06 January 2009

Space Operations

Joint Publication 3-14
PREFACE 

i 

1. Scope 

This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing joint 

space operations. 

2. Purpose

 This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for 

interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It 

provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and 

other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, 

education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in 

preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the 

authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the 

JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the 

overall objective. 

3. Application 

 a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, 

commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, 

subordinate components of these commands, and the Services. 

 b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances 

dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the 

contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. 

Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military 
Preface 

ii JP 3-14 

command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United 

States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should 

evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where 

applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine. 

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

STANLEY A. MCCHRYSTAL 

Lieutenant General, USA 

Director, Joint Staff 
iii 

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-14 

DATED 09 AUGUST 2002 

• Realigns space operations missions from US Space Command to US Strategic 

Command 

• Discusses space operations and the principles of joint operations consistent 

with Joint Publication 3-0 

• Updates missions in the space force enhancement mission area 

• Adds rendezvous and proximity operations in the space support mission area 

• Adds and defines offensive space control, defensive space control, and space 

situational awareness within the space control mission area 

• Discusses command and control relationships of space forces 

• Adds, defines, and discusses the space coordinating authority 

• Provides an example of implementation of a space coordinating authority's 

duties 

• Adds, updates, and outlines the responsibility of the Joint Functional 

Component Command for Space as well as other joint functional component 

commands, Service components, combat support agencies, and other 

agencies and organizations 
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 3-14 

Intentionally Blank 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

v 

 PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....................................................................................................ix 

 

CHAPTER I 

 FUNDAMENTALS OF MILITARY SPACE OPERATIONS 

SECTION A. MILITARY SPACE CONTRIBUTIONS TO JOINT OPERATIONS .... I-1 

• General ........................................................................................................................... I-1 

• Space and the Principles of Joint Operations ................................................................ I-2 

SECTION B. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR SPACE............................... I-7 

• General ........................................................................................................................... I-7 

• Characteristics of Space ................................................................................................. I-8 

CHAPTER II 

 SPACE MISSION AREAS 

SECTION A. SPACE FORCE ENHANCEMENT .......................................................... II-1 

• General .......................................................................................................................... II-1 

• Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance .......................................................... II-1 

• Missile Warning ............................................................................................................ II-1 

• Environmental Monitoring ........................................................................................... II-2 

• Satellite Communications ............................................................................................. II-2 

• Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing ..................................................... II-3 

SECTION B. SPACE SUPPORT ..................................................................................... II-3 

• General .......................................................................................................................... II-3 

• Spacelift Operations ...................................................................................................... II-3 

• Satellite Operations ....................................................................................................... II-4 

• Rendezvous and Proximity Operations ........................................................................ II-4 

• Reconstitution of Space Forces .................................................................................... II-5 

SECTION C. SPACE CONTROL .................................................................................... II-5 

• General .......................................................................................................................... II-5 

• Offensive Space Control ............................................................................................... II-6 

• Defensive Space Control .............................................................................................. II-6 

• Space Situational Awareness ........................................................................................ II-7 

SECTION D. SPACE FORCE APPLICATION ............................................................ II-10 

• Space Force Application ............................................................................................. II-10 

CHAPTER III 

 COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SPACE FORCES 

• General ........................................................................................................................ III-1 
Table of Contents 

vi JP 3-14 

• Command Relationships ............................................................................................. III-1 

• Responsibilities ........................................................................................................... III-2 

• Space Coordinating Authority .................................................................................... III-2 

• Role of Non-Department of Defense Capabilities ..................................................... III-3 

CHAPTER IV 

 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

• General ........................................................................................................................ IV-1 

SECTION A. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND 

COMBATANT COMMANDERS ................................................................................... IV-1 

• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ................................................................. IV-1 

• Combatant Commanders ............................................................................................ IV-1 

SECTION B. UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND AND COMPONENTS IV-2 

• General ........................................................................................................................ IV-2 

• Joint Functional Component Command for Space .................................................... IV-3 

• Other US Strategic Command Functional Components ............................................ IV-5 

SECTION C. SERVICE COMPONENT OPERATIONS ............................................. IV-7 

• General ........................................................................................................................ IV-7 

• Army Component ....................................................................................................... IV-8 

• Marine Corps Component .......................................................................................... IV-9 

• Navy Component ........................................................................................................ IV-9 

• Air Force Component ............................................................................................... IV-10 

• Theater Support ......................................................................................................... IV-11 

SECTION D. SPACE-RELATED SUPPORT TO THE JOINT FORCE ................... IV-11 

• Combat Support Agencies ........................................................................................ IV-11 

• Other Agencies and Organizations............................................................................ IV-14 

• Commercial Space Operations.................................................................................. IV-16 

• Multinational Space Operations ............................................................................... IV-18 

CHAPTER V 

 PLANNING 

• General ......................................................................................................................... V-1 

• Operational Art and Design ......................................................................................... V-2 

• Key Planning Considerations ...................................................................................... V-5 

• Control and Coordinating Measures .......................................................................... V-11 

APPENDICES 

A Space-Based Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.............................. A-1 

B Missile Warning ...................................................................................................... B-1 
Table of Contents 

vii 

C Space-Based Environmental Monitoring Capability ............................................. C-1 

D Satellite Communications ..................................................................................... D-1 

E Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing ............................................... E-1 

F Space Support to Information Operations ............................................................. F-1 

G Operationally Responsive Space ........................................................................... G-1 

H Space Fundamentals .............................................................................................. H-1 

J References................................................................................................................. J-1 

K Administrative Instructions ................................................................................... K-1 

GLOSSARY 

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .............................................................................. GL-1 

Part II Terms and Definitions ......................................................................................... GL-6 

FIGURE 

II-1 Space Common Operational Picture Development.................................................II-9 

V-1 The Joint Space Tasking Order Process ............................................................... V-11 

B-1 Theater Missile Warning Support Request Procedures.......................................... B-3 

D-1 Military and Commercial Satellite Systems .......................................................... D-2 

E-1 The Global Positioning System Space, Control, and User Segments ................... E-3 

E-2 Force Enhancement Operations — Positioning, Navigation, and Timing ........... E-6 

H-1 Orbit Formation ..................................................................................................... H-2 

H-2 Sun-Synchronous Orbits ....................................................................................... H-4 

H-3 Orbit Types ............................................................................................................ H-5 
Table of Contents 

viii JP 3-14 

Intentionally Blank 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW 

ix 

• Describes Fundamentals of Military Space Operations 

• Describes Space Mission Areas 

• Describes Command and Control of Space Forces 

• Outlines Roles and Responsibilities 

• Outlines Support to Planning 

Fundamentals of Military Space Operations 

Space systems have 

increased the importance 

of space power to joint 

force commanders (JFCs) 

and US national interests.

The use of space capabilities by the US military has 

changed significantly since the first military satellites 

were orbited. Continuous improvements in space 

technology have led to the development of more 

advanced space systems. Space capabilities have 

proven to be a significant force multiplier when 

integrated across joint military operations. Military, 

civil, and commercial sectors of the US are 

increasingly dependent on space capabilities, and this 

dependence can be viewed by adversaries as a 

potential vulnerability. 

Space operations ensure 

JFCs have the ability, 

flexibility, and freedom of 

action to take advantage of 

the capabilities provided by 

space systems.

Space has several unique characteristics that 

differentiate it from the air, land, and sea. Accepted 

international conventions do not extend a nation’s 

geographical boundaries into Earth orbit. Therefore, 

nations enjoy unimpeded satellite overflight of other 

nations through space. Spacecraft movement is not 

significantly impeded by any of the Earth’s surface 

features (such as terrain), but instead is primarily 

governed by orbital mechanics, thereby allowing 

satellites to remain in orbit for extended periods of time 

(i.e., years). The space environment affects the 

performance of both terrestrial and space systems.

JFCs need to be aware of these characteristics (and the 

resulting operational impacts) to understand the 

capabilities and limitations of space forces while in 

support of joint operations. The special characteristics 

of space and the difficulty in gaining access present 

unique planning and operational considerations that 

affect friendly, adversary, and neutral space forces 

alike. The joint space planner must not only understand 
Executive Summary 

x JP 3-14 

planning and operational considerations for 

employment of space capabilities, but must also have a 

firm knowledge of the threats to the use of those 

systems by an adversary and understand what can be 

done to limit an adversary’s use of space capabilities 

while protecting friendly uses of space. 

The United States must be able to protect its space 

assets (and when practical and appropriate, those of its 

allies) and deny the use of space assets by its 

adversaries. Commanders must anticipate hostile 

actions that attempt to deny friendly forces access to or 

use of space capabilities. They should also anticipate 

the proliferation and increasing sophistication of space 

capabilities and products with military utility that 

could be used by an adversary for hostile purposes. 

Potential adversaries no longer have to develop the 

infrastructure necessary to obtain space capabilities; 

today, the necessary capabilities may be purchased. 

Space Mission Areas 

Military space operations 

are an integral part of joint 

operations.

The importance of space operations is increasing due to 

the enabling capabilities they provide the JFC. Space 

capabilities are essential to overall military mission 

accomplishment, provide the advantages needed for 

success in all joint operations, and support the 

principles of war. 

US space operations are comprised of four mission 

areas: space force enhancement; space support; 

space control; and space force application.

Space force enhancement 

operations increase joint 

force effectiveness of 

military forces.

Space force enhancement operations multiply joint 

force effectiveness by increasing the combat potential, 

operational awareness, and providing needed joint force 

support. There are five force enhancement functions: 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); 

missile warning; environmental monitoring; satellite 

communications; and space-based positioning, 

navigation, and timing.
Executive Summary 

xi 

Space support are 

operations to deploy and 

sustain military and 

intelligence systems in 

space.

Space support includes space lift operations 

(launching and deploying satellites), satellite operations 

(maintaining, sustaining, and rendezvous and proximity 

operations), and reconstitution of space forces 

(replenishing lost or diminished satellites). 

Space control ensures 

freedom of action in space 

for friendly forces, and 

when directed, denies an 

adversary the same.

Space control consists of offensive space control 

(OSC), defensive space control (DSC), and space 

situational awareness (SSA). OSC is used to deny 

adversary freedom of action in space and is based on 

negation and offensive prevention measures. DSC is 

used to protect space capabilities and is based on 

protection and defensive prevention measures. SSA 

involves characterizing the space capabilities operating 

within the terrestrial environment and space domain. 

Space force application 

operations are combat 

operations in, through, and 

from space to influence the 

course and outcome of 

conflict.

Space force application operations consist of attacks 

against terrestrial-based targets carried out by military 

weapons systems operating in or through space. 

Command and Control of Space Forces 

The JFC must ensure the 

integration of space 

capabilities into joint 

military operations.

Space forces are an integral part of joint military 

operations and, consistent with the Commander, United 

States Strategic Command's (CDRUSSTRATCOM’s) 

guidance, are directed to meet the requirements of 

JFCs. During mission execution, CDRUSSTRATCOM 

will retain combatant command (command authority) 

of assigned space forces and where appropriate, transfer 

operational control or tactical control with Secretary of 

Defense approval, to the JFC depending upon the 

nature of the operation and the specific space 

capability. In most cases, space capabilities are 

available to JFC but may not deploy to the operational 

area. 

CDRUSSTRATCOM will plan and organize day-today operations and publish mission-type orders for 

execution by components. To facilitate unity of the 

operational area space effort, the supported combatant 

commander (CCDR) or a JFC may designate a space 

coordinating authority (SCA). Based on the 

complexity and scope of operations, the JFC can 
Executive Summary 

xii JP 3-14 

either retain SCA or designate a component 

commander as the SCA. The JFC considers the 

mission, nature and duration of the operation, 

preponderance of space force capabilities made 

available; and the resident command and control 

capabilities (including reachback) in selecting the 

appropriate option. The SCA will coordinate space 

operations, integrate space capabilities, and have 

primary responsibility for joint space operations 

planning in the operational area. The SCA will 

coordinate space support of established objectives and 

act on behalf of the CCDR, if designated, with primary 

responsibility for joint space operations planning. 

Each CCDR staff includes personnel who are trained to 

access and use products of space-based capabilities 

(ISR, satellite communications, etc.) to support CCDR 

mission requirements. 

Roles and Responsibilities 

The joint force achieves 

maximum utility from 

space forces when 

organized and employed 

effectively.

The Services, in accordance with Department of 

Defense (DOD) directives, shall integrate space 

capabilities and applications into all facets of their 

strategy, doctrine, education, training, exercises, and 

operations of US military forces. The Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is responsible for 

establishing a uniform system for evaluating readiness 

of each combatant command and combat support 

agency to carry out assigned missions by employing 

space forces, developing joint doctrine, education, and 

training for the operation and employment of space 

systems of the Armed Forces, integrating space forces 

and their supporting industrial base into the Joint 

Strategic Capabilities Plan, formulating policies for the 

integration of National Guard and reserve forces into 

joint space activities, and providing guidance to 

combatant commanders for planning and employment 

of space capabilities through the joint planning process. 

Commander, United States 

Strategic Command 

ensures the most effective 

use of space assets.

 CDRUSSTRATCOM integrates and synchronizes 

DOD space capabilities to ensure the most effective use 

of these resources. USSTRATCOM must be able to 

quickly plan, direct, coordinate, and control space 

assets and forces for daily operations, for crisis action 

planning, and in the event of war against the United 
Executive Summary 

xiii 

States and/or its allies. 

USSTRATCOM operates assigned space forces 

through Joint Functional Component Command for 

Space — JFCC SPACE, in coordination with Service 

component commands, USSTRATCOM functional 

component commands, and other agencies and 

organizations. 

Joint Functional 

Component Command for 

Space provides support to 

JFCs to assist in 

integrating space 

capabilities.

Commander JFCC SPACE, as designated by 

CDRUSSTRATCOM, serves as the single point of 

contact for assigned military space operational matters, 

including planning, tasking, directing, and executing 

space operations using space forces. For space related 

activities, JFCC SPACE is the primary 

USSTRATCOM interface to supported commanders. 

JFCC SPACE, along with the other JFCCs, integrates 

space capabilities in support of the JFC. 

USSTRATCOM’s Service components include; Space 

and Missile Defense Command/US Army Forces 

Strategic Command, Naval Network Warfare 

Command, United States Marine Corps Forces, US 

Strategic Command, and Air Force Space Command. 

Although each service component has distinct missions, 

common responsibilities include: advocating for space 

requirements; providing a single service point of 

contact; making recommendations for the employment 

of space forces; providing space forces to 

CDRUSSTRATCOM and CCDRs; planning in support 

of space operations; and supporting 

CDRUSSTRATCOM and CCDRs with space mission 

area expertise and capabilities. 

Planning 

Joint Operations Planning Commanders must address space operations in all types 

of plans and orders, at all levels of war to effectively 

synchronize and integrate space forces within the JOA, 

to counter an adversary’s use of space, to maximize use 

of limited space assets, and consolidate operational 

requirements for space capabilities. 

CDRUSSTRATCOM, in coordination with the CJCS, 

must make quick decisions and have the capability to 

plan, direct, coordinate, and control space assets. 

Coordination of space operations between staffs of the 
Executive Summary 

xiv JP 3-14 

supported and supporting commanders is normally 

established through the designation of a SCA. The 

SCA will ensure the identification of operational 

requirements and their inclusions in the appropriate 

annexes. Space planners understand the unique 

planning and operational considerations that affect 

friendly, adversary, and neutral space forces, alike. 

CONCLUSION 

The ability to rapidly project and sustain US military 

capability worldwide is a basic requirement for the 

Armed Forces of the United States. The US military 

continuously deploys space assets and space forces, 

enhancing military capability. This publication 

establishes a framework for the use of space 

capabilities and the integration of space operations into 

joint military operations. 
CHAPTER I

FUNDAMENTALS OF MILITARY SPACE OPERATIONS 

I-1 

SECTION A. MILITARY SPACE CONTRIBUTIONS TO JOINT OPERATIONS 

1. General 

a. This publication provides guidance for planning and conducting joint space 

operations. It provides space doctrine fundamentals for all joint forces; describes the 

military operational principles associated with support from, through, and operating in 

space; explains Joint Staff, combatant command, United States Strategic Command 

(USSTRATCOM), and USSTRATCOM functional and Service component relationships 

and responsibilities; and establishes a framework for the employment of space forces and 

space capabilities. 

b. Space capabilities have proven to be a significant force multiplier when 

integrated across the range of joint military operations. To ensure effective integration, 

joint force commanders (JFCs) and space operators should have a common and clear 

understanding of how space forces and space capabilities contribute to joint operations 

and how military space operations should be integrated with other military operations to 

achieve United States (US) national security objectives. To achieve optimal military 

utility from space, commanders ensure a basic understanding of space tools and utility 

among all Services, integrate all necessary space capabilities with military utility 

(military, national, civil, commercial, and foreign), and establish a means to reasonably 

include those capabilities in operational planning, execution, and assessment activities. 

c. US military use of space capabilities has changed significantly since military 

satellites were first placed in orbit. Continuous improvements in space technology have 

led to the development of more advanced space systems. This has changed how 

commanders view space capabilities. 

(1) Vulnerability. Military, civil, and commercial sectors of the US are 

increasingly dependent on space capabilities, and this dependence is a potential 

vulnerability. The US will view purposeful interference (PI) with any element of its 

space systems (ground, communications, or orbital) as an infringement on its rights. 

When practical and authorized, the joint force will protect space capabilities of civil, 

commercial, and foreign systems. Commanders (CDRs) must anticipate hostile actions

from state and non-state actors intended to deny friendly forces access to, or use of, space 

capabilities. They should also anticipate the proliferation and increasing sophistication of 

space capabilities and products with military utility that could be used by any adversary 

"To sum it up, your Department of Defense space assets are doing 

extremely well. What often gets lost as we talk about our space programs is 

that once we get them on orbit, they tend to far outlast their design lives, and 

they deliver fabulous capability.”

 Major General William L. Shelton 

Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Space, 

US Strategic Command 

April 10, 2007 
Chapter I 

I-2 JP 3-14 

for hostile purposes. Potential adversaries no longer have to develop large infrastructures 

to obtain or interfere with space capabilities. Today, many capabilities can be easily 

purchased. Options available to exert influence or prevent an adversary’s access to space 

capabilities include diplomatic, informational, military, and economic measures. 

(2) Freedom of Action. Permits US forces to have the freedom to take 

advantage of the capabilities provided by space systems at a given time and place without 

prohibitive interference by the opposing force. Commanders must ensure current US 

military capabilities remain protected and must constantly watch for the next space threat 

to ensure US military dominance in space utility. 

(3) Global Reach and Responsiveness. Space-based capabilities are unique in 

that they are not subject to traditional air overflight restrictions and may already be in 

position to support operations when crises arise. However, there may be instances when 

the rapid surge of a capability, or the expeditious replacement of a capability, is required. 

In those cases, commanders should be aware that increasing capabilities of deployed 

space-based systems may be accomplished in hours to days, while development and 

deployment of replacement capabilities could take a year or more.

d. Space systems provide specialized capabilities and offer global force 

enhancements critical to mission success. To realize the global advantage provided by 

space capabilities, JFCs must understand their applications and prioritize them for best 

effect. 

2. Space and the Principles of Joint Operations 

 

a. National security objectives and the needs of the supported commander compel 

the conduct of space operations. Space forces both employ principles of joint operations 

and enable the application of the principles of joint operations by other joint forces. 

b. Space capabilities enable the following applications of the principles of war in 

joint operations: 

(1) Objective. The purpose of the objective is to direct military operations 

toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal. 

(a) Employing. Commander, USSTRATCOM (CDRUSSTRATCOM) 

ensures that space objectives support, or are in alignment with, the supported 

commander’s objectives and are included in planning. 

(b) Enabling. Space operations provide insight into the operational 

environment including adversary actions and capabilities. Space forces enable 

continuous dissemination of supported commanders’ guidance. 

(2) Offensive. The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit 

the initiative. 
Fundamentals of Military Space Operations

I-3 

(a) Employing. CDRUSSTRATCOM establishes and maintains freedom 

of action in space by ensuring the availability of space capabilities to the joint force 

while, when directed, denying the opposing force the same advantage. 

(b) Enabling. Space forces provide globally available satellite 

communications (SATCOM); positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); environmental 

monitoring; warning systems; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 

capabilities and services. These support the joint force’s efforts to seize the initiative. 

With in-place, space-based capabilities, the joint force is able to see first, act first, 

maintain the offensive, and finish decisively. 

 (3) Mass. The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at 

the most advantageous place and time to produce decisive results. 

(a) Employing. CDRUSSTRATCOM integrates and synchronizes 

supporting space forces to maximize effectiveness when concentrating combat power at 

the proper time and place. This integration and synchronization conserves available 

resources, minimizes impact on nonadversaries, and maximizes the effect on the 

adversary. 

(b) Enabling. Space forces support the joint forces’ ability to concentrate 

combat power at the proper time and place by providing SATCOM to coordinate and 

direct forces, and PNT to synchronize operations, navigate, and guide precision 

munitions. 

(4) Economy of Force. The purpose of the economy of force is to allocate 

minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. 

(a) Employing. CDRUSSTRATCOM implements apportionment and 

allocation prioritization guidance. Maintaining effective liaison with supported 

commanders enables CDRUSSTRATCOM to recommend appropriate space forces, 

actions, and levels of effort. 

(b) Enabling. Space forces support JFCs in attaining information 

superiority, thereby reducing uncertainty and permitting reductions in the number and 

type of forces needed for secondary efforts. This allows commanders to concentrate 

forces and apply combat power at other points in the operational area. Space-based PNT 

enables joint force employment of precision munitions to minimize the number of 

weapons needed to create desired effects and minimize collateral damage. 

(5) Maneuver. The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of 

disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. 

(a) Employing. When necessary and feasible, CDRUSSTRATCOM 

directs the positioning of space forces to achieve advantage over adversaries. The 
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 3-14 

employment of US space capabilities in multiple orbital regimes provides a standing 

position of advantage. This advantage includes freedom from overflight restrictions. 

 (b) Enabling. Space forces provide ISR, PNT, weather, and 

communications support to the joint force, enabling precise blue force tracking (BFT), 

enhancing joint force situational awareness, maneuverability, and command and control 

(C2) effectiveness throughout the operational area. This enables the joint force to 

perform precise, coordinated maneuvers with speed, confidence, and stealth even in 

featureless terrain or under limited visibility. 

(6) Unity of Command. The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity 

of effort under one responsible commander for every objective. 

(a) Employing. In order to execute the responsibility to advocate, plan, 

and conduct space operations for national security objectives, CDRUSSTRATCOM 

exercises combatant command (command authority) over assigned US military space 

forces. CDRUSSTRATCOM normally delegates operational control (OPCON) and/or 

tactical control (TACON) of assigned space forces to subordinate USSTRATCOM 

commanders. Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), 

CDRUSSTRATCOM retains control of assigned space forces, even if they are deployed 

within the area of responsibility (AOR) of a geographic combatant commander (GCC). 

Space forces typically operate in general or direct support to other JFCs, with no 

reassignment of space forces or transfer of operational authorities. This allows 

CDRUSSTRATCOM to maintain unity of effort, not only for space forces, but across all 

strategic forces CDRUSSTRATCOM must integrate and employ. 

(b) Enabling. Supported commanders identify priorities to ensure 

supporting commanders and agency directors have clear guidance on the supported 

commander’s intent, integrate space capabilities into planning and operations, and 

consider the impact if space capabilities are unavailable. Supporting commanders then 

provide details of how priorities are fulfilled. CDRUSSTRATCOM provides priorities 

and conflict resolution guidelines in support of joint space operations.

(7) Security. The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire 

unexpected advantage. 

(a) Employing. CDRUSSTRATCOM conducts continuous operations to 

establish and maintain space situational awareness (SSA), which includes assessment of 

the capabilities and intent of potential or actual adversaries. In turn, this supports 

development of defensive measures within fielded space capabilities, operational 

planning to defeat threats, and timely employment of available defensive measures to 

ensure the availability of operational space capabilities. 

(b) Enabling. Space forces employ space-based ISR capabilities with 

timely, assured, and responsive C2 systems. This enhances the joint force’s ability to 

observe areas of interest (AOIs) and increases its situational awareness. JFCs maintain 
Fundamentals of Military Space Operations

I-5 

awareness of threats to space forces in their AORs and take measures to preempt or 

counter those threats in order to preserve US freedom of action in, and access to, space. 

(8) Surprise. The purpose of surprise is to strike at a time or place or in a 

manner for which the enemy is unprepared. Surprise is closely linked to security, since 

security measures are often needed to achieve the element of surprise. 

(a) Employing. CDRUSSTRATCOM’s centralization of operational space 

C2 capabilities, coupled with effective SSA, contributes to comprehensive assessment 

and speed in decision-making. This supports the ability of US forces to overwhelm 

adversaries’ decision-making cycles achieving surprise. Effective space control 

operations can negate threats and adversaries’ use of space. 

(b) Enabling. Space operations provide timely intelligence collection, 

enhanced information sharing, and precision targeting. 

(9) Simplicity. The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated 

plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. 

Dust Storm in Afghanistan: Space-based imagery of an operations area can enhance a 

commander’s understanding of impacts on the operational environment. 
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 3-14 

(a) Employing. CDRUSSTRATCOM provides authorities, intent, and 

guidance for space operations in orders and operational plans. This enables space forces 

to execute synchronized and mutually supporting operations with economy of force. 

(b) Enabling. CDRUSSTRATCOM’s guidance complements supported 

JFC plans and operations and provides a common understanding of required space 

capabilities. 

c. Space capabilities also enable the following applications of the principles of 

joint operations: 

(1) Restraint. The purpose of restraint is to limit collateral damage and prevent 

the unnecessary use of force. A single act could cause significant military and political 

consequences; therefore, the judicious use of force is necessary. 

(a) Employing. In the conduct of space operations, CDRUSSTRATCOM 

observes the laws of armed conflict, standing rules of engagement, and rules for the use 

of force. 

(b) Enabling. Space forces contribute to the joint force’s awareness of the 

operational environment and munitions accuracy.

(2) Perseverance. The purpose of perseverance is to ensure the commitment 

necessary to attain the national strategic end state. 

(a) Employing. Satellites remain in their established orbits for years after 

deployment, and require long-term Service commitment to ensure continued availability. 

(b) Enabling. Space forces enable persistent insight into adversaries’ 

actions and disposition. This helps to dissuade potential adversaries from direct military 

confrontation.

(3) Legitimacy. The purpose of legitimacy is to develop and maintain the will 

necessary to attain the national strategic end state. Legitimacy is based on the legality, 

morality, and rightness of the actions undertaken. 

(a) Employing. Adherence to the laws of armed conflict and compliance 

with US-ratified legal regimes assures legitimacy in US military space operations. 

Legitimacy is further underscored by safe and responsible space operations. 

 (b) Enabling. Space forces help maintain high standards of accuracy in 

military operations (for example, precision guided munitions). 
Fundamentals of Military Space Operations

I-7 

SECTION B. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR SPACE 

3. General 

a. The importance of space operations is increasing due to the enabling capabilities 

they provide to the joint force. Space capabilities are vital to overall military mission 

accomplishment and provide the advantages needed for success in all joint operations. 

(1) Space capabilities should be integrated and synchronized by the supported 

commander into specific joint offensive and defensive operations, campaign planning, 

and into their concept of operations (CONOPS), operation plans (OPLANs), and 

operation orders. 

(2) Supported and supporting commanders coordinate, as appropriate, the 

deployment and employment of space forces required to accomplish the assigned 

mission. 

(3) Space forces simultaneously support multiple users. This requires extensive 

coordination, planning, and the early integration of requirements and capabilities. 

CDRUSSTRATCOM will prioritize space capabilities and make apportionment and 

allocation recommendations for Department of Defense (DOD) systems in coordination 

with supported commanders. SecDef will determine solutions for the supported 

commander’s needs that cannot be fulfilled by the supporting commander. 

(4) Adversary knowledge of US space capabilities and the role of space assets 

in joint operations are formidable, and many resources are expended to constantly 

increase the awareness of technology and concepts of operation for current and planned 

space systems. At the same time, the use of space capabilities by friend and foe alike is 

increasing in both volume and sophistication. 

b. Commanders consider the following guidelines when planning and executing 

military operations, and when requesting space capabilities: 

(1) Understand how others, including other United States Government (USG) 

departments and agencies, adversaries, and neutrals, use space capabilities to support 

military and civilian operations (such as use of Global Positioning System (GPS) by civil 

aviation). 

(2) Provide allies and coalition partners appropriate access to systems and 

information. The joint force strives to provide necessary and appropriate space-related 

information at the lowest appropriate security classification level. However, established 

procedures for disclosure of intelligence information (specifically, information on US 

space systems and operations) must be followed in pursuing this goal. 

(3) Maintain an awareness of the space forces and their operational status. 
Chapter I 

I-8 JP 3-14 

(4) Understand how and why space capabilities are integrated across the range 

of military operations to include civil support operations. 

(5) Maintain SSA and assess the potential impacts on space-based and groundbased systems and operations. 

4. Characteristics of Space 

Space is a unique environment in which to conduct military operations. 

Commanders in all disciplines should have a basic awareness of the fundamental 

advantages and disadvantages offered by space operations in order to effectively employ 

space capabilities. 

a. No Geographical Boundaries. International law does not extend a nation’s 

territorial sovereignty up to Earth orbit. Therefore, nations enjoy unimpeded satellite 

overflight of other nations through space. Operating from space provides line of sight 

(LOS) access to large areas (including remote and denied access areas), which offers 

advantages for communications, navigation, ISR, and meteorological and oceanographic 

(METOC) information. 

b. Orbital Mechanics. Satellite orbits must follow certain orbital parameters due to 

physical laws. A satellite's orbit is chosen to best satisfy a satellite's mission. These 

orbital parameters can sometimes be changed, but will deplete fuel, which can 

significantly degrade the performance or lifespan of a system.

c. Environmental Considerations 

(1) Space Weather. Solar flares, charged particles, cosmic rays, the Van Allen 

radiation belts, and other natural phenomena in space create changes that can affect 

communications, navigation accuracy, the performance of sensors, and cause electronic 

failures. 

(2) Debris. Operational satellites are under constant threat of impact. Orbiting 

particulates left behind during a satellite's lifetime, debris from satellite explosions or 

impacts, orbiting "trash" such as rocket bodies, or natural objects such as meteoroids, can 

damage main operational systems. 

See Appendix H, “Space Fundamentals,” for additional information on space 

characteristics. 
CHAPTER II

SPACE MISSION AREAS 

II-1 

Today, US military space operations are comprised of the following mission areas: 

space force enhancement, space support, space control, and space force application. This 

chapter summarizes the role of each mission area and how they contribute to joint 

operations. 

SECTION A. SPACE FORCE ENHANCEMENT 

1. General 

Space force enhancement operations increase joint force effectiveness by 

increasing the combat potential of that force, enhancing operational awareness, and 

providing needed joint force support. There are five force enhancement missions: ISR, 

missile warning, environmental monitoring, satellite communications, and PNT. They 

provide a critical advantage by reducing confusion inherent in combat situations. Space 

force enhancement operations also afford joint commanders access to denied areas and 

persistence, which are important characteristics not afforded to air, land, or maritime 

capabilities. Space force enhancement functions are often provided by interagency 

organizations, commercial organizations, and consortiums. 

2. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

Monitoring AOIs from space helps provide information on adversary location, 

disposition, and intent; aids in tracking, targeting, and engaging the adversary; and 

provides a means to assess these actions through tactical battle damage assessment 

(BDA) and operational combat assessment. It also provides situational awareness, 

warning of attack, and feedback on how well US forces are affecting the adversary’s 

understanding of the operational environment. 

3. Missile Warning 

Spaced-based and ground-based systems are crucial for timely detection and 

communicating warning of nuclear detonations or adversary use of ballistic missiles to 

US forces and US allies. The tactical warning and attack assessment information space 

systems are essential for the proper execution of the missile warning mission. Tactical 

warning is a notification to operational command centers that a specific threat event is 

occurring or has occurred. Attack assessment is an evaluation of information to 

determine the potential or actual nature and objectives of an attack for the purpose of 

providing information for timely decisions. The component elements that describe threat 

"What's the big difference between 25 years ago and today? I would tell 

you, in my opinion, that space today is embedded in combat operations." 

General C. Robert Kehler 

Commander, Air Force Space Command 

November 16, 2007 
Chapter II 

II-2 JP 3-14

events include the country of origin, the event type and size, the country that is 

determined to be under attack, and the time of the event. 

4. Environmental Monitoring 

Space forces provide data on meteorological, oceanographic, and space 

environmental factors that might affect military operations. Additionally, space 

capabilities provide data that forms the basis for forecasts, alerts, and warnings for the 

space environment that may negatively impact space assets and space operations. 

Imagery capabilities such as multispectral imagery (MSI) and hyperspectral imagery 

(HSI) can provide joint force planners with current information on sub-surface, surface, 

and air conditions (e.g., trafficability, beach conditions, vegetation, and land use). 

Knowledge of these factors allows forces to avoid adverse environmental conditions 

while taking advantage of other conditions to enhance operations. Such monitoring also 

supports joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) by 

providing the commander with information needed to identify and analyze potential 

adversary courses of action (COAs). 

5. Satellite Communications 

Satellite communications offer many unique advantages that allow the JFC and 

subordinate commanders to shape the operational environment. Using military 

SATCOM and, in some cases, civil, commercial, and international systems, the JFC and 

subordinate commanders are provided a broad range of capabilities, including instant 

global reachback to the Global Information Grid (GIG), transmission of critical 

intelligence, the ability to tie sensors to shooters, and survivable communications in 

Portable satellite communications deployed to the field.
Space Mission Areas

II-3 

austere areas with limited or no infrastructure. While JFCs are apportioned SATCOM 

resources for planning, the actual allocation of SATCOM resources to JFCs for 

operations will be determined by the CDRUSSTRATCOM as the SATCOM operational 

manager (SOM). See Appendix D, "Satellite Communications," for more details.

6. Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing 

Space-based PNT assets provide essential, precise, and reliable information that 

permits joint forces to more effectively plan, train, coordinate, and execute operations. 

Precision timing provides the joint force the capability to synchronize operations, and 

enables communications capabilities such as frequency hopping and cryptological 

synchronization to improve communications security and effectiveness. PNT also 

enables precision attack from stand-off distances, thereby reducing collateral damage and 

allowing friendly forces to avoid threat areas. Navigation warfare (NAVWAR) ensures 

that friendly forces have unfettered access to PNT, while denying adversarial use of the 

same. 

SECTION B. SPACE SUPPORT 

7. General 

The space support mission area 

includes spacelift operations 

(launching and deploying satellites), 

satellite operations (maintaining, 

sustaining, and rendezvous and 

proximity operations), and 

reconstitution of space forces 

(replenishing lost or diminished 

satellites). 

8. Spacelift Operations 

a. Spacelift is the ability to 

deliver satellites, payloads, and 

material into space. Spacelift 

operations are conducted to deploy, 

sustain, augment, or reconstitute 

satellite constellations supporting US 

military operations and/or national 

security objectives. Spacelift 

operations include operationally 

responsive launch capabilities. 

b. Many of the products which 

are now used by US and multinational Atlas V / Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
Chapter II 

II-4 JP 3-14

forces (MNFs), neutral nations, and enemies are derived from capabilities provided by 

commercial and civil satellites, and launched aboard commercial spacelift vehicles. The 

linkage between commercial, civil, and military space operations is becoming 

increasingly commonplace, providing unique capabilities, but also presenting unique 

challenges. 

9. Satellite Operations 

a. Satellite operations are conducted to maneuver, configure, operate, and sustain 

on-orbit assets. Satellite operations are characterized as spacecraft and payload 

operations. Spacecraft operations include telemetry, tracking, and commanding (TT&C), 

maneuvering, monitoring state-of-health, and maintenance sub-functions. Payload 

operations include monitoring and commanding of the satellite payload to collect data or 

provide capability in the operational environment. Military satellite operations are 

executed through a host of satellite operations centers linked to space assets via dedicated 

and shared networks. Some systems utilize dedicated antennas for both mission data 

retrieval and routine satellite TT&C. The TT&C subsystem monitors and controls all of 

the other systems on the spacecraft, transmits the status of those systems to the control 

segment on the ground, and receives and processes instructions from the control segment. 

Telemetry components include sensors throughout the satellite to determine the status of 

various components, the transmitters and antennas to provide the data to the control 

segment and even the data itself. The various networks combined ensure total C2 of 

space resources. Additionally, as a critical and essential link between the satellite 

operator and joint force, and a significant contributor to SSA, satellite operations include 

protection mechanisms to assure access to space assets. 

b. DOD satellites are monitored, sustained, and operated out of satellite operations 

centers under the Service components. Globally-dispersed antennas for satellite C2 

provide the necessary link between the satellite operations centers and the on-orbit 

satellites. 

10. Rendezvous and Proximity Operations 

a. Rendezvous operations are specific processes where two resident space objects 

are intentionally brought operationally close together. 

b. Proximity operations are on-orbit activities of a resident space object that 

deliberately and necessarily maintains a close distance from another resident space object 

for a specific purpose. 

c. Rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) are conducted to support mission 

requirements, including such on-orbit activities as assembly and servicing and include the 

potential to support a wide range of future US space capabilities. To minimize the risk of 

collision and the creation of orbital debris, all RPO activities should ensure space flight 

safety. RPO planners should coordinate with USSTRATCOM to confirm space flight 

safety procedures are in place. 
Space Mission Areas

II-5 

11. Reconstitution of Space Forces 

Reconstitution refers to plans and operations for replenishing lost or diminished 

space capabilities. This includes repositioning, reconfiguring unaffected and surviving 

assets, augmenting capabilities with civil and commercial capabilities, and replacing lost 

assets. 

SECTION C. SPACE CONTROL 

12. General 

a. Space control provides freedom of action in space for friendly forces, and when 

directed, denies it to an adversary. It consists of offensive space control (OSC), 

defensive space control (DSC), and SSA. 

b. Space control enables space superiority through surveiling space and terrestrial 

AOIs that could impact space activities; protecting the ability to use space; preventing 

adversaries from exploiting US, multinational, or neutral space services and capabilities; 

and negating the ability of adversaries to exploit space services and capabilities. 

c. These operations change in nature and intensity as the type of military operations 

change. OSC is used to deny adversary freedom of action in space and is based on 

negation and offensive prevention measures. DSC is used to protect US space 

capabilities and is based on protection and defensive prevention measures.

(1) Prevention. Measures to preclude an adversary’s hostile use of US or third 

party space systems and services. Prevention can include diplomatic, informational, and 

economic measures as appropriate. Prevention measures support protection and negation 

measures by allowing the US to use other instruments of national power. For instance, 

by showing that an adversary is using a US or third-party system in a hostile manner, 

international pressure may be brought to bear against the adversary, thereby potentially 

forcing the adversary to cease its actions. The US could also present evidence of an 

adversary's use of a third-party system, and garner support for economic sanctions against 

the adversary. 

(2) Negation. Active and offensive measures to deceive, disrupt, deny, 

degrade, or destroy an adversary’s space capabilities. Negation includes actions against 

ground, data link, user, and/or space segment(s) of an adversary’s space systems and 

services, or any other space system or service used by an adversary that is hostile to US 

national interests. 

(3) Protection. Active and passive defensive measures ensure that US and 

friendly space systems perform as designed by overcoming an adversary’s attempts to 

negate friendly exploitation of space, or minimize adverse effects if negation is 

attempted. Such measures also provide some protection from space environmental 

factors. Protection measures must be consistent with the criticality of the mission’s 
Chapter II 

II-6 JP 3-14

contribution to the joint force and are applied to each component of the space system, 

including launch, to ensure that no potential single point of failure exists. Means of 

protection include, but are not limited to, ground facility protection (security, covert 

facilities, camouflage, concealment, deception, mobility, and hardening), alternate nodes, 

spare satellites, link encryption, increased signal strength, adaptable waveforms, satellite 

radiation hardening, signal monitoring (such as monitoring SATCOM signals for 

electromagnetic interference [EMI], characterization of any EMI, and EMI geolocation), 

and space debris protection measures. Finally, attack indications could be so subtle or 

dispersed that, individually, an attack is not detectable. 

13. Offensive Space Control 

OSC is defined as those offensive operations to prevent an adversary's hostile use of 

US/third-party space capabilities or negate an adversary's space capabilities. OSC entails 

the negation of enemy space capabilities through denial, deception, disruption, 

degradation, or destruction. Adversaries – both state and non-state actors – will exploit 

increased access to space-based capabilities. Hence, it is incumbent on the US military to 

negate the adversaries' use of those space capabilities that affect the safety and well-being 

of US, allied, and coalition forces. OSC actions may target an adversary's space-related 

capabilities, forces, information links, and space capabilities supporting those forces, 

using both destructive and nondestructive means. 

14. Defensive Space Control 

a. DSC is defined as those operations conducted to preserve the ability to exploit 

space capabilities via active and passive actions. DSC includes defensive operations that 

prevent adversaries from exploiting US or third-party space capabilities. These actions 

protect friendly space capabilities from attack, interference, or unintentional hazards. 

Although focused on responding to man-made threats, such as GPS and SATCOM 

jammers, DSC actions may also safeguard assets from unintentional hazards such as 

space debris, radio frequency (RF) interference, and other naturally occurring 

phenomenon such as radiation. 

b. DSC attempts to preserve US access to, and use of, space by employing all means 

available to react to events affecting US and allied space capabilities. A robust DSC 

capability influences adversaries' perceptions of US space capabilities and makes them 

less confident of success in interfering with those capabilities. DSC is built on several 

elements including capabilities to detect and characterize an attack, ability to attribute an 

attack to an adversary, ability to defeat the attack, and the ability to operate through or 

deter an attack. 

c. The USG considers PI with its space systems as an infringement on its rights. PI 

consists of deliberate actions taken to deny or disrupt a space system, service, or 

capability. The Purposeful Interference Response Team (PIRT) has been established to 

meet the threats posed by PI. The PIRT is led by DOD through USSTRATCOM and 

brings together representatives from the USG to include the Department of State, the 
Space Mission Areas

II-7 

intelligence community (IC), and the Federal Communications Commission. The PIRT 

is designed to provide a single point of entry to report PI, provide an interagency forum 

to evaluate the impact on US national interests, and provide options to resolve them. 

15. Space Situational Awareness 

a. SSA is fundamental to conducting space operations. It is a key component for 

space control because it is the enabler, or foundation, for accomplishing all other space 

control tasks. SSA involves characterizing, as completely as necessary, the space 

capabilities operating within the terrestrial environment and the space domain. It 

includes components of ISR; environmental monitoring, analysis, and reporting; and 

warning functions. SSA leverages space surveillance, collection, and processing of space 

intelligence data; synthesis of the status of US and cooperative satellite systems; 

collection of US, allied, and coalition space readiness; and analysis of the space domain. 

It also incorporates the use of intelligence sources to provide insight into adversary use of 

space capabilities and their threats to our space capabilities while in turn contributing to 

the JFC’s ability to understand enemy intent. 

b. SSA supports the following key objectives: 

(1) Ensure space operations and spaceflight safety. SSA provides the 

infrastructure that ensures that US space operators understand the conditions that could 

adversely impact successful space operations and spaceflight safety (i.e., collision 

avoidance). 

(2) Implement international treaties and agreements. SSA is a means by 

which compliance, via attribution, can be verified and by which violations can be 

detected. 

(3) Protect space capabilities. The ability of the US to monitor all space 

activity enables protection of space capabilities, helps deter others from initiating attacks 

against space and terrestrial capabilities, and assures allies of continuing US support 

during times of peace, crisis, and conflict. 

(4) Protect military operations and national interests. SSA supports and 

enhances military operations. 

c. Components of space situational awareness include: 

(1) Intelligence. For SSA, intelligence provides the characterization and 

analysis of foreign (adversary and third-party) space capabilities, to include adversary or 

third party use of US, or commercial space capabilities to their advantage and intent. 

Characterization includes, but is not limited to, how forces and assets operate, their 

impact upon military operations, and their vulnerabilities and strengths. Intelligence 

analysis of all elements of space systems is required to determine threats and 

vulnerabilities of foreign space capabilities. It primarily supports the characterization and 
Chapter II 

II-8 JP 3-14

analysis of space capabilities in preparation for targeting or protection. Reliable, timely, 

and accurate intelligence also supports assessment. 

(2) Surveillance. Space surveillance is the systematic and continuous 

observation and information collection on all man-made objects orbiting the Earth. 

Surveillance contributes to orbital safety, indications and warning of space events, initial 

indications of where threats may be located, and assessment. Space events include 

satellite maneuvers, anticipated and unanticipated launches, reentries, and missionimpacting space weather. Surveillance data, for example, is used to produce the satellite 

catalog — the fused product that provides the location of on-orbit satellites as well as 

man-made space debris. Information from the satellite catalog is used by predictive 

orbital analysis tools to anticipate satellite threats and mission opportunities for friendly, 

adversary, and third party-assets. 

(3) Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance provides the detailed characterization of 

a specific object needed to analyze and assess the operational environment. Space 

reconnaissance supports targeting and post-strike assessment. Reconnaissance data, for 

example, may come from an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) providing visual images of 

a mobile satellite ground station to aid in the planning of a strike against that ground 

station. Assets that perform reconnaissance may also conduct surveillance. 

(4) Environmental Monitoring. Environmental monitoring includes the 

characterization, analysis, and prediction of space weather (e.g., solar conditions), 

terrestrial weather near important ground nodes, and natural phenomena (e.g., 

interplanetary objects, such as meteoroids and asteroids) in space. This environmental 

information must be accurate and timely to protect space systems and support space 

control planning and execution. Predictions of natural environmental effects should be 

synchronized with military commanders’ COAs to enhance military effectiveness. 

Environmental monitoring, analysis, and prediction are critical in space control and space 

force enhancement operations. Natural phenomena, such as solar activity and lightning, 

can interfere with space systems. Operators must be able to differentiate between natural 

phenomena interference and an intentional attack on a space system in order to formulate 

an appropriate response. 

(5) Space Common Operational Picture. The space common operational 

picture (COP) is a subset of the overall COP that aggregates information about space and 

terrestrial weather that could impact space systems; the blue space picture showing US, 

allied, and civilian space capabilities; the red/grey space picture showing adversary and 

neutral space capabilities; and space debris tracking. SSA provides the relevant space 

information needed in planning, execution, and assessment. Combining multiple sources 

of information into a COP is essential for SSA. Likewise, C2 and reporting processes 

enhance SSA by providing feedback on the status/readiness of forces and insight on how 

integrated space capabilities are contributing to military operations. Fusion of SSA 

information occurs at several levels, but is crucial at the C2 nodes. Multiple C2 nodes 

will often require SSA information, making unity of effort for SSA activities essential. 

Figure II-1 provides a summary of the space COP. 
Space Mission Areas

II-9 

 d. The overall SSA of the US can benefit from cooperation with non-USG satellite 

operators by gaining insight into commercial and foreign systems' status, mission 

capabilities, maneuver plans, and knowing who to call in case of a potential conflict with 

a USG satellite, etc. 

 SPACE COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE DEVELOPMENT

AFSPC Air Force Space Command

AFWA Air Force Weather Agency

DOD Department of Defense

FNMOC Fleet Numerical Meteorology and 

Oceanography Center

NASIC National Air and Space Intelligence 

Center

Enhanced 

Military 

Effectiveness

Space Operations

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence 

Agency

NRO National Reconnaissance Office

NSA National Security Agency

SMC Space and Missile Systems Center

USSTRATCOM US Strategic Command

SPACE SITUATIONAL 

AWARENESS

z

z

z

z

Persistent, Predictive

Real-Time Status

Dynamic Change Detection

Intent

Space 

Control Space Force Application Space Support Space Force Enhancement

SPACE AND 

TERRESTRIAL WEATHER

BLUE SPACE PICTURE RED/GREY SPACE 

PICTURE

SPACE DEBRIS 

TRACKING

(DOD, NRO, SMC, Allies, 

US Civil, US Commercial) (NASIC, NSA, NGA, 

USSTRATCOM, AFSPC)

z

z

z

z

Space-Based Sensors

Ground-Based Sensors

AFWA

FNMOC

z

z

Space Surveillance

Owner/Operator Tracks/ 

Status z

z

Space Surveillance

All Source Intel

z Space Surveillance

Figure II-1. Space Common Operational Picture Development
Chapter II 

II-10 JP 3-14

SECTION D. SPACE FORCE APPLICATION 

16. Space Force Application 

 DOD policy defines space force application as combat operations in, through, and 

from space to influence the course and outcome of conflict. This mission area is 

incorporated into national space policy as well. Specific responsibilities can be found in 

DOD Instruction (DODI) 3100.13, Space Force Application. 
CHAPTER III

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SPACE FORCES

III-1 

1. General

 Command relationships are defined by the Global Force Management 

Implementation Guidance, and described in Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the 

Armed Forces of the United States. Applied to space forces, they establish and maintain 

unity of command, effort, and purpose in achieving joint force and national security 

objectives. CDRUSSTRATCOM advocates, plans, and executes military space 

operations and has the responsibility to prioritize, deconflict, integrate, and synchronize 

military space operations for current and planned joint operations. 

2. Command Relationships 

a. Joint space forces are an integral part of military operations, and command 

relationships are crucial for ensuring timely and effective employment. 

CDRUSSTRATCOM has the United Command Plan (UCP)-assigned role to conduct 

space operations. CDRUSSTRATCOM has designated the CDR, Joint Functional 

Component Command for Space (JFCC SPACE) to manage day-to-day space operations. 

The CDR JFCC SPACE is the focal point for military space operations, and has been 

delegated the following from CDRUSSTRATCOM: 

(1) Coordinating authority for planning and execution of space operations by 

designated space forces. 

(2) OPCON of designated space and missile warning forces under 

CDRUSSTRATCOM. 

(3) Management of the theater event system (TES) that provides theater ballistic 

missile warning to all GCCs. 

b. Space capabilities provide global communications PNT services, environmental 

monitoring, space-based ISR, and warning services to combatant commanders (CCDRs), 

Services, and agencies. Normally, space forces supporting multiple CCDRs remain 

assigned or attached to USSTRATCOM. In the past, command of satellites and space 

systems supporting multiple CCDRs have not been transferred to a CCDR. However, 

there may be a need during operations for command of these resources to be transferred 

to a CCDR. 

"It is through space that our troops and our leadership monitor the battlefield 

and communicate with each other." 

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates 

Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska 

October 17, 2007 
Chapter III 

III-2 JP 3-14 

3. Responsibilities 

 CCDRs: 

 a. Provide their prioritized space requirements to CDRUSSTRATCOM. 

 b. Establish specific joint force guidance and objectives for space operations. This 

guidance is integrated into appropriate OPLANs and their annexes. 

 c. Specify OSC and DSC objectives to be met, and provide guidance for the 

employment of C2, communications systems, intelligence, logistics, and attack 

operations. This guidance should be reflected in appropriate OPLANs and their annexes. 

The component commanders jointly conduct operations under the guidance and in 

support of the objectives of the CCDR. 

 d. May designate a space coordinating authority (SCA) and delegate appropriate 

authorities for planning, integrating, and coordinating space operations within the 

operational area. 

4. Space Coordinating Authority 

a. A supported JFC normally designates an SCA to coordinate joint space operations 

and integrate space capabilities. Based on the complexity and scope of operations, the 

JFC can either retain SCA or designate a component commander as the SCA. The JFC 

considers the mission, nature, and duration of the operation; preponderance of space force 

capabilities made available; and resident C2 capabilities (including reachback) in 

selecting the appropriate option. The SCA is responsible for coordinating and integrating 

space capabilities in the operational area, and has primary responsibility for joint space 

operations planning, to include ascertaining space requirements within the joint force. 

b. The SCA gathers operational requirements that may be satisfied by space 

capabilities and facilitates the use of established processes by joint force staffs to plan 

and conduct space operations. Following coordination, a prioritized list of recommended 

space requirements based on joint force objectives is provided to the JFC. Upon JFC 

approval, the list is submitted to the CCDR for coordination with CDRUSSTRATCOM. 

To ensure prompt and timely support, CDRUSSTRATCOM may approve direct liaison 

authorized as appropriate. This does not restrict CCDR Service component commands 

from communicating requirements directly to their counterpart USSTRATCOM Service 

component commander. However, SCAs keep their respective commanders apprised of 

all such coordination activities to ensure that space activities are coordinated, 

deconflicted, integrated, and synchronized. SCAs at subordinate commands, if 

designated, will accomplish the same requirements for submission to the combatant 

command SCA as directed. Summarizing, the SCA's roles and responsibilities include: 

(1) Coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing space capabilities in the 

operational area. 
Command and Control of Space Forces 

III-3 

(2) Planning space operations and ensuring inputs from the staff and 

components are incorporated. 

(3) Maintaining situational awareness of theater space operations, and 

coordinating with the combatant command SCA or CDR JFCC SPACE to integrate 

theater space operations into global space operations. 

(4) Providing consolidated space requirements through the JFC for coordination 

as required. 

5. Role of Non-Department of Defense Capabilities 

a. CCDRs have requirements that cannot always be provided by DOD space 

capabilities alone. Accordingly, DOD's reliance on non-DOD space systems continues to 

grow. DOD space capabilities can be supplemented through civil, commercial, 

international, allied, and other USG agency capabilities. Required capabilities that can be 

fulfilled by non-DOD assets include communications, imagery, environmental 

monitoring, and Earth resource information. 

b. USSTRATCOM or other organizations will coordinate the appropriate assets to 

fulfill the required capabilities sought by the CCDR. 

c. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) may provide launch 

facilities and environmental Earth science products that may have applicability to joint 

operations. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), under the 

Department of Commerce (DOC), provides weather information through the polar 

operational environment satellite (POES) system, geostationary operational environment 

satellites, and Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), as well as locating 

distress alerts via the search and rescue satellite-aided tracking (SARSAT) system. 

Additionally, commercial satellite programs such as Automatic Identification System and 

Long Range Identification and Tracking contribute to homeland security through global 

tracking of shipping traffic. The capabilities that many non-DOD agencies provide to 

joint forces are discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV, “Roles and Responsibilities.” 

d. Satellite systems are increasingly becoming national assets. Multiple agencies 

have combined separate programs to resource an interagency capability. As an example, 

the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) 

combines existing orbiting satellite systems, NOAA POES and DOD DMSP, under a 

single national program. NPOESS collects and disseminates data on Earth’s weather, 

atmosphere, oceans, and land environments for the DOC, DOD, and NASA. These 

polar-orbiting satellites are able to monitor the entire planet, thereby providing a wealth 

of environmental knowledge to joint forces and several agencies. 
Chapter III 

III-4 JP 3-14 

The designated space coordinating authority (SCA) should 

consider, as a best practice, establishing a jointly manned space 

element, with the appropriate joint command relationship, to aid the 

SCA in the execution of day-to-day responsibilities. All Services 

provide some level of support to the designated SCA to create synergy 

in space planning. All Services and operational units in the operational 

area should be afforded consideration in planning for space 

operations. 

For example, in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the Commander, US 

Central Command designated the joint forces air component 

commander as the SCA. The Army and Air Force have provided 

support to the US Central Command SCA, creating a level of synergy in 

space planning. However, since there is no Navy representation on the 

SCA staff, the SCA provides direct space support to the lead carrier 

strike group (CSG) in theater. The CSG commander requires direct 

liaison authorized in order to interact with the SCA at the operational 

level, for support to all tactical level maritime units. 
CHAPTER IV

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

IV-1 

1. General 

The joint force achieves maximum utility from space forces when they are organized 

and employed effectively. While some command and support relationships are enduring, 

others may vary for operations of different scopes and purposes. The joint force allocates 

space forces in the joint operations planning process. 

SECTION A. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND 

COMBATANT COMMANDERS 

2. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) will: 

a. Establish a uniform system for evaluating readiness of each combatant command 

and combat support agency (CSA) to employ space forces to carry out assigned missions. 

b. Develop joint doctrine for the operation and employment of space capabilities of 

the Armed Forces, and formulate policies for joint space training and military education 

of the Armed Forces. 

c. Integrate space forces and their supporting industrial base into the Joint Strategic 

Capabilities Plan, and formulate policies for the integration of National Guard and 

reserve forces into space activities. 

d. Provide guidance to CCDRs for planning and employment of space capabilities 

through the joint operation planning process. 

3. Combatant Commanders 

CCDRs also play a key role in space operations. Accordingly, they will: 

a. Consider space capabilities when selecting alternatives to satisfy mission needs, 

as well as develop and articulate military requirements for space and space-related 

capabilities. 

b. Provide prioritized theater space requirements to CDRUSSTRATCOM. 

c. Integrate space services and capabilities into OPLANs, concept plans 

(CONPLANs), campaign plans, theater guidance, and objectives, and plan for the 

employment of space capabilities within their AOR. 

d. Use staff elements and component commands to plan, monitor, advise, 

coordinate, and execute space operations within their AOR. 
Chapter IV 

IV-2 JP 3-14 

e. Provide input to the Joint Staff for evaluations of the preparedness of their 

combatant command to carry out assigned missions by employing space capabilities. 

f. Coordinate on operation and campaign plans and provide supporting plans as 

directed by the CJCS. 

g. Plan for and provide force protection for space forces deployed and operating in 

their AOR. 

SECTION B. UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND AND 

COMPONENTS 

4. General 

a. CDRUSSTRATCOM is charged with the missions of global strike, space 

operations, information operations (IO), missile warning, and integrated missile defense. 

With regards to the UCP-assigned space mission, the CDRUSSTRATCOM will advocate 

for desired capabilities, and plan and conduct space operations to include: 

(1) Providing warning and assessment of space attack. 

(2) Serving as the single point of contact for military space operational matters, 

except as otherwise directed. 

(3) Providing military representation to US national agencies, international 

agencies, and commercial entities for military matters related to space operations as 

directed and in coordination with the CJCS and other CCDRs. 

(4) Coordinating and conducting space campaign planning. 

(5) Serving as the DOD Manager for Human Space Flight Support Operations. 

(6) Setting protection and survivability requirements for space capabilities. 

(7) Supporting the SSA requirements of the Director for National Intelligence 

and conducting SSA for the USG; commercial space capabilities and services used for 

national and homeland security purposes; civil space capabilities and operations, 

particularly human space flight activities; and, as appropriate, commercial and foreign 

space entities. 

(8) Planning for the protection of national, civil, and commercial space 

capabilities used for national security and homeland security purposes, or as designated 

by the President. 
Roles and Responsibilities

IV-3 

b. CDRUSSTRATCOM: 

(1) Plans, integrates, coordinates, and develops desired characteristics and 

capabilities for global missile defense operations and support for missile defense. 

For more information on missile warning and defense see Appendix B, "Missile 

Warning," and JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats. 

(2) Plans, integrates, and coordinates DOD global network operations by 

directing GIG operations and defense. Within the GIG, space-based capabilities and 

services play a key role. 

(3) In coordination with the CJCS quickly plans, directs, coordinates, and 

controls assigned space assets and forces for daily operations and crisis action planning 

in the event of military action against the US and/or its allies. In addition, 

USSTRATCOM provides warning to US national leaders of attacks against US space 

assets worldwide. USSTRATCOM executes these warning responsibilities through 

JFCC SPACE and its Joint Space Operations Center (JSPOC). 

(4) USSTRATCOM performs the functions, roles, and responsibilities of the 

Strategic Missile Warning Functional Manager’s Office (FMO) and the Theater Missile 

Warning FMO that are collectively responsible for the management and oversight of the 

missile warning mission. 

5. Joint Functional Component Command for Space

a. Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Space. CDR JFCC 

SPACE, as designated by CDRUSSTRATCOM, serves as the single point of contact for 

assigned military space operational matters, including planning, tasking, directing, and 

executing space operations using assigned space forces. For space related activities, 

JFCC SPACE is the primary USSTRATCOM interface to supported commanders. The 

goal of JFCC SPACE is to provide unity of command and unity of effort in the 

unimpeded delivery of joint space capabilities to supported commanders and, when 

directed, to deny the benefits of space to adversaries. JFCC SPACE responsibilities are 

reflected in the pertinent USSTRATCOM directives and/or orders. Currently, these 

responsibilities include: 

(1) Plan and conduct space operations (force enhancement, space control, space 

support [excluding spacelift], and force application [excluding intercontinental ballistic 

missiles {ICBMs}]). 

(2) Conduct operational-level C2 of assigned forces. Report operations in 

direct support of other combatant commands to CDRUSSTRATCOM via the Global 

Operations Center. Provide continuous situational awareness of assigned forces engaged 

in ongoing space operations. 
Chapter IV 

IV-4 JP 3-14 

(3) Maintain a space COP as the operational manager for SSA. Ensure the 

common space picture is available to all authorized users and space mission partners to 

facilitate their planning, decision-making, and situational awareness. Maintain an 

operational picture of the blue force space order of battle. 

(4) Synchronize USSTRATCOM space operations with the National 

Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to develop shared SSA and jointly execute DSC. 

(5) Execute safety of flight and constellation management operations in 

accordance with CONPLAN 8035 and provide USSTRATCOM with situational 

awareness of any operational implications or impact to other combatant command AORs, 

to include any space vehicle repositioning that would impact CCDRs. Coordinate with 

Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) to conduct global SATCOM 

operations. 

(6) As CDRUSSTRATCOM's SCA, establish relationships and coordinate joint 

space operations with designated SCAs at each combatant command. 

(7) On behalf of CDRUSSTRATCOM, conduct operations in support of 

CDRUSSTRATCOM duties as DOD manager for human space flight support in 

compliance with headquarters (HQ) USSTRATCOM direction, to include any changes in 

mission or operational impacts. 

(8) Perform RF deconfliction and laser clearinghouse operations for all 

applicable DOD operations. 

(9) Provide warning and assessment of attack on space systems to 

CDRUSSTRATCOM and other combatant commands. Coordinate time sensitive 

analysis with HQ USSTRATCOM J-2 (intelligence directorate of a joint staff) and 

national intelligence agencies to provide indications and warning of attack on space 

assets. 

(10) Conduct the USSTRATCOM mission of providing missile warning to 

other combatant commands, allies, and others as directed. 

(11) Conduct integrated NAVWAR operations by providing global and GCCspecific space-borne and space-enabled NAVWAR capabilities. 

(12) Support HQ USSTRATCOM advocacy, identification, and assessment of 

current and future space requirements of combatant commands. 

(13) Plan, task, integrate, C2, and execute joint space operations in accordance 

with timing and tempo as established by CDRUSSTRATCOM, and, when in support, 

other CCDRs and allies, and other organizations as appropriate. 
Roles and Responsibilities

IV-5 

b. Joint Space Operations Center. The mission of the JSPOC is to provide 

CDR JFCC SPACE with agile and responsive C2 capabilities to conduct space operations 

on a 24/7 basis. The JSPOC is built around an air and space operations center adapted 

specifically for space missions and global operations and provides reachback to CCDRs’ 

SCAs. The JSPOC: 

(1) Provides operational-level space C2 support to CDR JFCC SPACE. 

(2) Provides SSA and maintains the single integrated space picture that is 

shared with CCDRs and appropriate SSA users. 

(3) Plans, directs, controls, integrates, and assesses space operations on behalf 

of CDRUSSTRATCOM and CDR JFCC SPACE. 

(4) Supports the intertheater responsibilities of CDR JFCC SPACE and 

coordinates with theater SCAs. 

(5) Develops COAs, plans, and executes military space operations. 

(6) Provides day-to-day operations with JSPOC crews in place to monitor dayto-day events. When a space-related incident or contingency requiring enhanced space 

support occurs, the JSPOC assesses the situation and notifies the appropriate operations 

centers within USSTRATCOM and the National Military Command Center, as 

necessary. 

6. Other US Strategic Command Functional Components 

a. Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations. The JTF-GNO directs the 

operation and defense of the GIG to ensure timely and secure net-centric capabilities in 

support of DOD's full range of warfighting and intelligence missions. CDR JTF-GNO is 

the supported commander for SATCOM, a key component of the GIG and GIG defense. 

Specific roles and responsibilities include: 

(1) Planning, coordinating, and overseeing or directing SATCOM network and 

payload reconfiguration plans for assigned users. 

(2) Developing COAs for GIG-related operations which include SATCOM 

operations in support of USSTRATCOM and national-level objectives as required to 

support net-centric warfare operations. 

(3) Performing operational functions and activities of the SOM, including dayto-day operations, management, and coordination with the strategic functions and 

activities of the SOM as performed by the strategic SATCOM manager. 

(4) Serving as the supported commander for EMI resolution. 
Chapter IV 

IV-6 JP 3-14 

(5) Providing full support to maintain availability and reliability of critical 

DOD SATCOM systems. 

(6) Serving as liaison between USSTRATCOM, Defense Information Systems 

Agency (DISA), and DOD customers for SATCOM-related issues. 

(7) Providing technical input to, and participating in, reviews and 

recommendations of best practices for Military Strategic and Tactical Relay System DOD 

use of commercial SATCOM. 

(8) Ensuring the global network operations (NETOPS) center, through the 

global SATCOM support center, theater NETOPS centers, satellite C2 centers, and other 

supporting elements, such as the regional SATCOM support centers (RSSCs), provide 

timely SATCOM status, and rapidly resolve outages or other problems. 

(9) Directing all operational and tactical SATCOM functions and tasks. 

For more information on JTF-GNO roles and responsibilities related to NETOPS, 

including SATCOM, see JP 6-0, Joint Communications System. 

b. Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance. Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance (JFCC ISR) plans, coordinates, and integrates defense global ISR 

strategies into combatant command planning and operations. JFCC ISR formulates 

recommendations to integrate global ISR capabilities associated with the missions and 

requirements of DOD ISR assets in coordination with the combatant command, the 

Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC), and 

CDRUSSTRATCOM. In coordination with the combatant commands, JFCC ISR 

provides personnel and resources in direct support of the combatant command joint 

intelligence operations centers. 

(1) JFCC ISR plans, integrates, and coordinates ISR activities in support of 

DOD's strategic and global operations. The JFCC ISR AOI extends worldwide, from 

underwater to space and overlays, but does not affect other AORs assigned to combatant 

commands. 

(2) JFCC ISR coordinates with multiple agencies which operate or use space 

capabilities, including the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National GeospatialIntelligence Agency (NGA), National Security Agency/Central Security Service 

(NSA/CSS), NRO, US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), the military Services, and 

other mission partners. Specific roles and responsibilities of JFCC ISR in relation to 

space operations include: 

(a) Developing and maintaining a global COP of ISR which is shared in 

real time with JFCC SPACE, USSTRATCOM and other combatant commands, and JFCs 

via the GIG. 
Roles and Responsibilities

IV-7 

(b) Supporting CDRUSSTRATCOM’s development of COAs and options 

to mitigate consequent risks and gaps. 

(c) Assessing, identifying, and defining gaps, shortfalls, priorities, and 

redundancies of ISR capabilities. 

(d) Integrating ISR special activities in support of combatant command 

requirements. 

For more information on JFCC ISR roles and responsibilities related to intelligence, see 

JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. 

c. Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare. The Joint 

Functional Component Command for Network Warfare (JFCC NW) is responsible for 

planning, integration, coordination, execution, force management, and capability 

management of the cyber warfare mission in support of the joint force, as directed by 

CDRUSSTRATCOM. It also provides situational awareness of opportunities to attack 

adversaries, and exercises OPCON and TACON of cyberspace forces and capabilities as 

directed. Space links and nodes may be incorporated in JFCC NW operations to ensure 

coordination and deconfliction of desired objectives. 

d. Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense. The 

Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense is responsible for 

integrated missile defense planning and operational support to include operational and 

tactical level plan development, force execution, and day-to-day management of assigned 

and attached missile defense forces. 

For more information on missile defense, see JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile 

Threats. 

e. Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike. The Joint 

Functional Component Command for Global Strike provides planning and force 

management in order to deter attacks against the US, its territories, possessions, and 

bases, and when directed, defeat adversaries through decisive joint global strike. 

SECTION C. SERVICE COMPONENT OPERATIONS 

7. General 

USSTRATCOM operates assigned and attached space forces through JFCC SPACE, 

in coordination with Service component commands and their operations centers, 

including Space and Missile Defense Command/US Army Forces Strategic Command

(SMDC/ARSTRAT), Naval Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM), United 

States Marine Corps Forces, United States Strategic Command (MARFORSTRAT), and 

Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). These Service components have distinct space 

missions. Common responsibilities of each of the Service components are: advocating 

for space requirements within their respective Services, providing a single point of 
Chapter IV 

IV-8 JP 3-14 

contact for access to Service resources and capabilities, making recommendations to 

USSTRATCOM on appropriate employment of Service forces, providing assigned space 

forces to CDRUSSTRATCOM and CCDRs as directed, assisting in planning in support 

of space operations and assigned tasking, and supporting CDRUSSTRATCOM and other 

CCDRs with space mission area expertise and advocacy of desired capabilities as 

requested. 

8. Army Component 

a. SMDC/ARSTRAT provides planning, integration, control, and coordination of 

Army forces and capabilities in support of USSTRATCOM missions. While

SMDC/ARSTRAT is the Army proponent for space, high altitude, and ground–based 

midcourse defense (GMD) the US Army Signal Center is responsible for SATCOM force 

integration and life-cycle management of all Army SATCOM user equipment, and the 

US Army Intelligence Center is responsible for space-based ISR force integration and life 

cycle management of related user equipment. Successful integration of space capabilities 

into Army operations results in some space capabilities being executed outside 

SMDC/ARSTRAT. 

b. SMDC/ARSTRAT contains two brigades. One provides space support, space 

force enhancement, and space control operations; the other provides space force 

application operations. 

(1) SMDC/ARSTRAT provides advanced geospatial intelligence, BFT, ballistic 

missile warning by deploying joint tactical ground stations, space expertise with Army 

space support teams, commercial satellite imagery products through commercial 

exploitation teams, and communication transmissions and satellite payload control of the 

wideband satellite constellation that includes Defense Satellite Communications System 

(DSCS) and Wideband Global Satellite Communications (WGS). 

(2) In its role of missile defense, SMDC/ARSTRAT provides GMD to dissuade, 

deter, and defeat ballistic missile attacks. 

(3) SMDC/ARSTRAT has OPCON/administrative control of the three RSSCs. 

A RSSC may support multiple CCDRs. 

c. The Army also integrates space capabilities at the army, corps, division, and fires 

brigade levels using space support elements (SSEs). SSEs organic space experts resident 

on the HQ staff, are an integral part of the staff and are directly involved in the staff 

planning process from the beginning. The element is responsible for identifying 

opportunities to employ space force enhancement, or space control, and then coordinating 

for the required support. When deployed, the SSE establishes and maintains contact with 

the SCA. It also coordinates with the SCA on procedures for space support requests and 

reachback support. The SSE participates in the conduct of mission analysis to determine 

which space-based capabilities are applicable to the particular operation and then 

coordinates and makes recommendations for the allocation and use of space services and 
Roles and Responsibilities

IV-9 

capabilities. The mission analysis performed by the SSE forms the basis of the staff’s 

space running estimate, as well as annex N (Space Operations), for all orders and plans. 

9. Marine Corps Component 

a. MARFORSTRAT, as the United States Marine Corps (USMC) Service 

component to USSTRATCOM, represents USMC capabilities and space interests. 

Marine Corps requirements for space exploitation and space force enhancement are 

supported through MARFORSTRAT. MARFORSTRAT brings resident knowledge and 

access to Marine Corps capabilities that can support USSTRATCOM mission areas and 

advises CDRUSSTRATCOM on proper employment and support of USMC forces. 

During planning and execution, MARFORSTRAT informs the CDRUSSTRATCOM of 

changes in space capabilities that would significantly affect operational capabilities or 

mission sustainment. MARFORSTRAT assists in developing operation plans and 

provides necessary force data to support all assigned missions to include contingency or 

crisis action planning. 

b. MARFORSTRAT also directly supports subordinate functional components and 

Service component commanders on the proper employment of USMC forces and 

capabilities, assists in developing operational and exercise plans, and provides necessary 

force data to support all assigned missions, including the space mission through the 

Marine Corps space cadre. MARFORSTRAT provides support to facilitate planning, 

operations, and exercises for space through established policy and joint employment of 

assets to Marine Corps forces. 

10. Navy Component 

a. NETWARCOM is assigned to USSTRATCOM and functionally serves as the 

Navy’s central operational authority for space, networks, and IO in support of maritime 

forces afloat and ashore. Commander, NETWARCOM is responsible for operating 

assigned space systems as an integral element of network operations and associated space 

control activities, and providing space expertise, support, products, and services, as 

required.

b. NETWARCOM Maritime Operations Center (MOC) provides planners and space 

reachback for maritime forces and coordinates with other space operations entities, 

including space operations officers on strike group staffs, on joint force maritime 

component commander staffs, or maritime HQ with MOCs responsibilities include: 

(1) Developing space effects packages (naval space plan for maritime forces) 

and providing space products in support of combat plans to satisfy strike group and 

forward deployed and theater maritime forces’ requirements derived in the planning 

process. 

(2) Providing SSA for maritime forces. 
Chapter IV 

IV-10 JP 3-14 

(3) Synchronizing with the fleet MOCs to provide operational assessment of 

maritime operations to facilitate translation of the maritime operator’s space needs and 

ensure delivery of critical space capabilities. 

c. Naval Satellite Operations Center (NAVSOC), administratively and operationally 

assigned under NETWARCOM, is responsible for operating, managing, and maintaining 

assigned satellite systems to provide reliable space-based services in direct support of 

Navy and joint forces. NAVSOC’s missions include the tracking, telemetry, and control 

operations of: 

(1) Ultrahigh frequency (UHF) follow-on satellite system and fleet satellite 

constellations that provide the military UHF narrowband voice and data communications. 

(2) Polar extremely high frequency (EHF) satellites. 

(3) Navy Ionospheric Monitoring System satellites that support upper 

ionospheric research. 

(4) Mobile User Objective System satellites that provide global SATCOM 

narrowband connectivity. 

11. Air Force Component 

a. AFSPC serves as the Air Force Service component to USSTRATCOM for space 

and ICBMs. Its mission is to organize, train, and equip Air Force space forces providing 

space control, force application, force enhancement, and space support to the JFC. 

AFSPC accomplishes its mission through two numbered air forces (NAFs) and a center 

which oversees space launch and on-orbit checkout. These NAFs provide operational 

space forces for space control, ballistic missile warning, PNT, communications, spacelift, 

satellite control operations capabilities, and the Nation’s ICBM force. Commander, 

AFSPC provides strategic planning and develops CONOPS to support strategic-level 

operations. 

b. The Commander, AFSPC presents a component numbered air force (C-NAF) to 

USSTRATCOM. This C-NAF exercises operational and tactical-level responsibilities of 

the Service component commander, as delegated by the AFSPC commander, to include 

operating space capabilities, and presentation, generation, readiness, and sustainment of 

Air Force space forces assigned to CDRUSSTRATCOM. This C-NAF commander 

performs Service operational needs identification and prioritization, and supports 

Service-component aspects of crisis and contingency planning and integration for global 

and theater objectives. 

c. AFSPC is responsible for services, facilities, and range control for the conduct of 

DOD, NASA, and commercial launches. Through control of DOD satellites, it provides 

continuous global coverage, operations for essential in-theater secure communications, 

environmental monitoring, and navigational data for joint operations and threat warning. 
Roles and Responsibilities

IV-11 

AFSPC also operates ground-based radar to monitor ballistic missile launches around the 

world and guard against surprise attack. AFSPC assures access to space by providing 

launch and range operations for a variety of launch vehicles including the Evolved 

Expendable Launch Vehicle. 

d. AFSPC operates the Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) which 

supports national security (defense and intelligence) satellites during launch and early 

orbit periods and is used to analyze anomalies affecting orbiting satellites. For particular 

constellations, AFSCN provides routine control functions and operates a few satellite 

constellations with a dedicated control network. 

e. The director of space forces (DIRSPACEFOR) is a senior Air Force officer with 

broad space expertise and theater familiarity, normally nominated by Commander 

AFSPC and approved by the commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR). AFSPC 

ensures DIRSPACEFORs are qualified to perform their responsibilities, and the 

COMAFFOR provides theater-specific information and orientation. The 

DIRSPACEFOR facilitates coordination, planning, execution, and assessment of Air 

Force space operations for the COMAFFOR to include providing support for joint space 

operations to the SCA. The COMAFFOR can also direct the DIRSPACEFOR to support 

the SCA by providing advice on Air Force space forces. When the COMAFFOR serves 

as the joint force air component commander and is designated the SCA, the 

DIRSPACEFOR typically accomplishes the day-to-day duties assigned to the SCA. 

12. Theater Support 

Services assign space operators to various joint and Service echelons. JFCs may 

assign space experts to the joint component commanders’ staffs. JFCs and their 

components request space services and capabilities early in the planning process to 

ensure effective and efficient use of space assets. Each GCC has a network of space 

operators, resident on staffs at multiple echelons, who serve as theater advisors for space 

capabilities (national, military, civil, commercial, and foreign). These individuals 

concentrate primarily on working the detailed activities of theater space operations in 

support of the SCA in developing, collecting, and prioritizing space requirements. 

Several DOD and national agencies deploy theater support teams that can provide 

additional space services and capabilities. 

SECTION D. SPACE-RELATED SUPPORT TO THE JOINT FORCE 

13. Combat Support Agencies 

The joint force uses DOD space capabilities supplemented by national, civil, 

commercial, and foreign partners. The CCDR’s staff element is responsible for a specific 

function which works through its channels to the correct CSA (e.g., DISA, NGA, 

NSA/CSS, or DIA) to obtain the needed support or products. Information from other 

defense agencies or USG organizations (e.g., NRO, NOAA) is available through 
Chapter IV 

IV-12 JP 3-14 

established procedures. The SCA can work with or through USSTRATCOM to establish 

additional support. 

a. Defense Information Systems Agency. DISA provides services and support in a 

wide range of missions, including communications, C2, information assurance, and GIG 

services, and plays a key role in ensuring that US capability to operate in space is 

maintained. The Director, DISA, responsibilities include: 

(1) Providing forces to JTF-GNO, under the direction of USSTRATCOM, to 

direct the operations and defense of the GIG. 

(2) Acquiring commercial communications services, including commercial 

satellite network assets for DOD. 

(3) Defining system performance criteria for military satellite communications 

(MILSATCOM) systems, identifying areas of deficiency, and recommending corrective 

actions as appropriate. 

(4) Assists USSTRATCOM with information assurance for SATCOM services. 

(5) Providing MILSATCOM technical support, to include representation to 

international and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forums. 

For additional information, see Department of Defense directive (DODD) 5105.19, 

Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). 

b. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. NGA provides geospatial 

intelligence in support of national security objectives. Geospatial intelligence is the 

exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and 

visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. 

Information collected and processed by NGA is tailored for customer-specific solutions. 

By giving customers ready access to geospatial intelligence, NGA provides support to 

civilian and military leaders, and contributes to the state of readiness of US military 

forces. NGA also contributes to humanitarian efforts such as tracking floods and fires, 

and in peacekeeping. NGA is a member of the US IC and a DOD CSA. NGA operates 

major facilities in the St. Louis, Missouri and Washington, D.C. areas, and fields support 

teams worldwide. The joint force contacts NGA Source for support. 

(1) NGA operates under Title 10, US Code (USC), Section 442 and Title 50, 

USC, Section 404e as well as the guidance of National Security Presidential Directive 

(NSPD) 27, US Commercial Remote Sensing Policy. Under this NSPD, the NGA is 

charged with effective implementation of key responsibilities for commercial remote 

sensing from space with respect to national security and foreign policy. 

(2) NGA is also the functional manager for the National System for Geospatial 

Intelligence (NSG). NSG integrates technology, policies, capabilities, and doctrine 
Roles and Responsibilities

IV-13 

necessary to conduct geospatial intelligence in a multi-intelligence environment. NGA 

provides geospatial intelligence to support senior national decision makers, and helps 

plan and prosecute military objectives. NGA’s strategy supports operational readiness 

through a set of geospatial foundation data. These may include controlled imagery, 

digital elevation data, and selected feature information which can be rapidly augmented 

and fused with other spatially referenced information such as intelligence, weather, and 

logistics data. The result is an integrated, digital view of the mission area. 

c. National Security Agency/Central Security Service. NSA/CSS is a unified 

organization structured to provide for the signals intelligence (SIGINT) mission of the 

US. The Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service 

(DIRNSA/CHCSS) acts as the principal SIGINT advisor to SecDef, the Director, 

National Intelligence, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The DIRNSA/CHCSS, under the 

authority delegated to him by the SecDef, exercises SIGINT operational control over US 

SIGINT operations. Specifically, the NSA/CSS also coordinates closely with the Central 

Intelligence Agency and DIA, who are responsible for human intelligence (HUMINT), 

the NGA for imagery intelligence (IMINT), and the DIA for measurement and signature 

intelligence (MASINT). NSA/CSS's SIGINT mission helps protect the nation by 

providing information in the form of SIGINT products and services that enable nationallevel decision makers to make informed decisions and operate successfully. DIRNSA 

also provides information assurance advice and assistance regarding national security 

information and information systems to the USG departments and agencies, and serves as 

the National Manager for National Security Telecommunications and Information 

Systems Security. The joint force contacts the Overhead Collection Management Center 

for support. 

d. Defense Intelligence Agency. DIA provides intelligence support in a variety of 

missions, including, but not limited to, all-source military analysis, measures and 

MASINT, HUMINT, counterintelligence, IO, personnel recovery, peacekeeping and 

coalition support, indications and warning, targeting, BDA, collection management, and 

intelligence support to operations planning. 

(1) DIA's core space-related functions include: 

(a) Coordinating DOD and national technical collection policy with 

agencies having policy responsibilities for those systems. 

(b) Facilitating and overseeing the processing, exploitation, and 

dissemination of tailored and timely MASINT in order to help the joint force and national 

customers. 

(c) Acting as the senior defense intelligence collection representatives and 

primary combatant command advocate for MASINT and technical collection capabilities. 

(d) Characterizing the environment, threats, and challenges, and defining 

technical and operational capabilities in support of DOD and IC planning. 
Chapter IV 

IV-14 JP 3-14 

 (e) DIA conducts evaluations and assessments on space based collection 

capabilities supporting the DOD Intelligence Information System Enterprise. 

(2) Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center. The DIOCC 

plans, coordinates, and integrates full-spectrum defense intelligence operations and 

capabilities in support of the combatant commands to satisfy the priorities of DOD and 

the Nation. DIOCC is the DOD-level lead organization for intelligence operations. The 

DIOCC formulates recommendations for the SecDef through the CJCS to realign defense 

intelligence resources in response to existing and emergent combatant command 

operational requirements. 

(3) Missile and Space Intelligence Center. The Missile and Space 

Intelligence Center (MSIC) is an element of DIA that produces finished, all-source 

scientific and technical intelligence in support of the combatant commands, force 

planners, and policy makers. It develops and disseminates scientific and technical 

intelligence on foreign threat systems, including guided missile systems, directed energy 

weapons, selected space programs or systems, and related command, control, and 

communications in support of operationally deployed forces and the materiel acquisition 

process. MSIC also develops and distributes digital simulations of threat weapon 

systems and provides threat simulation support to force developers and operational 

forces. 

(4) Defense Special Missile and Aerospace Center (DEFSMAC). 

DEFSMAC is a collaborative DIA and National Security Agency (NSA) activity that 

provides tasking, technical support, analysis, and reporting for various DIA and NSA 

intelligence activities. 

For additional information, see JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support To 

Military Operations, and DODD 5105.21, Defense Intelligence Agency. 

14. Other Agencies and Organizations 

a. National Reconnaissance Office. NRO is a joint organization engaged in the 

research and development, acquisition, launch, and operation of overhead reconnaissance 

systems necessary to meet the needs of the intelligence community and of DOD. NRO 

conducts other activities as directed by the SecDef or the Director of National 

Intelligence. 

(1) NRO responsibilities include support to intelligence and warning, 

monitoring arms control agreements, and crisis support to the planning and conduct of 

military operations. The NRO accomplishes its mission by building and operating 

reconnaissance satellites and associated communications systems. The NRO liaison 

officers and theater support representatives located with each of the combatant 

commands serve as direct links to NRO for the CCDRs and their staffs. 
Roles and Responsibilities

IV-15 

(2) DIA is the overall coordinator of NRO support for DOD, which it manages 

with on-line systems. IMINT requirements are tasked through NGA, SIGINT 

requirements through NSA, and MASINT requirements through DIA. The basic 

reference for obtaining support is the Joint Tactical Exploitation of National Systems 

Manual. 

For additional information, see JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support To 

Military Operations. 

b. National Air and Space Intelligence Center. The National Air and Space 

Intelligence Center (NASIC) is the principal agency for assessing the foreign air and 

space threat. NASIC can provide deployed forces with unique capabilities for aerospace 

intelligence for DOD operational commands, research and development centers, weapon 

acquisition agencies, and national planners and policymakers. 

c. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. A component of DOC, 

NOAA provides many products with commercial, civil, interagency, and defense 

applications. 

(1) NOAA has many programs and products with military applications, 

including: 

(a) Operational Significant Event Imagery (OSEI) — broadcast, print, and 

Web-quality imagery created by the OSEI team of particularly significant or newsworthy 

environmental events which are visible in available satellite data. These events include 

dust storms, fires, floods, icebergs, ocean events, severe weather, hurricanes, and other 

events, each of which can impact military operations. 

(b) National Geophysical Data Center — receives and archives Earth 

observations from space to include data from DMSP, a DOD program operated by 

NOAA, by agreement between DOD, DOC, and NASA. The DMSP constellation 

comprises several near polar-orbiting, as well as sun-synchronous satellites, monitoring 

the METOC and solar-terrestrial physics environments. 

(2) NOAA operates the Space Weather Prediction Center (SWPC) as part of 

the National Weather Service. SWPC is operated by NOAA and supports the Nation's 

civil and civilian space weather customer base. In addition, SWPC partners with the Air 

Force Weather Agency (AFWA) space weather production center to provide support to 

DOD. AFWA is the point of contact for all DOD and intelligence community space 

weather support. The two organizations work together to provide real-time monitoring 

and forecasting of solar and near-Earth space weather events that impact military 

operations. AFWA leverages SWPC's research and technique development capabilities 

to improve space weather support to military operations. 

(3) NOAA's operational environmental satellite system is composed of 

geostationary operational environmental satellites for short-range warning and 
Chapter IV 

IV-16 JP 3-14 

"nowcasting," and POES for longer term forecasting. Both kinds of satellites are 

necessary for providing a complete global weather monitoring system. The satellites also 

carry additional instruments which are used to support aviation safety and 

maritime/shipping safety which can impact military operations. 

 (4) NOAA also operates SARSAT which is a global search and rescue (SAR) 

system that detects and locates distress signals from emergency beacons carried by 

mariners, aviators, and land-based users and then relays this information to SAR 

authorities around the world. SARSAT’s global-reach is designed to primarily support 

civilian users; however, the system also supports military units particularly in noncombat/peacetime operations. DOD use of the SARSAT system is promulgated by 

Directive Type Memorandum 08-021, DOD Use of the Civil Search and Rescue Satelliteaided Tracking (SARSAT) System for Support to Personnel Recovery. 

15. Commercial Space Operations 

a. The commercialization of space supports a growing demand for technologies, 

services, and products which are commonplace in households, businesses, agencies, and 

governments on a global scale. Users of space-based products enjoy a wide range of 

products and services, including global positioning data, satellite radio, direct-to-home 

television, and even imagery-based products. Businesses and governments at all levels 

benefit from commercial space operations. Agriculture, fisheries, and geophysical 

services are among industries that benefit. Emerging services, such as space-based 

Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite imagery
Roles and Responsibilities

IV-17 

transportation and space-based tourism, are no longer out of reach. Due to the demand 

for space-based products and services, the USG has established policy to foster the use of 

US commercial space capabilities around the globe. These capabilities include: 

(1) Commercial Satellite Communications. Commercial satellite 

communications are a critical part of US military operations, and planning should include 

protection of these services. DISA is the only authorized provider of commercial 

SATCOM for DOD. 

See JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, for more information. 

(2) Remote Sensing. Commercial satellites provide remote sensing 

information. Meteorological satellites and various weather agencies provide additional 

and redundant capability to US systems. Additionally, many scientific and experimental 

satellites contribute information on the space environment and terrestrial monitoring. See 

Appendix C, “Space-Based Environmental Monitoring Capability,” for more 

information. 

(3) Positioning, Navigation, and Timing. US space-based PNT capabilities 

are, by national policy, dual military-civilian use. GPS is the PNT system of choice for 

US and international applications such as commercial shipping, safety of life, timing of 

commerce activities, and commercial aviation. Though operated by the United Sates Air 

Force (USAF), GPS is available to commercial and civilian users. The US is committed 

to improving current GPS capabilities to enhance today’s PNT capabilities. See 

Appendix E, “Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing,” for more information. 

(4) Commercial Satellite Imagery. Space-based imagery provided by 

commercial entities has become an important capability for civil and military operations. 

Commercial satellites provide electro-optical, infrared, and synthetic aperture radar 

imaging. Companies can provide imagery, cartography, basic analysis, vessel tracking 

data, and much more. The joint force obtains these products through NGA Source just 

like they would for products from US capabilities. The benefits of these products are that 

they are usually easily obtainable, they free up national systems for higher priority tasks, 

they can have high resolution and high revisit rates, and they are fairly inexpensive. 

Because they are unclassified, US forces often share these products with coalition and 

host-nation (HN) members. 

b. Commercial satellites present capabilities that military commanders may draw on 

to support planning, operations, and even morale and welfare of the fighting force. 

However, commercial space operations present unique challenges. Although commercial 

space capabilities may provide services, they lack assured access and timeliness because 

capabilities used by US forces are also used by adversaries. Military commanders may 

request satellite "surge" capabilities while providing civil support during natural 

disasters, yet commercial vendors may require long lead time and multiyear leasing to 

gain access to a capability. Finally, using commercial satellites for military operations 

presents additional legal issues which must be considered. 
Chapter IV 

IV-18 JP 3-14 

c. Even though these challenges exist, military use of commercial capabilities has 

dramatically increased due to requirements surpassing MILSATCOM resources. To help 

meet the increased demand, many commercial satellite product vendors have established 

government services and solutions branches within their organizations to coordinate 

usage requirements with DOD and other USG agencies. Although these relationships 

may be largely transparent to military field commanders, the products they request may 

be eventually fulfilled by a commercial application. In any case, requests for space-based 

products and services follow standard channels through established procedures. 

16. Multinational Space Operations 

a. The NATO Alliance has integrated several space capabilities and established 

offices which coordinate specific programs for NATO. Supreme Headquarters Allied 

Powers Europe oversees most programs, such as coordinating with USSTRATCOM for 

the shared early warning system and theater missile defense. The NATO Consultation, 

Command and Control Board overseas the Consultation, Command and Control Agency 

which is responsible for NATO's commercial space imagery and SATCOM programs. 

b. For most other nations, the civilian and commercial segments dominate space 

operations. Therefore, civilian space agencies have often taken the leadership role for 

space. Agencies such as the European Space Agency, the Japan Aerospace Exploration 

Agency, France’s Centre National d’Estudes Spatiales, and the Indian Space Research 

Organization often issue national policies and strategies in which military space 

operations may not be addressed. There are allied space operations centers, such as the 

European Union Satellite Centre, the British National Space Centre, and several others, 

but they are not typically part of military forces. However, there may be agreements and 

procedures in place for them to support military operations. 

c. US forces rely extensively on foreign environmental satellite capabilities to 

augment DMSP data. Foreign geostationary environmental satellite data is essential for 

military operations in Europe and Asia, and in the western-Pacific and Indian Oceans. 

Additionally, foreign POES information is being incorporated into the NPOESS 

constellation to assist in meeting DOD environmental satellite requirements. 

d. Space Integration into MNF Operations. Allied or coalition forces will have 

many of the same requirements for space services and capabilities as do US forces 

However, US foreign disclosure policy will dictate the nature and scope of disclosure and 

release of space-derived products to multinational partners. Commercial imagery 

products are normally unclassified and will be of great benefit to other MNFs. Weather 

data is also readily available to share, as is GPS navigation support. Of special 

importance is the provision for missile warning and defense against attack from theater 

ballistic missiles. USSTRATCOM is responsible, as part of an interagency process and 

in coordination with GCCs, for assisting in development of missile warning architectures 

and providing this information to MNFs in a process called shared early warning (SEW). 

See JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, for additional information. 
CHAPTER V

PLANNING 

V-1 

1. General 

a. Commanders address space operations in all types of plans and orders, at all 

levels of war. Additionally, plans must address how to effectively integrate capabilities, 

counter an adversary’s use of space, maximize use of limited space assets, and to 

consolidate operational requirements for space capabilities. 

(1) The GCC may request CDRUSSTRATCOM’s assistance in integrating 

space forces, capabilities, and considerations into each phase of campaign and major 

operation plans. 

(2) Joint force planners incorporate space forces and capabilities into the basic 

plan and the applicable annexes (e.g., A, B, C, H, J, K, L, M, N, S, and V, at a minimum). 

(3) During mission analysis, planners assist the CCDR to identify specified, 

implied, and essential tasks for space forces. Additionally, the capabilities of the 

adversary, including their ability to impact our space forces and their use of space 

capabilities, are considered in JIPOE. Finally, military planners identify those space 

forces and capabilities that are potential adversary or friendly centers of gravity (COGs), 

or are critical parts of COGs. 

(4) In staff estimates, the planners examine their functional specialties to 

identify the role and contributions of space forces in the various phases of the campaign. 

During preparation of the commander’s estimate, space forces and capabilities are war 

gamed along with land, maritime, air, and special operations forces to allow the CCDR to 

make an informed decision. Additionally, the JFC must adequately plan for operations 

without certain space forces or capabilities. Planners should consult space or functional 

experts to discern which capabilities will not be available during the operation. 

(5) The completed plan should describe how space supports or is employed to 

accomplish the commander’s stated objectives, how the adversary employs its space 

forces, the process and procedures through which additional support will be requested, 

and finally, how the commander will execute the plan in the event of the loss of space 

capabilities. 

(6) Space forces can also be used to support or conduct flexible deterrent 

options (FDOs). Conducting a theater ballistic missile defense exercise with US allies is 

one possible FDO if the CCDR is facing a ballistic missile threat. Another FDO could be 

to publish, in the world media, high-resolution images from commercial satellites and 

“The staff’s effort during planning focuses on developing effective plans and 

orders and helping the commander make related decisions. The staff does 

this by integrating situation specific information with sound doctrine and 

technical competence.” 

Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning
Chapter V 

V-2 JP 3-14 

other systems to clearly demonstrate the adversary’s preparations for war and to raise 

public awareness. 

(7) Annex N (Space Operations) provides detailed information on space 

forces and their capabilities that the supported commander can use throughout the 

campaign. The format for annex N is found in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II, 

Planning Formats. Annex N directly relates to those space capabilities included in other 

places such as annex A (Task Organization), annex B, (Intelligence), appendix 3 

(Information Operations) to annex C (Operations), annex H (Meteorological and 

Oceanographic Operations), annex K (Communications Systems), annex L 

(Environmental Considerations), annex M (Geospatial Information and Services), annex 

S (Special Technical Operations), and annex V (Interagency Coordination). 

b. Coordination. Coordination of space operations between the staffs of the 

supported and supporting commanders is normally established through the designation of 

an SCA. The designated SCA coordinates the identification of operational requirements 

and their inclusion in the appropriate annex. The result of this process is a supportable, 

valid statement of requirements that can be used by the supporting commander. 

(1) During coordination, the operational requirements are evaluated to identify 

shortfalls in capability, appropriate use of space forces, compliance with national policy, 

and feasibility of mission success. 

(2) When shortfalls or other limitations are identified, they are forwarded to the 

SecDef via the CJCS for further coordination, resolution, adjudication, and 

apportionment. 

c. Supporting Plans. USSTRATCOM components develop supporting plans as 

required. Consideration is given to, and balanced with, requirements of all supported 

joint force space users. 

(1) The Joint Staff evaluates requirements based on priority of use, alternative 

solutions, impact of loss, and SecDef or CJCS guidance. The review and approval of the 

supporting plan are the responsibility of the supported commander. 

(2) If the supporting commander cannot meet the supported commander’s 

requirements because of planning commitments previously granted to other commanders 

or agencies, the CJCS or the SecDef will adjudicate and resolve the conflicting 

requirements. 

2. Operational Art and Design 

a. Since operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war, 

operational art and design should be considered when planning space operations at all 

levels. Space forces and capabilities can support or enable operational art and design. 
 Planning 

V-3 

They are a means to achieve the required end, or a way to support or enable other means 

to achieve the required end. As such, space forces and capabilities must be considered 

equally with forces and capabilities in other domains. 

For additional information on operational art and design, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 

and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

b. Operational design is characterized by the following fundamental elements: 

(1) Termination. Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to 

preserve achieved advantages is a component of strategy and operational art and design. 

Space-based ISR supports the JFC's general situational awareness by enabling 

understanding of when to terminate operations. Space-based ISR can also persistently 

monitor situations in support of stability operations or treaty obligations. 

(2) End State and Objectives. Once the termination criteria are established, 

operational design continues with development of the military strategic objectives which 

comprise the military end state conditions. Since space operations are usually in support 

of other operations, the end state is not usually space specific. 

(3) Effects. Identifying desired and undesired effects within the operational 

environment connects military strategic and operational objectives to tactical tasks. 

Determining specific desired and undesired effects in relation to space operations can 

help commanders and their staffs gain a common picture and shared understanding of the 

operational environment that promotes unified action. 

(4) Centers of Gravity. The essence of operational art lies in being able to 

mass the effects of combat power against the enemy’s sources of power in order to 

destroy or neutralize them. COGs are those characteristics, capabilities, or locations from 

which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. 

Given our dependency on space capabilities, space should be considered a COG for the 

JFC. Space assets are also important in helping to identify enemy COGs. 

(5) Decisive Points. By correctly identifying and controlling decisive points, a 

commander can gain a marked advantage over the enemy and greatly influence the 

outcome of an action. For example, decisive points for the assured access to space are 

launch complexes and ground stations. 

(6) Direct vs. Indirect. In theory, direct attacks against enemy COGs is the 

most direct path to victory. However, where direct attack means attacking into an 

opponent’s strength, JFCs should seek an indirect approach. If space-enabled C2 is an 

adversary's COG, then OSC is an example of a direct approach against the space 

component of the adversary’s C2 COG. If public support for military operations is an 

adversary’s COG, then the use of SATCOM to deliver IO messages is an example of an 

indirect approach against an adversary’s COG. 
Chapter V 

V-4 JP 3-14 

(7) Lines of Operations. As JFCs visualize the design of the operation they 

may use multiple lines of operations. Generally, lines of operations describe the linkage 

of various actions on nodes and/or decisive points with an operational or strategic 

objective. In as much as space operations support most operations, lines of operations 

may be a factor during space planning. 

(8) Operational Reach. Operational reach is the duration and distance across 

which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities. Since national boundaries do 

not extend into space, satellites may provide the most timely access to denied areas. 

(9) Simultaneity and Depth. The intent of simultaneity and depth is to bring 

both military and nonmilitary power to bear concurrently across the tactical, operational, 

and strategic levels of war, to overwhelm the adversary across multiple domains, thus 

disrupting the opponent’s decision cycle causing failure of their moral and physical 

cohesion. PNT and SATCOM enable precision operations on a global scale and can be 

optimized to provide capabilities anywhere within a theater, or within multiple theaters. 

Additionally, space force enhancement contributes to the establishment and maintenance 

of a space COP, which is critical to carrying out simultaneity and depth in joint 

operations. 

(10) Timing and Tempo. The joint force should conduct operations at a tempo 

and time that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the enemy. With proper 

timing, JFCs can dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and operate beyond the 

enemy’s ability to react. For instance, the employment of OSC capabilities against 

adversary communications can inhibit the enemy's timing and tempo. 

(11) Forces and Functions. Commanders and planners design campaigns and 

operations that focus on defeating either enemy forces or functions, or a combination of 

both. Space control focuses on disrupting enemy functions while enhancing our own (see 

JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for a discussion of joint functions). 

(12) Leverage. Leverage is gaining, maintaining, and exploiting advantages in 

combat power across all domains and the information environment. Space capabilities 

enable JFCs to see the entire operational theater and provide the opportunity for the JFC 

to exploit advantages when detected. Reachback helps reduce the required footprint 

within a theater and leverages unique centers of expertise (e.g., JSPOC). 

(13) Balance. Balance is the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities within 

the joint force, and the nature and timing of operations conducted. The intent is to 

maintain friendly balance while disrupting the enemy’s. The employment of groundbased radars and space-based infrared sensors for missile warning is an example of 

balance. The joint force also deploys space forces into theater while relying on 

reachback for certain tasks reliant on special infrastructure. In this way, the overall 

placement of space capabilities is balanced to support an operation. Conversely, the JFC 

should not be completely dependent on space forces or capabilities to meet a particular 
 Planning 

V-5 

operational requirement, and should have alternatives available in case of the loss or 

disruption of space capabilities within the AOR. 

(14) Anticipation. JFCs should remain alert for the unexpected and for 

opportunities to exploit the situation. Space-borne ISR fused into the COP supports the 

JFC's overall situational awareness and improves his ability to exploit unexpected 

opportunities. The predictive attributes of SSA are key to the anticipation of threats to 

space systems. A JFC anticipates and plans for the loss of space systems or capabilities 

through regular exercises. 

(15) Synergy. Synergy involves integrating and synchronizing operations in a 

manner that applies force from different dimensions to shock, disrupt, and defeat 

opponents. JFCs seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in 

various domains and the information environment, all culminating in achieving the 

assigned military objective(s) in the shortest time possible and with minimal casualties. 

Planners need to consider how space operations can be integrated into all aspects of the 

planning process. Space planners also need to understand how different types of space 

systems and capabilities can be employed together to produce enhanced effectiveness. 

(16) Culmination. Culmination has both an offensive and defensive 

application. In the offense, the culmination occurs at the point in time and space at which 

an attacker’s combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender. A defender reaches 

culmination when the defending force no longer has the capability to go on the 

counteroffensive or defend successfully. Attacking an enemy’s C2 structure through 

OSC operations can reduce their combat power and lead to earlier culmination. 

Conversely, loss of critical space capabilities could lead to unanticipated early 

culmination for the JFC. 

(17) Arranging Operations. JFCs must determine the best arrangement in the 

execution of operations. This arrangement will often be a combination of simultaneous 

and sequential operations to achieve the desired end state quickly and at the least cost in 

personnel and other resources. When best to employ space capabilities, particularly 

during offensive operations, is a key concern for the JFC. Space-based sensors can 

provide details of geography of the operational area, thereby supporting planning and 

arranging of operations. In phasing operations, planners should consider the footprint, 

visibility, and signal strength of available space-based capabilities (e.g., GPS accuracy, 

overhead non-imaging infrared). 

For additional information on the elements of operational design, see JP 3-0, Joint 

Operations and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

3. Key Planning Considerations 

a. Space presents unique planning and operational considerations that affect 

friendly, adversary, and neutral space forces alike. Numerous resource and legal 

considerations impact planning and affect mission success. The space planner 
Chapter V 

V-6 JP 3-14 

understands planning and operational considerations for employment of space 

capabilities, and has a firm knowledge of the threats to the use of those systems by an 

adversary. The space planner must understand what can be done to limit an adversary’s 

use of space capabilities and how to protect our own use of space. Finally, a planner 

understands how space capabilities relate to and support capabilities and operations in 

other domains. 

b. Global Access. The fact that there are no geographical boundaries or physical 

obstructions in space gives military forces global access and extensive advantage. 

(1) A single satellite in a low Earth polar orbit can overfly any location on the 

Earth’s surface within a 24-hour period. However, basic orbital mechanics limit the 

time some satellites can remain over a particular geographic area. The amount of time 

that a terrestrial user will be within a satellite’s direct field of view will vary from 

minutes to years, depending on the satellite orbit type and the field of view of the satellite 

sensor/antenna (see Appendix H, “Space Fundamentals,” for a more in-depth discussion 

of orbit types and considerations). 

(2) With a sufficient number of satellites in appropriate orbits, it is possible to 

maintain continuous LOS of, and have access to, any points on the surface of the Earth. 

(3) Global access is one of the key advantages that space capabilities offer. 

Most spacecraft can serve multiple CCDRs and/or users around the world simultaneously 

(e.g., missile warning satellites). 

(4) Despite such global access, however, terrestrial obstructions can affect or 

limit observations of some points on the Earth from space. 

c. Persistence. Satellites in an equatorial, circular orbit with an orbital period of 

24 hours are called geostationary. A geostationary orbit allows the satellite to remain 

over the same area of the Earth 24 hours a day, providing continuous access to a given 

terrestrial AOI. However, geostationary orbits do not permit good views of high latitude 

regions. Polar or highly inclined orbits are needed to view these regions, at the cost of 

reduced dwell time over a given AOI. Because orbits are easily determined, short dwell 

times and intermittent coverage by a given satellite may provide an adversary significant 

windows of opportunity for unobserved activity. Therefore, most satellite surveillance 

systems must consist of multiple satellites or be supplemented by other sensors if 

continuous surveillance of an area is desired. 

d. Limitations on the operating lifetime of a satellite include the following: 

(1) The design life of the satellite. 

(2) Maintenance Considerations. Physical maintenance cannot currently be 

performed on most satellites on orbit. Maintenance is conducted daily using digital 
 Planning 

V-7 

commands transmitted via the RF spectrum. Satellite maintenance relies on the use of 

redundant systems, robust design, and alternative subsystems configurations. 

(3) The amount of fuel carried for changing or maintaining the spacecraft’s 

desired orbit and altitude. Satellite orbital maneuvers may be costly in terms of fuel 

expended. Although some satellite maneuvers can happen quickly (e.g., station keeping), 

the ability to move a geosynchronous satellite over another part of the Earth may require 

weeks to months to perform. Whatever the case, satellite maneuvers requiring the use of 

fuel could shorten the overall useful life of the satellite. 

(4) The type of orbit used by the spacecraft. 

 (5) Space Weather. Unexpectedly large or frequent space weather events could 

shorten a satellite’s planned life either by a significant single event or an increased rate of 

degradation to instruments and systems. 

e. Predictable Orbits. A satellite’s motion or orbital location is predictable, 

allowing for warning of satellite overflight, maintaining situational awareness, and 

tracking the location of objects in space. However, there are several forces at work that 

slowly degrade the prediction accuracy of a satellite’s location. These forces will cause a 

satellite’s orbit to slowly change. A satellite may use propulsive forces to maneuver and 

change its orbit, making the orbit hard to predict to anyone but the organization initiating 

the maneuver. However, maneuvering may come at a high cost in terms of on-board fuel, 

a limited resource. These motion predictions (satellite ephemeris) become less accurate 

over time and require periodic updates on a daily to weekly basis. 

f. Space capabilities may be vulnerable. Space capabilities are subject to the 

effects of space weather, including Sun spot activity. Additionally, ground-to-satellite 

links are susceptible to jamming, and C2 facilities are subject to attack. Launch facilities 

must be protected to ensure access to space so that force replenishment may be 

accomplished. Some space capabilities may also be subject to exploitation, such as an 

adversary using commercial GPS receivers for navigation. Knowledge of an adversary’s 

OSC and exploitation capabilities will allow a joint space planner to develop appropriate 

responses. 

g. Resource Considerations. Long lead times to replenish/replace space assets 

may result in less than adequate space assets to meet a commander’s requirements. 

(1) Current launch programs take 40-150 days to generate and launch, provided 

that all hardware, including payload, is available at the launch site. Payload availability, 

prelaunch processing, positioning, and on-orbit checkout are factors that can significantly 

lengthen the time from call-up to operating on-orbit. 

(2) Some forces can perform multiple missions. For example, some missile 

warning sites perform a secondary mission of space surveillance and missile defense. 
Chapter V 

V-8 JP 3-14 

(3) Multiple DOD organizations apportion space capabilities according to 

established and validated priorities which allow the greatest total mission assurance for 

the joint force. While there are numerous satellites capable of supporting a requirement, 

higher priority requirements will be satisfied first. 

(4) Users may be preempted based on priority. Competition for bandwidth, 

priorities for tasking, and similar constraints, combined with satellite physical access to 

specific locations, impact availability of space capabilities. 

h. Timing Considerations. SATCOM is heavily dependent on precise timing 

capabilities. Precise time enables information throughput by increasing the effective use 

of the bandwidth, and allows for the frequency hopping and cryptographic functions 

inherent in some communications systems. 

(1) According to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 

6130.01D, 2007 CJCS Master Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Plan (MPNTP), GPS 

time is the standard for DOD. However, the vulnerabilities of GPS warrant that 

communication systems have a back-up capability to acquire timing information. 

(2) Cryptologic systems and capabilities rely on precise time for 

synchronization of encrypted communications and information systems. Many 

communications networks use frequency hopping to improve security and increase 

resistance to jamming. Therefore, it is essential that planners allow for redundant timing 

capabilities in the event GPS is denied or degraded. See CJCSI 6130.01D for additional 

information on DOD's precise timing policy. 

i. Legal Considerations. The joint force complies with US policy and laws, as 

well as US-ratified treaties and international law, when planning space operations. Legal 

advisors participate in all stages of space operations planning and execution in order to 

ensure compliance with applicable legal considerations. Although some uses of space are 

prohibited, there are relatively few legal restrictions on the use of space for military 

purposes. The US is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations 

for peaceful purposes, and for the benefit of all humanity. Consistent with this principle, 

"peaceful purposes" allow US defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of 

national interests. 

(1) Some contracts and consortium agreements could prohibit certain space 

assets from being used for military purposes. For example, certain corporate agreements 

prohibit using SATCOM for military operations. 

(2) The law of armed conflict and certain treaties, acts, and conventions, as they 

pertain to the use of force, regulation of the means and methods of warfighting, and 

protection of civilians, must be complied with when conducting space control and space 

force application operations. 
 Planning 

V-9 

(a) Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 

Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial 

Bodies, 1967. The "Outer Space Treaty" provides that every activity in outer space must 

be carried out in accordance with international law, including the United Nations (UN) 

Charter, which recognizes the inherent right of self-defense. All nations are free to use 

and explore outer space, no nation may appropriate any part of outer space, and every 

activity in outer space must be carried out with due regard to the corresponding interests 

of other nations. No nuclear weapon or other weapon of mass destruction may be placed 

in orbit around the Earth, installed on the Moon or on any other celestial body, or 

otherwise stationed in outer space. A limited range of military activities, such as 

establishing bases, weapons testing, and the conduct of military maneuvers, are also 

prohibited on celestial bodies, to include the Moon.

(b) Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile 

Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, 1977. This convention prohibits 

military or other hostile use of environmental modification techniques as a means of 

destruction, damage, or injury to the environment (including outer space) if such use has 

widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects. 

(c) Other Space Treaties. Other major treaties pertaining to space are the 

1968 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of 

Objects Launched into Outer Space (The Rescue and Return Agreement), the 1972 

Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability 

Convention) and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space 

(Registration Convention) of 1974. The Rescue and Return Agreement obligates nations 

that have ratified this treaty to cooperate in the rescue and return of distressed personnel 

of a spacecraft and, upon request of the launching authority, to take those measures it 

deems practicable to return space objects of other nations that come to Earth within its 

territory. The Liability Convention provides a system for assessing liability for damage 

caused by space objects. Generally, a nation is responsible for direct damage caused by a 

space object to objects on the ground or to aircraft in flight. Damage caused to other 

space objects, on the other hand, will only lead to liability if one party can establish fault 

on the part of the other party. Finally, the Registration Convention requires nations to 

notify the UN “as soon as practicable” after an object has been launched into outer space, 

providing certain descriptive information, to include orbital parameters and a general 

statement of the purpose of the space object. 

(d) Noninterference with National or Multinational Technical Means of 

Verification. Various arms control treaties prohibit “interference” with national or 

multinational technical means of verification (NTM); i.e., the array of intelligencegathering capabilities that can be operated from outside the territory of the observed 

nation in order to monitor the treaty compliance, to include photoreconnaissance satellites 

and space-based sensors. The 1992 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 

extended application of what was once a bilateral precept to all NATO and former 

Warsaw Pact countries, so that the prohibition on interference with NTM now applies to 

30 countries. 
Chapter V 

V-10 JP 3-14 

(e) Frequency Spectrum Management. The International 

Telecommunications Union manages the assignment of orbital positions in the 

geosynchronous belt and coordinates the use of the RF spectrum with all member 

countries. Individual countries have sovereignty over frequency usage within their 

borders. The users of any spectrum dependent device, to include space systems, must 

obtain host nation approval to operate those devices in country. Users must obtain 

frequency clearance from the National Telecommunications and Information Agency 

when operating within US territory through their service frequency management office. 

In addition to frequency clearance, users must get landing rights from the host nation 

when operating outside of US territory. These are coordinated through the geographic 

combatant commands' joint frequency management office. 

(3) In some cases, national policy dictates that space-based capabilities are 

made available to civilian users. The USG is committed to providing GPS to users 

worldwide as a space-based navigation capability of choice. JFCs should be aware of 

this commitment and factor it into NAVWAR planning and operation plans. 

j. Multinational Space Operations 

(1) Space capabilities have become increasingly important to operations for all 

nations and nongovernmental organizations. Access to commercial space services has 

enabled even the smallest of nations to use GPS, commercial space imagery, SATCOM, 

and other services. Space capabilities are being used across the range of military 

operations by our allied and coalition partners and have become a critical enabler for civil 

and military operations. The US has the predominance of military space capability; 

however, many nations are pursuing their own space capabilities. Small satellites also 

present a very affordable option for many nations. As other nations begin to provide, and 

have access to, their own (or commercial) space capabilities, the US must integrate them 

into multinational operations. 

(2) Most nations do not have military space forces and only limited (if any) 

military space systems. They rely on dual-use satellites and leverage commercial space 

assets. It is critical to integrate and coordinate the requirements for various national 

space capabilities, and to work releasability issues of US space capabilities in 

multinational operations. Command and control and support relationships should be 

established among US forces, various partner space centers, and multinational space 

organizations. 

(3) Space is addressed in NATO’s Bi-Lateral Strategic Command Functional 

Planning Guide for Space Operations (NATO Restricted document), and provides 

guidance for space integration in the operational planning process. 
 Planning 

V-11 

4. Control and Coordinating Measures 

a. Control and coordinating measures are used by JFCs to provide deconfliction 

between assets and missions, to maximize efficient and effective use of limited assets, 

and to provide effective C2 of forces and assets within a defined area. For most DOD 

space operations, control and coordinating measures are primarily accomplished through 

the space tasking cycle, and through specific products which are derived during the 

tasking cycle. For operations conducted in theater, and/or through JFCC SPACE, the 

space operations directive gives visibility into the efforts of subordinate units assigned to 

a JFC (or via JFCC SPACE). The joint space tasking order (JSTO) tasks units with 

specific missions. See Figure V-1. 

b. The JSTO development process does not account for missions performed by 

non-DOD space assets or those limited space forces assigned to a GCC, thereby creating 

potential conflicts between DOD and non-DOD agencies. It is then incumbent upon the 

GCCs and JFCC SPACE to coordinate as required to minimize conflicts. To this end, 

CDRUSSTRATCOM authorized JFCC SPACE to directly liaison with other DOD and 

non-DOD agencies to help deconflict space operations. 

THE JOINT SPACE TASKING ORDER PROCESS

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

STRATEGY COMBAT PLANS COMBAT OPS

Planning Planning Production Execution

Deconfliction

MSP JSTO Production

SET Combat

Assessment

JSTO 

Execution

CDR JFCC 

SPACE

SPACE 

TASKING 

ORDER

CDR Commander

CA Combat Assessment

JFCC Joint Functional Component

Command

JIPTL Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List

JSTO Joint Space Tasking Order

MSP Master Space Plan

SET Space Effects Team

SOD Space Operations Directive

STRAT DEV Strategy Development

TNL Target Nomination List

STRAT 

Dev

C

A

JSTO

(H-6 

Hrs)

JSTO

(H-12 

Hrs)

MSP SOD TNL JIPTL Assessment 

Report

Unit 

Reports

Figure V-1. The Joint Space Tasking Order Process 
Chapter V 

V-12 JP 3-14 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX A

SPACE-BASED INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, 

AND RECONNAISSANCE 

A-1 

1. Overview 

Space-based ISR is a part of the synchronization and integration of sensors, assets, 

and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems for collection of data and 

information on an object or in an AOI on a persistent, event driven, or scheduled basis. 

The JFC and the components have access to space capabilities which can collect diverse 

military, diplomatic, and economic information that can be valuable for planning and 

execution across the range of military operations. Specifically, information can be 

collected, processed, exploited, and disseminated on such diverse subjects as indications 

and warning (to include ballistic missile launch), targeting analysis, friendly COA 

development, adversary capability assessment, BDA, or characterization of the 

operational environment. 

2. Application 

a. Intelligence. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, 

evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign 

nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential 

operations. Space systems contribute to the development of intelligence through 

surveillance and reconnaissance activities. 

b. Surveillance. Space systems can provide commanders with systematic 

observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by 

visual, electronic, photographic, or other means that provide commanders with situational 

awareness within a given area. Surveillance from space does not imply that a single 

satellite or capability must be continuously collecting. Satellites that are able to provide a 

snapshot in time can be augmented by additional capabilities collecting in the same or 

even different areas of the electromagnetic spectrum. There will be short gaps in 

collection (minutes or a few hours), but capabilities will be concentrating on a target, 

which, over time, constitutes surveillance. These “following” capabilities can continue 

collecting on a target as the previous satellite moves out of the area of access in its orbit. 

Several satellites in low and medium Earth orbits can provide coverage of targets on the 

order of minutes. Geosynchronous satellites can provide surveillance because their orbits 

allow them to have continuous access to large portions of the Earth. Collection from 

geosynchronous systems may, by necessity, be prioritized based on area of the world and 

where within the electromagnetic spectrum it can be tasked to collect. In many instances, 

the number of requirements levied against a system may also necessitate a prioritization 

of collection. Satellites may also be a contributor to an overall surveillance effort 

consisting of space, terrestrial, and airborne systems that together provide continuity in 

surveillance when space systems alone do not have continuous access or are unavailable. 

The JSPOC maintains the satellite catalog based upon a global network surveiling onorbit objects. This database is used to provide overflight warning to supported 

commanders. This database is also used for flight safety to inform satellite operators 

when satellites are in the path of other man-made orbiting objects. 
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-14 

c. Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual 

observation or other detection methods, information about activities and resources of an 

enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or 

geographic characteristics of a particular area. Single low and medium Earth-orbiting 

systems, or architectures that provide limited numbers of low or medium orbital systems, 

are well suited to the reconnaissance mission. Generally, their access to specific targets 

are limited in time based on their orbit such that data collected will be a “snapshot” of 

events in the portion of the electromagnetic spectrum where they can collect. 

Geosynchronous or geostationary satellites are capable of performing reconnaissance 

from space as well, focusing their collection efforts on a target or region for a relatively 

short amount of time before focusing on another area. 

3. Advantages 

a. The prime advantage of space-based ISR capabilities is their potential to provide 

systematic and focused coverage of AOIs, sometimes without detection, from sanction. 

b. Often, the product of a space or terrestrial capability can enhance accuracy and 

shorten reaction times to the user by cueing another space system to survey an AOI. 

Likewise, a space-based capability may be used to cue a terrestrial-based system for more 

precise location, discrimination, and targeting. 

c. ISR systems also enhance planning capabilities by providing updated information 

regarding terrain and adversary force dispositions. Space-based imagery, in particular, 

supports the full range of military intelligence activities including indications and 

warning, current intelligence, order of battle, scientific and technical intelligence 

assessments, targeting, and combat assessments. Imagery is also used to conduct mission 

planning and rehearsal. 

For additional information on space based intelligence support, see JP 2-0, Joint 

Intelligence and the other joint intelligence series JPs.

4. Limitations 

In addition to the access limitations and a predictable overflight schedule dictated by 

the satellite orbit, satellite systems may be affected by a variety of atmospheric 

disturbances such as fog, smoke, electrical storms, and precipitation and clouds, which 

affect the ability of imaging systems to detect adversary activity, missile launches, and 

battle damage. Other limiting factors include: priority conflicts; tasking, processing, 

exploitation, and dissemination limitations; and low numbers of assets. 

5. Support Procedures 

a. There are a number of national, military, and nonmilitary space capabilities that 

can be used individually or in combination to provide the information required by the 
Space-Based Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

A-3 

JFC. The support request procedures for products and information are dependent on the 

individual system. 

See JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, for 

additional information on national imagery sensors and capabilities. 

b. National and DOD ISR Support. National ISR systems provide direct support 

to the President. The information provided by these systems is used by senior 

government leaders to make strategic political or military decisions, and is also of great 

utility to the JFC. Information from national systems is provided to the JFC by direct and 

indirect feeds in addition to Service component tactical exploitation of national 

capabilities programs and Distributed Common Ground System elements. Requests for 

ISR support should go through the combatant command or joint force J-2 and the J-2 

collection manager. Additional sources of information and assistance include the liaison 

officer or support team assigned from the appropriate national or DOD intelligence 

agencies. 

c. Nonmilitary and Commercial Imagery Support. National and USG civil 

imagery satellites provide most of the imagery support to joint operations. However, 

nonmilitary space surveillance systems (including commercial and allied space 

capabilities) may augment DOD space systems, enhancing surveillance and 

reconnaissance coverage of the Earth. 

(1) Commercial electro-optical imaging satellites are capable of providing large 

area, mid-to-high resolution images with a revisit time from 8 to 15 days; others are 

capable of high-resolution imagery with a revisit time of 3 days. Recent increases in the 

number and quality of commercial imagery satellites provide a valuable opportunity to 

augment national systems with panchromatic, multispectral, and radar imagery products. 

All commercial imagery is requested through the NGA. 

(2) The greatest limitation of commercial imagery is a lack of understanding in 

how to use the available systems. Commercial imagery timelines are not adequate to 

fulfill most stated theater collection requirements with revisit times between 3 and 15 

days. Lengthy revisit times and competition will dictate how long a request for imagery 

takes to fill, and could take up to a year. In times of conflict, these capabilities could 

provide an advantage to adversaries, since the sale of information from these systems is 

often not restricted. The sale of commercial imagery to non-USG customers may be 

interrupted (i.e., “shutter control”) via the procedures contained in CJCSM 3219.01A, 

Interruption of Remote Sensing Space System Data Collection and Distribution During 

Periods of National Security Crisis. 

(3) NGA is the sole DOD action agency for all purchases of commercial and 

foreign government-owned imagery-related remote sensing data by DOD components. 

To support this, NGA has established contracts with all major commercial imagery 

vendors. 
Appendix A 

A-4 JP 3-14 

(4) Before commercial products can be relied upon for targeting and accurate 

geolocations, they should be verified by NGA. NGA provides this service on a case-bycase basis. Requests for these services must be validated by the appropriate geospatial 

information and services (GI&S) staff agency at the combatant command or Service 

component before being forwarded to NGA. Commercial imagery resolution and 

timeliness may not be adequate to satisfy specific needs. 

d. Geospatial Information and Services Support. Joint forces receive current and 

accurate GI&S products from NGA based on satellite imagery. In addition, NGA can 

provide supplemental updates to military forces on port conditions, river stages, recent 

urban construction, vegetation analysis, ice coverage, and oceanographic features. 

Space-based imagery can provide current information on terrain, surface moisture 

conditions, oceanic subsurface conditions, beach conditions, and vegetation that permit 

identification of avenues of approach, specific ingress and egress routes, and other 

mission parameters to assist in the JIPOE. 

(1) Currently, the major source for geospatial data is visible-spectrum imagery 

provided by national intelligence systems. Imagery provides a detailed overhead view of 

the area that is analyzed to identify natural and man-made features. Stereo imagery 

provides elevation data and improved identification of features. Ephemeris and altitude 

data that accompanies the imagery allows for the precise geodetic positioning of the 

image and mensuration of features. 

(2) Panchromatic, MSI, and HSI are contributing sources of data for the 

development and update of GI&S. Satellite systems are vital for providing GI&S data 

because of their global coverage and periodic updates. 

(3) During a crisis, it is important to understand that geospatial information 

producers are in direct competition with intelligence activities for national collection 

systems. In some cases, this competition could be mitigated by the use of civil and 

commercial imagery sources as discussed above. 

See JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, for additional 

information. 
APPENDIX B

MISSILE WARNING

B-1 

1. Overview 

Space forces significantly contribute to the ability to provide warning of ballistic 

missile launches. Voice and data warning information is relayed to the joint force in 

near-real-time to support tactical decision making and provide executable data to the 

missile defense network to counter the threat. 

2. Application 

a. There are two missile warning missions: strategic and theater. Both use a mix of 

space-based and terrestrial sensors. Strategic missile warning is the notification to 

national leaders of a missile attack against North America, as well as attacks against 

allied and coalition partners. Theater missile warning is the notification to geographic 

combatant commands, allied and coalition partners, and forward deployed personnel. 

(1) A well-organized missile warning system structure allows commanders to 

maximize detection and warning of inbound ballistic missiles, thereby ensuring effective 

passive defense, active defense, and attack operations. 

(2) Missile warning systems process raw sensor data into missile warning 

reports and disseminate the information to users globally. Missile warning consists of 

multiple ground and space-based systems located worldwide. 

b. Strategic Missile Warning. Space-based sensors, such as Defense Support 

Program and space-based infrared system, usually provide the first level of immediate 

missile detection. The satellite sensors also accomplish nuclear detonation detection. 

Ground-based radars provide follow-on information on launches and confirmation of 

strategic attack. A majority of the day-to-day mission is space surveillance; however, the 

radar is always scanning the horizon for incoming missiles. These ground-based radar 

systems include: ballistic missile early warning system, phased array warning system, 

and the Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System. Upgraded early 

warning radars are multi-mission radars supporting the missile warning, space 

surveillance, and the missile defense missions. There is no room for error in strategic 

Space-based and terrestrial sensors play a role in missile detection and warning. 
Appendix B 

B-2 JP 3-14 

missile warning, therefore, all information provided must be timely, accurate, and 

unambiguous. 

For information on performance criteria for missile warning, see CJCSI 6210.02B,

Information and Operational Architecture of the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack 

Assessment System. 

c. Theater Missile Warning. Because the reaction time for theater forces to 

respond to incoming missiles is relatively short, GCCs have adopted a strategy known as 

“assured” warning. This strategy weighs accepting potentially false reports against the 

time required to obtain unambiguous reports. Under this strategy, the GCCs have elected 

to receive quicker launch notifications understanding the warning could be ambiguous. 

(1) A well-organized missile warning system structure allows commanders to 

maximize detection and warning of inbound ballistic missiles, thereby enabling effective 

passive defense, active defense, and attack operations. 

(2) Theater missile warning elements process raw sensor data from satellite 

systems, form that data into missile warning reports, and disseminate the information to 

theater users. Missile warning elements consist of multiple US ground and in-theater 

units. 

d. Requests for Theater Missile Warning. A JFC should forward requests for 

theater missile warning to CDRUSSTRATCOM via approved procedures. (See figure B1.) 

(1) When requesting support from missile warning elements, users should 

clearly state their requirements and applicable objectives as appropriate. Requests should 

include specific threat assessment, location and type of threat, duration of support 

requested, primary and secondary communications media preferred for reporting, false 

reporting tolerance, and levels and units within the command structure to which the 

warning data and information will be provided. 

(2) Upon receiving a request, CDRUSSTRATCOM will assess its ability to 

provide support based on the assets assigned to the command. Once the command has 

determined a COA, it will provide that feedback through the SCA of the supported 

command. 

e. Missile Warning Exercise Support

(1) Exercise Design. The TES elements will use operational hardware, 

software, and procedures to the maximum extent possible for exercises. For each 

exercise requiring TES support, USSTRATCOM will determine, after taking into account 

the requirements of the requesting agency, if the TES processor elements or a simulation 

device will support the exercise. USSTRATCOM will provide the Missile Warning 

Center, theater, and all participating TES elements, or simulation organizations with the 
Missile Warning

B-3 

missile launch scenario, the voice reporting architecture, and templates (if different from 

real-world). 

(2) Exercise Coordination. Coordination with USSTRATCOM is required 

prior to TES elements or simulation systems injecting exercise traffic. Request for TES 

exercise support must be submitted to USSTRATCOM via a consolidated exercise 

support request. USSTRATCOM will review and approve exceptions on a case-by-case 

basis, and is responsible to ensure that a users message is released announcing the 

exercise specifics. 

(3) Dissemination of exercise data over the Integrated Broadcast Service 

requires separate approval and coordination. 

(4) The TES elements must keep exercise and real-world data separate and 

clearly defined. 

THEATER MISSILE WARNING SUPPORT REQUEST PROCEDURES

AFSPC, 

SMDC/ARSTRAT, 

NETWARCOM

Joint Staff

United States 

Strategic 

Command

Supported 

Combatant 

Command

Subordinate 

Joint Force

Once the system is in place, 

coordination will continue for 

feedback and refinement.

AFSPC Air Force Space Command

NETWARCOM Naval Network Warfare Command

SMDC/ARSTRAT US Army Space and Missile Defense Command/ 

US Army Forces Strategic Command

Coordination

Coordination Request Notification

Direction

Coordination to Determine:

– Report Format and 

Contents

– Timeline Required

– User Education 

Required

– Dissemination Media 

(Primary and Backup)

Figure B-1. Theater Missile Warning Support Request Procedures 
Appendix B 

B-4 JP 3-14 

f. Shared Early Warning. The US exchanges missile detection and warning 

information with its allies and coalition partners. The objective of SEW is the continuous 

exchange of missile early warning information derived from US missile early warning 

sensors and, when available, from the sensors of the SEW partner. Information on 

missile launches is provided on a near real time basis. This information can take the form 

of data, voice warning, or both. The objective of SEW is to enhance regional stability by 

providing theater ballistic missile warning to CCDRs, sponsored partner countries, and 

NATO allies. Regional CCDRs will recommend/sponsor SEW partner countries. DOD 

policy is to provide continuous, near-real-time, theater ballistic missile early warning 

information on regional launches that is of the same high quality and timeliness as the 

launch warning that would be made available to US Forces if operating in the same area 

at the same time. Currently, the SEW system provides both messages and voice warning 

to partner countries. 
APPENDIX C

SPACE-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING CAPABILITY 

C-1 

1. Overview 

METOC support from space is critical to the development of forecasts and 

assessments of environmental impacts on both friendly and adversary military operations. 

Environmental monitoring satellites, which typically use sun-synchronous, 

geosynchronous and Lagrangian orbits (see Appendix H, “Space Fundamentals,” for 

additional information about orbits), as well as some intelligence satellites, provide 

terrestrial and space environmental monitoring for joint forces. Environmental 

monitoring information includes data provided by non-DOD satellites, such as NOAA 

weather and NASA research satellites, which are used by AFWA and Fleet Numerical 

Meteorology and Oceanography Center (FNMOC) to support joint forces and Services. 

2. Application 

a. Weather. The terrestrial and space environment can adversely impact a wide 

range of space systems and missions. Space-derived meteorological information is 

crucial to understanding and reacting to the effects of the environment on both space and 

terrestrial operations. This information helps commanders assess the environmental 

impacts on both friendly and adversary forces alike and helps to complete operational 

preparation of the environment. The environment affects almost all aspects of operations. 

A few examples are: mission timing, route selection, target and weapon selection, mode 

of weapon delivery, communications, reconnaissance, and surveillance. 

Meteorological information from space sensors is a critical factor in planning and executing 

joint operations.
Appendix C 

C-2 JP 3-14 

b. Oceanography. Knowledge of the location and characteristics of oceanographic 

features, such as sea heights, sea surface ice, currents, fronts, and eddies, is essential to 

all maritime forces. It is especially critical for undersea warfare operations and can be 

used by commanders to avoid submarine or maritime mine threats. This knowledge can 

also be used to concentrate forces in an area where an adversary is most likely to be 

operating to optimize search and rescue operations at sea, and to help determine optimum 

locations for amphibious landings. 

c. Space Environment. Environmental data from the space domain must be 

available to integrate into SSA information to form a space COP. This enables joint 

forces to determine the impact of environmental factors on both adversary and friendly 

space and weapons systems. 

3. Advantages 

a. A prime advantage of environmental satellites is their ability to gather data 

regarding remote or hostile areas, where little or no data can be obtained via surface 

reporting stations. For example, space-based environmental data is critical over most 

oceanic regions, where data can otherwise be very sparse. 

b. Environmental satellites typically gather data in the visual, infrared, and 

microwave spectral bands. Infrared sensors provide images that are based on the thermal 

characteristics of atmospheric features, such as clouds, and Earth features, such as land 

masses and water bodies. This data can be used to calculate the altitude of cloud tops and 

ground or water surface temperatures. 

c. Thermal and visible images together provide the coverage and extent of clouds at 

various levels, as well as other physical features such as ice fields and snow. Current 

microwave sensors are used to measure or infer sea surface winds (direction and speed), 

ground moisture, rainfall rates, ice characteristics, atmospheric temperatures, and water 

vapor profiles. 

d. Space-based monitoring of the space domain provides the ability to detect and 

mitigate the impacts of space weather on satellites, manned spaceflight, and 

communications to, from, and through space. Detection of solar events and measurement 

of the radiation environment allow operators to protect resources and deduce likely 

causes of spacecraft anomalies. 

4. Limitations 

a. Polar-orbiting satellites have periodic revisit rates over the target area, and 

therefore have a limited time over target for observations. However, these satellites 

provide global coverage and high-resolution data at all latitudes. 

b. Geosynchronous satellites provide lower resolution images, but maintain a 

constant view of their coverage area. The image quality of geosynchronous satellites 
Space-Based Environmental Monitoring Capability 

C-3 

degrades as distance and angle from the point directly under the satellite increases. 

Coverage at polar latitudes is poor or nonexistent. US owned and operated geostationary 

environmental satellites are focused on the western hemisphere (the continental US, 

eastern Pacific, and western Atlantic). Foreign national capabilities are used for the 

remainder of the globe. 

c. Some METOC parameters needed by forecasters for operational support, 

including heights of cloud bases and visibility restrictions, cannot be accurately 

determined from environmental satellites. Data from several sources, including surface 

observations, upper air soundings, and satellite data, are combined to determine these 

parameters.

d. Due to the magnitude of the space domain, space-based capabilities are limited in 

their ability to characterize the space environment in all areas, thereby creating gaps in 

complete situational awareness. 

5. Support Procedures 

a. METOC support to joint operations is critical to a JFC’s awareness of the 

operational environment during all types of joint operations and across the full range of 

military operations. This support is normally provided by METOC forces assigned to 

one or more of the participating components. When two or more units are involved in a 

joint operation, coordination of their support is normally accomplished by the joint 

METOC coordination cell. See JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations, 

for more information on the organization of METOC forces. 

b. METOC satellite system data is supplied to AFWA, FNMOC, and the Naval 

Oceanographic Office. These central facilities provide users with real-time and stored 

environmental satellite cloud imagery, processed products, and satellite information 

incorporated into other environmental products. Another source of environmental 

satellite system information for joint operations is direct downlink of environmental 

satellite data from fixed and deployed mobile ground- and ship-based tactical data 

processing terminals within the operational area. 

c. AFWA is responsible for collecting, processing, and providing space 

environmental data products to the joint force. 

d. Weather satellite system data is distributed via the GIG. 
Appendix C 

C-4 JP 3-14 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX D

SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS 

D-1 

1. Overview 

SATCOM — military, commercial, foreign, and civil — provides global coverage 

which affords the US and allied national and military leaders with a means to maintain 

strategic situational awareness and a means to convey their intent to the operational 

commander responsible for conducting joint operations in a specific area (see Figure D1). SATCOM also provides critical connectivity for tactical maneuver forces whose 

rapid movement and nonlinear deployments take them beyond LOS communication. 

2. Application 

a. SATCOM collectively provides an essential element of national and DOD 

communications worldwide. They allow for information transfer from the highest levels 

of government to the theater tactical level for all matters to include operations, logistics, 

intelligence, personnel, and diplomacy. 

(1) It supports a variety of media, from television to interactive computer to 

digitized voice. 

(2) To a user, the satellite is transparent because it is only a space-based 

communications relay. The frequency band and waveform of a signal influences the 

throughput capacity and the degree of protection and survivability provided to the 

communications system (anti-jam [AJ], anti-scintillation, low probability of intercept 

[LPI], and low probability of detection [LPD] capabilities). 

(3) The frequency bands over which current MILSATCOM operate are: 

 

(a) UHF for narrowband communications. 

(b) Super-high frequency (SHF) for wideband communications. 

 (c) EHF for both wideband and protected band (protected band is defined 

as bandwidth that is specifically protected using satellite hardening techniques against 

solar/nuclear radiation, in addition to using communications security techniques and 

transmission security techniques). These frequencies are specifically used to permit 

transmission through the atmosphere without refraction back to Earth or significant loss 

due to atmospheric absorption. 

 b. Narrowband SATCOM systems support secure voice and data transmission at 

relatively low data rates for both mobile and fixed users by providing access on a single 

dedicated channel or demand assigned multiple access channel. 

(1) Narrowband communications traditionally support requirements such as 

emergency action message dissemination between the SecDef and CCDRs, force 
Appendix D 

D-2 JP 3-14 MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL SATELLITE SYSTEMS WIDEBAND BROADCAST WIDEBAND PROTECTED Ka-Band UFO X/Ka-Band EHF Q/Ka-Band Military Strategic and Tactical Relay System I/II AEHF WGS AEHF Advanced Extremely High Frequency AJ Anti-Jam C C-Band, 3.7-4.2 GHz COTM Communications on the Move CSS Commercial Satellite Services DAMA Demand Assigned Multiple Access DISN Defense Information System Network DSCS Defense Satellite Communications System EHF Extremely High Frequency EMP Electromagnetic Pulse GBS Global Broadcast Service GHz Gigahertz INTEL Intelligence

zzzz

GBS Ka PayloadHigh ThroughputSmall AntennaSmart Push-Pull Data 

Broadcasts

z High Data Rates for Deployed 

Forces and Enterprise Users DISN Enterprise Extentions and DISN Reachback for Deployed Forces

zzz

Well Protected Comm for 

the Joint Force [AJ, LPI, LPD, EMP hardening]

Crosslinks (No ground 

relay stations)

Survivable

zz

Improved ThroughputsImproved Coverage z

z

X and Ka BandsAirborne and Shipborne 

COTM Capability Wideband COTM w/Ka-Band

COMMERCIAL NARROWBAND

L, C, Ku, 

Ka-Band

UHF P/L-Band

UFO

zzzzz

Lightweight, MobileLow Data Rates/ 

Space Segment Limited

Supports Joint 

Force, INTEL, LOG Nets

DAMA Increases 

User Access

No AJ

MUOS

zzz

Global Cellular 

Service

On-Demand UseSupport Legacy 

UHF Transition

zzzzz

Growing Capability High 

Throughput

–Telemedicine–CSS–Split-based ops –Video

Less ProtectedPay for ServicesMobile Satellite 

System for COTM

WGS

zz

WGS - X and Ka BandsReturn Channel 

Capability w/2-Way Ka Band

Ka Kurtz-above Band, 27-40 GHz

Ku Kurtz-under Band, 12-18 GHz

L L-Band, 1-2 GHzLOG Logistics

LPD Low Probability of Detection

LPI Low Probability of Intercept

MHz Megahertz

MUOS Mobile User Objective System

P P-Band, 250-500 MHz

Q Q-Band, 33-50 GHz

SHF Super High Frequency

UHFUltraHigh Frequency

UFO Ultrahigh Frequency (UHF) Follow-On WGS Wideband Global Satellite Communications SystemX X-Band, 8-12 GHz

DSCS

zzz

X-Band OnlyAirborne and Shipborne 

COTM Capability

Some AJ

Figure D-1. Military and Commercial Satellite Systems 
Satellite Communications 

D-3 

direction messages, tactical C2, low data rate broadcasts, and force report-back message 

transmission and reception. 

(2) Narrowband systems support highly mobile, tactical users. Compact 

terminal equipment and directional and omnidirectional antennas allow deployed joint 

forces to quickly and efficiently exchange both voice and data communications. 

(3) Narrowband systems include mobile and fixed terminals installed in air, sea, 

and ground platforms; command centers and command posts; and missile launch control 

facilities. 

(4) Narrowband communications use UHF frequencies that allow excellent 

transmission quality through all types of terrestrial weather to small, tactical terminals; 

however, UHF frequencies can be totally disrupted by ionospheric scintillation. 

Additionally, the bandwidth itself is limited and therefore can only achieve data rates in 

the kilobits-per-second range. 

c. Wideband SATCOM supports multichannel, secure voice, and high data-rate 

communications for C2, crisis management, and intelligence data transfer. 

(1) Wideband communications support a range of government, strategic, and 

tactical users: 

(a) White House Communications Agency. 

(b) Uniformed Services, US Department of State. 

(c) Joint Staff, CCDRs. 

(d) Joint task force, coalition forces, mobile units, UAS. 

(2) Wideband SATCOM provides Defense Information Services Network 

common user information transport and allows the JFC to reach back to other portions of 

the GIG. It also supports services (e.g., Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network 

[NIPRNET], SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network [SIPRNET], and Joint 

Worldwide Intelligence Communications System). 

(3) Wideband communication tactical terminals support exercises and the 

deployed operations requirements of tactical forces for high-capacity, multichannel 

communications aboard ships and aircraft, as well as in support of ground forces. 

d. Protected SATCOM supports survivable voice and data communications not 

normally found on other systems. 
Appendix D 

D-4 JP 3-14 

(1) Protected SATCOM throughput is less than wideband. In a hostile 

environment where a wideband system could be degraded, protected SATCOM will 

allow survivable communication, but at a reduced data rate. 

(2) Protected SATCOM characteristics, such as narrow beamwidths and the use 

of spread spectrum and frequency hopping technology, provide capabilities such as AJ, 

scintillation-resistance, LPI, and LPD. Due to these unique capabilities, the use of the 

protected SATCOM frequency band has often been reserved for the most critical strategic 

forces and C2 systems. However, DSCS access also provides these enhanced capabilities 

through select satellite ground terminals. 

(3) Protected SATCOM also permits the use of smaller antennas that increase 

its mobility, enabling wider use of manpack, submarine, airborne, and other mobile 

terminals. Because of spot beam power considerations, use of smaller antennas will have 

a limiting effect on the number of simultaneous users within the satellite’s footprint. 

e. Commercial Capabilities. Commercial SATCOM offers another venue to 

satisfy DOD's rapidly growing information needs. Some wideband services and personal 

communications services (e.g., satellite phones) are examples of current commercial 

SATCOM support to strategic and tactical mobile users. Commercial systems currently 

support much of DOD's predictable, wideband, and fixed SATCOM needs when 

MILSATCOM is not available. Leasing commercial services also affords faster access 

to advanced capabilities and services than traditional government research, development, 

and acquisition programs. However, in an environment where both the US and its 

potential adversaries will have almost equivalent access to the same advanced 

technologies and commercial services, sustaining military advantage may largely rest on 

the US ability to integrate those technologies and commercial services into its force 

structure faster and more effectively than the adversary can. 

3. Advantages 

The inherent capabilities of satellite systems provide significant advantages over 

other communications systems. 

a. Global Coverage. Collectively, SATCOM systems provide global coverage. If 

required, satellites can provide focused capacity in areas of special interest. 

b. Real-Time Over-the-Horizon Transmission of Voice and Data. Like other 

communications media, most SATCOM systems provide real-time connectivity for both 

voice and data, but unlike other communications media above high frequency, SATCOM 

can provide over-the-horizon voice and data transmission. 

c. Data Relay. SATCOM links preclude the need for long terrestrial 

communications links. Furthermore, SATCOM enables US forces to communicate 

without substantial terrestrial communications architecture. 
Satellite Communications 

D-5 

d. Flexibility. Satellite systems allow global coverage and inter-linking between 

frequency bands and systems, and certain systems are able to provide a relatively LPD. 

Flexibility gives the JFC a great deal of latitude in mixing and matching satellite systems 

to meet specific operational requirements. Directional antennas afford LPD; wide 

bandwidths allow higher data rates; ground stations permit cross patching; and satellite 

positions make global coverage available. 

e. Support to Mobile Forces. SATCOM systems can provide the communications 

required by mobile forces operating over wide areas. This is especially true for those 

forces that require dynamic C2 when they are on the move. 

4. Limitations 

SATCOM has the following limitations: 

a. Limited Capacity. Requirements for SATCOM service worldwide exceed the 

capacity of current MILSATCOM systems. Through partnering, the DOD supplements 

SATCOM capabilities with commercial, international, and civil systems. 

(1) MILSATCOM systems support the SecDef, CJCS, national and DOD 

agencies, and CCDRs worldwide. Due to the number of SATCOM users, the priority of 

use, and the criticality of information carried over these systems, oversight through 

requirement validation and adjudication is required at the DOD, Joint Staff, and 

CDRUSSTRATCOM levels. 

(2) Identified requirements are carefully scrutinized through a validation 

process, starting with a USSTRATCOM-led assessment, with capacity eventually being 

allocated based on priority and availability. 

(3) Within their allocated capacity, CCDRs manage, direct, and control 

individual networks supporting component air, land, maritime, space, and special 

operations forces. 

See USSTRATCOM Strategic Instruction (SI) 714-4, Consolidated Satellite 

Communications (SATCOM) Management Policies and Procedures (C-SMPP), for 

additional information on the SATCOM request validation process. 

b. Orbital Considerations. Most DOD communications satellites are in 

geostationary orbits over the equatorial plane where they appear to be stationary over a 

point on the Earth’s equator. Due to the orbital mechanics of having to be over the 

equator, high-latitude and polar coverage is limited. See Appendix H, “Space 

Fundamentals” for a description of geostationary orbits. 

(1) A constellation of three geostationary communications satellites equally 

spaced, or nearly so, can provide near-total Earth coverage between 65 degrees north and 

south latitude. However, due to signals becoming weak at the edges of coverage, 
Appendix D 

D-6 JP 3-14 

MILSATCOM generally employs a constellation of four satellites to provide adequate 

worldwide coverage between 65 degrees north and south latitude. 

(2) In general, a mix of geosynchronous and polar satellites is required for full 

global coverage. A mixture of satellites in low-altitude, mid-altitude, or highly elliptical 

orbits can also provide global coverage; however, this requires a greater number of 

satellites in the constellation to accomplish. 

c. Frequency Constraints. Except in forcible entry situations, the terminal 

segments associated with space systems are subject to the same HN and National 

Telecommunications Information Agency frequency clearance processes as terrestrial 

radio systems. In addition, frequency bleed-over among antennas must be considered 

when configuring ground segments (e.g., antenna farms), to ensure self-imposed 

interference is avoided. 

d. Terminal and Antenna Size. Because antenna size, frequency, bandwidth, and 

data rate capacity are interrelated, commanders often must compromise either 

information flow rate or mobility. 

(1) Generally, the higher the frequency (e.g., SHF, EHF), the wider the 

available signal bandwidth (hertz) and the higher the data rate (bits per second) capacity. 

Similarly, within these frequency bands, the larger the antenna size, the greater the data 

throughput, but the smaller a SATCOM terminal’s mobility. However, small terminals 

and antennas are required to minimize the impacts on tactical force mobility and ensure 

that the many different platforms of the supported forces are suitably integrated in the 

operational, physical, power, and electromagnetic environments. Hand-held and/or manpack, maritime, and airborne platforms have especially demanding constraints. 

(2) Lower frequency systems have narrower signal bandwidth and lower data 

rate capacity. This narrower bandwidth allows generally smaller antenna sizes. 

e. Susceptibility to Jamming and Interference. All radio receivers, including 

satellite systems, are susceptible to jamming and interference. Unintentional interference 

can be as harmful to SATCOM operations as deliberate jamming. Mandatory jamming 

and interference processes for all JFCs, Services, and agencies are contained in SI 714-5, 

Space System Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Resolution Procedures.

(1) Narrowband satellites are the most susceptible to both jamming and 

intercept due to their narrower bandwidth, large antenna beamwidth, and low power. 

While most commercial satellites have no protection against jamming, some transponders 

installed on military UHF satellites have limited resistance through different modulation 

schemes and frequency hopping techniques. 

(2) Military wideband systems operate at higher frequencies, smaller antenna 

beamwidths, and wider bandwidth. This allows the incorporation of more effective 

modulation schemes that provide a higher degree of jam resistance. 
Satellite Communications 

D-7 

(3) Military protected systems afford even greater protection through the 

different techniques possible with wider available bandwidth. 

f. Constellation Reconfiguration. While the ability to move satellites to 

reconfigure constellations may be an advantage, there are also significant disadvantages 

to repositioning satellites. 

(1) Most communications satellites currently in service are positioned to 

provide communications connectivity to a large number of users. Moving any of the 

primary satellites to a new satellite region could disrupt communications connectivity for 

this population, and could impair their ability to accomplish their missions. Movement of 

satellites requires extensive coordination with multiple agencies. The process to move 

communications satellites is defined in SI 714-4. 

(2) Repositioning satellites can take weeks and can consume a significant 

amount of on-board, station-keeping fuel, thereby reducing the operational life of the 

satellite. 

(3) To offset this limitation, JFCs must identify their SATCOM requirements 

through the Joint Staff SATCOM Database (SDB) according to CJCSI 6250.01C, 

Satellite Communications by following the defined process of submissions through the 

appropriate combatant command. SATCOM is incorporated into operation plans as 

described in SI 714-4. 

g. Solar Activity. Increased solar activity can disrupt SATCOM for short periods 

of time. In extreme cases, this can cause communications outages. 

(1) The detection of solar flares can be used to forecast solar effects, thereby 

minimizing the disruption of communications by using workarounds. 

(2) Sun activity mostly affects small receivers in the Arctic and tropical regions 

as well as the UHF frequency band. 

(3) All SATCOM is susceptible to solar activity. 

h. Interference Due to Precipitation. SATCOM in the Ku- and Ka- bands, and 

EHF systems, are particularly affected by precipitation (the higher the frequency, the 

greater the effect). Precipitation not only degrades the signal but, if heavy enough, can 

cause a complete outage. While the percentage of time a system will not be available due 

to precipitation is small, this is an operational constraint which must be considered during 

planning or operations. 

i. Sun Conjunctions. Sun conjunctions (in this context, when a satellite is aligned 

between the Earth and Sun) cause communications disruptions and outages. Since their 

time and duration can be predicted, such events can be planned for and the impact on 

operations minimized. 
Appendix D 

D-8 JP 3-14 

j. Considerations for Military Use of Commercial SATCOM Systems. Access to 

commercial SATCOM systems raises several issues which must be considered: 

(1) Communications are not protected. 

(2) Potential competition for access with other customers, including adversaries. 

(3) Non-US ownership or control of commercial SATCOM services outside the 

borders of the United States. 

(4) The potential inability to quickly access commercial SATCOM capacity in 

many areas to which the military could deploy (often on a short notice). 

(5) Access and availability to commercial services are based on contractual 

terms which could be terminated at times not convenient to the military. 

(6) Potential for commercial SATCOM unencrypted TT&C links and lack of 

vendor ability to identify, geolocate, and support DOD jamming or interference response. 

k. National Systems for Communications. In some cases, specialized DOD 

communications needs can be met through national systems. As with MILSATCOM 

systems, these assets may be highly subscribed, and therefore require careful 

coordination and planning with national systems operators before military use can be 

ensured. 

5. Support Procedures 

The SATCOM requirements process is defined in CJCSI 6250.01C, Satellite 

Communications. A summary of the process is provided below. 

a. Requirements Process. The ultimate objective for SATCOM management is to 

provide the right users SATCOM resources when and where needed, in accordance with 

operational priorities. DOD needs to continually assess the SATCOM systems’ 

effectiveness in pursuit of this objective. 

(1) The CJCS, CCDRs, Services, and DOD agencies are all key stakeholders 

with military SATCOM requirements. CDRUSSTRATCOM, per the UCP, serves as the 

advocate for DOD operational SATCOM matters, representing the DOD SATCOM 

community by coordinating and orchestrating consolidated user positions with combatant 

commands, Services, and agencies. 

(2) Each CCDR will consolidate, validate, and prioritize all requests for use of 

SATCOM systems within their AOR. 

(3) CCDRs and Services will validate their requirements and submit them to the 

Joint SATCOM Panel, co-chaired by the Joint Staff and USSTRATCOM. 
Satellite Communications 

D-9 

(4) DOD agencies will validate and submit requirements in support of their 

agency mission and/or function to the Joint SATCOM Panel, co-chaired by the Joint Staff 

and USSTRATCOM. 

(5) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration) is 

responsible for non-DOD and federal agency requirements. 

b. Format. SATCOM requirements for user connectivity will be submitted via the 

SDB Management Tool or via DISA Form 772, SDB Requirement Request Form. 

Current and future requirements will be submitted with the format described in the DISApublished SDB Management Tool user guide. 

c. Prioritization. CCDRs, Services, and agencies review each requirement to 

ensure that it is valid, has a clear operational concept, identifies the operational needs and 

missions supported, and provides a mission impact if not satisfied. The requirements are 

then prioritized by category as prescribed and documented in CJCSI 6250.01C, Satellite 

Communications. 

d. Submission. All SATCOM (military and commercial) requirements are 

submitted to the Joint Staff through the joint SATCOM panel administrator (JSPA) at 

DISA who administers the SDB. 

e. Future Requirements. Future connectivity requirements are satisfied through 

ongoing changes to strategy, doctrine, forces, weapon systems, or changes in technology. 

The SDB consolidates future SATCOM requirements to assist planners in determining 

future SATCOM capabilities, trends, architectures, and acquisition strategies. 

f. SATCOM Access. Access is requested via the SATCOM allocation process 

described in SI 714-4. 

g. Adjudication. Per CJCSI 6250.01C, Satellite Communications, the CJCS has 

final adjudication authority for competing DOD SATCOM access requirements that 

cannot be resolved by CDRUSSTRATCOM. 

h. Urgent Requirements. For urgent requirements not documented in the SDB, a 

request is submitted to USSTRATCOM, with information copies to JSPA. Urgent 

requirements can be submitted by CCDRs, Services, and DOD agencies, but they must be 

validated as an operational necessity. The request must contain justification for urgent 

processing. For urgent requirements, the Joint Staff can grant a 30-day waiver for SDB 

approval. 

See JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, for keystone communications doctrine. 
Appendix D 

D-10 JP 3-14 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX E

SPACE-BASED POSITIONING, NAVIGATION, AND TIMING 

E-1 

1. Overview 

a. Space-based PNT systems, in combination with terminal units, support strategic, 

operational, and tactical missions by providing the joint force with essential and precise 

three-dimensional position capability navigation options, and a highly accurate time 

reference. US military forces use GPS for their space-based PNT information. 

 b. In conducting joint military operations, it is essential that PNT services be 

available with the highest possible confidence. PNT services must meet or exceed JFC 

mission requirements. Any information that makes reference to time must be able to 

provide that time in terms of the standard temporal reference defined by Coordinated 

Universal Time (UTC) as maintained by the US Naval Observatory (USNO) master 

clock, which is the standard for all military systems. 

c. GPS satellites broadcast navigation information on a continuous basis. The 

transmission has two levels of service — a standard positioning service (SPS) and a 

precise positioning service (PPS). The positioning code in each permits very precise 

matching of receiver-generated and satellite-generated waveforms, hence, precise 

measurement of the distance to each satellite. 

(1) SPS, which utilizes the coarse acquisition code, is the unencrypted civilian 

positioning and timing service that is provided to all GPS users. 

(2) PPS is a more accurate, military positioning, velocity, and timing service 

available to authorized encrypted users (US military and some allies) on a worldwide 

basis with limited AJ capabilities. Access to PPS is controlled by use of cryptography 

(encryption keys loaded in the terminal units). 

d. DOD Policy for Precise Positioning Service. In 2005, Congress directed that 

all DOD aircraft, ships, combat vehicles, and indirect-fire weapon systems must be 

equipped with a GPS receiver. However, certain federal civil agencies, allies, and 

coalition members are also authorized use of the PPS through department-level special 

agreements. GPS policy is included in the DOD GPS Security Policy, DODD 4650.05, 

Positioning, Navigation, and Timing, and CJCSI 6130.01D, 2007 CJCS Master 

Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Plan (MPNTP); each require all DOD assets to use 

a common precise time: UTC (USNO), and a common precise celestial reference frame 

(provided by USNO). 

 (1) GPS PPS and inertial navigation systems are the only authorized PNT 

sources for all military operations. Exceptions to this policy are approved according to 

the MPNTP. 

 (2) GPS is the primary source of PNT information for the DOD. Civil 

capabilities are permitted for use in peacetime operations when the use of the system does 

not jeopardize the ability to accomplish the US military mission. 
Appendix E 

E-2 JP 3-14

 (3) All DOD combatant users must acquire, train with, and use GPS PPS 

systems in accordance with the DOD GPS Security Policy and the MPNTP. 

2. Application 

GPS plays a key role in military operations in all four domains (land, sea, air, and 

space), and is likely to do so well into the future. Capabilities are increasing across the 

space, control, and user segments (see Figure E-1). 

a. Operations on Land. The inherent precision of GPS allows precise site 

surveys, emplacement of artillery, target acquisition, and location. GPS establishes a 

“common reference grid” within the operational area, enables a “common time,” helps 

establish “common direction,” and facilitates synchronized operations. Some of the 

benefits of using GPS include: 

(1) Mine fields and obstacles can be accurately surveyed, emplaced, and 

recorded. 

(2) The accuracy of artillery fire is improved through precise gun emplacement, 

precision gun laying, precision observer location, a reduction in adversary target location 

error, and precision guided artillery and mortar rounds. 

(3) Armored units can travel “buttoned-up” and still maintain highly accurate 

position awareness. 

(4) Exact location and navigation information helps logistic support by 

expediting resupply efforts. The precise information also supports the timely and 

efficient evacuation of wounded personnel to aid stations. 

(5) Enables BFT. 

(6) Enables all weather air support. 

b. Operations at Sea 

(1) Ships and submarines can precisely plot their position, thereby allowing 

safe port operations and navigation through restricted waters. 

(2) Coastlines can be accurately surveyed by using a combination of laser range 

finding and highly accurate position information. 

(3) Mines can be laid and precisely plotted for friendly force avoidance and 

safe, efficient retrieval. 

(4) Rendezvous at sea, sea rescue, and other operations that require precise 

tracking can be facilitated using space-based PNT support. 
Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing

E-3 

 c. Operations in the Air 

(1) Information on PNT enhances airdrop, air refueling, search and rescue, 

reconnaissance, terminal approach and recovery, low-level navigation, targeting, and 

precision weapons delivery. 

THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM SPACE, 

CONTROL, AND USER SEGMENTS

z

z

z

z

z

Basic GPS

C/A Civil Signal (L1C/A)

Std Pos Service

Precise Pos Service 

– L1 & L2 P(Y) Nav

NDS

z

z

TT&C

L1 & L2 Monitoring

z PLGR

z

z

z

2nd Civil Signal (L2C)

M-Code Signals 

(L1M, L2M)

Flex AJ Power (+7dB)

z

z

z

z

IIR-M IIF TT&C

WAGE, AII, LADO

SAASM

New MCS/AMCS

z

z

z

DAGR

CSEL

ADAP

z

z

z

GAS-1

MAGR2K

GB-GRAM

z 3rd Civil Signal (L5)

z

z

z

New Architecture

Signal Monitoring

M-Code

z

z

z

MGUE

MUE

MSR

Legacy (Block IIA/IIR)

Legacy

Legacy

Modernized (Block IIR-M)

Upgraded (AEP)

Upgraded

Modernized (Block IIF)

Modernized (OCX V1)

Modernized

IIA Block II A

IIF Block II Follow-On

IIR BlockII Replenishment

IIR-M Block II Replenishment -- Modernized

AJ Anti-Jam

ADAP Advanced Digital Antenna Production

AEP Architectural Evolution Program

AII Accuracy Improvement Initiative

AMCS Alternate Master Control Station

C/A Coarse Acquisition

CSEL Combat Survivor/Evader Location

DAGR Defense Advanced GPS Receiver

dB decibel

GAS-1 GPS Antenna System

GB-GRAM Ground-Based GPS Receiver 

Application Module

GPS Global Positioning System

L1M M-Code on the L1 frequency

L2C Civil Signal on the L2 frequency

L2M M-Code on the L2 frequency

LADO Launch and Early Orbit, Anomaly 

Resolution, and Disposal 

Operations

M-Code Military Code

MAGR/2K Miniaturized Airborne GPS Receiver 

(2000)

MCS Master Control Station

MGUE Military GPS User Equipment

MSR Modernized Space Receiver

MUE Modernized User Equipment

NDS Nuclear Detonation Detection 

System

OCX Operational Control Segment

P(Y) Precise Code

PLGR Precision Lightweight GPS 

ReceiverSAASM Selective 

Availability Anti-Spoofing Module

TT&C Telemetry, and 

Commanding

WAGE Wide Area GPS Enhancement

Tracking, 

SPACE SEGMENT

CONTROL SEGMENT

USER SEGMENT

Figure E-1. The Global Positioning System Space, Control, and User Segments 
Appendix E 

E-4 JP 3-14

(2) Air corridors for friendly return-to-force procedures can be set with greater 

accuracy, and aircraft have a greater capability to safely follow these corridors. 

(3) Nontraditional ISR and dynamic targeting enables near-real-time 

reallocation of airborne firepower. 

d. Operations in Space. The GPS navigation service provides exact positioning to 

other satellites to enable their “position autonomy.” The same service enables “orbital 

rendezvous” between space systems (e.g., space docking for the space shuttle). It also 

provides precise time to communications satellites and to systems in geosynchronous 

orbits. New launch vehicles rely upon GPS position and derived velocity information to 

aid in determining attitude orientation. 

3. Advantages 

Advantages of GPS include: 

a. Accuracy. The GPS constellation provides continuous global service. 

Accuracy of the service is provided by the type of receiver used, the number of satellites 

in view, and the geometric configuration of those satellites. 

b. Accessibility. Because GPS equipment is passive, it is capable of providing 

continuous real-time information. Any authorized user with a keyed PPS receiver has 

access to the most precise PNT information. However, commercial user equipment 

cannot receive and process the PPS information and is limited to the SPS signal. 

c. Graceful Degradation. Each GPS satellite can store information on board for 

up to 60 days. In the event the GPS constellation cannot be updated, accuracy will 

gradually degrade. The rate of degradation is very slow in the first few days but 

increases with time. This allows GPS to be used for several days even if the update 

capabilities are interrupted. 

d. Common Grid. The default navigation grid used by the GPS is the World 

Geodetic System 1984 (WGS-84). WGS-84 can be easily converted to any grid reference 

using the terminal device. 

 e. Jamming. Space-based navigation systems (e.g., GPS) are resistant to some 

types of jamming. The use of GPS encryption (like a more robust military code [MCode]) and nulling antennas/filters, as well as the correct placement of GPS receivers on 

various platforms, improves jamming resistance. Tactical measures employed by joint 

forces decrease vulnerability from ground-based jamming (such as placing a hand-held 

receiver at the bottom of a foxhole). 

 f. Anti-Spoofing (A/S). With the precise capability provided by the GPS, a 

logical concern is that an adversary could generate false signals to mislead an authorized 

user with respect to position or timing information. A/S technology is designed to 
Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing

E-5 

mitigate receiver confusion that could be caused by intentionally misleading 

transmissions. 

4. Limitations 

Limitations of GPS include: 

a. Adversary exploitation of the SPS can reduce the US military advantage. 

Commercial GPS receivers are vulnerable to jamming. 

b. Jamming GPS can adversely affect civil and first responder operations, as well 

as joint military operations within a geographic area. The stronger the jammer, the larger 

the affected area. CCDRs and their subordinate JFCs must factor potential GPS jamming 

into their electronic warfare (EW) plan. Consideration must also be given to friendly 

interference, which is mitigated via the joint restricted frequency list. Coordination 

procedures for this list are detailed in JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare. 

c. Signals from at least four satellites are required to build a three-dimensional 

position and navigation picture (only one signal is needed for timing). Units relying on 

hand-held GPS receivers in areas of dense vegetation or steep terrain may have 

diminished GPS capabilities due to the lack of LOS reception of GPS signals. 

d. GPS navigation signals are also affected by ionospheric scintillation, 

tropospheric errors, and signal multipath issues. Receivers capable of two frequency 

(i.e., some combination of L1, L2, and/or L5) reception minimize errors. 

Global Positioning System information enables 

situational awareness.
Appendix E 

E-6 JP 3-14

 e. Denial of the GPS "navigation" signal may have a direct negative impact on 

joint systems that have nothing to do with "navigation". This is particularly true for 

communications systems that rely on GPS timing. 

FORCE ENHANCEMENT OPERATIONS - POSITIONING, NAVIGATION, 

AND TIMING

Air, Land, Sea, Space, 

and Special Forces 

Operations

Accessibility

Accuracy

Graceful Degradation

Common Grid

Anti-Spoofing

Adversary Exploitation

Civil and Commercial 

Jamming Vulnerability

APPLICATION ADVANTAGES LIMITATIONS

Figure E-2. Force Enhancement Operations — Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
APPENDIX F

SPACE SUPPORT TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS 

F-1 

1. Information Operations 

a. IO is the integrated employment of the core capabilities of EW, computer 

network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception 

(MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and 

related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and 

automated decision making while protecting our own. 

b. Commanders should plan to fully integrate IO into their operations, to include 

how space-based capabilities can support IO. It is vital that IO and space representatives 

coordinate their efforts through an IO cell. The IO cell brings all capabilities, to include 

special technical operations, into the planning cycle to ensure the commander’s 

objectives are achieved. Planners need to coordinate and synchronize space control 

with IO plans to include which desired effects can be created by space forces or IO 

capabilities. Effective synchronization will prevent negative impacts to IO plans. 

c. Successful IO relies on global communication, reachback support, timing, and 

global synchronization. IO planners should coordinate with the SCA to cue space assets 

to recognize key events or triggers to initiate IO-specific plans or allow time to develop 

alternate COAs. 

2. Space Support to Information Operations 

a. General. Space forces have active and passive capabilities (collecting, 

controlling, exploiting, and protecting information) that can support joint force efforts to 

conduct influence operations, EW, and network operations. 

(1) Space assets provide global persistence that provides indications and 

warnings of adversary operations. 

(2) Space assets provide the venue to synchronize the joint efforts and enable 

maintenance of operational legitimacy and perseverance. 

(3) Space planners need to be integrally involved in the IO planning process as 

a member of the IO cell to ensure that redundant links and appropriate bandwidth are 

available to accomplish rapid and reliable global communication. 

(4) Space-based capabilities support IO personnel in the field by providing twoway secure communications in remote areas, imagery of an operational area, position and 

navigation information, ISR, and weather, terrain, and environmental monitoring. 

b. Intelligence Support to Information Operations. Intelligence, a key enabler 

of IO, is greatly enhanced through space-based capabilities. Understanding space 

enabled characteristics of the information environment is critical in developing offensive 

and defensive options to influence, protect, and deny information. Space-based imagery 
Appendix F 

F-2 JP 3-14 

products, SIGINT capabilities, and positioning and navigation capabilities are vital in the 

JIPOE process. 

For detailed guidance on intelligence requirements supporting IO, see JP 3-13, 

Information Operations. 

c. Assessment of Information Operations. Space assets can provide valuable 

assessment data that support measures of effectiveness (MOEs) or measures of 

performance (MOPs). MOE/MOP standards should be communicated to the SCA to 

coordinate the tasking of space assets to collect in support of MOEs/MOPs. IO planners 

need to communicate with the SCA or designated space planner to translate IO 

MOEs/MOPs into required space support tasking. Examples include: 

(1) PSYOP planners could assess if delivered messages are being transmitted to 

adversary forces. 

(2) MILDEC planners could assess if adversary sensors have detected 

deception maneuvers and are reacting to that deception in the anticipated manner. 

(3) Space assets can support BDA efforts feeding into MOEs for EW 

operations. 

(4) SIGINT data can discern if a specific emitter that was previously targeted 

has returned to operational status and needs to be reattacked. 

d. Support to Core Information Operations Capabilities

(1) Electronic Warfare. Space assets collect space-based intelligence data 

that, once analyzed, enables our forces to reprogram EW systems, locate adversary 

integrated air defense system locations, and map the critical links and nodes. Spacebased capabilities also provide intelligence and information on adversarial NAVWAR 

capabilities targeting friendly PNT. SIGINT data is utilized for discovering emitters that 

are either operating out of recognized parameters or have changed location. The speed at 

which these changes can be recognized and delivered to either EW planners for targeting 

or to the joint Electronic Warfare Integrated Reprogramming agencies, directly affects 

survival of joint forces. Space planners should coordinate with the electronic warfare 

coordination center to ensure processes are in place to accomplish these functions. 

(2) Operations Security and Military Deception. Space operations personnel 

can support OPSEC and MILDEC efforts by providing adversary space order of battle 

information, including orbital paths and satellite coverage areas. Using this information, 

planners can select optimum times to conduct their own operations (e.g., increasing 

chance that deception maneuvers are visible to adversary space assets), or determining 

when their own operations are at risk from an adversary's space-based sensors. Space 

imagery also provides valuable information for friendly forces to assess the OPSEC 

posture (i.e., observability) of their operations and infrastructure. Secure space 
Space Support to Information Operations 

F-3

communications links increase the global secure bandwidth. Ubiquitous secure 

communications enhance the ability of friendly forces to protect sensitive (even if not 

classified) voice and data transmissions, thereby practicing good OPSEC. 

(3) Psychological Operations. Space assets provide message delivery vehicles 

for PSYOP message dissemination. SSA can assist PSYOP planners in choosing the 

delivery vehicle for selected messages by providing exact coverage area and times of 

commercial satellites and the capabilities of those satellites to broadcast either by radio, 

television, or Internet. Linking that information with the target audience will enhance the 

effectiveness of PSYOP. 

(4) Computer Network Operations. CNO is comprised of three related areas; 

computer network attack (CNA), computer network defense (CND), and computer 

network exploitation. Real-time monitoring and analysis provides status of the overhead 

GIG components. This assessment can determine if GIG interruptions are caused from 

deliberate attack and may trigger CND response actions and/or CNA since jamming may 

not affect the satellite itself but is directed at the information dissemination 

management/content staging that uses the GIG. The analysis can also provide predictions 

of environmentally induced interruptions of service allowing development of alternate 

paths to ensure uninterrupted GIG capability. 

See JP 3-13, Information Operations, for additional details on information operations. 
Appendix F 

F-4 JP 3-14 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX G

OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE 

G-1 

1. Overview 

a. Per Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum dated 9 July 2007,

operationally responsive space (ORS) is defined as "assured space power focused on 

timely satisfaction of JFCs’ needs." ORS balances the requirement to meet JFC urgent 

space needs with the requirement to satisfy other users’ needs. ORS also provides the 

"capacity to respond to unexpected loss or degradation of selected capabilities, and/or 

provide timely availability of tailored or new capabilities" (per NSPD-40). Strategic or 

long-term needs are not a primary focus of ORS. 

b. Establishing Needs. The CDRUSSTRATCOM provides operational oversight 

for all ORS activities consistent with the UCP and other applicable authorities. This 

includes collecting, prioritizing, and managing identified joint force needs, and operating 

ORS capabilities to meet those needs. 

c. Capability Development. The ORS Office is a joint organization that reports 

to the DOD Executive Agent for Space To ensure a range of possibilities are available 

for consideration when responsive space capabilities are required, the IC, DOD, and 

national security space mission partners will collaborate in ongoing efforts to leverage 

existing systems and to provide responsive, actionable, near-real-time information to 

users. The ORS Office will also expedite development and fielding of capabilities by 

leveraging national security space-wide technology and operational capabilities, and 

provide integration and technical support to other Service and government agency 

activities. 

2. Application 

a. ORS missions support USSTRATCOM space mission areas of space force 

enhancement, space control, and space support by providing timely, responsive space 

capabilities when needed. 

b. To accomplish these missions, ORS capabilities are implemented in a threetiered approach: 

(1) Tier-1 uses existing or on-station capabilities to create highly responsive 

space effects through the employment, modification, and revised application of these 

space capabilities. The targeted timeframe for the application of Tier-1 solutions is 

immediately-to-days from the time the need is identified. Tier-1 solutions focus on 

existing ground and space systems, operations, and procedures. Although mission or 

system utilization analysis may be needed, Tier-1 solutions will not typically involve the 

design, engineering, or fabrication of new materiel items. 

(2) If all possible Tier-1 options have been evaluated and no Tier-1 solution can 

respond to the need, a Tier-2 solution will be considered. Tier-2 solutions will utilize 

field-ready capabilities or deploy new or additional capabilities that are field-ready. The 
Appendix G 

G-2 JP 3-14 

targeted timeframe for delivering usable Tier-2 solutions is days-to-weeks from the time 

the JFC need is established. Tier-2 solutions focus on achieving responsive exploitation, 

augmentation, or reconstitution of space force enhancement or space control capabilities 

through rapid assembly, integration, testing, and deployment of affordable small 

satellites. 

(3) There may be cases where an expressed need cannot be addressed through 

existing capabilities (Tier-1) or through rapid deployment of field-ready capabilities 

(Tier-2). In such events, ORS efforts must focus on the rapid development and 

deployment of a new capability (Tier-3). Once developed, Tier-3 capabilities will be 

responsively deployed and employed in the same manner as Tier-2 assets. The targeted 

timeframe for the presentation of an operational Tier-3 capability is months-to-1 year of 

the established JFC need. Meeting this challenging timeline cannot be accomplished 

unless the amount of new development involved is very limited. 

c. To develop capabilities, ORS leverages existing technology and capabilities to 

maximize their benefits. This includes exploring non-space options as well as other 

material and nonmaterial solutions. 

3. Advantages 

ORS helps to synchronize and integrate space capabilities in time and purpose 

with the employment of other forces by a JFC. Advantages of ORS include: 

a. Rapid presentation of new or enhanced space capabilities in response to JFC 

needs. These capabilities will be operational within one year of that need. 

b. Rapidly adapt or augment existing space capabilities when needed to expand 

operational capability. 

c. Rapidly reconstitute or replenish critical space capabilities to preserve 

operational capability, providing the JFC assured, persistent space power. 

4. Limitations 

Limitations of ORS include: 

a. Shortened timelines will challenge every aspect of the development and 

deployment process and increase risk. 

b. Congressionally-mandated cost ceilings will require well-defined JFC needs. In 

turn, these will drive “just-enough” developmental approaches. 

 
APPENDIX H

SPACE FUNDAMENTALS 

H-1 

1. General 

 a. Space is a domain enabling many joint force-essential capabilities. These 

capabilities derive from exploitation of the unique characteristics of space, among which 

include a global perspective and lack of overflight restrictions, as well as the speed and 

persistence afforded by satellites.

(1) Global Perspective. Space has been labeled “the ultimate high ground” for 

good reason. Even low earth orbit (LEO) satellites, which are relatively close to Earth’s 

surface (altitudes from roughly one hundred miles to a few hundred miles), have fields of 

view spanning hundreds of miles. At greater distances, geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) 

satellites can view slightly over one-third of the Earth at once. At this range, only three 

evenly-positioned GEO satellites are needed to provide almost complete global 

communications coverage (regions near the North and South Poles cannot be covered by 

GEO satellites due to reasons discussed below). Thus, space affords a global vantage point 

from which to assess several considerations, from tactical to strategic levels. 

(2) Lack of Overflight Restrictions. Unlike the international rules for overflight 

of state aircraft, under which nations may prevent—using force, if needed—aircraft 

overflight, currently there are no international overflight restrictions regarding overflight by 

other nations’ satellites. Thus, space provides unhindered access to points spanning the 

globe. It is this unhindered capability of ISR, communications, and navigation, coupled 

with the ability to traverse the globe in very short periods that provide capabilities unrivaled 

by other domains.

(3) Speed and Persistence. Satellites travel at incredible rates of speed and, 

unlike aircraft, do not require constant propulsion to remain in orbit. These factors enable 

satellites not only to cover vast amounts of ground in very short periods of time, but also to 

provide continuous operation and coverage. Often, a satellite’s life span is limited only by 

the reliability of its on-board systems and the quantity of propellant available for station 

keeping and additional maneuvers. 

b. All of these unique aspects make space a very desirable domain within which to 

operate. However, space also has many peculiar characteristics which must be appreciated 

by joint forces to plan and operate effectively.

2. Unique Characteristics of Space 

 While physical laws on land, in the water, or in the air are directly observable and 

commonly understood at a fundamental level, the physics of Earth-orbiting objects—

“satellites”—within the vacuum of space is more difficult to observe and understand. The 

unique attributes of space have profound implications for the inherent capabilities and 

limitations that derive from them. Consequently, though a comprehensive discussion of 

orbital mechanics is neither possible nor desirable within this publication, certain basic 

precepts must be understood to leverage space power effectively.

 a. Gravitational Forces Predominate. Due to the Earth's gravitational field, 

satellites orbiting the Earth are in a constant state of falling toward the Earth's center. At 
Appendix H 

H-2 JP 3-14 

the same time, the satellite is hurtling at extremely high speeds in a direction nearhorizontal to the Earth's surface. On average, the Earth's surface curves downward 5 

meters for every 8 kilometers traveled horizontally. Consequently, if a satellite is to stay 

in a simple circular LEO, it must traverse 8 kilometers of the Earth's surface in the time 

required to fall 5 meters towards the Earth's center. In essence, the Earth's surface will 

curve away at a rate proportional to the rate the satellite is falling and the satellite will 

never actually hit the Earth. The horizontal speed required to achieve this circular, LEO 

is roughly 17,500 miles per hour. The speeds required for orbit insertion and the rates at 

which a satellite falls to Earth are dependent on the altitude and shape of the orbit in 

question.

 b. Orbits Are Fixed in Space. With the exception of a few external forces (see 

"perturbations" discussion below), orbits do not move.. That is, a given satellite’s orbit is 

fixed in space, while the Earth rotates beneath the orbit and while the satellite itself traces 

around the orbit (Figure H-1). This phenomenon results from the satellite’s angular 

momentum. A gyroscope illustrates the effects of angular momentum on a much smaller 

scale. When holding a spinning gyroscope, it is difficult to twist in various directions. The 

inertia, or resistance to positional change is the effect of the gyroscope’s angular 

momentum. Satellites’ high altitudes (and thus great radial distances from Earth’s center) 

and very high velocities mean satellites have tremendous angular momenta, implying 

extremely large inertias and thus orbital planes that are very resistant to movement. 

Therefore, they are not easily repositioned. 

c. Satellites Are Not Very Maneuverable. Contrary to popular, but misleading, 

conceptions about maneuvering in space, satellites cannot maneuver much, if at all, because 

ORBIT FORMATION

Courtesy of McGraw-Hill Courtesy of Analytical Graphics, Inc.

Figure H-1. Orbit Formation
Space Fundamentals 

H-3

of the effects of angular momentum. Maneuvering, such as changing an orbit’s size or 

inclination, costs fuel and can severely limit the life of a satellite. As an example, if a space 

shuttle used every bit of on board fuel to change its orbital plane, the maximum plane 

change it could effect would amount to no more than two and a half degrees. A more 

important inference drawn from these limits is that satellites cannot “hover” over a given 

point on Earth, nor can they “bend” their orbital planes to maneuver to a specified point. 

Thus, a satellite’s arrival over a particular point on the Earth depends almost wholly upon 

the passage of time, as the Earth rotates through the plane of the satellite’s orbit, and the 

satellite orbits around the Earth. 

d. Orbital Planes Must Pass Through Earth’s Center. Gravity is the predominate 

force, continuously pulling the satellite toward Earth’s center. Because of this phenomenon, 

any orbit traced by a satellite must be within a plane that passes through the center of the 

Earth. Practically, this means orbits cannot be designed to be “offset” or “overhead” (e.g., a 

“halo” orbit over the North Pole) to one side or another from the Earth: each orbit must

encircle the Earth.

e. “Perturbations” Can Change an Orbit. Certain external forces can change the 

parameters of an orbit, producing an exception to the general rule that orbits are fixed in 

space. These forces are generally known as “perturbations,” because they perturb, or alter, 

the orbit. These include atmospheric drag (atmospheric particles exist even at very high 

altitudes, albeit in very low concentrations); gravitational pull of the Sun, Moon, and other 

planets; variations in the Earth’s gravitational field, resulting in orbital plane changes and 

other effects; solar pressure from the Sun’s radiation; and interactions between solar 

radiation and the Earth’s magnetic field. Perturbations have significant impacts on planning 

considerations. For example, contrary to popularly-held notions about satellite tracking, no 

country has the ability to continuously track every satellite orbiting Earth. However, if a 

satellite’s position is known at several points, predictive models using basic laws of physics 

can be used to calculate the satellite’s future position. Unfortunately, orbital perturbations 

can degrade the accuracy of those models. Generally, the lower a satellite’s altitude, the 

shorter the accuracy duration of a given model, and consequently the greater the need for 

up-to-date prediction data (see paragraph 3, “Operational Considerations”).

f. Certain Orbits Have Special Characteristics. Certain orbits have features that 

seemingly violate the general rules discussed above. On closer examination, however, these 

apparent exceptions are seen nonetheless to follow the general rules. 

(1) Geosynchronous/Geostationary. Geosynchronous satellites track in their 

orbit around the Earth at the same rate at which the Earth rotates upon its axis – they are 

synchronized to the Earth’s rotation. If placed directly over the equator, to a ground-based 

observer, a satellite in such an orbit appears to “hover” a little over 22,000 statute miles 

above that point. However, the satellite is actually moving very fast, in pace with Earth’s 

rotation. This special, but very common, type of geosynchronous orbit is called 

geostationary because it appears stationary above Earth. GEO orbits allow constant LOS 

with a given, very large (slightly over one-third of the Earth) footprint, and thus lend 

themselves readily to gross environmental imagery (i.e., tens-of-square-miles pixel sizes) 

and global communications. An exception occurs near the poles, where communication 
Appendix H 

H-4 JP 3-14 

with high north or south latitudes (roughly 75 degrees or greater) is not possible because of a 

lack of LOS with the satellite. 

(2) Sun-Synchronous. Natural perturbations will cause satellite orbits to 

change over time and mission planners can use this effect to their advantage. Such is the 

case with sun-synchronous orbits (See Figure H-2). A cross-section of the Earth is about 

44 kilometers wider at the equator than at the poles. This causes an orbital perturbation, 

known as the “J2 effect,” to alter the orientation of an orbital plane. By incorporating the 

J2 effect and carefully selecting the inclination of the orbit, a satellite can be placed in an 

orbital plane that shifts by slightly less than one degree per day to the east. The result is 

when the satellite passes over a given point, it will do so with the same sun angle (hence 

the label, sun-synchronous). This does not imply that a sun-synchronous satellite passes 

over the same point every day, only that when the satellite does pass over a given point 

along its ground track, it will have the same sun angle, and thus, the Sun shadows cast by 

features on the Earth’s surface will not change. These types of orbits are particularly 

useful for reconnaissance and weather applications, where maintaining a constant 

viewing condition is critical (e.g., height determination, change detection). 

(3) Highly Elliptical Orbit. A highly elliptical orbit (HEO), as its name implies, 

is a very flat, oval-shaped orbit. The usefulness of such orbits derives from the fact that 

satellites close to Earth travel quickly, and those further away travel slowly. At their most 

distant points form Earth, satellites in HEO orbits can be over 25,000 miles away. The 

relatively slow satellite speeds at these points combined with long orbit tracks provide HEO 

SUN-SYNCHRONOUS ORBITS

Typical Low-Earth Orbit Sun-Synchronous Orbit

Courtesy of Dr. Jesse Gossner, NSSI

Figure H-2. Sun-Synchronous Orbits
Space Fundamentals 

H-5

satellites long dwell times at these distance points, again giving the appearance that satellites 

in these orbits “hover” for a time being. Such orbits are normally inclined so that these long 

dwell times occur over high-latitude points on Earth, ideally suiting them for 

communication satellites serving high-latitude locales (e.g., Russia, Scandanavia, Canada). 

Although many types of HEO orbits are possible, the most useful is termed a Molniya orbit 

(from the Russian word for “lightning,” so named because of the dramatic speed of the 

satellite as it passes close to Earth). This type of orbit, inclined at 63.4 degrees, maintains 

perigee in the Southern hemisphere so that it dwells in the Northern hemisphere for nearly 

11 hours of its 12-hour period. Three satellites set in phased Molniya orbits could thus 

provide continuous Northern-tier coverage. Other applications include weather and ISR. A 

variety of commonly used orbit types and their parameters are described in Figure H-3. 

g. One Satellite Often Is Not Enough. No “one-size-fits-all” satellite exists for 

every application. Even satellites perfectly optimized for a particular mission may lack the 

required coverage for that mission. In such cases, a constellation—multiple satellites 

performing a single mission—is used to provide increased coverage or timeliness to meet 

ORBIT TYPES

Courtesy of Dr. Jesse Gossner, NSSI

Molniya

GPS DMSP

Altitude: DSP ~ 400 km at Perigee

~ 40,000 km at Apogee

Speed:

~ 10.13 km/s at Perigee

~ 1.48 km/s at Apogee

Period: 11 hrs, 58 min

Altitude: 20,184 km

Speed: 3.874 km/s

Period: 11 hrs, 58 min

Altitude: ~ 850 km

Speed: ~ 7.426 km/s

Period: 101 min

Altitude: 35,786 km

Speed: 3.075 km/s

Period: 23 hrs, 56 min

Highly Elliptical 

Orbit

Low Earth 

Orbit

Geo-Sync 

Orbit

Semi-Sync

Orbit

hrs hours

km kilometers

km/s kilometers per second

min minutes

DMSP Defense Meterological Satellite Program

DSP Defense Support Program

GPS Global Positioning System

Figure H-3. Orbit Types 
Appendix H 

H-6 JP 3-14 

mission requirements. For example, navigation constellations (such as GPS) are designed to 

ensure that signals from at least four satellites can be simultaneously received at any 

location on the ground, enabling three-dimensional position fixing unavailable using only a 

single GPS satellite. Other examples include communications constellations, which are 

designed to ensure continuous connectivity between both ends of the communications link. 

To provide truly global coverage, such systems may include both equatorial and polar 

components. A final example includes weather and reconnaissance systems, which 

typically require constellations that combine both high and low altitude components. This 

construct provides a capability to combine wide-area, low-resolution coverage with limited 

field-of-view, high-resolution coverage to provide a complete weather picture. Regardless 

of configuration, constellations are designed to optimize mission components across 

multiple satellites so that overall mission requirements are met.

3. Operational Considerations 

The unique characteristics of space drive important operational considerations that must 

be weighed when planning to provide space services and capabilites to the joint force:

 a. Revisit Rates. “Revisit rate” refers to the interval between successive passes of a 

satellite over the same point on the Earth. Revisit rates are dependent on the geometry of 

the orbit itself, as well as its period (the time required for a satellite to complete one orbit). 

The larger the orbit, the longer the period will be. For example, typical LEO periods 

average from 90 minutes to a few hours. During this time, the Earth will continue to rotate 

on its axis beneath the orbit. Thus, by the time the satellite completes one orbit, its track 

over the Earth has shifted appreciably. Revisit rates for some satellites are as much as 

several days, while other satellites have much shorter revisit rates, depending on the orbit. 

In the extreme, GEO satellites have no revisit rate, since these satellites constantly maintain 

LOS with particular sectors of the Earth. 

 b. Access Windows. “Access window” refers to the amount of time a given satellite 

will be able to maintain LOS geometry with a fixed point on Earth’s surface. With the 

exception of satellites in GEO and HEO orbits, a satellite cannot dwell over a fixed point for 

any prolonged length of time. The closer a satellite is to the Earth’s surface, the faster it will 

travel, and the smaller the field of view available to that satellite. LEO satellites, for 

example, can maintain sensor contact and/or communications with a fixed point for only 

about 10 to 15 minutes. Access times and fields of view for other satellites increase 

proportionally to increasing satellite altitudes. Just as knowledge of friendly access 

windows ensures timely satellite contact, knowledge of enemy access windows helps in 

planning appropriate counter-tactics. 

 

 c. Currency of Predictive Data. Parameters describing a given satellite’s position in 

space are derived from various sensors’ observations of the satellite’s azimuth, elevation, 

and range. These position “snap shots” are used to predict future satellite locations. 

Generally, the lower a satellite’s orbital altitude, the shorter the time window within which a 

given prediction will remain accurate, because aggregate perturbation impacts (such as 

atmospheric drag) increase in severity with decreasing altitude. Consequently, for satellites 

in LEO orbits, predictive models usually cannot provide accuracy within required tolerances 
Space Fundamentals 

H-7

beyond roughly one or two days. For the field-deployed joint force, this fact drives the need 

to ensure data sets are as current as possible for all orbits, increasing in importance for orbits 

closest to Earth. 

 d. Electromagnetic Interference. Every capability leveraged from space derives 

from the electromagnetic spectrum, whether the capability enables ISR, communications, or 

navigation. All of these capabilities are thus subject to disturbances known as

electromagnetic interference. EMI can be natural or man-made. An example of natural 

EMI derives from effects caused by Earth’s ionosphere. This outer region of Earth’s 

atmosphere is nothing more than a “soup” of atomic particles and electrons that acts as 

random noise within the electromagnetic spectrum. However, this is not a uniform region. 

The Sun’s electromagnetic energy and the Earth’s magnetic field interact in complex ways 

to strengthen or weaken this interference, with both global and local impacts. 

Understanding and predicting these impacts help to mitigate their effect through preparation 

(e.g., selecting different operating frequencies, boosting power, timing transmissions to 

occur during periods of minimum interference). This understanding also helps in space 

control, where employment of capabilities can be masked by, and/or attributed to, 

environmental impacts. An example of man-made EMI is drawn from jamming, where a 

stronger electromagnetic signal is used to overpower a weaker signal. Knowledge of the 

space domain and of threat capabilities can help mitigate both natural and man-made EMI. 

 e. Lack of Serviceability. Space assets normally are not serviceable after launch 

(the Hubble and space station being the exceptions). This means that their ability to change 

functions, recover from failures or attacks, or maneuver is based almost entirely on the 

design of the system at the time of deployment (some software uploads may be possible). 

This limits flexibility compared to terrestrial assets which can be serviced, repaired, or 

upgraded. Lack of serviceability puts tighter constraints on the operational C2 since some 

requests can reduce the asset lifetime – for example, too much fuel expenditure or too much 

battery depletion during eclipses. 
Appendix H 

H-8 JP 3-14 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX J

REFERENCES 

J-1 

The development of JP 3-14 is based upon the following primary references: 

1. Federal Law 

 a. Title 10, US Code. 

 b. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. 

2. Strategy and Policy Documents 

a. The National Security Strategy of the United States. 

b. The National Defense Strategy of the United States. 

c. National Military Strategy. 

d. NSPD-27, US Commercial Remote Sensing Policy.

e. NSPD-39, US Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Policy. 

f. NSPD-40, US Space Transportation Policy. 

g. NSPD-49, National Space Policy.

h. National Cryptologic Doctrine 2-1. 

i. National Cryptologic Doctrine 3-0. 

j. Unified Command Plan (UCP). 

3. Office of the Secretary of Defense Guidance 

a. Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, Operationally Responsive Space.

b. Report to Congressional Defense Committees, DOD Plan for Operationally 

Responsive Space. 

c. DOD Global Positioning System Security Policy. 

4. Department of Defense 

a. DODD 3100.10, Space Policy.

b. DODD 5100.1, Functions of Department of Defense and Its Major Components. 

c. DODD 5105.19, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).
Appendix J 

J-2 JP 3-14

d. DODD 5105.60, National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). 

e. DODI 3100.12, Space Support.

f. DODI S-3100.13, Space Force Application.

g. DODI S-3100.14, Space Force Enhancement. 

h. DODI S-3100.15, Space Control.

5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

a. CJCSI 3110.01F, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). 

b. CJCSI 6130.01D, 2007 CJCS Master Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Plan 

(MPNTP). 

c. CJCSI 6250.01C, Satellite Communications.

d. CJCSI 8910.01A, Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness Operations 

Guidance. 

e. CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) 

Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures. 

f. CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) 

Volume II, Planning Formats. 

g. CJCSM 3219.01A, Interruption of Remote Sensing Space Systems Data 

Collection and Distribution During Periods of National Security Crisis.

6. Joint Publications 

a. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

b. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

c. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. 

d. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

e. JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. 

f. JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 
References 

J-3 

g. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats. 

h. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. 

i. JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental 

Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I. 

j. JP 3-13, Information Operations. 

k. JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare. 

l. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. 

m. JP 3-27, Homeland Defense. 

n. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 

o. JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations. 

p. JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

q. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. 

r. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

s. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

7. International Law 

a. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 

Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1967. 

b. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of 

Environmental Modification Techniques, 1977. 

c. Charter of the United Nations, 1945.

8. Service Publications 

a. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2, Space Operations. 

b. AR 115-11, Geospatial Information and Services. 

c. Field Manual 3-14, Space Support to Army Operations. 

d. OPNAVINST 5400.43, Navy Space Policy Implementation. 
Appendix J 

J-4 JP 3-14

9. Supporting Documents 

a. Blue Force Tracking Report to Congress. 

b. CDRUSSTRATCOM CONPLAN 8035 (Change 2). 

c. CDRUSSTRATCOM Operational Directive for JFCC SPACE. 

d. CDRUSSTRATCOM, Strategic Command Directive 505-3, Space Support to 

Joint Force Commander or Designated Space Coordinating Authority.

e. CDRUSSTRATCOM, Strategic Command Instruction 534-5, Space-Based Joint 

Blue Force Situational Awareness Support to Combatant Commands and Allies.

f. CDRUSSTRATCOM Initial Concept of Operations, Operationally Responsive 

Space (ORS). 

g. Industrial College of the Armed Forces/National Defense University, Space 

Industry Study. 

 h. SD 714-02, SATCOM System Expert (SSE) Responsibilities. 

 i. SI 714-03, Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Support Center (SSC) 

Management. 

 j. SI 714-04, Consolidated Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Management 

Policies and Procedures (C-SMPP). 

 k. SI 714-05, Space System Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Resolution 

Procedures. 
APPENDIX K

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

K-1 

1. User Comments 

 Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Joint 

Doctrine Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments 

should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and 

appearance. 

2. Authorship 

 The lead agent for this publication is the United States Strategic Command. The Joint 

Staff doctrine sponsors for this publication are the Director for Operations (J-3) and the 

Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7). 

3. Supersession 

 This publication supersedes JP 3-14, 9 August 2002, Joint Doctrine for Space 

Operations. 

4. Change Recommendations 

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

TO: HQ USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE//J51// 

INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-3 DDGO/J-7-JEDD// 

 CDR USJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//DOC GP//

 Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Director for Operational 

Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7), JEDD via the CJCS JEL at 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. 

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, 

that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its 

proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint 

Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated. 

c. Record of Changes: 

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED 

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY 

 REMARKS 

______________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix K 

K-2 JP 3-14 

5. Distribution of Publications 

a. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is 

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint 

publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, Information Security 

Program. 

b. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET); https://jdeis.js.smil.mil (SIPRNET); 

and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). 

c. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside 

the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint 

publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local 

embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 

7400 Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400. 

d. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDCC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and 

deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications. 
GLOSSARY 

 GL-1 

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

AFSCN Air Force Satellite Control Network 

AFSPC Air Force Space Command 

AFWA Air Force Weather Agency 

AJ anti-jam 

AOI area of interest 

AOR area of responsibility 

A/S anti-spoofing 

BDA battle damage assessment 

BFT blue force tracking 

C2 command and control 

CCDR combatant commander 

CDR commander 

CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic Command 

CHCSS Chief, Central Security Service 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual 

CNA computer network attack 

C-NAF component numbered air force 

CND computer network defense 

CNO computer network operations 

COA course of action 

COG center of gravity 

COMAFFOR commander, Air Force forces 

CONOPS concept of operations 

CONPLAN concept plan 

COP common operational picture 

CSA combat support agency 

DEFSMAC Defense Special Missile and Aerospace Center 

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 

DIOCC Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center 

DIRNSA Director, National Security Agency 

DIRSPACEFOR director of space forces (USAF) 

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency 

DMSP Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 

DOC Department of Commerce 

DOD Department of Defense 

DODD Department of Defense directive 

DODI Department of Defense instruction 

DSC defensive space control 

DSCS Defense Satellite Communications System 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-14 

EHF extremely high frequency 

EMI electromagnetic interference 

EW electronic warfare 

FDO flexible deterrent option 

FMO functional manager office 

FNMOC Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

GEO geosynchronous Earth orbit 

GI&S geospatial information and services 

GIG Global Information Grid 

GMD ground-based midcourse defense 

GPS Global Positioning System 

HEO highly elliptical orbit 

HN host nation 

HQ headquarters 

HSI hyperspectral imagery 

HUMINT human intelligence 

IC intelligence community 

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile 

IMINT imagery intelligence 

IO information operations 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff 

JFC joint force commander 

JFCC ISR Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, 

 Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

JFCC NW Joint Functional Component Command for Network 

 Warfare 

JFCC SPACE Joint Functional Component Command for Space 

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational 

 environment 

JP joint publication 

JSPA joint satellite communications (SATCOM) panel 

 administrator 

JSPOC Joint Space Operations Center 

JSTO joint space tasking order 

JTF-GNO Joint Task Force - Global Network Operations 

LEO low Earth orbit 

LOS line of sight 

LPD low probability of detection 
Glossary 

GL-3

LPI low probability of intercept 

MARFORSTRAT United States Marine Corps Forces, United States Strategic 

 Command 

MASINT measurement and signature intelligence 

METOC meteorological and oceanographic 

MILDEC military deception 

MILSATCOM military satellite communications 

MNF multinational force 

MOC maritime operations center 

MOE measure of effectiveness 

MOP measure of performance 

MPNTP Master Positioning Navigation and Timing Plan 

MSI multispectral imagery 

MSIC Missile and Space Intelligence Center 

NAF numbered air force 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

NASIC National Air and Space Intelligence Center 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NAVSOC Naval Satellite Operations Center 

NAVWAR navigation warfare 

NETOPS network operations 

NETWARCOM Naval Network Warfare Command 

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

NIPRNET Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network 

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

NPOESS National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 

 System 

NRO National Reconnaissance Office 

NSA National Security Agency 

NSA/CSS National Security Agency/Central Security Service 

NSG National System for Geospatial Intelligence 

NSPD national security Presidential directive 

NTM national or multinational technical means of verification 

OPCON operational control 

OPLAN operation plan 

OPSEC operations security 

ORS operationally responsive space 

OSC offensive space control 

OSEI operational significant event imagery 

PI purposeful interference 

PIRT Purposeful Interference Response Team 

PNT positioning, navigation, and timing 
Glossary 

GL-4 JP 3-14 

POES polar operational environment satellite 

PPS precise positioning service 

PSYOP psychological operations 

RF radio frequency 

RPO rendezvous and proximity operations 

RSSC regional satellite communications (SATCOM) 

 support center 

SAR search and rescue 

SARSAT search and rescue satellite-aided tracking 

SATCOM satellite communications 

SCA space coordinating authority 

SDB Satellite Communications Database 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SEW shared early warning 

SHF super-high frequency 

SI United States Strategic Command strategic instruction 

SIGINT signals intelligence 

SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network 

SMDC/ARSTRAT United States Army Space and Missile Defense 

 Command/United States Army Forces Strategic 

 Command 

SOM satellite communications operational manager 

SPS standard positioning service 

SSA space situational awareness 

SSE space support element 

SWPC Space Weather Prediction Center 

TACON tactical control 

TES theater event system 

TT&C telemetry, tracking, and commanding 

UAS unmanned aircraft system 

UCP Unified Command Plan 

UHF ultrahigh frequency 

UN United Nations 

US United States 

USAF United States Air Force 

USC United States Code 

USG United States Government 

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command 

USMC United States Marine Corps 

USNO United States Naval Observatory 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

UTC Coordinated Universal Time 
Glossary 

GL-5

WGS Wideband Global Satellite Communications (SATCOM) 

WGS-84 World Geodetic System 1984 
GL-6 JP 3-14 

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

Unless otherwise annotated, this publication is the proponent for all terms and definitions 

found in the glossary. Upon approval, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, will reflect this publication as the source document for 

these terms and definitions.

Army space support team. A team of space operations experts provided by the 

Commander, US Army Forces Strategic Command upon request of an Army 

component commander or a geographic combatant commander to assist the 

supported commander in integrating space power into the terrestrial operation or 

campaign. Also called ARSST. (This term and its definition modify the existing term 

"space support team" and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

attack assessment. An evaluation of information to determine the potential or actual 

nature and objectives of an attack for the purpose of providing information for timely 

decisions. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-14) 

ballistic missile early warning system. An electronic system for providing detection 

and early warning of attack by enemy intercontinental ballistic missiles. Also called 

BMEWS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-14)

blue force tracking. Employment of techniques to actively or passively identify or track 

US, allied, or coalition forces for the purpose of providing the combatant commander 

enhanced situational awareness and reducing fratricide. Also called BFT. 

(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

constellation. A number of like satellites that are part of a system. Satellites in a 

constellation generally have a similar orbit. For example, the Global Positioning 

System constellation consists of 24 satellites distributed in six orbital planes with 

similar eccentricities, altitudes, and inclinations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-14) 

deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, 

or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to 

the enemy’s interests. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13.4) 

Defense Satellite Communications System. Geosynchronous military communications 

satellites that provide high data rate communications for military forces, diplomatic 

corps, and the White House. The Defense Satellite Communications System 

provides long-haul super-high frequency 7/8 gigahertz voice and high data rate 

communications for fixed and transportable terminals, and extends mobile service to 

a limited number of ships and aircraft. Also called DSCS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-14) 
Glossary 

GL-7

Defense Support Program. Satellites that provide early warning of missile launches; 

the first line of defense against missile attack against North America. Also called 

DSP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-14) 

defensive space control. Operations conducted to preserve the ability to exploit space 

capabilities via active and passive actions, while protecting friendly space 

capabilities from attack, interference, or unintentional hazards. (Approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

geospatial information and services. The collection, information extraction, storage, 

dissemination, and exploitation of geodetic, geomagnetic, imagery (both commercial 

and national source), gravimetric, aeronautical, topographic, hydrographic, littoral, 

cultural, and toponymic data accurately referenced to a precise location on the 

Earth’s surface. Geospatial services include tools that enable users to access and 

manipulate data, and also include instruction, training, laboratory support, and 

guidance for the use of geospatial data. Also called GI&S. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

2-03) 

geospatial intelligence. The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial 

information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and 

geographically referenced activities on the Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of 

imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. Also called GEOINT. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-03) 

Global Positioning System. A satellite-based radio navigation system operated by the 

Department of Defense to provide all military, civil, and commercial users with 

precise positioning, navigation, and timing. Also called GPS. (This term and its 

definition modify the existing term “global positioning system” and its definition and 

are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

latitude band. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

link element. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

multispectral imagery. The image of an object obtained simultaneously in a number of 

discrete spectral bands. Also called MSI. (This term and its definition modify the 

existing term “multi-spectral imagery” and its definition and are approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

negation. Measures to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy an adversary’s space 

systems and services or any other space system or service used by an adversary that 

is hostile to US national interests. See also space control. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-14) 

offensive space control. Those operations to prevent an adversary's hostile use of 

US/third party space capabilities and services or negate (disrupt, deny, degrade, 
Glossary 

GL-8 JP 3-14 

deceive, or destroy) an adversary's space capabilities. (Approved for inclusion in JP 

1-02.) 

period. The time it takes for a satellite to complete one orbit around the earth. (This 

term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved 

for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

polar orbit. A satellite orbit in which the satellite passes over the North and South Poles 

on each orbit, and eventually passes over all points on the earth. The angle of 

inclination between the equator and a polar orbit is 90 degrees. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-14) 

prevention. 1. The security procedures undertaken by the public and private sectors in 

order to discourage terrorist acts. (JP 3-07.2) 2. In space usage, measures to 

preclude an adversary’s hostile use of United States or third-party space systems and 

services. Prevention can include diplomatic, economic, and political measures. See 

also space control. (JP 3-14) (This term and its definition modify the existing term 

and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

protection. 1. Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related 

military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and 

infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given 

operational area. (JP 3-0) 2. In space usage, active and passive defensive measures 

to ensure that United States and friendly space systems perform as designed by 

seeking to overcome an adversary’s attempts to negate them and to minimize 

damage if negation is attempted. (JP 3-14) (This term and its definition modify the 

existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

proximity operations. In space operations, on-orbit activities of a resident space object 

that deliberately and necessarily maintains a close distance from another resident 

space object for a specific purpose. Two objects in space that pass each other by 

natural orbital mechanics (e.g., routine orbital conjunctions or close approaches) or 

Department of Defense space systems which are designated to utilize cluster or 

formation flight to maintain required proximity to provide required system 

functionality do not fall within this definition. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

purposeful interference. In space operations, deliberate actions taken to deny or disrupt 

a space system, service, or capability. Purposeful interference threats include but are 

not limited to: mission uplink or downlink interference; command uplink 

interference; telemetry downlink jamming; positioning jamming; unauthorized 

access; information insertion; and signal probing. Also called PI. (Approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

space asset. Any individual part of a space system as follows. (1) Equipment that is or 

can be placed in space (e.g., a satellite or a launch vehicle). (2) Terrestrially-based 
Glossary 

GL-9

equipment that directly supports space activity (e.g., a satellite ground station). (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-14) 

space capability. 1. The ability of a space asset to accomplish a mission. 2. The ability 

of a terrestrial-based asset to accomplish a mission in space (e.g., a ground-based or 

airborne laser capable of negating a satellite). (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-14) 

space control. Operations to ensure freedom of action in space for the US and its allies 

and, when directed, deny an adversary freedom of action in space. The space control 

mission area includes: operations conducted to protect friendly space capabilities 

from attack, interference, or unintentional hazards (defensive space control); 

operations to deny an adversary’s use of space capabilities (offensive space control); 

supported by the requisite current and predictive knowledge of the space 

environment and the operational environment upon which space operations depend 

(space situational awareness). (This term and its definition modify the existing term 

and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

space coordinating authority. A commander responsible for coordinating joint space 

operations and integrating space capabilities in the operational area. Also called 

SCA. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

space-faring nation. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

space force application. Combat operations in, through, and from space to influence the 

course and outcome of conflict. The space force application mission area includes 

ballistic missile defense and force projection. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-14) 

space force enhancement. Combat support operations and force-multiplying 

capabilities delivered from space systems to improve the effectiveness of military 

forces as well as support other intelligence, civil, and commercial users. The space 

force enhancement mission area includes: intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance; integrated tactical warning and attack assessment; command, 

control, and communications; positioning, navigation, and timing; and environmental 

monitoring. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition 

and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

space forces. The space and terrestrial systems, equipment, facilities, organizations, and 

personnel necessary to access, use and, if directed, control space for national 

security. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-14) 

space power. The total strength of a nation’s capabilities to conduct and influence 

activities to, in, through, and from space to achieve its objectives. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-14) 
Glossary 

GL-10 JP 3-14 

space sensor. An instrument or mechanical device mounted on a space platform or space 

vehicle for collecting information or detecting activity or conditions either in space 

or in a terrestrial medium. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-14) 

space situational awareness. The requisite current and predictive knowledge of the 

space environment and the operational environment upon which space operations 

depend – including physical, virtual, and human domains – as well as all factors, 

activities, and events of friendly and adversary space forces across the spectrum of 

conflict. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

space superiority. The degree of dominance in space of one force over another that 

permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, maritime, air, 

space, and special operations forces at a given time and place without prohibitive 

interference by the opposing force. (This term and its definition modify the existing 

term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

space support. Operations to deploy and sustain military and intelligence systems in 

space. The space support mission area includes launching and deploying space 

vehicles, maintaining and sustaining spacecraft on-orbit, rendezvous and proximity 

operations, disposing of (including deorbiting and recovering) space capabilities, and 

reconstitution of space forces, if required. (This term and its definition modify the 

existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

space surveillance. The observation of space and of the activities occurring in space. 

This mission is normally accomplished with the aid of ground-based radars and 

electro-optical sensors. This term is separate and distinct from the intelligence 

collection mission conducted by space-based sensors which surveil terrestrial 

activity. See also space control. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-14) 

space systems. All of the devices and organizations forming the space network. These 

consist of: spacecraft; mission packages(s); ground stations; data links among 

spacecraft, mission or user terminals, which may include initial reception, 

processing, and exploitation; launch systems; and directly related supporting 

infrastructure, including space surveillance and battle management and/or command 

and control. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition 

and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

space weather. The conditions and phenomena in space and specifically in the nearEarth environment that may affect space assets or space operations. Space weather 

may impact spacecraft and ground-based systems. Space weather is influenced by 

phenomena such as solar flare activity, ionospheric variability, energetic particle 

events, and geophysical events. (This term and its definition modify the existing 

term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

sun-synchronous orbit. An orbit in which the satellite’s orbital plane is at a fixed 

orientation to the sun, i.e., the orbit precesses about the earth at the same rate that the 
Glossary 

GL-11

earth orbits the sun. It has the characteristics of maintaining similar sun angles along 

its ground trace for all orbits, and typically has an inclination from 96 to 98 degrees, 

depending on the orbit altitude and orbit shape (eccentricity). (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-14) 

synchronous orbit. None. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition 

will be deleted from JP 1-02.) 

terrestrial environment. The Earth's land area, including its man-made and natural 

surface and sub-surface features, and its interfaces and interactions with the 

atmosphere and the oceans. (This term and its definition modify the existing term 

and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

theater event system. Architecture for reporting theater ballistic missile events, 

composed of three independent processing and reporting elements: the joint tactical 

ground stations, tactical detection and reporting, and the space-based infrared system 

mission control station. Also called TES. (This term and its definition modify the 

existing term "tactical event system" and its definition and are approved for inclusion 

in JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-12 JP 3-14 

Intentionally Blank 
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS

COMMUNICATION

PLANS SYSTEMS

JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to

fill extant operational void

US Joint Forces Command

(USJFCOM) conducts front-end

analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and

releases PD to lead agent (LA)

(Service, combatant command, JS

directorate)

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of

the development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 3-14 Operations