: Marjory Stoneman Douglas and the Transformation of American Environmentalism,” 

Environmental History 8 (January 2003): 53-61. For an excellent biography 

of Douglas, see Jack E. Davis, An Everglades Providence: Marjory Stoneman 

Douglas and the American Environmental Century (Athens: The University 

of Georgia Press, 2009).

10 Douglas, The Everglades, 349-350.
30 United States Army Corps of Engineers

11 Douglas, The Everglades, 383.

12 Marjory Stoneman Douglas, “What Are They Doing To The Everglades?” 8, at Library of Congress, “Reclaiming the Everglades: South 

Florida’s Natural History, 1884-1934” <http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/

award98/fmuhtml/everhome.html> (3 December 2004).

13 House, Comprehensive Report on Central and Southern Florida for 

Flood Control and Other Purposes, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948, H. Doc. 643, 

Serial 11243, 30. 

14 Johnson, Beyond the Fourth Generation, 85.

15 Douglas, “What Are They Doing To The Everglades?” 8.

16 Johnson, Beyond the Fourth Generation, 174-175; Blake, Land Into 

Water, 175.

17 Quotation in Johnson, Beyond the Fourth Generation, 155-256, 177-

179; see also Blake, Land Into Water, 175-176.

18 A. G. Matthews, Chief Engineer, to Hon. George W. Malone, 19 May 

1948, in Senate Committee on Public Works Subcommittee, Rivers and Harbors—Flood Control Emergency Act: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the 

Committee on Public Works, United States Senate, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948, 

269.

19 Matthews to Malone, 19 May 1948; Hanna and Hanna, Lake 

Okeechobee: Wellspring of the Everglades, 278-304; House, Comprehensive 

Report on Central and Southern Florida for Flood Control and Other Purposes, 8, 19-21; Vileisis, Discovering the Unknown Landscape, 174.

20 Johnson, Beyond the Fourth Generation, 139.

21 House, Comprehensive Report on Central and Southern Florida for 

Flood Control and Other Purposes, 2.

22 Johnson, Beyond the Fourth Generation, 135-136; Blake, Land Into 

Water, 176.

23 George Wedgworth and Barbara Miedema interview by Matthew 

Godfrey, Belle Glade, Florida, 9 July 2004 [hereafter referred to as Wedgworth and Miedema interview].

24 Quotation in Johnson, Beyond the Fourth Generation, 139-140; see 

also Blake, Land Into Water, 176-177; Grunwald, The Swamp, 219.

25 Senate Committee on Public Works Subcommittee, Rivers and Harbors—Flood Control Emergency Act, 141-142.

26 Johnson, Beyond the Fourth Generation, 145.

27 Irene B. Burnham, Corresponding Secretary, Soroptimist Club of 

the Palm Beaches, to Spessard L. Holland, Senator, 12 November 1947, File 

Flood Control (Oct.-Dec. 1947), Box 287, Spessard L. Holland Papers. Manuscript Series 55, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers 

Library (East), University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida [hereafter referred 

to as Holland Papers].

28 Resolution No. 406, 12 November 1947, File Flood Control (Oct.-

Dec. 1947), Box 287, Holland Papers.

29 Claude Pepper to Lt General R. A. Wheeler, Chief of Engineers, 28 

October 1947, Folder 11, Box 33, Series 201, U.S. Senate Correspondence, 

Claude Pepper Collection, Claude Pepper Library, Florida State University, 

Tallahassee, Florida [hereafter referred to as Pepper Collection].

30 Lieutenant General R. A. Wheeler, Chief of Engineers, to Honorable Claude Pepper, 3 November 1947, Folder 11, Box 33, Series 201, Pepper 

Collection.

31 House Committee on Public Works, Central and Southern Florida 

Flood Control Project, report prepared by the Library of Congress, 84th Congress, 2d session, 1956, Committee Print 23, 6.

32 Press Release, Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, Fla., District, 2 November 1947, Folder 11, Box 33, Series 201, Pepper Collection.

33 See, for example, Colonel Willis E. Teale, District Engineer, to Honorable Claude Pepper, United States Senate, 22 April 1947, Folder 11, Box 

33, Series 201, Pepper Collection.

34 H. H. Bennett, Chief, Soil Conservation Service, United States Department of Agriculture, to Hon. Claude Pepper, United States Senate, 9 

September 1947, Folder 11, Box 33, Series 201, Pepper Collection.

35 Press Release, Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, Fla., District, 2 November 1947.

36 All quotations in Press Release, Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, 

Fla., District, 2 November 1947.

37 See Pelican Lake Sub-Drainage District, et al., to Honorable Claude 

Pepper, United States Senate, et al., 13 November 1947, Folder 11, Box 33, 

Series 201, Pepper Collection.

38 See “Notes Covering Meeting Held at the El Comodoro Hotel, Miami, December 7, 10 A.M.—1 P.M.,” Folder 11, Box 33, Series 201, Pepper 

Collection.

39 Quotations in House, Comprehensive Report on Central and Southern 

Florida for Flood Control and Other Purposes, 15-18, 56-58; see also Hanna 

and Hanna, Lake Okeechobee: Wellspring of the Everglades, 352. For an example of a study conducted before 1947, see House, Caloosahatchee River 

and Lake Okeechobee Drainage Areas, Florida (Side Channels), 79th Cong., 

2d sess., 1947, H. Doc. 736, Serial 11059.

40 House, Comprehensive Report on Central and Southern Florida for 

Flood Control and Other Purposes, 32-35.

41 R. A. Wheeler, Lieutenant General, Chief of Engineers, to The Secretary of the Army, February 19, 1948, in House, Comprehensive Report on 

Central and Southern Florida for Flood Control and Other Purposes, 2. A 

paper written by Harold A. Scott, Chief of the Planning and Reports Branch 

of the Jacksonville District, in 1951, stated that the major purposes of the 

project were to protect the agricultural area and east coast communities 

from flooding. “Distribution of Water in the Central and Southern Florida 

Project,” 26 September 1951, 2, South Florida Water Management District 

Reference Center, West Palm Beach, Florida.

42 House, Comprehensive Report on Central and Southern Florida for 

Flood Control and Other Purposes, 36.

43 House, Comprehensive Report on Central and Southern Florida for 

Flood Control and Other Purposes, 38-42.

44 Despite Johnson’s bleak opinion about Florida referenda, residents of 

Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach counties, convinced by the devastation of 

the floods, had ratified establishment of the water conservation areas late in 

1947. Blake, Land Into Water, 177.

45 House, Comprehensive Report on Central and Southern Florida for 

Flood Control and Other Purposes, 42-43.

46 House, Comprehensive Report on Central and Southern Florida for 

Flood Control and Other Purposes, 44, 46-54 (quotation on p. 36).

47 Colonel Mason J. Young, Corps of Engineers, Division Engineer, to 

the Chief of Engineers, United States Army, 31 December 1947, in House, 

Comprehensive Report on Central and Southern Florida for Flood Control 

and Other Purposes, 59-60.

48 Board of Commissioners of Everglades Drainage District by W. D. 

Hilsabeck, Chairman, to Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, 27 

January 1948, File Flood Control Permanent (January 1948), Box 287, Holland Papers

49 R. C. Crawford, Major General, Senior Member, to The Chief of Engineers, 9 February 1948, in House, Comprehensive Report on Central and 

Southern Florida for Flood Control and Other Purposes, 11-12.
Chapter Two | Federal Intervention 31

50 Wheeler to The Secretary of the Army, in House, Comprehensive Report on Central and Southern Florida for Flood Control and Other Purposes, 

1-5.

51 Reuss, Designing the Bayous, 111, 121.

52 William G. Warne, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, to Lt. Gen. 

R. A. Wheeler, 13 April 1948, in House, Comprehensive Report on Central 

and Southern Florida for Flood Control and Other Purposes, vii. Likewise, in 

January, Daniel Beard, superintendent of the park, had conveyed to Teale his 

understanding that “future [Corps] studies will give full consideration to the 

interest of the Everglades National Park and that the water problem in the 

park area will be a subject of cooperative study.” Beard to The District Engineer, 28 January 1948, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Proj Genl—Flood Control 

(May 49-July 49), Box 8, Accession No. 077-01-0023, RG 77, Records of the 

Office of the Chief of Engineers, Federal Records Center, Atlanta, Georgia 

[hereafter referred to as FRC].

53 United States Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, 

Region 4, “A Preliminary Evaluation Report of the Effects on Fish and Wildlife Resources on the Everglade Drainage and Flood Control Project, Palm 

Beach, Broward, and Dade Counties, Florida,” October 1947, 1, 18-19, copy 

in Library, Jacksonville District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, 

Florida; see also Willis E. Teale, Colonel, Corps of Engineers, District Engineer, to The Regional Director, Fish and Wildlife Service, 21 November 

1947, File A—Policy Action Taken by Corps of Engineers, Box 3, Entry 

57A0179, Wetlands, 1944-1956, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Atlanta Regional Office, Office of River Basin Studies, RG 22, Records of the U.S. Fish 

and Wildlife Service, National Archives and Records Administration Southeast Region, Atlanta, Georgia.

54 Warne to Wheeler, 13 April 1948.

55 Spessard L. Holland to Honorable Edwin A. Menninger, Publisher, The Stuart News, 10 March 1948, File Flood Control Permanent (Feb. 

16-March 31, 1948), Box 287, Holland Papers. Apparently, the hurricanes 

had changed Holland’s view of flood control. In 1947, EDD engineer Lamar 

Johnson had enlisted Holland’s aid to get an appropriation for flood control. 

At that time, Johnson reported, Holland “figuratively jumped on me with 

both feet. He told me that I had no business in Washington and that I should 

take my problem to [Chief of Engineers] Colonel Jewett.” Johnson, Beyond 

the Fourth Generation, 158.

56 Atlantic Gulf Canals Association Inc. to Hon. Claude Pepper, Senate 

Office Building, 7 November 1947, Folder 11, Box 33, Series 201, Pepper 

Collection.

57 Johnson, Beyond the Fourth Generation, 160.

58 Senate Committee on Public Works Subcommittee, Rivers and Harbors—Flood Control Emergency Act, 144. 

59 Senate Committee on Public Works Subcommittee, Rivers and Harbors—Flood Control Emergency Act, 165. 

60 Quotation in Pearson to Colonel B. L. Robinson, Corps of Engineers, 

U.S. Army, South Atlantic Division, 21 August 1950, File 1110-2-1150a 

(C&SF) Proj Genl—Flood Control (May 50-Aug 50), Box 9, Accession No. 

077-01-0023, RG 77, FRC; see also Senate Committee on Public Works Subcommittee, Rivers and Harbors—Flood Control Emergency Act, 183-184, 

216-217, 249. Interestingly, the NPS initially proposed that the law authorizing the C&SF Project be amended to state that no work could occur that 

would affect Everglades National Park until the director of the NPS and the 

Chief of Engineers had established a mutually agreeable plan of operation. 

It dropped its request a few weeks later after Corps leaders assured it “that 

any plan of flood control will be taken up with us insofar as it may affect the 

Everglades National Park.” “Chronological Documentation of National Park 

Service Efforts and Corps of Engineers Responsibility to Assure Everglades 

National Park of Fresh Water Supply from Central and Southern Florida 

Flood Control Project,” 5, File CE-SE Central and Southern Florida FCP 

Everglades National Park Basic Data, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Vero 

Beach administrative records [hereafter referred to as FWSVBAR]. 

61 Act of 30 June 1948 (62 Stat. 1171, 1176).

62 Spessard L. Holland to Honorable Ray Iverson, 23 June 1948, File 

Flood Control Permanent (May-June 1948), Box 287, Holland Papers.

63 For more information on the development of the Mississippi River 

and Tributaries Project, see Charles A. Camillo and Matthew T. Pearcy, 

Upon Their Shoulders: A History of the Mississippi River Commission from Its 

Inception Through the Advent of the Modern Mississippi River and Tributaries Project (Vicksburg, Ms.: Mississippi River Commission, 2004), 141-172.

64 Douglas, “What Are They Doing To The Everglades?” 12.

33

The inclusion of the C&SF Project in the Flood Control Act of 

1948 was the first step in the implementation of a water management 

program in South Florida. Throughout the 1950s, the state of Florida, 

the newly created Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District (FCD), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers worked together 

to construct and operate the project works. The Corps and the FCD 

attempted to coordinate the project with interested federal, state, 

and local agencies, but by the end of the 1950s, it was clear that these 

entities all had different views as to how water should be distributed 

in South Florida. Agriculturists wanted water for their crops, while 

rapidly growing urban interests demanded water as well. Everglades 

National Park and FWS officials, meanwhile, claimed that the Corps 

needed to provide them with enough water to preserve plants, fish, 

and wildlife in the Everglades and other areas. By the end of the 

1950s, the collision of these different demands seemed inevitable.

In order for work to commence on the C&SF Project in the late 

1940s, the state of Florida needed to raise around $3.25 million, its 

share of the construction cost of the first phase, as well as acquire 

the necessary lands and rights-of-way. Unfortunately, the federal law 

mandating these responsibilities (the Flood Control Act of 1948) 

was passed nine months before the state legislature was scheduled 

to meet, meaning that no action could be taken to fulfill these duties in 1948. In preparation for the 1949 legislative session, Governor Millard Caldwell established a committee to investigate what tax 

revenues could support the flood control plan, while other officials 

explored the creation of a new state agency to cooperate with the 

Corps in project implementation. The Okeechobee Flood Control 

District and the Everglades Drainage District (EDD) still existed, but 

the EDD did not have authority to operate for flood control and the 

Chapter 3

Okeechobee district had jurisdiction over a limited area. According 

to Lamar Johnson, engineer for the EDD, several individuals, including himself, drafted bills to establish a local cooperating agency. The 

EDD also kept in close contact with the Corps during this period, 

receiving and clarifying information pertaining to local cooperation, 

and compiling engineering data in preparation for the beginning of 

construction.1

In April 1949, the Florida state legislature convened, passing 

three bills that pertained to state involvement in the C&SF Project. 

The first established the FCD as the major local agency to coordinate 

with the Corps on the project, replacing the Okeechobee Flood Control District. The second provided for the abolishment of the EDD 

after it had paid off its bonds, giving its responsibilities to the FCD. 

The third was the state’s General Appropriations Act, which included 

$3.25 million as the local share of the cost of the C&SF Project.2

The legislation authorizing the FCD established a five-member, 

non-salaried board, appointed by the governor for three-year overlapping terms, as the district’s governing body. This board would 

have “full responsibility for the District’s activities and interests.”3

One member of the board would become the executive director, 

who would serve with the executive staff, which included the heads 

of seven different divisions within the district: land, operation and 

maintenance, finance, engineering, public information and research, 

administration, and legal. Soon after the legislature created the FCD, 

the five appointed board members—Dave Turner, Fred Bartleson, 

Joe S. Earman, N. J. Hayes, and Lawrence Rogers—organized the 

district officially, designating Turner as executive director. The board 

also established its headquarters at West Palm Beach. As created, the 

FCD encompassed all or part of 17 counties in Central and South 

Balancing Demands: Implementing the Central and 

Southern Florida Flood Control Project, 1949–1960
34 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Boundaries of the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District. Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District, Facts about F.C.D. (West 

Palm Beach, Fla.: Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District, 1955)
Chapter Three | Balancing Demands 35

Florida, totaling 15,570 square miles. Its major responsibilities, according to a 1955 publication, was “cooperative participation in the 

advancement of studies design and construction” of the C&SF Project, as well as land acquisition, water control, and regulation once 

the system was developed.4

At a subsequent meeting attended by numerous state officials 

and legislators, W. Turner Wallis, appointed as chief engineer of the 

district, expounded on the FCD’s functions. Essentially, he said, the 

FCD was “a cooperative agency between the State and the Federal 

Government and local interests in projects concerned with water 

conservation, flood and water control, and allied problems.” John C. 

Stephens, a research project supervisor with the Soil Conservation 

Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, explained how the 

FCD coordinated with these interests. According to Stephens, the 

FCD held regular meetings with Corps engineers during the planning stages of C&SF project works, providing “basic data on economic, social, and physical factors essential to project development.” 

The FCD received these data by “maintain[ing] close liaison with all 

agencies—Federal, State, and local—having an interest in problems 

of water conservation and control and natural resource developments.”5

 These included the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the U.S. 

Geological Survey, the FWS, the Florida Geological Survey, the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, and the State Board of 

Conservation, among others. The FCD also held meetings with land 

action groups, county commissioners, subdrainage districts, and 

landowners in order to understand what local interests wanted from 

the project, and then presented these views to the Corps. After the 

Corps made its final construction plans, the FCD reviewed the proposals before they were sent out to bid, and then it worked to obtain 

necessary property and rights-of-way for construction.6

In order to perform these functions, the FCD needed money 

from the state, including the funds necessary to cover the state’s required contribution to the total cost of the project, and the financing 

to purchase lands and to provide operation and maintenance once 

the project was completed. The state legislature had created a flood 

control account in its general revenue fund, and had agreed to make 

occasional appropriations to the account, including the initial $3.25 

million required for construction. Other charges, such as for rightof-way purchases and for operation and maintenance, would come 

from an ad valorem tax on all real and personal property in the FCD, 

whereby the amount paid would depend on the value of the property. This meant that landowners in Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach 

counties would be responsible for 95 percent of the total tax.7

Using the money provided by the state, as well as the federal appropriation, the Corps began its construction of the C&SF Project. 

According to the FCD, there were several major components to be 

completed in the first phase of the program. First, the Corps would 

build a levee from northwest Palm Beach County to the south of 

Dade County along the east coast, thereby preventing flooding from 

the Everglades to the coastal communities. Second, the Corps would 

modify control facilities and levees around Lake Okeechobee in order to create more water storage, and it would increase the discharge 

capacity from the lake in order to prevent flooding. Third, the Corps 

would create three water conservation areas in Palm Beach, Broward 

and Dade counties for water storage. Fourth, the Corps would construct canals, levees, and pumping stations to protect 700,000 acres 

of agriculture south of Lake Okeechobee in Palm Beach, Hendry, 

and Glades counties, known as the Everglades Agricultural Area 

(EAA). Fifth, the Corps would build canals and water control structures to handle drainage in Dade, Broward, Palm Beach, Martin, and 

St. Lucie counties.8

As this construction began, Corps representatives freely admitted that the C&SF Project as proposed in House Document 643 

needed revising. Oscar Rawls, a spokesman for the Jacksonville District, informed state and local officials that because it had to produce 

a plan quickly, the Corps “in many instances” did not complete extensive studies of regional needs and instead relied on hasty estimates in its proposal. According to Rawls, the proposal was merely a 

quick report “stating the problems and in a preliminary sort of [way] 

an estimate of what the solution should be.” The Jacksonville District thus had only “a plan that they would use for the basic frame 

work [sic] on which further and more complete planning would take 

place.”9

 W. Turner Wallis, an engineer with the FCD, was even more 

blunt, stating that House Document 643 was “a hastily assembled 

document based on hydrological and agronomic data that even the 

most optimistic admitted was far from adequate.”10 More studies of 

the needs of Central and South Florida were necessary, and in many 

ways, the Corps and other federal and state agencies learned about 

these needs as they went throughout the 1950s.

Regardless of the inadequacies, the Corps began construction, 

and the FCD commenced its responsibilities. One of the first tasks 

the FCD faced was the acquisition of lands to be used as water conservation areas. As a preliminary step, the district made a restudy 

of how large the areas should be, using the “knowledge and experience of engineers familiar with the hydrology of the Everglades.”11 It 

recommended reductions in the three conservation areas proposed 

by the Corps in House Document 643 in order to keep valuable 

agricultural land and tracts held in trust for the Seminole Indians 

free from flooding. Smaller areas would also curb seepage rates, a 

problem because of the permeability of the limestone underlying 

the land. The FCD suggested that Water Conservation Area No. 1, 

originally proposed as 175,315 acres in the vicinity of Loxahatchee 

Marsh in Palm Beach County and supplied with water from the West 

Palm Beach and Hillsboro canals, be trimmed by 21,299 acres, while 

Conservation Area No. 2 in Broward County (containing water from 

the Hillsboro and North New River canals) be reduced from 142,259 

acres to 135,187 acres. The largest decrease would occur in Conservation Area No. 3 in Dade and Broward counties (supplied by the 
36 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Features of the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control Project. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Three | Balancing Demands 37

North New River and Miami canals), which would be reduced from 

671,411 acres to 563,724 acres. Over 130,000 total acres would be cut 

from the three areas, a 13.8 percent reduction.12

Despite the large acreage involved, the Corps agreed to the 

FCD’s suggestions, and in the early 1950s, the FCD purchased land 

for the water conservation areas. According to Lamar Johnson, who 

had been appointed assistant engineer of the FCD, “the landowners’ 

generally did not accept the appraised value of the lands,” meaning 

that “most of the lands were acquired by condemnation.”13 However, 

some landowners insisted that they be allowed to retain their possessions because the possibility existed that they contained oil and 

gas. To appease these owners, the FCD acquired only flowage rights 

to the private land that it could not condemn, amounting to approximately 10 percent of the conservation areas. Although the FCD did 

not have full possession of this land, the flowage rights still allowed 

it “to flood the surface of the lands at any time and to any degree 

necessary.”14 The land acquisition program for the conservation areas continued until its completion in 1954, upon which the FCD had 

purchased approximately 860,000 acres.

Yet in its land acquisition efforts, the FCD ran into some trouble 

with the Seminole Indians. As explained earlier, the state of Florida 

had moved the Seminole reservation out of the proposed boundaries of Everglades National Park in 1935. The new location of the 

reservation, however, infringed on the area where the Corps and the 

FCD wanted to build Conservation Area No. 3. In 1950, the Corps 

proposed to construct L-28, a north-and-south levee that would 

help impound water in Conservation Area No. 3, three miles east 

of the Hendry-Broward county line. The Seminole objected to this 

plan because the levee would bisect their reservation and cause more 

than half of their grazing and hunting lands to be used for water 

impoundment, making them virtually worthless. After Corps and 

Bureau of Indian Affairs officials convinced the Seminole that alignment would not harm them, alleging that land to the west of the 

alignment could not be used for agriculture anyway, the Indians retracted their objections, allowing the levee’s construction. Confirming Seminole fears, however, 16,000 acres east of the levee became 

part of Conservation Area No. 3, although the Indians could still use 

12,000 acres to the west for grazing.15

As the FCD acquired land for the water conservation areas, it 

negotiated with both the FWS and the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission for the management of the areas. As early as 

1946, the EDD had proposed that the FWS assume control over the 

conservation area in the vicinity of the Loxahatchee Marsh in order 

to provide a migratory bird refuge on the Atlantic and Mississippi 

flyways. The FWS agreed to the program, and when the area was 

finally created as Conservation Area No. 1 in 1950, the Service purchased a 50-year lease from the FCD. After some consultations, the 

Corps approved the lease as long as the FWS’s management did not 

“interfere with the regulation and operation of conservation area 1 

by the Corps of Engineers.”16 Thereafter, the FWS operated Conservation Area No. 1 as the Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge.

Yet tensions sometimes existed between the Corps and the FWS 

over Loxahatchee management. In 1952, for example, Roy Wood, 

the Service’s regional supervisor complained that the Corps had organized an inspection trip of the C&SF Project for the House Public 

Works Committee, but had not included any FWS representatives 

in the planning or on the tour even though the FWS managed Conservation Area No. 1. This snub, Wood claimed, “clearly reveals the 

Corps of Engineers’ mode of operation in the promotion of its program and perhaps the attitude which generally prevails in the Corps 

relative to active participation of other agencies in their affairs.”17 The 

Corps’ oversight was probably more unintentional than deliberate, 

but Wood’s complaint resonated with those who believed that the 

Corps did not regard fish and wildlife concerns as important as other 

parts of the C&SF Project.

In January 1952, the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission accepted responsibility over the other two water conservation areas, which were then designated as the Everglades Wildlife 

Management Area. According to the terms of the license agreement 

between Florida Game and the FCD, the commission would operate 

the areas “to attain the basic objectives of preservation, protection 

and propagation of wildlife and fish,” as well as for recreational benefits. Measures would include developing wildlife environments and 

habitat, planting crops and plants “to increase the carrying capacity 

of the area for wildlife,” and allowing controlled public hunting and 

fishing. However, the agreement clearly stated that the operation of 

the conservation areas for wildlife and fish objectives could not conflict with flood control and water retention.18

In addition to establishing the water conservation areas, the 

FCD and the Corps also investigated what other measures needed 

The Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge. (South Florida Water Management District)
38 United States Army Corps of Engineers

prioritization. One of the initial examinations was of the necessity 

of flood control work in the Kissimmee River Valley, located north 

of Lake Okeechobee. The Corps had performed survey work on the 

Kissimmee River, which flowed from Lake Tohopekaliga just south 

of Orlando into Lake Okeechobee, as early as 1901, receiving authorization under the River and Harbor Act of 13 June 1902 to maintain 

a channel in the river from 30 to 60 feet wide and three feet deep at 

ordinary low water from the town of Kissimmee to Fort Bassenger, 

a distance of about 100 miles. In the 1920s and 1930s, congressmen 

requested that the Corps investigate further improvements on the 

Kissimmee, including flood control, in order to make the land more 

suitable for ranching, but no action was taken.19 When the Corps 

proposed Kissimmee River flood control as part of the C&SF plan, 

many Kissimmee Valley residents believed that they would finally 

receive the protection they desired. However, the Kissimmee plans 

were pushed aside in order to provide flood relief for the coastal communities and for the agricultural region south of Lake Okeechobee.

To alleviate the growing concerns of local citizens, the FCD held 

one of its first meetings in the town of Kissimmee.20 At this gathering, Oscar Rawls of the Jacksonville District related that levees, improved channels, and impounding reservoirs were the three main 

ways to control floods in a valley. In the Kissimmee Basin, improved 

channels would be the most effective way, providing 90 percent 

of the flood relief. But since Kissimmee work was not part of the 

C&SF Project’s first phase, the Corps could not act until Congress 

appropriated the necessary funds. According to U.S. Senator Claude 

Pepper, who also attended the meeting, “when the money will be 

available is a political problem rather than an engineering one.” He 

promised the people that the Kissimmee region would be “taken care 

of in the course of the program,” and counseled patience.21 Kissimmee residents continued to clamor for flood control work, especially 

after more flooding in the latter part of 1949, but Chief of Engineers 

Major General Lewis A. Pick reported again that, although “the 

flood situation in the Kissimmee Valley is even more serious than 

Opening construction blast for S-5A, 1952, (left to right) Col. H. W. Schull, Jr., Rep. Dwight L. Rogers, Sen. Spessard Holland, Gov. Fuller Warren, Col. 

W. K. Wilson, Jr. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Three | Balancing Demands 39

that revealed by the flood of 1947,” the Corps could do nothing until 

Congress appropriated the necessary money.22

As concerns with the Kissimmee River Basin grew, the Corps 

investigated the feasibility of authorizing other phases of the C&SF 

Project. In November 1952, the Corps, the FCD, and the state of 

Florida held a conference to discuss the project’s progress. In this 

meeting, the parties determined that the first phase of the program 

should be modified in order to complete an outer perimeter levee 

around the EAA and to begin work in the Kissimmee River and 

Upper St. Johns basins.23 Before the Corps could get congressional 

authorization for this work, monetary problems developed. In the 

summer of 1953, Florida’s two U.S. senators, Spessard Holland and 

George A. Smathers, criticized the Corps for delays in its construction schedule for the C&SF Project. Holland reported that the Corps 

had an unexpended balance for the 1953 fiscal year of over $6.5 million. Holland had been able to get additional amounts appropriated 

for the 1954 fiscal year, but he claimed that his job was more difficult because of “the slow handling of the program by the U.S. Engineers.”24 Smathers agreed, stating that “whatever victory we achieve 

in the legislative halls will be of little value unless the Corps of Engineers gets on the ball, and performs in a more satisfactory manner 

than has been the case in the past few years.”25

Colonel H. W. Schull, Jr., District Engineer for the Jacksonville 

District, defended the Corps, explaining that the problems derived 

from “the system of appropriation and justification used on this 

project.” Because the Corps could construct only works “approved 

by the Bureau of the Budget and defended before the Appropriations 

Committee,” Schull said, it sometimes had to let funds lie until such 

approval had been obtained. The District Engineer explained further that the Corps was developing a system with the Bureau of the 

Budget “which will allow the construction agency more flexibility 

and which will still be acceptable to appropriations committees.”26

Instead of condemning the Corps, Congress should be proud of the 

effort the Jacksonville District had made to ensure that appropriations were judiciously and efficiently used. At the same time, however, Chief of Engineers Major General S. D. Sturgis, Jr., told Holland 

and Smathers that a lack of planning in the early stages of the project 

caused the delays because the Corps faced “many new problems” 

as construction continued. He pledged that more expert hydraulic 

engineers would be assigned to the project in order to “develop a 

backlog of plans.”27

The problems with construction delays and the desire to modify 

the first phase of the C&SF Project led Smathers to ask Charles D. 

Curran, a senior specialist in engineering and public works, to make 

a study of the entire project and how it was progressing. Curran 

explained that, since 1947, the Corps had made additional examinations of the project area and determined that “the original plans 

were not completely adequate.” It had thus made some “major design 

changes.” Because of these alterations, Curran reported, the estimated cost of the first phase had risen from $70 million as originally 

authorized to $116 million. Addressing the delays in project expenditures, Curran stated that “the fault does not seem to lie in any one 

place or be the result of any one situation.” He did admit that the bureaucracy surrounding appropriations caused problems, but he saw 

no solution. “It appears that the Central and Southern Florida Flood 

Control Project must progress somewhat slowly for reasons reflecting no discredit on the merits of the project itself,” he concluded.28

Curran’s report, which Smathers disseminated to interested 

parties, coupled with talks that the Corps was already holding with 

the Bureau of the Budget, convinced Congress in 1954 to authorize the entire C&SF Project, rather than continuing to allow the 

Corps to work in only approved phases. The Flood Control Act of 

1954 provided the necessary permission. According to the legislation, Congress would determine how much local interests would 

pay for aspects of the project beyond the first phase “based on 

C&SF Project status, 1953. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville 

District)
40 United States Army Corps of Engineers

recommendations to be submitted at the earliest practicable date by 

the Chief of Engineers, through the Bureau of the Budget.”29 When 

those studies were completed in 1956, they determined that local 

interests would be responsible for 39.8 percent of the total cost of 

the entire project.30

The passage of the 1954 Flood Control Act meant that the 

Corps could now proceed with all aspects of construction. Some 

delays continued—Conservation Areas No. 2 and 3, for example, 

were not completed until the mid-1960s—but, for the most part, the 

Corps moved construction along expeditiously. In addition, new 

areas were gradually added to the C&SF Project as studies indicated 

the necessity of their inclusion. Thus, in 1958, Congress authorized 

work on 64 square miles in Hendry County west of the EAA and 

the water conservation areas, and in 1960, the Nicodemus Slough 

in Glades County was added to the project. Areas in south and 

southwest Dade County were included in the 1960s, as was Martin 

County in 1968.31

But as the work progressed, criticism and complaints about the 

C&SF Project began to develop. One of the key points was the effect 

of flood and water control on plants and wildlife within Everglades 

National Park. In 1949, Congress had authorized the secretary of the 

interior to obtain the rest of the acreage established as a minimum 

boundary for the park in 1944, thereby increasing the amount of 

park land to approximately 1,220,000 acres.32 To manage this area, 

Park Superintendent Daniel Beard had a permanent staff of 20 people, seven of whom were in the field. This meant that each ranger had 

to patrol around 180,000 acres, which, according to chief ranger Earl 

M. Semingsen, was “too much to supervise and protect the way you’d 

like to see it done.”33 In addition to the problems of safeguarding the 

flora and fauna, personnel also had the task of figuring out just how 

the C&SF Project would impact the park, although officials held that 

the Corps should bear the responsibility of making these studies. 

Based on its own observations and on studies made by the U.S. Geological Survey, the NPS was convinced that a large water supply was 

critical, especially after more than 32 grass and forest fires exploded 

in the area in 1950.34

In order to maintain contact with the Corps about park needs, 

the NPS executed an agreement with the Jacksonville District “to 

discuss the project on the field level.”35 C. Raymond Vinten, coordinating superintendent of the Southeastern National Monuments 

in St. Augustine, Florida, was designated as the NPS representative. 

But in August 1949, NPS Region One Director Thomas J. Allen complained that the Corps had produced “no information whatsoever.” 

Hearing about Corps proposals to improve the Caloosahatchee River, to construct a levee on the western side of the water conservation 

areas, and to build a levee south of Tamiami Trail, Allen worried 

that such construction would block necessary water from entering 

Everglades National Park. He emphasized to the Corps that the park 

“can be even more seriously affected by lack of water than it can be 

by an excess of water.” Although the Corps had made general statements in House Document 643 about supplying water to the Everglades, Allen believed that this was not enough. “The water we need 

for dry periods,” he stated, “involves the very life of the park through 

the maintenance of bird, animal, plant, and reptile life without interruption.”36 Park officials desired something more than general statements to convince them that the park would receive adequate water 

from the north and from the east.

District Engineer Colonel R. W. Pearson responded to Allen’s 

complaints by insisting that the Corps had no new information to 

share. “This office is fully aware of the importance of proper supply and control of water for Everglades National Park,” Pearson explained, agreeing to arrange conferences and “every possible degree 

of liaison and cooperation” with park officials once the Jacksonville 

District began developing detailed plans. He also attempted to alleviate Allen’s fears by explaining that water storage in the water conservation areas would allow the Corps to release the resource “when 

C&SF Project status, 1955. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville 

District)
Chapter Three | Balancing Demands 41

needed most,” thereby creating “a regimen of flow . . . which in effect 

would tend to reduce the peaks and increase the valleys of the present natural flood hydrograph.” Such conditions would be “far more 

desirable for the park area than the present experiences of too much 

or too little water.” Finally, Pearson explained that the levees that 

concerned Allen were not designed to keep water out of the park, 

but to retain water in the Everglades. “It is regretted that your office 

has felt that it has not been properly informed,” he wrote, but it was 

merely a misunderstanding. It was the Corps’ “earnest desire . . . to 

work in close cooperation with your organization in all matters of 

mutual concern.”37 Allen thanked Pearson for his letter, explaining 

that it “clarifies the point that you are aware of the needs” of Everglades National Park.38

Less than a year later, however, such conciliatory attitudes had 

changed. After the NPS requested that the Corps make detailed hydrological studies to determine the water needs of Everglades National Park, Pearson issued a rather stilted reply. Referring to the 

park as a “local interest,” he stated that it had the responsibility of informing the Corps what its water needs were, and not the other way 

around. “Special investigations and studies related to the detailed 

determinations of requirements of local interest for water supply or 

other purposes . . . are not considered to be within the responsibilities or authorized functions of the Corps of Engineers,” he declared. 

Pearson further explained that even though language in House 

Document 643 referred to restoring park water supplies to “natural 

conditions,” that was not the purpose of the project. “Under natural 

conditions, the area was subjected to droughts, fires, and floods,” he 

asserted, “none of which would tend to make the area attractive as a 

park area.” Instead, the Corps would operate the project to provide 

“a regulated water supply,” thereby promoting “optimum, or at least 

improved, conditions for growth of native vegetation.” In addition, 

Pearson said, it was entirely possible that in some drought years, not 

Everglades National Park in the 1950s. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and Archives of Florida)
42 United States Army Corps of Engineers

enough water would be available from the conservation areas and 

Lake Okeechobee to serve all water needs. “In such cases,” he continued, “Everglades National Park will compete with agricultural areas 

and urban centers for water supply” according to “an orderly plan 

and a recognized authority.”39

Allen was uneasy with Pearson’s letter, believing that the colonel’s comments were “somewhat at variance with former official 

statements in the matter.” Especially troubling was Pearson’s reference to the park as a “local interest.” The park was “a national project 

authorized by the United States Congress,” he protested, “and cannot be disregarded in the planning by your organization of the flood 

control works.” Allen also considered it well within Corps authority to ensure that the park received a proper supply of water since 

“any damage which will occur to Everglades National Park originates 

within, and only within, the limits of your project.” Allen did not 

specifically address Pearson’s claim about park competition with 

agricultural and municipal interests for water, but he did express 

hope that the C&SF Project could “guarantee the park an amount 

of water comparable to the ‘normal’ run-off and still attain its many 

conservation objectives.” Based on measurements conducted at 23 

discharge points along the Tamiami Trail, and following the recommendations of an FCD study, Allen insisted that 300,000 acre feet of 

water annually was “a very reasonable minimum annual flow for the 

park to expect the flood control project to provide under managed 

conditions.”40 Thus, by the summer of 1950, the NPS and the Corps 

had already drawn their lines in terms of water supply to Everglades 

National Park.

Although the Corps did not agree to perform a hydrological 

study of the needs of the park,41 Lamar Johnson, the FCD engineer, 

assumed that function, having a “smoldering urge” to “analyze the 

park’s water problem.”42 In 1950, the FCD published Johnson’s report, which detailed the water resources of the park both in the predrainage and drainage eras. According to the report, a lack of records 

made it “impossible” to reconstruct accurately water flow into the 

Everglades before drainage, but Johnson still made an attempt, using rainfall and evaporation data and descriptions of the area before 

extensive drainage efforts began. He estimated that before drainage, 

the discharge into the region past the Tamiami Trail was “2,315,000 

acre-feet in an average year; 10,744,000 acre-feet in a wet year; and 

negligible runoff into the Park during a dry year.” In order to determine the amount of flow during the drainage era, Johnson used data 

obtained by the U.S. Geological Survey for the years 1940 to 1947, 

which contained “approximately normal years, a period of successive 

dry years and the wettest year of record.” He concluded that “during 

successive average years a runoff of approximately 300,000 acre-feet 

could be expected for supply to the Park under existing conditions.” 

Clearly, “water in primeval quantities cannot be made available,” but 

300,000 acre-feet as an annual minimum could “restore the former 

ecological balance of the Park—at least to a reasonable degree.”43

Johnson also disagreed with Pearson’s contention that “natural 

conditions” were not desirable for the park. “There is little doubt 

that the decision to approach primeval conditions, as nearly as possible, is the proper objective,” he stated. Individuals in South Florida wanted the park “because they liked the flora and fauna as it is, 

or has been,” Johnson continued, and “they will not be pleased by 

some brackish, bastard offspring sired by a fresh water deficiency.”44

To restore the balance between salt and fresh water in the park, 

Johnson proposed that some structures, such as knee-high overflow 

dikes, be placed within the park. He later recollected that the NPS 

“reacted with horror” to this suggestion because it did not want to 

“interfere with nature by doing something artificial.”45 But Johnson 

could see no other solution, especially because “the wish and purpose of the majority of the people” was to use water for agriculture 

and municipal water supplies, not to maintain Everglades National 

Park. “The aesthetic appeal of the Park can never be as strong in the 

people as the demands of home and livelihood,” Johnson claimed. 

“The manatee and the orchid mean something to most people in 

an abstract way, but the former cannot line their purse nor the latter fill their empty bellies.” Regardless, Johnson recommended that 

“complete hydrological data” be gathered within the park since little 

information existed about “the influence of water on the gross ecology.” The ultimate goal, he insisted, was to ensure that “one drop of 

water . . . preserve what two drops of water created.”46

For the rest of the 1950s, the issue over water supply to Everglades National Park simmered on the NPS’s backburner. One of the 

Map of Everglades National Park showing Shark River Slough. (The 

Florida Memory Project, State Library and Archives of Florida)
Chapter Three | Balancing Demands 43

problems was that although NPS authorities believed that the park 

needed a certain amount of water, they were unsure how much this 

was, Johnson’s conclusions notwithstanding. The superintendent of 

the park informed his superiors in 1957 that the Corps continued to 

request that park officials determine how much water they wanted, 

but park leaders knew only that they wanted “more water, but not 

too much.”47 Developing a definite figure was crucial in order to ensure that the C&SF Project supplied enough water to the park.

To obtain more specific figures, the NPS hired Johnson, who 

by now had left the FCD and was a private consultant, to conduct 

another study of park water needs in 1958. In many ways, Johnson’s conclusions were no different from his 1950 determinations. 

He again estimated that a normal average flow into the Everglades 

before drainage was around 2.5 million acre-feet, although he did 

not believe that it was possible to provide water in that amount to 

the park. Instead, he stressed the importance of restoring the balance between salt and fresh water through control structures within park boundaries. Because there was more information in 1958 

about how the water conservation areas would be operated, Johnson determined that the C&SF Project could provide “more water 

to the park in an average rainfall year than the old Everglades channel system had,” although any supply from the conservation areas 

would have to be supplemented from other sources.48 Therefore, he 

recommended that the NPS contact the Corps about diverting the 

runoff from a 745 square mile area in Collier and Hendry counties 

to the Shark River Slough within the park. Based on Johnson’s conclusions, the NPS informed the Corps that the “optimum Park requirements” were “two or more million acre feet,” including at least 

150,000 acre-feet entering Shark River Slough each month in the 

spring.49 More studies were necessary, however, to determine the 

minimum amount that the park needed. Yet the NPS did not heed 

many of Johnson’s other suggestions; instead, Johnson recalled, 

park officials merely sat “like a fledgling egret on its nest, mouth 

open and squawking, waiting to be fed.”50

While the NPS attempted to understand how much water it 

would receive from the C&SF Project and how this would affect 

plant and wildlife within Everglades National Park, the FWS and the 

Corps wrangled about how much water the water conservation areas could store. The Corps originally planned to maintain a constant 

level of 17 feet in Conservation Area No. 1 and 15.9 feet in Conservation Area No. 2. Engineering studies conducted in the 1950s, 

however, indicated that such stable levels were not “engineeringly 

feasible.”51 For one thing, a level of 15.9 feet in Conservation Area 

No. 2 would lead to seepage at rates that would prevent the maintenance of necessary levels for fish and wildlife. For another, engineers 

held that water as high as 15.9 feet would destroy vegetation and 

be susceptible to hurricane wind tides that could breach the levees 

and flood east coast communities. Therefore, the Corps proposed in 

1956 to maintain seasonal levels between 12.5 and 15 feet in Conservation Area No. 1 and between 10.1 and 13.0 feet in Conservation 

Area No. 2.52

When the FWS studied the problem, it decided that the proposed water levels would adversely affect fish and wildlife in the water conservation areas to the point of making any benefits negligible. 

The FWS therefore recommended a seasonal water level of between 

14 and 17 feet for Conservation Area No. 1, which would “provide 

adequate water depths for waterfowl, frogs and other wildlife and 

greatly increase fishing and other recreational use.”53 It also suggested that Conservation Area No. 2 be split into two pools (2A and 2B) 

by an interior levee in order to eliminate seepage loss, and that the 

level in Area 2A (the northwest portion) be maintained between 12 

and 14.5 feet. Because of high seepage in Area 2B (which consisted 

of highly permeable soils over the Biscayne Aquifer), the FWS recommended that no high stage be maintained in 2B. No suggestions 

Conservation Area Nos. 1 and 2, 1958. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

Jacksonville District)
44 United States Army Corps of Engineers

were made at that time for Conservation Area No. 3, which had yet 

to be completed, but it too was eventually partitioned into two sections (3A and 3B) to control seepage.54

Even though the Corps agreed to these changes, some of its 

leadership counseled the FWS to remember that it was only one of 

the interests involved in the overall water control program. Project 

works had to consist of “the most feasible plan of improvement, in 

accordance with the desires of all local interests” in order to be constructed.55 The Corps would willingly work to minimize fish and 

wildlife damages, but could only do so in ways that would not affect 

primary project purposes. Likewise, B. F. Hyde, Jr., executive director of the FCD, insisted that the FCD’s policy was “to preserve or enhance natural resources values wherever such is possible consistent 

with accomplishment of it’s [sic] prime responsibility,” namely “water 

control in the interest of all public needs and values.” According to 

Hyde, the FCD tried to preserve fish and wildlife “to the maximum 

possible degree consistent with full consideration of all resources involved and recognition of limitations inherent to the Federal Flood 

Control Project.”56

Such statements only confirmed a growing belief that the Corps 

and the FCD placed agricultural and urban interests above those of 

fish and wildlife.57 One of the reasons for this perception was that agriculture and urban growth expanded considerably throughout the 

1950s, increasing demands on water. Agricultural production escalated as the Corps built levees, canals, and pumping stations around 

the EAA in the 1950s, thereby walling it off from floodwaters and 

allowing needed irrigation in times of drought. More ranching occurred as well, in part because the Everglades Experiment Station 

indicated that St. Augustine grass, previously used only for lawns, 

was a nutritious forage well-suited for the Everglades. Sugar cane 

also maintained its place in the Everglades, although its largest boom 

would occur in the early 1960s. In addition, vegetable production 

continued in the EAA, mainly for winter markets.58

Meanwhile, urban populations, especially in Dade County, 

expanded considerably in the 1950s, as did the number of tourists to the region. Even though Americans had regarded Florida 

as a sun-drenched, desirable area since the 1920s, it was not until 

the post-World War II era that people began moving to the state 

in great numbers. Senior citizens migrated to St. Petersburg, Lake 

Worth, and Miami Beach in the 1940s, while Miami became noted 

in the 1940s and 1950s as “a winter playground for New Yorkers 

and a summer escape for Cubans.”59 By 1950, Dade County was the 

Miami Beach, 1955. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and Archives of Florida)
Chapter Three | Balancing Demands 45

host of several interesting attractions, including college football’s 

Orange Bowl, the Latin Quarter and Hialeah Race Track, Key Biscayne, and Brickell Avenue. In 1950, Miami had a population of 

250,000 (the largest city in the state), and it only increased as the 

decade continued.

But as the population of Dade County skyrocketed, and as 

more and more tourists frequented the region, Dade County officials claimed that the Corps placed agricultural interests above urban needs. Therefore, Dade County officials asked W. Turner Wallis, a consulting engineer in Tallahassee formerly with the FCD, to 

prepare a report on water control in the area. Upon completing his 

examination, Wallis criticized the C&SF Project and the Corps for 

not heeding concerns voiced by representatives of Dade County. The 

county accounted for almost half of the population included in the 

project area and paid around two-thirds of the FCD’s ad valorem tax, 

Wallis claimed, yet it had trouble getting the Corps to revise its plans 

as included in House Document 643. “Well over 50 percent of the 

total benefits claimed for the Central and Southern Florida Flood 

Control Project are based on land to be reclaimed for agricultural 

purposes,” Wallis complained.60 But the urban character of Dade 

County precluded it from obtaining any of these benefits; instead, 

county residents wanted more efforts to limit saltwater intrusion, an 

increased water supply for urban areas in the county, and recreation. 

Unfortunately, Wallis asserted, “the original project did not offer adequate measures in any of these three areas.”61 He called for the uniting of all interested parties in Dade County to pressure the Corps to 

address these concerns, thereby justifying the county’s investment 

of millions of dollars in the C&SF Project. He also recommended 

that a better plan be devised for Dade County to address its everincreasing water needs and that the county work more closely with 

the FCD to ensure that its needs were being met.

Wallis’s report seemed to work; in 1960, Chief of Engineers Lieutenant General E. C. Itschner made a tour of Dade County and concluded that the Corps needed to build outlet structures through the 

Tamiami Trail and construct a diagonal levee northeastward from 

the Tamiami Trail through Conservation Area No. 3. Itschner also 

recommended the relocation of L-31N, a north-south levee south of 

the Tamiami Trail, farther west to the border of Everglades National 

Park in order to facilitate agriculture in that area.62

Despite Itschner’s proposals, it was increasingly apparent that 

the county’s needs for water would conflict with the requirements 

of other interested parties, including Everglades National Park. At 

a conference between the NPS, the FWS, the Florida Game and 

Freshwater Fish Commission, the FCD, and the Jacksonville District, representatives from the Corps noted that “sufficient water is 

not available to supply all demands, and methods to conserve water 

will have to be developed.”63 As growth continued in South Florida 

in the 1960s, the question of how water should be distributed would 

be hotly contested—especially by the NPS.

By the end of the 1950s, the Corps had made great strides in the 

construction of the C&SF Project. The FCD noted in 1960 that “128 

miles of channels and canals have been dug, or improved, 300 miles 

of levees have been constructed and six pumping stations are serving the multiple purposes of flood control and water conservation.”64

The construction had occurred mainly along the east coast and Lake 

Okeechobee, creating both the EAA south of the lake and the water 

conservation areas between the EAA and the east coast. The FCD 

estimated that 60 percent of the levees surrounding the conservation 

areas were complete, 75 percent of the east coast levees were finished, and almost all of the levees surrounding the EAA were done.

But as this construction occurred, discontent emerged. Everglades National Park officials grew increasingly wary about the 

Corps’ seeming lack of concern for water supply to the park, especially as Corps and FCD representatives insisted that fish and wildlife benefits were secondary to flood control and water supply. The 

growth of agricultural and urban interests in South Florida worsened the situation by elevating demands on water, and urban interests themselves complained about the Corps’ operation of the project. By the end of the 1950s, various entities had drawn clear lines as 

to how they believed water should be managed in South Florida, and 

the purposes for which it should be used. Conflicts between these 

different interests seemed unavoidable as the 1960s dawned.

Endnotes

1 Johnson, Beyond the Fourth Generation, 160-161; Lamar Johnson, 

Engineer, to Hon. Spessard L. Holland of Florida, July 17, 1948, File Flood 

Control Permanent (July-December 1948), Box 287, Holland Papers.

2 Johnson, Beyond the Fourth Generation, 161; Jno R. Beacham, Chairman, Committee on Drainage and Water Conservation and Chairman, 

Committee on Drainage and Water Control, to Colonel Willis E. Teale, 

Corps of Engineers, April 8, 1949, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Proj Genl—

Flood Control (Jan 49-April 49), Box 8, Accession No. 077-01-0023, RG 77, 

FRC.

3 Minutes, 14 July 1949, Volume 1 of Governing Board of Central and 

Southern Florida Flood Control District Minutes, Box 27, South Florida 

Water Management District administrative records, West Palm Beach, Florida [hereafter referred to as SFWMDAR].

4 Quotation in Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District, 

Facts About F.C.D. (West Palm Beach, Fla.: Central and Southern Florida 

Flood Control District, 1955), 3, 7, 9; see also Minutes, 14 July 1949.

5 John C. Stephens, “The Cooperative Water Control Program for Central and Southern Florida,” paper presented at the Annual Winter Meeting 

of the American Society of Agricultural Engineers, 17 December 1958, in 

Library, Jacksonville District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, 

Florida.

6 Stephens, “The Cooperative Water Control Program for Central and 

Southern Florida.”

7 Johnson, Beyond the Fourth Generation, 161-163.
46 United States Army Corps of Engineers

8 Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District, Ten Years of 

Progress: 1949-1959 (West Palm Beach, Fla.: Central and Southern Florida 

Flood Control District, 1959), n.p.

9 “Round Table discussion on the drainage and flood control program 

for Central and Southern Florida, held at the annual convention of the Florida Wildlife Federation, November 3rd, at Daytona Beach, Florida,” n.d., 

Folder COOP Drainage Wetlands—Florida, Box 1, Entry 57A0179, Atlanta 

Regional Office, Office of River Basin Studies, Wetlands, 1944-1956, RG 22, 

Records of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, National Archives and Records Administration Southeast Region, Atlanta, Georgia [hereafter referred 

to as NARA-SE].

10 W. Turner Wallis, “The Interests of Dade County in relation to the 

Cooperative Water Control Program for Central and Southern Florida,” 

copy in South Florida Water Management District Reference Center, West 

Palm Beach, Florida. 

11 The Engineering Department of Central and Southern Florida Flood 

Control District, “Review of the Plan of Flood Control for Central and 

Southern Florida in connection with the proposed development of the Everglades area and the operation of the conservation areas,” November 1949, 

1, copy in South Florida Water Management District Reference Center, West 

Palm Beach, Florida.

12 The Engineering Department of Central and Southern Florida Flood 

Control District, “Review of the Plan of Flood Control,” 5-12.

13 Johnson, Beyond the Fourth Generation, 181-182.

14 Quotation in Stanley J. Niego, Attorney, to Annette Star Lustgarten, 

Assistant General Counsel, April 7, 1981, File Conservation Areas 1, 2, 3, 

1970-1986, Box 02193, SFWMDAR; see also Game and Fresh Water Fish 

Commission to Hon. Richard W. Erwin, Attorney General, 30 March 1960, 

File E.C.A. High Water and Deer Herds, 1959-1974, Box 1, Series [S] 1719, 

Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission Everglades Conservation Files, 

1958-1982, Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Florida [hereafter referred 

to as FSA].

15 Harry A. Kersey, Jr., “The East Big Cypress Case, 1948-1987: Environmental Politics, Law, and Florida Seminole Tribal Sovereignty,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 69 (April 1991): 459-466.

16 Quotation in R. W. Pearson, Colonel, Corps of Engineers, District 

Engineer, to The Division Engineer, 30 January 1951, File 1110-2-1150a 

(C&SF) Proj Genl—Flood Control (Jan 51-June 51), Box 7, Accession No. 

077-01-0023, RG 77, FRC; see also Frank Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Army, to 

The Honorable The Secretary of the Interior, 29 May 1951, ibid.; Johnson, 

Beyond the Fourth Generation, 182-183.

17 Roy Wood, Regional Supervisor, to Regional Director, 28 November 

1952, File RB Coop US Corps Engineers (General), Box 3, Entry 57A0179, 

RG 22, NARA-SE.

18 “Cooperative and License Agreement Between the Central and 

Southern Florida Flood Control District and the Game and Fresh Water 

Fish Commission,” 18 January 1952, File GOV 2-16-03 WV 91 6160 DOT/

Miccosukee Mediation, Box 19707, SFWMDAR.

19 See Office, District Engineer, Jacksonville, Fla., to the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army, 1 October 1929, File 1110-2-1150a (Kissimmee River) 

Project General—Flood Control 1924, Box 2, Accession No. 077-02-0048, 

RG 77, FRC; B. C. Dunn, Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers, District Engineer, to 

Hon. J. Mark Wilcox, House of Representatives, 10 January 1935, ibid.

20 The FCD’s governing board had decided soon after its formation 

to hold meetings “in different sections of the District in order to permit 

the people of the various areas involved to become better acquainted with 

the Board and its work.” W. Turner Wallis, Secretary, to District Engineer, 

Jacksonville District, 17 September 1949, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Proj—

Genl—Flood Control (Aug 49-Oct 49), Box 8, Accession No. 077-01-0023, 

RG 77, FRC.

21 Minutes, 3 September 1949, Volume 1 of Governing Board of Central 

and Southern Florida Flood Control District Minutes, Box 27, SFWMDAR.

22 Lewis A. Pick, Major General, Chief of Engineers, to Honorable 

Spessard L. Holland, 25 October 1949, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Proj—

Genl—Flood Control (Aug 49-Oct 49), Box 8, Accession No. 077-01-0023, 

RG 77, FRC. The Chief of Engineers usually carries the rank of Lieutenant General (which Pick eventually assumed), but because Pick was only 

appointed Chief of Engineers in March 1949, his promotion was probably 

either not yet approved or delayed.

23 C. H. Chorpening, Brigadier General, USA, Assistant Chief of Engineers for Civil Works, to The Division Engineer, South Atlantic Division, 10 

December 1952, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Proj Genl—Flood Control (Aug 

52-Dec 52), Box 8, Accession No. 077-01-0023, RG 77, FRC.

24 As cited in “Florida Senators Charge Flood Control Job Delayed,” St. 

Petersburg Times, 24 June 1953.

25 As cited in “Florida Senators Charge Flood Control Job Delayed,” St. 

Petersburg Times, 24 June 1953.

26 Quotations in H. W. Schull, Jr., Colonel, Corps of Engineers, District 

Engineer, to Honorable George A. Smathers, United States Senate, 5 July 

1953, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Proj Genl—Flood Control (July 1953-Nov 

1953), Box 8, Accession No. 077-01-0023, RG 77, FRC; see also Schull to 

Honorable Spessard L. Holland, United States Senate, 5 July 1953, ibid.

27 “Speed Assured on S. Florida Flood Project,” Miami Daily News, 24 

June 1953, clipping in File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Proj Genl—Flood Control (July 1953-Nov 1953), Box 8, Accession No. 077-01-0023, RG 77, FRC. 

As with Pick, Sturgis eventually was promoted to Lieutenant General, but 

at this time—only three months from the time he became Chief of Engineers—he was still listed as Major General. 

28 As quoted in A Study of the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control Project (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, 1953), 6-7, 15-18, 

42-46, copy in Library, Jacksonville District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

Jacksonville, Florida.

29 Act of 3 September 1954 (68 Stat. 1248).

30 Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, Office of the District Engineer, Jacksonville, Fla., Central and Southern Florida Project: Special Report on Local 

Cooperation in the Part of the Project Authorized by the Flood Control Act of 

1954 (Jacksonville, Fla.: Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, 1956), ii.

31 Buker, Sun, Sand and Water, 107-108.

32 Act of 10 October 1949 (63 Stat. 733).

33 As quoted in Carl L. Biemiller, “The Water Wilderness—The Everglades,” Holiday 10 (November 1951): 117.

34 Thomas J. Allen, Regional Director, to District Engineer, 19 July 

1950, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Proj Genl—Flood Control (May 50-Aug 

50), Box 9, Accession No. 077-01-0023, RG 77, FRC. See also Keith Wheeler, 

“Florida’s Never-Never Land,” Science Digest 29 (May 1951): 29-30.

35 Thomas J. Allen, Regional Director, to District Engineer, Jacksonville 

District, Corps of Engineers, 16 August 1949, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) 

Proj—Genl—Flood Control (Aug 49-Oct 49), Box 8, Accession No. 077-01-

0023, RG 77, FRC.

36 Allen to District Engineer, 16 August 1949.

37 R. W. Pearson, Colonel, Corps of Engineers, to Director, Region One, 

26 August 1949, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Proj—Genl—Flood Control 

(Aug 49-Oct 49), Box 8, Accession No. 077-01-0023, RG 77, FRC

38 Allen to District Engineer, Jacksonville District, 1 September 1949, 

File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Proj—Genl—Flood Control (Aug 49-Oct 49), 

Box 8, Accession No. 077-01-0023, RG 77, FRC.
Chapter Three | Balancing Demands 47

39 R. W. Pearson, Colonel, Corps of Engineers, District Engineer, to 

Regional Director, U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 

30 June 1950, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Proj Genl—Flood Control (May 

50-Aug 50), Box 9, Accession No. 077-01-0023, RG 77, FRC.

40 Allen to District Engineer, 19 July 1950.

41 Interestingly, in September 1951, Harold A. Scott, Chief of the Planning and Reports Branch of the Jacksonville District, presented a paper 

about water distribution from the C&SF Project. Using hydrologic studies 

completed by the Corps, he extensively discussed how much water would be 

available for agricultural and municipal areas and how it would be distributed. However, even though Everglades National Park was listed as a “major 

water-demand area,” there was no discussion of how much water it would 

need or how it would get it. See Scott, “Distribution of Water in the Central 

and Southern Florida Project,” 26 September 1951, 2, South Florida Water 

Management District Reference Center, West Palm Beach, Florida.

42 Johnson, Beyond the Fourth Generation, 208-209.

43 All quotations in Engineering Department, FCD, “A Report on Water 

Resources of Everglades National Park, Florida,” 22 May 1950, 5-7, 10-11, 

South Florida Water Management District Reference Center, West Palm 

Beach, Florida. 

44 Engineering Department, FCD, “A Report on Water Resources of 

Everglades National Park, Florida,” 11.

45 Johnson, Beyond the Fourth Generation, 209; see also Engineering 

Department, FCD, “A Report on Water Resources of Everglades National 

Park, Florida,” 12.

46 All quotations in Engineering Department, FCD, “A Report on Water 

Resources of Everglades National Park, Florida,” 13, 16.

47 Superintendent, Everglades National Park, to Regional Director, Region One, 26 November 1957, EVER 22965, Central Records, Everglades 

National Park Archives, Everglades National Park, Homestead, Florida 

[hereafter referred to as CR-ENPA].

48 Johnson, Beyond the Fourth Generation, 209-211. A copy of Johnson’s 

report was not available, but Johnson summarized his conclusions in Beyond 

the Fourth Generation. For NPS comments on the report, see Acting Supervisory Engineer to Superintendent, Everglades National Park, 19 September 

1958, EVER 22965, CR-ENPA; Chief, Water Resources Section, to Regional 

Director, Region One, 9 September 1958, ibid.; Superintendent, Everglades 

National Park, to Regional Director, Region One, 21 October 1958, ibid.

49 Warren F. Hamilton, Superintendent, to Col. Paul D. Troxler, Chief, 

U.S. Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, Florida, 29 December 1958, EVER 

22965, CR-ENPA.

50 Johnson, Beyond the Fourth Generation, 211.

51 United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Sport Fisheries 

and Wildlife, Region 4, A Fish and Wildlife Report for Inclusion in the Corps 

of Engineers’ General Design Memorandum, Part 1: Agricultural and Conservation Areas, Supplement 27—Plan of Regulation for Conservation Area 

#2, Central and Southern Florida Flood Control Project (Vero Beach, Fla.: 

Branch of River Basins, 1958), 8-9.

52 Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, Region 4, A Fish and Wildlife 

Report for Inclusion in the Corps of Engineers’ General Design Memorandum, 

Part 1, 8-9.

53 Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, Region 4, A Fish and Wildlife 

Report for Inclusion in the Corps of Engineers’ General Design Memorandum, 

Part 1, 13.

54 Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, Region 4, A Fish and Wildlife 

Report for Inclusion in the Corps of Engineers’ General Design Memorandum, 

Part 1, 17. The partitions of both Conservation Area No. 2 and No. 3 were 

largely completed in the 1960s. See Light and Dineen, “Water Control in the 

Everglades,” 63-65.

55 See Paul D. Troxler, District Engineer, to Regional Director, U.S. Fish 

and Wildlife Service, 3 October 1957, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Kissimmee 

River Valley Study (Study for Navigation) Jan 1957-Dec 1957, Box 11, Accession No. 077-01-0023, RG 77, FRC.

56 B. F. Hyde, Jr., Executive Director, to Mr. Walter A. Gresh, Regional 

Director, 7 October 1957, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Kissimmee River Valley Study (Study for Navigation) Jan 1057-Dec 1957, Box 11, Accession No. 

077-01-0023, RG 77, FRC.

57 See, for example, undated newspaper clipping in File 1110-2-1150a 

(C&SF) Proj Genl—Flood Control (June 56-Dec 56), Box 7, Accession No. 

077-01-0023, RG 77, FRC.

58 G. H. Snyder and J. M. Davidson, “Everglades Agriculture: Past, Present, and Future,” in Everglades: The Ecosystem and Its Restoration, 100-103.

59 Gary R. Mormino, “Sunbelt Dreams and Altered States: A Social and 

Cultural History of Florida, 1950-2000,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 81 

(Summer 2002): 4, 6, 14.

60 W. Turner Wallis, “The Interests of Dade County in relation to the 

Cooperative Water Control Program for Central and Southern Florida,” 

copy in South Florida Water Management District Reference Center, West 

Palm Beach, Florida.

61 Quotation in Wallis, “The Interests of Dade County in relation to 

the Cooperative Water Control Program for Central and Southern Florida”; 

see also “Dade County Water-Control Report,” 35-36, attachment to Marion 

E. Boriss, Director of Public Works, to Honorable O. W. Campbell, County 

Manager, 28 November 1958, copy in South Florida Water Management 

District Reference Center, West Palm Beach, Florida.

62 E. C. Itschner, Chief of Engineers, to Honorable A. S. Herlong, Jr., 26 

April 1960, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Dade County 1955-April 1960, Box 

4, Accession No. 077-96-0038, RG 77, FRC.

63 “Conference on Conservation Area No. 3, Jacksonville, Florida, 14 

April 1960,” File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Conservation Areas Jan 60-June 60, 

Box 15, Accession No. 077-96-0038, RG 77, FRC.

64 Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District, Ten Years of 

Progress, n.p.; see also Light and Dineen, “Water Control in the Everglades,” 

60-63.

49

When the Corps of Engineers first proposed the C&SF Project, 

the NPS and the U.S. Department of the Interior were both concerned about a lack of specifics in the plan about water supply to 

Everglades National Park. The Corps made general references to the 

necessity of providing adequate water to the park, but did not discuss explicit measures. These anxieties were heightened in the 1950s 

as project construction commenced, especially as the Corps and the 

FCD insisted that fish and wildlife preservation were secondary to 

flood control and urban and agricultural water supply. As population increased along Florida’s southeast coast, and as sugar production exploded in the EAA, demands for water became more pressing. After the construction of C&SF Project works and consecutive 

drought years constricted the amount of water flowing into Everglades National Park, cries for a guaranteed supply of water became 

more pronounced, leading to discussions on water supply and ownership in South Florida. These pleas, as well as the efforts of a growing environmental movement in South Florida, led to the passage 

of a congressional mandate in 1970 that the C&SF Project deliver a 

certain amount of water to the park each year.

At the advent of the 1960s, NPS officials had been wrangling 

with the Corps over the issue of water supply to Everglades National 

Park for years. No one seemed to know exactly how much water the 

park required, but park authorities believed that the area needed 

the traditional overflows from Lake Okeechobee to course through 

its veins, especially between the months of October and May when 

rainfall was scarce. Unfortunately, the construction of drainage and 

flood control works constricted that southward flow, reducing the 

hydroperiod of the park, or the time when water enveloped the landscape. This left Everglades National Park parched and dusty when 

Chapter 4

rainfall ceased. The situation did not seem too severe in the 1950s, 

mainly because the construction of the East Coast Protective Levee 

allowed water flowing to the ocean to be diverted south through 

the Everglades.1 As the Corps completed construction of L-29—the 

southern boundary of Water Conservation Area 3—these diversions 

were eliminated, causing clashes between the NPS and the Corps.

One of the primary agricultural industries that expanded considerably in the 1960s was sugar. Cane had been an important crop 

in the EAA since the 1920s, but because of the United States’ sugar 

quota system, established in the 1934 Sugar Act, the sugar industry 

in Florida remained relatively small, confined mainly to the operations of Charles Mott’s United States Sugar Corporation. In the early 

1960s, however, the industry expanded greatly in Florida due to several factors. For one, Fidel Castro overthrew the Cuban government 

in 1959, leading the United States government to sever all ties with 

Cuba, one of the main suppliers of sugar to the United States. For another, some vegetable growers in the EAA, facing unstable markets, 

wanted to diversify their crops and saw sugar as a safe and profitable 

venture. In addition, Puerto Rican growers could not meet their production quotas, creating a void in the market.2

Because of these conditions, sugar production increased dramatically in Florida in the 1960s. Numerous new companies began 

operations, including the Osceola Farms Company, formed by a Cuban family, the Fanjuls, who would eventually become the second 

largest sugar producer in Florida, and the Sugar Growers Cooperative of Florida, established in 1962 by George Wedgworth, the son of 

South Florida farming pioneers. The Glades County Sugar Growers 

Cooperative Association, the Talisman Sugar Corporation, and the 

Atlantic Sugar Association were other fledgling organizations. This 

Conflicting Priorities: Everglades National Park and 

Water Supply in the 1960s
50 United States Army Corps of Engineers

influx of companies expanded the amount of acreage under sugar 

production in Florida from 38,600 in 1954 to nearly 220,000 acres 

in 1964, mostly in the EAA.3 As sugar became the dominant EAA 

crop, its growers and representatives became increasingly interested 

in how water was distributed throughout South Florida.

Castro’s revolution also contributed to South Florida’s growing population, as numerous Cubans moved to Miami and Dade 

County to escape communism. Because many Cubans located elsewhere after landing in Miami, and because others did not register 

upon their entry into Florida, it is difficult to estimate the number 

of Cubans that relocated to Dade County during this period. However, by 1970, over 300,000 Cubans lived in the county, accounting 

for approximately 22 percent of its total population of 1,267,792. 

Although immigrants from other countries in the Caribbean, Latin 

America, and Asia would enter Florida in large numbers in later 

decades, Cubans, according to historian Charlton W. Tebeau, “were 

by far the most significant addition to Florida’s population in the 

sixties.”4

 By 1970, the combined population of Dade, Broward, and 

Palm Beach counties almost reached two million. As the urban 

region became more populated, settlement extended southwest toward Homestead and closer to the boundaries of Everglades National Park, and the larger populations made increasing demands 

on water.5

Miami was the center for much of this urban growth. Construction of hotels along Miami Beach facilitated the tourist industry, as did the broadcasting of television shows on the beach, which 

showed millions of Americans the leisure opportunities that Miami 

offered. More permanent residents were attracted by burgeoning 

economic opportunities, such as the growth of the Miami International Airport, more jobs generated by the increasing popularity of 

the fast-food chain Burger King (headquartered in the area), and the 

booming real estate market. By the late 1960s, South Florida had 

a developed area approaching 600 square miles, almost quadruple 

what it had been around 1955.6

This growth increased the demand for water, a situation that 

alarmed Everglades National Park officials, especially after the 

Corps began developing a South Dade County Project in the late 

1950s. This plan had several components, including a proposal to 

use water from Conservation Area No. 3, which was supposed to 

store water for national park usage, to enlarge the county’s water 

supply. The Corps also proposed to build a series of canals to drain 

land east and south of the park. Concerned that such waterways 

would divert water that normally drained into the park, NPS authorities protested.7

To address these concerns, the Corps held a conference with 

NPS, FWS, FCD, and Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission representatives in April 1960. At this meeting, NPS representatives emphasized the park’s need for a steady supply of water, especially in its southern and western sections and below the Tamiami 

Trail. The Corps understood these needs, but also reiterated its responsibilities to provide water for salinity control, sewage dilution, 

agriculture, and municipal purposes. “Methods to conserve water 

will have to be developed,” Jacksonville District officials stated.8 They 

also explained that although water from Conservation Area No. 3 

would be used for Dade County, such utilization would not “greatly 

affect” flood discharges into the park from the north, “the principal 

source of outside water supply to the Everglades National Park.”9 The 

Corps worked for the next few years to build conveyance canals to 

route water from Southwest Dade County into the park, but this too 

generated criticism because it had the potential of bringing insecticides, pesticides, and fertilizers into the park.10

Yet it was clear that as Dade County continued to grow—and 

projections estimated that the county would reach two million by 

1970 and four million by 1980—its population would need more 

and more water. This led Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall 

to wonder about how the C&SF Project would affect Everglades National Park in regard to the amount, place, and time of water releases. Fearing that Dade County would encroach on park water, Udall 

asked that the Corps grant the park a guaranteed annual supply that 

municipal or agricultural demands could not reduce.11

Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr, who would later become 

president of the National Audubon Society, explained that the Corps 

could not make such an assurance because it had no authority to 

grant water rights to any entity. “The Department of the Army does 

not acquire water rights for the construction and operation of Civil 

Works projects,” Stahr claimed, “except as they may be connected 

with lands being acquired for a dam or a reservoir.”12 If the NPS officials wanted a guarantee, they would have to coordinate with the 

FCD or the state of Florida, but the FCD believed that no such assurance was possible because of the difficulty of predicting how much 

water each interest would need in a given year.

Sugar cane plants in South Florida. (South Florida Water Management 

District)
Chapter Four | Conflicting Priorities 51

The situation became more pronounced as drought ravaged 

the park. In 1961, much of Everglades National Park received only 

half of its normal rainfall, and, by March 1962, the park was littered 

with “remnants and carrion—but no life,” according to National 

Parks Magazine contributor Gale Koschmann Zimmer.13 The lack of 

water destroyed fish and shellfish populations, and, faced with the 

decimation of these food sources, birds either died or fled. At the 

same time, fire danger became high, and saltwater concentrations 

along coastal areas of the park became pronounced. “The whole 

effect of the drought upon the ecology of the Everglades cannot now 

be foretold,” the park’s chief naturalist Ernst Christensen explained, 

but “the impact upon park life is already serious.”14

Park officials believed that C&SF Project features only exacerbated the drought because they eliminated traditional sheet flows 

into the area. They therefore demanded that the Corps give Everglades National Park as much water as it received before C&SF 

Project construction began. In addition, they asked the Corps to enlarge the water conservation areas to provide sufficient storage for 

the park’s needs. Acting South Atlantic Division Engineer Colonel 

H. J. Kelly responded that the C&SF Project actually delivered more 

Miami Beach, 1963. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and Archives of Florida)
52 United States Army Corps of Engineers

water than the park had received during Florida’s drainage era, and 

that the conservation area solution was unrealistic because increased 

seepage and evaporation would offset any raises in water levels. But, 

Kelly continued, although the Corps could not fully satisfy the NPS’s 

demands, it would search for “a middle ground of reasonable compromise” that would help the park receive more water.15

The NPS was especially concerned with the construction of 

Levee 29 and Control Structure 12, which would form the south 

boundary of Conservation Area No. 3. According to park officials, 

these devices would completely eliminate water entering the park 

from the north. The Corps proposed placing four major outlet spillways in the levee to discharge water into the park, as well as building transitions within the park so that the water could be effectively 

distributed. But NPS officials refused to allow the Corps to build 

any structures within the park, forcing the Jacksonville District to 

work outside park boundaries. Corps officials did not believe that 

this demand was too unreasonable, but at the same time, according 

to Colonel Kelly, it evinced an uncooperative, insular attitude that 

hindered discussion and negotiation.16

The positions of both sides hardened at an October 1961 conference between the NPS, the Corps, and the FCD in the Interior Department offices in Washington, D.C. As reported by FCD engineer 

William V. Storch, the NPS reiterated the necessity of a guaranteed 

water supply to Everglades National Park, and declared that if the 

Corps would not grant one, the NPS would petition Congress to restrict C&SF Project funds until an agreement was reached. Yet Corps 

representatives insisted that a guarantee had to be arranged between 

the FCD and the NPS. FCD officials agreed with the Corps’ position, 

but, they stated, no agreement could be made “until more accurate 

knowledge was available both as to Park minimum requirements 

and the east coastal demands.”17 Not all was lost for the park, however. According to Storch, the Corps did admit that House Document 

643 contained “an apparent obligation . . . to provide positive water 

supply benefits to the Park,” and it pledged that it would make “a 

thorough review of the overall water needs of the area” to determine 

how this could be accomplished.18

In 1962, tensions continued to simmer. When the Corps proposed to enlarge the lower 17 miles of the West Palm Beach Canal 

to facilitate floodwater discharge to the Atlantic Ocean, the NPS objected, stating that the Corps should expand storage facilities and 

divert the floodwater into the park. The Corps responded that such 

a proposal was not feasible because of the expense.19 Moreover, the 

NPS made good on its threat to turn to Congress, and in the summer 

of 1962, the Senate Committee on Public Works passed a resolution asking the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors to make 

a comprehensive survey of existing water supplies to the park and to 

recommend how it could receive more water.20

Before anything could be accomplished, trouble developed over 

Levee 29. Even though the Corps had placed four spillways within 

the structure to ensure that water reached the park, no water flowed 

through the levee between January and May 1962, causing, in the 

words of the USGS, “near-record low water levels” and saltwater 

encroachment in the southern portion of the park.21 The Corps 

claimed that the situation resulted because it had to shut off water to 

complete additional construction in the area, but many questioned 

that position. Verne O. Williams, a reporter for the Miami Daily 

News, wrote that the only reason why Everglades National Park did 

not have enough water was because of a “man-made drouth,” and he 

placed all of the blame on the Corps and its “costly drainage works,” 

calling Levee 29 “a plug in the throat of a funnel.”22

The FCD did not help matters by refusing to open Levee 29’s 

gates once the Corps had finished construction. From 1963 to 

1965, the gates remained shut, even though drought continued to 

ravage the Everglades. Although the FCD had legitimate reasons for 

closing the gates, such as the necessity of filling the finally completed 

Conservation Area No. 3 and of maintaining it at the desired level, 

many believed that the FCD was trying only to preserve more water 

for agricultural and urban interests.23 Paul Tilden, a contributor to 

National Parks Magazine, claimed that even though the park received 

more than 500,000 visitors annually, the FCD and the Corps regarded 

S-12C. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and Archives of Florida)
Chapter Four | Conflicting Priorities 53

it as an “afterthought” and an “appendage” that could get water only 

“after the Florida east coast cities, industries, and agricultural areas 

have been served.”24 This disregard, Tilden believed, mobilized 

individuals concerned with Florida’s environment, and they 

increasingly called for a halt to C&SF Project construction until 

Everglades National Park received a minimum guarantee of water.

Meanwhile, the Corps moved forward on its study of park water 

requirements. Yet its proposed plan of study focused on how engineering structures could bring more water to the area, rather than 

investigating how much water the park needed to survive.25 Therefore, the NPS called on different government and private agencies to 

examine the park’s water needs. Responding to these demands, the 

USGS, after correlating average monthly water stage data in the park 

with flows from the Tamiami Trail from 1953 to 1962, determined 

that water flows for that period averaged around 260,000 acre-feet at 

Shark River Slough and 55,000 acre-feet at Taylor Slough. This was a 

landmark finding even though park officials had no ecological data 

to show that this amount was necessary or sufficient to keep plant 

and wildlife alive. After receiving this information from the USGS, 

NPS officials agitated for an annual delivery of 315,000 acre-feet to 

the park, a figure they would continue to cite throughout the 1960s 

and 1970s.26 This figure, of course, was drastically different from the 

more than two million acre-feet that Superintendent Warren Hamilton said was the park’s optimum requirement in 1958. However, 

an Interior Department position paper published in 1964 clarified 

that the 315,000 acre-feet was merely what the park desired for an 

interim supply; it was not based on what was needed to maintain the 

park ecologically and should not be construed as such. Further longterm studies were necessary to determine the ecological needs of the 

park and its estuaries.27

Indeed, inquiries into the requirements of the Shark River and 

Taylor sloughs were ongoing. These sloughs were deep, wide water 

channels that conveyed water across the Everglades. Shark River 

Slough, the larger channel, was located south of Conservation Area 

No. 3 and the Tamiami Trail, and flowed southwest into the Gulf 

of Mexico. Taylor Slough ran southwest from the park’s eastern 

boundary, moving through the Royal Palm area into Florida Bay. 

If these sloughs did not receive enough water, the whole park suffered. In addition, a lack of water in Taylor Slough affected life in 

Florida Bay, an estuary that was a prime nursery for shrimp and 

coastal fishes. Shrimpers annually harvested $15 million worth of 

shrimp from Dry Tortugas, a cluster of seven islands located southwest from the bay, meaning that changes in water flow not only 

harmed the ecology of the bay, but a thriving South Florida industry as well.28

Aware of this situation, the Institute of Marine Science at the 

University of Miami conducted a study from 1963 to 1966 about the 

ecology of Everglades National Park’s estuarine regions and the effects of water—or the lack of it—on these areas. Institute scientists especially wanted to see how salinity and temperature changes affected 

plant and animal communities between the upper Florida Keys and 

the Chatham River of the Ten Thousand Islands. They could then use 

these data to construct the freshwater requirements of the estuaries, 

allowing park officials to make a more informed recommendation 

as to how much water the park needed annually to protect not only 

the land-based ecology but the estuarine regions as well. The study 

concluded that variations in salinity had the greatest impacts on plant 

and animal life, and that ground water elevation in the Homestead 

well—designated as S-196A—had a direct relation to Florida Bay’s 

salinity. Therefore, Everglades National Park had to have at least 

enough water to prevent high saline conditions in the bay.29

Meanwhile, the NPS received information that even though the 

Corps had not yet completed its restudy of water demands, Corps 

officials were planning works to supply water to Martin County. The 

NPS objected to such a program “until the project can and does supply the water needs of Everglades National Park.”30 In fact, between 

1962 and 1965, the NPS consistently denounced Corps plans for any 

new construction on the C&SF Project because the Corps would not 

guarantee water for Everglades National Park. But the Corps insisted 

that it was giving every consideration to park needs and that it was 

trying to solve the problem within project parameters. It would support releases to the park as long as they did not, in the words of the 

Secretary of the Army, “override the basic purposes of the project or 

the higher priority needs of water supply based on the rapidly expanding population of Florida.”31 Indeed, primary project purposes, 

as defined by House Document 643, were flood control and water 

supply for agricultural and municipal uses; fish and wildlife preservation was only a secondary purpose. But the Interior Department 

had insisted from the beginning (and even in House Document 643 

itself) that the Corps operate the project to benefit Everglades National Park, and the Corps had seemingly agreed to that arrangement.32 Now, NPS officials charged, the Corps had reneged on those 

promises to the detriment of the park’s ecology.

L-29 and its four spillway structures (S-12A, B, C, D). (U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, Jacksonville District)
54 United States Army Corps of Engineers

By 1965, the water situation in Everglades National Park had 

become critical. The Interior Department related that pools and 

marshes had evaporated, while saltwater intrusion along coastal areas had shrunk fish and wildlife habitat. At the same time, alligator holes dried up, forcing park officials to dynamite holes out of 

the limestone bedrock to provide adequate habitat for the animals. 

To alleviate the situation, the FCD worked on an emergency water 

release schedule for the park, whereby it would receive water from 

Conservation Area No. 3. This plan went into effect in 1965, but the 

NPS complained that it only provided at best one-tenth of the park’s 

monthly requirements. Meanwhile, because Lake Okeechobee was 

experiencing high water levels in the spring of 1965, the Corps allowed 70,000 acre-feet of water to flow to the Atlantic Ocean and 

the Gulf of Mexico between April 7 and April 22.33 The NPS loudly 

decried these releases because of the parched state of the Everglades, 

wondering why the Jacksonville District could not have sent the water directly to the park. The media picked up on these complaints, 

prominently displaying the park’s dry condition and excoriating the 

Corps for the discharges. Based on these reports, outraged citizens 

began writing letters to the Corps demanding that water from the 

water conservation areas be released into the park. At the same time, 

Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall demanded that the Corps 

study the park’s water problem and develop a solution, and the Senate and House Committee on Public Works passed resolutions requesting such a study. The Corps began work thereafter, but it would 

take three years before its report was finished.34

In the meantime, the Corps and the FCD explained that the 

discharge was necessary to relieve the high water situation quickly 

and that canals were not designed to divert large volumes of water 

southward to the park.35 In addition, William Storch, the director of 

the FCD’s engineering division, emphasized that the FCD had made 

“a reasonable effort” to provide more water for Everglades National 

Park in accordance with “the water needs of the area contributing 

taxes to the support of the District,” namely the EAA and east coast 

urban areas. Storch cautioned people to remember that water supply questions had difficult “social, economic and political considerations,” and he admonished participants to leave emotion out of the 

decision-making process.36

The situation became less severe in September 1965 when 

Hurricane Betsy flooded the Everglades with six to ten inches of 

rain, but the overall problem of water supply to the park remained.37

Therefore, after receiving recommendations from the NPS based 

on past water flows to the Everglades, the Corps and the FCD 

established an interim regulation schedule to supply water to the 

park until the Corps had completed its water study and constructed 

whatever works were necessary. According to the agreement, the 

FCD would pump water from Lake Okeechobee “in addition to 

or in conjunction with pumping for lake regulation as scheduled” 

and the Corps would reimburse the district’s expenses for such 

pumping based on the amounts that actually flowed to the park at 

S-12. The pumping would occur “whenever it is necessary to lower 

the lake level for flood control and at such other times when water is 

available in the lake,” and the water thus pumped would be supplied 

“to the lower East Coast Area and to the Park.”38 In order to allow 

for such conveyance, the Corps would enlarge and extend the North 

New River Canal, the Miami Canal, and the L-67 Borrow Canal. In 

times of imminent emergency, the Corps would still have to send 

floodwater to the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico through 

the St. Lucie Canal and the Caloosahatchee River, but on other 

occasions the FCD could pump water from Lake Okeechobee to 

the water conservation areas for park use.39 After much discussion 

with the Corps, the NPS approved the interim plan, and it went into 

effect in March 1966.40

But a comprehensive water plan was still necessary; as Michael 

Straight wrote in National Parks Magazine, “little can be gained by 

viewing the needs of the park only in emergency and in isolation.”41

Besides, the drought’s effects on wildlife in the park had been startling; NPS officials estimated that only 5 percent of the alligator 

population had survived, and bird numbers were drastically lower 

Deer in Everglades National Park. (The Florida Memory Project, State 

Library and Archives of Florida)
Chapter Four | Conflicting Priorities 55

as well. In the words of Park Superintendent Roger W. Allin, the 

drought years had “caused extensive changes in habitat which may 

have far-reaching influence on biotic balances.”42

Regardless of the damage that the drought had caused, Everglades National Park received more than 1.2 million acre-feet of 

water in 1966.43 Yet the impoundment of water in Conservation 

Area No. 3, coupled with heavy rainfall in the spring and summer 

of 1966, caused severe problems for deer herds in the region and 

placed both the Corps and the FCD under fire for allowing too much

water. But Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission Director O. E. Frye, Jr., claimed that several factors caused the high levels 

in Conservation Area No. 3. Because Everglades National Park demanded “a guaranteed amount of water introduced into the park on 

a daily basis,” and because Lake Okeechobee’s water levels exceeded 

its regulation stage, the Corps and the FCD had released “an unusual amount of water” from the lake and “conveyed [it] southward 

through various canals” to the water conservation areas. Frye continued that stands of sawgrass in the northern part of Conservation 

Area No. 3, coupled with the flat topography of the region, prevented 

water from flowing quickly to the park, making it “stack up in those 

parts of the conservation areas adjacent to the pumping stations.”44

Unfortunately, the region was the home of a large deer population 

which was fawning, and the high water had a devastating impact 

on those animals. As water levels increased, newspapers began publishing accounts of helpless and starving deer stranded in the area; 

environmentalists such as John “Johnny” Jones of the Florida Wildlife Federation characterized the situation as “a wildlife version of 

Auschwitz.”45

To alleviate the problems, the state’s cabinet issued an order to 

the FCD and the Board of Conservation on 12 April 1966 to halt 

pumping temporarily at pump station S-8, located in the northwestern corner of Conservation Area No. 3, so that water levels could 

decrease. When levels remained high, Florida Governor W. Haydon 

Burns ordered the pumping moratorium extended “until favorable 

conditions returned.”46

Even though large-scale pumping ceased, the situation became 

grave in June when Hurricane Alma dumped large amounts of rain 

on South Florida, causing levels in Conservation Area No. 3 to rise 

another six inches and placing already-stressed deer in an emergency situation. In response, sportsmen organizations and other concerned citizens called on Governor Burns to take decisive action. 

Robert F. McDonald, a delegate of the Palm Beach County Airboat 

and Half Track Club, asked Burns to end “this senseless and shameful disregard of our precious remaining wildlife” by forcing the FCD 

to stop pumping, but both the FCD and the Corps insisted that it 

had to pump during heavy rainfall in order to prevent flooding in 

the EAA.47

With the deer herd facing catastrophe, Florida’s cabinet created 

an interagency committee in July consisting of representatives from 

the Board of Conservation, the FCD, and the Game and Fresh Water 

Fish Commission “to develop a program to safeguard the Everglades 

deer herd and other wildlife from intermittent high waters.”48 The 

committee, known as the Everglades Natural Resources Coordinating Committee, consulted with state and federal management agencies to develop plans as to how the deer could be saved. These consisted of several temporary arrangements, including:

n Obtaining NPS approval to cut channels 200 feet wide and 1⁄2 

mile long “immediately south of S-12,” thereby increasing outflow to Everglades National Park (the NPS had previously refused to allow the construction of such structures);

n Increasing the flow of canals by sending water to coastal areas;

n Ceasing pumping at stations S-6, S-7, and S-8 and moving water from the EAA into Lake Okeechobee; and

n Moving some deer to higher ground.

Under the circumstances, Committee Chairman Randolph 

Hodges related, these were “the best solution[s] which could be 

evolved.”49

Meanwhile, the Corps developed both immediate and longterm solutions to the problems. In the summer of 1966, the agency 

supplied mowers to cut sawgrass in the northwestern portion of 

Conservation Area No. 3; it also prohibited vehicles from traversing 

levee roadways so that deer would not experience “needless frightinduced activity,” and it removed a plug at the intersection of the 

Tamiami Canal and Levee 67 Extension Canal so that more water 

could flow southward.50 At the same time, the Corps proposed more 

long-standing answers, such as completing the construction of a canal running south from the Tamiami Canal on Everglades National 

Park’s eastern boundary to increase water flow from the water conservation areas, and conducting studies into the feasibility of building another conveyance canal on the park’s western border. The 

Corps also provided the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission 

with a cost estimate for developing small islands in the conservation areas “above reasonable flood levels” so that deer could have 

“high-water grazing and refuge.”51 In addition, it proposed to build 

a conveyance canal through Conservation Area No. 3 so that water 

could more easily flow southward from the northern parts of that 

area. “All agencies concerned are cooperating fully and doing all possible to relieve the problem,” the Corps concluded, insisting that it 

could not possibly be blamed for not foreseeing the “extremely wet 

season” that affected “an area which is primarily intended for water 

impoundment.”52

But in the summer of 1966, the media continued to report that 

the C&SF Project was in large measure responsible for the deer 

situation, forcing the Corps to take a defensive stance. “The area 

in which these deer are located is a natural swamp,” Acting Chief 

of Engineers Major General R. G. MacDonnell told one concerned 

citizen. If the Corps had not constructed the C&SF Project, MacDonnell stated, the water in Conservation Area No. 3 would have 
56 United States Army Corps of Engineers

flooded cities on the east coast and “the major agricultural lands 

south of Lake Okeechobee.”53 Likewise, Joe J. Koperski, chief of the 

Jacksonville District’s Engineering Division, informed a journalist 

that the C&SF Project had actually prevented $15 million in damages from the June rains. “If the large volumes of excess floodwater 

had not been pumped to the lake and conservation areas,” he continued, “the deer situation would have been far overshadowed by 

headlines citing a disastrous flood in both urban and agricultural 

areas of south Florida.” Koperski claimed that “conservation of natural resources” was a “primary function” of the C&SF Project, and 

he emphasized that using the water conservation areas for flood 

control did not necessarily make them incompatible with fish and 

wildlife propagation.54 Ronald Wise, a commissioner with the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, agreed, although he 

characterized the conservation areas’ “primary purpose” as flood 

control and the storage of water to “guarantee” that Everglades 

National Park had a sufficient supply. Yet if the commission could 

construct “small islands at intervals throughout the conservation 

area,” he concluded, wildlife did not have to suffer during times of 

high water.55

Accordingly, in 1967, the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission began developing islands in Conservation Area No. 3, ensuring 

that they contained open sloughs on their sides so that water could 

continue to flow southward. In addition, the Corps started construction on the different canals and extensions that would facilitate water flow from and within the water conservation areas, including an 

extension of L-67 along the eastern boundary of Everglades National 

Park and a conveyance canal from L-67 to the park. It provided the 

spoil from these projects for the island development. According to 

Randolph Hodges, these measures were “the maximum compr[o]

mise of flood control facilities possible at this time for wildlife preservation without endangering the primary purpose of the flood control project.”56

In the meantime, another controversy arose in 1966 over the 

opening of the Aerojet Canal, or Canal 111, in Southwest Dade 

County. As part of the Dade County Project explained above, the 

Corps constructed the canal in the 1960s, running from just below 

Homestead to Barnes Sound. The initial purpose of the canal was 

to drain lands east and south of Everglades National Park, but after 

Aerojet General, a space technology company, built a rocket engine 

testing center in the region, critics saw the canal as creating a bargeaccessible waterway for Aerojet’s testing facility. In addition, the 

drainage aspect threatened to allow saltwater to creep up the canal 

and contaminate fresh water in the park in times of drought. To prevent water from interfering with bridge construction, the Corps had 

placed an earthen plug in the canal where it intersected U.S Highway 

1 (about two miles inland from Biscayne Bay), and this prevented 

the flow of seawater. Yet upon completion of the bridge, the Corps 

would remove the plug, allowing saltwater to mingle with freshwater 

during unusually high tides and strong winds. The NPS and environmental organizations petitioned the Corps to keep the plug in 

place, but Corps leaders proposed that it remove the plug and observe whether saltwater intrusion really occurred. Objecting to this 

plan, the National Audubon Society and other groups applied for a 

court injunction to maintain the plug. The Corps then informed the 

NPS that the plug would remain “indefinitely” while a plan was formulated to protect Everglades National Park, and by 1969, the Corps 

had constructed an earthen barrier with gated culverts downstream 

from the original plug.57

While the controversy raged over C-111, drought returned to 

South Florida in 1967, renewing cries for more water to the park. 

The battle was becoming more polarized as the 1960s progressed; essentially, it was a question of whether enough water existed for both 

Everglades National Park and agricultural and municipal purposes, 

or whether the FCD and the Corps had to choose among the three. 

As this polarization occurred, environmental organizations began to 

wade into the fray with increasing frequency. The National Parks Association asked Americans to contemplate whether sugar and cattle 

industries should be developed in Florida at the expense of the Everglades, and whether urban centers in South Florida should continue 

to grow if it endangered park tourism and the shrimp industry in 

Florida Bay.58

But not all proponents of fish and wildlife viewed the supply of 

water to Everglades National Park in positive ways. O. E. Frye, Jr., 

director of the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, for 

example, noted in 1968 that continual supplies of water to the park 

were creating critical situations for fish in the water conservation 

areas, and he requested, with the support of the governor’s cabinet, 

that “if it became apparent that a fish kill was in the offing, releases 

to the Park  .  .  .  be discontinued.”59 Clearly, many factors were 

involved in water supply issues for the park, and as views became 

C-111. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District)
Chapter Four | Conflicting Priorities 57

more hardened, the emotionalism decried by Storch became a larger 

component of water management.

Into this charged setting came the Corps’ report on its restudy 

of water needs in South Florida as requested by Secretary Udall and 

as required by Congress. Although the Corps originally planned on 

releasing the report in the summer of 1967, delays, including efforts 

to address concerns expressed by the NPS, extended the completion 

date. In the fall of 1967, the Jacksonville District held public hearings in Belle Glade and Coral Gables on its preliminary findings. 

According to a notice of the hearing, the Corps recommended that 

in order to provide enough water for the needs of South Florida 

through 2000, it needed to modify the C&SF Project in the following ways:

n Raise Lake Okeechobee by four feet to a seasonal regulation 

range between 19.5 and 21.5 feet above mean sea level to provide for more water;

n Pump excess floodwater first to the water conservation areas 

before discharging it to the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico;

n Backpump excess water from Martin and St. Lucie counties to 

Lake Okeechobee to increase available water;

n Allow several canals draining to the coast to backpump excess 

runoff to the conservation areas;

n Deliver 315,000 acre-feet to Everglades National Park annually; and

n Build conveyance canals to South Dade County and the Taylor 

Slough.60

The NPS offered its cautious approval to this plan, now believing that, according to available information, a minimum of 315,000 

acre-feet a year would allow the park to “survive.”61 Others were not 

so sure; the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, for 

example, supported the basic principles of the plan, but objected to 

several specific provisions, including the raising of Lake Okeechobee 

(which it claimed would have harmful effects on both vegetation and 

fish and wildlife) and the fact that the commission could find no 

evidence that the Corps had considered the ecological maintenance 

of the water conservation areas in its plan. Instead, it appeared to 

the commission, “the Conservation Areas will be drawn down and 

sacrificed for the benefit of the water demand areas.”62

Still others were more concerned with the amount of water going to Everglades National Park. For instance, the National Parks Association objected strongly to the proposal, holding that Everglades 

National Park needed at least 400,000 acre feet of water and that this 

amount needed to be explicitly guaranteed. Representatives of the 

National Wildlife Federation agreed, claiming that the annual delivery needed to be “adjusted to account for the [park’s] biological 

needs.”63 Therefore, the National Parks Association called on Congress to eliminate funding for more C&SF Project work in Florida 

“until the Nation as a whole has firm legal assurances, binding on 

the State of Florida and binding even on the Central Florida Flood 

Control District, guaranteeing the necessary water deliveries into 

Everglades National Park permanently.”64

At the same time, agricultural and municipal interests were not 

pleased with the Corps’ recommendations, believing that the Corps 

was providing too much water to Everglades National Park. Dade 

County Manager Porter Homer, for example, criticized the restudy, 

saying that “the 315,000 acre-feet per year used by the corps is not 

based on adequate research.”65 In the weeks following the public 

hearings, Corps officials seemed to pay more attention to agricultural and municipal complaints than to environmental criticisms. 

For one thing, the Corps rethought its proposal to deliver 315,000 

acre-feet to the park. Even though NPS leaders insisted that this was 

a minimum amount that the park needed, South Atlantic Division 

Engineer Major General T. J. Hayes echoed Homer’s complaints that 

no study existed showing that this was “the required amount to sustain the Everglades effectively” since the USGS had merely averaged 

the flow into the park from 1952 to 1961.66 The Corps also refused to 

guarantee water to the park for several reasons, including its lack of 

jurisdiction and the fact that “parks do not have an established priority over other authorized project purposes.”67 In addition, members of the Jacksonville District did not want to upset Florida state 

officials who believed that an annual guarantee would completely 

halt any urban or agricultural development in South Florida. Finally, 

Corps representatives believed that they could provide “the basic 

water demands of the park” without making a guarantee.68

When the Corps issued its final report—prepared under the direction of Colonel Robert Tabb of the Jacksonville District—in May 

1968, it recognized that “preservation of Everglades National Park 

is a project purpose and that available water should be provided on 

an equitable basis with other users.” The Corps stated that the prolonged drought had shown that additional measures were necessary 

“to meet the growing urban and agricultural water-supply needs of 

South Florida while still providing flows sufficient to maintain the 

environment of Everglades National Park.” To do so, the Corps proposed raising Lake Okeechobee levees so that the lake’s level could 

be maintained at between 19.5 and 21.5 feet above mean sea level; 

backpumping excess water into the lake and the water conservation 

areas; improving the conveyance and distribution of water to the 

park through a system of canals, levees, pumping stations, and control structures; increasing the capacity of the North New River and 

Miami canals; and providing for recreational development. If such 

improvements were made, the Corps concluded, it could, on average, offer Everglades National Park 315,000 acre-feet of water while 

still maintaining South Florida’s water needs. Although no specific 

guarantee was provided, the report seemed to make some concessions to the park and the environmental community. But to environmental supporters, the document’s lack of a guarantee was proof that 

the Corps was either unable or unwilling to correct the damage that 

its project caused.69
58 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Yet given the outcry that agricultural and municipal interests 

had raised, the Corps’ avoidance of an explicit assurance seemed a 

logical and middle ground position to take, although not one popular with environmental interests. But in the minds of Corps leaders, there was little else the agency could do. Because flood control 

and water supply were higher priorities under the C&SF Project, the 

Corps could not specifically guarantee water to the park without 

congressional direction, especially if the state of Florida, for whom 

the project was built, was unwilling to compromise on the issue.

At the same time, however, the Corps’ response was one that infuriated observers who noted that the Corps was not a passive agency, unable to do anything without congressional approval. Instead, 

critics charged, the Corps was a highly adaptable, fairly aggressive 

promoter of its own interests. It was especially difficult in the case 

of Everglades National Park to understand why the Corps could not 

merely direct the FCD to supply necessary water to the park, especially since benefiting fish and wildlife was a purpose of the C&SF 

Project, secondary or not. In the minds of many critics, the claim that 

the Corps just followed congressional instruction was disingenuous 

at best and historically inaccurate at worse. Arthur R. Morgan, a leading critic of the Corps who had formerly worked as Chief Engineer 

of the Miami Conservancy District and chairman of the Tennessee 

Valley Authority, for example, claimed that the real reason why the 

Corps did not guarantee sufficient water for the park was because it 

had not conducted “adequate engineering analysis” that focused on 

South Florida as “an environmental unit.” “There is no reticence in 

the Corps about interfering with and changing legislation of public 

policy,” Morgan argued. “It is only where the Corps wishes to prevent 

carrying through a program that it pleads its lack of power.”70

Upset by the lack of an unambiguous guarantee, NPS Director 

George Hartzog, Jr., informed the Board of Engineers for Rivers and 

Harbors that unless the report stated “clearly and unequivocally” 

that Everglades National Park would receive a certain amount of water, the NPS would not concur with the report.71 Unwilling to act on 

“national policy questions outside of the purview of the Board,” the 

board emphasized to the Chief of Engineers the need for water in the 

park, suggesting that the chief should “clearly define the ecological 

objectives and the amounts of supplemental water needed to meet 

those objectives.” But the board required no definite promise of water in the Corps’ report.72

Receiving no help from the Board of Engineers, Assistant Secretary of the Interior Stanley A. Cain reiterated that the Interior Department could not approve the proposed project modifications unless it received “written assurance by the Secretary of the Army that 

he will provide the water supplies as set forth in the report, undiminished by new incursions.”73 Perhaps fearing that Congress would 

not approve the modifications unless the NPS gave its concurrence, 

or perhaps in agreement with the NPS’s position, Major General F. J. 

Clarke, Acting Chief of Engineers, informed Secretary of the Interior 

Stewart L. Udall that “the Chief of Engineers will insure the project 

is regulated to deliver the water requirements of the Everglades National Park as so set forth in the report.”74 At a subsequent meeting 

between the Interior Department, the Department of the Army, and 

the Bureau of the Budget, the Corps assured Interior and the bureau 

verbally that it would provide 315,000 acre-feet of water to the park 

and that future demands would not reduce that figure, but it still 

would not place a specific guarantee in writing. Congress then published the Corps’ report as House Document 369, and authorized 

the modifications, estimated to cost about $70 million, in the Flood 

Control Act of 1968.75

The state of Florida continued to resist any kind of water guarantee to the park. Accordingly, in the summer of 1968, the Corps 

tried to mediate between the state and the NPS to develop a memorandum of agreement that would assure 315,000 acre-feet of water 

to the park except in times of drought when it would share shortages 

with other users on a pro rata basis. The Florida Board of Conservation refused to approve the memorandum, believing that the agreement would forfeit its water rights and insisting that no water user in 

Florida should have priority over another.76

Faced with these problems, the secretary of the interior requested that the department’s solicitor issue an opinion as to whether or 

not the Corps could require the FCD to deliver a certain amount 

of water to Everglades National Park each year. The solicitor argued 

that because Congress approved modifications to the C&SF Project 

upon the recommendation of the Bureau of the Budget, and because 

the Corps assured the bureau and the Interior Department in its July 

meeting that the park could receive 315,000 acre-feet, the law required the Secretary of the Army to manage the project “for the purpose of meeting the water requirements of the Everglades National 

Park.” The solicitor continued that the Secretary of the Army “not 

only has the statutory authority but also a Congressional mandate 

to issue, unilaterally, regulations for the delivery of project water to 

the park.”77

Nevertheless, the Corps began to renege on its verbal assurances, as Robert Jordan, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Civil 

Functions, insisted that the modification authorized the Corps to 

provide the 315,000 acre-feet as an objective, not as a guarantee.78

In an attempt to resolve the problem, the U.S. Senate Committee on 

Interior and Insular Affairs held hearings in June 1969 on water supply to Everglades National Park. At these hearings, Nathaniel Reed, 

special assistant to Florida Governor Claude R. Kirk, Jr., expressed 

the state’s concern for the park, but stated that it was impossible to 

guarantee a certain amount of water each year because of Florida’s 

erratic rainfall. Drought might decimate water supplies to the point 

where the FCD could not supply a required amount. Reed also told 

the committee that certain priorities existed in Florida regarding water: man—meaning municipal supplies—was first, agriculture was 

second, and “somewhere along the line” was Everglades National 
Chapter Four | Conflicting Priorities 59

South Dade County Project map. (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Vero Beach, Florida, administrative files)
60 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Park. However, under a new interim schedule that the FCD was 

developing, the park would receive the necessary water and would 

only be short in times of drought when “everybody will be short.” 

Robert Padrick, chairman of the FCD and a member of the Sierra 

Club, agreed with Reed, explaining that the interim schedule would 

deliver 260,000 acre-feet to Shark River Slough annually “in accordance with the park’s monthly requirements.”79

But Senator Gaylord Nelson, a Democrat from Wisconsin who 

had a strong interest in environmental matters, as evidenced by his 

support in this same time period for the National Environmental 

Policy Act, signed into law by President Richard Nixon on 1 January 1970, could not understand why the state would not agree to a 

guarantee. The federal government had expended $170 million on 

the project, he argued, so the state could not claim that the resulting 

water belonged to it. The intransigence of state officials on the matter 

infuriated Nelson, who called the situation “ridiculous,” “preposterous,” and a “disgrace.”80 Acceding to the wishes of the National Parks 

Association and other environmental groups (who also testified at 

the hearings), he threatened to halt a proposed $9 million appropriation for the C&SF Project if the state would not give the park a guarantee of 315,000 acre-feet regardless of future demands on water.

Only days after the conclusion of the hearings, Nelson 

executed his threat, asking the Senate Public Works Subcommittee 

of the Committee on Appropriations to halt the C&SF Project’s $9 

million appropriation for fiscal year 1970 until the state and park 

officials had reached a water supply agreement. Accordingly, the 

committee’s appropriations report directed the state of Florida, the 

Interior Department, and the Department of the Army to develop 

an operating agreement to ensure water deliveries to Everglades 

National Park. But by 1970, the three parties had held no meetings 

to formulate a plan. Therefore, Senator Spessard Holland requested 

that the Subcommittee on Public Works Appropriations convene a 

conference with the interested state and federal agencies to discuss 

the problem.81

In February 1970, this meeting occurred, with representatives 

from the state of Florida, the NPS, and the Corps attending. To 

begin the discussion, NPS Director George Hartzog stated that he 

could not agree to any plan whereby the park had to share water 

in drought years with future users. Despite these declarations, the 

parties, aided by Holland and Senator Allen J. Ellender, chairman of 

the committee, made some progress and eventually agreed to several 

things. First, they concurred that an interim water supply delivery 

plan developed by the FCD in the summer of 1969 to simulate more 

accurately historical flow patterns would go into effect immediately, 

supplying 260,000 acre-feet of water to Shark River Slough (canal 

enlargement had to occur before the Taylor Slough and the eastern panhandle could receive 55,000 acre-feet). Second, when the 

Corps had enlarged the capacity of Lake Okeechobee to 17.5 acrefeet (which was supposed to occur in two years), the state, the NPS, 

and the Corps would review the plan to see if the park could receive 

more than 260,000 acre-feet. Third, once the Corps had completed 

the necessary construction to increase Lake Okeechobee’s levels to 

21.5 feet, the interim agreement would cease and the FCD would 

deliver 315,000 acre-feet annually. Fourth, in 1980, the Corps would 

conduct a restudy of the C&SF Project and of water demands to see 

what other action was necessary. The only issue that remained was 

whether or not the Corps could establish a priority of use that would 

protect the park from future demands, and Holland and Ellender 

strongly suggested that a meeting to solve that difference occur 

quickly so that appropriations for the C&SF Project could resume.82

On 16 March 1970, the three parties held another conference 

to discuss the water supply problem, but although some conciliation 

was offered, no suitable agreement resulted.83 Therefore, in April, the 

Senate Subcommittee on Flood Control of the Committee on Public Works held a hearing on the matter. During this meeting, Senator Nelson reiterated that unless the state, the NPS, and the Corps 

reached an accord, he would again try to stop any appropriation for 

the C&SF Project, and representatives from environmental organizations such as the National Wildlife Federation, the Florida Wildlife 

Federation, the National Parks Association, and the National Audubon Association concurred with this stance. Harkening back to the 

July 1968 meeting between the Interior Department, the Corps, and 

the Bureau of the Budget, Nelson accused the Corps of reneging on 

its verbal pledge to provide 315,000 acre-feet to the park unencumbered by future uses, and expressed his hope that “escalating public 

concern in America over all environmental matters” would force 

the Corps and the state to guarantee a water supply.84 Upon Nelson’s 

conclusion, Senator Edmund S. Muskie, a Democrat from Maine 

Everglades National Park in the 1960s. (The Florida Memory Project, 

State Library and Archives of Florida)
Chapter Four | Conflicting Priorities 61

Everglades National Park. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and Archives of Florida)
62 United States Army Corps of Engineers

who was known for his support of environmental causes, proposed 

that the hearing investigate what protections Congress could provide to the park. Although no firm conclusions were reached, it was 

clear that some members of Congress would fight until Everglades 

National Park had its guaranteed water.

And, indeed, Nelson and Muskie did. Tired of the constant 

bickering between the state, the Corps, and the NPS, and resigned 

to the fact that no agreement was forthcoming, the two pushed a 

bill through Congress providing money for the conveyance canals 

and pumping stations proposed in the Corps’ 1968 report. But the 

bill also contained a stipulation added by the Committee on Public Works, of which Muskie was a member, that as soon as practicable, and no later than when the Corps had completed the necessary works, Everglades National Park would receive either 315,000 

acre-feet annually, prorated monthly according to an NPS schedule, 

or 16.5 percent of the total water deliveries from the project, whichever was less.85 The committee’s report explained that the proviso 

was added “to secure as promptly and regularly as possible delivery 

of water to the Everglades National Park” and to extinguish all questions of how much water the C&SF Project had to deliver to the park. 

Because the federal government had supplied so much money for 

the C&SF Project, and because the park was “a national asset to be 

preserved for our own and future generations,” the committee believed it had the authority to make this stipulation.86

Although the NPS now seemed to have the guarantee of water 

that it desired, problems resulted almost immediately. Since language 

in the act required the stipulation to become effective as soon as practicable, the Corps and the FCD began implementing it in 1971, a year 

when little rain fell. Therefore, even though the park would have received more water under the FCD’s interim plan, the FCD provided 

water throughout 1971 following Congress’s requirement. This meant 

that the park received 20 to 25 percent less water than what it would 

have procured, while agricultural and urban interests continued to 

receive normal amounts, a situation that struck FCD Executive Director G. E. Dail, Jr., as unreasonable. “Since there is agreement that 

this formula is an extremely poor one,” Dail told Jacksonville District 

Engineer Colonel A. S. Fullerton, “we do not believe that it should 

continue to be applied under current conditions,” especially since 

projections showed that normal rainfall would allow “all essential demands” to be met “without the need to impose a curtailment of water 

use.” Fullerton promised to investigate whether Congress intended 

the formula to apply immediately, but in the meantime, Everglades 

National Park faced a depleted water supply.87

Nevertheless, at least some strides had been made in providing necessary water to the park from the C&SF Project. Throughout the 1960s, the Corps, the FCD, and the NPS all had different 

viewpoints as to the water priority of Everglades National Park, and 

these disparities became glaringly apparent as drought ravaged the 

Everglades. When little water from the C&SF Project was forthcoming, NPS officials demanded that the Corps guarantee to the park 

a certain amount of water untouchable by future demands. In the 

words of NPS Director George Hartzog, it was time for the Corps to 

stop paying mere “lip service to the preservation of the Everglades.”88

Corps leaders, however, claimed that they could not provide such a 

promise, insisting that only the state of Florida could make that assurance. Because of the phenomenal growth of South Florida, and 

because supplying water to the park could have adverse effects on 

fish and wildlife in the water conservation areas (as evidenced by the 

problems with deer herds in 1966), state officials refused to provide 

a guarantee. Despite the opposition of the state and the reluctance 

of the Corps to provide a specific written guarantee, the Corps, in 

the 1968 restudy report, did, for one of the first times since the authorization of the C&SF Project, admit that the project needed to 

supply sufficient water to Everglades National Park. This reiteration 

of the promise in the C&SF Project plan, although somewhat vague, 

showed that the drought of the 1960s and the work of park proponents was having some effect on the Corps’ perception of how the 

project should be operated. It was a small step, but it set the stage 

for congressional leaders, such as Senators Gaylord Nelson and Edmund Muskie, to resolve the situation.

Despite the accomplishments, problems of water quality loomed 

on South Florida’s horizon. The 1968 report’s proposal to supplement Everglades National Park and Lake Okeechobee water by backpumping from east coast lands and agricultural areas, for example, 

produced new concerns about water quality, both in the lake and 

in the park, because the recycled water often contained pesticides, 

fertilizers, and other harmful chemicals. Even as the NPS fought 

for a guarantee of water, another danger threatened park ecology: 

a proposal to build a jetport in the Everglades region. In the 1970s, 

environmental forces first mobilized in the fight for a guaranteed 

water supply would need all of their resources to contend with these 

concerns.

Endnotes

1 See S. D. Leach, Howard Klein, and E. R. Hampton, Hydrologic Effects of Water Control and Management of Southeastern Florida, Report of 

Investigations No. 60 (Tallahassee, Fla.: State of Florida, Bureau of Geology, 

1972), 97.

2 Wedgworth and Miedema interview. Wedgworth, one of the founders 

of the Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida in the 1960s, vehemently 

denies that Castro’s revolution allowed Florida sugar production to increase. 

“Every pound of the quota that Cuba had,” he claims, “was reallocated to 40-

some odd foreign countries, and the domestic sugar producers . . . didn’t get 

one pound of the Cuban quota.”

3 “Florida Acres in Sugarcane (1,000 acres),” document provided by 

George Wedgworth and Barbara Miedema, Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida, Belle Glade, Florida.

4 Tebeau, A History of Florida, 434.
Chapter Four | Conflicting Priorities 63

5 “How the Florida Boom is Changing,” U.S. News & World Report 46 

(5 May 1969): 89; John G. Mitchell, “The Bitter Struggle for a National Park,” 

American Heritage 21, No. 3 (1970): 99; Tabeau, A History of Florida, 431-434.

6 Grunwald, The Swamp, 231-232.

7 See Major General William F. Cassidy, Assistant Chief of Engineers 

for Civil Works, to Honorable Spessard L. Holland, United States Senate, 27 

May 1960, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Conservation Areas Jan 60-June 60, 

Box 15, Accession No. 077-96-0038, RG 77, FRC; Paul M. Tilden, “The Water Problem in Everglades National Park, Part II,” National Parks Magazine

38 (March 1964): 9; Frank Nix, Hydraulic Engineer, Everglades, to Director, 

21 June 1967, File L54 Levee L-31W, EVER 22965, CR-ENPA.

8 “Conference on Conservation Area No. 3, Jacksonville, Florida, 14 

April 1960,” File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Conservation Areas Jan 60-June 60, 

Box 15, Accession No. 077-96-0038, RG 77, FRC.

9 Cassidy to Holland, 27 May 1960.

10 See Nix to Director, 21 June 1967; Stanley C. Joseph, Superintendent, 

to Mr. G. E. Dail, Executive Director, Central and Southern Florida Flood 

Control District, 13 December 1965, File L54 Levee L-31W, EVER 22965, 

CR-ENPA.

11 Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the Interior, to Mr. Secretary, 18 July 

1961, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Project Gen—Flood Control May 1961-

Apr 62, Box 7, Accession No. 077-01-0023, RG 77, FRC; Tilden, “The Water 

Problem in Everglades National Park, Part II,” 9.

12 Elvis J. Stahr, Secretary of the Army, to The Honorable Steward L. 

Udall, The Secretary of the Interior, 7 September 1961, File 1110-2-1150a 

(C&SF) Project Gen—Flood Control May 1961-Apr 62, Box 7, Accession 

No. 077-01-0023, RG 77, FRC; see also Colonel J. V. Sollohub, District Engineer, to Chief of Engineers, 2 August 1961, ibid.

13 Gale Koschmann Zimmer, “Unless the Rains Come Soon . . . “ National Parks Magazine 36 (June 1962): 4-7.

14 As quoted in Zimmer, “Unless the Rains Come Soon . . . “ 4-7.

15 Colonel H. J. Kelly, Acting Division Engineer, to Chief of Engineers, 

4 August 1961, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Project Gen—Flood Control May 

1961-Apr 62, Box 7, Accession No. 077-01-0023, RG 77, FRC.

16 Kelly to Chief of Engineers, 4 August 1961; Colonel J. V. Sollohub, 

District Engineer, to Chief of Engineers, 2 August 1961, File 1110-2-1150a 

(C&SF) Project Gen—Flood Control May 1961-Apr 62, Box 7, Accession 

No. 077-01-0023, RG 77, FRC.

17 W. V. Storch to Files, 13 October 1961, File Conservation Area 1, 2, 

3 1950-69 Deeds/General/Regulation/Petition for Change of Zoning, Box 

02193, SFWMDAR.

18 Storch to Files, 13 October 1961. The phrase “positive water supply 

benefits” was left undefined.

19 See Assistant Secretary of the Interior to General Wilson, 11 May 

1962, in U.S. Army Engineer District, Jacksonville, Corps of Engineers, 

Central and Southern Florida Project, Plan of Survey: Everglades National 

Park Water Requirements (Jacksonville, Fla.: U.S. Army Engineer District, 

Jacksonville, Corps of Engineers, 1964), A-1—A-3 [hereafter referred to as 

Plan of Survey]; Lieutenant General W. K. Wilson, Jr., Chief of Engineers, to 

The Honorable Stewart L. Udall, The Secretary of the Interior, 19 June 1962, 

File CE SE Central and South Florida FCP Everglades NP Basic Data, FWSVBAR. The NPS had first proposed this idea in 1958 when Park Superintendent Warren F. Hamilton told District Engineer Colonel Paul D. Troxler 

that the NPS would prefer to have floodwater provided to the park through a 

floodway flowing south rather than going to the Atlantic Ocean through the 

Caloosahatchee River and St. Lucie Canal. See “Chronological Documentation of National Park Service Efforts and Corps of Engineers Responsibility 

to Assure Everglades National Park of Fresh Water Supply from Central and 

Southern Florida Flood Control Project,” 5, File CE-SE Central and Southern Florida FCP Everglades National Park Basic Data, FWSVBAR.

20 Lieutenant General W. K. Wilson, Jr., Chief of Engineers, to The 

Honorable Stewart L. Udall, The Secretary of the Interior, File 1517-08 

(C&SF) So. Dade Co. Mult. Pur. Svy Reso. 11/15/54, Box 5, Accession No. 

077-96-0017, RG 77, FRC.

21 J. H. Hartwell, H. Klein, and B. F. Joyner, Preliminary Evaluation of 

Hydrologic Situation in Everglades National Park, Florida (Miami, Fla.: United States Department of the Interior, Geological Survey, Water Resources 

Division, 1963), 5, 8.

22 Verne O. Williams, “Man-Made Drouth Threatens Everglades National Park,” Audubon Magazine 65 (September-October 1963): 290-291.

23 U.S. Geological Survey, “The Road to Flamingo: An Evaluation of 

Flow Pattern Alterations and Salinity Intrusion in the Lower Glades, Everglades National Park,” available at <http://sofia.usgs.gov/publications/

ofr/02-59/culverts.html > (10 January 2005); “Summary of Everglades National Park and Its Water Problems,” 1 June 1965, 4, File Everglades Park 

Area—Review of Central and Southern Florida Vol. III, FWSVBAR.

24 Tilden, “The Water Problem in Everglades National Park, Part II,” 10.

25 Plan of Survey, 2-3, 8-9, B-1.

26 Hartwell, Klein, and Joyner, Preliminary Evaluation of Hydrologic 

Situation in Everglades National Park, Florida; “Supplemental Statement of 

Harthon L. Bill,” in Senate Committee on Public Works, Subcommittee on 

Flood Control—Rivers and Harbors, Central and Southern Florida Flood 

Control Project: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Flood Control—Rivers 

and Harbors of the Committee on Public Works, United States Senate, 91st 

Cong., 2d sess., 1970, 178; E. W. Reed, Chief, Branch of Water Resources, to 

Mr. Wallis, 7 July 1964, File L54 Water Resources USGS FY 65, EVER 22965, 

CR-ENPA.

27 United States Department of the Interior, “Position Paper: Water 

Problem, Everglades National Park,” 2-3, EVER 22965, CR-ENPA.

28 See “Research Plan,” 12 December 1963, File CE SE Central and 

South Florida FCP Everglades NP Conveyance Canals (Taylor Slough), 

FWSVBAR.

29 D. C. Tabb and T. M. Thomas, “Prediction of Freshwater Requirements of Everglades National Park,” 3, 4, 12, copy in South Florida Water 

Management District Reference Center, West Palm Beach, Florida.

30 George B. Hartzog, Jr., Director, to Major General Jackson Graham, 

Director of Civil Works, Office of the Chief of Engineers, ca. 22 September 

1965, File 1517-08 (C&SF—Martin County) Multiple Purpose Survey—SR 

7/22/50 August 1965-April 1966, Box 4, Accession No. 077-96-0017, RG 77, 

FRC. South Atlantic Division Engineer Major General George H. Walker 

recommended against parts of the Martin County plan, stating that “our 

relations at this time with various groups interested in the Everglades National Park do not shine bright with mutual trust and respect.” To propose 

to divert water from Lake Okeechobee to Martin County before the water 

budget study was complete, Walker argued, was “prejudging our own findings.” Walker to Chief of Engineers, 3 December 1965, ibid.

31 See “Summary of Corps of Engineers’ Reports on Central and Southern Florida Flood-Control Project,” 7-8, File CE-SE Central and Southern 

Florida FCP Everglades National Park Basic Data, FWSVBAR; “Chronological Documentation of National Park Service Efforts and Corps of Engineers 

Responsibility to Assure Everglades National Park of Fresh Water Supply 

from Central and Southern Florida Flood Control Project,” 13-14.

32 See House, Comprehensive Report on Central and Southern Florida 

for Flood Control and Other Purposes.

33 Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Everglades National Park: Hearings Before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
64 United States Army Corps of Engineers

United States Senate, Ninety-First Congress, First Session, on the Water 

Supply, the Environmental, and Jet Airport Problems of Everglades National 

Park, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, 24; “Summary of Everglades National Park 

and Its Water Problems,” 5; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Fact Sheet: 

The Water Situation in Southern Florida and the Everglades,” 30 June 1965, 

4, File Everglades Park Area—Review of Central & Southern Florida Vol. 

III, FWSVBAR; Luther J. Carter, The Florida Experience: Land and Water 

Policy in A Growth State (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 

1974), 120.

34 See Marian Sorenson, “The Everglades ‘Drought,’“ undated Christian 

Science Monitor clipping, File CE SE Central and South Florida FCP Everglades NP Basic Data, FWSVBAR; Lloyd R. Wilson to Lt. Gen. W. S. Cassidy, 

Chief of Engineers, 18 October 1965, File Everglades Park Area—Review 

of Central & Southern Florida Vol. III, FWSVBAR; Davis, An Everglades 

Providence, 406; Lieutenant General William F. Cassidy, Chief of Engineers, 

to The Secretary of the Army, 3 June 1968, in U.S. House, Water Resources 

for Central and Southern Florida, 90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968, H. Doc. 369, 1 

[hereafter referred to as House, Water Resources for Central and Southern 

Florida].

35 See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Fact Sheet: The Water Situation in Southern Florida and the Everglades” (including marginalia), 8-9; 

Ed Buckow, “Unraveling the Everglades Furor,” Field & Stream 71 (October 

1966): 15. Critics asserted that pumping water southward through the canals 

would have lowered the ground water on cropland.

36 William V. Storch, “South Florida Section, A.S.C.E., Fort Lauderdale, 

October 7, 1965,” 5, 9, File CE SE Central and South Florida FCP Everglades 

NP Basic Data, FWSVBAR.

37 For more information on Hurricane Betsy’s effects on the Everglades, 

see Taylor R. Alexander, “Effect of Hurricane Betsy on the Southeastern Everglades,” Quarterly Journal of the Florida Academy of Science 30 (1967): 10-

24.

38 “Agreement Between the Corps of Engineers and the Central and 

Southern Florida Flood Control District Establishing Basis of Payment for 

Pumping Water for Release to Everglades National Park,” 26 August 1966 

(emphasis in the original), File 1501-07 DACW17-72-A-0004 South Florida 

Water Management District (Lake Okeechobee Discharge into Everglades 

National Park), Box 19, JDAR.

39 Department of the Interior—National Park Service, Department of 

the Army—Corps of Engineers, “Joint Fact Sheet on: Water Situation at Everglades National Park,” 16 February 1966, File CE SE Central and South 

Florida FCP Everglades NP Basic Data, FWSVBAR; Wallace Stegner, “Last 

Chance for the Everglades,” Saturday Review (6 May 1967): 72.

40 Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Everglades National Park, 24.

41 Michael Straight, “The Water Picture in Everglades National Park,” 

National Parks Magazine 39 (August 1965): 7.

42 Quotation in “Rains Fail to Wash Out Florida Worries,” The Evening 

Star (Washington, D.C.), 24 June 1966; see also Stegner, “Last Chance for 

the Everglades,” 72.

43 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Water Levels Fall in Conservation 

Area of Flood Control Project,” File C&SF Flood Control Dist, Box 10, 

S1160, Florida State Board of Conservation Water Resources Subject Files, 

1961-1968, FSA.

44 O. E. Frye, Jr., Director, to Honorable Paul G. Rogers, Member, United States Congress, 31 May 1966, File Everglades High Water Correspondence: 1966, Box 1, S1719, Game & Fresh Water Fish Commission Everglades Conservation Files, 1958-1982, FSA.

45 John C. Jones interview by Brian Gridley, 23 May 2001, 42, Everglades Interview No. 9, Samuel Proctor Oral History Program, University of 

Florida, Gainesville, Florida [hereafter referred to as Jones interview].

46 Frye to Rogers, 31 May 1966.

47 Quotation in Robert F. McDonald, Delegate of Palm Beach County 

Airboat and Half Track Club, to Hon. Haydon Burns, Governor of Florida, 

11 July 1966, File Everglades Conservation Area: General Information Corr. 

1964-1967, Box 1, S1719, Game & Fresh Water Fish Commission Everglades 

Conservation Files, 1958-1982, FSA; see also “Fact Sheet on the Deer Situation in Conservation Area 3,” 8 August 1966, ibid.

48 As quoted in Florida Cabinet Press Release, 12 July 1966, File Everglades Conservation Area: General Information Corr. 1964-1967, Box 1, 

S1719, Game & Fresh Water Fish Commission Everglades Conservation 

Files, 1958-1982, FSA.

49 Randolph Hodges, Chairman, Everglades Natural Resources Coordinating Committee, to All Interested Persons, August 2, 1966, File Everglades 

Conservation Area: General Information Corr. 1964-1967, Box 1, S1719, 

Game & Fresh Water Fish Commission Everglades Conservation Files, 

1958-1982, FSA.

50 “Fact Sheet on the Deer Situation in Conservation Area 3,” 8 August 

1966, File Everglades Conservation Area: General Information Corr. 1964-

1967, Box 1, S1719, Game & Fresh Water Fish Commission Everglades Conservation Files, 1958-1982, FSA.

51 “Fact Sheet on the Deer Situation in Conservation Area 3,” 8 August 

1966.

52 “Fact Sheet on the Deer Situation in Conservation Area 3,” 8 August 

1966.

53 R. G. MacDonnell, Major General, USA, Acting Chief of Engineers, 

to Miss Linda K. Effler, 25 August 1966, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Conservation Area, January 1966-August 1966, Box 15, Accession No. 077-96-

0038, RG 77, FRC.

54 Joe J. Koperski, Chief, Engineering Division, to Miss Vickie Smith, 

St. Paul Dispatch, St. Paul Pioneer Press, 11 August 1966, File 1110-2-1150a 

(C&SF) Conservation Area, January 1966-August 1966, Box 15, Accession 

No. 077-96-0038, RG 77, FRC.

55 Ronald Wise, Commissioner, to Honorable Don Fuqua, Member of 

Congress, House of Representatives, 12 August 1966, File Everglades High 

Water Correspondence: 1966, Box 1, S1719, Game & Fresh Water Fish Commission Everglades Conservation Files, 1958-1982, FSA.

56 Quotation in Randolph Hodges, Director, Board of Conservation, 

to Dr. O. E. Frye, Jr., Director, Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, 

9 February 1967, File Everglades Conservation Area: General Information 

Corr. 1964-1967, Box 1, S1719, Game & Fresh Water Fish Commission Everglades Conservation Files, 1958-1982, FSA; see also “Deer Island Project,” 

File E.C.A. High Water & Deer Herds, 1959-1974, ibid.

57 See “NPA Urges Protection from Everglades ‘Salting,’“ National 

Parks Magazine 40 (July 1966): 19; “Opening of Canal 111 Is Delayed for 

Study,” National Parks Magazine 40 (August 1966): 24; Charles H. Callison, “National Outlook,” Audubon Magazine 69 (May/June 1967): 56; Wallace Stegner, “Last Chance for the Everglades,” Saturday Review (6 May 

1967): 72; Blake, Land Into Water, 216; Light and Dineen, “Water Control 

in the Everglades,” 70; “Aerojet Canal: No Barge Ever Came; Bridge Never 

Opened,” The South Dade News Leader, 13 July 1971. Other canals proposed as part of the Dade County Project aroused similar controversy; in 

1971, state officials halted digging of C-109 and C-110, located south of 

C-111, because agricultural interests north of the canals feared that the 

waterways would drain water that they needed. Park officials also worried 

that the canals would convey polluted water into the Everglades. See “Plug 
Chapter Four | Conflicting Priorities 65

to Remain in 2 SD Canals,” The South Dade News Leader, 1 September 

1971; Joe Brown, Superintendent, to Mr. Don Albright, State Planning and 

Development Clearinghouse, 6 July 1971, File L54 Canals 109-110 (106, 

107, 108), EVER 22965, CR-ENPA.

58 See “‘Glades Vs. Florida’ Issue Seen Brewing,” St. Petersburg Times, 

1 June 1967; “The Defense of the Everglades,” National Parks Magazine 41 

(August 1967): 2; “A Legal Ruling Needed on Everglades Water Rights,” 

Audubon 69 (July/August 1967): 5.

59 O. E. Frye, Jr., Director, to Mr. Randolph Hodges, Director, State 

Board of Conservation, 2 May 1968, File E.C.A. High Water & Deer Herds, 

1959-1974, Box 1, S1719, Game & Fresh Water Fish Commission Everglades 

Conservation Files, 1958-1962, FSA.

60 Department of the Army, Jacksonville District, Corps of Engineers, 

“Notice of Public Hearings on Improvements for Water Resources for Central and Southern Florida,” 27 October 1967, 3, File Draft Reports: Water 

Resources 1967, 1968, Box II-13, Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, Alexandria, Virginia [hereafter referred to as 

HQUSACE]. 

61 Deputy Director to Brig. Gen. H. G. Woodbury, Jr., Director of Civil 

Works, Office of the Chief of Engineers, 20 October 1967, EVER 22965, CRENPA. Another factor in the NPS’s willingness to accept the 315,000 acrefeet figure could have been the realization that, given the state of Florida’s 

concerted opposition to even a 315,000 acre-feet guarantee, obtaining more 

than 315,000 acre-feet was unlikely.

62 “Comments on the Survey Review Report on Water Resources for 

Central and Southern Florida Project by the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission,” 5, File E.C.A. Control Water Study Plans & Reports, 

1967-1970, Box 1, S1719, Game & Fresh Water Fish Commission Everglades 

Conservation Files, 1958-1982, FSA.

63 Herbert L. Alley, Director Region 4, National Wildlife Federation, 

to Colonel R. B. Tabb, District Engineer, 20 October 1967, EVER 22965, 

CR-ENPA.

64 “Water for Everglades National Park,” National Parks Magazine 41 

(December 1967): 2.

65 As quoted in “Corps Water Proposal ‘Failure,’ Says Homer,” South 

Dade (Fla.) News Leader, 16 November 1967.

66 Bill to Brig. Gen. H. G. Woodbury, Jr., 20 October 1967, File Central 

Florida Water Supply, Central and Southern Florida 1967, Box II-13, Office 

of History, HQUSACE; Hayes to Brigadier General H. G. Woodbury, Jr., 10 

January 1968, File Draft Reports: Water Resources 1967, 1968, Box II-13, 

Office of History, HQUSACE.

67 “Draft, General Position on Everglades,” 7 November 1967, File Central Florida Water Supply Central and Southern Florida 1967, Box II-13, 

Office of History, HQUSACE (emphasis in the original).

68 Quotations in Chief, Engineering Division, to District Engineer, 4 

January 1968, File Draft Reports: Water Resources 1967, 1968, Box II-13, 

Office of History HQUSACE; see also Hayes to Woodbury, 10 January 1968.

69 Quotations in House, Water Resources for Central and Southern Florida, 1, 6-7; see also Department of the Army, Jacksonville District, Corps of 

Engineers, Survey-Review Report on Central and Southern Florida Project: 

Water Resources for Central and Southern Florida, Main Report (Jacksonville, Fla.: Department of the Army, Jacksonville District, Corps of Engineers, 1968), 29, 46; Davis, An Everglades Providence, 407-408.

70 Arthur E. Morgan, Dams and Other Disasters: A Century of the Army 

Corps of Engineers in Civil Works (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1971),

386.

71 George B. Hartzog, Jr., Director, to Chairman, Board of Engineers 

for Rivers and Harbors, 11 April 1968, File BERH Public Notices 1968, Box 

II-13, Office of History, HQUSACE. For more information about Hartzog’s 

role in the fight for Everglades water supply, see George B. Hartzog, Jr., Battling for the National Parks (Mt. Kisco, N.Y.: Moyer Bell Limited, 1988), 225-

231.

72 See Major General R. G. MacDonnell, Chairman, to Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army, 7 May 1968, File BERH Public Notices 

1968, Box II-13, Office of History, HQUSACE.

73 Stanley A. Cain, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, to General Cassidy, 12 June 1968, File 1517-08 (C&SF Martain [sic] County) Svy Multiple 

Purposed—SR 7/22/50 July 1967, Box 4, Accession No. 077-96-0017, RG 

77, FRC.

74 Major General F. J. Clarke, Acting Chief of Engineers, to The Honorable Stewart L. Udall, The Secretary of the Interior, 14 June 1968, File 1517-

08 (C&SF Martain [sic] County) Svy Multiple Purposed—SR 7/22/50 July 

1967, Box 4, Accession No. 077-96-0017, RG 77, FRC.

75 Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Public 

Works, Water Supply for Central and Southern Florida and Everglades National Park: Meeting Arranged by Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, 21-22, 25-26; Act 

of 13 August 1968 (82 Stat. 731).

76 “Transcription of Information Given by Brigadier General Charles 

C. Noble, OCE, in Telephone Conversation with FBC for a Proposed Memorandum of Agreement Between OCE, BOB, and Dept. of Interior, to be 

Contained in a Letter from the National Park Service to the Chief of Engineers, 19 July 1968, File Everglades, Box 6, S949, Governor’s Office, Jay 

Landers, Subject Files, FSA; Randolph Hodges, Director, to Brigadier General Charles C. Noble, 23 July 1968, ibid.

77 Quotation in Solicitor to Secretary of the Interior, 8 October 1968; 

see also Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Public 

Works, Water Supply for Central and Southern Florida and Everglades National Park, 21-22, 25-26.

78 Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Public 

Works, Water Supply for Central and Southern Florida and Everglades National Park, 26.

79 Reed and Padrick quotations are both in Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Everglades National Park, 50-59, 65.

80 Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Everglades National Park, 32-33, 44-46; see also “Nelson Asks Water for Everglades,” The 

Miami Herald, 5 August 1969.

81 Spessard L. Holland to Hon. Allen J. Ellender, Chairman, Public 

Works Subcommittee, 22 January 1970, in Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Public Works, Water Supply for Central and 

Southern Florida and Everglades National Park, 1-2; Senate, Public Works for 

Water, Pollution Control, and Power Development and Atomic Energy Commission Appropriation Bill, 1970, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, S. Rept. 91-528, 

Serial 12834-4, 24-25; “Battle Rages Over Everglades Park,” The Christian 

Science Monitor, 14 June 1969.

82 Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Public 

Works, Water Supply for Central and Southern Florida and Everglades National Park, 20, 39-40.

83 “Report of Meeting with Representatives of the Departments of 

Army and Interior and State of Florida on Water Supply to Everglades National Park, Miami, Fla., March 12, 1970,” in Senate Committee on Public 

Works Subcommittee on Flood Control—Rivers and Harbors, Central and 

Southern Florida Flood Control Project, 98-100.

84 Senate Committee on Public Works Subcommittee on Flood Control—Rivers and Harbors, Central and Southern Florida Flood Control Project, 106, 111, 151, 228-232, 236-240.
66 United States Army Corps of Engineers

85 Act of 19 June 1970 (84 Stat. 310); see also Blake, Land Into Water, 

194; Carter, The Florida Experience, 124.

86 Senate, River Basin Monetary Authorizations and Miscellaneous 

Civil Works Amendments, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, S. Rept. 91-895, Serial 

12881-3, 16-17. The report further explained how the committee reached 

the 16.5 percent formula. The Corps had estimated in its 1968 report that 

the C&SF Project could deliver 1,905,000 acre-feet of water. Three hundred 

fifteen thousand acre-feet was approximately 16.5 percent of that figure. 

Therefore, whenever the project supplied water at its normal capacity, the 

park would receive at least 315,000 acre-feet. In times of drought, “the park 

guarantee of 315,000 acre-feet will be proportionately reduced.” This formula eliminated “priorities of use between present and future water users” and 

did not “rest on the reliability of Corps projections of future demand and 

water supply—concepts which have been the subject of continuing dispute 

and misunderstanding” (pp. 18-19).

87 See Colonel A. S. Fullerton, District Engineer, to Division Engineer, 

South Atlantic, 25 June 1971, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Water Resources—

Proj. Gen 1968 Authn Jan 1971-Dec 1971, Box 16, Accession No. 077-02-

0048, RG 77, FRC; G. E. Dail, Jr., Executive Director, to District Engineer, 

Jacksonville District, 18 October 1971, ibid.; James L. Garland, Chief, Engineering Division, to Superintendent, Everglades National Park, 28 October 

1971, ibid.

88 Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks, 228.


69

In the late 1960s, environmentalists came to the defense of Everglades National Park and its water needs. Two other controversies 

in the late 1960s and early 1970s—the proposal to build a jetport 

in Big Cypress Swamp and the construction of the Cross-Florida 

Barge Canal—would mobilize and crystallize the environmental 

movement in Florida to an even greater degree. On their faces, these 

two skirmishes, which have already been widely discussed by environmentalists, journalists, historians, and political scientists, seem 

to have little place in a history of the C&SF Project. The jetport, for 

example, generated little Corps involvement, in part because it had 

no direct impact on the C&SF Project.1 The barge canal—although 

planned and constructed by the Corps—was located in northern 

Florida, outside of the scope of the C&SF Project. But for several 

reasons, both of these stories must be told in order to comprehend 

the full history of water management in South Florida. Both highlighted growing concerns with water quality in Florida in the late 

1960s and early 1970s, concerns that would eventually reach an apex 

with the debate over the Kissimmee River and Lake Okeechobee in 

the 1970s. Both dealt with how industrial and engineering structures could harm a unique ecosystem, be it Big Cypress Swamp or 

the Oklawaha River Valley. Perhaps most importantly, both showed 

the increasing influence of the environmental movement in Florida 

in water management matters. In both instances, environmentalists were able to focus national attention on the controversies, 

forcing both the legislative and executive branches of the federal 

government to become involved. The jetport controversy and the 

debate over the Cross-Florida Barge Canal thus foreshadowed how 

environmentalists would handle water management issues in South 

Florida in the 1980s and 1990s.

Chapter 5

In the 1960s, environmentalism became an established force 

in the United States. The conservation movement of the late 1800s 

and early 1900s provided a greater awareness of the environment, 

but it was not until the 1960s that an actual movement—“concerted, 

populous, vocal, influential, active”—coalesced.2 Several factors 

contributed to this, including the expansion of the nation’s economy 

in the 1940s and 1950s, which created a more affluent society and 

increased the number of college educated, middle-class Americans 

who had time to think about and work for a better quality of life.3

This was significant, as it focused citizens more on a holistic view 

of the environment and the importance of environmental quality, 

rather than just wise use, efficiency, and the use of technology to help 

humans get the most from natural resources.

Likewise, the acceptance of environmental causes as a legitimate 

aspect of the liberal agenda, the grass roots activism of middle-class 

women and men, and an infusion of energy by the United States’ 

counterculture played a large role in heightening concern for the environment. Democratic politicians, for example, saw environmental preservation as a worthwhile cause. President John F. Kennedy 

sponsored a White House Conference on Conservation in 1962 and 

appointed environmental enthusiast Stewart L. Udall as his secretary 

of the interior, while President Lyndon B. Johnson pushed the environmental agenda even further as part of his “Great Society” plan, 

in part because of the influence of his wife, Lady Bird Johnson. Indeed, women were an essential part of the expanding environmental 

movement, just as they had been an important component of the 

conservation movement. Many women protested environmental 

degradation in the 1960s as part of their domestic sphere responsibilities: poor water quality or contaminated milk could affect the 

Flexing the Environmental Muscle: The Cross-Florida Barge 

Canal, the Everglades Jetport, and Big Cypress Swamp
70 United States Army Corps of Engineers

health of their children. Other women found the environmental 

cause liberating and a way to become more involved in politics and 

economics. Finally, many young activists in America embraced environmentalism as a part of their war against authority, consumerism, and large corporations, especially in the late 1960s. “Hippies” 

founded communes based on becoming one with the earth, while 

student radicals equated the use of chemical defoliants in the Vietnam War with oil spills and other environmental destruction in the 

United States. The vigor of these activists infused the environmental 

movement with necessary energy.4

As evidence of environmental destruction, environmentalists turned to ecologists for support. Ecology (a term first used by 

German zoologist Ernst Haeckel in 1866) had slowly evolved in the 

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries into a stand-alone scientific 

discipline focused on the study of how animals relate to their inorganic and organic environments. The Ecological Society of America 

was formed in 1915, and the first ecology departments at universities 

were established in the 1950s. By that same decade, the examination 

of all elements in a bounded environment, or ecosystem, and the effects that individual actions had on other aspects of the system, had 

become an essential part of ecology, influenced by the work of E. P. 

Odum.5

As the environmental movement gained in momentum, it used 

the ecosystem concept to show the consequences of human actions 

on the environment, and ecologists, in turn, became caught up in 

the environmental movement; scientists began to write books and 

articles for a more general audience, as well as giving public lectures, 

in order to obtain public support for funding and “to educate the 

public about the history of science as well as the significance of current research.”6

 Rachel Carson, a marine biologist, for example, published Silent Spring in 1962, a book that, in the eyes of many, ushered 

in the environmental movement. Other scientists followed, including biologist Barry Commoner, who published The Closing Circle, 

and Paul Ehrlich, an entomologist whose book The Population Bomb

warned about the dangers of overpopulation. Spurred on by these 

publications, environmentalism became more prominent in American society in the 1960s; the number of articles on environmental 

topics in national magazines increased by more than 300 percent 

from the late 1950s to the late 1960s. Membership in the Sierra Club 

grew from 15,000 in 1960 to 113,000 in 1970, while the National 

Audubon Society expanded from 32,000 constituents in 1960 to 

148,000 in 1970.7

By the end of the 1960s, environmentalism had become a hot 

political topic, and senators such as Wisconsin’s Gaylord Nelson, 

Maine’s Edmund Muskie, and Washington’s Henry Jackson made 

environmental protection one of their primary focuses in Congress. 

Due to their influence, Congress passed a law in December 1969 declaring the federal government’s responsibility towards the environment—the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). It stipulated 

that the government would cooperate with state and local entities to 

ensure the coexistence of man and nature “in productive harmony.” 

The law established a Council on Environmental Quality in the Executive Office of the President “to appraise programs and activities 

of the Federal Government,” and it also required federal agencies 

to prepare environmental impact statements (EISs) whenever they 

conducted activities “significantly affecting the quality of the human 

environment.”8

 In accordance with the policy established by NEPA, 

Congress and the White House created the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) soon after NEPA’s passage to regulate actions affecting the nation’s environment.9

With the aid of NEPA, environmental groups began to attack the Corps with more frequency and with more concerted approaches. Because the law required federal agencies to produce EISs 

for their projects, it opened federal construction proposals to more 

public scrutiny than ever before. The law therefore forced the Corps 

and other federal agencies to consider environmentalist concerns in 

their endeavors, heightening the already-burgeoning power of the 

movement.10 Nowhere is this more apparent than in the issues surrounding the Cross-Florida Barge Canal, the Everglades Jetport, and 

Big Cypress Swamp in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

As environmental organizations increased the visibility of 

construction projects in Florida, several Floridians increased their 

prominence in the national eye. Joseph B. Browder, for example, a 

former television producer who quit his job to focus on environmental issues, served as the southeastern regional representative of 

the National Audubon Society and was instrumental in forming the 

Everglades Coalition to defeat the jetport. During the debate over 

the jetport, he testified before numerous congressional committees 

about the airport’s potential effects on Everglades National Park. 

Browder also convinced Marjory Stoneman Douglas, the author of 

The Everglades: River of Grass, to found Friends of the Everglades 

in 1969 to fight the jetport proposal. Arthur R. Marshall, a marine 

biologist who worked at the Vero Beach office of the U.S. Fish and 

Wildlife Service until 1970 (when he took a position at the University of Miami), spent countless hours educating people on the South 

Florida water system, believing that the Everglades needed its natural flow restored in order to prevent the region from dying. Marshall 

also criticized Florida’s grow-at-all-costs approach to land use and 

water planning, believing that some restrictions were necessary to 

preserve the state’s water supply.11

In both federal and state offices, Browder, Douglas, and Marshall had some receptive audiences; the importance of ecological 

issues in Florida transcended political parties. Although President 

Richard Nixon, a Republican, did not agree with much of the environmental movement, he understood politics well enough to support some key issues, such as NEPA and the Clean Air Act of 1970, 

in order to deflect the political influence of rivals such as Edmund 

Muskie and Henry Jackson. Nixon also appointed some crucial 
Chapter Five | Flexing the Environmental Muscle 71

environmental officers, including Deputy Assistant to the President 

for Domestic Affairs John Whitaker, who held a deep concern for the 

environment; Russell Train, the undersecretary of the interior who 

became chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality in 1970; 

and Nathaniel Reed, special environmental assistant to Florida Governor Claude Kirk, who became assistant secretary of the interior for 

fish, wildlife, and parks. Because of Reed’s familiarity with Florida 

issues, he was instrumental in achieving national concern for problems affecting the Everglades and South Florida. On the state level, 

Governor Claude R. Kirk, Jr. (Republican, 1967-1971) understood 

the political benefits of supporting environmental causes, while his 

successor, Reubin Askew (Democrat, 1971-1979) was more committed personally to environmental action, as was Jay Landers, his environmental adviser. Because of the efforts of these officials, environmentalists were able to achieve some worthy goals in Florida in the 

late 1960s and early 1970s, especially revolving around Big Cypress 

Swamp and a proposed jetport in the area.12

In order to defeat the jetport, environmentalists used tactics 

pioneered in the fight against a Florida construction project, albeit 

in northern Florida, planned by the Corps of Engineers: the CrossFlorida Barge Canal. The canal had deep historical roots. The idea 

for a waterway connecting one side of Florida to the other had existed since the initial Spanish occupation of Florida in the 1500s, and 

Floridians had made several proposals of a trans-Florida canal in the 

1800s and early 1900s.13 With General Charles P. Summerall, a retired four-star general who had served as Chief of Staff from 1926 to 

1930 heading the efforts, support for the canal gained momentum in 

the 1930s, in part because it promised jobs for a depression-ridden 

state, and in part because the Corps determined that a feasible route 

existed. The Corps concluded that the best path for the canal, which 

would be a sea-level ship canal, would begin on Florida’s western 

gulf coast at Yankeetown (approximately 70 miles north of Tampa), 

where the Withlacoochee River flowed. The canal would follow the 

Withlacoochee east to Dunnellon, and then northeast (but south of 

Ocala) to the Oklawaha River. Following the Oklawaha, it would 

connect to the St. Johns River at Palatka, eventually emptying into 

the Atlantic Ocean at Jacksonville. President Franklin D. Roosevelt 

authorized using emergency funds for the construction of this route 

in order to provide jobs in Florida, leading the Corps to begin construction on the waterway. After spending $5 million and clearing 

nearly 5,000 acres of land in the late 1930s, however, the project 

was abandoned, largely because of opposition from railroads and 

other entities, which claimed that poor water quality and aquifer 

contamination would result. Therefore, the Corps developed a new 

plan in 1943, proposing that the canal be a lock, rather than a sealevel structure, that would serve barges instead of ships. The 12-foot 

deep waterway would contain five locks and two dams, including the 

Rodman Dam and Eureka Dam across the Oklawaha River. However, due to the United States’ participation in the Second World War, 

the canal received little federal support.14

Governor Claude Kirk (left) presenting an award to Nathaniel Reed 

(right). (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and Archives of Florida)

Location of the proposed Cross-Florida Barge Canal. (The Florida 

Memory Project, State Library and Archives of Florida)
72 United States Army Corps of Engineers

The major push for construction of the barge canal came in the 

1960s after John F. Kennedy won the presidency, partly on a platform 

guaranteeing the waterway’s construction. His support, coupled 

with state backing engineered by Governor Farris Bryan, pushed 

Congress to appropriate funds for the canal’s construction in 1962. 

On 27 February 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson presided over a 

groundbreaking ceremony in Palatka that commenced canal construction once again.15

However, opposition to the canal gradually coalesced, largely 

because of its potential environmental harm. In 1962, after seeing 

a presentation by the Alachua Audubon Society, Marjorie Carr, a 

resident of Gainesville and wife of University of Florida zoologist 

Archie Carr, became convinced that the canal would destroy much 

of the lower stretches of the Oklawaha River. This river meandered 

for 60 miles through northern Florida, east of Ocala, the largest city 

near the river, as an outlet for the Oklawaha chain of lakes, including Lake Apopka. Beginning at Lake Griffin, the river ran through a 

subtropical hardwood forest on its way to the St. Johns River, providing habitat for limpkin, otter, and alligator, as well as numerous game 

fish such as bass. Although farmers had diked the upper portion of 

the river in the 1800s, and although the timber industry extracted 

numerous trees from the forest in the 1880s, the Oklawaha still 

had, in the words of journalist Luther Carter, a “wild and junglelike 

character.”16 Realizing the beauty and importance of the Oklawaha 

ecosystem, Marjorie Carr, together with biochemist David S. Anthony of the University of Florida, began a society-sponsored study 

of the barge canal’s potential environmental effects.17 After deciding 

that the canal and the construction of Rodman Dam and Reservoir 

would largely destroy 40 out of the 50 miles of the Oklawaha that still 

flowed freely, Carr, the Alachua Audubon Society, and the Florida 

Audubon Society asked Congress to investigate alternate routes for 

the waterway, bypassing the river. Stating that the Corps claimed 

that environmental damage would be minimal, Congress refused.18

Yet Carr influenced others, and they began to agitate for the 

preservation of the Oklawaha. In 1966, over 350 people attended 

a state-sponsored public hearing on the canal, which, according to 

William N. Partington of the Florida Audubon Society, was “the largest of its kind to be held on a Florida conservation issue.”19 Critics, 

Governor Claude Kirk (left) presenting an award to Marjorie Carr (center), the driving force behind environmental opposition to the Cross-Florida 

Barge Canal. Carr’s husband Archie (right) looks on. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and Archives of Florida)
Chapter Five | Flexing the Environmental Muscle 73

including a group called Citizens for the Conservation of Florida’s 

Natural and Economic Resources, told state leaders that the canal 

and Rodman Reservoir would kill the Oklawaha’s natural beauty. 

According to Partington, Florida Secretary of State Thomas Adams 

and other officials, using arguments that jetport proponents would 

also make, dismissed these concerns as “birdwatchers let[ting] off 

steam” and counseled environmentalists to move out of the way “so 

that orderly progress could be made.”20 Despite the unproductive 

nature of the meeting, Partington believed it to be a turning point 

in the history of Florida’s environmental movement because it was 

the first time that individuals and disparate groups united behind a 

common ecological cause.

In March 1966, state officials formally endorsed the project, 

and for the next few years, the Corps worked on channel construction and building other works, including Rodman Reservoir. But 

when the Corps filled the reservoir in 1968 and 1969, water hyacinth began to flourish, validating a 1967 report by the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration indicating that algal blooms 

were likely in the reservoir. The Corps continued its work on the 

Eureka Lock and Dam on the Oklawaha, but the condition of Rodman Reservoir led Carr and others, who originally wanted the 

Corps to change only the course of the canal, to call for a complete 

halt to construction.21

In order to effectuate a work stoppage, Florida environmentalists formed the Florida Defenders of the Environment in July 1969 

to coordinate legal work with the Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., 

an organization established in 1967 to litigate against ecological despoilers, specifically against the use of the pesticide DDT (one of its 

founders, Victor J. Yannacone, Jr., lived by the motto “Sue the Bastards”).22 Using environmental litigation to stop potentially destructive projects was a relatively new tactic, having been pioneered in 

1965 by the Sierra Club and other environmental groups to stop the 

construction of a hydroelectric project above the Hudson River. Yet 

it had proved enormously effective, paving the way for the establishment of Florida Defenders, with Partington as chairman and Carr 

as assistant general chairman. Having commissioned a study of the 

canal’s ecological effects, Florida Defenders, assisted by the Environmental Defense Fund, filed a suit against the Corps on 15 September 

1969, charging it with violating the constitutional rights of American 

citizens by destroying the natural resources of the Oklawaha River 

Valley. The litigation asked that the U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., enjoin the Corps from further work on the canal until a 

study on social costs and benefits could be performed.23

Meanwhile, the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission and the FWS both determined that the canal would result in 

drastic changes in the Oklawaha ecosystem and that the Rodman 

Reservoir would degrade quickly into a stagnant nutrient trap. Both 

agencies recommended a detailed ecological study of the canal’s 

impacts.24 At the same time, Florida Defenders of the Environment 

completed its ecosystem study in March 1970. It foresaw only ecological disaster for the Oklawaha Valley—“the only large wild area 

remaining that supports the full spectrum of plant and animal life 

native to north-central Florida”—if the canal was completed. The 

organization, therefore, recommended the halt of further appropriations for the waterway, the draining of Rodman Reservoir, and the 

return of the Oklawaha to its “natural free-flowing condition.”25

In 1970, an article in Reader’s Digest, which had 18 million 

subscribers, attacked the project and the Corps further, influencing 

hundreds of people to write letters to the secretary of the interior 

about the project. In this essay, entitled “Rape of the Oklawaha,” 

James Nathan Miller, an environmentalist, characterized the Corps 

as “the most damaging single force at work on the U.S. countryside” 

and the canal as merely one more pork-barrel boondoggle. He accused Corps leaders of deliberately massaging the canal’s benefitcost ratio in order to justify it economically. Miller asked for not only 

a stoppage of construction, but also recommended that the federal 

government either eliminate benefit-cost analyses altogether (because no economic price could be placed on environmental values) 

or provide ways to “inject human judgment into a formula that now 

accepts only dollar signs.”26

The Corps also began facing battles on the economic front, as 

Congress cut congressional appropriations for the canal. This led to 

a slowdown in construction, and the delay allowed canal enemies to 

increase their efforts. Blazing a path that jetport opponents would 

follow, environmentalists decided to petition the federal government for help. In January 1970, 162 prominent scientists, including 

environmental leaders throughout the United States, sent a letter 

to President Richard M. Nixon, asking him to dismiss the project 

to prevent “further degenerative manipulation of one of the most 

valuable natural ecosystems of Florida” and to preserve “the quality 

of the subsurface water supply of Central Florida.”27 In June, Secretary of the Interior Walter Hickel asked the Secretary of the Army to 

implement a moratorium on construction until new ecological and 

economic studies could be completed. After some resistance, Corps 

leaders agreed to a six- to twelve-month moratorium.28

Meanwhile, the President’s Council on Environmental Quality 

(CEQ) investigated the canal situation. After perusing several ecological studies, the CEQ concluded that the canal would destroy the 

unique characteristics of the Oklawaha River Valley, causing water 

weed infestation in the area, polluting surface and subsurface water, 

and changing the river from “a cool, highly enriched, densely shaded, flowing” waterway to “a warm water, highly enriched, unshaded, 

shallow watercourse, with little or no flow.”29 Because of this potential damage, Russell Train, chairman of the CEQ, recommended to 

John C. Whitaker, Deputy Assistant to the President, that project 

construction halt.

Whitaker forwarded Train’s recommendation, as well as a separate decision paper Whitaker had composed, to John Ehrlichman, 
74 United States Army Corps of Engineers

President Richard Nixon’s aide over domestic affairs. After reviewing 

these documents, Ehrlichman decided that the CEQ had valid reasons for wanting the project halted, so he told the Chief of Engineers 

to end construction. “It’s doing terrific damage,” Ehrlichman recalled 

saying to the general, and “the cost-benefit basis doesn’t prove out to 

me.”30 The Corps did not necessarily disagree, and its Environmental 

Advisory Board (first established in April 1970 to provide advice to 

Corps leaders on ecological concerns) recommended a thorough review of the project in December 1970.31

Before the Corps could make a comprehensive examination, 

U.S. District Court Judge Barrington Parker issued a preliminary 

injunction barring the Corps from further work on the canal. Only 

four days later, on 19 January 1971, Nixon released a written directive that the Corps cease work on the canal to preserve the Oklawaha environment. Not only would the canal significantly harm “a 

uniquely beautiful, semi-tropical stream,” Nixon stated, but it was 

also economically unjustified. “The step I have taken today,” the 

President explained, “will prevent a past mistake from causing permanent damage.”32

But Nixon’s order had repercussions, as both state officials and 

canal proponents believed that he had exceeded his authority.33

Accordingly, the Authority filed a suit in the Jacksonville Federal 

District Court against the United States, stating that the President 

did not have the power to halt construction.34 The litigation continued for the next three years, and on 31 January 1974, U.S. Circuit Court Judge Harvey M. Johnsen ruled that Nixon did not have 

the proper authority to halt the canal, stating that such power rested 

only with Congress. Canal proponents celebrated this victory, but 

it seemed hollow, primarily because Johnsen also issued a permanent injunction on further construction until the Corps completed 

a comprehensive environmental impact statement (EIS) with a revised benefit-cost ratio. Johnsen’s ruling eroded state support of the 

project, as Florida Governor Reubin Askew stated that he and his 

cabinet would not ask for any additional canal appropriations until 

the Corps had completed the EIS, and the Florida Department of 

Natural Resources rescinded its previous support of the canal until it 

had examined the EIS and the economic report.35

The state’s position on the canal was clarified in a two-day public 

hearing held in December 1976. Three hundred fifty people attended, 

some of them wearing green signs proclaiming “Stop the Canal” or 

“Save the Oklawaha,” while others had red and blue buttons declaring 

“I Support the Canal.” After hearing testimony from both sides, the 

cabinet voted six to one to withdraw state support for the canal, and 

on 17 January 1977, it passed a resolution recommending against further construction and asking Congress to deauthorize the project.36

With no further state backing, and realizing that the issue had 

become so politicized that the Corps could not win, the Jacksonville 

District’s EIS, published in 1977, recommended against further construction. Jacksonville District Engineer Colonel Donald Wisdom 

still believed that the canal was both economically and ecologically 

viable, but only if both sides were willing to compromise. Unfortunately, according to Wisdom, canal opponents “no longer could look 

at anything but total stoppage of the canal”; there was no chance 

of conciliation.37 Chief of Engineers Lieutenant General J. W. Morris concurred in the Jacksonville District’s decision to abandon the 

canal, declaring that environmental concerns precluded the Corps 

from continuing the project. The only things left to accomplish were 

the Oklawaha River’s restoration and the project’s deauthorization, 

things that took several years to accomplish. Ultimately, however, 

the state designated canal route lands that it owned as the Cross 

Florida Greenway State Recreation and Conservation Area, renamed 

the Marjorie Harris Carr Cross Florida Greenway in 1998.38

The Everglades Jetport

The battle over the Cross-Florida Barge Canal was not an isolated 

incident; instead, there were several examples in the 1960s and 1970s 

of environmental interests halting or rejecting Corps projects. A proposed dam and reservoir on the Meramec River in eastern Missouri, 

first planned in the 1930s, met its ultimate demise in August 1978 

when voters voted against the project’s continuation for both economic and environmental reasons. Likewise, in southwestern Wisconsin, environmentalists banded with congressional leaders such as 

U.S. Senator Gaylord Nelson to prevent the Corps from building a 

dam and reservoir for flood protection on the La Farge River.39

Another example came in Florida itself, where environmentalists used many of the same tactics that they employed in the 

Cross-Florida Barge Canal fight to defeat a proposed jetport in Big 

Cypress Swamp in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The jetport proposal stemmed from the increasing growth and rapidly expanding 

An editorial cartoon from The Palm Beach Post depicts the “crazy” reasoning that barge canal proponents used to justify the canal.
Chapter Five | Flexing the Environmental Muscle 75

population of South Florida in the 1960s. Dade County, for example, 

saw its population climb from approximately 500,000 people in 1950 

to nearly 1.5 million in 1970. The larger number of residents created a real estate boom that showed no signs of stopping; Florida 

was projected in the 1960s to become the third largest state in the 

United States by 2000 (a prediction slightly off-the-mark, as the state 

had the fourth largest population in 2005). But the state itself did 

not have adequate planning measures for controlling the effects of 

this expansion on vital natural resources, including water. As Paul 

Brooks explained in an article in Audubon in 1969, “pressures on the 

land and water are at a maximum; zoning for their protection at a 

minimum.”40 As Florida continued to grow, the stress on its natural 

resources increased as well.

These problems were clearly seen when Dade County proposed 

the building of a jetport in Big Cypress Swamp on the northwest 

boundary of Everglades National Park. The swamp itself was a mix 

of marsh and lowland forest, containing sloughs, tree islands, bay 

and cypress trees, orchids, ferns, and bromeliads on limestone and 

sand formations. The area was almost completely flat, and it was estimated that 50 percent of the surface water running into Everglades 

National Park (or 9 percent of the park’s total water) came from the 

swamp’s extremely slow-moving sheet flow. The area also housed 17 

endangered species, including the Florida panther, the American alligator, and the roseate spoonbill.41

Despite its ecological importance, many believed that the swamp 

was the ideal place for a new jetport in South Florida. An airport 

was necessary, proponents claimed, because the increasing number 

of tourists going to Miami and South Florida’s east coast brought an 

ever-growing number of flights and travelers to Miami International 

Airport. The fact that Miami was a good departure point for transoceanic travel and that domestic carriers conducted many training 

flights in the area only compounded the problem. In the mid-1960s, 

transportation experts estimated that Miami International Airport, 

which saw 10 million passengers and 500 million pounds of air cargo 

a year, would reach its air traffic saturation point by 1973. Therefore, 

the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Department of 

Housing and Urban Development began searching for sites where a 

new training facility could be located, thereby relieving some of the 

airport’s pressure.42

Working jointly with the Dade County Port Authority, which 

the Florida state legislature had created in 1945, and desiring that 

the site be somewhere remote from human habitation, the FAA determined in April 1966 that the best site was north of the Tamiami 

Trail in Water Conservation Area No. 3, close by the boundary of 

Everglades National Park. But no one consulted with either the NPS 

or the FCD about this location until February 1967. At that time, the 

FCD announced its opposition to the site because it believed an airport was incompatible with the objectives of the water conservation 

areas, and the Dade County Port Authority and the FAA decided to 

search for a new location.43

Initially, the agencies investigated areas south of Tamiami Trail 

and next to Everglades National Park, but park officials complained 

that aircraft noise would disrupt wildlife in those locations. The Port 

Authority therefore turned its attention to southwestern Florida, and 

in November 1967, leaders of Dade and Collier counties announced 

that they had agreed to the construction of a jetport on a 39-square 

mile tract within Big Cypress Swamp, six miles north of the park’s 

Forty-Mile Bend Ranger Station, with an eastern boundary common 

with Conservation Area No. 3’s western border. Two runways would 

be completed within five years to begin pilot training, but the Port 

Authority envisioned that the jetport would eventually have another 

two to four runways and that it would begin conducting domestic 

and international commercial flights when Miami International 

Airport reached its saturation point. Preliminary construction plans 

commenced almost immediately.44

The proposal failed to produce any opposition in its first few 

months. The Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission reviewed the plans and offered no objection; Director O. E. Frye, Jr., 

told the Dade County Port Authority that he was concerned with 

possible jet fuel contamination of Conservation Area No. 3, but he 

dropped the matter after a Port Authority representative assured 

him that no problems would occur. Instead, Frye complimented the 

planners, envisioning “the creation of extensive waterways resulting 

from the construction of elevated runways which could afford virtually unlimited fishing possibilities.”45 According to journalist Luther 

Carter, the FCD, the State Board of Conservation, and the trustees 

of the Internal Improvement Fund also reviewed the plans and made 

no objections.46 NPS officials did voice some concern about the location, fearing a jetport would contaminate water flowing into the 

park, but these protests were only made to Florida Game officials.47

With only limited opposition, the Dade County Port Authority held a groundbreaking ceremony on 18 September 1968. Governor Kirk and U.S. Secretary of Transportation Alan Boyd did not 

attend the festivities, but Kirk sent a statement praising the jetport 

while Boyd participated by telephone. This spirit of cooperation 

ended in October during a meeting between the FCD and the State 

Road Department when Robert Padrick, chairman of the FCD and 

a member of the Sierra Club, discovered that the alignment of proposed Interstate 75 had been changed to cross through the middle of 

Conservation Area No. 3 in order to facilitate travel from Miami to 

the jetport. Because such a placement would have bisected the conservation area, potentially destroying its ecological values, Padrick, 

in the words of John Maloy, an engineer with the FCD, “sounded 

the clarion call,” writing to more than 100 Florida environmentalists, including Nathaniel Reed in the governor’s office, to mobilize 

opposition to the plan.48
76 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Padrick also called a meeting in December 1968 with representatives from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Florida Game 

and Fresh Water Fish Commission, the NPS, Everglades National 

Park, the FWS, the USGS, the Sierra Club, and the National Audubon Society to discuss how to proceed. Park leaders again raised 

concerns that the jetport would pollute water coming into the park, 

while others worried about the impacts of industrial and housing 

developments that would certainly follow the airport’s construction. 

Joseph Browder of the National Audubon Society and Gary Soucie 

of the Sierra Club indicated that the group should focus on relocating the facility, but others seemed unwilling to pursue that option. 

Instead, the gathering decided to submit questions and concerns to 

the Dade County Port Authority for its consideration.49

In the meantime, the jetport proposal began receiving national 

attention. The New York Times covered the issue extensively, in part 

because the New York Port Authority and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority believed that the completion of the jetport 

would divert international travelers to Miami. Some even speculated that the jetport would be bigger than the New York, Los Angeles, and Washington airports combined.50 Anthony Wayne Smith, 

president of the National Parks Association, published an editorial 

against the facility in National Parks Magazine. Calling the jetport 

the latest of numerous environmental follies in Florida, Smith wondered why the United States in general and Florida in particular 

had such difficulty with “economic, social, and governmental planning.” Could people not see that the jetport “greatly imperiled” a 

national park on which the public had “invested vast efforts and 

millions of dollars?” Could not effective land or water planning be 

implemented to prevent such travesties? Not only would the park 

suffer, Smith claimed, but the Miccosukee Indians, who were related to the Seminole and who had a state reservation in the area, 

would as well since the facility covered their traditional hunting 

Map showing the location of the proposed Everglades Jetport. (U.S. Geological Survey, “Preliminary Determinations of Hydrobiological Conditions in 

the Vicinity of the Proposed Jetport and Other Airports in South Florida,” 1969)
Chapter Five | Flexing the Environmental Muscle 77

grounds. He called for concerned citizens to write to Presidentelect Richard Nixon and ask for his help.51

As the criticism mounted, the Dade County Port Authority decided to hold a public hearing on 28 February 1969 to answer growing concerns. At this meeting, Port Authority officials addressed the 

questions submitted to it by federal and state leaders, including what 

other locations had been considered, how the jetport would be operated, what steps the Port Authority would take to guard against water pollution, and what overall regional development planning had 

been made. Yet the Port Authority did not resolve any of these issues, 

answering most of them with a perfunctory “this question is presently under study.”52 Despite this unaccommodating attitude, federal 

agency representatives persisted in their opposition. John C. Raftery, 

superintendent of Everglades National Park, discussed the “enormously complex problems” that the jetport would cause, “including 

disruption of the Park’s remaining natural water supply, introduction 

of pollutants and destruction of Park’s wilderness values.”53 According to one observer, Arthur Marshall, representing the Interior Department, stated that the main problem was the environmental damage the jetport could wreak on South Florida, especially Big Cypress 

Swamp, Conservation Area No. 3, Everglades National Park, South 

Florida estuaries, and the land of the Miccosukee Indians. Air, noise, 

and water pollution were all potential effects, Marshall continued, as 

was the possibility of a reduction in water reaching the park. Because 

of this, Marshall proposed that an interagency working committee be 

appointed consisting of representatives from state and federal agencies, as well as the Miccosukee, to provide solutions to these issues.54

Marshall’s suggestion fell on deaf ears, leading Browder to declare that unless the Port Authority could provide assurances that 

the jetport would not harm the Everglades ecosystem, he would 

wage a national campaign to stop its construction.55 State officials, 

however, seemed largely pacified after the hearing. Reed informed 

Governor Kirk that the building of the jetport in Big Cypress Swamp 

was inevitable, meaning that the state should work to ensure that it 

became a “great” facility with “minimal disturbance of natural values 

and historic water sloughes [sic].” By using “careful planning, zoning, 

and enforcement,” Reed continued, these goals could be reached; he 

also argued that development of the area by the Port Authority—“a 

well financed agency”—was preferable to actions by individual landowners.56

Facing the intransigence of the Port Authority and the passivity of the state, environmental organizations took another approach. 

In April 1969, Smith and Browder formed the Everglades Coalition 

as a way for different national associations to work together for the 

stoppage of the jetport proposal. Smith and Elvis Stahr, former Secretary of the Army who served as president of the National Audubon Society, co-chaired the organization, while Browder served as 

its coordinator. This group contained representatives from most of 

the major environmental organizations in the United States, including the National Parks Association, National Audubon Society, Wilderness Society, Sierra Club, Nature Conservancy, National Wildlife 

Federation, and the Friends of the Earth—in the words of Smith, 

“practically the entire conservation movement.”57 Other organizations, such as the United Automobile Workers of America and the 

United Steelworkers of America also joined. The major objectives of 

the Everglades Coalition were to stop jetport construction, to preserve Big Cypress Swamp, and to protect Everglades National Park.

Meanwhile, Marjory Stoneman Douglas formed another organization whose initial purpose was jetport opposition. One night 

in a Miami grocery store, Douglas encountered Susan Wilson, one 

of Browder’s assistants, and told her how impressed she was with 

Browder’s work on the jetport problem. Instead of accepting the 

compliment, Wilson asked Douglas what she was doing to help the 

Everglades. “Oh me?” Douglas answered. “I wrote the book.” Wilson, quick to seize the opportunity, rejoined “That’s not enough,” 

informing Douglas that they needed more help. A bit taken aback, 

Douglas mumbled that she was willing to do whatever she could. 

The next day, Browder called her and asked her to write a “ringing 

An editorial cartoon from Audubon Magazine shows the conflicts between airplanes and wildlife that the jetport would produce.
78 United States Army Corps of Engineers

denunciation of the jetport” in the press.58 When Douglas demurred, 

explaining that such statements were better coming from organizations, Browder told her to form one, explaining that she could unite 

some of the local individuals and organizations interested in preserving the Everglades in the same way that he had brought national 

interests together. Accepting Browder’s challenge, Douglas created 

the Friends of the Everglades and opened it to all interested parties, 

requiring only a membership fee of $1. It grew steadily over the next 

few years as Douglas and other members traveled throughout South 

Florida, informing citizens about the jetport and the destruction it 

could cause.59

The Everglades Coalition and the Friends of the Everglades 

heightened public awareness about the jetport, and they also implemented a new strategy to stop the development. In the Department 

of Transportation Act of 15 October 1966, Congress had inserted a 

proviso that the secretary of transportation could not approve any 

undertaking using land from “a public park, recreation area, wildlife 

and waterfowl refuge, or historic site” unless he or she had first determined that no other feasible alternative existed and that the program 

had implemented sufficient mitigations to “minimize harm” to such 

areas.60 Because the jetport required the rerouting of Interstate 75 

through Conservation Area No. 3, representatives of the Everglades 

Coalition, Sierra Club, National Audubon Society, and other organizations argued that the airport’s construction fell under the authority 

of the Transportation Act. Secretary of Transportation John Volpe 

had not made any studies of feasible alternatives or of environmental 

effects, they claimed, meaning that he had not complied with the law. 

In April 1969, Everglades Coalition members sent a letter to Volpe, 

urging him to conform to the act by stopping construction and relocating the airport. “We would hope that the burden of resolving this 

conflict would not have to fall upon the shoulders of the President of 

the United States,” they concluded.61

But environmentalists were well aware that the involvement of 

high-level federal officials, and perhaps even President Nixon, might 

be necessary to prevent the jetport’s construction.62 Fortunately for 

them, they had an ally in Secretary of the Interior Walter Hickel. 

In March 1969, Hickel had toured South Florida to attract attention 

to alligator poaching in Everglades National Park. While there, he 

flew over the proposed jetport site, observing the completed runway 

and contemplating the “long-term damage” that the facility could 

cause.63 Hickel and other Interior officials were especially worried 

about water pollution, stemming both from the jetport itself and 

from the construction of industrial and residential areas around the 

facility. Such development, Hickel believed, would dump fertilizer, 

insecticides, and sewage into water flowing into the park. After his 

return, Hickel contacted Volpe to express his concerns.64

Due to Hickel’s pressure, as well as the constant criticism of environmental organizations, Volpe agreed in June 1969 to the creation 

of a joint committee of Interior and Transportation representatives 

to conduct studies on the jetport. The Interior Department took 

the lead on the examination of environmental effects, designating 

Dr. Luna Leopold, a USGS research hydrologist who was one of the 

most prominent geomorphologists of the twentieth century, as well 

as former head of the USGS’s water resources division and the son 

of famed wildlife conservationist Aldo Leopold, as the coordinator 

of the study, with Arthur Marshall serving as the Florida liaison and 

Manuel Morris of the NPS as the federal contact. Governor Kirk, together with Reed, applauded the idea. Apparently, public discontent 

with the proposed jetport had convinced Kirk and Reed to cooperate 

with the environmental study.65

As the study commenced, the U.S. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, under the leadership of Senator Henry 

M. Jackson of Washington, held hearings on Everglades National 

Park water issues, including the jetport. All interested parties were 

Marjory Stoneman Douglas, founder of Friends of the Everglades. (The 

Florida Memory Project, State Library and Archives of Florida)
Chapter Five | Flexing the Environmental Muscle 79

represented, such as the Interior Department, the FCD, the Corps of 

Engineers, the EC, the National Audubon Society, the Sierra Club, 

and the Dade County Port Authority. Critics of the jetport explained 

that they wanted the Port Authority to find another location for the 

facility; they were not asking for its complete elimination. The Port 

Authority, however, represented by William W. Gibbs and C. H. Peterson, doubted that another feasible site existed. Besides, they testified, the Port Authority had only plans to construct a training facility; it would not build a full-fledged jetport “until it can be clearly 

proven that such development will not have an adverse effect” on the 

park.66 Senator Gaylord Nelson found that difficult to believe, especially because the Port Authority’s 1968 annual report had delineated 

plans to convert the training operation into a commercial jetport by 

1980 at the latest. In addition, Gibbs and Peterson angered Nelson by 

telling him that the Port Authority had no responsibility for any kind 

of development that occurred outside the 39-square-mile area, even 

though Port Authority Director Allen Stewart and Deputy Director 

Richard Judy kept boasting about the huge growth that would follow 

the jetport’s construction. Who would take responsibility for ensuring that development did not harm the park, Nelson wondered. Peterson answered that it was a county duty, but that did not appease 

Nelson who decried the lack of land and water planning in Florida.67

The flippant attitude of the Dade County Port Authority regarding Big Cypress development upset environmentalists, as did 

several inflammatory quotations attributed to jetport supporters in 

the press. Michael O’Neil, Florida’s secretary of transportation, for 

example, told reporters that he did not care if the jetport harmed 

alligators because the animals “make nice shoes and pocketbooks.” 

Meanwhile, Judy proclaimed that “Big Cypress Swamp is just typical South Florida real estate” that would eventually be “one of the 

great population centers of America,” while Stewart announced that 

“a new city is going to rise up in the middle of Florida . . . whether 

you like it or not.”68

As jetport proponents made such bold pronouncements, and as 

the September opening of the first runway neared, a spate of critical articles appeared in national publications. In July, National Parks 

Magazine published a piece, complete with photographs of bulldozers and downed trees, calling attention to the “serious new threat” 

that the jetport posed to Everglades National Park.69 That same 

month, an article in Audubon by environmentalist Paul Brooks condemned the jetport, quoting Park Superintendent John C. Raftery 

as stating that the park faced “slow death” if the facility became a 

reality. “As now located,” Brooks declared, “the Everglades jetport is 

an abortive offspring of the unholy wedlock of the booster and the 

engineer.”70 Only by ensuring its removal could environmentalists 

protect the park from ultimate destruction.

General news magazines also provided publicity. Time called 

the battle over the jetport a “testing ground for U.S. environmental policies,” stating that environmentalists feared the impacts of 

“jet noise, exhaust fallout, fuel and oil spills” on Everglades National 

Park, as well as “the prospect of helter-skelter development around 

the airport.”71 Look issued a photo essay depicting “the assault on the 

Everglades,”72 while Life published an article by Florida mystery writer John D. MacDonald, arguing that the jetport would eliminate the 

westward flow of water from Big Cypress Swamp, the last “reasonably natural” water supply to the park.73 These articles all mentioned 

that the joint Department of Transportation/Department of Interior 

study of ecological effects was in process, but, as Look pessimistically 

related, “there is no assurance that the county will be willing to abandon years of ambitious planning” even if the examination proved 

that such an action was necessary to save the park.74

As the news media continued its discussion of the jetport, representatives of the Department of Transportation and the Department of the Interior completed their environmental examination, 

issuing it in September 1969.75 The first sentence of the document, 

usually referred to as the Leopold Report after Luna Leopold, pulled 

no punches. It proclaimed that the

development of the proposed jetport and its attendant 

facilities will lead to land drainage and development for 

Cover of the Leopold Report.
80 United States Army Corps of Engineers

agriculture, industry, housing, transportation, and services in the Big Cypress Swamp which will inexorably destroy the south Florida ecosystem and thus the Everglades 

National Park.76

The major problems, the report continued, would result from 

the air, noise, and water pollution produced by the jetport and any 

commercial development, affecting plant and wildlife, the Miccosukee Indians, and tourists visiting the park. The report then outlined 

three alternatives that Florida officials could take: first, they could allow construction of the training facility, the subsequent jetport, and 

the commercial development to occur, thereby resulting in complete 

ecological devastation; second, they could allow the existing runway 

to be used as a training facility with no other expansion, which would 

give the state enough time to develop proper planning and land use 

regulations; or third, they could convince the Port Authority to remove the runway and abandon the site, which would “inhibit greatly 

the forces tending toward development in Big Cypress Swamp.”77 The 

report made no recommendation as to the appropriate course to take, 

content only to describe the environmental effects of each measure.

But to any careful reader, three conclusions were clear. First, jetport development should be abandoned and the runway should be 

removed in order to preserve Everglades National Park. Second, Big 

Cypress Swamp, as a watershed important to the park, needed additional forms of protection. And, third, the state of Florida needed to 

implement land use planning laws to safeguard its natural resources. 

Two subsequent reports from other sources bolstered these conclusions. The first, sponsored by the National Academy of Science, declared that the jetport would considerably damage Big Cypress and 

recommended instead that regional planning and Big Cypress preservation be implemented.78 The second, conducted by a task force 

called Overview, which was chaired by former Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall and commissioned by the Dade County Port 

Authority, outlined ways in which the jetport and the park could coexist, but ultimately called for the acquisition of Big Cypress Swamp 

by state or federal officials.79

With the growing amount of hard evidence that the jetport and 

commercial development in Big Cypress would have deleterious effects, state officials finally acted. Convinced that “poorly planned development” of the Big Cypress Swamp had harmed both Everglades 

National Park and South Florida’s “ecological balance,” Reed began 

agitating for regional planning and “enforceable land use programs 

that protect the environment while allowing the private owner use 

of his land.” He asked a commission composed of representatives 

from Dade, Collier, and Monroe counties to develop “a regional land 

use program to protect the Big Cypress Water Shed,” and he recommended the establishment of a state task force to aid Transportation 

and Interior in the selection of a new site.80 At the same time, Kirk informed Hickel and Undersecretary of the Interior Russell Train that 

the state no longer supported the jetport, and he requested abandonment of the Big Cypress site. The Everglades Coalition, meanwhile, 

filed a petition in October requesting that Volpe disapprove the jetport under the authority of the Department of Transportation Act of 

1966, while Hickel told John Ehrlichman, Nixon’s aide over domestic 

affairs, that the FAA had the power to delay and hinder the project, 

thereby making it too expensive for the Port Authority’s liking.81

Hickel and Train also gave a copy of the Leopold Report to Ehrlichman and to John C. Whitaker, Deputy Assistant to President 

Nixon, asking that the White House back the jetport’s relocation. 

Ehrlichman then prepared a summary of the issues and gave it to 

Nixon. After reading the brief, Nixon informed Ehrlichman that the 

South Florida airport must not be developed in Big Cypress, and 

that as soon as another location became viable, the training runway 

should be eliminated. He directed Ehrlichman to have Interior and 

Transportation officials begin negotiations with the Dade County 

Port Authority and the state of Florida to implement these actions.82

Nixon’s efforts to prevent jetport construction came at a time 

when the President was first beginning to embrace a strategy of addressing environmental concerns proactively, resulting in part from 

favorable publicity that Nixon received for his support and signing 

of NEPA. Nixon’s State of the Union address in January 1970, for 

example, would discuss the importance of the environment, and the 

President was also preparing an environmental message for Congress. Although Nixon would sour on environmental issues late in 

his presidency, his early administration sought to mine ecological 

concerns for political gold. Halting jetport construction early in 

1970 fit into this scheme; the concerns of Hickel, Whitaker, and Ehrlichman also played into the decision.83

Regardless, for the next several weeks discussions occurred between the Interior Department, the Department of Transportation, 

the Florida governor’s office, and the Dade County Port Authority 

about what to do with the runway and the ultimate development of 

the jetport. Finally, on 16 January 1970, all sides signed “The Everglades Jetport Pact.”84 This agreement recognized that South Florida 

needed another airport to relieve congestion at Miami International 

Airport, and it also acknowledged the Port Authority’s efforts at 

finding a reasonable site. However, because studies had concluded 

that the jetport “would not be compatible with the preservation and 

protection” of Everglades National Park and that unregulated operation of the training facility would “produce serious environmental 

and ecological effects,” all sides agreed to certain stipulations. The 

Port Authority assented to operate the training facility as a single 

runway, and it agreed to “immediately” institute measures to find 

another jetport site, submitting quarterly reports of its progress to 

the United States. If the federal government deemed that the Port 

Authority was not diligently pursuing another site, it could terminate the pact. Otherwise, when an appropriate location was found, 

the United States would purchase it for the Port Authority. The state 
Chapter Five | Flexing the Environmental Muscle 81

of Florida would “diligently assist” the Port Authority in its search 

and would convey any state lands free of charge to it. Once the Port 

Authority had constructed a suitable airport, it would then abandon 

the runway in the Big Cypress Swamp. It also consented to a list of 

measures to prevent fuel or oil contamination of land or water by the 

existing facility, and it agreed not to drain the land or use herbicides, 

insecticides, or fertilizers. The United States would monitor these 

operations to ensure that no harm came to the park. In addition, the 

United States would conduct an ecological study of the Big Cypress 

Swamp in order to develop planning that would preserve and protect 

the park and its water supply.85

Yet the fight was not over. Soon after the execution of the pact, 

the secretary of the interior, the secretary of transportation, the FAA 

administrator, Florida’s governor, and the Dade County board of 

county commissioners established an interdisciplinary team that began searching for a new jetport location. Over the next few years, 

the group evaluated 36 sites, and eventually decided that Site 14 in 

northwest Dade County by the Broward County line was the best location. This site was approximately 15 miles northeast of Everglades 

National Park along the transition between the Everglades and the 

Atlantic Coastal Ridge, covering approximately 48 square miles, 

two-thirds of which was in Conservation Area 3B. Several objections 

were raised to this location; the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers protested that it would affect C&SF Project works, while environmentalists worried about its impacts on the Everglades Kite, an endangered bird. An environmental impact statement was prepared, but 

by the late 1970s, use of the training facility in Big Cypress Swamp 

had drastically declined from 100,000 flights to 20,000, leading some 

to wonder whether a new site was really necessary. The debate over 

this issue eventually led to a temporary disbanding of the Everglades 

Coalition due to internal conflicts, as some members wanted no new 

jetport while others believed one was necessary. By the 1980s, no 

final jetport resolution had been reached, although Site 14 was still 

the desired location.86

Preservation of Big Cypress Swamp

Meanwhile, federal and state authorities wrestled with the problem 

of what to do with Big Cypress Swamp; in the press conference announcing the signing of the Everglades Jetport Pact, Secretary of 

the Interior Hickel had, in the words of historian J. Brooks Flippen, 

Map of the Big Cypress area. (Big Cypress Area Management Task Force, “Report to Governor and Members of the Cabinet,” 1983)
82 United States Army Corps of Engineers

“promised further administration action to protect the entire Big 

Cypress Swamp.”87 Indeed, many did not want to leave protection 

up to Collier County officials because of their action (or non-action) 

regarding Golden Gate Estates. In the 1960s, the Gulf American 

Land Corporation, led by brothers Leonard and Julius Rosen, had 

marketed 113,000 acres of land in the Big Cypress Swamp as Golden Gate Estates, a huge housing subdivision only a few miles from 

Naples and the Gulf of Mexico. To prepare for the development, the 

company built 171 miles of canals and 807 miles of roads, effectively 

draining much of the area and altering the ecosystem. But by the 

1970s, only a few dozen families lived in the development, mainly 

because of the legal problems of Gulf American and its successor, 

GAC Properties. Collier County authorities could have prevented 

the road and canal construction, but instead encouraged it, even 

though Gulf American had filed no firm plans for the development, 

because several Golden Gate promoters sat on the board of county 

commissioners. Therefore, state and federal officials had little faith 

in Collier County developing any meaningful protective measures, 

especially since Florida had outlawed county zoning.88

In April 1971, the Everglades-Jetport Advisory Board, a commission consisting of the heads of the seven agencies composing the 

Interior Department as well as the department’s solicitor, issued a 

study of how Big Cypress could be preserved. It concluded that outright purchase of the land would cost $155.6 million, so it recommended that the federal government acquire approximately 38,000 

acres adjoining the Tamiami Trail and operate it as the Tamiami 

Trail National Parkway. The rest of the Big Cypress would be subject to compensable land use restrictions, meaning that no drainage 

or construction would be allowed, but landowners could file claims 

with the U.S. Court of Claims for compensation, which would have 

a limit of $10 million for all awards.89

Many environmentalists, including Browder and Marshall, disagreed with this recommendation, claiming that the only way to save 

Big Cypress and to protect the Everglades’ water supply was through 

purchasing the entire area. They convinced Florida Governor Reubin Askew of this necessity, and in July 1971, he told Secretary of 

the Interior Rogers Morton (who had replaced Hickel in 1970) that 

“acquisition is the only sure method to protect the heart of this natural ecosystem,” a stand supported by the entire cabinet sitting as the 

trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund.90 With Askew’s backing, 

Florida’s two senators, Democrat Lawton Chiles and Republican Edward Gurney, introduced a bill (drafted by Browder) into Congress 

in August, stipulating that the federal government purchase 547,000 

acres in Big Cypress Swamp and designate it as the Everglades-Big 

Cypress National Recreation Area. As this bill made its way through 

Congress, Reed, who had become assistant secretary of the interior 

for fish, wildlife, and parks, began pushing for the Nixon administration to support the acquisition, as did other prominent environmentalists such as Elvis Stahr of the National Audubon Society, 

Anthony Wayne Smith of the National Parks Association, Browder, 

and Leopold. The Environmental Coalition for North America, an 

organization working for national environmental causes, pledged its 

backing as well. These individuals and groups had a ready ally in 

the White House in John Whitaker, Deputy Assistant to President 

Nixon. Because of Whitaker’s and Reed’s influence, and realizing the 

importance of obtaining Florida votes in the 1972 presidential election, Nixon issued a statement in November declaring that it was 

“essential for the federal government to acquire this unique and vital 

Watershed.”91

Only a day after Nixon’s proclamation of support, Senator 

Henry Jackson, chairman of the Senate Committee on Interior and 

Insular Affairs who had his own presidential aspirations, held a 

hearing on Chiles’ legislation in Miami. State officials and environmentalists made a united stand on the purchase, but landowners in 

Collier County complained about the measure, stating that 35,000 

landowners would be ruined by the acquisition. Some even likened 

the proposal to oppression by the Soviet Union. Former Florida 

Governor Fuller Warren, representing the landowners, stated that 

the government would severely cripple Collier County by removing 

so much land from the tax rolls, for “next to the air we breathe, the 

most essential ingredient of life is revenue.”92 Yet state officials and 

the Nixon administration continued to support acquisition; Nixon 

even sent his daughter, Julie Nixon Eisenhower, to tour the area 

with Secretary Morton in January 1972, while the administration 

introduced its own Big Cypress purchasing bill into Congress (S. 

3139).93

In April 1972, the Senate Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs held a hearing on the two bills, which were essentially similar except for three 

major points: S. 3139 created a national freshwater reserve rather 

than a recreation area, eliminated acquisition by legislative taking, 

and provided for joint state-federal management of the Big Cypress 

area. This time, however, Senator Alan Bible from Nevada presided, 

and he was not as favorably inclined toward the acquisition as Jackson. Bible found S. 3139 more palatable than Chiles’ bill, but he still 

found problems with the legislation, including the cost of acquisition and the provision in S. 3139 that landowners be compensated 

over 10 years rather than immediately. He made his views known 

throughout the hearing, giving a sympathetic ear to Collier County 

landowners.94

In the late spring of 1972, Bible’s opposition solidified when 

Robert O. Vernon, Florida’s state geologist, claimed that Big Cypress 

Swamp runoff was not essential for the park’s water supply because 

surface runoff accounted for only 11 percent of the park’s total water.95 Hearing this, Bible announced that he would not allow the Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation to release S. 3139 to the Senate 

“until the people of Florida resolve their differences on the Big Cypress question.”96 Environmentalists and other scientists vehemently 
Chapter Five | Flexing the Environmental Muscle 83

disagreed that water from Big Cypress was unessential, but the damage had been done.

Meanwhile, the Seminole and Miccosukee Indians objected to 

the Big Cypress plan, fearing its effects on their land. In 1957, the 

Seminole Tribe of Florida had organized itself under the authority of 

the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. In 1962, Indians living along 

the Tamiami Trail, who considered themselves as distinct from the 

Seminole (even though non-Indians generally referred to them as 

Seminole), had organized into a separate entity known as the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians. In order to ensure that the Miccosukee 

had a land base, the state had divided the Big Cypress Reservation 

in 1965, giving the lower 76,000 acres to the Miccosukee and allowing the Seminole to retain the upper 28,000 acres adjoining the 

federal tract.97 Both tribes worried that this land would be included 

in the Big Cypress boundaries. Howard Tommie, chairman of the 

Seminole Tribal Council, and Fred Smith, president of the Seminole 

Tribe, thus counseled legislators to forestall such an action, claiming that the Seminole already managed 62 percent of their land for 

natural resources. “We don’t want to be told what to do on our land,” 

Tommie explained, while Smith insisted that the Seminole were 

“more ecology-minded than some of the professional ecologists.”98

The major concern of both the Seminole and the Miccosukee was 

that the federal government would not allow them to maintain their 

traditional ways of life, including hunting and fishing, on any land 

included in the preserve. These fears evaporated, however, after 

Congress included specific language in the Big Cypress legislation 

allowing Indians the “usual and customary use and occupancy” of 

their lands, including hunting, fishing, trapping, and the conducting 

of tribal ceremonies.99

With the Seminole and Miccosukee on board, Governor Askew 

and the state legislature took some significant action in the spring 

of 1973, spurred on by Florida Wildlife Federation President John 

“Johnny” Jones. Jones, one of the most effective lobbyists in Florida 

history, was strongly in favor of Big Cypress preservation and obtained a meeting with Bible where he asked him why he opposed the 

bill. According to Jones, Bible told him that the federal government 

had already spent enough money to acquire Everglades National 

Park; he asked Jones, “When is Florida going to put the money into 

this damn thing?” Jones asked him how much he wanted Florida to 

contribute, and Bible said $40 million. Jones then informed Askew 

Big Cypress National Preserve. (South Florida Water Management District)
84 United States Army Corps of Engineers

of Bible’s request, and Askew had State Senator Daniel Robert “Bob” 

Graham, the future governor of Florida, propose a bill in the Florida 

legislature that the state contribute $40 million for land acquisition.100 That same law, known as the Big Cypress Conservation Act 

of 1973, also designated approximately 574,000 acres of Big Cypress 

Swamp, as well as an additional 285,000 acre buffer zone (including 

Okaloacoochee Slough, the Fakahatchee Strand, and the northern 

Ten Thousand Islands) as an “area of critical state concern.”101 This 

designation was created in the Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972 to allow the state to prevent development in and provide other protection to environmentally important 

regions.

Despite the passage of this legislation, Bible continued to oppose the bill, “double-crossing” Florida, in the words of Jones.102 But 

in the fall of 1973, the House of Representatives passed H. R. 10088, 

a bill introduced by Representative James Haley of Florida and 

sponsored by the rest of Florida’s congressional delegation. Similar 

to Chiles’ bill, it had one major difference: instead of establishing a 

national recreation area, it would create the Big Cypress Water Preserve, a new unit of the national park system. The House Committee 

on Interior and Insular Affairs envisioned preserves as areas with 

“exceptional values or qualities illustrating the natural heritage of the 

Nation,” including “ecological communities, . . . natural phenomena, 

or climax communities.” Under this bill, the NPS would manage the 

preserve to maintain “the natural and scientific values of the area.”103

After passing the House, the legislation went to the Senate where 

it sat for several months due to Bible’s opposition. Finally, Thomas 

Kimball of the National Wildlife Federation approached Senator 

Henry Jackson and, according to Jones, “told him [Jackson] what a 

dirty deal Bible had pulled.”104 Jackson then pushed the bill, forcing 

Bible’s subcommittee to consider it. The Subcommittee on Parks and 

Recreation made several changes and recommended its passage to 

the Senate. The alterations included replacing the legislative taking 

aspect of acquisition to “normal acquisition procedures” (meaning 

that landowners would receive compensation over a six-year period) 

and allowing “all improved residential and commercial property, including mineral estate” to remain in the Big Cypress area as long as 

it was not “detrimental to the Preserve.”105 The House agreed to these 

changes, and the bill went to President Gerald Ford for his signature. It became law on 11 October 1974, allowing $116 million for 

the purchase of 574,000 acres in the Big Cypress Swamp (the state 

of Florida would still contribute its $40 million).106 Although some 

details still had to be finalized with the acquisition, environmentalists, the state of Florida, and the federal government had effectively 

ensured the preservation of part of the Big Cypress Swamp, an area 

important not only for its water supply to Everglades National Park 

but for its own ecology as well.

The battles over the jetport and the barge canal, coupled with the 

passage of NEPA in 1970 and the growing use of environmental law, 

ushered in a new way of doing business for the Corps. Both of these 

controversies indicated that environmentalists now had the power to 

halt projects that they considered to be ecologically damaging. In the 

aftermath of these fights, the Corps acknowledged that it had to consider environmental concerns more closely, something which it had 

vocalized since the late 1960s. The Corps would frequently encounter 

bumps and setbacks as it began to change its mission-oriented focus to one that accepted the necessity of considering environmental 

concerns, but by the mid-1970s, the Corps was clearly on its way to 

making such changes permanent. As historian George E. Buker has 

indicated, the Cross-Florida Barge Canal was “the last major engineering project” in Florida that “ignored the protests of the environmentalists.”107 Part of the reason for this was that Corps leaders, such 

as Colonel Wisdom, were willing to consider carefully environmental 

concerns. Wisdom himself denied Section 404 permits on Marco Island to the Deltona Corporation in 1975, for example, inaugurating 

“the most important single event during the post-NEPA period” that 

“improve[ed] the Corps’ environmental image.”108

But another reason was merely the increasing influence of environmentalists. Victories in halting both jetport and canal construction and in obtaining protection for Big Cypress Swamp gave 

Miccosukee and Seminole representatives before the Florida legislature. 

(The Florida Memory Project, State Library and Archives of Florida)
Chapter Five | Flexing the Environmental Muscle 85

the environmental movement increasing confidence and more 

unity and cohesion, and highlighted its growing strength within 

Florida and the nation as a whole. Environmentalists were now major players in water management issues in Florida, and they had developed the organizational ability and the tactics to attack projects 

that could potentially degrade ecological values. The work of organizations such as the Everglades Coalition and the Friends of the 

Everglades, as well as individuals such as Joseph Browder, Arthur 

Marshall, and Marjorie Carr, pushed the administrations of Claude 

Kirk, Reubin Askew, and Richard Nixon to look more closely at environmental issues in Florida no matter what their political party. 

At the same time, the jetport and barge canal battles forced federal, 

state, and local officials to realize two things: first, that the state of 

Florida, in the face of continued growth, had inadequate measures 

to protect natural resources within its borders, and second, that 

the state’s water resources—especially in terms of quality—needed 

to be addressed. For the rest of the 1970s, all water management 

players would have the opportunity to apply the lessons learned 

from the jetport and the barge canal as they tackled a problem that 

threatened the entire South Florida ecosystem—the degradation of 

the Kissimmee River and Lake Okeechobee.

Endnotes

1 At a 1969 hearing before Congress, Chief of Engineers Lieutenant 

General William F. Cassidy explained that Big Cypress Swamp was outside 

of the boundaries of the C&SF Project, meaning that the Corps had no 

jurisdiction over the jetport. If the structure was actually built, the Dade 

County Port Authority would have to receive Corps approval before discharging water into any of the water conservation areas, but until that time, 

the Corps had no authority. Therefore, Corps participation in the jetport 

controversy was relegated to occasional attendance at meetings and hearings. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Everglades National 

Park: Hearings Before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United 

States Senate, Ninety-First Congress, First Session, on the Water Supply, the 

Environmental, and Jet Airport Problems of Everglades National Park, 91st 

Cong., 1st sess., 1969, 27 [hereafter referred to as Jetport Hearing]. As evidence of this, note that Cassidy’s testimony runs for over 20 pages, but only 

about six short paragraphs have any information about the jetport; the rest 

deals with water supply to Everglades National Park. 

2 Kirkpatrick Sale, The Green Revolution: The American Environmental 

Movement, 1962-1992 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 6.

3 Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental 

Politics in the United States, 1955-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 

Press, 1987), 2-5, 34-35; Samuel P. Hays, A History of Environmental Politics 

Since 1945 (Pittsburgh, Penn.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 15-19, 

22-23; Adam Rome, “‘Give Earth a Chance’: The Environmental Movement 

and the Sixties,” Journal of American History 90 (September 2003): 527-530; 

Lynton Keith Caldwell, The National Environmental Policy Act: An Agenda 

for the Future (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 26-28.

4 Rome, “‘Give Earth a Chance,’” 525-554; J. Brooks Flippen, Nixon and 

the Environment (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2000), 3-5.

5 Robert P. McIntosh, The Background of Ecology: Concept and Theory 

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 2, 194-196; Frank Benjamin Golley, A History of the Ecosystem Concept in Ecology: More Than the 

Sum of the Parts (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993), 1-3; Dorothy Nelkin, “Scientists and Professional Responsibility: The Experience of 

American Ecologists,” Social Studies of Science 7 (1977): 79-80.

6 Quotation in Michael A. Bryson, Visions of the Land: Science, Literature, and the American Environment from the Era of Exploration to the Age 

of Ecology (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2002), 134-135; see 

also Nelkin, “Scientists and Professional Responsibility,” 80.

7 Rome, “‘Give Earth a Chance,” 527; Flippen, Nixon and the Environment, 5; Michael E. Kraft, “U.S. Environmental Policy and Politics: From the 

1960s to the 1990s,” Journal of Policy History 12, no. 1 (2000): 23; Sale, The 

Green Revolution, 1-3, 20-22.

8 The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (83 Stat. 852).

9 Caldwell, The National Environmental Policy Act, 28-30, 37.

10 See Jeffrey K. Stine, “Environmental Politics and Water Resources 

Development: The Case of the Army Corps of Engineers during the 1970s,” 

Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Santa Barbara, 1984, 25, 35.

11 Arthur R. Marshall, “Repairing the Florida Everglades Basin,” 11 

June 1971, File Everglades National Park 1958-86 General/Resolutions/

Agreements, Box 02161, SFWMDAR; Blake, Land Into Water, 196-197.

12 Flippen, Nixon and the Environment, 8-11; Blake, Land Into Water, 

197-198; Carter, The Florida Experience, 50-53; Hays, Beauty, Health, and 

Permanence, 57-58. 

13 Blake, Land Into Water, 150-151. For a history of the canal up to the 

1920s, see Charles E. Bennett, “Early History of the Cross-Florida Barge Canal,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 45, no. 2 (1966): 132-144. This is not an 

entirely objective piece, as Bennett, a U.S. representative from Florida, was a 

major proponent of the canal.

14 See C. P. Summerall, Chairman, The Ship Canal Authority of the 

State of Florida, to Governor, 16 January 1943, File Canal 1940-1949, Box 2, 

Robert N. “Bert” Dosh Papers, Manuscript Series 25, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Library (East), University of Florida, 

Gainesville, Florida [hereafter referred to as Dosh Papers]; Walter F. Coachman, Jr., to The Members of the Executive Committee of Canal Counties, 24 

January 1942, ibid.; U.S. Engineer Office, Definite Project Report on CrossFlorida Barge Canal (Jacksonville, Fla.: U.S. Engineer Office, 1943). 

15 William N. Partington, “History of the Cross-Florida Canal,” in 

Florida Defenders of the Environment, Environmental Impact of the CrossFlorida Barge Canal (Gainesville, Fla.: Florida Defenders of the Environment, 1970), 55; Blake, Land Into Water, 152-162, 164-165, 201-203; Carter, 

The Florida Experience, 271-273, 276-278; J. Richard Sewell, “Cross-Florida 

Barge Canal, 1927-1968,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 46 (April 1968): 

371, 374-375, 379-381; Flippen, Nixon and the Environment, 58. Kennedy 

and Johnson’s support was not necessarily out of a belief in the benefits of 

the canal; at least some came from political expedience. In July 1963, Major 

Holbrook Scott, an Ocala resident, claimed that the “Barge Canal issue can 

make or break the Federal Administration in Florida in 1964.” The situation was probably not that dramatic, but it is clear that both Kennedy and 

Johnson realized the political value of supporting the canal, at least in these 

early stages. See Scott to Hon. Clarence Cannon, M. C. from Missouri, 29 

July 1963, Folder Canal 1960-1965, Box 2, Dosh Papers.

16 Carter, The Florida Experience, 267.

17 “Canal Fight Started At Audubon Meeting,” The Tampa TribuneTimes, 24 January 1971.
86 United States Army Corps of Engineers

18 Quotation in “Canal Fight Started at Audubon Meeting”; see also 

Stephen Trumbull, “The River Spoilers,” Audubon 68 (March-April 1966): 

109-110.

19 Partington, “History of the Cross-Florida Canal,” 55.

20 Quotation in William M. Partington, “Oklawaha—The Fight Is On 

Again!” Living Wilderness 33 (Autumn 1969): 19; see also Carter, The Florida 

Experience, 281-282; “Canal Fight Started At Audubon Meeting”; Partington, “History of the Cross-Florida Canal,” 55; “Cross Florida Barge Canal 

Chronological Development,” 12 February 1971, 4, File Cross Fla Barge 

Canal—General, Box 2, Davis Papers. For an example of the recreational 

benefits of Rodman Reservoir, see Department of the Army, U.S. Army Engineer District, Jacksonville, Florida, News Release, “Cross-Florida Barge 

Canal Project,” n.d., File Barge Canal 1969-70, Box 2, S949, FSA.

21 Partington, “History of the Cross-Florida Canal,” 55-56; “Canal Fight 

Started At Audubon Meeting”; Carter, The Florida Experience, 283.

22 For more information on the formation of the Environmental Defense Fund and its role in the fight against DDT, see Thomas R. Dunlap, 

DDT: Scientists, Citizens, and Public Policy (Princeton: Princeton University 

Press, 1981).

23 Partington, “Oklawaha—The Fight Is On Again!,” 19-22; “Canal 

Fight Started At Audubon Meeting”; Partington, “History of the Cross-Florida Canal,” 56; Carter, The Florida Experience, 284-287; Stine, “Environmental Politics and Water Resources Development,” 51-52, 59.

24 See Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, “A Brief Assessment of the Ecological Impact of the Cross Florida Barge Canal,” November 

1969, File Fla. Game and Fresh Water Fish Comm., Box 1, John Henry Davis 

Papers, Manuscript Series 23, Special and Area Studies Collections, George 

A. Smathers Library (East), University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida [hereafter referred to as Davis Papers]; United States Department of the Interior, 

Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, “Review 

and Appraisal of the Cross Florida Barge Canal,” 30 March 1970, File Florida 

Defenders of the Environment, ibid.

25 Florida Defenders of the Environment, Environmental Impact of the 

Cross-Florida Barge Canal, 1-5.

26 Quotations in James Nathan Miller, “Rape on the Oklawaha,” Reader’s 

Digest 96 (January 1970): 54-60 (emphasis in the original); see also Carter, 

The Florida Experience, 291-292.

27 “Text of a Letter Addressed to President Nixon, Dated January 27, 

1970, Mailed February 6, 1970 and Signed by 162 Environmental Scientists,” 

File Clippings 1969-1974, Box 3, Davis Papers; Carter, The Florida Experience, 290.

28 Flippen, Nixon and the Environment, 105; Robert E. Jordan III, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army (Civil Functions), to Honorable 

John C. Whitaker, Deputy Assistant to the President, 11 November 1970, 

File Barge Canal 2-71/8-71 (Governor Askew), Box 2, S949, FSA; “Canal 

Foe Coalition Seeks Drive Support,” The Tampa Tribune, 9 September 1970; 

“Army to Reject Halting Barge Canal?” Miami Herald, 19 June 1970; “Environmental Veto Threatens Florida Canal,” Christian Science Monitor, 29 June 

1970; “Cross Florida Barge Canal Chronological Development.”

29 Quotation in Executive Office of the President, Council on Environmental Quality, “Summary of Environmental Considerations Involved in 

the Recommendation for Termination of Construction of the Cross Florida 

Barge Canal,” File U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, Box 3, Davis Papers; see also Russell E. Train, Chairman, Memorandum for Mr. Whitaker, 1 

December 1970, in Carter, The Florida Experience, 311-312.

30 John D. Ehrlichman, “Presidential Assistant with a Bias for Parks,” an 

oral history conducted in 1991 by William Duddleson, in Saving Point Reyes 

National Seashore, 1969-1970: An Oral History of Citizen Action in Conservation, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of 

California, Berkeley, 1993, 368-369 [hereafter referred to as Ehrlichman interview]; see also Carter, The Florida Experience, 296-298.

31 Stine, “Environmental Politics and Water Resources Development,” 

59-60.

32 Quotation in Office of White House Press Secretary, Statement by 

the President, 19 January 1971, in Carter, The Florida Experience, 312; see 

also “President Blocks Canal in Florida,” New York Times, 20 January 1971; 

Blake, Land Into Water, 209; Flippen, Nixon and the Environment, 130; Stine, 

“Environmental Politics and Water Resources Development,” 60-61. Whitaker told journalist Luther Carter that Parker’s court injunction did not influence Nixon to halt construction; the White House had received Whitaker’s 

decision paper several days before the ruling was announced. Carter, The 

Florida Experience, 298-299.

33 See Ehrlichman interview, 369; Martin Reuss, Shaping Environmental Awareness: The United States Army Corps of Engineers Environmental 

Advisory Board, 1970-1980 (Alexandria, Va.: Historical Division, Office of 

Administrative Services, Office of the Chief of Engineers, 1983), 19.

34 “Wanted Dead or Alive? Cross Florida Canal,” Pensacola (Fla) NewsJournal, 18 April 1971; Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General, to The Honorable Reubin O’D. Askew, 15 February 1971, File Barge Canal 2-71/8-71 

(Governor Askew), Box 2, S949, FSA; L. C. Ringhaver, Chairman, to Richard 

M. Nixon, 12 February 1971 (with attachment), ibid.; Blake, Land Into Water, 212.

35 “Nixon Can’t Halt Canal, U.S. Judge Johnsen Rules”; “Resolution,” 

File Cross-Florida Barge Canal, Box 9, S1160, Florida State Board of Conservation Water Resources Subject Files, 1961-1968, FSA; Blake, Land Into 

Water, 213. The Corps had prepared an EIS in 1970, but environmentalists 

believed that this seven-page paper was insufficient and the court agreed. 

36 “Corps Strives To Blunt Barge Canal Opposition,” The Florida TimesUnion, 17 December 1976; “Cabinet Vote Doesn’t Bury the Barge Canal,” 

The Florida Times-Union, 19 December 1976; “Resolution,” 17 January 1977, 

in U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Cross Florida Barge 

Canal Restudy Report: Final Summary (Jacksonville, Fla.: Department of the 

Army, Jacksonville District, Corps of Engineers, 1977), A-1—A-4; Blake, 

Land Into Water, 214.

37 Colonel Donald A. Wisdom interview by George E. Buker, 22 and 23 

December 1978, Jacksonville, Florida, 22, transcript in Library, Jacksonville 

District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, Florida [hereafter referred to as Wisdom interview]; “Cross Florida Barge Canal Restudy Report, 

Appendix D, Major Issues,” in Jacksonville District, Cross Florida Barge Canal Restudy Report: Final Summary, D-12.

38 Jacksonville District, Cross Florida Barge Canal Restudy Report; Wisdom interview, 22; Florida Department of Environmental Protection, “Marjorie Harris Carr Cross Florida Greenway—History,” <http://www.dep.state.

fl.us/gwt/cfg/history.htm> (18 January 2005); Florida Defenders of the Environment, “Restoring the Ocklawaha River Ecosystem” <http://www.fladefenders.org/publications/restoring3.html> (18 January 2005). Ocklawaha is 

a variant spelling of the name of the river.

39 For more information about the La Farge Project, see Theodore Catton and Matthew C. Godfrey, “Steward of Headwaters: U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, St. Paul District, 1975-2000,” 75-82, manuscript prepared for the 

St. Paul District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, St. Paul, Minnesota. For 

more information about the Meramec Dam, see T. Michael Ruddy, “Damming the Meramec: The Elusive Public Interest, 1927-1949,” Gateway Heritage 10 (Winter 1989-1990): 36-45.

40 Paul Brooks, “Superjetport or Everglades Park?” Audubon 71 (July 

1969): 5; see also Planning Research Section, Department of Planning and 
Chapter Five | Flexing the Environmental Muscle 87

Zoning, Miami-Dade County, “Demographic Profile, Miami-Dade County, 

Florida, 1960-2000,” September 2003, 1 <http://www.co.miami-dade.fl.us/

planzone/Library/Census/demographic_profile.pdf> (21 January 2005).

41 Everglades-Jetport Advisory Board, “The Big Cypress Watershed: A 

Report to The Secretary of the Interior, April 19, 1971,” in Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, 

Everglades-Big Cypress National Recreation Area: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, 92d Cong., 1st sess., 1971, 137-139.

42 Robert S. Gilmour and John A. McCauley, “Environmental Preservation and Politics: The Significance of ‘Everglades Jetport,’” Political Science 

Quarterly 90 (Winter 1975-1976): 721-722; Carter, The Florida Experience, 

188.

43 Gilmour and McCauley, “Environmental Preservation and Politics,” 

723; “Miami Jetport and Interstate 75: Everglades National Park,” File Jetport 

Correspondence 1971, Box 8, S949, Governor’s Office Jay Landers Subject 

Files, FSA.

44 Gilmour and McCauley, “Environmental Preservation and Politics,” 

723; Carter, The Florida Experience, 189-191; “Miami Jetport and Interstate 

75.” For a full discussion of Port Authority consultations with the NPS during this process, see J. D. Brama, Assistant Secretary for Urban Systems and 

the Environment, to Hon. Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, 27 June 1969, in Jetport Hearing, 38-39.

45 O. E. Frye, Jr., Director, to Mr. Alan C. Stewart, Dade County Port 

Authority, 22 February 1968, File Big Cypress: Jetport (Environmental Studies), Box 1, S1719, Game & Fresh Water Fish Commission Everglades Conservation Files, 1958-1982, FSA.

46 Carter, The Florida Experience, 193.

47 “Report on Ecology Conference Relative to the Proposed CollierDade Training Airport, June 20, 1968,” File Big Cypress: Jetport (Environmental Studies), Box 1, S1719, FSA.

48 John “Jack” Maloy interview by Matthew Godfrey, 14 July 2004, 

West Palm Beach, Florida [hereafter referred to as Maloy interview]; Jetport 

Hearing, 68, 87-88; Gilmour and McCauley, “Environmental Preservation 

and Politics,” 725; Carter, The Florida Experience, 194-195; Blake, Land Into 

Water, 218.

49 “Minutes of a Meeting of the Governing Board of the Central and 

Southern Florida Flood Control District and the Interested Parties Who 

Were Present to Discuss the Dade County Port Authority’s Proposed Jet 

Port Site Held at the Riviera Country Club in Coral Gables, Florida, Friday, 

December 13, 1968,” File Big Cypress: Jetport (Environmental Studies), Box 

1, S1719, FSA; Carter, The Florida Experience, 195-196.

50 Flippen, Nixon and the Environment, 31-32.

51 “Folly in Florida,” National Parks Magazine 43 (January 1969): 2.

52 For the written answers to the questions, see “Answers to Questions 

Submitted by Central and South Florida Flood Control District, February 3, 

1969,” in Jetport Hearing, 74-79.

53 “Statement of John C. Raftery, Superintendent, Everglades National 

Park at Jetport Meeting, Miami Springs, Florida, February 28, 1969,” File 

Park Problems Big Cypress Jetport, EVER 22965, CR-ENPA.

54 As quoted in C. Edward Carlson, Acting Regional Coordinator, to 

Mr. Allen Stewart, Director, Dade County Port Authority, 7 March 1969, 

File Big Cypress: Jetport (Environmental Studies), Box 1, S1719, FSA; see 

also Carter, The Florida Experience, 196.

55 Jim Smith to Senator Adams, 7 March 1969, File Jetport Correspondence, Box 8, S949, FSA.

56 Nat Reed to Governor Kirk, 5 March 1969, File Jetport—Everglades, 

Box 9, S949, FSA. Michael Grunwald, citing an interview with Reed, claims 

that Reed, attending the meeting with Arthur Marshall, “jumped to his feet 

and berated Dade County mayor Chuck Hall for wasting everyone’s time” 

with the dismissive answers. However, such an action is not in accord with 

the letter that Reed wrote to Kirk a week after the meeting, and no other 

accounts of the meeting mention an outburst by Reed. See Grunwald, The 

Swamp, 255-256.

57 As quoted in Senate Committee on Public Works Subcommittee on 

Flood Control—Rivers and Harbors, Central and Southern Florida Flood 

Control Project: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Flood Control—Rivers 

and Harbors of the Committee on Public Works, United States Senate, 91st 

Cong., 2d sess., 1970, 228-230; see also Joseph Browder interview by Theodore Catton, 17 November 2004, Washington, D.C. [hereafter referred to 

as Browder interview]; “Coalition Forms to Fight Florida Jetport,” National 

Parks Magazine 43 (May 1969): 28; Carter, The Florida Experience, 196-197; 

Blake, Land Into Water, 218.

58 All quotations in Marjory Stoneman Douglas with John Rothchild, 

Voice of the River (Sarasota, Fla.: Pineapple Press, 1987), 224-226; see also 

Martha Munzer, “The Everglades and a Few Friends,” South Florida History 

Magazine 23 (Winter 1995): 12-13; Davis, An Everglades Providence, 473-

474.

59 Douglas, Voice of the River, 224-226; Munzer, “The Everglades and a 

Few Friends,” 12-13; Grunwald, The Swamp, 257-258; Davis, An Everglades 

Providence, 477-480.

60 Act of 15 October 1966 (80 Stat. 931).

61 National Parks Association et al., to Hon. John A. Volpe, Secretary of 

Transportation, 17 April 1969, in Jetport Hearing, 126-128. For examples of 

the arguments dealing with the applicability of the Department of Transportation Act, see Jetport Hearing, 121-122.

62 See Joe B. Browder, Southeastern Representative, to Mr. Charles H. 

Callison, Executive Vice President, National Audubon Society, 2 May 1969, 

File Jetport Correspondence 1971, Box 8, S949, FSA.

63 Walter J. Hickel, Who Owns America? (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), 101-102.

64 Hickel, Who Owns America?, 101-102; Walter J. Hickel, Secretary of 

the Interior, to Mr. Secretary, 30 April 1969, File Jetport Correspondence 

1971, Box 8, S949, FSA; “Clash Seen Over Jetport Plan,” The Washington 

Post, 15 May 1969; Carter, The Florida Experience, 197-198; “Conservationists Urge Halt on Jetport Work,” unidentified newspaper clipping, File Jetport Correspondence 1971, Box 8, S949, FSA; Blake, Land Into Water, 218; 

Flippen, Nixon and the Environment, 39.

65 Russell S. Train, The Under Secretary, to All Assistant Secretaries and 

Heads of Bureaus and Offices, 9 June 1969, File I.#2.A. Leopold Report, Box 

2, Accession No. 412-91-0041, RG 412, Records of the Environmental Protection Agency, NARA-SE; Carter, The Florida Experience, 198-200.

66 As quoted in Jetport Hearing, 101-102.

67 Jetport Hearing, 104-106.

68 O’Neil and Judy quotations in John G. Mitchell, “The Bitter Struggle 

for a National Park,” American Heritage 22, no. 3 (1970): 100; Stewart quotation in Brooks, “Superjetport or Everglades Park?” 5.

69 “‘Progress’ Menaces the Everglades,” National Parks Magazine 43 

(July 1969): 8-10.

70 Brooks, “Superjetport or Everglades Park?” 5-11.

71 “Conservation: Jets v. Everglades,” Time (22 August 1969): 42-43.

72 Anthony Wolff, “The Assault on the Everglades,” Look (9 September 

1969): 44-52.

73 John D. MacDonald, “Threatened America—Last Chance to Save the 

Everglades.” Life (5 September 1969): 58-66.
88 United States Army Corps of Engineers

74 Wolff, “The Assault on the Everglades,” 44. For more information on 

the national coverage, see “Jetport Fight Stirs National Interest,” The Miami 

News, 28 August 1969.

75 Although the Department of Transportation was also supposed to 

have a voice in the report, it submitted its revisions too late to have them 

effectively implemented in the final version. Transportation officials had a 

different view of the problems than Leopold and his team, believing that any 

threat to the park would exist with or without the jetport, and that commercial development would not be a great problem. The differences between the 

two viewpoints were so great, and the deadline for publication so near, that 

Leopold merely submitted the report to Under Secretary Russell Train with 

Transportation’s name eliminated from the cover. However, when Hickel 

transmitted the report to Governor Kirk, he stated that the conclusions were 

made “in consultation with Secretary of Transportation John A. Volpe.” 

Carter, The Florida Experience, 204-205; Walter J. Hickel, Secretary of the 

Interior, to Governor Kirk, 7 October 1969, File Jetport Correspondence 

1971, Box 8, S949, FSA.

76 United States Department of the Interior and Luna B. Leopold, Environmental Impact of the Big Cypress Swamp Jetport (Washington, D.C.: 

United States Department of the Interior, 1969), 1-2 [hereafter referred to 

as Leopold Report].

77 Leopold Report, 136-144; see also “Miccosukee See Airport as Final 

Destruction,” The Florida Times-Union, 12 September 1969.

78 Blake, Land Into Water, 220; Gilmore and McCauley, “Environmental Preservation and Politics,” 729.

79 For a reprinting of Overview’s report, see “Overview: There’s a Jetport in the Future If South Florida Plans Ahead,” The Miami Herald, 11 December 1969.

80 “Dictated by Nathaniel Reed—Thursday—September 11, 1969,” File 

Big Cypress: Jetport (Environmental Studies), Box 1, S1719, FSA

81 “Policy on Everglades Jetport,” File Big Cypress: Jetport (Environmental Studies), Box 1, S1719, FSA; Carter, The Florida Experience, 205; 

Gilmour and McCauley, “Environmental Preservation and Politics,” 730; 

Flippen, Nixon and the Environment, 41.

82 Gilmour and McCauley, “Environmental Preservation and Politics,” 

731-732; Carter, The Florida Experience, 207-208.

83 Flippen, Nixon and the Environment, 9, 55-56, 221.

84 Gilmour and McCauley, “Environmental Preservation and Politics,” 

731-732; Carter, The Florida Experience, 207-208. Collier County was supposed to be a party to the agreement as well, but its officials never signed it.

85 “The Everglades Jetport Pact: Articles of Agreement by and between 

The United States, State of Florida, Dade County Port Authority, Collier 

County,” File Jetport Correspondence 1971, Box 8, S949, FSA.

86 Peter L. Cook, Acting Director, Office of Federal Activites, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Memorandum for Barbara Blum, 21 October 

1977, File Jetport Background Info 1976-1979 DEIS, Box 1, Accession No. 

412-91-0041, RG 412, NARA-SE; Colonel Emmett C. Lee, Jr., District Engineer, to Division Engineer, South Atlantic, 7 November 1972, File 1110-

2-1150a (C&SF) Jetport 1972, Box 9, Accession No. 077-01-0023, FRC; 

Browder interview; Blake, Land Into Water, 221-222.

87 Flippen, Nixon and the Environment, 56.

88 Carter, The Florida Experience, 232-242; Grunwald, The Swamp, 234-

235, 244; “Drainage Halt Urged In Big Cypress Swamp,” The Miami Herald, 

30 August 1970.

89 Everglades-Jetport Advisory Board, “The Big Cypress Watershed: A 

Report to The Secretary of the Interior, April 19, 1971,” in Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, 

Everglades-Big Cypress National Recreation Area: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, 92d Cong., 1st sess., 1971, 131-181; Carter, The 

Florida Experience, 242-244; Department of the Interior, “Interior Secretary 

Morton Releases Land Use Plan for Big Cypress Swamp,” n.d., File Big Cypress, Box 3, S949, FSA; Secretary of the Interior to Director, National Park 

Service, et al., 19 November 1969, File USDI Everglades Jetport Advisory 

Board—File #1 Advisory Board Meeting Notes & Progress Report, Box 1, 

ibid.

90 Reubin Askew, Governor, to Honorable Rogers Morton, 20 July 1971, 

File Big Cypress, Box 3, S949, FSA; Resolution, 23 November 1971, ibid.

91 Quotation in The White House, Statement By the President, Big 

Cypress National Fresh Water Reserve, November 1971, File Legislation 

Big Cypress—Area of Critical Concern—Background Material 1973-1974, 

Box 20, D. Robert “Bob” Graham Papers, Manuscript Series 148, Special 

and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Library (East), University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida; see also Carter, The Florida Experience, 

245; Grunwald, The Swamp, 258. Grunwald argues that Nixon made his announcement because he caught wind that Senator Henry Jackson would be 

holding a hearing on Big Cypress in Miami and he wanted to “knock Jackson out of the box in Florida!”

92 Senate Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, Everglades-Big Cypress National Recreation Area, 53-54, 84-86.

93 “Julie and Rogers View Cypress Swamp Tract,” The Evening Star, 5 

January 1972; Nathaniel Reed, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, to Hon. 

Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 

19 April 1972, in Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, Everglades-Big Cypress National Recreation 

Area: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, Part 2, 92d Cong., 

2d sess., 1972, 15-17.

94 Senate Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, Everglades-Big Cypress National Recreation Area Part 2, 29, 42.

95 Robert O. Vernon, Director, Division of Interior Resources, to The 

Honorable Reubin O’D. Askew, Governor, 15 June 1972, File Big Cypress, 

Box 3, S949, FSA.

96 Quotation in “Second Look at Big Cypress Bill,” Fort Myers NewsPress, 6 June 1972.

97 Harry A. Kersey, Jr., “The East Big Cypress Case, 1948-1987: Environmental Politics, Law, and Florida Seminole Tribal Sovereignty,” The 

Florida Historical Quarterly 69 (April 1991): 458-459. In 1984, this state 

reservation became a federal Indian reservation held in trust by the United 

States. See Hobbs, Straus, Dean & Wilder to Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of 

Florida, 20 March 1989, File Indian Affairs Miccosukee Research 94, Box 

22792, SFWMDAR.

98 “Seminoles Ask Exemption of Lands in Swamp Deal,” unidentified 

newspaper clipping in Folder Legislation Big Cypress, 1972-1973, Box 20, 

Graham Papers.

99 Quotations in Senate, Establishing the Big Cypress National Preserve, 

Florida, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, S. Rept. 93-1128, Serial 13057-7, 7; see 

also Act of 11 October 1974 (88 Stat. 1258).

100 Jones interview, 20.

101 Quotation in “Big Cypress Conservation Act,” copy in File Legislation Big Cypress Conservation Act 1973, Box 21, Graham Papers; see also 

“Big Cypress Eminent Domain Bill Filed,” Orlando Sentinel-Star, 13 April 

1973; “Senator Proposes State Preserve Big Cypress Area,” Sarasota Herald-Tribune, 6 March 1973; “Memorandum for Record,” 13 March 1973, 

File Legislation Big Cypress 1972-1973, Box 20, Graham Papers; Senator 

D. Robert Graham Press Release, n.d., ibid.; “Big Cypress Act Defended,” 
Chapter Five | Flexing the Environmental Muscle 89

Tallahassee Democrat, 10 November 1973; Carter, The Florida Experience, 

246-247. 

102 Jones interview, 20.

103 Quotation in House, Establishing the Big Cypress National Preserve 

in the State of Florida, and for Other Purposes, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973, 

H. Rept. 93-502, Serial 13020-5, 6-7; see also “State and Federal Efforts to 

Preserve the Big Cypress Swamp,” Tropical Audubon Bulletin, n.d., copy in 

File Legislation Big Cypress—Area of Critical Concern 1973-1974, Box 20, 

Graham Papers.

104 Jones interview, 20.

105 Senate, Establishing the Big Cypress National Preserve, Florida, 93d 

Cong., 2d sess., 1974, S. Rept. 93-1128, Serial 13057-7, 7.

106 Act of 11 October 1974 (88 Stat. 1258); Blake, Land Into Water, 234.

107 Quotation in George E. Buker, The Third E: A History of the Jacksonville District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1975-1998 (Jacksonville, Fla.: 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1998); see also Stine, “Environmental Politics and Water Resources Development,” 39-40, 51.

108 Quotations in Jeffrey K. Stine, “Regulating Wetlands in the 1970s: 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Organizations,” Journal of Forest History 27 (April 1983): 71; see also Stine, “Environmental Politics and Water Resources Development,” 147-157.

91

By the end of 1971, environmentalists had a few successes to celebrate in Florida. They had halted construction of the Cross-Florida 

Barge Canal and forced proponents of a proposed jetport to rethink 

their Big Cypress Swamp location. But other problems loomed on 

the horizon, ones that would not see such immediate resolutions. 

“There is a water crisis in South Florida today,” a group of academic, government, and environmental scholars told Florida Governor 

Reubin Askew in September 1971, predicting a dire future for the 

region unless the state instituted land and water planning.

One of the major reasons for this pessimism was the condition of Lake Okeechobee. By the early 1970s, many scientists were 

forecasting the imminent demise of the lake because of a heavy 

influx of nutrients, especially from the Kissimmee River, which 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had channelized in the 1960s 

for flood control. All of these problems led Florida state officials 

to take major action in the early 1970s. During the 1972 legislative session, the Florida legislature passed several land and water 

planning measures, including authorization of a major study on 

the eutrophication of Lake Okeechobee. At the same time, environmentalists called for the restoration of the Kissimmee River, 

believing that this was one of the best ways to heal the lake. Despite all of these measures, little firm action had been taken to resolve the river and the lake’s problems by the end of the 1970s. The 

state had authorized additional studies and had formed a coordinating council to deal with Kissimmee restoration, but the river 

remained channelized and nutrient-rich water continued to pour 

into Lake Okeechobee, in part because of disagreement among 

environmentalists, state, and Corps officials as to the best remedy 

for the lake’s sickness.

Chapter 6

In 1970, environmentalists such as Arthur Marshall predicted 

that Florida would soon suffer from a water shortage if development 

continued at its current pace. “It became common, and indeed fashionable,” scholar Robert Healy has argued, “to question the value 

of growth itself ” in 1970s Florida because of the state’s tremendous 

growth.1 Florida as a whole had doubled in population every 22 years 

since 1920, while South Florida counties had doubled every 14 years 

in that same time span, adding at times an average of 110,000 people 

a year for an average annual growth rate of 3.08 percent.2

Compounding South Florida’s expansion was the construction 

of Disney World in Orlando on the northern border of the C&SF 

Project. Walt Disney Productions had secretly purchased approximately 27,000 acres near Orlando in the 1960s for $5 million, desiring to build a park five times larger than southern California’s Disneyland and to sequester it from the rest of the region. Construction 

began in the mid-1960s; the corporation hoped to have the amusement park in place by the end of 1971, as well as hotels, motels, and 

boating and golfing facilities. The company also planned on building an industrial park, an airport, 2,500 additional hotel and motel 

units, and a 50-acre shopping and recreation complex. In order to 

maintain water levels in the development and to prevent flooding, 

Disney also constructed a water conservation system of 40 miles of 

canals and 16 structures, using Major General William E. Potter, a 

former District and Division Engineer for the Corps, as its supervisor. As the construction occurred, the population of Orlando began 

climbing rapidly in the late 1960s, reaching 100,000 in 1970. Residents, as well as the new facilities, demanded not only water, but also 

dumped sewage and other wastes into existing waterways, creating 

water quality problems.3

The Liquid Heart of Florida: Lake Okeechobee and the 

Kissimmee River in the 1970s
92 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Concerned by these conditions, scientists and environmentalists wondered what the future held for South Florida, both in terms 

of water quantity and quality. By the 1970s, ecologists had begun to 

focus research efforts on an aspect of the science known as systems 

ecology. An outgrowth of the study of ecosystems, systems ecology, 

in the words of ecologist George Van Dyne, was “the study of the 

development, dynamics, and disruption of ecosystems.” Interdisciplinary in nature, systems ecology tried to integrate mathematics, 

engineering, and social science in its studies, which primarily focused on “large-scale biological communities or ecosystems of very 

great complexity.” Because it examined “inanimate processes of the 

ecosystem,” those involved in systems ecology had to have a “knowledge of physics, chemistry, geology, geochemistry, meteorology, and 

hydrology beyond that of traditional ecologists.” Thus, systems ecology differed in five major ways from more general ecology:

n it examined “ecological phenomena at large spatial, temporal, 

or organizational scales;

n it used methodologies from other disciplines;

n it emphasized mathematical models;

n it used digital and analog computers in its modeling;

n it embraced “a willingness to formulate hypotheses about the 

nature of ecosystems.”4

One of the areas that seemed well suited to the application of 

systems ecology was South Florida, an ecosystem of immense complexity. Therefore, scientists in the 1970s, such as Arthur Marshall, 

began to embrace the methods of systems ecology in their examinations of water issues in South Florida.

As Marshall continued his studies, he did not see bright prospects. An employee of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for 20 years, 

Marshall joined the University of Miami in 1970 because, according 

to some observers, his position with the FWS did not allow him to 

voice publicly his true convictions about South Florida’s ecosystem. 

Having removed those constraints, Marshall began speaking frequently to private groups and organizations, state officials, and the 

media about his concerns with man’s destruction of the Everglades 

in South Florida.5

Marshall promulgated his views as a member of the Special 

Study Team on the Florida Everglades, a group formed by the FCD 

and the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission in 1970 to 

investigate wildlife issues within the region. The genesis of this report stemmed from issues involving deer and water levels in Conservation Area No. 3. As explained previously, heavy rains in the spring 

and summer of 1966 had imperiled the deer herd in that region, and 

the same situation occurred in 1968 and again in 1970 despite attempts to provide long-term solutions to the problem, such as the 

Corps’ construction of 315 islands for refuge. Although the endangerment of deer did not seem to have any direct correlation to water 

quality in South Florida, the issue involved water management in the 

region in general, especially since the water conservation areas were 

storage areas for excess water. As the water rose in Conservation 

Area No. 3, the Corps again faced criticisms and attacks from the 

media and environmental organizations that it and the FCD placed 

agricultural and municipal interests over those of wildlife. This was 

especially prevalent in 1970 because high water in Conservation 

Area No. 3 that year was caused in part by the pumping of large 

amounts of excess water from the EAA, which experienced heavy 

rainfall in March. Although, in the words of a press release from the 

Florida Wildlife Federation, the preservation of the Everglades was 

a “more far reaching [problem] than saving the deer herd,” environmentalists considered deer to be “an indicator animal” signifying the 

health of the region. The fact that deer had suffered in both 1966 and 

1970 because of high water levels showed, according to the Federation, that “the ecology of the Everglades is being altered.”6

At the same time, wildlife problems occurred in the Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge (Conservation Area No. 1), albeit 

from fluctuating levels of water, rather than from an excess of the resource. In May 1970, FWS officials investigated the effects of a rapid 

Arthur R. Marshall. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and Archives of Florida)
Chapter Six | The Liquid Heart of Florida 93

drop in the water level of interior and exterior canals (estimated as a 

decline of over three feet in 30 days) and discovered that the drawdown might have harmed fledgling populations of the Everglades 

Kite, an endangered bird. By July, it was clear that fluctuating water 

levels in the refuge—caused by the Corps’ regulation of water—had 

adversely affected several other species as well, including the rare 

Florida Sandhill crane, the gallinule, and the alligator. John R. Eadie, 

manager of the refuge, emphasized that the problem was not that 

periods of high and low water existed, but that man had “artificially 

manipulate[d] the water levels in a short period,” leaving nature to 

“react violently to try to adjust the animal population to the reduced 

carrying capacity of the land.”7 Clearly, environmentalists believed 

that water management of the water conservation areas was significantly harming Everglades wildlife. 

These problems led the FCD and the Florida Game and Fresh 

Water Fish Commission to ask the Florida Chapter of The Wildlife 

Society to commission a special study team in March 1970 to investigate the problem and to propose solutions. This team consisted 

of George W. Cornwall, a professor of wildlife management at the 

University of Florida; Robert L. Downing, a wildlife research biologist with the FWS; James N. Layne, director of research at the American Museum of Natural History in Lake Placid, Florida; Charles M. 

Loveless, assistant director of the FWS’s Denver Wildlife Research 

Center; and Arthur Marshall, director of the Laboratory for Estuarine Research at the University of Miami. Because the team’s primary goal was to examine wildlife problems in the Everglades, the 

majority of its final report, issued in August 1970, dealt with wildlife 

matters, including the problems that fluctuating water levels in the 

water conservation areas had on deer. Along with specific recommendations about how to manage Conservation Area No. 3 to preserve deer life and about revisiting the regulation schedules for all of 

the conservation areas, the document related that concern for any 

individual species had to be “viewed in the context of the total problem.” It therefore suggested that the natural hydroperiod of the Everglades be restored, or at least be approximated as closely as possible, 

and it recommended that an interagency coordinating committee be 

established to allow for “interaction and information exchange” between those “agencies and groups” responsible for natural resource 

management in the Everglades.8

The report also examined the effects of poor water quality on 

flora and fauna in the Everglades. As such, the group mirrored 

larger concerns in the United States about water quality. As urban 

areas expanded, especially in the eastern United States, Americans 

became more concerned about how urbanization affected the quality of water. Therefore, in 1965, Congress passed the Water Quality 

Act to increase the amount of federal funding available for sewage 

treatment plants and to charge states with developing water quality standards. Shortly thereafter, jurisdiction over the Federal Water 

Pollution Control Administration shifted from the Department of 

Health, Education and Welfare to the Department of the Interior. 

By the early 1970s, some states, such as Maine, had already enacted 

significant measures to deal with water quality. Other programs were 

not as strong, perhaps in part because scientific technology had not 

yet advanced to the stage where it could accurately test and measure 

the “toxicity of chemicals to aquatic organisms.” Instead, administrators focused more on biological observations to determine where 

water quality problems existed.9

In Florida, the upper Kissimmee River Basin—the headwaters 

of the entire Florida watershed—exhibited water quality problems 

in the early 1970s. The Kissimmee chain of lakes, especially Lake 

Tohopekaliga, faced pollution from the dumping of cattle excrement 

and fertilizers into the water by dairies, ranches, and farms. These 

pollutants subsequently flowed down the Kissimmee River into Lake 

Okeechobee. Backpumping from the Everglades Agricultural Area 

(EAA) also contributed nutrients and pesticides to the lake. “It is 

therefore imperative that the quality of the water in the Everglades 

ecosystem be continually monitored,” the special study team’s report 

declared, “and that steps be taken to maintain high water quality 

standards.”10

Over the next few months, Marshall developed some of these 

ideas in his own speeches. At a state water resources conference in 

January 1971, he told Governor Askew and his cabinet that South 

Florida’s ecology was under “stress” from a variety of factors. “I view 

environment—human ecology—as the number one problem of 

Florida,” he declared.11 In June 1971, he produced a paper entitled 

“Repairing the Florida Everglades Basin,” claiming that drainage had 

wreaked devastation on Everglades ecology, not only because it had 

reduced the amount of water flowing through the area, but also because it had shortened the basin’s hydroperiod. This caused saltwater 

intrusion, salinity concentration in estuaries, and soil subsidence. 

Almost more damaging, however, was that drainage allowed farming and settlement in vast areas of South Florida, creating a water 

shortage by increasing demand while reducing supply. Marshall also 

expressed concern for the quality of water in Florida, especially the 

overenrichment of Lake Okeechobee and the Kissimmee lakes.12

To deal with these concerns, Marshall proposed a series of measures for the state of Florida to take. These included improving the 

quality of water in the Kissimmee lakes, restoring the channelized Kissimmee River, slowing the Kissimmee’s run-off into Lake Okeechobee, 

setting Lake Okeechobee’s water levels at 15.5 to 17.5 feet (rather than 

the 17.5-21.5 feet schedule proposed by the Corps), restoring coastal 

bays such as the St. Lucie Estuary, preventing waste and nutrients 

from flowing to Lake Okeechobee, and establishing constraints on 

urban and agricultural settlement in South Florida. “We must change 

direction,” Marshall pleaded. “Our exploitive and technological orientation must be re-directed in favor of more considerate uses of natural 

systems.” Otherwise, South Florida would continue to face “accelerating impoverishment of its natural and human resources.”13
94 United States Army Corps of Engineers

While admitting that South Florida had serious water problems 

in need of resolution, some scientists believed that Marshall was unnecessarily foisting “doomsday predictions” on Floridians and that 

the situation was not as dire as he forecasted.14 Others criticized him 

as not being realistic, of wanting to eliminate all human occupation 

of South Florida. William Storch, chief engineer of the FCD, called 

Marshall a polemicist and accused him of taking “immoral” actions 

to scare the public. “You seek to polarize rather than unite,” Storch 

said.15 But Garald G. Parker, a longtime hydrologist in South Florida, 

agreed with many of Marshall’s conclusions and had an even more 

extreme solution. “The only way to save [the Everglades],” he asserted, “is to move man off them, keep them flooded, and let nature, in 

her implacable way, start all over again.”16

Marshall’s statements came during a year of severe drought in 

Florida, when rainfall amounts were 22 inches below normal, forcing the FCD to pump surface water into Miami’s wells and causing 

fires in the Everglades that burned 500,000 acres. Marshall therefore 

caught Governor Reubin Askew’s attention, and the governor decided to call a special conference on water management in South 

Florida in September 1971. He asked some of the top scholars in 

ecological and water issues to congregate in Miami for discussions of 

what the state could do to maintain water supply and quality as the 

region continued to grow. Participants included John M. DeGrove, 

dean of the College of Social Sciences at Florida Atlantic University 

who chaired the conference, Marshall, State Senator Daniel Robert 

(“Bob”) Graham, Florida Wildlife Federation president John Jones, 

environmentalist William Partington, many scientists and engineers from Florida universities, and representatives from Everglades 

National Park, the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, the U.S. Geological Survey, and the U.S. Sugar Corporation. 

In his opening remarks, Askew told the gathering that he wanted 

answers—“stated clearly, bluntly and forcefully”—to five questions: 

how muck fires and saltwater intrusion could be halted; how an 

impending shortage of high quality water could be prevented; how 

soil subsidence could be curbed; whether there should be a limit on 

South Florida’s population growth; and who should manage South 

Florida’s natural resources. “I realize that no study and no three-day 

conference on Miami Beach is going to solve our water management 

and pollution problems,” Askew said, but—adopting a phrase first 

coined by landscape architect and regional planner Ian McHarg in 

1969—he wanted the meeting to mark “the beginning of a new ‘design with nature’ for South Florida.”17

After studying the issues, conference participants developed a 

statement of solutions for the governor; Marshall served as one of 

the prime authors. “There is a water crisis in South Florida today,” 

the statement proclaimed, recommending that the state immediately 

institute “an enforceable comprehensive land and water use plan” to 

limit population in certain areas. To solve the water quality issues, 

the statement suggested that Kissimmee marshes be restored and 

that backpumping from the EAA into Lake Okeechobee be eliminated, or at least not continued until backpumped water could be 

treated. It also recommended that, in order to preserve the animal 

and plant life immediately around the lakeshore, the lake’s level not 

exceed 17.5 feet, even though the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had 

believed that the maintenance of a higher level, coupled with backpumping, could provide more water for South Florida. The statement asked that the state establish an agency or board comprised of 

nine gubernatorial appointees to manage Florida’s land and water 

use plan, and that the board assume a wide range of responsibilities, 

including “managing water quality and quantity for the long term 

benefit of the environment of the region and the State” and “establishing policy and guidelines for such activities as drainage, water 

use, well drilling, land use, estuary protection, watershed management, flood control and soil conservation.”18

After reading the statement, Askew established a Task Force on 

Resource Management to draft legislation implementing the recommendations. This committee had several key members, including 

Cover of the FCD’s Water Management Bulletin detailing Governor 

Askew’s conference on Florida water issues.
Chapter Six | The Liquid Heart of Florida 95

DeGrove, who had written his Ph.D. dissertation on the C&SF Project; Marshall; and Graham, whose background in Miami real estate, 

coupled with his desire for environmental preservation, allowed 

him to see issues from both sides. Fred P. Bosselman, an attorney 

from Chicago who had been instrumental in the preparation of the 

American Law Institute’s Model Land Development Code, served as 

a consultant. Largely influenced by the institute’s code, which outlined how states could designate environmentally unique regions as 

areas of critical concern, the task force developed several bills for 

introduction, including an environmental land and water management act, a comprehensive planning act, a water resource act, and an 

act asking for a $200 million bond issue to purchase environmentally 

endangered lands.19

These bills were not without controversy; many special interests and large-scale developers did not agree with the proposals and 

lobbied hard for their defeat. But the proposals had the backing of 

several prominent individuals, including Governor Askew, who sent 

summaries of the “highest priority” bills to interested parties, telling 

them to inform their senators and representatives of their “strong 

support” for the legislation.20 Other important supporters included 

members of Conservation 70s, an organization formed in 1969 by 

Lyman Rogers, an environmental adviser to Governor Claude Kirk, 

to lobby environmental measures in the Florida legislature. Consisting of many state officials and legislators, the group had a great 

deal of influence in the early 1970s, and during the 1972 session, 

according to journalist Luther Carter, a well-known environmental 

reporter, it “was working the capitol corridors full time.”21 Senator 

Graham and Representative Richard Pettigrew, who sponsored the 

environmental land and water management legislation in their various chambers, also expended a great deal of effort, as did Representative Jack Shreve, who helped to usher the measures through Florida’s House of Representatives. Due to these exertions, the Florida 

Environmental Land and Water Management Act passed in 1972, 

as did the Water Resources Act, the Land Conservation Act, and the 

Florida Comprehensive Planning Act.22

These laws implemented many of the measures desired by 

Askew and the task force. The Land Conservation Act created a 

$200 million fund for the purchase of environmentally endangered 

lands, while the Comprehensive Planning Act formed the Division 

of State Planning and authorized it to prepare a comprehensive land 

and water plan for Florida. The Florida Environmental Land and 

Water Management Act, according to Graham, provided “a strong 

state role in those land use decisions which transcend the jurisdiction of individual local governments.”23 It allowed the governor and 

the cabinet, upon recommendations from the Division of State Planning, to designate regions as areas of critical state concern if they met 

environmental or historical standards. In such cases, local governmental agencies would compose and administer land development 

regulations, subject to the approval of the governor and cabinet. The 

state also had the power under the law to declare certain land developments as developments of regional impact when they affected 

more than one county in terms of health, safety, or welfare. The local 

government would then have to ensure that any construction conformed to the state land development plan.24

The Water Resources Act of 1972, meanwhile, created five regional water management districts to make all water resource decisions—be they flood control, drainage, water supply, or whatever 

else—in the counties over which they had jurisdiction. As part of 

this, the FCD was reorganized as the South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD)—although this did not officially occur until 

1977—and the Northwest Florida, Suwannee River Basin, St. Johns 

River Basin, and Southwest Florida water management districts were 

established. When the FCD became the SFWMD in 1977, several 

significant changes were made. For one thing, it fell under the supervision of the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation 

(formerly the Department of Pollution Control), although the governor and the cabinet still had the ability to rescind or modify district 

policies. For another, it received the responsibilities of maintaining 

Governor Reubin Askew. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and 

Archives of Florida)
96 United States Army Corps of Engineers

water supply and water quality as well as ensuring flood control. The 

importance of that change cannot be overemphasized, as it meant 

that the water management district would now be in a position to 

manage water in ways that did not harm the environment. Indeed, 

according to Executive Director John “Jack” Maloy, the district established an Environmental Sciences Division soon after the reorganization “in order to understand the effects of the (drainage) system.”25

All of these pieces of legislation greatly impacted water management 

in South Florida. According to Luther Carter, environmentalists were 

“jubilant” over the acts, but their effectiveness remained to be seen.26

As state legislators enacted measures to ensure better land and 

water planning in South Florida, the state also worked in cooperation with the USGS to prepare a report analyzing the effects that 

water control and management had had on South Florida since the 

establishment of the C&SF Project. Three USGS hydrologists—S. D. 

Leach, Howard Klein, and E. R. Hampton—studied the matter in cooperation with the FCD and with the financial backing of the Florida 

Department of Natural Resources, the counties of Broward, Dade, 

and Palm Beach, the cities of Fort Lauderdale, Miami Beach, and 

West Palm Beach, the NPS, and the U.S. Navy. This study admitted 

that “the prime effect of the water-control works in South Florida” 

was the “changing [of] the spatial and temporal distribution of runoff from the Everglades,” but it also pointed to the positive results of 

C&SF Project works, including a reduction in the amount of water 

discharged to the ocean from the Miami, North New River, Hillsboro, and West Palm Beach canals and the successful prevention of 

saltwater intrusion into the Biscayne aquifer. “Additional improvements in the hydrologic situation in places in southeast Florida can 

be achieved by applying existing hydrologic management practices 

to smaller, specific areas of need,” the report concluded.27

Yet despite the general positive nature of the USGS’s report on 

the C&SF Project, controversy swirled around the Kissimmee River 

and Lake Okeechobee. Marshall had noted in several of his speeches that concerns existed about the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ 

Boundaries of Florida water management districts, 1977. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and Archives of Florida)
Chapter Six | The Liquid Heart of Florida 97

channelization of the Kissimmee River as part of the C&SF Project. 

Before the 1960s, the river, which began near the town of Kissimmee, 

meandered along a 92-mile course through central Florida, eventually reaching Lake Okeechobee. A lyrical description of the river in a 

turn of the century edition of The Kissimmee Valley Gazette showed 

the appreciation that many observers had of the river’s beauty:

It is an extraordinary river in its narrowness, in the rampant 

growth of water plants along its low banks, in the unbroken flatness 

of the landscape, in the variety and quantity of its bird life, in the labyrinth of by-channels and cutoffs and dead rivers that best its sluggish 

course, and above all in the appalling, incredible, bewildering crookedness of its serpentine body. There are bends where it takes nearly an 

hour’s steaming to reach a spot less than 100 yards ahead of the bow.28

But the river flooded often, causing consternation for ranchers who wanted to raise cattle on the floodplain. Hamilton Disston 

had initially proposed channelizing the Kissimmee in the 1880s, but 

he had not made much progress by the time of his death. Therefore, 

when the C&SF Project was authorized, the Corps included flood 

control for the Kissimmee River Valley in its plans. The 1954 Flood 

Control Act allowed the Corps to begin its efforts in that basin, including the construction of eight water control structures in the Kissimmee’s upper headwater lakes, the straightening of the river itself, 

and the building of six water control structures within it. Essentially, 

the Corps removed the meanders and turns of the river and created 

Canal 38, a 52-mile waterway running to Lake Okeechobee with five 

different pools, each containing a water control structure and a lock.29

Some agencies objected to the channelization almost immediately. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the Florida Game and 

Fresh Water Fish Commission both claimed that the Corps’ actions 

would destroy fish and wildlife in the Kissimmee Valley. They proposed that the Corps investigate other alternatives, but the Corps 

believed that channelization was the only effective means of dealing 

with the flooding problems.30 Therefore, straightening proceeded, 

leading to other protests. The Florida Audubon Society passed a 

resolution in 1966 opposing the project, fearing “further destruction 

of the Kissimmee river and its wild tributaries,” while several individuals contacted Florida’s congressional delegation, requesting that 

construction be stopped.31 “We are aware that a straight, wide, deep 

canal is not as esthetically pleasing as a winding natural stream,” 

Jacksonville District Engineer Colonel R. P. Tabb responded, “but it 

does have distinct advantages where economics and water conveyance are concerned.”32

The Kissimmee River before channelization. (South Florida Water Management District)
98 United States Army Corps of Engineers

The Corps completed the channelization of the river, which cost 

approximately $30 million, in 1971, leaving it as a straight waterway interrupted by five shallow pools along the way. Not long after, the Corps manipulated Taylor Creek, Nubbin Slough, and other 

tributaries of the Kissimmee located north and northeast of Lake 

Okeechobee into one basin, totaling 116,000 acres, so that they 

would all drain into the lake. The Corps lauded these completions, 

believing that they prevented $12.1 million in flood damages between 1971 and 1978.33 But environmentalists were outraged, both 

because of the destruction of fish and wildlife and because they believed that the Corps had created “a sewer that funneled pollutants 

and nutrients straight into [Lake Okeechobee,] choking it.”34

Indeed, Lake Okeechobee experienced some problems at the 

beginning of the 1970s. Not only did C&SF Project canals bring 

EAA farmers lake water in times of drought, they also conveyed 

water from the farmlands back to the lake in times of excess rain—a 

process known as backpumping. Because such water contained fertilizers, pesticides, and other nutrients, environmentalists believed 

it contributed heavily to the eutrophication of the lake. Eutrophication essentially consisted of the contamination of surface waters 

by an influx of nutrients, usually nitrogen and phosphorous. It was 

the process of turning “clear, sandy-bottomed lakes filled with bass” 

into bodies of water “algae laden and swarming with gizzard shad.”35

Although all lakes experienced gradual natural eutrophication over 

an extended time span, cultural eutrophication, or the adding of 

nutrients by human land use, accelerated the process, killing lakes 

in a relatively short time. Florida’s Lake Apopka, located some miles 

west of Orlando in Central Florida, had become hypereutrophic 

through human interference, for example, and in the late 1960s and 

early 1970s, algal blooms indicated that Lake Okeechobee was on 

a path to the same fate. Many thought that the channelization of 

the Kissimmee compounded Lake Okeechobee’s problems, mainly 

because straightening the river had eliminated nutrient-filtering 

marshes in the Kissimmee Valley and had greatly shortened the basin’s hydroperiod, meaning the amount of time that water actually 

stood on the land.36

Critics pointed to another problem that, they claimed, channelization of the Kissimmee had exacerbated: regulatory releases from 

Lake Okeechobee to the St. Lucie and Caloosahatchee estuaries. Under the C&SF Project, the Corps had enlarged the Caloosahatchee 

River and had constructed additional canals facilitating the flow of 

water to the St. Lucie estuary. The Corps then used these structures, 

as well as the existing St. Lucie Canal, to regulate the level of Lake 

Okeechobee, sending water down the waterways when the lake got 

too high. Although the Corps enlarged the Caloosahatchee River in 

1970 to allow more water to flow down to the Gulf of Mexico, the 

St. Lucie estuary bore the brunt of the releases. Channelization of 

the Kissimmee River, some stated, worsened the situation by forcing 

the Corps to send even more “mud-laden” and polluted water to the 

estuaries.37 Residents of Martin County and FWS officials especially 

protested such releases, charging that they damaged estuary life, 

both because of the increased sedimentation that they caused and 

because the unnatural quantities disrupted the balance of fresh and 

salt water, driving fish from the estuaries. Because of these conditions, the Corps revisited the lake’s regulation schedule in the 1970s 

and informed interested parties that it was “constantly” pursuing 

ways to “alleviate the situation.”38

Although concerns about Lake Okeechobee estuary releases had 

existed since the 1950s, Arthur Marshall was one of the first to raise 

the alarm about the effects of Kissimmee channelization on Lake 

Okeechobee. Because the lake served as the “liquid heart” of South 

Florida’s water system, he explained, any problems with its water 

quality affected the region as a whole. Marshall called channelization 

“an abuse of the public’s water supply and wildlife resources,”39 while 

claiming that “re[c]ent analyses of algal content in Okeechobee waters clearly indicate approach of eutrophication. There is no question as to whether this will occur,” he continued, “it is a question of 

when.”40 To halt the process, the state of Florida could reflood Kissimmee marshes, thereby slowing the rate of runoff and allowing 

cleansing to occur. The final report of the Governor’s Conference on 

Water Management in South Florida suggested the same thing, recommending as well that backpumped water either be treated before 

flowing into the lake or not allowed at all. Meanwhile, the results of a 

USGS study, published in 1971, explained that Lake Okeechobee was 

in an early state of eutrophication and that many tributaries draining 

into the water body contained excessive amounts of nutrients.41

But some remained skeptical about Lake Okeechobee’s condition. William Storch, the FCD’s chief engineer, for example, claimed 

that the USGS study actually showed that the lake was not in danger of dying and that its nutrient concentrations were not excessive. 

The study did highlight that poor quality water flowed into the lake, 

Storch explained, but that did not mean that the lake was in imminent danger. In addition, Storch and other FCD officials, as well as 

the Corps, disputed whether Kissimmee River channelization really 

had a detrimental effect on the lake.42

Despite these doubts, the FCD did agree that the restoration of 

some Kissimmee marshes was desirable, mainly for fish and wildlife purposes. Accordingly, in the spring of 1972, the FCD’s board 

approved a restoration plan of approximately 9,000 acres, costing 

$400,000 in land acquisition costs. Because the FCD did not have 

any eminent domain authority, it needed the approval of the governor and cabinet in order to implement the proposal, and in the 

summer and fall of 1972, it prepared a presentation for the cabinet.43

In November, the FCD held a public hearing about the matter 

in West Palm Beach, obtaining testimony from those interested in 

Kissimmee restoration. Although admitting that marsh restoration 

was important, many environmentalists were disappointed at the 

small scale of efforts proposed by the FCD. FCD board member 
Chapter Six | The Liquid Heart of Florida 99

Don Morgan responded that it was “the best we can do with a flood 

control program,” but Marshall and other ecologists, including Dr. 

Robert Harris of the Florida State University Marine Laboratory, 

averred that more was necessary to prevent Lake Okeechobee’s eutrophication. On the other hand, Andrew Lamonds of the USGS 

contended that Kissimmee River channelization was not the only 

thing causing problems in Lake Okeechobee; population increases 

in the 1960s would have resulted in nutrient addition regardless of 

the channelization. “The rate of flow is not the primary concern,” 

he insisted. But others, including Marshall and O. Earle Frye, director of the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, disagreed. “Channelization has worsened conditions for fish and wildlife, and has reduced the buffering effect of marshes,” Frye stated. 

“We would like to see as much of the river put back in a natural 

state as possible.” John Jones, representing the Florida Wildlife 

Federation, agreed, calling river restoration the first step in restoring water quality to Lake Okeechobee. Most participants realized, 

however, that financing and land acquisition were obstacles in any 

reflooding plan. Representatives of landowners in the Kissimmee 

Valley, who vehemently opposed marsh restoration, emphasized 

these issues, declaring that alternative measures for improving Lake 

Okeechobee’s water quality should be studied.44

At the conclusion of the hearing, the FCD’s governing board finalized their findings and recommendations for the governor and 

the cabinet. Lake Okeechobee water quality, the statement began, 

was a “serious and perplexing problem” that required more authority 

and responsibility than any existing agency had. “Total restoration 

of the Kissimmee River marshes,” it continued, “may or may not be 

an effective solution by itself, in view of other possible grave consequences, especially flood control.”45 Because acquiring all of the 

lands in the river’s floodplain would require $88 million, the board 

recommended that its limited program be implemented and that 

polluted water be treated before entering the lake. Then additional 

studies could be made to discover whether or not complete restoration was necessary or possible.

On 12 December 1972, the FCD presented these findings and 

suggestions to Governor Askew and the cabinet at a four-hour hearing where representatives from the FCD, the Corps, and environmental groups testified on the condition of Lake Okeechobee and 

the channelization of the Kissimmee. After the FCD made its presentation, Marshall reported on analyses that the Center for Urban 

and Regional Studies at the University of Miami had conducted, 

stating that these showed that the state needed to take immediate 

action, including restoration of the whole Kissimmee River, in order 

to prevent further water quality loss in Lake Okeechobee. “The water quality situation in Lake Okeechobee is tending rapidly toward 

irrevocable misfortune,” he argued.46 To curb the destruction, Marshall wanted the governor to appoint a water quality master for the 

Kissimmee-Okeechobee Basin to oversee nutrient-removal efforts. 

Marshall also presented the governor and cabinet with a copy of the 

center’s report, entitled The Kissimmee-Okeechobee Basin. Colonel 

Emmett Lee, District Engineer of the Jacksonville District, however, 

opposed wholesale restoration, believing that it would return flooding problems to the Kissimmee Basin. After hearing these different 

viewpoints, the cabinet voted to implement a program to correct existing pollution in the Kissimmee Valley, to monitor water quality 

in the Kissimmee Basin and Lake Okeechobee, and to establish an 

interdisciplinary team of scientists to study whether or not restoration was necessary.47

The Florida legislature passed measures during its 1973 session 

to implement the governor’s and cabinet’s requests, including one 

creating a “Special Project to Prevent the Eutrophication of Lake 

Okeechobee” to conduct a study of the lake’s water quality problems. 

The Division of State Planning received the responsibility of overseeing the effort, while the Florida Department of Pollution Control 

and the FCD were charged with water quality and quantity data collection and analysis. Federal, state, and local agencies, universities, 

and private consultants also contributed; Dale Walker, a critic of 

Kissimmee channelization who had worked for the Florida Game 

and Fresh Water Fish Commission, was appointed project leader. 

The study’s main goal was to comprehend “the Lake Okeechobee 

The Kissimmee-Okeechobee Basin. (State Department of Administration, 

“Findings and Recommendations from the Special Project to Prevent the 

Eutrophication of Lake Okeechobee” (1976)
100 United States Army Corps of Engineers

ecosystem sufficiently to derive a land and water management plan 

which, when implemented, will prevent further cultural eutrophication of the lake.”48

As the study commenced, Corps leaders decided that an objective examination of the Kissimmee River Basin and the effects of 

channelization on water quality was necessary. Fearing that Floridians did not have sufficient emotional detachment to make an objective analysis, the Corps hired Atlantis Scientific, an environmental 

auditing firm in Beverly Hills, California, to conduct the study. In 

April 1973, Atlantis filed its report with the Jacksonville District after 

concluding two months of fieldwork and consultations in Florida. It 

found little evidence that the channelization of the Kissimmee had 

adversely affected Lake Okeechobee’s water quality and no definitive results as to how well marshlands would remove nutrients from 

water. Besides, the report argued, marshlands would serve only as a 

holding place for nutrients; any nutrients removed from the water 

would merely sit in the vegetation or soil until a future inundation 

released them back into water. This was a conclusion that seemed to 

fly in the face of assertions by environmentalists and scientists such 

as Marshall that the marshes acted as “scrubbers” to prevent nutrientloaded water. The report also claimed that the most polluted water 

reaching Lake Okeechobee came from EAA backpumping. Finally, 

Atlantis stated that no clear evidence existed that Lake Okeechobee 

was in an accelerated eutrophic state. “Eutrophication is the natural 

aging process of bodies of water,” the report related, and “every body 

of water is in some stage of eutrophication.” Although “components 

or constituent matter contributing toward eutrophication” all existed 

in the lake, “there is no evidence of the synergism necessary to supposedly expedite the process.”49

Supporters of Kissimmee restoration severely criticized Atlantis’s report, claiming that it had no objectivity because it was performed at the Corps’ bequest. Others saw the study as “a quiet effort 

[by the Corps] to discredit environmentalists’ proposals for restoring the channelized Kissimmee River.”50 Atlantis, which referred to 

its work as an “environmental audit,” insisted that it had no responsibility “to sustain the judgment of our client nor to refute the testimony of concerned citizens” and that its “first obligation” was “to 

our own professional integrity to provide an impartial and qualified 

assessment,” but its actions in Florida belied that statement.51

David S. Anthony, a biochemist with the University of Florida, 

for example, claimed that the Atlantis team had employed “deliberately deceptive behavior” in order to deflect attention from its relationship with the Corps. “I, personally, was given an evasive answer which contained no mention of the Corps when I asked one 

of the team what his mission in Florida was,” Anthony related. Two 

other scientists, he continued, “were given an answer that was a flat 

untruth when they asked the same question of one of the consultants.”52 It seems unlikely that the Corps pressured Atlantis to mirror 

the Corps’ own conclusions, and, indeed, scientists eventually came 

to accept some of Atlantis’s conclusions, including its contention that 

the Kissimmee River was not the major polluter of the lake. However, other findings, which directly contradicted conclusions reached 

by prominent Florida scientists (who had been studying the issues 

for years), indicate that the California firm may have been unqualified to analyze the pertinent subjects. Since the company based its 

conclusions on already-existing scientific literature, interviews with 

“a broad spectrum” of individuals, and an inspection of the area, 

rather than any scientific studies it conducted itself, this view seems 

justified. 

Meanwhile, the FCD conducted additional studies of Lake 

Okeechobee and the Kissimmee River, including one examining 

how manipulating water levels in impoundment pools on the river 

might affect vegetation. After extended observations, the report 

concluded that raising water levels two feet above their normal 

control stage would help to reproduce natural marsh conditions 

and enhance survival rates of the fish and birds.53 The FCD also 

studied how it could reduce nutrient loads in water flowing into 

Lake Okeechobee, especially from three sources: the Taylor Creek/

Nubbin Slough drainage area (the location of numerous dairies and 

cattle ranches), the north-central part of the EAA, and areas in the 

lower Kissimmee Basin including and below pools S-65D and S65E. The FCD recommended that Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough and 

Lower Kissimmee Basin farmers use land and water management 

techniques to prevent large-scale concentrations of nutrients, and 

that EAA agriculturists store runoff water for reuse in land between 

the Miami and North New River canals known as the Holey Land 

tract. This was a 55-square mile area in southwestern Palm Beach 

County that served as a kind of wildlife buffer zone for Conservation Area No. 3, protecting wildlife in that area from development. 

“The time has come to begin to move out of the study phase and into 

the action phase,” the FCD concluded, but “there must be assurance 

Cattle grazing around Lake Okeechobee. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Six | The Liquid Heart of Florida 101

that action is not taken just for the sake of action,” especially since 

another FCD study had determined that nitrogen and phosphorous 

levels in Lake Okeechobee had not significantly increased in the last 

five years.54

As different agencies performed their own analyses, some environmentalists, eager for concrete action, became angry. Lyman Rogers, environmental adviser to Governor Claude Kirk and a founder 

of Conservation 70s, complained that despite the clear recommendations of the Governor’s Conference on Water Resources in South 

Florida, the state had implemented only “studies” and “studies to 

study the studies.” In the meantime, he argued, “Lake Okeechobee 

is DYING” and would “continue to eutrophicate, until it becomes 

a giant sized Lake Apopka.” Rogers called Askew an environmental phony, saying that he promised Florida “all kinds of cures, and 

has given us none.” Askew needed to provide specific solutions to 

Lake Okeechobee’s problems, Rogers declared, rather than just 

commission more studies.55 Lieutenant Governor James H. Williams responded that Askew was “deeply committed” to finding a 

cure for Lake Okeechobee, but that “simple solutions do not solve 

complex problems.” He counseled patience, explaining that the report by the Special Project to Prevent the Eutrophication of Lake 

Okeechobee would contain detailed management plans to reduce 

Lake Okeechobee’s nutrient content.56

Before the publication of the Special Project’s findings and recommendations, the Florida Sugar Cane League, which represented 

the major sugar producers in Florida, commissioned its own examination of Lake Okeechobee’s problems, specifically focusing 

on backpumping. Black, Crow & Eidsness, Inc., a Gainesville firm, 

completed this study, which claimed that backpumping from the 

EAA supplied only 7.7 percent of the lake’s phosphorous and 20.2 

percent of its nitrogen. The Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough watershed, 

on the other hand, contributed 33.7 percent of phosphorous and 7.7 

percent of nitrogen, while the Kissimmee River supplied 30.5 percent of phosphorous and 36.4 percent of nitrogen. Citing studies of 

eutrophication in the Great Lakes, Black, Crow & Eidsness argued 

that phosphorous, and not nitrogen, was the limiting nutrient for 

algal and plant growth. Since the EAA was not a heavy supplier 

of phosphorous, the company recommended that backpumping 

continue while more investigations were performed to determine 

whether phosphorous or nitrogen served as the limiting nutrient in 

Lake Okeechobee. If phosphorous played the most important role, 

state officials should examine ways of reducing input from the Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough. If nitrogen was the critical element, backpumping from the EAA should be reduced or eliminated.57

In December 1975, the FCD released its findings as to the engineering and environmental feasibility of storing backpumped water 

in the Holey Land area, stating that such a project could work. It 

therefore recommended that a reservoir be constructed on the Holey Land and the adjacent Rotenberger Tract and that it have a regulation schedule of 12 to 15 feet. In order to make the plan work, the 

state would have to acquire private lands on the Rotenberger Tract, 

and to do so, the FCD suggested that an exchange for state-owned 

lands be made. In addition, the Corps would have to enlarge the Miami and North New River canals in order to ensure that runoff went 

to the reservoir instead of the lake. The project would cost approximately $14 million, but if constructed, would divert 203,910 acre feet 

of runoff annually away from the lake.58

Some disagreed with the FCD’s recommendations, in part because they wanted to maintain the Holey Land and Rotenberger 

tracts as buffer zones for wildlife. Others insisted that the areas 

were largely void of wildlife, using a report conducted by Ecoimpact, Inc., in 1974, to support their views. Ecoimpact’s study, however, was widely panned by environmentalists, in large part because 

they viewed it as a hatchet job performed at the bequest of sugar 

interests wanting to use the tracts for cultivation.59 Still others, such 

as the Florida Department of Environment Regulation, which had 

succeeded the Department of Pollution Control, rejected the FCD’s 

suggestions because they wanted a complete cessation of backpumping. The department’s Report of Investigations in the Kissimmee RiverLake Okeechobee Watershed, which summarized all of the studies the 

department had performed as part of the Special Project, claimed 

that EAA backpumping contributed more phosphorous to the lake 

than the Black, Crow & Eidsness report had indicated. C&SF Project 

pumping stations S-2 and S-3 alone contributed 10.9 percent of the 

lake’s phosphorous, the department contended, and when one added 

backpumping from private interests and small drainage districts, the 

total approached 45 percent. The department also concluded that 

channelization of the Kissimmee did impact Lake Okeechobee eutrophication because of the elimination of marshes and the development of higher flow rates that caused larger nutrient releases, conclusions that clashed with those presented in the Corps-sponsored 

Atlantis study.60

The Department of Environmental Regulation’s report, issued 

in March 1976, was the precursor to the Division of State Planning’s 

final Special Project report, which was not officially published until 

November 1976. The Special Project’s findings and recommendations, however, were provided to the state legislature in April. The 

major conclusion of the study was that Lake Okeechobee was “of 

such eutrophic condition that present nutrient loads must be substantially reduced.” Nutrients came from various sources, but EAA 

backpumping was an especially egregious supplier. To correct this 

problem, the Special Project recommended that backpumping from 

the EAA “be eliminated or reduced to the maximum degree feasible,” and it suggested that an impoundment reservoir be constructed 

on the Holey Land Tract in order to store water for reuse. The report 

did not recommend complete restoration of the Kissimmee River, 

but it did suggest that marshes be re-established in order to aid upland retention of water.61
102 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Despite its moderate findings, or perhaps because of them, the 

Special Project’s report met opposition from all sides. Colonel Donald A. Wisdom, District Engineer of the Jacksonville District, criticized the document for containing many “purely subjective” statements “designed to sell an idea by eliciting an emotional response in 

the reader.” The report did not address what the C&SF Project had 

done for South Florida in terms of “agricultural and human productivity,” Wisdom complained, although it delineated extensively “what 

has been lost in natural productivity.”62 Agricultural interests in the 

EAA, including sugar growers, did not like the backpumping recommendation, nor did they agree with the proposal to build a reservoir 

on the Holeyland, mainly because sugar producers wanted to expand 

into that area. Hunters did not like the Holeyland suggestion either, as 

it would eliminate an excellent deer hunting spot. Environmentalists, 

meanwhile, wanted the full restoration of the Kissimmee River, not 

just a reflooding of some of its marshes. All of these interests conveyed their displeasure to Florida senators and representatives. Especially vocal was Johnny Jones of the Florida Wildlife Federation, who 

was convinced that dechannelization of the Kissimmee River was the 

only way to save Lake Okeechobee. Jones wrote a bill mandating the 

restoration of the river and, with the approval of Marshall, sent it to 

the Florida legislature in its 1976 session.63

This bill, which was sponsored by Representative A. H. “Gus” 

Craig in the House and Senator Jon Thomas in the Senate, recognized the findings of the Special Project, but went further in its recommendations. It mandated the restoration of the Kissimmee River 

to its natural channel, and allowed for the reflooding of natural 

marshes in the Taylor Creek-Nubbin Slough basin. It also proposed 

that cattle and dairy farmers in the Taylor Creek-Nubbin Slough Basin build polishing ponds to remove nutrients before releasing water 

into Lake Okeechobee. These ponds would hold water for a short 

period of time, generally one to three days, in order to extract nutrients through biological processes. Moreover, the bill established a 

four-person advisory council to oversee restoration efforts—the Coordinating Council of the Restoration of the Kissimmee River Valley and the Taylor Creek-Nubbin Slough Basin—composed of the 

executive directors of the Florida Department of Natural Resources, 

the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, the FCD, and 

the secretary of the Department of Environmental Regulation. Jones 

lobbied for the bill incessantly, proclaiming to the media that “the 

View of the Kissimmee River. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Six | The Liquid Heart of Florida 103

Florida Legislature can pass a Kissimmee River bill or we in South 

Florida can all move out.”64 His tactics worked; the Senate and the 

House approved the measure unanimously, and Askew signed it in 

June 1976.65

The passage of the bill meant that the state now fully supported 

the restoration of the Kissimmee River. However, there were still a 

few unresolved issues. For one, the legislation did not clearly define 

what restoration meant. Thomas believed that it denoted returning the Kissimmee to its natural channel and “recreating the natural marshes and flood plain” in order to “enhance the water storage 

capabilities” of the Kissimmee Valley, improve Lake Okeechobee’s 

water quality, and increase wetland vegetation and wildlife.66 Others were not so certain. Colonel Wisdom, for example, who would 

have charge of the restoration since Kissimmee channelization was 

an authorized component of the C&SF Project, was not convinced 

that dechannelization was either necessary or mandated. “There is a 

large communication gap between the environmental investigators 

and the hydrologists and water resources managers,” he explained.67

Nowhere was that gap more clearly seen than in two accounts 

of the debate over Kissimmee River channelization and what the 

restoration bill actually meant. An article in ENFO, a periodical 

published by the Environmental Information Center of the Florida 

Conservation Foundation, depicted the initial channelization of the 

Kissimmee as the product of Corps leaders intent on steamrolling 

any opposition to straightening the river. “The project was promoted 

in the name of flood control,” the article argued, “and its opponents 

never had a chance.” The essay disputed that flood control really resulted from the channelization, claiming that it enabled settlement 

in the floodplain, an area obviously more prone to flooding, the 

Corps project notwithstanding. In addition, the article claimed that 

channelization had changed the Kissimmee Valley from an area with 

thriving fish populations, “hundreds of thousands of wading birds 

and waterfowl,” and a “healthy ecosystem” to a place of “stagnant water,” “noxious aquatic weeds,” “foul-smelling gas,” and “a biological 

desert.” Because the channelization of the Kissimmee sent pollutants 

from the Upper Kissimmee Valley to Lake Okeechobee, it threatened 

to give the “liquid heart” a massive “heart attack.” Therefore, the essay concluded, somewhat misleadingly, the Florida legislature had 

mandated complete restoration of the Kissimmee in the 1976 legislation; any alternative was out of compliance with the law.68

Patrick McCaffrey, staff director of the Coordinating Council 

of the Restoration of the Kissimmee River Valley and the Taylor 

Creek-Nubbin Slough Basin, had an entirely different perspective. 

He claimed that initial opponents of Kissimmee channelization, although unable to halt the process, forced the Corps to make major 

design modifications to accommodate fish and wildlife. The “fruits of 

their labors may not have been as sweet as expected,” McCaffrey explained, “but in the context of the times they were major concessions 

by the Corps of Engineers.” McCaffrey also expressed doubts that restoring the river would improve water quality in Lake Okeechobee, 

a view, he asserted, that the Special Project report supported. Because data showed that routing flows through natural or man-made 

marshes and nonpoint source control had a greater impact on Lake 

Okeechobee water quality than Kissimmee River restoration, the 

Special Project had dismissed reinstating the river as a viable option. 

Although pro-restoration forces claimed that the 1976 law mandated 

complete restoration of the Kissimmee, McCaffrey and FCD leaders 

believed that it merely required the Coordinating Council to “develop measures . . . to restore water quality,” and those measures could 

consist of marsh reflooding, partial restoration, or other solutions.69

This, then, was the point of contention: environmentalists (as well 

as the bill’s sponsors) believed that the law mandated dechannelization, but others, including FCD and Corps officials, interpreted it as 

requiring the restoration of water quality to the Kissimmee Basin 

in whatever ways the Coordinating Council deemed necessary, an 

opinion supported by Florida’s attorney general.70

Despite the disagreements, the Coordinating Council began operations in the summer of 1976, believing that it had the 

The ENFO publication heavily criticizing the channelization of the Kissimmee River and calling for restoration.
104 United States Army Corps of Engineers

responsibility for investigating different options for restoring good 

quality of water to the Kissimmee Valley. It quickly established an 

ad hoc advisory committee and an interagency technical committee to provide advice and assistance. The advisory committee contained representatives from environmental organizations such as the 

Florida Audubon Society and the Sierra Club, as well as members 

of agricultural groups such as the Florida Sugar Cane League and 

the Florida Cattleman’s Association. The interagency committee had 

representatives from the FCD, the Corps, several state agencies, and 

the U.S. Department of the Interior. With the help of these groups, 

the Coordinating Council developed 11 actions that the state could 

take to improve water quality in the Kissimmee Basin. These included dechannelizing the river through plugging the pools in the canal, recreating marshland through pool manipulation and tributary 

marsh impoundments, and backfilling Canal 38 to restore the river 

to its natural course. After holding public hearings on the alternatives in February 1977, the Coordinating Council made its recommendations to the state legislature in March.71

The Coordinating Council explained that the best way to restore 

water quality to the Kissimmee River Valley was by treating agricultural pollution at its source in the Taylor Creek-Nubbin Slough 

basin. This included creating an upland detention/retention project 

and implementing on-farm monitoring programs. As far as restoring 

the river was concerned, the Coordinating Council decided to let the 

legislature decide. If the legislature wanted complete restoration, the 

council suggested that a partial backfilling method be used, whereby 

60 percent of the canal would be refilled, restoring two-thirds of the 

marshland. The state would need to obtain congressional approval in 

this case since the Corps did not have authorization to undo a project unless Congress specifically mandated it. If the legislature did 

not intend for the Kissimmee to be dechannelized, the Coordinating 

Council recommended that pool stages be implemented in order to 

create impounded wetlands. The choice, however, solely rested with 

Florida’s legislators.72

As the 1977 legislative session began, environmentalists moved 

into action, believing that the impounded wetlands idea was merely, 

in the words of McCaffrey, “an attempt to prevent dechannelization.”73 Jones again lobbied hard for the legislature to mandate complete restoration, and initially it looked as though he would succeed, 

as both houses passed resolutions requiring dechannelization. But 

View of the Taylor Creek-Nubbin Slough area. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Six | The Liquid Heart of Florida 105

when the actual legislation came forward, agricultural interests influenced legislators to kill the bill unless other measures were implemented. With almost no chance of passing an act requiring restoration, proponents had to compromise, and the measure that emerged 

merely requested that the state ask Congress to authorize a Corps 

restudy of the river. Several state agencies issued resolutions supporting this action, and Congress authorized the restudy in April 

1978, appropriating money for the examination in September.74 The 

Corps clearly saw the examination as a way of investigating a variety 

of options for the river; dechannelization would only be an “alternative” under study, not the main purpose of the analysis.75

Likewise, little firm action was forthcoming on other issues 

pertaining to Lake Okeechobee water quality. Despite the Special 

Project’s recommendation that backpumping from the EAA cease, it 

continued. Because the pollutants resulting from backpumping exceeded state water quality standards, the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation was required to issue a permit to the South 

Florida Water Management District (as discussed above, the name 

and organization had changed in 1977) before backpumping could 

occur, but the state did not enforce that requirement until faced with 

litigation. In 1977, the state asked the SFWMD to apply for a permit, 

and after the district did so, the Department of Environmental Regulation issued a temporary operating permit with the understanding 

that the SFWMD would develop an Interim Action Plan to reduce 

nutrients flowing into the lake from the EAA. The plan did not diminish how much water was backpumped from the area, however; it 

merely redirected some of the backpumped water to the water conservation areas instead of the lake. Environmentalists were livid with 

the Department of Environmental Regulation for issuing the permit, 

believing that the state should require stricter measures to curtail 

backpumping, but agricultural interests, especially the sugar industry, protested that halting backpumping would have detrimental effects on farming activities.76

In many ways, the conflicts over Lake Okeechobee and the Kissimmee River in the 1970s represented a failure for the environmental community. Although it had successfully halted jetport construction and forced a halt to the Cross-Florida Barge Canal, the problems 

with water quality in Lake Okeechobee and the channelization of the 

Kissimmee River remained. Yet environmentalists had called attention to serious water quality issues in South Florida, and had forced 

state officials to take significant measures to ensure a clean and adequate water supply for the region in the future. The 1972 legislative session saw the passage of several land and water planning laws, 

while a plethora of scientific studies on Lake Okeechobee and the 

Kissimmee River were produced. At the least, environmentalists had 

set the necessary background for more stringent measures to occur 

at a later time.

But why was the environmental community not able to stop 

backpumping to Lake Okeechobee or to force the Corps to restore 

the Kissimmee River, especially in light of the jetport and barge canal successes? First, the problems surrounding Lake Okeechobee 

and the Kissimmee River did not receive significant national attention, and there were few in the federal government interested in 

these endeavors or willing to push legislation to resolve the issues. 

In addition, it was a different matter to get the Corps to halt a project under construction than it was to destroy a project already completed. Had the cry about the Kissimmee River been stronger during 

its actual construction (rather than just muted complaints from a 

few individuals in the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the Florida 

Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission), it might have been easier 

to stop channelization. For example, environmentalists in southern 

California in the late 1960s and early 1970s had successfully prevented the Corps from channelizing the Sierra Madre Wash through 

numerous protests and through the active efforts of city council personnel opposed to the project.77 Florida did not see the same scale of 

efforts when channelization of the Kissimmee River was proposed; 

instead, as former SFWMD executive director John Maloy related, 

the hot environmental issues in Florida in the 1960s were the barge 

canal and the condition of Lake Apopka—“the Kissimmee kind of 

slipped underneath the threshold and didn’t gain a lot of attention.”78

Finally, state officials, including Governor Askew, waffled as to their 

commitment to full restoration of the Kissimmee or to the cessation of backpumping. Although Askew had strongly acted in his first 

term to preserve Florida’s environment, several forces prevented the 

implementation of stringent measures regarding Lake Okeechobee 

and the Kissimmee River. For one, the sugar industry, which was 

increasing in political strength, vehemently opposed the stoppage of 

backpumping, as did agricultural interests in the Kissimmee Valley. 

For another, despite all of the studies that had been completed, an 

air of uncertainty still existed at the end of the 1970s as to whether 

complete restoration of the Kissimmee was really the best step to 

take, or whether water quality could be improved through other 

means. Also important was the issue of funding. Dechannelizing the 

Kissimmee would require a large amount of money, at least some 

of which would probably have to come from Florida. It would take 

several more years of studies, including water quality examinations 

conducted by the Lake Okeechobee Technical Advisory Committee 

and some strong gubernatorial support, before Kissimmee restoration and stringent measures to protect Lake Okeechobee’s water 

quality would become a reality.

Endnotes

1 Robert G. Healy, Land Use and the States (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns 

Hopkins University Press, 1976), 109.

2 Senator D. Robert Graham, “A Quiet Revolution: Florida’s Future on 

Trial,” The Florida Naturalist 45 (October 1972): 146-147.
106 United States Army Corps of Engineers

3 See “How the Florida Boom is Changing,” U.S. News & World Report

66 (5 May 1969): 88; “Florida’s Land Boom Gets Down to Earth,” Business 

Week (6 April 1968): 136; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Office of the Chief 

of Engineers, Engineering Memoirs: Major General William E. Potter, EP 

870-1-12 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1983), 189-194.

4 All quotations (including Van Dyne’s) in McIntosh, The Background 

of Ecology, 200, 203, 229.

5 “Arthur Marshall, Director of the Division of Applied Ecology, The 

Center for Urban Studies, University of Miami,” Folder 8, Box 4, Arthur R. 

Marshall Papers, Manuscript Series 73, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Library (East), University of Florida, Gainesville, 

Florida [hereafter referred to as Marshall Papers]. For more information on 

Marshall, see Grunwald, The Swamp, 246-248.

6 Quotation in Florida Wildlife Federation press release, 8 April 1970, 

File Everglades High Water & Deer Situation: U.S. Senate Subcommittee 

Hearing, Box 1, S1719, Game & Fresh Water Fish Commission Everglades 

Conservation Files, 1958-1982, FSA. For more information about the deer 

problems in 1970, see “Information Sheet on Spring 1970 High Water Situation—Southern Florida,” File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Conservation Area Jan 

1970-Dec 1970, Box 15, Accession No. 077-96-0038, RG 77, FRC.

7 Quotations in “Adequate Water Essential for Wildlife Survival,” Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, South Florida National Wildlife Refuges press release, File Conservation Areas 1, 2, 3, 1970-86, Box 02193, SFWMDAR; see also Joseph D. Carroll, Jr., Acting Field Supervisor, to Regional 

Director, 7 May 1970, no file name, FWSVBAR.

8 “Report of the Special Study Team on the Florida Everglades, August 

1970,” 3, 5-8, 12, 17-27, copy in South Florida Water Management District 

Reference Center, West Palm Beach, Florida.

9 Henry B. Sirgo, “Water Policy Decision-Making and Implementation in the Johnson Administration,” Journal of Political Science 12, nos. 1-2 

(1985): 53-58.

10 “Report of the Special Study Team on the Florida Everglades, August 

1970,” 13-15. The report did not dwell on the EAA backpumping issue, only 

listing it as one of the factors contributing to poor water quality in the lake.

11 Arthur R. Marshall, “Water Problems of South Florida,” 26 January 

1971, File Water Resources Development Comm. General/Meetings 1957-

73, Box 02500, SFWMDAR.

12 Arthur R. Marshall, “Repairing the Florida Everglades Basin,” 11 

June 1971, copy in South Florida Water Management District Reference 

Center, West Palm Beach, Florida.

13 Marshall, “Repairing the Florida Everglades Basin.”

14 See G. W. Cornwell, “The Everglades—Nature’s Yo-Yo,” Folder 16, 

Box 4, Marshall Papers

15 W. V. Storch to Professor Arthur R. Marshall, 6 July 1971, attachment 

to Marshall, “Repairing the Florida Everglades Basin.”

16 Garald G. Parker, Chief Hydrologist, to Dale Twachtmann, Executive 

Director, 3 August 1971, Folder 5, Box 7, Marshall Papers.

17 Quotations in “Remarks of Reubin O’D. Askew, Governor of Florida, 

at the Governor’s Conference on Water Management in South Florida, Miami Beach, Florida, September 22, 1971,” Folder 4, Box 6, Marshall Papers; 

see also “Five Major Problems Listed By Governor,” Water Management Bulletin 5 (October-November 1971): 2; Graham, “A Quiet Revolution,” 146-

147; Grunwald, The Swamp, 260; “Lake Okeechobee Health Center of Rising Dispute,” The Miami Herald, 20 September 1971. McHarg’s book Design 

With Nature (Garden City, N.Y.: Natural History Press, 1969) emphasized 

the importance of environmental planning in the protection of ecosystems.

18 Quotations in “A Statement to Reubin O’D. Askew, Governor, State 

of Florida, from the Governor’s Conference on Water Management in South 

Florida,” September 1971, 1-6, File Wetlands Regulation Federal, State, Local Correspondence/General 1973-75, Box 02500, SFWMDAR; see also 

“Population, Drainage Limits Urged,” The Miami Herald, 25 September 

1971; Grunwald, The Swamp, 260.

19 Reubin Askew, Governor, to Friend, 7 March 1972 (with attachment), 

File L54 Water Resources Jan 72-June 72, EVER 22965, CR-ENPA; Askew to 

Conference Participant, 30 December 1971, ibid.; Carter, The Florida Experience, 126-131; Healy, Land Use and the States, 110-111.

20 Askew to Friend, 7 March 1972.

21 Carter, The Florida Experience, 136.

22 Carter, The Florida Experience, 132-136; Grunwald, The Swamp, 261;

Jones interview, 20.

23 Graham, “A Quiet Revolution,” 148; see also The Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act, copy in EVER 22965, CR-ENPA.

24 “The Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 

1972,” summary in File Legislation Environmental Land & Water Management Act of 1972—General, Box 25, Graham Papers; “Water Management 

in Florida,” 2 November 1973, ibid.; Carter, The Florida Experience, 133; 

Blake, Land Into Water, 230.

25 As quoted in Stephen Glass, “Rebirth of a River,” Restoration & Management Notes 5 (Summer 1987): 7; see also Jack Shreve to Senator, 3 April 

1972 (with attachment), File Legislative Water Resources Act 1973-1975, 

Box 38, Graham Papers; “Water Management in Florida,” 2 November 1973, 

ibid.; “Water Management Act of 1972,” File Legislative Water Management 

Districts 1974-1975, Box 38, Graham Papers; Forrest T. Izuno and A. B. 

Bottcher, “The History of Water Management in South Florida,” in Everglades Agricultural Area (EAA): Water, Soil, Crop, and Environmental Management, A. B. Bottcher and F. T. Izuno, eds. (Gainesville: University Press of 

Florida, 1994), 21-22; Maloy interview; Carter, The Florida Experience, 133; 

Blake, Land Into Water, 230. Because the FCD did not become the SFWMD 

until 1977, we will continue to refer to it as the FCD until our discussion 

reaches that year.

26 Carter, The Florida Experience, 137.

27 Leach, Klein, and Hampton, Hydrologic Effects of Water Control and 

Management in Southeastern Florida, 1-3.

28 As quoted in M. Timothy O’Keefe, “Cows, Crackers and Cades: 

Bloody, Muddy and ‘Unbent,’ The Kissimmee River Has Seen Some Weird 

Goings-On,” Florida Sportsman (August 1978): 20.

29 “Presentation by Colonel James W. R. Adams, District Engineer, 

Jacksonville District, to the Florida Wildlife Federation, Orlando, Florida, 

23 September 1978: ‘Two Rivers—Kissimmee-Oklawaha—Where We Are 

Today,’“ 1-3, Kissimmee Binder, Box 4383, JDAR.

30 Unsigned letter to District Engineer, 17 December 1958, copy in 

South Florida Water Management District Reference Center, West Palm 

Beach, Florida; Blake, Land Into Water, 260.

31 C. Russell Mason to General W. S. Cassidy, Chief Army Engineer, 

4 February 1966, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Kissimmee River Valley Study 

Aug 1965-Feb. 1967, Box 10, Accession No. 077-01-0023, RG 77, FRC.

32 Colonel R. P. Tabb, District Engineer, to Honorable George A. 

Smathers, 17 October 1967, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Kissimmee River 

Valley Study March 1967-December 1968, Box 10, Accession No. 077-01-

0023, RG 77, FRC.

33 “Kissimmee River Survey Review, Town Hall Meetings, Information 

Packet,” Binder Kissimmee, Box 4383, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, JDAR; 

“Presentation by Colonel James W. R. Adams, District Engineer, Jacksonville 

District, to the Florida Wildlife Federation, Orlando, Florida, 23 September 

1978,” 3; James L. Garland, Chief Engineering Division, to Mr. Alexander 
Chapter Six | The Liquid Heart of Florida 107

L. Crosby, 25 May 1973, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Kissimmee River Valley 

Study Jan 1973-Dec 1973, Box 9, Accession No. 077-01-0023, RG 77, FRC.

34 M. Timothy O’Keefe, “The Kissimmee Problems: Trying to Unmuddle Man’s Meddling,” Florida Sportsman (August 1978): 29.

35 Carter, The Florida Experience, 26.

36 Carter, The Florida Experience, 26, 123.

37 Arthur R. Marshall, “Water Problems of South Florida,” 26 January 

1971, copy in File Water Resources Development Commission, General/

Meetings, 1957-73, Box 02500, SFWMDAR.

38 Quotation in Colonel Emmett G. Lee, Jr., District Engineer, to Honorable Lawton Chiles, United States Senate, 27 August 1974, File 1110-2-

1150a (C&SF Martin County) Project—General—1968 Authn 1968-1979, 

Box 1, Accession No. 077-01-0023, RG 77, FRC; see also Donald B. Benedict, Martin County Conservation Alliance, to Mr. Carol White, Corps of 

Engineers, 3 June 1976, ibid.; Joseph D. Carroll, Jr., Field Supervisor, Fish 

and Wildlife Service, to District Engineer, 4 June 1976, File 1520-03 (C&SF) 

Water Control Jan. 1976-Dec. 1976, Box 3579, JDAR.

39 Quotation in Marshall, “Water Problems of South Florida,” 1; see 

also “Report of the Special Study Team on the Florida Everglades, August 

1970,” 14.

40 Quotation in Arthur R. Marshall, “Are The Everglades Nearing Extinction?” The Florida Naturalist 44 (July 1971): 80-81 (this is a reprint of 

Marshall’s statement); see also Marshall, “Repairing the Florida Everglades 

Basin,” 4.

41 “A Statement to Reubin O’D. Askew, Governor, State of Florida, from 

the Governor’s Conference on Water Management in South Florida,” 1; see 

also Lothian A. Ager, Fishery Biologist, to John W. Woods, Fisheries Division, 16 September 1971, File LO Historical Data/Text, Box 18060, SFWMDAR.

42 “Lake Okeechobee Not Dying, Official Study Shows,” The Palm Beach 

Times, 24 August 1971.

43 J. Walter Dineen to Jack Maloy, 3 August 1971, Folder 5, Box 3, Marshall Papers; “FCD To Seek Restoration of Kissimmee Marshes,” The Palm 

Beach Times, 1 December 1972; “Urges Support Be Given To Restoring 

Kissimmee,” Stuart News, 19 November 1972. In August 1972, Marshall received an appointment to the FCD’s board, but he resigned in 1973 because 

he believed that other board members did not take environmental matters 

seriously. See Governor to Mr. Art Marshall, 17 August 1972, Folder 9, Box 

4, Marshall Papers; Askew to Marshall, 17 July 1973, ibid.

44 All quotations in “Summary of Kissimmee River Hearing—At West 

Palm Beach—November 15, 1972,” 3, 5-10, File Kissimmee River Restoration History, Box 17166, SFWMDAR.

45 “Findings and Recommendations of the Governing Board, Central 

and Southern Florida Flood Control District, as the Result of Public Hearing Concerning Alleged Environmental Damage Resulting from Channelization of the Kissimmee River, November 15, 1972,” copy in South Florida 

Water Management District Reference Center, West Palm Beach, Florida.

46 The Kissimmee-Okeechobee Basin: A Report to the Cabinet of Florida

(Miami, Fla.: Division of Applied Ecology, Center for Urban and Regional 

Studies, University of Miami, 1972), 2, 48-50.

47 “December 12, 1972, Cabinet Meeting, 9:00 A.M.,” 36-37, 53, 57, 67, 

File Lakes & Streams Kissimmee River Basin (FCD) 1969, Box 1, S1570, 

Game & Fresh Water Fish Commission, Lake & Stream Restoration Project 

Files, 1950-1986, FSA.

48 Quotation in Interim Report on the Special Project to Prevent the Eutrophication of Lake Okeechobee (Tallahassee: Florida Department of Administration, Division of State Planning, 1975), 1; see also Blake, Land Into 

Water, 263.

49 Atlantis Scientific, “An Assessment of Water Resource Management 

in the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District: A Review and 

Evaluation of Environmental Reports on the Kissimmee River and Lake 

Okeechobee,” 2 April 1973, 49-50, 52, 59-60, 69, 77, copy in Library, Jacksonville District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, Florida.

50 “Corps Is Quietly Attacking River Restoration Proposal,” The Miami 

Herald, 27 May 1973. 

51 Atlantis Scientific, “An Assessment of Water Resource Management,” 

2.

52 David S. Anthony, “Water Problems in the Kissimmee_Okeechobee 

Basin in Florida,” 6, File Kissimmee River Restoration History, Box 17166, 

SFWMDAR.

53 Robert L. Goodrick and James F. Milleson, Studies of Floodplain Vegetation and Water Level Fluctuation in the Kissimmee River Valley, Technical 

Publication No. 74-2 (West Palm Beach, Fla.: Central and Southern Florida 

Flood Control District, 1974); “Lake Okeechobee—Kissimmee Basin, Proposals for Management Actions, Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District, March 20, 1975,” copy in South Florida Water Management 

District Reference Center, West Palm Beach, Florida.

54 “Lake Okeechobee—Kissimmee Basin, Proposals for Management 

Actions, Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District, March 20, 

1975”; Frederick E. Davis and Michael L. Marshall, Chemical and Biological 

Investigations of Lake Okeechobee, January 1973-June 1974, Interim Report, 

Technical Publication No. 75-1 (West Palm Beach, Fla.: Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District, 1975). The Division of State Planning 

published an interim report on the SPPELO in 1975 that noted the FCD’s 

conclusions, but explained that other studies of vegetation and sediments 

showed that phosphorous and nitrogen levels had tremendously increased. 

It expected to have “hard data” about the lake’s eutrophic condition by the 

end of the study. Interim Report on the Special Project to Prevent the Eutrophication of Lake Okeechobee (Tallahassee: Florida Department of Administration, Division of State Planning, 1975), 32.

55 Lyman E. Rogers to Lt. Governor J. H. ‘Jim’ Williams, n.d., Folder 45, 

Box 1, Marshall Papers (emphasis in the original); see also Lyman to Art, 28 

August 1975, ibid.

56 Williams to Rogers, 11 September 1975, Folder 45, Box 1, Marshall 

Papers.

57 Black, Crow & Eidsness, Inc., “Report to Florida Cane Sugar League 

on Eutrophication of Lake Okeechobee,” December 1975, xii-xiii, xv, 1-2, 

2-7, copy in South Florida Water Management District Reference Center, 

West Palm Beach, Florida.

58 Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District, “Report on 

Investigation of Back-Pumping Reversal and Alternative Water Retention 

Sites, Miami Canal and North New River Canal Basins, Everglades Agricultural Area,” December 1975, i-iv, copy in Folder 12, Box 3, Marshall Papers. 

The Rotenberger Tract was named for Ray Rotenberger, a man who built 

a camp and airfield in the area in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The state 

purchased 6,300 acres of land in the area in 1975. Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, “Rotenberger Wildlife Management Area” 

<http://www.floridaconservation.org/recreation/rotenberger/history.asp> 

(March 22, 2005).

59 See J. Walter Dineen, Director, Environmental Sciences Division, to 

Director, Resource Planning Department, 16 September 1974, Folder 35, 

Box 2, Marshall Papers; Dineen to Director, Resource Planning Department, 19 November 1974, ibid.; John C. Jones, Executive Director, Florida 

Wildlife Federation, to Honorable Reubin Askew, Governor of Florida, 4 

December 1974, ibid.
108 United States Army Corps of Engineers

60 State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, Report of 

Investigations in the Kissimmee River-Lake Okeechobee Watershed (Tallahassee: State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, 1976), 2, 4, 

13.

61 Department of Administration, Division of State Planning, Bureau of 

Comprehensive Planning, “Findings and Recommendations from the Special Project to Prevent the Eutrophication of Lake Okeechobee,” May 1976, 

copy in South Florida Water Management District Reference Center, West 

Palm Beach, Florida. For the full report, see Florida Department of Administration, Division of State Planning, Final Report on the Special Project to 

Prevent Eutrophication of Lake Okeechobee (Tallahassee: Florida Department of Administration, Division of State Planning, 1976).

62 Colonel Donald A. Wisdom, District Engineer, to Honorable John H. 

Williams, Lieutenant Governor of Florida, 13 April 1976, File C&SF Special 

Project to Prevent Eutrofication [sic] of Lake Okeechobee 1975, Box 3693, 

JDAR.

63 Jones interview, 13-14; “Conservationist Urges River Bill Passage,” 

The Palm Beach Times, 24 May 1976; Patrick M. McCaffrey, “Politics of the 

Kissimmee River Survey Review,” 51-56, Folder 7, Box 3, Marshall Papers.

64 “Conservationist Urges River Bill Passage,” The Palm Beach Times, 

24 May 1976.

65 “New Law May Help Stricken Kissimmee River,” unidentified newspaper clipping, File Kissimmee River News Clippings, Magazine Articles, 

Box 17166, SFWMDAR; A. H. “Gus” Craig to Mr. Joseph W. Landers, Jr., 21 

June 1976, Folder 6, Box 3, Marshall Papers. Most accounts say that the bill 

passed unanimously, but “New Law May Help Stricken Kissimmee River” 

reported that two members of the House voted against it.

66 Jon C. Thomas to Mr. Jay Landers, Secretary, Department of Environmental Regulation, 22 June 1976, Folder 6, Box 3, Marshall Papers.

67 Colonel Donald A. Wisdom, District Engineer, to Honorable J. H. 

“Jim” Williams, 4 February 1976, File C&SF Special Project to Prevent Eutrofication [sic] of Lake Okeechobee 1975, Box 3693, JDAR.

68 “Restoring the Kissimmee River May Be Florida’s Environmental Armageddon,” ENFO, n.d., copy in Folder 7, Box 3, Marshall Papers.

69 McCaffrey, “Politics of the Kissimmee River Survey Review,” 51-56.

70 Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General, to Honorable A. H. “Gus” Craig, 

Representative, 28th District, 15 April 1977, File 10-1-7a (Kissimmee River 

Restoration-State Coop Study) May 1977-August 1977, Box 3693, JDAR.

71 Coordinating Council on the Restoration of the Kissimmee River 

Valley and Taylor Creek-Nubbin Slough Basin [Coordinating Council], Legislative Summary: First Annual Report to the Florida Legislature (Tallahassee, 

Fla.: Coordinating Council on the Restoration of the Kissimmee River Valley and Taylor Creek-Nubbin Slough Basin, 1977), 1-1—1-4.

72 Coordinating Council, Legislative Summary, 1-5—1-8; McCaffrey, 

“Politics of the Kissimmee River Survey Review,” 57.

73 McCaffrey, “Politics of the Kissimmee River Survey Review,” 58.

74 Colonel Donald A. Wisdom, District Engineer, to Honorable J. Herbert Burke, 24 August 1977, File 10-1-7a (Kissimmee River RestorationState Coop Study) May 1977-August 1977, Box 3693, JDAR; “Kissimmee 

River Battle Subsides,” The Palm Beach Times, 21 September 1977.

75 Colonel Donald A. Wisdom, District Engineer, to Arthur J. Fox, Jr., 

Editor, Engineering News Record, 7 July 1977, File 10-1-7a (Kissimmee River Restoration-State Coop Study) May 1977-August 1977, Box 3693, JDAR.

76 Thomas G. Tomasello, Counsel, to Colonel James W. R. Adams, District Engineer, 28 June 1979, File C&SF Special Project to Prevent Eutrofication [sic] of Lake Okeechobee 1975, Box 3693, JDAR; 12; South Florida 

Water Management District, “Executive Summary: Water Quality Management Strategy for Lake Okeechobee,” 11 December 1981, Folder 16, Box 

3, Marshall Papers; Forrest T. Izuno and A. B. Bottcher, “Introduction,” in 

Everglades Agricultural Area (EAA): Water, Soil, Crop, and Environmental 

Management, A. B. Bottcher and F. T. Izuno, eds. (Gainesville: University 

Press, of Florida, 1994), 8.

77 See Jared Orsi, Hazardous Metropolis: Flooding and Urban Ecology in 

Los Angeles (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 134-137.

78 Maloy interview.


111

In the early 1980s, two political leaders brought strikingly different agendas to bear on Florida’s water management problems. Daniel Robert “Bob” Graham, a Florida Democrat with a strong record 

on the environment in the state senate, was elected governor of the 

state in 1978. Ronald Reagan, the former governor of California who 

blamed many of the nation’s economic woes on “environmental extremists,” was elected president of the United States two years later. 

The two politicians moved forward with their respective agendas at 

different speeds but with telling synchrony. Upon taking office in 

1981, President Reagan began an immediate overhaul of environmental regulations that had developed over the past decade, and 

he reduced federal funding across a broad range of environmental 

agencies and programs. Reagan’s environmental policy provoked 

strong reaction in Congress and among the general public, forcing 

the president (along with some other factors) to dismiss the two 

cabinet members who were the most identified with his environmental agenda, EPA Administrator Ann Gorsuch and Secretary of 

the Interior James G. Watt. Governor Graham treaded cautiously 

in the environmental arena in his first two years in the state house, 

but began wading into environmental issues shortly after Reagan became president. In 1983—the high water mark of public consternation with Reagan’s environmental policy—Graham made “Save Our 

Everglades” a major element in his political program for Florida, 

continuing and strengthening the environmental concern first demonstrated by Reubin Askew’s administration.

The thrust of Reagan’s environmental agenda was to shift responsibility from the federal government to the states. Graham’s environmental program revolved around central planning and public 

land acquisition. In the face of Reagan’s electoral triumph and the 

Chapter 7

contraction of federal leadership in environmental affairs, Graham 

marshaled the state’s resources to undertake the mammoth task of 

restoring the Everglades ecosystem. Together, the policies of these 

two contrasting leaders—building on the foundation constructed 

by Askew’s administration—rearranged the political landscape of 

South Florida water management.

In February 1981, Sports Illustrated published a hard-hitting article about environmental degradation in Florida. Authors Robert H. 

Boyle and Rose Mary Mechem described the state’s rampant population growth and frenetic new construction and noted that Governor Bob Graham had declared his administration in full support of 

bringing in more industry. “The sad fact is that Florida is going down 

the tube,” the authors wrote. “Indeed, in no state is the environment 

being wrecked faster and on a larger scale.” The authors went on to 

cite dire warnings of ecological collapse by such prominent Florida environmentalists as Marjory Stoneman Douglas, Charles Lee, 

John “Johnny” Jones, Arthur R. Marshall, and Nathaniel P. Reed.1

What set this article apart from a dozen other contemporary essays 

about Florida’s ailing environment was its prominent placement in a 

magazine with a broad readership. This was Sports Illustrated’s hotselling annual swimsuit issue, and the 10-page article on Florida’s 

environment dovetailed with a 14-page spread of bathing beauties 

on Florida beaches.

The instigator of the Sports Illustrated article was none other 

than the brash and effective political lobbyist Johnny Jones, executive director of the Florida Wildlife Federation and an instrumental 

player in Kissimmee and Okeechobee issues in the 1970s. Negative 

publicity was just what Jones was seeking. In 1980, he began calling 

newspaper editors and outdoors writers around the state, feeding 

“Save Our Everglades”: Reagan’s New Federalism and 

Governor Bob Graham in the 1980s
112 United States Army Corps of Engineers

them information for stories on the environment. After some success at the state level, he approached Sports Illustrated. Jones’ idea at 

that point was to challenge the governor by making caustic remarks 

about Bob Graham’s commitment to the environment in the national magazine.2

 “There never was a better environmental senator than 

Bob Graham,” Jones was quoted as saying in the article, referring to 

Graham’s legislative achievements in the state senate. “But as governor he has wandered away from us. I can’t even get in to talk with 

him, and I run the biggest conservation organization in Florida. As 

a governor, he ain’t got it.” Jones went on to charge Graham with 

forsaking environmentalists, reaching out to sugarcane growers and 

agribusiness, and generally moving to the political center because he 

had presidential ambitions.3 Jones’ words were harsh but measured; 

privately he held the governor in high esteem. Yet he knew from experience, he told an interviewer many years later, “that if you want 

somebody to move in government . . . you have to pick up a two-byfour and hit him upside the head.”4

Graham’s commitment to the environment was both personal 

and complex. Born in the Miami suburb of Coral Gables in 1936, he 

was no stranger to South Florida’s growth issues. His father, Ernest 

Graham, had moved to Florida from Chicago and, in the words of 

Marjory Stoneman Douglas, “turned a Miami dairy farm into a real 

estate fortune.”5 As a young man, Bob Graham took a turn with cattle 

raising and home construction, before venturing into politics. He 

served in the Florida House of Representatives from 1967 to 1970, 

and in the Florida Senate from 1971 to 1978, where he got several 

important environmental laws enacted. In 1978, he was elected governor. One of his first acts was to create the Office of Planning and 

Budgeting, which was aimed at giving state planners more influence 

in shaping the state budget.6 In this regard, Graham’s approach to 

governance contrasted with that of President Ronald Reagan, who 

made masterly use of the federal budget as a tool for shaping federal policy. While both Graham and Reagan appreciated the nexus 

of budget and policy, Reagan approached it from the opposite direction, using the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to degrade 

federal programs he did not like—including many environmental 

programs affecting South Florida.

When Graham took office, one of the key planners in Florida 

state government was Estus Whitfield. Whitfield was the principal 

author of the state’s first land development plan. In 1979, Governor 

Graham asked Whitfield to join his staff, requesting that Whitfield 

attend some cabinet briefings. According to Whitfield, “the environmental stuff was always the most significant part of the Cabinet 

meetings. It did not necessarily take the most time, but it was always difficult, controversial, because you had the issues of the use of 

state-sovereign lands.”7

 Consistent with the acts he had sponsored 

in the state legislature in the early 1970s, Governor Graham wanted 

to facilitate dialogue between advocates of growth and environmental protection. Not surprisingly, the criticism of the governor in the 

Sports Illustrated piece found its mark.

Whitfield remembers bringing the governor a copy of the magazine. “There is some good news and some bad news here,” Whitfield said, “and the good news is on the front, Christie Brinkley in 

her swimsuit.” The bad news was inside. To see such a popular national magazine lambasting Florida’s mismanagement of the Everglades, and to read the criticism by Jones—a political friend and 

supporter who had a big following in the state—made a powerful 

impression on Graham. “I do not ever remember a time thereafter,” 

Whitfield remarked, “that the environment was not on the top of 

the agenda.”8

The environmental problems that the governor faced were tied 

inextricably to Florida’s continuing rampant growth. By the 1980 

census, the state had nearly 10 million people and had risen to the 

rank of seventh largest state in the union. Two cities, Miami and Orlando, were growing apace. Miami, long established as the nation’s 

gateway to Latin America, had become, like New York and Los Angeles, one of the nation’s great immigrant cities. Its population contained not only Cuban exiles, but also large numbers of non-Cuban 

Governor Bob Graham. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and 

Archives of Florida)
Chapter Seven | “Save Our Everglades” 113

Hispanics, Caribbeans, and Asians. In the early 1980s, Miami captured national headlines as it coped with a floodtide of refugee “boat 

people” and rising ethnic violence. Orlando, meanwhile, continued 

to grow as a destination resort and service center for Disneyworld’s 

Magic Kingdom. Sprawling across four counties, this metropolitan 

area was attracting some 150 new residents daily by the 1980s.9 The 

phenomenal growth of Miami and Orlando, together with the development of other cities and innumerable retirement communities, 

placed increasing demands on the water supply of South Florida.

Agriculture, too, continued to grow, imposing its own set of water demands. Sugar cane, in particular, consumed a huge quantity of 

water. While dairy farms and citrus groves north of Lake Kissimmee 

disappeared into subdivisions on the expanding fringes of Orlando, 

sugar cane interests further south increased their stake in the lands 

served by the C&SF Project. In the EAA, the farm crop amounted to 

$700 million in 1981, of which $600 million was in sugar cane. That 

year, Florida surpassed Hawaii as the nation’s top producer of sugar. 

Ornamental tree farms were another significant agricultural interest. In Dade County’s agricultural areas, intensive fruit and vegetable 

farming yielded 75 percent of the winter vegetables and 95 percent 

of the limes consumed in the entire country.10

One concern for many people was the water supply for Dade 

County. Three million people in South Florida depended on the Biscayne aquifer for their sole source of drinking water. As demands on 

the aquifer mounted, so did longstanding concerns about seawater 

infiltrating into the groundwater. Another concern was contamination of the water supply by chemicals and sewage. There were known 

hazardous waste sites all over South Florida where no barrier existed 

to stop potentially hazardous wastes from leeching into the groundwater. People, too, worried about contamination of shore waters. 

Pollution in Tampa Bay was so bad that parts of the bay were offlimits to swimmers.11

But the most pressing issue was the decline of the Everglades. 

By the early 1980s, experts were agreeing that the health of the Everglades ecosystem was deteriorating at an accelerating rate. The signs 

of ecological imbalance were many: soil subsidence; water scarcity 

and pollution; alteration and elimination of vegetation, wildlife, and 

fisheries; and intrusion of exotic species. If there was one ray of hope, 

Miami, 1985. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and Archives of Florida)
114 United States Army Corps of Engineers

it was in the growing recognition that water management was the 

key to saving the Everglades. It was not just a matter of protecting the 

quantity and quality of water in the natural system; it was imperative 

that resource managers discover how to distribute the water so that 

it closely paralleled the historic sheet flow and the region’s annual 

rainfall cycle.12

These ideas crystallized in 1982 when another deer crisis occurred in Water Conservation Area No. 3. From 1980 to 1981, South 

Florida had experienced a drought, and the low water, coupled with 

fewer hunting opportunities, had caused the deer population to expand. Then, in the spring of 1982, heavy rains began falling, raising water levels in Conservation Area No. 3 to 11 feet, significantly 

above the regulation schedule of 9.5 to 10.5 feet. The heavy rains 

also forced the Corps to pump water from the EAA to the water 

conservation areas, exacerbating the condition. With deer unable to 

find forage due to the high water, the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission called for an out-of-season hunt to reduce the 

deer population and enable more of the animals to survive. On 18 

and 19 July 1982, hunters killed 722 deer. But animal-rights activists 

protested strongly against the hunt, vilifying both the Corps and the 

Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, and the plight of the deer 

became nightly fodder on the national evening news. This negative 

publicity prompted Graham to create the Everglades Wildlife Management Committee, composed of representatives from state and 

federal agencies and headed by Estus Whitfield. Graham asked the 

committee to develop a wildlife management plan in harmony with 

water management goals.13

The Everglades Wildlife Management Committee held public 

hearings to gauge what could be done about the deer. Numerous 

animal-rights activists came, as did many environmentalists. According to Whitfield, “the common theme, which was repeated over 

and over and over again,” was that “poor water management” was the 

problem. Therefore, when the committee issued its report, it stated, 

in Whitfield’s words, that the deer should not only be managed at 

lower levels, but that “the water-management system is flawed and . 

. . needs to be altered.”14

One of the ways to change water management was by implementing steps that Arthur Marshall had been promoting for years—

something that Johnny Jones referred to as the “Marshall Plan.” Jones 

gave the program this designation both to honor his friend and for 

rhetorical effect, as it echoed the economic rebuilding program developed by Secretary of State George C. Marshall after the Second 

World War and the plan promulgated by U.S. Geological Survey 

employee Robert Marshall to solve the water woes of the San Joaquin Valley in the 1920s (which eventually became the Central Valley Reclamation Project). The Arthur Marshall Plan was essentially 

what Marshall had advocated since the early 1970s—a restoration of 

natural sheet flow to the entire ecosystem, from the headwaters of 

the Kissimmee River to Florida Bay. It was then a prototype for the 

comprehensive plan for ecosystem restoration that would emerge in 

the 1990s. Marshall’s ideas, however, focused on the problems of the 

upper basin, particularly along the Kissimmee River, and referred to 

the plan as a way to “repair” the Everglades, not “restore” it.15 Regardless, the program provided a blueprint for ecological restoration—albeit encompassing a limited area of the Kissimmee-Okeechobee-Everglades ecosystem—and it assumed a large commitment of funding 

by the state government.

Ironically, Florida’s latter-day Marshall Plan did not have any 

federal funding behind it even though the enormity of the proposal 

and the fact that it would affect Everglades National Park seemed to 

warrant it. Some even believed that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers would oppose the plan, given the extensive modifications of 

the C&SF Project it would require. Nor was it clear whether Florida 

would get much support for its environmental initiatives from agencies such as the EPA, the FWS, and the NPS, even though all of these 

entities had supported environmental initiatives in the 1960s and 

1970s. The reason was simple: about the same time that environmentalists succeeded in reawakening Graham to environmental issues in 

Florida, they lost whatever influence they had had in the executive 

branch of the federal government under Ronald Reagan. The newly 

elected president was avowedly pro-business, strenuously opposed 

to “big government,” and hostile to most of the environmentalists’ 

agenda. His election in 1980 created a new political context for environmental restoration initiatives in South Florida.

Reagan campaigned for the presidency on a theme of cutting 

taxes and government “red tape” in order to revitalize the economy. 

His vision of economic growth contrasted with President Jimmy 

Carter’s message of sacrifice. Reagan’s conviction that the United 

States could achieve energy independence by unlocking its own domestic resources contradicted Carter’s emphasis on conservation 

and limits to growth. Reagan also presented “simple” alternatives to 

Carter’s complicated analyses. Although environmental issues were 

not at the center of debate in the presidential campaign, the two candidates presented a stark difference on environmental policy.16

When Reagan won the election, environmentalists feared that 

the new president would undo many of the movement’s accomplishments of the previous decade. Reagan, for his part, claimed that his 

landslide victory at the polls (he had defeated Carter by 489 to 49 

electoral votes and garnered a plurality of popular votes in a threeway race with Independent John Anderson) gave him a popular 

mandate to reform the nation’s economic and regulatory policies, 

including those shaping the environment. Reagan’s environmental 

agenda was deregulation, reduction of programs, and the opening 

of public lands for energy development and other uses. But in spite 

of Reagan’s decisive victory, it was questionable whether his environmental policy was in sync with majority opinion. Because most 

people based their votes on multiple issues, no one could be sure that 

voters had given Reagan a mandate to reform environmental policy. 
Chapter Seven | “Save Our Everglades” 115

Indeed, one strong indication that the public remained committed 

to environmental reforms of the 1970s was the fact that environmental organizations dramatically increased in membership during 

the Reagan administration. Analysts came to believe that the public 

consensus that had formed behind the environmental movement in 

the 1970s held together in the 1980s. As the Reagan administration 

moved ahead on its agenda, environmentalists sought to protect the 

status quo through Congress and the courts.17

Reagan pursued his environmental policies through three principal strategies. First, he appointed administrators who shared his 

conservative ideology and who were willing to undertake an extensive rewrite of federal regulations. Whereas Carter had appointed 

many administrators from the environmental community, Reagan 

recruited largely from the business arena and his appointees to environmental agencies typically had cut their teeth opposing government regulators. While some of Reagan’s top appointments provoked 

congressional opposition, his lower level designees were too numerous for Congress, environmental groups, or the media to monitor. 

The Reagan administration’s political appointments reached farther 

down in the ranks of the executive branch than in any previous modern presidency, and the President accomplished his goals in part 

through a systematic weakening of federal environmental regulations and policies at the hands of these administrators.18

Reagan’s second principal strategy was to use the budget process to implement policy. He began his first term by pushing a package of massive tax and budget cuts through Congress. “No previous 

administration ever came into power more determined or better 

prepared to achieve substantial domestic policy change through the 

budgetary process,” political scientist Robert V. Bartlett argued. In 

each ensuing budgetary cycle following the 1981 tax cut, Reagan 

Ronald Reagan at a press conference in Florida. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and Archives of Florida)
116 United States Army Corps of Engineers

directed the inevitable reductions in federal appropriations toward 

those environmental programs he favored least. “Few environmental 

programs,” Bartlett wrote, “escaped the Reagan budgetary scalpel.”19

While Congress began to restore some environmental program budgets to former levels in Reagan’s second term, many programs—such 

as funding for research and development—bore lasting scars from 

this budget slashing approach to policymaking.

Reagan’s third principal strategy was to avoid battles with Congress. He sought to weaken environmental laws not through legislative amendment but through selective non-enforcement of the laws 

based on regulatory revision and budget cuts. The Reagan administration made few legislative proposals in the environmental arena. Although Congress opposed the Reagan environmental policy 

agenda in many particulars, it went along with the president’s tax 

and budget cuts in 1981. As a result, Congress’s opposition to the 

president on environmental issues during the 1980s was largely confined to budget battles.20

The poster child for Reagan’s environmental agenda was Secretary of the Interior James G. Watt, the most flamboyant and controversial of Reagan’s appointees. A Wyoming lawyer who had spent 

years lobbying for and battling against Interior Department policies, 

most recently as a member of the conservative Mountain States Legal Foundation, Watt was a self-proclaimed leader in the “Sagebrush 

Rebellion.” Centered in the West, the Sagebrush Rebellion was fueled by frustration over declining energy prices and protective land 

policies that were allegedly harming western rural communities. Its 

principal goal was to privatize certain public lands administered by 

federal agencies. Although the Sagebrush Rebellion focused most intently on federal wilderness areas and minerals administered by the 

U.S. Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management—western 

issues that were seemingly remote from Florida—its attack on public 

land ownership was significant. One of Secretary Watt’s first initiatives was to freeze expenditures by the Land and Water Conservation Fund.21 This fund was used primarily for purchasing land in 

authorized additions to the national park system, and from 1965 to 

1981, it had enabled the NPS to acquire 1.4 million acres—including land in Florida’s Big Cypress National Preserve and Biscayne National Monument. As proposals for ecosystem restoration in South 

Florida increasingly pointed to the need for more publicly owned 

conservation lands, the Reagan administration did nothing to encourage a vigorous federal or state land acquisition program.

The operating budget of Everglades National Park took some 

direct hits in Secretary Watt’s drive to reduce expenditures by the 

NPS. In 1982, the park was denied funding for restoration of natural drainage to the Turner River watershed in Big Cypress National 

Preserve and the western edge of Everglades National Park, a project 

that the Izaak Walton League claimed “would be truly a precedent 

setting action.”22 In 1983, the park lost funding of its exotic plant 

control program.

Watt also had a penchant for making flip remarks (Reagan once 

gave Watt a sculpture of a cowboy boot with a bullet hole through 

the toe to symbolize this characteristic) and this tendency was evident in his response to the ecological endangerment of Everglades 

National Park. In June 1983, at a time when the national news media were carrying stories about manmade flood disaster in the park, 

Watt said in a prepared address to the American Petroleum Institute, 

“I’m told that Everglades National Park is being improved and is in 

better shape than it has ever been.”23 Park officials told the press the 

next day that the secretary of the interior was vastly uninformed. 

Watt’s critics pounced on this flap as evidence that the secretary did 

not talk to his park superintendents and did not comprehend or care 

about the ecological integrity of national parks. Indeed, it seemed 

to be further proof that Watt was narrowly focused on infrastructure improvements in the national parks. Florida Audubon Society 

president Peter Mott saw it as evidence that the interior secretary 

was ignorant that the park had lost 90 percent of its wading bird 

population. “Or maybe he thinks visitor centers are more important 

so people can go there and see trees with no birds in them,” Mott 

sarcastically commented.24

Secretary of the Interior James G. Watt. (U.S. Department of the Interior 

Library)
Chapter Seven | “Save Our Everglades” 117

Another controversial Reagan appointee, Ann Gorsuch, presided over drastic reductions of budget, staffing, and regulatory enforcement at the EPA. Under her leadership, according to historian 

Edmund P. Russell, “EPA cut enforcement actions in half and morale 

plunged.” Administration critics asserted that Gorsuch was unqualified and incompetent to lead EPA. Pressured by Congress, and with 

critics within the White House as well, she resigned in 1983, and 

Reagan brought back EPA’s first administrator, William Ruckelshaus, 

to restore the agency’s sense of mission. In one important respect 

EPA had been adrift since the Carter administration. Originally, the 

EPA had concerned itself with the total environment, but it had since 

moved toward a narrower focus on cancer-causing toxins.25 In part 

because of this focus, EPA paid little attention to Everglades protection during the Reagan years.

Reagan’s choice to oversee water resource development programs of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was William R. Gianelli, 

who became Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) in April 

1981. Gianelli had served as head of California’s Department of Water Resources when Reagan was governor of that state. Gianelli had 

two principal goals as the assistant secretary. First, as part of Reagan’s effort to deregulate, he wanted to curtail the Corps’ Section 404 

regulatory program. This program was named for Section 404 of the 

Clean Water Act of 1972, which assigned the Corps responsibility for 

issuing permits to dredge and fill wetlands. During the Carter years, 

the Section 404 program evolved so that the permitting process 

served to protect, or at least mitigate, wetlands loss. Gianelli believed 

this was wrong. In his view, the intent of Section 404 was to protect 

water quality, not wetlands. If Congress really wanted to prevent the 

destruction of wetlands, Gianelli maintained, then it needed to pass 

another law and assign responsibility to EPA or the FWS. So Gianelli 

embarked on a revision of the Section 404 regulations with the assistance of his deputy, Robert Dawson. The principal result of these 

efforts was to streamline the permitting process and allow more development in wetlands. Gianelli was particularly proud that the revised regulations reduced the influence of “single-purpose agencies” 

such as the FWS and the NPS.26

Gianelli’s other main goal was to reform the system of funding for water development projects. Curiously, this was one environmental policy initiative the Reagan administration shared with 

the Carter administration. But Reagan would not repeat the mistake 

that Carter had made. In 1977, Carter had gone to Congress with a 

“hit list” of Corps of Engineers civil works projects that he considered unnecessary and worthy of deauthorization. Carter took aim at 

these projects because the Corps had a longstanding reputation as an 

agency that lent itself to “pork barrel” politics. Members of Congress 

had made an industry out of obtaining civil works projects for their 

local districts—projects that were often paid for by taxpayers at no 

additional cost to the local communities that were supposed to benefit from them. Moreover, the Corps’ civil works program carried a 

backlog of projects that, in the context of the environmental movement, appeared misguided and detrimental to the environment. 

Carter, however, underestimated how jealously Congress guarded its 

prerogative to authorize these civil works projects, and he encountered a firestorm of congressional opposition. The resulting standoff 

killed any new water resource development acts—the semi-annual 

appropriation bills of the Corps’ civil works program. Carter retreated from his hardline stance in the last two years of his administration, but the damage had been done.27

When President Reagan came into office in 1981, he was every 

bit as opposed to pork barrel politics as his predecessor. Yet Reagan 

strongly supported water resources development. Indeed, Carter’s 

assault on water development projects was one of the wellsprings 

of the Sagebrush Rebellion that had helped elect Reagan president. 

Therefore, Reagan’s prescription for the Corps’ civil works program 

was to get it moving again by shifting a greater proportion of project 

costs to the states. Carter, too, had proposed new cost sharing arrangements, but Reagan took it further.

Gianelli, again with support from his deputy, Robert Dawson, 

proposed substantially increased “cost-sharing” between the federal 

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) William R. Gianelli. (U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers)
118 United States Army Corps of Engineers

government and non-federal sponsors for construction of new 

projects. Historically, a study by the Water Resources Council had 

shown, local interests had paid an average of 19 percent for federal 

flood control projects, but Gianelli, using figures developed by Robert Eiland, his special assistant, proposed that this figure be increased 

to 35 percent. Congress resisted this reform, and the stalemate over 

new project authorizations that had begun in the Carter administration continued through the first term of the Reagan administration. 

Finally, the Reagan administration succeeded in passing the Water 

Resources Development Act of 1986 (WRDA-86), which required 

local interests to enter into cost sharing agreements with the Corps 

for almost all new flood control projects. Local interests would bear 

at least 25 percent of the burden, instead of the federal government 

paying the full amount, and they would also supply 50 percent of 

the cost for feasibility studies. According to the Corps’ chief counsel at the time, Les Edelman, it was Dawson who skillfully sold the 

cost-sharing idea to Congress, but congressional leaders, especially 

Senate Republicans such as Robert Dole, James Abdnor, and Mark 

Hatfield, were the ones who secured the legislation’s passage.28

WRDA-86 was a significant achievement for an administration 

that put forth few legislative proposals in the environmental policy 

arena. The Reagan administration advanced its environmental agenda most effectively through the budget process, slashing appropriations for the Department of the Interior, EPA, and even the Corps, 

which lost nearly 3,000 positions in the civil works division from 

1981 to 1983.29 Therefore, as Florida positioned itself to undertake 

much more extensive ecosystem restoration in the early 1980s, it 

had little support from Washington. Reagan’s new federalism would 

shape the direction of ecosystem restoration in South Florida for the 

next dozen years.

Reagan’s new federalism was evident in the return of the jetport 

controversy. Although the first jetport proposal in the Big Cypress 

Swamp had been defeated, controversy swirled again over Site 14, a 

26-square-mile area in northwest Dade County selected under the 

Everglades Jetport Pact in the 1970s. Construction had been delayed 

on the jetport, and by the late 1970s, environmentalists were bitterly 

divided over Site 14. Some environmental groups, notably the Florida Audubon Society, opposed Site 14, believing that the sacrifice of 

wetlands, the encroachment on critical habitat of several endangered 

species including the Everglades kite, and the disruption of sheet flow 

across Conservation Area No. 3B were unacceptable costs to accommodate further aviation needs.30 But most of the Everglades Coalition 

supported the alternative site in the belief that, if it were not approved, 

Dade County would eventually build somewhere else in a location 

that would probably do more harm to Everglades National Park. Nathaniel Reed took this point of view, arguing that Conservation Area 

No. 3B, in which Site 14 was located, must be treated as multiple-use 

land in order to protect the national park and preserve land to the 

south and west. The dispute drove a wedge in the coalition.31

In October 1979, EPA raised the bar for Site 14 when it designated the Biscayne aquifer as a sole source aquifer under Section 

1424(e) of the Safe Drinking Water Act. Now pollution discharged 

into the groundwater had to be considered in addition to the other 

environmental impacts of the proposed facility. EPA notified the 

FAA of its intent to review the project in light of its Section 1424(e) 

authority. By the spring of 1980, EPA officials in the Regional Administrator’s office in Atlanta were warning the FAA that EPA had 

“several major concerns”—particularly since the Dade County Water and Sewer Authority had recently proposed to develop a major 

new well field for tapping the Biscayne aquifer near Site 14.32

EPA completed its review of the final EIS for Site 14 in February 1982, nearly a year into Reagan’s first term. The agency reiterated its concern that the development of a commercial airport 

“within the cone-of-influence” of the newly developed well field 

represented a “potential threat to future drinking water quality in 

south Florida.” Yet EPA would not use its Section 1424(e) authority 

to prevent the project, stating that it could not “conclusively demonstrate that an airport at Site 14 will lead to contamination of the 

Biscayne [aquifer].”33

Commenting on the final EIS in January 1982, the Jacksonville 

District of the Corps of Engineers expressed its own reservations 

about Site 14. The jetport facility would render Conservation Area 

No. 3B “virtually useless” for its intended purpose as a floodwater 

storage area. Moreover, the Corps objected to a statement in the final EIS that the Corps, together with other federal agencies, had determined that the jetport development was compatible with plans 

for the building of a conveyance canal from Conservation Area No. 

3 to Everglades National Park. “The Corps of Engineers was not a 

party to this determination, and in fact disagrees with this determination,” the Jacksonville District stated.34 To the contrary, there 

was high potential for the jetport facility to contaminate water that 

was to be conveyed directly to Everglades National Park through 

the new canal. Therefore, the District requested that the FAA address these issues in its final EIS, noting that the FAA needed to 

follow the procedures outlined in Section 404(r) of the Clean Water 

Act as well.35

Faced with mounting criticisms of the project, Governor Graham formed a committee to study the issue and to recommend a 

final decision. He selected seven individuals: five from state government, one from private industry, and one from the University of 

Florida. The governor charged the group with making a thorough 

analysis of South Florida’s future aviation needs. The group considered a range of other measures to improve commercial aviation service and determined that existing facilities at Miami International 

Airport could meet the region’s demands through 2000. From a state 

perspective, further consideration of a proposed airport at Site 14 

was unwarranted, the group decided. The governor accepted the 

group’s findings.36
Chapter Seven | “Save Our Everglades” 119

On 11 May 1983, Graham announced that he opposed the jetport plan and would not renew the state’s participation in the Everglades Jetport Pact. “Our decision to withdraw the state’s support 

for a Jetport in Dade County will mean enhanced protection of the 

Everglades, the ‘river of grass’ unique to the world,” Graham stated. 

“This decision to withdraw state support of the study of a major new 

jetport in Dade County means that such a Jetport should not be built 

in this century.”37 Reminding people that the jetport proposal had 

been under consideration for a long time, the governor explained 

that public attitudes about land use had changed dramatically in the 

intervening years. Graham might have added, although he was too 

politically savvy to say it, that the federal perspective on land use had 

changed dramatically as well. If growth pressures in Dade County 

threatened Everglades National Park, it was now up to the state, not 

the federal government, to press for action.

At the same time that debate raged over the jetport proposal, 

the Corps struggled with another task that, in a different political 

climate, might have provided valuable help for addressing South 

Florida’s water management problems. In 1980, the Jacksonville District initiated a study of South Florida’s water supply mandated by 

Congress to resolve the questions of water supply to Everglades National Park. As explained previously, P.L. 91-282, passed in 1970, required that the Corps conduct a study in 1980 to “determine whether 

further modifications of the project [were] warranted, and [to] give 

further assurances of maintaining the essential water supply to insure the protection of the Park’s ecosystem.” 38 The study was funded 

as a component of the C&SF Project—another in a series of restudies 

of the huge project to gauge its progress and prospects. But instead of 

focusing on whether or not Everglades National Park was receiving 

enough water, the Jacksonville District decided to use the restudy to 

assess how the C&SF Project could increase water availability for the 

region’s agricultural, municipal, and industrial needs. The restudy 

of the early 1980s foreshadowed the extensive reexamination that 

would be undertaken in the following decade. Like the latter effort, 

its purpose was to identify means for expanding the water pie in 

South Florida so that all stakeholders in the project could get a larger 

piece. However, the water supply study of the early 1980s withered. 

It served to highlight needs and options, but did not result in any 

comprehensive plans or recommendations.

A drought beset South Florida at the same time that the study 

was commenced, heightening public interest in the water supply 

problem. Hardest hit by the drought was Lake Okeechobee. As the 

level of the lake dropped to its lowest point in history, the Corps was 

urged to reconsider old proposals to raise the lake level and increase 

its storage capacity. The problem was that the level of the lake directly affected its water quality and wildlife habitat. To resolve these 

conflicts, the Corps changed the lake-stage regulation schedule in 

1978 in order to increase water storage, and the SFWMD curtailed 

backpumping of water from the EAA into Lake Okeechobee in order 

to improve water quality. However, due to the drought, the lake level 

dropped despite the new regulation schedule. In order to prevent 

levels from decreasing even more, the SFWMD allowed a resumption of backpumping through August 1982.39

As part of the water supply study, the Corps investigated options 

for raising the level of Lake Okeechobee. It also considered backpumping water from east coast canals into the lake. Other alternatives included the establishment of additional water conservation areas, storage of freshwater in deep aquifers so that it could be pumped 

to the surface in times of shortage, desalinization of seawater, and 

water conservation. One concerned citizen wanted to import water to Lake Okeechobee from the St. Johns River basin to the north, 

a proposal that U.S. Senator Lawton Chiles (D-Florida) relayed to 

Colonel Alfred B. Devereaux, Jr., District Engineer of the Jacksonville District. Devereaux’s deputy responded to Senator Chiles that 

Urban encroachment of Dade County. (South Florida Water Management 

District)

Lake Okeechobee. (South Florida Water Management District)
120 United States Army Corps of Engineers

interbasin diversion was not among the alternatives under consideration.40

Governor Graham agreed with the Corps on this matter, stating that interbasin transfers of water should be considered only as a 

last resort, and that the state and the Corps were investigating other 

means of improving South Florida’s water supply. Graham noted that 

the array of water supply concerns included the protection of water quality, coordination of water use activities in each region, and 

“maintaining minimum flows for natural systems.”41 This last item 

was of crucial importance with respect to Everglades National Park.

Governor Graham was not the only one requesting that the 

Corps address the needs of Everglades National Park. John M. 

Morehead, superintendent of the park, was interested in the ultimate effects of the Corps’ study. In a letter to Colonel Devereaux, 

he expressed hope that the study would “examine ways to rejoin the 

historical hydrological equilibrium between the east Everglades, the 

Water Conservation areas, and Everglades National Park.”42 Environmental groups, too, wanted assurance that the water supply study 

would adequately address park needs. It was not an unreasonable 

demand, since Congress originally authorized the study in 1970 as 

part of its efforts to protect water supply to the park.43

But in the view of the Corps, the multiple demands on South 

Florida’s water supply by municipalities, industry, and agriculture 

required a broader approach. As the water supply study entered its 

third year, the Corps determined that the best way to complete it 

was to throw its effort behind an initiative of the SFWMD involving 

computer modeling. Thomas MacVicar, a state hydrologist in the Resource Planning Department of the SFWMD, had begun developing 

a computer model capable of simulating the hydrology of South Florida on a regional scale. As the model progressed, the Corps provided 

funding through contractual arrangements with the SFWMD. Gradually, the water supply study melded into the SFWMD’s computer 

modeling strategy.44 In its original published form (1984), the model 

was called the South Florida Water Management Model (version 

1.1). It would be continually modified, upgraded, and populated with 

additional data over the next two decades, and in the early 1990s, it 

would form the basis for a Natural System Model that was crucial in 

developing a comprehensive plan for ecosystem restoration.45

MacVicar’s original concept was to develop something that 

would simulate how water was distributed and flowed through the 

entire ecosystem so that managers could test how operational decisions in one locality would affect hydrologic conditions elsewhere. 

The hydrologic model simulated groundwater flow, surface water 

flow, and how hydrology would respond to hypothetical channel 

routings from changes in canals, levees, and other structures. Spatially, the model consisted of a grid-pattern overlay of South Florida 

composed of squares two miles on each side, with each point of 

intersection in the grid being a node in the computer model. For 

each node, the model was populated with data on topography, land 

use, and aquifer thickness and permeability. In terms of timing, the 

model used one-day intervals, and data were supplied for rainfall, 

well field withdrawal, and structure discharge for each day of simulation.46 Because it explored the relationship of disparate regions 

within the entire ecosystem—showing how changes in one part of 

the area affected water distribution or other characteristics in another section—MacVicar’s model foreshadowed the Corps’ restudy 

of the C&SF Project in the 1990s. In many ways, it was one of the 

key factors allowing the concept of Everglades restoration to bloom.

In its beginning stages, MacVicar’s program was used for developing “optimization” of the C&SF Project. MacVicar encoded the 

model so that it would compare actual water stages throughout the 

system with “optimum” stages. Actual amounts were computed by 

entering the previous day’s hydrologic data into the program. Optimums for each canal were variable depending on time of year, hydrologic conditions, and other operational considerations. The model helped managers to minimize the “absolute deviation” between 

the actual and optimum stages in each canal or reservoir, thereby 

allowing agencies “to drive the system to operate as close as feasible 

to the optimum.”47

Park Superintendent Morehead saw the possibility of adapting 

MacVicar’s hydrologic program to predict the results of different 

C&SF Project modifications for water deliveries to Everglades National Park. Through the Corps, he supplied MacVicar with data on 

mean monthly delivery volumes for the years 1969-1975.48 MacVicar 

then entered operational data—the spatial arrangement of levees, canals, and other structures—for the same period. As he explained in 

a meeting of Corps, SFWMD, and NPS hydrologists and engineers 

in May 1983, he could now run the computer model for “base” (current) or “historical” conditions. By operating the model on historical conditions, it was possible to rewind the clock on C&SF Project 

developments and simulate how the hydrology would respond. In 

this case, “historical conditions” referred only to the operational system in the years 1969-1975—not far in the past—but the idea was to 

model different scenarios for filling in or degrading existing canals 

and levees in order to achieve a measure of ecosystem restoration. 

Toney Lanier, the Corps’ project manager for the water supply study, 

assisted the development of MacVicar’s program by committing 

project monies for it.49

Yet the Corps never produced a final report with an analysis of 

alternatives, as was conceived at the outset of the study and in the 

examination’s congressional authorization. Yet the agency never officially abandoned it either. Strapped for funds and personnel, and 

distracted by project cost-sharing issues, it merely utilized the SFWMD’s hydrologic model of South Florida for information.50 After 

Congress passed an emergency measure for Everglades National Park 

in November 1983, requiring the Corps and the NPS to implement 

a two-year experimental program of modified water delivery for the 

park, the Corps became firmly wedded to the SFWMD’s computer 
Chapter Seven | “Save Our Everglades” 121

program as a means of re-evaluating water supply options not only 

for the park but throughout the Kissimmee River-Lake OkeechobeeEverglades ecosystem. It had used the water supply study to assess 

how agricultural, industrial, and municipal needs could co-exist 

with the park’s ecological needs, much to the chagrin of the park, 

and it subordinated the study to the state’s own water management 

objectives.

In 1987, seven years after the water supply study was initiated, 

the Corps sought comment from the FWS on another iteration of 

the examination, offering, for unclear reasons, only a meager $5,000 

transfer of project funds for the FWS review. Field Supervisor Joseph 

D. Carroll of the FWS’s Vero Beach office responded indignantly to 

Jacksonville District Engineer Colonel Charles T. Myers, III. “What 

is impending is a request at the 11th hour by your staff to respond in 

two weeks or 30 days to a ream of computer data,” Carroll wrote. “As 

indicated in the Scope of Work, your staff will want to know detailed 

biological effects on Lake Okeechobee, the water conservation areas, 

the Holeyland and Rotenberger tracts, and Everglades National Park 

(millions of acres). This just cannot be done!” Carroll accepted the 

$5,000 transfer but warned that such a trifling sum would merely pay 

for “the most superficial treatment of this huge project, largely based 

on past studies and experience.”51

Meanwhile, Governor Graham advanced his environmental 

agenda through state legislation. Graham’s first significant environmental law was his “Save Our Rivers” initiative, enacted in June 

1981, which provided $320 million to the state’s five water management districts over the next ten years for river cleanup. In 1983, the 

state legislature passed the Water Quality Assurance Act, creating a 

$100 million trust fund to help local governments upgrade sewage 

treatment plants. The law also established guidelines for protection 

of groundwater from industrial pollution and gave the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation $3 million for enforcement. 

In 1984, the legislature enacted the Wetlands Protection Act, which 

enlarged the department’s jurisdiction over swamps, marshes, and 

floodplains by extending the list of plants that identified an area as 

wetland from 67 to 266 species. The law also gave the department 

permitting authority for development in wetlands—a responsibility 

that overlapped the Corps’ regulatory program under Section 404 of 

the Clean Water Act. By 1985, officials in Tallahassee claimed that 

Florida was doing more than any other state to protect water supplies, with the possible exception of California. Despite these state 

efforts, Department of Environmental Regulation Secretary Victoria 

J. Tschinkel emphasized, Florida’s water supply remained vulnerable 

to threats of pollution. More than nine out of ten Floridians depended on groundwater for their drinking water. “In south Florida,” one 

environmentalist commented, “we live right on top of our water supply. It’s like drinking out of the toilet.” A noted expert on the state’s 

water resources, John DeGrove, testified in hearings held by the department that “what we’ve seen here scares the daylights out of me.”52

While President Reagan promised the nation regulatory relief, 

Governor Graham assured Floridians that they deserved more environmental safeguards—and as the governor’s popularity rose, it 

increasingly appeared that that was what most Floridians wanted. 

Under the strong leadership of Secretary Tschinkel, the Department 

of Environmental Regulation moved ahead of both the Corps and 

EPA to address state water problems. Tschinkel announced a protective state water policy in 1981, followed by a coastal management 

plan soon after that. Impatient for EPA to mandate allowable limits 

for toxic chemicals in drinking water under the federal Clean Water Act, Tschinkel’s agency established state standards, becoming the 

first state in the nation to do so.53

Governor Graham’s enthusiasm for land-use planning to 

protect environmental quality culminated in Florida’s Growth 

Management Act of 1985. Although the state had passed similar 

legislation a decade earlier, it was not effective in dealing with the 

pressures of Florida’s rapid population expansion. One of the most 

pressing issues for many Floridians was how to preserve the smalltown character of communities that were becoming smothered by 

strip malls and homogenous residential subdivisions. The Growth 

Management Act of 1985 aimed to address numerous problems 

in conjunction with this development, including inadequate infrastructure to support growth, affordable housing, and urban renewal, as well as environmental degradation. In essence, the law 

required local governments to develop local comprehensive plans 

for land use.54

In the long run, this law failed in its objectives. The principal 

reason was that the legislation was not enforceable: it allowed for 

substantial local control, and when developers wanted to develop a 

particular parcel of land that was out of bounds, they lobbied the local government to have the comprehensive plan modified. The law 

made Florida’s Department of Community Affairs responsible for 

Mangroves. (National Park Service)
122 United States Army Corps of Engineers

enforcing the comprehensive plans, but it allowed the plans to be 

modified as often as twice a year. Another limitation of the Growth 

Management Act was that it did not attempt to coordinate land-use 

planning with conservation needs. Land use plans too often ran 

afoul of the Section 404 permitting process, for example, or of requirements under the Endangered Species Act.55

Growth management was fundamentally a problem for local 

and state governments, but clean water, protection of wetlands, and 

cleanup of hazardous waste sites were environmental issues that 

involved state and federal cooperation. While Graham was willing 

to put the resources of the state behind various initiatives, he was 

frustrated by the lack of federal support. “To date, we have sort of 

dragged the federal agencies with us,” Graham remarked in 1986. “I’d 

like to see Washington move from a passive and reluctant partner to 

a full and enthusiastic one.”56

Nowhere was the state in more need of federal assistance than 

in South Florida, where the Everglades continued to show signs of 

inexorable decline. Environmentalists had long insisted that the 

federal government was neglecting its stewardship responsibilities 

in South Florida. The national parks and other federal interests in 

South Florida ought to compel greater federal involvement in that 

region’s ecological problems, environmentalists argued. Graham 

did not disagree, but he decided that the underlying problems were 

so broad and complex that environmental leadership had to come 

from the state. In particular, he was impatient with the Corps over its 

slow pace in studying how to repair environmental damage caused 

by the C-38 canal it had built down the Kissimmee River Valley. As 

Jones and Marshall reminded him following the exposé of Florida’s 

environmental problems in Sports Illustrated, the Corps had resisted 

modifying the Kissimmee River project since it was first asked to reexamine it in 1976. “The governor is not going to wait forever for the 

Corps of Engineers to act,” Graham’s chief environmental aide, Estus 

Whitfield, informed the media.57 Rather, the state would propose its 

own version of Kissimmee River restoration.

In late March 1983, Graham called a summit of his top environmental administrators. State agencies represented at the conference 

included the SFWMD, the DER, the DNR, the Florida Game and 

Fresh Water Fish Commission, and the Department of Community 

Affairs. He demanded interagency cooperation and gave meeting 

participants a 1 July deadline to develop a blueprint for saving the 

Everglades. Over the next three months, the governor held a series 

of other meetings on the Everglades with business leaders, environmentalists, and state officials. Although the governor conducted 

these conferences behind closed doors, word began to leak to the 

press that the plan would involve restoration of sheet flow through 

the entire ecosystem. It would likely mean changes of land use in 

two bitterly contested areas: the EAA (south of Lake Okeechobee) 

and the section of Dade County bordering Everglades National Park 

known as the East Everglades Area.58

On 9 August, Governor Graham unveiled his program of environmental initiatives for South Florida. Aimed at “rejuvenation” 

of the entire Kissimmee River-Lake Okeechobee-Everglades ecological system, the program took the name “Save Our Everglades” to 

highlight the significance of the effort for Everglades National Park. 

The program embraced six “Phase I” actions, presented roughly in 

north-south or downstream order. First, the state would seek federal cooperation in reestablishing the values of the Kissimmee River. 

Second, the Holey Land and Rotenberger tracts—lands within the 

EAA that were now mostly in state ownership—would be restored 

as wetlands for the benefit of water sheet flow and wildlife habitat. 

Third, the deer population in Conservation Area No. 3 would be 

managed so that high water levels would not cause massive die-offs. 

Fourth, the two highways traversing the Everglades east to west, Alligator Alley and the Tamiami Trail, would undergo extensive modification to reduce impoundment of sheet flow from north to south. 

Fifth, the state would acquire land, as well as encourage the federal 

government to acquire land, in the controversial East Everglades 

Area for the protection of Everglades National Park. In addition, the 

state would support the park’s demands for a modified water delivery plan. Sixth and finally, state and federal land acquisition would 

be pushed ahead in Big Cypress National Preserve and Fakahatchee 

Strand for the protection of the Florida panther.59

Of the six actions, only the second and third were primarily 

achievable without federal participation. Therefore, Governor Graham informed President Reagan about the “Save Our Everglades” 

program in a personal letter delivered to the White House on 8 August, one day prior to the program’s official disclosure. “Florida is 

undertaking an ambitious program to restore and preserve the Everglades, a national treasure and a key factor in the future prosperity of 

our State,” the governor began. “We will need the assistance of federal 

agencies. I urge your cooperation in revitalizing the Everglades and 

the environment of South Florida.” Graham then cited the actions 

that would depend heavily on federal support: restoration of fish and 

wildlife values in the Kissimmee River Valley, requiring the “expedited cooperation” of the Corps of Engineers; reconstruction of Alligator Alley as an interstate freeway, which would need the assistance of 

the U.S. Department of Transportation; mitigation of water management impacts on Everglades National Park, necessitating Corps help; 

and acquisition of lands adjacent to the park and within Big Cypress 

National Preserve, in cooperation with the Interior Department. The 

governor requested that President Reagan designate a federal coordinator “who would be charged with expediting the actions of federal 

agencies in concert with state and local governments.”60 Although this 

last request did not garner any response from the Reagan administration, it foreshadowed the establishment of a federal task force on 

South Florida ecosystem restoration a decade later.

“Save Our Everglades” was a program more than a plan: it put 

forth a public goal and six distinct “actions” that would be pursued 
Chapter Seven | “Save Our Everglades” 123

more or less independently of each other. Nevertheless, it was a huge 

step forward in forging public support for an ambitious program 

of environmental action in South Florida. And unquestionably, the 

program hung together around the central concept of ecosystem 

restoration. When Governor Graham announced “Save Our Everglades” in a press conference in Tallahassee on 9 August 1983, he 

defined three public purposes for the project that were “fundamental 

priorities” of his administration: first, to avoid any further degradation of the Everglades and related natural systems from the headwaters of the Kissimmee River to Florida Bay; second, to reestablish 

the “natural ecological functions” of the ecosystem; and third, to 

improve the overall management of recreation, water, fish and wildlife for the Everglades and surrounding areas.61 All three purposes 

emphasized the connectedness of the Everglades with all of South 

Florida. They could be summed up in three words: preservation, restoration, and use. The concept of ecosystem restoration presented in 

“Save Our Everglades,” then, enlarged upon the core national park 

mandate of preservation and use; it related Everglades National Park 

to the rest of South Florida, and it posited that ecological functionality was vital to both. An 11-page issue paper that accompanied the 

press release on “Save Our Everglades” made repeated references to 

“the Everglades and the environment of South Florida.”62 To save the 

Everglades was to save South Florida, home to six million people.

In the “Save Our Everglades” program, Graham offered a vision, 

or definition, for ecosystem restoration. The program was designed 

to provide “that the Everglades of the year 2000 looks and functions 

more like it did in 1900 than it does today.”63 The issue paper carried 

a “background statement” that sketched some history of human-induced changes to the environment from Hamilton Disston’s drainage works in the 1880s to the initiation of the C&SF Project in the 

late 1940s. It then declared, “Although the system can never be the 

same as it was before Disston began his work, many of its natural 

functions and values can be restored while providing water supplies 

and flood protection to south Florida.”64

Graham reiterated these themes on a barnstorming tour of South 

Florida on 10 August 1983, accompanied by state officials, members 

of the press, and Colonel Alfred Devereaux, District Engineer of the 

Jacksonville District. The governor emphasized the interdependence 

between the natural environment and the nearly six million people 

who lived in South Florida.65 In pledging Florida’s efforts to restore 

The area south of the Tamiami Trail was a key component of Governor Graham’s restoration plan. (Everglades National Park)
124 United States Army Corps of Engineers

the Everglades to its turn of the century condition, Graham had in 

mind an idealized baseline when the environment of South Florida 

supported agriculture, small cities, and the natural wonders of the 

Everglades in more or less equilibrium. In implementing this plan, 

Graham was continuing a process begun by Governor Reubin Askew 

in the 1970s: that of state initiative in repairing and restoring the 

South Florida ecosystem. The irony of the situation did not escape 

Audubon magazine, however, which observed that it was the state of 

Florida that had requested the C&SF Project in the first place, and 

now that same state was providing the program to save South Florida from the environmental destruction of the “enormous surface 

plumbing system.”66 Yet even though the state faced a presidential 

administration hostile to environmental policies, officials knew that 

federal involvement in Save Our Everglades was crucial. Whether or 

not that help would be forthcoming remained to be seen.

Endnotes

1 Robert H. Boyle and Rose Mary Mechem, “There’s Trouble in Paradise,” Sports Illustrated 54 (9 February 1981): 82-93 (quotation on p. 84).

2 Jones interview, 12.

3 Quotations in Boyle and Mechem, “There’s Trouble in Paradise,” 93; 

see also Grunwald, The Swamp, 273.

4 Jones interview, 12.

5 Douglas, Voice of the River, 245.

6 Estus Whitfield interview by Brian Gridley, 15 May 2001, 4, Everglades Interview No. 8, Samuel Proctor Oral History Program, University of 

Florida, Gainesville, Florida [hereafter referred to as Whitfield interview]; 

Grunwald, The Swamp, 272.

7 Whitfield interview, 12.

8 Quotations in Whitfield interview, 14; see also Grunwald, The Swamp, 

271-272.

9 Gary R. Mormino, “Sunbelt Dreams and Altered States: A Social and 

Cultural History of Florida, 1950-2000,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 81 

(Summer 2002): 15-17.

10 Kevin Hanson, “South Florida’s Water Dilemma: A Trickle of Hope 

for the Everglades,” Environment 26 (June 1984): 17.

11 Boyle and Mechem, “There’s Trouble in Paradise,” 86.

12 Hanson, “South Florida’s Water Dilemma,” 15; William J. Schneider 

and James H. Hartwell, “Troubled Waters of the Everglades,” Natural History

93 (November 1984): 47.

13 Untitled draft document, File 10-1-7a C&SF Wtr (1983), Central 

and Southern Florida Water Supply (January-September 1983), Box 3285, 

JDAR; “Everglades Deer Crisis,” File Everglades Conservation Area: Correspondence & Studies, 1978-1982, Box 1, S1719, Game & Fresh Water Fish 

Commission Everglades Conservation Files, 1958-1982, FSA; “Everglades 

Hunt: The Deer Can’t Win,” Newsweek 100 (17 October 1982): 27; John 

Weiss, “Everglades Deer in Trouble,” Outdoor Life 165 (April 1980): 32, 36. 

14 Whitfield interview, 14.

15 Boyle and Mechem, “There’s Trouble in Paradise,” 94; George Reiger, 

“The River of Grass is Drying Up!” National Wildlife 12 (December/January 

1974): 62.

16 C. Brant Short, Ronald Reagan and the Public Lands: America’s Conservation Debate, 1979-1984 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 

1989), passim.

17 Robert Cameron Mitchell, “Public Opinion and Environmental Politics in the 1970s and 1980s,” in Environmental Policy in the 1980s: Reagan’s 

New Agenda, Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft, eds. (Washington, D.C.: 

Congressional Quarterly, 1984), 51-74.

18 J. Clarence Davies, “Environmental Institutions and the Reagan Administration,” in Environmental Policy in the 1980s: Reagan’s New Agenda, 

145-148.

19 Robert V. Bartlett, “The Budgetary Process and Environmental Policy,” in Environmental Policy in the 1980s: Reagan’s New Agenda, 121-122.

20 Henry C. Kenski and Margaret Corgan Kenski, “Congress Against 

the President: The Struggle Over the Environment,” in Environmental Policy 

in the 1980s: Reagan’s New Agenda, 98-105.

21 Paul J. Culhane, “Sagebrush Rebels in Office: Jim Watt’s Land and 

Water Politics,” in Environmental Policy in the 1980s: Reagan’s New Agenda, 

293, 308.

22 Quotation in Franklin B. Adams, President, Florida Division of 

the Izaak Walton League of America to Robert Baker, Regional Director, 5 

March 1982, and Baker to Adams, 8 April 1982, Folder 24, Box 3, Marshall 

Papers; Hansen, “South Florida’s Water Dilemma: A Trickle of Hope,” 20.

23 As quoted in Naples Daily News, June 16, 1983.

24 As quoted in Naples Daily News, June 16, 1983.

25 Edmund P. Russell III, “Lost Among the Parts per Billion: Ecological Protection at the United States Environmental Protection Agency, 1970-

1993,” Environmental History 2 (January 1997): 36.

26 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Office of the Chief of Engineers, Water Resources, People and Issues: An Interview with William Gianelli, EP 870-

1-24 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1985), 32-33, 36 

[hereafter referred to as Gianelli interview].

27 Martin Reuss, Reshaping National Water Politics: The Emergence of 

the Water Resources Development Act of 1986, IWR Policy Study 91-PS-1 

(Fort Belvoir, Va.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Institute for Water Resources, 1991), 48-64; Stine, “Environmental Politics and Water Resources 

Development,” 179-182.

28 Reuss, Reshaping National Water Politics, 82-83, 145-199; Gianelli 

interview, 16-17; Les Edelman interview by Theodore Catton, 17 November 

2004, 3-4.

29 J. Clarence Davies, “Environmental Institutions and the Reagan Administration,” in Environmental Policy in the 1980s: Reagan’s New Agenda, 

147.

30 Joseph Browder interview by Theodore Catton, 17 November 2004, 4 

[hereafter cited as Browder interview].

31 Browder interview, 3-4.

32 Briefing Document, Site 14—Training Airport, 5 May 1980, File Jetport Important Correspondence 1979, Box 1, Accession 412-91-0041, RG 

412, NARA-SE.

33 Howard D. Zeller, Acting Assistant Regional Administrator for Policy and Management, to James E. Sheppard, Chief, Miami Airport District 

Office, 5 February 1982, Folder 18, Box 2, Marshall Papers.

34 A. J. Salem, Acting Chief, Planning Division to James E. Sheppard, 

Chief, Miami Airport District Office, 22 January 1982, Folder 18, Box 2, 

Marshall Papers.

35 Salem to Sheppard, 22 January 1982.

36 Untitled memorandum, no date, File Jetport, Box 6, S172, Executive 

Office of the Governor Press Secretary Subject Files 1979-86, FSA.
Chapter Seven | “Save Our Everglades” 125

37 Graham Announces Opposition to Southeast Florida Jetport, 11 May 

1983, File Jetport, Box 6, S172, FSA.

38 Senate, River Basin Monetary Authorizations and Miscellaneous 

Civil Works Amendments, 91st Cong., 2d sess., S. Rept. 91-895, 1970, Serial 

12881-3, 20.

39 R. Thomas James, Val H. Smith, and Bradley L. Jones, “Historical 

Trends in the Lake Okeechobee Ecosystem, III. Water Quality,” Arch. Hydrobiology 107 (January 1995): 52-53.

40 Robert J. Waterston III, Deputy DE to Lawton M. Chiles, Jr., 19 August 1981, File 10-1-7a C&SF Wtr (80-81) Central and Southern Florida 

Water Supply (January 1980—September 1981), Box 3285, JDAR.

41 Bob Graham to C. J. O’Brien, 7 July 1981, File 10-1-7a C&SF Wtr 

(80-81) Central and Southern Florida Water Supply (January 1980—September 1981), Box 3285, JDAR.

42 John M. Morehead, Superintendent, to Colonel Alfred B. Devereaux, 

District Engineer, 17 September 1982, File Everglades National Park 1958-

88, General/Resolutions and Agreements, Box 02161, SFWMDAR.

43 Alice Wainwright, National Audubon Society, to John Seiberling, 

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Public Lands and National Parks, 25 

February 1983, File 31, Box 2, Marshall Papers.

44 Toney Lanier, Project Manager, Memorandum for the Record, 11 

May 1983, File 10-1-7a C&SF Wtr (1983) Central & Southern Florida Water 

Supply Study (January—September 1983), Box 3285, JDAR.

45 Robert J. Fennema et al., “A Computer Model to Simulate Natural 

Everglades Hydrology,” in Everglades: The Ecosystem and its Restoration, Steven M. Davis and John C. Ogden, eds. (Delray Beach, Fla.: St. Lucie Press, 

1994), 250-251.

46 “Central and South Florida Water Supply Modeling,” no date, File 

10-1-7a C&SF Wtr (1983) Central & Southern Florida Water Supply Study 

(January—September 1983), Box 3285, JDAR.

47 “Water Management Decision Model,” no date, File 10-1-7a C&SF 

Wtr (1983) Central & Southern Florida Water Supply Study (January—September 1983), Box 3285, JDAR.

48 John M. Morehead, Superintendent, to Colonel Alfred B. Devereaux, 

District Engineer, 17 September 1982, File Everglades National Park 1958-

88, General/Resolutions and Agreements, Box 02161, SFWMDAR.

49 Toney Lanier, Project Manager, Memorandum for the Record, 11 

May 1983, File 10-1-7a C&SF Wtr (1983) Central & Southern Florida Water 

Supply Study (January—September 1983), Box 3285, JDAR.

50 On cost-sharing see A. J. Salem, Acting Chief Planning Division, to 

Commander, South Atlantic Division, 3 February 1982, enclosing “Benefit Evaluation Central and South Florida Project,” File 10-1-7a C&SF Wtr 

(1988) Central & Southern Florida Water Supply (1988), Box 3285, JDAR. 

On the use of computer modeling see Joseph D. Carroll, Jr., Field Supervisor, to Charles T. Myers III, District Engineer, 14 February 1985, File CE-SE 

Central and Southern Florida FCP Everglades National Park Water Requirements Study, FWSVBAR.

51 Joseph D. Carroll, Jr., Field Supervisor, to Charles T. Myers III, District Engineer, 3 March 1987, File 10-1-7a C&SF Wtr (83-85) Central & 

Southern Florida Water Supply (October 1983—1985), Box 3285, JDAR.

52 Both quotations in “Florida’s Growth Straining Fragile Groundwater,” Engineering News-Record 189 (3 January 1985): 26.

53 Victoria J. Tschinkel to David H. Pingree, 17 July 1981, File Department of Environmental Regulation, Box 4, S172, FSA; “Suggested Comments for Governor Graham, National Wetlands News Conference,” 12 

January 1983, File Environment, ibid.

54 Randall G. Holcombe, “Why Has Florida’s Growth Management Act 

Been Ineffective?” Journal of the James Madison Institute, No. 28 (Spring/

Summer 2004): 13-16.

55 Holcombe, “Why Has Florida’s Growth Management Act Been Ineffective?”; Jones interview, 31; Colonel Terry Rice interview by Theodore 

Catton, 6 December 2004, 9.

56 As quoted in Ron Moreau, “Everglades Forever?” Newsweek 98 (7 

April 1986): 72.

57 As quoted in The Post (West Palm Beach), 8 April 1983.

58 Fort Lauderdale News, 5 June 1983.

59 “Save Our Everglades,” 9 August 1983, SFWMDAR.

60 Bob Graham, Governor, to Ronald Reagan, President, undated, Folder 16, Box 2, Marshall Papers.

61 “Graham Announces Save Our Everglades Program,” 9 August 1983, 

Folder 16, Box 2, Marshall Papers.

62 “Save Our Everglades,” 9 August 1983, 4, 11.

63 “Graham Announces Save Our Everglades Program,” 9 August 1983, 

Folder 16, Box 2, Marshall Papers.

64 “Save Our Everglades,” 9 August 1983, 4.

65 Colonel Alfred B. Devereaux, Jr., District Engineer, Memorandum 

for the Record, 12 August 1983, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Kissimmee River 

Valley Basin Jan 1983, Box 9, Accession 077-01-0023, RG 77, FRC.

66 Steve Yates, “Saga of the Glades Continues,” Audubon 87 (January 

1985): 34.

127

Facing a federal government largely at odds with environmental 

concerns in the 1980s, Governor D. Robert “Bob” Graham initiated 

what was essentially an ecosystem restoration plan for South Florida 

known as “Save Our Everglades.” Developed through discussions 

with prominent environmentalists, including Marjory Stoneman 

Douglas, Johnny Jones, and Arthur Marshall, the plan acknowledged 

the interconnectedness of the Kissimmee-Okeechobee-Everglades 

ecosystems and outlined ways to restore the water health of the region. An integral part of that plan was dechannelizing the Kissimmee 

River in accordance with the 1976 state law requiring the restoration 

of water quality in the Kissimmee River Basin. Efforts in the 1980s to 

remove C-38—called “that damn sewer ditch” by some environmentalists1

—were promoted most vigorously by Graham and the South 

Florida Water Management District. Although the Corps seemingly 

dragged its feet for most of the 1980s on Kissimmee restoration, either by design or because of a lack of authorization to do much more 

than study the issue, it received an appropriation from Congress under Section 1135 of the Water Resources Development Act of 1986 to 

begin restoration efforts. By 1988, then, several significant steps had 

been taken toward dechannelization, setting a foundation for actual 

restoration in the 1990s.

In September 1978, Congress, responding to the state of Florida’s initiative, provided appropriations to the Corps for a restudy 

of the Kissimmee River, and the Corps began its work in 1979. According to a 1980 publication, the purpose of the study was “to 

determine the feasibility” of altering the Kissimmee River flood 

control system in order to enhance water quality and improve “environmental amenities” and “fish and wildlife resources,” among 

other things.2

 In October 1979, the Corps completed its reconChapter 8

naissance report (Stage I) and began Stage II of the restudy, which 

would develop numerous alternatives that the Corps could take. 

Thereafter, Phase III would examine the feasibility of those plans 

and recommend one as the course to follow. Because the Corps had 

a large amount of data to analyze, it decided to use a data management system known as SAM (Spatial Analysis Methodology) for the 

study. SAM, which had been developed by the Corps’ Hydrologic 

Engineering Center in Davis, California, could evaluate all study 

aspects, including economic, environmental, and hydraulic conditions. The Corps pledged to obtain as much public input as possible 

in its examinations by conducting public meetings and workshops, 

thereby allowing for comments from a broad constituency. Corps 

officials estimated that all three phases of the examination could be 

completed by August 1982, with a draft Stage III report issued by 

January 1982.3

For those who believed that the 1976 Florida law mandated 

dechannelization of the Kissimmee River, this timetable was too 

long. Likewise, Marshall and others felt that there was an urgency 

to the issue. “The effectiveness of all the elements” of the Marshall 

Plan, Marshall explained, were “totally dependent on filling the Kissimmee ditch.” In fact, he continued, “dechannelization [was] the answer and the hope for repairing the Everglades system.”4

 To pressure 

the Corps to expedite its study and to champion Kissimmee restoration, new environmental organizations appeared, including the Kissimmee Restoration Coalition and Marshall’s Coalition to Repair the 

Everglades.5 Meanwhile, the Friends of the Everglades, holding that 

“the opportunity for the State of Florida to dechannelize the lower 

Kissimmee will not remain long,” prepared a petition requesting that 

the state disallow further floodplain development, that it purchase 

“That Damn Sewer Ditch”: Kissimmee River Restoration Efforts, 

1978–1988
128 United States Army Corps of Engineers

floodplain lands, and that Congress and the President of the United 

States order the Corps to restore the river.6

As the first years of the 1980s passed, the Corps increasingly 

fell behind schedule on its feasibility study, frustrating many state 

officials. Victoria Tschinkel, secretary of the Florida Department of 

Environmental Regulation, for example, told newspapers that “the 

Corps was very behind schedule and above budget on its plans to 

restore the Kissimmee River.”7 She and Governor Graham called on 

the Corps to accelerate its work, and Jacksonville District Engineer 

Colonel Alfred Devereaux responded by pledging to have a decision 

by the end of 1982 as to how restoration could occur.

Many critics claimed that the Corps was merely dragging its feet 

because it did not want to dechannelize the Kissimmee, an accusation that Devereaux denied. He blamed the delays on SAM, explaining that the program had never been used on such a large study as 

the Kissimmee River plan, and that, therefore, establishing parameters became a long, drawn-out process. It “took a lot longer to get 

working than expected,” he said, estimating that the program “probably added a couple of years” to the study’s completion time.8

 M. 

Kent Loftin, an engineer in the Jacksonville District agreed, explaining that data compilation and the need to break the river into a grid 

of three and twelve-acre land cells caused the slowdown.9

But it was also clear that despite the growing power of environmental organizations in the 1970s and the Corps’ own attempts to 

transform itself into a more environmentally friendly organization, 

the agency was experiencing some setbacks. For one thing, it was 

difficult to shift agency culture away from engineering and towards 

environmental restoration. Corps leaders who actually embraced the 

transformation, for example, found resistance from old-time engineers who, in the words of historian Jeffrey Stine, declared that “they 

did not join the Corps of Engineers to come up with non-structural 

solutions to flood control problems.”10 Environmental organizations 

had helped to make the Corps more accountable in the 1970s, but, 

as Kissimmee River restoration efforts in the 1980s demonstrated, a 

long journey still lay ahead.

Regardless of the reasons for the delay, environmentalists wanted the Corps to act quickly. This feeling was heightened in 1982 

when several scientists, including Arthur Marshall, claimed that 

The Kissimmee River. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Eight | “That Damn Sewer Ditch” 129

the channelization of the Kissimmee River had altered the region’s 

normal rain cycle. Meteorologist Patrick Gannon first proposed 

this hypothesis in 1977 in a doctoral dissertation titled “On the 

Influence of Surface Thermal Properties and Clouds on the South 

Florida Sea Breeze,”11 but the theory was not widely publicized until 

an article appeared in a March 1982 issue of Sports Illustrated titled 

“Anatomy of a Man-Made Drought.” This essay, written by Robert 

H. Boyle and Rose Mary Mechem, cited Marshall’s assertion that 

drought in the Kissimmee Valley—which had approximated a onein-700 years event in 1981—was “a predictable consequence of the 

land development and the drainage of wetlands in the Everglades 

and the Kissimmee River basin.” According to the article, Marshall 

explained that water that flowed from the Kissimmee River Basin 

to Lake Okeechobee to the Everglades was “the key to the region’s 

abundant rainfall” because vast amounts of it evaporated quickly in 

the summer and descended in the form of afternoon rain. Marshall 

claimed that “almost all the water that had risen from the wetlands 

would come down again,” replenishing water supplies. With Kissimmee River channelization and other developments, however, not 

enough water was available for evaporation, meaning that the “rain 

machine” could not function as in the past. Boyle and Mecham also 

quoted Gannon as saying that the “entire [weather] cycle has been 

altered, weakened and shifted,” and “we’re setting up a heat regime 

rather than a rainy regime in the summer period.”12

After the publication of the Sports Illustrated article, the Florida Water Resources Research Center of the University of Florida 

sponsored a conference on 14 May 1982 to discuss drought, rain, 

and their causes in Florida. In the course of this meeting, several 

scientists raised doubts about Gannon and Marshall’s theory, noting that the 1981 drought affected all of Florida, not just the Kissimmee River Basin, and that more studies were necessary before anyone could definitively say that channelization provoked drought. 

Garald Parker, a former hydrologist with the U.S. Geological Survey, who had been quoted by Sports Illustrated as supporting Marshall’s position, distanced himself from the rain-machine theory, 

insisting that claims of channelization’s effects on climate were “not 

supported by anything more than a superficial look at hydrology. . 

. . We know there’s a whole lot more work to be done.”13 Gannon 

himself backed off slightly from his previous position, claiming that 

his research had focused only on urbanization’s effects on Florida’s 

coastal areas and that he had no expertise in Kissimmee River matters. However, discounting any human manipulation of nature, 

Gannon also noted that “if the entire 3,300 square mile basin was 

once shallow wetlands and is now no longer so,” climate changes 

“had to have occurred.”14

For the most part, the rainfall debate diminished after this May 

1982 conference, but efforts to dechannelize the Kissimmee River 

did not. Johnny Jones of the Florida Wildlife Federation continued his lobbying efforts for restoration, telling Senator John Vogt, 

chairman of the state senate’s Natural Resources Committee that the 

Corps was deliberately delaying its studies. According to Boyle and 

Mechem’s article, Jones then asked Vogt to propose a bill in the state 

legislature to use funds under Florida’s Conservation and Recreation 

Lands Act and the Save Our Rivers Act to “start filling that ditch . . . if 

the feds don’t get off their butts.” Vogt agreed, concerned that Florida 

would “become a desert” if “unlimited development and drainage of 

wetlands” continued.15

Others had similar ideas. In February 1982, Nathaniel Reed, 

former assistant secretary of the interior for fish, wildlife, and parks, 

requested that state officials designate the Kissimmee River floodplain as an area of critical state concern under the Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972. Likewise, Vince 

Williams, a fishery biologist with the Florida Game and Fresh Water 

Fish Commission, advocated the designation of the entire Upper 

Kissimmee River Basin (Lake Kissimmee northward) as an area of 

critical state concern, in part because the region suffered from significant fish and wildlife decline due to “deteriorating water quality 

and unregulated residential encroachment.”16

In the meantime, the SFWMD decided to take matters into its 

own hands. In May 1982, its governing board approved a plan to 

install a two-foot-high metal extension on the lift gates of five water 

control structures separating the Kissimmee River into five pools. In 

the rainy season, the SFWMD would raise water levels in the pools 

by two feet, allowing drained marshes to reflood. During the dry 

season, the SFWMD would reduce each pool’s level by one foot below its normal elevation so that the marshes could dry. In part, the 

SFWMD wanted to see the effects of such reflooding, but its scientists and engineers also believed that the program could “dramatically enhance fish and wildlife habitat.”17 The district noted that its 

plan, which it hoped to begin in the fall, would cost only $22,000, 

and it submitted an application for approval to the Coordinating 

Council for the Restoration of the Kissimmee River. According to 

John “Jack” Maloy, executive director of the SFWMD, the plan was 

“a way in which we can easily and inexpensively almost double the 

river’s marshlands without jeopardizing flood control objectives.”18

Although Graham and other state officials enthusiastically endorsed the SFWMD’s plan, not all Florida residents were pleased. 

Kissimmee Valley ranchers appeared before the SFWMD’s board in 

August and expressed concern with the reflooding. “The plan you are 

proposing is going to cripple every cattleman on this river-marsh,” 

said Perry Smith, who owned a farm in Okeechobee County.19 Others agreed; proprietors of McArthur Farms asked for a state administrative hearing because, they claimed, the SFWMD’s plan would 

unconstitutionally prevent them from using their land. Because of 

these protests, the governing board voted to stop its reflooding plans 

until, according to one newspaper account, “staff members have the 

opportunity to further assess what the impact will be on the lands of 

ranchers on the river.”20
130 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Agriculturists continued to fight against Kissimmee River restoration in general. “The people we are facing are the environmentalists who want to increase the bird and fish population,” said Mike 

Palmer, who owned a dairy in the Kissimmee Basin. “They want 

to help ducks and fish and forsake the land animals who have had 

10 years to adapt to habitats created” by channelization.21 Likewise, 

Paul Wilson, a rancher from Frostproof, insisted that he preferred 

the straightened river because “it handles the flow of water more 

efficiently,” while Allen Whitston, director of the Upper Chain of 

Lakes Property Owners Association, claimed that the state’s Kissimmee plans used too much “scientific theory” and ignored “historical 

documented fact.”22

Despite ranchers’ concerns, the move to do something on the 

Kissimmee River accelerated in 1983, a benchmark year in the push 

for dechannelization. For one thing, as we have already seen, Governor Graham instituted his “Save Our Everglades” program in August, 

in part from frustration with the lack of progress on the Kissimmee 

River. Indeed, one of the major components of the first phase of his 

program was to revitalize the river, and he called on both the state 

and the federal government to “recognize the problem and correct 

the wrong done to the Kissimmee and the people of Florida.” Specifically, Graham asked the Coordinating Council on the Restoration of 

the Kissimmee River Valley to make a firm recommendation as to 

how “the natural values of the Kissimmee River” could be restored, 

and he called on President Ronald Reagan to facilitate federal cooperation with the state.23 “The governor is not going to wait forever for 

a resolution to these problems,” Estus Whitfield, environmental aide 

to Graham, said. “He wants to start doing something now.”24

Under this pressure, the Coordinating Council asked the Corps, 

in the words of Colonel Devereaux, to interrupt its feasibility study 

and “pull together some options” about how restoration could proceed. According to Devereaux, the council then would study these 

choices and “decide where they wanted to go.”25 To fulfill the council’s needs, the Corps presented it with three options: the do-nothing 

alternative, where the river would be left alone; the partial backfilling alternative, consisting of refilling a large part of the river with 

dredged spoil material to allow for marshland reformation; and the 

combined wetlands alternative, which would leave the channelized 

river in place, but would develop pockets of wetlands along the watercourse.26

Cattle wading through the Kissimmee River. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Eight | “That Damn Sewer Ditch” 131

Before making its final decision, the Coordinating Council held 

a series of public meetings in August.27 Environmentalists championed the partial backfilling plan, asking the state to move forward 

with it even if the Corps refused to provide aid, and they disparaged 

the combined wetlands alternative as “highly structural” and “worse 

than what’s out there now.”28 Driving these statements was an implicit distrust of the Corps’ focus on structural solutions for water 

problems. As reported in an article in Oceans, Marshall and others 

believed that the Corps had “engineered” the state of Florida “nearly 

to death”; manipulating the system even more through the creation 

of artificial impoundments was not the answer.29

But ranchers and agriculturists in the Kissimmee River Basin expressed their opposition to backfilling, fearing that it would 

flood their lands. “We were told we would have flood control and 

our operation is based on that,” cattle rancher Pat Wilson said. 

“With restoration, you want to bring that water right back to our 

fro[n]t door.” Kent Bowen, manager of McArthur Farms, agreed. 

“We could lose up to 3,000 acres,” he protested, and “that would 

make our ranching operation economically unviable.”30 At the very 

least, ranchers called on the state to do nothing until the Corps had 

completed its feasibility study (now estimated to be finished in the 

spring of 1984).

The Coordinating Council did not take agriculturists’ advice; 

instead, on 19 August, it declared that, “after careful consideration” 

of the Corps’ preliminary findings, it supported the partial backfilling alternative. “As much of the original channel of the Kissimmee 

River should be restored as possible,” the council stated, and “any alternative which continues the existence and function of the C-38 Canal” should be shelved. The council tempered its decision by saying 

that it wanted more information about whether or not backfilling 

would “materially affect existing levels of flood protection in the Upper Kissimmee Basin,” but as long as flood control could continue, 

backfilling was the preferred option. The council also recommended 

that the state “assume primacy” in restoration efforts even though 

many state officials believed that the federal government had a “moral obligation” to participate since a federal project had caused the 

damage in the first place.31 Unfortunately, “it seems unlikely that the 

Corps could participate in restoration under the current Administration’s policies and guidelines,” the council explained, “unless there 

are quantifiable economic benefits.”32

Weirs placed in the Kissimmee as part of the Demonstration Project. (South Florida Water Management District)
132 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Acting on the council’s recommendations, the SFWMD took 

the lead in conducting state efforts. One reason for this, according to 

Stanley Hole, who was elected chairman of the SFWMD’s governing 

board in 1985, was that Graham had replaced members of the board 

“who [did] not share his environmental commitment to broad restoration.” This move, Hole continued, effectively “changed the character of the board,” making the SFWMD a “natural resources” district 

interested in environmental quality. “The most recognizable change,” 

Hole related, “is that we used to say, ‘Just tell me where you want the 

water put,’ and then we’d manage it. Now,” Hole concluded, “we have 

to be concerned with the overall effects of everything we do.”33

The SFWMD was not alone in making such an attitude adjustment. Other flood control districts in the United States, such as the 

Los Angeles County Flood Control District, also began exhibiting an 

increased awareness of environmental values in their water management efforts. The Los Angeles County Flood Control District, which 

had been formed primarily to operate Corps flood control operations on the Los Angeles River, stated as early as 1971 that it wanted 

“to make our engineers sensitive to possible social and environmental problems of each project.”34 It pledged to consider cultural values, 

recreation, aesthetics, and the environment in its operations, much 

like new SFWMD members promised to explore environmental 

quality measures in South Florida.

But even long-term SFWMD officials, such as Executive Director Jack Maloy, supported the restoration effort. Maloy initially proposed that the district fill in a ten-mile stretch of the river, at a cost 

of between $400,000 and $700,000, to observe whether positive ecological conditions would return.35 On 9 September 1983, the governing board of the SFWMD met to discuss Maloy’s plans, eventually 

adopting it as the best method to follow. Graham concurred on 11 

September after meeting with Florida’s congressional delegation and 

with authorities in the Reagan administration. Under Maloy’s plan, 

the SFWMD would place a weir at the south end of Pool B of C-38, 

effectively “plugging” the pool, and then refill approximately four to 

eight miles of the river between S-65A and S-65B. The SFWMD proposed to begin constructing the weir on 1 January 1984, estimating 

a completion date of two years for the entire project. After that time, 

the district would “monitor and evaluate” the “environmental impacts and benefits,” as well as how the reflooding affected area land 

use and whether it had detrimental consequences on flood control in 

the region north of Lake Kissimmee.36

Before any construction could begin, the SFWMD had to receive both state and federal permits for the project. After the SFWMD had submitted its applications to the State Department of 

Environmental Regulation and the Corps, the Latt Maxcy Corporation, a large cattle company in the region, filed a protest, arguing that the Corps had not finished its studies on restoration and 

that the SFWMD merely wanted to “dump 4,519,898 cubic yards of 

silty sands” in the river “without knowing the effect, method, and 

cost.” The corporation also contended that the demonstration project would forestall navigation of the Kissimmee, and that it would 

“destroy the biota and habitat” that had developed after the Corps 

straightened the river. Finally, the company argued, its operations 

“relied on the permanence of the canal” and any restoration efforts 

would “adversely” affect its land rights.37

It is unclear how much influence the protests of Latt Maxcy 

and other agriculturists had, but the Corps eventually rejected the 

SFWMD’s application. According to Colonel Deveraux, the denial 

occurred for several reasons. First, Corps officials believed that the 

demonstration project was large enough to require an EIS, something that would take at least a year to produce. Second, Devereaux 

explained, backfilling any part of the river would alter the navigability and flood control intent of the Corps’ original Kissimmee project, and that could not occur without congressional approval. Most 

importantly, Devereaux said, the project only “put dirt back in the 

ditch” and “did not generate any wetlands,” meaning that it did not 

fulfill “many of the State objectives.”38

Environmentalists, however, saw the action as more evidence 

that the Corps did not want to dechannelize the Kissimmee. According to Estus Whitfield, environmental aide to Graham, Corps 

officials were “quite reticent and not too thrilled with the state’s and 

the South Florida Water Management District’s exuberance to go 

out and fill in C-38.” One problem, Whitfield stated, was that “some 

of the [engineers] who designed the Kissimmee channel were still 

there” and did not want to undo it.39 Whitfield had a point; Devereaux himself characterized advocates for complete restoration as 

“starry-eyed folks” and claimed both privately and publicly that the 

combined wetlands alternative was the only feasible option.40

Regardless of the reasons for the permit’s denial, Corps officials, 

including Deveraux, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) 

William Gianelli, and Director of Civil Works Major General John 

Wall met with state and SFWMD authorities in January 1984 to develop an alternative plan. In February, the SFWMD proposed a new 

program. Under this plan, known as Kissimmee River Restoration 

Phase I, the SFWMD would place three metal sheet pile walls in Pool 

B in order to divert water into the river’s natural channels. A navigation notch would be placed in the walls so that boats could continue 

to navigate the river, and the Corps would construct baffle blocks 

on structures S-65B, C, and D so that it could manipulate the river’s 

water levels. If the state legislature approved the plan, the SFWMD 

proposed to begin work on the approximately $1.2 million project in 

the spring of 1984.41

Many SFWMD officials saw the new demonstration project 

as a way to determine “once and for all” whether it was “realistic” 

to restore the Kissimmee River to its “meandering, natural” state.42

Jan Horvath, director of the SFWMD’s Resource Coordination Department, also thought that the project could demonstrate the best 

way for the state to manage the floodplain, as well as show how 
Chapter Eight | “That Damn Sewer Ditch” 133

S-65 structures on C-38. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District)
134 United States Army Corps of Engineers

restoration would impact residents along the river. Yet others, including SFWMD Assistant Executive Director John Wodraska, worried that the SFWMD did not have enough information about the 

demonstration project’s impacts, and he wondered if it would just 

create another “environmental disaster.”43

Meanwhile, the state took other measures to aid in Kissimmee 

River restoration. In November 1983, Graham issued an executive 

order creating the Kissimmee River-Lake Okeechobee-Everglades 

Coordinating Council to coordinate state and regional endeavors 

that would “restore and enhance the natural values and functions” 

of the Kissimmee-Okeechobee-Everglades ecosystem.44 The council, which would basically have charge of Graham’s “Save Our Everglades” program, would consist solely of state officials, including 

the secretaries of the departments of Environmental Regulation, 

Community Affairs, and Transportation; the commissioner of the 

Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services; and the executive directors of the Department of Natural Resources, the SFWMD, 

and the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission. Likewise, these 

same entities concluded a memorandum of agreement on 1 November 1983, pledging to cooperate in dechannelization efforts and delineating specific responsibilities for each agency.45

One of the duties that the SFWMD assumed was purchasing 

floodplain lands in the Kissimmee Basin, both to expedite the demonstration project and to prevent further development in the area. 

In March 1984, the district’s governing board decided to pursue a 

purchase plan for 40,000 acres in the Kissimmee Basin, even though 

the state would have to provide at least $40 million for that action. 

According to board member Nathaniel Reed, price should not be a 

factor; “no blinking,” he stated, “regardless of the financial crunch.”46

SFWMD officials proposed to fund the effort at least partly through 

the Water Management Lands Trust Fund, which was created by the 

state’s Save Our Rivers Act of 1981 to allow the purchase of lands 

needed to conserve and protect water resources.

Yet an obstacle arose to both the purchasing plan and to the 

demonstration project. In March 1984, McArthur Farms Inc., Save 

Our Waterways Association, and Riley Miles (a Kissimmee resident 

and former SFWMD board member) opposed the SFWMD’s new 

permit application to the Department of Environmental Regulation, 

charging, in the words of one newspaper account, that the demonstration project would “cause temporary and longterm pollution of 

the river” and would “drastically decrease the river’s navigability.”47

Accordingly, the state held hearings on the application. In the course 

of these hearings, the SFWMD told concerned parties that the project would not adversely affect either navigation or flood control. The 

district also related the necessity of the demonstration project in order to determine exactly how restoring the river would impact the 

basin and whether or not changes in flora and fauna would occur. 

The project’s purpose, the SFWMD reiterated, was to see whether 

“the historical ecological function of the river” could be restored 

through “the overall management of water, fish, and wildlife,” in 

hopes that “further degradation of water quality” could be prevented 

and wildlife habitat restored.48 The SFWMD’s responses seemed to 

satisfy both the Corps and the Department of Environmental Regulation, and they issued permits for the Phase I work on 9 July and 29 

July 1984.49

But even though the SFWMD took the lead on the demonstration project, many of its officials still had viewpoints that differed 

from the opinions of other state authorities. In May 1984, for example, Estus Whitfield composed a draft outlining the Kissimmee River restoration program and why it was necessary. John Wodraska, 

who had become executive director of the SFWMD upon Maloy’s 

resignation, took issue with some of Whitfield’s statements. Whereas Whitfield claimed that channelization of the Kissimmee caused 

much ecological destruction, Wodraska held that actual construction work caused some damage, but that the system had “healed” 

since that time and was now “a stabilized ecosystem.”50 Likewise, 

Whitfield insisted that channelization was not necessary for flood 

protection in the Upper Kissimmee Basin (since improving structures in the area could accomplish the same purpose), but Wodraska disagreed, stating that channelization provided “necessary 

‘getaway’ for floodwaters from the upper basin.” Finally, Whitfield 

asserted that a diminishment in the river’s water quality resulted 

from channelization, while Wodraska claimed that degradation occurred because of “the development of intensive land use practices” 

rather than from a “reduction in wetlands.”51 Although both Whitfield and Wodraska agreed that some form of action was necessary 

A sign marks Phase 1 of the Demonstration Project. (South Florida Water 

Management District)
Chapter Eight | “That Damn Sewer Ditch” 135

to enhance ecological values in the Kissimmee Basin, they disputed 

how degraded the environment was and why that had occurred.

Such disconnect in views became more apparent in August 

1984 when the Corps finally released its draft feasibility report on 

Kissimmee River restoration. This document noted that because of 

state requests, Congress had directed the Corps in 1978 to determine whether modifications to the congressionally authorized Kissimmee River project were “advisable.” In discussing this question, 

the Corps noted that the construction of C-38 had “reduced flooding 

and enabled more intense land use,” which some believed had led to 

“a number of adverse environmental effects.” The Corps contended 

with claims that channelization had accelerated eutrophication of 

Lake Okeechobee, stating that the bigger problem was the Taylor 

Creek-Nubbin Slough area, which contributed most of the phosphorous to the lake, and the EAA, which supplied most of the nitrogen. 

“There is little evidence to suggest that water quality has been degraded in the Kissimmee basin as a result of channel modification,” 

the report declared, “or that C&SF Project works . . . have accelerated 

the eutrophication of Lake Okeechobee.”52 These, of course, were arguments that the Corps had been making since the mid-1970s.

Aside from its conclusions regarding the condition of the Kissimmee River and its effects on Lake Okeechobee, the Corps discussed 

different alternatives that it could take to allow for at least a partial restoration of ecological conditions along the Kissimmee River. The six 

that it found feasible included partially backfilling C-38; constructing 

controlled wetlands; having agriculturists implement Best Management Practices (BMPs) to decrease the amount of nutrients in runoff; creating impounded wetlands at various points along the river; 

manipulating pool stages to increase wetlands; and restoring wetland 

conditions to Paradise Run, an eight-and-a-half mile stretch of the 

river in the southern part of the Kissimmee floodplain. However, the 

Corps had serious reservations about several of these, including the 

partial backfilling plan. Although environmentalists, state officials, 

and the SFWMD had all embraced either partial or full backfilling 

as the best program, the Corps disagreed. For one thing, it believed 

that backfilling would increase flooding risks in the Lower Kissimmee Basin. The Corps also claimed that partial backfilling could actually reduce the number of wetland acres, in part because not enough 

water would exist “to attain a natural hydroperiod.” Indeed, the Corps 

asserted, it would produce only “a semi-natural riverine system.”53

Kissimmee River restoration project area. (South Florida Water Management District)
136 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Instead of partial backfilling, the Corps recommended the 

BMP, Paradise Run, and pool stage manipulation options because 

they would produce “the greatest benefit at the lowest cost.” Yet the 

Corps claimed that it could not participate in these programs because “while generally beneficial for environmental concerns,” they 

would not “contribute to the nation’s economic development.” Moreover, the Corps explained, if the state wanted to initiate the partial 

backfill plan or Phase II of the Demonstration Project, the Corps 

would have to obtain congressional authorization since these actions 

would “significantly alter the flood control and navigation purposes 

of the Kissimmee River project.” The Corps believed that its report 

contained useful information that the state could use in developing 

its own restoration efforts, but from the Corps’ perspective, “there is 

no basis for Federal implementation of modifications to the Kissimmee River Basin.”54

Upon examining the draft feasibility report, state officials wondered about some of the Corps’ conclusions. Governor Graham was 

especially concerned about the Corps’ unfavorable partial backfilling assessment, fearing that it would “impede the State’s restoration 

efforts,” and he disagreed with the Corps’ recommendation against 

federal participation.55 In response, the Corps emphasized that it 

was required by law to recommend the plan that had “the greatest 

net economic benefit” and that it could find “no basis for Federal 

implementation of project modifications.” According to the Corps, 

the Kissimmee River project was “functioning as designed,” and 

altering it through partial backfilling would reduce “existing and 

future” economic project benefits, while producing only “limited 

environmental benefits.” The Corps therefore had no “overriding 

reason” to suggest implementation of partial backfilling.56 This view 

did not change; when the Corps issued its final feasibility report in 

September 1985, its conclusions were largely the same as in the draft 

report, although, based on comments from state agencies, it did 

revise upward its estimate of wetlands acreage produced by partial 

backfilling. Regardless, the report still stated that BMPs, pool stage 

manipulation, and restoring wetlands at Paradise Run provided the 

best economic benefits, and it maintained that no federal action was 

warranted.57

To many environmentalists and state authorities, this was just 

another example of the Corps stonewalling the issue because it 

was not interested in restoring the Kissimmee River. That charge, 

although technically true, did not take into account all of the nuances of the situation. Some Corps officials, such as Devereaux, were 

clearly against complete restoration. “The Kissimmee River is a manchanged system now, and it will always be one as far as I can see,” 

he stated in 1984. “I don’t see any reasonable way that it can ever 

go back to doing what people refer to as a pure kidney function.”58

Colonel Charles Myers III, who replaced Devereaux as District Engineer, agreed. “There are people in the Kissimmee Valley benefiting 

from the valley as it now exists,” he said. “There’s no way we can 

back up to 1900.”59 Whether Devereaux and Myers took this position 

because they did not want to admit that channelization had been 

a mistake, or whether they truly believed that it was not possible 

to return the river to a natural state is unclear. On the one hand, 

the Corps’ position was technically correct: it could not do anything 

to alter the original purpose of channelization without authorization from Congress, nor could it recommend a project if economic 

benefits did not justify it. The main problem, however, was that the 

Corps did not pursue restoration with enthusiasm, or support the 

idea in a meaningful way, effectively preventing the issuance of any 

congressional “authorization.” In the eyes of many environmentalists 

and state officials, the agency was merely hiding behind its operating 

regulations to get what it truly wanted—the maintenance of C-38.60

With the Corps unwilling to participate in any restoration efforts, the state of Florida and environmentalists laid the groundwork 

for their own endeavors. In August 1984, Governor Graham oversaw 

the beginning of the SFWMD’s demonstration project by symbolically planting a baby cypress tree on the banks of the Kissimmee River. He declared that the state’s goal in the endeavor was that “by the 

year 2000, the water system will look and function more as it did in 

the year 1900 than it does today.”61 Graham also continued to call for 

federal participation in Kissimmee restoration, and environmental 

organizations sought to repair the breaches in the Everglades Coalition, banding together again in order to stimulate public involvement in South Florida ecological issues.62

At the same time, Graham adopted a seven-point plan for Kissimmee River restoration, beginning with Phase I of the demonstration project. Other steps included restoring wetlands in the Paradise 

Run area; expanding the Best Management Practice program to include not only Taylor Creek-Nubbin Slough, but also the lower Kissimmee River; developing modeling systems to measure hydraulic 

and sediment transport effects of restoration endeavors; and acquiring 50,000 total acres of the Kissimmee floodplain.63 As part of this 

plan, Graham dismantled the Kissimmee-Okeechobee-Everglades 

Coordinating Council and gave responsibility for all restoration aspects, such as land acquisition, physical modeling, and the development of restoration alternatives, to the SFWMD.64

To help the SFWMD in its endeavors, Graham also established 

a 34-member Kissimmee River Resource Planning and Management 

Committee—composed of individuals from local, state, and federal 

agencies, including the Corps and the SFWMD—to review land and 

water problems in the Lower Kissimmee and Taylor Creek basins. In 

August 1984, Graham directed the committee to focus on land use 

management, land acquisition, water quality protection, and economic development in its examinations; by doing so, he hoped that 

the state could “guarantee the long-term health of the [Kissimmee] 

river system.”65

One of the first tasks that the committee undertook was investigating land acquisition. This was important not only for the 
Chapter Eight | “That Damn Sewer Ditch” 137

demonstration project to occur, but also because of continuing agricultural encroachment into the Kissimmee floodplain, hastening 

drainage of the region. One account reported that between 1958 and 

1972—the era when the Corps was straightening the river—agriculturists drained over half of the unimproved land in the region and 

planted it to Bahia grass for grazing. Then, in the early 1980s, citrus growers considerably increased their holdings in the Kissimmee 

area. Because of these endeavors, according to naturalist Ted Levin, 

“land that once spawned bobcats and sandhill cranes now [grew] 

cattle and oranges.”66

To forestall further development, the Resource Planning and 

Management Committee proposed to develop “a workable land use 

strategy” to protect the river and allow for its restoration.67 In January 

1985, the committee sent to the state seven land management options 

that it considered viable. These ranged from doing nothing to acquiring land in fee simple to recommending that counties and the city 

of Okeechobee adopt a comprehensive land management and zoning plan.68 After receiving these suggestions, the SFWMD decided to 

continue with its goal of purchasing 50,000 acres of the Kissimmee 

floodplain, and in January 1985, it bought 7,500 acres with funds provided under the Save Our Rivers Act. The district stated that public 

management of half-mile strips of land on both sides of C-38 would 

be necessary for restoration to succeed, as well the acquisition of an 

additional 42,500 acres to protect the entire floodplain. According to 

Executive Director Wodraska, the purchase was “a giant stride” that 

would allow the SFWMD to see “if we can coax Nature to reestablish 

some of her lost beauties into the river’s marshes.”69

But as the end of 1985 approached, it was clear that, unless a 

change of attitude occurred, the state would have to generate any 

restoration effort without federal involvement. Colonel Charles T. 

Myers III, District Engineer of the Jacksonville District, for example, 

presented the Corps’ final feasibility report to the Board of Engineers 

for Rivers and Harbors, recommending in person that no federal action be taken. According to Myers, a District Engineer usually did 

not present negative reports to the Board, but because the Jacksonville District’s decision was “a very controversial” one “that necessitated lots of discussion,” he believed it was necessary.70

After receiving the report, the Board deliberated on the recommendation, while Governor Graham lobbied for federal involvement. 

“As the State of Florida pursues its goal of restoring the Kissimmee 

River,” he told the Board, “we will seek federal approval of and participation in this project.” Graham claimed that the channelization of 

Citrus groves near the Kissimmee River. (South Florida Water Management District)
138 United States Army Corps of Engineers

the river had decreased the basin’s original wetlands by “70 to 80 percent,” and that this had led to degradation of water quality and loss 

of wetland habitat. Therefore, “just as the Corps has been a partner 

with the State in flood control, water supply, navigation, and other 

public works projects,” Graham wanted it also to participate “in our 

new mission of environmental enhancement.” Although the state 

could pledge “a great many dollars” towards Kissimmee River restoration, it still needed federal help in order to make a final restoration 

plan viable. Graham asked the Board to overturn the Jacksonville 

District’s no federal participation recommendation, and he pledged 

to “work closely with the Corps” to develop “a specific restoration 

plan.”71 Despite Graham’s efforts, the Board ultimately agreed with 

the District’s decision, and in July 1987, Chief of Engineers Lieutenant General E. R. Heiberg III transmitted a report to Congress, stating that it was “not advisable” for the Corps to participate in project 

modifications “in the interest of water quality, flood control, recreation, navigation, loss of fish and wildlife resources, environmental 

problems, and loss of environmental amenities.” Instead, Heiberg 

recommended that District Engineer Myers “continue to cooperate 

with the State of Florida under his existing authorities.”72

In the meantime, Congress had passed the Water Resources 

Development Act of 1986 (WRDA-86), which authorized approximately $16 billion worth of water projects. Along with mandating 

cost sharing between local and federal interests on water projects, 

the law also contained a section significant to the Kissimmee River controversy.73 Riding the wave of environmental concerns with 

water resource development, Congress included Section 1135 in 

WRDA-86, authorizing the Corps to review existing projects and to 

“determine the need for modifications” in those projects in order to 

“improv[e] the quality of the environment in the public interest.”74

If the Corps made any modifications, the law directed, non-federal 

interests would pay 25 percent of the total cost.

Florida officials tried to get the Corps to undertake restoration of the Kissimmee River under the authority granted by Section 

1135. In 1987, according to an Everglades status report issued by 

the governor’s office, Governor Robert “Bob” Martinez, a Republican who had replaced Graham that same year (Graham had won 

an election bid for the U.S. Senate), informed Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) John Doyle of “Florida’s strong 

desire to restore the values of the Kissimmee River.” Martinez asked 

Doyle to consider the Kissimmee “as it makes plans for implementing Section 1135.”75 Florida’s congressional delegation, which now 

included Graham, requested the Corps to take the same action, but 

the politicians were not alone. Indeed, environmentalists, led by the 

Sierra Club and Theresa Woody, its Florida representative, made a 

push for Kissimmee River authorization under Section 1135. Their 

position was strengthened when the environmental community 

agreed that the only project it would request under Section 1135 

Kissimmee River. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Eight | “That Damn Sewer Ditch” 139

was Kissimmee River restoration.76 The Jacksonville District, led 

by Colonel Robert L. Herndon, District Engineer, nominated the 

project for Section 1135 consideration, but when it went to the Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) for approval, the Reagan administration determined that, according to Herndon, it was an “inappropriate use of federal funds to conduct such an environmental 

demonstration” and refused to transmit the request to Congress.77

Regardless, Congress included $2 million in its 1988 fiscal year 

budget for a Corps Kissimmee River demonstration project. Unfortunately, the executive branch’s Office of Management and Budget never allocated funds for that purpose, and Herndon was left to 

face environmentalist blame. “I would be more than willing to carry 

out environmental enhancement features of the Kissimmee River,” 

Herndon related in 1989, but until he received authorization to use 

money for that purpose, “my hands are rather well-tied.”78

In addition to this setback, some disagreements surfaced between environmentalists and state authorities as to what restoration 

meant. To people such as Richard Coleman, who spearheaded grassroots efforts supporting dechannelization, it meant “restoring [the 

Kissimmee] to what it was before, bend-for-bend, acre-for-acre.”79

State officials were not so sure. Louis Toth, who headed up the SFWMD Demonstration Project, defined restoration as “restoring a 

functioning ecosystem.”80 Stanley Hole, chairman of the SFWMD’s 

governing board in the mid-1980s, agreed. “We can’t just go in there 

and fill the [flood canal], no matter how the environmentalists cry 

for it,” Hole stated. Instead, the SFWMD would try to “restor[e] the 

values the river offered in its pristine state without sacrificing the 

navigational and recreational benefits that channelization brought 

about.”81

Despite these disagreements, the state and environmentalists 

had achieved some success on the Kissimmee front. Faced with a 

presidential administration largely uninterested in environmental 

quality, and with a Corps of Engineers that was, at best, unable to 

participate in restoration efforts and, at worst, dragging its feet because it did not want to dechannelize the Kissimmee, Governor Bob 

Graham and the SFWMD pushed Kissimmee restoration along. Because of the demonstration project (the construction of which the 

SFWMD had completed by 1986), the state now had a mechanism 

in place to observe how the environment would react if restoration 

occurred, and it had fully dedicated state resources to dechannelization. This commitment continued even when the Republican Martinez assumed the governorship from the Democrat Graham. With 

dechannelization, the state had taken its first steps along the road of 

ecosystem restoration, and it would move farther down that path in 

the 1990s.

Endnotes

1 See “The ‘Sewer Ditch’ Undone,” Audubon 89 (March 1987): 114.

2 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Kissimmee River 

Study Including Taylor Creek—Nubbin Slough Basins (Jacksonville, Fla.: U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, 1980).

3 Jacksonville District, Kissimmee River Study Including Taylor Creek—

Nubbin Slough Basins.

4 Arthur R. Marshall, “Repairing the Florida Everglades: A Brief Update to the members of the Coalition to Repair the Everglades,” 2 April 1983, 

Folder 5, Box 1, Marshall Papers.

5 “Report Backs Kissimmee River Restoration,” The News Tribune, December 13, 1981; Steve Yates, “Marjory Stoneman Douglas and the Glades 

Crusade,” Audubon 85 (March 1983): 118.

6 “The Problem & The Plan,” For the Future of Florida: Repair the Everglades 2 (1981): 2.

7 As cited in “Kissimmee ‘Disaster’: Graham Asks Corps To Speed Up 

Repairs,” The Tampa Tribune, 1 March 1982.

8 Colonel Alfred B. Devereaux interview by George E. Buker, 23 April 

1984, Jacksonville, Florida, 58-59, transcript in Library, Jacksonville District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, Florida [hereafter referred 

to as Devereaux interview].

9 “Political Fix For Wetland Woes,” ENR 186 (2 September 1982): 33.

10 Stine, “Environmental Politics and Water Resources Development,” 

65.

11 Patrick Thomas Gannon, Sr., “On the Influence of Surface Thermal 

Properties and Clouds on the South Florida Sea Breeze” (Ph.D. diss., University of Miami, 1977).

12 All quotations in Robert H. Boyle and Rose Mary Mechem, “Anatomy of a Man-Made Drought,” Sports Illustrated 56 (15 March 1982): 46-48.

13 As quoted in Margaret Yansura, Public Information Office, South 

Florida Water Management District, to Executive Director, Deputy Executive Director, and all Department Directors, n.d., File Kissimmee River, Box 

17166, SFWMDAR.

14 As quoted in Ron Mierau, “Trip Report—May 14, 1982, Regional 

Influence of Drainage on the Hydrologic Cycle in Florida,” 19 May 1982, File 

Kissimmee River, Box 17166, SFWMDAR.

15 As quoted in Boyle and Mechem, “Anatomy of a Man-Made 

Drought,” 48.

16 Quotation in Vince Williams, Fishery Biologist, to Mr. Richard Coleman, Polk County Sierra Group, 17 February 1982, Folder 8, Box 3, Marshall 

Papers; see also Nathaniel P. Reed to Victoria Tschinkel, et al., 2 February 

1982, Folder 43, Box 1, ibid.

17 South Florida Water Management District New Release, 24 May 

1982, File Kissimmee River Restoration (File #1), Box 17166, SFWMDAR.

18 South Florida Water Management District New Release, 24 May 

1982.

19 “Kissimmee Flood Plan Stalled After Protests,” Fort Lauderdale News 

and Sun-Sentinel, 14 August 1982.

20 “River Raising Halted,” Okeechobee News, 20 August 1982.

21 Quotation in “Ranchers: Kissimmee River Level Fine as Is,” The Palm 

Beach Post, 5 September 1982; see also “Kissimmee Plans for Restoration 

Slowed by Corps?” The Palm Beach Post, 4 September 1982.

22 Quotations in “Water-Management Fight Simmers Along Kissimmee,” The Miami Herald, 6 March 1983.
140 United States Army Corps of Engineers

23 Quotation in “Issue Paper: Save Our Everglades,” 9 August 1983, 5, 

copy in Folder 16, Box 2, Marshall Papers; see also Bob Graham, Governor, 

to Honorable Ronald Reagan, 8 August 1983, ibid.

24 As quoted in “Graham Seeking Rescue Blueprint for Everglades,” The

Palm Beach Post, 8 April 1983.

25 Quotation in Devereaux interview, 59; see also Buker, The Third E, 

85.

26 Coordinating Council on the Restoration of the Kissimmee River 

Valley and Taylor Creek—Nubbin Slough Basin, “Significant Findings Adopted by Majority Vote on 8/19/83,” File Kissimmee River Restoration History (File #1), Box 17166, SFWMDAR; “Efforts to Restore Kissimmee Called 

Political,” The Miami Herald, 10 August 1983; Devereaux interview, 59.

27 Coordinating Council on the Restoration of the Kissimmee River 

Valley and Taylor Creek—Nubbin Slough Basin, “Kissimmee River Restoration: Public Hearing Discussion Paper, Public Meetings, August 1983,” File 

Kissimmee Valley Planning Area, Box 17166, SFWMDAR.

28 First quotation in “Battle Lines Flank the Kissimmee’s Banks,” The 

Miami Herald, 8 August 1983; second quotation in David S. Anthony, “Kissimmee River Survey Review: Reasons for Preferring Partial Backfilling Alternative,” Folder 9, Box 3, Marshall Papers.

29 Sue Douglas, “Save the Everglades,” Oceans 18 (March/April 1985): 4.

30 Both quotations in “Angry Ranchers Oppose River Project,” The 

Palm Beach Post, 11 August 1983; see also “Water, Growth Hinge on Plan,” 

The Palm Beach Post, 11 August 1983; “Governor Sees the Caged and Free 

Kissimmee,” The Miami Herald, 11 August 1983; “Troubled Waters: Panel 

to Consider Fate, Direction of Kissimmee River,” Fort Lauderdale News and 

Sun-Sentinel, 7 August 1983.

31 Quotations in Coordinating Council on the Restoration of the Kissimmee River Valley and Taylor Creek—Nubbin Slough Basin, “Council 

Recommendations on Kissimmee River Restoration, Adopted by Unanimous Vote on August 19, 1983,” File Kissimmee River Restoration History 

(File #1), Box 17166, SFWMDAR; see also “Kissimmee Restoration Gets 

Boost,” The Miami Herald, 20 August 1983.

32 Coordinating Council on the Restoration of the Kissimmee River 

Valley, “Kissimmee River Restoration: Public Hearing Discussion Paper.”

33 As quoted in Douglas, “Save the Everglades,” 4. Hole himself came 

from an interesting background, as he was previously an engineer for the 

Gulf American Corporation, the promoter of Golden Gate Estates. After leaving the corporation to become chairman of Collier County’s water 

management advisory board, he continued to serve as a consultant to Gulf 

American. Carter, The Florida Experience, 241.

34 As quoted in Jared Orsi, Hazardous Metropolis: Flooding and Urban 

Ecology in Los Angeles (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 130-

131.

35 “Graham Applauds Decision on Kissimmee Restoration,” The Miami 

Herald, 20 August 1983; “Kissimmee Council Decides to Undo Channelization,” The Stuart (Fla.) News, 21 August 1983. Maloy later related that he 

came back from a Coordinating Council meeting, telephoned the SFWMD’s 

director of operation and maintenance, and told him, “Bill, I want you to put 

a weir across the Kissimmee Channel.” When the director expressed some 

disbelief, Maloy continued, “Let’s see whether or not we can really impact 

the reestablishment of the oxbows and the way the river actually ran.” See 

Maloy interview, 5-6. 

36 Quotations in “Kissimmee River Demonstration Project,” File Kissimmee River Demonstration Project, 1983 (File #1), Box 17166, SFWMDAR; see also Buker, The Third E, 86.

37 “Comments Submitted to the Department of Environmental Regulation by the Latt Maxcy Corporation,” 31 October 1983, File Kissimmee 

River Demonstration Project, 1983 (File #1), Box 17166, SFWMDAR.

38 Devereaux interview, 61.

39 Whitfield interview, 20.

40 Devereaux interview, 58, 62.

41 Will Abberger and Estus Whitfield, Save Our Everglades: The Kissimmee River (Tallahassee, Fla.: State of Florida, Office of the Governor, Office of Planning Budgeting, Natural Resources, Unit, 1985), 27-28; see also 

“WMD Seeks Permits for River Restoration,” South Florida Water Management District Bulletin 9 (Winter 1983): 1. 

42 Jan Horvath, Director, Resource Coordination Department, to 

Mr. W. H. Morse, Chairman, Osceola Waterways Committee, Kissimmee/

Osceola County Chamber of Commerce, 30 December 1983, File Kissimmee River Demonstration Project (File #1), 1983, Box 17166, SFWMDAR.

43 As quoted in “Saving the Everglades,” The Times-Union and Journal, 

8 January 1984.

44 State of Florida, Office of the Governor, Executive Order No. 83-178, 

4 November 1983, copy in Abberger and Whitfield, Save Our Everglades: The 

Kissimmee River, Attachment 12, 100-106.

45 Memorandum of Agreement Between Florida Department of Environmental Regulation and the South Florida Water Management District 

and the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, and the Florida 

Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, and the Florida Department of Natural Resources, and the Florida Department of Community Affairs Concerning the Restoration of the Kissimmee River, 1 November 1983, 

copy in Abberger and Whitfield, Save Our Everglades: The Kissimmee River, 

Attachment 11, 89-99.

46 Quotations in “District Will Push Restoring of River,” Fort Lauderdale News and Sun-Sentinel, 17 March 1984.

47 “SFWMD May Buy Kissimmee Flood Plain,” Fort Lauderdale News 

and Sun-Sentinel, 16 March 1984.

48 Fred Schiller, Director, Community Relations Division, to John P. 

Clark, Public Issue Specialist, Community Relations Division, 28 June 1984, 

File Kissimmee River Demonstration Project (File #1), 1983, Box 17166, SFWMDAR.

49 Abberger and Whitfield, Save Our Everglades: The Kissimmee River, 

28.

50 John R. Wodraska, Executive Director, to Mr. Estus Whitfield, Office 

of the Governor, 6 February 1985, File Kissimmee Restoration History (File 

#1), Box 17166, SFWMDAR.

51 Both quotations in Wodraska to Whitfield, 6 February 1985; see also 

“Draft—May 29, 1984, Kissimmee River Restoration,” File Kissimmee Restoration History (File #1), Box 17166, SFWMDAR.

52 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Central and 

Southern Florida, Kissimmee River: Executive Summary (Jacksonville, Fla.: 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1984), 2-5, 17 [hereafter referred to as 1984 

Executive Summary].

53 1984 Executive Summary, 6-10.

54 All quotations in 1984 Executive Summary, 22-23; see also Stuart 

Appelbaum interview by Brian Gridley, 22 February 2002, 8, Everglades Interview No. 11, Samuel Proctor Oral History Program, University of Florida, 

Gainesville, Florida.

55 As cited in untitled memorandum, 4 June 1985, File 1517-08 (Kissimmee River-Lake Okeechobee, FL-12222), Jan. 1985-Dec. 1985, Box 25, 

Accession No. 077-96-0033, RG 77, FRC. 

56 Untitled memorandum, 4 June 1985.
Chapter Eight | “That Damn Sewer Ditch” 141

57 See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Central and 

Southern Florida: Kissimmee River, Florida (Jacksonville, Fla.: U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, 1985), i-ii; Kissimmee River-Lake Okeechobee-Everglades Coordinating Council, “Save Our Everglades: Annual Summary Report,” January 1986, i.

58 Devereaux interview, 67.

59 As quoted in Ronald A. Taylor, “Saving a Fountain of Life,” U.S. News 

and World Report 100 (24 February 1986): 64.

60 See Buker, The Third E, 86-87.

61 As quoted in Natalie Angier, “Now You See It, Now You Don’t,” Time

124 (6 August 1984): 56.

62 See Robert Pierce, “South Florida’s Land Puzzle: Federal, State, and 

Private Agencies Purchase Protection,” National Parks 59 (July/August 

1985): 17.

63 Kissimmee River-Lake Okeechobee-Everglades Coordinating Council, “Save Our Everglades: Annual Summary Report,” January 1986, 7.

64 Attachment to Jon Glogau, Office of the Attorney General, Department of Legal Affairs, to Peter Antonacci, 17 September 1991, File PRO 

Background, Kissimmee River Restoration, Box 21213, SFWMDAR.

65 Quotations in “Graham Panel to Study Growth Problems in Kissimmee River Region,” State of Florida, Office of the Governor Press Release, 

20 August 1984, File Kissimmee River Resource Planning and Management 

Committee, Box 17166, SFWMDAR; see also Bob Graham, Governor, to 

Colonel Charles T. Myers III, District Engineer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 14 August 1984, File 1517-08 (Kissimmee River-Lake Okeechobee, 

Fla.) Study 12222, Box 25, Accession No. 077-96-0033, RG 77, FRC.

66 Ted Levin, Liquid Land: A Journey Through the Florida Everglades

(Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2003), 238-239.

67 “Issue Paper: Kissimmee River Resource Planning and Management 

Committee,” August 1984, 4, File Kissimmee River Resource Planning and 

Management Committee, Box 17166, SFWMDAR.

68 “Kissimmee River Resource Planning and Management Committee 

Land Acquisition Strategy Subcommittee Expanded Options A Through G,” 

attachment to John P. Clark, Public Issue Specialist, Resource Coordination 

Department, to Mr. Dwaine T. Raynor, Bureau of State Land Planning, 10 

January 1985, untitled file, Box 17166, SFWMDAR.

69 South Florida Water Management District News Release, 23 January 

1985, File Kissimmee River, Box 17166, SFWMDAR.

70 Colonel Charles T. Myers III interview by George E. Buker, 30 December 1987, Jacksonville, Florida, 30, transcript in Library, Jacksonville 

District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, Florida.

71 Bob Graham, Governor, to Colonel John W. Devens, Resident Member, Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, 28 January 1986, File 1517-

08 (Kissimmee River-Lake Okeechobee, FL-12222), Jan. 1986-Dec. 1986, 

Box 25, Accession No. 077-96-0033, RG 77, FRC.

72 Quotations in E. R. Heiberg III, Lieutenant General, USA, Chief of 

Engineers, to The Secretary of the Army, 6 July 1987, File 10-1-7a (Kissimmee River-Lake Okeechobee, FL) 12222, Box 25, Accession No. 077-96-

0033, RG 77, FRC; see also Buker, The Third E, 87.

73 For a thorough discussion of the Water Resources Development Act 

of 1986 and its significance, see Reuss, Reshaping National Water Politics.

74 Act of 17 November 1986 (100 Stat. 4082, 4251).

75 Quotations in “Everglades Status Report,” 12 January 1988, File Everglades, Box 88-02, S1331, Executive Office of the Governor, Brian Ballard, 

Director of Operations, Subject Files, 1988, FSA; see also Dale Twachtmann, 

Secretary, Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, to Honorable 

Robert K. Dawson, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works), 11 February 1987, File LO Major Programs, Correspondence, Background, LOSAC, 

Box 18060, SFWMDAR.

76 See Theresa Woody, “Grassroots in Action: The Sierra Club’s Role 

in the Campaign to Restore the Kissimmee River,” Journal of North American Benthological Society 12, No. 2 (1993): 203; Theresa Woody interview 

by Theodore Catton, 18 January 2005, Naples, Florida, 1; Theresa Woody, 

Southeast Associate Field Representative, Sierra Club, to John R. Wodraska, Executive Director, South Florida Water Management District, 5 June 

1987, File LO Major Programs, Correspondence, Background, LOSAC, Box 

18060, SFWMDAR.

77 Colonel Robert L. Herndon interview by Joseph E. Taylor, 26 May 

1989, Jacksonville, Florida, 19, transcript in Library, Jacksonville District, 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, Florida [hereafter referred to as 

Herndon interview].

78 Quotation in Herndon interview, 19; see also Buker, The Third E, 

87-88.

79 As cited in Glass, “Rebirth of a River,” 13-14.

80 As cited in Glass, “Rebirth of a River,” 13-14.

81 As quoted in Douglas, “Save the Everglades,” 5.

143

Throughout the 1980s, two other problems, inextricably tied 

to the Kissimmee, simmered in Florida: how to improve the water 

quality of Lake Okeechobee and how to regulate the lake’s stage in 

order to protect its littoral zone. Although studies were conducted 

and recommendations made about the littoral zone, most of the focus in the time period was on water quality. In December 1981, for 

example, the SFWMD adopted a management strategy for protecting water quality in Lake Okeechobee, a natural outgrowth of the 

SFWMD’s institutional transformation nine years earlier when the 

flood control district became a water management district. Historically, the district had two primary goals in managing the waters of 

Lake Okeechobee: to control flooding in time of heavy rainfall, and 

to supply water for agriculture and the urban centers in South Florida in time of drought. Now the SFWMD recognized “a third major 

goal of equal importance . . . namely, to maintain and improve the 

quality of the water resources within the District.”1

 But this bland 

pronouncement understated the extent that the ground was shifting 

under the SFWMD. If flood control and drainage were public works 

that abetted economic growth, water quality fundamentally involved 

the imposition of economic restraints. In the past, when the district 

was primarily concerned with water supply, it was able to treat water as a raw resource to be exploited for economic gain. Now that 

the district was responsible for water quality, it had to treat water as 

commons, not property. Neither the people within the institution 

nor the SFWMD’s many partners in government and the private sector were prepared for such a fundamental shift in thinking.2

Yet, still, as discussed in previous chapters, it was really state 

and not federal initiatives in the 1980s that drove water management in South Florida, including the work on Lake Okeechobee. The 

Chapter 9

Corps continued to operate the C&SF Project for flood protection 

and water supply (both to urban areas and to the Everglades), but 

these efforts were largely overshadowed by state promotion of the 

preservation of the South Florida ecosystem, in large part against the 

effects of the C&SF Project. Just as Kissimmee River restoration was 

one piece of the state plan to “Save Our Everglades,” the SFWMD’s 

concern with Lake Okeechobee water quality and regulation levels 

served as an essential part of the program.

In order to get a firm grip on the problems with water quality in 

Lake Okeechobee, scientists used a systems ecology approach, especially focusing on mathematical and computer models to determine 

nutrient loading in the lake. At the same time, advances in chemistry 

and other forms of scientific measurement that had been ongoing in 

the post-World War II era enabled scientists to measure smaller and 

smaller particles, allowing for better analyses of problems in waterbodies such as Lake Okeechobee. Scientists were thus able to use the 

techniques of physics, chemistry, geology, geochemistry, meteorology, and hydrology “to measure ecosystem parameters at increasingly 

sophisticated levels and to analyze large data bases.”3

In using these methods to scrutinize Lake Okeechobee, scientists focused on two separate but related problems to the waterbody’s 

eutrophication: how to get a better scientific understanding of what 

was causing the lake’s eutrophication, and how to distribute the burden of economic restraints that would accompany control measures. 

It was evident that the SFWMD must find a way to reduce nutrient 

loading of the immense lake, but farmers and environmentalists disagreed strongly about where the control measures should fall and 

who should pay for them. Indeed, agricultural interests were divided 

among themselves. Opinion differed as to whether dairy farms north 

Lake Okeechobee II: Science in a Race with Politics and Nature
144 United States Army Corps of Engineers

of the lake or sugar cane fields south of the lake were the main polluters. Opinion differed, too, on how fast eutrophication was occurring—an unknown that made it exceedingly difficult for the SFWMD to weigh management options on a cost-benefit scale.

One divisive issue was Lake Okeechobee’s regulation schedule, 

which dictated lake “stages,” or the quantity of water held in the 

lake from month to month. In 1978, the Corps of Engineers and 

the SFWMD implemented a new regulation schedule that raised 

the maximum lake stage level from 15.5 feet to 17.5 feet above sea 

level. While this increased the water supply, it had deleterious effects on water quality. High water affected marsh vegetation around 

the shoreline—the shallow lake’s extensive “littoral zone,” which 

accounted for more than one-fifth of the lake’s surface. Continuous 

inundation of much of Lake Okeechobee’s marsh area reduced the 

diversity of plant species, thereby affecting wading birds, waterfowl, 

reptiles, and fishes. In 1984, for example, the SFWMD published a 

study detailing the effects of high lake stages on wading bird utilization of Lake Okeechobee’s littoral zone. The study concluded 

that “successful feeding conditions” for wading birds required a receding lake stage below 15.0 feet above mean sea level (msl), while 

successful nesting required “that the ground beneath the colony 

during the nesting period be flooded” from March to July.4

 Other 

examinations verified the damage that high lake levels caused to 

vegetation. Three years after the Corps had elevated the regulation 

schedule to 15.5-17.5 feet msl, scientists reported that “substantial changes” had occurred “in the composition and distribution 

of plant communities” in the littoral zone. These included the destruction of spikerush (Eleocharis cellulose), the proliferation of cattails, and the domination of torpedo grass (Panicum repens) in the 

mixed grass zone.5

The problem was that the Corps of Engineers and the SFWMD 

had to develop a regulation schedule for Lake Okeechobee that also 

took into account the water storage needs of urban and agricultural 

areas. Before 1974, the schedule had kept lake levels from exceeding 

15.5 feet msl, while also allowing recessions down to 13.5 feet msl. 

This changed in the 1970s when the Corps elevated the schedule to 

between 14.5-16.0 feet msl in 1974 and then increased it to 15.5-17.5 

feet msl in 1978 as explained above. The changes created less than 

The Lake Okeechobee. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District)
Chapter Nine | Lake Okeechobee II 145

optimal conditions for flora and fauna inhabiting the littoral zone, 

although scientists still needed more time to analyze how severe the 

effects really were.6

The same battle had been waged in the 1970s over the regulation schedules of the water conservation areas. Environmentalists 

deplored the Corps’ drastic drawdowns of water levels in the areas, 

mainly because of the damage it caused to flora and fauna, and they 

also wanted better regulation in order to mitigate the effects of high 

water on deer populations. However, although the Corps reexamined its conservation area regulation schedules in the late 1970s, its 

final report—issued in October 1980—concluded that no reason existed for modifying the schedules.7

Environmentalists and sportsmen hoped for more success with 

Lake Okeechobee regulation. Yet sugar growers remained staunch 

advocates of the new regulation schedule since it protected them 

from drought. Thus, the schedule highlighted conflicts between the 

needs of water quality and water quantity, and the gulf in thinking 

about water as commodity or commons.8

At the same time, changes in marsh vegetation in turn affected 

the lake’s ability to assimilate nitrogen and phosphorus inputs, inextricably tying protection of the littoral zone to Lake Okeechobee 

water quality issues. One source of contention that aggravated the 

SFWMD’s efforts to approach water quality evenhandedly and 

dispassionately was backpumping. Environmentalists focused on 

backpumping in part because of their animosity toward the sugar 

industry. But they had pragmatic reasons as well: it was easy to locate where the effluent was coming from (in contrast to “nonpoint 

source pollution”), and they could request public officials to stop it. 

Moreover, it was completely unnatural. By the flip of a switch, the 

SFWMD and the Corps of Engineers could activate the large S-2 

and S-3 pumping stations on the south shore of Lake Okeechobee 

and reverse the flow of water through the three main canals braiding the 188,000-acre EAA, siphoning nutrient-laden water out of the 

sugar cane fields back into the lake. Environmentalists were appalled 

that the state would continue this practice in the face of mounting 

evidence that it was harming the lake. They were unmoved by arguments that backpumping was necessary during drought conditions 

to protect the water supply of South Florida. Although this activity 

was not the primary cause of nutrient loading of Lake Okeechobee, 

the S-2 and S-3 pump stations were obvious sources of agricultural 

pollution that the state controlled and could seemingly shut off at 

will. Therefore, environmentalists targeted backpumping as an evil, 

Bank along Lake Okeechobee during low water level. (South Florida Water Management District)
146 United States Army Corps of Engineers

pressured the SFWMD to stop it, and attacked the sugar growers by 

extension.9

The controversy over backpumping formed the immediate 

background to the SFWMD’s formulation of a water quality management strategy. Environmentalists argued that the state should 

not allow the operation of the S-2 and S-3 pumps without a permit. In 1977, the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation 

issued a Temporary Operating Permit to the SFWMD to continue 

backpumping, pending the completion of the district’s scientific investigation on the eutrophication of Lake Okeechobee. In 1979, the 

Florida Wildlife Federation and other environmental organizations 

brought suit against the Department of Environmental Regulation 

and the SFWMD, alleging that the backpumping of polluted water 

from the EAA into Lake Okeechobee violated state water quality 

standards. The Florida Sugar Cane League, Inc., and Dairy Farmers, Inc., intervened as interested parties in the lawsuit. The threat of 

litigation prompted the department to order the SFWMD to develop 

a water quality plan for Lake Okeechobee.10 This was the political 

underpinning of the SFWMD’s announcement in December 1981 of 

a new water quality management strategy. It was a necessary requirement to hold onto its Temporary Operating Permit.11

The SFWMD based the water quality management strategy on 

its newly completed scientific study of the lake. This study produced 

a conceptual model of Lake Okeechobee using extensive data on the 

lake’s chemical and biological properties. The purpose of the model 

was to predict ecological change, test outcomes based on different 

inputs, and inform management guidelines—all with the goal of 

preventing catastrophic eutrophication of Lake Okeechobee.12 Although overly simplistic by later standards, the model represented 

a sophisticated advance in water management and a first step on the 

path toward Everglades restoration.

As helpful as the conceptual model might be in selecting 

the appropriate management options for the protection of Lake 

Okeechobee, the model did not exist in a political vacuum, nor did it 

insulate management decisions from politics in the coming decade. 

Although the state successfully averted litigation over backpumping 

in the early 1980s, management of Lake Okeechobee continued to 

provoke considerable controversy. In 1985, Governor Graham established the Lake Okeechobee Technical Advisory Committee, made 

up of scientists from government, academia, and the private sector, 

to provide technical advice to the SFWMD in defining management 

options for Lake Okeechobee. Two years later, in 1987, the Florida 

legislature enacted the Surface Water Improvement and Management (SWIM) Act, requiring the SFWMD to develop a plan for Lake 

Okeechobee and other water bodies in South Florida.13 Ultimately the 

same water pollution problems that were involved in the protection 

S-135 pump station and lock; Lake Okeechobee during drought. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Nine | Lake Okeechobee II 147

of Lake Okeechobee would form the basis for a federal lawsuit against 

the state of Florida in 1988, even though that suit would focus on waters entering Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge and Everglades 

National Park. Throughout the 1980s, the SFWMD put forward its 

conceptual model of Lake Okeechobee in part to keep the district on 

an even keel as it navigated these roiling political waters.

The use of a model to represent Lake Okeechobee’s chemical 

and biological properties derived from a growing worldwide science on eutrophication of lakes and reservoirs. If the KissimmeeOkeechobee-Everglades ecosystem was biologically unique, the 

accelerated eutrophication of Lake Okeechobee was not unusual at 

all. The same phenomenon had overtaken Lake Apopka in North 

Florida and was occurring in numerous water bodies all over the 

world. A by-product of human population growth, agricultural expansion, and increased use of fertilizers in crop production, “cultural eutrophication” was found to result when unnaturally large 

quantities of plant nutrients, mainly nitrogen and phosphorus, were 

loaded into lakes, thereby stimulating production of algae and other 

macrophytes and starting a train of other biological and chemical 

effects that could ultimately kill the lake. In the 1960s, scientists began to develop simple models using algorithms to approximate the 

real-world conditions of lakes that were undergoing accelerated eutrophication. The algorithms correlated such lake characteristics as 

water depth and surface area, water residence time (or flushing rate), 

and volume of nutrient loading. The use of models as a management 

tool for controlling eutrophication required the accumulation of 

empirical and statistical data over several years, and the selection 

of an appropriate model for the lake. By the mid-1970s, there were 

a handful of tried and tested models available to water managers, 

and the use of models had become an integral part of recommended 

management practice for controlling eutrophication.14

The SFWMD initiated a study of the biology and chemistry of 

Lake Okeechobee in 1973 aimed at developing the necessary data for 

modeling the lake. The study included four components: collection 

of lake water samples to obtain water chemistry data for trend analysis; development of a “material budget” (the measurement of the 

amount of water, phosphorus, nitrogen, and chloride coming into 

and leaving the lake at various points around the lakeshore); collection of data on the physical, biological, and chemical properties 

of the lake in spatial relationship; and finally, a trophic state assessment (to determine if the lake was oligotrophic, mesotrophic, or eutrophic). This major study continued through March 1980, yielding 

seven years of data for the SFWMD’s initial modeling effort. In total, 

over 5,500 water samples were collected and analyzed for nitrogen 

species, phosphorus species, sodium, potassium, calcium, magnesium, chloride, alkalinity, color, turbidity, temperature, dissolved oxygen and specific conductivity, providing over 115,000 data points.15

Four scientists with the SFWMD—Anthony C. Federico, Kevin 

G. Dickson, Charles R. Kratzer, and Frederick E. Davis—analyzed 

the data and produced a detailed report, “Lake Okeechobee Water 

Quality Studies and Eutrophication Assessment,” in May 1981. One 

of the authors’ findings was that the chemical and biological properties of Lake Okeechobee varied widely across its large expanse. The 

highest concentration of phosphorus occurred at the outlet of Taylor 

Creek/Nubbin Slough at S-191 downstream from the dairy farms. 

The highest nitrogen levels were found at the pump stations S-2 and 

S-3 at the head of the North New River and Hillsboro canals and 

the Miami Canal, respectively, where irrigation water from the EAA 

was backpumped into the lake. Thus, at the northern location there 

was an excess of phosphorus relative to what plants could absorb, 

while at the southern location there was more nitrogen than plants 

needed.16 Since a major strategy in the control of eutrophication was 

to identify the limiting nutrient and reduce its input into the water 

body, this circumstance complicated the lake’s management. Neither 

phosphorus nor nitrogen could be conclusively identified as the limiting nutrient, so both would have to be addressed.

Another result of the study was an improved understanding 

of the residence time of water in the lake. There were two elements 

to this: the average time that water took to move through the lake 

The Lake Okeechobee watershed. (South Florida Water Management 

District)
148 United States Army Corps of Engineers

(excluding evaporation) and the average elapsed time for water coming into the lake to replenish water going out of the lake (excluding 

rainfall). For this large, shallow lake, the average water residence 

time was a sluggish 3.47 years, the hydraulic loading rate a somewhat 

brisker 1.57 years. During the period 1973 to 1979, direct rainfall and 

the Kissimmee River amounted to approximately 70 percent of the 

water coming into the lake, while evaporation accounted for almost 

66 percent of the water leaving the lake. These characteristics were 

important to understand in order to determine the impact that water 

from different sources had on Lake Okeechobee’s phosphorous levels. 

The authors found that the longer it took water to move through the 

lake the more phosphorus and nitrogen was retained.17

Federico, Dickson, Kratzer, and Davis tested eight nutrient loading models for their applicability to Lake Okeechobee, and selected 

a modified Vollenweider model, published in 1976. R. A. Vollenweider was a prominent limnologist of Canada. As the authors noted, 

Vollenweider’s first model, published in 1968, was based on a mathematical relationship between water depth and various measures of 

water quality.18 A limitation of the model was that the measures of 

water quality were largely subjective. Subsequent models in the early 

1970s refined Vollenweider’s equation by factoring in trophic state 

indices, or quantitative indices used in categorizing lakes according 

to their place on a continuum from oligotrophic (nutrient-poor) to 

eutrophic (nutrient-rich). The EPA had developed one such index, as 

had a number of limnologists in the early to mid 1970s. Kratzer, one 

of the authors of the SFWMD report, had developed a trophic state 

indice specific to nitrogen levels in Florida lakes. Federico, Dickson, 

Kratzer, and Davis found that the indices were useful as far as they 

went, but the early indice-based models did not take into account 

water residence time and hydraulic loading rate—critical factors recognized by Vollenweider in his model of 1976.19 The latter Vollenweider model discriminated among trophic states based on annual 

phosphorus loading and mean depth divided by hydraulic residence 

time.20 It took form as the following mathematical expression:

TP = (Lp/qs) (1 + √ tw)

where: TP = average annual in-lake total phosphorus 

concentration

Lp = annual areal phosphorus loading

qs = annual areal water loading

tw = hydraulic residence time, and

√ = mean depth21

However, one problem remained with this Vollenweider model: 

it was oriented to lakes in northern temperate zones. Florida lakes, it 

appeared, could withstand higher total phosphorus concentrations 

before reaching the same level of production. Based on Kratzer’s 

trophic state indice for Florida lakes, the authors modified the Vollenweider model to allow higher loading rates. The final result was a 

plot curve showing “permissible” and “excessive” phosphorus inputs 

into Lake Okeechobee. As water residence time increased, so too did 

the permissible phosphorus load. The report included a similar plot 

curve for the permissible nitrogen load.22

Using the modified Vollenweider model, Federico, Dickson, 

Kratzer, and Davis concluded that Lake Okeechobee had a 78 percent probability of being eutrophic if phosphorus was the limiting 

nutrient, and a 79 percent probability if nitrogen was the limiting 

nutrient. The model further indicated that the phosphorus and 

nitrogen loads were 40 and 34 percent, respectively, above the excessive loading rate. Since the authors could not conclusively state 

that phosphorus or nitrogen was the limiting nutrient, they recommended that both phosphorus and nitrogen inputs be reduced 

to the permissible levels predicted by the modified Vollenweider 

model.23

The report by Federico, Dickson, Kratzer, and Davis provided 

the technical foundation for the water quality management strategy 

that the SFWMD adopted seven months later. In the latter document, which was approved by the district’s governing board on 11 

December 1981, SFWMD leadership accepted the finding that both 

nitrogen and phosphorus loading must be reduced, and it evaluated 

alternatives according to cost-effectiveness. Describing the control 

of eutrophication of Lake Okeechobee as “a very ambitious endeavor,” it proposed a phased approach over a number of years. Phase 

I, of unspecified duration, would comprise five major activities. 

First, the SFWMD would continue the Interim Action Plan, with 

its provision for limited backpumping into the lake for five years. 

Second, the district would initiate development of a water retention 

facility within the EAA on the state-owned Holey Land tract. Third, 

it would accelerate use of Best Management Practices (BMPs) for 

dairy farms in the Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough basin. Fourth, it 

would implement an expanded regulatory program with more stringent controls on any new construction of drainage systems within 

the lake’s watershed. Finally, the district would coordinate with the 

Corps of Engineers in ensuring completion of the Kissimmee River 

Survey Review.24

The most controversial part of the strategy involved the Interim 

Action Plan. The SFWMD developed the plan as its initial response 

to the threat of litigation over its Temporary Operating Permit, issued to the district by the Department of Environmental Regulation 

so that the district could continue limited backpumping into the lake 

through pump stations S-2 and S-3. The plan promised to reduce 

the nutrient load on Lake Okeechobee by directing water from the 

sugar cane fields southward to the water conservation areas rather 

than northward back into the lake.25 However, it also allowed for a 

resumption of backpumping in periods of drought in order to take 

advantage of Lake Okeechobee’s water storage capacity. Just such 
Chapter Nine | Lake Okeechobee II 149

drought conditions prevailed during the summer of 1981, and as 

the S-2 and S-3 pumps went into action, quantities of nitrogen far 

in excess of the permissible level were dumped into the lake. In a 

12-month period during 1981-1982, water gauges recorded 14,250 

tons of nitrogen pouring into the lake—nearly five times the recommended maximum.26 To avoid a repetition of this event, district staff 

revised the Interim Action Plan to allow for backpumping in low 

volumes whenever the lake level fell below historical average.27

Reactions to the SFWMD’s Lake Okeechobee water quality 

management strategy were mixed. The Department of Environmental Regulation commented favorably on the overall conceptual plan. 

However, it added a number of stipulations to the Temporary Operating Permit; for example, it required the SFWMD to report in 

detail on the implementation of BMPs in the Taylor Creek/Nubbin 

Slough basin.28 The Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission 

responded chiefly to the proposal to develop a water storage facility 

on the state-owned Holey Land tract. It had opposed this option in 

the past, partly because of the impact it would have on the local deer 

herd, but primarily because the facility would adversely affect Everglades wildlife habitat in Conservation Area No. 3 downstream from 

the site. It responded more favorably to this proposal because the 

plan incorporated the adjoining Rotenberger tract into the project, 

essentially designating one area for water storage and the other area 

for wildlife.29

Environmental groups attacked the SFWMD’s plan as both 

overdue and inadequate. Johnny Jones, executive director of the 

Florida Wildlife Federation, expressed outrage over the proposed 

use of the Holey Land area for water storage. “As we read the Management Strategy, it is nothing more than a smoke screen for the 

South Florida Water Management District’s real agenda,” he wrote. 

“That is a further state and federal subsidy for the agricultural interests of the EAA.” The sugar growers, Jones insisted, should be forced 

to retain water on their own lands.30 Paul C. Parks, commenting on 

behalf of the Florida Chapter of the Sierra Club, also objected to the 

use of state land “to take the pollution from farms,” and declared, 

“this plan for the EAA is not going to be acceptable to the public.” 

He was even more skeptical about the district’s plan to implement 

BMPs among the dairy farmers in the Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough 

basin. The district was naïve to expect significant results through 

volunteerism. “These dairies are not ‘farms’ in the usual sense,” Parks 

wrote. “They are milk factories and their pollution ought to be regulated by the Department [of Environmental Regulation] like that of 

any other industry.”31

Parks also voiced skepticism about the district’s use of the modified Vollenweider model. He maintained that the model provided 

reasonable guidance for getting started on nutrient load reductions, 

but the Department of Environmental Regulation should require a 

continuing research program to assess whether the target amounts 

predicted by the model were adequate. The development of this 

model, he argued, was symptomatic of an unfortunate tendency to 

separate technical issues from policy issues. “The technical question 

is, can this be done; the policy question is, will this be done?”32

A month later, Parks wrote to the Department of Environmental Regulation again about the SFWMD’s water quality management 

plan, arguing that it failed to justify an extension of the Temporary 

Operating Permit “because it is unlikely to result in nutrient loading 

rate reductions which are sufficient to meet the criteria established 

by the modified Vollenweider equation,” that is, a 40 percent reduction of phosphorus loading and a 34 percent reduction of nitrogen 

loading. It was all very well for the SFWMD to establish targets for 

nutrient load reductions, Parks argued, but it also needed to demonstrate convincingly how it would achieve those levels.33

Initially, dairy farmers and sugar growers had little to say about 

the SFWMD’s water quality management strategy. They gave it their 

tacit approval, a reasonable position considering some of the management options advocated by environmentalists that would have 

been more costly to them. Later, as drought conditions brought 

about a resumption of backpumping and public debate about Lake 

Okeechobee in the mid-1980s, the sugar growers would raise some 

objections. They criticized the SFWMD’s strategy insofar as it did 

not pinpoint phosphorus as the chemical agent requiring the most 

stringent controls despite mounting evidence that phosphorus, not 

nitrogen, was the limiting nutrient in the eutrophication of Lake 

Okeechobee. Sugar growers also voiced skepticism about developing 

the Holey Land for water storage, as they eyed this area for future annexation to the EAA. Certainly they found this proposal preferable 

to taking land out of sugar cane production for water storage, however, so they muted their criticism.34 As for the dairy farmers, their 

action in implementing BMPs spoke most directly to their attitudes 

about the SFWMD’s strategy.

The Rotenberger Tract. (South Florida Water Management District)
150 United States Army Corps of Engineers

There were 24 separate dairy operations in the Taylor Creek/

Nubbin Slough basin in the mid-1980s, as well as an additional 12 

dairy operations in the Lower Kissimmee Valley plus some beef 

cattle operations. In keeping with industry trends nationwide, these 

were large livestock operations that involved concentrated animal 

feeding stations as well as pasturing of cows. The average dairy farm 

in the region had about 1,000 cows. The cows were fed a phosphorus 

supplement to enhance milk production, which the cows were unable to absorb fully, excreting the unabsorbed portion in their manure. Treating and disposing of this animal waste was a challenge. 

Although some dairy farms employed state-of-the-art livestock 

waste management techniques, more stringent and systematic controls were needed.35

The SFWMD recommended a number of BMPs to the dairy 

farmers. These included better rotation of cows between pastures, 

feedlots, and barns to distribute manure more widely; fencing and 

other measures to keep cows away from watercourses; and various 

types of “biological nutrient removal,” or use of aquatic plants to take 

up phosphorus that was already in the water. Such aquatic plants 

were called “scrubbers” or “polishers” since they had the effect of 

cleansing the water. In particular, there was a need to collect barn 

wash and direct this phosphorus-laden water through “oxidation/

polishing lagoons” for treatment before it was released as effluent to 

Lake Okeechobee. The SFWMD even proposed converting animal 

waste to methane gas for local energy use.36

Beginning in 1981, many dairy farmers in the Taylor Creek/

Nubbin Slough basin began upgrading their barns to improve treatment of barn wash (water used to rinse out dairy barns). They were 

aided by a federal grant under the federal Rural Clean Waters Project. For each barn, the federal government supplied 75 percent of 

the cost in a cost-share arrangement with the dairy farmer, up to a 

limit of $50,000 per barn. The SFWMD estimated the average cost at 

$100,000 per barn. Despite this funding shortfall, the dairy farmers 

were highly motivated to get their barns renovated. By 1987, all but 

three barns in the Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough basin had undergone 

modification under the Rural Clean Waters program, with work in 

progress on the remaining three. In the Lower Kissimmee Valley, 

meanwhile, where the state contributed funds to a similar cost-share 

program initiated in 1986, all 19 livestock operators had signed up 

for renovation of their barns at a cost per barn of $170,000 by 1987.37

Nubbin Slough. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Nine | Lake Okeechobee II 151

Despite early skepticism, the state got surprisingly good cooperation from the dairy farmers in implementing the BMPs. State 

officials favored this approach as a low-cost management option that 

treated the problem at the source, and the farmers recognized the 

program’s necessity. Although agriculturists benefited from federal 

and state funding supports, the program rested fundamentally on 

the farmers’ voluntary efforts, which they made largely at their own 

expense.38

BMPs were only a starting point, however. The SFWMD’s 

water quality management strategy called for additional control 

measures to reduce nutrient loading. District staff maintained that 

the results of BMPs had to be evaluated before pressing ahead with 

other, more expensive, engineering solutions such as the Holey 

Land reservoir. Such a systematic, fiscally conservative approach 

was standard practice in watershed management, but it carried the 

risk of doing too little too late. Indeed, the amount of nutrients 

pouring into Lake Okeechobee continued to exceed target levels 

in the mid-1980s and water quality monitoring showed that phosphorus concentrations were approaching the highest levels ever 

recorded. No one knew, of course, how long the excessive nutrient 

loading could persist before the ecological consequences became 

severe. Environmentalists argued that water managers, in the face 

of such uncertainty, must err on the side of caution, particularly 

since Lake Okeechobee was so large and central to South Florida’s 

ecosystem.39

There were other signs that time was running out. Fishing 

guides and commercial fishermen reported extensive growths of 

filamentous blue-green algae on the lake surface. South shore residents complained that their drinking water had acquired a bad odor 

and taste.40 Biologists studying the nesting success of wading birds 

in Lake Okeechobee’s marshes found the birds’ numbers declining 

because of damage to the littoral zone. When drought threatened 

in June 1985, causing the SFWMD to resume backpumping, the 

Florida Wildlife Federation again threatened to sue.41 Amid heightening public concern, Governor Graham called for a comprehensive review. He asked the head of the Department of Environmental 

Regulation, Victoria Tschinkel, to put together a committee. Eager 

to bridge conflicts surrounding the lake’s management, the governor 

wanted the review to “include consideration of the interests of federal, state and appropriate local government, agricultural and other 

users, environmentalists and sportsmen and other interests as may 

be appropriate.”42

The Lake Okeechobee Technical Advisory Committee (LOTAC), as it became known, made a hurried study and issued preliminary findings in August 1986. LOTAC generally endorsed the 

SFWMD’s approach, including the district’s emphasis on BMPs, although it shortened the list of BMPs to just three in order to gain 

maximum compliance. These included a reiteration of the SFWMD’s 

goal of fencing all animals away from watercourses, noting that 

about 75 percent of the appropriate land area in the Taylor Creek/

Nubbin Slough basin had been so fenced by 1987, much of it under 

the Rural Clean Waters Project; a prohibition of all direct discharge 

of barn wash into surface waters—a goal that was already practically attained in the Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough basin and within 

reach for the dairy operators in the Lower Kissimmee Valley; and 

the implementation of measures to control storm water runoff from 

high intensity use areas. Ultimately, LOTAC declared, it might prove 

necessary for all dairy farms in the region to become “confinement 

dairies,” where all runoff from the milking barns would be collected 

in a reservoir for treatment.43

In addition to its discussion of BMPs, LOTAC accepted the 

modified Vollenweider model as the best available mathematical 

model for predicting permissible nutrient loading rates. It also affirmed the district’s goal of reducing phosphorus loading by 40 

percent. LOTAC went further than the SFWMD’s water quality 

management plan, however, in identifying phosphorus as the limiting nutrient. Based on data accumulated since 1980, this conclusion was inescapable. While the amount of nitrogen had leveled off, 

the amount of phosphorus in the lake had doubled over the period 

1973-1984. LOTAC theorized that the lake was losing its capacity to 

assimilate phosphorus because bottom sediments could no longer 

bind the mineral. Adjoining watersheds such as the Taylor Creek/

Nubbin Slough basin were similarly unable to hold any more phosphorus. One scientist likened the situation to water dripping on a 

sponge: the sponge absorbed each drip until it became saturated, at 

which point the water passed right through.44 It appeared that with 

background levels in the environment already high, phosphorus increases could soon accelerate. LOTAC recommended an intensified 

plan of research focusing on phosphorus loading, BMPs, effects of 

lake levels on biological communities, and downstream impacts of 

proposed diversions.45

An algae bloom on Lake Okeechobee. (South Florida Water Management 

District)
152 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Governor Graham turned LOTAC’s recommendations into an 

executive order, promulgated on 23 August 1986. The order outlined 

more than a dozen action items—mostly research and monitoring—

for the Department of Environmental Regulation, SFWMD, and 

four other state agencies, and it requested the Corps of Engineers 

and U.S. Department of Agriculture to participate in cost sharing 

and research efforts. The Department of Environmental Regulation 

was responsible for overall program coordination, and the agencies 

were to execute a memorandum of understanding and prepare a 

comprehensive plan by 1 November 1986. The governor’s executive 

order contained one specific engineering requirement: it directed 

the SFWMD to coordinate with the Corps of Engineers on completion of a preliminary design for a diversion of waters from the Taylor 

Creek/Nubbin Slough basin.46

The Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough diversion was not a new proposal; the Corps had recommended it to Congress in 1968, and the 

governing board of the SFWMD had requested that the Corps develop plans for it in 1979. The general plan was to divert waters from 

the basin to the St. Lucie Canal, which flowed east to the St. Lucie 

Estuary. Although the plan held some attraction to citrus growers 

in St. Lucie County because it would provide an alternative source 

of irrigation water during drought, it also raised concerns that the 

polluted water from the dairy farms would degrade the St. Lucie Estuary. After public review of seven alternatives, the Taylor Creek/

Nubbin Slough diversion plan had been shelved in 1980. Now that 

the need to protect Lake Okeechobee appeared urgent, the SFWMD 

asked the Corps to give the plan further consideration. The project 

would be costly, primarily because it would involve the acquisition 

of a lot of private land, but it appeared to offer one of the fastest and 

most effective means of reducing phosphorus loading.47

At the same time, the SFWMD prepared cost estimates and fact 

sheets for the whole panoply of Lake Okeechobee protection options. The total cost, if all options were implemented, could run as 

high as $200 million, it suggested. But the SFWMD’s current budget 

for Lake Okeechobee was a mere $4.4 million, and LOTAC-recommended projects for the current year would require an additional 

$5.2 million. Given the significance of Lake Okeechobee as a state resource, the district sought additional monies from the state’s general 

fund. State legislators were sympathetic. In January 1987, the Senate Natural Resources Committee proposed a “Save Our Lakes” bill 

that would provide funding for protection and restoration through 

a documentary stamp tax. The House Natural Resources Committee considered a similar proposal. The SFWMD’s Patricia A. Bidol, 

executive program director, presented the district’s plans and cost 

estimates to the House committee at the end of January.48

Meanwhile, at the beginning of January 1987, there was a 

change of governors. Bob Graham went to the U.S. Senate and Robert “Bob” Martinez replaced him in the Florida statehouse. Governor Martinez, a Republican and former mayor of Tampa, promised 

to continue his Democratic predecessor’s popular environmental 

programs, including Save Our Everglades and the Lake Okeechobee 

protection plan. He indicated his support of the proposed legislation to protect and restore surface waters. However, soon after taking 

office the governor halted progress by the Department of Environmental Regulation and SFWMD in appointing a Lake Okeechobee 

Science Review Panel as recommended by LOTAC. Apparently, 

Martinez was responding to concerns by the sugar growers that the 

people making up the panel were all from out of state. Following the 

governor’s lead, Dale Twachtmann, the newly appointed secretary of 

the Department of Environmental Regulation, placed a three-month 

hold on all LOTAC-directed activities by his department. On 11 

April, Martinez and Twachtmann, accompanied by Estus Whitfield 

(who remained in his position as the governor’s environmental advisor despite the change in governors) and three other staff, met with 

the sugar growers in Belle Glade.49

Participating on behalf of sugar in this two-and-a-half hour 

meeting was the industry’s Environmental Quality Committee, composed of the six most prominent men in the business—Alex Fanjul, 

Nelson Fairbanks, Jose Alvarez, John Hundley, George H. Wedgworth, and Joe Marlin Hilliard. Accompanying them were four staff 

and four consultants. The sugar growers told the governor that they 

Governor Bob Martinez. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and 

Archives of Florida)
Chapter Nine | Lake Okeechobee II 153

had a history of involvement in environmental issues. Their Environmental Quality Committee, formed in 1963, had addressed the 

problem of air pollution in the 1960s and 1970s as the industry came 

under attack for its open-field burning of cane fields. The committee helped to develop regulations to limit open-field burning, and it 

oversaw technological improvements in the sugar mills so that they 

met Clean Air Act standards. In 1974, it initiated research on the 

eutrophication of Lake Okeechobee, and by 1987, it had completed 

more than a score of studies through contracts with environmental 

science and engineering firms. Many of the recommendations contained in these contracted studies, the agriculturists claimed, had appeared in the recommendations by LOTAC.50

The Environmental Quality Committee gave the LOTAC recommendations a strong endorsement. It agreed with LOTAC’s selection of phosphorus as the limiting nutrient in the eutrophication of 

Lake Okeechobee. It supported the use of the modified Vollenweider model as a management tool. Finally, the committee approved 

of three project recommendations by LOTAC: the diversion of water from the S-4 basin on the west side of Lake Okeechobee to the 

Caloosahatchee River (similar to the Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough 

diversion but much smaller), the Holey Land Reservoir project, and 

a pilot project to investigate the feasibility of Aquifer Storage Recovery. The agriculturalists favored these projects because they saw the 

necessity of increasing water supply for the EAA in place of backpumping and water storage in Lake Okeechobee.51

The sugar growers tried to demonstrate their willingness to 

compromise, but they also shared some concerns about the SFWMD 

with the governor. “We are concerned that the District has utilized a 

fast track approach recently on the Lake Okeechobee matter,” their 

written presentation stated. It seemed that the district’s leadership 

had decided that throwing enough money at these problems would 

solve them. Perhaps this could be attributed to a desire to put programs into effect before the new governor changed the makeup of 

the governing board. Most disturbing to the agriculturists, John R. 

“Woody” Wodraska, who had become chairman of the governing 

board, continued to make divisive public statements concerning the 

need to control nitrogen, despite LOTAC’s finding that phosphorus 

was the limiting nutrient.52

Although “Big Sugar” was greatly vilified in the public’s eye, 

Governor Martinez decided to go to Belle Glade, a town largely 

populated by sugar growers and Haitian cane cutters, to consult on 

environmental policy for Lake Okeechobee. Perhaps because of this 

trip, Martinez was soon beset by charges that he would not support 

the pending legislation to protect Lake Okeechobee. On 4 May, the 

governor felt compelled to issue a statement aimed at correcting the 

“misunderstanding.” Reiterating his support for the initiative to save 

Florida’s imperiled lakes (now titled the Surface Water Improvement 

and Management bill, or SWIM), he explained that he merely opposed two features of the bill: the establishment of advisory councils 

to guide each lake’s protection program—“new, unnecessary layers 

of bureaucracy”—and the use of state tax revenues to pay for the 

program.53 Both of these features remained in the bill, however, 

when the state legislature passed the measure and Martinez signed 

it into law.

The Surface Water Improvement and Management Act marked a 

turning point after nearly two decades of plodding efforts to prevent 

the catastrophic eutrophication of Lake Okeechobee. The SWIM Act 

declared that “the declining quality of the state’s surface waters has 

been detrimental to the public’s right to enjoy these surface waters 

and it is the duty of the state, through the state’s public agencies and 

subdivisions, to enhance the environmental and scenic value of surface waters.”54 The act mandated the establishment of a priority list 

of water bodies of regional and statewide significance, a list that began with Lake Okeechobee, Lake Apopka, Tampa Bay, Biscayne Bay, 

Indian River Lagoon, and Lower St. Johns River, and would grow to 

include 23 other water bodies by 1997.55 For each listed water body, 

the law required the appropriate water management district to design and implement a surface water and improvement (SWIM) plan. 

It also created an advisory council (in the case of Lake Okeechobee, 

this was the second incarnation of LOTAC, known as LOTAC II), 

and it established a SWIM trust fund to provide financial support 

for planning and implementation efforts mandated under the law.

Scientific understanding of the eutrophication of Lake 

Okeechobee had progressed from the first study by the U.S. Geological Survey in 1969 to a myriad of studies by federal and state 

agencies, universities, and consultants in the 1970s and 1980s. The 

SFWMD had drawn water samples on a regular basis since 1973, and 

it had expanded its lake monitoring program in 1986 to encompass 

more than 50 sites in an effort to improve understanding of areal 

differences in water quality and the influence of the littoral zone and 

localized inflows. It had also begun to assess the effects of such lake 

reclamation activities as aquatic weed control and bottom sediment 

removal. Meanwhile, continuous gauging of phosphorus and nitrogen loading at all major surface water inflow structures around Lake 

Okeechobee enabled managers to determine the relative effects of 

different protection options such as the Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough 

diversion. By 1987, managers had the requisite science to evaluate 

an array of potential engineering projects in various combinations, 

each project bearing an estimated cost, time of completion, and 

amount of phosphorus that would be subtracted from the total load 

going into Lake Okeechobee. The SWIM plan that emerged in 1989 

included some phosphorus reductions from biological and chemical 

treatments, as well as implementation of further BMPs, but by and 

large it involved engineering solutions.56

Even before the development of the SWIM plan, scientific investigation had pointed the way to two critical decisions by water managers. The first was their acceptance of the modified Vollenweider 

model to establish maximum loadings of nitrogen and phosphorus 
154 United States Army Corps of Engineers

that could be safely discharged into the lake. Modeling results called 

for reductions of nutrient loadings by 34 percent for nitrogen and 

40 percent for phosphorus. When district managers were unable to 

achieve these reductions, it lent urgency to their request for state and 

federal support of the effort. Indeed, while nitrogen levels fell, concentrations of phosphorus more than doubled from the mid 1970s 

to the late 1980s.57 The second important science-based decision by 

water managers was to adopt phosphorus control as the primary lake 

management strategy. Without that direction, water managers might 

have been faced with a standoff between the nitrogen-producing 

sugar growers on the south shore of the lake and the phosphorusproducing dairy farmers on the north shore.

But the SWIM plan did not only address water quality; it also 

recognized the need for action to protect Lake Okeechobee’s littoral zone. According to the plan, “the most practical means” to ensure the propagation of littoral zone vegetation and wildlife was the 

“development of an appropriate regulation schedule.” Yet the plan 

admitted that “the needs of natural systems in the Lake, especially 

the littoral zone plan communities have not yet been defined.” It 

therefore called for the creation of a “special technical committee” 

to “define water level requirements of the littoral zone communities.” 

Accordingly, in 1988, the Lake Okeechobee Littoral Zone Technical 

Group, composed of representatives from the SFWMD, the FWS, 

the Florida Game and Freshwater Fish Commission, Everglades National Park, the Florida Department of Natural Resources, the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, and different universities, worked to develop a sense of how much water was needed to 

protect the littoral zone.58

Throughout the 1980s, then, the SFWMD wrestled with important water quality and littoral zone issues pertaining to Lake 

Okeechobee, using science as a major guide. Especially important 

in the time period was the realization that phosphorous was the 

limiting nutrient in Lake Okeechobee, and that concentration levels of the mineral were reaching dangerous proportions. In many 

ways, this reliance on science and the solutions that were ultimately 

proposed foreshadowed efforts in the 1990s to restore the South 

Florida ecosystem. At the same time, some actions taken to prevent 

the eutrophication of Lake Okeechobee had effects that proponents 

did not fully consider—another example of the law of unintended 

consequences. The curtailment of backpumping under the Interim 

Action Plan, for example, probably saved Lake Okeechobee from 

hypereutrophication, but it merely moved the problem to the water 

conservation areas. The gradual spread of cattails and an exotic plant 

called melaleuca soon began to tell a story of creeping eutrophication of the Everglades, just as algae blooms had alerted people to 

eutrophication of Lake Okeechobee a decade earlier. As water quality problems worsened in the Everglades, Florida officials proposed 

a new solution: the purchase of environmentally threatened lands.

Endnotes

1 South Florida Water Management District, “Executive Summary, Water Quality Management Strategy for Lake Okeechobee,” 11 December 1981, 

Folder 16, Box 3, Marshall Papers.

2 Matthew Alan Cahn, Environmental Deceptions: The Tension Between 

Liberalism and Environmental Policymaking in the United States (Albany: 

State University of New York Press, 1995), 65-80.

3 McIntosh, The Background of Ecology, 203.

4 Quotation in Michael Zaffke, Wading Bird Utilization of Lake 

Okeechobee Marshes, 1977-1981, Technical Publication 84-9 (West Palm 

Beach, Fla.: South Florida Water Management District, Environmental Sciences Division, Resource Planning Department, 1984), 17; see also James 

F. Milleson, Vegetation Changes in the Lake Okeechobee Littoral Zone, 1972 

to 1982, Technical Publication 87-3 (West Palm Beach, Fla.: South Florida 

Water Management District, Environmental Sciences Division, Resource 

Planning Department, 1987), i.

5 Paul J. Trimble and Jorge A. Marban, “A Proposed Modification to 

Regulation of Lake Okeechobee,” Water Resources Bulletin 25 (December 

1989): 1250.

6 Zaffke, Wading Bird Utilization of Lake Okeechobee Marshes, 1977-

1981, 4.

7 Department of the Army, Jacksonville District, Corps of Engineers, 

“Review of the Regulation Schedule for Water Conservation Area No. 3A, 

Central and Southern Florida, October 1980,” File Conservation Areas 1, 

2, 3, 1970-86, Box 02193, SFWMDAR; James W. R. Adams, Colonel, Corps 

of Engineers, District Engineer, to Honorable Bob Graham, Governor of 

Florida, 31 October 1980, ibid.

8 “Summary of Florida Sugar Industry’s Presentation to Governor Bob 

Martinez and FDER Secretary Dale Twachtmann, Belle Glade, Florida,” 11 

April 1987, 19, File LOTAC I/LOTAC II, Box 18060, SFWMDAR.

The Palm Beach Post, 29 July 1985.

9 Joseph D. Carroll, Jr., Director, Vero Beach Field Office, U.S. Fish and 

Wildlife Service to Field Supervisor, 23 June 1982, File NWR Fisheries Studies, Conservation Area 1 Loxahatchee, CE-SE Central and Southern Florida 

FCP, FWSVBAR; John C. Jones, Executive Director, Florida Wildlife Federation to Victoria Tschinkel, Secretary, FDER, 16 April 1982, Folder 16, Box 

3, Marshall Papers.

10 State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings, “Recommended Order” in Florida Wildlife Federation et al. v. State of Florida et al., 8 November 1979; The Palm Beach Post, 29 July 1985.

11 Paul C. Parks, Ph.D., Florida Chapter of the Sierra Club, to William 

Buzick, Deputy Director, Division of Permitting, Florida Department of 

Environmental Regulation, 1 June 1982, Folder 15, Box 3, Marshall Papers.

12 Thomas James, telephone communication with Theodore Catton, 1 

April 2005.

13 South Florida Water Management District, “Draft Interim Surface 

Water Improvement and Management (SWIM) Plan for Lake Okeechobee,” 

10 October 1988, 1-2, File Okeechobee SWIM Plan (SFWMD) 1988, Box 1, 

S1497, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Surface Water 

Improvement and Management Plan Files, FSA.

14 Sven-Olof Ryding and Walter Rast, eds., The Control of Eutrophication of Lakes and Reservoirs (Park Ridge, N.J.: Parthenon Publishing Group, 

1989), 85-94. The leading institution in the development of eutrophication 

control strategies was the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Another source of support was UNESCO’s Man and 
Chapter Nine | Lake Okeechobee II 155

the Biosphere Program. The United Nations designated the 1980s the “Water 

Decade.” Within the United States, EPA and the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1972 provided guidance for water managers at the regional level.

15 Anthony C. Federico, et al., Lake Okeechobee Water Quality Studies and Eutrophication Assessment, Technical Publication 81-2 (West Palm 

Beach, Fla.: South Florida Water Management District, Resource Planning 

Department, 1981), 3-8.

16 Federico et al., Lake Okeechobee Water Quality Studies and Eutrophication Assessment, 21.

17 Federico et al., Lake Okeechobee Water Quality Studies and Eutrophication Assessment, 22-23.

18 Federico et al., Lake Okeechobee Water Quality Studies and Eutrophication Assessment, 215-216.

19 Federico et al., Lake Okeechobee Water Quality Studies and Eutrophication Assessment, 202-205, 219.

20 United Nations Environmental Programme, Division of Technology, 

Industry, and Economics, International Environmental Technology Centre, 

“Planning and Management of Lakes and Reservoirs: An Integrated Approach to Eutrophication” <http://www.unep.or.jp/publications/techpublications/techpub-11/1-4-2.asp> (5 April 2005).

21 Ryding and Rast, eds., The Control of Eutrophication of Lakes and 

Reservoirs, 96; Federico et al., Lake Okeechobee Water Quality Studies and 

Eutrophication Assessment, 226.

22 Federico et al., Lake Okeechobee Water Quality Studies and Eutrophication Assessment, 223.

23 Federico et al., Lake Okeechobee Water Quality Studies and Eutrophication Assessment, 24.

24 South Florida Water Management District, “Executive Summary, 

Water Quality Management Strategy for Lake Okeechobee,” 11 December 

1981, 3, 11, Folder 16, Box 3, Marshall Papers.

25 “Summary of Florida Sugar Industry’s Presentation to Governor Bob 

Martinez and FDER Secretary Dale Twachtmann, Belle Glade, Florida,” 11 

April 1987, 19, File LOTAC I/LOTAC II, Box 18060, SFWMDAR.

26 The Palm Beach Post, 29 July 1985.

27 South Florida Water Management District, “Executive Summary, 

Water Quality Management Strategy for Lake Okeechobee,” 11 December 

1981, 12, Folder 16, Box 3, Marshall Papers.

28 Terry Cole, Assistant Secretary, FDER, to John R. Maloy, Executive 

Director, SFWMD, 15 June 1982, Folder 16, Box 3, Marshall Papers.

29 Colonel Robert M. Brantly, Executive Director, FGFWFC, to Victoria 

Tschinkel, Secretary, FDER, 18 May 1982, Folder 32, Box 2, Marshall Papers.

30 John C. Jones, Executive Director, Florida Wildlife Federation, to 

Victoria Tschinkel, Secretary, FDER, 16 April 1982, Folder 16, Box 3, Marshall Papers.

31 Paul C. Parks, Ph.D., Florida Chapter of the Sierra Club, to William 

Buzick, Deputy Director, Division of Permitting, FDER, 2 May 1982, Folder 

16, Box 3, Marshall Papers.

32 Parks to Buzick, 2 May 1982.

33 Parks to Buzick, 1 June 1982, Folder 15, Box 3, Marshall Papers.

34 “Summary of Florida Sugar Industry’s Presentation to Governor Bob 

Martinez and FDER Secretary Dale Twachtmann, Belle Glade, Florida,” 11 

April 1987, 19.

35 Paul C. Parks, Ph.D., Florida Defenders of the Environment, to Nancy Roen, General Development Corp., 5 August 1987, File LO Major Programs—Correspondence, Background, LOSAC, Box 18060, SFWMDAR; 

William F. Ritter and Adel Schirmohammadi, eds., Agricultural Nonpoint 

Source Pollution: Watershed Management and Hydrology (Boca Raton, Fla.: 

Lewis Publishers, 2001), 136.

36 Appendix I in South Florida Water Management District, “Executive 

Summary, Water Quality Management Strategy for Lake Okeechobee,” 11 

December 1981, Folder 16, Box 3, Marshall Papers.

37 John R. Wodraska, Executive Director, SFWMD, to Jim Smith, Chief 

of Staff, Office of the Governor, 4 May 1987, File LO Programs—Correspondence, Background, LOSAC, Box 18060, SFWMDAR.

38 The success of the BMP program was not unusual. A recent study 

on agricultural pollution and watershed management states: “The main approach used to minimize pollution resulting from agricultural activities is 

implementation of Best Management Practices (BMPs). . . . Although costshare incentives and some regulations are used, current nonpoint pollution 

abatement programs rely mostly on voluntary implementation of management practices.” Ritter and Shirmohammadi, eds., Agricultural Nonpoint 

Source Pollution, 259.

39 Bob Graham to Victoria J. Tschinkel, Secretary, 26 August 1985, File 

Lake Okeechobee File #1, Box 06591, SFWMDAR; Paul C. Parks, Ph.D., 

Florida Defenders of the Environment, Inc., to Nathaniel P. Reed, 3 February 1986, ibid.

40 See Table 1, Major Algal Bloom Events on Lake Okeechobee, 1970-

1988, in South Florida Water Management District, “Draft Interim Surface 

Water Improvement and Management (SWIM) Plan for Lake Okeechobee, 

10 October 1988, File Okeechobee S.W.I.M. Plan (SFWMD)—1988, Box 1, 

S1497, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Surface Water 

Improvement and Management Plan Files, FSA.

41 Joseph D. Farish, Jr., 29 July 1985, File Lake Okeechobee File #1, Box 

06591, SFWMDAR.

42 Graham to Tschinkel, 26 August 1985. 

43 Patricia A. Bidol, Ph.D., Executive Program Director, SFWMD, 

“Lake Okeechobee: Proposed Solutions and Associated Costs,” Presentation 

to the Florida House Committee on Natural Resources, 21 January 1987, 

File Lake Okeechobee, Box 06591, SFMWDAR; South Florida Water Management District, “Summary Sheets: Lake Okeechobee Protection Options,” 

February 1987, ibid.

44 Paul C. Parks to Nancy Roen, 5 August 1987, File LO Major Problems—Correspondence, Background, LOSAC, Box 18060, SFWMDAR.

45 South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force, Science Subgroup, 

“South Florida Ecosystem Restoration: Scientific Information Needs,” 1996, 

147, available at <http://everglades.fiu.edu/taskforce/scineeds/sub2.pdf> 

(30 July 2004.)

46 Executive Order 86-150, 23 August 1986, File Lake Okeechobee #2, 

Box 06591, SFWMDAR. Estus Whitfield, the governor’s lead advisor on the 

environment, crafted the executive order with input from environmental 

groups and state agencies. See letters in this file.

47 Arthur G. Linton, Federal Facilities Coordinator, Enforcement Division, EPA to James L. Garland, Chief, Engineering Division, Jacksonville 

District, COE, 29 August 1980, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF Martin County) 

Project General 1980, Box 1, Accession No. 077-01-0023, RG 77, FRC; T. J. 

Griffiths, Florida Citrus Mutual to Corps of Engineers, 12 September 1980, 

ibid.; Bradley J. Hartman, FGFWFC, to Garland, 16 October 1980, and Garland to Nathaniel P. Reed, 23 October 1980, ibid.

48 Patricia A. Bidol, Ph.D., Executive Program Director, SFWMD, 

“Lake Okeechobee: Proposed Solutions and Associated Costs,” Presentation 

to the Florida House Committee on Natural Resources, 21 January 1987, 

File Lake Okeechobee, Box 06591, SFWMDAR; South Florida Water Management District, “Summary Sheets: Lake Okeechobee Protection Options,” 

February 1987, ibid.

49 “Summary of Florida Sugar Industry’s Presentation to Governor Bob 

Martinez and FDER Secretary Dale Twachtmann, Belle Glade, Florida,” 11 
156 United States Army Corps of Engineers

April 1987; Patricia A. Bidol to George H. Wedgeworth, Sugar Cane Growers Coop, 6 March 1987, File LOTAC I/LOTAC II, Box 18060, SFWMDAR.

50 “Summary of Florida Sugar Industry’s Presentation to Governor Bob 

Martinez and FDER Secretary Dale Twachtmann, Belle Glade, Florida,” 11 

April 1987, 1-5, 51.

51 “Summary of Florida Sugar Industry’s Presentation to Governor Bob 

Martinez and FDER Secretary Dale Twachtmann, Belle Glade, Florida,” 11 

April 1987, 17-23, 38.

52 “Summary of Florida Sugar Industry’s Presentation to Governor Bob 

Martinez and FDER Secretary Dale Twachtmann,” 43.

53 Quotations in “Statement by Governor Bob Martinez Concerning 

SWIM Bill,” 4 May 1987, File SWIM Bill 5/4/87, Box 1, S1401, Executive Office of the Governor Subject Files, 1987-1988, FSA; see also Alec Wilkinson, 

Big Sugar: Seasons in the Cane Fields of Florida (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 

1989), 239.

54 Quoted in South Florida Water Management District, “Draft Interim Surface Water Improvement and Management (SWIM) Plan for 

Lake Okeechobee, 10 October 1988, File Okeechobee S.W.I.M. Plan (SFWMD)—1988, Box 1, S1497, Department of Agriculture and Consumer 

Services, Surface Water Improvement and Management Plan Files, FSA.

55 Edward A. Fernald and Elizabeth D. Purdum, eds., Water Resources 

Atlas of Florida (Tallahassee: Institute of Science and Public Affairs, Florida 

State University, 1998), 164.

56 South Florida Water Management District, “Draft Interim Surface 

Water Improvement and Management (SWIM) Plan for Lake Okeechobee, 

10 October 1988, 18-19, File Okeechobee SWIM. Plan (SFWMD)—1988, 

Box 1, S1497, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Surface 

Water Improvement and Management Plan Files, FSA. See also Daniel E. 

Canfield, Jr., and Mark V. Hoyer, “The Eutrophication of Lake Okeechobee,” 

Lake and Reservoir Management 4 (No. 2 1988): 91-99.

57 South Florida Water Management District, “Draft Interim Surface 

Water Improvement and Management (SWIM) Plan for Lake Okeechobee, 

10 October 1988, Executive Summary 18-19, File Okeechobee SWIM Plan 

(SFWMD)—1988, Box 1, S1497, Department of Agriculture and Consumer 

Services, Surface Water Improvement and Management Plan Files, FSA.

58 South Florida Water Management District, “Draft Interim Surface 

Water Improvement and Management (SWIM) Plan for Lake Okeechobee,” 

Executive Summary 1-3.


159

At the beginning of the 1980s, many Floridians were concerned 

with the continuing growth of the state and the ever-increasing encroachment that this produced on South Florida’s fragile ecosystem. 

To solve these problems, Governor Bob Graham, in his Save Our 

Everglades program, called for increased state and federal involvement in land acquisition efforts. Florida already had an ambitious 

purchasing program, but Graham and others believed that it needed 

to be expanded and strengthened, and they instituted new measures 

accordingly. Especially concerned with the Florida panther and its 

habitat in the Big Cypress and Fakahatchee Strand, Graham and 

Florida’s congressional delegation proposed that the state—with federal help—acquire lands to add to the Big Cypress National Preserve, 

and Congress passed this measure in 1988. This was a significant 

achievement in the 1980s, especially given the negative attitude that 

the Reagan administration and its Interior Department had about 

land purchases. However, Governor Robert “Bob” Martinez, who 

succeeded Graham in 1987, believed that Florida needed to go even 

further, and he proposed Preservation 2000 in 1990, a massive funding effort for environmental land acquisition. By the early 1990s, 

Florida had the most impressive land acquisition program of any 

state, and it had secured vital territory in the Big Cypress area.

In the early 1980s, Florida already had a few ways to purchase 

environmentally endangered land. In 1963, state legislators amended 

the state constitution, authorizing officials to issue revenue bonds in 

order to acquire lands, water areas, or other resources in the interest 

of recreation or conservation. Income from these bonds was placed 

in a Land Acquisition Trust Fund.1

 The state empowered itself further in 1972 with the passage of two significant pieces of legislation. 

As we have already noted, the Florida Environmental Land and WaChapter 10

ter Management Act allowed the state to designate regions as areas 

of critical state concern. The state also passed the Land Conservation Act, which established the Environmentally Endangered Lands 

Bond Issue, whereby the state could issue $200 million in bonds so 

that it could purchase, in the words of Graham, “environmentally 

significant and threatened lands.”2 Even though the Land Acquisition Trust Fund enabled the state to buy land for conservation purposes, some Florida officials, including Estus Whitfield, who served 

as an environmental adviser to Graham, saw Environmentally Endangered Lands as “the first major state land-acquisition program 

in Florida.”3

The next important piece of legislation came in 1979 when the 

state legislature created the Conservation and Recreation Lands Program (also known as CARL). The Florida Department of Natural Resources called this plan a “direct successor to the Land Conservation 

Act.”4 It created a priority list for land purchases, administered by 

a Land Selection Committee. This committee had to follow certain 

procedures before placing lands on the final priority list, including 

holding public meetings and comparing and analyzing the selections. Each July, the committee presented its final priority list to the 

state cabinet for approval, and the state then worked to purchase the 

lands on that list.

Despite these measures, enormous growth in South Florida continued to threaten the environmental health of the region, especially 

the Everglades. Between 1970 and 1980, the population of Florida 

jumped from 6.8 million to 9.7 million, and it would escalate to 12.9 

million by 1990. Demographers estimated that as many as 1,000 new 

residents came to Florida every day. Much of this growth occurred 

in South Florida, where areas such as Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood 

Envelopes of Protection: Land Acquisition Programs 

in Florida, 1980–1990
160 United States Army Corps of Engineers

grew by 64.2 percent between 1970 and 1980. In addition, tourism 

was increasing, as 36 million people visited the state in 1980 alone. 

The tremendous growth had dire implications for South Florida’s environment. “We’re going to see enough water for the people,” Patricia 

Dooris of the Southwest Florida Water Management District related, 

“but we’re not going to have enough water to maintain the ecosystem 

that people expect in Florida.”5 Meanwhile, the sugar industry continued to expand in the EAA, creating pressure for more agricultural 

land and increasing the political influence of sugar growers. One 

1984 publication noted that growers planted 349,000 acres to cane 

sugar in the EAA, a value of $600 million. This made Florida the 

largest sugar producing state in the United States. Likewise, farmers 

in Dade County were producing 75 percent of the country’s winter 

vegetables and 95 percent of its limes.6 The expanding agricultural 

industry and the increasing population meant the development of 

more and more land, leading to growing encroachment on Everglades National Park and Big Cypress National Preserve.

The development especially affected wildlife. By the mid-1980s, 

some estimated that approximately 90 percent of wading birds in 

the Everglades had disappeared, dropping the population from more 

than 2.5 million in the 1930s to 250,000. The alligator was similarly 

imperiled, as were 13 other endangered species, including the Florida panther (placed on the Interior Department’s first endangered 

species list in 1967), whose traditional habitat north of Big Cypress 

was jeopardized by citrus growers building orchards in the area. The 

problem for the panther (Puma concolor coryi) was that it needed 

around 300 square miles of land to hunt, and development intruded 

on that territory. State Highway 84, also known as Alligator Alley, 

a 76-mile-long roadway that crossed the Big Cypress National Preserve, the Fakahatchee Strand, and Water Conservation Area No. 3, 

bisected the panther’s habitat as well, and the highway death rate for 

the animal surpassed its reproduction rate.7

In order to protect wildlife, as well as to preserve the quality of 

water flowing into Everglades National Park, restrictions on development or outright land purchases were necessary. But, as discussed 

previously, the Reagan administration did not place a high priority 

on environmental protection in the 1980s, and it weakened existing regulations and programs through budget cuts. The reduction in 

funding meant that little federal support was forthcoming for land 

purchases. As one periodical noted in 1985, the NPS “has not been 

buying land of late.”8

Because of the federal government’s attitude, Governor Graham and the state took even more responsibility to ease Florida’s 

environmental stress. In 1981, the Florida legislature passed a bill to 

implement the Save Our Rivers program, which used revenue from 

a documentary stamp tax to create the Water Management Lands 

Trust Fund, administered by the Department of Environmental Protection. With this money, the state’s five water management districts 

could purchase lands necessary for water management, water supply, 

and water conservation, following five-year plans that each district 

would develop. Also in 1981, the legislature established the Save Our 

Coasts program, which expanded the Land Management Trust Fund 

so that coastal lands could be acquired and preserved.9

 To coordinate 

these different programs, the state developed the Florida Statewide 

Land Acquisition Plan, thereby providing “a long-range strategy for 

the primary state-level acquisition programs.”10

When Graham issued his Save Our Everglades program in 1983, 

land acquisition for environmental preservation was a big part of the 

program. Two areas especially were highlighted: Big Cypress, and 

the Holey Land and Rotenberger tracts (which bordered Conservation Area No. 3). Graham proposed that the state use Holey Land 

and Rotenberger as a wildlife buffer against agriculture and development, but one of the problems was that the Rotenberger Tract was a 

part of the Seminole Indian’s state reservation and the Seminole were 

unwilling to agree to the flooding of this land. Negotiations over this 

area spilled into settlement talks over a lawsuit that the Seminole 

had introduced against the state in 1974, charging that Florida had 

never adequately compensated them for the flooding of their land in 

Conservation Area No. 3. After several years of negotiation, the two 

sides finally reached an agreement in September 1986. According 

to this settlement, the state would pay over $11 million to the Seminole for the Rotenberger Tract, the title and easement to other land 

flooded by Conservation Area No. 3, and for compensation for past 

projects conducted in Conservation Area No. 3A. Congress ratified 

this agreement in December 1987 under the Seminole Indian Land 

Claims Settlement Act, allowing the state of Florida to use the Rotenberger Tract for its buffer zone.11

Graham and state officials also focused on Big Cypress land 

acquisition, fearing that growth was adversely affecting both the 

Florida panther and the Big Cypress ecosystem. In order to obtain 

more information on these issues, he created the Big Cypress Area 

Workers harvesting vegetables in the EAA. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Ten | Envelopes of Protection 161

Management Task Force, composed of representatives from Collier 

County, the SFWMD, Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, Florida Department of Natural Resources, Florida Department of Transportation, the NPS, and the FWS. The governor instructed this committee 

“to review the known information concerning present and future access and uses in the Big Cypress Area” and to complete a report outlining the “environmentally sensitive areas” and what specific management actions were necessary.12 In February 1983, the task force 

issued its conclusions. A “basic conflict” existed between “protection 

of endangered species and other uses of the area,” it declared, such as 

hunting and the utilization of off-road vehicles. The task force also 

noted that plans were in the works to make Alligator Alley a part of 

Interstate 75, and it feared that this upgrade would “heavily impact 

the Preserve.”13

The same effects could be seen in the Fakahatchee Strand, a tract 

of land located at the western end of Big Cypress Swamp and containing several watercourses and ponds, as well as hammock forests 

and over 45 species of orchids.14 The state had designated the strand 

as a state preserve in 1974, and the Department of Natural Resources 

had attempted to acquire all of the acreage within the preserve. By 

1983, it had purchased approximately 2/3 of the land, but it estimated 

that over 5,000 landowners still held tracts. According to an official 

with the Florida Natural Areas Inventory (a project jointly operated 

by The Nature Conservancy and the Florida Department of Natural 

Resources to identify land and water areas in need of protection), it 

was essential to acquire these remaining lands, as well as three other 

parcels outside of the preserve’s boundaries, in order to manage and 

protect the area effectively.15

Fakahatchee was especially important because it was one of the 

primary habitats of the Florida panther. Therefore, both the FWS 

and the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission examined 

how the panther could best be preserved in the area. Whatever the 

two agencies decided, it was clear that some action had to be taken, 

as the Fakahatchee was threatened with agricultural development 

and drainage projects. “It would be counterproductive to try and halt 

all development in the area,” the Florida Natural Areas Inventory 

reported, but “development must be directed away from the most 

sensitive areas.”16

Meanwhile, the NPS studied the question of how to protect 

more land in Big Cypress. In 1979, the Service had developed a land 

acquisition plan for the area, but in May 1982, the Interior Department had issued a policy statement that required any purchase programs to be either revised or replaced. Accordingly, in April 1983, the 

NPS announced that it was beginning a “land protection planning 

process” for the region. This included deciding what lands needed 

Fakahatchee Strand Estuary. (South Florida Water Management District)
162 United States Army Corps of Engineers

to be held in public ownership, as well as examining “the means of 

protection available to achieve the purpose of the Big Cypress as established by Congress.”17 The NPS noted that although 95 percent 

of the Big Cypress National Preserve had been purchased, over 550 

tracts remained either in private or non-federal ownership. In order 

to maintain the preserve, the NPS would either have to acquire such 

lands or develop ways to manage them in accordance with the preserve’s purpose. Robert L. Kelly, president of the Tropical Audubon 

Society, emphasized how important it was to complete the purchase 

of Big Cypress Preserve, stating that it was not only “an important 

area for several endangered species,” but it also “protect[ed] the water supply of the western portion” of Everglades National Park.18

The importance of Big Cypress to endangered species was emphasized as state and federal officials continued to study the Florida 

panther problem. In October 1982, Graham and the state cabinet 

issued a one-year moratorium on oil and gas leasing within the Big 

Cypress National Preserve so that such practices would not “further 

compromise the panther’s already tenuous survival” (only between 

20 and 30 panthers still existed).19 In addition, the Florida Game 

and Fresh Water Fish Commission tracked panther movement and 

habitat, and it reported in July 1983 that three “elements of public 

use” in Big Cypress especially threatened the panther: the utilization of access points and mineral roads, new kinds of off-road and 

all-terrain vehicles, and “a rapid increase” in recreation.20 To combat these problems, the commission, together with the NPS, proposed certain management actions, such as requiring recreational 

use permits and annual vehicle registration, and supervising deer 

and hog hunting more closely (since those animals constituted the 

panther’s main prey). The commission would also continue to study 

the panther, since any decision or action affecting the management 

of Big Cypress needed to be “based on sound logic and scientific 

knowledge.”21

But Governor Graham decided that purchasing more land, 

rather than better management of the preserve, was needed, and he 

included acquisition of Big Cypress land and related regions as priorities in his Save Our Everglades program, announced in August 

1983. Graham explained that development threatened the Florida 

panther, and he called on the federal government to purchase 70,000 

acres of Big Cypress Swamp to provide protection. He also recommended that the state acquire the Fakahatchee Strand in order to 

forestall development in the panther’s main habitat. The governor 

related that both Big Cypress and Fakahatchee held “immense ecological value,” as they contained “some of the most diverse plant and 

animal communities in North America.” At least four endangered 

animal species lived in the regions—the panther, wood stork, peregrine falcon, and red-cockaded woodpecker—as did 15 threatened 

plant species. Yet extensive development jeopardized this rich and 

fragile ecosystem. Therefore, Graham designated the Fakahatchee 

Strand as a “high priority for acquisition under the CARL program,” 

and he lobbied the NPS “to increase its efforts to complete the acquisition of the Big Cypress National Preserve.”22

Graham also asked President Reagan for federal help, informing the president that one of “the issues which must be resolved” was 

“completion of the acquisition of the Big Cypress National Preserve.” 

This could not be done, Graham continued, without the cooperation 

of the Interior Department. “We pledge to work with you in such efforts,” Graham stated, “with a special emphasis on the protection of 

Everglades National Park and the Big Cypress National Preserve.”23

Before the Reagan administration could respond, Graham began formulating a land acquisition plan centered on the transformation of Alligator Alley into part of Interstate 75. Through consultations with federal officials from the Interior and Transportation 

departments, he reached an agreement that the restructuring of the 

highway be formulated so that the state could create a buffer zone 

around Everglades National Park, thereby protecting its resources 

and creating “permanent habitat for the Florida panther and other 

rare and endangered species.”24

Under this proposal, the state and the federal government 

would acquire 165,000 acres in the Big Cypress Swamp and Fakahatchee Strand. The majority of this acreage, approximately 127,738 

acres, was located northeast of the existing preserve, adjacent to the 

Miccosukee Indian Reservation, while the other 37,010 acres consisted of the northern part of Fakahatchee Strand. As a state news 

release reported, the land contained “wetlands, cypress swamp and 

hardwood hammock,” as well as “a diversity of rare and endangered 

plants and animals including the panther, the bald eagle, and native 

orchids.”25 A large chunk of this acreage—mostly owned by Collier 

Enterprises and the Barron Collier Company—would be damaged 

by the highway expansion, necessitating damage payments by the 

Department of Transportation (90 percent) and the state (10 percent). State officials proposed that this compensation be used to reduce the total cost of acquisition, and that the state (20 percent) and 

the Interior Department (80 percent) assume the rest of the charges, 

with the state’s contribution coming from Conservation and Recreation Lands Program funds. In addition, Graham proposed that 

the Department of Transportation build panther crossings into Alligator Alley, and that it design the reconstruction “to correct hydrologic problems in the Everglades.”26 On 18 April 1984, Graham 

announced this plan and asked Congress to approve it.

Over the next year, Graham met with Florida’s congressional 

delegation to develop the necessary legislation, and in January 1986, 

U.S. Representative Thomas F. Lewis, a Republican from Palm Beach, 

introduced into Congress H.R. 4090, a bill to authorize additions to 

the Big Cypress National Preserve. U.S. Senator Lawton M. Chiles, Jr., 

a lifelong Florida Democrat, submitted a companion measure to the 

Senate (S. 2029), showing that, once again, environmental concerns 

in Florida were largely bipartisan. The bills proposed that the federal government add approximately 128,000 acres to the Big Cypress 
Chapter Ten | Envelopes of Protection 163

National Preserve, to be known as the Big Cypress National Preserve 

Addition. These lands were necessary, the bills continued, in order 

to “limit development pressure on lands which are important both 

in terms of fish and wildlife habitat . . . and of wetlands which are the 

headwaters of the Big Cypress National Preserve.”27 The bills did not 

go into great detail about how the lands would be purchased, delineating only that the federal government would not pay more than 80 

percent of the total cost (meaning the total acquisition costs minus 

any charges incurred by the Federal Highway Administration or the 

Florida Department of Transportation in damage payments).

In May 1986, the House Subcommittee on National Parks and 

Recreation of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs held a 

hearing on H.R. 4090. Several individuals testified in favor of the 

acquisition, including Florida’s congressional delegation, James 

E. Billie, chairman of the Seminole Tribe of Florida, and Graham. 

As Graham stated, the acquisition would establish “an envelope of 

protection around Everglades National Park,” preventing more Big 

Cypress acreage from becoming “citrus groves and subdivisions.”28

The purchase would also help preserve the Florida panther and other 

endangered animal and plant species.

Representatives from environmental organizations provided 

their support at the hearing. Paul C. Pritchard of the National Parks 

and Conservation Association told the committee that the Everglades Coalition had been reconstituted, in part to fight for “the 

addition of these critical environmental lands to the Big Cypress 

National Preserve,” and he reported that the Sierra Club, Florida 

Audubon Society, Friends of the Everglades, and Florida Defenders of the Environment, among others, all backed the acquisition. 

Almost all of those who testified implored Congress to act quickly 

while the reconstruction of Alligator Alley was occurring, in order 

to minimize costs to both the federal government and the state of 

Florida.29

But not all were in favor of the acquisition. Benjamin G. Parks 

of the National Inholders Association protested the measure, stating that it left too many questions for property owners in the area. 

Claiming that approximately 1,000 litigation cases from the original 

establishment of Big Cypress National Preserve were still pending in 

court, Parks wondered whether an additional “4,000 small landowners” would be “left to battle in court for years . . . in order to receive 

a fair price on the property.” Parks admitted that the legislation was 

Florida panther. (South Florida Water Management District)
164 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Big Cypress National Preserve. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Ten | Envelopes of Protection 165

“well intended,” but he insisted that this solution to “an alleged wildlife problem” would create “a very real problem to the people—the 

access to their property and recreational use of the preserve.”30 Many 

landowners agreed; James Humble, an avocado grower, had earlier 

related his displeasure with state and federal land acquisition efforts 

to the U.S. News & World Report, saying that “in the fervor for environmentalism, a basic property right is being run over.”31

More startling, however, was the opposition expressed by P. 

Daniel Smith, deputy assistant secretary of the interior for fish, wildlife, and parks, at the hearing, especially since Graham had testified that Florida had worked closely with the Interior Department 

in the development of the acquisition strategy. According to Smith, 

the department could not “support the legislation based on current 

program and budgetary priorities” because it could not spend $40 

million (Smith’s estimate of the costs) for lands that “do not appear 

to be essential for purposes of the existing Big Cypress National Preserve.” Smith claimed that no one had ever explored “the majority of 

the tract” to determine panther occupancy—Game and Fresh Water 

Fish Commission efforts notwithstanding—and he claimed that no 

panthers actually lived in the proposed acreage, since their primary 

habitat was located on the Fakahatchee Strand. The Interior Department was already involved in a process to acquire Fakahatchee 

Strand, Smith continued, and it was examining less expensive ways, 

such as exchanges, to acquire more land in South Florida.32

In some ways, Smith’s testimony was accurate—the Fakahatchee 

Strand did constitute the main panther habitat, and most of the land 

to be purchased was not in the strand. However, Smith ignored the 

fact that panthers used a wide expanse of territory for hunting, and 

that the acquisition would protect such larger areas.33 Another problem with Smith’s testimony was that it implied that panther protection was the only reason why the legislation was necessary. While 

that was certainly an important reason for the measure, and perhaps 

even the driving force behind it, the preservation of water supply 

and water quality for South Florida was also a large reason why state 

officials wanted the land. Big Cypress National Preserve was created 

in 1974 to secure high quality water for Everglades National Park, 

and the addition would further that goal. Likewise, as Representative Lewis explained to his supporters, “this legislation is needed to 

ensure that South Florida’s water supply will keep pace with its population increases,” mainly because “the growing urban population of 

South Florida” was “dependent” on wetlands such as those in Big 

Cypress Swamp “as recharge sources for drinking water.”34

Indeed, Representative John F. Seiberling (D-Ohio) believed 

that Smith was just throwing up a smokescreen to hide the Reagan 

administration’s distaste for land purchases. “I am disappointed 

in the way the administration tempers its evaluation of things like 

this by the policy and ideology that is currently in vogue,” Seiberling declared, charging that Reagan had his priorities “screwed up.” 

The administration continually displayed an unfavorable reaction to 

“anything but the military,” Seiberling continued, even though the 

Florida situation constituted “a very serious problem.” “We ought 

to have a more cooperative approach from the Administration,” he 

concluded.35

When the Senate held a hearing on Chiles’ bill in September 

1986, William P. Horn, who also served as assistant secretary for fish, 

wildlife, and parks, made the same declarations as Smith. “We are 

aware that the lands covered by this legislation would be a desirable 

addition to the Big Cypress National Preserve,” he stated, but “a distinction must be drawn between desirable lands and critical lands.” 

The cost of the acquisition was prohibitive as well, Horn said, making 

it impossible for the Interior Department to support the measure.36

But Horn explained that another possibility existed to acquire at 

least some of the land: an exchange. According to Horn, the Interior 

Department proposed to give Collier Enterprises and Barron Collier Corporation federal lands in Phoenix, Arizona, currently housing a Navajo Indian school and worth $100 million, in exchange for 

115,000 acres owned by the Colliers in South Florida and a payment 

of $50 million. The lands provided by the Colliers would consist of 

70,000 acres to be added to the Big Cypress National Preserve; 16,000 

acres to be used in the development of a Florida Panther National 

Wildlife Refuge; and 20,000 acres to establish the Ten Thousand Islands National Wildlife Refuge. If the exchange worked, Horn continued, the state of Florida would have to acquire only 57,000 acres 

to equal what it wanted the Interior Department to purchase, and the 

state already had the money necessary to do this under its Conservation and Recreation Lands Program program. Horn claimed that 

the land gained through the exchange would “constitute a significant 

addition to both the Park and Refuge systems . . . at no direct cost 

to the federal taxpayer,” something that the Reagan administration 

fully supported.37

Nathaniel Reed, who was representing the environmental community, could see no real objections to the Interior Department’s 

plan, other than the difficulty of its execution. The exchange “has 

got some real politics and . . . some very, very difficult things to overcome in Arizona,” he related, but “it is doable, perhaps.” Yet Reed 

also advised Congress to pass the proposed legislation anyway as a 

sort of “safety” measure in case an exchange could not be effected.38

Steven Whitney, director of the national parks program for The Wilderness Society, agreed, explaining that “the exchange . . . would not 

be foreclosed by the passage of this legislation.”39

Accordingly, the House of Representatives approved Lewis’s 

bill in July 1986, but the Senate took no action before the adjournment of Congress, in part, according to one source, because of 

“Administration opposition to all discretionary federal land purchases.”40 Lewis and Chiles planned on reintroducing the measures 

in the subsequent Congress, believing that “the level of support” 

for the original bills indicated “a strong possibility” that they could 

pass.41 Accordingly, in January 1987, the two submitted S. 90 and 
166 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Pine prairie in the Big Cypress National Preserve. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Ten | Envelopes of Protection 167

H.R. 184, which, for the most part, were no different than the previous measures, except that they now proposed that 136,000 acres be 

acquired instead of 128,000. The new bills also specified that the 

Seminole Indians would maintain their traditional hunting, fishing, and trapping rights in the addition, just as they did in the original preserve.42

In February 1987, the Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands, 

National Parks and Forests held a hearing on the reintroduced bills. 

As in the 1986 hearings, many of the same individuals and organizations testified in favor of the legislation. Graham, who by now 

had become a U.S. Senator for Florida, claimed that not only was 

the addition necessary to preserve endangered wildlife such as the 

panther, it was also “crucial to the success of the Save our Everglades 

initiative, and to the maintenance” of Everglades National Park.43

Florida Governor Bob Martinez declared his support for the addition as well, stating that “timely authorization and funding of federal acquisition” would serve several purposes, such as protection 

of Everglades National Park and southwest Florida’s water supply, 

preservation of the Florida panther and other endangered species, 

and more recreational opportunities.44 In addition, environmental 

groups continued to support the legislation, although some now 

asked the Senate to amend the bill so that the entire Fakahatchee 

Strand could be added to the preserve.45

The Interior Department, however, maintained its opposition 

to the measure; Horn testified that unless the bill was “amended 

to provide for acquisition by exchange,” the department would not 

support it. “Our fundamental problem with S. 90 has nothing to do 

with the resources,” Horn insisted, but everything to do with fiscal 

conservatism. He reiterated that the Arizona/Florida land exchange 

proposal was still the best method to pursue, and he claimed that the 

department was “in the process of completing negotiation” of such 

an exchange. Upon further questioning, Horn admitted that the interested parties in Arizona had not agreed to the exchange, but he 

believed that “the outlook [was] entirely positive.”46

Whether because of the Interior Department’s intransigence or 

not, no federal legislation was forthcoming in the summer of 1987. 

The major holdup came from the Senate, as the House had passed 

the legislation in March. In December, the Senate finally considered S. 90, with Chiles and Graham offering several amendments. 

First, the senators increased the amount of acreage to be acquired 

to 146,000. Second, they included a new section in the legislation, 

specifically allowing oil and gas exploration, development, and production in the area under certain terms. Production companies had 

to obtain a permit from the NPS before conducting any activities in 

the addition, for example, and the secretary of the interior would 

have to establish rules for such activity largely in conformance with 

regulations in “similar habitats or ecosystems within the Big Cypress 

National Preserve.”47 No debate ensued over these amendments, and 

they readily passed, as did the entire measure.

When the bill went back to the House, Representative Bruce 

Vento of Minnesota noted that the legislation would not affect the 

land exchange discussions. However, Vento also explained that the 

“Arizona-Florida land exchange has proven to be quite complex.” He 

was not sure whether it would come to fruition, but he encouraged 

the House to pass the amended bill anyway, stating that the government should not “delay the addition of critical lands to the Big Cypress National Preserve on the basis of a land exchange that may or 

may not come about.”48 The Everglades Coalition agreed, petitioning Congress at the coalition’s third annual conference in January to 

approve the measure.49 Accordingly, the House passed the bill, and 

President Ronald Reagan signed it into law in April 1988, although 

he insisted that the land exchange proposal be pursued and executed 

as a condition of his approval.50

Only a few days after Reagan signed the act, Representative 

Morris Udall of Arizona introduced the Arizona-Florida Land Exchange bill into Congress. This measure, Udall explained, would 

allow the transfer of 118,000 acres owned by the Collier family in 

South Florida (valued at $45.1 million) to the federal government in 

exchange for 68 acres in downtown Phoenix and a payment of $34.9 

million. That money would be used to establish an Indian education 

trust fund to compensate the Navajo for the loss of their boarding 

school, while the Collier’s land would be added to the Big Cypress 

National Preserve and used to create the Florida Panther National 

Wildlife Refuge.51 Governor Martinez of Florida strongly supported 

this bill, calling it “a unique opportunity to acquire over one-half of 

the authorized Big Cypress Addition relatively quickly,” and he urged 

Florida’s congressional delegation to work hard for its passage.52

For the next several months, this measure was debated in both 

chambers of Congress. Various senators and representatives raised 

objections over the valuation of the land and the effect that the closure of the Navajo school would have on the Indians—some, such 

as Representative Sidney R. Yates of Illinois, even characterized the 

proposal as “a cozy, private, preferential deal” between the secretary 

of the interior and the Collier interests.53 Many, however, including 

Lewis, Graham, and Chiles, advocated the measure as a win-win situation for both Florida and Arizona. Likewise, in a hearing held on 

the bill in July 1988, numerous environmentalists and state officials 

favored the acquisition. Finally, on 18 November 1988, the measure, 

known as the Arizona-Florida Land Exchange Act, became law.54

Yet the authorization did not prevent problems that developed 

in the execution of the exchange. For one thing, Collier interests and 

the city of Phoenix could not reach agreement on the use of the exchanged land. Barron Collier wanted to create 7.7 million square feet 

of commercial and residential space on the acreage, while the city 

wanted a 90-acre park. For another, a recession in the first part of 

the 1990s devalued the land from $80 million to between $25 and 

$35 million, causing the Collier interests to declare that they were no 

longer interested in the exchange. By 1991, the agreement was still 
168 United States Army Corps of Engineers

undecided, and the federal government had made no appropriations 

for the purchase of the Big Cypress land.55 However, in December 

1996, the land exchange finally occurred, meaning that by the end of 

the 1990s, 146,000 acres had been added to the Big Cypress National 

Preserve, making a total of 700,000 acres under protection.56 In addition, 26,400 acres in the northern portion of the Fakahatchee Strand 

was preserved as the Florida Panther National Wildlife Refuge, administered by the FWS.

Some environmentalists, however, believed that the protection 

was not adequate. For one thing, hunting and off-road vehicles were 

still permitted in the Big Cypress National Preserve, even though 

earlier state studies had noted the threat that they posed to wildlife. 

For another, original landowners were permitted to maintain their 

mineral rights in the land, and oil and gas drilling could still occur, 

albeit under NPS supervision. To many, these concessions, granted 

at the bequest of Congress due to the pleadings of groups such as 

the National Rifle Association, meant that Big Cypress National Preserve was a “park service stepchild” and that the NPS could not adequately protect the region’s ecology.57

Regardless, the state of Florida had successfully obtained the 

means to acquire Big Cypress land. Yet state officials were not done. 

Governor Martinez, who many environmentalists had believed 

would work against ecological concerns and the Save Our Everglades program, actually accelerated environmental land acquisition 

efforts during his one term as governor. In the late 1980s, he ensured 

that Florida’s Conservation and Recreation Lands Program fund had 

$43 million for land acquisition, and he proposed that over the next 

nine years, the state enhance the fund by $200 million.58

As the 1990s approached, Martinez developed a plan to generate even more money for land acquisition, in part because, even 

with the efforts that the state had already made, much of Florida’s 

rich ecology still remained in danger. In 1990, a state commission investigating environmental concerns reported that by the year 2020, 

another three million acres of wetlands and forests would be lost to 

development. It was also estimated that, according to the Department of Environmental Protection, “about 19 acres per hour of forest 

wetland and agricultural land was being converted for urban uses.” 

Many Floridians were concerned with these facts; a November 1989 

poll indicated that 88 percent of Florida residents wanted the state 

to devote more attention to the environment. Aware of these trends, 

Martinez proposed—and the Florida legislature passed—a huge 

land acquisition program in 1990 known as Preservation 2000.59

Under Preservation 2000, the state increased the tax on real estate documents to fund an additional $300 million in bonds every 

year. With such an arrangement, Florida would have a $3 billion land 

preservation fund by the year 2000—more than the federal government spent on environmental land acquisition efforts. Martinez justified such a huge amount by saying that Floridians had “an important choice to make: We can buy up environmentally sensitive lands 

that would otherwise be lost to future generations, or we can let a 

golden opportunity slip by.”60 Newspaper editorials called the program “staggering,” “unprecedented,” and “one of the most significant 

environmental initiatives in the past two decades,” and environmentalists were pleased as well. “This, I think, is going to change the face 

of Florida more than any single thing I can think of,” Nathaniel Reed 

noted.61 Others agreed. Ernest “Ernie” Barnett of the Department of 

Environmental Protection claimed that Preservation 2000 was the 

shining environmental jewel in Martinez’s administration, and that 

it established a program that spent more per year than the federal 

government and many small countries on land acquisition.62

Yet Preservation 2000 was merely the culmination of land acquisition programs that the state developed in the 1960s and 1970s. 

Always one of the most ambitious states in terms of environmental 

land purchases, the state increased its efforts in the 1980s with the 

establishment of the Conservation and Recreation Lands Program, 

the Save Our Rivers and Save Our Coasts legislation, and the Save 

Our Everglades plan. This focus on land acquisition was necessary 

in the 1980s because of the Reagan administration’s discouragement 

of federal land purchases. In the words of one NPS officer, “it was 

Map of the Big Cypress National Preserve and Addition. (National Park 

Service, Big Cypress National Preserve, Florida: General Management 

Plan, Final Environmental Impact Statement, Volume 1, 5)
Chapter Ten | Envelopes of Protection 169

administration policy that they didn’t want to be expanding parks 

that they’d have to pay for.”63 Even though all sides agreed that additional lands in Big Cypress Swamp and in the Fakahatchee Strand 

were necessary for preservation, their acquisition occurred only 

after the Interior Department negotiated an exchange—not a purchase—between the Collier interests and the federal government. At 

the same time that the state fought for Big Cypress acquisition, however, an even bigger battle was occurring over another area in need 

of protection: the East Everglades. The fight over that land—largely 

between the NPS, the Corps, and agriculturists, hunters, and others 

interested in the region—would dwarf the Big Cypress difficulties.

Endnotes

1 See Supreme Court of Florida, Opinion No. 76,984, 20 December 

1990, Florida Supreme Court Briefs & Opinions, College of Law Library, 

Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida <http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/flsupct> (15 February 2006). In 1968, a new constitution was adopted 

in Florida that prohibited the issuance of any of these bonds, but Senate 

Joint Resolution No. 292 rescinded that prohibition and allowed the Land 

Acquisition Trust Fund to continue.

2 Senator D. Robert Graham, “A Quiet Revolution: Florida’s Future on 

Trial,” The Florida Naturalist 45 (October 1972): 149.

3 Whitfield interview, 11.

4 Florida Department of Natural Resources, “Statewide Land Acquisition Plan and Procedure for Individual Project Design and Acquisition 

Phasing,” 20 November 1984, 2-3, Appendix 4, copy in File Department of 

Natural Resources Statewide Land Acquisition Plan, 1984-85, Box 02161, 

SFWMDAR.

5 As quoted in “Florida’s Growth Straining Fragile Groundwater,” Engineering News Record 216 (3 January 1985): 26.

6 Hansen, “South Florida’s Water Dilemma,” 17, 20; Land Acquisition 

Selection Committee for the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, Florida Statewide Land Acquisition Plan (Tallahassee, 

Fla.: Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 1986), 1 

[hereafter referred to as Florida Statewide Land Acquisition Plan]; Southwest 

Florida Regional Planning Council, “Demographics” <http://www.swfrpc.

org> (16 December 2005).

7 Moreau, “Everglades Forever?” 72-74; James Carney, “Last Gasp for 

the Everglades,” Time 134 (25 September 1989): 26.

8 Yates, “Saga of the Glades Continues,” 38.

9 Florida Department of Natural Resources, “Statewide Land Acquisition Plan and Procedure for Individual Project Design and Acquisition 

Phasing,” 3.

10 Florida Statewide Land Acquisition Plan, 2. It appears that the need 

for a comprehensive plan was first addressed in 1984. See Florida Department of Natural Resources, “Statewide Land Acquisition Plan and Procedure for Individual Project Design and Acquisition Phasing.”

11 Seminole Indian Land Claims Settlement Act of 1987 (101 Stat. 

1556); Kersey, “The East Big Cypress Case, 1948-1987,” 466-474.

12 Quotations in Big Cypress Area Management Task Force, “Report 

to Governor and Members of the Cabinet,” 17 February 1983, 3-4, File Big 

Cypress Area Mgmt Task Force Report, 1983-85, Box 02186, SFWMDAR; 

see also Rob Magee, State of Florida Department of Community Affairs, 

Division of Local Resource Management, to Nancy Linnan, 5 July 1983, 

Folder 30, Box 25, Series II, Marjory Stoneman Douglas Papers, Manuscript 

Collection 60, Archives and Special Collections, Otto G. Richter Library, 

University of Miami, Miami, Florida [hereafter cited as Douglas Papers].

13 Big Cypress Area Management Task Force, “Report to Governor and 

Members of the Cabinet,” 29-30.

14 Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources Subcommittee 

on Public Lands, National Parks and Forests, El Malpais National Monument 

and Big Cypress National Preserve: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Public Lands, National Parks and Forests of the Committee on Energy and Natural 

Resources, United States Senate, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1987, 74 [hereafter 

referred to as El Malpais National Monument and Big Cypress National Preserve].

15 Steve Gatewood, Florida Natural Areas Inventory, to Jim McKinley, 

FLTNC, 6 June 1983, Folder 36, Box 25, Series II, Douglas Papers.

16 Gatewood to McKinley, 6 June 1983.

17 “National Park Service Initiates Land Protection Planning for Big 

Cypress National Preserve,” National Park Service News Release, 25 April 

1983, Folder 2, Box 23, Series II, Douglas Papers.

18 Robert L. Kelley, “The Future of Everglades National Park,” Folder 27, 

Box 25, Series II, Douglas Papers.

19 “Panther Preservation in the Big Cypress National Preserve: A Discussion of the Issues,” March 1985, File PRO Everglades Panther, Box 21213, 

SFWMDAR.

20 “Florida Panther Recovery: A Status Report to The Governor and 

Cabinet, July 7, 1983,” File PRO Everglades Panther, Box 21213, SFWMDAR.

21 “Florida Panther Recovery: A Status Report to The Governor and 

Cabinet, July 7, 1983.”

22 “Issue Paper: Save Our Everglades,” 9 August 1983, 9-10, copy in Folder 16, Box 2, Marshall Papers. The Save Our Everglades program also called for 

land acquisition efforts in East Everglades; this will be dealt with in another 

chapter.

23 Bob Graham, Governor, to Honorable Ronald Reagan, 8 August 

1983, Folder 16, Box 2, Marshall Papers.

24 “Save Our Everglades: Restoring Everglades National Park,” 18 April 

1984, 2, Folder 16, Box 2, Marshall Papers.

25 “Save Our Everglades: Restoring Everglades National Park,” 2-5.

26 “Save Our Everglades: Restoring Everglades National Park,” 2-5.

27 Quotations in House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation, Additions to the National Park 

System in the State of Florida: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on National 

Parks and Recreation of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House 

of Representatives, 99th Cong., 1st and 2d sessions, 1985 and 1986, 105-107 

[hereafter cited as Additions to the National Park System]; see also Bob [Graham], Governor, to Mrs. Marjory Stoneman Douglas, Friends of the Everglades, 25 February 1985, Folder 85, Box 30, Series II, Douglas Papers.

28 Additions to the National Park System, 164.

29 Additions to the National Park System, 187-188.

30 Additions to the National Park System, 173-174.

31 As quoted in Ronald A. Taylor, “Saving a Fountain of Life,” U.S. News 

& World Report 100 (24 February 1986): 64.

32 Additions to the National Park System, 151-152.

33 For a good discussion of panther movements in the Big Cypress area, 

see Levin, Liquid Land, 99-117.

34 “Big Cypress Addition: An Attempt to Preserve Water, Life in 

‘Glades,” Congressman Tom Lewis’ Florida Environment Report, n.d.
170 United States Army Corps of Engineers

35 Additions to the National Park System, 158-159.

36 Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources Subcommittee 

on Public Lands, Reserved Water and Resource Conservation, Additions to 

the Big Cypress National Preserve; Establishing the San Pedro Riparian National Conservation Area; Designating the Horsepasture River as a Component of the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System; and Amending FLPMA: 

Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Public Lands, Reserved Water and 

Resource Conservation of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 

United States Senate, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 1986, 99-103 [hereafter referred 

to as Additions to the Big Cypress National Preserve].

37 Additions to the Big Cypress National Preserve, 99-103.

38 Additions to the Big Cypress National Preserve, 162.

39 Additions to the Big Cypress National Preserve, 162.

40 “Big Cypress Expansion Legislation Fact Sheet, January 1987,” File 

Washington Office Big Cypress, Box 2, S1401, Executive Office of the Governor Subject Files, 1987-1998, FSA.

41 “Big Cypress Addition: An Attempt to Preserve Water, Life in 

‘Glades.”

42 El Malpais National Monument and Big Cypress National Preserve, 

20-30, 41.

43 El Malpais National Monument and Big Cypress National Preserve, 

39-42.

44 Bob Martinez, Governor, to Senator Dale Bumpers, Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Public Land, National Parks and Forests, 12 February 

1987, in El Malpais National Monument and Big Cypress National Preserve, 

43-44.

45 El Malpais National Monument and Big Cypress National Preserve, 

356. At a January 1987 meeting of the Everglades Coalition, the organization 

encouraged the Reagan administration to support the new measures, stating that “all available methods including possible land exchanges, should be 

considered to bring these critical lands under public ownership.” “Statement 

of Everglades Coalition Members, Lake Wales, Florida, January 17, 1987,” 

File 10-1-7a (Kissimmee River-Lake Okeechobee, FL) 12222, Box 25, Accession No. 077-96-0033, RG 77, FRC.

46 El Malpais National Monument and Big Cypress National Preserve, 

67-81.

47 Congressional Record, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 11 December 1987, 

133:17971.

48 Congressional Record, 100th Cong, 2d sess., 1 March 1988, 134:528.

49 “Coalition Outlines Plan to Halt Everglades Decline,” National Parks 

Magazine 62 (March/April 1988): 9.

50 Act of 29 April 1988 (102 Stat. 443); Ronald Reagan, “Statement on 

Signing the Big Cypress National Preserve Addition Act,” 29 April 1988, 

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Archives <http://www.reagan.utexas.

edu/archives> (20 December 2005).

51 Congressional Record, 100th Cong, 2d sess., 3 May 1988, 134:2897.

52 Bob Martinez, Governor, to The Honorable Lawton Chiles, United 

States Senate, 6 July 1988, File Big Cypress Land Swap, Box 88-02, S1331, 

Executive Office of the Governor, Brian Ballard, Director of Operations, 

Subject Files, 1988, FSA.

53 Congressional Record, 100th Cong, 2d sess., 14 July 1988, 134:5764.

54 Act of 18 November 1988 (102 Stat. 4571); see also Congressional 

Record, 100th Cong, 2d sess., 27 July 1988, 134:5895.

55 “Everglades Land Swap Imperiled,” National Parks Magazine 65 

(September/October 1991): 10-11.

56 See “Save Our Everglades: A Status Report by the Office of Governor 

Lawton Chiles,” 30 June 1996, 9, copy provided by SFWMD.

57 See, for example, Levin, Liquid Land, 101-102.

58 “Past Accomplishments,” File Governor’s Environmental Initiatives, 

Box 1, S1401, Executive Office of the Governor Subject Files, 1987-1988, 

FSA.

59 Florida Department of Environmental Protection, “History of Florida’s Conservation Efforts” <http://www.dep.state.fl.us/lands/acquisition/

P2000/BACKGRND.htm> (20 December 2005).

60 As cited in “Florida’s Preservation 2000,” St. Petersburg Times, 25 

January 1990.

61 Reed and editorial quotations in “Florida’s Preservation 2000,” St. 

Petersburg Times, 25 January 1990; see also Florida Department of Environmental Protection, “History of Florida’s Conservation Efforts.”

62 Ernest “Ernie” Barnett interview by Matthew Godfrey, 23 September 

2004, Tallahassee, Florida, 3-4.

63 As cited in “Everglades Land Swap Imperiled,” 10.


173

Ecological problems in Everglades National Park were getting worse fast. That was the consensus among science experts at the 

beginning of the 1980s. The good news was that scientific evidence 

increasingly pointed to poor water management as the underlying 

cause of most of the Everglades’ biological decline. If water deliveries 

to the park could be rectified, it followed, the Everglades might be 

saved. But scientific studies indicated that it was not enough simply 

to guarantee minimum quantities of water to the park. Rather, water 

management had to be modified so that water entering the park was 

distributed more nearly in the historic pattern of sheet flow. Moreover, the timing of water deliveries and duration of inundation—what 

was called “hydroperiod”—had to parallel the natural rainfall pattern.

Even as scientific understanding of the Everglades ecosystem 

improved, engineering solutions for modified water management became more difficult. Most of the sheet flow into Everglades National 

Park came through two broad sloughs: Shark River Slough and Taylor Slough. The entrance to both sloughs was an area bordering the 

east edge of the park that had remained practically uninhabited until 

recent years. By the early 1980s, it was lightly populated and portions 

were under cultivation. Initially, efforts to modify water deliveries to 

the park through this area focused on re-engineering options that 

would balance the park’s water supply requirements with the flood 

control needs of these area residents. By the end of the decade, those 

options no longer appeared realistic. In certain portions of this hotly 

contested area, the protection of park values was incompatible with 

flood control. Increasingly, water managers believed it was necessary to buy out the landowners and change the use of the land. This 

thinking culminated in the Everglades National Park Protection and 

Expansion Act of 1989.

Chapter 11

The East Everglades is the name given to an area bordering the 

east side of Everglades National Park. The East Everglades area in the 

1980s (until a portion was added to the national park in 1989) encompassed some 153,600 acres or approximately 242 square miles.1

It included the headwaters of Shark River Slough (until 1989) and 

Taylor Slough. Shark River Slough, the larger slough at approximately 25 miles wide, gathers some of its waters from north of the 

park in Conservation Area No. 3B; that portion of the slough that 

runs through the East Everglades area is called Northeast Shark 

River Slough. Taylor Slough drains approximately 40 square miles 

southeast of Shark River Slough. Sawgrass marshlands predominate 

throughout this area, while hardwood hammocks, or tree islands, 

occur on higher elevations.2

In terms of hydrology and biology the area is part of the Everglades ecosystem; in terms of land use and ownership it constitutes 

the farthest limits of Dade County’s urban/rural interface abutting 

the park. Its boundaries in the 1980s were the Tamiami Canal on the 

north, the national park on the west and south, and Levee 31 and Canal 111 on the east. The Tamiami Canal and Levee, or L-29, it will be 

recalled, formed the southern edge of Conservation Area No. 3 and 

was completed by the Corps in 1963. L-31 was a southern extension 

of the eastern perimeter levee, while C-111 was at the southern end 

of this system and dated from the mid-1960s.3

Although the land was mostly in private ownership, it remained 

largely uninhabited until the 1970s. Farther south, in the C-111 basin, it was still uninhabited in the 1980s, inundated by water during much of the rainy season. Early in the twentieth century the 

state had offered these lands for 25 cents an acre; speculators had 

purchased them in the 1920s and sold them as bonus property for 

Brewing Storm: Development, Water Supply, and 

the East Everglades
174 United States Army Corps of Engineers

the buying of land elsewhere. A generation passed and the worthless parcels of waterlogged property were sold and resold. The water 

conservation areas were created and portions of the East Everglades 

began to dry out. Even then, most of the area remained too wet to 

inhabit. Under the 1948 and 1954 congressional authorizations of 

C&SF Project works, the Corps had received approval to construct 

L-31, running southwest from L-29, in order to provide flood and 

salinity protection to the area. As proposed, L-31 would consist of a 

northern portion (L-31N) and a western portion (L-31W); the western component would encompass a 5,000-acre area known as the 

Frog Pond, located at the head of Taylor Slough. Farmed as early 

as the 1940s, the Frog Pond had agricultural potential, but had attracted only a few vegetable growers to this point. In the 1960s, the 

Corps aligned the different L-31 parts, completing construction of 

L-31W in the early 1970s. These engineering works, combined with 

severe drought in 1971, exposed more ground, and by the mid-1970s 

the situation changed rapidly as people moved in to build residences 

and raise crops, attracted by the comparatively low price of land in 

this area of southwest Dade County.4

The government of Dade County was ambivalent about development of this area. In the early 1960s, the Metro-Dade County 

Commission supported a water control plan that would permit 

agricultural use during the dry season. The Southwest Dade Project received congressional authorization in 1965, but after considerable planning by the Corps it was never built. County support for the project waned as the NPS began to voice opposition, 

fearing that the project would complicate efforts to convey water 

to Taylor Slough and the southeast corner of the park. County 

officials were even less enthusiastic about agricultural development in Southwest Dade County following the drought of 1971, 

which heightened concern about saltwater intrusion into the Biscayne aquifer. Nevertheless, Dade County classified nearly the 

entire area as agricultural in its land-use plan, and it supported 

construction of canals and levees north and west of the town of 

Homestead, which served to drain that area for crop production. 

It also passed zoning ordinances with stringent performance criteria that, in the minds of some residents, conveyed a public commitment to flood protection.5

Map of the East Everglades area. (Everglades National Park, “Seepage Control in Western Dade 

County,” 1994)
Chapter Eleven | Brewing Storm 175

The Corps, too, saw problems with development of the East Everglades. A farming practice known as “rock plowing” was particularly harmful to the environment. Farmers, when clearing the land 

for planting, would plow up the limestone substratum to augment 

the thin layer of topsoil. This limestone was very porous and acted 

as a filter as water percolated into the Biscayne aquifer. The Corps 

maintained that rock plowing was harmful to the aquifer. It discouraged the practice through its Section 404 permitting program, although by this time the Frog Pond area already bore the scars of rock 

plowing and the practice continued elsewhere to a limited extent.6

The Corps also required homeowners in the East Everglades to 

apply for Section 404 permits as they were filling in wetlands to improve their home sites. The agency notified some 50 residents that 

they must obtain permits. After residents ignored repeated orders 

by the Corps to desist, the U.S. Attorney’s Office brought suit against 

five offenders. U.S. District Judge James W. Kehoe ruled in favor of 

the government, persuaded by the testimony of eight government 

experts that dumping in the Everglades lowlands threatened the 

environment. One of the defendants, Russell Carter, formed a local 

group in defense of property rights and posted an anti-government 

sign in his yard. Another landowner threw “a pesky government bureaucrat” into a pond housing his pet alligator, while still others told 

the media that “if we don’t get justice through the courts we’ll get 

it with our guns.” Fairly or not, the homesteaders in the East Everglades were gaining a prickly reputation.7

In August 1981, Tropical Storm Dennis soaked the East Everglades with three days of torrential rain. Row crops of tomatoes and 

malanga disappeared under water. Avocado, lime, and mango groves 

were ruined. Roads around Florida City (between Homestead and 

the national park) remained impassable for three weeks following 

the storm. Farmers and homeowners angrily confronted SFWMD 

employees, accusing the district of deliberately ignoring their plight. 

Someone threw a pipe bomb into one of the canal structures on the 

edge of the East Everglades, though it failed to explode.8

If the county government had been dubious of this community before, it now took definite action to curtail further growth in 

the area, which soon became known as the 8.5 Square Mile Area. 

This moniker arose from the passage of a zoning ordinance on 27 

October 1981 by the Board of County Commissioners stating that 

within the region, located in the East Everglades area west of the levees separating the park and the Miami suburbs, the county would 

permit only a maximum of one dwelling unit per 40 acres for residential use or one dwelling unit per 20 acres in conjunction with 

agriculture, replacing the existing one house per 5 acres regulation. 

The ordinance also required notification of property purchasers 

and individuals seeking building permits that the county and the 

SFWMD had no drainage plan for the area. The Governing Board 

of the SFWMD endorsed the ordinance at a special meeting eight 

days prior to its enactment.9

The county aimed to slow growth in the 8.5 Square Mile Area in 

order to protect Miami’s water supply, but it had difficulty enforcing 

the ordinance. Some property owners openly defied the ordinance, 

building homes without permits. Others worked the system, obtaining a permit to build seasonal housing for migrant farm workers, 

for example, and subsequently expanding it into a second permanent dwelling, thereby getting two residential dwellings onto 40 

acres. Many of the landowners were Cuban refugees who were not 

familiar with the permitting process. Indeed, many had already paid 

too much for land that had been cynically advertised as “waterfront 

property” and they perceived the zoning restrictions and absence of 

flood security as added injustices.10

Settlement of the East Everglades, and specifically of the 8.5 

Square Mile Area, encroached on the national park, resulting in loss 

of wetlands and wildlife habitat and further interfering with the natural sheet flow of water into the park through Northeast Shark River 

Slough and Taylor Slough. As homesteaders in the East Everglades 

drained their land, it set in motion the familiar train of disturbances: 

marsh fires, soil subsidence, and invasion of exotic species such as 

Australian pine and melaleuca. To have this occurring on the park’s 

doorstep was especially harmful to fauna and flora. Many wildlife 

species used the upper sloughs within the East Everglades for nesting, feeding, foraging, and cover. It was estimated that the East Everglades had at one time provided 35 percent of South Florida’s wood 

stork feeding grounds, but water level manipulation rendered the 

area unsuitable for this species during its crucial nesting period. Development pressure also caused a reduction in incidence of 12 rare, 

endemic plant species, which appeared to have a detrimental effect 

on the biological diversity and productivity of the flora in the adjoining portion of the park.11

Park officials viewed these developments with growing concern. John M. Morehead, superintendent of Everglades National 

Park, welcomed the Dade County ordinance as a sign of “exceptional foresight” on the part of local officials, but it was the Corps, a 

sister federal agency, that held the key to improved water management in the area. In a long letter to Colonel Alfred Devereaux, Jacksonville District Engineer, in September 1982, the superintendent 

expressed gratitude that the Corps was studying water deliveries 

through the Shark River Slough and he urged the Corps to “examine ways to rejoin the historical hydrological equilibrium between 

the east Everglades, the Water Conservation areas, and Everglades 

National Park.”12

Morehead stressed the importance of Shark River Slough for 

wildlife habitat, and explained that loss of wetlands within the East 

Everglades as a result of development or hydrological change would 

substantially reduce wildlife populations in the park. “We believe 

that this condition must be reversed,” he noted. “Everglades National Park and the east Everglades are hydrologically connected 

and should be treated as one hydrological unit.” In other words, 
176 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Morehead urged a management approach that did not stop at the 

park boundary. In the superintendent’s opinion, the federal interest in preserving Everglades National Park justified federal action 

outside the park. “There can be little doubt,” Morehead stated, “that 

the future of Everglades National Park is intimately tied to the future 

of the Shark Slough within the east Everglades.”13 This was a bold 

position that reflected recent changes in NPS thinking about how to 

approach “external threats” to national parks.

Morehead explained that the paramount need of the park was 

to obtain a more natural flow of water based upon rainfall in the 

drainage north of the park. Currently, water deliveries were based on 

a minimum monthly delivery schedule established under P.L. 91-282 

(1970). A new approach was required. For one thing, the 260,000 

acre-feet minimum allocation for Shark River Slough was based 

on median flows through Tamiami Trail culverts during the period 

1940-1962. It had to be recognized, Morehead wrote, that these flow 

data were below pre-drainage era levels since six major Everglades 

drainage canals were already operational by that time.14

A revised water delivery schedule must also take into account 

natural fluctuations in rainfall within each season, Morehead argued. The current schedule was based on average monthly flows. 

The resulting monthly breakdown of the schedule provided for peak 

flows in October and minimum flows in April and May. While the 

current schedule did provide for some deviations in time of drought 

or high water, the magnitude and timing of the deviations were determined by urban and agricultural water supply needs rather than 

the park’s ecological needs. Morehead wanted a schedule that would 

allow fluctuations “in synchrony with the natural system; a system 

to which the slough’s animal and plant populations have become 

adapted over millennia.”15

Morehead had been arguing these points for two years. He had 

written a similar letter to Colonel Devereaux’s predecessor, Colonel 

James W. R. Adams, in July 1980, in response to proposed changes in 

regulation water levels for Lake Okeechobee and the water conservation areas. The concern in the summer of 1980 was that Everglades 

National Park could face a water shortage if there was a “drawdown” 

of water levels in these other areas. The SFWMD and the Corps were 

making plans to lower the water level in the conservation areas for 

the purpose of giving vegetation (and the deer population) a chance 

to rebound under drier conditions. But the park’s concerns went 

Everglades National Park provided habitat for rare birds such as the Snowy Egret. (Everglades National Park)
Chapter Eleven | Brewing Storm 177

beyond questions of water shortage. The regulation levels tended to 

flatten out extreme high and low water events. While this certainly 

benefited agriculture and the urban populations, it harmed the park. 

“The trouble biologically with all such modulations is that in time the 

modulation reduces animal and plant diversity and favors only those 

few species that happen to be adapted to the modulation,” Morehead 

cautioned. “In an ecosystem like the Everglades marsh that isn’t particularly diverse in species to begin with, reduction in population and 

loss of species can happen dramatically and rapidly.” Morehead posed 

a series of technical questions to Colonel Adams concerning the regulation schedules for the conservation areas. His last question was: 

“What modifications could be done to make the system react more 

fairly to systemwide rainfall?”16

The problem was deceptively complex. The C&SF Project was 

unique among the Corps’ flood control projects in that it covered 

vast areas of impounded waters moving very slowly over a nearly imperceptible gradient. From an operational standpoint it took weeks, 

even months, to move water from one end of the system to the other. 

The Corps followed a schedule of water releases for each area that 

was more weighted toward water supply and flood control, although 

other purposes such as fish and wildlife benefits were also taken into 

account. Maximum water levels were set according to normal rainfall patterns, meaning that when water levels rose above the maximum allowed in the regulation schedule the Corps had a responsibility to open gates and move water out of the area, if only as a hedge 

against flooding in case of abnormally high rainfall perhaps two or 

three months in the future. Colonel Adams readily admitted that the 

system was imprecise and subject to the caprice of nature. “We’re in 

a situation where science has gone about as far as it can in predicting 

Mother Nature but she still has the last card to play,” he told an interviewer in 1981.17 Not surprisingly, while the park superintendent 

focused on fluctuations in nature, the District Engineer concerned 

himself with weather extremes.

The winter of 1982-1983—an El Niño event—produced the 

kind of freakish weather that Colonel Adams warned about. Heavy 

rains began in October and continued through the winter—normally Florida’s dry season—culminating in a 60-day, 20-inch deluge 

in January and February. The SFWMD made emergency releases 

from Lake Okeechobee to the St. Lucie and Caloosahatchee estuaries but that was not enough. The Corps opened the floodgates in 

Gate structure at S-12C. (South Florida Water Management District)
178 United States Army Corps of Engineers

the Tamiami Canal and levee along the northeast boundary of Everglades National Park, and from October 1982 through February 

1983 the park received three-and-a-half times its minimum quota.18

In the month of February, when the minimum quota for releases 

through these structures was 9,000 acre-feet, the park received a 

whopping 88,000 acre-feet.19 While the C&SF Project afforded admirable flood protection to sugar cane fields in the EAA, winter crops 

in Dade County, and all the coastal cities in South Florida, the Corps 

succeeded only by dumping much of the excess water on the park. 

Ironically, at the same time that the four open gates in L-29 were 

disgorging water into the park at the rate of approximately five billion gallons per day, engineers and hydrologists in the Corps and the 

SFWMD were beginning to consult with the park’s chief scientist, 

Gary Hendrix, on how to develop a rainfall-driven water delivery 

schedule. This was hardly the type of deviation from average monthly flows that Superintendent Morehead had in mind.

Indeed, the dumping of excess water on the park caused severe 

ecological damage. According to Jim Kushlan, a park wildlife biologist, the practice destroyed alligator nests and disrupted feeding 

patterns of the woodstork.20 Morehead agreed. “Just as soon as the 

birds and gators would get their nests settled, they’d get blown away 

by waves of water,” he related. These releases destroyed the “natural 

wet-and-dry rhythm” that had characterized water flow in the Everglades before drainage began, harming the lifeways of both flora 

and fauna.21

Insisting that floodwaters were causing grave harm to the park, 

Morehead and Hendrix requested an emergency meeting with the 

SFWMD. On 10 March 1983, Hendrix arrived alone in West Palm 

Beach and presented a seven-point plan to the SFWMD’s Governing Board. He began by saying that in the past few months the park 

had been assessing the effects of the water delivery schedule that had 

been in place since 1970 and the park staff had concluded that most 

of the degradation to ecological values in the park had occurred from 

excess water in the dry season. (This was the opposite, of course, 

from the longstanding perception that the Everglades was dying of 

thirst.) Both he and the superintendent believed that without some 

“urgent measures” the park could not “sustain much of its resources 

for very long.”22

The first four points in the seven-point plan aimed at undoing the fragmentation of Conservation Area No. 3 and restoring 

sheet flow to the park. The plan called for filling in the L-28 canal, 

which ran north and south down the boundary of Conservation 

Area No. 3A and Big Cypress National Preserve; filling in the L-67 

canal extension and removing the levee; rededicating Conservation Area No. 3B for water storage and sheet flow; and redistributing water deliveries from Conservation Area No. 3A along the 

whole length of the Tamiami Canal from L-28 to L-30. Collectively, 

these four actions would redistribute water flowing into the park 

from the confined area around the four floodgates in the Tamiami 

Canal to several historic drainages south of Big Cypress as well as 

the Northeast Shark River Slough. The fifth item called for a water 

quality monitoring program. The sixth was a request that the Corps 

and SFWMD defer any implementation of new drainage districts 

until impacts to the park were fully considered. The seventh and 

final point was to field test a new water delivery schedule starting as 

soon as possible.23

At the end of Hendrix’s presentation the Governing Board recommended that the SFWMD’s executive director, John “Jack” Maloy, 

report to the board in a month with a studied response. When board 

member Jeanne Bellamy asked Maloy for his off-the-cuff reaction, 

he said that he was “overwhelmed.” “Oh, you’re never overwhelmed,” 

Bellamy prompted. “I’ll tell you one thing,” Maloy replied. “This is 

a real test of whether the organization is . . . a regular bureaucratic 

organization or something different.” A request of this scope, Maloy 

explained, would normally take the organization three years just to 

study it. “By then the Park will be a desert,” Bellamy cut in. Maloy 

noted that most of the points Hendrix brought with him had been 

discussed already with district engineers, but this was a lot to consider all at once.24

In a letter to Marjory Stoneman Douglas and 16 other “Everglades watchers,” Nathaniel P. Reed, a member of the governing 

board, offered further commentary on the meeting, characterizing 

the Seven Point Plan as a “bombshell.” Reed seemed most surprised 

that Morehead, who enjoyed an exceptionally close working relationship with the board, had chosen to send a messenger instead 

of appearing himself. “When the District and the Park have had a 

problem during Morehead’s tenure, his presence, his explanation, his 

superb ability at negotiation have made the Board willing to find 

some area of cooperation,” Reed explained. After Hendrix made his 

proposal, Reed continued, the Corps representative, Carol White, 

“appeared to have apoplexy.” The emergency ploy was even a bit 

worrisome to Reed, who wondered if “emergency actions” were appropriate or wise. He noted that such Everglades experts as Art Marshall and Johnny Jones had “expressed sincere reservations” about 

implementing some of the park’s proposals without further study.25

As a former assistant secretary of the interior, Reed offered his 

own analysis of the park’s Seven Point Plan. “The Park’s request represents a major change in attitude,” he headlined. “The new approach 

may be the result of the flood conditions inundating the Park or may 

reflect the Superintendent’s view that as the Department of the Interior and the National Park Service are not actively defending the 

Park’s integrity [then] the local representatives must declare the present state of affairs an ‘emergency’ requiring ‘emergency’ measures.”26

Following the meeting, Maloy acted decisively. He redeployed 

staff to evaluate the Seven Point Plan at lightning speed, and then he 

called an “emergency meeting” of the Governing Board for 5 April. 

Defining the situation as an “emergency” gave him authority to issue 

an order without prior notice. He had his legal staff prepare a draft 
Chapter Eleven | Brewing Storm 179

emergency order with findings of fact and conclusions of law for the 

Governing Board’s approval.27 At the Governing Board meeting on 

5 April, Maloy duly reported on the SFWMD’s technical response to 

the Seven Point Plan. He recommended support for all seven measures. If the board approved, the district would approach the Corps 

and the NPS and ask for financial help, recognizing the federal interest in protecting the national park. Maloy presented the board with 

the draft emergency order, which the board adopted.28

Representatives of several environmental groups also attended 

the emergency meeting and expressed support for the Seven Point 

Plan. Peter Mott, president of the Florida Audubon Society, correctly 

noted that the seventh point, calling for a field test of a new water 

delivery schedule (and the abandonment of the present congressionally mandated one) would require an act of Congress. He predicted 

a “united front” on this matter in the coming year.29 Two other attendees, Michael Hevener, executive director of the Dade County 

Farm Bureau, and William Earl, counsel for that organization, spoke 

on behalf of 5,800 farmers and 7,000 farm workers of Dade County. 

They worried that the Seven Point Plan would cause flooding, wreck 

crops, and damage private property. They wanted an EIS “for any 

structural changes that would affect the farming interests in south 

Dade County.”30 Immediately following the meeting, Earl sent a letter by courier to Colonel Devereaux, commander of the Jacksonville 

District, requesting an EIS.31

As the Corps and the SFWMD entered discussions about implementing the Seven Point Plan, it became clear that the Corps 

Study area of the water supply restudy. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Central and Southern Florida Water Supply: Reconnaissance 

Report, 1979)
180 United States Army Corps of Engineers

had serious misgivings. The main sticking point was the fate of the 

residential development in the East Everglades. Devereaux insisted 

that the Corps would not support steps to restore full flow through 

Northeast Shark River Slough until its study showed that area inhabitants would not be flooded out. Others were less sympathetic. 

Charles L. Crumpton, a member of the Governing Board and former 

Dade County planner, observed that 50 percent of the houses and 90 

percent of the mobile homes in the East Everglades had been erected 

without building permits.32 No state officials would say so explicitly, but to Devereaux the meaning was clear: “To heck with these 

people. Just flood them out. Then they’ll move. Then they’ll get out 

of there.” Devereaux disagreed with such a position, in part because 

he believed that, even though the property owners were “operating 

at their own risk in that area,” the federal government should and 

could not “deliberately flood somebody, or increase the risk of flooding, without compensation.” Devereaux admitted that restoring the 

flow to Shark River Slough would not cause immediate flooding of 

landowners, but it would raise the groundwater table, elevating the 

possibility of a flood. “I just did not personally feel, nor did my superiors feel,” he later recollected, “that the Corps of Engineers could be 

party to anything that would do that.”33

To break this impasse, Congressman John Seiberling (D-Ohio), 

chairman of the House Subcommittee on Public Lands and National 

Parks, visited South Florida with three members of the subcommittee—James Weaver (D-Oregon), Bruce Vento (Democrat-FarmerLabor-Minnesota), and Thomas Lewis (R-Florida)—at the end of 

April. Their three-day tour ended at SFWMD headquarters in West 

Palm Beach, where Seiberling had some stern words for the Jacksonville District commander. “I am here because I was told there 

is an emergency by a lot of experts,” Seiberling said. “It’s your position there is no emergency?” Devereaux responded, “There is no 

emergency right now. No sir.” Everyone in attendance—the four 

congressmen, the Governing Board members, SFWMD staff, and 

park staff—could not believe the colonel’s words. Seiberling asked 

incredulously, “There is a congressional subcommittee here because 

there’s an emergency . . . What does it take to prove it?” Congressman Lewis demanded, “What makes you think we don’t have an 

emergency? What does it take—the East Coast sliding off?”34 The 

colonel remained impassive.

Devereaux probably held his ground on this point because he 

was operating under a different code of authorities than the SFWMD 

and the NPS. He later explained to an interviewer, “I couldn’t use 

emergency measures, because emergency measures can’t be used for 

environmental purposes.”35 The Corps’ authorities to deal with an 

emergency came from Public Law 84-99, first passed in June 1955 

and amended several times since. According to this law, when flooding, hurricanes, or drought constituted an emergency, the Corps 

could engage in any action “which is essential for the preservation of 

life and property,” such as strengthening existing flood control structures, constructing temporary levees, clearing channels, removing 

debris and wreckage once a flood had receded, and providing clean 

water to regions in need. Nowhere in the act did it authorize the 

Corps to take emergency measures for environmental preservation 

purposes.36 By contrast, Florida state law explicitly allowed Maloy 

authority to protect wildlife and fish if he and the Governing Board 

found an emergency existed.

Nathaniel Reed, who sat at Seiberling’s side in the meeting at 

SFWMD headquarters, by now had resolved any doubts in his own 

mind about the need for emergency measures. Reporting on the congressional tour to Richard Davidge, a Watt loyalist who occupied the 

assistant secretary position that Reed himself had held in the Nixon 

and Ford administrations, he wrote: “To everyone’s astonishment, 

Col. Devereaux, the District Engineer, was totally uncooperative.” 

It was not clear to Reed if the colonel was acting under orders or on 

his own initiative, but he had never seen such a hard line in his 30 

years of involvement with the Everglades. “Apparently, the District 

staff is in an upheaval. The older in service staff members are rear 

guarding and resist any changes. The younger staff [members] want 

to solve the ongoing Everglades crisis and agree to be innovative.” 

Reed ended his letter to Davidge with a warning and a plea. “The 

general perception is that the Administration has written off Everglades Park. I urge you to give this issue priority.”37

Throughout 1983, the SFWMD strove for rapid implementation 

of the Seven Point Plan, including opening S-333 in April to allow 

water to flow to the eastern third of Everglades National Park. The 

Corps, meanwhile, took a more deliberative approach. Those different approaches were evident in how each agency dealt with challenges to the plan from farmers and property owners. Perhaps the most 

serious challenge involved efforts by residents of the 8.5 square mile 

area to have the restrictive county zoning ordinance lifted. Spurred 

Flooding in East Everglades area. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District)
Chapter Eleven | Brewing Storm 181

on by droughts in the 1970s that convinced many that flooding would 

not be a serious problem, the area had grown into a community of 

approximately 800 persons, who had constructed several hundred 

residences and agricultural structures to serve the region’s numerous 

plant nurseries and farms.38 As we have seen above, Tropical Storm 

Dennis debunked the flooding myth, making some residents clamor 

for a government-sponsored drainage plan and better flood protection, while others merely wanted to subdivide their land and cash out.

Underpinning the zoning ordinance was a county ruling that 

the East Everglades was an “Area of Critical Environmental Concern.” When Maloy learned that the Dade County Board of Commissioners was considering a repeal of that ruling, he acted swiftly 

and decisively to move the issue up to the state level. On 22 June, 

he appealed to Dr. John M. DeGrove, secretary of the Department 

of Community Affairs (the state land planning agency), to initiate 

the process of designating the East Everglades an “Area of Critical 

State Concern.”39 Governor Bob Graham established the Everglades 

National Park/East Everglades Committee on 7 February 1984—a 

major step in the designation process and a strong indication that 

the state would likely assert control if Dade County backed off its 

own environmental protection plan.40

The Corps, meanwhile, contended with a legal challenge, which 

would eventually become known as Kendall v. Marsh, after the Dade 

County Farm Bureau filed suit in U.S. District Court on behalf of East 

Everglades farmers and property owners. Concerned that knocking 

gaps into L-67 would flood 80,000 acres of vegetable and fruit farms, 

the farmers sought an injunction that would prevent the Corps from 

modifying any structures in the C&SF Project until it completed 

an EIS. The farm bureau contended that the removal of levees was 

not an emergency procedure and that agriculturists would “suffer 

substantial and irreparable harm” from “higher ground water and 

increased flooding danger” if the Corps was allowed to proceed.41

Wanting to forestall litigation, and without any authority to implement the Seven Point Plan, the Corps moved cautiously on any elements that might result in flooding of crops and homes in the East 

Everglades. The Corps also arranged for meetings with the farmers 

without notifying or consulting the SFWMD, much to the dismay of 

Maloy. Despite these efforts, the suit continued into 1985.42

The Corps’ deliberative approach frustrated the park superintendent, state water managers, and environmentalists, all of whom 

wanted prompt action and believed that the Corps should move 

ahead undeterred by the threat of lawsuits. The Corps was already on 

record concerning the first four points in the Seven Point Plan—the 

modifications to L-28 and L-67 and the redistribution of waters in 

Conservation Area No. 3A and 3B—but the report was still in draft. 

To implement those measures immediately would be to circumvent the standard process of sending project proposals up through 

the Board of Engineers and Congress. As Colonel Devereaux later 

explained to an interviewer, the park, by declaring an emergency 

and getting members of Congress involved, “put an extraordinary 

amount of political heat on the Corps to implement these things as 

rapidly as we could.” It placed Devereaux in a tenuous position because he did not have legal authority to expend funds for the actions 

that the park and SFWMD wanted done.43

The Corps was relatively receptive to the first action: modifications to the western levee, or L-28, in Conservation Area No. 3A. 

It was the least controversial action because it did not affect agricultural interests in Dade County. The Corps modified this levee so 

as to divert waters entering 3A back into Big Cypress National Preserve, from which they flowed to the western side of Everglades National Park. To accomplish this it breached the L-28 tie-back levee, 

installed culverts connecting the inside and outside canals on either 

side of the L-28 levee, and put plugs in the lower collector canal.44

This work was completed in March 1984.

The second point in the plan, removal of the L-67 extension, 

was more problematic, as it required the removal of structures already built. The Corps finally agreed to take more modest measures. 

It would install two control culverts or “plugs” in the canal in order 

to add resistance to its flow, forcing some of the water to move to the 

west. It also discussed putting gaps in the last four miles of the levee. When Nathaniel Reed heard of this he wondered if the park was 

backing off its request to have the entire canal and levee removed. 

Morehead informed Maloy, “We go along with these gaps only because it is action of some sort.”45 However, the Corps did not actually 

place gaps into L-67 until another crisis arose a few years later over 

the status of the Cape Sable seaside sparrow.

When it came to redistributing the waters in Conservation Area 

No. 3A and 3B in order to restore more sheet flow into the park, the 

Corps and the SFWMD disagreed about what to do. All the water entering the park from Conservation Area No. 3A came through a set 

of four gates spaced along the Tamiami Canal called S-12A, S-12B, 

S-12C, and S-12D. Most of the water came through S-12D. In order to 

spread this inflow into the park the Corps closed S-12D, forcing more 

water through the other three gates. The SFWMD argued that this was 

a half-measure. It proposed to use S-333 and divert water from Conservation Area No. 3A into the Tamiami Canal, where it would flow 

east and then south through a series of 53 culverts under U.S. Highway 

41, thereby feeding into the Northeast Shark River Slough. The Corps 

maintained that this would be a misuse of S-333 as it would likely flood 

out residents in the East Everglades area. The disagreement became 

bitter as state water managers tried to assert their prerogative to operate the C&SF Project as they saw fit, while the Corps insisted that the 

interests of property owners in the East Everglades must come first.46

Maloy raised the dispute over S-333 with the Department of 

Environmental Regulation, threatening to make control of the 

C&SF Project into a states rights issue. Colonel Devereaux offered 

to meet with the governor.47 Finally, in January 1984, the Corps and 

the SFWMD reached a compromise; the Corps consented to new 
182 United States Army Corps of Engineers

operating criteria for S-333 and water began to flow through this 

gate into Northeast Shark River Slough. The operating criteria were 

to be incorporated into the field test of a new water delivery schedule 

for the park (the seventh item in the Seven Point Plan).

The last point in the Seven Point Plan had to be addressed by 

Congress. Congressman Dante Fascell (D-Florida) introduced a 

bill in the House authorizing the Secretary of the Army to modify 

the water delivery schedule for the park. The measure was incorporated into a supplemental appropriations act for 1984, enacted in 

November 1983. The law provided for a two-year field test to begin 

immediately and authorized the Secretary of the Army to acquire 

farmlands that would be subject to flooding and to construct flood 

protection works for homes in the area. It provided $10 million for 

land acquisition.48

The Corps regarded this law with a great deal of skepticism—it 

could not possibly do all these things in the two-year timeframe that 

the law required—but by January 1985 it had prepared a “General 

Plan for Implementation of an Improved Water Delivery System to 

the Everglades National Park.” The plan set out a strategy for how 

the Corps would comply with P.L. 98-181. It required an innovative, 

expedited process, for the law had already circumvented the usual 

steps in which the Corps reported to Congress with a reconnaissance study, followed in a few years by a feasibility study. Instead, the 

Corps would proceed straight to the preparation of a General Design 

Memorandum, and, concurrently with that effort, it would prepare 

an EIS and conduct a “limited field test.” The field test would “not 

significantly impact residential or agricultural interests.”49

The field test rested on a compromise agreement that the Corps 

had worked out with the park, the SFWMD, and area farmers during 

the preceding year. The farmers, in their lawsuit against the Corps, 

raised two demands. The first, as already noted, was to delay additional water releases into the Northeast Shark River Slough until the 

Corps had prepared an EIS. The second demand was that the Corps 

should continue its annual fall drawdowns of water levels in the Frog 

Pond to assist fall planting. The park believed that the fall drawdowns, 

which flushed water through the L-31W and C-111 canals into Barnes 

Sound, sucked water out of the park as well. On the recommendation 

of the SFWMD, and to head off litigation, the park agreed not to object to the fall drawdowns for one year if, in turn, the farmers agreed 

not to oppose water releases into Northeast Shark River Slough.50

Gate structure at S-333. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Eleven | Brewing Storm 183

By the time the field test was set to begin, it came under the purview of the Everglades National Park/East Everglades Committee, 

established by Governor Graham in February 1984. This committee 

was also called the 380 Committee because it was formed according to Chapter 380 of the Florida statutes for the purpose of recommending whether the East Everglades should be designated an Area 

of Critical State Concern. Governor Graham charged this committee with finding consensus among the many disparate agencies and 

competing interests that had locked horns over water management in 

the East Everglades. The committee included federal, state, regional, 

local, tribal, and non-government representatives. The Miccosukee 

Tribe was represented on the committee, as were environmentalists, 

Dade County businessmen, East Everglades residents, and farmers. 

Colonel Devereaux sat on the committee for the Corps, and Superintendent Morehead represented the NPS, while the Florida Game 

and Fresh Water Fish Commission participated on behalf of fish and 

wildlife interests.51

After more than a year of study, the committee submitted an 

“implementation plan” to the governor. The plan proposed a threepart strategy for improving water management in the area. The first 

part of the strategy was to establish an “iterative testing process.” 

(This corresponded with the “field test” authorized by Congress.) Incremental changes to existing structures and operating procedures 

would be introduced and analyzed to determine best water management practices. The process, of course, would involve collaboration 

by the Corps, the SFWMD, and the NPS. In the second part of the 

strategy, the committee formed the Southern Everglades Technical 

Committee, a subgroup of hydrologists and ecologists who would 

review the analysis on the iterative testing process and recommend 

changes. Recognizing that this group’s recommendations could be 

controversial, the third part of the strategy was to impose a conflict 

resolution process for solving, or even mediating, disputes as they 

arose.52

The committee’s implementation plan focused, appropriately 

enough, on fashioning a workable administrative process. But it 

also provided a consensus-based view of the myriad land and water management problems that beset the park and the East Everglades. Significantly, the 90-page report recognized the ecological 

importance of restoring sheet flow through Northeast Shark River 

Slough, as well as the adverse impacts of certain farming practices, 

including rock plowing, on water quality. The committee also recommended that the 8.5 square mile area be provided with flood 

protection adequate to protect the community from a one-year-inten flood.53

The considerable time and commitment that went into the 

Everglades National Park/East Everglades Committee sowed good 

will among the many parties, and it produced about three years of 

concerted effort at building consensus. The Corps and the SFWMD 

began making field tests of water flows into the East Everglades in 

early 1984 and continued making them through the following year 

and into the next under the committee’s watchful eye. Near the end 

of 1985 the Corps began making controlled releases of water south 

of the Tamiami Canal to simulate natural sheet flow in response to 

rainfall, while the SFWMD used the field tests to refine its hydrological computer model.54

Meanwhile, the NPS initiated studies of aquatic vegetation 

where the sheet flow was tentatively being restored for the purpose 

of measuring water quality. These studies showed alarming results. 

Water flowing into the park from Conservation Area No. 3 was so 

laden with nutrients from the agricultural areas that it was altering 

plant life in the park. Both the Corps and the SFWMD had a growing body of data on water quality based on water sample analysis. 

According to an interagency memorandum of agreement on water 

quality executed in February 1984 (pursuant to the fifth point in the 

Seven Point Plan) the Corps collected samples of surface water at 

specific locations and tested them for pesticide residues and trace 

metals, providing data to the SFWMD and the NPS on a monthly 

basis. The SFWMD had a similar responsibility.55 Experts all over 

South Florida recognized that agriculture was loading nutrients into 

an ecosystem that was naturally nutrient-deficient; the spread of 

cattails through the water conservation areas provided proof. What 

they did not yet know was the extent to which nutrient “dosing” (or 

the addition of nutrients to the area) was affecting the ecology of 

Everglades National Park.56

Amid this synchronous hum of activity by the three agencies, 

a turnover of leadership occurred: Colonel Charles Myers III relieved Devereaux of command over the Jacksonville District, John 

R. “Woody” Wodraska replaced Maloy as executive director of the 

SFWMD, and Michael Finley took the place of Morehead as superintendent of Everglades National Park. The new leadership, coupled 

with a perception on the part of environmentalists that changes in 

water management were occurring too incrementally, led to renewed 

disagreement over how to implement a new water management regime in the East Everglades.57

Superintendent Finley brought a new edge to the park’s demands. Finley was a rising young star in the NPS, and Everglades 

National Park was a difficult post. The director of the NPS, William 

Mott, met Finley at National Airport in Washington, D.C., for what 

Finley thought was an interview. Instead, Mott simply told Finley 

he wanted him to go down to Florida and do what he could for the 

Everglades. Finley arrived in June 1986, and it did not take him long 

to decide that the Everglades were in “great jeopardy,” that this was 

a “system approaching collapse.” He quickly came to appreciate that 

the causes and the politics were complex. The Seven Point Plan and 

the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1984 notwithstanding, 

Finley took the view that “the park was not at the table nor taken 

seriously by any of the water management agencies.” His job, he believed, “was to get the park taken seriously.”58
184 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Despite Finley’s efforts, the SFWMD altered its position on the 

East Everglades following a 1987 change in state governors from the 

Democrat Graham to the Republican Bob Martinez. Whereas Graham had appointed a number of champions of Everglades National 

Park to the Governing Board of the SFWMD, the new governor returned the membership of the board to a more pro-business, proagriculture orientation. Woody Wodraska, executive director of the 

SFWMD since 1985, responded to the new dynamic—as did farmers. Although the SFWMD continued to support new approaches to 

water management in the East Everglades, after 1986 it leaned more 

toward agricultural interests.

The breach between the SFWMD and the park occurred over 

the Frog Pond, which had begun to attract interest in the mid- to late 

1970s when drier conditions encouraged much more intensive use. 

Farmers began planting tomato crops in the area as soon as standing 

water receded in the fall. After a winter harvest and the coming of 

summer rains, the Frog Pond once more filled with water. With the 

return of wetter weather in 1982, the Corps and the SFWMD began 

operating the L-31W canal as a means to prevent these tomato crops 

from being flooded in the fall and winter. The park considered this 

use of the canal inappropriate, since it had been built as part of the 

South Dade Conveyance System for the purpose of getting water to 

Taylor Slough and the southeast corner of the park. In 1984, the park 

consented to this use of the L-31W canal for one year in return for 

the farmers’ permission to allow field tests in Shark River Slough. 

The SFWMD renewed this arrangement with the farmers for two 

years following. In May 1987, the Governing Board passed a resolution calling for a phase-out of the use of L-31W by 1990, and construction of an internal drainage system so that excess water in the 

Frog Pond during the winter growing season would drain east. The 

purpose was to ensure there would be “no net reduction in farmable 

acreage in the Frog Pond.”59

It seemed to Superintendent Finley that neither the SFWMD 

nor the Corps was following through on earlier commitments to restore natural flow to the Taylor Slough. Draining the water to the east 

would still leave Taylor Slough in short supply. Moreover, draining 

the Frog Pond to the east depended on lowering the water level in 

the C-111 canal, with consequences for the southeast corner of the 

park and Florida Bay. The water level in the C-111 basin was normally maintained by a gated culvert structure or “plug” (S-197) in 

the lower end of the C-111 canal, which the Corps had added to the 

project in the 1960s as a result of a lawsuit by the National Audubon 

Society. Occasionally the Corps removed this plug to provide flood 

relief for the C-111 basin. It had done so in 1981, 1982, and 1985. 

Overruling the park’s objections, the Corps removed the plug again 

in 1988. For eight days, freshwater discharged in massive quantities 

through the C-111 canal into Barnes Sound and Florida Bay, with 

deadly consequences for the saltwater marine life.60

For all of these reasons, Finley believed the NPS must take a 

separate road in order to get acceptable water management. “My 

view,” Finley recalled in an interview, “was that this was going to 

have to be forced either by public opinion and politics or by the 

courts. Individual agency action wasn’t going to do it—they either 

didn’t have the guts or the ability to do it.”61 One surprise, however, 

was Governor Martinez’s strong support for his predecessor’s “Save 

Our Everglades” program. When Martinez was elected governor in 

November 1986, the environmental community was dubious. The 

Everglades Coalition immediately invited the governor-elect to address the coalition’s second annual conference in January. Meanwhile, Governor and Senator-elect Bob Graham communicated with 

Martinez about the importance of sustained gubernatorial focus on 

the federal-state agenda for Everglades restoration. According to one 

administrative official, it was Graham’s intention to present the new 

governor “with early opportunities to work visibly and productively 

with the Congressional Delegation on Save Our Everglades issues.”62

Graham had built strong public support in Florida for Everglades 

Sawgrass, once abundant, became displaced in areas with high nutrient 

levels. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Eleven | Brewing Storm 185

restoration, and the outgoing governor suggested that Martinez 

would be wise to embrace this popular agenda. Should he do so, it 

would “help establish a positive climate for dealing with the Congressional Delegation on other issues of interest to the Governor.”63

Martinez took this bait. After taking office, he quickly positioned 

himself to lead a number of Save Our Everglades program initiatives, 

and he retained Graham’s Save Our Everglades program coordinator, 

Estus Whitfield, on his staff.

In 1987, Martinez took important steps for expanding Big 

Cypress National Preserve, improving the water quality of Lake 

Okeechobee, and accomplishing restoration of the Kissimmee River. 

If there was one thing that distinguished Martinez’s overall approach 

to saving the Everglades from that of Graham’s, it was the Republican governor’s emphasis on just compensation for private property 

takings. “The key to protecting and restoring the Everglades is land 

acquisition,” Martinez announced toward the end of 1987.64 At Martinez’s urging, the state legislature increased the Conservation and 

Recreational Lands fund by $200 million over the next nine years.

With regard to the East Everglades, Martinez announced on 

22 January 1988 a federal-state initiative to acquire approximately 

70,000 acres in public ownership. Two months later, the governor 

established the East Everglades Land Acquisition Task Force, with 

members drawn from federal, state, and local government, as well 

as the environmental community and private landowners. The task 

force’s job was to evaluate the feasibility of joint federal/state acquisition of the land, and to develop a plan for acquiring, managing, and 

protecting it. In particular, the task force was to report to the governor in six months as to whether the state of Florida ought to support federal legislation to expand Everglades National Park in this 

controversial area.65

The task force made its report to the governor on 1 October 

1988. It recommended three areas for inclusion in Everglades National Park: first, the Northeast Shark River Slough, containing 

70,740 acres; second, the state-owned East Everglades Wildlife and 

Environmental Conservation Area, containing 34,560 acres; and 

third, an area between the wildlife sanctuary and the L-31 canal, 

containing about 2,300 acres. Five other tracts, it stated, should not 

be included: the area between the L-31 canal and Krome Avenue 

(the outskirts of Homestead), the 8.5 square mile area, the developed agricultural area south of it, the Frog Pond, and an area south 

The Frog Pond agricultural area. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District)
186 United States Army Corps of Engineers

of the Frog Pond known as the Aerojet lands. However, most of the 

Aerojet lands were newly acquired by the SFWMD using Save Our 

Rivers program moneys and the task force suggested this area might 

be added to the park at a later time. It proposed that the lands be 

acquired using the federal land acquisition process. It suggested that 

hunting should be prohibited and airboat use should be phased out 

in the additions to the park. It also recommended that field tests of 

modified water delivery to the park, currently set to expire in January 1989, should be continued “until the land acquisition is accomplished and the permanent water delivery program proposed in the 

Corps of Engineers General Design Memorandum begins.”66

Soon after the committee made its recommendations, Congressman Dante Fascell introduced legislation expanding Everglades 

National Park in the House, while Senator Bob Graham and Senator 

Connie Mack III (R-Florida) co-sponsored similar bills in the Senate. Mack, a former member of the House, had been elected as Florida’s junior senator in November. The bipartisan showing by Florida’s 

two senators helped the bill’s prospects. Also important was the election of George H. Bush as president. In his political campaign, Bush 

had promised to be “the environmental president,” a pledge environmentalists regarded with skepticism. Yet it did seem that Bush 

was genuinely more interested in protecting ecological values than 

President Ronald Reagan. A few weeks prior to his inauguration, 

President-elect Bush went sport fishing in the Florida Keys, and, 

through a prior arrangement, Superintendent Finley boarded Bush’s 

boat for a 20-minute chat. At the end of the conversation, Bush indicated that he would support the park expansion bill provided that 

it was bipartisan.67

There was little outright opposition to the legislation. Fiscal 

conservatives were concerned about the cost of land acquisition—an 

estimated $32 million according to the NPS or $70 million according to the Corps. Sportsmen’s groups wanted the area added to the 

national wildlife refuge system rather than the park. Dade County 

farmers had reservations about the modified water delivery plan, but 

they generally wanted a horse trade: restoration of sheet flow to the 

park for greater flood protection in nearby agricultural areas. The 

SFWMD backed the legislation with the proviso that the bill should 

be amended to recognize the multi-purpose nature of the C&SF 

Project.68 These were the main outlines of the demands for making 

the legislation bipartisan and acceptable to all interests.

After extensive amendment of the bill in committee, Congress 

enacted it in November 1989. The purpose of the act was first, to 

increase protection and “to enhance and restore the ecological values, natural hydrologic conditions, and public enjoyment” by adding 

certain lands to the park; and second, to assure that the park was 

“managed in order to maintain the natural abundance, diversity, and 

ecological integrity of native plants and animals . . . as a part of their 

ecosystem.”69 The act provided specific steps for modifications to the 

C&SF Project, and directed the Corps to complete a General Design 

Memorandum entitled “Modified Water Deliveries to Everglades 

National Park.” The study was to include flood protection, if warranted, for the 8.5-Square-Mile Area and the adjacent agricultural 

region. With regard to the C-111 basin, the General Design Memorandum was to “take all measures which are feasible and consistent 

with the purposes of the project to protect natural values associated 

with Everglades National Park.”70

The law stated that construction of modifications to the C&SF 

Project were justified by environmental benefits and did not require 

further economic justification. Thus, the General Design Memorandum would not be subject to the Corps’ usual cost-benefits analysis. 

Funds for the so-called Modified Water Deliveries project would 

subsequently come out of Interior Department appropriations acts, 

since this was national park legislation.

The law defined project purposes generally, but it stopped short 

of declaring that the project was multi-purpose, as Wodraska had 

requested in his testimony. Nothing relating to the Modified Water 

Deliveries was to be “construed to limit the operation of project facilities to achieve their design objectives, as set forth in the Congressional authorization and any modifications thereof.” Significantly, 

1989 Additions to Everglades National Park. (National Park Service, Big 

Cypress National Preserve, Florida: General Management Plan, Final Environmental Impact Statement, Volume 1, 5)
Chapter Eleven | Brewing Storm 187

the language in the House version of the bill asserted the interests 

of the park. In the bill passed by the House on 7 November, this 

subsection read as follows: “Nothing in this Act shall be construed 

to limit operation of project facilities to achieve their original design 

objectives . . . provided, however, that the project shall be operated 

to maximize the restoration of natural hydrologic conditions within 

Everglades National Park . . . and any modifications thereto, must 

receive the written concurrence of the National Park Service.”71 The 

Senate amended the House bill, eliminating this proviso, and the 

House concurred in the Senate amendment. The result of the Senate 

amendment was to maintain the possibility that structures such as 

the C-111 canal could be built for environmental purposes and then 

operated for other uses.72

Enactment of the Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act of 1989 was a victory for the park and environmentalists. It provided a roadmap for the SFWMD, the Corps, and the NPS 

to work together in resolving land use and water management issues 

in the East Everglades where conflicts were longstanding. However, 

park officials and environmentalists worried that the legislation was 

too little too late. The law addressed the problems of quantity, timing, and distribution of water deliveries to the park, but by 1989 the 

focus of environmental concern was already shifting elsewhere: to 

the protection of water quality. The problem of excessive phosphorus 

entering the Everglades and altering the aquatic life was rooted not 

in the East Everglades but in the sugarcane fields farther north and 

the heavily urbanized coastal area to the northeast.

Yet the 1989 act was also a triumph for Florida politicians who 

believed that bipartisanship and increased federal support were the 

key ingredients to shaping a brighter future for South Florida. Embedded in the notion of increased federal support was the expectation of greater federal-state cooperation. But by the time the act was 

passed, the issue of water quality had reached the point of litigation, 

and the lawsuit that followed would become one of the most divisive 

events in the history of South Florida water management.

Endnotes

1 Kathleen Shea Abrams, et al., “The East Everglades Planning Study,” 

in Collaborative Planning for Wetlands and Wildlife: Issues and Examples, 

Douglas R. Porter and David A. Salvesan, eds. (Washington, D.C.: Island 

Press, 1995), 226.

2 Abrams et al., “The East Everglades Planning Study,” 226.

3 Hansen, “South Florida’s Water Dilemma,” 18; Light and Dineen, 

“Water Control in the Everglades,” 68.

4 Statement of Nathaniel Pryor Reed in House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Subcommittee on National Parks and Public Lands, 

Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act of 1989: Hearing 

before the House Subcommittee on National Parks and Public Lands of the 

Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 1989, 63; 

Robert Johnson interview by Theodore Catton, 16 July 2004, 5-6 [hereafter 

referred to as Johnson interview]; Abrams et al., “The East Everglades Planning Study,” 231-232; Dade County Planning Department, “Water Control 

Facilities in and Around the East Everglades Area,” 18 September 1981, File 

Dade County East Everglades 1958-83 Resolutions/Ordinances/General, 

Box 02172, SFWMDAR; Walter A. Gresh, Regional Director, to District Engineer, 9 May 1963, File CE-SE Central and Southern Florida FCP, South 

Dade County, FWSVBA; University of Florida School of Natural Resources 

and Environment, “Water Management Issues Affecting the C-111 Basin, 

Dade County, Florida: Hydrologic Sciences Task Force Initial Assessment 

Report,” 6 June 1997, available at <http://snre.ufl.edu/publications/c111.

htm> (27 April 2006).

5 Dade County Planning Department, “Water Control Facilities in and 

Around the East Everglades Area”; A. J. Salem, Acting Chief, Planning Division to Henry Iler, Senior Planner, Metro Dade Planning Department, 1 

September 1981, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF Southwest Dade County) Project 

General 1965 Authority, Box 10, Accession No. 077-96-0037, RG 77, FRC; 

Abrams et al., “The East Everglades Planning Study,” 235.

6 Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Waterston III, interview by George E. 

Buker, 12 April 1984, Jacksonville, Florida, 24, transcript in Library, Jacksonville District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, Florida; 

Abrams et al., “The East Everglades Planning Study,” 236-237.

7 Quotations in “Florida’s Battle of the Swamp,” Time 118 (24 August 

1981): 41; see also The Miami Herald, 25 December 1981.

8 East Everglades Task Force, untitled 27-page memorandum, no date, 

File East Everglades, Box 15746, SFWMDAR.

9 M. R. Stierheim, County Manager to Joan Hagan, Secretary, Florida 

Department of Veteran and Community Affairs, 9 November 1981, File East 

Everglades, Box 15746, SFWMDAR.

10 Johnson interview, 6; Abrams et al., “The East Everglades Planning 

Study,” 236.

11 Abrams et al., “The East Everglades Planning Study,” 229-230.

12 John M. Morehead, Superintendent, to Colonel Alfred B. Devereaux, 

District Engineer, 17 September 1982, File Everglades National Park 1958-

88 General/Resolutions/Agreements, Box 02161, SFWMDAR.

13 Morehead to Devereaux, 17 September 1982.

14 Morehead to Devereaux, 17 September 1982.

15 Morehead to Devereaux, 17 September 1982.

16 John M. Morehead, Superintendent, to Colonel James W. R. Adams, 

District Engineer, 7 July 1980, File 1110-2-1150a (C&SF) Conservation Areas June 1980—December 1982, Box 12, Accession 077-96-0038, RG 77, 

FRC.

17 Colonel James W. R. Adams, interview by George E. Buker, 18 November 1981, Jacksonville, Florida, 33, transcript in Library, Jacksonville 

District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, Florida.

18 Hansen, “South Florida’s Water Dilemma,” 41.

19 South Florida Water Management District, “Order No. 83-10,” File 

Everglades National Park Relief Plan—General/Agreement 1983-85, Box 

02161, SFWMDAR.

20 Steve Yates, “Marjory Stoneman Douglas and the Glades Crusade,” 

Audubon 85 (March 1983): 122.

21 Moreau, “Everglades Forever?” 73.

22 Verbatim Excerpt from Workshop Meeting—Everglades National 

Park 7-Point Plan, 10 March 1983, no file name, Box 15747, SFWMDAR.

23 Verbatim Excerpt from Workshop Meeting—Everglades National 

Park 7-Point Plan, 10 March 1983.
188 United States Army Corps of Engineers

24 Verbatim Excerpt from Workshop Meeting—Everglades National 

Park 7-Point Plan, 10 March 1983.

25 Nathaniel P. Reed to Marjory Stoneman Douglas et al., 14 March 

1983, Folder 29, Box 2, Marshall Papers.

26 Reed to Douglas et al., 14 March 1983 (emphasis in original).

27 South Florida Water Management District News Release, 29 March 

1983, File Everglades National Park Relief Plan—General/Agreement 1983-

1985, Box 02161, SFWMDAR.

28 “Minutes of an Emergency Meeting of the Governing Board of the 

South Florida Water Management District,” 5 April 1983, File Everglades 

National Park Relief Plan—General/Agreement 1983-1985, Box 02161, SFWMDAR.

29 “Minutes of an Emergency Meeting of the Governing Board of the 

South Florida Water Management District,” 5 April 1983.

30 “Minutes of an Emergency Meeting of the Governing Board of the 

South Florida Water Management District,” 5 April 1983.

31 William L. Earl to Colonel Alfred B. Devereaux, District Engineer, 5 

April 1983, File Everglades National Park Relief Plan—General/Agreement 

1983-1985, Box 02161, SFWMDAR.

32 “Lawmaker: Everglades Faces Crisis,” The Palm Beach Post, 1 May 

1983.

33 Devereaux interview, 44.

34 As reported in “Lawmaker: Everglades Faces Crisis,” The Palm Beach 

Post, 1 May 1983; see also Nathaniel P. Reed to Rick Davidge, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 2 May 1983, Folder 25, Box 

2, Marshall Papers.

35 Devereaux interview, 45.

36 Public Law 84-99, Emergency Flood Control Work. 

37 Reed to Davidge, 2 May 1983.

38 Abrams et al., “The East Everglades Planning Study,” 234-235; 

“WMD Director: Corps Blocking Everglades Plan,” The Palm Beach Post, 

14 October 1983.

39 John R. Maloy, Executive Director to Mayor and Board of County 

Commissioners, 16 June 1983, and Maloy to Dr. John M. DeGrove, Secretary, Department of Community Affairs, 22 June 1983, File Dade County 

East Everglades 1958-83 Resolutions/Ordinances/General, Box 02172, SFWMDAR.

40 Abrams et al., “The East Everglades Planning Study,” 238-239.

41 Quotation in Dade County Farm Bureau v. John O. Marsh, Jr., et al., 

Case No. 83-1210, Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 

and Other Emergency Relief, 3-4, copy provided by James Vearil, Senior 

Project Manager, RECOVER Branch, Programs and Project Management 

Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Jacksonville, 

Florida; see also “Cite East Everglades as Area of Concern, Agency Asks 

Graham,” Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, 11 June 1983.

42 “WMD Wants State to Run East Everglades,” The Palm Beach Post, 

11 June 1983; “Cite East Everglades as Area of Concern, Agency Asks Graham,” Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, 11 June 1983; “Farmers’ Suits May Delay Plan,” The Evening Times, 14 October 1983.

43 Devereaux interview, 40.

44 Devereaux interview, 40-41; “Plan of Action Approved by SFWMD 

Governing Board on April 5, 1983 Designed to Improve Water Deliveries to 

Everglades National Park,” File Dade County East Everglades 1958-83 Resolutions/Ordinances/General, Box 02172, SFWMDAR.

45 John M. Morehead, Superintendent to Jack R. Maloy, Director, July 

12, 1983, File East Everglades, Box 15746, SFWMDAR. See also Devereaux 

interview, 42-43.

46 Devereaux interview, 43-45; “Plan of Action Approved by SFWMD 

Governing Board on April 5, 1983 Designed to Improve Water Deliveries to 

Everglades National Park,” File Dade County East Everglades 1958-83 Resolutions/Ordinances/General, Box 02172, SFWMDAR; “WMD Director: 

Corps Blocking Everglades Plan,” The Palm Beach Post, 14 October 1983. 

Ironically, in later years, the Corps operated S-333 instead of the SFWMD 

because of district fears about flooding and possible legal action.

47 Victoria J. Tschinkel to Stanley W. Hole, 29 November 1983, File 

Everglades National Park Relief Plan—General/Agreement 1983-85, Box 

02161, SFWMDAR.

48 Act of 30 November 1983 (97 Stat. 1153).

49 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “General Plan for Implementation of 

an Improved Water Delivery System to Everglades National Park,” January 

1985, copy in South Florida Water Management District Reference Center, 

West Palm Beach, Florida.

50 Abrams et al., “The East Everglades Planning Study,” 238. The arrangement was continued in 1985 and 1986. See “Frog Pond Summary,” 26 

May 1987, File Everglades National Park NESRS Frog Pond, Box 15746, SFWMDAR.

51 Abrams et al., “The East Everglades Planning Study,” 240-241; Devereaux interview, 34.

52 Quotations in Everglades National Park/East Everglades Resource 

Planning and Management Committee, “Everglades National Park/East 

Everglades Resource Planning and Management Implementation Plan,” 

18 April 1985, File East Everglades, Box 15746, SFWMDAR, 7-14; see also 

Abrams et al., “The East Everglades Planning Study,” 245-247.

53 Everglades National Park/East Everglades Resource Planning and 

Management Committee, “Everglades National Park/East Everglades Resource Planning and Management Implementation Plan,” 25-27, 53-63.

54 SFWMD, “District Proposal will Help Restore Natural Water Flow 

to Park,” 11 December 1985, File Pro Everglades SOE, Box 21213; “Agreement,” 1 October 1987, File Everglades National Park NESRS Frog Pond, 

Box 15746, SFWMDAR. The field tests were reauthorized by Congress in 

December 1985 to continue through 1 January 1989.

55 Memorandum of Agreement among the Army Corps of Engineers, 

the South Florida Water Management District, and the National Park Service for the Purpose of Protecting the Quality of Water Entering Everglades 

National Park,” 8 February 1984, File Everglades National Park, Box 15754, 

SFWMDAR.

56 Finley interview, 1.

57 T. MacVicar, Deputy Director to J. R. Wodraska, Executive Director, 

25 November 1985, and Alice Wainwright, Coordinator, Southeast Florida 

Chapters, National Audubon Society to Colonel Charles Myers, District Engineer, 21 March 1986, File Everglades National Park Relief Plan—General 

Agreement 1983-85, Box 02161, SFWMDAR.

58 Michael Finley interview by Matthew Godfrey, 20 October 2004, 2 

[hereafter referred to as Finley interview].

59 “Frog Pond Summary,” 26 May 1987, and D.W. Edwards, GenCorp 

Realty Company to John Wodraska, South Florida Water Management District, 21 May 1987, File Everglades National Park NESRS Frog Pond, Box 

15746, SFWMDAR.

60 Finley interview, 2; Herndon interview, 30-31; Light and Dineen, 

“Water Control in the Everglades: A Historical Perspective,” 70; Abrams et 

al., “The East Everglades Planning Study,” 236.

61 Finley interview, 2-3.

62 Dave Johnson, Office of the Governor, to Mac Stipanovich, 25 November 1986, File Pro Everglades SOE, Box 21213, SFWMDAR.

63 Johnson to Stipanovich, 25 November 1986.
Chapter Eleven | Brewing Storm 189

64 “Governor Issues Everglades Statement,” 17 November 1987, File Pro 

Everglades SOE, Box 21213, SFWMDAR.

65 East Everglades Land Acquisition Task Force, “A Report to Governor 

Bob Martinez,” 1 October 1988, ii, File Everglades, Box 88-02, S1331, Executive Office of the Governor, Brian Ballard, Director of Operations, Subject 

Files 1988, FSA.

66 East Everglades Land Acquisition Task Force, “A Report to Governor 

Bob Martinez,” 1 October 1988, iii-vii.

67 Finley interview, 6.

68 Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources Subcommittee on Public Lands, National Parks and Forests, Everglades National Park 

Protection and Expansion Act of 1989: Hearing before the Subcommittee on 

Public Lands, National Parks and Forests of the Committee on Energy and 

Natural Resources, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 1989, 3-7, 79; House Subcommittee on National Parks and Public Lands, Everglades National Park Protection 

and Expansion Act of 1989, 59, 117.

69 Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act of 1989 (103 

Stat. 1946).

70 Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act of 1989 (103 

Stat. 1946, 1949).

71 Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act of 1989 (103 

Stat. 1946, 1949).

72 “Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act,” no date, 

File Everglades National Park, Box 15754, SFWMDAR.

191

Litigation was part of the political mix in South Florida water 

management as early as the nineteenth century. But when the United 

States brought suit against the SFWMD in 1988 it raised litigation to 

a new level, initiating one of the largest environmental lawsuits in 

American history. The suit pitted federal and state agencies against 

each other, pushed agricultural organizations to harden their position against environmental remediation, incited environmental organizations to vilify Big Sugar, and alienated the people who were 

nearest to the geographic center of it all, the Miccosukee Tribe. For 

all of the turmoil that it caused, however, the suit raised awareness 

and compelled action. It laid the foundation for the broad consensus 

approach that would triumph at the end of the century in Congress’s 

billion-dollar blessing of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration 

Plan. To people who worked on Everglades issues and were inured 

to litigation, the suit that began in 1988 would long be known as “the 

Big One,” or simply as “Dexter Lehtinen’s lawsuit.”1

Dexter Lehtinen, raised in Homestead, Florida, in the 1950s, 

knew the Everglades as a place of tranquility and boyhood innocence. During the Vietnam War, Lehtinen volunteered to serve in 

the U.S. Special Forces as a paratrooper and ranger. Gravely wounded while leading his platoon on reconnaissance during the invasion 

of Laos in 1971, he bore a deep scar on his left cheek afterwards—

a “trademark,” journalists would later write, of his fiery, combative 

public persona. Returned from the war, he went to Stanford Law 

School and graduated at the top of his class. In the 1980s, he entered Florida politics, serving one term in the House and one in the 

Senate. As a state senator, Lehtinen switched from the Democratic 

to the Republican Party after marrying a Republican colleague—

Ileana Ros—thereby attracting the attention of Republicans at the 

Chapter 12

national level. In 1988, he was appointed the U.S. Department of 

Justice’s top attorney in South Florida. The Reagan administration 

picked Lehtinen for the prominent position of U.S. attorney in Miami because they saw a man who would increase efforts in the drug 

war. Said former Associate Attorney General Frank Keating, he was 

“the brightest, toughest, meanest scrapper we could find.” Lehtinen 

immediately grabbed attention by trying to assume the lead role in 

prosecuting former Panamanian dictator and drug lord General 

Manuel Noriega. Lehtinen further made news by carrying a plastic 

AK-47 as a symbol of his aggressive attack on drugs and by publicizing his office’s new motto, “No Guts. No Glory.”2

 He received the 

nickname “Machine Gun.”3

Lehtinen was also passionate, if less demonstrative, about protecting the environment. Soon after taking office he arranged a meeting with Michael Finley, the superintendent of Everglades National 

Park, who, since his arrival in 1986, had become very concerned 

about the quality of water entering the park. The problem, as Finley 

discovered, was that EAA farmers—primarily sugar growers—used 

nitrate and phosphate fertilizers to stimulate their crops, and these 

nutrients became absorbed in the runoff that ultimately flowed into 

the water conservation areas and then into the park. Because of the 

influx of nutrients, the water conservation areas (especially Loxahatchee National Wildlife Preserve, which adjoined the EAA) and 

the canals transmitting the water were choked with cattails and algae that prevented sunshine from reaching underwater plants, creating stagnant, oxygen-depleted waterbodies. Although Everglades 

National Park had so far experienced few of these problems, Finley 

realized that it was only a matter of time. “It’s like a cancer,” he told 

Time magazine, “and the cancer is moving south.”4

The “Ultimate Hammer”: Dexter Lehtinen’s Lawsuit
192 United States Army Corps of Engineers

After meeting together in 1988, both Lehtinen and Finley saw 

an opening to combat this agricultural pollution of South Florida 

waters. The state, under its five water management districts (including the SFWMD), was chiefly responsible for regulating water quality. Since the water entering the conservation areas and the park was, 

in the opinion of Lehtinen, Finley, and other park officials, of poor 

quality, the state had obviously failed to fulfill its mission, opening itself to litigation for damages done to Loxahatchee National Wildlife 

Refuge and Everglades National Park.5

Lehtinen and Finley relied on the work of Ron Jones, a microbiologist at Florida International University, for their evidence. 

Jones, described by one journalist as “a nerdy young [man] who was 

a devout adherent of an Amish-style sect called Apostolic Christianity, and believed God had sent him to Florida to save the Everglades,” conducted studies that convinced him that any phosphorous 

amounts over 10 parts per billion would destroy the Everglades ecosystem by, among other things, transforming sawgrass swaths into 

areas choked with cattails—“the markers on the grave of the Everglades,” according to Jones.6

 Phosphorous also killed periphyton, 

a food source for fish and snails that are then consumed by birds, 

disrupting the food chain. Yet phosphorous-rich runoff continued 

to pour into the Everglades, making it oligotrophic and poisoning 

it to death. Only by reducing phosphorous amounts to 10 parts per 

billion, Jones argued, could any healing begin.7

When the SFWMD released a first draft of its SWIM plan for 

protecting the water quality of Lake Okeechobee, Lehtinen and 

Finley had a clear target for their lawsuit. Although there was no 

direct federal interest in Lake Okeechobee, the SWIM plan clearly 

had ramifications for waters draining into Loxahatchee National 

Wildlife Refuge and Everglades National Park, two federal areas. In 

Lehtinen’s and Finley’s view, the draft SWIM plan would not reduce 

phosphorus levels quickly or drastically enough to protect the federal areas from the contaminated sheet flow emanating from Lake 

Okeechobee. Therefore, the lawsuit would ask the U.S. district court 

in Miami to maintain its jurisdiction until the state agencies developed an adequate plan. In other words, the suit would force the state 

to take a tougher stand against polluters, particularly the sugar industry.8

Finley had been searching for solid ground for a lawsuit against 

the state for the previous two years, consulting with legal counsel 

in the Natural Resources Defense Council and the Sierra Club, and 

later assigning members of his staff to develop causes for action. 

But it was Lehtinen who finally crafted the complaint. Legal scholar 

William H. Rodgers, Jr., has written that the lawsuit, entitled United 

States v. South Florida Water Management District and Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, et al., was “brilliantly conceived” and “one of the most creative contributions in the history of 

modern environmental law.”9 The complaint contained five counts. 

The first and second counts held that the damage to natural vegetation in the Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge and Everglades 

National Park—which the state was allowing to happen by not enforcing water quality regulations—violated state law and the public 

trust doctrine because it was destroying federal property. The third 

count alleged a breach of contract: the National Park Service had 

contracted with the SFWMD to have water of a certain quality delivered to the park and the SFWMD had not complied. The fourth 

count maintained that the excessive water-born nutrients entering 

the park constituted a nuisance under common law and riparian 

water rights, while the fifth held that the state’s actions violated the 

National Park Service Organic Act, which provided that parks would 

be preserved in an unimpaired condition for future generations.10

The strength of the lawsuit was that it claimed that the state 

failed to enforce its own water quality standards, in particular the 

narrative standard for high quality waters as defined in the Florida 

Administrative Code. For so-called Class III waters, the code stated 

that “in no case shall nutrient concentrations of a body of water be 

altered so as to cause an imbalance in natural populations of aquatic 

flora or fauna.” Although experts disagreed on the precise causes for 

the changes in natural vegetation, water quality was clearly involved. 

Thus, in the eyes of many environmentalists, Lehtinen’s nuisance 

theory was practically irrefutable, and the litigation came to focus on 

nutrient loading as the keystone pollutant that altered natural conditions in both the refuge and the park.11

But to state lawyers and administrators, a bitter irony existed in 

the lawsuit: the C&SF Project—the pollution delivery system—was 

largely a federal project. As Keith Rizzardi, an attorney for the SFWMD, later wrote, “The federal government sued the State of Florida 

and the Water Management District for the consequences of operating the flood control project that the United States had helped to 

design and build.”12 The lawsuit simply sidestepped the federal interest in the C&SF Project, focusing instead on the federal interest in 

Periphyton. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Twelve | The “Ultimate Hammer” 193

conservation lands. Lehtinen’s client in this case was the Department 

of the Interior, not the Corps of Engineers.

In a similar vein, the agricultural interests declared that the state 

had developed its water quality standards under the aegis of a federal 

statute, the Clean Water Act, in cooperation with the federal enforcing agency, the Environmental Protection Agency. There was no legal 

precedent, they observed, for using the Clean Water Act to control 

non-point-source pollution. Since the Biscayne aquifer lay just beneath the ground surface in South Florida, non-point source pollution was ubiquitous in that region. Agricultural interests contended 

that the Clean Water Act did not create a federal right to sue the state 

over how it was managing non-point-source pollution, but Lehtinen’s 

litigation took the opposite view, one of the first lawsuits to do so.13

Lehtinen filed the lawsuit on 11 October 1988, one day after the 

SFWMD released its draft SWIM plan for Lake Okeechobee. The 

SFWMD acknowledged in the plan that phosphorus levels in the 

lake had increased by more than two and a half times since the early 

1970s, and it recommended that the phosphorus concentration be 

reduced by at least half. According to the lawsuit, this was not good 

enough. Phosphorus levels in Lake Okeechobee had reached approximately 120 parts per billion (ppb), and ran as high as 200 ppb in the 

runoff from the EAA. By contrast, ambient levels of phosphorus in 

park waters were about 10 ppb. The lawsuit therefore highlighted the 

need for an Everglades SWIM plan in order to reduce nutrient levels 

to an amount that would not harm park resources.14

Lehtinen had other reasons for filing the lawsuit when he did. According to Finley, he and the U.S. attorney waited for Governor Martinez to endorse the proposed Everglades National Park Protection and 

Expansion Act, anxious that the litigation should not derail that effort. 

Perhaps, too, Lehtinen waited because he doubted whether the Reagan administration would support such a headlong legal battle with 

the sugar industry in Florida. By October, Vice President George H. 

W. Bush was in the final heat of his presidential campaign, castigating 

the Democratic Party nominee, Massachusetts Governor Michael S. 

Dukakis, for his failure to clean up Boston Harbor. The U.S. Justice 

Department would hardly be able to back away from a lawsuit aimed 

at protecting the Everglades. Regardless, Lehtinen filed the lawsuit 

without consulting his superiors at “Main Justice” in Washington.15

Because Finley had been working closely with Governor Martinez on the matter of expanding the boundaries of Everglades National Park, the superintendent wanted to maintain a good relationship. Therefore, immediately after Lehtinen filed the suit, Finley 

telephoned Martinez so the governor would not have to discover the 

action in the newspapers. Finley tried to inform Martinez gently, using the bad-news, good-news formula. “What could possibly be the 

good news?” the governor responded when he was told that his state 

and the water management district were being sued by the United 

States. The good news, Finley replied, was that the suit did not name 

the governor personally.16

Martinez issued a statement on the lawsuit the following day. 

He listed various initiatives he had taken as governor for the protection of Florida’s environment. He was proud of what his administration had accomplished, he said, and it would do more in the future. 

“While I have not seen the federal lawsuit and cannot comment on it 

at this time,” he said, “I welcome the efforts of anyone who chooses 

to join in our efforts to protect one of the world’s unique environmental resources.”17

Despite Martinez’s spirit of turning the other cheek, the litigation was politically charged from the outset, and it grew more politicized as various interest groups lined up on either side. The governing board of the SFWMD immediately hired outside counsel to 

assess the implications of the lawsuit. Vice Chairman James Garner 

persuaded Governor Martinez that he should request the Department of Justice to drop the suit. They flew to Washington and met 

with Attorney General Richard Thornburgh. According to another 

board member, Nathaniel Reed, who strongly opposed this move, 

Thornburgh told the governor, “I do not force my U.S. attorneys to 

drop lawsuits.” If Martinez felt that the state was being unjustly sued, 

Thornburgh continued, he should prepare a good defense. Reed recollected that the lawsuit divided the SFWMD’s governing board, as 

members like Reed contended that the district needed to listen more 

assiduously to its own scientists and agree to more stringent pollution controls, while others urged the state to spend enormous sums 

on legal defense so as to defeat the lawsuit without taking any action.18 “There has to be a change,” Reed insisted, while board member 

Doran Jason retorted, “If [Lehtinen] wants to fight, let’s go ahead.”19

An employee of the SFWMD conducting sampling for water quality studies. (South Florida Water Management District)
194 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Meanwhile, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ reaction to the 

lawsuit was mixed. Colonel Terrence “Rock” Salt, who became District Engineer of the Jacksonville District in 1991, claimed that the 

lawsuit was useful for bringing about stronger environmental protections, but he also recognized the unprecedented strain it placed 

on the Corps’ historic partnership with the SFWMD. The action put 

the Corps between the SFWMD and the National Park Service, two 

agencies with which it had long enjoyed close, if sometimes contentious, relationships. The Corps staff was conflicted about the litigation, with some division managers approving it and others opposing 

it. Legal counsel in the Jacksonville District were cautiously supportive, supplying documents upon request by the Justice Department, 

preparing its experts for deposition, but never offering advice on litigation strategy.20

In the Justice Department, the lawsuit was not given high priority, and many attorneys were doubtful that Lehtinen could win the 

case. His legal arguments involving the Clean Water Act were unprecedented. Moreover, without strong backing from Washington, 

Lehtinen and his staff attorneys in Miami were soon outgunned. 

While the federal government assigned relatively few lawyers to the 

case, the state began to spend millions of dollars on legal fees. In the 

words of one publication, it “responded to the suit by hiring the most 

expensive lawyers it could find,” eventually expending approximately $6 million.21 In addition, the court granted the Florida Sugar Cane 

League and other agricultural interests intervention in the case in 

January 1991, allowing the sugar industry to supplement state efforts 

with its financial resources. The industry hired high-priced law firms 

in Miami, and these attorneys began to accumulate deposition after 

deposition of interminable testimony taken from experts on both 

sides. By the early 1990s, the lawsuit rivaled the litigation surrounding the Exxon Valdez oil spill as the most expensive environmental 

litigation ever seen.22

U.S. Senator Lawton Chiles (D-Florida) made the litigation expense a campaign issue when he ran for Florida’s governorship in 

1990. Chiles argued that the millions of dollars Governor Martinez 

was spending on legal fees would be better spent on working with 

the federal agencies to solve the problem. Chiles promised not only 

to settle the lawsuit, but he also declared that cleanup of the water 

flowing into the Everglades would be his top environmental priority. In the November election, Chiles defeated Martinez, but it is unclear how much of a deciding factor the Everglades lawsuit played in 

the outcome. Nevertheless, in fulfillment of his campaign promise, 

Chiles made settlement of the Everglades lawsuit his “Number 1 Environmental Priority,” assigning Carol Browner, secretary of the Department of Environmental Regulation, to oversee the negotiations.23

Encouraged by the change in administration, a number of environmental organizations began to urge a negotiated settlement, and 

commenced work in that direction.24 Also influential was Richard 

Stewart, assistant attorney general for the Bush administration, who 

had formerly worked as a lawyer specializing in environmental lawsuits against copper smelters. Stewart, described by one observer as 

“pompous, well organized, and conniving,” in contrast to Lehtinen, 

who was “down-to-earth, frantic, and candid,” organized federal 

agencies responsible for the South Florida ecosystem and got them 

to submit unified comments on the Everglades SWIM Plan developed by the SFWMD, decrying the destruction that had taken place 

to the environment.25 This united front helped convince Governor 

Chiles that continuing a defense in the lawsuit was fruitless. Accordingly, on 20 May 1991, in a bit of political theater that Everglades 

hands would recount for years afterwards, Governor Chiles walked 

into the federal courthouse in Miami and appealed directly to Judge 

William Hoeveler to end the litigation. “I am ready to stipulate today that water is dirty,” Governor Chiles declared. “I am here and I 

brought my sword. I want to find out who I can give that sword to 

and I want to be able to give that sword up and have our troops start 

the reparation, the clean up . . . . We want to surrender. We want to 

plead that the water is dirty. We want the water to be clean, and the 

Governor Lawton Chiles, who “surrendered his sword.” (The Florida 

Memory Project, State Library and Archives of Florida)
Chapter Twelve | The “Ultimate Hammer” 195

question is how can we get it the quickest.”26 A few weeks later, the 

Florida Department of Environmental Regulation filed papers with 

the court agreeing that water going into the conservation areas and 

into Everglades National Park contained excessive amounts of nutrients. Department Secretary Carol Browner explained why both 

Chiles and the state took these actions. “The real challenge for everyone concerned,” she noted, “is to stop pointing fingers to prove who 

is at fault and get on with the cleanup.”27

Although environmentalists lauded Chiles and the state, some 

in the sugar industry were not pleased, especially since they believed 

that the state had a sound defense against Lehtinen’s allegations. 

Chiles did not “want to have an albatross of a lawsuit, so he waltzed 

into federal court [and] surrendered his sword,” Barbara Miedema, 

vice-president of communications for the Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida, stated in her characterization of the situation. 

This action, according to George Wedgworth, founder and president 

of the Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative, “forfeited our interests.”28

The sugar industry’s preferences notwithstanding, Chiles’ action set in motion a more intense period of negotiations, and in July 

1991, the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, the 

SFWMD, and the U.S. Department of Justice reached a settlement. 

In the resulting 30-page “Settlement Agreement,” a landmark document, the parties defined the problem, articulated a set of remedial 

solutions, and specified dates in the future by which certain goals 

had to be met. It began with a set of definitions, including item “F,” 

which defined “imbalance in natural populations of flora and fauna” 

as “situations when nutrient additions result in nuisance species.” 

Such circumstances included

replacement of native periphyton algal species by more 

pollution-tolerant algal species, loss of the native periphyton community or, in advanced stages of nutrient pollution, 

native sawgrass and wet prairie communities giving way to 

dense cattail stands or other nutrient-altered ecosystems, 

which impair or destroy the ability of the ecosystem to 

serve as habitat and forage for higher trophic levels characteristic of the Everglades.29

With “imbalance” of natural systems defined, the document 

proceeded to describe the problem, drawing a link between the 

phosphorus-loaded water flowing out of the EAA and the nutrientlean (oligotrophic) natural condition of the Everglades ecosystem. 

The following statement carried unusual weight because it was prefaced by “the Parties agree” and it concluded with the freighted term 

“imbalances”:

Excess phosphorus accumulates in the peat underlying 

the water, alters the activity of microorganisms in the water, and disturbs the natural species composition of the algal mat (periphyton) and other plant communities in the 

marsh. These disturbed communities deplete the marsh 

of oxygen, and, ultimately, result in native sawgrass and 

wet prairie communities being replaced by dense cattail 

stands or other nutrient-tolerant ecosystems. The ability of 

the ecosystem to serve as habitat and forage for the native 

wildlife is thereby greatly diminished or destroyed. These 

changes constitute imbalances in the natural populations of 

aquatic flora and fauna or indicators of such imbalances.30

Following the sections on definitions and background, the 

document contained 20 more numbered paragraphs, of which three 

were especially important. In Paragraph 7, the parties agreed that 

phosphorus concentrations in waters entering Everglades National 

Park would be reduced to amounts that would prevent an imbalance 

of flora and fauna. In general, the objective was to obtain prescribed 

concentration limits for Shark River Slough and Taylor Slough in 

two stages, with “interim concentration limits” met by 1 July 1997 

and “long-term concentration limits” by 1 July 2002. Target levels 

were tied to “baseline” amounts measured in 1978 and 1979. These 

levels, expressed in parts per billion (ppb), were set forth in Appendix A of the Settlement Agreement. The amounts varied to take into 

account wet and dry cycles, but reflected an overall target of about 

10 ppb. Paragraph 8 of the Settlement Agreement established similar goals for water discharged from the EAA into the Loxahatchee 

National Wildlife Refuge. Target levels for this area were set forth in 

Appendix B.31

Paragraph 10 committed the SFWMD to develop stormwater 

treatment areas (STAs). The agreement identified STAs as “the primary strategy to remove nutrients from agricultural runoff.” Construction and operation of these giant water filtration plants would 

constitute the primary remedial action, and, as such, they would 

become the focus of much further debate over the next decade. The 

district was to purchase land for the STAs, design the structures, and 

build them (the agreement was later amended to commit the Corps 

to this task as well). Initially, the SFWMD was to construct four 

STAs, and if these did not sufficiently reduce phosphorus concentrations coming from the EAA, the district would acquire more acreage 

and build additional facilities. The location and size of the four STAs 

and the basins that each STA would serve were stipulated in a table, 

with further specifications detailed in Appendix C. In addition to the 

STAs, the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation agreed 

to regulate agricultural discharges by a regulatory permit system. 

The STAs and the permits together were expected to reduce phosphorus loading by 80 percent.32

But the Settlement Agreement was not the only result of Lehtinen’s lawsuit. In May 1991, the Florida legislature had also passed 

unanimously the Marjory Stoneman Douglas Everglades Protection 

Act, which specifically dealt with water quality in the conservation 
196 United States Army Corps of Engineers

areas and Everglades National Park. The law declared that it was the 

state’s imperative to preserve and restore the Everglades Protection 

Area, which it defined as the Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge, 

the other water conservation areas, and the park, and it required 

the SFWMD to develop specific programs to protect and restore 

the Everglades. In addition, the act mandated tougher objectives for 

incorporation into the draft Everglades SWIM plan, including the 

development of STAs and the implementation of a permit system for 

discharges into waters managed by the district.33

In February 1992, Judge Hoeveler approved the Settlement 

Agreement, entering it as a consent decree. The judge noted that 

its “ambitious plan” essentially implemented what the state had set 

forth in the Marjory Stoneman Douglas Everglades Protection Act. 

Indeed, the only real differences were that the agreement delineated 

additional specificity for schedules and it imposed an administrative process rather than a result.34 This administrative process was 

based on interagency cooperation and consensus, achieved through 

a Technical Oversight Committee. This committee consisted of five 

members representing Everglades National Park, the Loxahatchee 

National Wildlife Refuge, the Florida Department of Environmental 

Regulation, the SFWMD, and the Corps. It had the responsibilities 

of planning, reviewing, and recommending all research pursuant to 

the Settlement Agreement, and it was supposed to operate under a 

consensus approach, defined as a four out of five majority. In the absence of a consensus decision, parties could seek arbitration.35

Although the entering of the Settlement Agreement as a consent 

decree supposedly ended the litigation, it continued, in large part because some entities were not happy with the arrangement. The Florida Cane Sugar League and other agricultural interests, for example, 

appealed the court order approving the settlement. Likewise, in the 

spring of 1992, following the SFWMD’s Governing Board’s approval of the final Everglades SWIM Plan (which, to no one’s surprise, 

mirrored the requirements in the Everglades Protection Act and 

the Settlement Agreement), more than 30 agricultural cooperatives 

and corporations brought suit against the SFWMD. Several of these 

entities, mostly representing the sugar industry, petitioned for administrative proceedings to determine the legality of the Everglades 

SWIM Plan. The petitioners argued that the SFWMD, in refusing to 

disclose technical information that had been used in the settlement 

process and in developing the Everglades SWIM Plan, had violated 

the Florida Administrative Procedures Act. The petitions went to the 

Division of Administrative Hearings, which consolidated them into 

three cases. The Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, 

the United States, the Miccosukee Tribe, and certain environmental 

organizations moved to intervene in the litigation, and the Florida 

Division of Administrative Hearings granted all these motions for 

intervention.36 As Carol Browner, secretary of the Department of 

Environmental Regulation derisively explained, “We get sued every 

day by sugar. I call it ‘suit du jour.’“37

Referring to these challenges, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Myles Flint later explained to Congress that “relaxed rules of 

evidence and procedure and a plenary grant of jurisdiction governed 

these proceedings,” so that despite efforts by the state and federal 

agencies to stand by the Settlement Agreement and Consent Decree, 

Stormwater Treatment Areas and Water Conservation Areas. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Twelve | The “Ultimate Hammer” 197

“the administrative challenges became protracted and complicated, 

with voluminous discovery.” Not only did this renewed litigation 

cause further delays and expense, it threatened to undermine the 

consensus approach fashioned in the Settlement Agreement and 

Consent Decree as agricultural interests took one side while the Miccosukee Tribe and environmental organizations closed ranks on the 

other.38

Indeed, even though the Miccosukee had not participated in the 

water quality suit, the tribe, whose reservation lands were affected by 

quality issues, still had an interest in the proceedings. Lehtinen and 

his staff had carefully framed the lawsuit so that it neither embraced 

nor prejudiced tribal interests, but once a settlement was reached the 

tribe did not want to be left out of the remediation effort. It therefore 

filed a motion to intervene in the case and attain status as a party to 

the Settlement Agreement. U.S. attorneys, however, were concerned 

that the tribe’s move might jeopardize the agreement. Following 

negotiations, the tribe withdrew its motion to intervene in return 

for a Memorandum of Agreement with three Interior Department 

agencies: the NPS, the FWS, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. This 

memorandum, dated 1 November 1991, pledged that the Interior 

Department would provide the tribe with results and data of all 

studies relating to water quality in the Everglades, allow the tribe 

to attend Technical Oversight Committee meetings as an interested 

non-member, and consult with the tribe on the Department’s position prior to such meetings. For its part, the tribe agreed to give the 

Department notice before taking any further actions in court with 

regard to the Settlement Agreement.39

Meanwhile, even though agricultural interests continued fighting the Settlement Agreement and Consent Decree in court, Lehtinen’s role in the lawsuit had just about run its course. His superiors in 

Washington had lost patience with his renegade spirit, while many 

of his staff attorneys in Miami had had enough of his autocratic 

management style. More importantly, the Justice Department now 

wanted to preserve the fragile consensus that the Settlement Agreement produced, even though it was seemingly teetering on a precipice. Toward the end of 1992, Lehtinen quit his office as U.S. attorney 

in Miami, leaving behind a staff that was deeply divided and isolated 

from the rest of the Justice Department.40

Lehtinen was far from through with Everglades litigation, however. Less than a year after resigning from the Justice Department, 

he went to work for the Miccosukee Tribe. As the tribe’s attorney, 

Lehtinen would file suit against the United States in 1995, initiating another phase in the Everglades litigation. For Lehtinen’s detractors, the volatile attorney’s new championship of the Miccosukee 

Tribe appeared self-serving, perhaps even vengeful. “You have to be 

careful, because Dexter is like gasoline,” complained one federal official.41 But by then, Lehtinen was no longer calling the shots. The 

Miccosukee Tribe was making its own decisions and Lehtinen was 

merely its agent. He would continue to make himself heard on Everglades issues, but henceforth he would be at the edge of the process 

rather than at the center of it, accusing the federal government of 

selling out the Everglades and his client, the Miccosukee Tribe, to 

the wealthy corporations that had an economic stake in polluting the 

waters of South Florida.42

In a similar way, Lehtinen’s lawsuit continued. Although the 

Everglades Forever Act of 1994, discussed in Chapter 14, brought 

some resolve to the litigation—in that it appeased the sugar industry, which called it a “far better, more comprehensive solution than 

the settlement agreement”—later amendments to that act would be 

the subject of additional appeals and contentions. In the initial years 

of the twenty-first century, U.S. v. South Florida Water Management 

District remained active, although under the jurisdiction of Judge 

Federico A. Moreno.43 To Michael Finley, this was a good thing. “The 

court still has jurisdiction,” he stated in a 2004 interview, “which is 

the ultimate hammer over the state and the South Florida Water 

Management District.”44

Cattails, “the markers on the grave of the Everglades.” (South Florida 

Water Management District)
198 United States Army Corps of Engineers

The lawsuit that Dexter Lehtinen instigated in 1988, then, was 

not a happy affair. It sharpened differences among all stakeholders 

in South Florida’s water resources and drove wedges between federal and state agencies that had long labored to work cooperatively 

and share information with one another. As Estus Whitfield, environmental adviser to both Governor Martinez and Governor Chiles 

maintained, “the lawsuit set back the restoration efforts substantially” by “pitt[ing] everybody against everybody else.” “That is not the 

formula for getting something done,” Whitfield contended. “That is 

the formula for fussing and fighting and going nowhere.”45

Yet in other ways, the lawsuit was a necessary instrument of 

change. The cost of litigation—both in monetary terms and in the 

toll it took on people’s lives—drove many diverse interests to seek 

consensus as an alternative to fighting and gridlock. At the same 

time, it jarred Florida into taking action to restore water quality to 

the Everglades. “Without litigation,” Nathaniel Reed contended, the 

SFWMD “never would have been able to persuade the taxpayers and 

the sugar industry that steps had to be taken to control the pollution of the Everglades marsh.”46 Indeed, the litigation brought about 

four specific actions that established a foundation for environmental 

mitigation efforts in the 1990s: the Marjory Stoneman Douglas Everglades Protection Act, the Everglades SWIM Plan, the Settlement 

Agreement, and the Consent Decree. Viewed in retrospect, the lawsuit was a major turning point in the long, complicated, and arduous 

transformation of the C&SF Project from a system designed primarily for flood control and irrigation to one bent toward ecosystem restoration and the preservation of a sustainable environment.

Endnotes

1 William H. Rodgers, Jr., “The Miccosukee Indians and Environmental Law: A Confederacy of Hope,” Environmental Law Reporter 31 (August 

2001): 10918; John D. Brady interview by Theodore Catton, 12 May 2005, 1 

[hereafter referred to as Brady interview].

2 All quotations in Rebecca Wakefield, “Lehtinen for Mayor,” Miami 

New Times, 22 May 2003; see also James Carney, “Last Gasp for the Everglades,” Time 134 (25 September 1989): 27.

3 Rodgers, “The Miccosukee Indians and the Environmental Law,” 

10918.

4 As quoted in Carney, “Last Gasp for the Everglades,” 27.

5 Finley interview, 2.

6 Both quotations in Grunwald, The Swamp, 284-285.

7 Michael Grunwald, “Water Quality is Long-Standing Issue for Tribe,” 

The Washington Post, 24 June 2002.

8 Keith Rizzardi, “Translating Science into Law: Phosphorus Standards 

in the Everglades,” Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law 17 (Fall 

2001): 151; “Everglades Water Threatened,” Engineering News-Record 221 

(27 October 1988): 16.

9 Rodgers, “The Miccosukee Indians and the Environmental Law,” 

10918.

10 Finley interview, 4; U.S. Civil Complaint, “Everglades Litigation 

and Restoration” <http://exchange.law.miami.edu/everglades> (29 August 

2005).

11 Rodgers, “The Miccosukee Indians and the Environmental Law,” 

10918. Florida Administrative Code quoted in “Settlement Agreement,” 

United States v. South Florida Water Management District, Case No. 

88-1886-CIV-Hoeveler, 4 January 1995, 3.

12 Rizzardi, “Translating Science into Law,” 150-151.

13 Brady interview, 2.

14 South Florida Water Management District, “Draft Interim Surface 

Water Improvement and Management (SWIM) Plan for Lake Okeechobee,” 

10 October 1988, 19, File Okeechobee S.W.I.M. Plan (SFWMD)—1988, Box 

1, S1497, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Surface Water 

Improvement and Management Plan Files, FSA, 19; Rizzardi, “Translating 

Science into Law,” 151; “Everglades Water Threatened,” 16.

15 Grunwald, “Water Quality is Long-Standing Issue for Tribe.”

16 Finley interview, 4.

17 “For Your Information,” 12 October 1988, File Everglades, Box 88-02, 

S1331, Executive Office of the Governor, Brian Ballard, Director of Operations, Subject Files 1988, FSA.

18 Nathaniel Reed interview by Julian Pleasants, 18 December 2000, 22, 

Everglades Interview No. 2, Samuel Proctor Oral History Program, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida [hereafter referred to as Reed interview].

19 As quoted in Carney, “Last Gasp for the Everglades,” 27.

20 Brady interview, 2.

21 Norman Boucher, “Smart as Gods: Can We Put the Everglades Back 

Together Again?” Wilderness 55 (Winter 1991): 18.

22 Brady interview, 2; Michael Satchell, “Can the Everglades Still Be 

Saved?” U.S. News & World Report 108 (2 April 1990): 24; Wedgworth and 

Miedema interview, 5.

23 Jim Lewis, “Key Environmental Accomplishments of the ChilesMcKay Administration,” 12 December 1991, File Environmental Issues, Box 

5, S1824, Executive Office of the Governor Subject Files, 1991-1996, FSA.

24 “Everglades Lawsuit and Cleanup,” undated memorandum, File Environmental Issues, Box 5, S1824, Executive Office of the Governor, Subject 

Files, 1991-1996, FSA. The environmental organizations were the Wilderness Society, Florida Audubon Society, and Environmental Defense Fund.

25 Rodgers, “The Miccosukee Indians and Environmental Law,” 10923.

26 As quoted in John J. Fumero and Keith W. Rizzardi, “The Everglades 

Ecosystem: From Engineering to Litigation to Consensus-Based Restoration,” St. Thomas Law Review 13 (Spring 2001): 674; see also Grunwald, The 

Swamp, 290-291.

27 “DER Stipulates to Majority of Disputed Facts in Everglades Lawsuit,” Florida Department of Environmental Regulation Press Release, 10 

June 1991, File Environmental Regulation, Box 5, S1824, Executive Office of 

the Governor Subject Files, 1991-1996, FSA.

28 Wedgworth and Miedema interview, 5.

29 United States of America, et al., v. South Florida Water Management 

District, Settlement Agreement, 26 July 1991, “Everglades Litigation and 

Restoration” <http://exchange.law.miami.edu/everglades> (25 August 2005) 

[hereafter referred to as Settlement Agreement].

30 Settlement Agreement.

31 Settlement Agreement.

32 Settlement Agreement.

33 South Florida Water Management District, “Draft Surface Water Improvement and Management Plan for the Everglades: Planning Document,” 

24 September 1991, File Everglades SWIM Plan 1990-1991, Box 1, S1497, 
Chapter Twelve | The “Ultimate Hammer” 199

Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services, Surface Water Improvement and Management Plan Files, FSA.

34 United States of America, et al., v. South Florida Water Management 

District, Consent Decree, 24 February 1992, File 1110-2-1150a Settlement 

Agreement, Case #88-1886-CIV-HOEVELER, Box 3977, JDAR.

35 Settlement Agreement.

36 SWIM Challenges, “Everglades Litigation and Restoration” <http://

exchange.law.miami.edu/everglades> (29 August 2005). The following organizations petitioned: Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida; Roth 

Farms, Inc.; and Wedgworth Farms, Inc. (DOAH Case No. 92-3038); Florida 

Sugar Cane League, Inc,; United States Sugar Cane Corporation; and New 

Hope South, Inc. (DOAH Case No. 92-3039); Florida Fruit and Vegetable 

Association; Lewis Pope Farms; W. E. Schlecter & Sons, Inc.; and Hundley 

Farms, Inc. (DOAH Case No. 92-3040).

37 As quoted in Boucher, “Smart as Gods,” 18. 

38 House Committee on Natural Resources, Subcommittee on National 

Parks, Forests and Public Lands, Oversight Hearing on the Land Use Policies 

of South Florida with a Focus on Public Lands and what Impact these Policies 

are Having, 103rd Cong., 2d sess., 1994, 66-67.

39 “Memorandum of Agreement among the National Park Service, the 

Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, of the United 

States Department of the Interior, and the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of 

Florida,” 1 November 1991, File Everglades Mediation Miccosukee, Box 

19706, SFWMDAR.

40 Rebecca Wakefield, “Lehtinen for Mayor,” Miami New Times, 22 May 

2003.

41 Stan Yarbro, “Dexter Lehtinen Makes His Stand with the Miccosukees,” The Daily Business Review, 3 March 1995.

42 Dexter Lehtinen, “The Everglades Need Clean Water, Not Broken 

Promises,” The Miami Herald, 12 November 1993.

43 Wedgworth and Miedema interview, 5-6.

44 Finley interview, 5.

45 Whitfield interview, 25.

46 Reed interview, 22.

201

Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, Florida politicians lobbied Congress and the president of the United States for federal help 

in Everglades restoration. Governor Bob Graham appealed to President Ronald Reagan for federal assistance in support of the state’s 

Save Our Everglades program. Congressman Dante Fascell pushed 

enactment of the law initiating experimental water deliveries to Everglades National Park—a federal incursion into state water rights 

that he and other Florida lawmakers regarded as a practical necessity. Graham, both as governor and as a U.S. senator, fought for a 

congressional directive for the Corps to restore the Kissimmee River. 

All of these initiatives required federal appropriations. The threshold 

question for these politicians was always whether or not there was a 

national interest. But the problems of ecological decline stemmed 

fundamentally from Florida’s burgeoning population growth, critics contended, and it was the responsibility of the state to manage 

growth. Therefore, why should the federal government invest in Everglades restoration if the state ultimately controlled the outcome?

With that counterargument in view, Florida’s entire congressional delegation vigorously pursued more federal protections for 

South Florida wild lands: establishment of Biscayne National Park 

in 1980, additions to Big Cypress National Preserve in 1988 and Everglades National Park in 1989, creation of Florida Keys National 

Marine Sanctuary in 1990, and designation of Dry Tortugas National 

Park in 1992. By the early 1990s, the federal interest in South Florida 

was manifestly huge, and Florida politicians pointed to the federal 

lands whenever they angled for more federal involvement in South 

Florida’s water management. “We are right now on the edge of a severe water crisis,” Congressman Clay Shaw, Jr., a Republican from 

Miami, declared to his fellow members of the House. “The Federal 

Chapter 13

Government, as the largest landowner . . . has the responsibility . . . 

of seeing to it that its investment is preserved and the water flow is 

preserved.”1

As the complexity, scale, and cost of ecosystem restoration in 

South Florida grew, the threshold question for federal involvement 

subtly changed. The national politics of saving the Everglades turned 

a corner. Instead of “is this a federal interest?” the question became 

“is this a national priority?” The problem was not if the government 

should develop and implement a comprehensive plan for saving the 

Everglades from ecological collapse, but how. And the politicians 

speaking out for Everglades restoration were no longer just Florida 

politicians. Increasingly, political leaders from across the nation saw 

Everglades restoration as a test case for efforts to restore and protect 

other ecosystems at risk throughout the United States. They adopted 

the dire rhetoric that Graham, other Florida politicians, and environmentalists had used for more than a decade: Everglades National 

Park, one of the crown jewels in the national park system, was dying. 

As Representative George Miller, a Democrat from California, ominously observed at a field hearing in the Florida Keys in July 1993, 

“We are not prepared to de-designate, if you will, the Everglades, Yellowstone, or Yosemite” as areas needing federal protection.2

This new political framework began to take shape following 

the election of William J. Clinton to the United States presidency 

in November 1992. Despite Clinton’s mixed record on the environment as governor of Arkansas, many environmentalists saw him as 

the “great green hope.”3 During the presidential campaign, Clinton 

made numerous pledges of increased federal support for environmental programs, such as enactment of a new Clean Water Act that 

would regulate nonpoint sources of pollution and real commitment 

A Broader Perspective: Ecosystem Restoration Becomes 

National Policy
202 United States Army Corps of Engineers

to “no net loss” of wetlands (two matters of importance to South 

Florida). Clinton also rejected the Bush administration’s position 

that environmental protection was adverse to economic growth. 

Rather, Clinton maintained, environmental cleanup efforts would 

create jobs and lead to a stronger economy based on sustainable development.4

 Florida lawmakers who wanted the federal government 

to get more involved in cleaning up the Everglades were encouraged 

by this rhetoric.

Clinton boosted his environmental credentials by selecting Albert Gore, Jr., as his vice-presidential running mate. Gore, a senator from Tennessee, was recognized as one of the leading thinkers 

on environmental policy in Congress; his book Earth in the Balance

came out during the election year. In that work, Gore argued that 

environmental problems were the most urgent global challenge of 

the post-Cold War era, that the United States had a responsibility to 

lead the world community on environmental issues, and that President George H. W. Bush had failed to provide that leadership.5

 When 

Clinton was elected president, members of Congress who supported 

environmental issues expected presidential leadership in areas where 

it had been lacking over the past 12 years.

Floridians who desired a larger federal role in saving the Everglades had reason to be pleased, too, as President Clinton formed his 

administration. His nominee for attorney general was Janet Reno, 

a Florida native, who soon began overseeing the job of preparing a 

new settlement in Dexter Lehtinen’s lawsuit. His choice for EPA administrator was Carol Browner, another Floridian, who had served 

under Governor Bob Martinez and Governor Lawton Chiles as chief 

of the state’s Department of Environmental Protection.6 Clinton’s selection for secretary of the interior, Bruce Babbitt, a former governor 

of Arizona, was not as familiar to Floridians. Babbitt, however, was 

eager to dispel any concerns that he would focus inordinate attention 

on the West, and he quickly dove into the Everglades issues, making 

Everglades restoration his leading cause in the eastern United States.7

As the Jacksonville District of the Corps, the SFWMD, and other 

agencies in South Florida took measure of the new administration, 

they noted events occurring in the opposite corner of the country. 

Clinton and Gore, delivering on a campaign promise, convened a 

“forest summit” to break the deadlock over old-growth logging and 

protection of the northern spotted owl on national forests in Oregon 

and Washington state. The president and vice-president met with 

environmentalists and the timber industry in Portland, Oregon, in 

April 1993, and announced a forest plan the following July. Emblematic of Clinton’s compromise approach to controversial issues, the 

plan allowed for a resumption of logging at set harvest levels for 10 

years, designation of certain areas for habitat conservation, and federal assistance for retraining displaced timber industry workers in 

other jobs. While the forest plan was fundamentally a political compromise, it charted a course for the future by employing a rigorous 

and revolutionary new method called “ecosystem management.”8

The Clinton administration’s early commitment to ecosystem management in such a highly charged atmosphere as that surrounding 

the northern spotted owl sent a powerful signal all the way from the 

Pacific Northwest to South Florida.

South Florida’s resource managers had long practiced elements 

of ecosystem management before the term became fashionable in the 

late 1980s and early 1990s. Members of the Corps of Engineers applied principles of ecosystem management when they worked with 

Everglades National Park staff in restoring sheet flow to Shark River 

Slough for the purpose of protecting the park’s flora and fauna. So, 

too, did NPS specialists who developed a fire management plan for 

Everglades National Park, scientists in the SFWMD who collected 

and analyzed water samples from Lake Okeechobee, and members of 

the Miccosukee Tribe who hunted, fished, and trapped in their usual 

and accustomed places within the Big Cypress National Preserve. 

President Bill Clinton at a joint session of Florida’s legislature. (The 

Florida Memory Project, State Library and Archives of Florida)

Vice President Albert Gore, Jr. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library 

and Archives of Florida)
Chapter Thirteen | A Broader Perspective 203

What was new in the 1990s was that resource management agencies 

began to adopt ecosystem management as an organizing principle 

for many of their disparate activities. With the advent of the Clinton 

administration in 1993, ecosystem management was elevated to national policy.

Amid a deluge of scientific papers examining ecosystem management as a concept, an essay by ecologist R. Edward Grumbine, 

published in the journal Conservation Biology in 1994, offered the 

most round and succinct appraisal of what it entailed.9 Grumbine 

recognized ten dominant themes of ecosystem management, beginning with a “hierarchical context,” or “systems perspective,” for addressing environmental problems. A systems perspective meant that 

managers working on a problem at any one level or scale in the biosphere—whether they were focused on genes, species, populations, 

ecosystems, or landscapes—needed to seek connections between all 

levels in the system. A corollary or second theme of ecosystem management involved the need to define ecological boundaries at appropriate scales. In other words, managers had to recognize when it 

was necessary to seek environmental solutions across jurisdictional 

lines. In the case of South Florida, resource managers had long understood—but with growing clarity—that the ecological boundaries 

of concern to them encompassed the entire Kissimmee River-Lake 

Okeechobee-Everglades watershed, even extending to Florida Bay 

and the Florida Keys. Third, ecosystem management aimed to preserve “ecological integrity.” Standards for maintaining this integrity 

varied, but generally they included conserving viable populations 

of native species and maintaining natural disturbance regimes. For 

example, in South Florida, a state game warden and a NPS scientist 

might have different objectives for maintaining ecological integrity, 

but they would agree that restoring the natural hydropattern and allowing for extremes of high water and drought were key elements 

in their work. Additional themes were associated with the scientific 

method—data collection, monitoring, adaptive management—and 

with institutional processes, such as interagency cooperation and 

organizational change. Finally, Grumbine emphasized that ecosystem management was a social construct: it recognized that “humans 

are fundamental influences on ecological patterns” and that “human 

values play a dominant role in ecosystem management goals.”10

Many viewed ecosystem management as essentially a change of 

focus from the protection of single species to the conservation of 

whole systems, but Grumbine noted that this did not capture the 

full scope of the “seismic shift” in thinking that the new approach 

required. At base, ecosystem management was “an early stage in a 

fundamental reframing of how humans value nature.” It was an alternative to “resourcism”—the premise long held by modern industrial 

societies that nature was a storehouse of raw materials awaiting exploitation by humankind. Ecosystem management recognized biodiversity as something with intrinsic value, or as one set of authors 

included in Grumbine’s survey explained, it assumed that “living 

systems have importance beyond their traditional commodity and 

amenity uses.”11 Other authors whom Grumbine cited argued that 

ecosystem management required an ethical reorientation to nature, 

even a “rejection of humanism or anthropocentrism” in favor of “a 

biocentric embrace of all life,” although not all proponents would 

accept this philosophy.12 One of the central challenges of ecosystem 

management, Grumbine suggested, was to pursue the goal of ecological integrity within a sociopolitical framework still governed 

by values that supported resourcism. Distilling all of these factors 

into a working definition, Grumbine declared that “ecosystem management integrates scientific knowledge of ecological relationships 

within a complex sociopolitical and values framework toward the 

general goal of protecting native ecosystem integrity over the long 

term.”13

When President Clinton came into office, the best example of 

ecosystem management in South Florida was what the Corps and 

the SFWMD were undertaking in the Kissimmee River restoration 

project. But the scale was limited; some resource managers had begun thinking more grandly. One reason for this was because major 

problems with Florida Bay had surfaced, and many believed that the 

water management regime in South Florida under the C&SF Project 

was to blame.

Florida Bay, a shallow triangular coastal lagoon located south 

of the southern Florida peninsula, extended south and east to the 

Florida Keys and west to the Gulf of Mexico. The unusual geography 

of the bay made it especially susceptible to changes in salinity. Exceedingly shallow (generally three to ten feet deep over most of its 

expanse), the bay’s rate of evaporation relative to the volume of water 

was very high. In addition, mud banks covered considerable parts of 

the bay floor, moving like underwater sand dunes. Resting just below 

the surface of the water, the banks reduced the force of lunar tides 

and restricted the circulation of seawater into the bay. Fresh water 

flowed to the bay mainly through Taylor Slough (and, to a lesser degree, Shark River Slough), and this water mingled with gulf currents 

in the outer portion of the bay. The brackish waters supported rich 

communities of seagrasses, molluscs, crustaceans, and fish, and, in 

general, the seagrasses were more prolific where the waters of the bay 

mixed more freely with gulf waters.14

Scientists and environmentalists had been concerned about the 

bay for years. In the 1960s, a dearth of fresh water in Everglades National Park caused many to worry that Florida Bay’s salinity would 

rise to dangerous levels, killing the shrimp and fish. This, in turn, 

harmed the shrimp and commercial fishing industries that depended on the bay for their livelihood. Additional concerns arose in the 

1970s, and resident fishermen, such as Michael Collins, were the 

first to call attention to ecological changes in Florida Bay. A resident 

of the island community of Islamarada in the Florida Keys, Collins made a living taking wealthy clients out on his charter fishing 

boat around the Everglades, the Bahamas, and the bay. With other 
204 United States Army Corps of Engineers

fishermen, Collins began observing changes in seagrass communities in Florida Bay, and in 1976 the Islamarada Fishing Guide Association sent him to Everglades National Park to consult with research 

scientists about possible causes. Not satisfied that the park was giving the problem adequate attention, Collins began to research the 

history of the C&SF Project on the theory that water diversions from 

the Everglades—particularly the construction of the C-111 canal—

had reduced freshwater flows into Florida Bay, thereby altering the 

bay’s estuarine characteristics.15

During the 1980s, Collins took his concerns to the SFWMD, 

and at the end of the decade Governor Bob Martinez appointed him 

chairman of the Resource Planning and Management Committee for 

the Keys Areas of Critical State Concern. According to Collins, that 

group’s activity “was one of the first efforts I saw to get a number of 

government entities from different branches of government together 

to discuss resource management.” The interagency cooperation was 

at the state and county level, rather than the federal level, and participants tried to define the ecological boundaries of the problem.16

Turtle grass, or Thalassia testinum, the most abundant species 

of seagrass in Florida Bay, proved to be the canary in the coalmine. 

Fishing guides first observed that the turtle grass was spreading, 

colonizing the inner part of the bay, an indication that conditions 

were becoming more saline. In 1987, they began to see huge patches 

of turtle grass looking sick or dead. During the next four years, the 

seagrass die-offs spread over several hundred thousand acres. Floating mats of the decomposing matter blocked out sunlight, lowered 

the oxygen content in the water, and led to massive algal blooms. The 

normally crystal clear waters of Florida Bay became more turbid. As 

Collins told one journalist, “You should be able to read a newspaper 

lying on the bottom in 10 feet of water.”17 In southwestern portions 

of the bay, increased turbidity and phytoplankton growth led to massive die-offs of sponges.18

By 1991, these conditions had reduced shrimp and fish harvests 

to record lows. Then, in November 1991, a huge algal bloom erupted 

in Florida Bay, spreading until, by the summer of 1992, it covered 

miles and miles of the bay, choking out sunlight, devastating sponge, 

shrimp, and fish populations, and creating a “dead zone” along the 

bay’s western edge.19 Observers, including commercial fishermen, 

Everglades National Park officials, and environmentalists, were horrified by the developments. “Florida Bay is falling apart like a rotting 

piece of cloth,” Jay Zieman, a marine scientist with the University of 

Virginia, asserted. “This is a disaster on the same scale as the Yellowstone fires” (which, ironically, turned out not to be a disaster after 

all).20 The bay was “becoming a huge dead zone,” an editorial in The 

Miami Herald, declared. “Slime and algae cloud its once clear waters, 

where sea grass waved gently in the current.”21 The condition of the 

bay, Mike Robblee, chief of Everglades National Park’s marine science section, related, showed that either the bay was “very sick” or it 

was “changing drastically.” Whatever the situation, Robblee continued, “we need to sit up and take notice.”22

Collins, who would later become a member of the SFWMD governing board, continued to assert that the cause of the devastation 

lay in the management of water in South Florida. “It was the drainage system that had been put in that was the problem,” he averred.23

Some environmentalists agreed. George Barley, an Orlando developer who was also an avid sports fisherman, part time summer resident of Islamorada in the Florida Keys, and chairman of the Florida 

Keys National Marine Sanctuary Advisory Council (created in 1990 

by the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary and Protection Act, 

in part to deal with Florida Bay issues), became convinced that “the 

basic problem in Florida Bay is its fresh water has been taken away 

by a variety of means upstream.”24 Barley and others claimed that 

development in South Florida and the C&SF Project had drastically 

reduced how much fresh water flowed into the bay, creating an imbalance between the amounts of salt and fresh water that characterized a healthy estuary and making it more like the sea. Others, 

however, insisted that the problem came from an overabundance of 

nutrients resulting from runoff from the EAA and South Florida’s 

urban areas.25

But the real dilemma was that no one could say with certainty 

what had caused the dramatic seagrass dieoff. Were the seagrass 

communities responding to nutrient loading similar to that occurring in Lake Okeechobee? Was Florida Bay receiving nitrogen 

and phosphorus coming all the way from the sugar cane fields? Or 

was it a problem of water supply and increased salinity? Was the 

sharp reduction of freshwater input from the C-111 basin causing more seawater to infiltrate and mix with the shallow waters in 

Florida Bay?26 No one seemed to know. As Everglades National Park 

Aerial view of Florida Bay. (Everglades National Park)
Chapter Thirteen | A Broader Perspective 205

Superintendent Richard Ring explained, park scientists had largely 

ignored Florida Bay since the 1960s in order to concentrate on mainland water issues. “Basic research that should have been done in the 

1970s has not been done,” Ring stated, noting that the park’s research 

center did not have the funding to study the problem adequately.27

Realizing the severity of the situation, and hoping to prevent the 

bay’s impending collapse, Barley used his position with the Florida 

Keys National Marine Sanctuary—and his friendship with President 

George H. Bush, an avid fisherman of Florida Bay waters—to warn 

public officials of the problems. He recruited a wealthy friend with a 

seaplane to give flight tours of the bay to any public official who was 

interested in having a look. At first county commissioners accepted 

the offer, then elected officials who came from outside the area. This 

sounded an alarm that was soon heard in Washington; in the words 

of Billy Causey, director of the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary, “the noise level started getting so loud that [Congress] couldn’t 

help but . . . hear it.”28

Even before Barley began publicizing the Florida Bay issue, the 

Corps of Engineers had recognized the need for increased coordination in South Florida between water management agencies in order 

to promote the overall environmental health of the region. Colonel 

Terrence “Rock” Salt, District Engineer of the Jacksonville District, 

for example, had proposed a review of the whole C&SF Project in 

1991 with a view to developing a comprehensive framework for interagency coordination on water management issues in South Florida. He took Lieutenant General Arthur Williams, director of the 

Corps’ civil works program, and Nancy Dorn, Assistant Secretary 

of the Army, on a helicopter tour of the Kissimmee River system, 

receiving their support to put the review study into the annual appropriation bill for the Corps’ civil works program. Although the 

Water Resources Development Act of 1992 (WRDA-92) authorized 

the review study, it got lost in the frenzy of the Corps’ emergency response to Hurricane Andrew, which struck South Florida in August 

1992, and, as a result, the Bush administration did not allocate funds 

for a review. When Clinton came into office in January 1993, then, 

the idea of a comprehensive ecosystem restoration plan was embryonic and without a federal funding source.29

Florida environmentalists knew of the proposed study and 

wanted to see it funded through the Corps. After Colonel Salt became absorbed in the Hurricane Andrew disaster relief efforts, James 

“Jim” Webb of the Wilderness Society took the matter into his own 

hands and drafted the language for a congressional authorization.30

Meanwhile, the Everglades Coalition produced its own restoration 

plan for the “Greater Everglades Ecosystem,” influenced in part by 

the condition of Florida Bay. Not surprisingly, the coalition’s plan 

called for restoration of “the essential features of the natural hydrology—the volume, depth, timing and distribution of water that once 

flowed through the system.” It also sought a return of pristine water 

quality and enhancement of urban and agricultural water supplies. 

Drawing upon ecosystem management concepts then in development for the “Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem,” the plan further 

called for restored connectivity among wetland communities and 

use of biological indicator species to monitor the health of the ecosystem.31

After the 1992 presidential election, Florida environmentalists 

scrambled to reposition themselves and to establish links to the Clinton administration, even though some took a dim view of Clinton. 

According to Joseph Browder of the Audubon Society, those who 

considered themselves close to Clinton advised that the way to get 

his attention was to recast the Everglades restoration plan as a way 

to create jobs. “I had been getting reports by people who were supposedly in the know that we needed to turn this into a pork barrel 

program,” Browder remembered in an interview. Browder himself 

heard the president-elect make an off-the-cuff remark at a gathering in Hilton Head, South Carolina, during the winter of 1992-1993, 

that the only people that mattered were those who invested money 

and created jobs. “It reinforced the feeling that this was going to be a 

tough slog,” Browder recalled.32

Jim Webb of the Wilderness Society had other ideas. Webb 

knew Bruce Babbitt from his years in Arizona and he correctly recognized the new secretary of the interior as the key figure on Clinton’s environmental team. Webb got Babbitt to come to Tallahassee, 

Florida, in January 1993 and give the keynote address to the annual 

conference of the Everglades Coalition. This was Babbitt’s first public 

appearance after his confirmation. At the podium, Babbitt referred 

warmly to his two dinner companions, Colonel Salt and Richard 

Ring, superintendent of Everglades National Park, and promptly 

launched into a visionary speech about a Corps restudy of the whole 

ecosystem based on consultation with other federal agencies, input 

by a team of scientists, and political support from the highest levels. 

The audience cheered, applauding this bold new course.33

Babbit’s resolve stiffened after paying a visit to Everglades National Park. His examination of the park left him “absolutely appalled,” and Webb convinced him that drastic measures were needed, including the purchase of more private land to protect the park’s 

boundaries. “We can’t defend the Everglades—or Yellowstone—just 

at their boundaries,” Webb noted. “We have to deal with the whole 

ecosystem.”34 Back in Washington, Babbitt put this plan into motion. 

Just as he had outlined in Tallahassee, the restoration effort would go 

forward simultaneously at three levels in the federal government: at 

the cabinet level in Washington, at the agency level with the coordination of key managers like Colonel Salt and Superintendent Ring, 

and at the field level with scientists in each agency participating on 

an interagency team. Cooperation would start at the cabinet level 

with a new interagency task force and flow down to the field level. 

Whatever emerged from this effort would be science-driven.

In attempting to implement this plan, Babbitt had other examples of interagency efforts providing advice on water resource 
206 United States Army Corps of Engineers

management. In the 1960s, for example, the St. Paul District of the 

Corps initiated the Upper Mississippi River Comprehensive Basin 

Study, an interagency examination of the river that morphed into 

the Upper Mississippi River Basin Coordinating Committee in the 

1970s. Consisting of representatives from the Corps and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health, Education and Welfare, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, and Transportation, as well as individuals from the EPA and the Federal Power 

Commission, this committee was specifically tasked with developing a plan to solve water and land resource problems on the Upper 

Mississippi River. For additional management of the Upper Mississippi, the Great River Environmental Action Team was formed 

in the late 1970s, made up of representatives from the Corps, the 

USGS, the EPA, the Soil Conservation Service, the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, and the Department of Transportation. The team, 

also known as GREAT, had the responsibility of coordinating navigation and dredging on the Upper Mississippi River with other 

river uses, especially recreation and fish and wildlife management. 

Studies initiated by GREAT eventually led to congressional authorization of the Upper Mississippi River System Environmental 

Management Program in 1986, which, under the leadership of the 

Corps, specifically focused on enhancing and preserving environmental values on the Upper Mississippi River.35

In a similar way to these Upper Mississippi management committees, Babbitt established a cabinet-level task force for South Florida, composed of five assistant or under secretaries representing the 

Departments of Interior, Defense, Commerce, Agriculture, and Justice, and an assistant administrator representing the Environmental 

Protection Agency.36 It would meet semi-annually. Although task 

force members would delegate most of the effort to the Interagency 

Working Group, such attention to an ecosystem by so many senior 

officers in the executive branch of government was unprecedented.

In the early 1990s, observers had begun making references to 

the “federal family” in South Florida, meaning the constellation of 

federal agencies involved in resource management. In welding this 

federal family into an interagency team, Babbitt’s first task was to 

get together the several agencies in the Department of the Interior. These included the NPS, the FWS, the Bureau of Indian Affairs 

(BIA), and the USGS. Babbitt arranged a meeting of the Interior 

agencies in South Florida in April 1993 so that they could begin to 

develop a united vision for Everglades restoration. He sent his own 

science advisor, Thomas E. Lovejoy, as his representative. Lovejoy, 

a renowned conservation biologist, had recently gone to work for 

Babbitt to head up a new National Biological Survey, and on top of 

that effort Lovejoy plunged headlong into Everglades issues. At the 

April meeting Lovejoy encountered a general mood of optimism, although the representative from Everglades National Park sounded 

a discordant note when he insisted that the park did not want the 

USGS to conduct a hydrological survey in the park, preferring to 

have its own science staff do it.37

The focal point of this meeting was a composite satellite view of 

South Florida in which human development showed up in red and 

natural vegetation appeared in green. The satellite view was a remarkably clear expression of the extent of human manipulation of 

the natural environment and the hydrological pattern of flow from 

the headwaters of the Kissimmee River through Lake Okeechobee 

and the Everglades to Florida Bay. “You could see where the agricultural interests had encroached, and the way the water didn’t flow 

unless somebody turned a valve somewhere,” Lovejoy remembered 

in an interview. “You could see all the manmade structures, ditches, and dikes.”38 The satellite image was a fitting point of departure 

for the new interagency planning effort. Jurisdictional lines did 

not appear in the image, though the location of certain boundaries 

could be inferred from various hard edges separating red and green 

areas. More importantly, the image stimulated a holistic view or 

ecosystem perspective.

In June, Babbitt called the first meeting of the Interagency 

Working Group in Key Largo. Billy Causey, director of the Florida 

Keys National Marine Sanctuary, described this conference as “pivotal.” The group’s initial task was to define the extent of the ecosystem and agree upon some restoration objectives. “Never in my 

wildest imagination,” Causey said, “did I expect all the people in that 

Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt. (U.S. Department of the Interior 

Library)
Chapter Thirteen | A Broader Perspective 207

room to define the ecosystem as starting in the Kissimmee headwaters and coming all the way down to the Florida Keys.”39 However, 

since Florida Bay’s condition was not improving, and, in many ways, 

was worsening, the group’s definition was not surprising. As a panel 

of scientists later concluded, South Florida ecosystems had been 

“managed as if they were in isolation from one another,” in many 

ways causing the freshwater problems that Florida Bay now faced. In 

their estimation, “it is clear that what is now needed is a broader perspective.”40 Accordingly, the group began coordinating several different Everglades project already underway, such as the C-111 Project 

(replumbing the East Everglades for better water flow to Everglades 

National Park) and the investigation of Florida Bay’s problems, with 

the goal of improving the Everglades ecosystem as a whole.41

The Key Largo meeting also saw the emergence of some interesting group dynamics. Babbitt had insisted that each department 

send two—and only two—representatives to this initial meeting 

because he did not want an influx of Interior personnel. Moreover, 

he asked Assistant Secretary of the Interior George Frampton to cochair the meeting with Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce Doug 

Hall—a clear signal that the Commerce Department’s National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) had a role in 

Everglades restoration as the managing agency of South Florida’s 

coastal waters. Frampton and Hall effectively led the group, displaying a new confidence that national park interests would get 

their due. Representatives of the Miccosukee and Seminole tribes 

and some state officials attended the meeting as well, but were not 

invited to sit at the table. Instead, they sat mutely against the back 

wall. This peculiar seating arrangement struck some participants 

as imperious on the part of the federal government. Colonel Salt 

showed up with Jimmy Bates, the senior civilian in the civil works 

directorate of the Corps’ headquarters division, plus four others, 

all in Army uniform. This military escort was contrary to Babbitt’s 

instruction that exactly two people attend for each department. 

“We all kind of bristled,” Causey remembered. “We started counting heads.” However, Salt, a large, square-shouldered man whom 

everyone knew as “Rock,” quickly put everyone at ease with his disarming and enthusiastic manner, and he began to act as the group 

facilitator. “We could see it was a new era for the Corps,” Causey 

recalled. “We had had some good colonels but Rock was here to get 

the work done.”42

Colonel Salt was undoubtedly the right man in the right place 

at the right time, another one of the many fortunate circumstances 

that propelled Everglades restoration to a national priority status 

during the Clinton administration. Salt’s consensus-based leadership style was atypical of a commanding officer.43 He was deeply interested in ecosystem restoration. Earlier in his career he had been 

assigned to the Corps’ Walla Walla District in the Pacific Northwest 

where he worked on mitigating the impacts of Columbia-Snake 

River dams on anadromous fish runs, and on other efforts to restore 

habitat for endangered salmon. He also had the backing of leaders 

in the Corps who wanted to move the organization in a “greener” 

direction, notably Lieutenant General Henry Hatch, Chief of Engineers from 1988 to 1992. When Salt was selected for the Jacksonville 

District command, he went to G. Edward “Ed” Dickey, the Acting 

Secretary of the Army for Civil Works who had contributed to the 

development of the “Principles and Guidelines” in 1983, by which 

the Corps evaluated the federal interest in proposed environmental 

projects. Salt asked Dickey bluntly if the Corps was serious about 

Kissimmee River restoration and Everglades modified waters projects. “Oh, yes,” Dickey replied, but the colonel must do two things: 

demonstrate that the project was in the federal interest, and show 

that it was deserving of high priority in the nation. Salt focused on 

those problems when he represented the Corps in the Interagency 

Working Group and when he initiated the restudy of the C&SF 

Project. Ultimately, he had to prove to his superiors in Washington 

that the federal interest in ecosystem restoration in South Florida 

was more compelling than competing initiatives contemplated in 

regions such as California or the Mississippi Valley.44

A satellite map of South Florida. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District)
208 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Salt understood the need to follow and respect the internal process of the Corps even as that process began to get short-circuited 

by Washington politics. One significant consequence of Babbitt’s 

initiative in creating a federal task force was that the Jacksonville 

commander communicated directly with the Army’s task force representative, Acting Assistant Secretary Dickey. The normal chain of 

command in the Corps of Engineers ran from the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and the Assistant Secretary of the 

Army to the Chief of Engineers at Corps headquarters, then to the 

Division Engineer, and then to the District Engineer. Direct communications between Dickey and Salt, which grew increasingly frequent, bypassed headquarters and the division. During Salt’s command the task force’s impact on the Corps’ organizational structure 

did not produce significant tensions or repercussions, but by the end 

of the Clinton administration it would.45

At the same time that Babbitt initiated the creation of a federal 

task force on ecosystem restoration in South Florida, he pushed the 

Corps to commence an immediate comprehensive review of the C&SF 

Project. If the seeds of this restudy were already sown before Babbitt came into office, it was undoubtedly Babbitt’s energy that caused 

the project to germinate. As Salt remembers, he received a “frantic 

call from Ed Dickey” in April 1993. Did Salt know anything about 

a restudy, Dickey inquired. The next day Dickey called him again, 

this time relating that the administration wanted the Corps to begin 

a restudy immediately using existing funds. Next, General Roger F. 

Yankoupe, Division Engineer of the South Atlantic Division, phoned 

Salt, telling him to bring his chief planner to Atlanta to get the restudy 

started. With the help of John Rushing, Chief of Planning in the South 

Atlanta Division, Salt moved the project expeditiously “through the 

stovepipes in the Corps.” Initially, Salt and others thought the study 

would be funded out of the Corps’ general investigations account, but 

Rushing had another idea. “By calling it a review study [we] could use 

construction dollars, which were an order of magnitude greater than 

[general investigations] dollars,” Salt later explained. “By putting it 

into that account we were able to initiate a $2 million reconnaissance 

study that was unprecedented in terms of size.”46

By June 1993, the “Restudy” (as it was now officially called) 

had assumed national importance. Jimmy Bates, Deputy Director of 

Civil Works, instructed Salt to select his planning team carefully and 

assemble the best talent the Corps had. With such strong backing 

at the highest Corps level, it was no wonder that Salt exuded confidence at the initial gathering of the Interagency Working Group.47

Salt tapped Stuart Appelbaum, chief of the Jacksonville District’s 

Flood Control and Floodplain Management Planning Group, to head 

the Restudy. Appelbaum, who had worked on the Kissimmee River 

restoration plan, had contemplated how he would run the C&SF Project review study since its first discussion in 1992, influenced by the 

mentoring of Mann Davis, who had headed the District’s 1980 water 

supply study. Because that examination had been less than a stellar 

success, Davis had determined that the Corps needed to improve the 

way it conducted the study, and he transmitted some of these ideas to 

Appelbaum. Appelbaum therefore decided that the Restudy would 

have to involve the public and be interdisciplinary and interagency. 

Most importantly, people had to perceive it as something new and 

different. In order to accomplish these purposes, Appelbaum co-located all of the team—all disciplines, all agencies—in one room. His 

organizational model was the Skunkworks operation in the Lockheed 

Corporation. As Appelbaum explained, “You give them their own 

status off on the side; they are no longer working for the same organization, but they’re kind of a unique, standalone organization; you 

let them go solve tough problems.” By late summer Appelbaum had a 

team of 12 people and a room in the basement of the Jacksonville District affectionately known as “the cave.” His oft-repeated instruction 

to his team members was that they leave their agency hats at the door. 

One wag brought in 12 hats with a generic “agency” logo printed on 

each one. The team began to form a group identity.48

By the end of summer it was clear that the Restudy would serve 

as the vehicle for developing a comprehensive Everglades restoration plan. The Task Force and the Interagency Working Group 

would provide oversight. In September 1993, the second meeting of 

the Interagency Working Group occurred in Orlando. Ed Dickey attended with Salt. Talking about the Restudy, Dickey told the group 

that the other agencies must decide what they wanted restored, and 

then the Corps would draw up the engineering plans. This was a familiar refrain, but never in history had such an invitation involved 

so many agencies and so much area. Indeed, it was now evident that 

the scope of the Restudy would exceed the geographic limits of the 

C&SF Project.49

The Orlando meeting produced an interagency agreement on 

South Florida ecosystem restoration, which formally established the 

Colonel Terrence “Rock” Salt, District Engineer of the Jacksonville District. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District)
Chapter Thirteen | A Broader Perspective 209

South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force. The agreement declared that the South Florida ecosystem encompassed the Kissimmee watershed, Lake Okeechobee, the Big Cypress Basin, the Everglades, Florida Bay, and the Florida Keys. It listed the many federal 

interests in the area. These were not limited to federal lands, but also 

included the C&SF Project and the enforcement of environmental 

laws such as the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, the Endangered Species Act, and others. The purpose of the Task Force was “to 

coordinate the development of consistent policies, strategies, plans, 

programs, and priorities for addressing the environmental concerns 

of the South Florida Ecosystem.” The agreement acknowledged the 

need for coordination with state, local, and tribal governments, as 

well as with member agencies. Specific goals of the task force were 

to agree on federal objectives for ecosystem restoration; to promote 

an ecosystem-based science program; to support the development of 

“appropriate multi-species recovery plans for threatened and endangered species” (a careful effort to move from single-species management to the conservation of whole systems); and to help expedite 

projects aimed at ecosystem restoration.50

The interagency agreement also formally established the Interagency Working Group. It was to be composed of Florida-based 

representatives of the following federal agencies: NPS, FWS, USGS, 

BIA, National Biological Survey (Department of the Interior); 

NOAA (Department of Commerce); Soil Conservation Service (Department of Agriculture); U.S. Attorney for the Southern District 

of Florida (Department of Justice); EPA; and U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers (Department of the Army). The Working Group was to 

prepare recommendations in the form of an integrated plan one year 

from the first meeting of the Task Force, and update this document 

annually thereafter. Other responsibilities included developing an 

integrated financial plan, an ecosystem-based science program, and 

public outreach efforts. The Working Group was also charged with 

identifying and resolving interagency differences concerning ecosystem restoration, and it was empowered to establish subgroups.51

Yet some groups—most notably the Miccosukee Indians—believed that they had been intentionally excluded from both the South 

Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force and the Interagency 

Working Group, despite their obvious interests in Everglades restoration. Indeed, both the Seminole and the Miccosukee were intensely 

interested in water quality and restoration issues, especially since the 

quality of water entering Conservation Area No. 3 directly affected 

their lands, and had developed water rights compacts in the 1980s 

and 1990s to protect their interests. Having expressed this concern 

in the past, both the Seminole and the Miccosukee expected at least 

some kind of a role in ecosystem restoration efforts. When no formal position was offered, the Miccosukee protested, spurred on by 

Dexter Lehtinen, who they had hired as their attorney. In 1994, for 

example, the tribe sued the federal government, charging that it had 

been unfairly excluded from a meeting where SFWMD and Florida 

Department of Environmental Protection scientists had met with 

federal scientists. Although Truman E. “Gene” Duncan, Jr., head 

of the Miccosukee water management division, attended the meeting, he alleged officials ejected him from the gathering. Jay Ziegler, 

spokesman for the Interior Department, did not dispute the charge, 

but said that the reason for the action was so that federal authorities 

could discuss President Clinton’s upcoming budget. The Miccosukee 

disagreed; Angel Cortinas, one of their attorneys, insisted that the 

Indians were “being excluded from the discussions that affect the 

tribe’s interest.”52

Yet the Task Force and the Working Group did not maliciously 

prevent the inclusion of the Miccosukee; instead, the Federal Advisory Committee Act, which authorized the creation of organizations such as the Task Force, precluded non-federal interests from 

actively sitting on federal committees. Non-federal groups could attend meetings, but could not participate in any decision-making. As 

explained in Chapter 18, not until 1995 would Congress remedy this 

situation by amending the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Until 

then, Task Force and Working Group officials believed there was 

nothing they could do.

The Miccosukee action indicated that the consensus approach 

that Secretary Babbitt was trying to produce with the working 

groups was not entirely successful, but the Task Force and Working 

Group continued their operation. In order to carry out Babbitt’s vision of science lying at the heart of the restoration efforts, the Working Group established a Science Subgroup, and in November 1993, 

this subgroup completed its initial report, “Federal Objectives for 

South Florida Restoration.” This document foresaw the outcome of 

ecosystem restoration as follows:

A field of sawgrass, one of the dominant plants of the pre-drainage Everglades. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and Archives of Florida)
210 United States Army Corps of Engineers

The idealized goal for the natural areas of South Florida is to 

restore to predrainage conditions the landscape-scale hydrologic 

and ecologic structure and function in order to reinstate ecological 

integrity and sustainable biodiversity. The goal is an ecosystem that 

is resilient to both chronic stresses and catastrophic events with as 

little human intervention as possible.53

The report also presented more specific restoration objectives 

and measurable success criteria for the entire region and nine subregions. In each case, it described three levels of protection based on 

the amount of developed area that would be restored to wetlands. 

The Science Subgroup termed the levels of protection at either end of 

this continuum as “constrained” and “unconstrained” options, while 

the level of protection in the middle was termed the “incremental” 

choice. The point of this presentation was to show that for each increment of developed area restored to wetlands, the social and economic costs rose while the environmental risk fell. Put another way, 

if ecosystem restoration did not go far enough, it would entail a high 

risk of failure.

When the Working Group released this report, controversy 

ensued. The “unconstrained” option of complete restoration of all 

wetlands, which the Science Subgroup described only for purposes 

of framing the “incremental” option, inflamed certain stakeholders—and with good reason. Under this option, the report graphically showed one swath of restored wetlands obliterating a small 

city north of Tampa Bay, while also displaying an immense area of 

restored wetlands completely engulfing the EAA. As if these visual 

images were not provoking enough, the Science Subgroup’s choice 

of terminology seemed strangely aggressive: to say that the presence 

of communities and farms was “constraining” sent the wrong public 

message. The Task Force, the Working Group, and the Science Subgroup were all chastened by the public reaction, which served as a 

healthy reminder to them that ecosystem management was fundamentally a social endeavor. 54 As Grumbine would write less than a 

year later in his timely synopsis of ecosystem management, “human 

values play a dominant role in ecosystem management goals.55

Thus far, Secretary Babbitt’s initiative had produced much organizational change but little else. Yet it was a necessary first step 

toward implementing an ecosystem management approach to Everglades restoration. In the new organizations that had been created—the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force, the Interagency Working Group, the Science Subgroup, and the Restudy 

team—the seeds of ecosystem management had been planted. Many 

of the attributes of ecosystem management were already visible and 

at play. The resource managers were adopting a systems perspective, 

formulating goals that would define success in the effort to restore 

ecological integrity, developing a science-based approach to decision 

making, and fostering interagency coordination. Although the South 

Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force was thus far a federal initiative, it would, once it received authorizing legislation, evolve to 

include representatives of state, local, and tribal governments. The 

organizational change provided a new institutional environment in 

which the idea of ecosystem restoration could grow and flourish.56

Endnotes

1 House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Subcommittee on 

National Parks and Recreation, Additions to the National Park System in the 

State of Florida: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on National Parks and 

Recreation of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 1st and 2d sess., 1986, 140.

2 Miller quoted in House Committee on Natural Resources Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations and Subcommitee on National Parks, 

Forests and Public Lands and House Committee on Merchant Marine and 

Fisheries Subcommittee on Environment and Natural Resources, Florida 

Everglades Ecosystem, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 1993, 14. On Everglades restoration as a test case for ecosystem management, see Congressional Research 

Service, “The Florida Everglades: An Ecosystem in Danger,” as published in 

the hearing, 201.

3 Byron Daynes, “Bill Clinton: Environmental President,” in The Environmental Presidency, Dennis L. Soden, ed. (Albany: State University of New 

York, 1999), 259.

4 Norman J. Vig, “Presidential Leadership and the Environment: From 

Reagan to Clinton,” in Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft, eds., Environmental Policy in the 1990s, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1997), 104-105.

5 Albert Gore, Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit (New 

York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992), 295-360.

6 Browner had earlier served as a Senate environmental aide of Gore. 

Another one of Gore’s environmental aides, Kathleen McGinty, was appointed head of the new Office of Environmental Policy. McGinty would 

become highly instrumental in Everglades restoration in Clinton’s second 

term.

7 Vig, “Presidential Leadership and the Environment: From Reagan to 

Clinton,” 106; William Leary interview by Theodore Catton, 24 November 

2004, Washington, D.C., 5; Stuart Stahl interview by Julian Pleasants, 22 

February 2001, 25, Everglades Interview No. 3, Samuel Proctor Oral History 

Program, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida [hereafter referred to as 

Stahl interview].

8 Lettie McSpadden, “Environmental Policy in the Courts,” in Environmental Policy in the 1990s, 176-177; Theodore Catton and Lisa Mighetto, The 

Fish and Wildlife Job on the National Forests: A Century of Game and Fish 

Conservation, Habitat Protection, and Ecosystem Management (Washington, 

D.C.: USDA Forest Service, 1998), 263-273.

9 R. Edward Grumbine, “What is Ecosystem Management?” Conservation Biology 8 (March 1994): 27-38.

10 Grumbine, “What is Ecosystem Management?” 31.

11 W.B. Kessler, H. Salwasser, C. Cartwright, Jr., and J. Caplan as quoted 

in Grumbine, “What is Ecosystem Management?” 34.

12 R.F. Noss and A. Cooperrider as quoted in Grumbine, “What is Ecosystem Management?” 34.

13 Grumbine, “What is Ecosystem Management?” 31. In a followup article, Grumbine reported that many managers and academics found 

the ten themes to form a useful framework for understanding ecosystem 
Chapter Thirteen | A Broader Perspective 211

management. See R. Edward Grumbine, “Reflections on ‘What is Ecosystem 

Management?’” Conservation Biology 11 (February 1997): 41-47.

14 James W. Fourqurean and Michael B. Robblee, “Florida Bay: A History of Recent Ecological Changes,” Estuaries 22 (June 1999): 349-350.

15 Michael Collins interview by Theodore Catton, 13 July 2004, West 

Palm Beach, Florida, 1-2 [hereafter referred to as Collins interview].

16 Collins interview, 1.

17 Ben Iannotta, “Mystery of the Everglades,” New Scientist (9 November 1996): 3535.

18 Fourqurean and Robblee, “Florida Bay,” 345.

19 See Billy Causey interview by Theodore Catton, 20 January 2005, 

Marathon, Florida, 3-5 [hereafter referred to as Causey interview]; Collins interview, 2; Fourqurean and Robblee, “Florida Bay,” 345; “Panel Blasts 

Florida Bay Neglect,” The Miami Herald, 21 September 1993; “If Florida Bay 

Dies, An Industry Will, Too,” Tallahassee Democrat, 17 February 1993.

20 As quoted in “Ailing Florida Bay Endangers Coral,” The Miami Herald, 11 August 1992.

21 “Florida Bay: Catastrophe,” The Miami Herald, 12 August 1992.

22 As quoted in “Ailing Florida Bay Endangers Coral,” The Miami Herald, 11 August 1992.

23 Collins interview, 3.

24 George M. Barley, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Council, to Honorable 

Jim Smith, Secretary of State, 27 August 1992, File Florida Bay, Box 157406, 

SFWMDAR.

25 See “Ailing Florida Bay Endangers Coral,” The Miami Herald, 11 August 1992.

26 Collins interview, 1.

27 As quoted in “Ailing Florida Bay Endangers Coral,” The Miami Herald, 11 August 1992.

28 Causey interview, 5-6.

29 House Committee on Natural Resources Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations, Committee on Agriculture Subcommittee on Specialty 

Crops and Natural Resources, and the Committee on Merchant and Marine 

Fisheries Subcommittee on Environment and Natural Resources, Ecosystem 

Management: Joint Oversight Hearing on Ecosystem Management and a Report by the General Accounting Office, “Ecosystem Management—Additional 

Actions Needed to Adequately Test a Promising Approach,” 103rd Cong., 2d 

sess., 1995, 99; Colonel Terrence C. “Rock” Salt interview by Theodore Catton, 19 January 2005, Miami, Florida, 5 [hereafter referred to as Salt interview—Catton].

30 Richard Bonner interview by Theodore Catton, 13 May 2005, Jacksonville, Florida, 13.

31 According to Joseph Browder, the plan was first published in 1992 

and republished in 1993. Browder interview, 6. The 1993 document is in 

House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations et al., Florida Everglades Ecosystem, 309-347.

32 Browder interview, 6.

33 Everglades Coalition, “Past Conferences” <http://www.evergladescoalition.org/site/pastconference.html> (26 May 2005); Salt interview—Catton, 5.

34 All quotations in Philip Elmer-Dewitt, “Facing a Deadline to Save the 

Everglades,” Time 141 (21 June 1993): 57.

35 George W. Griebenow, “A Team Called GREAT,” Water Spectrum 9 

(Winter 1976-1977): 19-20; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, North Central 

Division, Upper Mississippi River System Environmental Management Program, Sixth Annual Addendum (Chicago: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

North Central Division, 1991), 2-4; Upper Mississippi River Basin Coordinating Committee, Upper Mississippi River Comprehensive Basin Study Main 

Report (Chicago: Upper Mississippi River Basin Coordinating Committee, 

1972), 1-3.

36 Clinton had requested that EPA Administrator Carol Browner join 

his cabinet, as he wanted Congress to confer cabinet-level status on the 

agency.

37 Thomas E. Lovejoy interview by Theodore Catton, 9 December 2004, 

Missoula, Montana [by telephone], 1 [hereafter referred to as Lovejoy interview].

38 Lovejoy interview, 1.

39 Causey interview, 7.

40 As quoted in “Panel Blasts Florida Bay Neglect,” The Miami Herald, 

21 September 1993.

41 “Testimony of George T. Frampton, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Fish 

and Wildlife and Parks,” in House Committee on Natural Resources, et al., 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Ecosystem Management, 

100.

42 Causey interview, 6-8; Salt interview—Catton, 6.

43 Colonel Terry Rice interview by Brian Gridley, 8 March 2001, 29, 

Everglades Interview No. 4, Samuel Proctor Oral History Program, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida [hereafter referred to as Rice interview].

44 Salt interview—Catton, 1-2.

45 Leary interview, 12; General Joe Ballard interview by Theodore Catton, 18 November 2004, Missoula, Montana [by telephone], 7-8.

46 Salt interview—Catton, 5-6.

47 Salt interview—Catton, 5-6.

48 Quotations in Stuart Appelbaum interview by Brian Gridley, 22 February 2002, 18-19, Everglades Interview No. 11, Samuel Proctor Oral History Program, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida [hereafter referred 

to as Appelbaum interview]; see also James Vearil, personal communication 

with the authors, 18 April 2006.

49 Salt interview—Catton, 6. One year later, Colonel Terry Rice would 

make the same pitch to the Governor’s Commission on a Sustainable South 

Florida. See Rice interview, 18.

50 “Interagency Agreement on South Florida Ecosystem Restoration,” 23 

September 1993, Billy Causey’s Task Force Files, Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary administrative records [hereafter referred to as FKNMSAR].

51 “Interagency Agreement on South Florida Ecosystem Restoration.”

52 Quotations in “Indians Sue U.S. Government,” Sun-Sentinel, undated 

newspaper clipping in File Everglades Mediation Miccosukee, Box 19706, 

SFWMDAR; see also “Miccosukee Tribe Sues U.S. Agency Over Glades 

Plan,” The Herald, 4 November 1994. The Miccosukee’s accusation was nothing new; they had complained about being left out of financial discussions 

in 1993 as well. See Woodie Van Voorhees, Government & Public Affairs, to 

Til Creel, Irene Quincey, Steve Lamb, and Vince Katilus, 20 July 1993, File 

Everglades Mediation Miccosukee, Box 19706, SFWMDAR.

53 Quoted in House Committee on Natural Resources, et al., Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Ecosystem Management, 294.

54 Richard G. Ring, Chairman, South Florida Ecosystem Restoration 

Working Group, to George Frampton, Chairman, South Florida Ecosystem 

Restoration Task Force, n.d., Billy Causey’s Task Force Files, FKNMSAR; 

Stuart Appelbaum interview by Theodore Catton, 7 July 2004, Jacksonville, 

Florida, 1 [hereafter referred to as Appelbaum interview—Catton]; Salt interview—Catton, 6.

55 Grumbine, “What is Ecosystem Management?” 31.

56 Whitfield interview, 40; Water Resources Development Act of 12 October 1996 (110 Stat. 3658, 3771).

213

As the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force coordinated federal activities regarding Everglades restoration, the Clinton administration, embracing the principle of sustainable development, made overtures to Florida’s powerful sugar industry in order 

to gain its support of restoration efforts. These endeavors accorded 

with President Clinton’s belief in the necessity of balance to resolve 

environmental disputes. Just as he demonstrated at his vaunted Forest Summit in Portland, Oregon, in April 1993, Clinton’s aim in 

South Florida was to create common ground by persuading all sides 

to relinquish a little, end the fighting without declaring winners or 

losers, and move forward with a new consensus. Much to the discomfort of many environmentalists, this meant bringing Big Sugar 

into the circle.

President Clinton’s environmental team had good reasons for 

wanting to work constructively with the sugar industry. Beyond 

the immediate goal of ending the litigation and clearing the way for 

cleanup to proceed, the Clinton team wanted to secure Big Sugar’s 

philosophical and financial commitment to a long term ecosystem 

restoration plan. Such promises would ensure that growers made 

genuine progress in developing Best Management Practices (BMPs) 

aimed at reducing phosphorus levels in agricultural runoff; no one 

was in a better position than the industry itself to conduct research 

and development on the effects of farming on the natural ecosystem. 

Securing commitments would also ease the burden on federal and 

state coffers, and would create real, long range business incentives 

for the adoption of BMPs.1

According to Clinton administration officials, sugarcane growers had much to gain by supporting the restoration effort. They could 

improve their public image, deflect environmentalists’ demands that 

Chapter 14

the sugar industry pay a far greater share of the cleanup, and place 

their business on an environmentally sustainable footing. This latter action was the Clinton administration’s overarching goal, for 

the industry provided a livelihood to thousands of people in South 

Florida who would have little alternative employment if the industry 

collapsed. Many of the agricultural workers were underprivileged 

African Americans, Hispanics, and West Indian migrants who had 

worked their entire adult lives in the sugarcane fields and sugar mills. 

Despite frequent charges that the industry mistreated their workers, 

these rural inhabitants of the EAA were, for the most part, strongly 

attached to the region and supportive of the industry.2

As the Clinton team initiated settlement talks with sugar growers early in 1993, it sought to implement principles of “sustainable 

development.” If ecosystem management was at the center of an intellectual ferment among scientists and resource managers, sustainable development was a concept that excited interest among economists and policy makers. Like ecosystem management, it predated 

the advent of the Clinton administration by a few years. It had first 

emerged as a concept for addressing disparities of wealth between 

developed and developing nations in the context of caring for the 

global environment. One of the first organizations to develop the 

idea was the United Nation’s World Commission on Environment 

and Development, or Brundtland Commission, which first met in 

1984. The Brundtland Commission defined sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without 

compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 

needs.” The thrust of sustainable development, as explained in the 

Brundtland Commission’s final report to the United Nations, Our 

Common Future (1987), was to meld economic and environmental 

Searching for Consensus: Sustainability and the Move 

Towards Everglades Restoration
214 United States Army Corps of Engineers

concerns into a unified program. The environment could not be 

protected effectively without economic development, nor could economic development be sustained without environmental protection. 

Principles of sustainable development were outlined further at international conferences in New Delhi in 1990, Dublin in January 1992, 

and the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992.3

Only after the Rio meeting did political leaders in the United 

States begin to suggest that sustainable development was a useful 

concept for domestic issues; President Clinton broadened the idea 

to include social justice perspectives. In June 1993, he formed the 

President’s Council on Sustainable Development. This group was 

composed of 25 members drawn from government, industry, labor, and civil rights organizations. The council’s guiding principle 

was to recognize the interdependence of economic prosperity, environmental protection, and social equity. Its mission was to explore 

“bold, new approaches to achieve our economic, environmental, and 

equity goals.”4 Sustainable solutions, like a three-legged stool, rested 

on the points of intersection between what was ecologically viable, 

what was economically feasible, and what was socially desirable. 

The council was to innovate ways to achieve “sustainable development” through a balance of ecological, economic, and social values.5

Clinton took a concept that had been steadily gaining ground in the 

international environmental community and made it central to his 

administration’s domestic environmental policy. Sustainable development was an idea that would have great force in transforming the 

C&SF Project into the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan.

The first milestone in the Clinton administration’s efforts to 

co-opt Big Sugar was a much-ballyhooed “Statement of Principles,” 

which Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, Florida Governor 

Lawton Chiles, and sugar industry leaders jointly announced on 13 

July 1993 in a public ceremony held in the grand auditorium at the 

Department of the Interior in Washington, D.C. Largely orchestrated 

through the efforts of Gerald Cormick, the “leader of the school of 

alternative dispute resolution,” the Statement of Principles represented give-and-take by the sugar industry, state, and federal agencies.6

 It 

called for a 90-day stay of Dexter Lehtinen’s litigation; it provided an 

overview of a Technical Plan that was in development and would be 

finalized during the next 90 days as part of a final settlement agreement; and, most importantly, it spelled out financial commitments 

by the agricultural industry, the state, and the federal government. 

A sugar cane field and canal in Moorehaven, Florida. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and Archives of Florida)
Chapter Fourteen | Searching for Consensus 215

Babbitt and Chiles hailed the accord as the closing chapter to a fiveyear court battle that had been costing valuable time and diverting 

money away from where it was most needed. “With this action,” 

Babbitt related, “we expect to head off what could have been another 

decade of litigation and to immediately begin restoration.”7

Industry representatives sounded the note on sustainable development. Nelson Fairbanks, president of U.S. Sugar Corporation, told 

the audience that he had “long believed that it was possible to save 

the Everglades while saving farm-related jobs,” and this plan would 

do just that. “It asks farmers to pay a lot, much more than we wanted 

to pay,” he said. “But it also lets us and our communities survive. That 

is what we have wanted all along.” Robert Buker, senior vice president of U.S. Sugar and one of the chief negotiators for the industry, 

praised the Clinton administration for its role in the talks and called 

the breakthrough a “new paradigm” for resolving environmental disputes.8

 Alfonso Fanjul, president of Flo-Sun, said the Clinton administration had stood conventional wisdom on its head. “What’s good 

for the environment can also be good for business,” he said.9

The Statement of Principles began with a preamble asserting the 

parties’ understanding of the problem. Nearly a century of human 

manipulation of the Everglades had made an attractive environment 

in South Florida that was now home to millions of people as well as 

a flourishing agricultural industry. “But in the last decade we have 

come to realize the tremendous cost this alteration of natural systems has exacted on the region,” the statement read. “We pledge to 

inaugurate an unprecedented new partnership, joining the Federal 

and State governments with the agricultural industry of South Florida, to restore natural values to the Everglades while also maintaining 

agriculture as part of a robust regional economy.” The parties further 

pledged to conduct future scientific research in a spirit of cooperation, and they expressed their hope that ecosystem restoration in 

South Florida would “become a national and international model 

for sustaining both the environment and the economy.”10

Under the heading “Management Principles,” the statement 

echoed the Settlement Agreement and Consent Decree in calling 

for the acquisition and establishment of flow-through filtration 

marshes, known as stormwater treatment areas (STAs), as the major 

component for cleanup of nutrients in the EAA. Water would pass 

through these marshes, allowing plants and other matter to cleanse 

the resource of phosphorous and other nutrients. The statement 

stipulated that parts of the Holey Land and Rotenberger tracts be 

used for these STAs, and it provided strong incentives for industry 

to implement BMPs. Unlike the earlier documents, however, it did 

not stipulate target levels for phosphorus outputs: these would be 

developed through subsequent research and calculations. In the following section on “Financial Principles,” the statement described 

the respective commitments by the agricultural industry, the state, 

and the federal government in considerable detail. The agricultural 

industry agreed to pay up to $322 million over the next 20 years 

for construction, research, monitoring, and operation and maintenance of the STAs. This constituted an impressive two-thirds of a 

$465 million plan. However, the contribution by Big Sugar was much 

less than these gross figures suggested. The state and federal governments would outspend the agricultural industry by more than two to 

one in the early going, and the agricultural industry’s overall share, 

which would potentially escalate in the latter part of the 20-year period, would be substantially reduced through a credit system if target 

levels for phosphorus outputs were met according to schedule.11

Environmentalists almost unanimously denounced the Statement of Principles as vague, weak, and ingenuous. They did not like 

the provisions regarding the Rotenberger and Holey Land tracts, 

which they still wanted to use as buffer zones for the water conservation areas and Everglades National Park. They also wanted 

hard target levels of parts per billion, as they did not trust federal 

and state officials and industry representatives to calculate specific 

limits at a later time.12 With regard to the financial commitments, 

environmentalists believed the sugarcane growers had obtained a 

sweetheart deal from the Clinton administration. They wanted the 

A diagram of STA-1 East. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville 

District)
216 United States Army Corps of Engineers

growers to give up more of their land for filtration marshes and to 

pay a greater share of the cleanup cost. The Statement of Principles 

was vague on how the money would be collected, they declared, as 

well as how the credits would be assessed. In addition, environmentalists pointed out, some large sugarcane growers were not parties 

to the agreement.13

The Statement of Principles opened a fissure between environmentalists and the Clinton administration that would widen over 

the next three years. Environmentalists felt excluded by the mediation process, and although the Everglades Coalition and other 

environmental groups were invited to attend the ceremony at the 

Department of the Interior, the community was not mollified. EC 

members were quick to condemn the Statement of Principles as a 

sell-out to Big Sugar, whom they had been vilifying for years. Indeed, 

the fanfare surrounding its announcement, the photo opportunity 

for sugar industry moguls to share the podium with Secretary Babbitt and Governor Chiles, even the decision to unveil the Statement 

of Principles in the opulent auditorium of the Department of the 

Interior, all seemed calculated to offend in the view of some environmentalists. For Joe Browder, a consultant to the EC, the idea of inviting Big Sugar to proclaim its commitment to ecosystem restoration 

in the venerable old auditorium at Interior was no less than an act of 

defilement. “This [was] like pissing in the holy water,” he would later 

comment.14

Browder had harsh words for Secretary Babbitt at the conclusion 

of the event. As the press conference was drawing to a close, Browder 

rose from his chair and said angrily, “It’s an absolute betrayal, Bruce, 

and it won’t stand.” A few minutes later he buttonholed Babbitt on 

the floor of the auditorium. “This whole plan is bad science. I can’t 

understand why you would agree to this.” A Miami Herald reporter 

who was standing behind a pillar out of the secretary’s view recorded 

the exchange. “Well that’s my job, Joe, to find compromise,” was Babbitt’s exasperated reply.15

Dexter Lehtinen, who had spearheaded the earlier Settlement 

Agreement in 1991, blistered the federal government for giving away 

too much in the Statement of Principles. “It’s vague and ambiguous 

on all the important points,” he said. “It reminds me of Vietnam. You 

give up, declare victory, and go home.”16 A group called Clean Water 

Action immediately condemned the Statement of Principles as a taxpayer bailout of the sugar industry. Clean Water Action, more than 

any other group, appealed to people’s pocket books. Florida taxpayers, particularly those in the SFWMD, would soon face a substantial 

hike in property taxes. Sylvia Kule, a member of Clean Water Action, 

promised to lead a bus load of senior citizens from Delray Beach to 

West Palm Beach to confront the governing board of the SFWMD 

when it met to approve the new $21 million ad valorem tax as called 

for in the Statement of Principles.17

Environmentalists were not the only ones who had problems 

with the Statement of Principles; the Miccosukee and Seminole 

Indians vilified the arrangement as well. Because no Miccosukee 

had participated in the negotiation of the principles, Billy Cypress, 

chairman of the tribe’s business council, denounced them as sacrificing the Miccosukee’s interests “on the alter [sic] of consensus.” 

The document contained “shocking concessions to the special interests,” Cypress continued, and he charged negotiators with deliberately preventing the Miccosukee and environmentalists from participating in the discussions because of their objections.18 Lehtinen, 

speaking on behalf of the Miccosukee, went even further, claiming 

that the Statement of Principles would become known as “the Munich of the Everglades,” where the federal government purchased 

“peace in our time with Big Sugar, leaving to others the difficult task 

of actually saving the Everglades.”19 The specific problems with the 

principles, according to Cypress and Lehtinen, who the tribe had 

hired as their attorney, was that they allowed delays in implementing water quality standards; they provided no “method or mechanism for achieving final [water quality] standards”; and they allowed Big Sugar to “pay less than the full cost of its own pollution.” 

Instead, Cypress wanted to see the state and federal government 

adopt a final phosphorous standard of 10 parts per billion, achieved 

The first page of the Statement of Principles.
Chapter Fourteen | Searching for Consensus 217

by 2002 in the water conservation areas, Big Cypress National Preserve, and Everglades National Park.20 The Seminole were less strident in their comments, but still believed that the principles had 

several problems, including the possibility that they would “change 

the quantity of water flowing across the Big Cypress Reservation, . . 

. the timing and distribution of this water, and its quality.”21

Although the environmental community and the Miccosukee 

had some legitimate complaints of the Statement of Principles, in 

many ways their opposition demonstrated a growing belief that a 

plan that made any kind of concessions to Big Sugar was wrong, regardless of the benefits it might produce. This belief stemmed from 

many factors, but the primary dynamic was the mutually beneficial 

relationship that the sugar industry had with the federal government. 

The industry profited from federal subsidies and price supports and 

returned the favors with large donations to politicians that looked 

out for sugar’s interests. As one article reported, between 1979 and 

1994, the sugar industry donated $12 million to both Democratic 

and Republican politicians, including more than $660,000 to sitting 

members of the House Committee on Agriculture between 1985 and 

1990. In return, Florida’s sugar industry alone had received more 

than $5 billion in government subsidies since the 1940s. These figures, coupled with the notion that the industry abused its labor force 

for large profits, made any kind of compromise with Big Sugar hard 

for many environmentalists to swallow.22

Therefore, it was not surprising that Jim Webb of the Wilderness 

Society was the only environmentalist who endorsed the Statement 

of Principles. Having earlier worked with Babbitt and officials in the 

Corps to get Congress to fund a restudy of the C&SF Project, he now 

accepted the compromise as a necessary step in moving the ecosystem restoration effort forward. Amid all the criticism from the environmental community, Webb’s endorsement was a slender reed on 

which Babbitt and his team hoped to bring environmentalists back 

into the fold. But as some Democratic strategists soon observed, 

most environmentalists in Florida had nowhere else to go, as they 

would not vote Republican.23

Attention now turned to the state’s Everglades Nutrient Removal Project, the prototype for the $465-million system of STAs mandated by the Statement of Principles and prescribed by the Settlement Agreement and Consent Decree prior to that. Begun in August 

1991, the construction project was nearing completion. At a cost 

of $14 million, the constructed marsh occupied a 3,742-acre deltashaped area situated on the border of the EAA and the Loxahatchee 

National Wildlife Refuge. Surrounded on all sides by earthen berms, 

the marsh was to be fed by a two-mile supply canal that would drain 

35,000 acre-feet of water per year from the West Palm Beach Canal 

and farm seepage. The nutrient-laden water was to flow through a 

series of cells, each one filled with aquatic plants that would absorb 

phosphorus and “scrub” the water before it moved to the next cell. 

The first cell in the sequence, called the “buffer cell,” was a 135-acre 

area dense with cattails and algae that had a high capacity for taking phosphorus out of the water. As the cattails and algae died and 

decomposed, they would form a bottom layer of peat that would 

trap phosphorus permanently. From the buffer cell the water flowed 

through four massive cells, each covering several hundred acres 

and host to a different type of aquatic vegetation. Scientists hoped 

to compare the relative effectiveness of each type of aquatic plant 

for phosphorus removal. In addition, in Cells 1 and 2, separate 7.5-

acre research cells would test different combinations of water depth, 

speed, and quantity. Engineers expected to apply the test results to 

the design of other, larger facilities that would be built at other locations around the EAA.24

Some scientists worried that the restoration effort relied too 

heavily on this single technological solution. The goal of the Everglades Nutrient Removal Project was to reduce phosphorus concentrations from 200 parts per billion (ppb) to 50. These results had 

been achieved from constructed wetlands before, but only where the 

wetlands were far larger in relation to the quantity of water flowing 

through them. Here the technology was being applied in an intensified form on an unprecedented scale, and it was being put forward as 

the primary solution to the problem. It remained to be seen whether 

the STAs could get phosphorus concentrations down to 50 ppb, and 

it was also unknown how effective the STAs would be on a longterm basis. Some skeptics complained that too much was riding on 

untried technology, that Babbitt and others were pushing “voodoo 

science.” Other scientists shared these concerns, but emphasized that 

the Everglades cleanup could not wait for more answers. Richard 

Harvey of the Florida Department of Environmental Protection was 

one scientist who believed the gamble to be necessary. “Given a lot of 

time, waiting would be a valid argument,” he told a reporter. “We’re 

not willing to wait two to three years. We don’t want the process to 

be slowed down.”25

In November 1993, activation of this first experimental STA hit 

an unexpected snag. Water discharging from the STA into the Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge did not meet the 50 ppb standard. 

The EPA, citing authority under the Clean Water Act, decided that 

the SFWMD must obtain a federal permit to make further releases of 

this polluted water, a position consistent with the Settlement Agreement and Consent Decree of 1991-1992. It was also in step with plans 

in Congress to review the Clean Water Act in the upcoming session 

and extend its reach to farm-polluted water. But the requirement 

took SFWMD administrators by surprise. With water collecting in 

the STA and threatening to overtop the berms, the SFWMD resumed 

discharges into the Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge without 

a federal permit. Despite earlier threats, the EPA declined to levy a 

fine against the SFWMD. Nevertheless, the confrontation between 

EPA and the SFWMD alarmed farmers, who complained that they 

did not want to spend millions of dollars building filtration marshes only to have them commandeered by EPA. Moreover, they were 
218 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Map of South Florida environmental features. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Fourteen | Searching for Consensus 219

concerned that the federal government would condemn a portion of 

their sugarcane fields for wetlands restoration without due compensation. In December, even as federal and state officials worked out 

their differences over the permit issue, agriculturists walked out of 

mediation talks, with representatives of the U.S. Sugar Corporation 

and the Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida refusing to sign 

the final version of the 1993 compromise. By early January, the litigation threatened to begin anew, as the administrative law judge set two 

hearings to schedule more than 150 depositions.26

Federal and state officials were stunned by the breakdown of negotiations. Their effort to forge consensus lay in tatters. Six months 

earlier they had alienated the Everglades Coalition; now at the end 

of 1993 they had lost the farmers as well. But the Clinton and Chiles 

administrations remained committed to working together on an Everglades restoration plan; there would be no more division between 

the federal government and the state. The Settlement Agreement and 

Consent Decree ensured against that. Moreover, the Clinton administration still had links to Alfonso Fanjul, Jr., president of Flo-Sun 

and a generous donor to the Florida Democratic Party. When the 

farmers broke off negotiations, Florida Crystals, Inc., a subsidiary of 

Flo-Sun (and the largest sugar producer in the EAA) kept the lines 

of communication open. In February 1994, Florida Crystals and federal negotiators quietly reached a separate agreement, whereby the 

corporation agreed to pay for nearly half of the construction costs 

of the STAs in exchange for not having to implement phosphorous 

standards until 2008. This arrangement infuriated nearly everyone: 

the Miccosukee Indians, environmentalists, and even Florida Crystals’ counterparts, the U.S. Sugar Corporation and the Sugar Cane 

Growers Cooperative, whose strategy was now in disarray. Environmentalists and the Miccosukee took the issue to court, while Fanjul 

reaped the benefits: he was invited by Vice President Gore to attend 

an economic summit at the White House, and he hosted a tour of 

a waste-to-energy facility on his sugar plantation by the President’s 

Council on Sustainable Development.27

If the beginning of 1994 seemed to mark the nadir of the Clinton administration’s effort to build consensus around South Florida’s 

water management issues, it also galvanized public opinion for a renewal of that effort. On 3 March 1994, Governor Chiles announced 

that he was establishing the Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South Florida to solicit points of view and forge consensus in 

water matters. The commission would include 35 voting members 

appointed by the governor representing the business community, 

public interest and environmental organizations, county and city 

governments, and one representative each from the SFWMD, the 

South Florida Regional Planning Council, the Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council, the Florida Department of Environmental 

Protection, the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, 

the Florida Senate, and the Florida House. In addition, it would include four non-voting federal officials representing the Corps, the 

Department of the Interior, EPA, and NOAA. The commission’s primary charge was to “improve coordination among and within the 

private and public sectors regarding activities impacting the Everglades Ecosystem.” Like the President’s Council on Sustainable Development, it was to “recommend strategies for ensuring the South 

Florida economy is based on sustainable economic activities that can 

coexist with a healthy Everglades Ecosystem.”28

Governor Chiles asked Estus Whitfield, the longtime advisor to 

Florida governors on environmental matters, to recommend a chairman for the commission. Whitfield suggested Richard Pettigrew, a 

former state legislator and speaker of the house. It was a fortunate 

choice. Pettigrew had the necessary prestige to make the commission visible to the public; he had experience at building consensus 

in the state legislature; and he had the right personality and temperament to control a large commission: patient, soft-spoken, empathetic, a skilled debater. In 1994, Pettigrew had been retired from 

state politics for some years and was practicing law in Miami, but 

he agreed to serve as chairman, holding the position until the commission completed its work in 1999.29 Everglades hands who worked 

with the Governor’s Commission universally praised his leadership: 

“a masterful job,” “a fantastic job,” “a master at bringing the interests 

together,” “absolutely critical to the success.”30

But this remarkable achievement still lay several years in the future. As the Governor’s Commission began its work in the spring of 

1994, federal and state legislators were working to enact two pieces 

of legislation—one federal and one state—that would further define 

the Everglades restoration process as a joint federal-state undertaking. The first of these, passed by Congress in March 1994, amended 

the Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act of 1989 

to allow the secretary of the interior to take funds appropriated for 

flood control projects in the East Everglades and apply them for land 

acquisition in that area instead. The authorization paralleled another 

An editorial cartoon showing the disgust that some felt with the continuing litigation over phosphorous cleanup.
220 United States Army Corps of Engineers

federal commitment to land acquisition in the Kissimmee River Valley and buttressed the state’s ability to purchase land in the EAA. 

As such, it marked another step in the gradual transformation of 

the C&SF Project into the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration 

Plan. In a timely show of bipartisanship, Congressman Clay Shaw of 

Miami, a Republican, and Congressman Peter Deutsch of Broward 

County, a Democrat, co-sponsored the bill in the House, while Senator Bob Graham saw it through the Senate.31

State legislators, meanwhile, crafted a state law that went even 

further in solidifying federal support for Everglades restoration. The 

Everglades Forever Act, which Governor Chiles signed into law on 

3 May 1994, codified construction projects and other cleanup efforts embodied in the Settlement Agreement (1991), Consent Decree (1992), and Statement of Principles (1993). The law described a 

treatment system, funding plan, regulatory program, research program, land use plan (including land acquisition in the East Everglades Area), and restoration schedule. The treatment system, which 

would be built by the SFWMD and known as the Everglades Construction Project, featured a combination of STAs and BMPs. In addition to the six STAs previously contemplated, the law required the 

Corps to complete a seventh, STA 1-E as part of its work on a flood 

control project in the western C-51 basin.32

The funding plan called for a contribution of between $233 and 

$322 million by farmers (the same as in the Statement of Principles), 

and approximately $400 million by the state (a substantial increase 

over what had been outlined in the Statement of Principles). These 

amounts would be accompanied by an $87 million contribution by 

the federal government. The Florida Department of Environmental Protection and the EPA would regulate discharges by the STAs, 

and the SFWMD would supervise discharges by agricultural interests. The law mandated research to establish a scientific, numerically based standard for phosphorus levels and stipulated a default 

standard of 10 parts per billion if the Department of Environmental 

Protection did not set a standard by 2003. The restoration schedule 

called for the various STAs to become operational between 1997 and 

2003, and all areas of the Everglades were to meet applicable water 

quality standards by December 31, 2006.33

In the spirit of achieving “balance,” the Everglades Forever Act 

involved give and take by all sides. Governor Chiles could finally 

claim some success in bringing an end to the lawsuits and getting 

a restoration plan in place, while the Clinton administration had 

achieved its goal of establishing a long-range partnership between 

the federal government, the state, and the private sector. The sugar 

industry had held the line on its financial commitment, and it had 

obtained a reprieve of several years before more stringent guidelines on phosphorus levels would take effect. Environmentalists 

had won their point that the extensive acreage required for STAs 

should come out of agricultural lands, not the state-owned Rotenberger and Holey Land tracts.

Still, the environmental community, together with the Miccosukee Indians, believed that Big Sugar was the winner in this 

law, and that the environment and Florida taxpayers were the losers. The main problem, these groups contended, was that the Everglades Forever Act pushed back deadlines for agriculturists to 

meet water quality standards, essentially allowing the pollution 

of the Everglades to continue until 2006. These provisions convinced environmentalists and the Miccosukee that the Clinton 

and Chiles administrations, as well as state legislators, had sold 

out to the powerful sugar lobby, which, they said, had flooded the 

state capital with some 30 to 40 lobbyists.34 They characterized the 

law as a disgraceful retreat from the Marjory Stoneman Douglas 

Everglades Protection Act of 1991. Indeed, the 1994 legislation began as an amendment to the earlier act and was only given a new 

title after Douglas, the grand dame of Everglades preservation, denounced the effort and demanded that her name be taken off the 

bill.35 Although sugar interests contended with the notion that it 

had unduly influenced state politicians to pass the act, they did 

not disagree that the industry benefited from the law. According to 

Barbara Miedema, vice president of communications for the Sugar Drainage map of the Everglades Agricultural Area. (South Florida Water 

Management District)
Chapter Fourteen | Searching for Consensus 221

Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida, the Everglades Forever Act 

provided “a far better, more comprehensive solution” than the Settlement Agreement or Consent Decree.36

The Miccosukee were especially vehement in their denunciations 

of the Everglades Forever Act, claiming that it merely codified the objectionable parts of the Statement of Principles and that it kowtowed 

to the sugar industry. In protest, the tribe took several actions. First, 

it, along with other entities, petitioned the Florida Department of Environmental Protection to implement a 10 ppb phosphorous standard 

immediately. When the department refused, the tribe filed a case in 

the federal district court, charging that the act changed Florida’s water quality standards. At the same time, the Miccosukee—under the 

authority granted it by its water rights compact—began developing 

its own water quality standards, declaring that any water flowing onto 

reservation lands that exceeded the 10 ppb phosphorous limit would 

violate these standards. The tribe officially adopted these standards 

in December 1997, causing an uproar among the SFWMD and other 

agencies that would continue for the rest of the 1990s.37

Passage of the Everglades Forever Act was not the only setback 

for environmentalists and the Miccosukee in the spring of 1994. In 

its January meeting, the Everglades Coalition had made a strategic 

decision to endorse a petition drive to place a penny-a-pound pollution tax on sugar on the statewide election ballot.38 The pennya-pound tax was the brainchild of George Barley, an Orlando developer whom Joe Browder called “the strongest citizen Everglades 

leader in Florida.”39 As we have seen, Barley first got the attention of 

the environmental community for his efforts on behalf of Florida 

Bay. His success in bringing national attention to the degradation of 

Florida Bay was soon overshadowed, however, by his bold strategy 

to confront the Everglades polluters at the ballot box with the initiative for a tax on sugar. Barley’s organization, the Save Our Everglades 

Committee, argued that Big Sugar was not only the major culprit in 

the decline of the Everglades, but that it was trying to pass the buck 

for cleaning up its own waste. This line of argument had broad public 

appeal, especially among the urban populace of South Florida who 

paid, according to Barley’s organization, 111 times the amount that 

Big Sugar provided for water.40

The Everglades Coalition decided to get behind the Save Our 

Everglades campaign, a momentous decision as this was tantamount 

to the whole environmental community making a frontal attack on 

Big Sugar.41 Anticipating a hard fight, coalition members concluded 

that they needed new leadership. They asked Joe Browder, the irascible critic of the Statement of Principles and no friend of the Clinton 

administration, to provide that direction. Browder agreed to serve, 

but wanted a co-chairman. The coalition elected Browder and Tom 

Martin as co-chairmen, while Theresa Woody of the Sierra Club was 

appointed grassroots coordinator.42

The penny-a-pound campaign soon acquired its own momentum. By the spring of 1994, more than half a million Florida voters had signed the petition, with 104-year-old Marjory Stoneman 

Douglas heading the list. The sugar industry fought back in the 

courts, complaining that the language in the petition unfairly passed 

judgment on the industry. In May, the Florida Supreme Court ruled 

that the initiative as written read too much like partisan rhetoric and 

could not go on the November ballot. With so many signatures already gathered, it was too late to reword the petition. The Save Our 

Everglades Committee, acknowledging that it had lost the battle 

but not the war, vowed to fight on and pursue a sugar tax by some 

other means, and the Everglades Coalition closed ranks behind it. 

The Supreme Court decision came less than three weeks after Governor Chiles signed into law the Everglades Forever Act. Locked in a 

struggle over the proposed sugar tax, the coalition had no choice but 

to place itself in opposition to the federal-state-agricultural partnership established under the Everglades Forever Act.43

The grassroots campaign to tax sugar—to make the “polluter 

pay”—had yet to reach full steam. That would happen in the context 

of presidential election year politics in 1996. In the meantime, environmentalists retreated into a skeptical funk as the state and federal 

governments moved ahead with the Everglades Construction Project—the name given to the system of STAs and other civil works 

mandated by the Everglades Forever Act.44 As construction plans 

advanced through conceptual and preliminary design stages, the 

SFWMD acquired lands in portions of the EAA designed for STA 3 

and 4. EPA granted a two-year extension of the SFWMD’s operating permit for the Everglades Nutrient Removal Project, or STA 1 

W. Sugar growers, playing their new role of public-spirited private 

enterprise, implemented BMPs, and the governor’s office declared 

that the BMPs made a total phosphorous reduction of 44 percent 

compared to the baseline level of the previous decade.45

The federal and state governments proceeded as well with their 

respective efforts to build consensus for a comprehensive ecosystem 

restoration plan, aided by a workshop held in June 1994 for natural 

and social scientists funded by the U.S. Department of State’s Man 

and the Biosphere Program. These scholars—both academicians and 

government personnel—discussed principles of ecosystem restoration and used South Florida as a case study of sustainability, primarily 

because “the Everglades and South Florida exemplify the complex set 

of issues that must be addressed to sustain human-dominated ecosystems.” The group decided that federal and state forces needed to consider “urban, agricultural, and ecological systems” as they developed 

plans to maintain “fresh, flowing water” throughout the Everglades 

system. Based on a study of different hydrologic restoration scenarios, the group proclaimed the possibility of restoring the Everglades 

while continuing to meet urban and agricultural needs.46

At the same time, issues with Florida Bay continued to percolate. Scientists, including those from the NOAA, the SFWMD, and 

various universities, studied the issue in order to determine what 

was causing problems in the bay and how they could be resolved. 
222 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Different subgroups of the Interagency Working Group and the 

South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force examined the issues as well; the Interagency Working Group on Florida Bay sponsored efforts to develop an interagency science plan for the bay. In 

1994, the plan was completed, representing “the first interagency 

science plan for any South Florida subregion formulated under the 

aegis of the South Florida Ecosystem Task Force.” Among other 

things, the plan called for trying to understand Florida Bay’s condition prior to drainage and separating human-caused change from 

natural evolutions. It recommended the use of computer models to 

simulate how the bay would respond to change, and it posed a series 

of questions that needed answering.47

Despite these efforts, the end of 1994 saw little real progress, 

and the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary Advisory Council 

noted that no single issue was more important “to all of us, than getting restoration moving on Florida Bay.” Likewise, George Frampton, assistant secretary of the interior who chaired the task force, 

emphasized the importance of getting general restoration efforts off 

the ground. “This is not rescuing an ecosystem at the last minute,” he 

declared. “This is restoring something that has gone over the edge.”48

Meanwhile, the Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South 

Florida led the state’s effort to achieve consensus, meeting monthly 

and reporting to the governor on a quarterly basis. This body provided a crucial forum for representatives of the environmental community and the agricultural industry to go toe to toe and talk through 

their issues. In the early meetings, Chairman Richard Pettigrew enlisted the Florida Conflict Resolution Consortium to facilitate the 

process. With myriad issues to tackle, the commission had to decide 

whether to form committees or work through all the issues in a large 

group.

At first the members did not trust each other to divide into 

committees, but this soon changed. The commission met in a new 

location each month—Clewiston, Fort Myers, the Keys—and on 

the second day of these two-day meetings there was regularly a nohost event at which members had an opportunity to get to know 

one another as individual human beings, which built relationships of 

trust. This was essential to their mission of finding common ground. 

Gradually, commission members united behind a single vision: to 

put forward a plan for ecosystem restoration that would benefit all 

interests, be they agricultural, urban, recreational, or environmental. 

Florida Bay. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Fourteen | Searching for Consensus 223

Indeed, Carol Rist, an environmentalist on the Governor’s Commission, stated that a critical turning point for the commission came 

when agricultural and urban interests realized that they would not 

get federal money for reinventing the C&SF Project unless it was 

part of a program for restoring the Everglades. At that moment, Rist 

remembers, group members began to look for common ground with 

each other and with the environmental community.49

Meanwhile, the Corps proceeded with the reconnaissance phase 

of its restudy and, in 1995, presented a six-year plan for a feasibility 

study. An article in Science delineated the ultimate plan for restoration, stating that federal and state agencies wanted to “replumb the 

entire Florida Everglades ecosystem, including 14,000 square kilometers of wetlands and engineered waterways” at a cost of $2 billion, 

one-third of which was supposed to come from the federal government. The efforts would attempt to “take engineered swampland riddled with canals and levees and transform it into natural wetlands 

that flood and drain in rhythm with rainfall.” Wetlands managers 

across the world were watching with interest, the article claimed, 

to see if the Florida plan would succeed, hoping to discover solutions for “their own ravaged regions.” However, since nothing this 

complicated had ever been attempted, the restoration, which still did 

not have a “final blueprint,” would have to operate on “a hefty dose 

of scientific uncertainty.” In addition, politics threatened to capsize 

the undertaking, especially since it was unclear whether the “broad 

coalition of interests and money, from federal and state agencies to 

environmentalists and urban developers” could hold together over 

the life of the project. “We have the technical knowledge to do the 

restoration,” John Ogden, a biologist for Everglades National Park 

stated, “but I worry about sustaining the political will.”50 

Indeed, despite state and federal efforts, environmentalists and 

sugarcane growers remained hostile. In January 1995, the EC announced that it would initiate a nationwide campaign against sugar 

price supports. If the growers refused to pay a fair amount to clean 

up their own waste, environmentalists reasoned, then the next step 

was to attack federal subsidies and allow market forces to drive some 

of the producers out of the EAA. Many now argued that sugarcane 

did not belong in the area at all: it was grown in the Caribbean at 

much less expense and without so much harm to the environment. 

Environmentalists soon found an unexpected ally in U.S. Senator 

Richard Lugar, a Republican from Indiana.51 In the fall of 1995, Lugar 

was looking for voter support in Florida in his bid for the Republican 

Party presidential nomination. To court environmental interests, he 

proposed a federal tax on sugar, suggesting that the revenue be used 

to buy sugar plantations in the EAA for conversion into wetlands, 

thereby protecting the Everglades.52

Lugar’s opponent in the Republican Party primaries, Senator Robert Dole, had a counter proposal. Under Dole’s guidance, a 

section was inserted in the Federal Agricultural Improvement and 

Reform Act of 1996 appropriating $200 million (available to the secretary of the interior on 1 July 1996) to acquire property in the Everglades ecosystem for restoration purposes and to “fund resource 

protection and resource maintenance activities in the Everglades 

ecosystem.” Although this was one of the first federal appropriations 

specifically for Everglades restoration, it still upset some environmentalists because it did not force the sugar industry to contribute 

to the cost of these purchases.53

Not to be outdone, Vice President Albert Gore announced in 

February 1996 a comprehensive seven-year plan developed by the 

Clinton administration to restore the Everglades. This plan included 

both a slug of federal money to buy sugarcane plantations in the 

EAA and a penny-a-pound tax on Florida sugar. It proposed to double the federal government’s current spending levels on Everglades 

protection to at least $500 million.54 Sugar growers were not pleased; 

according to one account, Alfonso Fanjul called President Clinton 

after Gore unveiled the plan and “bitched” the President out. “He’d 

campaigned for Clinton, delivered a lot of votes,” one lobbyist explained, “and here was Gore paying him back with a tax.”55

In addition, the timing of Gore’s announcement, coming on 

the heels of the two Republican proposals and on the eve of the 

state primaries in the 1996 presidential election campaign, gave 

some observers the impression that South Florida’s environmental problems had ignited a bidding war. Newsweek saw the plan, 

which could ultimately total $1.5 billion, as “the high-water mark 

of reform,” trumping Dole’s “more modest plan to spend $200 

million of taxpayer funds—not sugar money—to buy some of the 

sugar cane land for a water-restoration project.”56 The Economist, 

a conservative British magazine, described the administration’s 

restoration plan under the jaundiced title, “The Florida Everglades, 

River of Money.” This writer had no doubt that the federal largesse 

was aimed at capturing Florida’s 25 electoral votes in the coming 

presidential election. “The federal cash has one source: election year 

politics,” the article intoned.57

Election year politics continued to frame the issues. Buoyed 

by the administration’s support for a penny-a-pound tax on sugar, 

the Save Our Everglades campaign secured enough signatures to 

get three proposed amendments to the Florida constitution on the 

November 1996 ballot. One would impose a penny-a-pound tax 

on sugar grown in the EAA, another would establish the principle 

that polluters were responsible for cleaning up their own waste, and 

the third would create a trust fund for Everglades restoration. The 

amendments were a bold and unusual step in two respects: they 

took the matter directly to a vote of the people, and they sought to 

hold one industry chiefly accountable for the pollution of the Everglades. After George Barley died in a 1995 plane crash on the way 

to an Everglades restoration meeting, his wife Mary headed the 

penny-a-pound campaign, using the financial backing of Paul Tudor Jones, the founder and chairman of the Tudor Group of Companies (a money management firm in Connecticut). Jones, a friend 
224 United States Army Corps of Engineers

of the Barleys who had become interested in Florida’s environmental 

health, pledged at George’s funeral to pick up the environmental flag. 

With Jones’ bankroll, Mary’s citizen effort provoked a massive response by the sugar industry, which filed some 38 lawsuits challenging the amendments and spent around $35 million on advertising 

that opposed the penny-a-pound tax; environmental interests were 

only able to generate approximately $11 million for advertising. The 

advertising campaign reached a crescendo on Election Day, when 

the industry spent more than a million dollars to convince voters 

that the tax would ruin the industry and eliminate 40,000 jobs. Voters approved two amendments, but they rejected the crucial pennya-pound tax.58

Environmentalists were not only stung by this second defeat of 

the tax initiative, some were embittered by what they viewed as a 

second betrayal by the Clinton administration. Once the Save Our 

Everglades campaign succeeded in getting the amendments on the 

ballot, the Clinton administration dropped its own proposal for a 

penny-a-pound tax on sugar. Ostensibly, the administration wanted 

to defer to Florida voters on this issue, a natural position, but environmentalists saw in this development the nefarious hand of Big 

Sugar. They were even more doubtful of the administration after it 

backpedaled from Gore’s earlier pledge to take no less than 100,000 

acres out of sugarcane production and rededicate the land for pollution abatement. Reportedly, the administration modified its position 

on this matter after another telephone call to the White House by 

Alfonso Fanjul.59

Embittered environmentalists claimed that the Clinton administration had politicized the planning process initiated by Secretary 

Babbitt in 1993 in order to win the state of Florida in the election of 

1996. They accused Vice President Gore of grandstanding with the 

“Gore plan” while capitulating to the sugar interests, so that Clinton and Gore could win votes and maintain Big Sugar’s political 

support.60 In fact, Florida did swing narrowly into the Democratic 

column in President Clinton’s re-election. It should be remembered 

that the Florida vote barely tipped to President George H. W. Bush in 

1992, and would be so close in 2000 as to confound the national election until the U.S. Supreme Court decided the matter for President 

George W. Bush. It is impossible to draw a precise connection between Florida’s crucial role in these national elections and the growing willingness by the White House and Congress to invest in Everglades restoration during the 1990s, but the connection cannot be 

ignored. As EPA administrator Carol Browner observed about the 

$200 million for Everglades restoration included in the 1996 farm 

bill, “suddenly, the political stars aligned.”61 The same thing would be 

said about CERP four years later.

But even with the Clinton administration’s apparent backpedaling, there were glimmers of hope. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, for example, had completed the reconnaissance phase of its 

Restudy of the C&SF Project, declaring in November 1994 that “the 

fundamental tenet of South Florida ecosystem restoration is that 

hydrologic restoration is a necessary starting point for ecological 

restoration.” Using an environmental evaluation methodology that 

compared the hydrological effects of different restoration projects, 

the Corps determined that “the hydrologic function of the historic 

south Florida ecosystems can be recovered,” and it recommended 

that it proceed with a feasibility study of the different restoration options that it could pursue.62 Accordingly, the Clinton administration 

directed that the Corps complete, in the words of H. Martin Lancaster, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works), “a study to 

develop a comprehensive restoration plan for South Florida.” This 

study, Lancaster explained, would try to “determine the feasibility 

of structural and/or operational modifications to the Central and 

Southern Florida Project to restore the Everglades and Florida Bay 

ecosystems.”63

Congress authorized the feasibility study in the Water Resources Development Act of 1996 (WRDA-96), drafted largely by Michael 

Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works), directing that the Corps develop “a proposed comprehensive plan for the 

purpose of restoring, preserving, and protecting the South Florida 

ecosystem,” including ways to protect water quality and to restore 

water to the Everglades, before 1 July 1999. The legislation stipulated 

that the Corps work with the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration 

Task Force (which it formally established) in this study, and it gave 

the Corps the authority to implement any restoration project “expeditiously” if it discovered that such an undertaking would “produce 

independent, immediate, and substantial restoration, preservation, 

and protection benefits.”64 To fund these efforts, the law appropriated $75 million, a large amount for projects that would normally 

fall under the umbrella of “continuing authorities.” Such continuing 

authorities were usually capped at $5 million in order to preserve 

Editorial cartoon from the St. Petersburg Times about Everglades restoration. (Used by permission of the St. Petersburg Times)
Chapter Fourteen | Searching for Consensus 225

congressional control over them, meaning that it required, in the 

words of Davis, “some heavy lifting” on the part of the Corps before 

Congress would authorize the $75 million. The law also stipulated 

that non-federal interests share 50 percent in the cost of any restoration effort. Because of these features, and because of the relatively short time span for the study, Davis considered it a “watershed 

event” that “set the bar high” for future restoration endeavors.65 The 

South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force agreed, declaring in 

a 1998 biennial report that WRDA-96 was “an ambitious milestone 

in the goal of restoring a sustainable South Florida.”66

By 1997, then, several pieces had fallen into place, expediting 

restoration of the Everglades ecosystem. Federal funding had been 

provided, both in the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 and in WRDA-96. Congress had stipulated that the 

Corps complete a restoration study by 1999, and had also authorized 

it to begin restoration efforts that would have a significant effect on 

the ecosystem. These gains were achieved, in large part, because 

of the cooperation of federal, state, and non-government interests, 

largely through the workings of the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force and the Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable 

South Florida.

But beneath this veneer of consensus, trouble still brewed, primarily between the sugar industry and environmentalists. Environmentalist criticism of the 1993 Statement of Principles and the Everglades Forever Act, which were supposed to end Dexter Lehtinen’s 

lawsuit, upset sugar magnates who had compromised to get them 

enacted, and these hard feelings were intensified by the environmental community’s efforts to enact the penny-a-pound sugar tax. 

Sugar forces, meanwhile, enraged environmentalists by filing new 

suits against water quality controls and by influencing politicians, 

including President Clinton, to weaken the industry’s responsibility 

for cleanup efforts. Because of these conditions, restoration efforts 

would proceed with some difficulty, even though they now had a 

level of unprecedented federal support.

Endnotes

1 G. H. Snyder and J. M. Davidson, “Everglades Agriculture: Past, 

Present, and Future,” in Everglades: The Ecosystem an Its Restoration, Steven M. Davis and John C. Ogden, eds. (Delray Beach, Fla.: St. Lucie Press, 

1994), 111.

2 Snyder and Davidson, “Everglades Agriculture: Past, Present, and 

Future,” 111. For more information on field workers (and for criticism of 

their treatment), see Wilkinson, Big Sugar.

3 Lynn R. Martin and Eugene Z. Stakhiv, Sustainable Development: 

Concepts, Goals and Relevance to the Civil Works Program, IWR Report 

99-PS-1 (Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Water Resources, Water Resources 

Support Center, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1999), 3-5.

4 “President’s Council on Sustainable Development, Overview” 

<http://clinton2.nara.gov/PCSD/ Overview/index.html> (1 September 

2005).

5 F. Douglas Muschett, ed., Principles of Sustainable Development

(Delray Beach, Fla.: St. Lucie Press, 1997): 53-57.

6 Rodgers, “The Miccosukee Indians and Environmental Law,” 10924.

7 As cited in “Everglades Plan Comes Under Fire,” National Parks 

Magazine 67 (September/October 1993): 10.

8 Department of the Interior News Release, 13 July 1993, File Pro Ever 

Everglades Restoration History, Box 21213, SFWMDAR; The Tampa Tribune, 15 July 1993.

9 The Miami Herald, 14 July 1993.

10 Statement of Principles, 13 July 1993, File Pro Ever Everglades Restoration History, Box 21213, SFWMDAR.

11 Statement of Principles.

12 Environmental groups had practical as well as philosophical reasons to be mistrustful: in their public service role as watchdogs over government regulatory agencies, environmental groups needed hard target 

levels to help them monitor the government’s job performance.

13 Everglades Coalition to Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior, 30 

July 1993, in House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations and 

House Subcommitee on National Parks, Forests and Public Lands, Committee on Natural Resources, and House Subcommittee on Environment 

and Natural Resources, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 

Florida Everglades Ecosystem, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 1993, 461-465; SunSentinel, 13 July 1993; Mark Derr, “Redeeming the Everglades,” Audubon 

95 (September/October 1993): 130.

14 Browder interview, 7.

15 All quotations in The Miami Herald, 14 July 1993; see also Browder 

interview, 7; Grunwald, The Swamp, 298.

16 Sun-Sentinel, 13 July 1993

17 Browder interview, 7; The Tampa Tribune, 15 July 1993.

18 Billy Cypress, Chairman, Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, 

to Honorable Harry Johnston, Member of Congress, 9 July 1993, File Everglades Mediation Miccosukee, Box 19706, SFWMDAR.

19 As cited in Rodgers, “The Miccosukee Indians and Environmental 

Law,” 10918.

20 Billy Cypress, Chairman, and Dexter Lehtinen, General Counsel, 

“Position Statement Regarding Everglades ‘Statement of Principles,’“ 13 

July 1993, File Everglades Mediation Miccosukee, Box 19706, SFWMDAR.

21 “Seminole Tribe of Florida Comments and Concerns with the Everglades Mediation Technical Plan,” 3, File Miccosukee WQ Standards, Box 

19706, SFWMDAR.

22 See Gary Barlow, “A Sweet Deal for the Sugar Industry,” In These 

Times 20 (14 October 1996): 10. For an explanation of general federal policies towards the sugar industry, see Andrew Schmitz and Douglas Christian, “The Economics and Politics of U.S. Sugar Policy,” in The Economics and Politics of World Sugar Policies, Stephen V. Marks and Keith E. 

Maskus, eds. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1993), 49-78.

23 Joe Browder, Tom Martin, and Theresa Woody to Everglades Coalition leadership, 7 April 1994, document provided by Joe Browder to author.

24 David Kohn, “Polishing an Ecological Jewel,” Engineering NewsRecord 231 (9 August 1993): 29.

25 Kohn, “Polishing an Ecological Jewel,” 29.

26 Sun-Sentinel, 10 December 1993; Palm Beach Post, 10 December 

1993; Malcolm Wade, Jr., interview by Julian Pleasants, 3 April 2001, 5, 
226 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Everglades Interview No. 5, Samuel Proctor Oral History Program, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida [hereafter referred to as Wade interview]; “Discord Swamps Everglades Talks,” Engineering News-Record

232 (3 January 1994): 9; “Everglades Case Heads Back to Court,” National 

Parks Magazine 68 (March/April 1994): 11-12.

27 Wade interview, 9; Levin, Liquid Land, 211; Joe Browder et al. to Everglades Coalition leadership, 7 April 1994; “Everglades Case Heads Back 

to Court,” 11; Paul Roberts, “The Sweet Hereafter,” Harper’s 299 (November 1999): 62. Fanjul had Clinton’s ear as well; it was alleged that he talked 

to the president in February 1996 about a proposed sugar tax, interrupting 

Clinton’s break-up speech to Monica Lewinsky. Grunwald, The Swamp, 

309.

28 State of Florida, Office of the Governor, Executive Order Number 

94-54, “Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South Florida,” Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South Florida <http://www.state.fl.us/

everglades/gcssf_eo.html> (8 September 2005).

29 Whitfield interview, 39.

30 Bonner interview, 4; Carol and Karsten Rist interview by Theodore 

Catton, 9 November 2004, 2 [hereafter referred to as Rist interview]; Causey interview, 9; Whitfield interview, 39.

31 House, Exchange of Certain Lands in California, 103d Cong., 1st 

sess., 1993, H. Rept. 103-362; Act of 9 March 1994 (108 Stat. 98).

32 Glynn D. Kay, “Outline of Florida Everglades Legislation,” 20 April 

1994, File PRO Ever Everglades Legislation, Box 21213, SFWMDAR.

33 Kay, “Outline of Florida Everglades Legislation,” 20 April 1994; 

“Governor’s Office: Everglades Bill Summary,” 3 May 1994, File PRO Everglades Forever Act 94, Box 15232, SFWMDAR. The full text of the bill 

with additional commentary is in House Committee on Natural Resources Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests, and Public Lands, Oversight 

Hearing on the Land Use Policies of South Florida, With a Focus on Public 

Lands and What Impact These Policies are Having, 103d Cong., 2d sess., 

1994, 119-221.

34 Save Our Everglades, “Everglades Forever Act,” no date, and Florida Audubon Society, The President’s Letter 19 (June 1994), File PRO Everglades Forever Act 94, Box 15232, SFWMDAR.

35 Joe Browder, Tom Martin, Theresa Woody to Everglades Coalition 

leadership, 7 April 1994.

36 Wedgworth and Miedema interview, 5.

37 See Alfred R. Light, “Miccosukee Wars in the Everglades: Settlement, Litigation, and Regulation to Restore an Ecosystem,” St. Thomas Law 

Review 13 (Spring 2001): 731-732; Miccosukee Environmental Protection 

Code, Subtitle B: Water Quality Standards for Surface Waters of the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, copy in Miccosukee WQ Standards, 

Box 19706, SFWMDAR; Sam Poole for Frank Williamson, Jr., to Secretary 

Murley, Florida State Clearinghouse, 13 October 1997, ibid. The Seminole 

also adopted its own water quality standards, but since it set phosphorous 

levels at 50 ppb, it was not as controversial as the Miccosukee code. See 

Seminole Water Commission, Seminole Tribe of Florida, “Proposed Rules, 

Water Quality Protection and Restoration; Rules to Carry Out the Federal Clean Water Act and the Tribal Water Code including Water Quality 

Standards for the Big Cypress Reservation, File Indian Affairs,” Seminole 

Water Quality Standard Research 94-98, Box 22792, SFWMDAR.

38 The Everglades Coalition, “Past Conferences, 2005” <http://www.

evergladescoalition.org/site/ pastconference.html> (13 September 2005).

39 Joseph Browder, e-mail communication with author, 17 November 

2004.

40 Save Our Everglades, “Everglades Forever Act,” no date, File PRO 

Everglades Forever Act 94, Box 15232, SFWMDAR.

41 The Everglades Coalition, “Past Conferences, 2005” <http://www.

evergladescoalition.org/site/ pastconference.html> (13 September 2005).

42 Everglades Coalition Meeting Minutes, 13-16 January 1994, document provided by Joseph Browder to author.

43 Save Our Everglades News Release, 26 May 1994, File PRO Everglades Forever Act ‘94, Box 15232, SFWMDAR, Tallahassee Democrat, 31 

May 1994; Browder interview, 8.

44 The Everglades Coalition invited Governor Chiles to deliver the 

keynote address at the coalition’s annual meeting in January 1995, despite 

its condemnation of the Everglades Forever Act less than a year earlier.

45 Office of the Governor, Save Our Everglades: A Status Report by the 

Office of Governor Lawton Chiles (n.p., 1994), 6-7.

46 As reported in Victoria Myers, “The Everglades: Researchers Take a 

New Approach to an Old Problem,” Sea Frontiers 40 (December 1994): 15. 

For more information on this study and on its findings, see Mark A. Harwell, “Ecosystem Management of South Florida,” BioScience 47 (September 1997): 499-512. Harwell was the chair of the Man and the Biosphere 

Program Human-Dominated Systems Directorate.

47 “Interagency Florida Bay Science Plan,” March 1994, Billy Causey’s 

Task Force Files, FKNMSAR.

48 As quoted in Elizabeth Culotta, “Bringing Back the Everglades,” 

Science 268 (23 June 1995): 1688.

49 Rist interview, 2-3.

50 All quotations in Culotta, “Bringing Back the Everglades,” 1688.

51 Levin, Liquid Land, 212.

52 “The Florida Everglades, River of Money,” The Economist 362 (30 

March 1996): 32.

53 Quotations in Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act 

of 1996 (110 Stat. 888, 1022-1025); see also Kim O’Connell, “Gore Unveils 

Everglades Plan,” National Parks 70 (May/June 1996): 13-14.

54 Harvey Wasserman, “Cane Mutiny,” The Nation 262 (11 March 

1996): 6.

55 As cited in Paul Roberts, “The Sweet Hereafter,” Harper’s Magazine 

299 (November 1999): 62.

56 Peter Katel, “Letting the Water Run into ‘Big Sugar’s’ Bowl,” Newsweek (4 March 1996): 56.

57 “The Florida Everglades, River of Money,” 32.

58 Gail DeGeorge, “Big Sugar is Bitter over the Everglades,” Business 

Week (4 November 1996): 192; Levin, Liquid Land, 216; Grunwald, The 

Swamp, 308-309; Reed interview, 7.

59 Levin, Liquid Land, 214; Michael Grunwald, “When in Doubt, 

Blame Big Sugar,” The Washington Post, 3 November 2004.

60 Big Sugar’s influence on the White House was not just direct; it 

also came through Florida politicians whose own re-election chances depended on Big Sugar’s continued campaign funding support.

61 Browner quoted in “The Florida Everglades: River of Money,” 32.

62 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Central and 

Southern Florida Project, Reconnaissance Report, Comprehensive Review 

Study (Jacksonville, Fla.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, 1994), EX-1—EX-4, 223-231.

63 House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment, Water Resources Development Act of 1996: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Water Resources 

and Environment, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House 

of Representatives, 104th Cong., 2d sess., 1996, copy at <http://web.lexisnexis.com.weblib.lib.umt.edu:2048 /congcomp> (3 January 2006).

64 Water Resources Development Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 3658, 3767-

3768).
Chapter Fourteen | Searching for Consensus 227

65 Michael Davis interview by Theodore Catton, 21 December 2004, 

1-2.

66 “Maintaining the Momentum: South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force Biennial Report to the U.S. Congress, Florida Legislature, 

Seminole Tribe of Florida, and Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida,” 

Draft, December 1998, 1, File Administrative, 1998, FKNMSAR.

229

As the clash between sugar interests and environmentalists 

threatened the consensus formula for Everglades restoration, the 

Seminole and Miccosukee Indians were waging battles that many 

perceived as equally divisive. These people had resided in the Everglades since the 1800s, obtaining state and federal reservations of 

land, making them especially concerned about water issues in the 

area. Because the Seminole did not have as much actual land in the 

Everglades, they generally used conciliatory approaches to promulgate their views. The Miccosukee Tribe, on the other hand, had a 

land base primarily in the Everglades, making them turn to litigation in the 1990s to protect their interests. Under the guidance of 

Dexter Lehtinen, the Miccosukee combated what they perceived as 

lax water quality standards through lawsuits and by setting their own 

guidelines. They justified their stance by declaring that the push towards ecosystem restoration had not sufficiently provided for their 

input, thereby threatening their interests.1

 The tribe’s actions forced 

federal, state, and local interests to pay more attention to the Indians 

in restoration efforts, and, at least in the minds of the Miccosukee, 

furthered progress towards a restored Everglades.

As explained previously, by the 1960s, the Seminole and Miccosukee had several state and federal reservations in South Florida. 

In addition to these lands, the Miccosukee obtained a 40-year special 

use permit from the National Park Service in 1964 for a five and 

a half mile strip of land along the Tamiami Trail, comprising 333 

acres and known as the Permit Area (this was later expanded to 667 

acres in 1998). The permit allowed the Miccosukee to build offices, 

housing, and schools, but made such development subject to NPS 

approval. Moreover, both tribes obtained a license from the state for 

the use of a large chunk of land north of the Permit Area and east 

Chapter 15

of the reservation, although Conservation Area No. 3 flooded much 

of the northern part of this tract as well, and this license eventually 

transformed into a perpetual lease of the area.2

Because of the implementation of the C&SF Project in 1948, 

the Seminole and Miccosukee had little control over water policies 

that affected their land. The Corps of Engineers and the SFWMD 

made decisions about how much water went into Conservation Area 

No. 3 and the Everglades, as well as regulating the water in Lake 

Okeechobee.3 These determinations affected not only the quantity of 

water flowing to Seminole and Miccosukee lands, but the quality as 

well. By the 1970s, the Seminole and the Miccosukee experienced the 

same ecological problems that the Everglades and the conservation 

areas faced as a consequence of water decisions and growth in South 

Florida. As Buffalo Tiger, a respected Miccosukee leader, related,

As for Everglades’ water, everything has changed. The water was very clean years ago. Miccosukees would swim in 

the Glades water and drink it. Today people are saying that 

the water is not clean. You can tell that is true because it 

is yellow-looking and does not look like water you would 

want to drink. You probably get sick from drinking it. That 

means that fish or alligators in the water are not healthy; 

white men did that, not Indians. Miccosukees were told 

that was what was going to happen many years ago, and 

now it has. We cannot just say that the water is no good or 

the land is no good and turn our back on that.4

Because of the conviction that the Indians had to do something 

to improve the quality of their water, even though the degradation 

Preserving Their Interests: The Seminole and 

Miccosukee Indians
230 United States Army Corps of Engineers

was not of their own making, the Seminole and Miccosukee struggled to gain some measure of control over the water flowing over 

their reservations.

The Seminole’s efforts began in 1973, when the tribe investigated whether or not the state of Florida ever compensated it for 

16,000 acres of reservation land flooded by Conservation Area No. 

3. The Seminole contacted Governor Reubin Askew, telling him that, 

in contrast with the state’s practice regarding private land, the tribe 

had never obtained a fee for the easement. One reason for this was 

that the easement had actually been granted by the Board of Commissioners of State Institutions in August 1950, rather than by the 

Seminole themselves, since the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund held title to the land in trust for the Indians.5

 R. L. Clark, 

Jr., chairman of the FCD’s governing board, explained that the Board 

of Commissioners of State Institutions had determined that the land 

flooded by Conservation Area No. 3 was worthless to the Seminole, 

and that its creation actually increased the value of other Seminole 

lands by making them “suitable for a higher and better use than 

previously existed.” Besides, Clark noted, if compensation had been 

warranted, it would have gone to the state, not the tribe, since the 

state held title to the land.6

The controversy soon extended into litigation. Alleging that 

they wanted to regain control over land that was rightfully theirs, 

the Seminole filed a civil action in 1974 against the state of Florida 

to establish their rights to the acreage flooded by Conservation Area 

No. 3. Over the next 13 years this suit languished in the courts, with 

settlement talks proceeding intermittently, including proposals to 

exchange state land outside of reservation boundaries for the Seminole’s 16,000 acres. The state especially wanted Seminole land known 

as the Rotenberger Tract in order to allow for additional impoundment as a part of Governor Bob Graham’s Save Our Everglades program. Finally, in 1985, the Seminole declared that unless a reasonable settlement was negotiated, they would oppose construction 

of the Modified Hendry County Plan, a $20 million flood control 

project planned by the Corps of Engineers and to be built by the SFWMD. This project was supposed to drain lands west of the EAA in 

order to provide acreage for citrus groves, placing the excess water in 

Conservation Area No. 3A. Because of this threat, the SFWMD and 

the state had more reason to resolve the litigation.7

In September 1986, the Seminole and the state finally reached 

a settlement. Under the agreement, the state would pay over $11 

million to the Seminole for the Rotenberger Tract, the title and 

Removal of invasive Melaleuca trees by the Miccosukee Tribe, behind a casino along Tamiami Trail. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Fifteen | Preserving Their Interests 231

easement to other land flooded by Conservation Area No. 3, and for 

compensation for past projects conducted in Conservation Area No. 

3A. The tribe, in turn, would withdraw its objections to the Modified 

Hendry County Plan. In addition, the settlement recognized that the 

Seminole wanted to develop a compact detailing its water rights and 

its responsibilities to preserve water quality.8

After state and tribal officials agreed to the settlement, the Seminole began work on the water rights compact. According to one 

source, the compact was “a way for the Tribe to integrate its own 

water use operations with most provisions of Florida water and environmental law.”9

 It required the creation of a tribal water department 

and the development of a tribal water code, and it gave the Seminole responsibility for water management on their reservations. The 

tribe’s legal representation claimed that the compact “recognize[d] 

the Tribe’s sovereign power in the administration of reservation water resources,” and that it allowed for “intergovernmental cooperation between sovereign governments,” rather than “subordination of 

the Tribe’s interests to the [SFWMD’s].”10 Upon the completion of the 

compact and its approval by the SFWMD, the entire settlement was 

forwarded to Congress for its authorization, provided in December 

1987 under the Seminole Indian Land Claims Settlement Act. This 

law stipulated that the compact would have “the force and effect of 

Federal law for the purposes of enforcement of the rights and obligations of the tribe.”11

Meanwhile, the Miccosukee made their own protests about the 

Modified Hendry County Plan. Fearing that the project would adversely impact water quality and vegetation in Conservation Area 

No. 3, the tribe filed an objection with the Corps, stating that the 

project had the potential of harming natural resources on tribal 

land. The SFWMD tried to assuage Miccosukee fears, stating 

that the project would have “no significant impact to the Indian 

land.” Besides, the SFWMD continued, the plan was just a part of 

an “environmental enhancement” program that it was conducting 

for Conservation Area No. 3. Other components, according to the 

SFWMD, included restoring 30 square miles of the Everglades under the Holey Land project, using the Rotenberger Tract to prevent 

agricultural runoff from entering Conservation Area No. 3, and 

conducting the Shark River Slough Restoration to provide “major 

improvement to the natural flow system of the Everglades.” Indeed, 

the SFWMD asserted that “the effects of the flood control portion 

of the Hendry County Project are inconsequential in comparison 

with the environmental benefits that will be associated with these 

three restoration projects.”12

The Miccosukee were not so sure, and they worked with the SFWMD on a memorandum of agreement assuring that Miccosukee 

interests would not be harmed. This memorandum was concluded in 

May 1987. According to its provisions, the tribe agreed to withdraw 

its objection to the Modified Hendry County Plan and to develop 

a water rights compact and a tribal water resources department in 

exchange for certain concessions from the SFWMD. These included 

the monitoring of discharges into Conservation Area No. 3A and 

on tribal land for pesticides, and the development of a monitoring 

program for water quality. As part of this plan, the SFWMD would 

make quarterly water quality reports to the tribe, and it would develop “nutrient standards” for 3A that would prevent “excessive nutrient enrichment.” Likewise, if a proposed SFWMD project had the 

potential to impact “water quantity or quality” on the Miccosukee 

Reservation, the district would consult with the tribe.13 The Miccosukee Business Council approved the memorandum of agreement 

on 11 May 1987, and began work on its compact soon after.14

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Seminole and Miccosukee 

became more concerned about water quality on their lands as 

the condition of Lake Okeechobee and the conservation areas 

worsened. In 1989, for example, the SFWMD issued an interim 

SWIM plan for Lake Okeechobee. This document noted that “in 

spite of intensified management efforts, . . . water quality conditions 

in Lake Okeechobee have not improved.” Instead, they hit “the 

highest [phosphorous] levels yet recorded” in 1988. According to 

the report, the Surface Water Improvement and Management Act 

The Modified Hendry County Plan. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District)
232 United States Army Corps of Engineers

had mandated that phosphorous levels be lowered by 1992, and the 

SFWMD had developed a management strategy that emphasized 

controlling phosphorous inflows and implementing practices within 

sub-basins to reduce how much of the nutrient reached the lake, but, 

so far, no significant downturn in phosphorous had resulted. The 

SFWMD therefore proposed that “a more aggressive management 

approach” be used, part of which included continuing to divert 

nutrient-rich water from the EAA to the conservation areas—where 

it would affect Seminole and Miccosukee land.15

Because of these diversions, it was not surprising when the 

SWIM plan for the Everglades (defined as Conservation Area Nos. 1, 

2A, 2B, 3A, 3B, the Arthur R. Marshall Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge, and the Everglades National Park) noted in 1992 that the 

discharge of water with high phosphorous levels into the conservation areas had “caused changes in existing vegetative species composition” that had the potential to “threaten fish and wildlife populations.” Cattails and other non-native plants, such as melaleuca, had 

overrun sawgrass in several areas, the report declared. The diversion 

of water from the EAA to the conservation areas, it claimed, had 

brought an additional 45.4 metric tons of phosphorus per year. To 

combat these problems, the plan proposed, among other things, to 

create a Scientific Advisory Committee for the Everglades, with representation from various state, federal, and local agencies, including 

the Seminole and Miccosukee. The plan would develop strategies to 

protect and restore water quality in the Everglades. It also called for 

the implementation of STAs to cleanse the water, as well as monitoring programs and better regulation of landowner discharges.16

But the Miccosukee and Seminole believed more needed to be 

done to protect their interests. The Seminole were especially concerned about water quality on the Big Cypress and Brighton reservations. Under the authority of its water rights compact, the tribe 

had implemented a water quality monitoring program in 1989 that 

demonstrated that “the quality of water entering the [Big Cypress] 

reservation from upstream sources is severely degraded,” exceeding 

phosphorous levels of 300 parts per billion (ppb).17 The Seminole 

therefore received permission from the EPA to set its own water 

quality standards for its lands, and it began work on a water conservation plan for the Big Cypress Reservation, designed to “provide a comprehensive, fully integrated water management system” 

that could “support sustainable agriculture while contributing to the 

restoration of significant portions of the Everglades ecosystem.”18 As 

part of this plan, the tribe proposed to use surface water management structures to treat, control, and redirect water, and to implement BMPs in order to reduce nutrient levels, targeting 50 ppb as 

the accepted phosphorous level. In 1994, the Seminole completed 

the design phase of this plan, but more money was needed to implement it. In the meantime, the tribe discussed phosphorous levels in 

Lake Okeechobee with the SFWMD, including how they affected the 

Brighton Reservation (located to the northwest of the water body) 

since water from the lake was backpumped to the reservation.19

From 1993 to 1995, the SFWMD and the Seminole negotiated 

an agreement detailing water quality efforts for Big Cypress and 

Brighton. This accord attempted to define the sources of water for 

these reservations, as well as outline efforts to preserve water quality. The agreement delineated that the main source of water for 

the Big Cypress Reservation would be the Rotenberger Tract, and 

Lake Okeechobee would serve as a secondary source. The SFWMD 

would ensure that the design of STA-5 and -6 would, in the words of 

SFWMD General Counsel Barbara Markham, “effectuate deliveries from both primary and secondary sources,” and it promised to 

conduct studies on water quality entering Big Cypress and Brighton 

reservations.20 For its part, the tribe agreed to monitor the quality 

of water leaving the reservation, and it would also implement its Big 

Cypress water conservation plan as long as it could get the necessary funding.21

There were several objections to the agreement between 

the SFWMD and the Seminole. Both environmentalists and the 

Miccosukee were concerned that it required only that phosphorous 

concentrations not exceed 50 ppb in water both entering and leaving 

the reservation. Vida Verde, a non-profit organization dealing with 

social and environmental issues, stated that “water entering and 

leaving the Reservation should be below 50 ppb in phosphorous 

concentrations.”22 The association also objected to a provision in the 

agreement involving the Rotenberger Tract. The original design of 

STA-5, located in Hendry County and bordered by the L-3 canal on 

the west and the Rotenberger Tract on the east, contemplated taking 

water from C-139 and routing it through STA-5 to the Rotenberger 

Tract to allow for a more natural hydroperiod on the land. Water 

from C-139 could then be filtered to 50 ppb before entering 

Rotenberger, which would cleanse it further to 10 ppb before 

discharging it to Conservation Area No. 3A. Under the Seminole/

Aerial view of WCA 3. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Fifteen | Preserving Their Interests 233

SFWMD agreement, however, the Seminole could take water from 

the Rotenberger Tract, use it on their citrus plantations and ranches, 

and then discharge it with a phosphorous level of 50 ppb. In Vida 

Verde’s view, this constituted “receiving clean water, polluting it and 

releasing it downstream.”23

Likewise, the Miccosukee objected to the plan, insisting that 

their own interests would be harmed if the Seminole did not mandate that water have a lower phosphorous level than 50 ppb. “Both 

the Seminole’s [sic] and the District has [sic] been advised that it is 

the Tribe’s intention to set a numeric standard for [total phosphorous] of approximately 10 ppb,” Miccosukee Water Resources Director Truman E. “Gene” Duncan, Jr., explained. “If the District executes the Draft Agreement, this action will be interpreted as a willful 

anticipatory violation of the Tribe’s water quality standards.”24 SFWMD officials did not see the situation in the same light, especially 

since the Everglades Forever Act did not set an immediate limit on 

phosphorous, pending more scientific research. “It is possible that 

phosphorous concentrations exceeding ten parts per billion (ppb) 

cause imbalances in Everglades’ flora and fauna,” Executive Director 

Samuel Poole III told Miccosukee Chairman Billy Cypress, “but we 

have not seen the scientific basis for this.” He also reassured Cypress 

that the SFWMD had “no intention of violating any applicable water 

quality standards,” including that of the Miccosukee.25

The problems that environmentalists and the Miccosukee articulated about the SFWMD/Seminole agreement spoke to the issues 

that both groups had with the Everglades Forever Act and its lack 

of a stringent phosphorous requirement. Whereas the Settlement 

Agreement had delineated 10 ppb as the appropriate criterion, the 

Everglades Forever Act had backed away from that figure, presumably at the bequest of the sugar industry and other agriculturists. 

Environmentalists and the Miccosukee used the scientific research 

of Ron Jones from Florida International University to show that any 

standard above 10 ppb would not effectively protect the Everglades. 

The Miccosukee were also concerned about the effects of the Everglades Construction Project—which would implement the structural features of the Everglades Forever Act, such as the STAs—on their 

water supply. The SFWMD insisted that STA-5 had to cleanse water 

only to 50 ppb, but the Miccosukee disagreed, stating that original 

conceptual design of STA-5 planned for a 10 ppb discharge.26

These differences convinced the Miccosukee that the state of 

Florida, through the SFWMD, had become misguided in its efforts 

to cleanse Everglades water, and that Miccosukee interests were at 

risk. The Miccosukee claimed that their reservation was being used 

as a “toilet” to collect phosphorous-laden farm water runoff. “Do 

you expect your neighbor to drink your garbage?” Miccosukee tribal 

chairman Billy Cypress asked. “We would not do that to anyone. We 

don’t want it done to us.”27

To protect its interests, the tribe decided to develop stringent 

water quality standards for its land, especially after the state of 

Florida’s Environmental Regulation Commission refused to look 

at the 10 ppb standard despite a petition from the Miccosukee and 

several environmental groups such as Friends of the Everglades. 

The Miccosukee thus requested authority from the EPA to set its 

own water quality standards, and the EPA granted permission in 

December 1994, giving the tribe “treatment as state” recognition 

under the Clean Water Act. Certain conditions existed, however. 

The standards had to apply only to those water resources that the 

Miccosukee actually held or that were held in trust for them by the 

federal government, and the tribe had to follow the same public 

participation regulations mandated by the EPA that states did. These 

included the publication of the proposed standards, public hearings 

on the criteria, and the opportunity for other groups to comment.28

Following these guidelines, the Miccosukee formulated their 

water quality standards. The stated purpose of these standards was 

not only to protect Miccosukee land, but also to ensure that water 

flowing into the conservation areas and Everglades National Park 

did not harm threatened and endangered species. Moreover, the 

tribe wanted to promote the social and economic well being of its 

members. Therefore, the tribe “vowed” that it would not “compromise” the health of its tribal members or of the Everglades ecosystem 

in setting its standards; instead, it would require that all water entering and leaving the reservation contain “a nutrient standard consistent with natural oligotrophic levels (including a total phosphorous 

limitation of 10 parts per billion of water),” oligotrophic meaning a 

low nutrient system. In enforcing these standards, the tribe insisted 

that it would not let “adjacent water users” utilize its water or its 

“vegetative communities . . . as a biological filter.”29

When the Miccosukee held public hearings on these criteria 

in 1997, however, many objected to the stringent requirements. Although the Miccosukee considered them necessary in order to preserve the Everglades ecosystem, others disagreed, especially since 

the standards conflicted with the Everglades Forever Act, which 

had stipulated that 50 ppb would be used until the state developed 

a firm, numerically based criterion (which did not have to happen 

until 2003 and which did not have to be implemented until 2006). 

The Florida Sugar Cane League, for example, stated that the Miccosukee should wait to implement the 10 ppb standard until after the 

state had completed its scientific research on phosphorous loads.30

Likewise, SFWMD official Frank Williamson, Jr., explained that 

the district’s “most significant concern” with the Miccosukee’s proposal was its “potential conflict” with both the Everglades Forever 

Act and the Settlement Agreement in United States of America, et 

al. v. South Florida Water Management District, et al. “If adopted,” 

Williamson noted, the Miccosukee standards “would arguably 

establish a 10 ppb total phosphorous standard immediately.” Williamson explained that this did not take into account “the needs 

and thresholds of the Everglades” and “the physical realities of water management within South Florida.” In addition, he continued, 
234 United States Army Corps of Engineers

the tribe was proposing only phosphorous limits “without providing a blueprint for improving water quality,” and it had failed to 

produce any scientific analysis or data supporting its 10 ppb standard. The requirements in the Everglades Forever Act were in the 

general public’s best interest, Williamson concluded, while the 

tribe’s standards only benefited the Miccosukee.31 In response, the 

Miccosukee declared that the law did not govern the tribe’s federal 

reservation lands.32

Another problem that the SFWMD had with the Miccosukee’s 

standards was that they did not conform to those developed by the 

Seminole Tribe. The Seminole’s standards proposed phosphorous 

levels of only 50 ppb, keeping them in conformity with the Everglades Forever Act. The SFWMD foresaw difficulties if the Miccosukee adopted the 10 ppb rule, since this would mean that two different 

standards would exist for “the same water body,” causing “unreasonable consequences” and “social and economic disruption.”33 In response to this concern, the EPA reminded the SFWMD that it had a 

dispute resolution mechanism in place that could “mediate disputes 

where the difference in water quality standards results in unreasonable consequences.”34

Meanwhile, environmentalists applauded the Miccosukee’s efforts. Joette Lorion, president of Friends of the Everglades and a 

Miccosukee consultant, stated that the tribe’s action was necessary 

because “right now, state enforcement officers are like the Maytag 

repairman: They have nothing to do until Dec. 31, 2006.” Charles 

Lee, senior vice president of the Florida Audubon Society, agreed, 

claiming that the sugar industry’s “game plan” was to “prevent” the 

10 ppb standard “from ever being set.” The Miccosukee’s water quality proposal, however, would make it more difficult for the industry 

to carry out its strategy. “We’re tired of waiting,” Miccosukee Water 

Resources Director Gene Duncan explained. “Broken promises—

that’s the history of the Indians and the Everglades.”35

Accordingly, despite the concerns expressed by the SFWMD 

and others, the Miccosukee adopted its 10 ppb standard in December 1997 and submitted it to the EPA for approval.36 The tribe also 

explained that it would determine whether water met the 10 ppb 

standard by measuring phosphorous content at five different locations: in the L-28 Interceptor Canal on the tribe’s western boundary, in the L-28 Interceptor Canal at its dogleg (where water was 

discharged into the Gap Area), at a site in the C-60 Canal east of 

the S-140 pump station (measuring water emptying into the North 

Grass and South Grass areas), at the northeastern corner of the Alligator Alley Reservation in the North Grass region, and in the western portion of the Gap Area.37

Although the EPA usually had to approve water quality standards 

within 60 days, it took the agency two years before it issued a decision 

on the tribe’s request. Some speculated that the reason for this was 

that the Miccosukee was the first entity—state or otherwise—to set 

a numeric criterion for phosphorous and it took considerable time 

for EPA personnel to wade through the stacks of scientific literature 

on the subject. Finally, in May 1999, the EPA approved the Miccosukee’s water quality standards, a significant victory for both the tribe 

and environmentalists. The EPA called the criteria “a significant step 

forward in protecting the health of the Everglades”; EPA Administrator Carol Browner, former secretary of Florida’s Department of Environmental Protection, lauded the “tough standards,” seeing them as a 

way to “protect and restore this national treasure [the Everglades] for 

future generations.”38 According to an article in Time magazine, the 

standards meant that “everyone” around the Miccosukee would have 

to meet the same criteria, even “sugar companies, which argue that 

they don’t have the technology to comply.”39 The EPA agreed. Regional Administrator John Hankinson explained that the EPA’s review 

provided “a strong foundation for developing future water quality 

standards and the technology necessary to meet those standards.”40

But the state continued its own scientific studies of phosphorous, unwilling to accept the 10 ppb without further review.

The Miccosukee also began pursuing means to end the Special 

Use Permit relationship with Everglades National Park for the 333 

acres on the park’s northern border. The catalyst for this action was 

Everglades National Park Superintendent Richard Ring’s objections 

to the construction of houses in the Special Use area. In order to 

resolve the matter, the Miccosukee worked with Florida’s congressional delegation—including Alcee Hastings and Carrie Meek—to 

pass legislation ending the Special Use relationship. In 1998, Congress enacted the Miccosukee Reserved Area (MRA) Act that terminated the Special Use Permit, expanded the area to approximately 

660 acres, and granted the Miccosukee the right to govern the land 

“as though the MRA were a Federal Indian reservation.”41 After the 

passage of the act, the Miccosukee began developing water quality 

standards for that area as well, which, because of its location, affected 

Everglades National Park. The tribe essentially applied the same 10 

The S-140 pumping station. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Fifteen | Preserving Their Interests 235

ppb numeric criterion to the region as it did to its reserved lands, 

and the EPA approved this action in October 1999.42

Meanwhile, the Miccosukee employed another tactic in its 

fight to preserve the Everglades ecosystem: litigation. Throughout 

the 1990s, the tribe sued several federal and state agencies for many 

different reasons. In 1995, for example, the tribe filed a lawsuit, ultimately unsuccessful, against the U.S. Department of the Interior, 

the Corps of Engineers, and the SFWMD because of flooding on 

their land in 1994 and 1995 caused by Tropical Storm Gordon. The 

Miccosukee claimed that the Corps and the SFWMD did nothing to 

alleviate the flooding because of NPS opposition to receiving more 

water.43 Other Miccosukee lawsuits included one in 1999 alleging 

that deviations from Conservation Area No. 3A’s regulation schedule 

by the Corps and the SFWMD (done at the request of the National 

Park Service to preserve the endangered cape sable seaside sparrow) 

violated the Endangered Species Act by threatening the wood stork 

and the snail kite in 3A.44

Perhaps the most prominent Miccosukee litigation, however, 

dealt with water quality standards under the Everglades Forever 

Act. As explained above, in 1994, the tribe had joined other petitioners to request that the Florida Department of Environmental 

Protection establish a numeric water quality standard of 10 ppb. 

The department rejected the petition, but the state’s Fourth District 

Court of Appeals reversed that decision (Miccosukee Tribe v. Florida 

Department of Environmental Protection), ruling that only Florida’s 

Environmental Regulation Commission had the authority to either 

accept or reject the petition. The Environmental Regulation Commission decided that it would review the standards at some undesignated point, and the court subsequently found that this meant that 

the state was working as expeditiously as possible under provisions 

of the Everglades Forever Act. Only the Florida legislature, the court 

ruled, could hasten the timeline.45

At the same time, the Miccosukee sued the U.S. Department of 

the Interior, requesting that the U.S. District Court for the Southern 

District of Florida require the enforcement of the 1991 Settlement 

Agreement and 1992 Consent Decree. The genesis for this action 

was a 1994 settlement between the U.S. Department of the Interior 

and Flo-Sun Sugar Company, whereby the corporation agreed to pay 

$4 to $6 million a year in Everglades clean-up costs in exchange for 

the Interior Department not enforcing phosphorous standards until 2008. The Miccosukee objected to this arrangement, saying that 

it was opposed to “government attempts to substitute less stringent 

provisions of the Everglades Forever Act for those of the Settlement 

and Consent Decree.”46 The compromise between the Interior Department and Flo-Sun merely delayed the implementation of strict 

phosphorous standards to the detriment of the ecosystem. “Delay 

is the enemy of the Everglades,” Cypress related. “The Miccosukee 

Tribe will not accept delay.”47 Dexter Lehtinen was even more forceful, claiming that the federal government, through its concurrence 

with the Everglades Forever Act, had authorized not only the continued pollution of the Everglades, but had also “polluted the democratic process.” Lehtinen vowed that “the Miccosukee Tribe will not 

allow their Everglades homeland to be sacrificed on the altar of political expediency.”48

The Miccosukee continued its assault by filing an action against 

the EPA as well, charging that the Everglades Forever Act had 

changed Florida’s water quality standard and that the EPA therefore had the responsibility to either approve or reject the changes, 

as stipulated by the Clean Water Act. According to one observer, 

the tribe claimed that, under the Everglades Forever Act, the state 

was allowing water with high levels of phosphorous to flow across 

South Florida, causing “an imbalance in the natural aquatic flora and 

fauna through 2006.”49 After representatives of the EPA testified that 

the presence of polluted waters did not necessarily mean that water 

quality standards had changed, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida rejected the tribe’s claim. The tribe appealed 

the ruling, leading the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to remand 

the case back to the district court, instructing it to decide independently whether water quality standards had been altered. After its 

review, the district court ruled that a change had been made, and it 

instructed the EPA to take action. The EPA again stated that the act 

did not alter the standards, claiming, according to one legal scholar, 

that “it did not change any designated uses of downstream waters” 

and that “it did not change anti-degradation policy.”50

In 1998, after conducting a judicial review of the EPA’s decision 

under the Administrative Procedure Act, Judge Edward B. Davis of 

the district court overturned the EPA’s decision as “arbitrary and capricious.”51 According to Davis, the Everglades Forever Act did not 

establish a legitimate compliance schedule as required by the Clean 

Water Act, and, because no numerical criterion had to be in place 

A Miccosukee Indian village. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library 

and Archives of Florida)
236 United States Army Corps of Engineers

until 2006, the EPA was effectively allowing violations of state water 

quality standards by agricultural interests until that time. Therefore, 

Davis ordered the EPA to view the Everglades Forever Act as violating Florida’s water quality standards. This seemed to be a significant 

ruling in favor of the Miccosukee, but the EPA stated that it would 

have to carefully analyze the decision before taking any action.52 According to scholar William Rodgers, whatever the outcome, the case 

“had the collateral benefit of drawing EPA—the ‘expert’ water quality 

agency—into the South Florida water wars.”53

Throughout the 1990s, then, the Miccosukee and the Seminole 

worked to protect the interests of their reservations and their interest in the Everglades—an area where they had resided for many decades. This fight focused on water quality, especially in relation to 

phosphorous concentrations. Although the Seminole generally used 

conciliatory methods to achieve their objectives—formulating water 

quality standards in conformance with the Everglades Forever Act, 

establishing a water conservation plan for Big Cypress Reservation in 

collaboration with several state and federal agencies—the Miccosukee took the opposite approach. Believing that the desire to achieve 

consensus was sacrificing its interests, the Miccosukee implemented 

water quality standards significantly more stringent than those set 

up by the Everglades Forever Act and sued federal and state entities 

over both water quality and quantity. Although these suits deepened 

conflicts with the SFWMD, the Corps, the EPA, the NPS—in short, 

almost every entity with a stake in water resource management—the 

Miccosukee regarded them as necessary to preserve the Everglades 

ecosystem. “The Everglades are dying,” Buffalo Tiger declared. “The 

land cannot recover from this.”54 Besides, according to Gene Duncan, the “only time” the Miccosukee could “get anyone’s attention is 

when we’re in court.”55 If nothing else, the lawsuits focused attention 

in the late 1990s on the importance of lowering phosphorous concentrations to 10 ppb and made state and federal agencies take both 

tribes more seriously in water management decisions. As environmentalist Nathaniel Reed observed, the Seminole and the Miccosukee now had “a large say in how the Everglades is restored.”56

Endnotes

1 Billy Cypress, Chairman, Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, to 

Honorable Harry A. Johnston, Member of Congress, 9 July 1993, File Everglades Mediation Miccosukee, Box 19706, SFWMDAR.

2 Robert H. Keller and Michael F. Turek, American Indians & National 

Parks (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1998), 230; Parker Thomson 

to The Honorable Reubin O’D. Askew, Governor, 14 April 1977, File Conservation Area 3, Miccosukee Tribe, 1966-78, Re: Declaration of Trust, Box 

02194, SFWMDAR. This license was later amended to become a perpetual 

lease.

3 Harry A. Kersey, “Introduction,” in Buffalo Tiger and Harry A. Kersey, 

Jr., Buffalo Tiger: A Life in the Everglades (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 

Press, 2002), 2.

4 Buffalo Tiger and Kersey, Buffalo Tiger, 126.

5 Joel Kuperberg to Hugh McMillan, 15 November 1973, File Re Seminole Tribe, Trustees Correspondence, State Lands Records Vault, Division 

of State Lands, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Marjory 

Stoneman Douglas Building, Tallahassee, Florida.

6 R. L. Clark, Jr., Chairman, to The Honorable Reubin O’D. Askew, 7 

January 1974, File Re Seminole Tribe, Trustees Correspondence, State Lands 

Records Vault, Division of State Lands, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Marjory Stoneman Douglas Building, Tallahassee, Florida.

7 Kersey, “The East Big Cypress Case, 1948-1987,” 466-474.

8 Kersey, “The East Big Cypress Case,” 474.

9 Hobbs, Straus, Dean & Wilder to The Honorable Sidney R. Yates, 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Interior, House Committee on Appropriations, 9 March 1989, File Miccosukee Campground Project, Box 19707, SFWMDAR.

10 Hobbs, Straus, Dean & Wilder to Ralph W. Tarr, Esq., Office of the 

Solicitor, 15 February 1989, File Miccosukee Campground Project, Box 

19707, SFWMDAR.

11 Quotation in Seminole Indian Land Claims Settlement Act of 1987 

(101 Stat. 1556). For more information on the Seminole water rights compact, see Jim Shore and Jerry C. Straus, “The Seminole Water Rights Compact and the Seminole Indian Land Claims Settlement Act of 1987,” Journal 

of Land Use and Environmental Law 6 (Winter 1990): 1-24.

12 “Summary Information on the Modified Hendry County Plan,” File 

Memorandum of Agreement, Miccosukee Tribe, Box 19707, SFWMDAR.

13 “Memorandum of Agreement between the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida and the South Florida Water Management District,” attachment to Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, Business Council Resolution No. MBC-27-87, File Memorandum of Agreement, Miccosukee Tribe, 

Box 19707, SFWMDAR.

14 Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, Business Council Resolution 

No. MBC-38-88, File Indian Affairs Miccosukee Research 94, Box 22792, 

SFWMDAR.

15 South Florida Water Management District, Interim Surface Water 

Improvement and Management (SWIM) Plan for Lake Okeechobee, Part 1: 

Water Quality & Part VII: Public Information (West Palm Beach, Fla.: South 

Florida Water Management District, 1989), Executive Summary—1-2, 7-8.

16 South Florida Water Management District, Surface Water Improvement and Management Plan for the Everglades: Planning Document (West 

Palm Beach, Fla.: South Florida Water Management District, 1992), 5, 10-

14, 36, 40.

17 “Seminole Tribe Everglades Restoration Initiative: Water Conservation System Conceptual Plan, Briefing Paper for the U.S. Department of the 

Interior,” 17 February 1995, File GOV 02-16-03 Federal Government 95 Interior Department, Indian Affairs—Seminoles, Conceptual Water Conservation System Design DOC, Box 15771, SFWMDAR.

18 Seminole Tribe of Florida to the Honorable Ralph Regula, Chairman, 

and the Honorably Sidney Yates, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on the 

Interior, House Committee on Appropriations, 1 June 1995, File Seminole 

SWIM Big Cypress Plan, Box 19707, SFWMDAR.

19 Woodie Van Voorhees, Government & Public Affairs, to Irene 

Quincey, et al., 2 March 1994, File Seminole SWIM Big Cypress Plan, Box 

19707, SFWMDAR; Draft Agreement Between the South Florida Water 

Management District and the Seminole Tribe of Florida Providing for Water 

Quality, Water Supply and Flood Control Plans for the Big Cypress Seminole 
Chapter Fifteen | Preserving Their Interests 237

Indian Reservation and the Brighton Seminole Indian Reservation, Implementing Sections V.C. and VI.D of the Water Rights Compact, 15 November 

1993, ibid.

20 Barbara A. Markham, General Counsel, to Governing Board Members, 30 June 1995, File Micco WQ Standards, Box 19706, SFWMDAR.

21 Draft Agreement Between the South Florida Water Management 

District and the Seminole Tribe of Florida Providing for Water Quality, Water Supply and Flood Control Plans for the Big Cypress Seminole Indian 

Reservation and the Brighton Seminole Indian Reservation, Implementing 

Sections V.C. and VI.D of the Water Rights Compact, 26 June 1995, ibid.

22 Phillip C. Garcia, President, and Shannon Larsen, Acting SecretaryTreasurer, to Valerie Boyd, et al., 8 December 1995, unlabeled file, Box 

22792, SFWMDAR (emphasis in the original).

23 Garcia and Larsen to Boyd, 8 December 1995.

24 Truman E. Duncan, Jr., Water Resources Director, to Mr. Sam Poole, 

III, Executive Director, South Florida Water Management District, 25 September 1995, unlabeled file, Box 22792, SFWMDAR.

25 Samuel E. Poole III, Executive Director, South Florida Water Management District, to Billy Cypress, Chairman, Miccosukee Tribe of Indians 

of Florida, 11 August 1995, File Micco WQ Standards, Box 19706, SFWMDAR.

26 Duncan to Poole, 25 September 1995; see also Joette Lorion interview by Matthew Godfrey, 18 January 2006, 5 [hereafter referred to as Lorion interview].

27 As quoted in “Indians Seek to Have Say in Everglades Suit,” The Miami Herald, 28 March 1993.

28 Elizabeth D. Ross to Distribution List, 4 September 1996, File Indian Affairs, Seminole Water Quality Standard Research 94-98, Box 22792, 

SFWMDAR; Lorion interview, 5; Rodgers, “The Miccosukee Indians and 

Environmental Law,” 10926.

29 “Miccosukee Environmental Protection Code Subtitle B: Water 

Quality Standards for Surface Waters of the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of 

Florida” [hereafter referred to as Miccosukee Water Quality Standards], File 

Micco WQ Standards, Box 19706, SFWMDAR.

30 “March 21, 1997 Summary of Comments Submitted by Interested 

Parties Concerning Micosukee Tribe’s Proposed WQS,” File Miccosukee 

WQ Standards, 1997-98, Box 19706, SFWMDAR.

31 Frank Williamson, Jr., to Secretary Murley, Florida State Clearinghouse, Department of Community Affairs, 13 October 1997, File Micco WQ 

Standards, Box 19706, SFWMDAR.

32 Miccosukee Tribe’s Proposed Water Quality Standards (WQS),” File 

Miccosukee WQ Standards, 1997-98, Box 19706, SFWMDAR.

33 Quotation in Williamson to Murley, 13 October 1997; see also Seminole Water Commission, Seminole Tribe of Florida, “Proposed Rules: Water 

Quality Protection and Restoration: Rules to Carry Out the Federal Clean 

Water Act and the Tribal Water Code, Including Water Quality Standards 

for the Big Cypress Reservation,” File Indian Affairs, Seminole Water Quality Standard Research 94-98, Box 22792, SFWMDAR.

34 Robert F. McGhee, Director, Water Management Division, United 

States Environmental Protection Agency, to Mr. Frank Williamson, Jr., 

Chairman, Governing Board, South Florida Water Management District, 

17 November 1997, File Miccosukee WQ Standards, 1997-98, Box 19706, 

SFWMDAR.

35 Lorion, Lee, and Duncan quotes all cited in Neil Santaniello, “Cleanup Pace Prompts Tribe to Take Hard Line,” Sun-Sentinel, 15 October 1997.

36 Miccosukee Water Quality Standards. The Miccosukee Reserved 

Area had previously been called the Permit Area, but under the Miccosukee 

Reserved Area Act of 1998, Congress recognized the 667 acres that the tribe 

had leased from the state as “Indian country.” Rodgers, “The Miccosukee 

Indians and Environmental Law,” 10926-10927. 

37 “Methodology for Determination of Compliance with the 10 Parts 

Per Billion Numeric Criterion for Total Phosphorous,” 6 December 1998, 

Miccosukee WQ Standards, 1997-98, Box 19706, SFWMDAR. 

38 Quotations in “EPA Approves Tough Phosphorous Limit for Tribal 

Waters in Everglades,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Press Release, 

26 May 1999 <http://www.epa.gov/Region4/ oeapages/99press/052699.

htm> (25 November 2003); see also Lorion interview, 5.

39 Tim Padgett, “Last Stand,” Time 154 (5 July 1999): 61.

40 As quoted in Light, “Miccosukee Wars in the Everglades,” 736.

41 Act of 30 October 1998 (112 Stat. 2964).

42 Lorion interview, 5-6.

43 See Omnibus Order, Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United 

States of America, et al., copy provided by James W. Vearil, Chief, Water 

Management Section, Met Section, Jacksonville District, U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers; Rodgers, “The Miccosukee Indians and Environmental Law,” 

10920.

44 See Dexter W. Lehtinen, Esquire, for the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, to Honorable Secretary Bruce Babbitt, U.S. Department of the Interior, 

16 March 1998, File Miccosukee WQ Standards, 1997-98, Box 19706, SFWMDAR.

45 Keith W. Rizzardi, “Alligators and Litigators: A Recent History of 

Everglades Regulation and Litigation,” The Florida Bar Journal 18 (March 

2001): n.p. (copy provided by John D. Brady, principal assistant, Jacksonville 

District Office of Counsel, Jacksonville, Florida).

46 Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, Press Release, 6 November 

1995, File Everglades Mediation Miccosukee, Box 19706, SFWMDAR.

47 As cited in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, Press Release, 6 

November 1995.

48 As cited in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, Press Release, 6 

November 1995; see also “Tribe Sues U.S. Agency Over Cleanup,” unidentified newspaper clipping in File Everglades Mediation Miccosukee, Box 

19706, SFWMDAR.

49 Quotation in Rodgers, “The Miccosukee Indians and Environmental 

Law,” 10926; see also Light, “Miccosukee Wars in the Everglades,” 731.

50 Quotations in Rizzardi, “Alligators and Litigators”; see also Light, 

“Miccosukee Wars in the Everglades,” 731-732.

51 As cited in Rizzardi, “Alligators and Litigators.”

52 Rizzardi, “Alligators and Litigators”; Light, “Miccosukee Wars in the 

Everglades,” 731-732.

53 Rodgers, “The Miccosukee Indians and Environmental Law,” 10926.

54 Buffalo Tiger and Kersey, Buffalo Tiger, 3.

55 Unidentified transcript, File Everglades Mediation Miccosukee, Box 

19706, SFWMDAR.

56 Reed interview, 36.

239

While the Miccosukee focused on water quality problems, the 

Corps undertook a remarkable project in the 1990s—the restoration 

of the Kissimmee River. In the late 1980s, Kissimmee River restoration efforts had crystallized around the concept of watershed restoration, rather than focusing only on dechannelization of the river. 

The impetus was a growing mass of scientific literature informing the 

process of restoration, an accumulation of knowledge that increased 

in the 1990s and defined clearly what restoration meant. Kissimmee 

River restoration thus became the model for ecosystem management 

in South Florida, and it convinced federal and state agencies of three 

things: ecosystem restoration was possible; a clear definition of what 

was being restored was necessary; and reliance on scientific studies 

was crucial. The effort also provided many lessons to the Corps of 

Engineers of what was necessary to make restoration a success, but 

some still questioned whether the Corps was the proper agency to 

take the lead in such endeavors.

By the late 1980s, plans to restore the Kissimmee River were tenuous. The Corps could not recommend federal participation, both 

because it did not have congressional authorization and because 

dechannelizing the river did not have a positive benefit-cost ratio, 

at least in basic economic terms. Even when Congress appropriated 

money for restoration, the Reagan administration refused to allocate the funds. Meanwhile, agricultural interests and cattle ranchers 

in the Kissimmee basin continued to oppose restoration, concerned 

that it would infringe on the lands they used for their livelihood. 

SFWMD officials, however, became increasingly convinced that 

restoration was necessary, desirable, and possible, and the SFWMD 

proceeded with a demonstration project attempting to prove those 

points to detractors.

Chapter 16

But questions arose over just what the term “restoration” meant. 

When Arthur Marshall, Johnny Jones, and other environmentalists 

had first called for the dechannelization of the Kissimmee in the 

1970s, they did so because they believed that the river was facilitating 

the flow of nutrient-rich water to Lake Okeechobee, hastening that 

lake’s demise. In the 1980s, however, studies showed that phosphorous was the limiting nutrient in the lake and that the Taylor CreekNubbin Slough area and the EAA were the greatest contributors of 

the mineral.1 Because of these findings, the justification for restoring 

the Kissimmee River gradually began to turn towards reestablishing the ecological conditions of the Kissimmee River Basin to their 

pre-channelization state, rather than improving Lake Okeechobee’s 

water quality.2

Throughout the 1980s, scientists such as Louis Toth, a biologist 

with the SFWMD, published studies of the conditions of the Kissimmee River and its floodplain before channelization. According 

to Toth, 94 percent of the floodplain was covered with water over 50 

percent of the time, while seasonal wet-dry cycles occurred as well. 

These conditions produced “a mosaic of hundreds of distinct patches 

of intermingled vegetation,” dominated by three community types: 

willow and buttonbush woody shrub wetlands; broadleaf marshes; 

and maidencane, beakrush, and mixed species wet prairies.3

 Toth 

continued that the basin housed approximately 35 species of fish, 16 

species of waterfowl, 6 species of waterbirds, and numerous invertebrates. When channelization occurred, Toth explained, it drained 

over 30,000 acres of floodplain wetlands and disrupted the wet-dry 

cycles, causing water oxygen levels to drop. This caused an exodus 

of wading birds, a decline in waterfowl populations by 92 percent, a 

diminishment in fish populations, and exotic replacement of natural 

A Laboratory for the Everglades: Kissimmee River 

Restoration in the 1990s
240 United States Army Corps of Engineers

vegetation. In order to restore natural conditions to the Kissimmee 

Basin, Toth argued for a holistic approach to restoration, taking into 

consideration all of these disparate factors.4

Toth’s ideas were reinforced as the SFWMD monitored the effects of its demonstration project. In 1986, the SFWMD had completed construction of project features in Pool B, a 12-mile stretch of 

C-38 between S-65A and S-65B. Three weirs in the pool redirected 

water through seven miles of the old Kissimmee River bed, including three of its oxbows, allowing 1,300 acres of pasture to flood. By 

1987, the SFWMD could already observe positive results. Marshland 

plants returned, as did clams and invertebrates. The rapidity of the 

change surprised even Toth, who stated that he did not “expect to 

see that much change in such a brief time in an area that hadn’t been 

flooded in 20 years.”5 The SFWMD continued to monitor the project 

area until November 1988, claiming that it clearly showed that “restoration of wetland communities on the Kissimmee River floodplain 

is feasible” and that “restoration of ecological integrity of the river 

channel is possible.” However, the SFWMD concluded, restoration 

could succeed only if a “holistic approach” was used to reestablish 

“both the form and function of the former ecosystem.”6

The need for an integrated approach was emphasized at a Kissimmee River Restoration Symposium hosted by the SFWMD in 

Louis Toth, the guiding scientist of Kissimmee River restoration. (South 

Florida Water Management District)

Results of the Kissimmee River Demonstration Project. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Sixteen | A Laboratory for the Everglades 241

October 1988 in cooperation with the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish 

Commission, the Office of the Governor, the Florida Dairy Farmers, 

Inc., and the Florida Sierra Club. Co-sponsored by several national 

environmental and engineering societies, the conference brought together scientists and engineers from a host of areas to examine data 

gained from the demonstration project, and to “provide a forum” 

for scientists and engineers to present their findings “as they relate 

to options for restoration.”7 Nearly 200 people attended, and 27 papers were presented on subjects ranging from vegetation to fish and 

wildlife to engineering concerns. According to M. Kent Loftin, the 

SFWMD representative in charge of the demonstration project, the 

symposium was “a major milestone—sort of a starting line for the 

final lap in a race to restore the Kissimmee River.”8

By the end of the symposium, according to Toth and Nicholas 

Aumen, two scientists who attended the meetings, participants had 

decided that restoration efforts would have to revive the “physical, 

chemical, and biological characteristics, processes and interactions 

that governed the ecology and evolution of the historic ecosystem” 

in order to be successful.9 Recognizing this, the conference developed a unified goal for Kissimmee River restoration: the reestablishment of the basin’s “ecological integrity.” Toth later elaborated that 

this meant “reestablishing a river-floodplain ecosystem that is capable of supporting and maintaining a balanced, integrated, adaptive community of organisms having a species composition, diversity, and functional organization comparable to that of the natural 

habitat of the region.”10

To achieve that goal, the symposium outlined specific guidelines and criteria. These included restoring both the “lateral connectivity” and the “longitudinal continuity” between the river and 

the floodplain, as well as reestablishing pre-channelization vegetation communities in order to recreate habitat. Such endeavors could 

be accomplished by allowing water flows in the river to approach 

pre-channelization levels in terms of duration and variability, and by 

restoring the hydroperiod of floodplain inundation. “The ecosystem 

restoration goal requires that all criteria [be] interdependent and 

mutually reinforcing,” Toth and Aumen explained.11

With the development of these goals, guidelines, and criteria, 

the SFWMD now had a clear restoration objective in mind. In order 

to determine the best method to obtain that objective, the district, 

in 1986, had hired Dr. Hsieh Wen Shen, a sedimentation and environmental river mechanics expert at the University of California at 

Berkeley, a leading center for hydrology research, to examine different restoration proposals. Using computer models for guidance, 

Dr. Hsieh Wen Shen’s Kissimmee River model. (South Florida Water Management District)
242 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Shen constructed a 60- by 100-foot model of a square mile section of 

the river and used it to test various approaches, such as using weirs 

and plugs to redirect water into the old riverbed or backfilling C-38.12

In 1989, Shen provided SFWMD officials with the data he had 

gathered for the various proposals, allowing them to evaluate the information and decide which alternative they wanted to implement. 

He recommended backfilling the upper stretches of C-38 as the best 

plan, but he expressed some apprehension about the whole restoration process, given that it was another engineering manipulation of 

nature. “When you disturb a thing one way, and you disturb or distort it another way, there are always all types of dangers,” Shen noted. 

“My concern is, if any, that in a few years from now, there may be 

other ecological concerns that we cannot foresee now.”13

Despite Shen’s trepidation, the SFWMD published a report in 

1990 detailing what it perceived as the best plan in order to reestablish the “ecological integrity” of the Kissimmee basin. The district 

determined that a proposal designated as the Level II Backfilling 

Plan was the only strategy that had the potential to restore all aspects 

of the ecosystem. Under this plan, large sections of C-38 would be 

filled with dirt, thereby restoring 52 miles of the old river channel 

and flooding 24,000 acres of floodplain.14 According to Jacksonville 

District Engineer Colonel Bruce A. Malson, it was “the most aggressive alternative,” calling for the removal of four water control structures along C-38 in order to restore about 50 miles of the original 

river.15 Despite strong opposition from agriculturists in the basin, 

Governor Bob Martinez endorsed the proposal, calling it “the only 

plan that will restore a functional, riverine, floodplain ecosystem 

with nearly the same biological characteristics as the preproject system,” and he asked the Corps to use its Section 1135 authorization to 

help the state with the plan.16

Indeed, even though the Corps had recommended no federal 

involvement in 1987, SFWMD and Florida officials were optimistic that the Corps would now cooperate. For one thing, the presidential administration had changed from Ronald Reagan to George 

H. Bush. Although no strong supporter of environmental policies, 

Bush had made some campaign promises relative to the environment, including no net reduction of wetlands, and he had criticized 

Governor Michael Dukakis, his opponent in the 1988 presidential 

election, for ignoring environmental problems in Massachusetts. At 

the very least, the Bush administration was more open to environmental issues than the Reagan administration. Likewise, Lieutenant 

General Henry Hatch, who became Chief of Engineers of the Corps 

in 1988, wanted to “green” the Corps by becoming more responsive 

to environmental concerns. “We engineers must look at our work 

in a broad social and environmental context as well as in technical 

and short term economic terms,” Hatch explained.17 Encouraged by 

such comments, Senator Bob Graham contacted Hatch and asked 

him to support the Level II Backfilling Plan. Hatch was reluctant 

to request Section 1135 funding for the proposal because that section authorized only environmental restoration projects that were 

consistent with authorized project purposes. The Level II Backfilling Plan, however, would effectively dismantle the Kissimmee River 

flood control project. Therefore, Hatch wondered whether the Corps 

could receive authorization and funding from Congress to dechannelize the Kissimmee, and the Jacksonville District prepared draft 

legislation for this purpose.18

With the Corps’ support, and through the work of Graham, the 

Water Resources Development Act of 1990 (WRDA-90), passed in 

November 1990, contained a section specific to Kissimmee River 

restoration. Section 306 of the law also stipulated that environmental 

protection was a major Corps mission. The act therefore directed the 

Secretary of the Army to make a feasibility study of modifying the 

Kissimmee River flood control project in order to develop “a comprehensive plan for the environmental restoration” of the river.19 In 

order to ensure that the Corps’ ultimate proposal was in line with 

what the state wanted, the law required the Corps to base its study 

on the Level II Backfilling Plan developed by the SFWMD, and it set 

a deadline of 1 April 1992 for report submission to Congress.

According to one Corps official, the 16-month turnaround time 

for the study was a “wink of an eye” for the Corps since it usually 

took three to four years to complete a feasibility report. Yet the District would have to meet the deadline.20 After the passage of WRDA90, Graham told Corps leaders, in the words of one observer, that 

Congress would “hold [their] feet to the fire” and that there would 

be “hell to pay” if the deadline was missed.21 This political pressure 

was stiff enough that the Corps made a policy decision to meet the 

1 April deadline, and, in the Jacksonville District, District Engineer 

Colonel Bruce A. Malson pledged all of his efforts and resources to 

comply.22

To take charge of the feasibility study, Malson chose Stuart 

Appelbaum, Chief of the Jacksonville District’s Flood Control and 

Floodplain Management Planning Division. Appelbaum, who had 

come to Jacksonville from the Baltimore District, had degrees in water resources engineering, but had no emotional connection with the 

Kissimmee flood control project, unlike several oldtimers within the 

District. “We [were] just looking to do whatever need[ed] to be done 

to solve problems,” Appelbaum related. If that meant “removing the 

projects or structures that the Corps built in an earlier generation, so 

be it.” The whole restoration philosophy was a “radical” concept for 

many in the Corps at the time, Appelbaum stated, but he embraced 

it as “the thrill of the project.”23

Because of the strict deadline that the Corps faced, and because 

WRDA-90 specifically instructed the Corps to base its study on the 

Level II Backfilling Plan, Appelbaum put together a “game plan” 

that essentially involved putting the SFWMD report into “Corpsspeak,” completing a project cost estimate and an EIS, and packaging them all together as one report.24 A Special Review Conference, 

held in February 1991 to “resolve policy and procedural issues” on 
Chapter Sixteen | A Laboratory for the Everglades 243

Kissimmee River restoration and attended by the SFWMD, the Jacksonville District, the South Atlantic Division, Corps Headquarters, 

and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works), essentially 

concurred with Appelbaum’s plan, providing a Project Guidance 

Memorandum to govern the completion of the report.25 The Jacksonville District then worked feverishly to produce the required 

document, holding weekly meetings with all of the chiefs of its various branches and using all of its resources. “I had carte-blanche [for] 

the people that worked for me [to do] whatever was needed,” Appelbaum recollected. “Other projects or jobs suffered for resources 

because we got whatever we wanted.”26

At the same time that the Jacksonville District worked on the 

Level II Backfilling Plan, it also began a feasibility report on another 

aspect pertaining to Kissimmee River restoration: modification of 

the Upper Kissimmee Basin flood control project. The Upper Kissimmee Basin consisted of 15 lakes, including Kissimmee, Tohopekaliga, Hatchineha, Cypress, Gentry, and Alligator, and formed the 

headwaters of the Kissimmee-Okeechobee-Everglades ecosystem. 

After receiving permission in the 1954 Flood Control Act to implement a flood control plan in the upper basin, the Corps constructed 

eight regulatory structures in the headwater lakes. However, the plan 

created problems for the Lower Kissimmee Basin, as it caused the 

river to run dry 30 percent of the time.27 As District Engineer Colonel Terrence “Rock” Salt (who replaced Malson in August 1991) explained, the Corps lowered water levels in the lakes before the rainy 

season began by discharging water to the Kissimmee, and then, once 

the rains came, it allowed the lakes to fill up with water, rather than 

releasing it to the Kissimmee. This meant that water flowed down the 

Kissimmee in the dry season, while the river was essentially dry during the rainy season, an unnatural effect. “In order to get the system 

to function more naturally,” Salt related, “you have to have a way for 

the upper lakes to act the way they used to act so that the lower Kissimmee could act the way it used to act.”28

Thus, the SFWMD had recommended in its 1990 report on 

Kissimmee restoration that work be done on the Upper Kissimmee 

chain of lakes in order to ensure more natural water flows in the 

river, and it suggested that this be done as Part I of the river’s restoration. Because the Corps could perform headwaters revitalization and 

still maintain the flood control for which the project was authorized, 

the Corps undertook a study of how the upper lakes system could be 

modified under the authority of Section 1135 of WRDA-86. As the 

Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors explained, modifying the 

headwaters project was “a prerequisite for successful restoration of 

the lower Kissimmee River basin ecosystem.”29

In August 1991, the Jacksonville District produced a draft feasibility report on Kissimmee River restoration and made it available 

for public comment. The report noted that, although channelization 

of the Kissimmee River had prevented flooding in the Lower Kissimmee Basin, it had also caused “long term degradation of the natural Lower Basin ecosystem,” including a decline in fish and wildlife 

populations and a reduction in wetland acreage from 35,000 acres to 

14,000 acres.30 To correct these problems, the Corps had examined 

the SFWMD’s Level II Backfilling Plan and had developed a Modified Level II Backfilling Plan. Under this new proposal, the Corps 

would

n backfill 29 miles of C-38;

n excavate 18 new river channel sections, totaling 11.6 miles;

n remove project structures in the area of backfilled reaches, including S-65B, S-65C, and S-65D; Upper Kissimmee Basin Headwater Lakes. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

Jacksonville District)
244 United States Army Corps of Engineers

n build a bypass spillway and channel at S-65 to serve as Lake Kissimmee’s primary outlet; and

n modify the three weirs in Pool B from the demonstration project in order to “restore flows through oxbows and facilitate local flood plain inundation.”31

To ensure the success of restoration, the report continued, the 

Corps would complete its Headwaters Revitalization Project, whereby it would modify some structures in the upper lakes to let water 

pass more easily, as well as acquire land so that it could better regulate discharges from the lakes. The Corps estimated that 68,395 acres 

of land would have to be obtained in either fee or easement for the 

entire project, necessitating the relocation of 356 residences. It outlined the total cost of the project as $422 million, with an additional 

$91 million for headwaters revitalization, and noted that negotiations were still underway as to how cost sharing would work. When 

completed (after an estimated 15 years), the project would produce a 

“restored ecosystem” consisting of “56 miles of restored river, 35,000 

acres of restored wetlands, improved water quality, and improved 

conditions for numerous fish and wildlife species.”32

In October 1991, the Corps held public hearings on the draft report. At these hearings, the Okeechobee County Commission went 

on record as opposing the project for various reasons, including the 

relocation plan and the belief that the project would harm existing 

environmental habitat.33 Others expressed concerns about the differences between the Corps’ plan and the SFWMD’s. The SFWMD, for 

example, did not require the removal of any residences, but the Corps 

believed it was necessary to acquire land within the five-year floodplain so that the river could run its natural course. Price was another 

issue, as the Corps’ estimated its project would cost significantly more 

than what the SFWMD had calculated. The reason for this discrepancy, the Corps stated, was that it had to pay a 25 percent contingency 

fee on any real estate costs, and because its “more refined” analysis 

had added items to the cost estimate, including containment levees 

and project monitoring.34 Some, however, charged that the Corps was 

intentionally “jacking up the cost” in order “to kill the project.”35

Other questions revolved around the effects of restoration on 

navigation and flood control. The Corps related that under its proposal, the river would be “at least 3 feet deep 90% of the time,” allowing most crafts (aside from houseboats) to navigate the river. Likewise, even with the headwaters revitalization proposal, the Corps 

would continue to provide flood control in the upper basin “at the 

current authorized level.” In the lower basin, flood control would 

occur through non-structural means, such as the purchase of lands 

in the five-year floodplain.36 “Please remember that our findings to 

date are still tentative,” Colonel Salt declared, “and do not necessarily 

represent the final results.”37

After receiving comments from the general public and from 

other interested parties, the Jacksonville District produced its final 

feasibility report and EIS and transmitted it to the South Atlantic 

Division Engineer, who approved it in December 1991. This report explained that the major objections to the plan came from two 

sources: land owners opposed to relocation and recreational boaters concerned about navigation effects. Despite these concerns, the 

Jacksonville District still claimed that its recommended plan—consisting essentially of backfilling 29 miles of C-38 and excavating 

11.6 miles of new river channel, among the other structural changes 

listed above—offered “the best solution for environmental restoration of the Kissimmee River.”38 Before submission to Congress, however, the report had to go to Corps Headquarters for review by the 

Washington Level Review Center (which, from 1989 to 1994, was 

responsible for technical and policy compliance reviews), the Board 

of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, the Chief of Engineers, and the 

Secretary of the Army.

As these examinations were conducted, problems developed 

over cost sharing. In its initial draft feasibility report, the Corps had 

listed cost sharing requirements at 75 percent federal and 25 percent 

state, the normal division for fish and wildlife restoration projects. 

Before the draft was issued for public comment, a Corps review team 

composed of Headquarters and Division officials told Colonel Salt to 

leave the cost sharing requirement open. In the meantime, some environmentalists, including Theresa Woody of the Sierra Club, wondered if the federal cost could be lowered so that Congress would 

be more likely to approve the project. After receiving additional advice from Corps officials, Salt changed the cost share arrangement 

in the District’s final report to 50/50.39 This outraged Florida Governor Lawton Chiles. “It is not a showing of good faith to, at this 

critical point, back away and demand that the local sponsor should 

shoulder the cost of all lands, easements, rights-of-way, relocation, 

dredged material disposal areas, plus 50 percent of the construction 

costs,” Chiles told Salt.40 The Corps argued, however, that since the 

whole purpose of the proposal was ecosystem restoration, and since 

the state was basically requiring it to perform this action according 

to the state’s plans, Florida should have to bear more of the costs.41

“The feds and the state had made this problem,” Salt explained, “and 

together they would fix it.”42

Other disagreements arose over the number of residences that 

would have to be moved because of the relocation plan. The displacement proposal led residents of a subdivision and two trailer parks 

along the banks of C-38 to band together in November 1991 as 

ROAR—Realists Opposed to Alleged Restoration—in opposition to 

relocation.43 After hearing numerous protests from concerned property owners, the SFWMD’s governing board concluded in February 

1992 that the Corps should not backfill any part of C-38 south of S65D (essentially, seven miles of the canal in Pool E) and that it should 

not flood any homes south of U.S. Highway 98, which basically would 

allow the Kissimmee River Shores and Hidden Acres Estates communities to remain. If the Corps approved these arrangements, it would 

also mean that only 47 residences would have to be relocated, and 
Chapter Sixteen | A Laboratory for the Everglades 245

that only 22 miles of C-38 would be refilled. At the same time, the 

SFWMD claimed, it would reduce any economic hardships that the 

restoration project might cause to local residents.44

In order to discuss these issues, Governor Chiles met with 

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) Nancy P. Dorn in 

March 1992, the same month that President George Bush declared 

his support for restoration while on a campaign trip to Florida. In 

the meeting between Dorn and Chiles, the governor agreed that the 

backfilling of C-38 south of S-65D would be considered a “locally 

preferred option,” meaning that if the state wanted that part of the 

project done, it would be responsible for it without federal participation. Chiles also accepted the modification of weirs in Pool B as 

a locally preferred option, and he agreed that the state would share 

construction costs on a 50/50 basis. In return, Dorn committed the 

federal government’s 50/50 participation in land acquisition. This 

meant that the state would ultimately pay $286 million for the Level 

II Backfilling Plan—which now would fill only 22 miles of C-38—

while the federal government would provide $139 million.45

With this arrangement in place, the report passed the Washington Level Review Center and went to the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors for approval. According to Colonel Salt, members of 

the board were upset that they had had no input on the cost sharing 

formulation, which had already been worked out by the time they 

received the report, and characterized their review as merely “rubber stamping” a done deal.46 In any case, the board explained in its 

official report that its review focused on “the proposed performance 

and effects of the recommended plan.” After examining these aspects and investigating whether the plan conformed to guidelines 

outlined by the Water Resources Council, the board concurred with 

the recommendations in the Jacksonville District’s final feasibility 

report and EIS. It noted, however, that Kissimmee River restoration 

was “unique” and “should not be viewed as precedent setting, or as a 

guideline for any future restoration projects,” mainly because it involved “almost the total dismantling of a federally constructed flood 

control project” and because its “project formulation was constrained 

by congressional direction.” In addition, the board emphasized that 

restoration would not succeed unless the Corps implemented the 

Section 1135 Headwaters Revitalization Project.47 The feasibility report and EIS then went to Chief of Engineers Lieutenant General 

Henry Hatch, who approved it and transmitted it to the Secretary of 

The channelized Kissimmee River. (South Florida Water Management District)
246 United States Army Corps of Engineers

the Army. Thereafter, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) 

Nancy Dorn sent the plan to Congress for its approval on 3 April 

1992, requesting that it be included in the Water Resources Development Act of 1992 (WRDA-92).48

In the spring and summer of 1992, Congress considered the 

Corps’ report. As it did so, supporters and detractors of the restoration project made their feelings known. The Florida Cattlemen’s 

Association, for example, unanimously passed a resolution in June 

in opposition to the project, claiming that it would destroy “many 

thousands of acres” of wildlife habitat that had appeared since channelization had occurred. Claiming that the Corps had not adequately studied the environmental and economic impacts of restoration, 

the association registered its strong opposition to dechannelization 

until the plan went through “the same scrutiny and permitting procedures” as other “large project[s] in this area.”49 The association was 

not alone in its hostility, as ROAR continued to pepper the SFWMD 

with questions and concerns about the project, while the Florida 

Farm Bureau declared its opposition. At the same time, local ranchers made a video of boats floating down C-38 as “Let It Be” played 

in the background, and Okeechobee County issued a resolution of 

protest against the project.50

These objections were nothing new; almost since the time that 

environmentalists began advocating the restoration of the river, opponents had voiced their disapproval. Many critics used the destruction 

of existing environmental habitat as a reason to oppose the project. 

John B. Coffey, former chairman of the Glades County Commission 

and of the Kissimmee River Resource Planning and Management 

Committee, for example, stated that backfilling C-38 would cause 

“massive environmental disturbance.” Instead, he advocated state purchase of “submerged lands of the old river.”51 Others believed that environmentalists were bullying the SFWMD, the Corps, and Congress 

to get what they wanted. “It seems that when Sierra Club or Audubon 

Society speaks, politicians wet their pants,” W. H. Morse of the Kissimmee/Osceola County Chamber of Commerce declared before accusing environmental groups of misrepresenting the benefits of the 

project. Morse, as well as many residents around the Kissimmee River 

and Lake Okeechobee, wanted the Corps to leave the river alone, and 

he asked Congress not to be “conned” by environmentalist efforts.52

Other interests whole-heartedly supported restoration efforts. The Wilson Ornithological Society, for example, requested 

that the Corps “proceed with the Level II backfilling plan for the 

restoration of the flood plain marshes of the Kissimmee River” as 

Lake Kissimmee and its connection to the Kissimmee River. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Sixteen | A Laboratory for the Everglades 247

soon as possible.53 Meanwhile, the Everglades Coalition, led by 

Theresa Woody of the Sierra Club, advocated the restoration of the 

river through the Level II Backfilling Plan. Observing that restoration of the Kissimmee had been “a major environmental priority 

for the state of Florida since the mid-1970s,” Woody related that 

the plan had “the broad bi-partisan support of the Florida Cabinet, state and national conservation organizations and the last four 

Governors of Florida,” as well as that of President George Bush 

and the Corps of Engineers.54 In another publication, Woody explained several ways in which the Level II Backfilling Plan was “a 

history-making project.” For one thing, she said, it would be “the 

largest river restoration project ever undertaken”; for another, it 

would offer the Corps a way to “showcase” its “environmental enhancement” skills, thereby “expanding” its mission. Perhaps most 

importantly, Woody concluded, it would be a “pioneering work” in 

the field of ecosystem restoration, as it attempted “to heal a system 

that humans have torn apart.”55

Heeding the arguments of the Wilson Ornithological Society 

and the Everglades Coalition, Congress included Kissimmee River 

restoration in WRDA-92, which became law on 31 October 1992. 

Not only did this act authorize “the ecosystem restoration of the Kissimmee River” (at a total cost of $426 million), it also instructed the 

Corps to carry out the Headwaters Revitalization Project (at a total 

cost of $92 million). The only caveat was that the Corps had to “ensure” that the project gave “the same level of flood protection as is 

provided by the current flood control project,” but the Corps had 

already planned for that.56

With the passage of WRDA-92, the Corps began the “precedent-shattering” Kissimmee River restoration project.57 In order to 

ensure the plan’s success, the Corps tried to implement an effective 

partnership with the SFWMD, whose project it really was. In the 

early 1980s, SFWMD officials had evinced some dissatisfaction with 

the Corps, and its governing board had even discussed divorcing the 

district from its Corps relationship. The major problem was that the 

SFWMD focused less on flood control and more on water management after its reorganization in the 1970s, and several of its officials 

believed that the Corps did not share that vision. The Kissimmee 

River restoration project gave both agencies an opportunity to heal 

that relationship. “The Kissimmee, to me, was the beginning of the 

modern era [of working] with the Water Management District,” Stuart Appelbaum would later recollect.58

One of the SFWMD’s roles was to continue to supply necessary 

scientific information about the process of restoration. An area on 

which its researchers, including Louis Toth, focused was the importance of the Headwaters Revitalization Project. With his colleague 

Jayantha Obeyserka, former SFWMD scientist M. Kent Loftin, and 

William A. Perkins of Battelle Northwest, Toth published a paper 

in 1993 emphasizing that the “pulse-like” regulation schedule of the 

headwater lakes produced low dissolved oxygen levels in the river 

and left it with either low or no flow for extended periods of time. 

This led to “repetitive fish kills” and “limited floodplain inundation.” 

Therefore, “modified flow regulation [was] a key component” of the 

“plan to restore the ecological integrity” of the Kissimmee River.59

The Corps agreed. In 1992, it began work on an alternative regulation schedule for the Upper Kissimmee lakes, proposing to increase the permissible high levels in Lakes Kissimmee, Cypress, and 

Hatchineha from 52.5 feet to 54.0 feet during the dry season, and to 

raise Lake Kissimmee’s level in the wet season to 52.5 feet (instead 

of 51.0). This would allow the Corps to elevate seasonal storage capacities by 100,000 acre feet, permitting it to more effectively “simulate the historic seasonal flow from Lake Kissimmee to the Lower 

Basin.”60 The Corps estimated that the revised schedule would also 

have positive environmental impacts on the upper basin, including 

increasing “the quantity and quality of the wetland habitat . . . to 

benefit fish and wildlife.”61 In addition, the Corps proposed several 

other measures for the headwaters, including the purchase of 16,000 

acres of land bordering Lakes Hatchineha, Kissimmee, Cypress, and 

Tiger; the widening of C-36 (which connected Lake Hatchineha to 

Lake Cypress) and C-37 (which connected Lake Kissimmee to Lake 

Hatchineha) in order to “flatten the flood profile through the upper 

lakes and prevent excessive flooding”; and increasing S-65’s outlet 

capacity in order to allow Lake Kissimmee to discharge more water.62

Meanwhile, the SFWMD created a Headwaters Revitalization 

Project 1135 Study Interagency Team, composed of representatives 

from the SFWMD, the Corps, the Florida Game and Fresh Water 

Fish Commission, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. This interagency group studied various plans, but ultimately concluded, 

through the use of computer simulation models, that the Corps’ 

proposal provided the best opportunities for more natural releases 

from the headwaters.63 At the same time, the team examined how 

the Corps’ plan would enhance environmental features of the upper 

basin. Unfortunately, computer models showed that “the potential 

for environmental benefits within the upper chain of lakes is much 

lower than originally envisioned.”64 Instead, beneficial environmental impacts from headwaters revitalization would mainly be confined to the river itself. Fearing that headwaters revitalization would 

thus not meet necessary environmental criteria on its own, and in 

order to allow the Corps to spend money allocated specifically for 

headwaters revitalization on either the upper or lower basin plans, 

the team insisted that the two projects be combined into one.65 Accordingly, a conference report on appropriations for fiscal year 1994 

consolidated the two projects, and the Corps developed a Project 

Management Plan combining the two separate endeavors.66

As the headwaters revitalization program progressed, the Corps 

also began planning a test fill project for C-38 in order to determine 

the best way to plug the channel, including types of material to use 

and construction methods. It decided to conduct the test on a 1,000-

foot stretch of Pool B, filling the canal with the dredged spoil taken 
248 United States Army Corps of Engineers

from the area during the original construction of C-38. The test fill 

began in March 1994 and lasted until August.67 In April, the Corps 

held an official groundbreaking ceremony near Lorida, located on 

U.S. Highway 98 between Okeechobee City and Sebring. State officials, federal authorities, and environmentalists all threw dirt into 

the canal, and newspapers heralded the ceremony as “the first actual 

step toward fixing South Florida’s plumbing system.”68 Others tempered their enthusiasm. Richard Coleman, a member of the Sierra 

Club who had been pushing for restoration since the 1970s, characterized the groundbreaking as merely “another step in a long process,” while Theresa Woody of the Sierra Club saw it as only “the first 

official bit of dirt to go back into the Kissimmee ditch.”69

Even with the beginning of the test fill, much work remained. 

Since no one had ever restored a river on the scale of the Kissimmee plan, uncertainty existed as to how the ecosystem would react. 

However, several scientists in South Florida had been promoting 

the use of a strategy known as adaptive management as key to ecosystem restoration endeavors. Essentially “learning in the midst 

of doing,” adaptive management was first used by the Northwest 

Power Planning Council in 1984 in its efforts to preserve salmon in 

the Pacific Northwest.70 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Florida 

scientists such as Buzz Holling, Carl Walters, and Lance Gunderson called for the use of the strategy in South Florida’s ecosystem 

restoration endeavors. Holling and Walters, for example, organized 

symposia and workshops with biologists and hydrologists to discuss how adaptive management could aid restoration efforts. The 

central concepts under adaptive management were that uncertainties were unavoidable in resource management. Instead of avoiding 

those uncertainties, adaptive management confronted them, using 

conceptual models to develop hypotheses and then testing them 

“in the real world.” Based on the feedback from such experiments, 

strategies would be revised and altered. As one scholar explained 

it, the concept “aspires to create a new dialogue between humans 

and nature by treating policy as hypothesis and management as experiment, learning to live with and profit from the uncertainty and 

variability inherent in interacting ecological, economic and institutional systems.”71

Because of the use of Dr. Hsieh Wen Shen’s model to determine 

the best plan for Kissimmee River restoration, the waterway seemed 

like an ideal place to observe how adaptive management could aid 

in ecosystem restoration. Yet the strategy was not without its critics. For one thing, many correctly observed that its “trial-and-error” 

method was both slow and costly. Continuous testing and re-testing 

was frustrating, in large part because of the inability to cite accurate 

time and funding figures and to gage how those targets were being 

met. For another, adaptive management’s embrace of uncertainty 

was unsettling to some. Many policy managers and scientists either 

preferred to “assume most uncertainty away” or to “seek spurious 

Birds in a restored section of the Kissimmee River. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Sixteen | A Laboratory for the Everglades 249

certitude,” meaning “to break the problem or issue into trivial questions spawning answers and policy actions that are unambiguously 

‘correct,’ but, in the end, are either irrelevant or pathologic.”72 Others merely did not want to admit that they did not have all of the 

answers. Just as importantly, adaptive management was essentially 

“experimentation that affects social arrangements and how people 

live their lives” since one of its purposes was to understand the impacts that human beings have on the natural world. Therefore, “those 

who have been users, owners, or governors of an ecosystem” often 

“resisted or sabotaged” the efforts.73

Regardless of the problems with adaptive management, many 

scientists and resource managers saw Kissimmee River restoration 

as an opportunity to integrate its concepts. In July 1991, for example, 

the SFWMD had established a scientific advisory panel of seven scientists to develop a comprehensive ecological evaluation plan. This 

commission recommended that any evaluation examine three specific things: whether the restored river and the floodplain met the 

necessary hydrologic objectives, whether specific biological and ecological characteristics were reestablished, and whether the SFWMD 

and the Corps had executed an adaptive management plan to track 

the first two objectives. It also suggested that the evaluation program 

consist of five stages: establishing reference conditions, ascertaining 

baseline conditions (or the current status of biological populations), 

assessing construction impacts, evaluating post-construction restoration, and “fine-tuning” restoration endeavors.74

The SFWMD took these suggestions to heart and formulated 

a restoration evaluation team in 1992. This team administered the 

evaluation program, which included the five stages recommended 

by the scientific advisory committee, as well as the extra step of developing conceptual models.75 The SFWMD placed a high priority 

on evaluation; as Louis Toth observed, “Restoration evaluation will 

be the cornerstone of future environmental studies on the Kissimmee.”76 In the meantime, the Corps performed a construction evaluation of the test fill, publishing a report in 1995 on those efforts.77

Yet it took a few more years before construction actually began. 

For one thing, the Jacksonville District did not finalize its Section 

1135 Project Modification Report on the Headwaters Revitalization Project until 1996 (after the District had completed an extreme 

drawdown of lake levels to clean up lake bottom and shorelines). Under that plan, the Corps proposed to modify regulation schedules, 

purchase 20,800 acres bordering the lake, and enlarge C-36 and C-37 

in order to “restore the Kissimmee River and to expand the Upper 

Kissimmee Basin lake littoral zones.”78 For another, the Corps and 

the SFWMD monitored the results of the test fill for a two-year period. According to Jacksonville District Engineer Colonel Terry Rice, 

who replaced Salt as commander of the District in 1994, the agencies 

examined water quality improvement, fill stability, and vegetation 

reestablishment.79 Finally, it took the SFWMD some time to acquire 

the necessary land along the river; by 1998, it had acquired most of 

the required tracts.80 In 1999, all the pieces finally came together, 

Kissimmee River South plug, Phase IV-A. (South Florida Water Management District)
250 United States Army Corps of Engineers

resulting in the commencement of C-38 backfilling on 31 March. 

It did not take many years for positive results to appear; vegetation 

more characteristic of pre-channelized floodplain marshes soon returned, indicating that Kissimmee River restoration would succeed.81

According to Stuart Appelbaum, the Kissimmee River achievement was significant for the Corps in many ways. For one thing, 

it was one of the first times that the Corps had undone one of its 

projects solely for environmental reasons. This gave the Corps much 

more credibility in the eyes of environmental organizations, such as 

the Sierra Club, and it formulated better relations with environmental groups. Much of the credit for that goes to Colonels Bruce Malson, Rock Salt, and Terry Rice, who shepherded restoration plans 

through the Corps bureaucracy and were willing to make Kissimmee restoration a priority, not only because Congress had mandated 

it, but because they truly believed in the importance of ecosystem 

restoration.

Restoration efforts in the 1990s also created a successful partnership with the SFWMD that had been lacking in the 1980s, a time 

when the SFWMD, in its adjustment to its role as water manager 

rather than just flood control provider, occasionally clashed with the 

Corps. Because the state wanted Kissimmee restoration to succeed 

so badly, and because the Corps was the agency targeted by Congress for that effort, the two sides had to reach an agreement. Thus, 

both agencies exerted efforts to work together productively, including establishing a partnering charter with clear goals for each entity 

and conducting periodic partnering workshops.82 But the Corps also 

worked with other local and federal groups, including environmental organizations such as the Everglades Coalition, in the Kissimmee 

project. The importance of outreach and partnerships was not lost 

on the Corps, which pledged to apply its experiences to the overall 

Everglades restoration.83

The Kissimmee River project also highlighted how important 

science was to ecosystem restoration. The work of Louis Toth and 

other scientists provided a blueprint for the SFWMD and the Corps 

to follow in its restoration efforts, and also created a process to evaluate how successful restoration would be. As Theresa Woody of the 

Sierra Club related, Toth was “our scientist, our guide. He believed. 

. . . He laid out the monitoring program that allowed us to build 

the science and lay down the baselines.”84 Likewise, the concept of 

adaptive management, which would take a prominent place in the 

Kissimmee River oxbow near Phase IV-A. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Sixteen | A Laboratory for the Everglades 251

overall efforts to restore the Everglades, was introduced to many 

South Florida water planners through Kissimmee River restoration. 

Scientists regarded the restoration effort as a resounding success in 

the use of adaptive management in that it “achieved new ecological 

understanding and fundamental reorganization of large-scale water resource management approaches through iterative interaction 

of science and management, in a process that engaged stakeholders 

and generated social learning.” Restoration efforts especially showed 

that in ecosystem restoration, resource managers needed to establish clear goals, expect surprises, be able to learn from mistakes, and 

keep communication lines open with all interested parties through 

public involvement.85

Clearly, efforts to restore the Kissimmee in the 1990s allowed 

the Corps, the SFWMD, and environmental groups to experiment 

with the best ways to conduct ecosystem management, and, if nothing else, it showed that if a clear definition of restoration was generated and then implemented, restoration efforts would work. Yet 

not all was rosy. For one thing, not everyone supported Kissimmee 

River restoration, including many residents living in the vicinity 

of the Kissimmee. This indicated that no matter what kind of consensus federal and state agencies reached on ecosystem restoration, 

some groups would be left on the sidelines. In addition, even though 

the Corps had effectively planned and begun Kissimmee restoration, some still wondered whether engineers were the best individuals to perform environmental restoration. Louis Toth, for example, 

claimed that many within the Corps still saw restoration as a “construction project” rather than an effort to reestablish an ecosystem. 

“These guys just don’t get it,” Toth declared in 2002. “I hate to say it, 

but [they] haven’t learned anything about restoring an ecosystem.” 

Toth’s denunciations, although overstated, had a kernel of truth. To 

Toth, ecosystem restoration meant doing whatever was best for the 

environment, instead of “manipulating nature and managing different parts of the system for different things.”86

In many ways, Kissimmee River restoration was just another 

human manipulation of nature—creating more storage in the headwaters so that the Corps could pattern water releases after pre-channelization tendencies, and forcing water back through old oxbows 

rather than through the C-38 channel. Was that true ecosystem restoration? If so, then the Corps was clearly the best agency to perform 

such work, given its experience on the Kissimmee River. Although a 

definitive answer to that question was elusive, it would continue to 

be debated throughout the 1990s in the context of Everglades restoration as a whole.

Endnotes

1 See, for example, South Florida Water Management District, Interim Surface Water Improvement and Management (SWIM) Plan for Lake 

Okeechobee, Part 1: Water Quality and Part VII: Public Information (West 

Palm Beach, Fla.: South Florida Water Management District, 1989).

2 Louis A. Toth and Nicholas G. Aumen, “Integration of Multiple Issues in Environmental Restoration and Resource Enhancement Projects in 

Southcentral Florida,” in Implementing Integrated Environmental Management, John Cairns, Jr., Todd V. Crawford, and Hal Salwasser, eds. (Blacksburg, Va.: University Center for Environmental and Hazardous Material 

Studies, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1994), 63.

3 Louis A. Toth, “The Ecological Basis of the Kissimmee River Restoration Plan,” Florida Scientist 56, no. 1 (1993): 29. 

4 Toth, “The Ecological Basis of the Kissimmee River Restoration Plan,” 

25-32; Joseph W. Koebel, Jr., “An Historical Perspective on the Kissimmee 

River Restoration Project,” Restoration Ecology 3, no. 3 (1995): 149-152. 

5 Quotation in “Return of the River: Florida’s Kissimmee May Meander 

Again,” The Wall Street Journal, 8 September 1987; see also John Clark, Public Issue Specialist, to Kathy Cavanaugh, Public Issues Specialist, 14 April 

1986, File PRO Kiss 380 Committee, Box 21213, SFWMDAR. 

6 Quotations in Louis A. Toth, Environmental Responses to the Kissimmee River Demonstration Project, Technical Publication 91-02 (West Palm 

Beach, Fla.: Environmental Sciences Division, Research and Evaluation 

Department, South Florida Water Management District, 1991), ii-iii; see 

also Toth, “The Ecological Basis of the Kissimmee River Restoration Plan,” 

39; “Kissimmee River Restoration/Closer Look,” Fall 1988, File PRO Background Kissimmee River Restoration, Box 21213, SFWMDAR; Koebel, “An 

Historical Perspective on the Kissimmee River Restoration Project,” 154-

155.

7 M. Kent Loftin, “Foreword,” in Kissimmee River Restoration Symposium: Proceedings, M. Kent Loftin, Louis A. Toth, and Jayantha T. B. Obeysekera, eds. (West Palm Beach, Fla.: South Florida Water Management District, 1990), iii.

8 Loftin, “Foreword,” iii.

9 Quotations in Toth and Aumen, “Integration of Multiple Issues in 

Environmental Restoration and Resource Enhancement Projects in Southcentral Florida,” 64-65; see also Koebel, “An Historical Perspective on the 

Kissimmee River Restoration Project,” 154-155. 

10 As quoted in Louis A. Toth, D. Albrey Arrington, and Glenn Begue, 

“Headwater Restoration and Reestablishment of Natural Flow Regimes: 

Kissimmee River of Florida,” in Watershed Restoration: Principles and Practices, Jack E. Williams, Christopher A. Wood, and Michael P. Dombeck, eds. 

(Bethesda, Md.: American Fisheries Society, 1997), 432.

11 Toth and Aumen, “Integration of Multiple Issues in Environmental 

Restoration and Resource Enhancement Projects in Southcentral Florida,” 

64-65.

12 “Stakes High in Kissimmee Experiment,” The Miami Herald, 4 August 1989; “Kissimmee River Restoration/Closer Look.”

13 As quoted in “Stakes High in Kissimmee Experiment,” The Miami 

Herald, 4 August 1989; see also “Everglades: Render Back to Nature,” The 

Economist 298 (9 December 1989): 50; “Kissimmee River Restoration/Closer Look.”

14 Major General C. E. Edgar III, Chairman, Board of Engineers for 

Rivers and Harbors, to Chief of Engineers, 12 March 1992, unlabeled black 

binder, Box 4386, JDAR.
252 United States Army Corps of Engineers

15 Quotations in Colonel Bruce A. Malson interview by Joseph E. Taylor, 15 August 1991, Jacksonville, Florida, 2, transcript in Library, Jacksonville District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, Florida; see also 

Buker, The Third E, 88.

16 Bob Martinez, Governor, to Honorable Robert W. Page, Assistant 

Secretary for Civil Works, Department of the Army, 28 March 1990, File 

PRO Kissimmee Restoration Plan Authorization, 1990, Box 21213, SFWMDAR.

17 As quoted in “Corps of Engineers Focus on the Environment in the 

1990’s: A New Direction for a New Decade,” U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

Jacksonville District, News Release, 18 January 1990, File PRO Kissimmee 

Restoration Plan Authorization, 1990, Box 21213, SFWMDAR.

18 See Appelbaum interview, 8; “Kissimmee River Restoration/Section 

1135 Project Briefing Paper,” Binder Kissimmee River Section 1135 Study, 

Box 4383, JDAR; Lewis Hornung, Project Manager, Kissimmee River Restoration, “Presentation to the South Florida Water Management District,” 

File PRO Kissimmee Restoration Plan Authorization, 1990, Box 21213, SFWMDAR.

19 Water Resources Development Act of 1990 (104 Stat. 4604, 4624-

4625).

20 Appelbaum interview, 11.

21 Appelbaum interview, 8.

22 John Broaddus, CECW-ZE, to MG Kelly, 21 February 1991, Binder 

Kissimmee River Restoration General, Box 4384, JDAR.

23 Appelbaum interview, 9-10.

24 Appelbaum interview, 8-9.

25 Quotation in Jimmy F. Bates, Chief, Policy and Planning Division, 

Directorate of Civil Works, Memorandum for Commander, South Atlantic Division, 8 March 1991, Binder Kissimmee River Restoration General, 

Box 4384, JDAR; see also Russell V. Reed, Study Manager, Memorandum 

for Record, 21 February 1991, ibid.; The Kissimmee River, Florida, Project,” 

May 1999, 2, Kissimmee River Restoration Miscellaneous Facts & FDM-1 & 

FDM-2 Binder, Box 4382, JDAR.

26 Appelbaum interview, 11, 13.

27 “Kissimmee Restoration Flooded With Options,” The Palm Beach 

Post, 26 June 1989.

28 Colonel Terrence C. Salt interview by George E. Buker, 18 July 1994, 

Jacksonville, Florida, 22, transcript in Library, Jacksonville District, U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, Florida [hereafter referred to as Salt 

interview—Buker).

29 Quotation in Major General C. E. Edgar III, Chairman, Board of 

Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, 12 March 1992, in House, Kissimmee 

River Restoration Study, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992, H. Doc. 102-286; see 

also “Proposal for Project Modifications for Improvement of Environment 

Under Section 1135, Water Resources Development Act of 1986, Kissimmee River, Florida,” December 1990, Binder Kissimmee River Restoration 

General, Box 4384, JDAR.

30 “Summary of Corps Feasibility Report,” 25 September 1991, 1-5, File 

DEIS, Box 1263, JDAR.

31 “Summary of Corps Feasibility Report,” 1-5.

32 Quotations in “Summary of Corps Feasibility Report,” 1-5; see also 

Salt interview—Buker, 22-23.

33 Dave Johnson to Tom MacVicar, 4 October 1991, File PRO Kissimmee River Restoration, Box 21213, SFWMDAR.

34 “Issues for Public Meeting,” 30 September 1991, File DEIS, Box 1263, 

JDAR.

35 “A New Kissimmee Curve,” The Palm Beach Post, 10 September 1991.

36 “Issues for Public Meeting,” 30 September 1991.

37 “Procedure for Public Meeting on Kissimmee River Restoration Feasibility Study,” 8, File DEIS, Box 1263, JDAR.

38 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Central and 

Southern Florida Project, Final Integrated Feasibility Report and Environmental Impact Statement: Environmental Restoration, Kissimmee River, Florida

(Jacksonville, Fla.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1991), n.p. (quotation in 

syllabus section).

39 Salt interview—Catton, 4; see also “Wildlife Agency Enters Kissimmee River Fray,” The Palm Beach Post, 10 October 1991; Kent Loftin, “Restoring the Kissimmee River,” Geotimes 35 (December 1991): 16.

40 Lawton Chiles to Colonel Terrence Salt, Chief Engineer, Jacksonville 

District Corps of Engineers, 18 November 1991, File PRO Kissimmee River 

Restoration, Box 21213, SFWMDAR. SFWMD Executive Director Tilford 

Creel expressed these same views. See Creel to Salt, 19 November 1991, ibid.

41 Appelbaum interview, 9.

42 Salt interview—Catton, 4.

43 The organization was originally known as Residents Opposing Alleged Restoration, but it changed its name in August 1992 because the original name indicated that it was only “a small group of homeowners who lived 

on the river and were just trying to save their homes.” “ ‘Realists’ Oppose 

Alleged River Restoration,” Okeechobee News, 30 August 1992.

44 See Kissimmee River Restoration Update, South Florida Water Management District, 22 October 1992, File PRO Kissimmee River Restoration, 

Box 21213, SFWMDAR; attachment to Tilford C. Creel, Executive Director, 

to Ms. Susan L. Marr, President, ROAR, 13 July 1992, ibid.; Louis A. Toth 

and Nicholas G. Aumen, “Integration of Multiple Issues in Environmental 

Restoration and Resource Enhancement Projects in Southcentral Florida,” 

68; Buker, The Third E, 88-89.

45 See Kissimmee River Restoration Update, South Florida Water Management District, 22 October 1992; Lieutenant General H. J. Hatch, Chief of 

Engineers, to The Secretary of the Army, 17 March 1992, in House, Kissimmee River Restoration Study; Lawton Chiles to Ms. Nancy Dorn, Assistant 

Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, 11 March 1992, in ibid.; “U.S. Agrees 

to Pay Half of River Restoration,” Sun-Sentinel, 6 March 1992; “Critics Vow 

To Keep Fighting Kissimmee River Restoration,” The Tampa Tribune, 12 October 1992; “SFWMD Says Bush Administration Decision is Great News for 

Kissimmee Restoration,” South Florida Water Management District Press 

Release, 5 March 1992, File PRO Kissimmee River Restoration, Box 21213, 

SFWMDAR.

46 Salt interview—Catton, 4.

47 Major General C. E. Edgar III, Chairman, Board of Engineers for 

Rivers and Harbors, 12 March 1992, in House, Kissimmee River Restoration 

Study.

48 Nancy P. Dorn, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works), to 

Honorable Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of the House of Representatives, 3 

April 1992, in House, Kissimmee River Restoration Study; Hatch to The Secretary of the Army, 17 March 1992.

49 “Kissimmee River Restoration,” attachment to Paul Genho, President, Florida Cattlemen’s Association, to John Studt, Chief of Regulatory 

Branch, 25 June 1992, File 1110-2-1150a 1135 Kissimmee River Correspondence 1992, Box 1263, JDAR.

50 Michael Grunwald, “An Environmental Reversal of Fortune: The 

Kissimmee’s Revival Could Provide Lessons for Restoring the Everglades,” 

The Washington Post, 26 June 2002; “ROAR Questions River ‘Restoration’ 

Plan,” Okeechobee News, 5 April 1992; “County Resolution Protests Kissimmee River ‘Restoration’ Plans,” Okeechobee News, 15 January 1992; “Critics 

Vow To Keep Fighting Kissimmee River Restoration,” The Tampa Tribune, 

12 October 1992.
Chapter Sixteen | A Laboratory for the Everglades 253

51 John B. Coffey, “Rerouting of Kissimmee River A Waste of Taxpayers’ 

Money,” The Palm Beach Post, 11 November 1991.

52 Quotation in W. H. Morse, Chairman, Waterways Task Force, Kissimmee/Osceola County Chamber of Commerce, to Honorable Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 10 July 1990, File PRO Kissimmee Restoration Plan Authorization, 1990, Box 21213, SFWMDAR; see also Morse to The Honorable 

Henry J. Nowak, U.S. Representative, 1 October 1990, ibid.

53 “Resolution by the Wilson Ornithological Society,” attachment to 

Richard C. Banks, President, to Colonel Terrance Salt, District Engineer, 

28 May 1992, File 1110-2-1150a 1135 Kissimmee River Correspondence to 

1992, Box 1263, JDAR.

54 Theresa Woody, Sierra Club, to The Honorable Robert A. Roe, 18 

September 1992, File PRO Kissimmee River Restoration, Box 21213, SFWMDAR.

55 Woody, “Grassroots in Action,” 204-205.

56 Water Resources Development Act of 1992 (106 Stat. 4797, 4802).

57 Appelbaum interview, 9.

58 Appelbaum interview, 11-12.

59 Louis A. Toth, et al., “Flow Regulation and Restoration of Florida’s 

Kissimmee River,” Regulated Rivers: Research & Management 8 (1993): 155, 

164.

60 A. J. Salem, Chief, Planning Division, to Addresses on Attached List, 

14 August 1992, File Kissimmee Headwaters Revitalization Section 1135, 

Box 1263, JDAR.

61 Kissimmee River Headwaters Revitalization, Section 1135 Study, 

Team Meeting, 14 September 1993, Binder Kissimmee River Restoration 

Miscellaneous Facts & FDM-1 & FDM-2, Box 4382, JDAR.

62 “Central and Southern Florida Project, Kissimmee River, Headwaters Revitalization Project: Draft Integrated Project Modification Report and 

Supplement to Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS),” n.d., File Kissimmee Headwaters Revitalization Section 1135, Box 1263, JDAR. 

63 Michael A. Smith, CESAJ-PD-PF, Memorandum for Record, 30 November 1993, Binder Ukiss #3, Box 4386, JDAR; “Kissimmee 1135 Hydrologic Model Review, Scope of Work,” Binder Joint Probability Coincident 

Frequency, Box 4382, JDAR; “Kissimmee 1135,” 21 March 1994, ibid.

64 Smith, Memorandum for Record, 30 November 1993.

65 “State Plans Fight to Restore Money for Kissimmee River,” The Palm 

Beach Post, 9 April 1993.

66 “The Kissimmee River, Florida, Project,” May 1999, 7, Kissimmee 

River Restoration Miscellaneous Facts & FDM-1 & FDM-2 Binder, Box 

4382, JDAR.

67 Koebel, “An Historical Perspective on the Kissimmee River Restoration Project,” 157.

68 “Fixing Nature’s Filter,” The Palm Beach Post, 2 May 1994.

69 First quotation in “Restoring A River,” The Miami Herald, 1 May 

1994; second quotation in “Ground Broken, Returned to River,” The Orlando 

Sentinel, 24 April 1994.

70 National Research Council of the National Academies, Science and 

the Greater Everglades Ecosystem Restoration (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2003), 63.

71 Quotation in Steven Light, “Key Principles for Adaptive Management 

in the Context of Everglades History and Restoration,” paper presented at 

Everglades Restoration Adaptive Management Strategy Workshop, October 

2003, copy provided by James Vearil, Senior Project Manager, RECOVER 

Branch, Programs and Project Management Division, U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Jacksonville, Florida; see also Lance 

Gunderson, “Resilience, Flexibility and Adaptive Management—Antidotes 

for Spurious Certitude?” Conservation Ecology 3, no. 1 (1999): 7, copy available at <http://www.consecol.org/vol3/iss1/art7> (28 April 2006); James 

Vearil, personal communication with authors, 19 April 2006.

72 Gunderson, “Resilience, Flexibility and Adaptive Management.”

73 Kai N. Lee, “Appraising Adaptive Management,” Conservation Ecology 3, no. 2 (1999): 3, copy at <http://www.consecol.org/vol3/iss2/art3> (28 

April 2006).

74 Koebel, “An Historical Perspective on the Kissimmee River Restoration Project,” 157-158; see also “Restoration Evaluation Program,” unlabeled 

black binder, Box 4386, JDAR.

75 Tilford C. Creel, Executive Director, South Florida Water Management District, to Mr. David Ferrell, Field Supervisor, U.S. Fish and Wildlife 

Service, 25 November 1992, File 1110-2-1150a 1135 Kissimmee River Correspondence 1992, Box 1263, JDAR; “Restoration Evaluation Program.”

76 Toth, “The Ecological Basis of the Kissimmee River Restoration 

Plan,” 47.

77 For an example of the Corps’ findings, see U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Central and Southern Florida Project, Kissimmee 

River Restoration Test Fill Project: Construction Evaluation Report, Preliminary Draft (Jacksonville, Fla.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville 

District, 1995).

78 Quotation in U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, 

Kissimmee River, Florida, Headwaters Revitalization Project: Integrated Project Modification Report and Supplement to the Final Environmental Impact 

Statement (Jacksonville, Fla.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville 

District, 1996), n.p. (included in syllabus); see also Buker, The Third E, 90-91; 

“The Kissimmee River, Florida, Project,” May 1999, Kissimmee River Restoration Miscellaneous Facts & FDM-1 & FDM-2 Binder, Box 4382, JDAR.

79 Rice interview, 27.

80 South Florida Water Management District, Save Our Rivers: 1998 

Land Acquisition and Management Plan (West Palm Beach, Fla.: South Florida Water Management District, 1998), 46-50.

81 Grunwald, “An Environmental Reversal of Fortune.” 

82 “Final Report for the Partnering Workshop, Kissimmee River Restoration Project, August 27-29, 1997,” File Kissimmee Headwaters Revitalization Section 1135, Box 1263, JDAR.

83 Kimberly Brooks-Hall interview by Theodore Catton, 7 July 2004, 

Jacksonville, Florida, 1.

84 Theresa Woody interview by Theodore Catton, 18 January 2005, 

Naples, Florida, 7.

85 “RECOVER Workshop Case Study: Kissimmee River Restoration,” 

paper written by Steven Light and presented by Kent Loftin at the CERP 

Adaptive Management Workshop, June 2003, copy provided by James 

Vearil, Senior Project Manager, RECOVER Branch, Programs and Project 

Management Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, 

Jacksonville, Florida.

86 Both quotations cited in Grunwald, “An Environmental Reversal of 

Fortune.”

255

As Kissimmee River restoration proceeded in the mid-1990s, 

no one doubted that a drastic overhaul of South Florida’s water distribution system was necessary. The tricky part was to craft a plan 

that all sides—whether environmental, agricultural, or urban—

could accept. The South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force 

and the Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South Florida 

were attempting to build consensus for restoration, but water management in South Florida had a long history of contention that could 

not be put aside. Three plans that involved water distribution issues 

in the 1990s highlighted the difficulty in attaining consensus. The 

first dealt with Lake Okeechobee’s regulation schedule, which influenced how much water interests downstream from the lake received, 

as well as the ecological quality of the surrounding area. The second 

consisted of an experimental Corps program (implemented as part 

of the Corps’ Modified Water Deliveries Project) that analyzed how 

best to deliver water to Everglades National Park. This project became caught up in controversy over the flooding of agricultural areas and possible disruptions of the habitat of the Cape Sable seaside 

sparrow, which was first listed as an endangered species in 1967. The 

third, which involved the Modified Water Deliveries Project itself, 

emphasized land acquisition difficulties and their ultimate effects on 

interests such as the Miccosukee Indians. All of these examples saw 

hard-line stances exhibited by competing interests, indicating that 

the path to restoration would be rocky and difficult.

Lake Okeechobee Regulation

For many years, the major problem with Lake Okeechobee had been 

its phosphorous levels. Since the 1970s, federal, state, and local agencies had labored to diminish the mineral’s concentration. The SWIM 

Chapter 17

plan developed for the lake in the late 1980s, for example, required 

an average annual phosphorous reduction of 40 percent. To achieve 

that goal, the SFWMD stipulated that no water could flow into the 

lake without a phosphorous standard of 0.18 milligrams per liter. 

The implementation of BMPs, as stipulated by the Everglades Forever Act, lowered levels as well, as did a dairy cow relocation effort. 

In 1996, the SFWMD reported that average annual amounts of phosphorous were half of what they were before the implementation of 

the SWIM plan, but further reductions were still necessary.1

Another issue with Lake Okeechobee was its regulation schedule. In the 1978, the Corps had modified its operational plan to allow 

lake levels between 15.5 and 17.5 feet (upwards from the existing 

13 to 15 feet schedule). This provided more water for agricultural, 

urban, and environmental needs in times of drought, but it also 

meant that the Corps had to send larger slugs of water to the Caloosahatchee and St. Lucie estuaries during the rainy season in order 

to prevent flooding, even though residents of Martin County and 

other interested parties had protested such releases as far back as the 

1950s. The releases to the areas, critics charged, disrupted salinity 

and deposited large amounts of sediment, killing fish and other life. 

Likewise, the higher stages caused problems in the lake’s littoral zone 

because they pushed phosphorous concentrations to the shore and 

flooded areas used as habitat and feeding grounds for surrounding 

flora and fauna.2

In 1988, the Lake Okeechobee Littoral Zone Technical Group, 

composed of representatives from the SFWMD, the FWS, the Florida Game and Freshwater Fish Commission, Everglades National 

Park, the Florida Department of Natural Resources, the Florida 

Department of Environmental Regulation, and several universities 

Conflicts and Difficulties: Water Distribution on the 1990s
256 United States Army Corps of Engineers

issued a report on the lake’s regulation schedule, claiming that it had 

“induced changes in the littoral zone” (meaning the water body’s 

shore). These alterations included “loss of wading bird feeding habitat, decline in willow, and loss of moist-soil annual plant production.” Because it considered the diminishment of the wading bird 

habitat critical, the group requested that an immediate lowering of 

the schedule occur “to improve fish and wildlife habitat.” It recommended that the Corps implement a new plan fluctuating “between 

a high of 16 feet and a low of 14 feet,” levels that would still allow 

the Corps to meet “the other demands placed on the lake.”3

 In making this suggestion, the group was repeating only what other fish 

and wildlife experts had already proclaimed to be necessary. The 

Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, for example, had 

informed the SFWMD in April 1988 that “the existing schedule has 

reduced the probability of maintaining a productive littoral zone 

into the future.”4 Meanwhile, the SFWMD, in the midst of a threeyear modeling study of lake levels, requested that the Corps use 

a schedule, known as “Run 25,” which would hold levels between 

15.65 and 16.75 feet. According to the SFWMD, those levels would 

provide the most “benefit to the estuarine environment” while “having no negative impacts on the lake’s water supply or littoral zone.”5

The Corps, however, made no changes to the schedule, in part because agricultural and urban interests demanded that higher levels 

in Lake Okeechobee were necessary.6

After environmental groups such as the Florida Lake Management Society protested the Corps’ inaction, the SFWMD renewed 

its request in 1991, reiterating that Run 25 would “reduce damaging flows to the nearby St. Lucie Canal and Caloosahatchee River 

estuaries without sacrificing the flood control or water supply benefits derived from the lake.”7

 The FWS, however, clamored for even 

lower levels, claiming that Run 25 would actually have little effect on 

the littoral zone. A group of 30 “environmental professionals” who 

examined the “overall ecological conditions of Lake Okeechobee” 

agreed with the FWS, insisting that lower levels would provide for 

“the sustained ecological health of Lake Okeechobee.”8 Accordingly, 

the SFMWD revisited Run 25 and developed a new schedule, known 

as Run 22, which would allow levels between 13.5 and 15.5 feet. The 

FWS applauded this proposal, as well as what it termed “the four 

step pulse release concept,” whereby water would be discharged from 

the lake in a way that would mitigate damage to the St. Lucie and 

Caloosahatchee estuaries.9 Other groups, such as the Okeechobee 

Waterway Association, the Glades County Board of County Commissioners, and the City of Belle Glade, disagreed with the Run 22 

plan, stating that it would disrupt fishing, cause even more pollution 

in Lake Okeechobee, and jeopardize water supplies.10

In response to these Run 22 criticisms, scientists and environmentalists pointed to numerous studies indicating that high water levels in Lake Okeechobee caused increased phosphorous concentrations by “facilitat[ing] the movement of phosphorous laden 

water from the turbid center of the lake to the edge of the littoral 

zone.”11 Likewise, the studies showed that wading birds needed levels below 15 feet in the spring to feed and nest successfully, while 

marshlands also required lower levels for optimum health. Despite 

this evidence, and despite the SFWMD’s suggestion that Run 22 be 

adopted, the Corps, hoping to achieve more of a middle ground between water supply and ecological protection, made a preliminary 

recommendation in 1994 to continue with Run 25 and to adopt it 

as its regular regulation schedule until the completion of the C&SF 

Restudy (which would analyze more thoroughly what levels were 

appropriate). Run 25, Corps officials claimed, would secure a sufficient water supply for downstream interests, including Everglades 

National Park and Florida Bay, while also causing some improvement in the littoral zone.12 The Corps did not rule out the possibility 

of implementing Run 22 at some point, but explained that it would 

have to conduct an economic and environmental impact study before it could take such action.13

The Caloosahatchee estuary. (South Florida Water Management District)
Chapter Seventeen | Conflicts and Difficulties 257

Predictably, environmentalists and fish and wildlife interests denounced the maintenance of Run 25. “Lake management decisions 

have placed other objectives above the lake’s ecological health,” the 

Florida Department of Environmental Protection declared, petitioning the Corps to stop “the sacrifice of the environment for other 

goals.”14 When the Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida supported the Corps’ recommendation, saying that the Corps should 

not operate Lake Okeechobee “solely for in-lake environmental objectives,” it seemed to prove that environmental surrenders were occurring.15 Regardless of the criticism, the Corps did not budge on 

the issue, leading environmental interests to cry that urban and agricultural concerns had won the battle. Given the “environmental 

concerns” that the Corps’ Restudy “was attempting to address,” environmentalists were “surprised” that the Corps had seemingly paid 

no heed to their concerns, leaving them wary of what kind of a plan 

the Restudy would actually produce.16

Modified Water Deliveries and C-111 Projects

Along with the divisions evident in the debate over Lake Okeechobee 

regulation schedules, the Corps’ Modified Water Deliveries and 

C-111 projects provoked controversy in the 1990s. In 1989, the Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act had authorized the Modified Water Deliveries Project. The law stated that in 

coordination with the Interior Department, which would purchase 

107,600 acres of land, the Corps would modify structures of the 

C&SF Project in order to restore more natural water flows to Shark 

River Slough, as well as to provide flood mitigation for residents in 

the 8.5 square mile area. The act required the Corps to complete a 

General Design Memorandum for the project, and in May 1993, the 

Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) approved the design memorandum, allowing for engineering design to begin. At the same time, 

the Corps worked on a General Reevaluation Report of the C-111 

project, authorized by both the Flood Control Act of 1968 and by 

the Everglades National Park Expansion and Protection Act of 1989 

to provide more water to Taylor Slough. Finalized in May 1994, the 

General Reevaluation Report proposed the construction of a water 

retention area on the eastern edge of Everglades National Park, as 

well as the development of a transition area to divide the park from 

agricultural lands. To accomplish these purposes, the reevaluation 

report recommended the purchase of the Frog Pond area.17

The Interior Department and the NPS agreed that acquisition 

of Frog Pond was essential, claiming that it would restore freshwater 

The St. Lucie estuary and Indian River Lagoon. (South Florida Water Management District)
258 United States Army Corps of Engineers

flows to Florida Bay. As discussed earlier, the Frog Pond area had 

long been the subject of controversy, mainly because its agricultural 

production complicated an experimental delivery program that the 

Corps had undertaken in the 1980s to restore more natural water 

flows to Shark River and Taylor sloughs.18 When the Corps had begun the experimental program in 1985, the Dade County Farm Bureau had sued because the plan “rerout[ed] . . . excess waters from 

federally-owned lands to privately-owned agricultural lands,” causing flooding problems for farmers in the Frog Pond area (Kendall, et 

al. v. Marsh, et al.).19 In order to halt the litigation and to continue 

the experimental program, the Corps reached a settlement with the 

bureau and other agriculturists, whereby the farmers would drop 

their suit if the Corps reduced water levels in the L-31W canal (running north to south on the border of East Everglades), allowing for 

more drainage during wet periods. This arrangement lasted until the 

1990s, when, as part of another iteration of the experimental program, Frog Pond lands were flooded again. In response, the South 

Dade Land Corporation sued the Corps in 1993, hoping to obtain 

an injunction against further flooding (South Dade Land Corporation v. Sullivan). The U.S. District Court for the Southern District 

of Florida, Miami Division, denied this injunction, stating that the 

Corps had adequately sought to mitigate any flooding, but the threat 

of litigation remained.20

Meanwhile, according to the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), the drainage of Frog Pond lands had resulted in detrimental effects on both the Cape Sable seaside sparrow and on wetlands bordering the eastern portion of Everglades National Park. The 

council claimed that the experimental plan had drained the Rocky 

Glades (a wetlands area southeast of Shark River Slough), Taylor 

Slough, and the C-111 basin to such an extent that wet-season water 

levels were as much as two feet lower than before the experiment’s 

beginning. This caused an invasion of exotic and woody plants that 

destroyed the sparrow’s habitat and caused declines in fish populations. The experimental program was designed to reestablish more 

natural water conditions to Shark River and Taylor Slough, but instead, the NRDC claimed, it was causing unnatural circumstances 

that violated the Endangered Species Act.21

The NRDC was not alone in this belief; FWS and Everglades 

National Park officials also claimed that the experimental program 

adversely affected the Cape Sable seaside sparrow. As mentioned 

above, the experimental program had gone through several different 

iterations before 1996, the first five of which consisted of delivering water from Conservation Area No. 3 to the western and northeastern portions of Shark River Slough. When the Corps conducted 

a sixth iteration, which provided water to both Shark River Slough 

and Taylor Slough, FWS and Everglades National Park officials objected, citing the effects of the program on the sparrow and requiring that certain restrictions be implemented. In its preparation for 

the seventh iteration in 1996, the Corps asked that the restraints be 

removed, claiming that this phase, which proposed to establish a 

more natural hydroperiod in Northeast Shark River Slough and Taylor Slough, would not harm the sparrow. The FWS responded with 

a biological opinion stating that, although the program would improve long-term environmental conditions for the sparrow, it would 

have adverse effects in the short term because the sparrow needed a 

shorter hydroperiod to nest. To mitigate these effects, the FWS requested frequent consultations with the Corps, the SFWMD, and the 

park, and it also asked for the establishment of “a comprehensive 

The Frog Pond area. (South Florida Water Management District, Save Our 

Rivers: 1998 Land Acquisition and Management Plan (1998)
Chapter Seventeen | Conflicts and Difficulties 259

monitoring and research program.” Moreover, the FWS suggested 

that the Corps use the Modified Water Deliveries Project and the 

C&SF Restudy “to identify ways to redistribute regulatory releases 

from Water Conservation Area 3A more naturally over as large a 

geographic area as possible.”22

Meanwhile, the NRDC and others wanted levels in the L-31W 

canal (as well as the L-31N and C-111) returned to “a minimum of 

initial design optimum settings,” but the Corps refused, citing the 

need to look out for the interests of Frog Pond farmers. The NRDC 

argued that “concerns about flooding in the Frog Pond are increasingly irrelevant and unjustified,” a view that seemed vindicated when 

the SFWMD purchased the Frog Pond area in 1995 for $12.5 million.23 But the SFWMD allowed the corporation to lease the Frog 

Pond area for agricultural purposes, meaning that the Corps still 

faced the problem of coordinating the experimental program with 

the needs of both agriculture and the sparrow.

In February 1999, the FWS reiterated that the experimental 

program adversely affected the sparrow, and the Corps, with the approval of the Council on Environmental Quality, revised its experimental plan to retain more water in the conservation areas. It also 

pledged to reroute the water so that the point of discharge would 

occur south of where the sparrow lived. These proposals, however, 

led to two lawsuits filed by the NRDC and the Miccosukee Tribe of 

Indians of Florida. The NRDC action alleged violations of the Endangered Species Act and requested that the Corps follow a different 

water delivery plan, one that would carry water through the Northeast Shark River Slough and the 8.5 Square Mile Area to the potential detriment of agricultural and residential interests in western 

Dade County. The Miccosukee’s lawsuit, meanwhile, attempted, in 

the words of one Jacksonville District legal advisor, “to preserve the 

status quo” and to prevent the impoundment of more water in the 

conservation areas.24 The court eventually ruled in favor of the Corps 

in both actions, stating that the Jacksonville District was performing 

sufficient mitigation, but the dismissal did little to assuage the fears 

of the Miccosukee and some environmentalists that restoring water 

flows to Everglades National Park would harm other interests.25

The Frog Pond negotiations and the Cape Sable seaside sparrow situation created discontent exacerbated by battles in the 1990s 

over the 8.5 Square Mile Area. Under the Modified Water Deliveries 

Project, as authorized by the 1989 Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act, the Corps was supposed to construct flood 

mitigating works around the 8.5 area to protect it from any flooding 

caused by water releases to Everglades National Park. Yet some, including NPS authorities, claimed that the easiest way to restore natural flows to Shark River Slough would be to purchase the entire 8.5 

Square Mile Area and allow water to run across the area unhindered 

by any mitigation.26 In recognition of these views, Congress amended the Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act in 

March 1994, specifically authorizing the secretary of the interior to 

use funds appropriated for the Modified Water Deliveries Project to 

acquire the 8.5 section, as long as the secretary did not contribute 

more than 25 percent of the total cost.27

But, as explained in an earlier chapter, property owners in the 

area had vehemently objected to any kind of relocation in the 1980s, 

and they did not retreat from that position in the 1990s. Instead, 

a 1992 Corps study declaring that acquisition was not necessary as 

long as flood mitigation structures were built fortified their stance. 

The Interior Department, however, disagreed with the Corps’ conclusion and refused to release funding to construct the flood works 

(as the Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act had 

mandated), delaying the implementation of the Modified Waters 

Project. Not only did this mean that necessary water was not restored 

to the Everglades, it also caused more water to collect in Conservation Area No. 3A, leading to the drowning of tree islands and wildlife, much to the chagrin of the Miccosukee Indians. Miccosukee attorney Dexter Lehtinen thus blasted the Interior Department for its 

uncooperative attitude, accusing it of “scandalous” behavior, such as 

“selfish National Park Service obstructionism and outright misrepresentation” and the destruction of property rights.28 The Interior 

Department denied that it had deliberately withheld funds, claiming 

instead that Hurricane Andrew (which hit Florida in August 1992) 

and its aftermath had “brought . . . things to a halt.” Besides, Interior 

officials insisted, the Corps’ plan would not give full flood protection 

to 8.5 Square Mile Area residents, especially if residential expansion 

in the area continued.29 Regardless of who was right, the situation 

created a standstill, pitting the Interior Department against the Miccosukee, the Corps, and landowners.

In 1994, the state of Florida became involved in the controversy. 

That year, Governor Lawton Chiles issued an executive order requesting that the Corps hold any flood mitigation efforts for the 8.5 

section “in abeyance” until more studies could be made.30 To make 

those examinations, Chiles established a committee of Corps, SFWMD, Everglades National Park, and landowner representatives. 

When it issued its report in 1995, the committee took a middleground approach, stating that the best solution was to create a flow 

way buffer between the 8.5 Square Mile Area and the park. However, 

Jacksonville District Engineer Colonel Terry Rice dismissed the recommendation because the committee provided no information as to 

how to deal with the “increased budgets, more environmental problems, and congressional approvals” that would result.31

Because of the Corps’ rejection, the SFWMD decided in 1996 

to review the situation on its own, hoping to find a locally preferred 

option that it could implement. More studies just made the Miccosukee anxious, especially since flooding continued to be a problem 

on their lands, and the tribe appealed for speed in the SFWMD’s 

review. Regardless, the district studied the issue for two years before finally deciding in November 1998 to support full acquisition 

of the 8.5 Square Mile Area. In the eyes of the Miccosukee, this was 
260 United States Army Corps of Engineers

the worst possible solution because it would lead only to protracted 

negotiations with landowners that would further delay implementation of the Modified Waters Project, meaning that they would 

obtain no relief. Some environmentalists, including Joette Lorion, 

president of Friends of the Everglades, supported the Miccosukee’s 

stance, requesting that full acquisition be eliminated as an option. 

Likewise, landowners, such as Ibel Aguilera of the United Property 

Owners & Friends of the 8.5 Square Mile Area, Inc., contended that 

the SFWMD was employing coercive tactics to try to force property owners to sell their land, including sending letters that discussed acquisition as a foregone conclusion. Aguilera, spurred on 

by Representative John J. Duncan, Jr. (R-Tennessee), implied that 

such methods were more characteristic of the Cuban communist 

regime that she and many others in the 8.5 section had fled, rather 

than the United States.32

Interior Department officials, however, supported the SFWMD’s 

decision, claiming that acquisition was necessary to restore “short 

hydroperiod wetlands” that could support “habitat for populations 

of wading birds” on the eastern edge of the Everglades.33 Moreover, 

environmentalists such as Mary Barley of the “penny-a-pound” 

campaign called for acquisition, believing that it would allow the 

establishment of a recharge area between Everglades National Park 

and the urban development of Dade County, thereby allowing more 

fresh water to flow to Florida Bay and the Florida Keys.34 The different perspectives produced a stalemate, and by 1999, no progress 

had been made on any front, although the Corps had successfully 

completed two new control structures (S-355A and S-355B) to divert 

more water to Northeast Shark River Slough.35

In a similar way, differences between the Corps, the NPS, and 

other groups resulted in delays on the C-111 project, developed to 

restore “more natural quantity, quality, timing, and distribution of 

water deliveries to Taylor Slough and wetlands in the panhandle 

of Everglades National Park.”36 To accomplish this, the Corps and 

the SFWMD constructed S-332D, a new pump station along C-111 

C-111 project. (Everglades National Park)
Chapter Seventeen | Conflicts and Difficulties 261

(which ran east to west from the park’s eastern border), which would 

allow the Corps to increase water levels in the canal, thereby providing more water to the slough. But farmers located north of the pump 

objected to the higher canal levels, claiming that more water would 

damage their crops. When the NPS tried to purchase their lands, the 

agriculturists refused to sell, creating yet another standoff. By 1999, 

each side had hardened their stance, meaning that nothing more 

could be done on the C-111 work.37

According to many observers, one of the major reasons for the 

lack of progress in the Modified Water Deliveries and C-111 projects was the unwillingness of Everglades National Park officials to 

budge once they had declared their position. Critics claimed that NPS 

authorities saw the park’s interests as supreme, and did not believe 

that any concessions could or should be made. This intransigence 

stemmed both from an overall insular mentality within the NPS, as 

well as from the attitude of specific leaders at Everglades National 

Park. For example, because officials believed that NPS personnel 

were the best authorities on park management, the NPS regarded 

each park, according to environmental scholar Richard West Sellars, 

as “a superintendent’s realm,” to be governed with as little outside 

interference as possible. The culture of the NPS, Sellars continued, 

produced “a strongly utilitarian and pragmatic managerial bent” that 

created “a management style” emphasizing “expediency and quick solutions” and disregarding “information gathering through long-term 

research.”38 Colonel Terry Rice put it more strongly. “The NPS culture 

is a selfish, self-centered culture,” he declared. “They trust nobody.”39

Many believed that Richard Ring, who was superintendent of 

Everglades National Park for most of the 1990s (and who also served 

for a period as chairman of the Task Force), epitomized these stubborn, self-centered characteristics. As superintendent of the park, 

critics charged, he clung to his beliefs about what was right or wrong 

and would not move from his position regardless of the situation. 

Although Ring held what he perceived to be the best interests of the 

park at heart, his uncompromising attitude irritated those who had 

to work with him. “I didn’t know anybody that didn’t like Dick Ring,” 

Colonel Terrence “Rock” Salt, District Engineer of the Jacksonville 

District, explained, but “he was also the most frustrating guy to work 

with that you could find.” The problem, in Salt’s mind, was that Ring 

“had a tactical view of things and he would fight so hard for it that he 

would expend all the strategic capital he had built up.”40 Michael Collins, a member of the SFWMD’s governing board, agreed. “Basically 

[Ring] believed that if you obstructed everything that came down 

the road you protected the park.”41

But Ring was not alone in his actions. Michael Finley, superintendent of Everglades National Park in the mid-1980s, had resorted 

to litigation and polarized stances as well because he believed that 

it was the only way to get water management agencies to take the 

park seriously.42 Environmentalist Joseph Browder of the Audubon 

Society applauded Ring and Finley, claiming that the superintendents were only doing what was necessary to force the Corps to 

operate the C&SF Project to the benefit of fish and wildlife interests. In Browder’s mind, the original project plan had required the 

Corps to provide flood control and water supply “in a way that does 

not damage the national interest lands protected by the NPS.” Since 

the Corps disregarded this responsibility, Browder continued, Ring, 

Finley, and the entire environmental community had to expend efforts “to enforce the terms of the original agreement.” “It’s really that 

simple,” he concluded.43

The Corps, however, claimed that the park’s uncooperative attitude did nothing to help the cause of ecosystem protection; instead, 

it merely created an atmosphere of paranoia and polarization that 

frustrated any true restoration efforts. As proof, Corps personnel 

pointed to notes taken at park meetings entitled SWOT workshops, 

where the park’s “strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats” 

(SWOT) were analyzed. These notes showed that park officials had 

listed “powerful organizations/interests with goals at odds with 

ours”—specifically the Corps, the SFWMD, the Miccosukee, developers, and agricultural interests—as threats.44 As Rice, who by 

now was working as a consultant to the Miccosukee Indians, noted, 

SFWMD and Corps employees—“dedicated to Everglades restoration”—were “frustrated and beat down” by such statements and by 

the NPS’s “culture of paranoia.”45

Internal Corps emails corroborated Rice’s statements. Richard 

Punnett, a modeler in the Jacksonville District’s Hydrology and Hydraulics Branch, discussed the “real feeling of depression” that he 

experienced when considering the “delays, confusion, demands, red 

herrings, bad science, changing of positions” that the NPS used to 

“undercut” the restoration effort. Punnett claimed that Everglades 

National Park officials misrepresented scientific data and made 

“false claims” about restoration plans. Punnett and others were “doing [their] best to work through the gauntlet” of delays and obstructionist tactics employed by the NPS, but believed that the Service’s “ 

‘red herrings’ will never be an endangered species.”46

Michael L. Choate, a hydrologist with the Jacksonville District, 

made even stronger statements, accusing Everglades National Park 

officials of conducting a “jihad” against “the infidels” (meaning the 

Corps, the SFWMD, and any other interest that disagreed with park 

stances). “We have wasted 8 years on [Modified Water Deliveries] 

and 6 years on C-111 arguing over L-28 (flood the Indians), 8.5 sma 

(flood the homesteaders) and L-31N canal stages (flood the farmers),” Choate charged. Park officials had no problem with such delays, Choate declared, because “they have not lost until something 

is built.” This attitude, Choate continued, meant that the NPS would 

obstruct any projects resulting from a comprehensive restoration 

plan, “resulting in time and cost escalations.”47 In the words of Hanley “Bo” Smith, chief of the Environment and Resources Branch, 

“it’s hard to imagine worse interagency relationships than those” between the Corps, the FWS, and the NPS.48
262 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Others within the Corps tried to be more philosophical about 

relationships with the NPS. James Vearil, a project manager for the 

Corps’ Restoration Coordination and Verification team (RECOVER), for example, believed that the major reasons for the problems 

were “differences in our agencies missions, organizational structures, legal authorities, philosophy, customers, styles, rules and regulations, and organizational culture.” Citing several publications on 

conflicts within water management (such as publications by William 

Lord and Peter Loucks), Vearil related that the conflicts between 

the Corps and the NPS lay in three arenas—cognitive (or technical 

issues), value, and interest—although, in Vearil’s mind, the values 

and interests of both parties caused the majority of contention. “In 

order to adequately improve Corps/DOI communications,” Vearil 

asserted, “our organizational leaders will also need to address the 

broader institutional/political/legal issues.”49 John Ogden, a former 

scientist with Everglades National Park who was now an ecologist 

for the SFWMD, agreed. “I still have hopes that we can forge a new, 

more productive relationship with the staff of Everglades National 

Park,” he told Robert “Bob” Johnson, director of research at the park, 

but as long as Johnson and other park officials took “cheap shots” at 

restoration plans, the process would be difficult.50

To those dealing with the problems created by Lake Okeechobee 

regulation schedules, experimental water deliveries, the 8.5 Square 

Mile Area, and the C-111 project, Vearil’s comments rang true. In 

all of these cases, the issues were not so much technical (although 

all sides used scientific information to support their positions) as 

they were questions of values and interests. What was important to 

one side was not necessarily important to the other, and if one refused to compromise, solutions were difficult to reach. Unfortunately, these problems portended difficulties for ecosystem restoration 

plans and projects. The whole basis for restoration, and the whole 

goal of the Task Force and the Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable Florida, was to create consensus so that a restoration plan could 

move forward. But with sides clinging to their own values and interests, consensus was difficult to achieve. No one doubted that Lake 

Okeechobee had to be regulated in a different way in order to protect 

estuaries and to preserve water supply, just as no one questioned that 

restoring more natural flows to both Everglades National Park and 

Florida Bay were necessary. The problem was developing plans to 

which all sides could agree. If the Corps, the Interior Department, 

the SFWMD, agricultural interests, the Miccosukee Indians, environmentalists, and others could not agree on a Lake Okeechobee 

restoration schedule, or on how flows could best be restored to the 

park, how would they ever agree on an acceptable restoration plan 

in general?51 That question plagued officials in the midst of developing a workable proposal and placed a pall of pessimism over the 

entire restoration effort. As Bradford Sewell, an attorney with the 

NRDC, observed, no “worse advertisements for Everglades restoration” could have appeared.52

Endnotes

1 “Save Our Everglades: A Status Report by the Office of Governor 

Lawton Chiles,” 30 June 1996, 5.

2 See Herbert H. Zebuth, Environmental Coordinator, Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, to Ms. Sharon Trost, South Florida Water Management District, 31 March 1993, File Attachment 1, Box 

782, JDAR; Joseph D. Carroll, Jr., Field Supervisor, Fish and Wildlife Service, to District Engineer, 4 June 1976, File 1520-03 (C&SF) Water Control 

Jan. 1976-Dec. 1976, Box 3579, JDAR.

3 Lake Okeechobee Littoral Zone Technical Group, “Assessment of 

Emergency Conditions in Lake Okeechobee Littoral Zone: Recommendations for Interim Management,” November 1988, File New EA Lake O, Box 

782, JDAR.

4 Colonel Robert M. Brantly, Executive Director, to Mr. John R. Wodraska, Executive Director, South Florida Water Management District, 25 

April 1988, File New EA Lake O, Box 782, JDAR.

5 John R. Wodraska, Executive Director, South Florida Water Management District, to Ms. Martha Musgrove, The Miami Herald, 31 May 

1988, File Lake O (Background), Box 782, JDAR.

6 Tilford A. Creel for Valerie Boyd, Governing Board Chairman, 

South Florida Water Management District, to Captain Ed Hansen, Marine 

Surveyor, 24 May 1993, File Attachment 1, Box 782, JDAR; Paul J. Trimble 

and Jorge A. Marban, “A Proposed Modification to Regulation of Lake 

Okeechobee,” Water Resources Bulletin 25 (December 1989): 1249-1257.

7 Colonel Terrence C. Salt, Corps of Engineers Commanding, Memorandum for CDR, South Atlantic Division, n.d., File Lake O (Background), 

Box 782, JDAR. 

8 Tilford C. Creel, Executive Director, South Florida Water Management District, to Colonel Terrence Salt, District Engineer, 12 December 

1991, File Lake O (Reports), Box 782, JDAR.

9 Quotation in Joseph D. Carroll, Acting Field Supervisor, to Colonel Terrence C. Salt, District Engineer, 14 May 1993, File Lake O Scoping 

Comments, Box 782, JDAR; see also A. J. Salem, Chief, Planning Division, 

Jacksonville District, to Addressees on Enclosed List, 8 March 1993, File 

Attachment 1, Box 782, JDAR.

10 See Captain Ed Hansen, Past President, Okeechobee Waterway Association, to Ms. Valerie Boyd, Governing Board Chairman, South Florida 

Water Management District, 2 June 1993, File Attachment 1, Box 782, 

JDAR; Franklin D. Simmons, Chairman, Glades County Board of County 

Commissioners, to Mr. A. J. Salem, Chief, Planning Division, Environmental Studies Section, Jacksonville District, 23 March 1993, ibid.; Lomax 

Harrelle, City Manager, City of Belle Glade, to Colonel Terrence Salt, Department of the Army, 20 April 1993, ibid.

11 Quotation in Zebuth to Trost, 31 March 1993; see also Colonel Robert M. Brantly, Executive Director, Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish 

Commission, to Mr. A. J. Salem, Chief, Planning Division, U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, 12 April 1993, ibid.; Karl E. Havens, “Water Levels and 

Total Phosphorous in Lake Okeechobee,” Journal of Lake and Reservoir 

Management 13, no. 1 (1997): 16-25.

12 Colonel Terrence C. Salt, U.S. Army, District Engineer, to Mr. Tilford C. Creel, Executive Director, South Florida Water Management District, 14 March 1994, File Lake O, Box 745, JDAR; Jacksonville District 

Corps of Engineers, “Public Meeting Notice on a Proposed Change in the 

Lake Okeechobee Regulation Schedule,” 8 April 1994, File Lake O Scoping 

Comments, Box 782, JDAR.
Chapter Seventeen | Conflicts and Difficulties 263

13 Richard E. Bonner, Deputy District Engineer for Project Management, to Mr. Tilford C. Creel, Executive Director, South Florida Water 

Management District, 9 August 1994, File Lake O EA Comments, 1994, 

Box 782, JDAR.

14 “Department of Environmental Protection Staff Assessment, Lake 

Okeechobee Regulation Schedule Environmental Assessment,” File Lake 

O EA Comments, 1994, Box 782, JDAR.

15 Stephen A. Walker to Rea Boothby, Department of the Army, Jacksonville District, 10 May 1994, File Lake O EA Comments, 1994, Box 782, 

JDAR.

16 Quotation in Thomas D. Martin, Co-Chair, Everglades Coalition, 

et al., to Col. Terrence Salt, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 9 May 1994, File 

Lake O EA Comments, 1994, Box 782, JDAR; see also Thomas D. Martin, 

Executive Director, and G. Thomas Bancroft, Senior Scientist, National 

Audubon Society, to Salt, 31 May 1994, ibid.

17 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Central and 

Southern Florida Project, Flood Control and Other Purposes, Canal 111 (C111) South Dade County, Florida: Final Integrated General Reevaluation 

Report and Environmental Impact Statement (Jacksonville, Fla.: U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, 1994), 3-4, 1-13; House Committee on Natural Resources Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests 

and Public Lands, Issues Relating to the Everglades Ecosystem: Oversight 

Hearing before the Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests and Public 

Lands of the Committee on Natural Resources, House of Representatives, 

One Hundred Third Congress, Second Session, on the Land Use Policies of 

South Florida with a Focus on Public Lands and What Impact These Policies are Having, 103d Cong., 2d sess., 1994, 5, 20 [hereafter referred to as 

Everglades Ecosystem Hearing].

18 Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1984 (97 Stat. 1153, 1292-

1293). The original legislation authorized the program for only two years, 

but Congress extended the deadline and finally, in the Everglades National 

Park Protection and Expansion Act, allowed the Corps to continue the 

program indefinitely.

19 Quotation in Dade County Farm Bureau v. John O. Marsh, Jr., et al., 

Case No. 83-1210, Memorandum in Support of Emergency Motion for a 

Temporary Restraining Order and Other Emergency Relief, 1-2, copy provided by James Vearil, Senior Project Manager, RECOVER Branch, Programs and Project Management Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

Jacksonville District, Jacksonville, Florida; see also James Vearil, personal 

communication with authors, 26 May 2005; Brady interview, 1.

20 South Dade Land Corporation, et al. v. Gordon Sullivan, et al. (853 F. 

Supp. 404), copy provided by James Vearil; Brady interview, 1.

21 Sarah Chasis, Senior Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, 

to Mr. A. J. Salem, Chief, Planning Division, 12 January 1995, File Test 7, 

Box 15754, SFWMDAR.

22 Noreen K. Clough, Regional Director, Fish and Wildlife Service, to 

Mr. A. J. Salem, Planning Division, District Corps of Engineers, 27 October 1995, File Test 7, Box 15754, SFWMDAR.

23 Quotation in Chasis to Salem, 12 January 1995; see also “South 

Florida Ecosystem Restoration: FY 1996 Budget Cross-Cut, Summary of 

Federal Projects, Summary of State Projects,” 15 May 1995, 13, Billy Causey Files, FKNMSAR.

24 John D. Brady, Principal Assistant, Office of Counsel, Jacksonville 

District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, personal communication with the 

authors, 12 May 2005.

25 Brady interview, 4.

26 See House Committee on Resources Subcommittee on National 

Parks and Public Lands, Issues Regarding Everglades National Park and 

Surrounding Areas Impacted by Management of the Everglades: Oversight 

Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Parks and Public Lands of 

the Committee on Resources, House of Representatives, 106th Cong., 1st 

sess., 1999, 2 [hereafter referred to as Issues Regarding Everglades National 

Park].

27 Act of 9 March 1994 (108 Stat. 98).

28 Issues Regarding Everglades National Park, 63-64; see also United 

States General Accounting Office, South Florida Ecosystem Restoration: An 

Overall Strategic Plan and a Decision-Making Process Are Needed to Keep 

the Effort on Track, GAO/RCED-99-121 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General 

Accounting Office, 1999), 43.

29 Issues Regarding Everglades National Park, 2-3, 8.

30 “Executive Order: East Everglades/8.5 Square Mile Area,” File PRO 

Florida Bay—General 94, Box 15232, SFWMDAR.

31 Issues Regarding Everglades National Park, 8, 36.

32 Issues Regarding Everglades National Park, 79-81, 99-100, 118-119.

33 Issues Regarding Everglades National Park, 9, 31, 73.

34 Issues Regarding Everglades National Park, 136-137.

35 “Maintaining the Momentum: South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force Biennial Report to the U.S. Congress, Florida Legislature, 

Seminole Tribe of Florida, and Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida,” 

March 1999 <http://www.sfrestore.org/documents/biennialreport/01.

htm> (3 February 2006).

36 “Maintaining the Momentum.”

37 U.S. General Accounting Office, South Florida Ecosystem Restoration, 44-45.

38 Richard West Sellars, Preserving Nature in the National Parks: A 

History (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), 283-284.

39 Colonel Terry Rice interview by Theodore Catton, 6 December 

2004, 5 [hereafter referred to as Rice interview—Catton].

40 Salt interview—Catton, 10.

41 Collins interview, 4.

42 Finley interview, 1.

43 Browder interview, 2.

44 “Park Management Team SWOT Workshop Notes,” 22 May 2000, 

copy provided by Colonel Terry Rice, Southeast Environmental Research 

Center, Florida International University, Miami, Florida.

45 Terry Rice, Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, email to Mary Doyle, 21 

June 2000, copy provided by James Vearil, Senior Project Manager, RECOVER Branch, Programs and Project Management Division, U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Jacksonville, Florida.

46 Richard Punnett email to James W. Vearil et al., 15 February 

2001, copy provided by James Vearil, Senior Project Manager, RECOVER 

Branch, Programs and Project Management Division, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, Jacksonville District, Jacksonville, Florida.

47 Michael L. Choate email to Cheryl P. Ulrich, 26 January 2001, 

copy provided by Colonel Terry Rice, Southeast Environmental Research 

Center, Florida International University, Miami, Florida; see also Michael 

Grunwald, “An Environmental Reversal of Fortune,” The Washington 

Post, 26 June 2002.

48 Bo Smith email to Cheryl P. Ulrich, 31 January 2001, copy provided 

by James Vearil, Senior Project Manager, RECOVER Branch, Programs 

and Project Management Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Jacksonville, Florida.

49 Jim Vearil email to Michael E. Magley, 30 March 2001, copy provided by James Vearil, Senior Project Manager, RECOVER Branch, Programs and Project Management Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

Jacksonville District, Jacksonville, Florida.
264 United States Army Corps of Engineers

50 John Ogden email to Bob Johnson, Director, Everglades National 

Park Research Center, 23 September 2000, copy provided by James Vearil, 

Senior Project Manager, RECOVER Branch, Programs and Project Management Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, 

Jacksonville, Florida.

51 Grunwald, The Swamp, 315.

52 Quotations in Michael Grunwald, “An Environmental Reversal of 

Fortune,” The Washington Post, 26 June 2002.


267

In November 2000, the U.S. House of Representatives approved 

a bill authorizing the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan 

(CERP), an ambitious project headed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, to restore the South Florida ecosystem. Buoyed by the passage of the act, which President Bill Clinton signed on 11 December 

2000, congressional leaders, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, 

environmentalists, and even a man in a large green alligator costume 

(the mascot of the SFWMD) joined in a celebratory “love fest.”1 Sugar interests, environmental groups, state and county officials, Indian 

tribes, federal agencies, Republicans, and Democrats had all come 

together—through the Task Force, the Governor’s Commission for 

a Sustainable Florida, and the Corps’ Restudy team—in the latter 

part of the 1990s to develop a workable and agreeable restoration 

plan. Even though questions remained about the ultimate effects of 

CERP, it seemed that consensus had won the day. But it had been a 

long road to gain that consensus, fraught with pitfalls and obstacles.

As explained earlier, the Water Resources Development Act of 

1996 (WRDA-96) directed the Corps to conduct a feasibility study 

on a comprehensive plan for Everglades restoration. At the same 

time, it mandated that the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task 

Force include non-federal interests. This stemmed from concerns 

expressed in 1994 and 1995 that non-federal groups—specifically 

the state of Florida and the Miccosukee and Seminole Indians—did 

not have enough input in the restoration effort. One of the problems 

was that the Federal Advisory Committee Act severely limited how 

non-federal organizations could participate on federal committees. 

Therefore, in the words of Colonel Terrence “Rock” Salt, now serving as the executive director of the Task Force, “Federal law does 

not provide a mechanism to build the sorts of relationships needed 

Chapter 18

in the Everglades restoration efforts without complications from the 

FACA.”2 Salt recommended that the Task Force support legislative 

proposals to exempt the Task Force from the Federal Advisory Committee Act, and that it then appoint the Miccosukee, the Seminole, 

the state, and the SFWMD as ex officio Task Force members.

The Task Force had the immediate opportunity to implement 

Salt’s suggestions, as Congress was considering a bill to promote better cooperation between federal and non-federal interests. In March 

1995, Congress passed the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, stating that the Federal Advisory Committee Act would not apply to 

“meetings . . . held exclusively between Federal officials and elected 

officers of State, local, and tribal governments,” where the conferences were “solely for the purpose of exchanging views, information, 

or advice relating to the management or implementation of Federal 

programs.”3

 Accordingly, in June 1995, the Task Force expanded its 

membership to include the state of Florida, the Miccosukee Tribe of 

Indians, and the Seminole Tribe of Florida.4

To ensure that no difficulties would result from this arrangement, and to provide a congressional mandate for these groups’ participation, Congress included a provision in WRDA-96 specifically 

delineating the membership of the Task Force. It stated that the committee would consist of the secretary of the Interior (who would chair 

the group), the secretaries of Army, Commerce, Agriculture, and 

Transportation, as well as the Attorney General, the administrator 

of the Environmental Protection Agency, and representatives from 

the state of Florida, the SFWMD, the Miccosukee, the Seminole, and 

a local government. The Task Force was instructed to consult with 

the Corps in the Corps’ preparation of the Restudy; to coordinate 

different policies and plans for restoration; to facilitate coordination 

Getting the Water Right: The Restudy and Enactment of 

CERP, 1996–2000
268 United States Army Corps of Engineers

between the different agencies; and to manage the gathering of scientific data.5

 According to the Task Force’s 1996 annual report, the 

inclusion of the non-federal groups allowed the organization to shift 

its focus “toward issue resolution,” and it also “increas[ed] its emphasis on the urban and agricultural components” of restoration.6

With its official mandate, the Task Force delineated its goals 

for South Florida restoration. These included restoring the “diversity, interconnectedness and function of the region’s predrainage 

landscape,” as well as ensuring that the “working landscape” could 

sustain both “a healthy economy and a vibrant society while complementing the management of vital natural resources.” The Task 

Force wanted to restore “estuarine and marine systems,” and allow 

for “natural hydrologic functions in wetlands.” It would strive to 

provide air “healthy to breathe,” and it would educate South Floridians so that they could “understand and support the need to restore, 

preserve and protect the South Florida Ecosystem.” To achieve 

these “desired future conditions,” restoration had to consist of three 

components: getting the water right, restoring and enhancing the 

natural system, and transforming the built environment. It would 

also have to be based on sustainability, utilizing an “Ecosystem Approach.” The Task Force committed to employ “sound science,” as 

well as adaptive management, in its efforts, and it pledged to use 

“expanded Partnerships,” including public involvement, to “integrate Restoration Planning.”7

In its restoration activities, the Task Force had several good 

resources, including Colonel Salt, who, as executive director of the 

Task Force, assisted the secretary of the interior in the management 

of the group, and Colonel Terry Rice, who had replaced Salt as District Engineer of the Jacksonville District in 1994. Both believed that 

Floridians needed to coordinate human needs with environmental 

quality, and both were firmly committed to the restoration effort. 

During his 1991-1994 term as District Engineer of the Jacksonville 

District, environmentalists had embraced Salt as a “green” commander because of his work on both the Kissimmee River and the 

Restudy. According to Rice, Salt was “the bee’s knees” in the eyes of 

many South Floridians.8

 Salt emphasized the same integrated system 

approach to South Florida’s problems as he had used while dealing 

with salmon runs on the Columbia and Snake rivers as deputy commander of the Walla Walla District. The colonel had provided such 

strong leadership in environmental issues as District Engineer that 

restoration interests wrote letter after letter to Corps Headquarters in 

1994, requesting that Salt be allowed to extend his three-year term.9

Because of Salt’s popularity, Rice faced a daunting situation, 

but he committed to do his best to “continue what [Salt] had started.” By the end of his tenure, restoration proponents were also asking for an extension of Rice’s time.10 Rice, who had a Ph.D. in water 

resources engineering, had spent most of his professional life in Africa, South America, Central America, and Europe, trying to solve 

water resource problems in developing countries. After becoming 

immersed in Everglades issues, Rice discovered that “the problems 

we face in South Florida are really the same problems we face everywhere,” namely, “how does man take care of himself and not 

destroy the environment in which he lives.” He foresaw Everglades 

restoration as a prime opportunity to experiment with solutions to 

that fundamental question, and he regarded it as “one of our greatest chances on this earth” to develop “the model that we need to 

move forward into history.”11

The Clinton Administration, especially Vice President Albert 

Gore, Jr., also provided strong support for Everglades restoration. Gore 

had been an early convert to the principles of ecosystem restoration 

and sustainability, and in the mid-1990s, he latched onto Everglades 

restoration as the crowning example of these concepts in action. He 

had strategic helpers in the Office of the Secretary of the Army, including Joseph Westphal and Michael Davis, Assistant Secretary and 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works), respectively. 

Davis, for example, had studied wildlife ecology and wetlands science for 25 years, and had worked for the Council on Environmental 

Quality (CEQ) in the White House before becoming Deputy Assistant Secretary. Westphal, meanwhile, had been both a senior fellow 

at the Institute for Water Resources and the Senior Policy Advisor for 

Water at the EPA before his appointment as Assistant Secretary. Both 

held strong feelings in favor of Everglades restoration.12

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) Joseph Westphal. (U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers)
Chapter Eighteen | Getting the Water Right 269

In Florida, the state government had restoration proponents 

as well. Governor Lawton Chiles, who died in office in 1998, had 

worked for years, both as a state senator and as governor, on environmental initiatives. Governor John Ellis “Jeb” Bush, who became governor in 1999, did not have as strong of an environmental 

record, but he readily embraced restoration as both necessary and 

desirable, telling a gathering of the Everglades Coalition in January 

2000 that “there certainly should be no question about my personal 

commitment.”13

Alarming statistics also fueled the desire for some kind of a 

comprehensive plan. According to a Task Force report, South Florida’s population was expected to expand to as much as 12 million 

in “the next generation,” fed by an estimated overall increase of 700 

new residents every day. Such expansion, the Task Force declared, 

would continue to affect the natural resources of the area, which had 

already been “significantly disrupted” by “extensive drainage and 

flood control systems.” It noted that half of the Everglades had disappeared due to drainage, wading bird populations had declined by 

90 percent, exotic plants threatened to eliminate native vegetation, 

pollutants diminished water quality, and Florida Bay was “in a state 

of ecological collapse.” All of these problems, the Task Force argued, 

revolved around the disruption of the “quantity, timing and distribution” in fresh water deliveries.14

An excess of rainfall in 1994 and 1995 emphasized the water 

distribution problems. The Corps’ flood control system functioned 

adequately, but it created difficulties in other areas. In order to 

maintain acceptable levels in Lake Okeechobee, for example, the 

SFWMD had to flush hundreds of thousands of gallons of water 

down the St. Lucie and Caloosahatchee canals. This pounded the 

estuaries with slugs of fresh water and silt, disrupting their salinity 

balance, causing lesions on game fish, and killing seagrass. Likewise, pumping water from the EAA into the water conservation 

areas threatened deer populations and damaged tree islands, much 

to the dismay of the Miccosukee Indians.15 Accordingly, the Miccosukee sued the United States in 1995, charging that the Corps 

had refused to send water to Everglades National Park because of 

objections from the NPS, causing undue damage to Miccosukee 

land in Conservation Area No. 3.16 Facing such difficulties, the Task 

Force determined that restoration efforts should be centered on reestablishing the “historic hydrologic functions” of the Everglades, 

meaning balancing the “quantity, quality, timing, and distribution 

of fresh water” throughout the ecosystem.17

Another problem involved the resurrection of the idea to build 

a commercial airport near Everglades National Park, this time at 

a site formerly housing the Homestead Air Force Base. In August 

1992, Hurricane Andrew, a Category Five storm, had pummeled 

South Florida, destroying the Homestead base, which lay between 

Everglades National Park and Biscayne National Park (established in 

1968 to preserve Biscayne Bay). Several politicians, including thenpresidential candidate Bill Clinton and U.S. Senator Bob Graham, 

declared their support for redevelopment, and, soon after, Carlos 

Herrera, president of the Latin Builders Association, spearheaded a 

plan to construct a commercial airport on the former base’s site. In 

January 1996, Dade County, in what many believed was a classic Miami backroom deal, voted to allow Herrera and his colleagues to begin plans for the development, and an EIS was concluded that year.18

However, the Everglades Coalition charged that the EIS was 

inadequate, stating that it did not take into account numerous factors. For one thing, there was no analysis of how runoff through the 

Military Canal (which removed water from the area) would affect 

Biscayne Bay, nor were there adequate considerations of the effects 

of noise on Everglades and Biscayne visitors. In addition, Task Force 

agencies had determined “that the Proposed Action likely conflicts 

with their restoration initiatives” and that it would not allow for adequate “protection of natural resources in Southern Dade County.”19

The coalition therefore requested that a supplemental EIS be performed, and Vice President Gore ordered that action in 1997.20

Meanwhile, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Sierra 

Club, and the Friends of the Everglades contemplated filing a lawsuit. 

Yet not all environmentalists agreed with litigation, causing a rift 

within the environmental movement itself. The Audubon Society, 

Map showing the location of the Homestead Air Force Base. (U.S. 

Geological Survey, “Preliminary Determinations of Hydrobiological Conditions in the Vicinity of the Proposed Jetport and Other Airports in South 

Florida” (1969).
270 United States Army Corps of Engineers

for example, claimed that the Clinton administration’s support of the 

airport, coupled with the fact that Senator Graham wanted it built 

to promote Homestead’s economic development, made it useless 

to fight. Others, such as Joe Browder and Nathaniel Reed, however, 

were opposed to the airport and derided Audubon leaders for their 

stance.21

Such divisions generated by the Homestead airport, as well as 

the flooding problems in the water conservation areas, fragmented 

the foundation of consensus that the Task Force and the Governor’s 

Commission were constructing. One of the ways that the groups 

hoped to repair the damage was through the inclusion of unbiased 

scientific studies in the restoration effort, something that the Task 

Force’s Science Subgroup had recommended in 1996. The subgroup 

claimed that a South Florida Comprehensive Science Plan was essential, giving priority to studies detailing how the hydrologic system needed to be modified and operated to restore the ecosystem. 

Especially important was the delineation of pre-drainage hydrology 

and the use of adaptive management in the final comprehensive plan, 

including models, restoration support studies, and monitoring.22

Indeed, the strategy of adaptive management was a major focus for those developing the comprehensive plan. Proponents of 

adaptive management believed that it was a necessary component 

of CERP for several reasons. The uncertainty surrounding the effects 

of the restoration efforts and the size of the South Florida ecosystem were important factors, as was the fact that adaptive management recommended openness in the planning and implementation 

of components. Since water management decisions had generated 

so much mistrust over the years, such openness and commitment 

to conflict resolution was both desirable and necessary. Resource 

managers hoped that employing an adaptive management approach 

would “substantially improve the chance of success in achieving ecosystem goals” through several means. It would ensure a “proactive 

approach” in dealing with problems, while ensuring that “active collaboration” occurred between scientists, planners, and managers. It 

would provide a “formal mechanism to expedite and facilitate system-wide decision making, while also providing an “opportunity to 

develop best available science.”23

In integrating adaptive management into the comprehensive 

plan, the Corps was merely riding a wave sweeping over the United 

States. Many land management agencies, including the U.S. Forest 

Service and the U.S. Department of the Interior, had implemented 

adaptive management into certain projects, such as the Forest Service’s management plan of coastal forests in California, Oregon, and 

Washington in 1993, or the Interior Department’s building of riparian habitat in the Grand Canyon in 1996. Yet South Florida was one 

of the first places to use adaptive management in a large ecosystem 

restoration project. As such, observers focused on whether the strategy would actually work, or whether it would merely result in a series of expensive and time-consuming disasters. At the same time, 

scientists involved in the implementation of restoration endeavors 

charted the lessons whether the guiding principles of adaptive management proved true in South Florida. These included admitting that 

no easy answers and no experts existed; that new methodological approaches and new scientific methods were needed to solve ecological 

problems; that uncertainty should be embraced and acknowledged 

rather than minimized; that the ultimate goal of management was 

resilience, meaning “enhancing the ability of a system to persist and 

function in the face of extreme disturbance”; that surprises were 

the rule, not the exception; that the devil was in the dynamics of 

an ecosystem’s function, not just the details; that human and ecological systems were always changing and uncertain; and that management cannot be separated from the scientific process.24 But the 

relative newness of adaptive management, coupled with the fact that 

the strategy could potentially result in expensive experiments that 

wasted time and money without doing anything to restore the ecosystem, meant that criticisms and second-guessing were sure to arise 

in the process, as they certainly did.

Yet in dealing with scientific issues and with adaptive management, restoration proponents already had a good base. In 1989, the 

SFWMD and Everglades National Park had co-sponsored a symposium at Key Largo to examine what scientists knew about the Everglades ecosystem. Several hundred scientists attended, continuing 

the discussions after the conference in six adaptive environmental 

assessment workshops and in informal interactions and contacts. 

The result of these efforts was the publication in 1994 of Everglades: 

The Ecosystem and Its Restoration, edited by Steven M. Davis of 

the SFWMD and John C. Ogden of Everglades National Park. This 

volume, which demonstrated the interdisciplinary nature of ecology and ecosystem studies, included contributions by 57 scientists 

from various universities and organizations, including the National 

Audubon Society, the SFWMD, the National Marine Fisheries Service, the Bureau of Land Management, Everglades National Park, 

the University of Florida, and the University of Miami, among others. Each chapter was peer-reviewed by at least three outside evaluators, and the final product covered a host of subjects, including 

agriculture, wetland protection, fresh water flows to Florida Bay, 

climate, fire, hydrology, vegetation, fish and wildlife, phosphorous, 

and ecosystem restoration. Contributors discussed these topics in 

both their historic and contemporary contexts. The main focus of 

the work, however, was on “the interrelated roles of ecosystem size, 

disturbance patterns, and hydrology as determinants of large-scale 

ecosystem restoration,” and its final chapter, co-authored by Davis 

and Ogden, synthesized the hypotheses and conclusions of the contributors into a set of problems that ecosystem restoration would 

have to solve.25

According to Ogden and Davis, “the reduction in ecosystem size 

and compartmentalization of the remaining system are trends that 

must be reversed in any Everglades restoration initiative.” Likewise, 
Chapter Eighteen | Getting the Water Right 271

hydrologic and fire fluctuations needed to approach natural characteristics. Moreover, water delivery should occur according to historical rainfall patterns in an attempt to reestablish natural hydrology. 

Such a plan, they concluded, should also have components allowing 

for natural “volumes and distributions” and “depth patterns in time 

and space.” Finally, water delivery needed to “mimic extended periods of flooding” in Everglades marshes. These objectives would succeed, Davis and Ogden insisted, only if they occurred under a “regional ecosystem-level planning process.”26 The Corps agreed, and 

used the publication as “a primary source for the basic hypotheses 

and technical understandings of the Everglades system.”27

Using the blueprint that Davis and Ogden’s book provided, the 

Corps began working in earnest on a comprehensive plan. Instrumental in the program’s development was the Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South Florida. In the eyes of many, the commission played a major role in the creation of CERP because it brought 

together a host of divergent interests—environmentalists, dairy 

farmers, sugar growers, vegetable producers, state agencies, county 

governments, and federal groups—and persuaded them to agree to 

a central plan. The task of building consensus was not easy; Richard 

Pettigrew, chairman of the commission, noted that when the commission first came together in 1994, distrust abounded among the 

different groups. In the words of Robert Dawson, former Assistant 

Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) during the Reagan administration and current lobbyist for the sugar industry, a lot of “scar tissue” 

had developed around water management issues through the years, 

influencing how interests perceived each other.28 To eradicate this 

baggage, Pettigrew forced the different representatives to mingle socially, planning evening “happy hours” for this purpose. “The happy 

hours were critical,” Pettigrew later recollected, because they made 

commission members “g[e]t to know each other as people.”29

As Pettigrew slowly built relationships of trust between the different interests, the sides compromised and negotiated in a productive manner. Their efforts were accelerated after Rice met with them 

in June 1995 and declared that if the Governor’s Commission could 

outline a comprehensive restoration program that met the approval 

of all its members, it would serve as the template for the Corps’ restudy. Although commission members expressed skepticism with 

Rice’s pledge, they spent the next year developing a plan, using staffing and other support from the Corps. According to Rice, the negotiations were at times “excruciating” because of the manifold interests that had to be satisfied. “Every issue that came up [was] a major 

discussion,” the colonel noted, leading to the creation of numerous 

working groups to sort out the problems.30 Finally, the commission 

constructed a plan unanimously approved by the whole group, and 

it submitted the proposal to the Corps in 1996.

After receiving the plan, the Jacksonville District’s interdisciplinary Restudy team molded and formatted it into a feasibility 

report. In essence, the Corps’ team had to take the recommendations made by the Task Force and the Governor’s Commission and 

formulate them into a clear and workable restoration plan (accepted 

by all interested parties) that the Corps could implement in South 

Florida. Stuart Appelbaum, of Kissimmee River restoration fame, 

headed this effort, using the same novel approaches to the comprehensive plan as he did in the preparation of the Kissimmee feasibility study. Patterning the organization of his team after Skunk 

Works, the nickname for Lockheed Martin’s Advanced Development Program that built fighter planes, Appelbaum placed the 

different members—ecologists, biologists, engineers, economists, 

hydrologists, planners, public relations personnel, real estate specialists, and so forth—in the same area to facilitate communication. 

He also integrated similar personnel from federal, local, state, and 

tribal agencies into the process, making the Restudy team as inclusive as possible. Shaking things up was the only approach to take, 

Appelbaum insisted, because “the Corps was perceived as the bad 

guys.” If the agency presented the “traditional” Corps arrogance, 

Appelbaum believed, it would not be able to generate the necessary 

cooperation that it needed.31

With Appelbaum’s fresh approach—designated the “Something 

Tells Me We’re Not in Kansas Anymore, Toto” method32—the Corps 

Richard Pettigrew when he was Speaker of the House in Florida’s state 

legislature. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and Archives of 

Florida)
272 United States Army Corps of Engineers

analyzed the conceptual plan submitted by the Governor’s Commission. This report recommended that numerous water projects be undertaken to “achieve a healthy ecosystem” capable of supplying “vital 

water resources” for “a sustainable South Florida.” It grouped these 

proposals under 13 thematic concepts:

n Regional Storage Within the Everglades Headwaters and Adjacent Areas

n Lake Okeechobee Operational Plan

n Everglades Agricultural Area Storage

n Water Preserve Areas

n Natural Areas Continuity

n Water Supply and Flood Protection for Urban and Agricultural 

Areas

n Adequate Water Quality for Ecosystem Functioning

n Increase Spatial Extent and Quality of Wetlands Beyond the 

Everglades

n Invasive Plant Control

n Aquifer Storage and Recovery

n Protection and Restoration of Coastal, Estuarine, and Marine 

Ecosystems

n Conservation of Soil

n Operation, Management, and Implementation of the C&SF 

Project Modifications and Related Lands.33

The Corps took the recommended projects and ran them 

through a model-based screening process, using the resulting data 

to determine, in Appelbaum’s words, “what ideas made the most 

sense.”34 The Internet facilitated the compilation and sharing of this 

data, allowing team members to post and download documents and 

reams of data.

By the middle of 1997, the team had targeted six options as feasible. After making additional analyses, the group made one proposal 

the preferred choice and formulated an initial draft plan for that option, releasing it to the public in June 1998. After receiving comments 

on the plan, the Corps finished its draft feasibility report in October 

1998, “a record pace given the scale and complexity of this work,” and 

Vice President Gore, who happened to be at the West Palm Beach 

airport the day of its release, officially submitted it to the public.35

Equating the importance of ecosystem restoration in South 

Florida to “the first pyramid, the first dam, the first skyscraper, [and] 

the first trip to the moon,” the report outlined the pre-drainage 

conditions of the Everglades and the environmental effects of the 

C&SF Project. Although the project adequately fulfilled its designated 

responsibilities of flood control and water supply, “it significantly 

changed the way water moved and paused in the Everglades.” 

Therefore, “a rethinking” of the project was “in order.” The major 

problem was that project works and operation allowed as much as 

1.7 billion gallons of water to flow to either the Atlantic Ocean or 

the Gulf of Mexico per day, reducing the amount of the resource 

“needed for the ecosystem and regional water supplies.” These flows 

also damaged estuaries, causing imbalances in salt and fresh water 

and killing seagrass, fish, and animal life. Other areas, such as Florida 

Bay and Everglades National Park, had too little water, causing 

another kind of ecological damage. Moreover, Lake Okeechobee 

was “often managed as if it were a reservoir,” diminishing the quality 

of its water and the water it emitted to the rest of South Florida. 

“These conditions,” the document concluded, “seriously threaten the 

natural and human environment of south Florida.”36

The Corps proposed 12 solutions. To conserve some of the water flowing to the ocean, and to reduce freshwater discharges to the 

Caloosahatchee and St. Lucie rivers, the Corps would construct surface water storage reservoirs, water preserve areas (between urban 

areas and the eastern portion of the Everglades), and more than 300 

underground units used for aquifer storage and recovery. Aquifer 

storage and recovery, or ASR, was a process by which excess surface 

and ground water was injected underground into the Floridan Aquifer, where it was stored in a “freshwater bubble” until it was needed. 

Then, the water was extracted, requiring only disinfection before being placed in water distribution systems.37

In addition to ASR and above-ground reservoirs, the Corps also 

proposed the use of limestone quarries in northern Miami-Dade 

County for water storage. In addition, it would change the existing 

“rainfall-driven operational plan” so that it could “mimic nature” in 

its water deliveries to Everglades National Park and the water conservation areas. The removal of approximately 500 miles of canals 

and levees and the reconstruction of 20 miles of the Tamiami Trail 

into bridges would also allow for more natural sheet flow while improving water deliveries to Florida Bay and Biscayne Bay. In order to 

improve water quality, the Corps would manage Lake Okeechobee 

“as an ecological resource,” and it would construct over 30,000 acres 

of additional stormwater treatment areas (STAs) to cleanse urban 

and agricultural runoff. Implementing these proposals, the Corps 

stated, would provide “a comprehensive solution for ecosystem restoration” while still maintaining “the same level of flood protection, 

if not more, for south Florida.”38

The admission of the ecological damage caused by the C&SF 

Project, and, especially, the proposals to correct such problems 

(including the removal of canals and levees), constituted a major 

concession for the Corps. According to Michael Davis, the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works), “we have people who 

worked on the original draining of the Everglades and who now, 

at the end of their careers, are seeing our work turn around 180 

degrees.” Yet Davis did not perceive the Corps’ proposals as anything out of the ordinary. “Our traditional mission was flood control and navigation,” he explained, “but really it’s always been about 

problem solving.”39 In addition, the 12 plans of action were really 

just more engineering solutions, something that Appelbaum considered entirely appropriate. “You have to understand the system 

has been irrevocably altered,” he related. “50 percent of the spatial 
Chapter Eighteen | Getting the Water Right 273

extent of the original [Everglades] is gone, so the patient is always 

going to have to be on a respirator.”40

But the plan dissatisfied many, something that the Corps readily 

admitted. Criticisms ranged from those who claimed that the restoration projects were a waste of money to those who believed that the 

Corps had not gone far enough. Some expressed skepticism about 

the ASRs, calling them a new, untested method of water storage. The 

cost of the plan—which the Corps estimated at $7.8 billion—gave 

others pause. The Corps agreed that the price tag was high, constituting a “major investment,” but it claimed that it would be worth it: 

“the overall beneficial effects of the recommended plan are expected 

to far outweigh its adverse effects.”41

Perhaps the most stinging and surprising criticisms came from 

NPS officials and environmentalists who had worked with the 

Corps’ Restudy team.42 They claimed that the proposal placed agricultural and urban interests above environmental concerns and 

did not significantly enhance water supplies to Florida Bay, Biscayne 

Bay, Northeast Shark River Slough, and Taylor Slough. According to 

Everglades National Park scientists, the plan increased flows to the 

park from 60 percent of predrainage levels to only 70 percent. Yet, 

the scientists argued, the plan provided immediate opportunities for 

developers, agriculture, and property owners to extend their holdings.43 “It doesn’t take $8 billion to get restoration benefits—it takes 

$1 billion,” Brad Sewell of the Natural Resources Defense Council 

explained. “Our concern is that most of the money will be spent on 

water-supply projects rather than restoration projects.”44

What environmental critics really wanted was the implementation of a modeling scenario developed by Everglades National Park 

and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, called D13R1-4. This model 

proposed that water which normally ran to tide in the C-51 basin in 

Palm Beach County and in the C-14/C-13 basins in Broward County 

be cleansed of impurities and stored in Conservation Area No. 2A 

for future release to the park. Such a plan could produce an additional 245,000 acre feet of water for the Everglades. The Corps agreed to 

study the plan, even though it appeared it would adversely affect the 

conservation areas.45

Based on the input that it received at public meetings, as well 

as comments from other federal and state agencies, the Corps 

revised its draft report and issued the final version in April 1999. 

This report, which totaled over 4,000 pages, represented the efforts 

of over 150 people representing 30 different federal, state, and 

local agencies, including American Indian tribes, all of which had 

a slightly different perspective on water management. Some were 

from environmental organizations, others represented agricultural 

interests, while still others were from urban areas. According to 

Appelbaum, the final report dealt with essentially one question: 

how to enlarge the “water pie” so that “everybody can get a bigger 

slice.”46 The report itself explained that the Restudy team had 

focused on certain guiding principles in its preparation of the plan, 

including restoring the South Florida ecosystem without ignoring 

other “water needs”; using an “inclusive and open process” to 

engage “all stakeholders”; partnering with all interested federal, 

Historic water flow in the Everglades. (South 

Florida Water Management District)

Current water flow in the Everglades. (South 

Florida Water Management District)

Future water flow in the Everglades (with 

implementation of CERP). (South Florida Water 

Management District)
274 United States Army Corps of Engineers

state, local, and tribal agencies; using the best available science; and 

advocating adaptive management techniques in order to make the 

program as flexible and successful as possible.47

In essence, the final comprehensive plan was little different from 

the draft proposal, including the ultimate cost. As one summary 

put it, the final version attempted to conserve 1.7 billion gallons of 

water a day through the construction of above- and below-ground 

reservoirs. It also proposed that 240 miles of levees and canals be removed, that 35,600 acres be used for the creation of additional STAs, 

and that over 200,000 acres of land be acquired for both the STAs 

and for the reservoirs.48

However, there were some changes. For one, the Corps proposed 

in the final report to implement a series of pilot projects in order to 

investigate whether certain proposals were really feasible. These included “wastewater reuse, seepage management, Lake Belt technology, and three aquifer storage and recovery projects” in the vicinity of 

Lake Okeechobee, the C-43 basin, and Site 1. It also outlined that a 

Florida Keys Water Quality Protection Program was “critical for restoration of the South Florida ecosystem,” and it proposed that water 

deliveries to Everglades National Park and the conservation areas be 

based on a rain-driven regulation schedule rather than a calendarbased one. Because of the uncertainty of how successful some of the 

proposals would be, the report called for the implementation of an 

Adaptive Assessment Program to monitor the accomplishments of 

the different phases of the plan. “Adaptive assessment provides an 

organized process for confronting and reducing the levels of uncertainty” resulting from insufficient information, the document noted. 

Although listing the D13R1-4 scenario as a tentatively promising 

plan, the report did not fully commit to the proposal, indicating only 

that more studies would be conducted in order to assess its impacts 

on the conservation areas. The Corps did promise, however, that it 

would “provide for an improved capability for delivery of additional 

water to Everglades National Park and Biscayne Bay by capturing 

additional runoff from urban areas.”49

Perhaps because the final proposal differed in only minor ways 

from the draft, criticism of the plan continued, largely at the hands 

of environmentalists. The Sierra Club, for example, argued that the 

ASRs would merely worsen urban sprawl in South Florida by providing more water for growth, while six ecologists, including Stuart 

Pimm from the University of Tennessee and Gordon Orians from 

the University of Washington, claimed that the lack of a firm commitment to provide 245,000 additional acre feet of water to Everglades National Park proved that the plan was based upon science 

that was faulty at best and manipulated at worst. Citing “deep, systematic problems,” they composed a letter to Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, asking for an independent scientific review of the 

proposal.50 Pimm also criticized the plan for its structural aspects. 

“We should just take out the damn dikes, for God’s sake, and leave 

the area alone,” he proclaimed, fearing that the Corps’ plan would 

just “maintain a managed, fragmented structure instead of restoring 

the natural system.”51 Likewise, Orians asserted that the Corps had 

allowed flood control and urban and agricultural water supply concerns to supersede ecological needs.

Meanwhile, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed 

the final plan and concluded that the restoration process still needed 

a “strategic plan that clearly lays out how the initiative will be accomplished and includes quantifiable goals and performance measures.” 

The main problem, according to the GAO, was that the Task Force 

had delineated three specific goals for restoration—getting the water 

right, restoring and enhancing the natural system, and transforming the built environment—but the Corps’ plan focused only on the 

first, ignoring the other two. The GAO also expressed concern that 

the comprehensive plan included no clear way to resolve conflicts. 

Using the C-111 and Modified Water Deliveries Project as examples, 

the GAO declared that turf wars were sure to develop between the 

Corps and the Interior Department if a resolution mechanism was 

not included, resulting in delays and increased costs. “Without some 

means to resolve agencies’ disagreements and conflicts in a timely 

manner,” the GAO concluded, “problems . . . could continue to hinder the initiative.”52

Michael Davis disagreed with the GAO’s assessment, presenting to 

Senate subcommittees a joint statement with the Interior Department 

The D13R1 plan. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, 

Central and Southern Florida Project Comprehensive Review Study: Final 

Integrated Feasibility Report and Programmatic Environmental Impact 

Statement (Jacksonville, Fla.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville 

District, 1999).
Chapter Eighteen | Getting the Water Right 275

indicating “the close working relationship between the Army and 

[Interior] on all levels on Everglades issues.” He defended the Corps’ 

focus on water distribution by saying that getting the water right was 

an integral part of restoring the natural system and transforming the 

built environment, and he emphasized that the Corps was attempting 

to develop “an overarching strategic framework that ties all the pieces 

together.” “Waiting until we complete a detailed strategic plan would 

not be prudent in light of the declining health of this ecosystem,” 

Davis argued. Although “in certain cases decision making could 

have been more efficient,” Davis claimed that the Restudy team, the 

Task Force, and the Governor’s Commission had been “efficient and 

successful in resolving issues.”53

Davis may have overstated his case, as disagreements still existed about the plan. Yet many environmentalists decided to support 

the project despite their reservations, believing it was the best proposal they could get. Charles Lee of the Florida Audubon Society, for 

example, backed the plan even though he preferred the removal of 

“every man-made barrier in the Everglades.”54 As Tom Adams, lobbyist for the National Audubon Society related, “First, you get the 

deal—and then [you] decide if it’s a good deal.”55

There were also encouraging signs that the sugar industry would 

not hinder the plan’s land acquisition proposals. For one thing, the 

industry had proved somewhat cooperative in the late 1990s in the 

purchase of what was known as the Talisman property. This land consisted of approximately 52,000 acres south of Lake Okeechobee and 

immediately north of the Holey Land Wildlife Management Area. 

It was divided into a central 32,000-acre parcel and smaller tracts 

totaling 20,000 acres. Owned by the Talisman Sugar Corporation, a 

subsidiary of the St. Joe Paper Company (which had purchased the 

acreage in 1971), these tracts had been used for sugar cultivation, but 

had experienced decreased productivity in recent years because of 

heavy soil subsidence. Therefore, Talisman Sugar wanted to sell the 

The Talisman tracts (shaded in dark gray). (South Florida Water Management District, Save Our Rivers: 1998 Land Acquisition and Management Plan

(1998)
276 United States Army Corps of Engineers

land. Other sugar companies were interested, but environmentalists 

had different ideas, advocating the purchase of the property, which it 

termed “the golden fleece,” so that it could be used as part of a large 

storage reservoir between the Miami and North New River canals in 

Palm Beach County.56

After the 1996 Farm Bill provided $200 million for the acquisition of lands for conservation purposes, the Interior Department 

began looking in earnest at the Talisman property, as well as at other 

EAA lands necessary for the storage reservoir. Because the department proposed taking as much as 150,000 to 200,000 acres in the 

EAA, the sugar industry was initially uncooperative, claiming that 

no scientific evidence indicated that such a large reservoir was necessary. The industry even filed a lawsuit against the federal government 

over Talisman. Facing this standoff, some hydrologists and biologists 

suggested that the government start with a 60,000-acre reservoir and 

then add additional space later if necessary. Subsequently, the sugar 

industry softened its stance and proposed that the two sides engage 

in a land swap. The Interior Department agreed, and William Leary 

(senior counselor to the assistant secretary of the interior for fish, 

wildlife, and parks), John Hankinson (a regional administrator of the 

EPA), Barry Roth (an Interior Department solicitor), and Buff Boland 

(a private consultant experienced in land purchases for conservation) 

began negotiations between the department, Florida’s governor’s office, the SFWMD, the Nature Conservancy, representatives of the St. 

Joe Paper Company, and a joint venture of sugar growers.

In 1998, an agreement was reached, and Vice President Gore 

announced its terms on a trip to South Florida. The sugar industry 

agreed not to obstruct the acquisition of the central 32,000 acres of 

the Talisman property and to provide additional EAA acreage to the 

federal government for the reservoir in exchange for some of the 

scattered pieces of land owned by St. Joe, as well as the right to farm 

the Talisman property for at least five years. This would enable the 

federal government to acquire a little over 60,000 acres, 50,400 of 

which would be used for the reservoir, while the remaining 10,700 

acres would serve as filtering marshes. The Task Force regarded the 

settlement as “a testimony to how cooperation among government 

agencies and stakeholders can help to accomplish South Florida 

ecosystem restoration and sustainability.” Restoration proponents 

hoped that this was an accurate observation.57

Meanwhile, the final feasibility report made its way through 

the higher echelons of the Corps. The usual practice was to have the 

Chief of Engineers review the report, comment on it, and send it 

to Congress. However, tension between Chief of Engineers Lieutenant General Joe Ballard and Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army 

(Civil Works) Michael Davis, exacerbated by continuing denunciations of the report by environmentalists and Everglades National 

Park officials, complicated this arrangement. Because of Davis’s 

connections to the Clinton Administration, Ballard claimed that 

Davis and Joseph Westphal, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil 

Works), were actually trying to use Corps projects to garner more 

support for Vice President Gore in the 2000 presidential elections. 

At the very least, Ballard stated, Davis was acting as the “stovepipe” 

for Kathleen McGinty, chief of the CEQ and a strong advocate for 

Everglades restoration. Therefore, Ballard averred, Davis pushed the 

comprehensive plan incessantly because of Gore’s public commitment to it. Such actions infuriated Ballard, not because he disagreed 

with ecosystem restoration (he actually saw it as a prime market for 

the Corps), but because he believed that Davis “had an overbearing 

personality” without “a good understanding of the issues.”58

The problems between the two reached a head in 1999 over 

General Ballard’s Chief of Engineers report, which Davis supposedly 

rewrote—expanding it from two to twenty-five pages—to include 

a Corps commitment to provide an additional 245,000 acre feet of 

water to Everglades National Park. This assurance caused a storm 

of controversy. According to Ballard, different interests who had 

participated on the Restudy team were “surprised” by the recommendation, believing “they had been back-doored” by the Corps.59

In the words of Stuart Appelbaum, “some of the stakeholders viewed 

it as a [firm] commitment to deliver the water through the D13R4” 

scenario.60 Especially livid were the Miccosukee Indians, who worried that the D13R1-4 plan would cause even more flooding in the 

conservation areas. Therefore, the Miccosukee filed a lawsuit against 

the Corps in 1999, alleging that the pledge to provide 245,000 acre 

feet to the park violated both the National Environmental Policy Act 

(because it had not undergone the EIS process) and the Corps’ restudy authority.61

In spite of the controversy, Vice President Gore presented 

the final feasibility report on the comprehensive plan to Congress 

in July 1999, calling it “the single largest ecosystem restoration 

ever attempted anywhere in the world.”62 At the same time, Davis 

composed a bill authorizing the plan, entitled “Restoring the 

Everglades, An American Legacy Act” (REAL), for inclusion in 

the Water Resources Development Act of 2000. The purpose of the 

bill, according to Davis, was to obtain congressional authorization 

of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP) “as the 

conceptual road map for restoring the Everglades.”63 It would also 

include provisions to begin four of the six recommended pilot 

projects—the Caloosahatchee River (C-43) Basin ASR, the Lake 

Belt In-Ground Reservoir Technology project, the L-31 Seepage 

Management Project, and the Wastewater Reuse Technology 

Project—while providing a programmatic authority for the Corps. 

In addition, the act would authorize 10 initial construction projects, 

including reservoirs in the EAA and the C-44 Basin, as well as the 

establishment of STAs in various locations. The bill proposed the 

use of adaptive assessment and monitoring to analyze the success 

of the efforts, and it encouraged the completion of the Modified 

Water Deliveries Project. Davis pointed out that the “bulk” of the 

comprehensive plan would be authorized in future water resources 
Chapter Eighteen | Getting the Water Right 277

development acts, and the Corps was therefore requesting only a 

little over $1 billion for the initial appropriation (only half of which 

the federal government would have to provide, as project costs 

would be shared 50/50 with the state).64

After its introduction into Congress, the bill went to the Senate 

Committee on Environment and Public Works, where, proponents 

believed, danger lurked. Senator John Chafee, a Republican from 

Rhode Island who was a firm supporter of the restoration effort, 

had just passed away, replaced by Senator Robert C. Smith of New 

Hampshire, a conservative who had once declared that the Republican party was too liberal for his taste. According to Davis, Smith’s 

chairmanship worried many environmentalists, who believed that 

Smith’s conservatism would cause him to shoot the restoration effort out of the water. Yet to Davis’s surprise, Smith declared at the 

first hearing on the comprehensive plan—located in a packed, hot 

auditorium at the Naples Golf Club in Naples, Florida—that “you 

will not find daylight between John Chafee and Bob Smith on the 

support for the Everglades.”65 Smith pledged his full commitment to 

the comprehensive plan, and to those who questioned the large cost 

of the project, he replied that it would cost Americans only the price 

of “a can of Coke a year,” or “about 50 cents per person, per year.”66

Because of Smith’s support, Davis considered him as an instrumental 

force in the authorization of CERP. Having the complete backing of 

the Clinton Administration did not hurt either; Davis related that 

Gore made Everglades restoration a high priority, regarding it as an 

unprecedented and important program that required the full attention of senior staff.67

Another important facet to the actual authorization of the program was the fact that representatives from such divergent groups as 

the sugar industry and the National Audubon Society joined forces 

in support of the bill. Tom Adams of Audubon and Robert Dawson, 

a representative of sugar and urban interests, for example, patrolled 

the halls of Congress together, drumming up support. The culmination of the consensus-based effort that the Task Force and the Governor’s Commission had promoted since the mid-1990s, the unified 

support showed that interest groups were committed enough to Everglades restoration to support CERP, even though they might not 

agree to the full plan and despite their ideological differences with 

others who backed it.68

Yet as the bill made its way through Congress, criticisms continued to resound. Dexter Lehtinen, attorney for the Miccosukee Indians, testified before Smith’s Committee on Environment and Public 

Works that the “parochial attitudes” of the restoration effort discriminated against the Miccosukee and caused continuing and accelerated damage to Miccosukee land in the conservation areas. Lehtinen 

compared restoration to the Vietnam War, saying that everyone believed that things were “fine” in the Everglades, even as officials of 

the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission reported that 

Conservation Area No. 3A had experienced more ecological deterioration in the past five years than in the preceding 40. Lehtinen 

charged that the restoration effort was in “chaos” and needed to be 

exposed, much like the emperor who had no clothes.69 Sugar interests, represented by Malcolm “Bubba” Wade, senior vice president of 

the U.S. Sugar Corporation, as well as other agricultural interests and 

the Board of Commissioners for Miami-Dade County, also called 

for Congress to place assurances in the authorizing legislation that 

agricultural and urban interests would not have their water supplies 

reallocated for environmental restoration “without replacement water being available on comparable terms.”70

In contrast, environmentalists and Everglades National Park authorities continued to claim that CERP offered no real solutions to 

the park’s water problems. Joe Browder was especially adamant in 

his opposition, as was the Natural Resources Defense Council and 

scientists such as Stuart Pimm, all of whom wanted a guarantee in 

the legislation that the park would have the extra 245,000 acre feet 

of water it needed. Yet, in part because of the Miccosukee lawsuit, 

Pilot projects and other recommended features in CERP. (U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Central and Southern Florida 

Project Comprehensive Review Study: Final Integrated Feasibility Report 

and Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (Jacksonville, Fla.: 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, 1999)
278 United States Army Corps of Engineers

the Clinton administration emphasized that the Corps would merely 

study the proposal; the legislation would contain no such guarantee. 

Environmentalists such as Browder continued to push for the commitment, but leaders of the Audubon Society, concerned that such 

efforts would submarine the bill, exerted pressure on the agitators 

to hold their tongues, believing, in the words of Audubon President 

John Flicker that “this isn’t perfect, but it’s more good than bad.”71

Hearing such complaints, Senator Max Baucus (D-Montana), 

one of the members of the Committee on Environment and Public 

Works, began to question the entire restoration plan. “I have this 

funny feeling that I might be buying something that sounds good,” 

Baucus stated, “but on down the road, I am going to leave to my successors here a huge, huge problem.” Baucus was especially concerned 

because no one seemed to be able to definitively list the problems, 

the solutions, and the issues that the restoration program would address. “Nobody,” he concluded, “has really provided a compelling 

case that this plan is going to work.”72 In response, Senators Smith 

and Graham jokingly threatened to leave Baucus in the Everglades as 

alligator fodder.73 With such pressure, whether serious or not, Baucus eventually muted his criticisms, although affirming that the plan 

was an imperfect proposal.74

By the summer of 2000, the complaints about CERP threatened 

to shatter the consensus surrounding the plan. As they had with 

Baucus, Senators Smith and Graham, together with Florida’s other 

senator, Connie Mack, coerced the major interests to concede to 

the plan, offering some compromises along the way. To satisfy 

agricultural and urban interests, for example, the bill specifically 

declared that no water could be taken from agriculture, urban areas, 

Everglades National Park, fish and wildlife, or the Miccosukee and 

Seminole Indians unless other comparable water sources were 

available. To reassure the Miccosukee and other critics, it stipulated 

that no conveyance of 245,000 acre feet of water to Everglades 

National Park would be made until the Corps had conducted a 

feasibility study and until Congress had specifically authorized such 

an action. To appease environmental concerns, the bill declared that 

its major purpose was ecosystem restoration. Senator Smith also 

ensured that a report of the Senate Committee on Environment 

and Public Works stated that “the water necessary for restoration, 

currently estimated at 80 percent of the water generated by the 

Plan, will be reserved or allocated for the benefit of the natural 

system.”75 Since this pledge was not proposed in the law itself (as 

were the urban and agricultural assurances), some hard-line, such 

Senator Bob Graham and President Bill Clinton. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and Archives of Florida)
Chapter Eighteen | Getting the Water Right 279

as the Friends of the Everglades, as well as Everglades National Park 

scientists, were not happy, and they denounced CERP as “a plan for 

ecological inaction.”76

Despite these few voices in the wilderness, most groups, including environmentalists, rejoiced when Congress passed the Water Resources Development Act of 2000 in November 2000 (signed 

by President Clinton in December), complete with the CERP provisions.77 As passed, the act authorized CERP “as a framework for 

modifications and operational changes to the Central and Southern Florida Project” necessary to “restore, preserve, and protect the 

South Florida ecosystem while providing for other water-related 

needs of the region, including water supply and flood protection.” 

The law required that the $7.8 billion cost of the project be shared 

50/50 with the state of Florida, and that the state be responsible for 

only 50 percent of the project’s operation and maintenance (estimated at $172 million annually). In accordance with the recommendations of the GAO, it required the Secretary of the Army and Florida 

Governor Jeb Bush to establish “an agreement for resolving disputes” 

within 180 days, and it stipulated that “an independent scientific review panel” would oversee “the Plan’s progress toward achieving the 

natural system restoration goals.” So that Congress could also track 

progress, it mandated that the Corps and the Interior Department 

submit a joint report “on the implementation of the Plan” at least 

every five years.78

With the passage of the act, the Corps, the Task Force, the Governor’s Commission, and all interests that had worked on CERP celebrated a great victory, and reactions were effusive. “The Everglades 

legislation is the most important piece of environmental legislation” 

of its generation, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt remarked. 

“It’s going to open an entirely new chapter in conservation history.” 

Governor Jeb Bush agreed, calling the measure the first step in “the 

restoration of a treasure for our country.”79 In the words of Senator Graham, the signing of the bill was “a signal day for the movement around the world to try to repair damaged environmental systems.”80 Audubon magazine was no less enthusiastic, stating that “on 

an overcast, bone-chilling December morning in Washington, D.C., 

President Bill Clinton launched the restoration of the Everglades and 

quietly made conservation history.” The culmination of more than 

50 years of effort, Audubon continued, CERP held the promise of a 

new day for the South Florida ecosystem.81

In many ways, the stars seemed to align to ensure the passage 

of CERP. Even though it carried the huge price tag of $7.8 billion—

making it the “most expensive environmental project ever,” according to Audubon—it came at a time when the economy of the United 

States was surging and when the federal government had money to 

spend, largely because of the Clinton administration’s efforts to balance the federal budget.82 In addition, the work that environmentalists, state officials, and federal agencies had done since the 1970s 

to restore the Kissimmee River, to preserve Lake Okeechobee, and 

to reestablish more natural water flows to Everglades National Park 

had made Everglades restoration a non-partisan issue, one that both 

Republicans and Democrats supported. Florida had gone through a 

series of Republican and Democratic governors in the 1970s, 1980s, 

and 1990s, but each, beginning with Reubin O’D. Askew, had supported Everglades measures. Governor Jeb Bush, a Republican who 

assumed Florida’s governorship in 1999, promised to keep that bipartisanship alive, “pressur[ing] and cajol[ing]” the state legislature 

“to pick up half the tab for restoration.”83 According to Charles Lee, 

senior vice-president of the Florida Audubon Society, “you cannot 

overstate [Bush’s] importance” to the passage of CERP.84 Likewise, 

the Clinton Administration, and especially Vice President Gore and 

Michael Davis, had embraced Everglades restoration as one of its 

primary environmental focuses, providing crucial leadership and 

backing. The fact that Florida’s electoral votes played such an important role in the 2000 presidential election did not hurt either, nor did 

having two environmentally aware District Engineers—Rock Salt 

and Terry Rice—as commanders of the Jacksonville District between 

1991 and 1997.

Because federal, state, local, and tribal interests had accomplished something that no one else had been able to do—the inauguration of a massive ecosystem restoration effort that would extensively modify a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers project—observers 

from across the United States looked to this success as a template for 

other environmentally troubled areas. Dan McGuinness, director of 

the National Audubon Society’s Upper Mississippi River campaign, 

for example, noted that “the prescription for restoring the [Upper 

Mississippi] means an Everglades-scale congressional appropriation 

and the same kind of national focus.”85 William C. Baker, president 

of the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, agreed, relating that it would 

Editorial cartoon from the St. Petersburg Times showing the skepticism 

some expressed about CERP. (Used by permission of the St. Petersburg 

Times)
280 United States Army Corps of Engineers

cost at least $8.5 billion over the next 10 years to restore the bay. The 

funding of CERP left him hopeful that, in the words of one article, 

“the environment’s big win in the Everglades can be repeated.”86

But had the environment won in the Everglades, or was CERP 

just another way to provide more water for the continued growth of 

agriculture and population in South Florida? What would actually 

be restored by the various projects proposed under CERP? Would 

vegetation and fish and wildlife populations really return? Did CERP 

do enough to revive Lake Okeechobee, and would it really provide 

for cleaner water in South Florida? These questions tempered the 

enthusiasm occasioned by CERP’s authorization, as did the fact that 

the Homestead airport proposal was still alive and kicking, despite 

nearly 40 years of environmentalist efforts to keep airports from 

infringing on Everglades National Park. In many ways, these questions were nothing that CERP proponents had not foreseen and 

were a major reason why adaptive management was implemented 

as an overall strategy. “It would be almost arrogant to get up and say 

we’ve got a plan, we’re just going to go down this track for the next 

thirty-plus years and we’ve got all the answers,” Stuart Appelbaum 

explained. Uncertainty was a part of ecosystem restoration because 

“we don’t have 100 years of experience” in that field. “In fact,” Appelbaum continued, “nobody’s ever done this before at this scale.”87 The 

ambiguity unnerved some observers, especially because technology 

and nature had collided frequently throughout the 1900s in South 

Florida, leaving only ecological devastation in its wake. Whether or 

not additional technologies could heal that damage remained to be 

seen.

Endnotes

1 Mary Doyle, “Implementing Everglades Restoration,” Journal of Land 

Use and Environmental Law 17 (Fall 2001): 59-60.

2 Col. Terrence Salt, Executive Director, to Mr. George Frampton, 

Chairman, South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force, 7 February 

1995, Billy Causey’s Files, FKNMSAR. EPA Assistant Administrator Robert 

Perciasepe had also called for the expansion of the Task Force’s membership 

in 1994, specifying the inclusion of the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, the Florida Department of Community Affairs, the SFWMD, 

and the Governor’s Commission on a Sustainable South Florida. Perciasepe 

to Frampton, 7 September 1994, Billy Causey’s Task Force Files, FKNMSAR. 

3 Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (109 Stat. 48, 65-66).

4 Rock Salt, Executive Director, to Task Force Members, South Florida 

Ecosystem Restoration Task Force, 26 June 1995, Billy Causey’s Task Force 

File, FKNMSAR.

5 Water Resources Development Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 3658, 3772-

3773); “1996 Annual Report of the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Working Group,” 12 December 1996, 5, Administrative Files, 1998, 

FKNMSAR.

6 South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force, “Annual Report 

1996,” copy in Everglades Digital Library <http://everglades.fiu.edu/taskforce/ar1996/index.html> (19 October 2004).

7 Quotations in “The Science Plan” (excerpt from Cross Cut Budget FY 

99,” available at Everglades Information Network, South Florida Ecosystem 

Restoration Task Force Collection <http://everglades.fiu.edu/taskforce/index.html> (1 February 2006); see also U.S. General Accounting Office, South 

Florida Ecosystem Restoration: An Overall Strategic Plan and a DecisionMaking Process Are Needed to Keep the Effort on Track, GAO/RCED-99-121 

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office), 6.

8 Rice interview, 11.

9 Salt interview—Catton, 5; “Update Regarding Colonel Rice,” File S. 

Fla. Water Mgt. Dist., Box 14, S1824, Executive Office of the Governor Subject Files, 1991-1996, FSA.

10 Rice interview, 11.

11 Rice interview, 10-11.

12 General Joe N. Ballard interview with Theodore Catton, 18 November 2004, Washington, D.C., 6 [hereafter referred to as Ballard interview].

13 Cyril T. Zaneski, “The Players: The Politicians,” Audubon 103 (July/

August 2001): 74.

14 Quotations in “South Florida Ecosystem Restoration: FY 1996 Budget Cross-Cut Summary of Federal Projects, Summary of State of Florida 

Projects,” 19 May 1995, 1, Billy Causey Files, FKNMSAR; see also “A LastDitch Attempt to Save the Everglades,” ENR 240 (8 June 1998): 36.

15 “Testimony of Nathaniel P. Reed Before the Water Management District Review Commission,” 26 September 1995, File GOV 16 Water Management District Review Commission, 1995, Box 15771, SFWMDAR; Michael 

Grunwald, “Water World,” The New Republic 230 (1 March 2004): 23; Melanie Steinkamp to High Water File, 28 August 1996, File 1996 High Water 

Review Panel, FWSVBAR.

16 See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States of America, 

et al., Case No. 95-0532-CIV-DAVIS, Omnibus Order, 31 July 1997, copy 

provided by James W. Vearil, Chief, Water Management Section, Met Section, Jacksonville District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

17 “South Florida Ecosystem Initiative,” 9 December 1994, Billy Causey’s Task Force Files, FKNMSAR.

18 Grunwald, The Swamp, 309.

19 Bradford H. Sewell to William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, 28 October 1996, Administrative Files, 1996, FKNMSAR.

20 Grunwald, The Swamp, 313.

21 Grunwald, The Swamp, 310, 335.

22 “South Florida Ecosystem Restoration, Scientific Information Needs: 

A Science Subgroup Report to the Working Group of the South Florida 

Ecosystem Restoration Task Force,” 1996, iii-iv, copy at Everglades Information Network, South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force Collection <http://everglades.fiu.edu/taskforce/scineeds/ index.html> (1 February 

2006).

23 RECOVER, “Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan Adaptive 

Management Strategy,” April 2006, copy provided by James Vearil, Senior 

Project Manager, RECOVER Branch, Programs and Project Management 

Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Jacksonville, 

Florida.

24 Steven Light, “Key Principles for Adaptive Management in the Context of Everglades History and Restoration,” paper presented at Everglades 

Restoration Adaptive Management Strategy Workshop, October 2003, copy 

provided by James Vearil, Senior Project Manager, RECOVER Branch, Programs and Project Management Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

Jacksonville District, Jacksonville, Florida.

25 Quotation in Steven M. Davis and John C. Ogden, “Introduction,” 

in Everglades: The Ecosystem and Its Restoration, Steven M. Davis and John 

C. Ogden, eds. (Delray Beach, Fla.: St. Lucie Press, 1994), 4; see also John 
Chapter Eighteen | Getting the Water Right 281

Ogden interview by Brian Gridley, 10 April 2001, 4, 6, 16, Everglades Interview No. 7, Samuel Proctor Oral History Program, University of Florida, 

Gainesville, Florida [hereafter referred to as Ogden interview].

26 Steven M. Davis and John C. Ogden, “Toward Ecosystem Restoration,” in Everglades: The Ecosystem and Its Restoration, 792-794.

27 “Responses by Dr. Joseph Westphal to Additional Questions from 

Senator Graham,” in Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works 

Subcommittee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers’ Budget for Fiscal Year 2001: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure of the Committee on Environment and 

Public Works, United States Senate, 106th Cong., 2d sess., 2000, 68.

28 As cited in Cyril T. Zaneski, “Anatomy of a Deal,” Audubon 103 (July/

August 2001): 50.

29 As cited in Zaneski, “Anatomy of a Deal,” 52.

30 Quotations in Rice interview, 17-18; see also “Central and Southern 

Florida Project Comprehensive Review Study,” 3 January 1996, File General 

Information, Interagency MTGS/GRPS, Box 15079, SFWMDAR.

31 Appelbaum interview, 39.

32 Appelbaum interview, 19.

33 “The Conceptual Plan of the Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South Florida” <http://fcn.state.fl.us/ everglades/gcssf/concept/conc_

tc.html> (3 February 2006).

34 Appelbaum interview, 28.

35 Quotation in U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, 

“Overview: Central and Southern Florida Project Comprehensive Review 

Study,” October 1998, 22, copy in File Restudy Feasibility, Box 1365, JDAR; 

see also Appelbaum interview, 29-30; Buker, The Third E, 114-115.

36 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, “Overview,” 

9-11.

37 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, “Overview,” 16-

17; CERP Aquifer Storage and Recovery Program <http://www.evergladesplan.org/facts_info/sywtkma_asr.cfm> (25 May 2006).

38 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, “Overview,” 16-

17.

39 As cited in David Helvarg, “Destruction to Reconstruction: Restoring the Everglades,” National Parks Magazine 72 (March/April 1998): 24.

40 As cited in Helvarg, “Destruction to Reconstruction,” 24.

41 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, “Overview,” 20-

21.

42 Appelbaum interview, 31.

43 As quoted in Grunwald, The Swamp, 320-321.

44 As quoted in Zaneski, “Anatomy of a Deal,” 53.

45 See South Florida Restoration Office, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 

“Final Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act Report, March 1999,” 1-5, copy 

in Library, Jacksonville District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, 

Florida; Appelbaum interview, 31-32.

46 Appelbaum interview, 30.

47 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Central and 

Southern Florida Project Comprehensive Review Study: Final Integrated Feasibility Report and Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (Jacksonville, Fla.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, 1999), ii 

[hereafter referred to as Final Integrated Feasibility Report].

48 See Tom Ichniowski, “Everglades Plan Sent to Hill,” Engineering 

News-Record 243 (12 July 1999): 12.

49 Final Integrated Feasibility Report, ix-x, 9-30—9-33, 9-38—9-39, 

9-54—9-55. 

50 Quotation in “Saving the Everglades: Water In, Water Out,” The Economist (6 February 1999): 30; see also Mark Alpert, “Replumbing the Everglades,” Scientific American 281 (August 1999): 16; Grunwald, The Swamp, 

324.

51 As cited in Alpert, “Replumbing the Everglades,” 16.

52 Quotations in U.S. General Accounting Office, South Florida Ecosystem Restoration, 17, 19; see also Andrew Wright and Tom Ichniowski, “GAO 

Hits Everglades Program,” Engineering-News Record 242 (10 May 1999): 13.

53 Quotations in Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

Subcommittee on National Parks, Historic Preservation, and Recreation 

and the Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies, South Florida Ecosystem Restoration: Joint Hearing Before the 

Subcommittee on National Parks, Historic Preservation, and Recreation of the 

Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and the Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies of the Committee on Appropriations, United States 

Senate, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 1999, 26; see also Wright and Ichniowski, 

“GAO Hits Everglades Program,” 13.

54 All quotations in Alpert, “Replumbing the Everglades,” 16.

55 As quoted in Zaneski, “Anatomy of a Deal,” 53.

56 Quotation in Leary interview, 7; see also “Questions & Answers: The 

Talisman Property,” File Everglades, Box 13, S1824, Executive Office of the 

Governor Subject Files, 1991-1996, FSA; “Babbitt Enters Talisman Land 

Discussions,” The Palm Beach Post, 13 October 1995; Final Integrated Feasibility Report, F-34—F-35.

57 Quotation in South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force, 

“Maintaining the Momentum”; see also Michael Davis interview by Theodore Catton, 21 December 2004, 2 [hereafter referred to as Davis interview]; 

Wade interview, 32-33; Leary interview, 8. Nathaniel Reed pointed to the 

fact that in 2000, the sugar industry was trying to negotiate an additional 

10-year delay for the completion of the reservoir as evidence that the industry would “do everything in its power quietly . . . to prevent Talisman from 

becoming a reservoir.” Reed interview, 2.

58 Ballard interview, 6; see also Davis interview, 3-4.

59 Ballard interview, 8.

60 Appelbaum interview, 32.

61 Appelbaum interview, 33; see also John D. Brady, personal communication with the authors, 12 May 2005. This lawsuit was eventually dismissed 

by mutual agreement, but it had the effect of removing any references to the 

Chief of Engineers report from the eventual authorizing legislation.

62 Quotation in Ichniowski, “Everglades Plan Sent to Hill,” 12; see also

Appelbaum interview, 30.

63 As quoted in Quotations in Senate Subcommittee on Transportation 

and Infrastructure and the Committee on Environment and Public Works, 

Everglades Restoration: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Transportation 

and Infrastructure and the Committee on Environment and Public Works, 

United States Senate, 106th Cong., 2d sess., 2000, 24 [hereafter referred to as 

Everglades Restoration].

64 Everglades Restoration, 3, 24-25; see also Senate, Restoring the Everglades, An American Legacy Act, 106th Cong., 2d sess., 2000, S. Rept. 106-

363, 7-13.

65 As cited in Everglades Restoration, 3; see also Davis interview, 5.

66 Everglades Restoration, 162.

67 Davis interview, 5.

68 Doyle, “Implementing Everglades Restoration,” 62.

69 Everglades Restoration, 46.

70 Everglades Restoration, 121, 320, 348.

71 As quoted in Grunwald, The Swamp, 341.

72 Everglades Restoration, 219.

73 Everglades Restoration, 224-225.

74 Grunwald, The Swamp, 346.
282 United States Army Corps of Engineers

75 Senate, Water Resources Development Act of 2000, 106th Cong., 2d 

sess., 2000, S. Rept. 106-362, available at <web.lexis-nexis.com> (22 February 2006).

76 As quoted in Grunwald, The Swamp, 344 (see also p. 343).

77 Davis interview, 4; “Clinton Signs Bill Endorsing $7.8-Billion Everglades Job,” Engineering News-Record 245 (18 December 2000): 9.

78 Water Resources Development Act of 2000 (114 Stat. 2572, 2681, 

2684-2686, 2690-2692). 

79 Both quotations in Zaneski, “Anatomy of a Deal,” 48-50.

80 As quoted in Grunwald, The Swamp, 352.

81 Zaneski, “Anatomy of a Deal,” 48-50.

82 Zaneski, “Anatomy of a Deal,” 51.

83 As quoted in Zaneski, “The Players,” 74.

84 As quoted in Zaneski, “The Players,” 74.

85 As quoted in Jon R. Luoma, “Blueprint for the Future,” Audubon 103 

(July/August 2001), copy available at <http://magazine.audubon.org/features0107/nation/nation0107.html> (7 February 2006).

86 As quoted in Luoma, “Blueprint for the Future.”

87 Appelbaum interview, 35.


285

Although a feeling of exuberance followed the authorization 

of CERP in the Water Resources Development Act of 2000, a long 

road lay ahead for Everglades restoration. To expedite efforts, the 

Jacksonville District morphed its Restudy team into the Restoration 

Coordination and Verification (RECOVER) branch, with Stuart Appelbaum remaining as chief, and the Clinton Administration created 

an Office of Everglades Restoration within the Department of the 

Interior, headed by Michael Davis (although Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton abolished it in November 2001). Environmentalists gained another victory when the Clinton administration issued 

its decision against the Homestead airport on 16 January 2001. The 

major problem was ensuring that the fragile coalition that had coalesced around the development of CERP held together. As Appelbaum related in 2002, “Keeping the focus, keeping the camaraderie, 

the partnerships, is . . . challenging,” especially with all of the different interest groups that had staked out a claim to water.1

One of the major interests, of course, was the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers, builders of the C&SF Project. As authorized by Congress, two of the purposes of that project, as stated by Chief of Engineers Lieutenant General R. A. Wheeler in 1948, were to provide 

“a high degree of flood protection” in South Florida and to control 

water levels in the region “for agricultural use of lands . . . and for 

maintenance of municipal water supplies.” The Corps would fulfill 

these objectives by removing “excess waters in wet seasons” and storing them for dry season use.2

 As designed, the C&SF Project fulfilled 

these responsibilities admirably. It allowed for the creation of the Everglades Agricultural Area, a 700,000-acre region that became a bastion for sugar and vegetable growing, generating millions of dollars 

in revenue, while also providing the necessary mechanisms to allow 

South Florida to achieve phenomenal growth in the last half of the 

twentieth century, going from a population of about 500,000 in 1950 

to six million in 2000. Moreover, the project successfully impeded 

saltwater intrusion, a large problem in South Florida urban areas at 

the time that the C&SF Project was proposed.

Its flood control functions also worked remarkably well. Hurricane Frances, a Category Four hurricane that dumped 13 inches of 

water on Florida in September 2004, for example, did not cause any 

major flooding within the borders of the C&SF Project, largely because of the Corps’ flood control works. The Corps and the SFWMD 

redirected much of the water into Lake Okeechobee, storm basins, 

estuaries, and marshes, providing protection against significant flood 

damage. Compared with the devastation wreaked by hurricanes in 

1926, 1928, and 1947, the contrast was striking. As Richard Bonner, Deputy District Engineer for the Jacksonville District, related, 

“There was a time when thousands of people were killed because 

we couldn’t provide protection.” Now, the C&SF Project safeguarded 

both lives and property.3

Another purpose of the project was “the preservation of fish 

and wildlife resources,” something that the Corps considered an 

“important feature” of its C&SF plan. But the C&SF Project did 

not fulfill this objective as well as the others, in part because the 

original plan was vague as to exactly what “benefits” would accrue 

and how the project would allow for them.4 Some advantages did 

result from the creation of water conservation areas, but in general, the C&SF Project damaged South Florida’s ecosystem by disrupting hydroperiods and patterns of water flow in order to provide flood control and water supply. This damaged vegetation and 

fish and wildlife habitat, leading to startling decreases in certain 

conclusion
286 United States Army Corps of Engineers

populations. By 2000, 50 percent of the historic Everglades had 

disappeared, used instead for agriculture or urban growth, leading to a 90 percent reduction in the number of wading birds and 

the listing of 68 South Florida animal and plant species as either 

threatened or endangered.5 According to many environmentalists, 

this destruction largely occurred because the Corps reneged on its 

promise to provide sufficient water to Everglades National Park. 

The Corps countered that the problems resulted more from innocent ignorance rather than malicious intent.

Yet some concerns, such as the NPS and the FWS, were convinced that the Corps elevated flood control and urban and rural 

water supply above the needs of fish and wildlife, and they objected 

accordingly. The NPS, for example, continually asked for more water 

for the park and eventually got Congress to pass different pieces of 

legislation mandating this practice. The FWS, meanwhile, requested 

that the Corps operate the water conservation areas to benefit fish 

and wildlife, which occurred as long as no flood control or water 

supply problems resulted. In cases of high water, however, the Corps 

pumped water from the EAA into the conservation areas, drowning 

deer and vegetation. The lack of water to Everglades National Park, 

coupled with the management of the conservation areas, created an 

early adversarial relationship between the Corps, the NPS, and the 

FWS that never really improved. By the 1980s, superintendents of 

the park felt that they had to take drastic measures, including litigation, to get the Corps and the SFWMD to respond to their concerns. 

The FWS took a less contentious approach, but still frequently commented that Corps plans ignored fish and wildlife.

From a legal standpoint, the Corps considered fish and wildlife preservation to be on the same level as flood control and water 

supply since Congress did not give a higher priority to any of these 

authorized purposes. Yet from a practical standpoint, at least in the 

early years of the C&SF Project, the Corps seemed to place more 

emphasis on flood control and water supply. The primary reason 

for this was that, until the 1970s, state of Florida officials and many 

The Everglades landscape. (National Park Service)
Conclusion 287

Floridians themselves were more concerned about flood protection 

and water supply than they were about preserving flora and fauna. 

The Corps, which in those decades still focused primarily on flood 

control and navigation itself, responded accordingly. E. Manning 

Seltzer, general counsel for the Department of the Army, for example, opined in the 1960s that “the project is primarily for flood 

control, . . . water conservation and storage.” Because House Document 643 referred to Everglades National Park, Seltzer claimed that 

“it was the congressional intent that the planning and operation 

of the project be carried out in such a way that the national Park 

would not suffer damage.” The park would receive “additional benefits” (undefined by Seltzer) as long as these benefits were “consistent with the other purposes of the project.” Otherwise, the park 

would lose out. This mantra seemed to guide the Corps throughout 

the second half of the twentieth century, although by the 1980s and 

1990s, fish and wildlife concerns were considered more equally in 

policy decisions.6

In its attempts to balance various purposes and interests in 

South Florida water management decisions, the Corps had precedents to follow. As early as the Progressive Era in American history, 

federal agencies advocated the creation of “multiple-use stewardship of the nation’s water resources.” They thus developed projects 

that would “support navigation, irrigation, hydroelectric power and 

also prevent wasteful flooding by the operation of regulated reservoirs.” Prominent examples included the Tennessee Valley Authority, created in the 1930s, and the Pick-Sloan Plan of the 1940s that 

enabled management of the Missouri River.7 In addition, the Corps 

had developed other large-scale water management plans, including 

the Mississippi River and Tributaries Project in 1928, and had also 

established environmental restoration projects for rivers and other 

waterbodies, including the Upper Mississippi River Environmental 

Management Program.

Yet the development of the C&SF Project was different in several ways. For one thing, the water in question originated and remained in Florida, meaning that state and local entities would not 

have to worry about sharing the resource with other areas. Perhaps 

because of this, the state of Florida took on much of the responsibility for developing programs and water management plans through 

the SFWMD and other state agencies. Indeed, for much of the 1970s 

and 1980s, major water management actions in South Florida were 

proposed and developed by the state, not by the federal government. This was not unusual per se, as Louisiana, for example, floated several ideas in the late twentieth century about restoring the 

Atchafalaya Basin, but the innovations proposed by Florida officials 

and the strong support over time for environmental measures were 

remarkable. The SWIM plans for Florida waterbodies, for example, 

and their level of funding represented a significant effort on Florida’s part to try to resolve water quality problems at a time when 

the federal government seemed lax on such issues. Likewise, the 

fact that most elements of Governor Graham’s Save Our Everglades 

program continued into the twenty-first century was noteworthy. 

All of these efforts, however, had to be coordinated with federal 

and local agencies, meaning that a comprehensive restoration plan 

was only feasible after commissions and committees such as the 

South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force and the Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South Florida had brought all 

interests to the table.

And there were numerous interests to please. In the 1960s, environmental groups began to support NPS and FWS stances, riding the wave of a strengthening environmental movement in the 

United States to stake out their claim in South Florida water management. Groups such as the National Audubon Society (and its 

Florida chapter), the Friends of the Everglades, the Sierra Club, and 

others made their presence known with their protests over the proposed Everglades Jetport. They used their success in stopping this 

project—revolving around appeals to the Nixon administration—as 

a blueprint for future protests about Kissimmee River channelization, Lake Okeechobee water quality, water deliveries to Everglades 

National Park, and the preservation of environmentally endangered 

lands. Led by such luminaries as Marjory Stoneman Douglas, Arthur Marshall, Johnny Jones, and Nathaniel Reed, environmentalists 

effectively informed the Corps in the 1970s that they were major 

players at the table, and they continued that oversight role through 

the subsequent decades.

The sugar industry was also becoming more powerful in the 

1960s as well, and it began exerting its own political pressure on 

water management issues. Because of the need for drainage to keep 

lands dry for farming, and because agricultural runoff contained 

pollutants adversely affecting South Florida’s water quality, environmentalists and sugar quickly developed a mutual antagonism that 

colored each side’s approaches to water management. Dealing with 

water quality in Lake Okeechobee and in the Everglades in general 

in the 1980s and 1990s made the differences especially pronounced, 

culminating in the 1988 lawsuit over water quality and the pennya-pound tax campaign. The animosity between the two groups 

remained a serious threat throughout the development of CERP, 

which is why Tom Adams and Robert Dawson walking the halls of 

Congress together was such a striking symbol.

Likewise, conflicts existed between those advocating the protection of the Everglades and property owners, especially in southwest 

Florida and in the East Everglades region. These Floridians—who, 

in many instances, were the ones actually residing in the remaining 

Everglades—claimed that government officials needed to consider 

property, hunting, fishing, and airboating rights as supreme to environmental preservation. But restoration of the ecosystem clashed 

with these ideas, especially after the state of Florida made land acquisition a priority in the 1980s. The SFWMD, the Corps, and property owners around the Kissimmee River were able to compromise 
288 United States Army Corps of Engineers

in order to allow Kissimmee restoration to proceed, but when Everglades National Park clamored for the removal of property owners 

from the Frog Pond and the 8.5 square mile area in order to improve 

water deliveries, only messy controversy resulted. The discord in that 

matter delayed the implementation of the Modified Water Deliveries 

Project and eventually cast a shadow over the entire development of 

CERP. The purchase of the Talisman property from sugar interests 

indicated that settlements were possible, but it was clear that protracted negotiations would be necessary.

The Miccosukee and Seminole Indians, meanwhile, claimed 

that no federal, state, or local agencies adequately protected their 

interests in water management. Holding land in the water conservation areas, these tribes had a large stake in seeing the resolution 

of water quality and water supply issues. When solutions were proposed that contradicted Seminole and Miccosukee ideas of what the 

Everglades needed (such as in the Settlement Agreement stemming 

from the 1988 lawsuit and the Everglades Forever Act), the Miccosukee resorted to litigation to ensure that their lands were protected. 

Both tribes also developed their own water quality standards to govern the resource on reservation lands. Some observers regarded such 

tactics as divisive, but the Miccosukee did not care about that perception, placing the health of the Everglades ecosystem, as they saw 

it, above all other concerns.

With all of these different interests, it truly was amazing that architects of CERP such as Richard Pettigrew, Colonel Rock Salt, Colonel Terry Rice, Stuart Appelbaum, Senator Bob Graham, and others 

were able to forge a restoration plan that all sides could accept, or 

at least that was reasonable enough to prevent outright opposition. 

Many heralded CERP as a model for other regional ecosystems to 

follow, but there were unique South Florida characteristics that influenced the development of the plan and that ultimately allowed the 

necessary consensus to occur.

For one thing, had the state of Florida not experienced an influx 

of politicians and officials who truly cared about the environment, 

it is doubtful that restoration efforts ever would have amounted to 

anything. Several were critical to transforming Florida from a state 

primarily concerned about flood control and drainage to one intent 

on restoring ecosystem quality. Fundamental in that transformation 

was Governor Reubin Askew’s administration, which was the first 

to admit that significant environmental problems existed in South 

Florida. Listening to the concerns of Arthur Marshall, Askew oversaw the passage of several significant acts in 1972, such as the Florida 

Environmental Land and Water Management Act, which proposed 

measures to protect environmentally endangered lands.

Yet Askew’s successor, Bob Graham, deserves the lion’s share of 

the credit for making ecosystem restoration a critical component of 

state planning. Graham, who had supported environmental measures while a state senator, became convinced while governor that 

Florida had to provide more leadership in environmental issues, in 

part because the federal government under the Reagan administration had little concern for such matters. Graham therefore inaugurated the “Save Our Everglades” program, which focused attention 

on measures to save the Kissimmee-Okeechobee-Everglades watershed. After becoming one of Florida’s U.S. senators, Graham continued his leadership on a national level. As many South Floridians 

have observed, it is impossible to overestimate his influence on Everglades restoration.8

Another important factor was the increasing environmental 

awareness of the Corps of Engineers, especially the Jacksonville District. In large part because of issues such as the Everglades Jetport 

and the Cross-Florida Barge Canal, the Corps began to take environmental concerns into consideration in its project planning. The 

Jacksonville District had several District Engineers that moved this 

process along, including Colonel Donald A. Wisdom, Colonel Rock 

Salt, and Colonel Terry Rice. Each of these individuals attempted 

to implement a more environmentally friendly attitude in the District. The Jacksonville District was not alone in this process, as other 

Corps districts also evinced more concern for the environment in 

the last half of the twentieth century. Some St. Paul District personnel, for example, were called “ecofreaks” as early as the late 1970s 

because of environmental enhancement efforts that they promoted.9

Yet the level of support that Salt and Rice in particular evidenced for 

environmental restoration was remarkable, indicating that the Jacksonville District cared just as deeply about environmental quality as 

it did about engineering proficiency.

In addition, the establishment of an Environmental Advisory 

Board in 1970, which provided recommendations and aid to Corps 

leadership on environmental issues, facilitated the development of 

environmental concern among higher Corps authorities. The need 

to consider ecosystem health in Corps projects convinced Corps officials in the 1980s to accept environmental restoration, and Congress 

Dade County urban and agricultural areas. (South Florida Water 

Management District)
Conclusion 289

included Section 1135 in the Water Resources Development Act of 

1986, authorizing the Corps to perform that function on existing 

projects. Accordingly, the Jacksonville District began looking in earnest at dechannelizing the Kissimmee River (as requested by environmentalists and Florida authorities). When Salt and Rice assumed 

district leadership in the 1990s, they furthered the acceptance of ecosystem restoration, relying on individuals such as Stuart Appelbaum 

to change the District’s usual methods of operation.

Also affecting the Corps’ attitude was the degree to which 

Everglades issues played out on a national stage and became embroiled in federal politics. Environmental organizations discussed 

matters such as water supply to Everglades National Park and the 

Everglades jetport in their national publications, bringing unwanted publicity to the Corps, while presidential administrations, 

including those of Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton, grasped on to 

Everglades issues, hoping to use them to make their environmental mark. This presidential support was not surprising, considering 

how crucial Florida was in several presidential elections, including 

those in 1996 and 2000, but the fact that presidents saw the environment—rather than economic or social issues—as the way into 

Floridians’ hearts is significant.

Water issues in South Florida also forced the Corps (and Floridians in general) to rethink whether technological and engineering 

solutions to environmental problems were really the right directions 

to take, paving the way for the more open process in the Jacksonville 

District’s Restudy project. Indeed, the extent of the environmental 

damage that canals and levees had produced in South Florida indicated that other methods needed to be considered. Ultimately, the 

Corps still relied on structural solutions in its CERP proposal, but it 

expressed a willingness to consider non-structural answers throughout the process. The problem was that so much development had 

occurred in South Florida that it was impossible to reverse the entire 

S-9 pumping station. (The Florida Memory Project, State Library and Archives of Florida)
290 United States Army Corps of Engineers

C&SF Project. Yet the Jacksonville District’s work on the Kissimmee 

River indicated that the Corps was no longer as wedded to technology and engineering as the ultimate answers.

In fact, ecological and biological studies became almost as significant in Corps plans for restoration as engineering reports, highlighting the growing importance and influence of science in water 

issues, as well as showcasing the growth of ecology in the latter half 

of the twentieth century and the increasing sophistication of scientific measuring techniques. Spurred on by Arthur Marshall in 

the late 1960s, the Everglades, Lake Okeechobee, and the Kissimmee River became enmeshed in an avalanche of scientific studies, 

many of which embraced the principles of systems ecology, whereby 

mathematical and computer models were increasingly used to analyze complex ecosystems. By the 1990s, seminal publications such as 

Everglades: The Ecosystem and Its Restoration (1994) provided a blueprint for restoration efforts, while Louis Toth’s work on the Kissimmee River informed much of the plans to reestablish that waterway. 

The implementation of Kissimmee River restoration efforts as well 

as CERP also provided a platform on which to test the strategy of 

adaptive management, a set of ideas and methods that embraced scientific uncertainty and used the “real world” as a testing ground for 

the management and restoration of ecosystems. Although the jury 

was still out in 2000 on whether or not adaptive management was a 

proper tool for South Florida, the uncertainty surrounding restoration efforts and the disparate interests with a stake in restoration had 

necessitated its implementation.

Nearly 60 years ago, Marjory Stoneman Douglas noted that the 

people of South Florida faced an “eleventh hour” in regard to the 

“dying Everglades.” She hoped that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ C&SF Project would save the region, but she understood that 

politics would influence its implementation. “How far [the Corps] 

will go with the great plan for the whole Everglades,” she continued, 

“will depend entirely on the co-operation of the people of the Everglades and their willingness, at last, to do something intelligent for 

themselves.”10 Douglas’s statement was prophetic. For many years, 

the people of South Florida generally regarded flood control and water supply as more important than fish and wildlife issues, and, in 

the eyes of many observers, the Corps’ C&SF Project accordingly 

shunted ecological concerns aside.

In the late 1990s, the people of South Florida once again faced 

an “eleventh hour,” leading the Corps to develop another plan. Because of the numerous interest groups that had emerged between 

1948 and 2000 to influence water management decisions, environmental restoration now took its place besides flood control and 

water supply as a primary purpose of the C&SF Project. Whether 

this primacy would continue was largely in the hands of these conflicting interests and the fragile consensus they had built. Whatever 

happened, the process of implementing and operating the C&SF 

Project, with all of its attendant controversies and difficulties, had 

left an indelible mark on the South Florida landscape, for good and 

for bad. CERP now had a chance to make its own impression, but, 

much like its C&SF parent, its form and depth depended on the 

communication, compromises, and collaboration that disparate 

stakeholders were willing to make.

Endnotes

1 Quotation in Appelbaum interview, 39; see also Grunwald, The 

Swamp, 354.

2 House, Comprehensive Report on Central and Southern Florida for 

Flood Control and Other Purposes, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948, H. Doc. 643, 

Serial 11243, 2.

3 Quotations in Michael Grunwald, “This Time, Man Defeated Nature: 

Florida’s Flood-Control System Kept Frances from Swamping Plains,” The 

Washington Post, 9 September 2004.

4 House, Comprehensive Report on Central and Southern Florida, 2.

5 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Overview: Central and Southern 

Florida Project Comprehensive Review Study, October 1998,” 11, copy in 

File Restudy Feasibility, Box 1365, JDAR.

6 Both quotations as cited in James W. Vearil personal communication 

with Matthew Godfrey, 16 May 2006.

7 John E. Thorson, River of Promise, River of Peril: The Politics of Managing the Missouri River (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1994), 

59-61.

8 See, for example, Reed interview, 23.

9 Ben A. Wopat interview by Matthew Pearcy, St. Paul, Minnesota, 25 

April 2002, 19, Oral History File, St. Paul District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, St. Paul, Minnesota.

10 Douglas, The Everglades, 385.


293

The passage of CERP seemed to herald a new environmental age 

for South Florida—one in which repairing damage to the ecosystem would be a priority to stakeholders in water management. Yet 

ten years later, few CERP projects were constructed and the Corps 

had yet to execute most of the plan. Implementing CERP proved to 

be just as difficult and time-consuming as its development. In the 

years between 2000 and 2010, criticisms of CERP mounted, heightened by a belief that the federal government was not as committed 

to restoration as proponents had hoped. The reasons for the lack 

of progress stemmed mainly from factors that no one foresaw in 

2000, including the need to develop project processes, an economic 

recession that siphoned money from the restoration effort, a presidential administration caught up in high-profile distractions that 

detracted focus from CERP, and the escalation of concerns over 

water quality. Whether the Corps and other stakeholders could 

overcome these issues and actually make CERP effective remained 

to be seen, but the slow progress in implementation frustrated both 

stakeholders and Corps personnel. As the ecosystem continued to 

decline, some wondered whether CERP could ever deliver the healing it promised.

Initially, CERP implementation rode the momentum of the Water Resources Development Act of 2000 (WRDA-2000). Even before 

WRDA-2000 passed, the Corps had initiated either project management plans or the formation of project delivery teams for 12 CERP 

projects, and it planned on starting the process for other projects in 

the spring of 2001.1

 However, implementation soon slowed, in large 

part because of project requirements contained in WRDA-2000. Deciding how to best meet these stipulations took the Corps and its 

partners a few years, as it involved complexities that no side really 

understood. “Between 2000 and 2004 the [Corps] and the SFWMD 

largely focused on developing a complex coordinating structure for 

planning and implementing CERP projects,” a report stated, leading 

to delays in actual CERP construction.2

 As Stuart Appelbaum of the 

Jacksonville District explained, “[T]he whole nature of the relationship and . . . setting up the process was much more complex [and] 

cumbersome than anybody would have imagined in 2000.” According to Appelbaum, “we just basically underestimated how difficult it 

was going to be to set this up.”3

For one thing, WRDA-2000 directed the Corps to develop programmatic regulations for CERP. These regulations would provide 

“processes and procedures” to “guide the Army Corps of Engineers 

in the implementation of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration 

Plan.” The Corps first issued draft regulations on 2 August 2002, and 

received 820 comments on them. Wading through the comments 

and adjusting the regulations accordingly took time, involving a 

process of “reconcil[ing] different points of view and . . . find[ing] 

consensus solutions to common concerns.” One item of debate was 

how to know when “restoration” had occurred. The Corps proposed 

using the level of performance delineated in CERP’s Final Integrated 

Feasibility Report and Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement of April 1999, but others wanted success defined “in terms of 

hydrologic and ecologic targets.” Still others saw restoration simply 

as “getting the water right,” whatever that might mean. Taking into 

account these comments, the Corps ultimately defined restoration 

“as the recovery and protection of the South Florida ecosystem so 

that it once again achieves and sustains the essential hydrological 

and biological characteristics that defined this ecosystem in an undisturbed condition.” Having attempted to resolve such debates (but 

EPILOGUE Administering the Cure: Implementing the CERP Program, 

2011–2010
294 United States Army Corps of Engineers

recognizing that in some cases it was not possible to please all sides), 

the Corps published the final regulations on 12 November 2003.4

The concern over defining “restoration” highlighted the fact 

that some environmental organizations believed that CERP—“with 

its aquifer storage wells, mining pits, and rebuilt canals”—was more 

“a water delivery system for cities and suburbs” than a restoration 

program.5 According to some environmentalists, the Corps and the 

SFWMD needed reminders that, as Robert Johnson of the NPS’s 

South Florida Natural Resources Center said, they “didn’t get funding for the Central and Southern Florida Restudy to provide cheaper 

water to the South Florida residents or to greatly enhance flood protection.”6

 Others claimed that merely having the Corps in charge of 

restoration meant that the environment would never get its due. As 

Joe Browder declared, putting the Corps as the lead on restoration 

was like placing the “Bureau of Reclamation in charge of protecting the Grand Canyon.” The Corps relied on “expensive, unproven, 

high-technology efforts”—namely, the aquifer storage and recovery 

proposals—rather than “biologically friendly, natural-system based 

restoration,” environmentalists argued. Until the Corps’ approach 

changed, they asserted, the plan would ultimately benefit urban interests more than the ecosystem.7

These criticisms were similar to what the Corps had heard during the development of CERP, but in the 2000s, such perspectives 

contributed to CERP delays. As one report explained, “The greatest 

challenge in the project planning process has been developing technically sound project plans that are acceptable to the many agencies 

and stakeholders involved.”8

 According to Carol Wehle, who became 

executive director of the SFWMD in 2005, the situation was exacerbated by the disbanding after CERP’s passage of the Governor’s 

Commission for a Sustainable South Florida. Had “the core group 

that crafted Everglades restoration” continued to meet on a regular 

basis, Wehle asserted, it would have “facilitat[ed] communication, 

[kept] consensus and provid[ed] a stronger lobby . . . for the issues 

that we needed Congress to address.”9

With differences of opinion persisting about the Corps’ environmental commitment , it became important for the Jacksonville 

District to highlight how each proposed CERP project met the ecological needs of South Florida. One way of doing this was through 

the development of project implementation reports, another requirement stipulated in WRDA-2000. According to the act, the Corps had 

to submit a project implementation report to the House Committee 

on Transportation and Infrastructure and the Senate Committee on 

Environment and Public Works for every project authorized under 

CERP before construction could begin. These reports had to include a justification that the project would result in “environmental 

benefits” for South Florida and that the project was “cost-effective.” 

Project implementation reports also had to comply with NEPA requirements, and they had to include feasibility and cost effectiveness 

reports. In addition, projects had to have assurances that the water 

“generated by the [project] will be made available for the restoration 

of the natural system.” A “binding agreement” between the president 

of the United States and the governor of Florida supplemented these 

assurances, specifically ensuring that the state would make no “consumptive use” of water “until such time as sufficient reservations of 

water for the restoration of the natural system are made under State 

law.”10

The Jacksonville District took the preparation of project implementation reports very seriously. According to Dennis Duke, former 

Jacksonville District project manager for CERP, the District asked 

itself several questions when putting the reports together: “Is this the 

right plan? Is it still cost effective? Does it still produce the benefits? 

Is it justified? Will it be justified if nothing else is built?”11 Answering these questions took more time than anyone had realized during 

the CERP planning process, frustrating the different stakeholders 

in South Florida, including the Jacksonville District. As one report 

concluded, “PIR completion . . . represents a major hurdle in the 

implementation process for all CERP projects.”12

Indeed, taking a CERP project from planning to construction 

was even more convoluted than a traditional Corps project. Corps 

regulations required very specific processes in traditional civil 

works projects, including the completion of a reconnaissance study, 

a feasibility and cost-sharing agreement, a design agreement, and 

The programmatic regulations governing CERP implementation, published on 12 November 2003.
Epilogue 295

a project cooperation agreement, leading some to assert that the 

Corps was “not an institution . . . built for speed and flexibility.”13

CERP projects were even more complicated, requiring a design 

agreement, a master program management plan, a project management plan, a project implementation report, a report containing 

detailed designs, plans, and specifications, and a project cooperation agreement. Moreover, after the Jacksonville District prepared 

each of these reports, both Corps leadership and the SFWMD (as 

local sponsor) had to provide their approval before the District 

could proceed to the next stage.14 “You’ve got to be very nimble to 

do Everglades restoration because the circumstances are constantly changing,” Robert Johnson of the NPS asserted, and the Corps’ 

“standardized, . . . very rigid process” was not conducive to that.15

In the words of Paul Souza of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the 

Corps’ planning process was not “designed [with] such a multifaceted restoration project in mind.”16

To streamline procedures, the Corps and the SFWMD tried to 

develop a plan explicating how the two sides would work together. 

According to Stuart Appelbaum, such an agreement would provide 

“a legal mechanism” outlining each organization’s responsibilities for 

each project. “We didn’t want to go back and have to re-negotiate 

every one of these terms every time for every project,” Appelbaum 

stated.17 A master agreement would serve as “an umbrella framework,”18 streamlining how the Corps and the SFWMD would work 

together by covering such elements as how the SFWMD would receive credits for work previously done, how lands, easements, and 

rights-of-way would be provided, and how the sides would deal with 

historic properties. Begun in 2002, the master agreement took seven 

years to complete because of the complexities of the issues. When it 

was finally executed in 2009, some considered that to be “one of the 

major accomplishments over the last decade.”19

Additional delays in CERP implementation resulted from a lack 

of federal funding and project authorization. Under CERP, the State 

of Florida and the federal government were to share project costs 

50/50. The Corps estimated that the federal government would need 

to appropriate over $1.6 billion between 2001 and 2010 (and nearly 

$4 billion over 30 years) to meet CERP requirements as delineated in 

WRDA-2000. Congress would also need to authorize 26 additional 

CERP plan components at a cost of $6.2 billion in water resource 

development acts passed every two years (from 2002 to 2014).20 Yet 

Congress passed no additional water resource development acts until 2007, causing projects to “stack up in a pipeline.” By 2007, the 

Bush administration had spent only $358 million on CERP projects, 

while the State of Florida had expended $2 billion.21 In terms of federal financial support, the future did not look bright either, as one 

2006 report noted that planned federal expenditures for the next five 

years were only 21 percent of the amount the federal government 

was supposed to spend.22

One reason for the lack of funding was the terrorist attack of 

11 September 2001 that destroyed the World Trade Center towers 

in New York City. After this strike, President George W. Bush focused his efforts on what he called the Global War on Terror, which 

included an invasion of Iraq, beginning in 2003. These national 

defense endeavors siphoned money from other federal programs, 

leaving little for CERP appropriations. When Hurricane Katrina hit 

Louisiana and Mississippi in 2005, virtually destroying New Orleans 

in the process, it too diverted restoration funds. Another reason for 

insufficient appropriations was the Bush administration’s lack of 

commitment to Everglades restoration. Vice President Al Gore had 

championed the Everglades during the Clinton administration, but 

Bush had no similar proponent. Everglades restoration was “a really high priority in the 1990s,” Shannon Estenoz of the SFWMD 

recalled. “We were not a high priority in the next decade.”23 According to Thomas Van Lent of the Everglades Foundation, the fault did 

not lie entirely with the Bush administration. In Van Lent’s view, 

the Corps did not do a good enough job of explaining in terms that 

non-engineers could understand what CERP would accomplish and 

how individual projects would result in environmental benefits. The 

Corps did not “relate [CERP] in a way that the average constituent” 

could grasp, Van Lent said, reducing the amount of support for restoration.24 Whatever the reasons, Congress appropriated few funds 

to CERP for much of the 2000s.

Because of funding and project planning factors, as a 2005 article in The Economist explained, “[f]ive years [after the passage of 

CERP], not a single CERP project has been built.”25 The Committee 

on Scientific Review of Everglades Restoration Progress, which was 

appointed in 2004 by the Corps and the U.S. Department of the Interior to provide biennial reviews of CERP, painted a bleak picture 

of restoration progress in its 2006 report. While noting that “much 

good science has been developed to support the restoration efforts” Signing of the CERP Master Agreement on 13 August 2009. (South 

Florida Water Management District)
296 United States Army Corps of Engineers

and that “progress has been made in CERP program support,” the 

committee explained that the ten CERP components scheduled in 

the original plan for completion by 2005 were delayed, as were the 

six pilot projects that should have been finished in 2004.26 The U.S. 

Government Accountability Office agreed with the committee’s assessment in 2007, stating that CERP projects “are significantly behind their original implementation schedule,” some by “as many as 

6 years.”27

Delays also plagued non-CERP projects essential to restoration. 

The Modified Water Deliveries Project (Mod Waters), for example, 

was a “poster child” for problems.28 Characterized by the Miccosukee as a project “seriously delayed by a lack of leadership and constantly changing plans,”29 Mod Waters, according to the Interior 

Department’s Office of Inspector General, was eight years behind 

schedule by the middle of the decade and its costs had ballooned 

from approximately $80 million to nearly $400 million.30 Disagreements between the Corps and other stakeholders contributed to the 

problems. For example, the Corps’ proposed acquisition of 2,100 

acres in the 8.5 Square Mile Area and 77 residential tracts led to litigation from landowners. Not only did residents claim that the Corps 

could not exercise eminent domain, they also argued that the Corps’ 

flood control plan for the area—known as Alternative 6D and consisting of “a perimeter levee, seepage canal, pump station, and storm 

water drainage for flood protection in the 8.5 SMA”—would protect 

only between a third and a half of the residents, rather than everyone living in the area. Congress, they declared, had not authorized 

the Corps “to implement a plan that does not protect the entire 8.5 

SMA from flooding.” The U.S. District Court initially ruled against 

the Corps in 2002, but Congress eventually authorized Alternative 

6D in a joint resolution dated 20 February 2003.31

Other issues included whether or not the quality of water flowing into Everglades National Park once Mod Waters was constructed 

would meet the necessary standards.32 In response to this concern, 

Congress included a provision in the Interior Department Appropriation Act for 2004 making funding for the Mod Waters project 

contingent on whether the quality of water going into Loxahatchee 

National Wildlife Refuge and Everglades National Park met “applicable State water quality standards and numeric criteria adopted 

for phosphorous.”33 Trying to resolve these water quality and land 

acquisition issues seriously hindered Mod Waters’ implementation, 

causing in part its delays.

Even water quality seemed to suffer setbacks in the 2000s. Although some observers lauded the SFWMD’s efforts to improve water quality, pointing to the 44,000 acres of stormwater treatment areas built under its Everglades Construction Project (which resulted 

in a reduction in phosphorous concentrations in agricultural runoff 

Vegetable farming in the Everglades Agricultural Area. (South Florida Water Management District)
Epilogue 297

from 147 ppb to 41 ppb),34 others claimed the state did not take water quality seriously. Environmentalists and the Miccosukee Indians pointed specifically to actions taken by the Florida legislature. 

In 2003, the legislature passed an act extending the deadline for 

meeting the phosphorous guidelines delineated in the Everglades 

Forever Act from 2006 to 2016. This extension applied to all areas in 

the Everglades except for the Arthur R. Marshall Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge and Everglades National Park.35 Meanwhile, 

a state commission in charge of setting the phosphorous standard 

had decided in July 2003 to “allow the measurement of pollution 

levels to be averaged over time and at many different measuring 

stations.” This had the potential of allowing phosphorous levels in 

one location “to drastically exceed the standard as long as other 

areas remain below it.”36 Claiming that these developments were 

“an absolute betrayal,” in the words of Charles Lee of the National 

Audubon Society, many expressed disappointment with the state, 

convinced that the sugar industry was behind its actions, something that state officials denied.37 Yet to individuals such as Mary 

Munson, Sun Coast regional director of the National Park Conservation Association, “Big Sugar’s political influence and backroom 

deals overwhelmed good sense.”38

With criticism of its water quality efforts mounting, and with 

federal funding lagging, State of Florida officials decided to take restoration matters into their own hands, thereby hoping to demonstrate the state’s commitment to the environment. At the same time, 

the SFWMD hoped to break out of the Corps’ plodding pace on restoration that had contributed to implementation delays. Such delays 

meant that “CERP was $1 billion over budget and two years behind 

schedule” by 2004, according to one report. Thus, in 2004, Governor 

Jeb Bush implemented what became known as Acceler8, a program 

developed by SFWMD Executive Director Henry Dean. Under this 

program, Bush allocated $1.5 billion of state money to “jump-start” 

the design and construction of eight different CERP projects.39 These 

included:

n Work on water preserve areas (specifically Site 1, C-9, and C-11 

impoundments, Acme Basin B, and seepage management in 

Water Conservation Areas 3A and 3B);

n Expansion of the EAA Stormwater Treatment Area (Compartments B and C);

n Construction of the EAA Reservoir (A-1) and Bolles and Cross 

canals;

C-111 Spreader Canal emptying into Florida Bay. (South Florida Water Management District)
298 United States Army Corps of Engineers

n Hydrologic restoration of Southern Golden Gate Estates (Picayune Strand);

n Implementation of Biscayne Bay Coastal Wetlands Phase I;

n Construction of C-111 Spreader Canal;

n Construction of C-43 (Caloosahatchee River) West Storage 

Reservoir; and

n Construction of C-44 (St. Lucie Canal) Reservoir and Stormwater Treatment Area.40

n In the words of one SFWMD report, Acceler8 was supposed 

to “achieve 70 percent of the restoration plan’s goals by 2011—

five years ahead of the current schedule—while maintaining 

CERP’s momentum.”41

According to the scientific review committee, however, the 

eight projects under Acceler8 focused on preventing the flushing 

of water to the St. Lucie and Caloosahatchee estuaries and mainly 

benefited Lake Okeechobee, the northern estuaries, the Ten Thousand Islands National Wildlife Refuge, and Biscayne Bay.42 Yet the 

program did ignite work on several projects that were passed on 

to the Corps once the Corps had authorization and funding to 

work on them (see below). By 2006, the SFWMD had completed 

full design work on the EAA reservoir, while also beginning some 

construction work on the Picayune Strand Restoration Project and 

the C-44 Reservoir and Stormwater Treatment Area. Over the next 

couple of years, it also started construction on the C-111 Spreader 

Canal (which did have positive benefits for Everglades National 

Park) and on the Biscayne Bay Coastal Wetlands project. Such 

progress led Ken Ammon, the SFWMD’s deputy executive director 

over Everglades Restoration and Capital Projects, to call Acceler8 

“a huge jumpstart.”43

Yet that jumpstart came at a cost, including straining the already 

tense relationship between the Corps and the SFWMD. The SFWMD claimed the Corps moved too slowly, while the Corps, according to SFWMD Executive Director Carol Wehle, found it “unsettling 

. . . to have a local sponsor be able to step up and more quickly plan, 

design and permit, and construct projects.”44 According to Shannon 

Estenoz, Acceler8 worsened an anti-federal culture among the SFWMD that was difficult to eradicate, especially since it “damaged 

a lot of the [person-to-person] relationships that existed” between 

the Corps and the SFWMD.45 Even as late as 2009, when Colonel 

Alfred Pantano became district engineer of the Jacksonville District, 

Plugging the Prairie Canal, part of the Golden Gate Estates, Picayune Strand Restoration Project, under the Acceler8 program. (South Florida Water 

Management District)
Epilogue 299

tension remained. The SFWMD “had some very serious issues and 

concerns with us,” Pantano stated.46

Meanwhile, some environmentalists did not like the idea of 

the State of Florida leading the CERP effort, fearing that the state’s 

major goals lay in water supply for agricultural and urban interests, 

and that the state would not be subject to the same environmental 

assurance requirements under WRDA-2000 that the Corps had to 

meet. The SFWMD’s development of a water supply plan for South 

Florida in 2005 seemed to confirm these fears. The plan “call[ed] for 

the forecast water needs of cities over the next 50 years to be met by 

2010; for farmers’ needs to be met by 2015; and for basic environmental standards to be met only after 2020,” seemingly prioritizing 

water use for cities and agriculture above the environment.47

These criticisms highlighted the difficulty the Corps had in 

maintaining the consensus it had built around CERP. According to 

Pantano, CERP was based on a “fragile coalition of the willing” that 

could easily be broken. Indeed, Pantano continued, relationships 

were key to the success of CERP, but they could be damaged. When 

that occurred, the entirety of CERP was endangered.48 Such disruption was evidenced in discussions over different CERP projects. As 

Thomas Van Lent of the Everglades Foundation explained, the Corps 

“had consensus of restoration of the Everglades as a concept,” but 

not consensus on the many different aspects of CERP. In the eyes of 

Van Lent and other environmentalists, many parts of CERP “still remained very controversial.”49 According to Stuart Appelbaum, CERP 

issues were “more contentious” after the passage of the legislation 

“because they’re real. You can’t just paper them over; you’ve got to 

solve the issue.”50 Robert Johnson of the NPS agreed. “When you actually start[ed] implementing [projects] on the ground,” he asserted, 

“not everybody loved [CERP] as much as they thought they did.” 

The Corps and its partners, said Johnson, had to work to resolve 

“tradeoffs and conflicts.”51

One example of the disagreements between stakeholders over 

specific CERP projects came with discussions of decompartmentalization, defined as the removal of “canals, levees and other barriers that impede the natural sheetflow of water into and through 

the historic Everglades.”52 Under CERP, the Corps planned to “reestablish the ecological and hydrologic connection of Water Conservation Area (WCA)-3A with WCA-3B and Everglades National 

Park.”53 Realizing the complexity of making such connections—and 

the scientific uncertainty surrounding it—the Corps proceeded 

slowly. Before moving forward with project planning, for example, 

the Jacksonville District wanted to see how Mod Waters worked and 

then, under the adaptive management principle, adjust how decompartmentalization proceeded. This cautious approach maddened 

environmentalists who saw decompartmentalization as the key to 

Everglades restoration. “We’ve got to get this decomp project moving 

along,” Van Lent asserted. “That’s a pretty uniformly held view from 

just about every major environmental group.”54 The NPS agreed. “If 

we’re going to restore the river of grass,” Superintendent Dan Kimball declared, “we need to start looking at how we bring water down” 

into Everglades National Park.55 Even though some Corps officials 

agreed that it was “crucial to get storage north of the conservation 

areas so that we can begin decompartmentalizing some of the central Everglades,”56 some environmentalists did not think that the two 

sides were “speaking the same language” over how to proceed with 

decompartmentalization.57

Environmentalists’ frustration stemmed in part from the fact 

that the Corps was unable to make any real progress on projects that 

would move water south of Lake Okeechobee into the Everglades. 

Jacksonville District officials recognized the need to stop flushing 

water to the St. Lucie and Caloosahatchee estuaries, but adequate 

conveyance and reservoir systems did not exist to enable the Corps 

to move the water south. Even if the Corps could get authorization 

to proceed on developing those systems, other issues would prevent 

it from moving water south. These included issues with endangered 

species, specifically the Cape Sable seaside sparrow and the need 

to prevent flooding of its habitat in the conservation areas (see below). They also included water quality problems (see below), as the 

technology had not yet been implemented to effectively treat large 

amounts of water moving south. Faced with these issues, decompartmentalization could not get off the ground, and the stakeholders 

could not agree on how to proceed. Water therefore continued to 

inundate the estuaries, but, as Jacksonville District Colonel Alfred 

Pantano explained, the Corps was unable to “fix” the problem.58

As mentioned above, the endangered species issue proved especially problematic to decompartmentalization. The Miccosukee Indians, for example, accused the Corps of “discriminatory water management” in its efforts to protect the endangered Cape Sable seaside 

sparrow. The sparrow had habitat in Everglades National Park, Big 

Cypress National Preserve, and the Southern Glades Wildlife and 

Environmental Area (Units 1 and 2), and the timing and amount 

of water flowing into this habitat was critical for its survival. Recognizing this, the Corps sometimes closed the S-12 gate so that water 

would not run from WCA 3A into the park and flood the sparrow’s 

habitat. The tribe claimed that this action stacked water on tribal 

lands and degraded tree islands in the conservation area. The tribe 

also contended that an excess of water in WCA 3A adversely affected 

the snail kite, another endangered species, causing an alarming drop 

in its numbers. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service disagreed, stating 

that the decline of the snail kite had occurred because of long-term 

drought, not because of the shutting of the S-12 gate. The Corps, 

meanwhile, was caught in the middle, as the tribe clamored for “an 

end” to “more than a decade of discriminatory water management 

actions” and the FWS pleaded for sparrow protection.59

With cracks appearing in the coalition and no federal CERP 

project under construction, many observers predicted the demise of 

CERP. As early as 2006, the St. Petersburg Times declared that CERP 
300 United States Army Corps of Engineers

was “on its last legs,” while Southeast Construction asked “Is the Everglades Restoration Dying?” The New York Times, meanwhile, proclaimed that “the rescue of the Florida Everglades . . . is faltering.”60

Cynicism and frustration had replaced the hope and optimism of 

2000, while the South Florida ecosystem continued to waver on 

the brink of total collapse. According to the CERP scientific review 

committee, “the delays afflicting CERP and foundational non-CERP 

projects are creating increased concern that the Everglades ecosystem may suffer irreparable losses before major restoration actions 

are taken to reverse the ecosystem decline.”61 Journalist Michael 

Grunwald put it more bluntly. Lake Okeechobee was fast “becoming 

a dead zone,” he declared, while the St. Lucie and Caloosahatchee 

estuaries were experiencing “a massive increase in toxic ‘red tides’” 

as well as “dramatic die-offs of manatees, dolphins and oysters.”62

But the Everglades were not dead yet, and neither was CERP. 

After being elected governor of Florida in 2006, Charlie Crist overhauled the governing board of the SFWMD, helping to reduce some 

of the anti-federal sentiment that had simmered since Acceler8. The 

new SFWMD board promptly shifted policy by declaring that municipalities needed to have additional sources of water, other than 

what the SFWMD was already providing, if they wanted to continue 

to grow. “[T]hat was a major wakeup call” for the municipalities, 

stated Stuart Appelbaum, forcing them to start exploring wastewater 

reuse and conservation techniques.63

The passage of a water resources development act in 2007 (over 

President Bush’s veto) was another important milestone. This law 

contained authorizations for the expenditure of $1.82 billion on 

three CERP projects: the Picayune Strand restoration project in Collier County, the Indian River Lagoon-South project, and the Site 

1 Impoundment project. Not only did WRDA-2007 enable these 

projects to go forward but, as Stuart Appelbaum explained, it had 

a drastic psychological effect on restoration because “it got the authorization ball rolling again.”64 According to Jacksonville District 

Engineer Colonel Alfred Pantano, it showed “meaningful” progress 

on CERP— “actually doing something, as opposed to fighting and 

talking about it.”65

The Picayune Strand restoration project, formerly known as the 

Southern Golden Gate Estates Ecosystem Restoration Plan, dealt 

with land included in the proposed Southern Golden Gate Estates 

development of the 1960s. Located between Alligator Alley and the 

Tamiami Trail, the project involved 55,000 acres and was called the 

“missing piece” in the restoration of southwestern Florida. According to project plans, the Corps and the SFWMD would plug 49 miles 

of canals and redirect the fresh flow of water across drained wetlands. 

The project also involved the removal of 227 miles of roads. Planners 

hoped that such actions would restore fish and wildlife habitat (including 82 square miles of Florida panther habitat), protect against 

saltwater intrusion by recharging the aquifer, and re-establish wetlands in the area. The Corps had finished the project implementation 

report and environmental impact statement for the project in 2004. 

The SFWMD got a jump on the project under Acceler8 by completing most of the design work by 2007 and by plugging the Prairie Canal, which allowed for increased water flow into Fakahatchee Strand 

State Preserve. When WRDA-2007 authorized the project, the Corps 

began in earnest with design and construction.66

Meanwhile, the Indian River Lagoon-South project, located in 

Martin and St. Lucie counties on Florida’s east coast, was one on 

which the Corps and the SFWMD had worked since 1996. Characterized as “a poster child for environmental restoration in the 

long-term Everglades plan,”67 its goal was to reverse the “damaging 

effects of pollution and unnaturally large fresh-water discharges” 

into Indian River Lagoon (described as “the most biologically diverse estuarine system in all of North America”) and St. Lucie Estuary.68 The project had several components, including construction 

of four above-ground water storage reservoirs and four stormwater 

treatment areas, enabling the capture of water from the C-23, C-24, 

Ft. Lauderdale area looking into WCA-2B. (South Florida Water Management District)
Epilogue 301

and C-25 north and southfork basins, the return of that water into 

a reservoir demarcated as C-44 for water supply and environmental benefits, and the reduction of phosphorous and nitrogen going 

into the St. Lucie Estuary. The Corps had completed the project implementation report in 2004, enabling Congress to authorize it in 

WRDA-2007. Before Congress gave its authorization, the SFWMD 

had built a test cell for the C-44 reservoir and had finished designing 

the project under the Acceler8 program.69

The Site 1 Impoundment project involved capturing excess water discharged to the Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway by the Hillsboro 

Canal in southern Palm Beach County and delivering that water 

into the Hillsboro Canal Basin, thereby alleviating demand on water 

from the Arthur R. Marshall Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge 

and from Lake Okeechobee. To store this water, the Corps would 

construct a 1,660-acre impoundment. According to Paul Souza of 

the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, this would “allow water levels in 

Loxahatchee to be more natural” by providing more “flexibility” in 

the management of water supply.70 The Corps completed the project 

implementation report in October 2006, allowing for its inclusion in 

WRDA-2007. Prior to that authorization, the SFWMD completed 

approximately 30 percent of the design work for the project under 

Acceler8, and upon the passage of WRDA-2007, the Corps completed the design work and broke ground on construction.71 With the 

Florida Bay mangrove islands near Fakahatchee Pass. (South Florida Water Management District)

Indian River Lagoon-South project map. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

Jacksonville District)
302 United States Army Corps of Engineers

successful authorizations and the beginning of construction of these 

projects, proponents of CERP finally began to feel that some movement was occurring. As Paul Souza, field supervisor for the U.S. Fish 

and Wildlife Service’s South Florida Ecological Services office, declared, work on these projects constituted “an important historical 

time in the history of Everglades restoration.”72

This feeling was heightened in June 2008 when Governor 

Crist—“against a backdrop of water, grass and birds”—announced 

that the State of Florida was planning to purchase 187,000 acres of 

U.S. Sugar lands in the EAA for $1.75 billion. Listening to the announcement, “dozens of advocates gathered in small groups, gasping 

with awe,” one newspaper reported, “as if at a wedding for a couple 

they never thought would fall in love.”73 Characterized by Crist as “as 

monumental as the creation of the nation’s first national park,”74 the 

plan called for the state to allow farming for six years while it negotiated land swaps with other property holders in the EAA. After six 

years, the SFWMD would use the acreage to restore natural water 

flow and to store approximately a million acre feet of water. SFWMD 

officials hoped to have all details of the purchase finalized by 30 November 2008.75

After the initial enthusiasm for the purchase passed, criticisms 

emerged. Some questioned whether the SFWMD would really use 

the lands to benefit the ecosystem, or whether it would just use them 

to further South Florida’s development. Others saw the purchase as a 

bailout of U.S. Sugar, which was struggling economically. Still others 

believed that the buyout would have no impact on Everglades National Park unless the Mod Waters project (including modifications 

to Tamiami Trail to allow water to pass under the road) was completed. “If the federal government does not release the water down 

south,” Kirk Fordham of the Everglades Foundation stated, “then the 

State of Florida will have built the world’s largest swimming pool 

with absolutely no purpose at all.” Perhaps most disconcerting, however, was the high price tag for the purchase. Some, including former 

Jacksonville District Engineer Colonel Terry Rice, who continued to 

advise the Miccosukee Indians (which sued the SFWMD over the 

purchase), feared that the expenditure of $1.75 billion by the state 

would divert resources from other restoration projects, causing delays. Others wondered whether the high price would prevent the 

purchase from ever happening. As Damien Cave wrote in The New 

York Times, the “eye-popping price” might mean “that the purchase 

will be too expensive and too unwieldy to reach its full potential.”76

These criticisms proved prophetic. With Florida’s property values shrinking (thereby reducing the ad valorem taxes that funded 

land purchases), the state was forced to downsize the purchase to 

181,000 acres for $1.34 billion in November 2008. In the first months 

of 2009, it reduced it again to 72,800 acres for $536 million. As the 

economic recession deepened and property values continued to fall, 

the state had to reconfigure the deal in August 2010, reducing it to 

26,800 acres for $197 million. In the meantime, other problems with 

the deal surfaced, including reports that some of the land was not 

suitable for restoration and that appraisals showed that the state was 

paying too much per acre for it. In addition, over a dozen projects 

were delayed because of the state’s efforts to retain money for the purchase. The most controversial of these was the construction of the A-1 

Reservoir in West Palm Beach County, one of the projects jumpstarted under the Acceler8 program. Although some entities, such as the 

Natural Resource Defense Council, opposed construction of the A-1 

Reservoir because of fears it would destroy wildlife habitat,77 the Miccosukee pressed for its construction, claiming that it would significantly improve water quality. On 15 May 2008, the SFWMD halted 

construction on the reservoir, claiming it “could not afford both” the 

reservoir and the U.S. Sugar land purchase. This stoppage led to the 

Miccosukee Indians successfully petitioning the U.S. District Court 

for the Southern District of Florida to issue an order on 31 March 

2010 requiring the SFWMD to build the reservoir.78

Despite the controversy over A-1 Reservoir, the SFWMD completed the purchase of 27,000 acres of U.S. Sugar lands in October 

2010.79 Although not nearly on the level envisioned by Crist in 2008, 

the purchase sparked optimism in some observers. As Shannon 

Lt. Gen. Robert Van Antwerp, chief of engineers of the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers, speaks to the SFWMD Governing Board prior to the 

signing of the Site 1 Reservoir Project Partnership Agreement.

(South Florida Water Management District)
Epilogue 303

Estenoz of the SFWMD explained, “If you would have told me 15 

years ago that U.S. Sugar was going to put itself up for sale to the 

government for Everglades restoration, I would have laughed you 

out of the room. But,” she continued, “it happened,” proving that 

CERP itself—which at times seemed impossible—could succeed 

as well.80 Some environmentalists were also pleased, believing, in 

the words of Charles Lee of Audubon of Florida, that “out of all 

the possible lands that they could have targeted, they got the best 

ones.”81 Nathaniel Reed, vice chairman of the Everglades Foundation, agreed. “The U.S. Sugar lands,” he claimed, “are the most important lands that could possibly be acquired for the restoration of 

the Everglades.”82 At the same time, critics lamented the shrinking 

size of the land purchase, wondering if the acreage would really be 

enough to make any kind of difference.83

Indeed, as a whole, concerted progress on CERP was still lacking, the sugar purchase notwithstanding. A 2008 report by the scientific review committee emphasized that CERP was still “bogged 

down in budgeting, planning, and procedural matters and is making only scant progress toward achieving restoration goals.” “Meanwhile,” it continued, “the ecosystems that the CERP is intended to 

save are in peril.”84 Newspaper articles trumpeted this “harsh review,” 

quoting William L. Graf, chairman of the committee, as saying that 

the nation was “in danger of losing” the Everglades “for our kids and 

their kids.”85 But restoration leaders pointed to signs that CERP was 

slowly gaining momentum, such as the development of an integrated 

water delivery schedule (completed in 2008). This schedule was “a 

strategy that coordinates and prioritizes projects for planning and 

construction based on project benefits, costs and funding,” providing much-needed guidance for how to proceed with CERP projects 

once funding and authorization was available.86

Meanwhile, the nation’s economic recession actually proved in 

some ways to be a boon. With the United States dealing with high 

unemployment, President Barack Obama signed into law a stimulus 

bill on 13 February 2009 intended to create new jobs and to “spur 

economic activity” by both businesses and consumers. One key 

component of the act—entitled the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA)—allocated $2 billion to the Corps 

for civil works construction projects. From this pot, the Corps designated more than $80 million to the Site 1 Impoundment project 

and to the Picayune Strand Restoration project (over $40 million 

each), enabling construction to begin on both in 2010. Other CERP 

projects also received ARRA funding, including the L-31N Seepage 

Construction of the A-1 Reservoir. (South Florida Water Management District)
304 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Management pilot project, a melaleuca eradication proposal, and an 

adaptive assessment and monitoring program. In addition, the Kissimmee River restoration project received funding. As one report indicated, “The infusion of federal dollars [for restoration programs]—

more than $200 million in fiscal year 2009—is the largest amount in 

any single year since Congress passed CERP in 2000.”87 According 

to Shannon Estenoz, the stimulus funding was a “huge shot in the 

arm” for CERP.88

In addition to funding, CERP got a boost with the appointment 

of two leaders to prominent positions in the Army. In 2009, Jo-Ellen 

Darcy, a former senior staffer in the U.S. Senate who had worked 

Everglades issues for many years, became assistant secretary of the 

Army (civil works). Terrence “Rock” Salt, former commander of 

the Jacksonville District and former head of the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force (his tenure as chairman had ended 

in 2003), became her deputy that same year. Both Darcy and Salt 

brought wisdom gained from years of working on restoration issues, 

and both provided credibility with environmental groups and with 

the Corps. Jacksonville District Commander Colonel Alfred Pantano explained that Darcy had “a very informed perspective . . . and 

appreciation” for CERP, while Salt, who had worked as the director 

of the Department of the Interior’s restoration initiatives since 2003, 

brought the potential to ease the sometimes contentious relationship 

between Everglades National Park and the Corps. Their appointments brought optimism to all sides.89

Yet these glimmers of hope were dimmed by continuing issues 

with water quality. Because of the changes the State of Florida had 

made to the Everglades Forever Act in 2003, including the extension 

of the time limit for phosphorous reduction compliance, the Miccosukee Tribe sued the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, claiming that the alterations violated water quality standards in the Clean 

Water Act but that the EPA had refused to take any action.90 On 29 

July 2008, the U.S. District Court agreed that the amendments to the 

act “change[d] Florida’s previous water quality standards” and ordered the EPA “to comply with its duty under the Clean Water Act to 

approve or disapprove those change in a manner consistent” with the 

court’s findings and conclusions.91 When the EPA did not act on the 

court’s order, the Miccosukee petitioned the court to find the agency 

in contempt. On 14 April 2010, the court directed the EPA to issue an amended determination no later than 3 September 2010 that 

would “specifically direct the State of Florida to correct the deficiencies in the Amended EFA and the Phosphorous Rule that have been 

invalidated.” The court also insisted that the EPA “notify the State of 

Florida that it is out-of-compliance with the narrative and nutrient 

standards for the Everglades Protection Area” and that it direct the 

state “to measure on a yearly basis the cumulative impacts and effects 

of phosphorous intrusion beyond the 10 ppb standard.”92 The EPA 

complied with this order on 3 September 2010, requiring the state to 

reduce total phosphorous levels of water flowing into the Everglades 

Protection Area so that stormwater treatment area discharge would 

“not cause an exceedance of the long-term criterion of 10 ppb.” The 

EPA also told the state to expand stormwater treatment areas in the 

EAA by 42,000 acres. According to the determination, these actions 

would “ensure” that the quality of water flowing from the EAA and 

the C-139 Basin (located southwest of Lake Okeechobee and northwest of the Everglades Protection Area) would meet “a scientifically 

sound Water Quality Based Effluent Limit (WQBEL) in permits in 

the shortest time possible.”93

Meanwhile, in November 2008 and June 2009, total phosphorous levels in the Arthur R. Marshall Loxahatchee National Wildlife 

Refuge exceeded the Consent Decree’s long-term levels. The Miccosukee Tribe therefore filed motions under existing litigation asking 

the court to do three things: make a formal declaration of Consent 

Decree violations; declare that the state had breached its commitment to the Special Master in the case to restore water quality; and 

order the state to complete construction of the A-1 reservoir in the 

EAA (see above discussion). The court complied with this request on 

31 March 2010, ordering the Special Master to conduct evidentiary 

hearings on the issues.94

The results of this litigation—which, in the eyes of the Miccosukee, was necessary to get the State of Florida to fulfill its water quality commitments—had the potential to drastically affect the state’s 

ability to fund CERP projects. Would the state be “focused on water 

quality to the exclusion of everything else?” Stuart Appelbaum wondered.95 Shannon Estenoz believed that was the case. The state “has 

been plopped on a water quality path for the foreseeable future,” she 

declared, and it no longer had the flexibility to pursue CERP projects 

according to the priorities it and the Corps had set.96 In the words of 

the NPS, “existing shortfalls in State funding will make compliance 

with these water quality requirements very difficult, and severely 

limit the SFWMD’s ability to continue their cost sharing agreements 

for the CERP.”97

Carol Wehle, executive director of the SFWMD, was even blunter. Litigation over water quality, she said, “could bring [CERP] to 

its knees.” For one, she explained, the SFWMD did not “have the 

financial wherewithal to do those water-quality projects and be the 

fiscal partner” in CERP. For another, she wondered whether it was 

even technically feasible to construct “a large-scale facility” that 

could consistently cleanse water to 10 ppb “through rainy seasons 

and drought seasons.” The SFWMD would make its best effort, but 

if it could only consistently clean water to 12 ppb, she asked hypothetically, “are you going to starve the Everglades of water forever?”98

Jacksonville District Commander Alfred Pantano sympathized with 

these difficulties, but he claimed that CERP could continue unhindered until 2014 without any additional outlays from the state because of credits the SFWMD had accrued. Yet he still considered 

water quality “the single most critical item . . . that somehow needs to 

be addressed.”99 Dan Kimball, superintendent of Everglades National 
Epilogue 305

Park, agreed. “Ultimately, we want the quality, quantity, and timing 

of distribution of water to be right.”100

Aside from the funding issues, the problems over water quality 

had the capacity to halt progress on CERP in other ways. As Ken 

Ammon of the SFWMD explained, if the 10 ppb standard had to 

be met before water could be pumped into the Everglades, it could 

take “a decade or decades to get to that level.” In the meantime, areas of the Everglades in desperate need of water would continue to 

suffer, and “a large part of the Everglades [could] be lost.” Ammon 

did not dispute that maintaining water quality was important, pointing to the fact that by the middle of 2011, the SFWMD would have 

nearly 60,000 acres of stormwater treatment areas in operation. In 

his mind, however, it was preferable to send water into the Everglades to stop soil oxidation, even if that water had phosphorous levels exceeding 10 ppb.101 But until the state met the 10 ppb standard, 

litigation would continue because the Miccosukee had pledged not 

to “ignore the water quality problems that exist in the Everglades.”102

Because of the need for more stormwater treatment areas, the 

increased water storage proposed by CERP would not be forthcoming in the near future. Although the SFWMD announced at the 

end of 2010 that it would restart construction on the A-1 Reservoir, 

the structure was now planned to be a flow-equalization basin (or 

shallow reservoir) that would more effectively move water through 

stormwater treatment areas, rather than the originally proposed 

190,000 acre-feet reservoir. In addition, the SFWMD would have to 

use the U.S. Sugar land for stormwater treatment instead of for storage. The NPS held out hope that the state would continue to acquire 

parcels of U.S. Sugar land so that the SFWMD could eventually store 

an additional 500,000 acre-feet of water, but the economic woes of 

the state and the need to focus on water quality made that possibility 

dubious.103

Questions also remained about aquifer storage and recovery 

(ASR). In the original CERP program, ASRs were promoted as an alternative to reservoirs, but there were questions about whether ASRs 

would actually work. The CERP program proposed several ASR pilot projects to gather scientific information, but they had made only 

modest progress in the 2000s. At least one had pumped water contaminated with arsenic back to the surface. In 2008, the Corps and 

the SFWMD issued an interim report on the ASR program, stating 

that pilot projects had been constructed along the Kissimmee River 

The Arthur R. Marshall Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge. (Everglades National Park)
306 United States Army Corps of Engineers

and the Hillsboro Canal to allow for “cycle testing” over the next 

several years, but other pilots (such as the Lake Okeechobee ASR 

pilot) were still in process. “To date, no ‘fatal flaws’ have been uncovered that might hinder the implementation of CERP ASR,” the 

report concluded. “It is believed that ASR will work almost anywhere 

in south Florida on some scale and with some degree of efficiency.”104

Others were more lukewarm about ASR prospects. As Colonel Pantano explained, the Corps had not “dismissed” ASRs, but he did not 

believe they would be “a practical solution any time soon.”105 If they 

were used, Ken Ammon of the SFWMD asserted, it would be on a 

“much smaller scale than we had originally envisioned.”106

With storage possibilities diminishing, and with water quality dominating the discussion, the Committee on Scientific Review 

of Everglades Restoration Progress noted again in 2010 the slow 

progress of CERP and the continuing decline of the health of the 

overall South Florida ecosystem. Yet the report saw some positive 

trends as well, including the stability of or increase in populations 

of wading birds, Cape Sable seaside sparrows, and panthers, as well 

as successful control of some exotic plant species. In addition, water 

conservation efforts, coupled with a slower-than-predicted population growth, had resulted in “substantially lower” water demands 

by urban populations, increasing the amount of water available for 

the environment. Moreover, with three CERP projects under construction, the committee could report “tangible progress” on CERP 

implementation. “After years of delay,” the committee concluded, “it 

is critically important to maintain this momentum to minimize further degradation of the system.”107

Some believed that issuing plaudits of what CERP had accomplished was just grasping at straws to try to find anything positive in 

the plodding pace of CERP. Indeed, many actively involved in South 

Florida restoration were insistent that more needed to be done. Even 

though projects such as Picayune Strand, Site 1, and Indian River 

Lagoon-South were proceeding, some observers argued, they were 

mere showcase projects that would not have any real meaningful impact on CERP. Picayune Strand, Colonel Alfred Pantano explained, 

“is a good project. But in the big scheme of Everglades restoration, 

you would never do that project first.” The projects were authorized 

and funded, Pantano continued, in part because they were noncontroversial. “We can’t continue to do these compartmentalized 

projects, which on their own may function, but don’t achieve the 

The Hillsboro ASR pilot project. (South Florida Water Management District)
Epilogue 307

end,” Pantano explained. “We’ve got to get to the heart of the matter, which is the central part of the Everglades, so we can convey the 

water south where it needs to go.”108

One project that had the potential to impact the Everglades 

positively was the construction of a one-mile bridge over Tamiami 

Trail, part of the Mod Waters project designed to accelerate the flow 

of water into Everglades National Park. Several interest groups saw 

the Tamiami Trail bridge as “an important first step in reconnecting the natural flow path of the Everglades and putting water where 

it belongs.”109 Since its construction, Tamiami Trail had served as a 

virtual dam to the southward flow of water into Shark River Slough. 

Allowing water to flow again would provide benefits to Everglades 

National Park—as long as the Corps could actually get meaningful amounts of water to the trail. Regardless, some claimed that the 

Tamiami Trail project would also benefit Miccosukee Indian lands 

by alleviating the backup of water in WCA 3A.110

The Miccosukee, however, had a different perspective, calling 

the project the “White Elephant Bridge” and the “Bridge to Nowhere.” It accused the Department of the Interior and the Corps with 

developing the plan for its construction “behind closed doors” and 

without Miccosukee involvement, even though it had the potential 

to affect Miccosukee land.111 Indeed, the Miccosukee declared that 

the project would “destroy ancient sacred archeological sites and artifacts of the Tribe.”112 Instead of elevating Tamiami Trail, the tribe 

proposed that the Corps “clean out the sediment and vegetation built 

up downstream of the existing culverts and structures” which, tribal 

officials believed, would enable necessary southward flow of water to 

proceed.113 The Corps and the Interior Department, however, continued to move forward with the bridge, causing the tribe to accuse 

them of pursuing “an unconstitutional path that has resulted in an 

ad-hoc process in which the Tribe was not allowed to participate in a 

fulsome manner.”114 In Pantano’s view, “the tribe ultimately supports 

what we’re trying to achieve” with the bridge, but it was using litigation to address concerns about water quality, seepage, and especially 

the prospect of flooding tribal lands to clean the water.115

 Although the Miccosukee objected to the Tamiami Trail bridge, 

others saw it as a concrete indication that Mod Waters and Everglades restoration was proceeding. But clearly much more needed to 

be accomplished in the years after 2010 to alleviate continuing damage to the South Florida ecosystem. Some, such as the Miccosukee, 

saw water quality as the most important issue. Colonel Pantano of 

the Corps did not disagree, declaring that effectively resolving the 

federal government’s role in water quality would be a key factor in 

the future, as would deciding how to clean up Lake Okeechobee and 

its “legacy source of phosphorous” from years of agricultural runoff. In fact, the Miccosukee characterized Lake Okeechobee water 

quality as “the elephant in the restoration room,” stating that it was 

essential that the EPA more vigorously implement National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits and enforcement for the 

lake. Otherwise, tribal representatives declared, “there is no assurance that water quality will ever be met in Lake Okeechobee or in its 

discharges to the Everglades and the estuaries.”116

Just getting more water directed south to the Everglades was 

also important. But in order to do this, the Corps, the SFWMD, and 

the Interior Department had to solve seepage issues so that landowners surrounding Everglades National Park would be protected 

from flooding. As Everglades National Park Superintendent Dan 

Kimball explained, seepage management presented some “challenging” problems, especially because seepage projects as proposed in 

the CERP plan were “no longer feasible.” Until the issue was solved, 

and until adequate storage and conveyance systems could be built 

south of Lake Okeechobee, no more water could be moved into the 

Everglades, and Lake Okeechobee would continue in a never-ending 

cycle of being either too low (in drought years) or too high (causing 

destruction to the Caloosahatchee and St. Lucie estuaries).117

Controlling invasive species was another important component of Everglades restoration that needed more attention. Although 

popular television programs focused on the presence of pythons in 

South Florida, other non-native species were also problematic, including lygodium (or climbing fern), melaleuca, Brazilian pepper, 

Australian pine, and exotic fish. The Corps had taken various measures to control these species, including partnering with the University of Auburn to use black Labradors to sniff out pythons. The 

Corps also worked on a melaleauca eradication program as part of 

CERP (experiencing some success when it released a moth that successfully helped eliminate the exotic vegetation), but according to 

Pantano, the Corps did not have the money to battle all of South 

Florida’s invasive species.118 One solution, according to Lieutenant 

Colonel Michael Kinard, deputy district engineer of the Jacksonville 

District, was to include provisions for dealing with exotic species 

in management plans so that funding was available when invasives 

inevitably appeared in a project area. “We’re trying to implement” 

The Tamiami Trail. (South Florida Water Management District)
308 United States Army Corps of Engineers

this measure “in current and future projects,” Kinard explained, but 

“that’s an area [where] we still need to do a better job.”119 According 

to Paul Souza of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, managing the 

invasive species problem was “a very key part of Everglades restoration” because one of CERP’s goals was to improve conditions for 

natural flora and fauna in South Florida.120

With all of these issues, the key, according to Robert Johnson 

of the NPS, was patience. “I don’t think any of us expected that we 

would go for almost ten years before we’d see a groundbreaking 

in CERP,” Johnson asserted, but that was the nature of environmental restoration. “You dig the hole one shovel load at a time,” he 

said, and “you’re not going to fill it back very quickly.”121 But that 

patience was sometimes hard to maintain, and Stuart Appelbaum’s 

“biggest concern” was whether the interests that cooperated to get 

CERP passed would stick with “multi-generational implementation.” CERP was “more complex and more difficult than anybody 

thought,” Appelbaum said, but if stakeholders would stay the 

course, Appelbaum was “very optimistic that we’ll achieve the result.”122 Carol Wehle shared that optimism, recognizing the “passion” of those working on CERP. “They truly believe in Everglades 

restoration,” Wehle said. “And they care about it so much they will 

not allow it to fail.”123

Others were more concerned, seeing the construction of compartmentalized and out-of-sequence projects, the litigation over 

water quality, and the lack of adequate progress in moving water 

south from Lake Okeechobee as signs that CERP was in serious 

jeopardy. The fact that the relationships conceived in the program’s 

development were falling apart, and no entity had enabled all sides 

to come together, exacerbated the problems. “Looking back, I don’t 

know how we ever got CERP authorized,” Colonel Pantano declared. 

“What happened back then, we need it now, desperately.” But instead of cooperation, Pantano saw litigation and tensions between 

the SFWMD and the Corps. “We’re at such a critical point with this 

[program],” Pantano explained. “We need people to step up and lead, 

to lay the sword on the table.”124

Part of the responsibility, in Pantano’s view, lay with the South 

Florida Ecosystem Task Force which, he and others believed, had 

failed to effectively coordinate the interests of different parties. Composed of high-ranking federal, state, local, and tribal representatives, 

the task force had shown little ability to get the major stakeholders 

to meet at the negotiating table, giving way instead to an atmosphere 

of litigation and intransigence. Rather than providing the necessary 

coordination, compromise, and leadership, Pantano asserted, “the 

cynicism and sarcasm about [the task force] has become so great that 

people go there with an attitude that nothing is going to be accomplished.” Pantano hoped that the organization would take stronger 

action in confronting the “difficult and controversial and litigious” 

issues surrounding CERP. “All the good work [the task force] did 

leading up to 2000,” he declared, was close to disappearing.125

As hope in CERP’s ability to restore the South Florida ecosystem 

ebbed and flowed, one Corps project stood as “a sign” that restoration could really produce what it promised: the Kissimmee River 

restoration.126 In 2001, the Corps had finished Phase I of the restoration, with Phase II completion following in 2009, resulting in 

“continuous water flow” to 19 miles of the river. Phase III, which 

consisted of backfilling C-38 and restoring water flow to another 

8 miles of the river, was in progress, with an estimated completion 

date of 2015. When Phase III was done, the Corps declared, “more 

than 40 square miles of river-floodplain ecosystem will be restored, 

including almost 20,000 acres of wetlands and 44 miles of historic 

river channel.”127

Even with only the first two phases complete, the ecological improvements in the Kissimmee River Basin were remarkable. A 2010 

Jacksonville District publication detailed some of these advances: 

thriving wetland plants, decreases in organic deposits on the river 

bottom, increases in dissolved oxygen, the return of largemouth bass 

and sunfishes, and the increase and restoration of several bird species, including white ibis, great egret, snowy egret, little blue heron, 

ducks, and black-necked stilts.128 These improvements were noted in 

a 25 January 2009 article in the St. Petersburg Times by Jeff Klinkenberg, who described a trip along the Kissimmee River with guide 

Paul Gray, a biologist with the National Audubon Society. As they 

traversed portions of the restored river, the two saw ducks, a great 

blue heron, sandhill cranes, and glossy ibis, all indications that restoration was working. Gray told Klinkenberg about the flooding of 

four miles of the old floodplain in August 2008 after Tropical Storm 

Fay hit Florida. “It was the most exciting thing I’ve seen,” Gray remarked, because, as Klinkenberg noted, it indicated that “the canal remembers how to be a river.” As the pair took in the scene, it 

seemed almost idyllic:

A marsh wren hollered. A Northern harrier, a beautiful hawk, 

soared inches above the millet. We saw a pair of wood storks. We 

heard a limpkin squawking. A raccoon and her young swam across 

the creek in front of us. An otter poked its head up, glanced our way 

and vanished as quickly. Alligators tried to get warm on the bank.

Seeing this tumult of life, Klinkenberg remembered something 

his friend Richard Coleman once told him: “A river is a cauldron of 

birth, death and diversity.”129 With restoration proceeding, C-38 was 

again becoming that cauldron. It was again becoming a river.

Success in Kissimmee restoration not only provided hope, but 

served as a good example of what could happen if patience with 

CERP were maintained. Indeed, the years between 2000 and 2010 

provided several important lessons learned for the Corps and other 

stakeholders in water management. The first—as indicated by the 

Kissimmee restoration—was merely that reversing the ecological 

damage in South Florida was possible, if not extremely difficult to 

achieve. “Does ecological restoration work?” Appelbaum asked. “I 

think we’ve answered that on the Kissimmee.”130 Yet these years also 
Epilogue 309

Kissimmee River restoration. (South Florida Water Management District)
310 United States Army Corps of Engineers

showed the need for the Corps to be flexible in its project processes. 

Ecological restoration required dexterity, an ability to change directions if conditions warranted it, and a need to implement projects 

quickly before more damage occurred. The Corps’ planning processes did not necessarily provide that flexibility—a situation that 

not only made Everglades restoration difficult but that also had repercussions for a Corps that was trying to become a major player in 

ecosystem restoration.

The efforts to implement CERP also indicated that firm commitments to restoration were necessary from both the federal government and the state of Florida. CERP could limp along if one party 

evinced a stronger commitment than the other, but difficulties invariably resulted, including inequities in project spending and hard 

feelings between agencies. Finally, the years since 2000 had shown 

that maintaining the fragile coalition of interest groups that had 

developed CERP was as difficult as originally expected. Invariably, 

some groups wanted CERP and the Corps to address their own issues, regardless of whether solving those issues advanced CERP in a 

systematic way. For CERP to succeed, those groups had to be willing 

to compromise and even sacrifice some of their own interests for the 

good of the program. If groups were unwilling to do that, stakeholders would be unable to maintain the “laser beam” focus that Paul 

Souza believed was essential for CERP to succeed. “Our success is 

solely founded upon our ability as partners to set differences aside 

[and] focus on our common vision,” Souza stated, but the willingness of interest groups to do this remained an issue.131

Even though these lessons seemed clear to observers in 2010, 

exactly how the Corps would use them in the upcoming years remained to be seen. By the end of 2010, Everglades restoration stood 

at “a crucial crossroads,” teetering on a line separating failure and 

success.132 To some watching this balancing act, it was only a matter 

of time before it all came crashing down. “If [the stakeholders] don’t 

get our act together” soon, Colonel Pantano observed in 2011, “we’re 

going to have a massive crater in the Everglades restoration program, 

and we’re going to come to a screeching halt.”133

Events early in 2011 prompted further concern. Florida’s state 

legislature passed a budget “requiring deep budget cuts for the state’s 

five water districts,” including the SFWMD, leaving some wondering 

whether CERP projects would end up on the cutting-room floor. “I 

think it’s going to shut Everglades restoration down,” Miami attorney 

Eric Buermann predicted. “I don’t think you can accomplish anything with that level of funding.”134 Meanwhile, U.S. District Judge 

Alan Gold issued an order in the water quality litigation requiring 

the EPA to take responsibility for improving water quality in South 

Florida, since the state seemed incapable of doing so. “Protection of 

the Everglades requires a major commitment which cannot be simply pushed aside in the face of financial hardships, political opposition, or other excuses,” Gold warned. “These obstacles will always 

exist, but the Everglades will not—especially if the protracted pace of 

preservation efforts continues at the current pace.”135

Such bleak developments and alarming pronouncements recalled Marjory Stoneman Douglas’s declaration in 1948 that the Everglades were in their “eleventh hour.”136 In the sixty years that followed, the ecosystem had faced drainage, drought, and destruction, 

leaving it on its deathbed. CERP had promised healing, but the doctors could not agree on how to administer the medicine, nor could 

they find the funding to implement the necessary cures. Meanwhile, 

life continued to ebb from the land, although a heartbeat remained. 

CERP proceeded against the backdrop of an ecosystem in danger, 

at the confluence of numerous and disparate competing interests. 

As urgency mounted, the bonds of cooperation strained. At stake 

was no less than “the greatest concentration of living things on this 

continent.”137

Endnotes

1 Dennis Duke, “Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Program,” 

Powerpoint presentation, File TP 200-1F CERP Program Files (2000), CERP 

Code: 01.09.02, South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force, Box 1, Location 4078, JDAR. Before the passage of CERP, the Corps had executed a 

master design agreement with the SFWMD that covered pre-construction 

engineering and design work on six pilot projects and 56 other components, spanning 38 years at an estimated $712 million, to be cost-shared 

between the Corps and the SFWMD. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and 

South Florida Water Management District, “The Comprehensive Everglades 

Restoration Plan: Implementing CERP,” Powerpoint presentation, File LOW 

Kick-off Meeting, Box 2, Lake Okeechobee Watershed, JDAR; South Florida 

Water Management District, 2001 Executive Summary: Everglades Consolidated Report, January 1, 2001 (West Palm Beach, Fla: South Florida Water 

Management District, 2001), 2, 24. 

2 Committee on Independent Scientific Review of Everglades Restoration Progress (CISREP), Water Science and Technology Review Board, 

Board on Environmental Studies and Toxicology, Division on Earth and Life 

Studies, Progress Toward Restoring the Everglades: The First Biennial Review 

– 2006 (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2007), 8-9.

3 Stuart Appelbaum interview by Joshua Pollarine, 27 September 2010, 

Jacksonville, Florida, 4 (hereafter referred to as Appelbaum II interview). 

A 2002 article in National Parks noted that “the first step” in CERP was the 

completion of “a cumbersome planning process.” Phyllis McIntosh, “Reviving the Everglades,” National Parks 76 (February 2002): 30.

4 All quotations in this paragraph are from “Programmatic Regulations 

for the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan,” Federal Register 68, 12 

November 2003, 64200-64206.

5 Kim Todd, “Who Gets the Water?” Sierra 88 (January 2003): 10.

6 Robert Johnson interview by Joshua Pollarine, 18 October 2010, 

Homestead, Florida, 6 (hereafter referred to as Johnson II interview).

7 All quotations in Jack E. Davis, An Everglades Providence: Marjory 

Stoneman Douglas and the American Environmental Century (Athens: 

The University of Georgia Press, 2009), 599-600. Critics still claimed that 

the Corps was relying too much in its planning on ASRs, which were still 

considered expensive and untested. See National Research Council et al., 
Epilogue 311

Aquifer Storage and Recovery in the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration 

Plan: A Critique of the Pilot Projects and Related Plans for ASR in the Lake 

Okeechobee and Western Hillsboro Areas (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2001), 1.

8 CISREP et al., Progress Toward Restoring the Everglades: The Second 

Biennial Review – 2008 (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 

2008), 7.

9 Carol Wehle telephone interview by Nicolai Kryloff, 17 March 2011, 

transcript, 4.

10 Water Resources Development Act of 2000 (114 Stat. 2572 at 2681-

2683, 2686-2690).

11 Dennis Duke interview by Joshua Pollarine, 29 September 2010, 

Jacksonville, Florida, 9.

12 CISREP et al., Progress Toward Restoring the Everglades: The Second 

Biennial Review – 2008, 82.

13 Shannon Estenoz telephone interview by Joshua Pollarine, 20 October 2010, transcript, 7; see also Ken Ammon telephone interview by Joshua 

Pollarine, 4 March 2011, transcript, 6.

14 “The Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan: Implementing 

CERP,” Powerpoint presentation.

15 Quotations in Johnson II interview, 11; see also Colonel Alfred Pantano telephone interview by Matthew Godfrey, 13 January 2011, transcript, 

7.

16 Paul Souza telephone interview by Joshua Pollarine, 8 March 2011, 

transcript, 15.

17 Appelbaum II interview, 5.

18 Estenoz interview, 12.

19 Quotation in Brooks Moore telephone interview by Joshua Pollarine, 3 March 2011, transcript, 3; see also “Master Agreement Between the 

Department of the Army and South Florida Water Management District 

for Cooperation in Constructing and Operating, Maintaining, Repairing, 

Replacing, and Rehabilitating Projects Authorized to be Undertaken Pursuant to the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan,” 13 August 2009 

<http://www.evergladesplan.org/pm/program_docs/master_agreement 

_cerp.aspx> (22 November 2010). According to Estenoz, the master agreement “was languishing for six and a half years” before Terrence “Rock” Salt 

became deputy assistant secretary of the army (civil works) and took action.

20 See “The Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan: Implementing CERP,” Powerpoint presentation; Appelbaum II interview, 4; “Overall 

CERP Schedule and Funding: Projected Combined Funding Requirement,” 

in “Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan – CERP,” Powerpoint presentation, File TP 200-1F CERP Program Files (2001), CERP Code 01.09.02, 

South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force, Box 1, Location 4078, 

JDAR.

21 Quotations in Ammon interview, 5; see also CISREP et al., Progress Toward Restoring the Everglades: The Second Biennial Review – 2008, 

84; Abby Goodnough, “Vast Effort to Save Everglades Falters as U.S. Funds 

Dwindle,” The New York Times, 2 November 2007. The State of Florida had 

overpaid its required costs by 2007.

22 CISREP et al., Progress Toward Restoring the Everglades: The First Biennial Review – 2006, 10.

23 Quotation in Estenoz interview, 3; see also Goodnough, “Vast Effort 

to Save Everglades Falters as U.S. Funds Dwindle.”

24 Thomas Van Lent interview by Joshua Pollarine, 19 October 2010, 

Palmetto Bay, Florida, 4.

25 “Water, Bird and Man – The Everglades,” The Economist 371 (8 October 2005): 32-34.

26 CISREP et al., Progress Toward Restoring the Everglades: The First 

Biennial Review – 2006, 1-2, 9. The six pilot projects included the Lake 

Okeechobee, Caloosahatchee River (C-43), and Site 1 Impoundment aquifer storage and recovery projects, as well as the L-31N Seepage Management 

project, the Wastewater Reuse Technology project, and the Lake Belt InGround Reservoir Technology project.

27 U.S. Government Accountability Office, South Florida Ecosystem: 

Restoration is Moving Forward but Is Facing Significant Delays, Implementation Challenges, and Rising Costs, Report GAO-07-520 (Washington, D.C.: 

Government Accountability Office, 2007), 6-7.

28 Dan Kimball telephone interview by Joshua Pollarine, 1 March 2011, 

transcript, 3-4.

29 Dexter W. Lehtinen, “The Myth of Everglades Restoration: An Additional View of the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida,” 6 (documents 

pertaining to water quality litigation in possession of authors).

30 U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Inspector General, Modified Water Deliveries to Everglades National Park: Audit Report, Report No. 

C-IN-MOA-0006-2005 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Inspector General, 

2006), i. 

31 Quotations in Pervase A. Sheikh, “Everglades Restoration: Modified 

Water Deliveries Project,” 5, CRS Report for Congress, 17 March 2005, Order Code RS21331; see also Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003 

(117 Stat. 11).

32 “Mod Waters & CSOP: ‘It’s Still the Park’s way or the highway’” (documents pertaining to water quality litigation in possession of authors).

33 Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations 

Act, 2004 (117 Stat 1241, 1251).

34 CISREP et al., Progress Toward Restoring the Everglades: The First Biennial Review – 2006, 6, 151-156. 

35 U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Everglades 

National Park, “South Florida Natural Resources Center Water Quality Program,” document provided by South Florida Natural Resources Center, National Park Service, Homestead, Florida.

36 Ryan Dougherty, “Sugar Deal Sours ’Glades Restoration,” National 

Parks 77 (September/October 2003): 10-11.

37 As quoted in Michael Grunwald, “Sugar Plum: Jeb v. the Everglades,” 

The New Republic 228 (12 May 2003): 16.

38 As quoted in Dougherty, “Sugar Deal Sours ’Glades Restoration,” 10.

39 “Water, Bird and Man – The Everglades”; Nathaniel Reed telephone 

interview by Nicolai Kryloff, 11 March 2011, transcript, 4 [hereafter referred 

to as Reed telephone interview]. As Stuart Appelbaum remembered, the 

state “got pretty frustrated” and decided to just “get it done” themselves. Appelbaum II interview, 10.

40 Joni Warner email to Nicolai Kryloff, 28 March 2011, personal communication in possession of the authors.

41 Quotation in South Florida Water Management District, 2006 South 

Florida Environmental Report: Executive Summary (West Palm Beach, Fla.: 

South Florida Water Management District, 2006), 26; see also Ammon interview, 9-10.

42 CISREP et al., Progress Toward Restoring the Everglades: The First Biennial Review – 2006, 9, 140.

43 Quotation in Ammon interview, 12 (see also pp. 9-11); see also CISREP et al., Progress Toward Restoring the Everglades: The Second Biennial 

Review – 2008, 82-84. Even though Acceler8 did not have a huge impact on 

Everglades National Park, the NPS still liked the program because, as Superintendent Dan Kimball explained, “it is really important to show progress on 

the ground.” Kimball interview, 17-18.

44 Wehle interview, 9.
312 United States Army Corps of Engineers

45 Estenoz interview, 4.

46 Colonel Alfred Pantano telephone interview by Matthew Godfrey, 13 

January 2011, transcript, 7.

47 “Water, Bird and Man – The Everglades.”

48 Pantano interview, 3, 5-6. 

49 Van Lent interview, 3.

50 Appelbaum II interview, 11.

51 Johnson II interview, 7-8.

52 “CERP Project: Water Conservation Area 3, Decompartmentalization & Sheet Flow Enhancement (Decomp)” <http://www.evergladesplan.

org/pm/projects/proj_12_wca3_1.aspx> (13 November 2010).

53 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, “Project Status Report: CERP WCA 3 DECOMP” <http://www.evergladesplan.org/pm/

projects/project_docs/status/proj_12_current.pdf> (13 November 2010).

54 Van Lent interview, 8.

55 Kimball interview, 11.

56 Kim Taplin telephone interview by Nicolai Kryloff, 25 February 

2011, transcript, 15.

57 Van Lent interview, 8.

58 Pantano interview, 21-23 (quotation on p. 23).

59 Quotations in Dexter W. Lehtinen to Susan Conner, Planning Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, 1 February 2010 

(documents pertaining to water quality litigation in possession of authors); 

see also U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service South Florida Ecological Services Office, “Species Conservation Guidelines, South Florida: Cape Sable seaside 

sparrow,” Draft, 8 October 2003 <http://www.fws.gov/verobeach/images/ 

pdflibrary/Cape_Sable_Seaside-Sparrow_Conservation_Guidelines.pdf> 

(30 March 2011); Paul Souza telephone interview by Joshua Pollarine, 8 

March 2011, transcript, 6.

60 Craig Pittman, “A Fearful Bog,” St. Petersburg Times, 12 March 2006; 

Debra Wood, “Life Support: Is the Everglades Restoration Dying?” Southeast Construction 7 (1 November 2007): 28; Abby Goodnough, “Vast Effort 

to Save Everglades Falters as U.S. Funds Dwindle,” The New York Times, 2 

November 2007.

61 CISREP et al., Progress Toward Restoring the Everglades: The Second 

Biennial Review – 2008, 88. 

62 Michael Grunwald, “Everglades,” Smithsonian 36 (March 2006): 57; 

see also Grunwald, The Swamp, 362-363.

63 Appelbaum II interview, 23-24.

64 Quotation in Armistead, “Cash and Commitment Rescue Everglades 

Replumbing”; see also Duke interview, 12.

65 Pantano interview, 3.

66 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Reviving the 

Picayune Strand (Jacksonville, Fla.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, 2010), 1-4; “Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan, 

Picayune Strand Restoration (formerly Southern Golden Gate Estates Ecosystem Restoration Plan), Final Integrated Project Implementation Report 

and Environmental Impact Statement” < http://www.evergladesplan.org/

pm/projects/ docs_30_sgge_pir_final.aspx> (20 November 2010); “CERP 

Project: Picayune Strand Restoration” <http://www.evergladesplan.org/pm/

projects/proj_30_sgge.aspx> (20 November 2010); Appelbaum II interview, 

14; Thomas F. Armistead, “Feds Award First Everglades Contract,” Engineering News-Record 253 (23 November 2009): 1; Taplin interview, 4; Souza interview, 13, 17. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Kinard, deputy district engineer 

of the Jacksonville District, noted that just the work that the SFWMD had 

done under Acceler8 had resulted in progress. “Getting to see [the area] after 

just seven years’ worth of growth is just amazing,” he asserted. “Once you 

return nature back and just let the water take its natural course it’s amazing 

how fast that it starts to rebound.” Kinard telephone interview by Joshua 

Pollarine, 7 March 2011, transcript, 16.

67 As quoted in Libby Wells, “Last Public Hearing on Indian River Lagoon Restoration,” The Palm Beach Post, 12 January 2004, copy in File: IRL-S 

(04), CERP Code 07.98, Box 1, Location 4413, JDAR.

68 First quotation in U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Indian River Lagoon – South: Facts & Information (Jacksonville, Fla.: 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, 2010), 1; second quotation in “CERP Project: Indian River Lagoon – South” <http://www.evergladesplan.org/pm/projects/ proj_07_irl_south.aspx> (20 November 2010). 

69 “CERP Project: Indian River Lagoon – South” <http://www.evergladesplan.org/pm/projects/ proj_07_irl_south.aspx> (20 November 2010); 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and South Florida Water Management District, “Final Integrated Project Implementation Report and Environmental 

Impact Statement, Indian River Lagoon – South” <http://www.evergladesplan.org/pm/studies/irl_south_pir.aspx> (20 November 2010); John Paul 

Woodley, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works), “Record of Decision: Central and Southern Florida Project, Indian River Lagoon—South,” 

25 January 2006, File: IRL-S (06), CERP Code: 07.02.01, Box 1, Location 

4413, JDAR; Appelbaum II interview, 16.

70 Souza interview, 19.

71 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Fran Reich 

Preserve/Site 1 Impoundment (Jacksonville, Fla.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, 2010), 1; “Central and Southern Florida Project, 

Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan, Site 1 Impoundment Project, 

Final Integrated Project Implementation Report and Environmental Impact 

Statement” <http://www.evergladesplan.org/pm/projects/docs_40_site_1 

_pir.aspx> (20 November 2010); “CERP Project: Site 1 Impoundment” 

<http://www.evergladesplan.org/pm/ projects/proj_40_site_1_impoundment.aspx> (20 November 2010); Appelbaum II interview, 15.

72 Souza interview, 12.

73 Quotations in Mary Williams Walsh, “Helping the Everglades, or Big 

Sugar?” The New York Times, 14 September 2008; see also Kris Hundley, 

“Deal Would Be the End for Florida Sugar Giant,” St. Petersburg Times, 24 

June 2008.

74 As quoted in Walsh, “Helping the Everglades, or Big Sugar?” The New 

York Times, 14 September 2008.

75 Quotation in Damien Cave, “Florida Buying Big Sugar Tract for Everglades,” The New York Times, 25 June 2008; see also Erik Stokstad, “Big 

Land Purchase Triggers Review of Plans to Restore Everglades,” Science 321 

(4 July 2008): 22. One report indicated that in addition to the U.S. Sugar 

lands, the State of Florida needed an additional 40,000 acres owned by the 

Okeelanta Corporation to allow it to restore natural flow to the EAA. Walsh, 

“Helping the Everglades, or Big Sugar?” The New York Times, 14 September 

2008.

76 All quotations in Damien Cave, “Possible Flaws in State Plan to Rescue the Everglades,” The New York Times, 2 July 2008; see also Walsh, “Helping the Everglades, or Big Sugar?” The New York Times, 14 September 2008.

77 Bradford Sewell, Senior Attorney, NRDC, to The Honorable Jeb Bush 

et al., 13 December 2006 (documents pertaining to water quality litigation 

in possession of authors). According to former Assistant Secretary of the 

Interior Nathaniel Reed, who, in 2011, was serving as vice chairman of the 

Everglades Foundation, environmental groups also opposed the reservoir 

because the SFWMD “refused to guarantee that the water stored in that reservoir [would] be used for restoration of the Everglades.” In Reed’s words, after “it became increasingly clear that the water stored in that reservoir could 

be used to irrigate sugarcane land . . . the entire environmental community 

turned against” the reservoir. Reed telephone interview, 5.
Epilogue 313

78 Quotations in Don Van Natta Jr. and Damien Cave, “Deal to Save Everglades May Help Sugar Firm,” The New York Times, 8 March 2010; see also 

United States of America and Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. South Florida 

Water Management District, Case No. 88-1886-CIV-MORENO, Miccosukee 

Tribe of Indians’ Emergency Motion for Injunctive Relief and Supporting 

Memorandum of Law, 1-2; United States of America and Miccosukee Tribe of 

Indians v. South Florida Water Management District, Case No. 88-1886-CIVMORENO, Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida’s Closing Brief on the 

July 26, 2010 Evidentiary Hearing, 6-7.

79 Don Van Natta Jr. and Damien Cave, “Deal to Save Everglades May 

Help Sugar Firm,” The New York Times, 8 March 2010; Simone Baribeau, 

“Florida Weighs Swapping Cash for Debt in Scaled Back Everglades Purchase,” <http://www.bloomberg.com/news> (10 August 2010); Adam Playford, “Everglades Restoration Buy of U.S. Sugar Land May Be Sharply Downsized,” The Palm Beach Post, 4 August 2010. The Miccosukee Tribe disagreed 

with this reasoning, stating that the U.S. Sugar lands were not “instrumental 

to remedying violations of the Consent Decree.” United States of America 

and Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. South Florida Water Management District, 

Case No. 88-1886-CIV-MORENO, Miccosukee Tribe of Indians’ Emergency Motion for Injunctive Relief and Supporting Memorandum of Law, 6-7.

80 Estenoz interview, 11.

81 As quoted in Adam Playford, “Everglades Restoration Buy of U.S. 

Sugar Land May Be Sharply Downsized,” The Palm Beach Post, 4 August 

2010.

82 Reed telephone interview, 17. According to Superintendent Dan 

Kimball of Everglades National Park, the NPS was “very supportive” of the 

acquisition because of the “strategic location” of the lands. “When you have 

an opportunity like that from a willing seller with a strategic location . . . you 

should take it,” he explained. Kimball interview, 16.

83 For example, see Damien Cave, “In the Everglades, the Miracle that 

Wasn’t,” <http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/13/the-miracle-thatwasnt-everglades-restoration/> (11 August 2010).

84 CISREP, et al., Progress Toward Restoring the Everglades: The Second 

Biennial Review – 2008, 1-12.

85 As quoted in Damien Cave, “Harsh Review of Restoration in Everglades,” The New York Times, 30 September 2008; see also Craig Pittman, 

“Red Tape Snarls Glades Rescue,” St. Petersburg Times, 30 September 2008; 

“Biennial Report Finds Little Progress, Many Hindrances,” Engineering 

News-Record 261 (13 October 2008): 16.

86 “Biennial Report Finds Little Progress, Many Hindrances,” 16; U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Integrated Delivery Schedule: Facts & Information (Jacksonville, Fla.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

2009), 1-2; Pittman, “Red Tape Snarls Glades Rescue,” St. Petersburg Times, 

30 September 2008. 

87 Quotations in “Everglades Projects Receive $103 Million in Recovery Act Funds,” Everglades Report (May/June 2009): 1, 3; see also “American 

Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Army Corps of Engineers, Civil 

Works Construction” <http://www.usace.army.mil/recovery/Documents/

ComprehensiveConstruction.pdf> (8 December 2010); U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers, “Stimulus Money for US Army Corps of Engineers” <http://

www.usace.army.mil/recovery/Pages/CWMoney.aspx> (8 December 2010).

88 Estenoz interview, 12-13. Appropriations in the fiscal year 2010 

budget for CERP projects continued the momentum. U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, Jacksonville District, Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan, 

Central and Southern Florida Project: Report to Congress (Jacksonville, Fla.: 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2010), viii. 

89 Quotation in Pantano interview, 4; see also “Everglades Leader Appointed to Pentagon Post,” Everglades Restoration (March/April 2009): 1, 4; 

Estenoz interview, 12.

90 See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States of America, 

the Environmental Protection Agency, Michael O. Leavitt, and Jimmy Palmer, 

Complaint, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

91 Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States of America, et 

al., Lead Case No. 04-21448-CIV-GOLD/McALILEY, U.S. District Court, 

Southern District of Florida, Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motions [DE 357]; 

[DE 364] in Part; Granting Equitable Relief; Requiring Parties to Take Action by Dates Certain, 14 April 2010, 2, 44-45.

92 Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States of America, et 

al., Lead Case No. 04-21448-CIV-GOLD/McALILEY, U.S. District Court, 

Southern District of Florida, Order Granting Summary Judgment; Closing 

Case, 29 July 2008, 98-99.

93 Quotations in United States Environmental Protection Agency, 

Amended Determination, i-v, (documents pertaining to water quality litigation in possession of authors); Sylvia R. Pelizza, Refuge Manager, Arthur R. 

Marshall Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge, and Dan B. Kimball, Superintendent, Everglades and Dry Tortugas National Parks, Briefing Memorandum, Current Water Quality Litigation (Moreno and Gold cases), 7 May 

2010, document provided by Alice Clarke, Everglades National Park.

94 Quotation in United States of America v. South Florida Water Management District, et al., Case No. 88-1886-CIV-MORENO, U.S. District 

Court for the Southern District of Florida, Miami Division, Order Granting 

Motion to Adopt the Special Master’s Report, Motion Seeking Declaration 

of Violations, and Motion for Declaration of Breach of Commitments, 31 

March 2010, 19; see also United States of America v. South Florida Water 

Management District, et al., Case No. 88-1886-CIV-MORENO, U.S. District 

Court for the Southern District of Florida, Miami Division, Order Requiring Special Master to Hold a Hearing on the Issue of Remedies and Submit 

a Report to the Court; Pelizza and Kimball, Briefing Memorandum, Current 

Water Quality Litigation (Moreno and Gold cases), 7 May 2010; Pelizza and 

Kimball, Briefing Memorandum, Everglades Consent Decree Compliance, 

7 May 2010, document provided by Alice Clarke, Everglades National Park.

95 Appelbaum II interview, 18.

96 Estenoz interview, 12.

97 “Department of Interior Vision and Strategic Plan for Achieving Everglades Restoration,” 24 September 2010, 5, document provided by Robert 

Johnson, Director, South Florida Natural Resources Center, National Park 

Service, Homestead, Florida.

98 Wehle interview, 13-14.

99 Pantano interview, 9-10, 17-19. Wehle said that the SFWMD had already purchased nearly 65 percent “of all lands necessary for CERP projects” 

and 100 percent of the land needed “for the first suite of projects.” Wehle 

interview, 2. Exacerbating the water quality issue was a new challenge resulting from converting lands that previously had been used for agriculture to 

reservoirs. Because of high levels of fertilization and crop protection chemicals used on the land, much of the soil was contaminated to levels that would 

violate water quality. Cleansing the soil took money, and it was unclear who 

would be responsible for these costs. See Pantano interview, 14-15; Taplin 

interview, 18-19; Ammon interview, 7. 

100 Kimball interview, 11.

101 Ammon interview, 15-20.

102 Lehtinen, “The Myth of Everglades Restoration,” 2.

103 Quotations in “Department of the Interior Vision and Strategic Plan 

for Achieving Everglades Restoration, Sept 24, 2010,” 6-7, document provided by Robert Johnson, Director, South Florida Natural Resources Center, 
314 United States Army Corps of Engineers

National Park Service, Homestead, Florida; see also Debra Wood, “Everglades Restoration: What’s Going On?” Southeast Construction 6 (1 April 

2006): 74; Pantano interview, 18; Taplin interview, 16-17.

104 Quotations in South Florida Water Management and U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, Aquifer Storage & Recovery Program: Interim Report 

2008 (West Palm Beach, Fla: South Florida Water Management District, 

2008), v-vi; see also Taplin interview, 8-9.

105 Pantano interview, 11.

106 Ammon interview, 13.

107 CISREP et al., Progress Toward Restoring the Everglades: The Third 

Biennial Review, 2010, 5-6.

108 Pantano personal communication with Nicolai Kryloff, 2 June 2011.

109 Quotations in Souza interview, 12; see also Reed telephone interview, 6; Kimball interview 8.

110 See, for example, Souza interview, 12-13.

111 Lehtinen, “The Myth of Everglades Restoration,” 6-7.

112 Steve Terry, Truman Eugene Duncan, Jr., Rory Feeny, Colonel 

(Ret’d) Terry L. Rice, and Ronald D. Jones memorandum to Chairman Colley Billie, 11 January 2011 (documents pertaining to water quality litigation 

in possession of authors). 

113 Lehtinen, “The Myth of Everglades Restoration,” 6-7.

114 Terry et al. memorandum to Chairman Colley Billie, 11 January 

2011 (documents pertaining to water quality litigation in possession of authors).

115 Pantano personal communication with Nicolai Kryloff, 2 June 2011.

116 Lehtinen, “The Myth of Everglades Restoration,” 4.

117 Quotations in Kimball interview, 20, 34; see also Pantano interview, 

20-23; Sean Smith telephone interview by Joshua Pollarine, 24 February 

2011, transcript, 36.

118 Quotations in Pantano interview, 28-30; see also Taplin interview, 

10-12; Smith interview, 30-31; Ammon interview, 29-32.

119 Kinard interview, 9. Paul Souza agreed with Kinard, stating that “the 

best way to deal with invasive species is to keep them from becoming problems in the first place.” Souza interview, 28. Dan Kimball lauded the work 

that the Corps had done on invasive species, saying that it was “the first time 

I’ve really seen them focused on it as part of CERP.” Kimball interview, 24.

120 Souza interview, 22-23.

121 Johnson II interview, 22-23.

122 Appelbaum II interview, 28-29.

123 Wehle interview, 21.

124 Pantano personal communication with Nicolai Kryloff, 2 June 2011.

125 Pantano personal communication with Nicolai Kryloff, 2 June 2011.

126 Pantano interview, 15.

127 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Kissimmee River Restoration Progress: Facts & Information (Jacksonville, Fla.: U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, 2010), 1.

128 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Kissimmee 

River Restoration Progress, 1.

129 Paul Klinkenberg, “Regarding a River’s Reincarnation,” St. Petersburg Times, 25 January 2009.

130 Appelbaum II interview, 22-23.

131 Souza interview, 35.

132 “Department of Interior Vision and Strategic Plan for Achieving Everglades Restoration,” 24 September 2010, 1.

133 Pantano personal communication with Nicolai Kryloff, 2 June 2011.

134 As quoted in Curtis Morgan, “Critics Fear Everglades Projects Won’t 

Escape Budget Ax,” The Miami Herald, 4 June 2011.

135 Quotation in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida and Friends of 

the Everglades v. United States of America, Case No. 04-21448-CIV-GOLD, 

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Omnibus Order, 26 

April 2011, 38.

136 Douglas, The Everglades, 385.

137 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Overview: Central and Southern 

Florida Project Comprehensive Review Study, October 1998,” 6.
Acknowledgments 315

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to acknowledge the gracious help and support of several individuals in the preparation of this history. Martin Reuss, one of the most noted scholars of water history in the 

United States, served as the original technical advisor on this project and provided helpful direction and comments throughout the 

process. He also opened research and interview doors, and was a 

good sounding board for our ideas about the direction of the history. 

When Marty retired, Matthew Pearcy became the technical advisor 

and provided valuable help and encouragement. Daniel Hayes, formerly with the Jacksonville District’s West Palm Beach office, also 

provided valuable assistance in making contacts with individuals 

and in facilitating the research process. We are grateful for their help.

In the course of preparing this history, the authors and their research team made several trips to Florida, consulting numerous repositories, including records of the Jacksonville District, U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers; the South Florida Water Management District; 

the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; Everglades National Park; Florida 

Keys National Marine Sanctuary; and the Florida State Archives. 

They also consulted manuscript collections at the University of Florida, Florida State University, and the University of Miami, including 

those of Arthur Marshall, Marjory Stoneman Douglas, and Spessard Holland. The authors researched in National Archives records 

for the Corps, the National Park Service, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 

Service, and the Environmental Protection Agency. In addition, the 

authors used transcripts of additional interviews done by the Samuel 

Proctor Oral History Program at the University of Florida.

Several individuals were instrumental to this research effort, including Colonel Alfred Pantano, Oriana Armstrong, James Vearil, 

and Jean Pavlov of the Jacksonville District; Lori Ojala, Earl Johnson, and Ann Gangitano of the South Florida Water Management 

District; Joseph Carroll of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; Nancy 

Russell of Everglades National Park and the NPS’s staff at the South 

Florida Natural Resources Center; Billy Causey of the Florida Keys 

National Marine Sanctuary; Julian Pleasants, director of the Samuel 

Proctor Oral History Program; and Andre Wilkerson of the Federal 

Records Center in Atlanta, Georgia.

In addition to documentary research, we conducted more than 

fifty oral history interviews. We thank those who took time out of 

their busy schedules to speak with us: Kenneth Ammon, Stuart Appelbaum, General Joe Ballard, Ernie Barnett, Frank Bernardino, 

Richard Bonner, John Brady, Kim Brooks-Hall, Joseph Browder, 

Eric Bush, Billy Causey, Michael Collins, Wesley Bowman “Bo” 

Crum, Michael Davis, Gene Duncan, Dennis Duke, Lester Edelman, 

Shannon Estenoz, Michael Finley, Susan Gray, Daniel Hayes, Eric 

Hughes, Robert Johnson, Haynes Johnson, Drew Kendall, Dan Kimball, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Kinard, William Leary, Joette Lorion, Thomas Lovejoy, John “Jack” Maloy, Barbara Miedema, Gerald 

Miller, Brooks Moore, Colonel Alfred Pantano, Garth Redfield, Nathaniel Reed, Colonel Terrence Rice, Karsten and Carol Rist, Colonel 

Terrence “Rock” Salt, W. Ray Scott, Deborah Scerno, David Sikkema, 

Paul Souza, Randy Smith, Rick Smith, Sean Smith, Kimberley Taplin, Tom Teets, Thomas Van Lent, James Vearil, Herschel Vinyard, 

George Wedgworth, Carol Wehle, General Arthur Williams, and 

Theresa Woody. Nanciann Regalado of the Jacksonville District’s 

Public Relations Office and Oriana Armstrong, Jacksonville District 

Librarian & Regional Knowledge Coordinator, facilitated many of 

our interviews with District personnel, and Carol and Karsten Rist 

provided us with a list of Everglades Coalition members.

Many individuals also provided us with copies of documents 

from their own research files, including Joseph Browder, Terrence 

Rice, Joette Lorion, and James Vearil. We thank them for their assistance in gathering information. Thanks also to Susan Bennett, Olga 

Cruz, Patrick Lynch, and Randy Smith of the South Florida Water 

Management District for their assistance in sharing digital photographs and other indispensible visual elements.

Several reviewers commented on the draft manuscript and 

provided invaluable suggestions. We would especially like to thank 

Lisa Mighetto, Martin Reuss, James Vearil, Susan Sylvester, Matthew 

Pearcy, Steven Robinson, and Kent Sieg for their comments. Within 

HRA, David Strohmaier, Nicolai Kryloff, and Joshua Pollarine provided both helpful reviews and invaluable research assistance. Despite their help, however, the conclusions and assessments in this 

report remain the sole responsibility of the authors.
316 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Manuscripts

Administrative Records of the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Florida Keys National 

Marine Sanctuary Headquarters, Marathon, Florida.

Administrative Records of the Jacksonville District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Jacksonville District, Jacksonville, Florida.

Administrative Records of the South Florida Natural Resources Center, National Park Service. Homestead, Florida.

Administrative Records of the South Florida Water Management District. 

West Palm Beach, Florida.

Administrative Records of the Vero Beach Office, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Vero Beach Office. Vero Beach, Florida.

B i b liogr a phy

The research for this book encompassed several different sources. Of 

most significance were manuscript collections in a variety of repositories. Especially important were the records of the South Florida 

Water Management District, located in the district’s headquarters in 

West Palm Beach, Florida. These records not only detail SFWMD 

management of water in South Florida, but also contain information 

about other interested parties in the state, including the Seminole 

and Miccosukee Indians, county and city governments, and federal 

agencies. In a similar way, the records of the Jacksonville District of 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, both in Jacksonville and in the 

Federal Records Center in Atlanta, Georgia, contain an abundance 

of information on not only the C&SF Project and CERP, but on different perspectives of other agencies and the general public. With 

the increased trend of digital documentation in more recent years, 

inter-agency documents accessed via the world wide web proved 

invaluable to researching the recent history discussed in this work. 

Public access to this digital record, as well as access provided by the 

Army Corps to the Jacksonville District’s digital archive, allowed the 

authors to review material not available in hard copy.

The authors also researched in the files of Everglades National 

Park, the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary (which provided 

many documents on the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task 

Force and Florida Bay problems), the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 

and the Office of History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Other valuable sources included records of the National Park Service in the National Archives and various governors’ papers in the Florida State 

Archives (which also houses an extensive photograph collection). 

Supplementing these record collections were perusals of private 

manuscript collections at various Florida universities, including the 

papers of Spessard Holland, Claude Pepper, Bob Graham, Arthur 

Marshall, and Marjory Stoneman Douglas, among others.

In order to gain more insight into the environmental perspective, the authors used publications from several national periodicals, including National Parks Magazine, Audubon, Time, Newsweek, 

Reader’s Digest, U.S. News & World Report, and Sports Illustrated. 

Scientific information was mainly gleaned from reports and publications in the libraries of the SFWMD and the Jacksonville District, 

although periodicals such as Science and Engineering News-Record

were helpful as well.

A host of books also exist on South Florida water management. 

Particularly insightful were Nelson Manfred Blake’s Land Into Water—Water Into Land, David McCally’s The Everglades: An Environmental History, Michael Grunwald’s The Swamp, and Ted Levin’s 

Liquid Land: A Journey Through the Florida Everglades. All of these 

sources provide a good overview of the problems that the Everglades 

have faced historically, as well as some of the proposed solutions.

Particularly important to this project were numerous oral histories, which provided first-hand accounts of many of the issues discussed. The authors and their research team performed more fifty 

oral histories themselves, but also relied heavily on interviews conducted by the Samuel Proctor Oral History Program at the University of Florida. Also important were oral histories conducted with District Engineers of the Jacksonville District, available in that agency’s 

library. These not only provided useful insights, but also added some 

rhetorical flair to the manuscript.

A complete bibliography of sources used and consulted follows.

Arthur R. Marshall Papers. Manuscript Series 73. Special and Area Studies 

Collections, George A. Smathers Library (East), University of Florida, 

Gainesville, Florida.

Central Records of Everglades National Park. Everglades National Park Archives, Everglades National Park, Homestead, Florida.

Claude Pepper Collection. Claude Pepper Library, Florida State University, 

Tallahassee, Florida.

D. Robert “Bob” Graham Papers. Manuscript Series 148. Special and Area 

Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Library (East), University of 

Florida, Gainesville, Florida.
Bibliography 317

Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. Surface Water 

Improvement and Management Plan Files. Series 1497. Florida State 

Archives, Tallahassee, Florida.

Florida Executive Office of the Governor. Brian Ballard, Director of Operations, Subject Files, 1988. Series 1331. Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Florida.

Florida Executive Office of the Governor. Press Secretary Subject Files 1979-

86. Series 172. Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Florida.

Florida Executive Office of the Governor. Subject Files, 1987-1988. Series 

1401. Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Florida.

Florida Executive Office of the Governor. Subject Files, 1991-1996. Series 

1824. Florida State Archives, Tallahasseee, Florida.

Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission. Everglades Conservation Files, 1958-1982. Series 1719. Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, 

Florida.

Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission. Lake and Stream Restoration Project Files, 1950-1986. Series 1570. Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Florida.

Florida Governor’s Office. Jay Landers Subject Files. Series 949. Florida State 

Archives, Tallahassee, Florida.

Florida State Board of Conservation. Water Resources Subject Files, 1961-

1968. Series 1160. Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Florida.

Florida State Land Records. State Lands Records Vault, Division of State 

Lands, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Marjory 

Stoneman Douglas Building, Tallahassee, Florida.

John Henry Davis Papers. Manuscript Series 23. Special and Area Studies 

Collections, George A. Smathers Library (East), University of Florida, 

Gainesville, Florida.

Marjory Stoneman Douglas Papers. Manuscript Collection 60. Archives and 

Special Collections, Otto G. Richter Library, University of Miami, Miami, Florida.

Records of the Environmental Protection Agency. Record Group 412. National Archives and Records Administration Southeast Region, Atlanta, 

Georgia.

Records of Everglades National Park. Documents provided by Alice Clarke. 

Homestead, Florida.

Records of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Record Group 22. National Archives and Records Administration Southeast Region, Atlanta, Georgia.

Records of the National Park Service. Record Group 79. National Archives 

and Records Administration II, College Park, Maryland.

Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers. Record Group 77. Federal 

Records Center, Atlanta, Georgia. 

Records of the Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

Alexandria, Virginia.

Robert N. “Bert” Dosh Papers. Manuscript Series 25. Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Library (East), University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida.

Spessard L. Holland Papers. Manuscript Series 55. Special and Area Studies 

Collections, George A. Smathers Library (East), University of Florida, 

Gainesville, Florida.

Trustees Correspondence. State Lands Records Vault, Division of State Lands, 

Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Marjory Stoneman 

Douglas Building, Tallahassee, Florida.

Water Quality Litigation Documents. In possession of authors.

Interviews

Adams, Colonel James W. R. Interview by George E. Buker. 18 November 

1981. Transcript in Library, Jacksonville District, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, Jacksonville, Florida.

Ammon, Ken. Interview by Joshua Pollarine. 4 March 2011.

Appelbaum, Stuart. Interview by Brian Gridley. 22 February 2002. Everglades 

Interview No. 11. Samuel Proctor Oral History Program, University of 

Florida, Gainesville, Florida.

________. Interview by Joshua Pollarine. 27 September 2010.

________. Interview by Theodore Catton. 7 July 2004.

Ballard, General Joe. Interview by Theodore Catton. 18 November 2004.

Barnett, Ernest “Ernie.” Interview by Matthew Godfrey. 23 September 2004.

Bonner, Richard. Interview by Theodore Catton. 13 May 2005.

Brady, John D. Interview by Theodore Catton. 12 May 2005.

Brooks-Hall, Kimberly. Interview by Theodore Catton. 7 July 2004.

Browder, Joseph. Interview by Theodore Catton. 17 November 2004.

Causey, Billy. Interview by Theodore Catton. 20 January 2005.

Collins, Michael. Interview by Theodore Catton. 13 July 2004.

Davis, Michael. Interview by Theodore Catton. 21 December 2004.

Devereaux, Colonel Alfred B. Interview by George E. Buker. 23 April 1984. 

Transcript in Library, Jacksonville District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, Florida.

Duke, Dennis. Interview by Joshua Pollarine. 29 September 2010.

Edelman, Les. Interview by Theodore Catton. 17 November 2004.

Ehrlichman, John D. “Presidential Assistant with a Bias for Parks.” An oral 

history conducted in 1991 by William Duddleson. In Saving Point Reyes 

National Seashore, 1969-1970: An Oral History of Citizen Action in Conservation. Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1993.

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Act of 30 May 1934 (48 Stat. 816).

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Act of 30 June 1948 (62 Stat. 1171).

Act of 10 October 1949 (63 Stat. 733).

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Act of 13 August 1968 (82 Stat. 731).

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Act of 11 October 1974 (88 Stat. 1258).

Act of 30 November 1983 (97 Stat. 1153).

Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1984 (97 Stat. 1153).

Act of 17 November 1986 (100 Stat. 4082).

Seminole Indian Land Claims Settlement Act of 1987 (101 Stat. 1556).

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Act of 18 November 1988 (102 Stat. 4571).

Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act of 1989 (103 Stat. 

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Water Resources Development Act of 1990 (104 Stat. 4604).

Water Resources Development Act of 1992 (106 Stat. 4797).

Act of 9 March 1994 (108 Stat. 98).

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (109 Stat. 48).

Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 888).

Water Resources Development Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 3658).

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Water Resources Development Act of 2000 (114 Stat. 2572).

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Fisheries Society, 1997.

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330 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Biogr a phic a l I nform a tion

Matthew C. Godfrey is an associate historian with Historical Research Associates, Inc. He received a Ph.D. in American and Public 

History from Washington State University, and has completed several research projects and reports on water issues in the United States, 

including a study of the St. Paul District of the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers, co-authored with Theodore Catton. He has published 

articles and book reviews in Agricultural History, Pacific Northwest 

Quarterly, Utah Historical Quarterly, Western Historical Quarterly, 

and Columbia: The Magazine of the Pacific Northwest. He has a book 

forthcoming from Utah State University Press on the beet sugar industry in the Intermountain West.

Theodore Catton is an environmental historian based in Missoula, Montana.  In his 15 years with Historical Research Associates, 

he specialized in the conservation mandates and history of various 

federal land management agencies including the Corps of Engineers, 

National Park Service, USDA Forest Service, and Bureau of Indian 

Affairs.  His publications include Inhabited Wilderness: Indians, Eskimos, and National Parks in Alaska, and National Park, City Playground: Mount Rainier in the Twentieth Century.
Index 331

INDEX

8.5 Square Mile Area, 175, 259–260

380 Committee. see Everglades National Park/East Everglades Committee

A

A-1 reservoir, 302, 303, 304–305

Acceler8 program, 297–298, 298

Adams, Eustace L., 28

Adams, James W.R., 177

Adams, Tom, 274, 277

Adaptive Assessment Program, 274

adaptive management

described, 248–249

use in CERP, 270

Aerojet Canal, 56

agriculture, 160, 296. see also sugar cane industry

beginnings, with early drainage, 5

development after canal construction, 7

extent of, 22

first consideration of, 3

growth, 113

pressure to resist new paradigm, 22

Aguilera, Ibel, 260

airports

Everglades Jetport, 74–81

Homestead redevelopment, 269–270

Site 14 development, 118–119

Albright, Horace, 10

algae blooms, 151, 204

Allen, Thomas J., 40–42

Alligator Alley, 161, 162

alligators, 54, 79

Allin, Roger W., 55

Allison, R.V., 19–20

Alternative 6D, 296

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 303–304

Ammon, Ken, 298, 305

analysis, 143

Anthony, David S., 100

Appelbaum, Stuart, 208, 242, 250, 271, 308

aquifer storage and recovery, 272, 305–306

Arizona-Florida Land Exchange Act, 167

Arthur R. Marshall Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge. see Water 

Conservation Area No. 1

Askew, Reubin, 94, 95, 288

Atlantis Scientific, 100

Aumen, Nicholas, 241

B

Babbitt, Bruce, 202, 205, 206, 279

backpumping, 101, 105, 145–146

Baker, William C., 279

Ballard, Joe, 276

Barley, George, 204–205, 221

Barley, Mary, 223–224, 260

Barnett, Ernest “Ernie,” 168

barn upgrading, 150

Barron Collier Company, 162, 165

Baucus, Max, 278

Beard, Daniel, 12, 40

Belle Glade, 8

Best Management Practices (BMPs), 150

Bestor, H.A., 20

Bible, Alan O., 82, 84

Big Cypress Area Management Task Force, 160–161

Big Cypress Conservation Act of 1973, 84

Big Cypress National Preserve, 83, 164, 168

Big Cypress Seminole reservation

water quality, 232

Big Cypress Swamp, 160–162

area map, 81

Everglades Jetport, 74–81

preservation efforts, 81–85

Big Sugar. see sugar cane industry

Billie, James E., 163

Biscayne aquifer, 113, 118

Biscayne National Park, map, 174

Black, Crow, & Eidsness, Inc., 101

Boland, Buff, 276

Bolles, Richard J., 6

Bowen, Kent, 131

Brighton Seminole reservation, 232

Broward, Napoleon Bonaparte, 6, 6

Browder, Joseph B., 70, 76, 205, 216, 221, 261, 277

Browner, Carol, 195, 202

Brundtland Commission, 213

budgeting, 115–116, 117–118

Buffalo Tiger, 229

Buker, Robert, 215

Burghard, August, 13

Bush, George H., 186, 242, 279

Bush, John Ellis “Jeb,” 269

C

C-36, 247

C-37, 247

C-38, 133
332 United States Army Corps of Engineers

conversion to Kissimmee River, 308

creation, 97

demonstration project in, 240, 242

test fill project, 247–250

C-111, 56, 56, 260, 297

modification projects, 257–262

water level in Frog Pond, 184

Caldwell, Millard, 33

Caloosahatchee River, 98, 256

Calusa people, 1

Cammerer, Arno, 10

Cape Sable seaside sparrow, 258–259, 299

Carr, Marjorie, 72, 72

Carson, Rachel, 70

Carter, Russell, 175

cattails, 192, 197

Causey, Billy, 206

Central & Southern Florida (CS&F) Flood Control Project

boundaries, 34

creation, 19

features, 36

funding, 35, 39

historical background, 1

initial costs, 27

modifications, 57

project status, 1953, 39

project status, 1955, 40

relative successes and failures, 285–286

summary, 285

unique aspects, 287

water delivery mandate, 49

Chiles, Lawton M. Jr., 162, 194, 194, 219, 244, 259

Choate, Michael L., 261

citrus crops, 22, 137

Clark, R.L., 230

Clarke, F.J., 58

Clean Water Action, 216

climate, described, xi

Clinton, Bill, 201–202, 202, 278

Coe, Ernest, 10, 13

Coffey, John B., 246

Coleman, Richard, 139

Collier Enterprises, 162, 165

Collins, Michael, 203–204

Committee on Scientific Review of Everglades Restoration Progress, 306

Commoner, Barry, 70

Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP)

authorization, 267, 279

coalition fragility, 308

implementation regulations, 294

map, 277

Master Agreement, 295

momentum slowing, 293

political cartoon, 279

predictions of demise, 299–300

signing ceremony, 295

Comprehensive Planning Act, 95

Congressional hearings, 28

Conservation 70s, 95

Conservation and Recreation Lands Program (CARL), 159

Conservation Area No. 1, 43

Conservation Area No. 2, 43

conservation areas, 26

conservation movement, 6

Coordinating Council of the Restoration of the Kissimee River Valley and 

the Taylor Creek-Nubbin Slough Basin, 102, 103–104, 130–131

Council on Environmental Quality, 73

Craig, A.H. “Gus,” 102

Crist, Charlie, 299–300

Cross-Florida Barge Canal, 71–74

map, 71

political cartoon, 74

Crumpton, Charles L., 180

Cubans, 50

Curran, Charles D., 39

Cypress, Billy, 216

D

D13R1-4 plan, 273

D13R1 Plan, 274

Dade County, 113

urban-agricultural proximity, 288

urbanization, 119

Dade County Farm Bureau, 258

Dade County Port Authority, 75, 77

Dail, G.E. Jr., 62

dairy operations, 129–131, 150–151

Darcy, Jo-Ellen, 304

data modeling, Kissimee River restoration, 241–242

Davis, Edward B., 235

Davis, Michael, 268, 272, 275, 276, 285

Davis, Steven M., 270

Dawson, Robert, 277

decompartmentalization, 299

deer, 54, 55, 92, 114

DeGrove, John, 121

Demaray, A.E., 12–13

Department of the Interior, evaluation of C&SF plan, 27–28

Devereaux, Alfred, 132, 136, 180

Dickey, G. Edward “Ed,” 207

Disney World, 91

Disston, Hamilton, 3, 5, 5

Dole, Robert, 223

Dooris, Patricia, 160

Dorn, Nancy P., 245

Douglas, Marjory Stoneman, 21, 77–78, 78

The Everglades: River of Grass, 20

drainage patterns

described, xi–xii

historical, xi, xi

Drane, Herbert, 8

drilling rights, 12–13, 162

drinking water, saltwater intrusion, 13, 20

drought, 51

early indications, 10

effect on public perception, 119

effects, 10
Index 333

Duke, Dennis, 294

Duncan, Truman E. “Gene” Jr., 209, 233

E

EAA

drainage map, 220

vegetable farming, 296

vegetable harvesting, 160

Eadie, John R., 93

Earl, William, 179

East Everglades, 173, 174

Ecoimpact, Inc., 101

ecological integrity, defined, 203

ecology, 70. see also systems ecology

ecosystem, rapid recovery potential, 308

ecosystem management, 202–203

Ehrlich, Paul, 70

Ehrlichman, John, 74

Ellender, Allen J., 60

El Niño, 177–178

emergency measures, 179–180

ENFO, 103, 103

environment, early damage to, 10

Environmental Advisory Board, 289

Environmental Defense Fund, 73

environmental impact statements, 70

environmentalism, 69–70

development in South Florida, 9

rise in influence, 287

and Statement of Principles, 215

Environmentally Endangered Lands Bond Issue, 159

Environmental Quality Committee, 152–153

Estenoz, Shannon, 298, 303

eutrophication, 100, 147

of Lake Okeechobee, 98

Evergades: The Ecosystem and Its Restoration, 270

Everglades

eastern area map, 174

historical character, xii–xiii

hydrological units, 20

images, 286

land patent issued for, 6

prospects/pre-statehood, 1–2

southern area, 123

Everglades Agricultural Area (EAA), 285

establishment, 35

Everglades and Land Sales Company report, 7

Everglades Coalition, 77, 205, 216, 247

Everglades Construction Project, 221

Everglades Drainage District, 6–8, 21

Everglades Engineering Board of Review, 7

Everglades Forever Act, 220–221

Everglades Jetport, 74–81

Leopold Report, 79

map, 76

political cartoon, 77

Everglades National Park, 41

1944 boundaries, 12

1989 additions, 186

establishment, 10–11, 13

images, 60, 61

land acquisition, 11–12, 13, 185–186

map, 42

water need estimates, 42–43, 57–62

water supply guarantees, 57–60, 62

Everglades National Park/East Everglades Committee, 181, 183

Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act of 1989, 173, 

186–187, 257

Everglades Natural Resources Coordinating Committee, 55

Everglades Nutrient Removal Project, 217

Everglades Wildlife Management Committee, 114

F

Fairbanks, Nelson, 215

Fairchild, David, 10

Fakahatchee Strand, 161, 161, 162

Fanjul, Alfonso, 215, 219, 223

fauna. see wildlife

Federal Advisory Committee Act, 267

“Federal Objectives for South Florida Restoration,” 209–210

Finley, Michael, 183–184, 191–192, 261

fire

as consequence of drainage, 13, 40, 94

soil subsidence, 22

Flagler, Henry L., 5

Fletcher, Duncan U., 9

Flint, Myles, 196

Flood Control Act of 1954, 39

Flood Control District (FCD), 33

flooding

after 1926 hurricane, 7

in East Everglades, 180

El Niño, 177–178

hurricanes of 1947, 22–23

flora

detrimental effects from drainage, 9

environmental damage to, 12–13

Florida Bay, 204, 222, 297, 301

disturbances in, 203–204

interagency plan, 221–222

Florida Coast Line and Transportation Company, 5

Florida Crystals, Inc., 219

Florida Defenders of the Environment, 73

Florida East Coast Railroad, 5

Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act, 95

Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972, 84

Florida Game and Fresh Water Commission, 256

Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary Advisory Council, 222

Florida Keys Water Quality Protection Program, 274

Florida Lake Management Society, 256

Florida panther, 160, 162, 163, 165

Florida Panther National Wildlife Refuge, 168

flowage rights, 37

Frampton, George, 207, 222

Friends of the Everglades, 78

Frog Pond agricultural area, 174, 185
334 United States Army Corps of Engineers

acquisition of, 257–258

map, 258

water management in, 184

Frye, O. Earle Jr., 55, 56, 75, 99

G

Gannon, Patrick, 129

gate structures, 177

S-333, 182

General Design Memorandum, 186

General Reevaluation Report, 257

Gianelli, William R., 117, 117–118

Gibbs, William W., 79

Golden Gate Estates, 82

Gore, Albert Jr., 202, 202, 223, 268

Gorsuch, Ann, 117

Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South Florida, 219, 222–223, 271

Governor’s Conference on Water Management in South Florida, 98

Graf, William L., 303

Graham, Bob, 111, 112, 112, 278, 279, 288

Great River Environmental Action Team (GREAT), 206

Growth management Act, 121–122

Grumbine, R. Edward, 203

Gulf American Land Corporation, 82

H

Haley, James, 84

Hall, Doug, 207

Hankinson, John, 234, 276

Hartzog, George Jr., 58, 60

Hatch, Henry, 242

Hayes, T.J., 57

Headwaters Revitalization Project, 243

Headwaters Revitalization Project 1135 Study Interagency Team, 247

Heiberg, E.R. III, 138

Hendrix, Gary, 178

Hendry County. see Modified Hendry County Plan

Herrera, Carlos, 269

Hevener, Michael, 179

Hickel, Walter, 78

Hills, George B., 7, 9

Hillsboro ASR pilot project, 306

Hodges, Randolph, 55

Hole, Stanley, 132

Holey Land Tract, 100–102, 149, 215

Holland, Spessard, 23, 23, 38, 39

Holling, Buzz, 248

Homer, Porter, 57

Homestead Air Force Base, 269, 269–270

Hoover Dike, 9, 9

Horn, William P., 165, 167

House Document 369, 58

House Document 643, 27

Humble, James, 165

Humble Oil and Refining Company, 12

hurricanes. see also tropical storms

of 1920’s, damage area, 8

1926 damage, 7

1947, damage from, 22, 22–23, 28

Alma, 55

Andrew, 269

Betsy, 54

Frances, 285

Katrina, 295

Hyde, B.F. Jr., 44

hydroperiod, defined, 173

I

implementation reports, 294

Indian River Lagoon, 257, 301

Indian River Lagoon-South project, 300–301

Ingraham, James, 10

inholdings, 161, 163

Interagency Working Group, 206–207, 209

interbasin transfers, 119–120

Interim Action Plan, 148–149

Internal Improvement Fund (IIF), 3, 5

invasive species management, 307–308

Itschner, E.C., 45

Ives, J.C., 3

Ives map, 4

J

Jackson, Henry, 82

Jacksonville District (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers)

1947 proposal, map, 24

areas of responsibility, ix, x

no-participation decision, 137–138

water control plan development, 25

Jadwin, Edgar, 8–9

Jennings, William S., 6

jetport. see Everglades Jetport

Johnsen, Harvey M., 74

Johnson, Lamar, 21–22, 33, 42

Jones, John (Johnny), 83, 99, 102, 111–112, 129, 149

Jones, Paul Tudor, 223–224

Jones, Ron, 192

Jordan, Robert, 58

Judy, Richard, 79

K

Kehoe, James W., 175

Kelly, Robert I., 162

Kendall v. Marsh, 181

Key Largo symposium, 270

Kimball, Dan, 304–305

Kimball, Thomas, 84

Kirk, Claude R. Jr., 70, 71, 72

Kissimmee-Okeechobee Basin, map, 99

Kissimmee River

channelization, 97–98, 245

before channelization, 97

images, 102, 128, 138
Index 335

initial recommendations, 26

model, 241

original state, 97

oxbow, 250

restoration, 309

South plug, 249

Upper Basin headwater lakes, 243

Kissimmee River basin

intial investigations, 38

original ecological communities, 239–241

water quality in, 93

Kissimmee River Demonstration Project, 131, 134, 240

project area, 135

Kissimmee River-Lake Okeechobee-Everglades Coordinating Council, 134

Kissimmee River Resource Planning and Management Committee, 136–

137

Kissimmee River restoration

Coordinating Council plan, 131–132

Corps report, 133–136

data modeling, 241–242

financing for, 242

justification for, 239

Level II Backfilling Plan, 242–246

political opposition to, 239

rapidity of recovery, 240

recommendations, 98–99

as sign of progress, 308

study project, 127

Kissimmee River Restoration Phase 1, 132, 134

Kissimmee River Restoration Symposium, 240–241

Klinkenberg, Jeff, 308

Koperski, Joe J., 56

Kratzer, Charles R., 148

Kushlan, Jim, 178

L

L-28, 37, 181

L-29, 49, 52, 52, 53

L-31W, 174, 259

L-67, 55, 181

L-67 Borrow Canal, 54

Lake Kissimmee

Kissimme River junction, 246

water level adjustment, 247

Lake Okeechobee

algae bloom, 151

Corps map, 144

images, 119

levels to achieve flood control, 7

low water level, 145

modeling study, 147

nutrient overload, 91, 98

regulation difficulties, 255–257

remediation focus, 143

restoration recommendations, 98–99

S-135 pump station and lock, 146

water levels, 144–145, 255–256

watershed regions, 147

Lake Okeechobee Littoral Zone Technical Group, 255–256

Lake Okeechobee Technical Advisory Committee, 145–146

Lake Okeechobee Technical Advisory Committee (LOTAC), 151–153

“Lake Okeechobee Water Quality Studies and Eutrophication Assessment,” 

147

Lamonds, Andrew, 99

Lancaster, H. Martin, 224

land acquisition, 185

funding for, 159, 168

for Water Conservation Districts, 37

Land Acquisition Trust Fund, 159

Land Conservation Act, 95

land swaps, 165, 167–168, 302

land takings, 230–231

land use permits, 234

Latin Builders Association, 269

Latt Maxcy Corporation, 132

Leary, William, 276

Lee, Charles, 234, 274, 279, 303

Lee, Emmett, 99

Lehtinen, Dexter

environmental activism, 191–192

as Miccosukee attorney, 197, 235, 259, 277

Statement of Principles response, 216

Leopold, Luna, 78

Leopold Report, 79, 79–80

levees

Corps of Engineers proposal, 26

for flood control, 7–8

initial appropriations and construction, 9

Level II Backfilling Plan, 242–246

Lewis, Thomas F., 162, 180

littoral zone, 144

livestock. see also dairy operations

around Lake Okeechobee, 100

in Kissimmee River area, 130

Loftin, M. Kent, 128

logging compromise, in Pacific Northwest, 202

Lorion, Joette, 234

Lovejoy, Thomas E., 206

Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge. see Water Conservation Area No. 1

Lugar, Richard, 223

M

MacDonnell, R.G., 55

MacVicar, Thomas, 120

Maloy, John “Jack,” 96, 132, 178–179

Malson, Bruce A., 242

mangrove islands, 301

mangroves, 121

Marjorie Harris Carr Cross Florida Greenway, 74

Marjory Stoneman Douglas Everglades Protection Act, 195–196

Marshall, Arthur R., 92, 92, 93–94, 98. see also Loxahatchee National 

Wildlife Refuge

Marshall Plan, 114

Marston, Anson, 7

Martin, John W., 8

Martin, Tom, 221
336 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Martinez, Bob, 138, 152, 152, 184–185

on Lehtinen suit, 193

Mayaimi people, settlements, 1

McArthur Farms, 129, 131, 134

McCaffrey, Patrick, 103

McCrory, S.H., 7

McDonald, Robert F., 55

McGuiness, Dan, 279

melaleuca eradication, 230, 307

Miami, 112–113, 113

Miami Beach, 44, 51

Miami Canal, 54

Miami International Airport, 75

Miccosukee Reserved Area Act, 234

Miccosukee people

Everglades Forever Act response, 220–221

exclusion from Interagency Working Group meetings, 209

land use permits, 229

lawsuits filed, 235, 269, 276, 304

at legislative hearings, 84

and Lehtinen suit settlement, 197

Melaleuca tree removal efforts, 230

negotiating strategies, 288

Seminole water plan response, 233

Statement of Principles response, 216

village view, 235

water levels in 8.5 Square Mile Area, 259–260

water standards development, 233

Miedema, Barbara, 195

Miles, Riley, 134

Miller, James Nathan, 73

mineral rights, 12–13

Modified Hendry County Plan, 230–231, 231

Modified Water Deliveries Project (Mod Waters), 257

delays in, 296

Moore Haven, 7

Morehead, John M., 120, 175–176

Morgan, Arthur R., 58

Morgan, Don, 99

Morris, J.W., 74

Morse, W.H., 246

Mott, Charles Stewart, 7

Munroe, Mary Barr, 10

Myers, Charles T. III, 136, 137

N

National Environmental Policy Act, 70

national interest, expansion of, 201

national parks, beginnings of concept, 10

National Park Service

8.5 Square Mile Area position, 261

creation, 10

funding cuts under Reagan, 116

as player in water disposition, 14

response to Restudy team proposal, 273

native Americans, 1–2. see also Miccosukee people, Seminole people

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), 258, 277

Nelson, Gaylord, 60, 79

Nicodemus Slough, 40

Nixon, Richard M., 80

North New River Canal, 54

Nubbin Slough, 104, 150

nutrient overload

from agricultural runoff, 191–192

Lake Okeechobee, 91

modeling for, 147–148

O

Odum, E.P, 70

Ogden, John C., 223, 262, 270

oil, discovery in the Everglades, 12

Okeechobee Flood Control District, 8

Oklawaha River, 72–74

O’Neil, Michael, 79

Orians, Gordon, 274

Orlando, 113

P

Padrick, Robert, 75–76

Palmer, Mike, 130

Pantano, Alfred A, 299, 304, 308, v

Paradise Key, 10

Parker, Barrington, 74

Parker, Garald G., 94, 129

Parks, Benjamin G., 163, 165

Parks, Paul C., 149

Partington, William N., 73

Pearson, R.W., 40–42

penny-a-pound tax, 221, 223

Pepper, Claude, 23, 23, 38

periphyton, 192, 192

Peterson, C.H., 79

Pettigrew, Richard, 95, 219, 271, 271

phosphorous

from agricultural runoff, 191–192

in Lehtinen suit settlement, 195

levels in Everglades, 304–305

levels in Lake Okeechobee, 255

levels in Seminole water plan, 232–233

as limiting nutrient, 151

vs. nitrogen as limiting nutrient, 101

political cartoon, 219

Picayune Strand restoration project, 298, 300

Pick, Lewis A., 38–39

Pimm, Stuart, 274, 277

pine prairie, 166

plume trade, 9

poaching, 9

polishing, 102, 150

political influences, 289

election years, 223–224

Reagan administration, 114

population pressure, 44–45, 91, 112–113, 159–160

toward Everglades solution, 269

on water supply, 22
Index 337

Potter, Willam E., 91

Prairie Canal, 298

Preservation 2000, 159, 168

President’s Council on Sustainable Development, 214

Presnall, Clifford C., 13

Pritchard, Paul C., 163

project management, 250–251

Punnett, Richard, 261

python eradication, 307

R

railroads, 3

rainfall, 129

Randolph Report, 7

Rawls, Oscar, 35, 38

Reagan, Ronald, 111, 114–115, 115

Realists Opposed to Alleged Restoration (ROAR), 244, 246

Reed, Nathaniel P., 70, 71, 129, 162, 178, 180, 193, 303

reflooding, 129

Reno, Janet, 202

Report of Investigations in the Kissimee River-Lake Okeechobee Watershed,

101

residence time, 147–148

resident displacement

in 8.5 Square Mile Area, 259–260

Level II Backfilling Plan, 244

restoration, “success” definition, 293

Restoration Coordination and Verification (RECOVER) branch, 285

restoration efforts, political cartoon, 224

Restoring the Everglades, An American Legacy Act (REAL), 276–278

“Restoring the Florida Everglades Basin,” 93

Restudy

scope of, 208–209

study area, 179

Restudy team

GAO assessment of, 274

recommendations, 272

report altered, 276

Rice, Terry, 259, 268

Ring, Richard, 261

Rist, Carol, 223

rock plowing, 175

Rocky Glades, map, 174

Rodman Reservoir, 73

Rogers, Dwight L., 38

Rogers, Lyman, 95, 101

Rotenberger Tract, 101, 149, 160, 215, 230–231, 232–233

Roth, Barry, 276

Royal Palm State Park, 10

Run 22 water schedule, 256

Run 25 water schedule, 256

Rural Clean Waters Project, 150

Rushing, John, 208

S

S. 90 Act, 167

S-2, 145–146

S-3, 145–146

S-5A, 38

S-8, 55

S-9, 289

S-12C, 52, 177

S-12 gates, 52, 181, 299

S-65, 133, 247

S-135 pump station and lock, 146

S-140 pumping station, 234

S-332D, 260–261

S-333, 181, 182

Salt, Terrence “Rock,” 208, 243, 261, 268, 304

Interagency Working Group negotiations, 207–208

saltwater intrusion, 13, 19

Save Our Coasts program, 160

“Save Our Everglades” program, 122–123, 184

sawgrass, 184, 209

Schull, H.W., 38, 39

Science Subgroup, 209–210

seagrasses, 203–204

sealife, 204

Section 404 programs, 117

Section 1135, 138–139, 289

seepage management, 307

Seiberling, John F., 165, 180

Sellars, Richard West, 261

Seltzer, E. Manning, 287

Semingsen, Earl, 40

Seminole Indian Land Claims Act, 231

Seminole reservation, 11, 37

Seminole people

Big Cypress plan response, 83

conflict with Everglades land, 11

land takings, 230–231

land use permits, 229

at legislative hearings, 84

presence in South Florida, 2

Statement of Principles response, 216

Seven Point Plan, 178–179

Shark River Slough, 42, 53

and 8.5 Square Mile Area refloding, 260

area defined, 173

land draining in, 175

map, 174

wildlife habitat, 175

Shaw, Clay Jr., 201

sheet flow, 173

Shen, Hsieh Wen, 241–242

Shreve, Jack, 95

Site 1 Impoundment project, 301

Site 14, 81, 118–119

Small, John Kunkel, 10

Smathers, George A., 39

Smith, Anthony Wayne, 76

Smith, Buckingham, 3

Smith, Daniel P., 165

Smith, Fred, 83

Smith, Hanley “Bo,” 261
338 United States Army Corps of Engineers

Smith, Perry, 129

Smith, Robert C., 277

snail (Everglades) kites, 13

snowy egret, 176

Soil Conservation Service, 21, 25

Soil Science Society of Florida, 19–20

soil subsidence, 19–20

Soucie, Gary, 76

South Dade County Project, map, 59

South Dade Land Corporation, 258

Southern Everglades Technical Committee, 183

South Florida

climate, xi

early settlers, 5

satellite view, 207

South Florida ecosystem, major features, xii

South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force, 308

consensus development, 267

mission, 268

South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD)

demographics, x–xi

emergency response, 178–179

focus shift, 143

formation, 95–96

map, 218

relationship with ACOE, 247, 250

South Florida Water Management Model, 120

Southwest Dade Project, 174

Souza, Paul, 294–295

Spanish, exploration by, 2, 2

Spatial Analysis Methodology (SAM), 127–128

Special Project to Prevent the Eutrophication of Lake Okeechobee, 99–100

species diversity, in East Everglades, 175

Sports Illustrated articles, 111, 129

St. Lucie River, 98, 257

STA-1 East, 215

Stahr, Elvis, 50, 77

statehood, 3

Statement of Principles, 214–215, 216

Stephens, John C., 33

Stewart, Allen, 79

Stewart, Richard, 194

Storch, WIlliam V., 52, 54, 94, 98

stormwater treatment areas, 195, 196, 217

Sturgis, S.D. Jr., 39

sugar cane, 50, 214

Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida, 257

sugar cane industry

beginnings in South Florida, 7

Clinton administration, cooperation with, 213

Environmental Quality Committee, 152–153

extent of, 22, 49–50, 160

growth, xi

Interim Action Plan skepticism, 149

intervention in Lehtinen suit, 194

land swap deal, 276

objections to Lehtinen suit settlement, 196

penny-a-pound tax response, 221

relationship with federal government, 217

rise in influence, 287

Summerall, Charles P., 71

Surface Water Improvement and Management (SWIM) Act, 146, 153

Surface Water Improvement and Management (SWIM) plans, 153–154

Everglades, 196, 232

Lake Okeechobee, 192

sustainability, as bargaining point, 213–214

Swamp Lands Act of 1850, 3

systems ecology, 92

systems perspective, 203

T

Tabb, Robert, 57

Talisman property, 275, 275–276

Tamiami Canal, 55

Tamiami Trail, 307, 307

Task Force on Resource Management, 94–95

Taylor Creek-Nubbin Slough basin, 104, 152

nutrient remediation, 102

Taylor Creek Slough, 53, 104

area defined, 173

map, 174

Teale, Willis, 25

Tekesta people, 1

Temporary Operating Permit, 146, 148–149

terrorist attacks, 295

The Everglades: River of Grass, 20–21

Thomas, Jon, 102, 103

Thornburgh, Richard, 193

Tilden, Paul, 52

Toll, Roger, 10

Tommie, Howard, 83

Toth, Louis, 139, 239–241, 240, 247

tropical storm Dennis, 175. see also hurricanes

Tropic Everglades National Park Association, 10

Tschinkel, Victoria J., 121

turtle grass, 204

Twachtmann, Dale, 152

U

Udall, Stewart L., 50

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 267

United Property Owners & Friends of the 8.5 Square Mile Area, Inc., 

260–261

United States v. South Florida Water Management District and Florida 

Department of Regulation, et al.

characteristics and negotiations, 192–195

settlement, 195–198

Upper Kissimee Basin, flood control modification, 243

Upper Mississippi River Basin Coordinating Committee, 206

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

“build first” approach reconsidered, 289

first efforts in Everglades, 8–9

increasing environmental awareness, 288

planning processes, 294–295

as player in water disposition, 19
Index 339

relationship with SFWMD, 194, 298

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 304

focus during Reagan administration, 117

Miccosukee water standards approval, 234

stormwater management, 217, 219

U.S. Sugar, 302 V

Van Antwerp, Robert, 302

Van Lent, Thomas, 295, 299

Vearil, James, 262

Vento, Bruce, 167

Vernon, Robert O., 82

Vida Verde, 232–233

Vollenweider model, 148, 149

Volpe, John, 78 W

Walker, Dale, 99–100

Wallis, W. Turner, 33, 45

Walters, Carl, 248

Warne, William, 27

Warren, Fuller, 38, 82

Water Conservation Area No. 1, 35, 37, 43, 92–93, 305

Water Conservation Area No. 2, 35, 43

Water Conservation Area No. 2B, 300

Water Conservation Area No. 3, 35, 37, 92, 232

Water Conservation Area No. 3A, 231

Water Conservation Areas, 196

water delivery schedules

for East Everglades, 176

field testing, 182

water flow, C&SF success, 285

water flow patterns, over time, 273

Water Management Bulletin, 94

water management district boundaries, 96

Water Management Lands Trust Fund, 160

water quality

analysis technique improvement, 143

degradation under CERP, 304

early assessment efforts, 93

in Florida Bay, 203–205

on Seminole reservations, 232

Seminole vs. Miccosukee standards, 234

setbacks in, 296–297

and Seven Point Plan, 183

SFWMD’s new focus, 143

water quality studies, 193

Water Resources Act of 1972, 95

Water Resources Development Act of 1986, 117–118, 138

Water Resources Development Act of 1990, 242

Water Resources Development Act of 1992, 246, 247

Water Resources Development Act of 1996, 224–226, 267

Water Resources Development Act of 2000, 279, 293

Water Resources Development Act of 2007, 299–300

water schedules, 144–145, 256

water supply study, 119–121

water use, priority setting, 299

Watt, James G., 116, 116

Webb, James “Jim,” 205, 217

“Weeping Cow” book, 28, 28

Wehle, Carol, 304

weirs, 132

Westcott, John, 5

Westphal, Joseph, 268, 268, 276

Wetland Protection Act, 121

Wheeler, R.A., 27

Whitaker, John C., 73

White, Carol, 178–179

white ibis, 11

Whitfield, Estus, 112, 132, 134, 198

Whitston, Allen, 130

Wilbur, Ray Lyman, 10

wildlife

declines in, 160

detrimental effects from drainage, 9

environmental damage to, 12–13

Kissimmee River restoration, 248

management strategies, 93

preservation, as priority in C&SF project, 286

Shark River Slough habitat, 175

snowy egret, 176

Wiley, H.W., 5

Willamson, Frank Jr., 233–234

Williams, James H., 101

Williams, Vince, 129

Wilson, Paul, 130, 131

Wilson, W.K. Jr., 38

Wilson Ornithological Society, 246

Wisdom, Donald A., 74, 102, 103

Wise, Ronald, 56

Wodraska, John R. “Woody,” 134, 153, 184

Wood, Roy, 37

Woody, Theresa, 247

Wright Report, 7 Y

Yates, Sidney R., 167

Young, Mason J., 26 Z

zoning restrictions, 175, 181