alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>
                                               
<ARTICLE>                                           5
<LEGEND>                                       
     This schedule  contains summary  financial  information  extracted from the
historical  financial statements of American Pad & Paper Company's September 30,
1998 10-Q and is  qualified  in its  entirety  by  reference  to such  financial
statements. </LEGEND>
<CIK>0000005588
<NAME>American Pad & Paper Company
<MULTIPLIER>                                                 1,000
                                                     
<S>                                                   <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                       9-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                   Dec-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                      Jan-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                        Sep-30-1998
<CASH>                                                           0
<SECURITIES>                                                     0
<RECEIVABLES>                                                    0
<ALLOWANCES>                                                     0
<INVENTORY>                                                      0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                                 0
<PP&E>                                                           0
<DEPRECIATION>                                                   0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                             558,281
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                            0
<BONDS>                                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                            0
<PREFERRED>                                                      0
<COMMON>                                                       277
<OTHER-SE>                                                  28,986
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                               558,281
<SALES>                                                          0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                           482,479
<CGS>                                                            0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                                    0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                                 0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                 0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                               0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                                  0
<INCOME-TAX>                                               (16,907)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                        (71,416)
<DISCONTINUED>                                                   0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                  0
<CHANGES>                                                        0
<NET-INCOME>                                               (71,416)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                                (2.58)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                (2.58)
        

 
</TABLE>
SCPW-24-0000150 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI 

________________________________________________________________ 

RICHARD RAPOZO, Petitioner, 

vs. 

STATE OF HAWAIʻI, Respondent. 

________________________________________________________________ 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING 

(CASE NO. 1PR141000016) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION 

(By: Recktenwald, C.J., McKenna, Eddins, and Devens, JJ., 

and Circuit Judge Nakamoto, in place of Ginoza, J., recused) 

Upon consideration of the “Motion to Compel Discharge of 

Movant Pursuant to Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1874) in effect 

May 16, 1979” (Motion), filed on March 11, 2024, and the record, 

we construe the Motion as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

So construed, Petitioner has not demonstrated a special reason 

for this court to invoke its original jurisdiction in a habeas 

corpus proceeding. See Oili v. Chang, 57 Haw. 411, 412, 557 

P.2d 787, 788 (1976). 

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCPW-24-0000150

21-MAY-2024

11:05 AM

Dkt. 10 ODDP
2 

It is ordered that the petition is denied. 

DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, May 21, 2024. 

/s/ Mark E. Recktenwald 

 /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna 

 /s/ Todd W. Eddins 

/s/ Vladimir P. Devens 

/s/ Henry T. Nakamoto
[Civ. No. 6415.

Third Appellate District.

December 7, 1939.]

#### GANTNER & MATTERN COMPANY (a Corporation), Petitioner, v. CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al., Respondents.

Milton Marks for Petitioner.

Richard Gladstein for Respondents.

*743Brobeek, Phleger & Harrison as *Amici Curiae*on Behalf of Petitioner.

THE COURT. —

In this matter claimants and respondents are or were employees of petitioner. Upon the 16th day of October, 1939, a picket line was established around the premises of petitioner, and claimants herein refused to cross such line and have since that date continued in their refusal to enter the premises of Gantner & Mattern Company.

These claimants, as unemployed workers, filed with the California Employment Commission claims for benefits under the California Unemployment Insurance Act. (Stats. 1935, chap. 352, as amended.) After a hearing thereon a finding was made, directing payment of such benefits to claimants, and thereafter application was made to this court by the employer for a writ of mandate to test the legality of the acts of the commission and an alternative writ was issued and a temporary stay ordered as to the payment of these claimants.

A request has been made to set aside this temporary restraining order. In view of the finding of the California Employment Commission that such employees are entitled to temporary benefits, this court, out of respect to such order and in the exercise of its discretion, believes that such restraining order should be set aside. This action, however, is not to be construed as a precedent in any similar cause which may come before us. We reserve the right, upon proper showing in this cause, to reimpose a restraining order if it appears proper or if the cause is unnecessarily or unreasonably delayed in its presentation upon its merits.

The temporary restraining order heretofore entered is hereby set aside.
<PAGE>   1
EXHIBIT 11.1


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                            Fiscal Year Ended
                                                    -------------------------------
                                                     April 1,  March 27,  March 28,
                                                      2000      1999        1998
                                                    --------  ---------  ----------
<S>                                                  <C>      <C>         <C>
Basic earnings per share:
      Weighted average shares outstanding             9,349      9,096     8,863
                                                     ======   ========    ======

      Net income (loss)                              $1,538   $ (5,538)   $  629
                                                     ======   ========    ======

      Basic earnings (loss) per share                $ 0.16   $  (0.61)   $ 0.07
                                                     ======   ========    ======

Diluted earnings (loss) per share:
      Weighted average shares outstanding             9,349      9,096     8,863

      Common stock equivalents: stock options(1)        259         --       669
                                                     ------   --------    ------
                                                      9,608      9,096     9,532
                                                     ======   ========    ======

      Net income (loss)                              $1,538   $ (5,538)   $  629
                                                     ======   ========    ======

      Diluted earnings (loss) per share              $ 0.16   $  (0.61)   $ 0.07
                                                     ======   ========    ======
</TABLE>


(1) Stock options based on the treasury stock method using average market
price.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 9, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 05-10717

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SANTIAGO COVARRUBIAS-COVARRUBIAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 6:04-CR-72-ALL

--------------------

Before REAVLEY, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Santiago

Covarrubias-Covarrubias raises arguments that are foreclosed by

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998),

which held that a prior conviction is a sentencing factor under

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) and not a separate criminal offense. The

Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
# Comments on: 17-2128: DBN HOLDING, INC. v. ITC [OPINION], Nonprecedential
###### Editorial Note on Part 1

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 1 appear at 63 FR 54077, Oct. 8, 1998.

#### § 1.110 Partial grants; rejection and designation for hearing.

Where the Commission without a hearing grants any application in part, or with any privileges, terms, or conditions other than those requested, or subject to any interference that may result to a station if designated application or applications are subsequently granted, the action of the Commission shall be considered as a grant of such application unless the applicant shall, within 30 days from the date on which such grant is made or from its effective date if a later date is specified, file with the Commission a written request rejecting the grant as made. Upon receipt of such request, the Commission will vacate its original action upon the application and set the application for hearing in the same manner as other applications are set for hearing.
<PAGE>   1

                                                                     Exhibit 23


               Consent of Ernst & Young LLP, Independent Auditors

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements of
Pittsburgh Financial Corp. on Forms S-8 (Registration Nos. 333-35984 and
333-19805) pertaining to the Company's Stock Option Plans of our report dated
October 27, 2000, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of
Pittsburgh Financial Corp. and incorporated by reference in the Annual Report
(Form 10-K) for the year ended September 30, 2000.


                                                  /s/ Ernst & Young LLP

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
December 22, 2000
# Comments on: 18-1151: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC. v. ARKEMA INC. [OPINION], Precedential
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 17

- 2841

_____________________________
N ANCY G ONZALEZ , Appellant,

v.

T HE K ENT H OTEL /A M T RUST N ORTH A MERICA O F F LORIDA , Appellee s

.

_____________________________

On appeal from 

### an order of Judge of Compensation Claims

. Sylvia Medina

- Shore , Judge

.
Date of Accident: March 18, 2015

. April 11, 2018

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.
L EWIS , R OBERTS , and J AY , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Kimberly A. Hill of Kimberly A. Hill, P.L., Fort Lauderdale
, for Appellant.

Rayford H. Taylor of Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Atlanta, and Kip O. Lassner of Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., Plantation
, for Appellee s

.
433P15

#### Cheri Joyner Stallings v. Jeffrey Driver Stallings

Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 (COA15-327)

Denied
083P16

#### State v. Nashid Porter

Defs *Pro Se*Motion to Dismiss - Grounds Applicable to All Criminal Proceedings

Dismissed
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4317 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4317

   To designate temporary protected status under the Immigration and 
       Nationality Act for Rwandan students in the United States.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 28, 1994

 Mr. Kopetski (for himself and Mr. Jefferson) introduced the following 
       bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To designate temporary protected status under the Immigration and 
       Nationality Act for Rwandan students in the United States.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION OF TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS FOR RWANDAN 
              STUDENTS.

    (a) Designation.--In accordance with the provisions of this 
section, Rwanda is hereby designated under section 244A(b)(1)(A) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)), but only with 
respect to eligible aliens under subsection (b).
    (b) Aliens Eligible.--For the purposes of this section an eligible 
alien is an alien who--
            (1) is a national of Rwanda (or in the case of an alien 
        having no nationality, is a person who last habitually resided 
        in Rwanda);
            (2) as of April 6, 1994, has been admitted or who has 
        otherwise lawfully attained the status of a nonimmigrant under 
        section 101(15)(F) or 101(15)((M);
            (3) has been continuously physically present in the United 
        States since April 6, 1994;
            (4) is admissible as an immigrant, except as otherwise 
        provided under section 244(c)(2)(A) of such Act and is not 
        ineligible for temporary protected status under section 
        244A(c)(2)(B) of such Act; and
            (5) registers for temporary protected status in a manner 
        which the Attorney General shall establish.
    (c) Period of Designation.--The designation under subsection (a) 
shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act and shall remain 
in effect for a period of 12 months or until the President certifies 
that the conditions for designation under section 244A(b)(1)(A) are no 
longer being met, whichever occurs earlier. The President may extend 
the period of designation under this section.
    (d) Application of Immigration and Nationality Act Provisions.--
Except as specifically provided in this section, section 244A and other 
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act shall apply to the 
designation of temporary protected status under this section.

                                 <all>
```
Editorial Note on Part 1
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 1 appear at 63 FR 54077, Oct. 8, 1998.

§ 1.93 Consent orders. ( a ) As used in this subpart, a “consent order” is a formal decree accepting an agreement between a party to an adjudicatory hearing proceeding held to determine whether that party has violated statutes or Commission rules or policies and the appropriate operating Bureau, with regard to such party's future compliance with such statutes, rules or policies, and disposing of all issues on which the proceeding was designated for hearing. The order is issued by the officer designated to preside at the hearing proceeding.
( b ) Where the interests of timely enforcement or compliance, the nature of the proceeding, and the public interest permit, the Commission, by its operating Bureaus, may negotiate a consent order with a party to secure future compliance with the law in exchange for prompt disposition of a matter subject to administrative adjudicative proceedings. Consent orders may not be negotiated with respect to matters which involve a party's basic statutory qualifications to hold a license (see 47 U.S.C. 308 and 309).
[41 FR 14871, Apr. 8, 1976, as amended at 85 FR 63173, Oct. 6, 2020]
#### Joel CASTRO-GAXIOLA, Petitioner, v. John ASHCROFT, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 02-71229.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 15, 2004.*

Decided March 24, 2004.

*990Kevin A. Bove, Esq., Attorney at Law, Escondido, CA, for Petitioner.

Regional Counsel, Laguna Niguel, CA, CAS-District Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, Executive Office of Immigration Review, Office of Immigration Judge, San Diego, CA, Ronald E. LeFevre, Chief Legal Officer, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Richard M. Evans, Esq., Timothy P. Mcllmail, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before B. FLETCHER, LEAVY, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Joel Castro-Gaxiola, whose true name is Joel Castro-Valdez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) summary affirmance of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review claims of due process violations in immigration proceedings de novo, *Lopez-Urenda v. Ashcroft,*345 F.3d 788, 791 (9th Cir.2003), and we deny the petition for review.

We review the IJ’s opinion as the “final agency determination” for purposes of this appeal. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(7)(iii); *Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft,*350 F.3d 845, 849 (9th Cir.2003). Because the IJ’s interpretation and application of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard found in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) was well within the broad bounds of the statutory language, it does not violate due process. *See Ramirez-Perez v. Ashcroft,*336 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir.2003). Once we determine that the IJ’s interpretation falls within this broad range authorized by the statutory language, our inquiry ends. *See id.*at 1005.

To the extent Petitioner contends that the BIA’s streamlining procedures violate due process, his challenge is foreclosed by *Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft,*350 F.3d 845, 850-51 (9th Cir.2003).

The Clerk is directed to stay the mandate pending the resolution of *Desta v. Ashcroft,*No. 03-70477 and further order of this Court.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1000

<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-2000             MAR-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1999             APR-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999             DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                          20,467                   1,812
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    6,773                   6,337
<ALLOWANCES>                                       107                     127
<INVENTORY>                                          0                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                29,550                   9,698
<PP&E>                                           5,522                   3,245
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,617                     915
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  33,483                  12,056
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            4,243                   5,332
<BONDS>                                              0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       6
<COMMON>                                            16                       3
<OTHER-SE>                                      28,759                   6,715
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    33,483                  12,056
<SALES>                                         10,144                   8,323
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                16,890                  12,339
<CGS>                                              346                     272
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    4,761                   2,293
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                13,350                   7,952
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                      66
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               (595)                   (127)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (626)                   2,155
<INCOME-TAX>                                     (225)                     836
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              (401)                   1,319
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                     (401)                   1,319
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.03)                    0.55
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.03)                    0.09


</TABLE>
I

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 4199

To require that Federal prisoners obtain a General Equivalency Degree before

receiving credit toward service of sentence.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 13, 1994

Mr. FRANKS of New Jersey introduced the following bill; which was referred

to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

To require that Federal prisoners obtain a General Equivalency Degree before receiving credit toward service of

sentence.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Inmate Rehabilitation

5 Act of 1994’’.

6 SEC. 2. EDUCATION REQUIREMENT FOR EARLY RELEASE.

7 Section 3624(b) of title 18, United States Code, is

8 amended—

9 (1) by inserting ‘‘(1)’’ after ‘‘BEHAVIOR.—’’;
2

HR 4199 IH

1 (2) by striking ‘‘Such credit toward service of

2 sentence vests at the time that it is received. Credit

3 that has vested may not later be withdrawn, and

4 credit that has not been earned may not later be

5 granted.’’ and inserting ‘‘Credit that has not been

6 earned may not later be granted.’’; and

7 (3) by adding at the end the following:

8 ‘‘(2) Credit toward a prisoner’s service of sentence

9 shall not be vested unless the prisoner has earned a high

10 school diploma or an equivalent degree.

11 ‘‘(3) The Attorney General shall ensure that the Bu12 reau of Prisons has in effect an optional General Edu13 cational Development program for inmates who have not

14 earned a high school diploma or its equivalent.’’.

Æ