NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 22-3368

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

SOULEYMANE FADIGA,

Appellant

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware

(No. 1-21-cr-00061-001)

U.S. District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews

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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

July 8, 2024

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Before: SHWARTZ, PHIPPS, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges.

(Filed:July 9, 2024)

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OPINION

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 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 

not constitute binding precedent.
2

SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.

Souleymane Fadiga appeals his sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm by a 

convicted felon. His counsel argues that his appeal presents no nonfrivolous issues and 

moves to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We agree and 

will grant the motion and affirm.

I 

In May 2021, a police officer saw Fadiga’s Instagram page, which include a photo 

of Fadiga with a rifle and a video of him at a shooting range. At the time, Fadiga was on 

probation for second-degree robbery and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person 

under Delaware law. The police arrested Fadiga, searched his home, and found a gun 

box matching the firearm Fadiga used at the shooting range, along with ammunition and 

firearm grips. Police later found the gun at Fadiga’s friend’s home. Fadiga subsequently

pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

922(g)(1). 

The District Court imposed a thirty-six-month sentence, which was below the 

applicable Guidelines range of forty-six to fifty-seven months, which range resulted from 

a total offense level of seventeen and criminal history category of V. Fadiga’s Delaware 

second-degree robbery conviction triggered a base offense level of twenty under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2K2.1 because the Court concluded that such an offense is a “crime of violence” under 

the U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). The base offense level was 

reduced by three under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility. 
3

Fadiga’s counsel filed a notice of appeal, and we stayed the appeal pending the 

resolution of United States v. Stanford, 75 F.4th 309, 311 (3d Cir. 2023), in which we 

eventually held that Delaware second-degree robbery qualified as a “crime of violence.”

After we decided Stanford, we lifted the stay, and Fadiga’s counsel moved to withdraw

under Anders.

1

II2

A

Our local rules allow defense counsel to file a motion to withdraw and an 

accompanying Anders brief when counsel reviews the record and concludes that “the 

appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit.” 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a). When counsel 

submits an Anders brief, we must determine: “(1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled 

the rule’s requirements; and (2) whether an independent review of the record presents any 

nonfrivolous issues.” United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing 

United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 2000)). An issue is frivolous if it 

“lacks any basis in law or fact.” McCoy v. Ct. of Appeals of Wisc., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 

1 Fadiga did not file his own pro se brief despite having the option to do so.

2 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We 

exercise plenary review to determine whether there are any nonfrivolous issues for 

appeal, Simon v. Gov’t of the V.I., 679 F.3d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Penson v. 

Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80-83 & n.6 (1988)), but once the issues are identified, we apply the 

standard of review applicable to the particular issue before us, see United States v. Schuh, 

289 F.3d 968, 974-76 (7th Cir. 2002) (applying, in an Anders case, different standards to 

different possible claims).
4

429, 438 n.10 (1988).

To determine whether counsel has fulfilled his obligations, we examine the Anders

brief to see if it: (1) shows that counsel has thoroughly examined the record in search of 

appealable issues, identifying those that arguably support the appeal even if “wholly 

frivolous,” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000); and (2) explains why those 

issues are frivolous, Marvin, 211 F.3d at 780-81. If counsel satisfies these requirements, 

“then we may limit our review of the record to the issues counsel raised.” United States 

v. Langley, 52 F.4th 564, 569 (3d Cir. 2022). 

B

Counsel’s Anders brief satisfies both elements, and an independent review of the 

record reveals no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. First, the brief thoroughly examines the 

record and identifies three issues that relate to the procedural and substantive 

reasonableness of Fadiga’s sentence: (1) the District Court’s determination that Fadiga’s

Delaware second-degree robbery conviction is a “crime of violence”; (2) the Court’s 

calculation of Fadiga’s criminal history category; and (3) the reasonableness of Fadiga’s 

sentence.

3

 Second, the brief explains why any arguments concerning these issues would 

3 Because Fadiga pleaded guilty, his appellate issues were limited to the District 

Court’s jurisdiction, the voluntariness of his plea, and the reasonableness of his sentence. 

United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989). Counsel appropriately did not raise 

arguments regarding the Court’s jurisdiction or the voluntariness of Fadiga’s plea 

because such arguments would be plainly frivolous. The District Court had jurisdiction 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Moreover, a review of the plea colloquy shows that 

Fadiga’s guilty plea was voluntary, knowing, and complied with the Constitution and 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. 
5

be frivolous under governing law. Therefore, counsel’s brief is sufficient, and there are 

no nonfrivolous issues warranting relief.

Fadiga’s sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable.4 The District 

Court followed United States v. Gunter’s three-step procedure, which requires that a 

district court (1) calculate the applicable Guidelines range, (2) consider departure 

motions, and (3) meaningfully consider all relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. 462 

F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). 

First, the District Court identified the applicable Guidelines provision and 

calculated the Guidelines range. Under Stanford, the Court correctly held that Fadiga’s 

prior Delaware second-degree robbery offense was a crime of violence under the 

Guidelines’ elements clause. Stanford, 75 F.4th at 319. The Court also correctly 

calculated Fadiga’s criminal history.5 Accordingly, there are no nonfrivolous arguments 

concerning the Court’s Guidelines calculation. 

Second, there were no departure motions. 

Third, the Court addressed the § 3553(a) factors. It considered: (a) the seriousness 

of Fadiga’s offense; (b) Fadiga’s background, including his prior convictions and

mitigating factors, such as traumatic events Fadiga endured and his attempts at securing 

4 We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse 

of discretion. United States v. Pawlowski, 27 F.4th 897, 911 (3d Cir. 2022). 

5 The criminal history category of V captured: (1) the three criminal history points 

Fadiga received for three separate Delaware and Maryland convictions, (2) the six

criminal history category points for three separate Delaware convictions, and (3) the two 

criminal history category points for committing the instant offense while on probation. 

See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1. 
6

education and employment; and (c) the need for deterrence and punishment.

6

 It thus gave 

“rational and meaningful consideration” to the § 3553(a) factors, United States v. Tomko, 

562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 

571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc)), complied with Gunter, and imposed a procedurally 

reasonable sentence. 

Fadiga’s sentence was also substantively reasonable. A sentence is substantively 

reasonable unless “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same 

sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” Id. 

The District Court sentenced Fadiga to a below-Guidelines, thirty-six-month sentence. 

We cannot conclude that no judge would have imposed this sentence given Fadiga’s 

offense, criminal history, commission of this offense while on probation, conduct after 

being charged, and employment. Thus, any challenge to the substantive reasonableness 

of Fadiga’s sentence would lack merit.

C

Although we need only “confine our scrutiny to those portions of the record 

identified by an adequate Anders brief,” Youla, 241 F.3d at 301, our independent review 

of the record revealed one issue not raised by defense counsel: whether § 922(g)(1), as 

applied to Fadiga, is consistent with the Second Amendment following New York State 

Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and Range v. Attorney General United 

6 As to the need for deterrence and protecting the public, the District Court noted 

that Fadiga has already served prison terms, but those previous sentences did not “really 

seem to have brought home the message to [Fadiga] that [he] can’t have anything to do 

with firearms.” App. 119-20.
7

States, 69 F.4th 96 (3d Cir. 2023) (en banc), petition for cert. filed (Oct. 5, 2023). The 

Supreme Court issued Bruen one month before Fadiga entered his guilty plea, and we 

issued Range while this appeal was stayed.7

Neither Bruen nor Range show that the District Court plainly erred by failing to 

sua sponte find § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied to Fadiga. Neither decision called 

into question § 922(g)(1)’s facial constitutionality or addressed the constitutionality of § 

922(g)(1) in the criminal prosecution context. Moreover, Bruen did not “cast doubt on 

longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 81 

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see also id. at 72 (Alito, J., concurring) (similar). Finally, 

Range and Fadiga are different. Range had (1) a single, decades-old welfare fraud 

conviction; (2) received no prison time; and (3) showed that he wished to possess 

firearms for self-defense and hunting, Range, 69 F.4th at 98-99, whereas Fadiga is a 

criminal defendant who had (1) numerous criminal convictions, including for robbery, 

theft, and firearms offenses within the five years preceding the instant offense; (2) served 

several stints in prison and committed this offense while on probation; and (3) not sought

civil relief before illegally possessing firearms. Thus, the District Court did not commit

7 Because Fadiga failed to raise this argument before the District Court, we review 

it for plain error. See Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503, 507 (2021). In reviewing for 

plain error, we must decide whether “(1) an error occurred, (2) the error is ‘plain,’ and (3) 

it ‘affect[s] substantial rights.’” United States v. Payano, 930 F.3d 186, 192 (3d Cir. 

2019) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). “An error is ‘plain’

where it is ‘clear’ or ‘obvious.’” United States v. Scott, 14 F.4th 190, 198 (3d Cir. 2021) 

(quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734). If a party can show plain error, we may exercise our 

discretion to correct the error if it “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 736 (quoting United States v. 

Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).
8

any clear or obvious error under current Second Amendment law. United States v. 

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993).

III

For the foregoing reasons, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm.