United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION 

TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

SHOPPERSCHOICE.COM, LLC,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________

2019-2087

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Florida in Nos. 9:16-cv-81669-KAM, 

9:16-cv-81677-KAM, Senior Judge Kenneth A. Marra.

______________________

Decided: July 1, 2020

______________________

ARTOUSH OHANIAN, OhanianIP, Austin, TX, argued for 

plaintiff-appellee. 

 DAVID K. FRIEDLAND, Friedland Vining, PA, Miami, FL, 

argued for defendant-appellant. Also represented by 

JAMES STEPAN, Law Offices of James A. Stepan, P.A., Hollywood, FL. 

 ______________________

Before PROST, Chief Judge, DYK and WALLACH, Circuit 

Judges.

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2 ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION v. SHOPPERSCHOICE.COM, LLC

WALLACH, Circuit Judge.

Appellant ShoppersChoice.com, LLC (“ShoppersChoice”) appeals the denial of attorney fees by the U.S. 

District Court for the Southern District of Florida (“District 

Court”) pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285, following a judgment 

invalidating independent claim 11 of Appellee Electronic 

Communication Technologies, LLC’s (“ECT”) U.S. Patent 

No. 9,373,261 (“the ’261 patent”) as patent ineligible under 

35 U.S.C. § 101. J.A. 1626–28 (Attorney Fee Order); see

J.A. 1629 (Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration of 

Denial of Attorney Fees); see also J.A. 1–17 (Motion to Dismiss Judgment), 18–34 (Judgment on the Pleadings).1 We 

have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). We 

vacate and remand. 

BACKGROUND

This case arises from ECT’s allegation that ShoppersChoice infringed claim 11 of the ’261 patent. J.A. 1049. 

Entitled “Secure Notification Messaging with User Option 

to Communicate with Delivery or Pickup Representative,” 

the ’261 patent is directed “to systems and methods that 

notify a party of travel status associated with one or more 

mobile things (MTs).” ’261 patent col. 1 ll. 50–51. Independent claim 11 recites a system that provides notification “involving advance notice of a delivery or pickup of a 

good or service” to a “personal communication device 

(PCD)[,]” by means of “one or more transceivers[,]” “one or 

more memories[,]” “one or more processors[,]” and a “computer program code[.]” Id. col. 93 ll. 12–45; see id. col. 6 

ll. 31–33 (describing “a possible screen message that can 

1 We affirmed the District Court’s decision on the 

merits. See Elec. Commc’n Techs., LLC v. ShoppersChoice.com, LLC, 958 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 

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be . . . shown on a notified PCD . . . during a notification 

communication”); id. Fig. 16A.2

In September 2016, ECT filed a complaint in the District Court against ShoppersChoice for, inter alia, infringement of claim 11. J.A. 1399 (Amended Complaint); see J.A. 

1049 (Complaint).3 In December 2016, ShoppersChoice 

filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, challenging 

claim 11 as patent ineligible. J.A. 1513–14; see 35 U.S.C. 

§ 101. In February 2017, following discovery, the parties 

filed a joint claim construction statement, in which ECT

specified that each of the disputed terms in claim 11 should 

be given its “[o]rdinary and customary meaning.” 

J.A. 1582–88; see J.A. 1581–90 (Joint Claim Construction 

Statement). ShoppersChoice then moved to join a patenteligibility hearing set in a parallel lawsuit, also before the 

District Court, in which ECT alleged claim 11 infringement 

against other companies. J.A. 1047–48. The District Court 

granted the motion and conducted a consolidated patenteligibility hearing regarding claim 11. See Motion Hearing, 

Elec. Commc’n Techs., LLC v. ShoppersChoice.com, LLC, 

No. 9:16-cv-81677-KAM (S.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2017), ECF 

No. 59.4 

2 ECT’s previous name was Eclipse IP, LLC; the entity changed names in 2015. J.A. 255. Eclipse IP was listed 

as the applicant for the ’261 patent, but the patent was assigned to ECT following the name change. J.A. 35, 520. 

3 While ECT initially claimed that ShoppersChoice 

infringed claims from three patents, it subsequently 

amended its Complaint to assert infringement only of 

claim 11 of the ’261 patent. J.A. 1626. 

4 These parallel proceedings before the District 

Court include: Elec. Commc’n Techs., LLC v. Minted, LLC, 

No. 16-cv-81669-KAM; Elec. Commc’n Techs., LLC v. 

Lakeshore Equip. Co., No. 16-cv-81672-KAM; and Elec. 

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4 ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION v. SHOPPERSCHOICE.COM, LLC

Following the hearing, the District Court granted 

ShoppersChoice’s motion for a judgment on the pleadings 

and invalidated independent claim 11 of the ’261 patent. 

J.A 33–34; see J.A. 1581–90. The District Court conducted 

the two-step analysis set forth in Alice Corp. Party Ltd. v. 

CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). J.A. 20–33. 

The District Court determined that, under Alice step one, 

“[independent] [c]laim 11 is directed to the abstract idea of 

providing advance notification of the pickup or delivery of 

a[n] [MT].” J.A. 23. Regarding Alice step two, the District 

Court concluded that “the elements of [independent] 

[c]laim 11 do not transform the abstract idea that they recite into . . . patent-eligible subject matter.” J.A. 27–28. 

Accordingly, the District Court concluded that independent 

claim 11 was directed to patent-ineligible subject matter 

and granted judgment on the pleadings to ShoppersChoice. 

J.A. 33–34. We recently affirmed the District Court, holding that “the claim only entails applying longstanding commercial practices using generic computer components and 

technology.” ShoppersChoice.com, 958 F.3d at 1183.

Subsequently, ShoppersChoice filed a motion for attorney fees. See ShoppersChoice.com’s Local Rule 7.3 Motion 

for Attorneys’ Fees (“Motion for Attorney Fees”) at 5, Elec.

Commc’n Techs., LLC v. ShoppersChoice.com, LLC, 

No. 9:16-cv-81677-KAM (S.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2019), ECF 

No. 82. In it, ShoppersChoice cited evidence it presented 

to the District Court that ECT sent standardized demand 

letters and filed repeat patent infringement actions for the 

purpose of obtaining low-value “license fees” and forcing 

settlements. Id. at 4–5. Specifically, ShoppersChoice had 

provided the District Court with evidence that, between 2011 and 2015, ECT, under its former name Eclipse, 

filed lawsuits against at least 150 defendants, alleging 

Commc’n Techs., LCC v. Pep Boys–Manny, Moe & Jack, 

d/b/a The Pep Boys, No. 16-cv-81676-KAM. See id.

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infringement of claims in the ’261 patent and in other patents in the ’261 patent’s family. Id. at 4. Following attorney fee briefing, but before the District Court ruled, the 

U.S. District Court for the Central District of California 

(“California District Court”) entered an award of attorney 

fees against ECT in yet another case for conduct related to 

one of ECT’s numerous ’261 patent infringement lawsuits. 

See Kindred Studio Illustration & Design, LLC v. Elec. 

Commc’n Techs., LLC (“True Grit”), Case No. 2:18-cv07661-GJS, 2019 WL 3064112, at *6–9 (C.D. Cal. May 23,

2019). ShoppersChoice filed a letter of supplemental authority informing the District Court of the ruling. 

J.A. 2155–56.5 

A week after the letter was filed, the District Court denied ShoppersChoice’s motion for the award of attorney 

fees. J.A. 1628; see J.A. 1626–28 (Attorney Fee Order). In 

doing so, the District Court explained that “[u]nder the 

Lanham Act, ‘[t]he court in exceptional cases may award 

reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.’” 

J.A. 1627 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1117). In “considering the 

totality of the circumstances,” the District Court determined the case was not exceptional. J.A. 1627. First, the 

5 Prior to the instant action, ECT filed a lawsuit in 

the California District Court, alleging infringement of 

ECT’s U.S. Patent Nos. 7,064,681 (“the ’681 patent”), 

7,113,110 (“the ’110 patent”), and 7,119,716 (“the ’716 patent”) against McKinley Equipment Corporation. See 

Eclipse IP LLC v. McKinley Equip. Corp. (“McKinley”), No. 

SAVC 14-154-GW(AJWx), 2014 WL 4407592, at *1 (C.D. 

Cal. Sept. 4, 2014). The ’681, ’110, and ’716 patents all contain claims that recite methods for a computer-based notification system. See id. The California District Court 

conducted patent eligibility analysis for each asserted 

claim in the ’681, ’110, and ’716 patents and concluded that 

they were patent ineligible. See id. at *7, 9, 11, 12.

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District Court explained that “the substantive strength of 

the litigating position in this case does not render [it] ‘exceptional[,]’” as ECT’s “litigating position was [not] so obviously weak[.]” J.A. 1627. The District Court explained 

that, as “[t]here were no binding cases on point that stated 

that automated delivery notification [wa]s an abstract 

idea[,]” “the [District] Court analogized delivery notification to the kinds of conventional business practices that 

have been found to be abstract ideas.” J.A. 1627. “Moreover,” the District Court stated that it “had to” analyze 

whether independent claim 11 “was directed to a transformative application of an abstract idea[,]” suggestive of 

some substantive strength. J.A. 1628. Second, the District 

Court stated that it “[could not] conclude that [ECT] exhibited the kind of unreasonable behavior that would make 

this case stand apart from others.” J.A. 1628. Accordingly, 

the District Court denied ShoppersChoice’s Motion for Attorney Fees. J.A. 1628. ShoppersChoice moved for reconsideration, J.A. 2175–76, which the District Court denied, 

J.A. 1629. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review and Legal Standard

Pursuant to the Patent Act’s fee-shifting provision, a

“[district] court in exceptional cases may award reasonable 

attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 35 U.S.C. § 285 (emphasis added). “[A]n ‘exceptional’ case is simply one that

stands out from others with respect to the substantive 

strength of a party’s litigating position (considering both 

the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.” Octane 

Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 

554 (2014). A “[d]istrict court[] may determine whether a 

case is ‘exceptional’ in the case-by-case exercise of [its] discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances.” Id.

While “there is no precise rule or formula” for considering 

the totality of the circumstances, id. (internal quotation 

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marks and alteration omitted) (citing Fogerty v. Fantasy, 

Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994)), a district court may weigh

such factors as “frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal components of 

the case)[,] and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence[,]” id.

at 554 n.6 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 

Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534 n.19). Section 285 “imposes no 

specific evidentiary burden,” and is instead “a simple discretionary inquiry[.]” Id. at 557. 

We review a district court’s denial or grant of attorney 

fees under § 285 for abuse of discretion. See Highmark Inc. 

v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 561 (2014); 

see also ThermoLife Int’l LLC v. GNC Corp., 922 F.3d 1347, 

1356 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“We review a district court’s grant of 

attorney[] fees under § 285 for abuse of discretion.”). An 

abuse of discretion occurs where a district court makes “a 

clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors or in 

basing its decision on an error of law or on clearly erroneous factual findings.” Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 851 F.3d 1302, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A factual 

finding is clearly erroneous if, despite some supporting evidence, we are left with the definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake has been made.” Insite Vision Inc. v. 

Sandoz, Inc., 783 F.3d 853, 858 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). A district court 

must “provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons 

for the fee award.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 

(1983); see In re Rembrandt Techs. LP Patent Litig., 899 

F.3d 1254, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 

II. The District Court’s Exceptional Case Determination 

Constitutes an Abuse of Discretion

The District Court denied ShoppersChoice’s Motion for 

Attorney Fees, by finding the case not “exceptional” under 

the Lanham Act. J.A. 1627–28 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1117). 

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ShoppersChoice contends that the District Court abused 

its discretion in weighing relevant factors, Appellant’s 

Br. 31, and by applying the incorrect attorney fee statute, 

id. at 40. We agree with ShoppersChoice. 

A. The District Court Failed to Address ECT’s Manner of 

Litigation

The District Court clearly erred by failing to address 

ECT’s manner of litigation and the broader context of 

ECT’s lawsuit against ShoppersChoice. See generally 

J.A. 1626–28. These are relevant considerations. See SFA 

Sys., LLC v. Newegg Inc., 793 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. 

Cir. 2017) (“[A] pattern of litigation abuses characterized 

by the repeated filing of patent infringement actions for the 

sole purpose of forcing settlements, with no intention of 

testing the merits of one’s claims, is relevant to a district 

court’s exceptional case determination under § 285.”). Before the District Court was evidence that ECT sent standardized demand letters and filed repeat patent 

infringement actions to obtain low-value “license fees” and 

forcing settlements. See Motion for Attorney Fees at 5. For 

example, ShoppersChoice provided the District Court with 

evidence that, between 2011 and 2015, ECT, under its former name Eclipse, filed lawsuits against at least 150 defendants, alleging infringement of claims in the ’261 patent 

and in other patents in the ’261 patent’s family. Id. at 4. 

This number does not reflect the additional pre-litigation 

demands made by ECT. See generally id. ECT’s demand 

for a low-value settlement—ranging from $15,000 to 

$30,000—and subsequent steps—such as failure to proceed

in litigation past claim construction hearings—indicates 

the use of litigation to achieve a quick settlement with no 

intention of testing the strength of the patent or its allegations of infringement. See id. at 4–6. Not only did ShoppersChoice provide the District Court with a list of other 

court proceedings involving ECT and its demand letters involving claim 11, id. at 5, ShoppersChoice filed the True 

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Grit opinion with the District Court prior to its attorney fee 

determination, J.A. 2155–56. 

Indeed, the True Grit opinion reveals problems with 

the District Court’s analysis. The opinion provided a detailed account of ECT’s practice of seeking nuisance-value 

license fees. True Grit, 2019 WL 3064112, at *8–9. In the 

decision, the California District Court concluded that 

awarding attorney fees against ECT was appropriate, either “consider[ing] only the litigation history of ECT (as 

both ECT and Eclipse IP) or the entire history of the entities that True Grit has demonstrated are related (including 

Shipping & Transit[, LLC (‘S&T’)]) the [California District] 

Court can discern a clear pattern of serial filings, and also 

several (and presumably many more) instances of threats 

of litigation, intended only to obtain quick settlements[.]” 

Id. at *9. In reviewing ECT’s actions, the California District Court explained that “ECT’s immediate demand for a 

low[-]value settlement, apparent willingness to reduce that 

amount to avoid any challenge to its patent, and immediate 

provision of a [covenant not to sue] to True Grit once the 

declaratory judgment action was filed demonstrate ECT’s 

‘in terrorem’ tactics—threatening litigation in hopes of a 

quick settlement with no intention of ever testing either 

the strength of its patent or its allegations of infringement.” Id. Moreover, the California District Court took 

judicial notice of “yet another litigious entity,” S&T, “seeking nuisance value patent ‘rents’ that is helmed by many of 

the same individuals that control ECT[.]” Id. at *5. It explained that “[a]fter extracting nuisance value rents in 

many filed cases—and more than likely additional pre-litigation demand situations—[S&T] finally stopped sending 

demand letters and filing lawsuits after several federal 

courts” awarded attorney fees. Id. The California District 

Court stated that S&T then “filed for bankruptcy in an apparent bid to avoid paying attorney[] fees or other sanctions.” Id. The California District Court highlighted that 

“ECT [does not] affirmatively state—in the [California 

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District] Court’s view, because it cannot while remaining 

in compliance with [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 

Rule 11 and ethical rules—that the same group of people 

do not control the actions of each of these rent-seeking shell 

holding companies.” Id. Moreover, the California District 

Court explained that ECT did not contest True Grit’s assertion that, of the 875 times ECT has asserted the ’261 

patent and other patents in the patent family, ECT has 

never “tak[en] a single case to a merits determination.” Id.

at *6.6

6 Additionally, before the District Court was evidence that ECT’s conduct regarding the ’261 patent was 

not an isolated practice. ShoppersChoice presented evidence that ECT was managed by Peter Sirianni and had 

employed Edward Trumbull as a licensing agent. See Motion for Attorney Fees at 5. ShoppersChoice asserted that, 

prior to and concurrent with running Eclipse and ECT, 

Mr. Sirianni and Mr. Trumbull were associated with S&T, 

which has been widely recognized as “one of the most prolific” non-practicing entity plaintiffs in the United States. 

Id. at 5–6. ShoppersChoice also provided evidence that, at 

its peak, S&T had filed over five hundred lawsuits involving patent infringement and related claims, and that the 

pervasive litigation only stopped after several federal 

courts granted attorney fees against S&T. Id. at 5; see, e.g.,

Shipping & Transit, LLC v. 1A Auto, Inc., 283 

F.Supp.3d 1290, 1299 (S.D. Fla. 2017); Shipping & Transit, 

LLC v. LensDiscounters.com, No. 16-80980-Civ-Rosenberg/Brannon, 2017 WL 5434581, at *7–8 (S.D. Fla. July 

11, 2017); Shipping & Transit, LLC v. Hall Enterprises, No. 

16-cv-06535-AG-AFM, 2017 WL 3485782, at *8 (C.D. Cal. 

July 5, 2017). Following these decisions, S&T filed for 

bankruptcy. Chapter 7 Voluntary Petition at 1, In re Shipping & Transit, LLC, No. 9:18-bk-20968-MAM (Bankr. S.D. 

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ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION v. SHOPPERSCHOICE.COM, LLC 11

Despite the arguments and evidence presented by 

ShoppersChoice before the District Court regarding ECT’s 

manner of litigation, including the True Grit opinion, the 

District Court only briefly addressed ECT’s litigation conduct, explaining that it “[could not] conclude that [ECT] exhibited the kind of unreasonable behavior that would make 

this case stand apart from others” and that it was not the 

“‘rare case’” that would warrant an exceptional determination. J.A. 1628 (quoting Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 555). 

There was no mention of the manner in which ECT litigated the case or its broader litigation conduct. J.A. 1626–

28. Such conduct is a relevant consideration. See Rothschild Connected Devices Innovations, LLC v. Guardian 

Prot. Servs., Inc., 858 F.3d 1383, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[I]n 

the absence of evidence demonstrating that [ECT] engaged 

in reasonable conduct before the District Court, the undisputed evidence regarding [ECT’s] vexatious litigation warrants an affirmative exceptional case finding here.”). 

“While [a] district court need not reveal its assessment 

of every consideration of § 285 motions, it must actually 

assess the totality of the circumstances.” AdjustaCam, 

LLC v. Newegg, Inc., 861 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 

By not addressing the “adequate evidence of an abusive 

pattern” of ECT’s litigation, Newegg, 793 F.3d at 1352, the 

District Court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry and so 

abused its discretion, see Rothschild, 858 F.3d at 1388 (“A 

district court abuses its discretion when, as here, it fails to 

conduct an adequate inquiry.” (internal quotation marks, 

brackets, and citation omitted)); see also Octane Fitness, 

572 U.S. at 554, 554 n.6 (stating that, while “there is no 

precise rule or formula” in considering the totality of circumstances, the district court may weigh, inter alia, “the 

need in particular circumstances to advance considerations 

Fla. Sept. 6, 2018), ECF No. 1; see Motion for Attorney Fees 

at 5–6. 

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of compensation and deterrence” (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (citing Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534 n.19)); Newegg, 

793 F.3d at 1350 (“[A] pattern of litigation abuses characterized by the repeated filing of patent infringement actions for the sole purpose of forcing settlements, with no 

intention of testing the merits of one’s claims, is relevant 

to a district court’s exceptional case determination under 

§ 285.”). 

B. The District Court Failed to Sufficiently Address the 

Objective Weakness of Claim 11

The District Court clearly erred by failing to consider 

the objective unreasonableness of ECT’s alleging infringement of claim 11 against ShoppersChoice. The Attorney 

Fee Order did not reference, much less reconcile or account 

for, the District Court’s determination on the objective unreasonableness of the claims against ShoppersChoice with 

the conflicting conclusions reached in True Grit or McKinley. J.A. 1626–28; see Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 554 n.6 

(explaining that a district court, in analyzing the totality of 

circumstances, may weigh, inter alia, the “objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal components of 

the case)”). In True Grit, the California District Court concluded that “no reasonable patent litigant would have believed that [c]laim 11 of the ’261 patent”—the same claim 

at issue in the instant case—“was viable[.]” 2019 

WL 3064112, at *4. 

In McKinley, which was decided two years before ECT 

filed its Complaint against ShoppersChoice, the California 

District Court invalidated claims of patents in the ’261 patent’s family as patent ineligible under § 101, finding the 

claims “directed to the abstract idea of asking people, based 

on their location, to go places[,]” and implemented with 

only “‘generic computer[s]’” that did not transform the 

claims into patent eligible subject matter. 2014 

WL 4407592, at *11 (quoting Alice, 573 U.S. at 223). In 

True Grit, the California District Court explained that all 

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of the asserted claims in McKinley came from patents that 

share the same specification as the ’261 patent, and that 

“[c]laim 11 of the ’261 [p]atent suffers from the same type 

of obvious defect” as the asserted claims in McKinley. 2019 

WL 3064112, at *4. While ShoppersChoice stops short of 

claiming that either McKinley or True Grit bind the District Court, see generally Appellant’s Br., the absence in the 

Attorney Fee Order of any reference to either relevant case, 

or any allusion to their opposing conclusions, is problematic, J.A. 1626–28; see AdjustaCam, 861 F.3d at 1360 (explaining that “[t]he record developed over [time] points to 

this case as standing out from others with respect to the 

substantive strength of [the] litigating position[,]” as the 

“suit became baseless after the district court’s Markman

order” as shown by “the evidence proffered by” the plaintiff). Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court 

abused its discretion in weighing relevant factors in its exceptional case analysis.

C. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the District 

Court’s Attorney Fee Order and remand for further proceedings. In assessing the totality of the circumstances on 

remand, the District Court should consider, in a manner 

consistent with this opinion, ECT’s manner of litigation 

and the objective unreasonableness of ECT’s infringement 

claims.

We further note that the District Court applied the incorrect attorney fee statute. Specifically, the District Court 

applied 15 U.S.C. § 1117, J.A. 1267, which provides for the 

“award [of] reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing 

party” in “exceptional cases” concerning trademark violations, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Instead, the District Court 

should have applied 35 U.S.C. § 285, as the lawsuit involved the sole claim of patent infringement. J.A. 1 (finding independent claim 11 patent ineligible following a 

claim of infringement); see 35 U.S.C. § 285 (stating that, in 

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the context of patent infringement remedies, “[t]he court in 

exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to 

the prevailing party”). Although we acknowledge that the 

District Court ultimately applied the proper standard,

J.A. 1627, 1628 (citing Tobinick v. Novella, 884 F.3d 1110, 

1118 (11th Cir. 2018) (concluding that the exceptional case 

standard pertaining to 35 U.S.C. § 285 applies to 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1117)), on remand the District Court should apply § 285 

and relevant precedent. 

Accordingly, the Attorney Fee Order of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida is

VACATED AND REMANDED

COSTS

Costs to ShoppersChoice.

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