J-S11027-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MARIA DEDOS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2669 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered August 15, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-23-CR-0002734-2016

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MARCH 21, 2019

Maria Dedos (Appellant) appeals from the order denying her first petition 

filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546. In this appeal, Appellant’s court-appointed counsel, Scott D. Galloway, 

Esquire (Counsel), filed a petition for leave to withdraw as counsel and an 

“Anders brief.”1 Because we conclude that Counsel fulfilled the procedural 

requirements of Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc), and 

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1 Counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 

S.Ct. 1396 (1967), apparently in the mistaken belief that an Anders brief is 

required where counsel seeks to withdraw on appeal from the denial of PCRA 

relief. A Turner/Finley no-merit letter, however, is the appropriate filing. 

See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth 

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). Because an Anders

brief provides greater protection to a defendant, this Court may accept an 

Anders brief in lieu of a Turner/Finley letter. Commonwealth v. 

Fusselman, 866 A.2d 1109, 1111 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2004).
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this appeal is without merit, we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm 

the PCRA court’s order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition. 

The PCRA court summarized the factual and procedural history of this 

case as follows:

On March 22, 2016, Ridley Township police officers were 

dispatched to a Wawa convenience store, where a woman was 

alleged to be harassing patrons and employees while possibly 

under the influence. There they encountered [Appellant] who 

cursed and screamed at them – as well as store employees and 

customers . . . . After she refused to comply with their demands 

that she leave the store, the officers arrested her, but only after 

she actively resisted them. When taken to the police station, she 

refused to comply with their reasonable demands and even kicked 

one officer. She was charged with Aggravated Assault, Simple 

Assault, Harassment, Resisting Arrest, and two counts of 

Disorderly Conduct.

On June 29, 2016, [the trial court] entered an Order granting a 

Petition for Involuntary commitment due to incompetence, not to 

exceed 60 days. On September 27, 2016, [the trial court] ordered 

that [Appellant] be re-examined to determine if she was 

competent to stand trial. On September 30, 2016, Jeffrey M. 

Lazaroff, Ph.D. conducted a psychological competency 

examination and concluded that she was competent.

The Commonwealth extended a plea bargain offer to [Appellant’s] 

court-appointed counsel but, against his recommendation, she 

rejected it and opted instead to go to trial.[2] On December 14, 

2016, [the trial court] conducted a bench trial, at which the 

Commonwealth withdrew the disorderly conduct offenses. After 

hearing evidence and arguments of counsel, [the trial court] found 

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2 Appellant was originally represented by court-appointed counsel, Nusrat 

Rashid, Esquire. However, Appellant later retained Anthony List, Esquire, as 

private counsel, who entered his appearance on November 20, 2016. 
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[Appellant] guilty of the four remaining charges. On February 28, 

201[7], [the trial court] imposed sentences on all four counts.[3]

PCRA Court Opinion, 11/13/18, at 1-2 (unpaginated) (original footnote 

omitted)

On August 14, 2017, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition, in which she 

alleged that trial counsel, Anthony List, Esquire, was ineffective. The PCRA 

court appointed Counsel, who filed two amended petitions on April 10, 2018 

and May 7, 2018 raising additional claims. The Commonwealth filed a

response on May 30, 2018. The PCRA court held a hearing on Appellant’s 

petition on June 27, 2018, at the conclusion of which the court orally denied 

Appellant’s request for relief. On August 15, 2018, the PCRA court issued an 

order formally denying Appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief. This 

timely appeal followed.

On January 8, 2019, Counsel filed a petition to withdraw with this Court, 

attaching his no-merit letter, with notice to Appellant that she had the right 

to proceed pro se or retain private counsel. Appellant filed a pro se response 

to Counsel’s no-merit letter indicating that she wished to continue with her 

appeal pro se; Appellant’s response did not raise any additional issues for our 

review and consideration.

Appellant presents one issue for our review:

I. WAS THE [PCRA] COURT IN ERROR FOR DISMISSING 

APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF 

ALLEGING THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN 

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3 The trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 21 to 42 months of 

incarceration, followed by one year of probation.
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FAILING TO MAKE A TIMELY REQUEST AS TO A VIDEO THAT 

EXISTED FROM A WAWA FOOD MARKET AS WELL AS THE 

RIDLEY TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT?

Anders Brief at 4. 

In reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, our review is limited to 

examining whether the PCRA court’s findings are supported by the record and 

free of legal error. See Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 438 (Pa. 

2011). We view the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record in 

the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Id. “The PCRA court’s 

credibility determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this 

Court; however, we apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s 

legal conclusions.” See Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 617 (Pa. 

2015).

As noted, Counsel has filed in this Court a petition for leave to withdraw 

as counsel and an appellate brief. Before we may review the merits of 

Appellant’s claim, we must determine if Counsel has satisfied the requirements 

to be permitted to withdraw from further representation. Pursuant to 

Turner/Finley, an “[i]ndependent review of the record by competent counsel 

is required before withdrawal [on collateral appeal] is permitted.” 

Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 876 n.1 (Pa. 2009). In Pitts, our 

Supreme Court explained that such independent review requires proof of:

1. A “no merit” letter by PC[R]A counsel detailing the nature and extent 

of his review;

2. The “no merit” letter by PC[R]A counsel listing each issue the 

petitioner wished to have reviewed;
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3. The PC[R]A counsel’s “explanation”, in the “no merit” letter, of why 

the petitioner’s issues were meritless;

4. The PC[R]A court conducting its own independent review of the 

record; and 

5. The PC[R]A court agreeing with counsel that the petition was 

meritless.

Id. (citation and brackets omitted). Further, PCRA counsel seeking to 

withdraw in this Court must contemporaneously forward to the petitioner a 

copy of the petition to withdraw that includes (i) a copy of both the no-merit 

letter, and (ii) a statement advising the PCRA petitioner that, upon the filing 

of counsel’s petition to withdraw, the petitioner has the immediate right to 

proceed pro se, or with the assistance of privately retained counsel. 

Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 141 A.3d 509, 511-12 (Pa. Super. 2016).

[W]here counsel submits a petition and no-merit letter that do 

satisfy the technical demands of Turner/Finley, . . . this Court[ 

] must then conduct its own review of the merits of the case. If 

the [C]ourt agrees with counsel that the claims are without merit, 

the [C]ourt will permit counsel to withdraw and deny relief. By 

contrast, if the claims appear to have merit, the [C]ourt will deny 

counsel’s request and grant relief, or at least instruct counsel to 

file an advocate’s brief.

Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation 

omitted).

Upon review of Counsel’s petition for leave to withdraw and the appellate 

brief submitted on Appellant’s behalf, we conclude that Counsel has 

substantially complied with the procedural requirements of Turner and 

Finley, as restated in Pitts. Counsel identified the claim asserted by 
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Appellant, reviewed the merits of that claim and explained why the claim lacks 

merit. Finally, Counsel also represented to this Court that he has provided 

Appellant with notice of his intention to seek permission to withdraw from 

representation, a copy of the appellate brief, and advised Appellant she may 

proceed with privately retained counsel or pro se. See Application to 

Withdraw Appearance, 1/8/19. Thus, we conclude that Counsel has complied 

with the requirements necessary to withdraw as counsel. We now turn to an 

independent review of Appellant’s PCRA petition to ascertain whether her 

claim entitles her to relief.

Appellant’s issue, as raised by Counsel in his no-merit brief, asserts that 

the PCRA court erred in denying Appellant’s PCRA petition because trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to make timely requests and obtain video 

footage of the incidents at the Wawa convenience store and at the Ridley 

Township Police Department.

In deciding ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we begin with the 

presumption that counsel rendered effective assistance. Commonwealth v. 

Bomar, 104 A.3d 1179, 1188 (Pa. 2014). To overcome that presumption, 

the petitioner must establish: “(1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; 

(2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s action or failure to act; and (3) 

the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, with prejudice 

measured by whether there is a reasonable probability that the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citation omitted). 
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Regarding whether counsel had a reasonable basis for his or her action 

or inaction, “we do not question whether there were other more logical courses 

of action which counsel could have pursued; rather, we must examine whether 

counsel’s decisions had any reasonable basis.” Commonwealth v. 

Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 594 (Pa. 2007). We will conclude that counsel’s 

chosen strategy lacked a reasonable basis only if Appellant proves that “an 

alternative not chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater 

than the course actually pursued.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 899 A.2d 

1060, 1064 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted). To demonstrate prejudice in an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “the petitioner must show that there 

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Commonwealth v. 

King, 57 A.3d 607, 613 (Pa. 2012). If the petitioner fails to prove any of the

three prongs, the claim is subject to dismissal. Bomar, 104 A.3d at 1188.

Appellant alleges trial counsel ineffectiveness for failing to request and 

obtain video footage of the incidents that gave rise to the criminal charges 

filed against her. See Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief, 5/7/18, at 

¶ 4-6. Appellant surmises that “[Attorney] List knew that there was video 

taken by cameras, both within the Wawa as well as the Ridley Township Police 

Department but did not take any steps to procure said videos and examine 

same.” Id. at ¶ 6. 

Appellant’s argument lacks arguable merit. As the PCRA court 

recognized, “[Appellant’s] argument fails because she has not located any 
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video footage. She cannot, therefore, be heard to say that it would have been 

of assistance to her case at trial.” PCRA Court Opinion, 11/13/18, at 6 

(unpaginated). Counsel testified at the PCRA court hearing that he attempted 

to obtain videos of the incidents, but learned that no videos existed. See 

N.T., 6/27/18, at 11, 30. Appellant likewise testified during the PCRA hearing 

that she was aware Counsel attempted to obtain the videos, but was told no 

videos existed. Id. at 38-39. Because video footage of the incidents do not 

exist, Counsel cannot be found to be ineffective for failing to obtain them. 

Further, even if the video footage did exist, Counsel had a reasonable 

basis for not obtaining it. The incident giving rise to Appellant’s convictions

occurred on March 22, 2016. In response to the request for video surveillance 

footage, Wawa indicated that its store surveillance automatically recycles 

every 52 days. See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Amended 

POST-Conviction Relief-Act Petition, 5/30/18, at Ex. 3. Similarly, the Ridley 

Township Police Department explained that video footage taken at the station 

is erased every 30 days. Id. at Ex. 2. Appellant retained Counsel on 

November 20, 2016, several months after the 30-day and 52-day periods

when video surveillance is erased at the Ridley Township Police Department 

and Wawa, respectively. 

For these reasons, the PCRA court properly denied Appellant’s PCRA 

petition.

Petition to withdraw granted. Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/21/19