16 June 2008

Joint Forcible Entry

 Operations

Joint Publication 3-18
PREFACE 

i 

1. Scope 

 This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing joint 

forcible entry operations. 

2. Purpose 

 This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for 

interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It 

provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other 

joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and 

training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their 

appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC 

from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most 

appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. 

3. Application 

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of 

combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of 

these commands, and the Services. 

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate 

otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of 

Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of 

a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational 

doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not 

ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational 

command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, 

regulations, and doctrine. 

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

 STEPHEN M. GOLDFEIN 

 Major General, USAF 

 Vice Director, Joint Staff 
Preface 

ii JP 3-18 

Intentionally Blank 
SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-18 

DATED 16 JULY 2001 

iii 

ï Adds a discussion of principles for forcible entry operational success 

ï Covers multinational considerations 

ï Discusses maintaining operational area access 

ï Revises the discussion of command relationships 

ï Adds coverage of forcible entry and the joint planning process 

ï Reorganizes the chapter which discusses integration and synchronization and 

supporting operations 

ï Modified the definitions of the terms ëlodgmentí and ëMarine expeditionary 

brigadeí

ï Deleted the terms ëair control operations,í ëalert,í ëconnectivity,í and 

ëcommunications centerí 
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 3-18 

Intentionally Blank 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

v 

PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................... vii 

CHAPTER I 

 INTRODUCTION 

• Forcible Entry ................................................................................................................ I-1 

• United States National Military Strategy and Joint Forcible Entry Operations .......... I-1 

• Principles for Forcible Entry Operational Success ...................................................... I-2 

• Operational Applications of Forcible Entry Operations .............................................. I-4 

• Forcible Entry Capabilities ........................................................................................... I-6 

• Multinational Considerations ........................................................................................ I-8

CHAPTER II 

 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

• Purpose .......................................................................................................................... II-1 

• Force Employment ....................................................................................................... II-1 

• Organization of the Forcible Entry Operational Area ................................................. II-2 

• Command Relationships for Forcible Entry Operations ............................................. II-3 

• Airspace Control ........................................................................................................... II-6 

• Air Defense Command and Control ............................................................................ II-7 

• Communications ........................................................................................................... II-9

• Rules of Engagement .................................................................................................. II-11 

• Fratricide Prevention .................................................................................................. II-12

CHAPTER III 

 PLANNING 

• Purpose ......................................................................................................................... III-1 

• Forcible Entry and the Joint Planning Process ........................................................... III-1 

• Forcible Entry Planning Considerations ..................................................................... III-2 

CHAPTER IV 

 OPERATIONS 

• Purpose ........................................................................................................................ IV-1 

SECTION A. INTEGRATION AND SYNCHRONIZATION ..................................... IV-1 

• Introduction ................................................................................................................. IV-1 

• Forcible Entry Operations Phases .............................................................................. IV-1 

• Integration and/or Synchronization Considerations .................................................. IV-9 

SECTION B. SUPPORTING OPERATIONS .............................................................. IV-11 
Table of Contents 

vi JP 3-18 

ï Special Operations Forces ........................................................................................ IV-11 

ï Fires ........................................................................................................................... IV-12 

ï Intelligence Support and Considerations.................................................................. IV-12 

ï Information Operations ............................................................................................ IV-15 

CHAPTER V 

 LOGISTICS 

ï General .......................................................................................................................... V-1 

ï Specific Logistic Considerations for Supporting Forcible Entry Operations ............ V-1 

APPENDIX 

 A Amphibious Assault Operations ........................................................................... A-1 

 B Airborne and Air Assault Operations .................................................................... B-1 

 C References .............................................................................................................. C-1 

 D Administrative Instructions ................................................................................... D-1 

GLOSSARY 

 Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ...................................................................... GL-1 

 Part II Terms and Definitions .................................................................................. GL-4 

FIGURE 

 I-1 Forcible Entry Operations .................................................................................. I-2 

 I-2 Phasing Model .................................................................................................... I-4 

 III-1 The Joint Operation Planning Process ............................................................ III-2 

 IV-1 Operation Plan Rehearsal Benefits.................................................................. IV-2 

 IV-2 Forcible Entry Operations Phases ................................................................... IV-3 

 IV-3 Intelligence Support ...................................................................................... IV-13 

 IV-4 Information Operations Support to Forcible Entry ...................................... IV-15 

 V-1 Planning Considerations ................................................................................... V-2 

 V-2 Logistic Core Capabilities ................................................................................ V-3 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

•

•

•

•

•

•

vii

Provides an Overview of Forcible Entry Operations

Covers Command and Control Considerations

Describes Planning for Forcible Entry Operations

Explains Integration and Synchronization of Forcible Entry Operations

Covers Supporting Operations

Describes Logistic Considerations

Forcible entry operations

are joint in nature.

Achieve surprise.

Control of the air.

“Forcible entry” is a joint military operation conducted against

armed opposition to gain entry into the territory of an adversary

by seizing a lodgment as rapidly as possible in order to enable

the conduct of follow-on operations or conduct a singular

operation. A lodgment is a designated area in a hostile or

potentially hostile territory that, when seized and held, makes the

continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides

maneuver space for subsequent operations (a lodgment may be

an airhead, a beachhead, or a combination thereof). Lodgment

requirements depend upon the objective(s) of the overall operation

or larger campaign. A lodgment may have established facilities

and infrastructure. Forcible entry planning must consider the

political, military, economic, social, informational, and

infrastructure realities.

Planners should strive to achieve surprise regarding exact

objectives, times, methods, and forces employed in forcible entry

operations. The degree of surprise required depends on the nature

of the operation to be conducted.

Air superiority should be achieved in the operational area to

protect the force during periods of critical vulnerability and

to preserve lines of communications. At a minimum, the joint

force must neutralize the enemy’s offensive air and missile

Overview

Principles for Forcible Entry Operational Success
viii

Executive Summary

JP 3-18

capability and air defenses to achieve local air superiority over

the planned lodgment.

Space superiority allows the joint force commander (JFC) access

to communications, weather, navigation, timing, remote sensing,

and intelligence assets without prohibitive interference by the

opposing force.

Control of the sea in the operational area enables the joint force

to project power ashore in support of the joint forcible entry

operation and to protect sea lines of communications.

The joint force attacks or neutralizes any enemy capabilities

with the potential to affect the establishment of the lodgment.

Gaining and maintaining access is a critical precondition for

successful forcible entry. In any given operational area, numerous

and diverse limitations to access will present themselves.

The joint force must neutralize enemy forces within the

lodgment to facilitate the establishment of airheads and

beachheads within the operational area and to provide for the

immediate protection of the force.

The joint force quickly builds combat power in order to: enhance

security and the ability to respond to enemy counter attacks; enable

continuous landing of troops and materiel; and, facilitate transition

to subsequent operations.

Managing the impact of environmental factors refers to

overcoming the effect of land and sea obstacles; anticipating,

preventing, detecting, and mitigating adversary use of chemical,

biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive

weapons; and, determining the impact of climate, weather, and

other natural occurring hazards.

Intelligence, information operations, civil-military operations,

and special operations (SO) are key to setting the conditions

for forcible entry operational success. These enablers must be

integrated into the operation from initial planning through

completed execution and transition.

Control of space.

Control of the sea.

Isolate the lodgment.

Gain and maintain access.

Neutralize enemy forces

within the lodgment.

Expand the lodgement.

Manage the impact of

environmental factors.

Integrate supporting

operations.
ix

Executive Summary

Amphibious assault

operations.

Airborne assault

operations.

Air assault operations.

Forcible entry is usually a

complex operation and

should therefore be kept

as simple as possible in

concept.

The Armed Forces of the United States have the capability to

conduct three primary forcible entry operations: amphibious

assault, airborne assault, and air assault. Based upon mission

analysis, these operations may be used singularly or in

combination to open one or multiple entry points.

An amphibious force, composed of an amphibious task force

(ATF) and a landing force (LF), together with other forces that

are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations,

may project power directly against the enemy in a coup de

main or may attack across a beach and/or by vertical

envelopment to establish a lodgment to enable the introduction

of follow-on forces. In addition to serving as a forcible entry

assault force, such forces are capable of conducting follow-on

operations from the lodgment.

Airborne forces may be used as the assault force or used in

combination with other capabilities for a forcible entry; or

they may conduct follow-on operations from a lodgment. As

an assault force, airborne forces parachute into the objective area

to attack and eliminate armed resistance and secure designated

objectives.

Air assault forces execute forcible entries using fixed- and rotarywing aircraft. Air assault forces can deploy from land-based

facilities and naval platforms. These forces can rapidly project

combat power throughout the depth of an operational area.

The JFC should determine the forcible entry capability or

combination of capabilities needed to accomplish the mission.

Unity of command is vital when amphibious, airborne, and

air assault operations are combined. All elements of the joint

force and supporting commands should understand the

commander’s intent, concept of the operation, scheme of

maneuver, and coordination requirements.

If the decision is made to use a combination of forcible entry

capabilities to seize a lodgment, the JFC must decide whether to

conduct the forcible entries as concurrent or integrated operations.

Concurrent operations occur when a combination of amphibious

assault, airborne, and/or air assault forcible entry operations are

Forcible Entry Capabilities

Force Employment
x

Executive Summary

JP 3-18

conducted simultaneously, but as distinct operations with

separate operational areas and objectives. Integrated forcible

entry operations result when amphibious assault, airborne, and/

or air assault forcible entries are conducted simultaneously

within the same operational area and with objectives that

are mutually supporting.

JFCs have full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts,

and direct coordination among subordinate commanders.

JFCs should allow Service tactical and operational groupings to

function generally as they are organized and trained.

The combatant commander may organize the forcible entry force

as a subordinate joint task force (JTF) or the forcible entry force

may be organized from an existing component. An initiating

directive will provide guidance on command relationships and

other pertinent instructions for the duration of the forcible entry

operation.

The multiple complex tasks confronting the JFC may challenge

the JFC’s span of control and ability to oversee and influence

each task. Designating a joint force functional component

commander for a particular functional area allows resolution of

joint issues at the functional component level and enhances

component interaction at that level. In a large operation, delegating

control of the forcible entry operation to a functional component

commander will permit the JFC to focus on other responsibilities

in the operational area. Based on the JFC’s guidance, the forcible

entry operation may be conducted by functional component

commanders.

If the forcible entry operation is an amphibious assault, it will

include air and land assaults that originate from the sea. The JFC

will organize the amphibious force in such a way as to best

accomplish the mission based on the concept of operations

(CONOPS). The command relationships established among

the commander, ATF (CATF), commander, LF (CLF), and

other designated commanders of the amphibious force is an

important decision. An establishing directive is essential to

ensure unity of effort within the amphibious force. Normally, a

support relationship is established between the CATF and CLF

by the JFC or establishing authority.

Joint force commander

authority.

Functional component

commanders.

Amphibious task force

and landing force

commanders.

Command Relationships
xi

Executive Summary

Command and control of

special operations forces.

Joint planning is

conducted through a

disciplined process by

policies and procedures.

When directed, Commander, US Special Operations Command

provides continental United States-based special operations forces

(SOF) to a geographic combatant commander (GCC). The GCC

normally exercises combatant command (command authority)

of assigned and operational control of attached SOF through a

commander, theater special operations command (TSOC), a

subunified commander. When a GCC establishes and employs

multiple JTFs and independent task forces (TFs)

concurrently, the TSOC commander may establish and

employ multiple joint special operations task forces (JSOTFs)

to manage SOF assets and accommodate JTF/TF SO

requirements. Accordingly, the GCC, as the common superior,

normally will establish support or tactical control command

relationships between the JSOTF commanders and JTF/TF

commanders.

Joint planning is conducted through a disciplined process by

policies and procedures established in the Joint Operation

Planning and Execution System and joint operation planning

process. In addition to facilitating contingency planning, these

processes have additional procedures for crisis action planning

and for time-sensitive development of operation orders when a

forcible entry operation requirement occurs with little or no

warning.

Forcible entry operations require extensive joint intelligence

preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE). The

primary purpose of JIPOE is to support the JFC’s decision-making

and planning by identifying, analyzing, and estimating the enemy’s

centers of gravity, critical factors, capabilities, limitations,

requirements, vulnerabilities, intentions, and courses of action

that are most likely to be encountered by the entry force.

Time, distance, physical attributes of the operational area,

agreement/arrangement with other host nations, or the nature of

the crisis may dictate the deployment of a joint force to staging

areas outside the US. Likewise, authorizations may be required

to conduct advance force operations in the operational area to

prepare the operational environment for the introduction of combat

forces. Commanders and operational planners may have to

compress planning timelines to meet time-sensitive mission

requirements.

Forcible Entry and the Joint Planning Process
xii

Executive Summary

JP 3-18

Within the context of the “Seize the Initiative” or “Dominate”

phase of a joint operation established by a higher-level JFC, the

forcible entry operation commander may establish additional

phases that fit the forcible entry CONOPS. Forcible entry

operations may be planned and executed in the following five

phases: (1) Preparation and Deployment (Phase I); (2) Assault

(Phase II); (3) Stabilization of the Lodgment (Phase III); (4)

Introduction of Follow-on Forces (Phase IV); and, (5) Termination

or Transition Operations (Phase V).

Planning for each phase must include branch and sequel planning.

Transitions between these phases are designed to be distinct

shifts in focus by the joint force, often accompanied by changes

in command or support relationships. The activities that

predominate during a given phase, however, rarely align with

neatly definable breakpoints. The need to move into another

phase normally is identified by assessing that a set of objectives

are achieved or that the enemy has acted in a manner that requires

a major change in focus for the joint force and is therefore usually

event driven, not time driven. Changing the focus of the operation

takes time and may require changing commander’s objectives,

desired effects, measures of effectiveness, priorities, command

relationships, force allocation, or even the organization of the

operational area.

SO are an integral part of forcible entry operations and these

actions and operations are integrated to complement the

achievement of strategic and operational objectives. SOF may

be employed prior to forcible entry operations to collect

intelligence, seize key terrain, organize and train guerrilla forces,

and conduct other activities that facilitate the introduction of

conventional forces. In the execution stages of a forcible entry

operation, SOF can seize objectives, interdict targets (especially

those than can severely disrupt the assault to open entry points),

and conduct other operations to support the main force. In the

closing stages of the operation, SOF can play a key role in

transition or termination by working with host nation,

multinational, interagency, and intergovernmental partners.

Forcible entry operations

are normally conducted

during the “Seize the

Initiative” or “Dominate”

phase of a joint operation.

Special operations forces.

Integration and Synchronization

Supporting Operations
xiii

Executive Summary

Fires.

Intelligence support.

Information operations.

Logistic planning for the

phases of forcible entry

operations occurs

concurrently, not

sequentially.

In forcible entry operations, the initial assault forces are building

combat power in the operational area from nothing as quickly as

possible. They will normally have very minimal or no artillery

support available for fire support in the early stages of the

operation. Fires from aircraft (manned and unmanned) and/

or naval platforms (surface/subsurface) take on added

importance to compensate for the lack of artillery. The

supported commander established the priority, timing, and effects

of all fires within the boundaries of the operational area that has

been designated.

The JFC uses intelligence to: decide what, why, when, where,

and how to attack; determine forcible entry capabilities needed

and task organization required to seize initial objective(s); support

targeting and combat assessment; and anticipate future operations.

Counterintelligence (CI) helps the JFC maintain the element of

surprise essential to forcible entry operations by supporting

operations security (OPSEC) and deception.

Information operations (IO) are integral to successful military

operations and are key during forcible entry operations. The

full impact of IO on friendly, neutral, and hostile forces should

be considered with the key goal of IO achieving and maintaining

information superiority for the United States and its allies. IO

are described as the integrated employment of the core capabilities

of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological

operations, military deception, and OPSEC, in concert with

specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt,

corrupt, or usurp adversary human and automated decisionmaking while protecting our own. Supporting IO capabilities

(information assurance, physical security, physical attack, CI, and

combat camera) have military purposes other than IO, but either

operate in the information environment or have impact on the

information environment.

Within the context of forcible entry operations, logistics enables

movement and maintenance of forces from preparation and initial

deployment to the envisioned end state of the operation or larger

campaign. This requires commanders to plan and establish the

logistic systems that flow sufficient logistics through the

lodgment(s) created to support follow-on operations. Logistic

Logistics
xiv

Executive Summary

JP 3-18

planning must account for early resupply of initial assault forces

as these forces will generally be employed with limited on-hand

capacities.

This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing,

and assessing joint forcible entry operations.

CONCLUSION
CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTION 

I-1 

ìJoint warfare is team warfare. Effective integration of joint forces exposes no 

weak points or seams to an adversary. They rapidly and efficiently find and 

exploit the adversaryís critical vulnerabilities and other weak points as they 

contribute most to mission accomplishment. This does not mean that all forces 

will be equally represented in each operation. Joint force commanders may 

choose the capabilities they need from the forces at their disposal.î 

Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the 

Armed Forces of the United States 

1. Forcible Entry 

a. ìForcible entryî is a joint military operation conducted against armed opposition to 

gain entry into the territory of an adversary by seizing a lodgment as rapidly as possible in 

order to enable the conduct of follow-on operations or conduct a singular operation. A 

lodgment is a designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile territory that, when seized 

and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides 

maneuver space for subsequent operations (a lodgment may be an airhead, a beachhead, or 

a combination thereof). Lodgment requirements depend upon the objective(s) of the overall 

operation or larger campaign (see Figure I-1). A lodgment may have established facilities 

and infrastructure. Forcible entry planning must consider the political, military, economic, 

social, informational, and infrastructure realities. Commanders and staffs visualize and 

analyze civil considerations in terms of relevant areas, structures, capabilities, 

organizations, people, and events. 

b. Forcible entry operations are joint in nature. There are many Service-unique 

forcible entry capabilities, techniques, and procedures the Nation has developed since 

World War II, primarily consisting of amphibious assault, airborne assault, and air assault 

operations. Despite these Service-oriented capabilities, techniques, and procedures, forcible 

entry operations are inherently joint as evidenced by the need for using resources (e.g., 

command and control [C2], transportation, sustainment) from all elements of Department of 

Defense (DOD) and often other resources (multinational, other government agencies, etc.). 

2. United States National Military Strategy and Joint Forcible Entry Operations 

a. The National Military Strategy (NMS) supports the aims of the National Security 

Strategy and implements the National Defense Strategy. It describes the Armed Forcesí 

plan to achieve military objectives in the near term and provides the vision for ensuring they 

remain decisive in the future. The NMS establishes three supporting military objectives: 

protect the United States against external attacks and aggression, prevent conflict and 

surprise attack, and prevail against adversaries. 
Chapter I 

I-2 JP 3-18 

b. To achieve these objectives, the Armed Forces must effectively project and sustain 

power in distant environments where adversaries may seek to deny access. To be credible 

both as a deterrent and as a viable military option for policy enforcement, the Armed Forces 

of the US must be capable of deploying and fighting to gain access to geographical areas 

controlled by forces hostile to US interests. Swift and decisive victory in these cases 

requires forcible entry and the ability to surge follow-on forces. Alerting rapid deployment 

forces for employment or moving naval expeditionary forces toward the area of the crisis is 

a show of force that is politically significant in a strategic context. 

3. Principles for Forcible Entry Operational Success 

To set favorable conditions for operational success, the following principles apply for 

forcible entry operations: 

a. Achieve Surprise. Planners should strive to achieve surprise regarding exact 

objectives, times, methods, and forces employed in forcible entry operations. The degree of 

surprise required depends on the nature of the operation to be conducted. Achieving 

surprise is dependent upon comprehensive information operations (IO) planning 

(especially operations security [OPSEC] and military deception [MILDEC]) followed 

by disciplined execution by the joint force. Surprise is not a necessary condition for 

FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS

FORCIBLE ENTRY

Seizing and holding a lodgment in hostile or

potentially hostile territory that, when seized and

held, makes continuous landing of troops and

materiel possible and provides maneuver space

for subsequent operations

OPERATIONAL

APPLICATIONS

seize the initiative

dominate

OPERATIONS

amphibious assault

operations

airborne assault

operations

air assault operations

Figure I-1. Forcible Entry Operations
Introduction 

I-3 

operational success (particularly when the force has overwhelming superiority), but it can 

significantly reduce operational risk. 

b. Control of the Air. Air superiority should be achieved in the operational area to 

protect the force during periods of critical vulnerability and to preserve lines of 

communications (LOCs). At a minimum, the joint force must neutralize the enemyís 

offensive air and missile capability and air defenses to achieve local air superiority over the 

planned lodgment. The joint force controls the air through integrated and 

synchronized air operations, including missile defense. Air interdiction of enemy forces 

throughout the operational area enhances the simultaneity and depth of the forcible entry 

operation. 

c. Control of Space. Space superiority allows the joint force commander (JFC) 

access to communications, weather, navigation, timing, remote sensing, and intelligence 

assets without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. 

d. Sea Control. Control of the sea in the operational area enables the joint force to 

project power ashore in support of the joint forcible entry operation and to protect sea 

lines of communications (SLOCs). Protection of SLOCs ensures the availability of 

logistic support required to sustain operations and support the transition to continuing 

operations by follow-on forces. 

e. Isolate the Lodgment. The joint force attacks or neutralizes any enemy 

capabilities with the potential to affect the establishment of the lodgment. These 

capabilities include enemy ground, sea, and air forces that can be committed to react to joint 

force assaults, indirect fire systems and theater missile systems that can range the lodgment, 

and related C2 systems. 

f. Gain and Maintain Access. Gaining and maintaining access is a critical 

precondition for successful forcible entry. In any given operational area, numerous and 

diverse limitations to access will present themselves. Access may be restricted due to 

diplomatic, economic, military, or cultural factors. Ports, airfields, and infrastructures may 

also be physically limited. 

(1) Commanders conducting forcible entry operations should leverage the basing, 

access, and security cooperation agreements established as well as the regional expertise 

developed through pre-crisis engagement activities at the national and regional levels. 

(2) When planning indicates the future requirement for a forcible entry operation, 

appropriate shaping efforts or activities could focus on identifying and neutralizing an 

adversaryís anti-access capabilities. Shaping could include the expansion of intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to locate natural and man-made impediments 

to access. 

g. Neutralize Enemy Forces Within the Lodgment. The joint force must neutralize 

enemy forces within the lodgment to facilitate the establishment of airheads and 
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 3-18 

beachheads within the operational area and to provide for the immediate protection of 

the force. Planning considerations should include identification of enemy infrastructure 

which may be of value for future use by friendly forces. Limiting physical damage will 

lessen the time needed to rebuild. 

h. Expand the Lodgment. The joint force quickly builds combat power in order to: 

enhance security and the ability to respond to enemy counter attacks; enable continuous 

landing of troops and materiel; and, facilitate transition to subsequent operations. 

i. Manage the Impact of Environmental Factors. Managing the impact of 

environmental factors refers to overcoming the effect of land and sea obstacles; 

anticipating, preventing, detecting, and mitigating adversary use of chemical, 

biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive weapons; and, determining the 

impact of climate, weather, and other natural occurring hazards.

j. Integrate Supporting Operations. Intelligence, IO, civil-military operations 

(CMO), and special operations (SO) are key to setting the conditions for forcible entry 

operational success. These enablers must be integrated into the operation from initial 

planning through completed execution and transition. 

4. Operational Applications of Forcible Entry Operations 

 Generally, joint operations and campaigns involve six phases, as illustrated in Figure I2. The geographic combatant commanderís (GCCís) vision of how a joint operation should 

unfold will drive decisions regarding the phasing of an operation. Within the context of the 

phases established by a GCC, subordinate JFCs and component commanders may establish 

additional phases that fit their concept of operations (CONOPS). A forcible entry operation 

will normally be conducted during phases II (Seize the Initiative) or III (Dominate) of a 

joint operation. 

STABILIZE

PHASING MODEL

CRISIS

DEFINED

PREVENT

PREPARE

ASSURE FRIENDLY

FREEDOM OF

ACTION/

ACCESS THEATER

INFRASTRUCTURE

ESTABLISH

DOMINANT FORCE

CAPABILITIES/

ACHIEVE

FULL-SPECTRUM

SUPERIORITY

TRANSFER TO

CIVIL

AUTHORITY

REDEPLOY

ESTABLISH

SECURITY

RESTORE

SERVICES

SEIZE

INITIATIVE DOMINATE

ENABLE

CIVIL

AUTHORITY

SHAPE DETER

Phase 0 Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV Phase V

Figure I-2. Phasing Model 
Introduction 

I-5 

a. Seize the Initiative. A forcible entry operation may be the JFCís opening move to 

seize the initiative. For example, a JFC might direct friendly forces to seize and hold an 

airhead and/or a beachhead to ensure the continuous landing of troops and materiel and 

provide the maneuver space to conduct follow-on operations. The establishment of the 

lodgment, followed by the arrival and preparation of follow-on forces, usually marks the 

end of the forcible entry sub-phase of the operation and a transition to further offensive 

operations to seize the initiative or dominate. Operation CHROMITE is an example of 

forcible entry as a major operation with a campaign. 

OPERATION CHROMITE 

On September 15, 1950, eighty-three days after North Korea invaded 

South Korea, a joint command of the United States, Joint Task Force 7, 

initiated Operation CHROMITE by conducting an amphibious assault on 

the port of Inchon on Koreaís west coast. 

Operation CHROMITE took place on the heels of the retreat of the United 

States and Republic of Korea forces down the Korean Peninsula in June 

and July to an enclave on the peninsulaís southern tip. The primary 

objectives were to land a large force behind the bulk of the North Korean 

Peopleís Army (NKPA), recapture South Koreaís capital, Seoul, cut NKPA 

logistic lines, and provide an ìanvilî against which the US Eighth Army, 

attacking from the south, would crush the NKPA. 

Joint Task Force 7 commenced operations at 0630 on September 15th 

with an assault against the critical island of Wolmi-Do following massive 

bombardment. By 1800 on September 16th, main landings on Inchon 

had secured a beachhead. 

Various Sources 

b. Dominate. Forcible entry operations during the dominate phase of a campaign may 

be used for the following purposes: a coup de main, conducting operational movement and 

maneuver to attain positional advantage (see Operation CHROMITE vignette), or as a 

military deception. 

(1) Coup de Main. A forcible entry may be designed as a coup de main that will 

achieve decisive results. Often conducted by small forces conducting short duration, 

limited objective attacks against opponents with modest but still lethal capabilities, these 

operations are seldom studied in detail but may be the most likely type of forcible entry in 

the near future. Operation URGENT FURY (1983) and Operation JUST CAUSE (1989-

90) are specific examples of the use of simultaneous operations overwhelming an enemyís 

ability to respond. The capitulation of enemy forces usually marks the end of the dominate 

phase of the operation and a transition to further operations to stabilize and enable civil 

authority. 
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 3-18 

(2) Military Deception. The mere existence of a forcible entry capability may be 

used by the JFC in any phase as a show of force or to force enemy movement even without 

mounting a forcible entry operation, as with the amphibious demonstration during 

Operation DESERT STORM (1991). 

For further information on phasing, refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, 

and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

5. Forcible Entry Capabilities 

 Forcible entry capabilities can be used to force enemy action or inaction. It can be 

used for deterrence, as a show of force, or as a demonstration, like the amphibious 

demonstration during Operation DESERT STORM (1991). As long as the potential for a 

forcible entry exists, the enemy must guard against such operations. This may result in the 

thinning of enemy combat power at the decisive point selected by the JFC (e.g., during 

Operation DESERT STORM, two US Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) were 

embarked on Navy amphibious shipping in the Persian Gulf. As a result, the Iraqis 

deployed units to defend the Kuwait coastline in anticipation of an amphibious assault that 

never materialized.) The Armed Forces of the United States have the capability to conduct 

three primary forcible entry operations: amphibious assault, airborne assault, and air 

assault. Based upon mission analysis, these operations may be used singularly or in 

combination to open one or multiple entry points. 

a. Amphibious Assault Operations. An amphibious force (AF), composed of an 

A US Navy Wasp Class Amphibious Assault Ship underway in the Pacific Ocean.
Introduction 

I-7 

amphibious task force (ATF) and a landing force (LF), together with other forces that are 

trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations, may project power directly 

against the enemy in a coup de main or may attack across a beach and/or by vertical 

envelopment to establish a lodgment to enable the introduction of follow-on forces. In 

addition to serving as a forcible entry assault force, such forces are capable of conducting 

follow-on operations from the lodgment. AFs may also be inserted as a follow-on force. 

An AF with a forcible entry capability may be forward-deployed to quickly initiate or join 

other forces in a forcible entry operation or as a show of force. 

Appendix A, ìAmphibious Assault Operations,î and JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations, 

provide more specifics on amphibious operations. 

b. Airborne Assault Operations. Airborne forces may be used as the assault force 

or used in combination with other capabilities for a forcible entry; or they may conduct 

follow-on operations from a lodgment. As an assault force, airborne forces parachute into 

the objective area to attack and eliminate armed resistance and secure designated objectives. 

Airborne forces may also be employed from a lodgment in additional joint combat 

operations appropriate to their training and equipment. Airborne forces offer the JFC an 

immediate forcible entry option since they can be launched directly from the continental 

United States without the delays associated with acquiring intermediate staging bases or repositioning of sea-based forces. 

c. Air Assault Operations. Air assault forces execute forcible entries using fixedand rotary-wing aircraft. Air assault forces can deploy from land-based facilities and 

naval platforms. These forces can rapidly project combat power throughout the depth of 

an operational area. 

Appendix B, ìAirborne and Air Assault Operations,î provides more specifics on airborne 

and air assault operations. 

OPERATION URGENT FURY 

Operation URGENT FURY, the US battle plan for the rescue of American 

citizens in Grenada, began during the early hours of October 25, 1983 

when an elite squad of Navy SEALs [sea-air-land teams], trained in 

special seaborne operations, landed near St. Georgeís to secure the 

Governorís residence. A short time later, US Marines landed at Pearls 

Airport on the northeast side of the island aboard armed helicopters from 

the amphibious assault ship Guam. The Guam was part of a nine-ship 

task force supporting the operation off the coast of Grenada. Meanwhile, 

in the south of the island at the Point Salines Airport, Army Rangers 

(flown in from Savannah, Georgia) conducted an airborne assault to 

seize the airport. After fierce fighting in the Point Salines area, some six 

hundred Cubans were captured. This assault allowed 
Chapter I 

I-8 JP 3-18 

elements of the 82nd Airborne Division to air-land there. In the 

meantime, US Marines who had landed at Pearls had reembarked on the 

Guam and were taken by sea to the west side of the island. These 

Marines landed at Grand Mal Bay just to the north of St. Georgeís. They 

secured the Texaco oil farm and the Beau Seíjour wireless relay station 

with little problem. They quickly overcame resistance from Grenadian 

troops defending the outskirts of St. Georgeís and relieved the US Navy 

SEALs at the Governor Generalís mansion. 

The capital was taken with little fighting. Its defenses had been softened 

by repeated air attacks from US planes flying from the USS 

Independence offshore. The main Grenadian Army camp at Calivigny 

Point to the east of Point Salines was taken by elements of the 2nd 

Ranger Battalion on October 27. By October 28 all of the major military 

objectives had been achieved. By this time over six thousand US troops 

were on the island. 

SOURCE: The Battle for Grenada 

Mark Adkin, 1989 

6. Multinational Considerations 

 Forcible entry operations with multinational partners are planned and conducted much 

the same as a US joint force operation. However, there are a number of aspects that are 

unique to multinational operations that the commander of a US joint force may not 

encounter that must be taken into consideration. Attaining unity of effort through unity of 

command for a multinational operation may not be politically feasible, but it should be a 

goal. There must be a common understanding among all national forces of the overall aim 

of the multinational force and the plan for its attainment. 

For additional information, see JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. For information 

specific to US participation in NATO operations see the appropriate Allied joint 

publications and Allied tactical publications. 
CHAPTER II 

COMMAND AND CONTROL 

II-1 

“. . . a superior command system may serve as a force multiplier and compensate 

for weaknesses . . . such as numerical inferiority or the politically induced need to 

leave the initiative to the enemy.” 

Martin van Creveld 

Command in War, 1985 

1. Purpose 

This chapter provides guidance on the employment options, organization of the 

forcible entry operational area, command relationships, and major C2 functions that support 

the conduct of joint forcible entry operations. 

2. Force Employment 

 The JFC should determine the forcible entry capability or combination of capabilities 

needed to accomplish the mission. Unity of command is vital when amphibious, airborne, 

and air assault operations are combined. Forcible entry is usually a complex operation and 

should therefore be kept as simple as possible in concept. All elements of the joint force 

and supporting commands should understand the commander’s intent, concept of the 

operation, scheme of maneuver, and coordination requirements. 

a. If the decision is made to use a combination of forcible entry capabilities to seize a 

lodgment, the JFC must decide whether to conduct the forcible entries as concurrent or 

integrated operations. Concurrent operations occur when a combination of amphibious 

assault, airborne, and/or air assault forcible entry operations are conducted simultaneously, 

but as distinct operations with separate operational areas and objectives (e.g., the 

amphibious assault operation around Pearls Airport and the airborne operation at Point 

Salinas in Grenada during Operation URGENT FURY). Integrated forcible entry 

operations result when amphibious assault, airborne, and/or air assault forcible entries are 

conducted simultaneously within the same operational area and with objectives that 

are mutually supporting (e.g., the airborne operation in support of the amphibious assault 

landings in Normandy during Operation OVERLORD). Integrated forcible entry 

operations feature the complementary employment of forces and seek to maximize the 

capabilities of the respective forces available to the commander. 

b. The distinction between concurrent and integrated operations has implications 

for organizing forces, establishing command relationships, and applying force to 

accomplish the mission. The JFC must consider the unique aspects of the specific 

operation and should organize the force, establish command relationships, and apply force 

in a manner that fits the current situation. Factors that may impact the establishing 

authority’s decision include the following: 
Chapter II 

II-2 JP 3-18 

(1) The responsibility for the preponderance of the mission. 

(2) Time, phase, and duration of the operation. 

(3) Force capabilities. 

(4) Threat. 

(5) C2 capabilities. 

(6) The operational environment. 

(7) Recommendations from subordinate commanders. 

(8) Follow-on missions, anticipated operations, or transition considerations based 

upon the objective(s) of the overall operation or larger campaign plan. 

(9) The diplomatic and politico-military environment. 

3. Organization of the Forcible Entry Operational Area 

a. Maintaining Operational Area Access. JFCs establish and maintain access to 

operational areas where they are likely to operate, ensuring forward presence, basing (to 

include availability of airfields), freedom of navigation, and cooperation with allied and/or 

coalition nations to enhance operational reach. In part, this effort is national or 

multinational, involving maintenance of intertheater air and sea LOCs. 

b. Operational area is an overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for 

geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. Operational areas include, but 

are not limited to area of operations (AO), amphibious objective area (AOA), and joint 

special operations area (JSOA). The JFC may designate operational areas on a temporary 

basis to facilitate the coordination, integration, and deconfliction among joint force 

components and supporting commands. Operational areas have physical dimensions 

comprised of some combination of air, land, and maritime domains and are defined by 

geographical boundaries. 

c. Area of Operations. JFCs may define AOs for land and maritime forces. AOs do 

not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough 

for the land and maritime component commanders to accomplish their missions and 

protect their forces. Component commanders with AOs may designate subordinate AOs

within which their subordinate forces operate. For example, the joint force land component 

commander (JFLCC) may assign subordinate commanders separate AOs within an assigned 

airborne or air assault AO, or an AOA. These subordinate commanders employ the full 

range of joint and Service doctrinal control measures and graphics to delineate 

responsibilities, deconflict operations, safeguard friendly forces and civilians, and promote 

unity of effort. 
Command and Control 

II-3 

d. Amphibious Objective Area. An AOA is described as a geographical area, 

delineated in the initiating directive, for purposes of C2, within which is located the 

objective(s) to be secured by the AF. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure 

accomplishment of the AF’s mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting 

necessary sea, air, and land operations. 

e. Joint Special Operations Area. The JSOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace, 

assigned by a JFC to the commander of a joint SO force to conduct SO activities. The JFC 

may establish a JSOA when geographic boundaries between special operations forces 

(SOF) and conventional forces are the most suitable control measures. Establishment of a 

JSOA for SOF to conduct operations provides a control measure and assists in the 

prevention of fratricide. The commander, joint special operations task force (CDRJSOTF) 

may also request the establishment of a JSOA. When a JSOA is designated, the 

CDRJSOTF is the supported commander within the designated JSOA. The CDRJSOTF 

may further assign a specific area or sector within the JSOA to a subordinate commander 

for mission execution. The scope and duration of the SOF mission, operational 

environment, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, 

and sequencing of SOF deployed into a JSOA. It may be limited in size to accommodate a 

discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range 

of unconventional warfare (UW) operations. 

f. Airspace Control Area. The airspace control area for the forcible entry operation 

is that airspace laterally defined by the boundaries that delineate the operational area. 

This airspace may include sub-areas. This airspace may entail any operational area and is a 

means of planning and dividing responsibility. While an operational area is in existence, 

airspace control within the operational area is in accordance with JFC guidance, the 

airspace control plan, and airspace control order. 

g. Control and Coordination Measures. Control and coordination of forcible entry 

operations pose a particularly difficult challenge to all elements of the joint force. In 

addressing this challenge, the JFCs and appropriate commanders may employ various 

control and coordination measures that will facilitate the execution of operations and, at the 

same time, protect the force to the greatest possible degree. These measures include, but are 

not limited to, boundaries that circumscribe operational areas; control measures to facilitate 

joint force maneuver; fire support coordination measures (FSCMs); and airspace 

coordinating measures. 

4. Command Relationships for Forcible Entry Operations 

a. JFC Authority. JFCs have full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and 

direct coordination among subordinate commanders. JFCs should allow Service tactical 

and operational groupings to function generally as they are organized and trained. 

b. The combatant commander (CCDR) may organize the forcible entry force as a 

subordinate joint task force (JTF) or the forcible entry force may be organized from an 
Chapter II 

II-4 JP 3-18 

existing component. An initiating directive will provide guidance on command 

relationships and other pertinent instructions for the duration of the forcible entry operation. 

See JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, for guidance. 

c. Functional Component Commanders. The multiple complex tasks confronting 

the JFC may challenge the JFC’s span of control and ability to oversee and influence each 

task. Designating a joint force functional component commander for a particular functional 

area allows resolution of joint issues at the functional component level and enhances 

component interaction at that level. In a large operation, delegating control of the forcible 

entry operation to a functional component commander will permit the JFC to focus on other 

responsibilities in the operational area. Based on the JFC’s guidance, the forcible entry 

operation may be conducted by functional component commanders. If organized under 

functional lines, the following information is relevant. 

(1) Joint Force Land Component Commander. The JFLCC’s overall 

responsibilities and roles are to plan, coordinate, and employ designated forces/capabilities 

for joint land operations in support of the JFC’s CONOPS. The JFLCC will normally 

command forcible entry operations that involve airborne assaults or air assaults that 

originate from land bases, and will typically designate the commander, airborne/air assault 

force (CAF). 

(2) Joint Force Maritime Component Commander. The joint force maritime 

component commander’s (JFMCC’s) overall responsibilities and roles are to plan, 

coordinate, and employ designated forces/capabilities for joint maritime operations in 

support of the JFC’s CONOPS. The JFMCC will normally command forcible entry 

operations that involve amphibious operations or air assaults that originate from the sea, and 

typically will designate and establish the command relationship between the commander, 

ATF (CATF) and the commander, LF (CLF) based on the mission, nature and duration of 

the operation, force capabilities, and C2 capabilities. 

(3) Joint Force Air Component Commander. The joint force air component 

commander (JFACC) synchronizes and integrates the actions of assigned, attached, and 

supporting air capabilities/forces in time, space, and purpose in support of the JFC’s 

CONOPS. The JFACC must closely coordinate with the supported functional component 

commander or JTF commander to establish airspace control and air defense plans in support 

of the forcible entry operation as discussed below. 

d. ATF and LF Commanders. If the forcible entry operation is an amphibious 

assault, it will include air and land assaults that originate from the sea. The JFC will 

organize the amphibious force in such a way as to best accomplish the mission based on the 

CONOPS. The command relationships established among the CATF, CLF, and other 

designated commanders of the amphibious force is an important decision. An establishing 

directive is essential to ensure unity of effort within the amphibious force. Normally, a 

support relationship is established between the CATF and CLF by the JFC or establishing 

authority. 
Command and Control 

II-5 

For additional information on C2 by functional component commanders, see JP 3-30, 

Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint 

Land Operations, and JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations. For 

further details on amphibious command relationships, see JP 3-02, Amphibious 

Operations. 

e. C2 of Special Operations Forces. When directed, Commander, US Special 

Operations Command provides continental United States-based SOF to a GCC. The GCC 

normally exercises combatant command (command authority) of assigned and operational 

control of attached SOF through a commander, theater special operations command 

(TSOC), a subunified commander. When a GCC establishes and employs multiple JTFs 

and independent task forces (TFs) concurrently, the TSOC commander may establish and 

employ multiple joint special operations task forces (JSOTFs) to manage SOF assets and 

accommodate JTF/TF SO requirements. Accordingly, the GCC, as the common superior, 

normally will establish support or tactical control command relationships between the 

JSOTF commanders and JTF/TF commanders. 

f. Forcible Entry Employing a Combination of Forces. Forcible entry operations 

employing a combination of airborne, air assault, SOF, and amphibious forces (to include 

multinational forces with these capabilities), may be under the command of the JFC or a 

Service or functional component commander and must be closely coordinated. The 

command relationships between the JFC and subordinate component commanders are 

critical to success of these operations. Once the forcible entry has been accomplished, 

follow-on or transition operations may require changes in command relationships to support 

Effective and efficient airspace management complements and supports the 

joint force commander’s operational objectives.
Chapter II 

II-6 JP 3-18 

the JFC’s campaign plan. Supporting operations will be coordinated with the supported 

commander. 

g. Command Relationships During Planning. Forcible entry operations can have 

unique command relationships during the planning phase to ensure that air, land, maritime, 

space, and SO considerations are factored into decisions made concerning the conduct of 

the forcible entry operation. 

5. Airspace Control 

 Airspace management increases combat effectiveness by promoting the safe, 

efficient, and flexible use of airspace with a minimum of restraint placed on airspace users 

— all while complementing and supporting the JFC’s operational objectives. C2 of 

airspace requires two key elements: a control authority and a control system. 

For further details on airspace control, refer to JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control. 

a. Airspace Control Authority. The JFC normally designates an airspace control 

authority (ACA), who has overall responsibility for establishing and operating the airspace 

control system. The ACA monitors, assesses, and controls operational area airspace and 

directs changes in accordance with the JFC’s intent. 

(1) Airspace Control Authority During Amphibious Operations. JP 3-02, 

Amphibious Operations, and JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, provide detailed discussions 

on airspace control during amphibious assault operations. 

(2) Airspace Control Authority During Airborne/Air Assault Force 

Operations. When an airborne/air assault force is the supported entry force in a forcible 

entry operation, the air component commander for the operation or JFACC (if designated) 

may use airborne C2 assets to enhance coordination and control of joint air operations and 

airspace management. 

(a) The distances involved and the duration of airborne and air assault 

operations may require establishing special air traffic control facilities or special tactics 

teams to extend detailed control into the objective area. 

(b) The volume of air traffic throughout the airhead demands careful 

coordination to limit potential conflict and to enable the success of mission-essential 

operations within the airhead. A high-density airspace control zone (HIDACZ) may 

be established around a drop zone (DZ) or landing zone (LZ), which includes sufficient 

terrain and airspace to permit safe and efficient air traffic control. The HIDACZ can be 

nominated by the ground force commander and should, at a minimum, include the airspace 

bounded by the airhead line. Within the HIDACZ, all aircraft flights should be 

coordinated with the DZ, LZ, and the agency responsible for controlling the joint 

airspace. The air mission commander coordinates with the assault force commander to 

select the time on target and the direction of approach into and through the airhead. 
Command and Control 

II-7 

b. Airspace Control System. The forces involved in the operation largely 

determine the choices available to the ACA in designating an airspace control system

to control joint air operations; system interoperability will also be a major determining 

factor. For the airspace control system to function effectively, the ACA must maximize 

and enhance the capabilities of the collective force using existing control systems. 

(1) Airspace Control System During Amphibious Operations. In this 

situation, the tactical air control system will normally be the system used to control joint air 

operations within the AOA. The system provides the capability for autonomous airspace 

control operations, airspace management, and air defense operations and consists of two 

elements: the Navy tactical air control system (NTACS) and the Marine air command 

and control system (MACCS). NTACS controls the initial phase of the operation. Air 

control is incrementally transferred from NTACS to MACCS as the force is established 

ashore. Once control has been passed ashore, NTACS takes a back-up role to MACCS for 

landward air operations but may continue to control seaward air operations in a subordinate 

role to MACCS. 

(2) Airspace Control System During Airborne/Air Assault Force Operations. 

The ACA will normally control the airspace through the theater air control system 

(TACS) and the Army air-ground system (AAGS) in forcible entries. Situations may 

limit establishment of ground systems and require airborne or seabased systems to conduct 

airspace control. Commanders and staffs should closely monitor and plan the employment 

of critical communication nodes within TACS/AAGS. 

6. Air Defense Command and Control 

 The operational area, including ingress and egress routes, must be fully protected by an 

integrated air defense system consisting of air, land, maritime, and space assets. The joint 

force is particularly vulnerable to attacks by enemy aircraft or surface-to-surface missiles 

during the early stages of a forcible entry. Accordingly, the primary objectives for air 

defense operations are to assist in gaining air superiority. The area air defense 

commander (AADC) is responsible for integrating the joint force air defense effort. 

All available surface-to-air assets should be incorporated into the overall air defense plan 

and comply with procedures and weapons control measures established by the AADC. The 

AADC will exercise a degree of control of all systems through established guidelines, 

determination of weapons control status, and JFC-approved procedural controls. 

a. Air Defense C2 During an Amphibious Assault

(1) The AADC bears overall responsibility for defensive counterair operations of 

the joint force. The AADC may, however, divide the airspace into regions or sectors with 

regional air defense commanders (RADCs) or sector air defense commanders (SADCs) to 

enhance the decentralized execution of the defensive counterair operations. 

(2) The CATF is usually designated RADC for the airspace allocated for 

amphibious operations. The CATF and CLF will coordinate active defense plans and 
Chapter II 

II-8 JP 3-18 

procedures with the establishing authority of the amphibious operation and the AADC. The 

CATF usually assigns an air defense commander (ADC), normally on the most capable air 

defense platform, to carry out air defense operations. The ADC coordinates with the 

tactical air control center (TACC) afloat to maintain a current air picture. If the ADC is not 

collocated with the TACC afloat, close coordination between the ADC and TACC afloat is 

essential. 

(3) As LF air defenses are established ashore, the CLF will coordinate with the 

CATF to create an airspace sector and assume responsibility as SADC for the landward 

sector of the airspace allocated to the AF. Upon concurrence from the CATF, the ADC will 

pass responsibility of the landward sector to the LF control agency while retaining overall 

ADC responsibility in the AOA as well as coordination duties with the JFC’s AADC and 

ACA. 

(4) When an AOA is established, airspace assigned to the AF usually includes a 

margin of airspace surrounding the AOA called the amphibious defense zone (ADZ). An 

ADZ is the area encompassing the AOA and the adjoining airspace required by 

accompanying naval forces for the purpose of air defense. The actual size and shape of an 

ADZ is dependent upon capabilities of air defense platforms assigned to the CATF; the size 

of the AOA; and agreement between the AF’s RADC, the AADC, and adjacent ADC. 

Within the ADZ, the AF air defense agency maintains positive identification of all aircraft 

and conducts air defense within established rules of engagement (ROE) and air defense 

procedures. 

b. Air Defense C2 During Airborne/Air Assault 

(1) During air movement to the operational area, the AADC will normally 

control air defense operations from an airborne platform (e.g., Airborne Warning and 

Control System). In practice, extended distances from staging bases to designated AOs 

may require the AADC to delegate control responsibilities to an air control element on 

board the airborne platform. Initial air defense assets may be limited to fighter aircraft only. 

Control of these aircraft will normally be exercised through established procedural controls. 

(2) Forces initially entering the AO will be accompanied by organic shortrange air defense systems that must be integrated into the air defense C2 architecture. 

Planned procedural control measures and guidelines may be established by the AADC to 

expedite integration of assets. 

(3) With force buildup and the introduction of follow-on forces into the lodgment 

area, more robust high to medium altitude air defense systems will likely become 

available. These systems must establish communications with the AADC’s C2 agency and 

be incorporated into the established air defense system. 

(4) Once established, designated AADC control and reporting centers will 

normally assume air defense control responsibilities for forces external to an established 

AOA or AO as defined by the JFC or the initiating directive. 
Command and Control 

II-9 

(5) Specific implications for forces supporting CAF are addressed below. 

(a) Participating naval aircraft may be placed under the control of the 

appropriate C2 agency. 

(b) In some circumstances, naval air defense systems aboard participating 

ships may be limited. Accordingly, the AADC must take measures to ensure that a 

supporting AF is protected by other means. 

7. Communications 

Communications systems supporting forcible entry operations must be interoperable,

agile, trusted, and shared. Interoperability can be achieved through commonality, 

compatibility, standardization, and liaison. To support agile forces and operational 

concepts, the communications system must also be agile. The joint force must have 

confidence in the capabilities of the network and the validity of the information made 

available by the network. Sharing allows for the mutual use of information services or 

capabilities between entities in the operational area. Typical forcible entry operations 

communications will employ single and multichannel tactical satellites (TACSATs); 

commercial satellite communications (SATCOM); and single-channel ultrahigh frequency 

(UHF), very high frequency, and high frequency radios. The communications system 

directorate of a joint staff (J-6) is responsible for providing input to orders and plans, and 

coordinating communications system support and services during operations. 

a. Communications System Planning. Once the JFC establishes the specific C2 

organization for the forcible entry operation, the information exchange requirements are 

established as communications system planning begins. Communications system planning 

must be an integral part of joint force planning. The J-6 is responsible for planning and 

establishing the communications system and the communications estimate of supportability 

during course of action (COA) development and selection under the crisis action planning 

(CAP) process. Communications system planning must be conducted in close coordination 

with the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) to identify specialized equipment and 

dissemination requirements for some types of information. Because communications 

systems must be built-up at the objective area, some aspects of communications support are 

unique in forcible entry operations. 

For further details on communications system planning, refer to JP 6-0, Joint 

Communications System. 

b. Communications Support for Amphibious Force Operations. Communications 

requirements vary with the size and composition of the AF and must support the 

specific needs of each phase of the operation. Plans must accommodate the potential 

increase in requirements for long-range communications to support dispersed forces over 

extended distances. Communications for amphibious assault operations must integrate 

C2 systems that control naval surface fire support, ship-to-shore movement, joint air 

operations, assault vehicle control, surface fire support, and logistics. The CATF 
Chapter II 

II-10 JP 3-18 

coordinates C2 system requirements with the CLF and other forces within the AF and 

establishes an integrated C2 plan. The plan, designed to fully support the operation plan 

(OPLAN), reflects the requirements of the JFC, CATF, CLF, and other subordinate 

commanders as appropriate. 

(1) The CATF is responsible for the following:

(a) Preparation and promulgation of a coordinated plan for employment 

of AF communications during the operation. 

(b) Acquisition and assignment of necessary communications assets to 

subordinate elements of the force. 

(c) Providing necessary shipboard C2 facilities and services in support of 

the embarked LF. 

(d) Development of a coordinated communications plan for the ATF for 

inclusion in the overall C2 systems support plan. 

(e) Development and promulgation of a plan for communications 

connectivity with other maritime forces. 

(2) The CLF is responsible for the following:

(a) Development of a coordinated communications plan for the LF 

component of the AF for inclusion in the overall force C2 systems support plan. 

(b) Development and promulgation of a plan for communications 

connectivity with other ground forces ashore. 

(c) Establishment of computer and network requirements while 

embarked. 

(d) Identification of connectivity requirements prior to movement ashore 

for follow-on operations, if required. 

(3) Other commanders of the AF are responsible for determination of their C2 

systems requirements and submission of those requirements. 

c. Communications Support for Airborne/Air Assault Force Operations. 

Communications requirements vary with the mission, size, composition, geography, and 

location of the joint force and the senior headquarters. Significant considerations for 

airborne and air assault operations include the use of intermediate staging bases (ISBs) 

and airborne C2 platforms, which can add to the complexity of managing the 

communications architecture. Airborne/air assault forces will initially deploy with a 

limited communications capability, largely based on UHF SATCOM. Communications 
Command and Control 

II-11 

support becomes more robust as signal units and equipment enter the operational area via 

airdrop or are air landed into the airhead. 

(1) C2 relationships, nets, frequency management, codes, navigational aids, and 

any other communication issues must be resolved before the assault phase begins. 

(2) Long-range radio communications may be necessary with US-based forces 

or ISBs to facilitate control of personnel, supplies, and equipment into the airhead or 

lodgment. Long-range communications are initially established from higher to lower 

headquarters. The higher headquarters may be on land, sea, or air and may maintain 

contact through retransmission and relay sites. The communications plan must ensure 

interoperability with the overall joint force communications architecture and provide the 

redundancy for CAF and subordinate commanders to adequately command and control 

operations. 

(3) Ground commanders in airlift aircraft may communicate with the chain 

of command over the Army secure en route communications package. Normally, the 

airlift mission commander and the airborne force commander are in the same aircraft. The 

senior ground commander can advise embarked ground commanders of changes in the 

ground tactical situation or to the air movement plan. 

(4) Airborne/air assault forcible entry operations require the use of 

redundant airborne and ground command posts. Normally, a joint force airborne 

command post will operate from a joint airborne communications center and command 

post, while a command post from the airborne/air assault force will operate from fixed-wing 

platform with required communications installed or a specially configured C2 rotary-wing 

aircraft. 

(5) TACSAT downlink and other en route communications systems can be 

used to communicate with United States Air Force (USAF) special tactics teams, air 

mobility liaison officers, contingency response elements, and contingency response teams 

in objective areas. The use of special navigational aids and homing devices to direct 

aircraft to specified areas (e.g., a designated DZ) may be necessary. Specialized 

airborne/air assault force personnel (e.g., special tactics teams or long-range surveillance 

units) are equipped with navigational aids, global positioning systems, and homing 

devices. These teams will be employed early to guide the airborne/air assault forces, and 

provide reconnaissance, surveillance, visual flight rules service, and limited instrument 

flight rules air traffic control service. Other joint force assets such as SOF or Marine force 

reconnaissance elements are also capable of performing some of these functions. 

8. Rules of Engagement 

a. ROE are developed by the Joint Staff and CCDRs and reviewed and approved by 

the President and Secretary of Defense (SecDef) for promulgation and dissemination. ROE 

ensure actions, especially force employment, are consistent with military objectives, 

domestic and international law, and national policy. Joint forces operate in accordance with 
Chapter II 

II-12 JP 3-18 

applicable ROE, conduct warfare in compliance with international laws, and fight within 

restraints and constraints specified by their commanders. Properly developed ROE must be 

clear, tailored to the situation, reviewed for legal sufficiency, and included in training. ROE 

typically will vary from operation to operation and may change during an operation. The 

challenge for a JFC is to ensure that the ROE for a forcible entry operation provides the 

commander with the flexibility to accomplish the mission, while assuring adherence to 

political, legal, operational, and diplomatic factors the force may encounter. The ROE 

also provides a specified level of protection to those persons and/or objects entitled to 

protected status. 

For additional information on ROE, see Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 

(CJCSI) 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for 

US Forces. 

b. Forcible entry operations are normally characterized by a high operational tempo 

and violent execution. Circumstances may require unexpected changes to ROE. 

Commanders must be attuned to changes in the tactical and political situations, specifically 

as they relate to ROE, and ensure that members of their force receive timely notification of 

ROE changes. 

c. To mitigate unnecessary loss of life and unintended collateral damage, commanders 

should ensure that members of their force are adequately trained in the application of force; 

from nonlethal to lethal. 

9. Fratricide Prevention 

a. The complexity of forcible entry operations increases the potential for fratricide and 

demands efforts by all elements of the joint force to deliberately reduce the risk of 

fratricide. Friendly force tracking provides JFCs with enhanced situational awareness that 

can help to reduce fratricide. 

b. Primary Mechanisms for Fratricide Prevention. Detailed integration of 

maneuver and fire support is required to prevent fratricide. Coordination center personnel 

seek to prevent fratricide through close coordination at all levels by maintaining situational 

awareness. Use of FSCMs, coordination of position areas, and the consideration of the 

locations of friendly forces during target analysis all contribute to safeguarding friendly 

units. 

For further details on preventing fratricide, refer to JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile 

Threats; JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support; JP 3-09.1, Laser Designation Operations, JP 3-09.3, 

Close Air Support (CAS); and JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control. 
CHAPTER III 

PLANNING 

III-1 

ìNow the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple before 

the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations 

before-hand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to 

defeat: How much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I 

can see who is likely to win or lose.î 

Sun Tzu, c. 500 BC 

The Art of War

1. Purpose 

This chapter provides information on planning forcible entry operations. Existing joint 

planning processes and considerations are used in planning these operations. 

2. Forcible Entry and the Joint Planning Process 

 Joint planning is conducted through a disciplined process by policies and procedures 

established in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and joint 

operation planning process (JOPP) (see Figure III-1). In addition to facilitating 

contingency planning, these processes have additional procedures for crisis action planning 

and for time-sensitive development of operation orders when a forcible entry operation 

requirement occurs with little or no warning. 

a. Forcible entry operations require extensive joint intelligence preparation of the 

operational environment (JIPOE). The primary purpose of JIPOE is to support the JFCís 

decision-making and planning by identifying, analyzing, and estimating the enemyís centers 

of gravity, critical factors, capabilities, limitations, requirements, vulnerabilities, intentions, 

and COAs that are most likely to be encountered by the entry force. 

b. Time, distance, physical attributes of the operational area, agreement/arrangement 

with other host nations, or the nature of the crisis may dictate the deployment of a joint 

force to staging areas outside the US. Likewise, authorizations may be required to conduct 

advance force operations in the operational area to prepare the operational environment for 

the introduction of combat forces. Commanders and operational planners may have to 

compress planning timelines to meet time-sensitive mission requirements. Time-sensitive 

situations will likely demand: establishing joint staffs and exchanging liaison personnel 

as soon as command relationships are defined; conducting parallel planning at all command 

levels; establishing the supporting intelligence architecture from national to tactical levels; 

pre-positioning airlift and sealift with supported units; loading unit sets of equipment on 

surge sealift ships at US or allied seaports of embarkation (SPOEs); directing the movement 

of sea-based pre-positioned equipment to the operational area; embarking personnel and 

equipment at US or allied aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs); and conducting 

reconnaissance operations. 
Chapter III 

III-2 JP 3-18 

c. Forcible entry will require well-trained, well-prepared, joint forces capable of 

executing operations on short-notice. It is essential that all key elements associated with the 

operation are included in the planning forum from the onset. This ensures resources needed 

are available in a timely manner and that ample time is available for preparation. When 

operations require specialists, it is essential that the requirements are identified early and 

those organizations are included in planning. 

3. Forcible Entry Planning Considerations 

 JOPP underpins planning at all levels and for missions across the range of military 

operations. The process is designed to facilitate interaction between commander, staff, and 

subordinate headquarters throughout planning. Often forcible entry planning occurs within 

CAP. The JFC, staff, and subordinate and/or supporting commanders and staffs follow 

JOPP and consider the following factors when developing forcible entry operations. 

a. Initiation. The President, SecDef, or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may 

initiate planning for forcible entry operations to develop military options to respond to a 

potential or actual crisis. Additionally, GCCs and other commanders may initiate planning 

on their own authority when they identify a planning requirement not directed by higher 

authority. 

THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS

Step 1:

Initiation

Step 2:

Mission Analysis

Step 3:

Course of Action (COA) Development

Step 4:

COA Analysis and Wargaming

Step 5:

COA Comparison

Step 6:

COA Approval

Step 7:

Plan or Order Development

Figure III-1. The Joint Operation Planning Process
Planning 

III-3 

 

b. Mission Analysis. The joint force mission describes the essential task or set of 

tasks, together with the purpose, clearly indicating the action to be taken and the reason for 

doing so. In analyzing a forcible entry operation, the JFC and staff consider: 

(1) Higher mission and guidance. 

(2) A thorough JIPOE, including: 

(a) Threat to joint forces en route to, and operating in, the operational area. 

(b) Geography of the operational area. 

(c) Lodgment terrain and infrastructure, with a critical eye on the ability to 

support follow-on operations. 

(3) Operational reach and approach. 

(4) Forces available including multinational and indigenous. 

(5) Time available. 

(6) Strategic and operational aims, including the military end state. 

(7) Command relationships and force composition. 

(8) Combat power required to achieve operational objectives. 

(9) Operational restrictions that may inhibit subordinate commanders. 

(10) Initial staff estimates. 

(11) Media and public perception. 

(12) Political environment. 

For more discussion on staff estimates, see JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

c. COA Development. In the development of a forcible entry COA, five phases are 

addressed: preparation and deployment, assault, stabilization of the lodgment, introduction 

of follow-on forces, and termination or transition. To produce a valid COA the following 

should be considered (Chapter IV, ìOperations,î further expands on the five phases.): 

(1) Phase I (Preparation and Deployment). Considerations include the 

following: 
Chapter III 

III-4 JP 3-18 

(a) Determine the forcible entry option(s) to be executed, how those 

operations will support campaign success, and the command relationships required. 

(b) Determine deployment sequencing of forces that supports gaining access 

into the objective area, the initial assault, reinforcement, and the introduction of follow-on 

forces. 

(c) Determine requirements for local air and maritime superiority to conduct 

the forcible entry operation. 

(d) Determine forcible entry go/no-go criteria. 

(e) Determine logistic factors and establishing airhead and beachhead 

resupply responsibilities. 

(2) Phase II (Assault). Considerations include the following: 

(a) Analyzing objectives and potential lodgment with regard to: 

1. The proposed ground tactical plan. 

2. Potential capability for air and sea landing of personnel and 

equipment. 

3. Space within the lodgment and maneuver space for future operations. 

4. Vulnerability to interdiction and counterattacks. 

(b) Operating facilities and/or infrastructure to support operations. 

(c) Identify forces securing airheads and/or beachheads (e.g., advance, preassault, and landing forces). 

(d) Reception of reinforcing forces (if required) and follow-on forces for 

subsequent operations. 

(3) Phase III (Stabilization of the Lodgment). Considerations include the 

following: 

(a) Identify the requirements for reinforcing forces and projected deployment 

flow, with attention to: 

1. Cross-loading among lift assets. 

2. Task-organized by arrival sequence. 
Planning 

III-5 

(b) Identify potential restrictions and/or limitations in force flow, and 

eliminating and/or reducing accordingly. 

(c) Establish redundancy of force capability in deployment flow for added 

flexibility. 

(d) Establish call-forward procedures for reinforcing forces, if required. 

(e) Calculate throughput capability of ports of debarkation. 

(f) Determine preparation requirements needed to reinforce forces for combat 

on arrival. 

(g) Determine requirements for expansion of the lodgment. 

(h) Establish force link-up procedures. 

(4) Phase IV (Introduction of Follow-on Forces). Considerations include the 

following: 

(a) Identifying tasks for follow-on forces. 

(b) Preparing for arrival of follow-on forces. 

(c) Coordinating arrival and/or disposition of any allocated maritime prepositioning force (MPF) and Army pre-positioned stocks (APS). 

(5) Phase V (Termination or Transition). Considerations include the 

following: 

(a) Continuing planning and coordination actions initiated in early phases. 

(b) Planning for reconstitution and redeployment of the assault force. 

(c) Planning to terminate the forcible entry portion of the joint operation. 

(d) Planning for transition to follow-on operations or termination of the entire 

joint operation. Planning for follow-on operations may include planning requirements for 

the use of nonlethal weapons. 

(e) Planning for hand over to civil authorities (if applicable). 

d. COA Analysis and Wargaming. The commander and staff will analyze each 

COA separately according to the commanderís guidance to bring out relevant factors in 

each COA. Wargaming provides the means for the commander and participants to analyze 

a COA and obtain insights not otherwise discernable. 
Chapter III 

III-6 JP 3-18 

e. COA Comparison. The staff will evaluate COAs using governing factors 

identified during the wargame in order to identify the COA with the highest probability of 

success. 

f. COA Approval. The staff determines the best COA and presents a 

recommendation to the commander for approval. 

g. Plan or Order Development. Contingency planning results in plan development, 

while CAP typically will lead directly to operation order (OPORD) development. 

JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, provides guidance regarding JOPES and JOPP. 
CHAPTER IV 

OPERATIONS 

IV-1 

ìSuccess in war depends upon the Golden Rule of War. SpeedóSimplicityó

Boldness.î 

GEN George S. Patton 

Inscribed in his field notebook 

1. Purpose 

 This chapter provides information on the execution of forcible entry operations. 

Section A describes the five phases of a forcible entry operation and discusses the 

integration and synchronization of these operations in the context of the forcible entry 

phases. Section B focuses on supporting operations such as intelligence, IO, and SO in 

support of forcible entry operations. 

SECTION A. INTEGRATION AND SYNCHRONIZATION 

2. Introduction 

a. General. This section highlights some common issues and considerations that 

integrate and synchronize activities during a forcible entry operation. The discussion that 

follows is not a checklist, but may be used by JFCs and staffs as appropriate to meet their 

specific needs. 

b. Rehearsals. In order to integrate, synchronize, and confirm the timing of an 

operation, the JFC may choose to conduct a rehearsal (other benefits of rehearsals are 

listed in Figure IV-1). Rehearsals at the operational level range in scope from joint force 

exercises (driven by resource, time, space, and force availability constraints), to command 

post exercises supported by computer aided-simulations, to commanders and/or key 

personnel conferences. The decision to conduct rehearsals will be influenced by the time 

available and by OPSEC considerations. 

3. Forcible Entry Operations Phases 

 Forcible entry operations are normally conducted during the ìSeize the Initiativeî or 

ìDominateî phase of a joint operation. Within the context of these phases established by a 

higher-level JFC, the forcible entry operation commander may establish additional phases 

that fit the forcible entry CONOPS. Forcible entry operations may be planned and 

executed in the five phases listed in Figure IV-2. Planning for each phase must include 

branch and sequel planning. Transitions between these phases are designed to be distinct 

shifts in focus by the joint force, often accompanied by changes in command or support 

relationships. The activities that predominate during a given phase, however, rarely align 

with neatly definable breakpoints. The need to move into another phase normally is 

identified by assessing that a set of objectives are achieved or that the enemy has acted in a 
Chapter IV 

IV-2 JP 3-18 

manner that requires a major change in focus for the joint force and is therefore usually 

event driven, not time driven. Changing the focus of the operation takes time and may 

require changing commanderís objectives, desired effects, measures of effectiveness, 

priorities, command relationships, force allocation, or even the organization of the 

operational area. 

For further information on phasing in joint operations, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 

and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

a. Preparation and Deployment (Phase I). Forcible entry operations are conducted 

by organizations whose force structures permit rapid deployment into the objective area. 

Joint forces may deploy directly to the operational area or to staging areas to prepare for 

subsequent operations. 

(1) Planning. The JFC, the component commanders, and their staffs must be 

intimately involved in planning and executing the deployment of forces to the 

operational area. Planning must begin as early as possible, including developing 

contingencies during peacetime. Staffs should plan all phases, including transition. 

(2) Movement. Forcible entry operations involve movement planning from 

both strategic and operational perspectives. These operations involve movement from 

OPERATION PLAN REHEARSAL BENEFITS

Common Understanding

Unity of Effort

Articulate Supporting Intents

Subordinate and Supporting Commanders' Questions

Branches or Sequels

Integration and Synchronization

Figure IV-1. Operation Plan Rehearsal Benefits
Operations 

IV-3 

marshalling areas as well as loading and departure from ports and ISBs for the sequenced 

movement of forces to objective area(s) in accordance with the OPORD. During this phase, 

the forcible entry force will typically conduct rehearsals of the operation as time and 

resources permit. 

(3) Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 

Increased intelligence collection efforts focus on gathering information to satisfy priority 

intelligence requirements that the JFC requires and determining if the required conditions 

for the assault have been established (e.g., local air superiority has been achieved). 

Reconnaissance and surveillance assets (e.g., SOF) may be inserted into the objective 

area during this phase as part of this effort. SOF may be introduced to the area well in 

advance of a possible assault to conduct special reconnaissance or UW to develop and 

prepare the area. UW and the use of surrogate forces can significantly reduce opposition to 

the assault. 

(4) Transition to Assault. During Phase I, the joint force sets the conditions 

that are required for a successful assault, achieving air, sea, and space superiority and 

isolating the lodgment. Air interdiction, naval surface fire support (NSFS), SOF missions, 

and/or other actions to prepare assault objectives will normally occur prior to the 

commitment of assault forces. In other situations, political or operational considerations 

may preclude such actions prior to the initiation of the assault phase of the operation. 

FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS PHASES

Preparation and Deployment

PHASE I

Assault

PHASE II

Stabilization of the Lodgment

PHASE III

Introduction of Follow-On Forces

PHASE IV

Termination or Transition Operations

PHASE V

Figure IV-2. Forcible Entry Operations Phases 
Chapter IV 

IV-4 JP 3-18 

b. Assault (Phase II). Phase II begins with joint force assaults to seize initial 

objectives in the lodgment and concludes with the consolidation of those objectives. 

(1) Initial Assaults. Initial assaults are designed to surprise and overwhelm 

the enemy with decisive force and to protect assault forces as they accomplish assigned 

missions. SOF may be employed to precede assault forces to identify, clarify, and modify 

conditions in the operational area; and/or to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and 

interdiction operations well beyond the initial assault objectives. Opening entry points will 

involve actual assault by various combinations of amphibious and airborne forces to 

achieve a coup de main or enable follow-on operations through the seizure of existing ports 

and airfields or the establishment of expeditionary facilities. SOF may be used in 

combination with naval forces to conduct assaults to open entry points. Planning for this 

phase may include pre-assault strikes by cruise missiles, armed unmanned aircraft, fixedwing aircraft, attack helicopters, and/or NSFS to destroy enemy forces in the objective areas 

and/or enemy ground force reserves, aircraft, theater missiles, weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD), and naval forces that could disrupt the operation. Assault forces may use multiple 

approaches and entry points to deceive the adversary and diminish his ability to observe, 

orient, decide, and act. 

(2) Overcoming Obstacles. The JFC will be faced with natural and man-made 

obstacles intended to restrict or halt movement that allows the enemy to mass its forces and 

repel the assault. Naval mine countermeasures (MCM) forces may be required to conduct 

Planning for the initial assault phase may include pre-assault strikes by cruise missiles, armed 

unmanned aircraft, fixed-wing aircraft, attack helicopters, and/or naval surface fire support. 
Operations 

IV-5 

MCM operations in order to clear transit and assault lanes of sea-based mines and/or 

obstacles in order to facilitate rapid movement of landing forces and follow-on forces from 

the sea. Combat engineers enhance the mobility of assault forces on land by clearing roads 

and airfields of explosive hazards, mines, and obstacles and by conducting forward aviation 

combat engineering operations. 

(3) Main Assault. Landing forces will enter objective areas via parachute 

assault, air landing forces, helicopter-borne air assault, and/or amphibious assault. 

Throughout the assault phase, landed forces must have immediately available joint fire 

support to destroy, interdict, or suppress enemy forces and missile defense. The joint force 

must maintain the initiative and rapidly prepare to receive follow-on forces to develop the 

combat power necessary to secure the lodgment. CAS and naval surface fire support are 

critical resources during the assault. Depending on resources available to the JFC, the 

introduction of landing forces may be combined with simultaneous strikes against 

other key enemy assets throughout the operational area in order to prevent the enemyís 

ability to react effectively. 

(4) Transition to Stabilizing the Lodgment. The assault may be capped by 

offensive, defensive, or retrograde operations as described by the JFCís operational 

concept, and by the introduction of follow-on forces to assist in securing the lodgment and 

continue on to follow-on operations without an operational pause. 

c. Stabilization of the Lodgment (Phase III). Stabilization involves securing the 

lodgment to protect the force and ensure the continuous landing of personnel and materiel, 

organizing the lodgment to support the increasing flow of forces and logistic resource 

requirements, and expanding the lodgment as required to support the joint force in 

preparing for and executing follow-on operations. Force buildup begins with the securing 

of objectives by assault forces and must be consistent with the overall operation or 

campaign plan with regard to the proper balance of combat forces and logistics required to 

conduct subsequent operations. The joint force takes immediate steps to optimize lodgment 

throughput capabilities. 

(1) Securing the Lodgment. Whether the forcible entry is envisioned as the 

establishment of a lodgment to enable future combat operations, or as a coup de main, the 

lodgment must be secured and protected in order for it to serve as an entry point for followon forces and sustainment. Based on the JFCís analysis of the threat and available forces, 

the lodgment is expanded as required. Lodgment security is continuous and enables 

organization and expansion. 

(2) Organizing the Lodgment. Details concerning the introduction of follow-on 

forces must be prepared during the planning phase of the operation. Commanders introduce 

reinforcing forces as required based on the tactical situation. All means of delivery are 

exploited to maximize combat power in the lodgment. Aerial ports of debarkation 

(APODs) and seaports of debarkation (SPODs) must be secured and repaired as necessary. 

Appropriate logistic and communications infrastructure must be established as quickly as 

possible to facilitate the reception of follow-on forces. 
Chapter IV 

IV-6 JP 3-18 

(3) Expanding the Lodgment. Expansion is when the lodgment is not fully 

established and the introduction of combat power significantly contributes to the 

development of the security situation. During the expansion, the capacity of ground forces 

to maintain the lodgment in the face of a coherent enemy response should significantly 

increase. 

(4) Transition to Introducing Follow-on Forces. Though intended to conduct 

follow-on operations, in extreme circumstances, follow-on forces may be required to 

assist assault forces in the seizure of initial objectives, or may be used to help secure and 

defend the lodgment. Provisions must be made to clear follow-on supplies and equipment 

immediately from offload points to maximize airlift and sealift efficiency. The joint force 

must avoid an unnecessary operational pause. The tempo of operations directed against 

the enemy must be maintained to prevent the enemy from reorganizing and effectively 

countering the establishment of the lodgment. 

d. Introduction of Follow-on Forces (Phase IV). (Note: This phase is required 

when subsequent operations are planned for conduct in or from the lodgment.) Follow-on 

forces provide the JFC with increased flexibility to conduct operations as required by 

operational conditions; once the lodgment has been established with APODs and SPODs, 

a joint security area may be identified and developed to facilitate and provide security for 

subsequent support operations. Follow-on forces and equipment may flow via air LOCs 

and SLOCs into the APODs and SPODs located within the now-established lodgment. 

During this phase, joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) operations commence in earnest. 

The joint force must maintain the initiative and rapidly prepare to receive follow-on forces to 

develop the combat power necessary to secure the lodgment.
Operations 

IV-7 

Follow-on forces may also deploy to the operational area to link up with pre-positioned 

equipment. Initially, airfield operations may be conducted in a combat environment. 

Airfield operations and security should conform to currently published guidance and in 

accordance with any valid intra-service agreements or plans. Once the airfield is secure and 

open for full operations, improvements can be made to provide the capacity for aircraft 

maintenance and parking. Follow-on force equipment will largely flow from pre-positioned 

stocks. 

(1) Maritime Pre-Positioned Force and Army Pre-Positioned Stocks 

Employment. MPF and APS options provide the JFC with significant combat 

capabilities to initiate or prosecute follow-on operations. Fundamental requirements for 

MPF or APS operations include intertheater lift and a secure environment (e.g., arrival 

airfields, ports, and/or beaches) for arrival, off-load, and assembly of forces. These are the 

conditions that will be achieved during the stabilization phase of a forcible entry operation. 

(a) MPF. The purpose of an MPF operation is to rapidly establish a MAGTF 

ashore that is prepared to conduct the full range of military operations. 

(b) APS. APS, when available, provides the GCC or designated subordinate 

JFC with a similarly responsive brigade size armored force to be employed rapidly in 

response to a crisis situation. Like the MPF, this capability consists of the equipment 

required by brigade combat teams (BCTs) and enabling units to conduct a wide range of 

operations. 

22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit embarks aboard the USS Gunston Hall (LSD 44) by way of 

landing craft, air cushion, while under way in the Atlantic Ocean, July 31, 2007.
Chapter IV 

IV-8 JP 3-18 

(2) Follow-on Force Preparation for Subsequent Operations. Ideally, all 

follow-on forces will be organized and tailored so they are ready for combat upon arrival in 

the lodgment; however, in most situations, follow-on forces will require a period of time to 

link up with equipment, organize, and prepare for operations that follow the forcible entry. 

The following organizations can enable the start of subsequent operations. 

(a) Contingency Response Group (CRG). The CRG is composed of Air 

Force assets, trained and equipped to accompany dedicated Army airborne and air assault 

forces to establish airfield operations. The CRGís mission is to prepare the lodgment 

airfield for follow-on forces by providing engineer, explosive ordnance disposal, security, 

communications support, and airfield support assets needed to support the forcible entry 

effort. 

(b) The Tactical Air Control Party (TACP). The TACP performs both 

airspace and ground control for aircraft supporting the lodgment. 

(c) Maneuver Enhancement Brigade. This Army brigade provides 

protection and enhances the mobility of supported forcible entry forces. During forcible 

entry the brigade supports BCTs with tailored engineer; military police; chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear; and other supporting capabilities required for 

successful forcible entry operations. 

e. Termination or Transition Operations (Phase V). The transition from a forcible 

entry operation to subsequent operations or termination must be an integral part of 

predeployment planning. A successful forcible entry operation is completed in one of 

two ways: attainment of the campaign objectives (termination); or completion of the 

operational objectives wherein a lodgment is established for follow-on combat operations 

(transition). 

(1) Achievement of Operation or Campaign Objectives. If the forcible entry 

operation accomplishes the strategic objectives, then the JFC may be directed to 

reconstitute and redeploy the joint force either to home station or to some other theater of 

operations. 

(2) Achievement of Operational Objectives. In many cases, a forcible entry 

operation will probably be only one phase of a campaign or major operation. As such, the 

forcible entry operation establishes the conditions for follow-on operations. Follow-on 

forces generally focus on executing sequels to the forcible entry operation that are designed 

to achieve additional campaign objectives. These sequels include the full range of military 

operations across the operational phases depicted in JP 3-0, Joint Operations, (e.g., seize 

the initiative, dominate, or stabilize phases) as part of the larger operation. 

For further details on stability operations, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-57, 

Civil-Military Operations. For further details on interagency coordination, refer to JP 

3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization 

Coordination During Joint Operations. 
Operations 

IV-9 

For additional information regarding transition, refer to DODD 3000.05, Military Support 

for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. 

4. Integration and/or Synchronization Considerations 

 The following discussion illustrates the type of activities that may occur at the JFC 

level to integrate and synchronize a forcible entry operation. This list is not all-inclusive, 

but presents activities for JFCs and staffs to consider when synchronizing a typical 

forcible entry operation. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, reflects six phases for an operation: 

shape; deter; seize the initiative; dominate; stabilize; and enable civil authority. The 

number and types of phases for forcible entry operations, as with all operations, may vary. 

As phasing is a key synchronization action, these activities are organized into the five 

phases of forcible entry operation presented earlier in this chapter. The example assumes 

that a combination of forcible entry capabilities will be used to obtain a lodgment as the 

initial operation of a larger campaign. These phases are normally sequential but may 

overlap. During planning, commanders must establish conditions for transitioning from one 

phase to another. The commander adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities presented by 

the enemy or to react to unforeseen situations. 

a. Phase I: Preparation and Deployment

(1) An accurate time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL) is developed up 

through level 4 detail. 

(2) The JFC assigns complementary and/or deconflicted missions to components. 

(3) Operational areas are designated. 

(4) Command relationships are delineated. 

(5) Rehearsals are conducted. 

(6) The intelligence effort for components is prioritized. 

(7) Initial air apportionment decisions are made. 

(8) Targeting guidance is disseminated. 

(9) Desired arrival sequence of forces in the operational area is matched to 

available transportation and validated with the time-phased force and deployment data. 

(10) Integration and/or synchronization with other (if any) operations is 

completed. 
Chapter IV 

IV-10 JP 3-18 

(11) Plan for the use and integration of the military activities that support strategic 

communication themes and messages ó IO, public affairs (PA), and defense support to 

public diplomacy (DSPD). 

(12) Deception operations are executed. 

(13) Advance force operations (e.g., countermine, air superiority, space 

superiority, preparation of the operational environment, and isolation) to include SOF 

conducting special reconnaissance and UW are executed. 

(14) Sustainment activities and/or requirements are planned. 

(15) Plan for casualty operations is formulated. 

(16) Fire support coordination and airspace coordinating measures are formulated. 

b. Phase II: Assault

(1) Air apportionment is reassessed and revised. 

(2) H-Hour synchronization is completed among components. 

(3) Modifications to existing plans and branches and/or sequels are deconflicted. 

(4) Operational areas are activated. 

(5) Fire support coordination and airspace coordinating measures are activated. 

(6) Pre H-Hour activities and/or staging are completed. 

(7) Supported and supporting relationships among components are modified, as 

required. 

(8) Provide for casualty evacuation. 

(9) Link up with assault follow-on echelon and/or SOF. 

c. Phase III: Stabilization of the Lodgment

(1) Terrain management issues are addressed. 

(2) Runways, aprons, taxiways, and parking areas are repaired and maintained to 

support continuous air landed operations. 

(3) Airspace management is coordinated. 
Operations 

IV-11 

(4) Provide for medical evacuation. 

(5) TPFDL flow is managed. 

d. Phase IV: Introduction of Follow-on Forces

(1) Force sequencing is adjusted continuously. 

(2) Battle handover is completed. 

(3) Reconstitution and/or redeployment of assault forces (e.g., embark the LF for 

a subsequent mission) is completed. 

(4) Joint security operations issues are addressed. 

(5) AOA is dissolved. 

e. Phase V: Termination or Transition Operations

(1) Joint force and/or component missions and command relationships are 

reorganized. 

(2) Priorities of support are shifted. 

(3) Transition to further operations in the ìseize the initiative,î ìdominate,î or 

ìstabilizeî phase of the joint operation. 

SECTION B. SUPPORTING OPERATIONS 

5. Special Operations Forces 

SO are an integral part of forcible entry operations and these actions and operations are 

integrated to complement the achievement of strategic and operational objectives. SOF 

may be employed prior to forcible entry operations to collect intelligence, seize key terrain, 

organize and train guerrilla forces, and conduct other activities that facilitate the 

introduction of conventional forces. In the execution stages of a forcible entry operation, 

SOF can seize objectives, interdict targets (especially those than can severely disrupt the 

assault to open entry points), and conduct other operations to support the main force. In the 

closing stages of the operation, SOF can play a key role in transition or termination by 

working with host nation, multinational, interagency, and intergovernmental partners. 

See JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, for more information on SOF. 
Chapter IV 

IV-12 JP 3-18 

MILITARY DECEPTION OPERATIONS 

UTILIZING SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES DURING DESERT STORM 

From 29 January until 16 February 1991, Naval Special Warfare Task 

Group elements conducted near-shore and off-shore reconnaissance 

missions in support of US Central Commandís deception strategy to fix 

Iraqi attention on a potential amphibious assault by US Marines. The 

special reconnaissance missions resulted in the collection of 

information, established a naval presence along the Kuwaiti coast, and 

focused the attention of the Iraqi command on a possible maritime 

invasion. The deception effort culminated in a large-scale operation on 

the night of 23-24 February 1991, the eve of the ground offensive, which 

simulated a beach reconnaissance and clearing operation. The 

deception campaign prevented Iraqi units at the beaches from 

reinforcing those being attacked in the west. 

SOURCE: United States Special Operations 

Command History, 2d Edition 

6. Fires 

 In forcible entry operations, the initial assault forces are building combat power in the 

operational area from nothing as quickly as possible. They will normally have very 

minimal or no artillery support available for fire support in the early stages of the operation. 

Fires from aircraft (manned and unmanned) and/or naval platforms (surface/subsurface) 

take on added importance to compensate for the lack of artillery. The supported commander 

established the priority, timing, and effects of all fires within the boundaries of the 

operational area that has been designated. 

JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, and JP 3-02 Amphibious Operations, provide more information 

on fire support. 

7. Intelligence Support and Considerations 

a. The JFC uses intelligence to: decide what, why, when, where, and how to attack; 

determine forcible entry capabilities needed and task organization required to seize initial 

objective(s); support targeting and combat assessment; and anticipate future operations (see 

Figure IV-3). Counterintelligence (CI) helps the JFC maintain the element of surprise 

essential to forcible entry operations by supporting OPSEC and deception. 

See JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, to identify the 

primary providers of intelligence assigned to or supporting the JFC, and the diverse 

products and services available to satisfy joint force intelligence requirements. 
Operations 

IV-13 

b. Intelligence considerations for the five phases of a forcible entry operation are 

described below. 

(1) Preparation and Deployment (Phase I). Specific considerations during 

this phase include the following:

(a) Establishing the Intelligence Architecture. The intelligence 

architecture must be capable of supporting joint forces en route to and within the 

operational area. Architecture planning must consider establishing connectivity over long 

distances between the joint force, the supporting theater joint intelligence operations center, 

and other intelligence organizations (to include federated intelligence partners) outside the 

operational area. 

(b) Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 

JIPOE is a key input to mission analysis and the process continues to refine and update 

intelligence products to provide commanders and staffs the means to successfully prosecute 

operations. 

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

PROVIDES ENEMY INFORMATION













Goals

Objectives

Values

Centers of Gravity

Composition

Threats













Disposition

Strengths

Weaknesses

Vulnerabilities

Courses of Action

Intentions

INTELLIGENCE

JOINT FORCE COMMANDER MAKES DECISIONS











when, where, and how to attack

determine capabilities needed and task organization required to

seize initial objective(s)

support targeting and combat assessment

anticipate future operations

weigh the differences between risk and gain

Figure IV-3. Intelligence Support 
Chapter IV 

IV-14 JP 3-18 

For further guidance on intelligence support, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, JP 2-01, 

Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, and JP 2-01.3, Joint 

Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 

(2) Assault (Phase II). The joint force is most vulnerable to enemy action during 

the assault phase. Effective indications and warnings of enemy reaction to the assault and 

force protection are paramount concerns during this phase. 

(3) Stabilization of the Lodgment (Phase III) and Introduction of Follow-on 

Forces (Phase IV). In the remaining phases of the operation, intelligence assets within 

the lodgment increase in numbers and contribute to an enhanced collective 

intelligence capability. If the joint force headquarters deploys into the lodgment, the J-2 

must ensure the availability of sufficient assets to assure uninterrupted intelligence support 

to the joint force. The J-2 should anticipate an increase in the demand for human 

intelligence and CI assets to conduct interrogation, intelligence collection, and support 

liaison with the host nation country team and with any multinational forces introduced into 

the lodgment. 

(4) Termination or Transition Operations (Phase V). 

(a) Termination of Operations. Intelligence assets continue to support 

the JFCís operations requirements and address the potential for resurgent hostilities

by either conventional or unconventional forces. Intelligence support may be required for 

such activities as minefield clearing, infrastructure reconstruction, foreign humanitarian 

assistance (FHA), or restoring civil law and order, while continuing the key task of 

intelligence support to force protection. 

(b) Transition to Follow-on Operations. Once a forcible entry has been 

successfully executed as the first phase of a larger campaign, the JFC shifts the focus of 

intelligence support from establishing the lodgment to sustained operations. 

Intelligence support for sustained operations, planned during the initial phase of the 

operation and continually refined as the forcible entry operation progresses, now allows for 

a seamless transition that allows the JFC to begin execution of the specific sequel that will 

achieve campaign objectives. In some instances, follow-on operations will be in the form 

of stability operations or other forms of civil-military actions. These operations encompass 

a variety of activities that vary in their respective intelligence support requirements. 

Some operations such as a show of force, attacks and raids, and noncombatant evacuations 

may require the same level of support demanded by combat operations. Other operations 

such as FHA or counterdrug operations may not involve large scale combat, but will, 

nevertheless, still require intelligence support to plan and execute. 
Operations 

IV-15 

8. Information Operations 

 IO are integral to successful military operations and are key during forcible entry 

operations. The full impact of IO on friendly, neutral, and hostile forces should be 

considered with the key goal of IO achieving and maintaining information superiority for 

the United States and its allies. IO are described as the integrated employment of the core 

capabilities of EW, computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations 

(PSYOP), MILDEC, and OPSEC, in concert with specified supporting and related 

capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversary human and automated 

decision-making while protecting our own (see Figure IV-4). Supporting IO capabilities 

(information assurance, physical security, physical attack, CI, and combat camera) have 

military purposes other than IO, but either operate in the information environment or have 

impact on the information environment. 

See JP 3-13, Information Operations, for more information. 

a. ìInformation assuranceî is described as measures that protect and defend 

information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 

confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information 

systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. 

b. IO is a key part of setting the conditions for forcible entry operational success; IO 

efforts will be central to achieving surprise and isolating the lodgment and will also be an 

important enabler for gaining control of the operational environment and neutralizing 

enemy forces. OPSEC and MILDEC, combined with the other IO core and supporting 

INFORMATION OPERATIONS SUPPORT TO FORCIBLE ENTRY

Achieving surprise

Isolating the lodgment

Controlling the operational environment

Neutralizing the enemy

Electronic

Warfare

Psychological

Operations

Computer Network

Operations

Operations

Security

Military

Deception

SUCCESSFUL INFORMATION

OPERATIONS STRATEGY

Figure IV-4. Information Operations Support to Forcible Entry
Chapter IV 

IV-16 JP 3-18 

capabilities will be the heart of achieving operational and tactical surprise during the 

forcible entry operation. 

(1) OPSEC attempts to deny critical information about friendly forces to the 

adversary. Forcible entry forces preparing for deployment have large, distinct signatures. 

Masking the movement of forces to staging bases and to the operational area is critical to 

ensure OPSEC. These movements may not be totally hidden; however, such detail as the 

composition of the forces or the time and location of the forcible entry should be concealed. 

The object is to surprise, confuse, or paralyze the enemy. OPSEC procedures must be 

planned, practiced, and enforced during training, movement, and operations. 

For further details on OPSEC, refer to JP 3-13.3, Operations Security. 

(2) MILDEC misleads adversary decision makers as to friendly military 

capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific 

actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. 

MILDEC operations must be closely coordinated with the overall operational scheme of 

maneuver and other IO efforts. The deception operation will have little effect if it is 

compromised by poor OPSEC or conflicts with concurrent PSYOP. Successful military 

deceptions require sufficient resources, leadership, and linked objectives and goals from the 

strategic to tactical level. A well known example of MILDEC supporting forcible entry 

operations was Operation FORTITUDE prior to Operation OVERLORD (1944) used to 

convince the enemy that the Allied objective was the port of Calais instead of the actual 

landing sites in Normandy. For forcible entry operations, MILDEC operations may be 

planned and executed to complete the following: 

(a) Deceive the enemy as to the time, location(s), and strategic and/or 

operational purpose of the forcible entry. 

(b) Focus enemy attention and effort away from actual assault objectives. 

(c) Cause the enemy to disperse forces to defend all possible airheads and 

beachheads in the operational area so the enemy cannot mass decisive force to deny joint 

force assaults. 

(d) Induce the enemy to piecemeal resources. 

(e) Desensitize the enemy to US actions by appearances of ìroutineî 

activities. 

(f) Force the enemy to maintain heightened states of alert and/or readiness for 

extended periods of time. 

For further details on MILDEC, refer to JP 3-13.4, Military Deception. 
Operations 

IV-17 

c. IO capabilities will also play an integral role in isolating the lodgment. The 

lodgment must not only be isolated from nearby enemy military forces, but also from 

command and control centers outside the operational area. CNO and electronic warfare 

(EW), supported by physical attack on C2 networks, will play a decisive role in this 

isolation. 

d. EW includes any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed 

energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. The JFCís plan 

must be developed to ensure complementary use of assets and weapons systems to 

effectively disrupt and/or destroy enemy C2 and weapons systems, while protecting 

joint force capabilities. 

See JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, for additional detail on EW. 

e. CNO stems from the increasing use of networked computers and supporting 

information technology infrastructure systems by military and civilian organizations. CNO, 

along with EW, is used to attack, deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, exploit, and defend 

electronic information and infrastructure. For the purpose of military operations, CNO are 

divided into computer network attack (CNA), computer network defense (CND), and 

related computer network exploitation (CNE) enabling operations. CNA consists of actions 

taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy 

information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks 

themselves. CND involves actions taken through the use of computer networks to protect, 

monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within DOD information 

systems and computer networks. CND actions not only protect DOD systems from an 

external adversary but also from exploitation from within, and are now a necessary function 

in all military operations. CNE is enabling operations and intelligence collection 

capabilities conducted through the use of computer networks to gather data from target or 

adversary automated information systems or networks. 

f. Related Information Operations Capabilities

(1) Defense Support to Public Diplomacy. DSPD consists of activities and 

measures taken by DOD components, not solely in the area of IO, to support and facilitate 

public diplomacy efforts of the US Government. DSPD requires coordination with both the 

interagency and among DOD components. 

(2) Public Affairs. A PA plan should be prepared and conducted upon 

execution/detection of the forcible entry operation. PA planning must anticipate detection 

of all but small covert operations by the enemy and the press. 

(3) Civil-Military Operations. Properly executed CMO during forcible entry 

operations can reduce potential friction points between the civilian population and the joint 

force, specifically by eliminating interference with military operations and limiting the 

impact of military operations on the populace. CMO encompass the activities taken by a 

commander to establish and maintain effective relations between military forces and civil 
Chapter IV 

IV-18 JP 3-18 

authorities, the general population, and other civil institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile 

areas where those forces are employed. Use of civil affairs (CA) forces and units 

specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct CA operations in support of CMO 

can assist the commander. 

For further details on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 
CHAPTER V 

LOGISTICS 

V-1 

ìThe great question of the campaign was one of supplies.î 

General William T. Sherman 

Memoirs of General William T. Sherman, 1875 

1. General 

 Within the context of forcible entry operations, logistics enables movement and 

maintenance of forces from preparation and initial deployment to the envisioned end state 

of the operation or larger campaign (see Figure V-1). This requires commanders to plan 

and establish the logistic systems that flow sufficient logistics through the lodgment(s) 

created to support follow-on operations. Logistic planning must account for early resupply 

of initial assault forces as these forces will generally be employed with limited on-hand 

capacities. 

For additional information on deployment and redeployment planning, see JP 3-35, 

Deployment and Redeployment Operations, and for logistic consideration, planning, and 

execution see the JP 4-0 Series. 

2. Specific Logistic Considerations for Supporting Forcible Entry Operations 

 Logistic planning for the phases of forcible entry operations occurs concurrently, not 

sequentially. Planning should address the logistic core capabilities as identified in Figure 

V-2. The following specific planning considerations supplement those detailed in JP 4-0, 

Joint Logistics, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

a. Phase I (Preparation and Deployment)

(1) Identify and coordinate for ISBs as required. 

(2) Identify time-phased logistic requirements. 

(3) Develop prioritized transportation requirements. 

(4) Analyze capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of APODs and APOEs, 

SPODs and SPOEs, coastal areas for JLOTS, and operational area infrastructure to support 

projected operations. 

(5) Determine air, land, and sea LOC requirements to support forcible entry and 

subsequent operations. 
Chapter V 

V-2 JP 3-18 

(6) Determine logistic factors and establish airhead and beachhead resupply 

responsibility. 

(7) Analyze force health protection and health service support planning 

considerations. 

(8) Analyze and/or assess multinational support and contractor capabilities to 

support operations. 

(9) Analyze and recommend changes to TPFDL flow to ensure that adequate 

support will be available. 

(10) Integrate and synchronize logistic support of initial and subsequent flow of 

forces into the operational area. 

b. Phase II (Assault)

(1) Analyze potential lodgment area to ensure continuous air and sea landing of 

personnel, equipment, and logistic resources, as well as availability of facilities. 

(2) Provide adequate medical support and evacuation to support concurrent or 

integrated assaults by amphibious, airborne, air assault, and SOF. 

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Geography

Transportation Considerations

Logistic Capabilities

Logistic Enhancements

Protection of Logistics

Responsive Echeloned Support

Multinational Support

Contractor Support

Assignment of Responsibility

Risk Analysis

Demands of an Expanding Force

Critical Items

System Constraints

Movement Control

Resupply Systems

Intermediate Staging Base

Figure V-1. Planning Considerations 
Logistics 

V-3 

c. Phase III (Stabilization of the Lodgment)

(1) Project and/or resolve restrictions and/or limitations in the capability to 

support force flow. 

(2) Determine means of delivery and capacities to maximize combat power. 

(3) Identify and plan advanced logistic bases in support of the joint force 

operational concept. Unless additional forcible entry operations are anticipated, planning 

for follow-on operations will be in accordance with standard joint force logistic planning 

doctrine in JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. 

(4) Seek methods to maximize and expand throughput capabilities of APODs and 

SPODs. 

(5) Develop provisions to clear reinforcing supplies and equipment from off-load 

points. 

LOGISTIC CORE CAPABILITIES

Supply Operations

Maintenance Operations

Operational Engineering

Logistic Services

Operational Contract Support

Health Services

Distribution and Deployment

Figure V-2. Logistic Core Capabilities
Chapter V 

V-4 JP 3-18 

(6) Analyze requirements to expand the lodgment with regard to maximum on 

ground capabilities, throughput, and infrastructure. 

d. Phase IV (Introduction of Follow-on Forces)

(1) Identify mission support requirements for follow-on operations. 

(2) Begin MPF and APS afloat operations. 

(3) Continue buildup of preplanned supplies. 

(4) Initiate general engineering and construction plans for support to follow-on 

operations. 

(5) Plan for reconstitution and redeployment of the assault force for follow-on 

operations. 

e. Phase V (Termination or Transition Operations)

(1) Redeploy and/or reconstitute assault forces as appropriate. 

(2) Plan for preparing the force for follow-on, out-of-area operations, such as 

redeployment to another geographical area. 

(3) Once plans have formally addressed and integrated all seven core logistic 

capabilities, the force should be well prepared to begin the application of those functions 

that support operational execution (see Figure V-2). 
APPENDIX A 

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT OPERATIONS 

A-1 

1. Purpose 

 This appendix provides an overview of amphibious assault operations. For detailed 

information on amphibious assault and other amphibious operations, see JP 3-02, 

Amphibious Operations. 

2. Amphibious Operations 

 Factors that influence a commanderís decision to elect an amphibious assault as the 

type of forcible entry operation to be conducted include its mobility, flexibility in task 

organization, ability to rapidly build up combat power ashore, and sustainability. 

Amphibious assault operations can exploit the element of surprise and capitalize on enemy 

weakness by projecting combat power at the most advantageous location and time. As with 

other types of forcible entry operations, the threat of an amphibious assault can induce 

enemies to divert forces, establish or reinforce defensive positions, divert major resources, 

or disperse forces. 

a. Characteristics. An amphibious assault is a complex operation normally requiring 

well coordinated support from the entire joint force and thus is best executed by a well 

trained and rehearsed joint force. An amphibious operation is executed within a clearly 

defined operational area, either an AOA or an AO with a HIDACZ. This operational area 

includes land surfaces, water surfaces and subsurfaces, and the airspace above them. 

b. Amphibious Force Composition. An AF is composed of an ATF and an LF 

together with other forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious 

operations. 

(1) An ATF is defined as a Navy task organization formed to conduct amphibious 

operations. 

(2) An LF is defined as a Marine Corps or Army task organization formed to 

conduct amphibious operations. 

3. Organization and Command 

a. Establishing Authority. The establishing authority is the JFC, Service component 

commander, or functional component commander assigned overall responsibility for the 

operation. The establishing authority is responsible for establishing communications 

channels with assigned forces to facilitate planning prior to promulgation of the initiating 

directive, and for coordinating requirements which cannot be met from within the AF. The 

command relationship established during amphibious assault operations is an important 

decision. The type of relationship chosen should be based on the mission, nature and 
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-18 

duration of the operation, force capabilities, C2 capabilities, and recommendations from 

subordinate commanders. Relationships and detailed principles and guidance for an 

amphibious assault are described in JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations. 

b. Principles of Amphibious Organization. Considerations that govern task 

organization of forces for any combat operation apply to amphibious operations. However, 

the organization for execution of the amphibious operation reflects complex 

interrelationships at every level among the elements of the LF, naval forces, SOF, and 

participating Air Force forces. These interrelationships dictate that special emphasis be 

given to task grouping and economy. 

(1) Task Grouping. After the mission is analyzed and necessary forces are 

allocated, they are assigned to task groups according to their respective functions in support 

of the amphibious operation. 

(2) Economy. Amphibious operations make extensive demands on shipping. 

Limited availability of these assets requires that the landing force be composed of only 

those units necessary to accomplish the mission. There must, however, be a balance 

between resource constraints and the decisive force necessary to successfully conduct a 

forcible entry operation. 

(3) Chains of Command. The JFC, or establishing authority, has the authority to 

organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the CONOPS. The JFC 

ensures unity of effort in achieving the amphibious objectives by establishing unity of 

command over AFs. Accordingly, he or she will choose a command relationship between 

the CATF and CLF appropriate to the mission. Elements of the AF (ATF and LF) may be 

embarked on the same platforms, but responsible to different, or parallel, chains of 

command. Such parallel chains create special requirements for coordination. The CATF is 

a Navy officer responsible for the Navy task organization formed to conduct amphibious 

operations. The CLF is a Marine Corps or Army officer responsible for the Marine and/or 

Army task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations. 

c. Navy Forces. The Navy component of the AF, which may consist of US and 

multinational forces, is organized according to the separate functional tasks required to meet 

the operational requirements. The key operational characteristics upon which the Navy 

organization is based include movement, force protection, power projection, functional 

control, NSFS, surveillance, deception, logistics, and SO. Each task group may be 

organized separately, or several may be combined based upon operational requirements. 

d. Landing Forces

(1) Landing Force. The LF component of the AF is composed of Marine Corps, 

Army, or both forces. It consists of command, combat, combat support, and combat service 

support forces. It is task-organized to conduct ship-to-shore movement of personnel and 

materiel by air and surface. It also coordinates NSFS and external air support and provides 

assault support, CAS, and logistics to landing force units during the assault phase of an 
Amphibious Assault Operations 

A-3 

amphibious operation. Both the MPF and, when available, APS-3 (afloat) programs are 

ideally suited to support Phase IV (Introduction of Follow-on Forces) of a forcible entry 

operation. 

(2) Marine Air-Ground Task Force. A MAGTF is comprised of a command 

element, a ground combat element, an aviation combat element, and a logistics combat 

element (LCE). (Army and multinational forces are composed of elements similar to the 

MAGTF when conducting amphibious assault operations. However, the exact composition 

of their forces will depend on the situation and the needs of the JFC.) The MAGTF will 

vary in size depending on the requirements of the AF mission. Notional task organizations 

include the Marine expeditionary force (MEF), Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB), and 

Marine expeditionary unit (MEU). 

(3) Marine Expeditionary Force. The MEF may range in size from less than 

one full division to several divisions, an aircraft wing or wings, and a Marine logistics 

group or groups. A division-sized MEF consists of one division, one wing, and one Marine 

logistics group; the ground combat element includes nine infantry battalions in three 

regiments. Normally, a force of this size would include one artillery regiment, a tank 

battalion, an assault amphibious battalion, a light armored reconnaissance battalion, a 

combat engineer battalion, and a reconnaissance battalion. The aviation combat element 

consists of a Marine aircraft wing with fixed-wing and vertical and/or short takeoff and 

landing aircraft . The LCE of a MEF is a Marine logistics group that can provide supplies, 

maintenance, engineering, motor transport, and medical and dental care for 60 days. 

(4) Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The MEB is a mid-sized MAGTF that 

provides CCDRs with an extremely flexible expeditionary force. Commanded by a general 

officer, a MEB is normally built around a ground combat element of a reinforced infantry 

regiment. The aviation combat element consists of a Marine aircraft group with fixed-wing 

and vertical and/or short takeoff and landing aircraft squadrons. The LCE is a combat 

logistics regiment that is organized to provide the full spectrum of combat service support 

to the MEB. As an expeditionary force, the MEB is capable of rapid deployment and 

employment via amphibious shipping and strategic airlift and sealift, marrying with 

maritime or geographical pre-positioning force assets or any combination thereof. The 

MEB is a complete fighting force with a self-sustainment capability of 30 days. It can 

function alone, as a logical follow-on force to the MEU, a part of the JTF, or as the lead 

element of a MEF. 

(5) Marine Expeditionary Unit. The MEU is comprised of a reinforced infantry 

battalion and a reinforced aircraft squadron. Usually sea-based, the MEU is the most 

responsive MAGTF. The LCE of a MEU is a combat logistics battalion. It normally is 

prepared to operate with 15 days of ammunition, supplies, and medical support. It can be 

reinforced or resupplied rapidly. Usually embarked aboard three to five Navy amphibious 

ships, the MEU may also be airlifted. Two to three MEUs usually are deployed forward or 

standing ready for immediate movement to forward combat areas or peacetime crisis points. 
Appendix A 

A-4 JP 3-18 

(6) Maritime Pre-positioning Force and Army Afloat Pre-positioning. See 

Chapter IV, ìOperations,î for a discussion of the MPF and APS-3 (afloat) programs. 

e. Air Force Forces

(1) When self-deploying Air Force forces are made available to support an 

amphibious operation by the JFC, they will normally be task-organized under the command 

of an Air Force officer who is established by the JFC as a supporting commander with the 

CATF established as a supported commander. 

(2) When the Air Forces supporting the amphibious operation are provided by the 

USAF component of the joint force, the Air Force component commander should provide a 

USAF liaison officer to advise the CATF concerning the total air effort in the AOA. 

f. Advance Force. The advance force precedes the main AF to begin shaping and 

gathering information on the operational area. Forward-deployed AFs normally have an 

embarked naval special warfare task unit, consisting of a sea-air-land platoon, a special boat 

unit detachment, and US Marine Corps reconnaissance units. These forces may conduct 

reconnaissance, hydrographic surveys, and direct action missions, which will provide 

critical information to the CATF and CLF. A naval special warfare liaison detachment is 

normally available to the CATF for these missions. 

g. Planning Relationships. Operational planning for an amphibious operation is 

designed to ensure that both ATF and LF considerations are adequately factored into the 

operational decision. The CATF and CLF are responsible for preparation of the overall 

plan and are coequal in planning matters. 

4. Termination of the Amphibious Operations 

 When the amphibious mission has been completed, the CATF and CLF will 

recommend termination of the amphibious operation and, if required, the disestablishment 

of the AOA or AO, as appropriate. The JFC, or other designated superior commander, 

provides positive instructions governing termination of the operation and, if possible, 

command arrangements, force dispositions, and operations to be in effect following 

termination of the amphibious operation. 

5. Transition 

 As conditions permit, the buildup of forces and supplies for follow-on operations is 

conducted as specified in the initiating directive. The termination of the amphibious 

operation depends on the accomplishment of the AF mission. The establishment of the LF 

ashore may be specified as one of the conditions. When the AF mission is to establish a 

lodgment, the beachhead must be secure and sufficient forces must be established ashore to 

ensure continuous landings to support subsequent operations. C2 systems and supporting 

arms coordination facilities must be established ashore, and the CLF must be ready to 

assume responsibility for subsequent operations. When follow-on operations are to be 
Amphibious Assault Operations 

A-5 

conducted by forces other than the LF, these forces must be in position and ready to initiate 

operations as directed. 
Appendix A 

A-6 JP 3-18 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX B 

AIRBORNE AND AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS 

B-1 

1. Purpose 

 This appendix provides an overview of airborne and air assault operations. 

2. Airborne and Air Assault Operations 

 Joint airborne and air assault operations involve the air movement and delivery of 

specially trained combat forces and logistic support into an objective area to execute a 

mission. Airborne and air assault forces provide the commander with the unique ability to 

quickly respond on short notice and mass rapidly on critical targets. Airborne operations 

are executed by specially trained forces and can be launched at a considerable distance from 

the target area with such speed as to cause tactical or operational surprise and prevent 

effective action by the enemy. Airborne forces can secure and/or destroy critical 

installations, facilities or terrain; reinforce US and multinational forces; and conduct a show 

of force or attack an adversary in isolated areas. Air assault operations increase mobility 

and freedom of action by providing operational and tactical mobility for both the offense 

and defense. Air operations enable forces to reduce time and space limitations normally 

encountered in movement of assault forces by land, cross terrain obstacles, bypass hostile 

areas, and attack, destroy, and/or seize objectives deep in enemy territory. Each component 

can significantly contribute to the successful execution of airborne and air assault 

operations. 

a. Concept. Airborne and air assault forces are capable of conducting operations in 

support of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. They land intact with weapons, 

ammunition, and other combat equipment and are prepared for combat immediately. 

Airborne forces aggressively seize and hold objectives until linkup is accomplished. An 

airborne operation usually terminates upon seizure of the objective, linkup with other 

ground forces, or extraction. Air assault operations are deliberate, precisely planned, and 

vigorously executed to strike over extended distances. 

b. Characteristics. Airborne and air assault forces share many of the same 

capabilities. They can extend the battlefield, move, and rapidly concentrate combat power 

quicker than land forces. Airborne and air assault forces also share the same limitations. 

They are dependent on the availability of airlift assets, fire support, and combat service 

support resources; they are highly vulnerable to enemy attack by ground and air forces 

while en route to the LZ and/or DZ; and are equally assailable when operating in open 

terrain against an armored threat or WMD. Environmental conditions and adverse weather 

can also impact performance. There are four phases of airborne operations: marshalling, 

air movement, landing, and ground tactical phases. Air assault operations have five phases: 

staging, loading, air movement, landing, and ground tactical phases. 
Appendix B 

B-2 JP 3-18 

3. Organization and Command 

a. Planning. From the time an operation is announced until it is completed or 

terminated, echelons of participating components coordinate continuously. The 

commander, joint task force initiates airborne and/or air assault operations with a planning 

directive to participating units. The directive is distributed through normal command 

channels and pertinent information is issued to subordinate units. After receipt of a 

directive and preparation of initial estimates and studies, the commanders, staffs, and 

representatives of supporting forces meet in a joint conference to develop a CONOPS. The 

CONOPS forms the basis for the preparation of the commanderís planning directive and 

development of OPLANs and OPORDs, including a list of forces in support, a schedule of 

events, and stated conditions under which the operation will begin, be delayed, altered, or 

terminated. 

b. Coordination. Airborne and air assault commanders begin planning operations 

with a visualization of the ground tactical plan and work through a reverse-planning 

sequence. Planning for airborne and air assault operations is as detailed as time permits. 

For airborne operations, this sequence includes the development of a ground tactical plan, 

landing plan, air movement plan, and marshalling plan. For air assault operations the 

sequence is the same, but instead of a marshalling plan, loading and staging plans are 

developed. Direct liaison and coordination between the logistic support agencies of the 

participating components and other supporting forces occur during the preliminary planning 

stages. For airborne and air assault operations, intelligence systems assist in accomplishing 

strategic objectives, including all factors which will impact the arrival of forces into the 

objective area, establishment of airheads and lodgments, and linkup of forces in preparation 

for follow-on operations. Also included in the planning process are the following: 

counterair, IO, logistics, joint fire support, force protection, special operations, engineer 

support, PA, and military police. When developing the OPLAN, the JFC anticipates that 

assault forces may face natural and man-made obstacles that are intended to restrict their 

movement so that the enemy can mass its forces and repel the assault. Combat engineers 

facilitate insertion of assault forces and prepare the onward movement to the objective by 

clearing breaches, roads, and airfields of mines and obstacles. 

c. Command. The JFC may initiate joint airborne and/or air assault operations in 

support of strategic and/or operational objectives. The complexity of airborne and air 

assault operations and their vulnerability require an exceptional degree of unity of effort and 

operational coherence. The initiating directive is an order to the airborne and/or air assault 

commander to conduct the operation. It is issued by the JFC delegated overall authority for 

the operation. JFCs establish command relationships and assign authority to subordinates 

based on the operational situation, the complexity of the mission, and the degree of control 

needed to ensure that strategic intent is satisfied. 

d. Control. Airspace C2, established boundaries, ability to communicate, and the 

effective employment of intelligence and EW are key elements in facilitating effective C2 

of airborne and air assault operations. The airborne force commander establishes a standard 

C2 system by defining the functions and responsibilities of key personnel, ensuring that all 
Airborne and Air Assault Operations 

B-3 

preliminary operational planning is accomplished, and publishing OPLANs and orders. Air 

assault operations feature extended distances and speed of execution. To work swiftly 

under pressure, efforts must be integrated and synchronized. Effective liaison between 

operational elements of an airborne and/or air assault operation and with higher authorities 

will facilitate mutual understanding, unity of purpose, and unity of action. 

e. Forces

(1) US Army Airborne forces are committed to combat by parachute assault, air 

landed operations, or by a combination of these two methods. Normally, airborne 

operations are initiated by parachute assault conducted by an airborne infantry brigade 

combat team. Parachute assault permits delivery of combined arms teams into the airhead 

in less time than air landed operations require. Once the assault phase is initiated, it is 

followed by one or more of the following: a defensive phase; an offensive phase; or an 

extraction phase. 

(2) The initial assault stresses the coordinated action of small units to seize initial 

objectives before the advantage of surprise has worn off. After the initial assault landings 

accomplish the initial ground missions, commanders must organize the airhead line. 

Airborne forces defend to protect and retain areas or installations seized during the assault 

phase of the operation. Because an airborne assault is most often conducted in the enemy 

rear, an all-around defense is required. Units can be airlanded on terrain under the control 

of friendly forces near the line of contact or on secured locations in the enemyís rear; 

however, it takes time to land a sizable force and a secured LZ is necessary. Even when 

multiple LZs are employed, it takes longer to mass forces in the airhead during airland 

operations than during parachute operations. Subsequent operations can include continued 

defense of the airhead, linkup, passage of lines, relief, withdrawal, or offensive operations, 

to include exploitation or further airborne and/or air assaults. 

(3) Air Assault. Whether performed from the sea or from an ISB on land, 

aviation and combined arms provides the JFC with a remarkably agile fighting force 

capable of conducting both offensive and defensive operations. The air assault attack (hasty 

or deliberate) is the basic type of offensive operation conducted by air assault forces. Other 

types of offensive strategies include exploitation, pursuit, secure and defend, reconnaissance 

in force, and raids. Defense is a coordinated effort by a force to defeat an attacker and 

prevent the enemy from achieving its objectives. An air assault force screening force 

provides early warning over an extended frontage. Guard force missions, covering force 

missions, reinforcement of committed units, linkup operations, gap crossing operations, 

security operations, limited visibility operations, and ship-to-shore operations must all be 

considered during air assault operations. 

(4) Sustainment. Minimum sustainment elements accompany airborne forces into 

the airhead or lodgment. They perform most essential services in the marshalling area or 

they defer them. Sustainment is normally divided into three echelons during deployment: 

assault, follow-on, and rear echelons. Sustainment of these forces is helped by distribution 

of supplies, resupply by air including planned resupply, immediate airdrop resupply, and 
Appendix B 

B-4 JP 3-18 

emergency airdrop resupply requests; maintenance during airborne operations; 

transportation; and health services support. The air assault force is supported by both 

organic and external elements organized to push supplies, materiel, fuel, and ammunition 

forward by air. The exact organization and disposition of the assault and follow-on 

sustainment elements is a function of the air assault forceís mission and anticipated followon operations. 

4. Termination or Transition 

a. Airborne/air assault operations will normally transition combat operations to followon forces. However, the JFC should prepare contingency plans for the possibility that 

follow-on forces are unable to relieve the airborne/air assault force. The follow-on 

operation would be one of the following: 

(1) Withdrawal or evacuation of units. 

(2) Linkup with ground forces. 

(3) Exfiltration. 

(4) Breakout from encirclement. 

b. As conditions permit, the build up of forces and supplies continues and follow-on 

operations commence. The airfield transitions from being seized, to being improved for use 

as an airbase suitable for joint operations. 
APPENDIX C 

REFERENCES 

C-1 

The development of JP 3-18 is based upon the following primary references: 

1. Department of Defense Publications 

 DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major

Components. 

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications 

a. CJCSI 3110.10D, Command, Control, Communications, and Computer System 

Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). 

b. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of 

Force for US Forces. 

c. CJCSI 5120.02, Joint Doctrine Development System. 

d. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01A, Joint Operation 

Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I Planning Policies and Procedures. 

e. CJCSM 3122.03C, JOPES Volume II, Planning Formats. 

f. CJCSM 3122.02C, JOPES Volume III, (Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and 

Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution). 

g. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

h. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 

i. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. 

j. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 

k. JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

l. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats. 

m. JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations. 

n. JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction. 

o. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. 
Appendix C 

C-2 JP 3-18 

p. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support. 

q. JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support (CAS). 

r. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater. 

s. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

Environments. 

t. JP 3-13, Information Operations. 

u. JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare. 

v. JP 3-13.2, Psychological Operations. 

w. JP 3-13.3, Operations Security. 

x. JP 3-13.4, Military Deception. 

y. JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations. 

z. JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations. 

aa. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 

bb. JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations. 

cc. JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations. 

dd. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

ee. JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations. 

ff. JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations. 

gg. JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

hh. JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control. 

ii. JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. 

jj. JP 3-61, Public Affairs. 

kk. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. 
References 

C-3 

ll. JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore(JLOTS). 

mm. JP 4-02, Health Service Support. 

nn. JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations. 

oo. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

pp. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System. 

3. Multi-Service Publications 

 Field Manual (FM) 3-52.2/ Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-25F/Navy 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-56.2/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures (Instruction) (AFTTP[I]) 3-2.17, TAGS: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System. 

4. US Army Publications 

a. FM 3-0, Operations. 

b. FM 3-05, Army Special Operations Forces. 

c. FM 4-0, Combat Service Support. 

d. FM 90-4, Air Assault Operations. 

e. FM 90-26, Airborne Operations. 

5. US Naval Publications 

a. Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare. 

b. NTTP 3-02.2, Supporting Arms Coordination in Amphibious Operations. 

6. US Marine Corps Publications 

a. Marine Corps Doctrine Publication (MCDP) 1, Strategy. 

b. MCDP 1-2, Campaigning. 

c. MCDP 1-3, Tactics. 

d. MCDP 3, Expeditionary Operations. 

e. MCDP 6, Command and Control. 
Appendix C 

C-4 JP 3-18 

f. Marine Corps Capabilities Plan, Volume One and Volume Two. 

7. US Air Force Publications 

a. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine. 

b. AFDD 2-1.1, Counterair Operations. 

c. AFDD 2-1.2, Strategic Attack. 

d. AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland Operations. 

e. AFDD 2-1.8, Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Operations. 

f. AFDD 2-5, Information Operations. 
APPENDIX D 

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

D-1 

1. User Comments 

 Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: 

Doctrine Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments 

should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and 

appearance. 

2. Authorship 

 The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for 

this publication is the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7). 

3. Supersession 

 This publication supersedes JP 3-18, 16 July 2001, Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry 

Operations. 

4. Change Recommendations 

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

TO: HQDA WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-SSP// 

INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD// 

 CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//JT10// 

 Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting 

Center, Joint Doctrine Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for Operational Plans 

and Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. 

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that 

directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. 

The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when 

changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated. 
Appendix D 

D-2 JP 3-18 

c. Record of Changes: 

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED 

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS 

_____________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________ 

5. Distribution of Publications 

 Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. 

However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be 

in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, Information Security Program. 

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications 

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET), and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil 

(SIPRNET) and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). 

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the 

combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication 

to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy 

(Defense AttachÈ Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 

Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400. 

c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and 

deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications. 
GLOSSARY 

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

GL-1 

AADC area air defense commander 

AAGS Army air-ground system 

ACA airspace control authority 

ADC air defense commander 

ADZ amphibious defense zone 

AF amphibious force 

AFDD Air Force doctrine document 

AO area of operations 

AOA amphibious objective area 

APOD aerial port of debarkation 

APOE aerial port of embarkation 

APS Army pre-positioned stocks 

ATF amphibious task force 

BCT brigade combat team 

C2 command and control 

CA civil affairs 

CAF commander, airborne/air assault force 

CAP crisis action planning 

CAS close air support 

CATF commander, amphibious task force 

CCDR combatant commander 

CDRJSOTF commander, joint special operations task force 

CI counterintelligence 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual 

CLF commander, landing force 

CMO civil-military operations 

CNA computer network attack 

CND computer network defense 

CNE computer network exploitation 

CNO computer network operations 

COA course of action 

CONOPS concept of operations 

CRG contingency response group 

DOD Department of Defense 

DSPD defense support to public diplomacy 

DZ drop zone 

EW electronic warfare 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-18 

FHA foreign humanitarian assistance 

FM field manual 

FSCM fire support coordination measure 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

HIDACZ high-density airspace control zone 

IO information operations 

ISB intermediate staging base 

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff 

J-6 communications system directorate of a joint staff 

JFACC joint force air component commander 

JFC joint force commander 

JFLCC joint force land component commander 

JFMCC joint force maritime component commander 

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment 

JLOTS joint logistics over-the-shore 

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 

JOPP joint operation planning process 

JP joint publication 

JSOA joint special operations area 

JSOTF joint special operations task force 

JTF joint task force 

LCE logistics combat element 

LF landing force 

LOC line of communications 

LZ landing zone 

MACCS Marine air command and control system 

MAGTF Marine air-ground task force 

MCDP Marine Corps doctrine publication 

MCM mine countermeasures 

MEB Marine expeditionary brigade 

MEF Marine expeditionary force 

MEU Marine expeditionary unit 

MILDEC military deception 

MPF maritime pre-positioning force 

NMS national military strategy 

NSFS naval surface fire support 

NTACS Navy tactical air control system 

NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures 
Glossary 

GL-3 

OPLAN operation plan 

OPORD operation order 

OPSEC operations security 

PA public affairs 

PSYOP psychological operations 

RADC regional air defense commander 

ROE rules of engagement 

SADC sector air defense commander 

SATCOM satellite communications 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SLOC sea line of communications 

SO special operations 

SOF special operations forces 

SPOD seaport of debarkation 

SPOE seaport of embarkation 

TACC tactical air control center 

TACP tactical air control party 

TACS theater air control system 

TACSAT tactical satellite 

TF task force 

TPFDL time-phased force and deployment list 

TSOC theater special operations command 

UHF ultrahigh frequency 

USAF United States Air Force 

UW unconventional warfare 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 
Glossary 

GL-4 JP 3-18 

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

Unless otherwise annotated, this publication is the proponent for all terms and definitions 

found in the glossary. Upon approval, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, will reflect this publication as the source document for 

these terms and definitions. 

air assault. The movement of friendly assault forces (combat, combat support, and combat 

service support) by rotary-wing aircraft to engage and destroy enemy forces or to seize 

and hold key terrain. (JP 3-18) 

air assault force. A force composed primarily of ground and rotary-wing air units 

organized, equipped, and trained for air assault operations. (JP 3-18) 

air assault operation. An operation in which assault forces (combat, combat support, and 

combat service support), using the mobility of rotary-wing assets and the total 

integration of available firepower, maneuver under the control of a ground or air 

maneuver commander to engage enemy forces or to seize and hold key terrain. (JP 

3-18) 

airborne operation. An operation involving the air movement into an objective area of 

combat forces and their logistic support for execution of a tactical, operational, or 

strategic mission. The means employed may be any combination of airborne units, air 

transportable units, and types of transport aircraft, depending on the mission and the 

overall situation. (JP 3-18) 

air control operations. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

airhead. 1. A designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that, when 

seized and held, ensures the continuous air landing of troops and materiel and provides 

the maneuver space necessary for projected operations. Normally it is the area seized 

in the assault phase of an airborne operation. 2. A designated location in an 

operational area used as a base for supply and evacuation by air. (This term and its 

definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in 

JP 1-02.) 

airhead line. A line denoting the limits of the objective area for an airborne assault. The 

airhead line is bounded by assault objectives that are operationally located to ensure 

that enemy fires cannot be brought to bear on the main objective and for friendly forces 

to conduct defensive operations in depth. (JP 3-18) 

alert. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-5 

amphibious assault. The principal type of amphibious operation that involves establishing 

a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. (JP 3-02) 

amphibious objective area. A geographical area (delineated for command and control 

purposes in the order initiating the amphibious operation) within which is located the 

objective(s) to be secured by the amphibious force. This area must be of sufficient size 

to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious force’s mission and must provide 

sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations. Also called 

AOA. (JP 3-02) 

amphibious task force. A Navy task organization formed to conduct amphibious 

operations. The amphibious task force, together with the landing force and other 

forces, constitutes the amphibious force. Also called ATF. (JP 3-02) 

assault. 1. The climax of an attack, closing with the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting. 2. 

In an amphibious operation, the period of time between the arrival of the major assault 

forces of the amphibious task force in the objective area and the accomplishment of the 

amphibious task force mission. 3. To make a short, violent, but well-ordered attack 

against a local objective, such as a gun emplacement, a fort, or a machine gun nest. 4. 

A phase of an airborne operation beginning with delivery by air of the assault echelon 

of the force into the objective area and extending through attack of assault objectives 

and consolidation of the initial airhead. (JP 3-18) 

beachhead. A designated area on a hostile or potentially hostile shore that, when seized 

and held, ensures the continuous landing of troops and materiel, and provides 

maneuver space requisite for subsequent projected operations ashore. (JP 3-02) 

combined arms team. The full integration and application of two or more arms or 

elements of one Military Service into an operation. (JP 3-18) 

commander, amphibious task force. The Navy officer designated in the order initiating 

the amphibious operation as the commander of the amphibious task force. Also called 

CATF. (JP 3-02) 

commander, landing force. The officer designated in the order initiating the amphibious 

operation as the commander of the landing force for an amphibious operation. Also 

called CLF. (JP 3-02) 

communications center. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

connectivity. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

covering force. 1. A force operating apart from the main force for the purpose of 

intercepting, engaging, delaying, disorganizing, and deceiving the enemy before the 

enemy can attack the force covered. 2. Any body or detachment of troops which 
Glossary 

GL-6 JP 3-18 

provides security for a larger force by observation, reconnaissance, attack, or defense, 

or by any combination of these methods. (JP 3-18) 

forcible entry. Seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. 

(JP 3-18) 

landing force. A Marine Corps or Army task organization formed to conduct amphibious 

operations. The landing force, together with the amphibious task force and other 

forces, constitute the amphibious force. Also called LF. (JP 3-02) 

lodgment. A designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that, when 

seized and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and 

provides maneuver space for subsequent operations. (This term and its definition 

modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

Marine expeditionary brigade. A Marine air-ground task force that is constructed around 

a reinforced infantry regiment, a composite Marine aircraft group, and a combat 

logistics regiment. The Marine expeditionary brigade, commanded by a general 

officer, is task-organized to meet the requirements of a specific situation. It can 

function as part of a joint task force, as the lead echelon of the Marine expeditionary 

force, or alone. It varies in size and composition, and is larger than a Marine 

expeditionary unit but smaller than a Marine expeditionary force. The Marine 

expeditionary brigade is capable of conducting missions across the full range of 

military operations. Also called MEB. (This term and its definition modify the 

existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

seize. To employ combat forces to occupy physically and to control a designated area. (JP 

3-18) 

staging base. 1. An advanced naval base for the anchoring, fueling, and refitting of 

transports and cargo ships as well as replenishment of mobile service squadrons. 2. A 

landing and takeoff area with minimum servicing, supply, and shelter provided for the 

temporary occupancy of military aircraft during the course of movement from one 

location to another. (JP 3-18) 

vertical envelopment. A tactical maneuver in which troops, either air-dropped or airlanded, attack the rear and flanks of a force, in effect cutting off or encircling the force. 

(JP 3-18) 
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ENHANCED

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WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to fill

extant operational void

US Joint Forces Command

(USJFCOM) conducts front-end

analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and

releases PD to lead agent (LA)

(Service, combatant command, JS

directorate)

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the

development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 3-18 Operations