SIGAR Audit-12-3 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Afghan National Security University

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Afghan National Security University Has Experienced 

Cost Growth and Schedule Delays, and Contract 

Administration Needs Improvement

October 26, 2011
SIGAR Audit-12-3 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Afghan National Security University Page i

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

October 26, 2011

General James N. Mattis 

Commander, U.S. Central Command

General John R. Allen 

Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, and 

Commander, International Security Assistance Force 

Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV

Commanding General, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan 

Mr. Terry Edwards 

Director, Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment 

This report discusses the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction’s audit of U.S. Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE) 

infrastructure projects at the Afghan National Security University (ANSU). This report includes two 

recommendations to the Director, AFCEE, to assure that contract files are complete and file information 

is consistent and that out-of-scope modifications are justified, approved, and documented. 

A summary of this report is on page ii. When preparing the final report, we considered comments from 

AFCEE and the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition CommandAfghanistan, which are reproduced in appendices II and III of this report, respectively. AFCEE noted our 

recommendations and discussed actions taken to address them. We conducted this performance audit 

under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended; the Inspector General Act of 1978; and the 

Inspector General Reform Act of 2008.

Steven J Trent

Acting Special Inspector General 

for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGAR Audit-12-3 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Afghan National Security University Page ii

SIGAR

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGAR Audit-12-3 October 2011

Afghan National Security University Has Experienced Cost 

Growth and Schedule Delays, and Contract 

Administration Needs Improvement

What SIGAR Reviewed

A key objective of the coalition efforts in Afghanistan is to build the country’s capacity to provide for its own security by 

housing, training, equipping, and sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces. The Combined Security Transition 

Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) provided $170 million to the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment 

(AFCEE) to support construction of facilities at the Afghan National Security University (ANSU), Afghanistan’s premier 

officer training facility. AFCEE awarded a task order for the first phase of construction in September 2008 to AMEC Earth 

and Environmental, Inc. (AMEC). AFCEE awarded a task order for the second phase to Lakeshore Engineering in 

February 2011. SIGAR did not include the second phase in our scope because work had just begun. AFCEE officials were 

responsible for providing contract oversight of construction activities and contract administration. SIGAR initiated this 

audit to examine (1) construction at ANSU during Phase I, including cost, schedule, and outcomes; (2) contract oversight 

and administration by AFCEE; and (3) efforts to obtain security services for ANSU construction activity. To accomplish 

these objectives, we reviewed relevant contract files; performed site inspections at ANSU; and interviewed officials 

from CSTC-A and AFCEE, among others. We conducted our work at AFCEE headquarters in San Antonio, Texas; Kabul, 

Afghanistan; and Washington, D.C., among other places, from December 2010 to October 2011, in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

What SIGAR Found

Construction at ANSU has experienced cost growth and schedule delays. The task order ceiling price has grown from 

$70.2 million to $91.5 million, and the scheduled completion was delayed from June 2010 to October 2011. The cost 

growth and schedule delay were due to a combination of added work, costs AMEC incurred awaiting site demining 

(conducted under another government contract) and CSTC-A’s changing design preferences, and increased construction 

costs. Overall, AFCEE has paid $21.3 million more for 18 fewer facilities and 8 fewer projects than originally planned. 

However, AFCEE data show that the ANSU schedule delays are not unique because the large majority of AFCEE projects 

for CSTC-A—80 percent—experienced similar delays. According to CSTC-A and AFCEE officials, schedules are purposely 

aggressive to push the contractors to complete construction in the shortest time possible so that the overall mission is 

successful. Finally, we found that construction quality generally met contract requirements. 

Although AFCEE provided active contract oversight at ANSU, we identified some weaknesses in contract administration. 

For example, contract files were generally complete, but the task order files contained incomplete and sometimes 

inconsistent information as to the reasons for modifications and, for the most part, did not include notices to proceed,

called for by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). AFCEE awarded AMEC two task order modifications that 

included a total of almost $60,000 for providing security that was outside the original scope of the ANSU task order. 

While permissible, in doing so AFCEE did not follow Department of Defense (DOD) policy and acquisition requirements. 

Finally, AFCEE paid AMEC about $53,500 for the cost of demining activities that should have been paid for under a 

separate contract with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 

Work at ANSU almost shut down because of issues involving the employment of personnel for the private security 

contractor used at the site. In December 2010, AMEC’s security provider, G4S, informed AMEC that it would have to 

stop providing security because of its inability to renew the visas of its non-Afghan personnel. AMEC was prepared to 

stop work and demobilize, but eventually was able to transition security to the Olive Group, another private security 

contractor. 

What SIGAR Recommends

To strengthen contract administration, SIGAR is making two recommendations to the Director, AFCEE, to assure that

(1) contract files contain complete and consistent information as to the reasons for task order modifications and (2) 

that out-of-scope modifications are justified, approved, and documented. AFCEE noted the recommendations and 

discussed actions taken to address them. In response to the second recommendation, AFCEE stated that modifications 

are already properly justified and approved through CSTC-A and documented by the AFCEE contracting officer.

However, because SIGAR found that the process used by AFCEE did not work in this case and, as the contracting entity 

for CSTC-A, AFCEE’s responsibility is to ensure that it follows DOD policy and FAR requirements. 

For more information contact: SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 602-8742 or PublicAffairs@sigar.mil
SIGAR Audit-12-3 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Afghan National Security University Page iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background ...................................................................................................................................................2

Phase I Construction Experienced Cost Increases and Schedule Delays......................................................4

AFCEE Demonstrated Strong Contract Oversight, But Contract Administration

Needs Improvement...............................................................................................................................8

Issues in Providing Security Services Almost Shut Down Construction at ANSU........................................12

Conclusion...................................................................................................................................................12

Recommendations......................................................................................................................................12

Comments...................................................................................................................................................12

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology.........................................................................................................14

Appendix II: Comments from the Air Force Center For Engineering and the 

Environment.........................................................................................................................................16

Appendix III: Comments from the NATO Training MissionAfghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan .................................................17

TABLES

Table 1: Basic Task Order and Modifications to Contract FA8903-06-D-8507, 

Task Order 0012, dated September 11, 2008 ........................................................................................5

PHOTOS

Photo 1: ANSU Construction Site.................................................................................................................3

Photo 2: Sink Plumbing Fixtures ..................................................................................................................8

Photo 3: Shower Plumbing Fixtures.............................................................................................................8
SIGAR Audit-12-3 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Afghan National Security University Page iv

ABREVIATIONS

AFCEE Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment

AMEC AMEC Earth and Environmental, Inc.

ANA Afghan National Army

ANSF Afghan National Security Forces

ANSU Afghan National Security University

CH2M Hill CH2M Hill Constructors, Inc.

CO Contracting Officer

COR Contracting Officer Representative

CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan

DOD Department of Defense

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

MOD Modification

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Ronco Ronco Consulting Corporation

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
SIGAR Audit-12-3 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Afghanistan National Security University Page 1

Afghan National Security University Has Experienced Cost Growth and Schedule 

Delays, and Contract Administration Needs Improvement

One objective of coalition efforts in Afghanistan is to build the country’s capacity to provide for its own 

security by training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).1

 The Combined Security 

Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is responsible for planning, programming, and implementing 

U.S. training and equipping efforts for the ANSF using funds provided through the Afghanistan Security 

Forces Fund.

2

As part of these efforts, CSTC-A is funding the construction of the Afghan National Security University 

(ANSU),

 Between fiscal years 2005 and 2011, the U.S. Congress has appropriated about 

$39.5 billion for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, which provides the funding to train and equip the 

ANSF through CSTC-A. 

3

which is intended to provide military training for officer candidates through the highest 

echelons of Afghan National Army (ANA) military personnel. At least 300 officers are expected to be 

commissioned annually. ANSU is being built in phases, each to be funded by a task order4

This report is part of a series of Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction performance 

audits examining contract outcomes, costs, and oversight. We initiated this audit to examine 

(1) construction at ANSU during Phase I, including cost, schedule, and outcomes; (2) contract oversight 

and administration by AFCEE; and (3) efforts to obtain security services for ANSU construction activity. 

We did not include Phase II in our analysis because work had just begun.

through the 

Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE), which performs construction services on 

behalf of CSTC-A. Phase I is the National Military Academy of Afghanistan. On September 11, 2008, 

AFCEE awarded a task order to AMEC Earth and Environmental, Inc. (AMEC) for Phase I in the amount of 

$70.2 million. Phase II is the Command General Staff College, which is planned to contain several 

schools dedicated to specific areas of advanced military training and education. AFCEE awarded a task 

order to Lakeshore Engineering for Phase II on February 28, 2011, in the amount of $78.8 million. 

To accomplish these objectives, we reviewed relevant contract files, including the statements of work, 

modifications, available construction plans and specifications, and quality assurance plans and reports. 

We examined criteria and guidance in AFCEE’s policies, as well as in the Federal Acquisition Regulation 

(FAR). We inspected ANSU construction, and we interviewed officials from AFCEE headquarters in San 

Antonio, Texas; AFCEE-Afghanistan; CSTC-A; AMEC; and Versar, which is AFCEE’s quality assurance 

 1

ANSF includes the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police.

2

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission/CSTC-A operates with a single commander for 

both the U.S.-led CSTC-A and NATO. The mission provides training for the Afghan National Army, develops 

doctrine, and trains and mentors the Afghan National Police. U.S Forces in Afghanistan report to the commander 

of the U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, who also serves as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander. 

The majority of U.S. resources and personnel not dedicated to ISAF are committed to training the Afghan National 

Security Forces through CSTC-A. 3

ANSU is located in Qarghah, Afghanistan, near Kabul. 4

A task order is an order for services placed against an established contract, in this case the Heavy Engineering, 

Repair, and Construction contract.
SIGAR Audit-12-3 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Afghanistan National Security University Page 2

contractor. We conducted our work in Washington, D.C; Kabul, Afghanistan; and other places from

December 2010 to October 2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. A more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is in appendix I. 

BACKGROUND

AFCEE performs construction contracting services on behalf of CSTC-A. A memorandum of agreement, 

dated August 8, 2006, between AFCEE and CSTC-A, delineates the services and the costs of those 

services that AFCEE will provide to CSTC-A, including contracting for real property construction and 

quality assurance services. In accordance with the memorandum of agreement, AFCEE established an 

in-country contracting officer representative (COR) and provided contract administration and technical 

support. 

In total, CSTC-A plans to spend $190 million to build ANSU. For Phase I, AFCEE competitively awarded a 

cost-plus-fixed-fee task order5

Construction at ANSU consists of a wide array of facilities. 

to AMEC on September 11, 2008, in the amount of $70.2 million. 

Construction of Phase I is nearing completion and is the focus of this report. AFCEE competitively 

awarded a firm-fixed-price task order to Lakeshore Engineering on February 28, 2011, for Phase II in the 

amount of $78.8 million. Construction began in March 2011. Through August 2011, AFCEE obligated 

approximately $170.3 million to construct the first two phases of ANSU. CSTC-A spending plans include 

an additional $20 million for Phase III construction of ANSU if funds become available from a foreign 

donor; according to CSTC-A, no U.S. funds will be used. 

• Phase I includes 16 student and other barracks, four administrative buildings, two three-story 

classroom buildings, two dining facilities, a 2,600 square meter auditorium, a library, two 

multi-purpose gymnasiums, and related utility and site work.

• Phase II includes the ANSU headquarters building, Joint Services Academy, Legal Branch School, 

Non-Commissioned Officer Academy, Foreign Language School, Counterinsurgency Academy, 

and Religious and Cultural School. Construction is scheduled to be completed in September

2012.

• Phase III would include a Community Center, three single faculty housing units, and fifteen 

family faculty housing units to house a total of 339 families.

Photo 1 shows some of the work underway. 

 5

Under cost-plus contracts the government agrees to pay all costs associated with the work under a contract or 

task order that are reasonable, allowable under the FAR, and allocable to the contracted work. The government 

bears the risk of any increase in costs, provided the costs are reasonable, allowable, and allocable. 
SIGAR Audit-12-3 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Afghanistan National Security University Page 3

Photo 1: ANSU Construction Site

Source: SIGAR, March 2011

AFCEE Selects Contractors Through a Two-Tiered Approach

AFCEE uses a two-tiered approach to select contractors for its construction projects. First, under its 

Heavy Engineering, Repair, and Construction business model, AFCEE solicits bids, selects contractors, 

and awards multiple contracts, in accordance with the FAR, to provide heavy construction and 

engineering activities worldwide. Second, AFCEE headquarters requests proposals covering potential 

heavy construction and engineering projects exclusively from the Heavy Engineering, Repair, and 

Construction prime contractors. Contractors interested in competing for the work provide proposals. 

The AFCEE contracting officer (CO), located in San Antonio, Texas, makes a determination as to which 

contractor will provide the best value for the dollar, and the selected contractor is awarded the task 

order. The task orders for both phases at ANSU were competitively awarded. 

AFCEE Outsources Quality Assurance, but the Contracting Officer Is Ultimately Responsible 

for Contractor Oversight

AFCEE engages engineering contractors to provide quality assurance for its construction projects, but 

the AFCEE contracting officer has final responsibility for monitoring contractor performance and holding 

the contractor accountable for its actions. The quality assurance contractors perform onsite 

supervision, inspection, and oversight for construction throughout Afghanistan to ensure that 

construction contractors meet quality control and construction standards. Duties include, but are not 

limited to, onsite technical surveillance and project assessment; review and comment on the 

contractor’s submittals; and preparation and posting of daily quality assurance reports that document 

project details, actions taken, and items inspected. The quality assurance contractor provides 

documentation of these actions to the COR, who is responsible for evaluating the quality assurance 

contractor’s performance and for using the information provided to interact with and advise the CO. 

The CO for ANSU, located in San Antonio, Texas, delegates day-to-day oversight to a deployed COR 

based in Kabul and a COR based in San Antonio, Texas, who administer the contracts. Quality assurance
SIGAR Audit-12-3 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Afghanistan National Security University Page 4

services for work at ANSU were initially awarded to Versar, Inc. through November 2009.

6

AFCEE’s COR in Kabul is, in turn, supported by the quality assurance contractor, Versar, which maintains

personnel on site at ANSU. Versar works with and reports its observations to AFCEE’s COR. AFCEE’s 

COR for ANSU is not located on site and is responsible for multiple projects, which results in Versar’s 

personnel serving as the government’s primary onsite monitors for the project and reports regularly to 

the COR. Versar's quality assurance activities include, but are not limited to, monitoring contractor 

performance; reviewing building designs; inspecting and testing construction materials, analyzing 

contractor cost and schedule performance; and inspecting construction quality through routine, prefinal, and final project assessments. Versar documents and provides to the AFCEE COR the results of its 

oversight activities in daily and weekly activity reports, construction deficiency logs, and contractor noncompliance logs; and it provides AFCEE recommendations on approval of designs and materials. AFCEE’s 

COR, in turn, reviews Versar’s reporting and adds observations as comments to the weekly activity 

report. The COR is responsible for acting on any concerns identified by Versar. Versar has no authority 

to direct the contractor. 

 As that task 

order was expiring, AFCEE awarded the task order for quality assurance services to Jacobs Government 

Services Company on September 30, 2009. That task order overlapped with Versar's contract through 

November 30, 2009. Jacobs then subcontracted with Versar to continue providing quality assurance for 

AFCEE construction projects in Afghanistan. 

PHASE I CONSTRUCTION EXPERIENCED COST INCREASES AND SCHEDULE DELAYS 

Construction at ANSU has experienced cost growth and schedule delays. Total project cost has grown 

from $70.2 million to $91.5 million, and the scheduled completion date has been delayed from June 

2010 to October 2011. The cost growth and schedule delay were due to a combination of added work,

costs AMEC incurred awaiting site demining (conducted under another government contract) and 

CSTC-A’s finalizing design requirements, and increased construction costs. Overall, CSTC-A, through 

AFCEE, has paid $21.3 million more for 18 fewer facilities and 8 fewer projects than originally planned. 

Our review of AFCEE data shows that ANSU is not unique because most AFCEE projects for CSTC-A have

experienced schedule delays. Finally, we found that construction quality generally met contract

requirements. 

Phase I Is Over Its Original Cost and Behind Schedule

Phase I was originally scheduled to be completed in June 2010, at a cost of $70.2 million, but is now 

scheduled to be completed in October 2011, at a cost of $91.5 million. Phase I was under a cost-plus 

task order, and the government paid all the additional costs. As shown in table 1, as of August 2011, 

AFCEE awarded 10 modifications for the ANSU task order increasing the overall cost of Phase I by 

$21.3 million. 

 6

This was a time-and-materials task order. According to the FAR, a time-and-materials contract provides for the 

acquisition of supplies or services on the basis of direct labor hours at fixed hourly rates and actual costs of 

materials. The task order covers quality assurance services at multiple AFCEE construction projects, including 

ANSU.
SIGAR Audit-12-3 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Afghanistan National Security University Page 5

Table 1: Basic Task Order and Modifications to Contract FA8903-06-D-8507, Task Order 0012, dated 

September 11, 2008

Award Date Purpose Cost/Schedule Changes

Basic Award Sep. 11, 2008 Construction of facilities at ANSU. Originally for $70.2 million 

and work scheduled to be 

complete June 10, 2010.

Modification 

(MOD) 1

Sep. 30, 2009 Revised the size of 14 buildings; added one 

new building; revised utility infrastructure 

installation; added compensation for 

redesign delays and additional security; and 

descoped seven facilities and six other 

projects, i.e., parking areas, driver and 

weapon ranges, and tree planting.

Task order increased by 

almost $11.5 million and 

schedule extended by 

12 months to June 10, 2011.

MOD 2 Apr. 2, 2010 Expanded scope to include provision for

security at Task Force Kabul (see note) for 

2 months.

Task order increased by 

$40,796.

MOD 3 May 18, 2010 Extended requirement for AMEC to provide 

security at Task Force Kabul; added funds to 

cover additional cost for wastewater 

treatment facility; changed design of ANSU 

headquarters building; and descoped 

six facilities and one project, i.e., asphalt 

paving.

Task order increased by 

$22,196.

MOD 4 Sep. 14, 2010 Changed requirements for culverts, power 

generation, and electrical work and 

descoped six facilities.

No change to schedule or 

cost.

MOD 5 Oct. 8, 2010 Revised scope to include providing 

communication backbone for all Phase I 

facilities; included requirements to connect 

water line to existing Kabul city water line; 

and descoped one project, i.e., support area 

well.

Task order increased by 

$1.0 million.

MOD 6 Jan. 10, 2011 Changed design of one entry control point 

and descoped two facilities.

No change to schedule or 

cost.

MOD 7 Feb. 23, 2011 Made minor adjustment to the design of 

two facilities.

No change to schedule or 

cost.

MOD 8 Jun. 2, 2011 Descoped one project, i.e., the entry control 

point between ANSU/Task Force Kabul; 

added funds to construct additional 

generator/transformer pad; install 64 base 

cabinets, 60 lab bench tops, and seven

chemical exhaust hoods in building 162; 

added rejection lane and two drop arm 

barriers.

Task order increased by 

$452,479 and extended 

schedule by over 1 month to 

July 31, 2011.

MOD 9 Jul. 21, 2011 Increased the funding ceiling while longer 

extension was being prepared.

Task order increased by 

$654,480 and extended 

schedule by 2 weeks to 

August 15, 2011.
SIGAR Audit-12-3 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Afghanistan National Security University Page 6

Award Date Purpose Cost/Schedule Changes

MOD 10 Aug. 8, 2011 Provided increased funding; no change in 

scope.

Task order increased by 

$7.6 million and extended 

schedule by over 2 months 

to October 31, 2011.

Source: Developed by SIGAR from HQ AFCEE contract, task order, and modification data.

Note: Task Force Kabul is a separate ANA facility adjacent to ANSU but within the ANSU perimeter wall.

According to an AFCEE official, AMEC has turned over 38 facilities and continues to work on the 

remaining facilities.

Several Factors Combined to Increase Cost and Delay Completion

The reasons for the cost growth and schedule delay were a combination of added work, the need for 

AMEC to wait for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to conduct demining of the work site and for 

CSTC-A to decide on desired design changes to facilities, and increases in AMEC’s construction cost. 

According to AFCEE, additional reasons for cost growth were logistical and transportation delays of 

materials and equipment, unforeseen site conditions, delays due to security incidents and the high 

threat environment, and a lack of skilled local labor. Overall, we determined that AFCEE has paid 

$21.3 million more for 18 fewer facilities and 8 fewer projects than originally planned. 

Because facilities that were removed will likely be included in later contracts for construction at ANSU,

the overall cost of construction at ANSU could easily be higher. Although AFCEE deleted $12 million in 

work from the Phase I task order, it also added a total of $33.4 million, for an overall cost increase of 

$21.3 million. The $33.4 million included $14.8 million to pay for new work and changes to planned 

facilities, $5.7 million to cover the costs of government delay, and $12.9 million to pay for higher 

construction costs and increased labor costs associated with the longer construction period. Specifically, 

• AFCEE added $14.8 million to fund new work and changes to facilities under the original 

contract. Between June 2009 and April 2010, AFCEE added construction of two K-spans7

• AFCEE also added $5.7 million to the task order to pay costs AMEC incurred awaiting completion 

of demining and design changes. 

and a 

small arms storage building. It also added a communication system for the site. According to 

file documentation, AFCEE removed facilities in order to cover cost overruns, ensure AMEC was 

able to meet the completion date, and pay for added facilities or design changes. In 

commenting on a draft of this report, CSTC-A indicated that facilities were added and removed 

as the vision and requirements for ANSU evolved and were updated, and that these mission and 

associated end-user requirements were responsible for a significant portion of the cost and 

schedule growth. 

 Regarding demining, CSTC-A and AFCEE did not ensure that site demining was 

synchronized with the construction effort. AFCEE awarded the contract for construction 

of ANSU 2 weeks prior to USACE awarding a separate contract for demining on the site. 

According to a USACE official, having AMEC on site during demining delayed USACE’s 

progress because CSTC-A requested that demining activities be moved multiple times. 

The official added that typically demining should be complete or nearly complete before 

 7

A K-span is a pre-engineered building built with roll-formed arched steel structures that weld together in large 

sections to form a self-supporting building with no internal structure. A K-span building can be used many ways, 

including as a warehouse, hangar, office space, or troop barracks. 
SIGAR Audit-12-3 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Afghanistan National Security University Page 7

any construction contract is awarded. The portion of the increased cost due to delays 

in demining is unclear. 

 According to the project files, after the task order was awarded, CSTC-A requested 

changes to facility designs, including making buildings more ornate. After AMEC spent 

several months developing these new designs, the government estimate revealed that 

the desired changes would cost $37 million, so CSTC-A decided not to pursue them. 

More than 6 months later, and after a rotation of personnel, AFCEE requested that the 

facility designs revert to the original, basic plans specified in the task order, and CSTC-A 

agreed. As with the demining costs, the portion of the increased cost due to delays 

while awaiting design changes is unclear. 

• Finally, higher construction costs and increased labor costs associated with the longer 

construction period totaled $12.9 million. According to AFCEE, these costs increased for a 

number of reasons. For example, AMEC’s cost estimates for construction were 3 years old and,

therefore, did not reflect current costs. In addition, customs issues in Pakistan delayed shipping 

of major components needed to build ANSU’s power plant. Finally, poor performance on the 

part of some of AMEC’s subcontractors resulted in a 30 to 45 day delay in construction of some 

of the larger buildings, including the dining facility, auditorium, and headquarters building. 

Schedule Delays Appear to Be a Systemic Issue

The construction delays at ANSU are not unique. We reported in our review of construction at the Kabul 

Military Training Center that about 80 percent of all AFCEE construction projects for CSTC-A experienced 

schedule delays.8

Construction Quality Generally Met Contract Requirements

 Specifically, between 2006 and 2010, our review of AFCEE data showed that 33 of 

41 of AFCEE construction projects for CSTC-A were delayed. The delays ranged from less than 1 month 

to 24 months and averaged 10 months. We found that delays occurred for a variety of factors, including 

work added to task orders, unanticipated site conditions, contractor performance problems, difficulties 

in delivering materials, security concerns, and delays associated with waiting for government action. 

Based on meetings with contractor, CSTC-A, and AFCEE officials, we concluded that aggressive schedules 

driven by mission needs did not take factors that cause delays into account. Consequently, construction 

often could not be completed within the desired timeframe. AFCEE told us that schedules are purposely 

aggressive to push the contractors to complete construction in the shortest time possible so that the 

overall mission is successful. 

We found that the quality of construction at ANSU generally met contract requirements. When our 

engineer inspected the ANSU site in May 2011, he noted some problems, but found that construction 

quality generally aligned with contract standards. For example, most of the construction at this facility is 

reinforced concrete pier and beam with concrete masonry unitwalls. In the finished and in-progress 

construction samples he observed, reinforced concrete and concrete masonry unit construction was 

generally acceptable in walls, columns, beams, flooring, and roofs. No cracks or failures were evident. 

Floors were finished with a two-part epoxy, which should last for years. A good quality example is the 

main dining facility—a large facility designed to seat 2,000 people—which is constructed almost entirely 

of reinforced concrete and had no evidence of any structural defects. Because construction of this 

phase of work was nearing completion, our inspection was limited to the nearly completed structures; 

we were not able to examine construction features such as foundation footings and wiring inside walls

that are no longer visible.

 8 SIGAR Audit-12-2 Better Planning and Oversight Could Have Reduced Construction Delays and Costs at the Kabul 

Military Training Center, October 26, 2011.
SIGAR Audit-12-3 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Afghanistan National Security University Page 8

Although overall construction met contract requirements, we identified quality issues involving 

plumbing fixtures. Specifically, we found the contractor had installed “goose-neck” faucets and

unsubstantial shower heads in the shower buildings, as shown in photos 2 and 3. 

Photo 2: Sink Plumbing Fixtures Photo 3: Shower Plumbing Fixtures

Source: SIGAR, May 2011 Source: SIGAR, May 2011

According to the AFCEE COR, the plumbing fixtures that were installed are acceptable for ANSU because 

it is a university and not a typical ANA facility. However, these plumbing fixtures will be more difficult to 

maintain in the long-term due to the heavy use they will receive. The AFCEE COR is aware of the 

concern that “goose-neck” faucets are not sufficiently sturdy for facilities in Afghanistan. 

On February 3, 2011, well after the ANSU requirements were developed in 2006-2007, CSTC-A issued a 

memorandum on “austere” construction specifications. Among other things, the new standards call for 

the use of more durable low profile metal valves, rather than “goose-neck” faucets. CSTC-A officials 

explained that developing construction standards for use by the ANSF has been a learning experience 

regarding cultural differences, and that the changes to the standards reflect the results of that 

experience. In our May 2011 site inspection of ANSU, we observed the use of austere standards in 

flooring, heating, and cooling systems, but not in plumbing fixtures. 

AFCEE DEMONSTRATED STRONG CONTRACT OVERSIGHT, BUT CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION 

NEEDS IMPROVEMENT

Versar, AFCEE’s quality assurance contractor, exercised extensive contract oversight at ANSU; however,

AFCEE’s contract administration was weak in some instances. Versar performed a wide array of 

oversight functions, including design reviews, onsite inspection, and testing of construction material. At 

the same time, AFCEE did not fully exercise all of its contract administration responsibilities. For 

example, AFCEE’s task order files contained incomplete and sometimes inconsistent information as to 

the reasons for modifications and, for the most part, did not include notices to proceed called for by the 

FAR. In addition, AFCEE did not comply with administrative requirements when awarding AMEC two 

task order modifications for work outside the original scope of the ANSU task order. Finally, AFCEE paid 

AMEC almost $54,000 for demining activities that should have been covered under a USACE contract for 

demining. 
SIGAR Audit-12-3 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Afghanistan National Security University Page 9

AFCEE and Versar Demonstrated Active Oversight of ANSU Construction

We found extensive contract oversight at ANSU. Versar’s daily and weekly activity reports and 

construction deficiency logs/contractor non-compliance logs contained considerable information on a 

variety of topics, including quality, status, and key events. For example, our review of the daily reports 

indicated that Versar prepared documentation relevant to the various construction activities and the 

reports complied with criteria found in the contract. The reports were detailed and indicated the 

contractor paid close attention to the construction. We also found that the AFCEE COR closely reviewed

Versar’s reporting, adding his own observations as comments to the weekly activity report. In addition, 

during our inspection of ANSU, we observed Versar personnel on site providing inspection, field 

construction management, and quality assurance oversight of the project. Finally, we observed that 

Versar personnel assisted AFCEE’s COR in enforcing contractual requirements and construction 

standards and that AFCEE’s COR periodically visited the work site. 

The Contract File Was Largely Complete, but Documentation Could Be Improved

Our review of the ANSU task order files showed them to be largely complete, with some exceptions. 

According to FAR Subpart 4.8, contract files shall contain documentation sufficient to constitute a 

complete history of the transaction.9

While the contract files were largely complete, the ANSU contract file contained incomplete and 

sometimes contradictory information as to the reasons for modifying the contract. As was the case with 

our review of AFCEE’s construction task orders for construction at the Kabul Military Training Center,

 We reviewed AFCEE’s official contract file for the ANSU Phase I 

award and all modifications, as of April 25, 2011. For the ANSU task order and its modifications, about 

150 items should be included in the file. We found that all but five of the required items were in the file. 

10

• In one instance involving increased security costs, the change request included in the file 

indicated an increase of about $440,000, but the award was for $1.5 million. The file contained 

no explanation as to why the amounts differed. 

the ANSU task order modifications did not provide detail as to the reasons for them. We were able to 

identify the reasons for some, but not all, from a review of other file documentation. In addition, the 

files sometimes contained contradictory information. For example, file documentation was inconsistent 

in explaining reasons for cost growth. 

• In another instance, AFCEE documentation indicated delays in demining resulted in increased 

cost, while AMEC documents indicated the primary reason was changes to facility designs. The 

file contained no discussion of the costs associated with adding and revising facilities. 

In addition, we found that AFCEE did not maintain documentation of the notices to proceed.

11 The FAR

cites the notices to proceed as examples of records normally contained in contract files, if applicable.

12 

AFCEE’s Contingency Construction Project Manager Handbook13

 9

This documentation serves to provide a basis for informed decisions, to support actions taken, to provide 

information for reviews and investigations, and to furnish essential facts in the event of litigation or congressional 

inquiries. 

also recognizes the importance of 

notices to proceed. The handbook states that the project’s notice to proceed authorizes the contractor 

10SIGAR Audit-12-2, Better Planning and Oversight Could Have Reduced Construction Delays and Costs at the Kabul 

Military Training Center, October 26, 2011. 11The notice to proceed is the government’s authorization for the contractor to begin work. 12FAR Subpart 4.803. 

13The handbook was developed by AFCEE from lessons learned throughout its contingency construction 

experiences and serves as guidance concerning contract file documentation.
SIGAR Audit-12-3 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Afghanistan National Security University Page 10

to begin initial activities and that any work change cannot be executed until a notice to proceed is issued 

by the CO. 

AFCEE and AMEC officials could not provide documentation of partial or full notices to proceed directing 

the contractor to begin work on the basic award or any modifications. Although we found a partial 

notice to proceed for a stone wall project, AFCEE officials told us they do not document notice to 

proceed because it is included with the award of the task order. An AMEC official agreed that notice to 

proceed is included in the award of the task order. However, we found that not documenting notices to 

proceed created some confusion. For example, ANSU project correspondence contains an email from 

one of the project CORs who was confused about what the contractor was directed to do and when. 

Without including the notice to proceed in the contract file, the file did not provide a complete history 

of the transaction, which can lead to confusion and potential waste if the contractor is performing work 

without specific direction to do so. In discussing this matter with AFCEE, the CO for ANSU agreed that 

AFCEE should include notices to proceed in the file. In July 2011, AFCEE officials stated that including 

notices to proceed in the files was initially an informal process, but that they are now including them

more systematically.

AFCEE Did Not Follow DOD Policy and FAR Requirements in Awarding Almost $60,000 in Work 

That Was Out of Scope 

AFCEE modified the ANSU task order to award almost $60,000 to AMEC to provide security at Task Force 

Kabul, but did not follow DOD policy and FAR requirements in awarding this out-of-scope work. Task 

Force Kabul is a separate ANA facility within the ANSU perimeter wall. Work at Task Force Kabul was 

being conducted by a different contractor, CH2M Hill Constructors, Inc. (CH2M Hill), under a separate 

AFCEE contract. AFCEE officials told us that as Task Force Kabul was being completed, it became clear 

that while the contractor was demobilizing, the ANA was not ready to accept transfer of the Task Force 

Kabul facility. AFCEE reviewed its options for protecting the site, including extending CH2M Hill’s 

contract versus providing security through AMEC’s task order for ANSU. Although it recognized that this 

work was out of the scope of the ANSU task order, AFCEE determined that using AMEC would be in the 

best interest of the government. As a result, AFCEE modified the ANSU task order, adding a total of 

$59,704 for AMEC to provide security at Task Force Kabul. 

However, AFCEE did not adhere to both DOD policy and FAR requirements in doing so. DOD’s Defense 

Procurement and Acquisition Policy14 allows for modifying existing contracts to add work that is outside 

the scope of the existing contract as long as three general rules are followed. Those rules are (1) the 

modification must be agreed to by both the government and the contractor; (2) the modification must 

have a justification and approval; and (3) if the modification value exceeds $550,000, it must be 

approved above the CO level. AFCEE did not comply with the first two rules, and the third did not 

apply.15

Adding security for Task Force Kabul to the ANSU task order was also, in effect, a sole source award, i.e.,

the work was awarded without competition. According to the FAR, the CO must justify the award in 

writing, certify the accuracy and completeness of the justification, and obtain relevant approvals.

 Specifically, AFCEE made the award unilaterally, not bilaterally, and did not prepare the 

required justification and approval. 

16

 14 Defense Contingency Contracting Handbook, Chapter 6-Contract Administration.

 

However, as of May 2011, AFCEE has not complied with this FAR requirement. According to AFCEE, the 

government obtained cost savings by using the task order with AMEC. Furthermore, AFCEE stated that 

15 For the Task Force Kabul modification, the value was less than $60,000, so it only required contracting officer 

approval.

16 See FAR Subpart 6.303-1.
SIGAR Audit-12-3 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Afghanistan National Security University Page 11

it would not have solicited just the additional security work to all Heavy Engineering, Repair, and 

Construction contractors. While this information helps explain why AFCEE awarded the work to AMEC, 

it does not explain why AFCEE failed to follow the policies or requirements related to sole-source 

awards. 

AFCEE Unnecessarily Paid About $53,500 for Demining at ANSU

AFCEE paid AMEC $53,519 for demining at ANSU in 2009, even though a USACE contract was in place to 

provide for demining at the site. Beginning in September 2008, USACE contracted with Ronco 

Consulting Corporation (Ronco) to clear landmines and unexploded ordnance at ANSU. AFCEE informed 

AMEC of this contracting arrangement and instructed AMEC in writing that it was not to conduct any 

demining activities. However, in December 2008, AMEC subcontracted with Ronco to conduct demining 

at the site and between October and December 2009 AMEC submitted three invoices to AFCEE totaling 

$53,519 for Ronco’s work. AFCEE accepted these invoices for payment in December 2009. 

However, in a review of AMEC’s invoices, the AFCEE program manager identified AMEC’s divergence 

from AFCEE’s instructions. The program manager then informed AMEC that he had rejected paying one

invoice because demining was not covered as a reimbursable expense in the contract between AFCEE 

and AMEC. According to an internal AFCEE memo, when the issue was brought to another AFCEE 

official, that official stated the charges should be paid because “the auditors would not catch something

this small” and because “we [AFCEE] do what we need to do to get the job done.” AMEC resubmitted 

this invoice, and AFCEE approved it for payment in March 2010. 

When we asked AFCEE officials why they ultimately agreed to pay the voucher, they stated that they 

had determined that the voucher was allowable because of confusion at the time regarding the scope of 

Ronco’s two demining contracts. Specifically, AMEC had initially understood the contract between 

USACE and Ronco to cover demining only up to a 1-meter depth. AMEC subcontracted with Ronco only 

to sweep and clear areas from the 1 meter already cleared to a depth of approximately 3 to 4 meters. 

The AFCEE COR in Afghanistan also understood the two contracts to cover different depths. Therefore, 

according to AFCEE, “AMEC’s limited clearance during the pre-clarification period was an allowable 

task...and not a duplication of effort.” 

In its response to our draft report, AFCEE asserted that the USACE contract did not include the demining 

activities required and was not the exclusive contract for demining. AFCEE also stated that since AMEC 

used the same demining subcontractor that USACE used, Ronco, the government did not have to pay for 

additional mobilization costs.

Our review of USACE’s contract with Ronco shows that it did not limit demining to a 1-meter depth and, 

therefore, the two contracts are duplicative. In addition, project file correspondence among AFCEE, 

USACE, and AMEC shows that AFCEE and USACE ultimately reached agreement that all demining should 

be done by USACE and that AMEC’s work was duplicative of USACE’s contract. Therefore, AFCEE did not 

have to pay the $53,519 in demining work because it was covered under the USACE contract with 

Ronco. Although AFCEE could take steps to recoup the $53,519 from AMEC, this may not be warranted 

because AFCEE shares responsibility for any confusion during the period of performance under the 

subcontract.
SIGAR Audit-12-3 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Afghanistan National Security University Page 12

ISSUES IN PROVIDING SECURITY SERVICES ALMOST SHUT DOWN CONSTRUCTION AT ANSU

Work at ANSU almost shut down in December 2010 when AMEC’s security provider, G4S, informed 

AMEC that it would have to stop providing security services because of its inability to renew the visas of 

its non-Afghan personnel.17

CONCLUSION

 The Afghan government was unwilling to issue visas, despite promises to do 

so and AFCEE’s support of the visa request. In a December 10, 2010 email and an update on 

December 16, 2010, AMEC advised AFCEE that its security subcontractor would be required to withdraw 

all of its non-Afghan security personnel unless its visas were renewed by December 19, 2010. Due to the 

decreased security force, AMEC advised AFCEE that it would withdraw its personnel if it could not 

supplement G4S security personnel with another security subcontractor. Although AMEC was able to 

negotiate a transition to another security provider, Olive Group, and continue work in Afghanistan, 

AMEC had begun making plans to close its ANSU operations. Olive Group took over movement security 

and security for AMEC’s life support areas in December 2010, and AMEC restructured its contract with 

G4S to limit it to perimeter and entry control point security. Effective June 12, 2011, all security services 

transitioned to Olive Group.

Construction at ANSU experienced net cost growth as facilities were added, overall construction costs 

grew, and other facilities were removed. The project’s completion is currently delayed by over 1 year. 

Contract administration needs improvement. We found that the contract file for ANSU contained 

incomplete and sometimes contradictory information as to the reasons for task order modifications. In 

addition, contrary to FAR requirements and AFCEE’s Contingency Construction Project Manager 

Handbook, notices to proceed were often not included in the contract files. AFCEE awarded AMEC two 

modifications that included a total of almost $60,000 for providing security that was outside the original 

scope of the ANSU task order. While permissible, in doing so AFCEE did not follow DOD policy and FAR

requirements. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

To strengthen contract administration at ANSU and ensure appropriate use of government funds, SIGAR 

is making two recommendations to the Director, AFCEE: 

1. Assure that, in the future, the ANSU task order file is complete, including complete and 

consistent documentation as to the reasons for task order modifications and that all notices to 

proceed are included in the contract files and consider expanding the practice to all CSTC-A 

funded task order files. 

2. Assure that out-of-scope modifications are properly justified, approved, and documented. 

COMMENTS

AFCEE and CSTC-A provided written comments on a draft of this report. These comments are

reproduced in appendices II and III, respectively. AFCEE and CSTC-A also provided technical comments, 

which we incorporated into the draft, as appropriate. 

 17 The ANSU task order requires that AMEC provide for its own site and movement security. AMEC originally 

contracted with the security provider G4S (formerly Armour Group) in November 2008 to provide for all its 

security. 
SIGAR Audit-12-3 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Afghanistan National Security University Page 13

In its comments, AFCEE indicated that it has taken actions to implement our first recommendation. 

Specifically, AFCEE stated that the ANSU task order file has been updated and that the file will be 

reviewed after each modification to ensure that it is complete and accurate. In response to our second 

recommendation, AFCEE stated that because CSTC-A signs off on all work change requests the 

modification action is justified and approved by the organization responsible for the development of the 

project requirements and funding. In addition, AFCEE noted that the CO makes a determination to 

ensure that the modification is within the scope of the active task order. AFCEE also stated that all 

documentation is placed in the file and reviewed during every modification action. However, our review 

found that, despite the described process, AFCEE did not follow DOD or FAR requirements in awarding 

almost $60,000 in out-of-scope work. As the contracting entity, AFCEE’s responsibility is to ensure that 

modifications are properly justified and approved. Therefore, AFCEE still needs to take corrective action 

to address this recommendation. 
SIGAR Audit-12-3 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Afghanistan National Security University Page 14

APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report provides the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction’s (SIGAR) review of construction at the Afghan National Security University (ANSU). 

ANSU is being built in phases. As of August 2011, the Combined Security Transition CommandAfghanistan (CSTC-A) had funded two task orders through the Air Force Center for Engineering and the 

Environment (AFCEE) to support construction at ANSU. Phase I is the National Military Academy of 

Afghanistan, which will serve as the Afghan National Army Officer Candidate School. AFCEE awarded a 

task order to AMEC Earth and Environmental, Inc. (AMEC) for Phase I on September 11, 2008. 

Construction of Phase I is nearing completion and is the focus of this report. AFCEE competitively 

awarded a firm-fixed-price task order to Lakeshore Engineering on February 28, 2011 for Phase II. We 

did not include this phase in our scope because construction is just beginning. These task orders were

funded by CSTC-A and implemented by AFCEE. This report is part of a series of performance audits by 

the SIGAR examining contract outcomes, costs, and oversight. This report examines (1) construction at 

ANSU during Phase I, including cost, schedule, and outcomes; (2) contract oversight and administration 

by AFCEE; and (3) efforts to obtain security services for ANSU construction activity. 

To examine contract modifications and whether construction at ANSU met the terms of the task order, 

SIGAR met with officials from AFCEE (based in San Antonio, Texas); AFCEE-Afghanistan; CSTC-A; the 

construction contractor (AMEC); and the quality assurance contractor (Versar, Inc.). We reviewed the 

contract documentation, including statements of work, modifications, email documents, and contracting 

officer correspondence. We conducted a site inspection in March 2011, and again in May 2011. During 

our site inspections, we examined the interior and exterior of all completed buildings, as well as the 

grounds within the perimeter of the construction sites. We also reviewed electronic files and 

correspondence from AFCEE-Afghanistan and CSTC-A. We did not rely on computer processed data to 

determine construction status. We obtained documentation available on the prime and quality 

assurance contractor Web sites (designed and provided in accordance with AFCEE contracts).

To examine project oversight, we met with officials from AFCEE; AFCEE-Afghanistan; Versar, Inc.; and 

CSTC-A. We reviewed criteria and guidance in the Federal Acquisition Regulation, Versar’s quality 

assurance reports, and AFCEE guidance for construction to determine if the contracting process and 

oversight of the contracts met AFCEE regulations and contract requirements. Additionally, we reviewed 

AFCEE guidance to determine the roles and responsibilities of AFCEE and AFCEE-Afghanistan personnel. 

To examine the status of providing security, we held discussions with officials from AFCEE-San Antonio, 

AFCEE-Afghanistan, and AMEC, and reviewed AMEC’s subcontracts for security services. We also 

reviewed email communication in which AMEC advised AFCEE of the difficulties its security provider was 

facing. 

We assessed internal controls over contract administration and oversight procedures through interviews 

with contracting officials and reviews of relevant contract files. The results or our assessment are 

included in the body of this report.

We conducted work in at AFCEE headquarters in San Antonio, Texas; AMEC’s corporate office in 

Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania; Vesar’s office in Westminster, Colorado; Kabul, Afghanistan; and 

Washington, D.C., from December 2010 to October 2011, in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The audit was conducted by the Special Inspector 
SIGAR Audit-12-3 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Afghanistan National Security University Page 15

General for Afghanistan Reconstruction under the authority of Public Law 110-181, as amended; the 

Inspector General Act of 1978; and the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008.
SIGAR Audit-12-3 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Afghanistan National Security University Page 16

APPENDIX II: COMMENTS FROM THE AIR FORCE CENTER FOR ENGINEERING AND THE 

ENVIRONMENT
SIGAR Audit-12-3 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Afghanistan National Security University Page 17

APPENDIX III: COMMENTS FROM THE NATO TRAINING MISSION-AFGHANISTAN/COMBINED

SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN
SIGAR Audit-12-3 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Afghanistan National Security University Page 18
SIGAR Audit-12-3 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Afghanistan National Security University Page 19

(This performance audit was conducted under the audit project code SIGAR-040A).
SIGAR’s Mission The mission of the Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance 

oversight of programs for the reconstruction of 

Afghanistan by conducting independent and objective 

audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of 

taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to 

provide accurate and balanced information, evaluations, 

analysis, and recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, 

U.S. agencies, and other decision-makers to make 

informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions to:

• improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction 

strategy and its component programs;

• improve management and accountability over funds 

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their 

contractors;

• improve contracting and contract management 

processes;

• prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and

• advance U.S. interests in reconstructing 

Afghanistan.

Obtaining Copies of SIGAR 

Reports and Testimonies

To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGAR’s Web site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all 

publically released reports, testimonies, and 

correspondence on its Web site.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Afghanistan 

Reconstruction Programs

To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and 

reprisal contact SIGAR’s hotline:

• Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud

• Email: hotline@sigar.mil

• Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300

• Phone DSN Afghanistan 318-237-2575

• Phone International: +1-866-329-8893

• Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378

• U.S. fax: +1-703-604-0983

Public Affairs Public Affairs Officer

• Phone: 703-602-8742 

• Email: PublicAffairs@sigar.mil

• Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs

2530 Crystal Drive

Arlington, VA 22202