U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

75–441 PDF 2012

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BLUE RIBBON 

COMMISSION ON AMERICA’S NUCLEAR FUTURE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND THE 

ECONOMY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 1, 2012 

Serial No. 112–109 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

energycommerce.house.gov 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

Chairman 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

Chairman Emeritus 

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MARY BONO MACK, California 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan 

SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina 

Vice Chairman 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California 

CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey 

BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

DAVID B. MCKINLEY, West Virginia 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

MIKE POMPEO, Kansas 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

Ranking Member 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

Chairman Emeritus 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

JAY INSLEE, Washington 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

JIM MATHESON, Utah 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

JOHN BARROW, Georgia 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin Islands 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

Chairman 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

Vice Chairman 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MARY BONO MACK, California 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma 

CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

FRED UPTON, Michigan (ex officio) 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

Ranking Member 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

JOHN BARROW, Georgia 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California (ex officio) 

(II) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hon. John Shimkus, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 1 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 4 

Hon. Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 6 

Hon. Joe Barton, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 7 

Hon. Henry A. Waxman, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

California, opening statement ............................................................................. 8 

WITNESSES

Lee Hamilton, Co-Chair, Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future ........................................................................................................................ 10

Brent Scowcroft, Co-Chair, Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear 

Future ................................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared statement of Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Scowcroft .............................. 16 

Lake H. Barrett, President, L. Barrett Consulting ............................................... 65 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 68 

D. Warner North, President and Principal Scientist, NorthWorks, Inc. ............. 73 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 75 

Martin G. Malsch, Partner, Egan, Fitzpatrick, Malsch & Lawrence, PLLC ...... 99 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 101 

Edwin Lyman, Senior Scientist, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned 

Scientists ............................................................................................................... 113 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 115 

Thomas A. Schatz, President, Citizens Against Government Waste .................. 126 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 128 

David A. Wright, President, National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners ............................................................................................................. 136 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 138 

(1) 

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BLUE RIBBON 

COMMISSION ON AMERICA’S NUCLEAR FUTURE 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY, 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:37 a.m., in room 

2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Shimkus (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Shimkus, Whitfield, Bass, 

Latta, McMorris Rodgers, Harper, Cassidy, Gardner, Barton, 

Green, Butterfield, Barrow, Matsui, Capps, and Waxman (ex officio). 

Also present: Representatives Kinzinger and Inslee. 

Staff present: Charlotte Baker, Press Secretary; Dave McCarthy, 

Chief Counsel, Environment and the Economy; Andrew Powaleny, 

Assistant Press Secretary; Tina Richards, Counsel, Environment 

and the Economy; Chris Sarley, Policy Coordinator, Environment 

and the Economy; Brett Scott, Staff Assistant; Peter Spencer, Professional Staff Member, Oversight; Lyn Walker, Coordinator, Administrator/Human Resources; Alex Yergin, Legislative Clerk; Jeff 

Baran, Minority Senior Counsel; Alison Cassady, Minority Senior 

Professional Staff Member; and Caitlin Haberman, Minority Policy 

Analyst. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. We are going to call the hearing to order and welcome our first panel. And I will begin with my 5-minute opening 

statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SHIMKUS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 

Good morning, and welcome to our first Environment and the 

Economy Subcommittee hearing of 2012. Today I am pleased to 

kick off the subcommittee’s agenda on a topic many of you know 

I am very engaged with and passionate about: the disposal of highlevel nuclear waste. As a result of our successful defense programs, 

and as contractual obligations to taxpayers and consumers who 

have invested billions of dollars and counting, we, as a Federal 

Government, have responsibilities to permanently dispose of nuclear waste. This debate has lead us here today to discuss a report 

from the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future 

2 

and how its recommendations might aid in moving the existing law 

forward while staying ahead of the curve into the future. 

As I read the report over the last few days and—I actually did 

read the report—I agree with many of the Commission’s recommendations. I too think a new organization tasked with nuclear 

waste management is needed. I agree access to the funds nuclear 

utility ratepayers and taxpayers have invested should not be 

squandered by political brinksmanship. And as I have been talking 

about each week on the House floor, I agree that Yucca Mountain 

as designated by law remains fixed on the table as a solution to 

the nuclear waste debate. 

In the wake of the administration’s interference with the independent technical evaluation of the repository of Yucca Mountain, 

the resulting Blue Ribbon Commission found what many of us have 

long have been saying about the failed management of nuclear 

waste. The Commission’s report correctly advises control of the nuclear waste fund be removed from the purse string of political 

ideologues and entrusted to a new organization dedicated solely to 

implementing the waste management program set forth under law. 

It is clear the dysfunction within and between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy has rendered the 

current waste management structure ineffective. We simply cannot 

burden our children with 65,000 and growing metric tons of nuclear waste simply because of a bureaucratic failure to carry out 

the law of the land. 

Yucca Mountain remains the most shovel-ready, thoroughly-studied geological repository for spent nuclear fuel, there are possibly 

no other 230 square miles in the world that have been examined 

and reexamined more by America’s greatest scientific minds than 

Yucca Mountain. 

Three decades of study, $15 billion and quite frankly, common 

sense support the current requirement to secure high-level nuclear 

waste on Federal property, under a mountain in a desert. While 

the extensive research and millions of man-hours by expert scientists and engineers have proven we can safely and securely store 

nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain, this debate is also about jobs. 

The Department of Energy estimates continuing construction at 

Yucca Mountain would employ 2,600 workers, with about 1,100 of 

them being additional jobs and new jobs. Additionally, DOE estimates an almost equal number indirect jobs bringing the total to 

7,000 jobs in Nevada, a State currently suffering from 13 percent 

unemployment. In addition to job creation, this would help stimulate the struggling Nevada economy. 

In 2000, research done by the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 

concluded the Yucca Mountain project contributed nearly 200 million to the Nevada economy that year and similar amounts in 2001. 

The reality is Yucca Mountain not only fulfills our commitment to 

the American taxpayers to secure high-level nuclear waste as required by law, but makes a commitment to the people in Nevada 

to turn around a struggling economy and expanding infrastructure 

and creating jobs. 

I would like to welcome the co-chairs of the Blue Ribbon Commission, a former colleague of ours, Congressman Lee Hamilton, it 

is great to see you and welcome back. And Lieutenant General 

3 

Scowcroft. I would say beat Navy, and also Air Force, but you 

might have twisted loyalties there. I look forward to their thoughts 

on implementing some of the recommendations and how they fit 

into current law. 

I also want to thank our second panel of witnesses for being here 

today to give us their outside perspective on the report, as those 

who have been a part of the process for many years, their input 

will be invaluable as we consider how to utilize the Commission’s 

recommendations. With that, I finish my opening statement and I 

would like to recognize the ranking member, Congressman Green 

from Texas, for 5 minutes. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shimkus follows:] 

4 


75441.001
5 


75441.002
6 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GENE GREEN, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing 

entitled ‘‘Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission on 

America’s Nuclear Future.’’ Many of us on this subcommittee have 

been anxiously awaiting the completion of the Blue Ribbon Commission’s report since they were tasked with the responsibility a 

couple of years ago. As a long-term supporter of nuclear energy, because this is a cleaner energy alternative, I had the opportunity to 

visit countries like France and Sweden to learn about their nuclear 

energy programs. I accompanied our committee colleague, Representative Murphy on a CODEL to France and Sweden last year 

and were able to see how French and Swedish reprocess and store 

their nuclear waste. 

The issue of long-term and interim nuclear waste storage and 

disposal is a very important topic in this country and there is no 

doubt we are well behind our foreign counterparts when it comes 

to disposing of nuclear waste. 

This subcommittee’s examining the issue of nuclear waste storage in past hearings. These hearings have primarily been focused 

on Yucca Mountain and the actions of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and we have yet to examine other issues or alternatives 

for permanent nuclear storage and disposal. 

I had the opportunity to visit Yucca Mountain last year also with 

Chairman Shimkus, and I have supported the use of Yucca Mountain in the past and still believe it is a terrible waste of taxpayer 

dollars to have this $12 billion facility sitting unused in the desert. 

While I am supportive of using Yucca Mountain as a permanent 

nuclear waste disposal facility, it is clear that certain political realities must be accepted in the here and now, and we have been 

fighting a battle to use Yucca since it was first proposed in 1987 

and have not been able to come to a resolution. The issue of Yucca 

Mountain may not be resolved in the near future, but perhaps 

there will come a time we can move past the political logjam, and 

if we do, we can revisit utilizing Yucca Mountain in the future. Regardless one fact is certain, the U.S. Has a very real and serious 

impending issue at hand with regard to the storage and disposal 

of nuclear waste, and it must be dealt with sooner rather than 

later. 

Currently spent fuel and reprocessed waste is stored at nuclear 

plants in 30 sites scattered across the U.S., local communities are 

spending millions of dollars to ensure the safety and protection of 

our nuclear waste. Even with these current sites, we are still producing nuclear waste and that waste will need to be stored for at 

least 1,000 years. If we begin reprocessing our nuclear waste, it 

still will not solve or eliminate our problem. I strongly support research and developing of reprocessing because it could, in the future, reduce the amount of the waste and it is not the ultimate solution, but it is not the ultimate solution of our nuclear storage 

problem. 

I would like to note that reprocessing spent fuel could be a job 

creator in this country. Research and development jobs are needed 

in the U.S. and we should be doing more in the reprocessing arena 

to foster job development as well as reducing our nuclear footprint. 

7 

That is why I look forward to the testimony of Blue Ribbon Commission. I think it is important we learn how we can begin the 

process of finding one or more interim and alternative storage and 

disposal sites to Yucca Mountain. I am also interested in hearing 

the opinions of the Commission on creating a new organization 

dedicated to nuclear waste management, reprocessing investments 

in U.S. research and development for the workforce development, 

and legislative proposal to help access funds from the nuclear ratepayers for nuclear waste management. 

I want to commend the Blue Ribbon Commission for completing 

a report on time and producing a consensus document. In this Congress, it is impressive that all 15 members of the Commission 

signed the report. Additionally, I know they reviewed more than 

1,000 comments and submitted the draft report and included several changes that are reflected in the final report. I also want to 

thank the witnesses for appearing today, and I look forward to 

your testimony. Thank you. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. The chairman 

now recognizes the chairman emeritus, Congressman Barton, for 5 

minutes. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE BARTON, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t think I will take 

that time. It is good to see—I still call him Congressman Hamilton, 

but Dr. Hamilton and General Scowcroft, I have been around here 

long enough to remember when both of you were—when the Congressman was actually chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the House, and General Scowcroft was National Security 

Advisor to the first President Bush, so it is good to have you two 

gentleman still serving the public. 

On the Energy and Commerce Committee, I think we have 59 

members, only three of them served when the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1982 was passed, Mr. Waxman, Mr. Dingell, and I believe Mr. Markey. Mr. Hall, who is on leave from the committee on 

the Republican side, is the only Republican who was here then. I 

didn’t get here until 1985. 

My first job as a White House fellow for President Reagan at the 

Department of Energy in 1981 was to brief the then Secretary of 

Energy, James B. Edwards, on the proposed Nuclear Waste Policy 

Act. They asked me to brief him because they thought if an Aggie 

could understand it and explain it, then anybody could. And so the 

technical experts spent a day explaining to me what they were trying to do, and then I had 15 minutes to explain that to the Secretary of Energy. 

So I have been involved with this for a few years and it is a 

shame that we are still where we were basically then, and that is 

that we don’t have a solution. And it is really not fair to you two 

gentleman or the other commissioners to expect you to pull nuclear 

waste depository rabbit out of a hat when we haven’t been able to 

do it in the Congress for the last 30 years. We are not here to name 

names, but if I had to name somebody who really put the fly in the 

ointment, I would say former Senator Bennett Johnson of Louisiana and Senator Trent Lott of Mississippi. They made a deal in 

8 

the Senate to put it in Nevada over the objections of the Nevada 

delegation and the Nevada delegation pledged eternal opposition, 

and they meant it and that is kind of why we are here today. 

Gentleman, in your final report the Secretary of Energy you do 

speak of the importance of Federal relations and public confidence. 

You discuss how a continued delay to store the 65,000 metric tons 

of inventory, which as Congressman Green pointed out, is growing 

is damaging America’s standing in the world as a source of nuclear 

expertise, as a leader of global issues on nuclear safety, non proliferation and security. We have spent in the neighborhood of $15 

billion building Yucca Mountain and don’t have a whole lot to show 

for it. I think that is inexcusable. 

Dr. Peter Swift, who is the chief scientist for Yucca’s lead laboratories, Sandia National Laboratory, has discussed how the technical basis for the Yucca Mountain repository has been developed 

by hundreds of scientists and multiple technical experts. He said, 

‘‘One of the main conclusions of these analysis is that the estimated releases of radiation doses to hypothetical future humans 

are well below the EPA and NRC standards.’’ He goes on to say, 

there is sufficient technical basis for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to issue a license authorizing construction of the facility. 

To kind of put that in layman’s terms, he is basically saying we can 

continue to have debates about how many nuclear angels are dancing on the head of the pin, but there is basis to think that the current design is sufficient and safe and we should move forward. 

I do think that your report is going to help us in the political 

arena make a decision on what to do. I also believe that it is probably time to reform the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 incorporating some of the recommendations that you gentlemen and 

your other commissioners have made in the report. We do need to 

develop secondary geological disposal facilities. It is important to 

provide real access to the funds for the sole purpose of waste management. 

And last but not least, I think we do need to work to find opportunities to address recycling and new technologies by instituting 

legislation to make that possible. 

Again, gentlemen, thank you for your time and effort. I hope that 

your work will actually be used in a legislative fashion in the near 

future to reform the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and let’s finally get 

going. With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair 

now recognizes the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. 

Waxman, for 5 minutes. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In 1982, Congress 

passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the Act sought to establish 

a fair and science-based process for selecting two nuclear fuel and 

high-level radioactive waste. Under this approach, no one State or 

locality would bear the entire burden of the Nation’s nuclear waste. 

In the years that followed, the Department of Energy began evaluating a number of potential repository sites. Then in 1987, ConVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:12 Aug 20, 2012 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\112-00~1\112-10~2\112-10~1 WAYNE
9 

gress made the decision to designate Yucca Mountain in Nevada as 

the sole site to be considered for a permanent geologic repository. 

There was no plan B. As the Blue Ribbon Commission explained, 

this decision was widely viewed as political and provoked strong 

opposition in Nevada where the legislation was poorly received. 

Ever since Congress decided to short-circuit the site selection 

process it established 5 years earlier, the State of Nevada, the majority of its citizens, have opposed the Yucca Mountain project. In 

2002, President Bush recommended the Yucca Mountain site to 

Congress. Using the State veto procedures set forth in the Nuclear 

Waste Policy Act, Nevada then filed an official notice of disapproval 

of the site. Congress proceeded to override Nevada’s veto by enacting a resolution that was marked up in this Energy and Commerce 

Committee. 

Twenty-five years after the 1987 amendments to the Nuclear 

Waste Policy Act, it is clear that this top-down, Federally-mandated approach has not worked. 

The Department of Energy has terminated its Yucca Mountain 

activities. Last year, and again this year, Congress has provided no 

funding for Yucca Mountain, even the biggest advocates for Yucca 

Mountain in the Republican House have not acted to provide any 

funding. In light of the poor track record of the current top-down 

approach, President Obama directed Secretary Chu to charter a 

Blue Ribbon Commission to perform a comprehensive review of 

U.S. policies for managing nuclear waste and to recommend a new 

strategy. The Blue Ribbon Commission spent nearly 2 years conducting this review and its recommendations are timely. 

The Commission recommendations deserve our serious consideration. They raise a number of important policy questions, such as 

whether a new organization should be established to address the 

nuclear waste problem, how the nuclear waste funds should be 

used, and whether one or more centralized storage facilities should 

be developed in addition to one or more geologic repositories. 

Answering these questions requires an open mind and a willingness to move past the narrow obsession with Yucca Mountain. It 

is time to move forward and today’s hearing is a good first step. 

I thank our witnesses for being here today to share their views and 

I thank them for their contribution and their work on this Commission, which I hope will be helpful to us. Thank you. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. 

Mr. WAXMAN. I yield back my time. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Then what I would like to do, asking unanimous 

consent, is I will put 10 minutes on the clock and we will let you 

all give your opening statements. This is a very important period 

of time, and so I don’t know how you plan to split, maybe 5 minutes each. So we will put 10 minutes on and then go from there, 

and just don’t be worried about the clock too much. I would now 

like to recognize our former colleague Mr. Hamilton for as much 

time as he may consume. 

10 

STATEMENTS OF LEE HAMILTON AND BRENT SCOWCROFT, 

CO–CHAIRS, BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON AMERICA’S NUCLEAR FUTURE 

STATEMENT OF LEE HAMILTON 

Mr. HAMILTON. To allow us to come before. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Still having trouble. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Is that on now? 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Yes. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you. I ask unanimous consent of course 

that the full testimony be submitted. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. HAMILTON. We are very grateful to you and appreciate the 

leadership this subcommittee and the full committee have shown 

over a period of years on a lot of our biggest challenges in the Nation. Certainly, the topic that we present to you today, managing 

nuclear spent fuel and high-level nuclear waste. 

It is a rare privilege for me to have the opportunity to work with 

General Scowcroft. By any measure, he is one of the great Americans, and a distinct privilege for me to be with him, but also with 

the other 13 members of the Commission appointed by Secretary 

Chu. They really were an outstanding group, talented and dedicated in every way, and their professionalism contributed to the 

unanimity of the report. 

What I will do is take the first part of our testimony, and General Scowcroft will take the second part, and we will take up the 

full 10 minutes, perhaps a little more. 

As has been stated here several times this morning already, the 

nuclear waste management program is at a real impasse, it has 

been in deep trouble for decades. One or two of you in this room 

are old enough to remember when Congressman Mo Udall stepped 

on the floor of the House of Representatives 30 or 40 years ago, I 

am not sure when, and said to us shame on us because we haven’t 

solved the problem of what to do with nuclear waste. That was decades ago, and here we are and the process has about completely 

broken down. It has been decades going along this current path 

and it has led to controversy, litigation and protracted delay, and, 

most of all, not a solution. 

This is a serious failure of the American government, and it has 

had real consequences which Chairman Emeritus Barton has already referred to. Our failure to come to grips with this problem 

has meant that we are slowing down for sure, damaging the prospects of a very important potential energy supply, nuclear energy. 

It has damaged our State-Federal relationships very sharply, and 

it has caused the public to lose confidence in the Federal Government’s competence to solve the problem, and it has damaged America’s standing in the world and its leadership. We cannot really 

claim to be a leader in nuclear power if we can’t solve one of the 

fundamental problems that exist with nuclear power what do with 

the nuclear waste, and of course, we haven’t solved that. 

Likewise, the whole inability to solve the problem has been very 

costly. It has been costly to the ratepayers who have to continue 

to pay for nuclear waste management, a solution that has not yet 

been delivered. It has been costly to communities who have been 

11 

unwilling hosts of long-term nuclear waste storage; it has certainly 

been costly to the American taxpayers, who face billions of dollars 

now every year in liabilities as a result of our failure to meet our 

responsibilities here. 

And underlying all of this is really an obligation, an ethical obligation, if you will, to avoid burdening future generations with finding a safe, permanent solution for hazardous materials that they 

did not create, we created them. And we are about ready to hand 

over to them the problem we created without a solution unless we 

move forward promptly. 

So there is a real urgency here, 65,000 metric ton inventory of 

spent nuclear fuel spread across the country, growing at the rate 

of about 2,000 metric tons per year, and I think all of us can agree 

that the status quo is not acceptable. 

Now we have eight key elements of our recommendations, they 

are integrated, in other words, they are packaged in our point of 

view, all are necessary to establish a truly nuclear national nuclear 

waste management system. I will talk about three and General 

Scowcroft will talk about the others. I will try to be quite brief. 

The first one, of course, is a new consent-based approach to 

siting future nuclear waste management facilities. You, in some of 

your opening statements, referred to this. We have had, over a period of years, a top-down forced solution to the problem and it has 

not worked. In a sense, we are faced with a choice in this Nation, 

and the choice is we can continue along to fight the same battles 

we have been fighting for decades now, 30 or more years, with no 

conclusion, or we can step back and try to chart a new course, and 

that is what we are trying to recommend to you with this consentbased approach. 

The top-down forced solution, trying to force a solution over the 

objections of State and local communities is not efficient, it takes 

longer, costs more, has lower odds of ultimate success. The approach we recommend is adaptive, it is staged, it is consent-based. 

It is based on a review of successful siting processes in the United 

States, the WIPP project in New Mexico, and of course, in several 

other countries around the world, Spain, Finland and Sweden 

among them. We believe this type of consent-based approach has 

the best chance of succeeding and building the confidence that is 

needed to get these controversial facilities through to completion. 

The second recommendation we make is to say that a new organization has to be created here to handle the waste management 

program, and it has to be empowered with the authority to act, and 

it has to have the resources to succeed. The DOD has wrestled with 

this problem for a long time, for more than 50 years. That record 

has not inspired confidence, created a lot of criticism, we heard an 

awful lot of criticism during the 2 years in the way in which that 

program has been handled. The Commission has concluded, thus, 

that a new institutional leadership is needed and we specifically 

recommend a congressionally-chartered Federal corporation. There 

are other organizational structures that the committee may want 

to consider, we looked at some of those, but we think this is best 

suited to provide the stability and the focus and the credibility that 

you need in order to put a waste product—waste management system in place. 

12 

The new organization to succeed would have to get the waste 

program back on track, and it will need a substantial degree of implementing authority and a sure access to funding. Throughout, of 

course, there will have to be rigorous oversight by the Congress of 

this new organization and the appropriate government agencies. 

The third point I want to make, the third of our recommendations is that access to the funds that the nuclear ratepayers are 

now paying, are now providing for the purpose of waste management must be available to this new organization so that it has the 

resources to move forward. The 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 

which has already been referred to, had a polluter-pay theme, or 

funding mechanism, to ensure that the full cost of disposing of commercial spent fuel would be paid by the utilities, or their ratepayers obviously, with no impact on taxpayers or the Federal budget. 

For a variety of reasons, and for many reasons really, this fund 

has not worked as intended. A series of executive and congressional 

actions has made the annual fee revenues, which are approximately $750 million a year, and the unspent $25 billion balance in 

the fund effectively inaccessible to the waste program. Instead, the 

waste program must compete today for funding, and is, therefore, 

subject to exactly the budget constraints and uncertainties that the 

fund was created to avoid. We think that situation has to be remedied right away to allow the program to succeed. And we make 

several recommendations as to how that should be done. For the 

balance of our testimony, I turn to General Scowcroft. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. You are recognized, General Scowcroft. 

STATEMENT OF BRENT SCOWCROFT 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, may I 

just say that it is an honor for me to participate on an issue so 

deeply in the national interest, and it is a delight to work with my 

co-chairman, former Congressman Lee Hamilton, whom I have 

knowledge and worked with for decades. 

The fourth element of our recommendations are prompt efforts to 

develop one or more geological disposal facilities. The conclusion 

that disposal is needed in deep geologic disposal is the scientifically-preferred approach has been reached by every expert panel 

that has looked at this issue, and by every other country that is 

pursuing a nuclear waste management program. 

Moreover, all fuel processing or recycle options either are already 

available or under active development at this time still generate 

waste streams that require a permanent disposal solution. We believe permanent disposal will very likely also be needed to safely 

manage, at least some portions of the commercial spent fuel inventory. 

The Commission recognizes the current law establishes Yucca 

Mountain in Nevada as the site for the first repository for spent 

fuel and high-level waste. Provided the licensed application submitted by DOE meets relevant requirements. Our Blue Ribbon 

Commission was not chartered as a siting commission; accordingly, 

we have not evaluated Yucca Mountain or any other particular location as a potential site for the storage or disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. Nor have we taken a position on 

13 

the administration’s request to withdraw the license application. 

We simply note that regardless of what happens with Yucca Mountain, the U.S. inventory of spent nuclear fuel will soon exceed the 

amount that can be legally in place at this site until a second repository is in operation. 

So under current law, the United States will need to find a new 

disposal site, even if Yucca Mountain goes forward. We believe the 

approach set forth here provides the best strategy for assuring continuing progress regardless of the fate of Yucca Mountain. 

The fifth element of our recommendations are efforts to develop 

one or more consolidated storage facilities. And here, let me point 

out the difference between storage and disposal. Storage is a temporary condition, disposal is a permanent condition, although 

retrievability is a possible issue there. 

Developing consolidated interim storage capacity would allow the 

Federal Government to begin the orderly transfer of spent fuel 

from reactor sites to safe and secure centralized facilities, independent of the schedule for opening and operating a permanent repository. The arguments in favor of consolidated storage are strongest for the so-called stranded spent fuel, that is, fuel from shutdown plant sites of which there are nine presently across the country. 

Stranded fuel should be first in line for transfer to a consolidated 

facility so these plant sites can be completely decommissioned and 

put to other beneficial uses. 

Looking beyond the issue of today’s stranded fuel, the availability 

of consolidated storage would provide valuable flexibility in the nuclear waste management system that could achieve significant cost 

savings for both ratepayers and taxpayers when a significant additional number of plants are shut down in the future. It can provide 

emergency backup storage in the event spent fuel needs to be 

moved quickly from a reactor site and would provide an excellent 

platform for ongoing R&D to better understand how storage systems currently in use at commercial and DOE sites perform over 

time. 

The sixth element of our recommendations are prompt efforts to 

prepare for the eventual large scale transport of spent nuclear fuel 

and high-level waste to consolidated storage and disposal sites 

when such facilities become available. 

The current system of standards and regulations governing the 

transport of spent fuel and other nuclear materials has functioned 

very well, and the safety record for past shipments of these types 

of materials is excellent. That being said, past experiences in the 

United States and abroad and extensive comments to this Commission indicate many people fear the transport of nuclear materials. 

Thus greater transport demands for nuclear materials are likely to 

raise new public concerns. 

In order to deal with these concerns, while ensuring the highest 

level of transport safety, the Commission believes that State, Tribal 

and local officials should be extensively involved in transportation 

planning and should be given the resources necessary to discharge 

their roles and obligations in this area. Given that transportation 

represents a crucial link in the overall storage and disposal system, 

it would be important to allow substantial lead time to assess and 

14 

resolve transportation issues well in advance of when materials 

would be expected to actually begin shipping to a new facility. Historically some programs have treated transportation planning as 

an afterthought. No successful programs have done so. 

The seventh recommendation we have is support for advances in 

nuclear energy technology and for workforce development. Advances in nuclear energy technology have the potential to deliver 

an array of benefits across a wide range of energy policy goals. The 

Commission believes these benefits, in light of the environmental 

and energy challenges the United States and the world will confront this century, justify public and private sector support for 

RD&D on advanced reactor and fuel cycle technology. 

In the near term, opportunities exist to improve the safety and 

performance of existing water reactors and spent fuel and highlevel waste storage transportation and disposal system. In the 

longer term, the possibility exists to advance game-changing innovations that offer potentially large advantages over current technologies and systems. 

Additionally, the Commission recommends increased support for 

ongoing work by the NRC to develop a regulatory framework for 

advanced nuclear energy systems. Such a framework can guide the 

design of new systems in lower barriers to commercial investment 

by increasing confidence that new systems can be successfully licensed. 

The Commission also recommends expanded Federal joint labor 

management and university-based support for advanced science 

technology, engineering and mathematics training to develop the 

skill workforce needed to support an effective waste management 

program, as well as viable domestic nuclear energy. The stalemate 

we have faced over the years has paid enormous cost in the workforce and skills. 

At the same time, the Department of Energy and the nuclear energy industry should work to ensure that valuable existing capabilities and assets, including the critical infrastructure on human 

expertise are maintained. 

On our last recommendation, is an observation really, active U.S. 

leadership is essential in international efforts to address issues of 

safety nonproliferation and security. As more nations consider pursuing nuclear energy or expanding their nuclear programs, U.S. 

leadership is urgently needed on issues of safety, particularly in 

light of events at Fukushima, nonproliferation, security and 

counterterrorism issues. 

Many countries, especially those just embarking on commercial 

nuclear power development, have relatively small programs and 

they lack the regulatory and oversight resources available to countries with more established programs. International assistance may 

be required to ensure they do not create disproportionate safety, 

physical security and proliferation risks. 

In many cases, mitigating these risks will depend less on technological interventions than on the ability to strengthen international 

institutions and safeguards while promoting multilateral coordination and cooperation. 

From the U.S. perspective, two further points are particularly 

important, first, with so many players in the international and nuVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:12 Aug 20, 2012 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\112-00~1\112-10~2\112-10~1 WAYNE
15 

clear energy and policy arena, the United States will increasingly 

have to lead by engagement and by example. Second, the United 

States cannot exercise effective leadership on issues related to the 

back end of the fuel cycle so long as its own program is in disarray. 

Effective domestic policies are needed to support America’s international agenda. 

To conclude, the problem of nuclear waste may be unique in the 

sense there is wide agreement about the outlines of the solution, 

put very simply, we know what we have to do, we know we have 

to do it, and we even know how to do it. Experience in the United 

States and abroad has shown that suitable sites for deep geologic 

repository for nuclear waste can be identified and developed. The 

knowledge and experience we need are in hand, and the necessary 

funds have been and are being collected. 

The core difficulty actually remains what it has always been, 

finding a way to site these inherently controversial activities—facilities and to conduct the waste management program in a manner that allows all stakeholders, but most especially, host communities, States and tribes to conclude that their interests have been 

adequately protected and their well-being enhanced, not merely 

sacrificed and overridden by the larger interest of the country as 

a whole. 

We believe the conditions for progress are arguably more promising than they have been in some time, but we will only know if 

we start, which is what we urge the administration and the Congress to do without delay. 

We thank you for allowing us to meet with you today. And we 

intend to submit a full version of our testimony for the record, and 

we look forward to your questions. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, I thank my colleagues for sitting patiently. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Scowcroft follows:] 

16 


75441.003
17 


75441.004
18 


75441.005
19 


75441.006
20 


75441.007
21 


75441.008
22 


75441.009
23 


75441.010
24 


75441.011
25 


75441.012
26 


75441.013
27 


75441.014
28 


75441.015
29 


75441.016
30 


75441.017
31 


75441.018
32 


75441.019
33 


75441.020
34 


75441.021
35 


75441.022
36 


75441.023
37 


75441.024
38 


75441.025
39 


75441.026
40 


75441.027
41 


75441.028
42 


75441.029
43 

Mr. SHIMKUS. I think it was very important. You both have 

earned the ability to speak for as long as you want, based upon 

your service to this country. So thank you. Now I would like to recognize myself for the first 5 minutes. 

I did go through the report and the advisory committee charter 

and all the—who actually told the Commission not to consider 

Yucca Mountain? Was it a statement by any one individual or— 

Mr. HAMILTON. We had a statement from Secretary Chu. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. So it was Secretary Chu who said do not consider 

Yucca Mountain in the Blue Ribbon Commission report? 

Mr. HAMILTON. I will quote him precisely. ‘‘What I don’t want the 

committee to be doing is just spending time and saying by looking 

at past history was Yucca Mountain a good decision or a bad decision, and whether it can be used as a future repository.’’ He followed that up by saying to us, ‘‘This is not a citing commission.’’ 

And then he reiterated that in a letter to us. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Great, thank you. I have a lot of questions so I am 

going to try to be pretty brief. The Commission did not evaluate 

and take a position on the technical suitability of Yucca Mountain; 

is that correct? 

Mr. HAMILTON. That is correct. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The Commission did not take a position regarding 

the request to withdraw the license application for Yucca Mountain; is that correct? 

Mr. HAMILTON. That is correct. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The Commission did not evaluate the possibility of 

public acceptance of Yucca Mountain should the NRC complete and 

provide a positive safety evaluation; is that correct? 

Mr. HAMILTON. That is correct. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. I want to underscore this, because you address a 

lot on this consent-based approach, right. It is all through the report. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. It is hard to get to a final consent-based approach 

when we are stopped from funding the final scientific report. Don’t 

you think a final scientific report might help educate the locals and 

develop a consent-based approach? 

I am not trying to be tricky, but having scientific—the final report on a suitability of a site, wouldn’t that be helpful to develop 

a consent-based approach? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, our—we have to be very clear here as I 

think we have been that we are not taking—have not taken a position on Yucca, did not study it, were not asked to study it. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. But the question is—— 

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, having said that, obviously evaluating that 

experience can teach us a lot. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Yes, but just generally, if there is a scientific report due on a site, should that be finished in helping develop a consent-based approach of whether that site—don’t you think the local 

community would like to see the final scientific study? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I suspect the answer to that question carries a lot of weight with regard to Yucca, and it is impossible really 

to divorce the question from that context. 

44 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Always a politician, you can’t get away from—I 

will just move on, you understand—is it true that the Commission’s 

recommendations could be implemented with Yucca Mountain’s development? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes. 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Yes. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Nothing in this report forecloses Yucca Mountain 

as a potential suitable site, correct? 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Correct. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Now, let me go—up on the chart there, I want to 

talk about this debate that you had in this report on locality. When 

I read the report, it was like kissing your sister, you know, I mean, 

there is really not meat in some of these specific issues of how to 

solve some of these problems. So that is the State of Nevada. Hit 

the next slide. That is the Federal land. Hit the next slide. And 

that square is approximately the size in Finland of their disposal 

site. Now, based upon that, which in the local community in that 

square said, yes. Based upon that, who would be local? 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Well, that is a very good question. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. One that I came up with myself. Very good. 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. One of the problems is the definition of consent, 

and it is especially true in our Federal system. And while Secretary—Mr. Hamilton described the Spanish, the Finns and the 

Swedes as having solved this problem, they don’t have exactly the 

same kind of jurisdictional issues that we have. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Let me go to finish this. My time is running out. 

So I would argue that the Federal Government is a local entity 

here, the Federal Government, we are the locals, we own the land. 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. We own the land. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Then go to the next. I think that is Nye County. 

They support Yucca Mountain. We have a commissioner back here, 

I saw him, you probably know him, Gary Hollis, from Nye County. 

We have their report saying we support this. 

Next slide, next slide, next. OK, and then the counties are popping up, their names Esmerelda, Mineral, keep going, keep going. 

OK, all these localities have endorsed the siting of Yucca Mountain, 

and I am sure they testified in front of you. There is a lot more, 

I will have time to go with the second panel. But I think it is safe 

to say that because one U.S. Senator doesn’t want the site, that is 

not speaking for the locals, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

I would like to recognize Mr. Green for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and we can spend a lot 

of time, and I think we will with the second panel on consent on 

the State and local community. I was out there and I met with all 

those County commissioners, a number of them and they are very 

supportive. It is a beautiful area but not a lot of people out there. 

I guess the people are in Las Vegas and Reno and Nevada. I guess 

from my experience when I was in Sweden and looked at Sweden 

had built a prototype of a deep facility, much more advanced even 

their prototype. And we asked the folks there, is this where ultimately—oh, no, this is our experimental facilities because that region and whatever they call them in Sweden stayed or local community would not have agreed to it if they thought it was a permanent site. 

45 

Now, maybe 20 years from now or whatever they may change 

that on the national government can make that, but consent is always tough, because that is why in the 1980s, I assume Congress 

just made the decision. 

But let me get to some recommendations on your panel. And first 

of all, I want thank you for appearing before the committee and 

thank all the other commissioners for producing a really good report, I think. A couple issues I want to talk about. The report stated believes there is enough funding in the nuclear waste fund to 

take care of all the activities related to the siting, possibly two new 

waste disposal facilities not including Yucca Mountain, as well as 

one more interim facility. Right now the nuclear waste fund contains about $27 billion, 

which seems like enough money, but once you include funding for 

a new independent organization, which I think might be what we 

need to move off dead center and all the other logistical details surrounding the siting, could we face a problem at that nuclear waste 

fund would not have enough funding? And how did you come up 

with the conclusion that the current stream or waste fund dollars 

recover all the costs associated with your recommendations? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, we were very sensitive, of course, to the 

whole question of the impact on the deficit and the Federal spending issue. And by the very nature of these recommendations, precise cost estimates really are not possible. We think that the costs 

are something that can be managed within current spending 

streams, if you would, within the Department of Energy and perhaps other places. 

In other words, the waste management recommendations can be 

implemented with existing revenue streams that are already dedicated for that purpose, as nearly as we can estimate. But we do not 

have precise estimates. We call, for example, as you know, and several of you have cited for a new organization, that is going to cost 

some money. We didn’t try to make estimates of that. And there 

are other things here that would require expenditures. So we don’t 

have exact information of it. 

It is impossible to estimate the cost of the nuclear waste program 

without knowing the specific sites that are going to be developed. 

And of course, we don’t that at this point. 

Mr. GREEN. Well, now, Lee, I only have a minute and a half left, 

did the Commission discuss anything what would happen if we 

didn’t have it? My next question, I want to get to the legislative 

changes, because that is something our committee has jurisdiction 

on. You recommend some of the legislative changes allowed to proceed to the independent organization, can you explain any of those, 

or if you have a summary of those, can you provide them to the 

committee? I know its in the report. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, we have a summary on the page, Roman numeral VIII of the executive summary. We have a chart on proposed 

legislative changes that I think can sum it up. What we say, broadly speaking, is there are six areas that you have to look at: A new 

facility siting process, consolidated interim storage facilities, broadening support the jurisdictions affected by transportation, establishing a new waste management organization, establishing access 

to dedicated funding, and promoting international engagements. So 

46 

there is a lot for the Congress to do here and the specifics are pretty well spelled out within the report. 

Mr. GREEN. My last question is and you heard my opening statement about reprocessing. It doesn’t really reduce the footprint very 

much, but it also creates, and again, I was in France in 1998, and 

then just last year again and saw their reprocessing site there in 

Normandy expand substantially. That is almost an interim storage 

facility for them. Did the Commission talk at all about reprocessing 

as an option? 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Well, we did look at reprocessing and we are in 

favor of research and development going forward, but no form of 

reprocessing eliminates the issue of waste. And so, you know, we 

use only about 1 percent of the energy value of the nuclear fuel we 

use now. Certainly we can do better I think, but we just recommend that R&D go forward to see if we cannot improve the 

whole nuclear fuel cycle to make it more effective, but whatever 

what happens, we don’t see the possibility of eliminating the need 

for waste facilities. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you for letting me run over time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time has expired. The Chair recognizes the chairman of the Energy and Power Subcommittee, Mr. 

Whitfield, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you very much. I also want to thank you 

all for appearing here today, and also thank you for the hard work 

that you have put forward in coming up with some suggestions for 

the U.S. Congress. I must say to you, and certainly none of this is 

your fault, but I was reading the testimony of Mr. Schatz, who is 

the President Citizens Against Government Waste, and in his testimony, he says the Yucca Mountain project owes its ultimate demise 

to years of delays, manipulation and obstructionism by Senate majority leader Harry Reid, and the exigencies of election-year politics. 

I for one—I am not really going to have much of a question, but 

I think the American people would be in an uproar of rage if they 

knew all the facts surrounding what has happened since 1983 

when the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was signed by President 

Reagan. In 1987, DOE conducted studies of nine potential repository sites. Congress selected Yucca Mountain soon after that. 

In 2002, following extensive evaluation of the site by DOE in its 

National Laboratories, the Secretary of Energy determined Yucca 

Mountain was suitable for repository development and recommended that the President approve the site. The President did 

approve the site, the Congress approved the site, and June 3rd, 

2008, after additional scientific and engineering studies on development and design, DOE submitted a license application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission seeking construction authority for the 

repository. The NRC docketed the license application in September 

2008 and directed the body to conduct a review within 4 years looking at all of this in preparation to issue a license to construct. 

And before that 4 years was up, Secretary Chu filed a motion 

within NRC’s construction authorization board to withdraw the license application, and then the board denied the DOE’s motion to 

47 

withdraw the application. And then Chairman Jaczko delayed and 

delayed and so the whole thing has fallen apart. 

And Congressman Hamilton, you made the comment, this is a serious failure. I think it is one of the most significant failures of the 

American policy on an energy issue ever. You also said that it damaged the American standing in the world and I agree with that 

completely. And then when you look on top of that, that we spent 

$15 billion on this site, the Department of Justice spent $188 million in legal fees when some of the 104 nuclear power plants filed 

the lawsuits because the government could not meet its contractual 

obligation to take possession of the material, and now DOE is saying well, the ultimate liability legally may be 20 billion, but some 

of the people in the energy field, the nuclear energy field say the 

ultimate liability may be 50 billion. 

So I think the American people have every right to be totally 

upset and irate about what has happened in this instance which 

clearly shows pure politics by the President, by the Secretary of 

Energy by Mr. Jaczko, and by Senator Harry Reid. 

And I hope, I agree with Chairman Shimkus, I hope, since you 

all were not asked to look at Yucca Mountain or render any opinion 

on Yucca Mountain, I hope that there is some way we can continue 

at Yucca Mountain myself, because it would be a vast waste of 

human resources, financial resources if we cannot do it. Having 

said that, I just want to thank you all for this report to the Secretary of Energy, it is quite comprehensive, but I, for one, feel it 

is a travesty that we find ourselves in this situation today and I 

yield back my 5 seconds. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The Chair appreciates the gentleman’s question. 

And now I would like to recognize my friend Congressman Capps 

from California for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. CAPPS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate very 

much both of you being here today and your testimony, and also 

the work of the Commission, the work you have done to investigate 

these issues which are particularly relevant to my State of California, given the logistical challenges we face in the storage and 

transport of spent fuel, as well as more pressing seismic concerns, 

which really have yet to be fully addressed. 

As you know, three of California’s civilian power reactors are located directly on the Pacific Rim: Humboldt Bay, San Onofre, and 

in my Congressional district, Diablo Canyon. At present, Diablo 

Canyon and San Onofre, both of which reside in highly active seismic zones, are scheduled for decommissioning between 2022 and 

2025. And both are currently storing high-level radioactive waste 

on the site, both in pools as well as dry cask. New seismic unknowns are also emerging, such as the discovery in 2008 of the 

Shoreline fault less than a mile from the Diablo Canyon spent fuel 

storage casks. I would note that the current seismic analysis is still 

incomplete on that fault system. 

Further, the NRC acknowledges the special seismic circumstances of California’s nuclear reactors in its draft generic EIS 

for license renewal of nuclear plants. I know that you agree that 

placing radioactive waste in the presence of seismic forces is an 

issue we must treat with utmost care. So before I get to some questions on reprocessing, which I would like to do, I would want to ask 

48 

you to share with us any general comments on the topic of storing 

spent fuel in dry casks as opposed to pools in seismically-active 

sites. For example, over the past couple of years the Commission 

has been active, what did you hear or learn about this issue if you 

would share, please? 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. We have looked at that issue, and we are examining it further in the light of the Fukushima—— 

Mrs. CAPPS. Yes. 

Mr. SCOWCROFT [continuing]. Which could be very valuable in 

analyzing some—it is not clear for example on the Fukushima how 

much of the problem came from the earthquake and how much 

from the tsunami, and you don’t have the tsunami problems that 

Japan has in California. 

Mrs. CAPPS. No. 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. That is—there has been research under dry 

cask and it is very positive, but for the first 5 years after the fuel 

is removed, it needs to be in wet storage, after that it can be put 

in dry storage, and one of the things we would like to see is the 

temporary storage places to evaluate what happens under longer 

conditions of storage and security and earthquakes and so on, to 

that. But the reports that we got were that dry storage is a very 

promising way to go. 

Mrs. CAPPS. Thank you. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Congresswoman Capps, you probably saw the article in The Wall Street Journal this morning about you Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission’s actions with regard to earthquake damage in present nuclear reactors in this country, they are obviously 

worried about it and they are thinking of further requirements, apparently further studies. Fukushima happened as we were in process, and obviously it turned our thoughts as it did all persons interested in nuclear power to the question of safety. What we ended 

up recommending, because there is so many complications here 

was that the National Academy of Sciences conduct a thorough review of the lessons learned from Fukushima, I think they are going 

to do that, it may already be underway. There are others that can 

speak to that—— 

On the safety and security of these current storage arrangements, we simply didn’t have the technical expertise or the time, 

frankly, to get into that in great detail. 

Mrs. CAPPS. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I know this is going to 

go over a little bit, but I would like to pose my question on reprocessing options, and if there is no time to answer verbally they can 

get back to me. 

And just to the point of your saying there hasn’t been time currently and more studies need to be done, one concern that many 

of my constituents have is over the relicensing process while these 

needs for further study continue, which poses a challenge because 

the licensing process is under way, at least in Diablo Canyon. But 

I am also very concerned about the reprocessing situation in light 

of all these with the earthquake fault possibilities. And my understanding is that reprocessing options produce radioactive streams, 

waste streams, that would need to be disposed of, is that correct? 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Yes, that is correct. 

Mrs. CAPPS. So—— 

49 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. No kind of reprocessing at present that we 

know can eliminate the need for waste disposal. 

Mrs. CAPPS. And does that underscore your statement to a previous question that this is not going to eliminate the need for a 

permanent geologic repository? 

Mr. HAMILTON. That is correct. It is simply premature to make 

a judgment now based on the technical information that is available as to whether or not you proceed with recycling and reprocessing, so-called closing the nuclear fuel cycle. 

Mrs. CAPPS. Would you be willing to estimate how much time 

and money it would take to redevelop and commercialize a processing technology that could fundamentally alter the waste management challenge we face? Do you see what posing those two challenges sort of simultaneously to—this is all within a time frame. 

What kind of resources and time would it take to do this? 

Mr. HAMILTON. I just don’t think we are competent to answer 

that question. Listen, that is the reason we recommend going forward with more research and development here. There are so many 

open-ended questions that need to be resolved, and that is one of 

them. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentlelady’s time is expired. 

In part of the report you have spent nuclear fuel, but you also 

have nuclear waste. And they do talk a lot about the Department 

of Defense waste in Hanford and all that stuff that was designed 

to go to Yucca Mountain, too. So there is other waste than just 

spent nuclear fuel that is to go to these depositories? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Now I would like to recognize Congressman Barton for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Chairman. We have two hearings going 

on. We have the FDA Commissioner downstairs in the Health Subcommittee, so that is why some of us are yo-yoing back and forth. 

I want to pick your two gentlemen’s brains on this consent-based 

approach that you talk about in your recommendations. Is there a 

technical evaluation of sites before you go through the consentbased process, or could anybody—just take an extreme case, if New 

York City wanted to apply, could they apply without any technical 

evaluation of their site at all? 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I think the notion is that there would, first of 

all, be a technical evaluation of what general areas are suitable so 

that we didn’t go down this consent process with something that 

technologically was not accurate. 

Mr. BARTON. So you would put out some sort of a technical requirement list and if you felt like you met the technical requirements and got approval based on technical merit, whatever that 

was, then there would kick in this consent-based process? 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Right. That is basically it. Although even that 

could be iterative. A community could come up and say we want 

to have a site, and then a quick evaluation could show that the terrain is not suitable. 

Mr. HAMILTON. We recommend that the EPA develop generic disposal standards and supporting regulatory requirements. Very 

early in the siting process that has to be done. 

Mr. BARTON. You are recommending the EPA do it—— 

50 

Mr. HAMILTON. That is right. 

Mr. BARTON [continuing]. And not NRC? You just set your program back 10 years. 

Mr. HAMILTON. I think under current law EPA would have that 

responsibility. I stand to be corrected on that. That is my understanding of that. But anyway, the Federal Government should set 

the standards, whether it is EPA or DOE or somebody else. 

Look, this consent-based process, I don’t want to give the impression we think it is easy. It is a very complex process. You can’t sit 

down and spell out in detail exactly what has to happen. This is 

going to be a matter of negotiations between the parties. There has 

to be flexibility, transparency, patience, consultation, all of these 

things in order to make it work. In practical terms what I think 

you are talking about here is encouraging communities to volunteer 

if they want some of these sites, and clearly some of them do. 

There are a lot of jobs created when you put these sites in place. 

And it would also involve the entity that has the responsibility for 

organizing this system of what you do with nuclear waste. They 

may want to approach a community and provide incentives for that 

community to put forward a proposal. You can’t spell out how all 

that is going to go. It is going to be a very elaborate process, just 

as was followed in the New Mexico case where we have successfully 

sited a waste facility. 

Mr. BARTON. Well, I have a question here that the staff has provided that I want to ask. While your group has been conducting 

your study, your committee, the Department of Energy has been 

dismantling the waste disposal office in DOE. How do you go forward given what the Department of Energy has done in their nuclear waste office cutback and their abandonment, at least at the 

secretarial level, of the Yucca project? 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Well, we recommend creating a new entity, a 

Federal corporation, if you will, to take over those responsibilities 

for siting construction. 

Mr. BARTON. Do you fund it with the funds that are being collected now? Is that correct? 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Yes. 

Mr. HAMILTON. But there is an important point here. I don’t 

know how long it will take to create a new organization. You would 

know. 

Mr. BARTON. Longer than you think. 

Mr. HAMILTON. I suspect you are right. You are at least talking 

a year, maybe 2 years, maybe more. It is going to take some time. 

Now, we don’t want everything to come to a dead stop while we are 

sitting around waiting for a new organization to be built. And the 

DOE is going to have to move forward with a number of the recommendations, I think, and begin a lot of the process that we identify in the report with regard to siting and with regard to transportation and all the rest of it so that we can keep this process moving. We don’t want a dead stop here for 2 or 3 years while we wait 

to develop an organization. 

Mr. BARTON. My time is expired. Mr. Chairman, I have one more 

question. Do you gentlemen and the other commissioners of your 

Blue Ribbon Commission expect the Congress to act legislatively on 

51 

your recommendations in this Congress? In other words, put a bill 

on the President’s desk in the next 10 months? 

Mr. HAMILTON. We don’t anticipate that. We would be delighted 

if you did it, but we recognize the realities of it. Look, we recommend—— 

Mr. BARTON. You should say you do expect it. 

Mr. HAMILTON. We recommend a new organization, but we recommend it only in very general terms. And the Congress would 

have to fill in a lot of the details on that. So it is going to take you 

time, and we would want you to take time to look at that. Do I personally expect that you would have it done in 2012? The answer 

is no. 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. But it is one of our priority recommendations. 

Mr. BARTON. It is an honest answer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time is expired. The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Matsui, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. MATSUI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank 

both of you for being here today. Thank you for your service. Both 

of you have been called upon many times to deal with challenging 

issues, and this is certainly the latest of them. Commercial nuclear 

power’s future I think depends a lot on what we are talking about 

today, what we do at the back end, particularly in light of 

Fukushima, which occurred almost a year ago, and that really 

brought to fore some of the problems inherent in nuclear power. 

And I am very concerned because I believe unless we take care of 

this back end we are going to have difficulties moving forward, and 

I don’t want to wait for another Fukushima again. 

But at any rate, what I would like to kind of delve into, I really 

looked at your consent-based siting and I think that is a good way 

to go forward with. I think that is probably something we would 

have to really look at in a positive manner. I want to kind of drill 

down a little bit more because you mentioned that there are nine 

commercial shutdown nuclear power plant sites in the U.S. One of 

them is in my district, the Rancho Seco power plant, which is 

owned by my local utility, the Seco Municipal Utility District, 

which is a wonderful utility, one of the top utilities in the country. 

Now, the spent fuel is still stored at this site, so the question of 

how we move forward to find a safe place to dispose of this spent 

nuclear fuel is important to my district and to my constituents. 

Now, as you report, sites at all of these places the spent fuel is 

monitored and well guarded, and they are, and is not thought to 

present immediate safety or security concerns. But the presence of 

this spent fuel at these sites is costly and really prevents the use 

of those sites for more economically productive uses that would 

benefit the communities. 

So my question is, being very parochial about this, but I have to 

be because I think it is an example of what lies ahead, I would like 

to know whether the Commission regards a recommendation of 

taking the stranded fuel from shutdown reactors first as a mustdo task regardless of the ultimate decisions that are made on permanent disposal and reprocessing. 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I think the short answer is yes. 

Ms. MATSUI. OK. And you also, too, Mr. Hamilton. 

52 

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes. We think the strongest case for consolidated 

storage facilities can be made with regard to the so-called stranded 

fuel. But we also think that that consolidated storage facility is 

necessary for a variety of reasons, safety is a big one, but it has 

advantages of flexibility, it creates a backup storage capability, it 

is a very excellent platform for research and development. There 

are a lot of reasons why it is important to move this spent fuel 

from these sites where it now is to consolidated storage. That is an 

important one, stranded fuel. 

Ms. MATSUI. All right. That is great to know. On this consentbased, on the siting aspect, we are also having to look at the transport related activities, too. I would imagine obviously where the 

sites are located would obviously sort of be a determinant to a certain degree what kind of transport activities would have to occur. 

Do you foresee going through the same process with the transport related activities, and many communities would be along the 

way on the transport, transportation aspect, would you look at this 

being more of a consent-based way of looking at this as far as the 

transportation aspect of it also? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, in our original draft report we did not address the question fully of transportation. In the final report because of a lot of feedback we had on the draft report we elaborated 

on transportation. We think it is a very big large issue. The record 

of transporting spent fuel in this country is very good. I don’t think 

there has ever been a really serious accident. However, if you create consolidated storage facilities, several of them around the country, two or three, you are obviously going to increase the amount 

of transportation necessary to get to those storage facilities. 

Ms. MATSUI. Right. 

Mr. HAMILTON. All of us who have represented constituents know 

that they are uneasy about transportation of nuclear waste to the 

point that many communities are very—many people are very fearful of it. So I think an enormous amount of work has to be done 

to educate people about the safety of the process. A lot of planning 

has to be done, a lot of preparation has to be done, before you get 

to the point of major transportation of this fuel. We have really got 

a psychological hurdle to get over, I believe. 

Ms. MATSUI. So in essence then, though, the siting and the transportation will have to be considered at the same time. There might 

be some wonderful sites, but the transportation aspects of it might 

be negative. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Absolutely, yes, indeed. It is a very important 

part of our recommendations. If you cannot assure people that you 

can transport this stuff safely you are going to lose the battle. 

Ms. MATSUI. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentlelady’s time is expired. I would just add, 

too, I think part of your report talked about the fund money going 

to developing and build out transportation systems, which is also 

I think a very valuable part of what you have done. 

Now the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. 

Cassidy, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CASSIDY. Hi, gentlemen. I am privileged to be in front of the 

two of you. I am struck in your report that you are even pessimistic 

about the ability of a closed nuclear fuel cycle to make a difference 

53 

right now, and you mention that there are concerns about the merits in commercial viability. You know more about this than I, which 

is why I am asking the questions and you are answering. But don’t 

I know that European countries and perhaps Japan have already 

implemented closed fuel cycles and that in turn reduces waste by 

a quarter. 

Now, first I will—that said, why would you—but your statement 

is that you are concerned about the commercial and scientific merits. So knowing that it is being done but knowing that you have 

this concern, how do you reconcile the two? 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Well, I would say basically the notion is that recycling is done for a variety of reasons. And in talking with the experts on it no one was able to say that reprocessing in order to reduce the amount of waste at the present time was economically 

practical. 

Mr. CASSIDY. Now, I have read something by the CEO of AREVA, 

the French concern that does nuclear, they claim that now they reduce waste down to a quarter of what the waste would be with 

their reprocessing. Now, is that hyperbole or is that rooted in fact? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, what came through to us I think was that, 

in listening to the experts, and I think neither the General nor I 

qualify as experts here, is that there are just enormous uncertainties that exist about the merits and the commercial viability of different fuel cycles and the various options you would have, technological options. Given that fact, we didn’t try to make a judgment 

there. We really weren’t qualified to do that I think. 

Is reprocessing-recycling a possibility in the future? Of course it 

is. And you are exactly right, several countries are using it and are 

reducing, not eliminating, nuclear waste. But I don’t think our nuclear community, however defined, is quite ready to say this is the 

future. 

Mr. CASSIDY. That is also what I don’t understand, Mr. Hamilton. Is it because of previous decisions made by, say, President 

Carter that we have not committed to reprocessing, or is there actually a technical barrier that our guys cannot embrace? I hate to 

think the French can do better engineering than we. 

Mr. HAMILTON. I do not know the answer as to why we are 

where we are with regard to recycling. I think I am correct in saying that, and maybe the panel that follows us will be better qualified to answer that question, I think I am correct in saying that 

the nuclear community at this point is not ready to say that this 

is the best way to proceed reprocessing. Other options have to be 

explored. 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I think that is correct. And most countries who 

recycle, like France, don’t do it to save money. And recycling 

changes the nature of the waste stream. It also isolates certain materials like plutonium which then become a great security problem. 

Mr. CASSIDY. Now, let me ask you, if—it does seem though if we 

are going to commit, as the President has committed, to building 

some new nuclear power plants, that one, it would be a logical time 

if we do have that technology to integrate the two. But secondly, 

if you have the potential to decrease your waste down to a fourth 

of what it would be, is it possible that we could use this fund set 

up to manage the waste to partly fund whatever Federal subsidies 

54 

would be required, bond guarantees, et cetera, for the development, 

assuming that we could work out the issues of security for plutonium, et cetera? 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Well, to be honest, we didn’t get into that much 

detail about the allocation of funds. But we do recommend that recycling options as well as research on new reactor design continue, 

absolutely, without identifying the source. 

Mr. HAMILTON. I think the 1982 act makes it clear with this polluter-pays concept behind it, that that is to be the funding mechanism to ensure that all costs of disposing of commercial fuel will 

be paid. 

Mr. CASSIDY. So if there is an alternative mechanism that in the 

initial steps of disposal would decrease the volume significantly, 

theoretically at least, that would be within the kind of intent of the 

law? 

Mr. HAMILTON. That would be my understanding of the law. I 

don’t have the language of the law in front of me, but that would 

be my understanding. 

Mr. CASSIDY. Thank you both. I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time is expired. The Chair now 

recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Butterfield. 

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Thank you. Let me join Dr. Cassidy and others for their extraordinary service to our country. Thank you very 

much for coming back and thank you for your willingness to tackle 

this incredibly important issue. I also want to thank the other 

members of the Commission. All of you have worked so hard. 

As many of you know, I reside and represent a good portion of 

the great State of North Carolina. My State has a robust nuclear 

portfolio with nearly 30 percent of our electricity provided at relatively low cost by nuclear energy. However, the issue of waste disposal has been a concern, to put it mildly, for many years. Even 

before I came to Congress I was concerned about this, if for no 

other reason than it is expensive. North Carolinians don’t like to 

lose $900 million of their money to what some people would call a 

worthless fund. Therefore, I want to see this body and the regulators take steps to move beyond the tired, unsuccessful battles of 

the past to something productive and with real milestones. That 

said, I have several questions about the report and hope that you 

can help me clarify some of this. 

I am intrigued by the idea of the consent-based approach to 

siting a facility. However, I am a little doubtful about it. My question is, what case studies, case studies, did the Commission review 

in consent-based siting that have worked in the past, and what lessons might be gleaned from those experiences? 

Either one of you may answer that. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, the successful example in this country is 

the New Mexico plant, WIPP. One of the members of our Commission was Senator Domenici, who had a lot to do with that and of 

course could speak to it in great detail. But we consider that an 

example of consent-based siting. Several of the other countries, 

Sweden, Finland, Spain, have basically followed a consent-based 

process that has been successful. 

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. General, anything you could add to that? 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. No. 

55 

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Is it unlikely that a community, and one of my 

colleagues made reference to New York City, that might be an extreme example, but is it unlikely that a community might have 100 

percent support for such a site? I think that is probably unlikely. 

How does the Commission think that we might measure the whole 

notion of consent? 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. That is one of the ambiguities in the term ‘‘consent-based,’’ and you all have a lot of experience in how you determine consent. We think it has to be an iterative process. The chairman pointed out the differences between Nevada counties and Nevada State in terms of their attitude toward Yucca. So how do you 

determine consent? We have a section which discusses it in considerable length, but it is an imprecise process and we say it needs 

to be iterative. 

Mr. HAMILTON. At the end of the day the parties have to reach 

an agreement; that is, consent. And so if you want a test as to 

whether or not you can get consent, the test is can the parties 

reach an agreement voluntarily amongst themselves, the parties 

being this new organization, local, State, tribal communities. So 

that is the key. But as I tried to suggest, this process is going to 

be complex, it is not something you are going to be able to predict 

ahead of time. The parties are going to have to work it out. But 

we think it has to have the characteristics we have spelled out in 

the report. It has to be adaptive, it has to be flexible, transparent, 

there has to be a lot of consultation involved, and there has to be 

a lot of give and take back and forth. But the test of consent will 

be can you reach an agreement. 

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. But you certainly mean more than 50 percent? 

Mr. HAMILTON. What is that? 

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. You simply mean more than 50 percent or a 

simple majority of the affected? 

Mr. HAMILTON. I would think so. You are talking about a lot of 

different bodies here. You are talking about tribal governments, 

you are talking about State governments, local governments, county governments, city governments, there are all kinds of people, 

Federal Government, that can get into the act here and will because there is a lot at stake. And we don’t suggest that process is 

going to come smoothly; it is going to take a lot of work and a lot 

of skill to negotiate these agreements. 

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Thank you, gentlemen. You have been very 

kind. I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time is expired. I now recognize 

the gentleman from New Hampshire, Mr. Bass, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you gentlemen 

for being here today. Thanks to the wonders of modern communication or the Internet, I would like to read you a brief paragraph 

from the Nashwood Telegraph, Monday, February 17, 1986. I was 

a sophomore State legislator at the time. It says, not in my backyard you won’t. Nobody wants a nuclear waste disposal site next 

door. Nobody wants a nuclear waste disposal site in their neighborhood. Nobody wants a nuclear waste disposal site in their town. 

Nobody wants a nuclear waste disposal site in their area. Nobody 

wants a nuclear waste site in their State. OK, that takes care of 

the United States. And then it goes on to discuss the fact that 

56 

Hillsborough, New Hampshire, which is about 15 miles from my 

home, is not the right place to locate what is now Yucca Mountain. 

Having qualified myself there, I say to you that you have in your 

testimony, quote, that we need an explicitly adaptive, staged and 

consent-based process. And I know you have addressed that question to Mr. Butterfield most recently and understand the problems 

associated with that. It is my view that 27 years—1986—27, is that 

right, 26, 27 years later we are where we are today, and it would 

be a shame if we had to go back to 1986 again at the cost—you 

know, the torture that we would go through as a Nation to get to 

where we were in 1986, it would hardly be worth the cost, you 

know the benefit for that. 

My question for you gentlemen is do you have recommendations 

in your report as to what the DOE should do now? I understand 

that this report process, and so forth, has cost $5 million or $4 million. Do you have any specific recommendations to the Department 

of Energy for the short term, for short-term action? 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Well, if I could make a comment on your general notion. What we determined in our research is that the approach we use, which is a top-down approach, you do it, hasn’t 

worked. And in New Mexico with the WIPP plant and in Sweden 

and in Finland and approaching in Canada, the approach of consent, come to an agreement on it, show the advantages, make it 

worthwhile, is showing promise, and that is why we are recommending that approach to it. 

Mr. BASS. But I think you also recognize the fact that these nations have different governmental structures and cultures, and so 

forth, that make it easier for that. 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. No question about that. 

Mr. BASS. And I can tell you from personal experience that this 

is 1986. By 19—let’s see, where are we in the presidential cycle? 

We are the first in the Nation primary. Every single candidate that 

came to New Hampshire had to vow on a Bible that they would 

never support a nuclear waste site in New Hampshire, otherwise 

they wouldn’t get a single vote. I am just giving you the historical 

context here. That is the way our system is and that is how it 

works. 

Mr. HAMILTON. We spell out in the 13th chapter of the report the 

actions that the DOE needs to take right now and in the future. 

I can read that to you but I don’t think it is necessary to do it. We 

gave a lot of thought to your question as to what do you do now 

and what does the DOE have to do, what does the Congress have 

to do, and we tried to spell that out in one of the chapters of the 

report. That is not, incidentally, in the executive summary. 

Mr. BASS. Thank you. I would conclude by saying that I was 

taken by Chairman Shimkus’ slide showing the level of consent, if 

you will, that exists today in the region. Knowing what this country has gone through to get where it is today not to consider this 

site and move forward on it I think is a terrible mistake. And I 

yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. Just for clarification to people who are watching us here, the rules of the committee say that if you are a member of a subcommittee then you 

get to ask questions first. We are joined by Mr. Inslee. He is going 

57 

to patiently wait until his time to come. So I would now recognize 

Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. Are you ready? 

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. No. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Then I will turn to Mr. Harper for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HARPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I have listened to 

your testimony in going through this process, you know, and I 

guess your Commission work was what, about a 2-year—— 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Two years. 

Mr. HARPER. Two years. And aren’t you glad it is over? 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Yes. 

Mr. HARPER. But we certainly thank you for investing that 

amount of time in what is a very emotional subject. Of course I 

have to say the idea of forming anything new up here is anything 

less than inspiring. And so to think about forming some type of 

new agency or organization I am not sure that we can endure perhaps another dysfunctional group, but perhaps this is where you 

have landed. 

I would like to just read to you something that was put out by, 

that was said by the Nuclear Energy Institute, Edison Electric Institute, American Public Power Association, National Rural Electric 

Cooperative Association, the National Association of Regulatory 

Utility Commissioners, and the Nuclear Waste Strategy Coalition, 

what they said last week about Yucca Mountain. We continue to 

believe that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s review of the 

DOE’s license application for the proposed Yucca Mountain in Nevada repository should be completed to determine whether it is a 

suitable site. You know, your report says that we need a geologic 

repository. 

Do you agree or disagree with those groups that we ought to take 

advantage of these billions of dollars that have been spent so far 

on Yucca Mountain and find out if it is indeed a suitable or unsuitable repository. 

Mr. HAMILTON. We—— 

Mr. HARPER. Do you want me to just move to the next question? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Look, a commission was formed. We operated 

under a mandate and under rules, we followed those rules, and the 

rules were we were not going to get into Yucca. 

Mr. HARPER. And certainly—but your duties are over, so I am 

asking the question. We have the beautiful report right here. So 

the question is should we with all the money, the billions of dollars 

that have been spent, should we not at least—does it not make 

sense to find out if it is indeed suitable or not? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me respond this way, and this is not really 

a direct answer to your question, but I think it is a fair response. 

There has been a feeling here for 30 years or more that once the 

next election comes the results of that election will be so decisive 

that Yucca Mountain will be resolved one way or the other. It 

hasn’t happened. It has not happened. Now, it may happen the 

next election. I don’t think it is likely, but it could happen. And 

that is a possibility. 

Our view, however, is that we have now had 30, 40 years experience, and as a country we have not been able to reach a solution 

to the problem. You can blame whomever you want to. I suspect 

there is plenty of blame to go along, and we have heard some speVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:12 Aug 20, 2012 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\112-00~1\112-10~2\112-10~1 WAYNE
58 

cific names just today. But the fact is that the process we are now 

following has not worked for whatever reason, and it continues to 

roll up huge costs for the American taxpayer. Liabilities explode 

into the future, and there are all kinds of damages to the American 

national interest. 

OK. We have to find a way forward. We have got to find a way 

forward to solve this problem. It could be the next election will 

solve it. I don’t think it will, but it could be. It hasn’t in the past. 

So we are operating on the assumption and the Commission that 

we had to try a new way forward and that is what we did. 

Mr. HARPER. You put a lot of emphasis on the consent-based 

process—— 

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes. 

Mr. HARPER [continuing]. On how to do, how someone should 

move forward on this. But it appears, certainly looking at the map 

that the chairman pulled up of local consent that is there, it met 

what appears to be that criteria, but yet someone else was able to 

intervene, whether that is the Senate majority leader or someone 

else. How do we get to the point of where we can actually make 

a decision on this? And I have to say Yucca Mountain has met that 

criteria yet it has been rejected. So my confidence level is not real 

strong, and my time is up, but it appears to me that we should 

complete this licensing process, get back on track and let’s find out 

if indeed it is a suitable process. 

I thank you both for your time. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair 

now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Gardner, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. GARDNER. I thank the chairman for the time. And thank you 

to the panel for being here and sharing with us your work, and certainly appreciate the work that you did. A couple of questions, and 

it has been touched on here a couple of times today already, and 

so I just want to maybe go into them a little bit further. So when 

you are looking for the most cost effective approach for new strategies that you discussed in the report, did you compare that to the 

time and cost to continue work to gain regulatory and public acceptance of Yucca Mountain? 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. No, we did not because we did not consider 

Yucca Mountain or any other site. We discussed a process. And 

going forward theoretically if our approach is accepted Yucca 

Mountain, Nevada can come forward and be evaluated on a consent 

basis like everybody else. 

Mr. GARDNER. But obviously the money we have already put into 

Yucca Mountain is significant? 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Oh, no question about that, no question about 

that. 

Mr. GARDNER. Your testimony states that finding sites where all 

affected units of government, including the host State or tribe, regional and local authorities and host community, are willing to 

support or at least accept a facility has proved exceptionally difficult. That is a quote from the report. So how do we ensure that 

a unit of government remains supportive of or committed to accepting a repository? 

59 

Mr. HAMILTON. I don’t think there are any guarantees here. 

Look, this process of siting, forget Yucca Mountain for a while, this 

process of siting is going to be a very difficult process. What we believe is that the Federal Government or any entity cannot force the 

decision down the throats of a local community, and that is exactly 

what the Congress has done. 

Mr. GARDNER. I mean, I have—— 

Mr. HAMILTON. That won’t work in our view. 

Mr. GARDNER. I have 15 metric tons of nuclear waste in my district. 

Mr. HAMILTON. How much? 

Mr. GARDNER. Fifteen metric tons, which is stored for Fort St. 

Vrain, which is being managed by the Department of Energy in 

Colorado. If we were to go forward with Yucca Mountain, if we 

were to go forward with the repository, it would be a safer place 

for that than stuck at St. Vrain. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I don’t know the conditions there obviously. 

Mr. GARDNER. But in general isn’t it better to have a repository 

than leaving it scattered across the country? 

Mr. HAMILTON. We believe it is better to have consolidated storage facilities and a repository in place. 

Mr. GARDNER. So we are more safe with a Yucca Mountain type 

facility than we are without it? 

Mr. HAMILTON. We are more safe with consolidated storage and 

a sound repository. 

Mr. GARDNER. And so how do we keep a party from later then 

refusing or somebody who is unable to perform under the agreement? Is there anything we can do under this analysis? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Sure. First of all, you can ask communities to 

volunteer. 

Mr. GARDNER. And if the community volunteers—— 

Mr. HAMILTON. And if you don’t get it then you may have to offer 

some incentives to get the communities to accept the waste. There 

are a lot of advantages to accepting waste. You create a lot of jobs 

in a community. That is the New Mexico experience. So there are 

techniques that can be used to persuade, if you would, among them 

the ones that I mentioned. 

Mr. GARDNER. And that leads I guess to another question. I have 

got ICBM sites in my district. And we are happy to have them part 

of our national defense. Jobs are created because of them. But what 

if we decided in Colorado that we no longer wanted those ICBMs 

there, would we have a choice, should we have a choice? 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. You know, I don’t think that is really a question 

for the Commission as it is a question for you all. I mean, you are 

the custodians of the Federal system under which we live. I would 

point out that next door in New Mexico the WIPP plant has been 

extremely successful and the local communities are leasing land because they hope to expand their role. So it is not impossible to do 

because they have found it very worthwhile to have a disposal site 

in their district. 

Mr. GARDNER. And I guess I would follow up with the findings 

of your report. What assurance or commitments do you have, conversations you have had with the administration that they will act 

on your recommendation? 

60 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. We have had none. 

Mr. GARDNER. OK. So this is a report that may just go into the 

Ethernet? 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. We were asked to produce a report and we have 

done the best that we are able to do. 

Mr. GARDNER. So have you consulted with Secretary Chu about 

the potential next steps by the agency? 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Oh, yes. 

Mr. HAMILTON. We have reported to the Secretary our findings. 

We have discussed them at some length with him and his advisors. 

We have reported to the White House staff. 

Mr. GARDNER. And what should we expect as a result of those 

reports? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, they can speak for themselves. I believe 

they recognize, first of all, that we have a very difficult problem 

that needs to be solved, that we haven’t found a way to solve it. 

And they take seriously our recommendations. I can’t cite a single 

person within the administration who says I endorse all of your 

recommendations. Are they receptive to it? Yes. Have they asked 

a lot of questions about it? You bet they have. And that is the appropriate role for them and for you. 

Mr. GARDNER. Have they given you a timeline? 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, we spell out a timeline in the report. We say 

for a consolidated storage facility 10 to 15 years, I believe, and for 

a repository 15 to 20. Those are guesses. But the point is that it 

is long term. This is not a problem that is going to be resolved in 

the next year or two. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time is expired. The Chair now 

recognizes the gentleman from Washington State, Mr. Inslee, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. INSLEE. Thank you, gentlemen, for your long public service. 

This is another step in that. We really do appreciate it. But coming 

from the State of Washington I have to say that I really am 

alarmed by the failure of public process and something that I just 

think is a disregard of the law in this instance that led to this 

Commission. And that is a serious issue. And that is serious language to use, but I think it fits this circumstance. We have seen 

NRC Chairman Jaczko order his Commission to shut down review 

of the Yucca application leading to further delays. And it is very, 

very troubling to me to see this very talented and dedicated Commission really directed from the start not to consider Yucca, which 

I believe to be the law of the United States of America. And you 

are not responsible for that, I want to make that very clear, as to 

where responsibility lies for this. But we have spent over $12 billion and 30 years moving forward in Yucca, and now we are at this 

point where we have a commission that I liken to sort of the group 

that is scouting the best NBA—since Representative Hamilton is 

one of our great all-star basketball teams I will just use that metaphor. It is kind of like asking you to scout for the NBA and told 

whatever you do don’t consider that Michael Jordan young guy. 

And I think that is the situation that we were in. And you can’t 

just do a good scouting job and not take a look at that young number 23. And this really hits home in my State. We are home to the 

61 

Hanford site, nine former nuclear reactors, we were a stalwart in 

the Cold War, and now we still have that residue in my home State 

and close to the Columbia River—53 million gallons of radioactive 

and chemical waste and 177 underground tanks at one time. We 

have been preparing and planning for Yucca for disposal since 

2002. I have got thousands of my State people getting this ready 

to ship to Yucca and it is going to be all dressed up and no place 

to go. And I have been working on this since the mid-1980s to not 

see my State become a de facto interim storage in substandard conditions. So this is of great concern to me. And I am really concerned that if we do require, quote, a consensus it basically is going 

to require my State to become a de facto repository for these wastes 

through my grandchildren’s, and I get a new one this week I hope, 

her lifetime. And I think that is the route we are on if we don’t 

follow the law. 

So I guess the first question I have, and I just want to make 

clear, does anything in this report suggest in any way that Yucca 

would not be suitable to consider for scientific reasons? 

Mr. HAMILTON. No. 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. No. 

Mr. INSLEE. I appreciate that. And by the way, I appreciate your 

personal service. I think you have articulated the position of the 

Commission well and the limitations of your decision. This is kind 

of a difficult situation for you, and you have been in difficult situations before. But I guess looking to the future if we are unable to 

reach the consensus that you have suggested perhaps we should 

look for, does it effectively make the current situation in the places 

that now house the waste the de facto permanent storage sites, 

permanent in the foreseeable future? Isn’t that a fair statement? If 

you share the view that I have that that consensus is going to be 

harder to find, then an obligation to follow the law which we have 

in place, doesn’t it make these places de facto permanent sites? 

Mr. HAMILTON. We visited Hanford. Those people were very gracious to us. And we had a hearing there. And I think all of the 

frustrations which you have expressed came out to us very strongly. And I don’t criticize them in the least for thinking that they 

could become a permanent site because they have had it so long 

and the risks, as you have said, to the Columbia River and elsewhere are real. The frustrations in our inability to resolve this 

problem are huge. There isn’t any doubt about that. And there are 

a lot of people who have very, very legitimate complaints. We listened to miles and miles of testimony expressing the frustrations 

people have with the way the Federal Government has handled the 

waste problem. And that is one reason we recommend a new organization, because we think the DOE can’t do it, it has lost credibility on it. So the frustrations are there. 

The question is, however, what do you do, how do you get out of 

the box? It is the law, you are correct, that Yucca Mountain is the 

repository. The only problem is we can’t enforce the law. That has 

not been a solution. It may be the law but we can’t enforce it. OK. 

Is that a good thing? No, it is not a good thing. It is always good 

if you follow the law. But you can’t. And you haven’t been able to 

for 40 years. Now, you can sit around and hope that it is all going 

62 

to be resolved if the next election breaks right. And that has been 

exactly the hope for 40 years and it hasn’t worked. 

Now, we got a problem, we got a problem in this country that 

is very, very difficult to solve. We don’t know if we got the answers 

here. We think we have got a good approach. And we think it is 

the only path on the table, if you would, to get us out of the box. 

And if you stand around and insist on Yucca, Yucca, Yucca, which 

people have been insisting on for a long, long time, but have not 

been able to pull it off, we think the result of that is an impasse, 

a failure to solve the problem. Where do you go? You can go for another 40 years and not solve the problem. We are trying to indicate 

a path forward. That is what we are trying to do. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time is expired. The Chair now 

recognizes the other Member from the great State of Washington. 

Cathy McMorris Rodgers is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And I too just want to say thanks for your work and thanks for 

being here. Like so many, I have been in and out. And I kind of 

want to— you know, coming from Washington State, we pay close 

attention to Hanford. And the part of the report that really suggests that a site like Hanford could become a de facto repository 

I think is what raises the greatest concern. And I would just—I 

would like to start by just asking what would you, what do you see 

is the future of Hanford then and what role do you see Hanford 

playing moving forward? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Look, I think you have got to give those people 

in Hanford some hope. It is exactly as Mr. Inslee said, they are so 

frustrated now because no progress has been made on this. The 

problem is getting worse and they have every right to be discouraged, frustrated and mad. What hope do we give them? The hope 

is that if you adopt our resolutions they will have the hope, a real 

one, of establishing a consolidated storage disposal—consolidated 

storage entity within 10 or 15 years, say. That is a rough guess. 

Now, that is something they haven’t had. And it gets them out of 

the feeling that they are going to be permanently dealing with this 

stuff. We think the process we have set forward gives them real 

hope, a genuine hope, which they don’t have today under present 

law. 

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. I guess what that approach ignores is 

the consent decree that has already been agreed upon with the 

Federal Government and a lot of concerns that have been raised 

about the location of Hanford next to the Columbia River and an 

agreement that was put in place that said we were going to move 

that waste off site and the importance of moving that waste off 

site. And so that is what we would concede to be the concern. And 

I am not sure that the fears and the anger will go away by simply 

just saying, OK, in 15 years—— 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, you are exactly right about that. Those 

fears—you can’t wave a magic wand here, you can’t undo the sins 

of the past, they are done, they are in place. All you can try to do 

is correct the problem. And that is what we are trying to do. Now, 

if you got a solution, and I am not pointing this to you directly, a 

better way to solve this problem, we are certainly open to it. 

63 

Mr. SHIMKUS. If the gentlelady would yield, I would suggest a solution would be for the administration to follow the law as written. 

With due respect to my colleagues, we understand that there is a 

1982 Waste Policy Act, we have 1987 amendments to that, we have 

votes. You want to talk about consent, Mr. Hamilton. Consent was 

decided here in Congress by numerous votes, whether that is the 

vote to fund the science study, which we had 297 Members of the 

House. We throw out the word Congress as—you know, Congress 

consists of two Chambers. The House has historically consistently 

spoken in support of Yucca Mountain. 

Mr. HAMILTON. That is right. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And what is interesting on the legislation to address the Nevada veto, that was a 306 to 117 vote. And do you 

know what the United States Senate did? They voice voted it, they 

voice voted it. So my question—and we are going to hear in the 

next panel some comments about it. This isn’t a failure of the 

science or the studies. And I would reject the premise that we have 

failed. My stated position is this President and this majority leader 

have failed to comply with the law, and that is why unfortunately 

they have asked you to spend a lot of good time, effort and energy 

covering their rear ends on this, and that is unfortunate. 

I yield back to my friend. 

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And I would just say I am hopeful that the courts are actually 

going to rule in favor of enforcing the law and that the administration’s efforts to terminate Yucca will actually be stopped and that 

they will require that the Yucca application proceed. So we will 

wait for that day. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentlelady yields back her time. And the 

Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Kinzinger, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all 

very much for your work on these issues and for coming in front 

of us today. I am glad we are talking about this. This is very important. It may not be on the national radar and the front page of 

the newspaper every day, but it is extremely important I think to 

the future of energy in this country. 

Actually, Illinois’ 11th district that I represent is the largest nuclear district in the country. We have three plants, six reactors, 

and we have a home of where there was originally going to be nuclear recycling in Morris, Illinois, which is now a spent fuel storage 

pool. So we have four areas where fuel is stored in my district. 

Given as how we have paid $15 billion into this fund, including 

many of the rate payers in my district, it has been now over a 

quarter of a century. So when I go back home to tell the people in 

my district that the Federal Government is responsible for the 

waste, how long should I tell them that it is going to take to create 

a corporation to build community consensus—I don’t have—there 

you go. Can you hear me now? It is red. Maybe I will move. 

Mr. GREEN. You are welcome to come to one of these mics on our 

side. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. That is the bipartisan nature of this subcommittee. 

Mr. KINZINGER. I am back. OK. Great. So as I was saying, when 

we talk about building the corporation, building community conVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:12 Aug 20, 2012 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\112-00~1\112-10~2\112-10~1 WAYNE
64 

sensus, constructing interim sites, what kind of a time scale are we 

talking about? I mean, the fear is we are talking another quarter 

century. And so as you continue to have waste buildup on-site it 

is a serious issue. So what are your all’s inputs in what you think 

this is going to take from a time perspective? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, creating a new organization will take legislative action. And we talked about that a little earlier today here 

I think with Chairman Barton. Neither he nor I think it can be 

done in 2012, and it is likely to be at least a 2-year and maybe 3- 

or 4-year project to create a new organization. Now, that doesn’t 

mean you don’t do anything between now and the time the organization is created. I think there are a lot of things that the DOE, 

and these are spelled out in detail in the report, can do now to 

begin to prepare for establishing a repository and a storage facility. 

Specifically in the report we take a guess and we say that in order 

to establish a storage facility you are talking 10 to 15 years and 

15 to 20 years on a repository, so you are talking about a long 

length of time. There isn’t any doubt about it. 

Mr. KINZINGER. The next question I had, in reading through the 

report I was disappointed with the Commission’s timeline for developing advanced reactors to recycle used fuel. I understand the report is based on a consensus and members had differing opinions 

on whether to recycle nuclear waste, but I would like to know 

would a demonstration project if we were able to get one off the 

ground and online, would that shorter the time estimate? Is that 

something you could see as being positive in bringing that technology closer? 

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Well, we had a panel, a subcommittee, look at 

this and they consulted the nuclear experts, if you will. And what 

we are doing is reflecting the best thought that our own nuclear 

scientists have presented. So what we say is we support a vigorous 

R&D program both in reactor development and in recycling, reprocessing spent fuel. But farther than that we wouldn’t go because 

that is not fundamentally what we were asked to do. 

Mr. HAMILTON. We want to keep options open in the future. And 

we believe a lot of advances in nuclear energy technology have the 

potential to deliver a lot of benefits. We don’t rule out R&D on recycling and reprocessing. This could be the answer. We think it is 

premature now to say that it is the answer, but it could be. And 

we certainly want to proceed with research and development on it. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. And I thank you gentlemen and 

would echo the chairman’s comments of earlier. I would love to see 

the law of the land become the enforced law of the land and would 

love to see Yucca Mountain opened up. But with that said, I appreciate your time and I yield back to the chairman. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. We would like 

to thank you for coming for 2 hours. If you had known you had to 

do this when you accepted the Blue Ribbon Commission mission, 

you may have said no. But again, with all sincerity it does for me 

personally to say if I am able to live long, to stay active, to stay 

vibrant, you guys are a credit to our country, and we do appreciate 

your time. We will dismiss this panel so you can get out of here 

before anyone else shows. And ask the second panel to come join 

us. 

65 

Thank you very much. 

We would like to thank our second panel for joining us and sitting through the first panel. I think we found that very informative 

and educational and I think that will add to the second one. 

What I would like to do is you all have 5 minutes for your opening statements. We know your formal testimony is submitted for 

the record, and I am going to do a basic introduction, and then we 

will move right through once I formally introduce you all here. 

First, we have Mr. Lake Barrett, President of L. Barrett Consulting; he is the former deputy director of the Civil Radioactive 

Waste Management of the U.S. Department of Energy, formally. 

Dr. D. Warner North is the president of NorthWorks, Incorporated, catchy name. A consulting professor in Stanford’s department of management and science engineering. Dr. North is a 

former member of the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board 

and a member of the board of radioactive waste management at the 

National Research Council. Welcome. 

Mr. Martin G. Malsch is a partner of Egan, Fitzpatrick, Malsch 

and Lawrence. Previously Mr. Malsch served as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s acting general counsel, deputy general counsel 

and inspector general. He represents the State of Nevada in litigation relating to Yucca Mountain testifying on his on behalf, welcome. 

Dr. Edwin Lyman, is that pronounced right? 

Mr. LYMAN. Yes. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Is a senior staff scientist for the Union of Concerned Scientists, Dr. Lyman’s research focuses on the prevention 

of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. We have Mr. Thomas A. Schatz is the president of Citizens Against Government 

Waste. And Mr. David A. Wright is the chairman of the board and 

the president of National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, he is also the vice chairman of the South Carolina Public Service Commission. Gentlemen, welcome and with that, we 

would like to start with Mr. Barrett, you have the time for 5 minutes for your opening statement. 

STATEMENTS OF LAKE H. BARRETT, PRESIDENT, L. BARRETT 

CONSULTING; D. WARNER NORTH, PRESIDENT AND PRINCIPAL SCIENTIST, NORTHWORKS, INC.; MARTIN G. MALSCH, 

PARTNER, EGAN, FITZPATRICK, MALSCH & LAWRENCE; 

EDWIN LYMAN, SENIOR SCIENTIST, GLOBAL SECURITY PROGRAM, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS; THOMAS A. 

SCHATZ, PRESIDENT, CITIZENS AGAINST GOVERNMENT 

WASTE; AND DAVID A. WRIGHT, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY COMMISSIONERS 

STATEMENT OF LAKE H. BARRETT 

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Chairman Shimkus, Ranking Member 

Green, and other members of the committee. Thanks for the opportunity to provide my personal views regarding the Blue Ribbon 

Commission’s recommendations. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act established a scientific regulatory and political administrative process for safely disposing of our Nation’s spent nuclear fuel and highlevel radioactive waste. And this process lawfully selected Yucca 

66 

Mountain as the Nation’s first repository site as the BRC properly 

states on page 12 of their report. 

Unfortunately, this administration has succumbed to politics and 

have reversed much of the process that has been made over last 

25 years. Although this Commission was created partially as a 

cover for the administration’s actions, it has produced a very 

thoughtful report with excellent useful recommendations that 

should be implemented regardless of the future of Yucca Mountain. 

It is not the fault of the BRC that they were not allowed to examine the obvious and lawful Yucca Mountain geologic repository 

disposal solution. Despite such a politically imposed shortcoming, 

they produced a well-reasoned report with excellent conclusions. I 

strongly urge the administration and Congress to act promptly to 

incorporate the BRC recommendations into our existing national 

program and get our Nation’s nuclear waste disposal program moving forward again. 

I strongly agree with the BRC’s finding that a solution to the Nation’s spent fuel management needs is urgently needed and the 

substantial cost of inaction is mounting every day. The BRC properly concludes that a national geologic repository is the foundation 

of any national spent fuel program. Although they were not allowed 

to say it, that site exists today at Yucca Mountain. They clearly 

confirm there is no new technological silver bullet that can replace 

the need for a geologic repository like a Yucca Mountain. Although 

they were prevented from considering Yucca Mountain, I believe 

most of their recommendations are applicable to Yucca Mountain. 

Clearly, everyone wishes that a consensus agreement could have 

been established between the Department of Energy and the State 

of Nevada. Clearly that was my personal goal when I directed the 

program. Unfortunately, political positions in those times prevented any meaningful negotiations to resolve Nevada’s issues. One 

step in the right direction today would be to finish the Yucca 

Mountain NRC licensing process in an open and transparent manner to independently resolve all of Nevada’s safety and environmental concerns. I am personally very confident that the site will 

be safe for well over a million years. 

Completing the nearly finished NRC licensing process would 

hopefully make safety evident to all Nevadans such a politicallydriven, fear-mongering sound bites would be seen for what they 

are, and a meaningful negotiation could be begin. Such a negotiation would lead to the necessary changes, assurances, and substantial benefits that Nevada deserves from the Federal Government 

for acting in the national interest. Such a binding agreement would 

be of great value and be of mutual benefit to all Nevadans and the 

rest of Nation as well. 

The BRC report properly highlights the need for Federal action 

to remove spent fuel which is stranded at shut-down nuclear reactors. To achieve this important goal in a timely, effective manner 

the BRC correctly recommends a partnership, consensus-based, 

consolidated interim storage facility. In my view, that process 

should start immediately. It is not a technical problem, it is a problem of our collective failure to act in our mutual national interest 

with respect to the host State. 

67 

DOE has the authority, under existing law and capability with 

its commercial contractors to act now on many of the BRC recommendations, such as working to develop consensus hosting partnerships. It is also a factor DOE’s commercial contractors made significant progress in developing over 10 State and local hosting expressions of interest for the past global nuclear energy partnership 

facilities. Although that program no longer exists, the volunteer 

hosting partnership concept fits perfectly with the BRC recommendations and our national needs today. 

DOE should now task their existing commercial nuclear contract 

support teams to engage with potentially interested communities 

and States to explore mutually beneficial hosting partnerships arrangements. This simple but important first step will begin the 

process of developing what I envision as a volunteer, integrated 

used nuclear fuel management R&D center, and possibly a volunteer host for the needed second geological repository. 

I believe this Nation stands at a critical ethical crossroad on nuclear waste management. We owe our grandchildren a protected 

disposal solution for used nuclear fuel in high-level radioactive 

waste that our generation has made. In my view, it is irresponsible 

to just continue kicking the problem down the road to the next generation just because someone has localized political pressure during 

a primary campaign. Solutions are at hand, and the Blue Ribbon 

Commission, despite its politically imposed restrictions, has provided useful actionable recommendations, that can greatly enhance 

and preserve what has already been achieved. Let us not waste 

this opportunity. Thank you. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Barrett. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Barrett follows:] 

68 


75441.030
69 


75441.031
70 


75441.032
71 


75441.033
72 


75441.034
73 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Now I would like to recognize Dr. North for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF D. WARNER NORTH 

Mr. NORTH. Thank you for this opportunity. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Dr. North, I think you need to press the little button there. 

Mr. NORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, now it is on. Ranking 

Member Green and other members of the subcommittee, I strongly 

endorse the BRC final report and its recommendations, the Commission and its staff have produced an excellent document within 

its scope. BRC states that national policy has, ‘‘been troubled for 

decades and has now all but broken down.’’ 

I would have preferred more clarity at the outset in this report 

as to where responsibility for this impasse lies. DOE, NRC and the 

Nuclear Waste Technical Review Boards worked diligently and 

commendably to implement the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. The impasse comes from the law established by Congress, inconsistency 

and national leadership, and opposition by State political leaders, 

especially Nevada. The impasse did not come from people like Lake 

Barrett and many others who have devoted many years of their 

professional careers to implementing the existing law in the work 

on Yucca Mountain. 

Much of BRC’s guidance is consistent with findings and recommendations of earlier reports. There are no major breakthroughs 

in understanding or from new technology. The Nation needs geological disposal, it is the only long-term solution. There is international consensus on how to do it. Many other nations are making 

progress. Our progress has stopped, our country has a liability of 

$50 billion, 30 billion from ratepayers in the nuclear waste fund. 

And my figure is from the 2011 financial report to the United 

States Government, plus 20 billion in legal penalties for failure to 

fulfill contracts. This number should not continue to grow. 

The new consent-based approach BRC recommends is not a new 

idea but one that has been around for decades. It would be new for 

the U.S. Federal Government, a change from existing law. 

Siting success is defined by BRC as a legally binding agreement 

among the parties. This is formalizing what was described in the 

Republican presidential candidates’ debate in Las Vegas as a pretty 

good deal. New Mexico negotiated a pretty good deal with the Federal Government on WIPP, more pretty good deals could restore 

U.S. progress. Deal-making is a societal or political matter, not 

overcoming technical challenges. Perhaps there will be some benefit to looking at flexible and significant incentives. The technical 

community should be assuring safety and minimizing cost, but this 

is not something where we can help a lot. 

Many State governments have opposed the siting of a nuclear 

waste facility in their State. Nevada established an organization to 

oppose such a facility, the Nevada Nuclear Waste Project Office in 

1985. According to the Web site, the mission remains the same, not 

improved scientific understanding and support for wise decisionmaking but opposition. In contrast, local government entities near 

Yucca Mountain such as Nye County have expressed support for 

74 

the facility. The presentation of the map I thought was most appropriate. 

Can the Federal Government go from opposition to pretty good 

deal with one or several States? During my service on a nuclear 

waste technical review board 20 years ago, DOE had a program in 

place that developed the system planning for packaging and transporting spent fuel which TRB reviewed and encouraged, but Congress cut the appropriations forcing this work to be deferred. A 

lead time on the order of a decade is needed before waste transport 

begins. For WIPP timely and effective advance planning for the 

transport of waste was done by DOE in cooperation with State and 

local agencies. 

DOE and the administration should carry out the steps in chapter 13, Congress should take steps needed to implement the recommendations, but more discussion and debate will be needed. 

DOE should designate a senior official as BRC has recommended. 

This senior official should be supported by staff and consultants at 

the same level of excellence as the staff and consultants who participated in the preparation of the BRC final report. Thank you. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. North follows:] 

75 


75441.035
76 


75441.036
77 


75441.037
78 


75441.038
79 


75441.039
80 


75441.040
81 


75441.079
82 


75441.080
83 


75441.081
84 


75441.082
85 


75441.083
86 


75441.084
87 


75441.085
88 


75441.086
89 


75441.087
90 


75441.088
91 


75441.089
92 


75441.090
93 


75441.091
94 


75441.092
95 


75441.093
96 


75441.094
97 


75441.095
98 


75441.096
99 

Mr. SHIMKUS. I would like to recognize Mr. Malsch for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MARTIN G. MALSCH 

Mr. MALSCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Minority Member Green and other members of the subcommittee. I appreciate 

the opportunity to provide testimony today regarding the Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future released just last week. My name is Marty Malsch, I 

am a partner in the law firm Egan, Fitzpatrick, Malsch & Lawrence which specializes in nuclear energy and nuclear waste matters. As the chairman has indicated, I do represent the State of Nevada on Yucca Mountain matters. My testimony today represents 

my own views and they do not necessarily represent the view of the 

State of Nevada. 

In accordance with the committee’s rules, I will proceed to offer 

a brief oral summary and would like to have my full testimony included in the record. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. MALSCH. The BRC studied the history of successful and unsuccessful attempts around the world to develop geologic repositories for radioactive waste. Its recommendations based on this 

study and other factors are thoughtful and well supported. We owe 

a debt of gratitude to the BRC members and the BRC staff for 

their willingness to serve, their dedication to the task, their openness to diversion of ideas and opinions and their careful analysis 

of problems and feasible solutions to the nuclear waste management issues confronting America today. 

While I generally support all of the BRC’s recommendations, I 

would like to focus my testimony today on four especially important 

and closely connected ones. First, I agree there should be prompt 

efforts to develop one or more geologic disposal facilities, although 

not in the sense that we need to select and license a repository in 

the near term. We are not facing any disposal crisis because vitrified high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel can be stored safely for 

a long time, but in many of the Nuclear Waster Policy Act organizing and staffing a new waste management organization, and implementing a new consent based site selection process as the BRC 

has recommended will take considerable time. We should start the 

process promptly especially the process to make necessary legislative changes. 

Second, the BRC recommended an adaptive stage facility licensing and development process whereby project managers are able to 

reevaluate earlier decisions and redesign or change course where 

new information warrants. This recommendation addresses, I believe, what is one of the key lessons from the past that premature 

commitments to one site should be avoided. There should be multiple opportunities to assess the quality of the technical program 

and the safety case supporting the decision-making process and to 

pull the plug when warranted. 

Third, I support the BRC’s recommendations that there should 

be a new organization devoted solely to implementing the waste 

management program. DOE has not performed well here and a 

new organizational approach is clearly needed. 

100 

Fourth and most important, the BRC recommended a new consent-based approach to future siting waste management facilities. 

I believe that a consent-based site selection process is not just good 

government, it is a frank concession to reality and one of the key 

lessons that must be learned from history. 

We should not assume that the objections of a host State or local 

government or Indian tribe will melt away and that they will be 

ready to deal if the NRC grants a license or construction authorization. Nor should we assume that the preemptive powers of the Federal Government are so great and that State and local rights and 

preferences are so undeserving of respect that a site can always be 

thrust upon an unwilling host State government or tribe. This 

means must be found to elicit the cooperation, or at least the acquiescence of the host State government or tribe. 

I agree with the BRC that a successful site selection decision will 

most likely result from the negotiations between the implementing 

organizations and the potentially affected governments and that it 

will be desirable for these negotiations to result in some form of legally enforceable agreement. I also recognize that a State, local or 

tribal government’s ability to veto a repository project cannot last 

indefinitely. Otherwise, the uncertainty of whether a project could 

ever successful would be so great that any significant investment 

and it would be imprudent. Ending the veto can be matter of subject negotiation between the waste management organization and 

the governmental entity. 

The BRC report includes a brief summary of the U.S. experience 

in developing geological repositories and draws some conclusions 

based on this experience. My written testimony adds some details 

about this experience focusing on Lyons, Kansas, and Yucca Mountain, Nevada. I believe these are worth considering because they 

add substantial context and support for the BRC’s recommendations and conclusions. 

In conclusion, almost everything that could go wrong with a geologic repository program in the United States has now gone wrong. 

It would be unfortunate if the nuclear power program in this country floundered because of because of poorly chosen policies for managing spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste. And the citizens 

living near DOE legacy sites deserved a better program than the 

one they got. The BRC has now offered and recommended a path 

forward. We have ample time to consider the BRC’s recommendations and get things right. Thank you for your consideration of my 

testimony. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Malsch follows:] 

101 


75441.041
102 


75441.042
103 


75441.043
104 


75441.044
105 


75441.045
106 


75441.046
107 


75441.047
108 


75441.048
109 


75441.049
110 


75441.050
111 


75441.051
112 


75441.052
113 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Now I would like to recognize Mr.—Dr. Edwin 

Lyman, sir, recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF EDWIN LYMAN 

Mr. LYMAN. Thank you. On behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists, I appreciate the opportunity to present our views on the 

recommendations on the Blue Ribbon Commission. I would like to 

thank Chairman Shimkus and Ranking Member Green and other 

members for hearing us out. 

The Union of Concerned Scientists is neither pro nor anti nuclear 

power, but we have served as a safety and security nuclear watchdog for over 40 years. We are deeply concerned about global climate 

and we have never ruled out an expansion of nuclear power to cope 

with those problems provided that it meets high standards of safety and security. However, the Fukushima Daiichi accident has revealed significant vulnerabilities in nuclear safety that really need 

to be addressed if nuclear is going to be a serious option in the future and the management disposal of the nuclear waste is clearly 

a major factor in that. 

Before proceeding, I would like to point out that UCS has never 

had a position for or against Yucca Mountain or any other site, we 

simply don’t have the geological expertise to be able to assess a 

site’s ability independently. We commend the Commission staff of 

the BRC for an excellent report and think they have addressed 

very well a very challenging set of issues. We reviewed all eight 

recommendations, and agree with most of them, but our greatest 

area is of agreement concerns, the absence of a recommendation. 

We were pleased to see that the Commission did to not call for an 

immediate change in U.S. long-standing policy not to reprocess 

spent nuclear fuel. So we do concur with BRC on that. 

UCS has long opposed reprocessing primarily because it produces 

Plutonium and other weapons-useable materials that greatly increase the risk of nuclear terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and at 

the same time, do not provide any benefits for waste management. 

Now we heard earlier about figures provided by AREVA that claim 

they can reduce the volume of nuclear waste for final disposal 

through reprocessing. I reviewed those numbers and I can say the 

factor of 4, which we heard earlier this morning is not technically 

valid and I would be happy to provide more details on that. 

Be also believe if the BRC had endorsed reprocessing, it would 

have send the wrong message to the rest of the world control, undermining efforts to control the growth of separated Plutonium. For 

instance, in Japan today, they are currently reconsidering the start 

up of a large reprocessing plant at Rokkashomura, which has been 

idle because of the technical problems and the ramifications of 

Fukushima. Japan already has 45 metric tons of Plutonium, of 

which 10 tons are in Japan that is on the order of a thousand Nagasaki-type weapons, Japan just simply doesn’t need any more Plutonium. And we are just glad that the BRC did not give the signal 

that would have given coverage to Japan for restarting that facility. 

On the recommendation for creating a new entity independent 

from Department of Energy, we agree with that, but we believe 

that it is very important to limit that entity to the constraints 

114 

called for in the report with, based on transports storage and direct 

disposal, spent fuel and high-level waste with only limited research 

and development to support those activities. 

We did disagree with the BRC on the urgent need for centralized 

interim storage. We still are not persuaded that there is a good 

reason to cite our new centralized interim storage facilities, either 

for operating or for shutdown reactors. And we are concerned that 

an effort could to distract from the goal of citing a geological repository. Simply too many moving parts, too many potential sites being 

considered, too much incentive money that would have to go 

around we think could really interfere with the goal of finding a 

repository which we think we agree as a fundamental requirement. 

We do think that spent fuel can be stored safely and securely for 

probably 100 years at reactor sites provided that the NRC upgrade 

its safety and security practices. 

In particular, we are continually concerned about the long-term 

storage of spent fuel in wet pools under densely-packed conditions. 

We believe that poses a greater threat of large radiological release, 

and we encourage the thinning out of those pools by transferring 

spent fuel into dry casks. Dry casks are safer but do need to be protected especially against sabotage, and we also call for increased 

protection against sabotage in dry cask facilities. 

Finally with regard to research and development, we believe a 

limited program of R&D on nuclear energy continues to be appropriate, but we think it needs to be focused, needs peer review, and 

that the merits of those programs need to be under constant observation so we don’t waste taxpayer money on options like reprocessing that have not shown to be successful in the past. I thank you 

and would be happy to take your questions. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Dr. Lyman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lyman follows:] 

115 


75441.053
116 


75441.054
117 


75441.055
118 


75441.056
119 


75441.057
120 


75441.058
121 


75441.059
122 


75441.060
123 


75441.061
124 


75441.062
125 


75441.063
126 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Now I would like to recognize Mr. Shatz for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS A. SCHATZ 

Mr. SCHATZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Green, 

other members of the subcommittee. My name is Tom Schatz, I am 

president of Citizens Against Government Waste. The organization 

was founded in 1984 by the late industrialist, J. Peter Grace and 

nationally-syndicated columnist Jack Anderson to build support 

through the implementation of the recommendations of the Grace 

Commission, which was established by President Reagan. CAGW 

was, as I said, founded in 1984, that was a year after President 

Reagan signed into law the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1983. And 

yet, we have certainly seen a lot of wasteful expenditures over the 

years, but the fact that we spent all this money and come up with 

zero in terms of anything being sent to Yucca Mountain is certainly 

one of the largest examples of wasteful spending we have ever 

seen. Usually we are looking at examples of ear marking a few million here and there, but we are talking about tens of billions of dollars that have been spent, and based on some of the estimates, possibly $100 billion, and now we have a Commission coming in and 

saying let’s pull the plug on all of this and start over. 

So we understand and appreciate the outrage that has been expressed by some of the members here today. And while we are usually pretty expressive about our concerns on this, maybe we understated some of the comments in our testimony. 

Yucca Mountain has been certified, nuclear waste fund has assessed ratepayers between 750- and $780 million each year since 

1983. As everybody has mentioned, $15 billion spent to evaluate 

sites to get Yucca Mountain going. We have 65,000 metric tons, 

and not one spent fuel rod has been sent to Yucca Mountain or 

anywhere else for permanent storage. 

And the fuel languishes at 75 sites in 33 States so it is a little 

difficult to hear people say we don’t have a problem, we can just 

leave it there. Clearly that is not only a problem, it is also against 

the law, because all of those facilities went into operation understanding that the fuel would be sent to a permanent repository. 

The White House, unfortunately, made good on President 

Obama’s campaign promise to close Yucca Mountain, no funding in 

the fiscal year 2011 budget, but the determination to close this facility was not based on science or technology. The administration 

stated the decision was predicated upon a proposed change of department policy for managing spent nuclear fuel, but they didn’t 

come up with an alternative plan except to call on some very distinguished gentlemen to create a commission and issue a report 

that took 2 years, cost $5 million at a time when another $2 billion 

in liability was assessed against the Department of Energy. 

The fact that the Commission couldn’t review the suitability of 

Yucca or evaluate any site certainly creates another problem because we are back starting over based on their recommendations 

with the new organization. Perhaps this new corporation will be as 

effective as maybe Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac or some other 

Federal corporation that’s done such a great job with our tax dollars over the years. 

127 

And we had consent, as the chairman’s chart showed, the local 

community said yes, the State of Nevada itself in 1975, the legislature said yes. So if we had a ‘‘consent-based agreement,’’ what is 

to stop that same community 10 years later from saying, no, we 

don’t it want in the middle of construction? This is a national issue. 

There is local consent, and as many have mentioned, there are a 

handful of people that are getting in the way of moving this forward. 

It seems that even the commissioners admitted that indirectly, 

that Yucca should have moved forward, at least the licensing 

should have moved forward because if we don’t do that, we are 

going sit here for another 10, 20, 30 years trying to figure out 

where to put all of this nuclear waste. 

Utility industry estimates it is a $50 billion liability, DOE says 

20 billion, but the Department of Energy estimate is based on a 

promise that Yucca would accept fuel in the next 8 years. Clearly 

that estimate is now quite low. 

There’s also a report sitting out there that has not been released, 

the safely evaluation report volume 3 the science-based and technology committee has it, I think taxpayers should see it. Because 

this will also establish the science on this issue and hopefully move 

some of the politics out of the way. 

The BRC noted that this generation has an ethical obligation 

avoid burdening future generations with the entire task of funding 

a permanent solution for hazardous materials. We agree, that burden should not be passed on to the next generation along with a 

lot of other burdens that are going to be passed on to the next generation based on Congress’s failure to act on other good ideas to cut 

spending. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Schatz. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schatz follows:] 

128 


75441.064
129 


75441.065
130 


75441.066
131 


75441.067
132 


75441.068
133 


75441.069
134 


75441.070
135 


75441.071
136 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And now I would like to recognize Mr. Wright for 

5 minutes, sir. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID A. WRIGHT 

Mr. WRIGHT. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman, Ranking 

Member Green. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Your microphone. 

Mr. WRIGHT. It is on, I believe, I will pull it closer. My name is 

David Wright, and I am a commissioner with the South Carolina 

Public Service Commission, and I serve as president of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners on whose 

behalf I am speaking today. NARUC and State utility commissions 

in 40 States served by nuclear generated electricity have been involved in the troubled history of nuclear waste disposal since 1983. 

That is when the utilities, which own the fuel, were required by the 

Nuclear Waste Policy Act, to enter into contracts with DOE. Those 

contracts called for payments of fees for nuclear-generated electricity to the Treasury for deposit into the nuclear waste fund to 

pay for the cost of disposal of used fuel beginning in 1998. 

Disposal has not happened, but the fee payments continue to be 

made. Or as a former Florida utility commissioner summarized the 

status in 1991, the government has our money, we have their 

waste. It is now 20-plus years later, and we still have the government’s waste. 

Utilities passed the cost of the fees to their customers through 

their electric bill. In addition, and because of the government’s failure to open Yucca, customers, through their rates, have had to pay 

additional amounts to cover the cost of reracking utility spent fuel 

pools to accommodate more spent fuel. And have had to pay for onsite dry cask storage as well as the increased security required 

there. 

Moreover, all taxpayers, through the judgment fund, have had to 

pay damages for the lawsuits brought to date as well as those to 

come. In 2009, the administration pronounced Yucca Mountain not 

a workable option, and that it intended to terminate the repository 

development there, a position contrary to the law of the land. In 

March 2010, DOE asked the NRC’s Atomic Safety Licensing Board 

for permission to withdraw the application with prejudice. In June, 

the ASLB rejected the request. The decision was appealed to the 

NRC. While the NRC was disposing of the license matter the President directed that the Secretary of Energy appoint the Blue Ribbon 

Commission on America’s nuclear future to consider and recommended a new strategy, a strategy that soon became evident 

would be a post-Yucca strategy. 

In 2010, NARUC and several other parties petitioned the Court 

of Appeals under the NWPA, to challenge DOE’s authority to withdraw the Yucca Mountain license application, but the case dismissed because there had been no final agency action by the NRC 

on the appeal of the board’s decision rejecting DOE’s request. The 

NWPA mandates that once the Yucca Mountain license was submitted. The NRC had only 3 years to complete the review proceedings, those 3 years have expired. Currently, the NRC faces a 

mandamus action to force it to complete the required review in the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia circuit. NARUC 

137 

is one of several petitioners in that suit. Our reply briefs were filed 

last Friday. 

Notwithstanding, our pro Yucca position, NARUC was closely involved in the work of the BRC, we wrote letters, gave testimony, 

provided comments to the subcommittee and attended the public 

meetings. As for the recommendations, we have the following 

points: 1, reform with nuclear waste fund is, essential; 2, regardless of Yucca Mountain, we will need another new repository. The 

lessons of Yucca and others suggest the consent-based siting approach may get better reports but will require patients; 3, we have 

long favored consolidated and home storage on a parallel track 

with Yucca, but find the report vague as to quantity, duration and 

cost as well as what the effect will be on the fee if the nuclear 

waste fund is to be used to pay for storage; 4, we agree with the 

concept and benefits of a new Federal corporation that can focus 

solely on the waste management mission; 5, transportation planning and coordination with States and others cannot begin soon 

enough. 

There are two areas where we disagree with the Commission report. A, the report says, ‘‘Overall we are confident that our waste 

management recommendations can be implemented using revenue 

streams already dedicated for this purpose.’’ There are no cost estimates to substantiate that belief, which likely also assumes the 

$26.7 billion under the nuclear waste fund is assured; B, the report 

further says, ‘‘We know what we have to do, we know we have to 

do it, and we even know how to do it.’’ While we may wish that 

were true, our assessment is that there were too many people who 

are content to pass the problem along to future generations and 

leave the waste where it is. Continuing to kick the dry cask down 

the road should not be an option. 

So yet another study calls for prompt action, yet despite on paper 

a financing plan, implementation relies on leadership from the administration and the Congress. NARUC stands ready to assist on 

behalf of ratepayers who may not even realize it, but they are already paying for safe waste disposition. Thank you for listening. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wright follows:] 

138 


75441.072
139 


75441.073
140 


75441.074
141 


75441.075
142 


75441.076
143 


75441.077
144 


75441.078
145 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you. Now I would like to recognize myself 

for the first 5 minutes of questions. And just to follow up, Mr. 

Wright, I would cut the Blue Ribbon Commission a little slack because I think they do know what they need to do, long-term geological repository; they do know how to do it because Yucca Mountain is there to do it. So I think in them saying that, that—I mean, 

that they were very careful if you read the whole document in saying, no, we are not supposed to, but we are not limiting it and stuff 

like that. 

So let me first start with Dr. Lyman just as an aside, I appreciate your testimony. I have had some good battles with your organization on climate. But your position on nuclear power and carbon 

dioxide emissions, it is very clear: If we are going to go in that 

route, if electricity generation is boosting 30 percent or 27 percent 

in 30 years and you keep the same ratio of 20 percent electricity 

generation, that would be 37 new nuclear power plants, that just 

exacerbates the problem we have with nuclear waste. Whether we 

go in that direction I don’t know because of natural gas and things. 

But I did appreciate your testimony. I wanted to give Mr. Barrett 

and Dr. North a chance to comment on comments from the first 

panel. 

Mr. Barrett, do you have anything you want to publicly say 

about our 2 esteemed members of the commission who were before 

us? 

Mr. BARRETT. I believe they are great public servants to America 

and have done many great things and they deserve a lot of praise 

for a job well done. I am very unhappy and disappointed that they 

were constrained so due to the political actions of this administration. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. I like both, and I want to key on because you could 

tell, I got frustrated at the end when they kept stating how we 

have failed to act. And we have known a long time in this process, 

it does take a long time. We are right at the cusp of really doing 

that. And now I think the frustration—Dr. North, in your testimony, you hit the nail on the head and you have said we have had 

long working public servants over decades to get here now because 

of the fault of who? The politicians were not there. 

Mr. NORTH. I have to say as once his critic when I was on the 

TRB, there has been a lot of oversight and criticism and get it right 

on DOE from lots of places, including the Nevada Waste Project Office. On TRB meetings, I was amazed how much they would come 

in and try to help pointing out technical problems on Yucca so that 

we could find solutions to them. So there has been a huge investment here by the technical community, but the issues I thought 

former Congressman Hamilton spoke to about the difficulty of electoral politics in the United States and getting a large enough majority in the Congress to override the present majority leader in the 

Senate, is that politically realistic? We might hope and pray for it, 

but it seems to me that what the presidential candidates have been 

saying, we need a pretty good deal, maybe a good place to back up 

to and think about what might be done, either in Nevada or in 

other sites. 

For example, the State of Washington, the basalt rock was considered as a potential host site when DOE was looking at five sites 

146 

and picking three, and I was brought in to be a consultant on the 

methodology they were using to make the choice. Or New Hampshire, we were looking at granite as the rock for the second repository program. On the eve of a presidential primary, the second repository program went away. It seems to me these are failures in 

leadership rather than failures in the technical community. And if 

States wish to submit a bid because they think it will be a pretty 

good deal, we definitely need to talk. New Mexico is talking, maybe 

other States will be attracted to this, maybe even Nevada. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. My time is short. Let me go—how many of you 

would agree that the nuclear waste fund mechanism should be 

fixed so that managers of it can have access to the money paid into 

it, yes or no. Mr. Barrett? 

Mr. BARRETT. Yes. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Dr. North? 

Mr. NORTH. Yes. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Mr. Malsch? 

Mr. MALSCH. Yes. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Dr. Lyman. 

Mr. LYMAN. Yes. 

Mr. SCHATZ. Yes. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Very good. My time has expired. I now would like 

to turn to my ranking member, Mr. Green, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. I have a number of questions, but first, let me say 

politics in Washington, we are shocked that is being done. We have 

a President who campaigned in Nevada saying he was going to 

shut down Yucca, we have the majority leader in the Senate saying 

that. We know what happens in New Hampshire, it is an early 

State, that is why we have Iowa with corn subsidies, ethanol, 

which coming from my part of the country, I am not a big ethanol 

person, as our chairman knows, so that is the dilemma we are in. 

And the Blue Ribbon Commission gave us somewhat of a way we 

can get out of it. 

I have been to Yucca Mountain, I think some day, Senator Reid 

will not be there anymore than any of us will be here and that will 

be a possibility. But between now and then, we need to get serious 

about doing particularly interim storage facilities so we take it out 

of our site base that we are doing. It is not just in the United 

States. 

I was surprised last year because of what happened in Japan, 

Germany are now shutting down their nuclear power plants. So I 

guess they will buy more gas from Russia, or maybe they will frack 

it because there are some places in Eastern Europe that have 

shale. 

So politics is part of our governance, and we have to deal with 

it and sometimes we have to survive. And that will change, and 

that is what elections are about. 

Mr. Malsch, one of my concerns is consent-based process necessary and how it could help with the potential approval of some 

type of Yucca Mountain-type facility in the future. After spending 

time in Nevada in talking with New Mexico Members of Congress, 

even though the southern part of New Mexico likes what is going 

on now and would like to expand it, nobody thinks that the New 

Mexico legislature will approve it. And so if we are considering conVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:12 Aug 20, 2012 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00150 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\112-00~1\112-10~2\112-10~1 WAYNE
147 

sent-based on some legislative body, we will be back where we are 

in Nevada with everybody who runs for office in Nevada, Republican or Democrat, says I am against Yucca, so you will see the 

same thing, not in my backyard. In fact, Congressman Bass talked 

about it in New Hampshire. 

If we base it only on consent, we will not get there, that is where, 

I think, the frustration was in the 1980s when Congress made that 

decision for Nevada, because they couldn’t get anyone else to settle 

on it. 

I don’t want to rehash the history, but in your testimony you 

offer a few key lessons on efforts to site repositories in Kansas and 

Nevada that we could apply to move forward to a new strategy. 

First, you suggest the Federal Government not commit to repository until the appropriate scientific investigation is complete. That 

seems a no-brainer that we should do that. Can you explain how 

the Federal Government failed to heed this lesson in both Kansas 

and Nevada and how, if we change, the likelihood of success? 

Mr. MALSCH. Well, certainly in Kansas, the AEC pressed forward 

in the face of—with only very incomplete investigations and didn’t 

pay sufficient attentions to the advice of experts in Kansas, including the Kansas geologist. And ultimately the project failed. 

In the case of Yucca Mountain, the Congress decided that Yucca 

would be the only site to be studied and characterized in the face 

of incomplete information, and information was even incomplete 

when the President recommended the site to the Congress because 

it took another 6 years even to complete the license application 

after the site recommendation was made. 

I think I agree with the Blue Ribbon Commission that there has 

to be an iterative process in which decisions are made on an 

iterative step-wise basis consistent with the level of information 

available. It would be one thing for a State or community or tribe 

to agree, for example, to have a site investigated; quite another to 

agree prior to the completion of the investigations with repository 

or even for that matter, centralized storage facilities. You have to 

go step by step, you can’t ask too much in the earlier stage. I think, 

really, that premature commitments its Lyons, Kansas and Yucca 

greatly eroded the credibility of the program, and I would hate to 

see that repeated again. 

Mr. GREEN. I am going run out of time. There is a history of Congress overriding States’ decisions, and obviously the Yucca Mountain is one of them, but the 2005 energy bill that we passed on 

siting at that time, we needed importation of L&G, and a great 

many States would not allow those facilities to be built, obviously 

Texas and Louisiana we build them everyday. We took away that 

permission and Federalized that permitting process, because our 

country in 2005 needed natural gas. Now some of those plants are 

actually retooling to export it. 

So there are times where the Congress makes a decision for the 

country and doesn’t necessarily get the consent of the local States, 

but we have to have a process that gives them time, but I think 

there is a National imperative we have to have some place to put 

nuclear waste instead of storing it where we have it now. Thank 

you. 

148 

Mr. SHIMKUS. I agree, I think that is the debate on eminent domain, local people have—that someone has to make some decision 

sometimes. I would now recognize my colleague from Ohio, Mr. 

Latta, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LATTA. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you gentlemen for being here this afternoon and this morning. If I could 

start with Mr. Wright. There were some suggestions made to the 

Commission that instead of using geologic repositories or central 

interim storage facilities, that they should be—maybe the waste 

should be held on site and hardened on site storage. Do you have 

any comments on that? 

Mr. WRIGHT. Well, I don’t think that is a good idea. You know, 

when you talk about harden on site storage, that is not what was 

mandated by the Nuclear Waster Policy Act nor is that what the 

contracts that all the utilities which own the fuel are compelled to 

enter with DOE. 

There are technical and operational factors that should be considered, and this little added benefit to the cost. And it is probably 

well intended the process, but it is a little—I don’t know, it begs 

the question and then what, and you miss the opportunities, I 

think, to take advantage of consolidation of fuel and the associated 

economies of scale that come with that. 

Mr. LATTA. Thank you. Mr. Barrett, what should we expect to see 

out of DOE next if this administration is going to take the Commission’s recommendation seriously? 

Mr. BARRETT. I hope Secretary Chu directs the staff to move forward on things that the BRC has recommended, start the consensus process, let’s see if it is going to work, let’s see if they bring 

in a consensus site. We know the issue is not with the locals. We 

know the issue rests in the State capital. Santa Fe has not spoken 

to New Mexico yet. Let’s find out, will they speak in a reasonable 

condition. So let’s start the consolidated storage process. Let’s move 

forward, they can do it under existing law, and I hope the Secretary does it very soon. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Would the gentleman yield for one second? 

WIPP is not high-level waste. We have to make that clear. We 

are making them synonymous, and they are not. 

Mr. BARRETT. That is absolutely true. WIPP is only defense true 

waste, is not high-level waste at all, but the people in the southeast 

of New Mexico have aspirations to do that. 

Mr. LATTA. Let me ask the other panelists, what should the DOE 

action be that would demonstrate concrete and rapid action take up 

on these recommendations? Anyone? 

Mr. NORTH. I think in the near-term, they can provide the staff 

support for discussion on these issues and we will need a good deal 

of such discussion. But until the money is made available to go forward, for example, the planning of the packaging and the transportation will be very difficult. The problem here is that spent fuel is 

stored in dry casks and can be moved only in very special transporting casks. 

Some of these casks can be designed in such a way to serve multiple purposes, but they are very expensive, they are very heavy 

and if you have an accident involving them, you really want the 

State and local authorities to know how to handle that. So for 

149 

WIPP with a much easier transportation problem for transuranic 

waste, this was done over the period of a decade with a lot of funding and a lot of cooperation between the parties. The process was 

put on hold for transporting and packaging spent nuclear fuel. It 

needs to be restarted and in my judgment it will take at least a 

decade to get it to where we need it for doing the transport wherever it is going to go, an interim storage facility or a geologic repository. 

Mr. LATTA. Anyone else? 

Mr. MALSCH. I would like to add to what Dr. North just said that 

the Commission has recommended a number of actions, that could 

be implemented administratively without legislation to deal with 

the unfortunate status and use of the nuclear waste line. I think 

those things should be considered promptly. 

Mr. LATTA. Well, let me ask this to the panelists again that, I 

have sat through a lot of hearings in here with NRC and DOE. 

With the administration’s track record right now, do you think 

there will be any stalling or delaying to get this thing done? Anyone? 

Mr. BARRETT. I hope not. There is a big responsibility that they 

have when they swore their oaths of office to uphold the law. I 

hope that Secretary Chu now that he has the results from the BRC 

which doesn’t show any new path forward that we ever thought of 

before, and we have always thought about consultation cooperation 

agreements that he would resume licensing and move forward. 

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Wright, and I know, Mr. Chairman, my time has 

expired, but he was going to answer, Mr. Wright. 

Mr. WRIGHT. If it is appropriate. You know, it is going to take 

leadership on a number of levels, all across this country to get moving, but I think that we need to—we have got to move forward with 

things as simple as providing funds just for the completion of the 

license app, that is a simple thing to do. But we also need to take 

what is in the BRC and look at what we can all agree on and move 

forward on, rather that wait for some giant legislative package to 

come through, because I think the bigger the package, it probably 

is going to move very, very slow. So I think we need to be a little 

bit specific in what everybody can agree on and move forward. 

Mr. LATTA. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired and 

I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana for 5 minutes. 

Dr. CASSIDY. Mr. Malsch, you may have addressed this earlier, 

I was in a committee hearing earlier, but Chairman Shimkus put 

a thing up there, he asked what is local; and he showed how all 

these surrounding counties in Nevada actually favor this project. 

But, obviously, Senator Reid does not and he has effectively used 

his power to kill it. 

So let me just ask you what is local? Is it the people that live 

next door, in the next county, in the next two counties, or is it the 

Senator that represents. 

Mr. MALSCH. Well, I think that—I mean, it obviously includes 

the people that live and work closest to the facility, but it also includes the people, as I have stated, as a whole, because the facility 

150 

can impact the State as a whole, not only in terms of its own operations but in terms of the transportation that is necessary. 

Mr. CASSIDY. That is true of the entire country, correct? 

Mr. MALSCH. That is true of the entire country. 

Mr. CASSIDY. And if you bring this in from Georgia and you were 

to bring it all the way across, assuming it is I–10, you are going 

to affect my State, Louisiana. So again, theoretically somebody in 

India is affected. So do we have a workable definition of local more 

workable than anyone that may potentially be affected? 

Mr. MALSCH. Well, I think the Commission recommended a negotiation process and an iterative consent-based process that involves 

the State, local governments and Indian tribes. I think the relationships among those is going to vary. 

Mr. CASSIDY. Now, at some point though, one of my favorite 

quotes—I don’t mean to interrupt, I only have 3 or 4 minutes left— 

is a Samuel Johnson quote: ‘‘No one likes change, even from worse 

to better.’’ Now, I can see it is easy for some well funded group to 

whip up emotional opposition, particularly when there are reports 

that are not being released that may show the safety of this 

project. So I am a little bit kind of concerned that as long as there 

is somebody well funded who wants to show pictures of mutant animals that we won’t have—so going back to my definition, what is 

local? If it is not the country surrounding and the county surrounding the counties which surround, indeed what is local? 

Mr. MALSCH. Well, I think that has to be worked out on a facility-by-facility basis, but I think you have to include both the local 

governments, Indian tribes and the State just as a practical matter. As the Commission said here this morning, this is not going 

to be easy, it is going to be very difficult, but I really do see it as 

the only reasonable path forward. 

Mr. CASSIDY. Is it a path or is it a dead end? I am asking that 

not rhetorically, but I mean, because you obviously are an attorney 

representing the State of Nevada, you got a position, I understand 

that. At the same time knowing the emotional aspect of this, it just 

seems almost like almost it can’t happen as long as you define local 

so broadly. 

Mr. MALSCH. Well, I really think we should not be so discouraged. I mean, it has worked reasonably well in the case of one geologic disposal facility in New Mexico. It worked and is apparently 

working in several foreign countries. 

Mr. CASSIDY. And I gather from the earlier testimony that it 

worked there because they have a different structure so the central 

government was better able to impose its will upon a State government; is that correct or incorrect? 

Mr. MALSCH. I am sorry, are you talking about foreign countries? 

Mr. CASSIDY. Yes. In Spain, for example, the Federal Government can make a decision the province could not object sort of 

thing. Is that correct? I don’t know that. I am just asking. 

Mr. MALSCH. I am not sure that is correct. I would have to go 

back and read the report. 

Mr. CASSIDY. Let me go back to—thank you—Mr. Wright. I have 

read Dr. Lyman’s testimony so I am familiar with that. Going back 

to the reprocessing question which we had earlier, again, if you 

read AREVA, which I gather Dr. Lyman objects to theirs, but I am 

151 

sure it would be vice versa. But you also said that you are not sure 

that the reprocessing is ready for prime time. I ask this not as an 

advocate but as someone who is curious. Why would you not say 

it is not ready? Do you not believe AREVA, but you do believe Dr. 

Lyman, or you see where I am going with that? 

Mr. WRIGHT. I guess to be really clear about it, I mean, the technology, it depends on what you are going to be picking, what technology you are looking at. You know, are you looking at some new 

generation of technology. So until we kind of determine which way 

we want to go there I believe that is what we mean. I don’t think— 

we haven’t been—we haven’t picked one yet or even several to 

choose from. You know, they are doing—we used to have the technology and now France has it. 

Mr. CASSIDY. But at the French I understand there AREVA has 

even proposed as a private entity to set up a reprocessing plant, 

which obviously logically would be right next to a regular nuclear 

power plant, if you will. They seem to feel like they have it. And 

I know that Dr. Lyman objects to this but they claim that they are 

reducing the amount of waste. 

Mr. WRIGHT. Well, there is no question it would probably reduce 

the amount of waste and probably what would be left if you did it 

in a way that you took care of the proliferation issues, the half 

lives would be less, you have less waste. I mean, that is just common sense that would tell you that would probably be the case. 

How much that reduces I don’t know. But DOE was looking and 

exploring something a number of years ago with the GNEP program. And they went around to places, including one in South 

Carolina, around Akin, where we had a big meeting, a willing host 

site. But it was a willing host site for the fabrication of the fuel 

and also for a reactor, and then as long as it was an approved 

pathway out to a geological repository with the waste that was left. 

Because no matter what you do in a commercial back end of the 

cycle you are going to have waste. That stands alone from the defense waste which is not a candidate for reprocessing. And we are 

going to have defense waste no matter what. We got to put that 

somewhere. 

Mr. CASSIDY. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Dr. North, I was curious, you were looking at this 

book and it looked like you wanted to comment. 

Mr. NORTH. Yes. I was going to say the National Academy of 

Sciences did an exhaustive study on separation and reprocessing in 

1996. My committee, the 2001 National Academy Report, looked at 

this issue, and we had access to the same staff who had done the 

investigations earlier. So the BRC cited in an end note our committee’s report in this area. The problem is the geologists became too 

good at finding high grade uranium ore. So using plutonium and 

mixed fuel is too expensive. It is an economic issue. But several 

hundred to let’s say 1,000 years from now we may have depleted 

all the high grade uranium ore. And at that point being able to retrieve spent nuclear fuel and reprocess it then may be economically 

very important. And the fission products will have died way down 

and so less radioactivity, it will be easier to do it. 

So I think there is a very strong argument for retrievability. 

Even if reprocessing isn’t economic now, it may become so in the 

152 

future. And ask the French and the British and maybe the Japanese about the economics of their present process and I think they 

will tell you that it is a problem. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you. That is very, very helpful. We are 

going to end here. Instead of just placing this in the record I just 

want to reiterate a couple things. On the House vote to override 

the Nevada disapproval in May 2002, that vote was 306 to 117. As 

I said before, the override was a voice vote in the U.S. Senate, 

which I found amazing. I also want to put the report language out 

of the House, just highlighting Congress is both of us but there are 

two chambers. In the report language for the House to pay for the 

BRC study, I quote, therefore, the committee makes the $5 million 

for the Blue Ribbon Commission available provided that Yucca 

Mountain is considered in the review. That was pulled out by the 

Senate. We are just again addressing the facts. Finally, we did 

have an appropriation vote to fund the scientific study co-authored 

by my colleague from Washington State. That vote on the floor was 

306 to 117. 

The House has spoken numerous times that it is the will of the 

House that we move forward on Yucca Mountain, and we hope that 

we can get there some day in the near future. With that, I do appreciate your time, I look forward to working with you in the future, and with that I will adjourn the hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

Æ