alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 102-80.40 What are Federal agencies' responsibilities concerning the management of underground storage tanks? Federal agencies have the following responsibilities concerning the management of underground storage tanks in real property: ( a ) Register, manage and close underground storage tanks, including heating oil and fuel oil tanks, in accordance with GSA, EPA, and applicable State and local requirements.
( b ) Require the party responsible for tanks they use but do not own to follow these requirements and to be responsible for the cost of compliance.
(6217) 

Volume 3 of 3, Part E 

A. DEMONSTRATIVE EXHIBITS UTILIZED 

DURING THE COMMITTEE’S EVIDENTIARY 

HEARINGS (IN NUMERICAL ORDER) 
6218 
6219 
6220 
6221 
6222 
6223 
6224 
6225 
6226 
6227 
6228 
6229 
6230 
6231 
6232 
6233 
6234 
6235 
6236 
6237 
6238 
6239 
6240 
6241 
6242 
6243 
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6245
#### § 10.410 Prioritization.

A Participating CMS Provider is required to transmit National Alerts upon receipt. National Alerts preempt all other Alert Messages. A Participating CMS Provider is required to transmit Imminent Threat Alerts, AMBER Alerts and Public Safety Messages on a first in-first out (FIFO) basis.

[86 FR 46790, Aug. 20, 2021]
No. 10-11115.

#### Gutierrez-Jacquez *v.*United States.

C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
#### ON-LINE TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PERKIN-ELMER CORP., Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer GMBH, Perkin-Elmer Inc., Sick UPA GMBH, and Sick, A.G., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 03-1425.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal CircAit.

March 4, 2004.

Before MAYER, Chief Judge, CLEVENGER and GAJARSA, Circuit Judges.

*ORDER*

In the absence of a final judgment or certification, the case is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
#### § 60-3.12 Retesting of applicants.

Users should provide a reasonable opportunity for retesting and reconsideration. Where examinations are administered periodically with public notice, such reasonable opportunity exists, unless persons who have previously been tested are precluded from retesting. The user may however take reasonable steps to preserve the security of its procedures.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Bancshares of Florida, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
Report), I, Tracy L. Keegan, Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as added by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:



| | 3. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 4. | To my knowledge, the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for
the period covered by the Report.
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                  |  |     |  |                            
|----------------- |  | --- |  | ---------------------------
|Date: May 3, 2006 |  | By: |  | /s/ Tracy L. Keegan        
|                  |  |     |  | Tracy L. Keegan,           
|                  |  |     |  | Principal Financial Officer
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 128 (Monday, July 3, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 41063]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-16695]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Project No. 2496]


Eugene Water and Electric Board, Leaburg Walterville Project, 
Oregon; Notice

June 27, 2000.
    The following Commission staff are assigned to help facilitate 
resolution of environmental issues and related issues for any filings 
that may be submitted to the Commission for the Leaburg Walterville 
Project.

Office of General Council

Ellen Korthaus-Vos (202) 501-6794
Merrill Hathaway (202) 208-0825

Office of Energy Projects

Jim Hastreiter (503) 944-6760

    The staff listed above are separated from the advisory staff in 
these proceedings and will not participate as advisory staff in these 
proceedings.

David P. Boergers,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 00-16695 Filed 6-30-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
#### § 301-70.507 May we authorize per diem if an employee discontinues a TDY assignment because of a personal emergency situation?

Yes. Expenses of appropriate transportation and per diem while en route may be allowed, with the approval of an appropriate agency official, for return travel from the point of interruption to the official station.

[FTR Amdt. 70, 63 FR 15971, Apr. 1, 1998. Redesignated by FTR Amdt. 108, 67 FR 57967, Sept. 13, 2002]
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**Exhibit99.1**

 

 

**Certification of Chief Executive Officer and Chief FinancialOfficer****pursuantto 18 U.S.C. § 1350 adopted pursuant to****Section906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

In connection with the AnnualReport of Reef Global Energy I, L.P. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for theperiod ended December 31, 2002 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), we, Michael J. Mauceli, Chief Executive Officer, and DanielC. Sibley, Chief Financial Offficer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, that:

 

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and result of operations of theCompany.

 
| /s/ Michael J. Mauceli  |   |                    | /s/ Daniel C. Sibley |   |
|-------------------------|--------|-------------------------|----------------------|--------|
|                    |   |                    |
| Michael J. Mauceli      |   | Daniel C. Sibley        |
| Chief Executive Officer |   | Chief Financial Officer |
| April  15, 2003         |   | April  15, 2003         |

 

 

 

 

Note:      A signed original of this writtenstatement required by Section 906 has been provided to Reef Global Energy I,L.P. and will be retained by Reef Global Energy I, L.P. and furnished to theSecurities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

----
696 P.2d 918

#### Thomas W. MAKIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David H. LIDDLE, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 15630.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Feb. 11, 1985.

Petition for Review Denied April 30,1985.

*68Thomas W. Makin, plaintiff-appellant, pro se.

William A. Stellmon, Rapaich, Knutson & Stellmon, Lewiston, for defendant-respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Thomas Makin has twice sued his former attorney, David Liddle, for alleged malpractice in connection with a civil action Makin brought against one Emily Zinn. In both malpractice suits the district court entered summary judgment against Makin’s claim. The Supreme Court affirmed the first judgment. *See Makin v.*Liddle, 102 Idaho 705, 639 P.2d 3 (1981) (herein *Liddle I).*We now affirm the second.

The instant suit against Liddle, like the first one, was brought because Makin was dissatisfied with the way Liddle had represented him during proceedings in the Zinn case. The first suit alleged that Liddle negligently failed to call Zinn as an adverse witness while presenting the plaintiff’s evidence. Here, Makin argues in his brief that he has brought a “totally unrelated individual claim founded in legal malpractice.” Makin asserts that

> [ajfter resting the Plaintiff’s case, Liddle failed to address issues raised by Zinn’s attorney during the point in the trial involving the courts [sic] determination of Zinn’s Motion for Summery [sic] Judgement [sic]; thereby causing the threat of an adverse ruling against the Plaintiff by the court.

The district court granted Liddle’s motion for summary judgment in this case because the judgment in the first malpractice action barred another suit under the doctrine of res judicata. We believe the district court acted correctly. Where a summary judgment adjudicates a claim on its merits, the judgment invokes the doctrine of res judicata. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19, comment g (1980). The summary judgment in *Liddle I*was such an adjudication. Although the present action purports to focus upon a different aspect of the attorney’s conduct in the Zinn case, the underlying claim of malpractice is the same as that asserted in *Liddle I.*The present action, therefore, is barred by res judicata in the form of claim preclusion. *See Aldape v. Akins,*105 Idaho 254, 668 P.2d 130 (Ct. App.1983).

Liddle has requested an award of attorney fees, contending that this appeal was frivolous and without merit. In light of *Aldape,*which was decided before the appeal was taken, we hold that Makin has presented no genuine issue of law nor any error in the application of law to the undisputed facts germane to the appeal. Accordingly, we award attorney fees pursu*69ant to I.C. § 12-121. *See Christensen v. Idaho Land Developers, Inc.,*104 Idaho 458, 660 P.2d 70 (Ct.App.1983).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Costs and attorney fees on appeal, as determined under I.A.R. 41, to respondent, Liddle.
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**EXHIBIT      32**

**SECTION      1350 CERTIFICATIONS**

| 1.   | The              Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)              of              the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934;              and |
|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2.   | The              information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material              respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the              Company              as of and for the period covered by the              Report. |
|----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | Date:                May 14, 2007 |   | /s/                DOULGAS J. ANDREA                                                                                                        |
|--------|-----------------------------------|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |                              |   | **Douglas                J. Andrea**Chairman                of the Board, President, Chief Executive Officer and Corporate Secretary        |
|   |                              |   |                                                                                                                                        |
|   |                              |   | /s/                CORISA L. GUIFFRE                                                                                                        |
|   |                              |   | **Corisa                L. Guiffre**Vice                President, Chief Financial Officer and Assistant Corporate                Secretary |

----
§ 51-5.1 General. ( a ) Contracting activities are encouraged to assist the Committee and the central nonprofit agencies in identifying suitable commodities and services to be furnished by nonprofit agencies employing persons who are blind or have other severe disabilities so that the Committee can attain its objective of increasing employment and training opportunities for individuals who are blind or have other severe disabilities. For items which appear to be suitable to be furnished by nonprofit agencies, the contracting activity should refer the candidate commodities and services to the Committee or a central nonprofit agency. If a contracting activity decides to procure one or more commodities which are similar to a commodity or commodities on the Procurement List, the contracting activity should refer the commodities it intends to procure to the Committee or a central nonprofit agency.
( b ) Contracting activities shall provide the Committee and designated central nonprofit agencies with information needed to enable the Committee to determine whether a commodity or service is suitable to be furnished by a nonprofit agency. For commodities, information such as the latest solicitation and amendments, bid abstracts, procurement history, estimated annual usage quantities, and anticipated date of next solicitation issuance and opening may be needed. For services, similar information including the statement of work and applicable wage determination may be required. In order to assist in evaluating the suitability of an Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-76 conversion, contracting activities should provide a copy of the draft statement of work and applicable wage determination to the central nonprofit agency upon its request.
Argued and submitted March 13,

reversed and remanded July 19,

petition for review allowed September 26, 1995 (322 Or 167)

#### PAUL EDWARD KIBBLE, *Respondent, v.*G. H. BALDWIN, Superintendent, Eastern Oregon Correctional Institution, *Appellant.*

(CV 92-960; CA A82560)

899 P2d 731

Jonathan H. Fussner, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Theodore R. Rulongoski, Attorney General, and Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General.

Theresa M. Kohlhoff filed the brief for respondent. Before Riggs, Presiding Judge, and Landau and Leeson, Judges.

PER CURIAM

*541PER CURIAM

The state seeks reversal of an order granting post-conviction relief. It argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that petitioner received inadequate assistance of counsel. We reverse.

The post-conviction court based its decision on the fact that trial counsel did not pursue an extreme emotional disturbance (EED) defense to the charge of attempted murder. The court relied on *State v.*Carson, 292 Or 451, 640 P2d 586 (1982), which held that EED may be a defense to a charge of attempted murder. However, the statutory underpinnings of *Carson*have changed. The defendant in *Carson*was tried in 1979. In 1981, the legislature amended ORS 163.135; it now provides that EED is an affirmative defense to a charge of intentional murder and “does not constitute a defense to the prosecution for * * * any other crime.” The Supreme Court has since held that “EED is a defense to the crime of intentional murder, and to no other crime.” *State v. Wille,*317 Or 487, 492, 858 P2d 128 (1993). Defendant here pleaded guilty to the charge of attempted murder in 1991, well after the amendment took place. Accordingly, the trial court erred in holding that petitioner’s trial counsel was inadequate.1

Petitioner’s other contentions are without merit.

Reversed and remanded.

1

 We do not mean to imply that, had EED been available as a defense, petitioner necessarily would have received inadquate assistance of counsel if the defense was not pursued.
D ORIGINAL 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

DA 21-0657 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

v. 

DANIEL E. NEWBY, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

FILED 

MAR 0 3 2022 

Bowen Greenwood 

Clerk of Supreme Court 

O R llyEgRof IVInntana 

Appellant Daniel E. Newby has filed a second motion for a 60-day extension of time 

within which to file his opening brief. 

Upon consideration of Appellant's motion for extension of time, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant's motion for extension is GRANTED. 

Appellant has until May 0\ 9 2022, within which to file his opening brief. 

DATED this 3 day of March, 2022. 

For the Court, 

Chief Justice 

03/03/2022

Case Number: DA 21-0657