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i 

73–441 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–115] 

REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION OF ANOTHER BRAC ROUND AND ADDITIONAL 

REDUCTIONS IN OVERSEAS BASES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 8, 2012 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

BILL OWENS, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

DAVID SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

BRIAN GARRETT, Professional Staff Member 

NICHOLAS RODMAN, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, March 8, 2012, Request for Authorization of Another BRAC Round 

and Additional Reductions in Overseas Bases .................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, March 8, 2012 ........................................................................................ 39 

THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 2012 

REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION OF ANOTHER BRAC ROUND AND 

ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS IN OVERSEAS BASES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 2 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Bishop, BG Christopher D., Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Plans, Department of Defense ....................................................................... 7 

Lepore, Brian J., Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office ............................................................................. 8 

Robyn, Dr. Dorothy, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations 

and Environment, Department of Defense ........................................................ 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 43 

Lepore, Brian J. ................................................................................................ 61 

Robyn, Dr. Dorothy ........................................................................................... 46 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Chart distributed by Dr. Robyn ...................................................................... 91 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 95 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 99 

Mr. Courtney ..................................................................................................... 101 

(1) 

REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION OF ANOTHER BRAC 

ROUND AND ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS IN OVERSEAS 

BASES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 8, 2012. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:04 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON READINESS 

Mr. FORBES. We want to welcome all of our members and our 

distinguished panel of experts to today’s hearing that will focus on 

the administration’s request for another Base Realignment and 

Closure round. I want to begin by apologizing to all of our witnesses for the fact that we have had to delay this because of our 

votes. Thank you so much for your patience and putting up with 

that delay. 

And I welcome this discussion to assess whether our facilities 

and infrastructure are aligned with our force structure, but to answer this question I think we need to assess the size of our Armed 

Forces. In my estimation there are two courses of action for Congress to consider. While our military exists in an era of peace and 

tranquility that includes reducing the size of our Armed Forces or 

one that presumes the changing security environment will challenge our strategic objectives and require a robust military to provide peace and stability. 

One does not need to look too far in our past to predict our future. Countless intelligence estimates underscore the fact that we 

will be challenged in any number of regions and by numerous nongovernmental entities. The proliferation of nuclear capabilities as 

sought by Iran and North Korea, the emerging influence of an expanding People’s Republic of China, and the continued instability 

in Afghanistan, Syria, and Libya all point to an uncertain future 

where our Nation’s Armed Forces will be called upon to provide 

stability. 

I believe in maintaining peace through strength. I believe that a 

strong economy requires a strong military to protect the free flow 

of goods around the world. And I believe in American exceptionalism. 

My friends, it is for these reasons that I believe our Nation is 

charting the wrong course with these sweeping military reductions. 
2 

The President’s new strategic guidance departs from a bipartisan 

strategy that has been in existence for nearly two decades. 

The shortsighted, budget-driven imperatives underpinning this 

strategy presume our military will not be required to prevail in two 

simultaneous regional engagements. Again, in my estimation this 

direction is fraught with danger and will place American interests 

as well as American lives at risk. 

Let me be very clear: I will oppose any initiative that seeks to 

undermine the preeminence of our military. I will oppose any effort 

that breaks faith with our service members and veterans. And I 

will oppose any effort that seeks to diminish the capabilities of our 

service members in favor of an expanded social agenda. 

The administration presumes that our military will go quietly in 

the night. Thus far, the silence of our uniformed leadership on this 

issue has been deafening. Speaking for myself and what I believe 

is the majority of Americans, our Nation cannot afford additional 

reductions in our military. 

As to the request that is before our subcommittee this morning, 

I look forward to better understanding the reason the administration believes that another round of base closures is necessary. In 

my initial assessment of this issue I believe that our current force 

structure is correct and our infrastructure is adequately sized for 

our future force. If the administration presumes that a reduced 

force structure is required to meet our future security challenges 

and cite this as the principal reason for this BRAC [Base Closure 

and Realignment] request I must move to vigorously oppose another round of BRAC. 

Joining us today to discuss reasons for another round of base closure are three very distinguished individuals, and we appreciate 

their expertise and their willingness to be here today. Dr. Dorothy 

Robyn is the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations 

and Environment. Brigadier General Christopher D. Bishop is the 

Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans. And Brian 

Lepore, Director, Defense Capabilities Assessment, the U.S. Government Accounting—Accountability Office. 

Once again, ladies and gentlemen, we thank you all for being 

here. 

And I now recognize my good friend, the ranking member, Ms. 

Bordallo, for any remarks she may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE 

FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Robyn, welcome. Welcome to our subcommittee. I have appreciated the opportunity to work closely with you over the past 3 

years on issues pertaining to the realignment of Marines on Guam 

as well as some environmental issues. 

General Bishop, thank you for your service and for appearing before the committee this morning. 

And also, I welcome Brian Lepore, from GAO [U.S. Government 

Accountability Office], back to our subcommittee. 
3 

Today our subcommittee is going to receive testimony on an issue 

that evokes a lot of passion and concern from our members. Many 

of us remember BRAC 2005 and some even previous BRAC rounds. 

As the former Lieutenant Governor of Guam, I remember working 

hard to protect the bases on Guam. 

And I have also found it very ironic that despite BRAC rounds 

on Guam, the Department of Defense continues to seek private or 

Government of Guam land to meet training requirements on the island. I think this serves to highlight how shortsighted the BRAC 

process can be given the dynamic nature of our military requirements. 

However, from my personal experience I am deeply concerned 

about the administration’s intent to request another BRAC round. 

A 2007 GAO report and analysis indicated that the annual net recurring savings for the BRAC 2005 round was $4.0 billion while 

total costs for that BRAC round increased 66 percent, from $21 billion to $35 billion, compared to the BRAC Commission’s reported 

estimates. 

Moreover, GAO estimates indicated that cumulative BRAC 2005 

savings would not exceed cumulative costs until 2018. Due to the 

significant upfront costs associated with BRAC and the length of 

time to see a payback, how can we afford another BRAC round, 

given the funding reductions mandated by the Budget Control Act? 

Furthermore, our discussion about overseas basing posture is 

very important for the current and future security of our Nation. 

As we decrease our operational tempo in Afghanistan and have 

ended the war in Iraq we need to make sure that our country is 

postured for the next century. 

I appreciate this administration’s continued commitment to the 

Asia Pacific region. However, I am concerned that the fiscal year 

2013 budget does not match the rhetoric of this strategy. 

This committee has remained supportive of efforts to increase 

our focus on the Asia Pacific region, but questions remain about 

the strategic value of recent realignment decisions. I do fear that 

the Department is making short-term decisions on overseas basing 

posture to the detriment of our long-term strategy and requirements. While I remain supportive of the overall goals of realigning 

Marines from Okinawa to Guam, I think the strategic value—not 

just perceived budget or political constraints—need to be better understood by me and the members of this subcommittee. 

I believe it is important for our Nation to maintain an intelligent, 

well-balanced forward presence of forces in overseas locations. It is 

important for us to find the right balance between permanent presence in some locations as well as reliance on host nation support 

and rotational forces. 

But the risks associated with finding balances must be weighed 

very carefully. I am concerned that these risks have not been clearly weighed in the matter of realigning forces in Japan, and I am 

also concerned about proposed reductions in Europe and the message that it sends to our allies in NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], especially Germany. 

So today I look forward to the testimony from our witnesses and 

to our question and answer period. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 
4 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you for those remarks, Madeleine. 

As we discussed prior to the hearing, I ask unanimous consent 

that it be made in order to depart from regular order so that Members may ask questions that follow the train of thought from the 

preceding Member. I think this will provide a roundtable-type format and will enhance the dialogue of these very important issues. 

So without objection, that is so ordered. 

And with that, Dr. Robyn, thank you for being here. We look forward to your statement, and the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF DR. DOROTHY ROBYN, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Dr. ROBYN. Thank you very much, Chairman Forbes, and Ranking Member Bordallo, other members of the subcommittee. Thank 

you for the opportunity to testify on the Department’s request for 

authority to conduct two more rounds of base realignment and closure. 

A year ago I spoke to a gathering of aerospace executives in 

Phoenix about what the Department of Defense [DOD] was doing 

about facility energy. At the beginning of the speech, as a way to 

explain the challenge and the urgency of the task that I faced in 

overseeing that, I pointed out that DOD has a very large infrastructure footprint—300,000 buildings, 2.2 billion square feet of 

space. That is three times as much space as Walmart, six times as 

much space as GSA [U.S. General Services Administration]. 

I went on to talk about—in very excited way about all that we 

are doing to cut our energy costs on installations and improve energy security. Given that the audience was aerospace executives, I 

was looking forward to a lively exchange of questions about 

microgrids and other high-tech solutions. 

When I finished my speech the CEO [chief executive officer] of 

one of the largest defense contractors in the country quickly raised 

his hand. He said, ‘‘How many of those 300,000 buildings do you 

really need?’’ It was a good question and it was for me a sobering 

reminder that at a time when the Department of Defense is cutting 

weapon systems and telling defense contractors they have to reduce 

their overhead, that defense industry leaders and others are looking to the Department to do just the same thing. 

And as you know, it isn’t just weapon systems that we are cutting. In keeping with the new strategic guidance and to meet the 

demands of the Budget Control Act, which requires a cut of $487 

billion over 10 years, we are also reducing our force structure. 

You have heard the numbers. The Army is reducing force levels 

by 72,000; the Marine Corps is resizing to 182,000 active Marines; 

and the Air Force is eliminating nearly 300 aircraft over 5 years. 

That, in a nutshell, is why we are asking for additional BRAC 

rounds. 

The math is straightforward. Force reductions produce excess capacity; excess capacity is a drain on resources. Only through BRAC 

can we align our infrastructure with our defense strategy. 

Now, I know that BRAC is not popular and I expect to get many 

tough questions today. Let me respond to two of them in advance. 
5 

First, why can’t we cut bases in Europe before we pursue a 

BRAC round here at home? Let me start by noting that we have 

already made significant reductions in our European footprint. 

In the last 20 years U.S. force presence in Europe, as measured 

by number of personnel and installation sites, has gone down by 

about 80 percent. Just since 2003 the Department has returned 

more than 100 sites in Europe to their respective host nations and 

we have reduced our personnel by one-third. 

And I distributed to you a chart showing just what Army has 

done in the last—in the last 5 years. And the chart also shows that 

over the next 3 years Army will close an additional 23 sites, as previously announced. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 91.] 

Dr. ROBYN. Now, with the recently announced force structure 

changes in Europe we can do more to consolidate our infrastructure 

there, and my office is working with the EUCOM [U.S. European 

Command] theater commander, his component commanders, and 

service leadership here in Washington to measure the capacity of 

all of our European installations. This inventory will allow us to 

analyze how much capacity can be shed and where. 

With the goal of long-term cost reduction we will assess the costs 

and savings of each proposed action and identify those with the 

highest payback. We anticipate having preliminary options for the 

Secretary of Defense to review by the fall. 

However, even a significant reduction of our remaining footprint 

in Europe will not achieve the needed cuts to overall infrastructure. Hence, our request for a parallel BRAC process. 

The second question—or criticism that I want to respond to is 

this: Why would we do—and, Congresswoman Bordallo, you mentioned this in your remarks—how can we afford another BRAC 

round given that the last one, the 2005 round, doesn’t pay off until 

2018? That is an eminently fair question but I would argue that 

the 2005 round is not the right comparison. 

Unlike the first four BRAC rounds, which paid off in a relatively 

short period of time, the 2005 round was not about savings and 

eliminating excess capacity. Carried out in a post-9/11 environment 

when the Department was at war, it was about transforming installations to better support the warfighter. 

The Army, in particular, used BRAC 2005 to carry out major 

transformational initiatives, such as the modularization of brigade 

combat teams. Let me quote Dr. Craig College, the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Army Installation Management: ‘‘The urgency 

of war drove the Army to leverage BRAC 2005 as the tool to integrate several critical transformational initiatives, which, if implemented separately, might have taken decades to complete.’’ 

In short, the 2005 round took place during a period of growth in 

the military and it reflected the goals and needs of that time. Because the focus was on transforming installations as opposed to 

saving money and space, it is a poor gauge of savings that the Department can achieve through another BRAC round. The prior 

BRAC rounds, which reduced capacity and paid off in a relatively 

short period of time, represent a better gauge of such savings. 
6 

And just for the record, let me note that the first four BRAC rounds generated a total of $8 billion in annual recurring savings— 

savings that we get each and every year. The total savings to date 

from the first four BRAC rounds is $100 billion. 

For the BRAC 2005 round the annual recurring savings are $4 

billion, but because the payback period is longer we will not see the 

net savings from those until 2018. The total of $8 billion and $4 billion—$12 billion—represents the 

additional cost that DOD would incur each and every year for base 

operating support, personnel, leasing costs had we not had BRAC. 

These annual savings or avoided costs are equivalent to what the 

Department would spend to buy 300 Apache attack helicopters, 124 

Super Hornets, or 4 Virginia class submarines. 

Let me make a final point: Given the fiscal and strategic imperatives we face, if Congress does not authorize additional BRAC 

rounds the Department will be forced to use its existing authorities 

to begin to realign and close bases. One reason we want to avoid 

that approach is that if the Department acts outside of the BRAC 

process it is severely constrained in what it can do to help local 

communities. 

To elaborate, when the Department closes and realigns bases 

within the statutory BRAC process the local community is a key 

participant. Using the authorities provided in the BRAC Act, the 

Department—we work hard with—to help local communities respond following a base closure. 

This was not always the case. Following the 1988 and 1991 

BRAC rounds the Department of Defense was largely indifferent to 

the fate of communities that had hosted its bases for decades. The 

services stripped property of assets that would have made it more 

valuable to the community—they would strip out underground 

sprinkler systems. Environmental cleanup took forever and the 

process of disposing of property, a key asset around which the community could build its base reuse plan, was slow, bureaucratic, and 

penny-pinching. 

As a member of President Clinton’s White House economic team, 

I led the Clinton administration’s effort in 1993 to transform the 

way DOD and the rest of the Federal Government dealt with 

BRAC’d bases and the surrounding communities in an effort to promote job creation and economic development. My strongest supporter was then OMB [Office of Management and Budget] Director 

Leon Panetta, who had represented the California district that was 

home to Fort Ord when that base was closed as part of the 1991 

BRAC round. The changes that we made laid the groundwork for 

many base—the many base reuse success stories from the 1990s 

that you hear about today. 

If the Department were forced to begin the closure and realignment process using its existing authorities, communities would 

have to fend for themselves to a much greater degree. Under that 

scenario, local communities would have no role in the process for 

disposing of installation property. Land disposal outside of BRAC 

is done on a parcel-by-parcel basis with no mechanism for taking 

big-picture considerations into account. 

Moreover, there would be no requirement for the services to dispose of the property in accordance with the local community’s 
7 

plans. Finally, there would be no special property disposal preference for the local community. By law, the local community would 

have to stand in line for the property behind, in order, other Federal agencies, the homeless, and potential public benefit recipients. 

In closing, let me restate the case for BRAC. The cuts in force 

structure that we are implementing and must implement to meet 

the requirements of the Budget Control Act must be accompanied 

by cuts in supporting infrastructure, including military bases. Absent a process for closing and realigning bases, the Department 

will be locked in a status quo configuration that does not match its 

evolving force structure, doctrine, and technology. 

Moreover, given the expense of our installation infrastructure, if 

we retain bases that are excess to strategic and mission requirements we will be forced to cut spending on forces, training, and 

modernization. We will also be forced to use our existing authorities to begin the realignment and closure process, a scenario that 

will deny communities the help they so deserve. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Robyn can be found in the Appendix on page 46.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Dr. Robyn. 

General Bishop. 

STATEMENT OF BG CHRISTOPHER D. BISHOP, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PLANS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

General BISHOP. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo, 

and members of the committee, good afternoon. I am Chris Bishop. 

I am the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans and Policy 

and I am here to answer any questions I can about the new defense 

strategy that is behind our posture decisions. 

The President and the Secretary of Defense recognize the changing geopolitical environment and our financial circumstances, to include the Budget Control Act for the tune of $487 billion, required 

to revise U.S. defense strategy. They led the civilian military leadership of the Department through an extensive deliberation to develop the most recent strategic guidance, which was issued on January 5, 2012. 

The Secretary’s priorities as we went into the strategy were very 

clear: maintain the world’s finest military. A smaller, ready, wellequipped military is preferable to a large force that has been arbitrarily cut across the board. 

Savings must come through a balanced approach. We need to 

preserve the quality of an All-Volunteer Force and not break faith 

with our men and women in uniform and their families. 

This strategy directed the Department to sustain a global presence with a rebalancing of our forces towards the Asia Pacific region and a sustainment of our presence in the Middle East. In Europe we are ensuring our ability to maintain defense commitments, 

including our NATO Article 5 commitment, and placing greater reliance on rotational presence and our partnership programs. 

In Asia the Department is working to make our posture more 

geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically 

sustainable. And last, as part of our strategy the Secretary of De-
8 

fense, the chairman, and other senior leaders wanted to make sure 

we increased critical—we made critical—increased investments in 

critical capabilities, such as cyberspace, special operations forces, 

and similar other capabilities. 

I will be glad to answer any questions, and thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. General, thank you. 

Brian Lepore. 

STATEMENT OF BRIAN J. LEPORE, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. LEPORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo, and members of 

the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today 

to present to you our preliminary findings on our review of—and 

oversight of BRAC 2005. As you know, GAO serves as an independent and objective observer of the BRAC process and we review 

implementation of the BRAC recommendations in just the same 

way as we review implementation of many other Federal programs. 

We have issued many reports on BRAC 2005—about 30 to date, 

Mr. Chairman—and also, as directed by the subcommittee, as you 

know, we are identifying lessons learned from BRAC 2005 and we 

will be reporting to you on that later this year. 

My testimony today is based on our prior and our current work, 

and I will make two points. First, I will identify the key factors and 

challenges from BRAC 2005, and I will provide to you our latest 

cost and savings estimates. 

Now, my first point: Some of the key challenges from BRAC 

2005, some stem from the atypical way that DOD used BRAC. 

Here is what I mean: Prior rounds were more focused on saving 

money by reducing excess infrastructure, but this round was different. DOD established force transformation and enhancing 

jointness as goals along with reducing infrastructure to save 

money. These goals and the selection criteria focusing on military 

value led DOD to propose some atypical BRAC recommendations, 

and that is my point. 

The round’s goals and the military value selection criteria help 

to explain some recommendations that DOD proposed to the commission and the consequent outcomes from BRAC 2005. Here is an 

example: the consolidation of supply, storage, and distribution functions in the Defense Logistics Agency. The recommendation is to 

transform business processes after transferring them to the military services but this required a process to involve key stakeholders across the services and strategic agreements, among other 

things—a little unusual approach. 

Also, initiatives outside of BRAC can impact transformational 

recommendations within BRAC. Let me explain. DOD wanted to 

increase recruiting and foster jointness by consolidating functions 

in new Armed Forces Reserve Centers all across the country. The 

Army was to introduce 44—to implement 44 recommendations to 

construct 125 new Armed Forces Reserve Centers, but 

compounding the challenge of all of this construction was that it 

took place at a time when the force structure was changing among 

many of those units slated to occupy the centers. 
9 

Transformational recommendations can have far-reaching consequences but may not necessarily be focused just on saving 

money. Here is an example: The Air Force and the Air National 

Guard were implementing 37 recommendations affecting 56 Air 

National Guard bases to better support the future force structure. 

As we previously reported, these recommendations were not likely to produce net annual recurring savings. The recommendations 

led to significant implementation challenges, also—completing 

staffing documents, ensuring adequate capacity at technical 

schools, staff getting new missions, for example. Thus, implementing transformational-type recommendations can require significant collaboration and coordination among stakeholders, sometimes at multiple levels of government, and effective implementation planning and execution. 

We saw challenging interdependent recommendations. Delays in 

one affected others. 

Here is an example: The Communications-Electronic Life Cycle 

Management Command was scheduled to move from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Aberdeen Proving Ground, in Maryland, in 

a recommendation. But in another recommendation at Aberdeen 

the unit there had to move out of Aberdeen and move to Fort Lee, 

Virginia, first. Construction delays at Fort Lee rippled back to Aberdeen, delaying construction supporting the relocation from Fort 

Monmouth. So interdependent recommendations were a key challenge in BRAC 2005. 

The commission reported its struggle to understand the impact 

on bases that were both gaining and losing missions at the same 

time and felt they would have benefited from the staff expertise 

from successive and overlapping BRAC rounds like those in the 

1990s. Here is why: core staff stayed in place from one round to 

the next. The 2005 commission felt that its staff had a steep learning curve. 

Now, my last point: the cost and savings from BRAC 2005. 

DOD’s fiscal year 2011 budget shows BRAC costs grew from $21 

billion to about $35.1 billion. Military construction costs contributed about $2.4 billion of that. 

Construction costs are partially explained because DOD transferred about 123,000 people from one location to another without 

reducing the force structure. Thus, DOD effectively concentrated 

more people on fewer bases since about over 20 major bases did 

close in this BRAC round and incoming personnel need places to 

work and other support, thus fueling much of this military construction. 

Now, the savings: DOD’s budget shows net annual recurring savings now at about $3.8 billion, so DOD should recoup the upfront 

costs of BRAC 2005 in 2018, the break-even point. That said, the 

commission’s 20-year net present value savings estimate has decreased by 73 percent to about $9.9 billion. 

Now, some recommendations were known to be unlikely to 

achieve savings in the 20-year net present window all along. The 

commission approved 30 such recommendations in 2005, although 

that has now grown to 77 recommendations. 
10 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks and I would 

be happy to answer any questions that you or the other members 

of the subcommittee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lepore can be found in the Appendix on page 61.] 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Lepore, we would like to thank you and all 

those who work with you for the great job you guys do over there 

at GAO, and thank you for being here today. 

To all of our witnesses, again, thank you for being here. I 

thanked you and—for your patience in being here with us through 

these votes. 

I also thank our Members. I know some of them are going to 

have to leave and have travel plans, so I am going to defer my 

questions until the end to make sure as many of them can get 

theirs in as possible. 

And so I am going to at this point in time recognize the distinguished gentlewoman from Guam for any questions she might 

have. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will make mine 

quick. 

Mr. Lepore, GAO has written substantially about the impact of 

previous BRAC rounds. The GAO has done a very thorough job in 

detailing the cost increases to implement BRAC 2005 as well as the 

reduced payback time. If—and I stress, if—another BRAC round 

were authorized, what could the Congress do to help ensure a 

quicker payback time? 

Mr. LEPORE. Congresswoman Bordallo, I think the key point that 

I would make is that the choices that DOD makes in terms of selecting the goals of the round, the reasons for doing BRAC, as well 

as the selection criteria that they propose, go a long way toward 

explaining the nature of the recommendations that are put forward. Thus, if saving money is going to be the key goal of BRAC— 

of our future BRAC round, should you authorize one, then it is a 

fair question to ask them what goals they propose and how the 

military selection criteria, or whichever selection criteria they 

choose, will actually help to achieve those goals. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

Dr. Robyn, the Department, in its fiscal year 2013 budget, has 

suggested significant personnel and force structure changes. Unlike 

the military transformation efforts of last decade, these current 

changes seem aimed more at cost savings given our fiscally austere 

times. Are these current forces structure changes and, for example, 

retirement of aircraft in the Air Force, foreshadow where the Department may use BRAC authority if another round was authorized? 

Dr. ROBYN. No, I don’t think that is a fair—I don’t think it is— 

it is reasonable to think that that is the case. When we do a—a 

BRAC round we are—the process requires us to consider every installation equally. So you can’t really say, oh, because we are cutting that particular part of the force structure it is necessarily 

going to impact that installation. 

Under the rules of BRAC—and this is one of the strengths of the 

process—we look at everything equally. So even if a—you were cut-
11 

ting a weapon system at a particular base you would consider that 

base for additional missions. 

So I would not draw that—that link that you are—that you 

are—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

I just have one quick question, Mr. Chairman. 

My final question is for you, Dr. Robyn, or General Bishop. Can 

you detail the efforts that have been ongoing to look at our overseas basing posture? I would like to and think it is important for 

members of this subcommittee to understand what metrics and 

analysis are ongoing to look at our overseas bases. 

To what extent are we factoring in host nation support, like in 

Japan, where they pay for our forces stationed in the country to 

travel to their training locations? I have always been concerned 

about some comments from Members in the other body that want 

to broadly target overseas bases without having a very solid, analytical basis for these comments. 

And I am also curious how this overseas basing analysis will impact our overseas location in the Asia Pacific region. How does the 

President’s announcement of a pivot to the region make a difference in the analysis? 

Either one of you? 

Dr. ROBYN. I think some of what you are asking we would be 

happy to provide but we can’t do it in an open hearing. 

From an installations perspective, we will align the infrastructure to properly support evolving operational requirements and 

strategic commitments. Our current analysis is focused heavily on 

our legacy infrastructure in Europe, particularly in view of the 

force structure changes—strategic changes we announced there, 

the elimination of two BCTs [Brigade Combat Teams] and associated support forces, decreases in Air Force presence, decreases in 

required support to CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command], and I 

have talked about our—our work with the EUCOM theater commander. 

As you know, the Asia Pacific is an area where we are trying to 

enhance our focus and the buildup of Marines on Guam is part of 

that. 

General Bishop, would you like to add to that? 

General BISHOP. Ma’am, thank you. A couple of comments, if I 

could. 

We will be providing the required NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] reports—one on the Pacific Asia region at the end 

of June, which will describe in detail that posture laydown, and we 

have a second study that you have asked us to do, which is the 

global view, and that will be completed March 2013, and we anticipate that will be fairly—fairly complete. 

If I could, I would like to make a comment about the Asia Pacific 

as an example. Part of what the senior leadership of the Department has wanted to do is have a very geographically distributed 

presence, and a great example of this is how we are looking at the 

Marines, and the Marines in Okinawa, in Hawaii, in Guam, in 

Australia. And of course, Australia—and I can talk about this more 

as the—later in the hearing if you would like—Australia will be 
12 

a—what we call a low-cost, small footprint presence because that 

is a rotational force there. 

So we are looking at the Pacific in a very broad way. We are 

looking at it perhaps a little differently than before, trying to 

strengthen the places that have provided tremendous value for us 

and provide additional posture elsewhere, ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. 

I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Madeleine. 

The distinguished gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I just, again, want to remind everybody that the money 

taken out of—out of national security is not going to go to pay 

down the national debt or reduce the deficit; it will, in effect, go 

to fund social programs for which, quite honestly, we don’t see a 

willingness to—to cut, and I think that puts every American at 

risk. 

But General, you said that you would be happy to explain anything about the U.S. defense strategy that has changed. A little 

less than 12 months ago there was a proposed reduction of 25,000 

uniformed personnel in the Army; now it is 75,000. Can you, in approximately—make—make it brief, but tell me what the—what 

change in the defense strategy has led to a three-fold increase in 

the number of soldiers that are going to be terminated? 

General BISHOP. I would say it is in a broader context as we look 

at the—the drawdown in Afghanistan, the drawdown in Iraq, as we 

look more globally. A good example would be Europe, for example. 

We have had four combat brigades in Europe for quite some time. 

There have been discussions the last number of years with both administrations on how many BCTs there should be in Europe. 

Truth be told, as you think about the work—the ongoing events 

in Afghanistan and Iraq, some of that BCT presence has not been 

in Europe for some time because it has been in Iraq and Afghanistan engaged. So as the Army looked at things in general I think 

they are heading towards a reduction of about eight BCTs, you 

know, worldwide, and two of those would come out of Europe, just 

if—as an example, if I could offer. 

Mr. SCOTT. Do you think the world is going to be a safer place 

tomorrow than it is today? 

General BISHOP. That is a difficult question for me to answer. I 

would say from the—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Let me apologize for interrupting you, then, but the 

bottom line is, most of us don’t think it is going to be safer tomorrow than it is today. 

Dr. Robyn, you said that math is straightforward. You work with 

the DOD yet the DOD is unable to produce an audited financial 

statement. They have, for the last 20 years, been under a law that 

says that they would produce an audited financial statement. 

Have they simply been negligent in their duties to do that or 

have they just decided not to comply with the law? 

Dr. ROBYN. Well, that is a little outside my lane. I oversee real 

property, and the normal—so I—I get involved in that debate only 

insofar as it applies to real property. The normal rules of account-
13 

ing don’t—don’t—you know, DOD is a funny place. It is certainly 

not—I mean, there is enormous amount of oversight, including by 

you folks. So I don’t think it is at all a dereliction of duty. 

Mr. SCOTT. But they cannot produce it and they have had—— 

Dr. ROBYN. Well, I believe the new Secretary Panetta has committed to—to doing that by—I mean, we have always had a deadline. It is a question of when we—when we have it. I believe he 

accelerated the process. This, as I say, this is not directly in my 

lane. 

Mr. SCOTT. How many square feet is the Pentagon? 

Dr. ROBYN. Oh. I don’t know. I don’t know. 

Mr. SCOTT. The largest building in the world and you are in 

charge of it—— 

Dr. ROBYN. Yes. I know the 2.2 billion for all of our facilities; I 

don’t know what it is for the—— 

Mr. SCOTT. It is about 6.5 million square feet—— 

Dr. ROBYN. Okay. Good. 

Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. If I am not mistaken, somewhere in 

there. How many civilians work at the Pentagon? 

Dr. ROBYN. Roughly 20,000 to 25,000. 

Mr. SCOTT. 20,000 to 25,000. 

Dr. ROBYN. Right. 

Mr. SCOTT. How many total people work at the Pentagon? 

Dr. ROBYN. Well, that was the number that I—I think it is 

20,000 to 25,000 people. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. That is a pretty big difference. That is about 

a 20-plus percent—— 

Dr. ROBYN. You mean whether it is 20,000 or 25,000? 

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, ma’am. 

Dr. ROBYN. 23,000, I am hearing from the—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. How many of them are civilian? 

Dr. ROBYN. I don’t know the ratio of civilian to military. 

Mr. SCOTT. It seems to me that the civilians at the Pentagon are 

perfectly willing to recommend reductions of those who are in the 

fight—our warfighters, our soldiers—and reductions of those who 

are working to support our warfighters, yet when we ask them 

about reductions to the areas where they work those—those areas 

seem to be off limit to reductions. 

So I can tell you, as somebody who has a large base in their district in Robins Air Force Base, and I have a tremendous number 

of bases in the State of Georgia that I represent, we are extremely 

concerned about BRAC—extremely concerned not—not so much because of what it is, but because of—the DOD’s math doesn’t, quite 

honestly, in my opinion, sometimes seem to be straightforward, and 

there seems to be the willingness of the civilians at the Pentagon 

to cut the military but, quite honestly, not look at where the waste 

is, which may very well be in the civilian workforce and the—the 

procurement processes. 

Mr. Chairman, I will yield back my time and ask that we get 

that audited financial statement from the Pentagon as soon as possible—— 

Mr. FORBES. Good. 

Mr. SCOTT. It has been 20 years. 
14 

Mr. FORBES. Dr. Robyn, if you would like to answer you can. As 

I told you at the beginning, we want you to have the ability to answer any of the questions. But if you would like to take that for 

the—— 

Dr. ROBYN. Well, sure. I will get back to you in terms of—but I— 

I think, I mean, BRAC—BRAC affects civilians. It doesn’t just affect people in uniform; it affects—it affects civilians who work in— 

and it affects communities. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Dr. ROBYN. And we have a—you know, our country was established around civilian control of the military. We were told by Congress to reduce the budget by $487 billion over 10 years. You can’t 

do that without cutting infrastructure. It costs us $55 billion a year 

to maintain our installations and we have to be—— 

Mr. SCOTT. But, ma’am, you are more willing to cut the men and 

women that are out there—you are more willing to cut the men 

and women that are out there putting together the equipment that 

the men and women in the war need than you are to cut those who, 

quite honestly, don’t get any dirt under their fingernails. 

Mr. FORBES. And the gentleman’s time is expired. 

The distinguished gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney, is 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, Dr. Robyn, you just cited the Budget Control Act as 

the sort of mission of what is behind this proposal. However, you 

know, since Secretary Panetta announced his request for authorization of BRAC he has never once cited a single penny of projected 

savings within any framework through the Budget Control Act, 

whether it is the first 5 years or the first 10 years. 

Under the best scenario—you know, if you get full authorization 

next week and you begin your process, by your own testimony and 

by his own comments there is no question there are upfront costs 

that are associated with the BRAC. We know that from, you know, 

the GAO report. 

Yet, the budget that got sent over from the administration, 

again, gave us nothing in terms of, you know—you know, how 

many Virginia class subs or how many helicopters or how many 

other weapons platforms it is going to cost for you to do the early 

year implementation of BRAC. And frankly, without that, at the 

same time that by your own testimony it is clear that the Pentagon 

is already doing internal governance for BRAC process—you are already moving—this train is moving in your Department. You 

haven’t given us language for BRAC authorization, which, you 

know, we—we need to pass that I—last time I checked. And you 

haven’t given us a single number in terms of how, you know, we 

can really evaluate whether or not this even fits within the Budget 

Control Act at all. 

And, you know, to me, you know, that gap—that absence of any 

hard, you know, budget data about why—why we should do this, 

and yet all we—you know, we hear the Budget Control Act cited 

but we have been given nothing to show where it fits in within the 

caps that are—that are part of the Budget Control Act. I mean, I 

think the reason why is—and the, you know, the Secretary said, 
15 

well, because he has to wait for—for Congress to do it and we don’t 

want to project something that may not happen, okay, and that is, 

you know, respectful of the process and I appreciate that. But 

frankly, I think the other reason is—is I think everybody who— 

who knows this process and can read a GAO report knows that 

even in the best BRAC rounds it costs money to do this. 

So when are we going to see those numbers, in terms of how 

much you say this is going to cost? 

Dr. ROBYN. You mentioned two issues. Frankly, we were—I 

asked our comptroller the other day what—you know, why didn’t 

we put something in, and he said, frankly, we just didn’t have 

time. I mean, this, you know, we—we were debating this. We were 

debating a lot of things. And the decision to ask for two rounds of 

BRAC was under debate. We did not have time. 

Had we had time it would have taken the form of a cost wedge, 

not a savings number, because we don’t know what the—we can estimate what it would cost based on prior BRAC rounds. It is not 

a terribly good estimate but we have done that before. 

In earlier years we did not put anything in the budget in terms 

of what BRAC would—would cost or save up until fairly far along 

in the process. My understanding is we began putting in a cost 

wedge. It is a very, very rough—rough analysis. So, you know, I 

think we could probably come up with something but obviously it 

won’t be—it won’t be in the budget. 

In terms of what are we doing to move out—is the train moving, 

we—we do—our legislation is at OMB. I expect it to be here any 

day now. I think by law it has to be here by the 17th of March and 

it—and it will be, and it will look, I believe, very much like the 

past legislation. 

We are doing those things that can be done without authorization. We are doing an inventory. We are looking at our analytic 

tools, things like COBRA [Cost of Base Realignment Actions], looking at whether we need to update the tools that we have. 

We are doing the things that we can do so that if we do get authorization for a 2013 round we can move out smartly, but I 

wouldn’t—I don’t think it is fair to say the train—— 

Mr. COURTNEY. You know, again, I appreciate the honesty of 

your answer in terms of the comptroller’s inability to give us a 

number, but frankly, you know, if we are going to see testimony 

that touts the transparency of what is going on here, at the same 

time you are asking for authorization—I mean, look at—under the 

best scenario we are probably not going to get a defense authorization bill until after the election. It will probably be a lame duck 

measure. 

Dr. ROBYN. Right. 

Mr. COURTNEY. 2013 is when you are asking for an actual list to 

come out. You know, that is just completely unrealistic and—and 

frankly, unfair to ask Congress to—to accept that kind of a 

timeline when you haven’t given us a scrap of information in terms 

of savings. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. 

Distinguished lady from Missouri, Mrs. Hartzler, is recognized 

for 5 minutes. 
16 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was thinking the 

same line of questioning as my colleague here. 

In order to call for this there has to be some justification that 

it is going to save money, I would assume. So what is that assumption? What types of savings are you hoping to achieve with a round 

of BRAC? 

Dr. ROBYN. Well, BRAC always saves money. The question is 

when is—when is that break-even point. And as I said before, it 

was—it came, that break-even point, the point where you begin 

getting net savings, came relatively soon in the first four rounds, 

later in the BRAC 2005 round because it—as—— 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Right. I am sorry. I didn’t want to interrupt but 

I am—— 

Dr. ROBYN. No, no, no. That is fine. 

Mrs. HARTZLER [continuing]. 5 minutes. 

But you are saying that we have to cut $487 billion with the 

Budget Control Act over 10 years and so because of that you are 

going to have to have BRAC in order to make up part of that $487 

billion. So how much of that are you anticipating saving through 

BRAC? 

Dr. ROBYN. BRAC is a response to force structure cuts, and the 

force structure cuts are a response to both fiscal realities—the 

Budget Control Act—and to strategic changes—— 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. So if it is not because of the Budget Control Act it is because of force structure change then won’t we have 

a larger force structure still than before pre-9/11? Even with the 

drawdowns we will still have a larger troop force than we had then. 

So we needed to house them then; we needed to have a place for 

them to train. And so what has changed? 

Dr. ROBYN. Well, we have 500—today we have 500 fewer aircraft 

than we did in—after the 1995 round. We calculated in 2004 that 

at that time we had 24 percent excess capacity in our infrastructure. You know, rough—those were crude estimates but we—we did 

those calculations, sent it up to you all in a report. That was 

2004—24 percent excess capacity. 

By our calculations, again, we think we reduced excess capacity 

in the 2005 round by only 3 to 5 percent, so we began with excess 

capacity, and I think you heard from—I think you have—my colleague on the Air Force said that yesterday in another—another 

hearing. The force structure cuts will generate additional excess capacity. There is just no two ways around that. And that is what 

we need to respond to. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. How much excess infrastructure do you think we 

have right now? 

Dr. ROBYN. I mean, the only thing I can give you is this 2004 

report. That is the best thing I have. We have not done that kind 

of analysis. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. So you don’t know how much infrastructure you 

have. You don’t know how much savings you are going to have. You 

don’t know how much cost this is going to have. And yet, you are 

coming to us and asking for BRAC? 
17 

Dr. ROBYN. You never know what your costs and savings from 

a BRAC round are going to be until you undertake it. You do have 

a sense that you have got—we knew in—in the late 1980s that we 

had excess capacity. I don’t know if we knew exactly how much. 

And we knew at the end of 1995 that we still had excess capacity. 

We began asking for—when I was still in the Clinton White 

House we began asking for another BRAC round in 1997, 1998, 

and Congress finally gave us that in 2001. But because of changes 

in circumstances—9/11 and the war in Iraq—the 2005 round didn’t 

focus on cutting excess capacity; it focused on transformation of the 

Army. 

So we had some level of excess capacity even at the end of the 

2005 round, and we can see that we are going to have more with 

the force structure cuts. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. You would think there would be a cost-benefit 

analysis done from that. The information I have shows the administration indicated the services had between 15 and 20 percent excess infrastructure before 2005, yet they only closed 1 percent of 

the infrastructure. 

And so you should be able to say, ‘‘Okay, we have 19 percent 

extra infrastructure, and here is X amount of dollars it is costing 

us, and so here is how much we are going to save if we do it,’’ as 

some justification. So you don’t have those figures now? 

Dr. ROBYN. Well, I can show you our 2004 report that shows that 

we had 24 percent excess capacity. I don’t want to fall on my sword 

over the statistical techniques that were used to get that but it was 

a reasonable estimate—24 percent. The BRAC 2005 round eliminated, again, using similar techniques, roughly 3 to 5 percent of capacity. So that suggests roughly 20 percent. 

Now, if you want to—you know, again, I mean these are really rough numbers. We spend $55 billion a year on installations. You 

can take 20 percent of—of that as some rough order—— 

Mrs. HARTZLER. I think that would be helpful for all of us 

through the process if you give us more hard data. 

Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mrs. Hartzler. 

Mr. Loebsack, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And I want to thank the ranking member and you both for having this important hearing today. The more I sit here and the more 

I listen the more I am kind of reminded of Charles Lindblom, who 

used to talk about muddling through. 

And it is actually pretty disconcerting, I have to say. I mean, a 

lot of us who—who consider ourselves at least social scientists if 

not something more than that, and that is who I was, numbers 

matter. Numbers make a big difference in—and now that I am 

here in Congress and—and responsible for taxpayer dollars and 

making sure they are spent correctly I have to tell you that unfortunately, the more I hear today the more disconcerting all this is, 

and the more concerns I have, and the more I wonder if at best 

what is happening here is an attempt at muddling through. And 

that is not meant to be a compliment. I am sorry. 

It is really a very, very difficult situation and I have a lot of 

questions about even the wisdom of another BRAC given that— 
18 

that taxpayers won’t even see the upfront $35 billion cost of the 

2005 BRAC start to be paid off—even start to be paid off, until 13 

years after that round was initiated. 

And I understand, I mean, there are a lot of questions out here, 

a lot of unknowns and all the rest, but given all the unknowns then 

that makes me question even more why the heck people are thinking about doing another BRAC. It just doesn’t seem to make much 

sense to me given all those—all those unknowns. 

And, you know, I want to go back a little bit to data and—and 

all the rest, which, you know, is a concern today. But my first question is, would—will the Department be open with its data collection 

and the process that it uses to gather those data as we go through 

this if we were to go through this, and what steps would be taken 

to ensure that openness? 

Dr. ROBYN. First, let me say, thank you for invoking Charles 

Lindblom. I don’t think I ever thought I would be at—— 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Not everybody here knows—— 

Dr. ROBYN [continuing]. A hearing where that would—that would 

happen, but I do. I went to public policy school and I read Charles 

Lindblom, and he was one of the greats. And I have got to say, I 

know this is not where you were going, but, you know, I think 

among people like Charles Lindblom BRAC is an amazing process. 

I mean, here you had a need to close bases; it worked in a very 

political, partisan way; it did not work—the process didn’t work in 

the 1960s and the 1970s. 

Dick Armey came up with a marvelous mechanism. When the 

task is to impose harm—do something that is going to impose enormous harm on individual members but be for the collective good, 

do it in this all or nothing way. What a marvelous mechanism. And 

people come from all over the world, literally, to talk to us about 

how BRAC works. OMB is leading a civilian version of BRAC. You 

know, it is tough. It is really, really tough, and that is why we are 

having the discussion that we are. 

And I agree. I think numbers are important. It is ironic because 

I had an interesting exchange with Congressman Farr, from California, yesterday, who feels that we go too far in quantifying 

things, that we use this COBRA model that reduces everything to 

costs and benefits and we miss things like the fact that if the 

Naval Postgraduate School is in Monterey you are going to be able 

to attract eminent scholars—— 

Whereas you are not if it is in Fort Huachuca. That was a place 

where the commission came down against the Army. 

So I think if—you know, I think we have to be careful that we 

use numbers a lot. We quantify a lot in the BRAC process in an 

effort to—when—we don’t share it when it is an internal DOD debate; we share it when it goes to the commission and the idea is 

that then it becomes—it is supposed to be transparent so that the 

commission can hold hearings. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. I have just got a minute left so I just want to—— 

Dr. ROBYN. Yes. I am sorry. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. That is okay. I think there might be a number 

of people who will maybe question the assumption at the outset 

that this is all going to be for the collective good. We have to accept 

that assumption in the first place to go forward with any kind of 
19 

a BRAC, and I am not sure that we are all willing to accept that 

at this point. 

But the second thing you mentioned, Congressman Farr and the 

Naval Postgraduate School, I have a real question about the ability 

of communities who would be affected by any of this—a challenge 

the data and the rating of installations prior to any of this going 

into effect. Can you speak to that issue? 

Dr. ROBYN. Well, I thought—I had a—a conversation with Congressman Courtney before the hearing started and he told me that 

the folks in New London did not have access to the data that DOD 

used to deliberate the—that issue internally. I thought—I will have 

to get back to both of you on this—I thought that the idea was we 

keep it confidential while we are debating within DOD for very 

good reasons; it then becomes very transparent once it goes to the 

commission. 

Brian, can you speak to this? 

Mr. LEPORE. It is my understanding that much of the data does 

eventually become public. I think Dr. Robyn does make an important point that the process, of necessity, probably, does need to 

occur in some level of secrecy—at least the part where DOD is developing the recommendations that it proposes back to the commission. But my understanding is it becomes public eventually. I can’t 

speak to that specific—— 

Mr. LOEBSACK. It needs to, if I might just say that. 

I have to yield back at this point. We have already gone over. 

And I thank you, Mr. Chair. 

But that has to be public. We have to have that transparency in 

a democracy. That is all there is to it. So thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Dave. 

Mrs. Roby is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for all being here today. 

I have a very specific timing question, and, you know in—the 

2005 BRAC was authorized in December of 2001 and initial guidance was not given by the Secretary of Defense until March 2004. 

How in the world are you planning on accomplishing any type of 

assessment and how do we expect to approve, authorize, or complete a full BRAC in significantly less time under the President’s 

request? It doesn’t seem possible, and as suggested before, certainly 

not a fair, transparent process. 

Dr. ROBYN. Well, two issues. Secretary Rumsfeld actually issued 

a memo in 2002 which laid out the objectives. I have seen that 

same reference that you have and I think there was another document that came out in 2004, but the—the kickoff—what we call the 

kickoff memo came out in November of 2002 and laid out the objectives. 

And in this case, where you had a compressed time, obviously 

you would have to do that. You know, the—I mean, we would need 

to figure out very quickly what the—what the goals—goals are. 

And Brian stressed the importance of the goals to determining 

what sort of an outcome you get. 

It is an aggressive—it is an aggressive schedule. There is no—— 
20 

Mrs. ROBY. Well, and let me just stop you right there because I 

think part of it is we have—we have had posture hearings in this 

committee, and we have had the Joint Chiefs here, and we have 

talked about the $487 billion in cuts that—that is current law that 

we are having to work under, but we are facing sequestration in 

January, and I guess my question would be, do you think it is wise 

to move this rapidly and this aggressively, to use your word, not 

knowing what January holds when we have got almost a half trillion dollars in cuts now under the Budget Control Act, a half trillion cuts in January? Wouldn’t it be irresponsible to move that 

quickly without us knowing what that looks like? 

Dr. ROBYN. We have asked for two rounds, and one—one reason 

is clearly it is—it is aggressive to do a round in 2013. We think 

we can do it but it is aggressive. But we have asked for two rounds 

because things are changing. We are not necessarily anticipating 

sequestration but a second round would give us an opportunity to 

adapt and to take into account things that happen subsequently. 

Mrs. ROBY. Well, it is tremendous—of tremendous concern to me, 

this path, and I would suggest, as I just did, again, that under our 

current fiscal restraints and not knowing what is going to happen 

in the next 10 months, when the Joint Chiefs have sat in front of 

us and we have asked specifically about sequestration and they 

have said, ‘‘We are not even discussing sequestration right now,’’ 

then how in the world can we prepare for this type of aggressive 

BRAC under those circumstances? And I would just suggest that— 

that in some respects it would be irresponsible to our military, 

but—but to our military families, as well. 

And with that, I will yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mrs. Roby. 

Mr. Reyes is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am more than a little 

concerned that we are talking about authority for two more BRAC 

rounds when we still have huge issues cleaning up environmental 

sites. I know that in Fort Bliss we have Castner Range, which is 

full of unexploded ordinances. It is an old artillery and mortar 

range. 

So is there—has DOD factored in the remaining issues with the 

past BRACs in terms of moving forward with additional—with additional potential closings? Is somebody strategically planning 

through all of that? 

Because I know I am as concerned as other Members about not 

knowing exactly the cost of the last BRAC. We are moving, it 

seems to me, in the dark with this request for two additional 

BRACs without having a clear understanding or idea of how we are 

going to work our way through the results of the last BRACs. 

Dr. ROBYN. I think that is a—it is a fair question and it is one 

that Congressman Farr asked me yesterday—wouldn’t you have 

more credibility if you upped the budget for cleanup of past BRAC 

sites? Let me answer that—let me give you a two-part answer. 

First of all, the bases that we would close or realign as part of 

a 2013 round or a 2015 round would likely be in much better shape 

than those that we closed in the 1990s because we do a lot better 

job now of doing cleanup on our active bases. So just as a factual 

matter, we don’t face—even in the 2005 round the cleanup prob-
21 

lems were not nearly as great. And you can measure that by the 

fraction of total BRAC costs that go for environmental cleanup. 

They were much lower in the 2005 round. We are still carrying 

them out, obviously. 

We have very clear goals and a path to get to remedy in place, 

response complete at—at all of the different categories of sites that 

we have, including the legacy BRAC sites and the 2005 BRAC 

sites. So we are not operating in the dark. We have a very clear 

path. We are, you know, in a resource-constrained world. We get 

X amount of money every year. Our total environmental budget is 

about $4 billion and a fraction of that goes for environmental cleanup. 

So we are on track to meet goals. Should those goals be more aggressive if we are asking for another BRAC round? I think that is 

a fair—I think that is a fair question. 

Mr. REYES. So just to put things in context, so the—for lack of 

a better word to describe it, the backlog results of the last BRACs 

are—if I understood you correctly, the—you are working on it. Is 

that—— 

Dr. ROBYN. Yes. You know, I should have those numbers handy 

on how many of those we have—we have—— 

Mr. REYES. That would be helpful—— 

Dr. ROBYN. Yes. I will get you—I do have those in my office. 

Let me just say that the critical thing isn’t necessarily when the 

cleanup is completed. It depends on the nature of the—the remediation that is required. But a lot of places—for McClellan Air Force 

Base, for example, a 1995 closure, that—because of the nature of 

the contamination that cleanup is going to go on for a long, long 

time but McClellan is thriving. I mean, it is—they are doing—that 

is a tremendous reuse success story. 

And a lot of other places—once you get the—what is called the 

remedy in place you can have development. And in fact, we put at 

the top of the list those BRAC’d—those base closure properties for 

which there is economic development on track. We put those at the 

top of the list. If a community hasn’t figured out how they are 

going to use a piece of property it is lower down on the list. So we 

do rank order in terms of economic development potential. 

Mr. REYES. Well, and I think it would be important to the committee if we were to have a way to measure the track record of 

DOD, the impact that it has had on different communities, and 

how that prioritization—— 

Mr. FORBES. Dr. Robyn, would you commit—— 

Dr. ROBYN. Yes. We will—— 

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. To get that for the record? Mr. Reyes 

would like to know the answer. 

Dr. ROBYN. Absolutely. Yes. We have those handy. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. REYES. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Schilling is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCHILLING. Thank you, Chairman. 

Thank you all for coming here today. And, you know, one of the 

things that the chairman usually starts out our committee meetings with is, ‘‘Are we ready?’’ And one of the fears that we have 
22 

up here is that one of our main objectives here is—constitutionally 

is to defend the United States of America, and—and with all of the 

cuts happening and—and not having the full numbers and knowing 

where we are headed, it is actually quite scary for us here. And 

like my colleague from Georgia, you know, I don’t believe that the 

world is going to get any safer tomorrow; I think it is actually, as 

we watch what is going on in Iran and what we are finding even 

as of today, it is quite a hostile situation, I would say, at the least. 

But what I would like to do is start out with Mr. Director, if I 

could, sir. You mention in your testimony that the GAO will be reporting on lessons learned from the BRAC of 2005 later this year, 

and do you believe, sir, that this report will come too late to use 

its recommendations in the first of the two rounds of BRAC, sir? 

Mr. LEPORE. Well, I certainly hope it gets here in time to be 

helpful. We are required by the directive—the 2008 Defense Authorization Act—to report to you by September 15th, 1 year after 

the end of implementation. In consultation with the subcommittee, 

you all have asked us to report earlier than that, and so to try to 

get it up here in time for the conference committee, and—and we 

are—we have committed to do that and so we are going to try— 

we are going to do our level best to get it here in time for your conference. 

Mr. SCHILLING. That would be great. It is kind of like building 

a house, you know, to have the builders show up and they just 

start building before you have the plans drawn, so that would definitely be a good thing. 

In your testimony you state that the Congress codify the eight 

final 2005 BRAC selection criteria—you stated that the first—let’s 

see how I—I have got to reread this here. In your testimony you 

state that Congress codify the eight final 2005 BRAC selection criteria used in the—that BRAC and stated that the first four, enhancing military value, were the priority criteria. Will these similar criteria likely be used again for the proposed two rounds? 

Mr. LEPORE. The way the process has worked with the military 

value selection criteria, at least in BRAC 2005, was that the Congress directed DOD to propose the selection criteria, and they did 

that. You also directed that it be available for public comment. 

DOD published it in the Federal Register, accepted comments, and 

may have made changes. We haven’t actually looked at exactly how 

they tweaked, if they were tweaked, after that process. 

But the criteria started with DOD and it was proposed to you— 

you, the Congress. And then the Congress subsequently, in authorizing the BRAC round, you all basically put the DOD proposal, if 

you will—I think with some, perhaps some changes—but the DOD 

proposal in statute and directed that the first four, known as the 

military value selection criteria, be the primary criteria. 

Number five, which is in the other criteria, or secondary criteria, 

is actually the one that talks about the time between which you— 

you have actually begun the process of implementing a recommendation and hit the payback period—you have hit the breakeven period. But that is actually a secondary criteria. 

Mr. SCHILLING. Very good. 

And then lastly—I will make this one quick—Mrs. Robyn, in 

your testimony you state that there is too much overhead in con-
23 

struction, sustainment, recapitalization, and operation costs for the 

bases which we currently have in the strategic force we are planning for. If this is the case then how do we rectify not only the remaining cost for the most recent 2005 BRAC and those previous 

but also the new cost that the two proposed rounds of BRAC will 

bring on DOD’s shrinking budget? 

Dr. ROBYN. Sorry. Could you clarify the question, please? 

Mr. SCHILLING. Yes. Basically what we are trying to figure out 

is, you know, here we have—we started out in 2005; we are going 

to go all the way to 2018 to get this thing paid for and we are going 

to bring on another BRAC. So basically, are we going to pay off the 

previous BRAC before we start to bring on—this is kind of like 

buying a car while you still owe on the other one and you can’t afford the payments. 

Dr. ROBYN. Well, we are reaping savings from the last BRAC 

round, but it—it was an expensive—expensive BRAC round. And it 

was expensive in part because it wasn’t focused on just eliminating 

excess capacity. That was an objective but it wasn’t the major objective. The major objective was transformation and jointness. 

So I think it did not get at excess infrastructure. We have a certain amount of it now. We are going to have more of it. There is 

no other way to get at that other than BRAC, and it—inherently 

it requires some upfront investment. 

I would envision that if we have a 2013 round that it would pay 

back more quickly because it would be focused on going after our 

focus, our desire is to go after—is to reduce overhead, so cut where 

we can achieve savings, more like we did in the first four BRAC 

rounds. 

Mr. SCHILLING. Very good. 

Thank you all for your time. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Rogers is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am mindful of what things were like around here 9 years ago 

when we went into Iraq and Afghanistan, and one of the great 

problems we experienced is our depot system was not ready, and 

it was embarrassing, frankly, and hard to go home and explain to 

family members who had loved ones over there why we weren’t 

able to support them in the way they should have been supported. 

Now, it took us about 18 months to get up to speed, and what I 

worry about now as you all talk about this—this BRAC is us trimming down and not being ready—A, just losing sight of the fact we 

are still in war. We could be in Iran in a heartbeat, or somewhere 

over trying to keep folks off Israel or North Korea. I don’t want to 

see us degrade our depot infrastructure and lose any core capability that we may need soon, and I would like to hear you reassure 

me that you don’t think that is a threat. 

And start with you, Mr. Director? 

Mr. LEPORE. As I said earlier in my testimony, Congressman 

Rogers, the key for doing a successful BRAC are the choices that 

DOD makes—the goals that they set for the round, the selection 

criteria that they propose and ultimately employ, and the nature 

of those goals and the nature of the—of the selection criteria will 

logically lead to the outcome. And I think that is the point I made 

with respect to BRAC 2005. 
24 

And to the extent that—that DOD’s—these hypothetical recommendations—we are speaking hypothetically here—to the extent 

that they proposed recommendations that had some impact on 

depot capabilities, your concern could prove to be well-founded. But 

it really would depend on the nature of the recommendations that 

DOD would put forward and be based on the goals of the round 

and the nature of the military selection criteria. 

Mr. ROGERS. General. 

General BISHOP. I can offer this, just kind of in the broader posture context: I think that you are exactly right. There were some 

challenges in the depot systems, especially in those—the period of 

time you referenced before. 

One of the things the Secretary has talked about is taking the 

excellence of—that we have learned in the last 10 years from sometimes very difficult, sometimes very hard-fought lessons and make 

sure we don’t lose that, make sure that we don’t slip back to that 

level of inefficiencies. And just a general comment, I would offer 

that the logistics enterprise in DOD, I would offer that the depot 

enterprise is considerably different today than it was 10 years ago, 

and—— 

Mr. ROGERS. And that is what I want to keep. You know, I met 

with General Dunwoody last week about this and she assured me 

that—that she learned her lesson and that she will—even though 

she is retiring, that that department is not going to let us get 

caught like that again. 

But then when I hear this talk it just—it worries me that maybe 

we have—we have got a real short memory. I am very apprehensive about this for that reason, but also, I am apprehensive about 

these end strength reductions that are being proposed for the same 

reason. You know, we are liable to be in another war in the next 

90 days, so—— 

Anyway, ma’am, will you tell me—tell me why I am wrong? 

Dr. ROBYN. I honestly don’t have a—any sense of whether we 

have excess depot capacity. We did in 1995. We closed Kelly and 

McClellan, as you know, because there clearly was excess capacity 

among the five big Air Force depots. We got it down to three. 

I just don’t know what the situation is today. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I just hope you all will be mindful that we 

have to maintain a certain core capability at all times, whether we 

are in war or not, because we didn’t expect to be in Iraq and Afghanistan and all of a sudden in the blink of an eye we are in both 

places. So we have to always be ready. 

Thank you very much for your time. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Rogers. 

As I mentioned to all of our witnesses, I was going to defer my 

questions till the end and—and I thank you for your patience. And 

I just have a number I would like to go through with you and kind 

of start with what Mr. Loebsack said, and that is basically that we 

need some facts. You know, we might not need all the facts but we 

have got to have some facts, and that is what we are trying to get 

our hands around. 

The other thing is, one of the things that I really appreciate 

about these hearings is yesterday Mr. Lepore was kind enough to 
25 

come meet with me before this, as you were, Dr. Robyn and General Bishop, and Mr. Lepore said, ‘‘My opinion doesn’t matter.’’ 

Well, I quickly told him that was wrong, and it is wrong, and here 

is why: because the great thing about these hearings—and we have 

had this from the Secretary of Defense on down—you guys have 

been authorized to give us your opinions as well as, you know, the 

Department’s, and we value those opinions. 

And, Dr. Robyn, the only thing that I would get on some of the 

semantics—and I wouldn’t dare suggest what you should say and 

what you don’t say—but it hits us a little bit odd when we hear 

people come in and say, ‘‘Congress made me do this.’’ You know, 

the President proposed these cuts long before Congress issued them 

and the President signed the bill, and the President has made very 

clear if he doesn’t like what Congress is going to do he is going to 

go around it, so this is not just the Congress imposing these things 

on us. 

The second thing is, it is a little hollow to many of us who 

watched what happened in the 1990s to be bragging about what we 

did in the 1990s because most of the witnesses we have had coming 

in here have talked about, we don’t want to repeat that again 

where we hollowed out the force. When I first came in to Congress 

I remember going out and meeting with our pilots on an aircraft 

carrier and asking them what they needed, and they didn’t talk 

about retirement systems or any of the things that we—we normally look to—they wanted engines for their airplanes. They didn’t 

have enough engines for their airplanes to do the training and stuff 

they have. 

And then the third thing—and I am not sure if it—I think it was 

Mr. Loebsack said but it might have been Mr. Courtney—but to 

say that we are getting ready to impose harm on members and that 

that is what is driving us to do a better good, believe me—most of 

the people that sit on this committee are looking and thinking that 

we are imposing harm on the—the American people by these force 

structures that we are having. 

But I want to kind of walk through just to make sure I have got 

a clarity on what some of the facts are, and as I understand reading your testimony and hearing you today that—Mr. Lepore has 

said the objectives and the goals that we have for BRAC will ultimately determine the outcome. 

Fair statement, Brian? 

Mr. LEPORE. That is fair, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

If that is true, Dr. Robyn, then as I understand what you are 

saying, the primary goal for this BRAC is that because we have 

this huge reduced force structure that we need to have a BRAC because we are going to have excess capability. Is that just a fair 

statement? 

Dr. ROBYN. Yes. 

Mr. FORBES. If we didn’t have the force structure we wouldn’t 

necessarily be coming here asking to do the BRAC. 

Dr. ROBYN. I think that is fair. I also said we think we do have 

excess capacity even before—— 

Mr. FORBES. But you have had that—— 

Dr. ROBYN. We have had that for a while. 
26 

Mr. FORBES. I think it would also be fair for those of us who feel 

it is wrong to reduce the force structure the way we are doing, we 

shouldn’t be supporting this round of BRAC because basically we 

are tearing up the very ability we would have to rebuild that force 

structure. Fair statement? 

I mean, it is divided in two camps. I mean, if you feel this force 

structure is right, that we should reduce it, you ought to go on with 

the BRAC; if you think this force structure is not the right thing 

to do you ought to oppose the BRAC. Fair? 

Dr. ROBYN. Well, I think it depends on whether you think your 

views will—will prevail in the—— 

Mr. FORBES. No. We are not talking about whether I prevail; I 

am talking about whether I—my position and what I think is right. 

Dr. ROBYN. I think there is a logical internal coherence to that 

logic. 

Mr. FORBES. Then let me also ask you this: You have a great 

deal of expertise you bring to this from not just your service in government but you being a professor at the government—School of 

Government at Harvard, and you make this statement, ‘‘While 

some may view our request for a round in 2013 as aggressive the 

magnitude of the cuts we are making in force structure means we 

simply can’t wait. Leading U.S. corporations retain their vitality 

and market position by being able to adapt quickly to changed circumstances and U.S. military is no different.’’ Fair quote of what 

you said? 

Dr. ROBYN. Yes. 

Mr. FORBES. I take it, then, that it would be bad policy in your 

mind if we did not move forward with a round of BRAC based on 

the fact that we have these force structure changes that are going 

to be taking place over—I guess it is a 5-year period of time, or so, 

that—they are not all going to take place now, but over a 5-year 

period. Is that a fair statement? 

Dr. ROBYN. Yes. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. The reason I ask that—— 

Dr. ROBYN. There is a trick here. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. FORBES. There is not always a trick, you know? No, the question I want to ask is this: If that is true then what I am looking 

at is how do you know what these force structure numbers are? 

This is kind of what Mrs. Roby was saying, and I guess you were 

given those by looking at the budget over that 5-year period of 

time. Is that where they come from, or—— 

Dr. ROBYN. Well, I think the Department had an extensive, 

lengthy debate, as General Bishop described, to—— 

Mr. FORBES. I am going to get to him in a just a second—— 

Dr. ROBYN. Okay. 

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. On that, but if that is true why are we 

not talking about the amount of force structure that would take 

place with sequestration? That is not 5 years out. That is in January. That is the law of the land—President signed it. Why aren’t 

you guys coming here and telling us this is not going to be just 

70,000 people in the Army, but we are talking about a half trillion 

dollars more of force structure that we are talking about. Why is 

there such a silence on that? 
27 

Dr. ROBYN. I think that is probably not the appropriate—I don’t 

think I am the right person to answer the question, but—— 

Mr. FORBES. But wouldn’t it be bad policy, if it is bad policy not 

to be moving forward on a force structure cuts that are going to 

take place over 5 years shouldn’t we be moving forward on a force 

structure that is going to have to take place in a few months? 

Dr. ROBYN. I think the Secretary has said we will begin planning 

for it in this summer if—— 

Mr. FORBES. But help me with this—— 

Dr. ROBYN [continuing]. If there is not some indication—— 

Mr. FORBES. You have indicated that it would be bad policy for 

us not to be planning force structures that are going to take place 

over a 5-year period of time, but do you think it is not bad policy 

if the Secretary is going to wait and start planning the force structures that are going to take place just months from now? 

Dr. ROBYN. We are hoping not to have sequestration. 

Mr. FORBES. But I am hoping not to have these $487 billion of 

cuts, but that doesn’t mean we can’t plan for them. 

Dr. ROBYN. But one is law and the—well, I guess they are—— 

Mr. FORBES. They are both law. 

Dr. ROBYN. Yes. But one is contingent. One is a—— 

Mr. FORBES. How is it contingent? I don’t understand that. 

Dr. ROBYN. Well, the sequestration is if there is not an agreement on other—— 

Mr. FORBES. There wasn’t an agreement. That time—that time 

period has passed. 

Dr. ROBYN. I don’t think there is a general acceptance that sequestration is a fait accompli. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, what do you base that on? I mean, it is—no, 

seriously. This is what I have a problem with: I think the American 

people have a right to know, and not just wait until after the election, what these cuts are going to mean in sequestration as well 

as the other cuts. But there is this deafening silence. 

And you can’t just walk back and say, ‘‘Oh, I am hoping that 

won’t happen.’’ 

Dr. ROBYN. I believe—when we were asked this question—my 

colleagues and I—at a—service counterparts—yesterday at a hearing some of them offered up things that the chiefs have said on 

record. I am not going to—— 

Mr. FORBES. But as the person coming here and telling us what 

you are looking for in terms of facilities, are you telling us that you 

don’t have any idea what those potential cuts could be in January? 

Dr. ROBYN. There will be an impact on facilities, to be sure, but 

that is, I think, a—that is a second-order calculation once you have 

a sense of what the magnitude of the cuts will be. 

Mr. FORBES. But it doesn’t bother you as the person in charge 

of those facilities? I mean, you know, do you see the conflict that 

we have here when you come in and—— 

Dr. ROBYN. Well, to me, asking for two rounds is consistent with 

that. You know, I can’t say we are—we are asking for two rounds 

because we think we will get sequestration; we are hoping not to. 

But I think—— 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. Let me ask you this question, if you don’t 

mind, then: You talk about the fact—and you mentioned 70,000- 
28 

some in the Army, and that is going to mean we have excess capacity—but the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Odierno, testified, 

he said, I don’t think you will see a big installation being asked to 

close; we think we have the right footprint. You also heard just last 

week before this committee the Commandant of the Marine Corps, 

General Amos, indicated, my sense is we are pretty much there; we 

are pretty lean. 

Were they wrong? 

Dr. ROBYN. I have given a lot of thought to those—those statements. I work for the Secretary of Defense. Let me say that the 

Secretary of Defense is—very much believes that we need another—another BRAC round. 

Mr. FORBES. I understand. But you are coming back to my first 

part about we need a little facts—you know, just some facts. You 

can’t just walk in and say, ‘‘We need it,’’ but not give us any facts. 

And I have got the Chief of Staff that is coming here—of the 

Army—who is saying, ‘‘No, no. We are pretty much there. We are 

not going to—we don’t need all these closures.’’ I have got the Commandant of the Marine Corps saying, ‘‘No, no. We are pretty much 

there.’’ And then I have got you coming in here and saying, ‘‘Oh, 

no, we have got all these cuts—we have got to cut these facilities.’’ 

Help me with why you are right and they are wrong. 

Dr. ROBYN. When he testified last week before HAC MILCON 

[U.S. House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies] General 

Odierno said he fully supported the Department’s request for another—another BRAC round, and my colleague—— 

Mr. FORBES. I don’t disagree with that. They always come in 

here—you know, I ask Admiral Mullen—he came in here and he 

said he was supporting the administration so I said, ‘‘Admiral, in 

the whole time you have been here have you ever not supported 

what they did?’’ And he said no. 

I mean, so, we—I understand they are going to support that 

but—but we have to make an independent calculus that the facts 

justify that. Was he factually correct or was—were they factually 

wrong in their testimony? 

Dr. ROBYN. I don’t want to second guess the—the chief of the 

Army. That is not a good—a good career move. 

Mr. FORBES. So then would we say that he was correct? 

Dr. ROBYN. I think the Army is still digesting the 2005 round, 

number one. It was huge for the Army and it—and as we discussed 

earlier, the implementation was pushed out and so they are still— 

I mean, they are still dealing with that. 

Mr. FORBES. Do you at least appreciate the conflict we have between that testimony and your testimony? 

Dr. ROBYN. No, I do. I do. But I think it is—I also—I think it 

is not always easy to—to say, ‘‘We need to close bases.’’ You alienate—— 

Mr. FORBES. Oh, I know it is not easy, but I mean, this is the 

Chief of Staff of the Army. He didn’t mind going down and shutting 

down the Joint Forces Command, you know, at all. I mean, that 

wasn’t hard. He is a pretty tough guy. You know, I don’t—I don’t 

think he would come in here because it was hard and, you know, 

not—not do it. 
29 

General Bishop, you have got a very impressive resume ́, and one 

of the things that—that I look at here is you were the Vice Director 

for Operations, Plans, Logistics and Engineering, the United States 

Joint Forces Command. You are responsible for the force structure 

issues, providing oversight for deployment—you have looked at 

numbers, and people, and where we have deployed them. 

You have heard a lot of concerns up here about the world situation right now, and we are just getting things in on our BlackBerry 

right now where your boss has said that they are planning at least 

potential possibilities for strikes against Iran. You have probably 

seen that, today, coming out in the news. 

As you look at that, General—and I want to ask you, again, what 

I said earlier, your personal opinion for all the logistics and that— 

with that even on the planning prospect, with the situations we are 

seeing in the world today, do you think it is wise from a strategic 

point of view—not from a budgetary point—a strategic point of 

view, to be making the kind of drastic structure reductions that we 

are making? 

General BISHOP. See if I can—I can best—best answer your question. I think it goes back to context. We have had two hard-fought, 

long-term engagements—many, many forces on the ground and in 

the air in Iraq and Afghanistan over these last 10 years. 

As we close down our operations in Iraq, or have closed down our 

operations in Iraq and we draw down our 33,000 this year in Afghanistan we are—I believe the Department is trying to position 

themselves to deal with the global threats in a reasonable and appropriate level. There is certainly risk in any strategy that arises. 

There were risks in former strategies; there are certainly risks in 

this strategy, which have been addressed and viewed holistically by 

the Secretary and the chairman. 

But as we have looked at the strategy we put the strategy together with that careful look and that context, but clearly, you 

know, in law we have a reduction of $487 billion. 

Mr. FORBES. And that is why I ask, outside of the $487 billion, 

if you weren’t looking at those—and I realize, you play the cards 

that you are dealt. I am talking about, we don’t look at those cards; 

we look at what we need to do to defend the country. If we have 

got to go back and change the $487 we have got to change it; if 

we have got to change sequestration we have got to change it. 

I am talking about your personal look-down as you have done 

this logistics for our force structure. You are looking at a situation 

right now with all the contingencies we see in the world where we 

see right now, news today, the Secretary of Defense says that they 

are planning potential strikes against Iran—just doing the planning process. Would you recommend from a strategic point of view 

the size of the force structure reductions that we are having outside of budgetary restraints that were forcing us to do that? 

General BISHOP. In my view, Mr. Chairman, I think the strategy 

makes sense. I think the force posture adjustments along with the 

strategy make sense. I think it is a reasonable risk assessment. 

Anybody in uniform would probably say we would always prefer 

to have more, but there is—as we have looked at this we have really carefully looked at it, and I want to emphasize the Secretary, all 

the chiefs—service chiefs—the chairman himself, and senior people 
30 

in OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], throughout the period 

of time this strategy was put together, spent a tremendous amount 

of time looking at this and looking at it very closely. 

But we clearly have to balance, you know, as you said, the cards 

that we are dealt, as well, and we do have the reduction of dollars, 

and we do have a drawdown of two wars. And it is in that reality, 

I think, the strategy, in fact, does make sense. 

Mr. FORBES. If you are looking at the fact, as I understand it 

now, that we are making an assessment of our overseas force structure, does it really make sense to initiate a round of BRAC if the 

Department is still in the process of assessing what we are going 

to do with our overseas force structure before that is done? 

General BISHOP. I would say in many ways that our service 

chiefs, our combatant commanders have done an initial round of— 

of carefully viewing how they want to see the posture change. We 

rely on very, very strong partnerships across the globe. Part of the 

strategy is to strengthen those partnerships. We talked earlier 

about the strategy being about—in some ways about low costs, 

small footprints. 

Many of the members here today, they come from states that 

participated in the Partnership for Peace program, which has been 

tremendously successful throughout Europe in developing capabilities it didn’t have and wouldn’t have served with us, and some of 

those states—some of those countries have, in fact, served side by 

side the United States military in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

So I think it is all those things—the preserving—preserving the 

partnership development—in fact, enhancing that. We need to shift 

how we are doing our engagement to some degree as we shift away 

from these two wars, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. But as we are looking at all of those assessments 

shouldn’t we do the assessment before we start a round of BRAC 

to see what we are going to be closing here? 

General BISHOP. Perhaps I didn’t answer your question well before. I am going to avoid the—the BRAC question; I am going to 

defer that to my colleague to the left here. 

But I would offer to you that the service chiefs, the chairman, 

and the Secretary, you know, have, in fact, done a—as they were 

putting the strategy together did very much—very closely look at 

that. 

Dr. ROBYN. I would say, to the contrary, we would like to do the 

two in tandem. We would like to be reviewing our domestic bases 

at the same time that we are doing our—our look at foreign consolidation, and the reason is it gives us more, in thinking about 

where to put troops as they return we can be more efficient and 

more creative if we have the tool of BRAC so that we are not just 

putting people where we happen to have capacity; we can move— 

move people around. 

We did that in 2004 and 2005. We had the luxury of being able 

to do the foreign review at the same time as the domestic. We 

would ideally like—like to do them in tandem again. 

Mr. FORBES. One last question—Mr. Courtney has a couple questions that he would like to follow up with—as I understand the sequencing of the BRAC process, the Secretary of Defense has to give 

a certification that a BRAC is needed and then the cost saving— 
31 

that there is going to be cost savings that he is going to guarantee, 

and he certifies to that. Then after that there is this lengthy process where the Department pulls together all of its recommendations, and then the recommendations are given to the commission, 

and then the commission makes the recommendations to Congress, 

and then they pass it or not, and President decides to sign it. 

How can the Secretary—am I wrong? Correct me, please. 

Dr. ROBYN. Goes to the President before it goes to Congress. 

Mr. FORBES. And then it comes back to Congress. 

Dr. ROBYN. Right. 

Mr. FORBES. How does the Secretary accurately certify that he 

knows there is going to be cost savings before he has even had the 

recommendations from the Department, much less from the BRAC 

commission? 

Dr. ROBYN. I think the Secretary’s certification does reflect a certain amount of internal analysis. I am not—— 

Mr. FORBES. Can you get with your folks—have you all—you 

know, because I just want to get the facts right. 

Dr. ROBYN. There are two pieces that—of analysis on which he 

draws. One is a 20-year force structure plan developed by the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, and then the other is an inventory of installation—— 

Mr. FORBES. And I understand that. 

Dr. ROBYN [continuing]. Capacity and capability—— 

Mr. FORBES. But I want to come back—this is the Secretary’s 

certification. This kicks it all off. He has got to give this to Congress. 

This says he is guaranteeing—certifying, according to the language—and, Brian, you correct me if I am wrong on the language 

here—it says he is certifying that a round is necessary, and then 

he is also certifying that it is going to result in annual net savings 

for each of the military departments. And correct me, guys, if that 

is not a part of—Brian, is that a part of the process? 

Mr. LEPORE. Yes, that is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. And it is my understanding that this comes before 

the recommendations. 

Mr. LEPORE. It is our understanding that the certification essentially kicks off the process. 

Mr. FORBES. Right. 

Mr. LEPORE. It is that certification that the Secretary says, ‘‘I 

need to do this because I have got excess capacity; I want to close 

bases.’’ 

Mr. FORBES. And he certifies to say that there is going to be—— 

Mr. LEPORE. And he certifies the savings, and that is in the statute, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Yes. And the reason I ask is because that is what, 

in fact, happened. He made that certification in here, he gave this 

to Congress, but—but the two questions I would have for you—the 

first one is, how in the world do you know what the—that you are 

going to definitely have savings before you even know what the recommendations are? 

Dr. ROBYN. Well, I don’t think we—we don’t even ask for the authority to do a BRAC round until we think there will be savings, 

so I think—— 
32 

Mr. FORBES. That is not what he is saying here. I mean, when 

I get something that says I certify something that is more than ‘‘I 

think’’—you know, that is—I mean, that comes back to what you 

heard here about the audits and all that—and I realize this is not 

about audits. But what I am saying is when we see something as 

Congress—this is what Mr. Courtney has been saying, Mr.—everybody up here has been saying—the fact, some—it is the Secretary’s 

certification. That is the name—— 

Dr. ROBYN. Right. 

Mr. FORBES. This is what he files. He signs this. 

This looks to us—and maybe we shouldn’t be trusting this. We 

are not trusting it as much anymore, but—you know, I am looking 

at this and I am saying, well, somebody has looked at this and— 

and they are certifying that this is true. 

Dr. ROBYN. I just got a note saying—I mean, you have a 20-year 

force structure plan developed by the Joint Chiefs and you have a 

comprehensive installation inventory. I mean, that is the basis 

for—— 

Mr. FORBES. Well, first of all, the 20-year plan—the one thing I 

do agree with the Department on, you can’t do that. That is fantasy. I mean, you know, to do 20 years. You might do 5 years; you 

can’t do 20 years. And that is what the Secretary has testified to, 

and everybody else. That is not what I am looking at. 

I am looking at some point in time it would make sense to me 

that the recommendations would determine—what if they come 

back and say, after looking at this objectively, which is what we 

are—we shouldn’t make—we shouldn’t close these facilities; we 

need them; they are too important. I shouldn’t shut down Mr. 

Courtney’s facility, or I shouldn’t shut down anything else. 

How can he certify that there would be savings if he doesn’t even 

know what the recommendations are? 

Dr. ROBYN. Well, we clearly won’t—wouldn’t put forward recommendations that we didn’t think would—would make—— 

Mr. FORBES. But you don’t know what—are you telling me that 

you know before you start this process what the recommendations 

are going to be? 

Dr. ROBYN. No. No. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, if you don’t do that, and even if you took your 

recommendations—— 

Dr. ROBYN. That is the later. No, you said what if you find out 

of your analysis—— 

Mr. FORBES. No, no. I am aware of that. But what I am saying 

is, even if you make recommendations the BRAC commission 

doesn’t have to take any of those—— 

Dr. ROBYN. Right. 

Mr. FORBES. So how do you know to certify something before you 

even know the recommendations that there is going to be net savings? 

Dr. ROBYN. I mean, it is comparison of needed capability and— 

and infrastructure, you know? I mean, that is—— 

Mr. FORBES. Brian, help me with this one. How would you—I 

mean, from the GAO’s point—how could you possibly give a certification like this if you don’t even know what the recommendations 

are? 
33 

Mr. LEPORE. Well, let me try to answer your question this way: 

One of the things that we look at in GAO when we look at things 

like assertions that something is going to happen or something has 

happened is we like to see some evidence that says that whatever 

the nature of this assertion is, there is some fact-based reason why 

the individual made that. One of the things that struck us about 

the sequencing is that the certification, as we understand it, that 

you are referring to, Mr. Chairman, occurs at the point where—it 

effectively kicks—kicks off the process. I mean, that is what the— 

what the certification is for. 

So I think what we—if we were going to look at that and—and 

we are—we—as you know, under our lessons learned report we are 

looking at the sequencing of the whole process, quite frankly. One 

of the questions I think we would certainly ask is, is the order of 

the steps the right order, might be a way to say it. 

Mr. FORBES. Would you at least agree with me that it would be 

impossible to know whether you had—were going to have net annual savings if you didn’t know what the ultimate recommendations were going to be from the commission? 

Mr. LEPORE. I think it is really hard to know where you are 

going to end up before you have started. 

Mr. FORBES. And with that being said, the Secretary does give 

the certification. Can you tell me, if he is wrong, to the best of your 

knowledge, what is the penalty for that? 

Mr. LEPORE. To the best of my knowledge, there is no real sort 

of legal penalty. I think one of the things that any assertion that 

any Federal official makes where we can’t find evidence to support 

it—and I don’t know that that is the case here—but where we cannot find evidence to support it, it does—it would raise questions in 

my mind as an auditor whether I would want to trust that kind 

of an assertion or—or a certification the next time. 

Mr. FORBES. And I am not just catching you off guard on that 

question. I have asked you—told you I was going to ask you that, 

and you have tried to inquire with counsel and all, as to whether 

or not there were any penalties, and you haven’t been able to find 

any. 

Mr. LEPORE. That is what our general counsel tells me, that 

there—there is no real—no real penalty. And as you know, Mr. 

Chairman, under the lessons learned report we are going to go 

ahead and look at that sequencing and see whether there may be 

things that we could suggest to you as you consider this question 

of another round, and if so, whether there are appropriate changes 

you may want to consider. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I just have a 

couple sort of follow-up questions. 

You know, this question about end strength reductions and how 

that fits into the need for a BRAC, you know, I thought it was kind 

of interesting that when Secretary Panetta announced the budget 

back in January, you know, one of the things that he was very, I 

think, adamant about insisting on was that the reduction of end 

strength is not a hollowing out of the force, that we are not sort 

of turning the clock back to the 1990s, that in fact, the—the troop 
34 

levels are going to be higher than—in 2017 than where we were 

when 9/11 occurred; and in fact, in the—in the case of the Marines 

they are going to be higher than they—they were in 2005 when the 

last BRAC round was completed. 

And frankly, I think that is one of the reasons why General 

Odierno—I can’t read his mind, but it would seem logical that, you 

know, the fractional reductions of—of troop levels, you know, really 

would make you conclude that, well, yes, you know, the footprint 

isn’t really that far off in terms of what we need. And really going 

through all the branches, I mean, the proposal in the budget over 

5 years in terms of reduction of end strength is actually quite minimal, and—but again—and he was, you know, clear that he wanted 

to reassure people that we weren’t, you know, sort of again just 

kind of, you know, surrendering the country, or however you want 

to, you know, phrase it. 

But again, the flip side of that is, well, then why are you insisting on a BRAC? I mean, the total number of folks in uniform is 

really not that much different than it was in 2005. 

So, you know, I—for the record, I think it is important to reiterate that point, because again, some of us who really are not 

happy about this BRAC proposal are not necessarily adamantly opposed to other components of his plan that he—that he released. 

But frankly, that is the mystery here is that, you know, a proposal like BRAC, which in January and then as of today we still 

have been told zero is the net savings—we have given nothing in 

terms of how this is supposed to fit within the Budget Control Act. 

I mean, the fact is, zero minus zero is zero. I mean, if we reject 

this proposal it—it has—it has no impact in terms of the budget 

document that was submitted back in January. 

And again, I—there is no way, I believe, Dr. Robyn, that you can 

present us with, you know, an accurate BRAC proposal that 

doesn’t, in fact, tip the—the balance in terms of exceeding the 

spending caps in the Budget Control Act. I mean, General Dempsey 

and Secretary Panetta, when they came before this committee, 

were very clear about, you know, if we sort of mess with this package, you know, it has all been sort of carefully crafted to sort of 

hit that number very precisely. Well, you know, if you are going to 

come up with a—with an honest or accurate proposal about how to 

do this we are going to have to spend money, and that has got to 

come out of some other part of the plan that the Secretary presented to this committee. 

And frankly, you, in my opinion, have a high burden of proof to 

overcome for many of us that this is really, actually, comports with 

the Budget Control Act. 

The other point I just want to make, in your opening comment 

you talked about the 300,000 buildings that the Pentagon has, and 

there is no question that within that inventory there have got to 

be some structures that are excess, and frankly, probably a drain 

in terms of energy costs, et cetera. But the fact is, you don’t need 

a BRAC to take down a building. I mean, we had—we had a wrecking ball down in Groton, you know, 2 or 3 years ago that took down 

World War II dormitories that frankly were an eyesore and a drain 

in terms of the operating budget of the base that was there. 
35 

And so, you know, I would just sort of say that, I mean, yes, 

there is 300,000 buildings; yes, there is probably excess there. But 

that is not what we are being asked to do. This isn’t a building realignment commission request; this is a base realignment request. 

And that is a far different issue than just excess buildings. 

And I think, again, it is important for the record that that be 

made clear, is that there is nothing that really prohibits the Department from going through and—and eliminating structures that 

make no sense in terms of their operating overhead. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just very quickly, if Congress were to consider another round of 

BRAC is there any way we can ensure that—or you can assure 

Congress that a quicker payback might be provided, given the concern that so many Members are expressing to you? And what 

would be the limiting factors to our ability to get that kind of a 

quick payback? 

Dr. ROBYN. I think every—I mean, every—the first four rounds 

of BRAC paid—paid off relatively quickly. We do BRAC to save 

money. The 2005 round is the outlier. 

Just as the 2005 round reflected the needs of the time, 2013 

round would reflect the needs of the current time, which are to 

eliminate excess overhead in order to put those resources back into 

enhancing other—other capabilities. So, you know, is there a way 

to—you know, there may be a way for Congress to, you know, exclude certain things, but I—you know, I think that is what we 

are—we are focused on trying to get rid of capacity that we don’t 

need so that we can put the resources elsewhere. 

Mr. REYES. So you are telling us that for these two that have 

been requested there would be a quick—— 

Dr. ROBYN. Well, I think they are more—they are likely to look 

like the first four rounds, because that is the environment that we 

are in. We are in an environment where we need to reduce—create 

and generate savings, reduce excess capacity and the resources 

that that consumes in order to put those resources into enhancing 

capabilities. 

Mr. REYES. And there would be no difference between international presence versus domestic, or would there? 

Dr. ROBYN. A difference in what—— 

Mr. REYES. In the payback. 

Dr. ROBYN. Well, I think with the—when we close foreign—you 

are saying what the—the payback between the—I was distinguishing between the 2005 round of domestic closures and the—— 

Mr. REYES. Well, in terms of the savings, I mean, one of the concerns that you have heard Members express has been—— 

Dr. ROBYN. Right. 

Mr. REYES [continuing]. There is a BRAC and then there—it just 

lingers, and lingers, and lingers, and—— 

Dr. ROBYN. Right. 

Mr. REYES [continuing]. For the 2005 we were told it is going to 

be some time before it even breaks even, and we are not sure—— 
36 

Dr. ROBYN. Yes. Again, I feel like I am—the 2005 round was different than all the other rounds. You know, I think we can debate 

whether one should use BRAC for transformation. I think the 2005 

round did fabulous things, but I think one can have a debate about 

is that—is that a good use—is that a good use of BRAC? It worked, 

but I think we got a lot out of it. 

Is that what we—is that what we need to do in 2013 and 2015? 

No. That is not the—the agenda is not to do transformation. More 

jointness, yes, I think, but we are not trying to do the kinds of 

transformational changes that the Army did, which reflected the 

needs of the time and the urgency of the war. 

Mr. REYES. That is it, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding—— 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Reyes. 

I want to thank all of you for your patience, and I am going to 

have one last question. 

But I wanted to also tell you, Dr. Robyn, we just don’t buy any 

more of this stuff of we are—we are taking excess resources so we 

can enhance other capabilities when Secretary Gates came out and 

announced he was going to shut down the Joint Forces Command 

in his press conference that day, he said, because this is going to 

be great. We are going to put this in shipbuilding; we are going to 

put this in ship repair. That lasted about 4 months before all that 

money was gone, you know, out of there. 

And so I think most of us understand here this isn’t because we 

are taking this out and putting it somewhere else. It is going out 

of the defense budget completely. 

The other thing is, as Mr. Courtney pointed out, a lot of things 

you can do outside of BRAC. You can knock down a lot of these 

buildings and things—— 

Dr. ROBYN. Sure. Oh, yes. I didn’t mean—— 

Mr. FORBES. I mean, we are only talking about for BRAC, when 

you have 300 civilians or more that you are relocating. 

And the final question I would have for you, because as I heard 

Mr. Lepore’s testimony—and, Mr. Lepore, I would like for you to 

correct me if I am wrong on your testimony, but you said basically 

that when you do BRAC the goals that are set kind of drive the 

selection criteria, and the selection criteria, with that, will drive 

the outcome. Correct me on what part of that I was wrong on. 

Mr. LEPORE. I think you are close. What I think I said was that 

the goals help to drive where the Department hopes to end up and 

the selection criteria helps to define how they will get there, is a 

way to think about—— 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. They work together. Good. 

Then, Dr. Robyn, last question I would have for you: Can you 

state for this committee the specific goals that the Department 

would have for this round of BRAC so we can at least have some 

forecast of where you might end up, and how do you think the selection criteria will help you reach those goals? 

Brian, is that a fair statement? 

Mr. LEPORE. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

Dr. ROBYN. It would be presumptuous of me to say what the 

goals for the—for the round are. I think that needs to be an internal deliberation. I am giving you a sense of—that the focus is going 
37 

to be much more on getting rid of excess capacity than on transformation. 

In terms of how the criteria relate, the criteria are in statute. 

You will see when you get our bill within the week that they are— 

they are set out. We preserved the same ones that were used in 

2005, and I believe those were put in statute in 2005 in response 

to congressional desire, and we had a set of criteria and Congress 

made some changes, and it—so we—we have preserved what came 

out of the—or, I am sorry, it was 2001 legislation. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, let me just tell all of you, I think you can tell 

by this subcommittee that they are going to have to have a lot 

more facts to—before they are going to bite off on this—another 

round of BRAC. And specifically, one thing they are not going to 

do is pass it so we can find out what is in it, you know, so we are 

going to need to know those goals and we are going to need to 

know some of the specifics in doing it. 

But I promised all three of you if you had anything else you want 

to say or anything you want to clarify on any of the questions that 

came up that you didn’t get all the time—Dr. Robyn, anything else? 

Dr. ROBYN. No. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. And if you don’t mind, if you could get Mr. 

Reyes—— 

Dr. ROBYN. Yes. Yes, I will. 

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. Information back. 

General, thank you for your service. Anything else that we have 

left out that you would like to—— 

General BISHOP. No, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. And, Mr. Lepore, anything that we have omitted 

that you feel is appropriate? 

Mr. LEPORE. No. And I appreciate the opportunity to be here 

once again. 

Mr. FORBES. Listen, we want to thank you all for your service. 

Thank you so much for your patience and being here with us. 

And, Mr. Reyes, if you have no additional questions, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:02 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 8, 2012 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 8, 2012 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 8, 2012 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. Has the Secretary of Defense assessed whether excess infrastructure 

exists in the Department? What empirical support can the Department provide to 

support the BRAC request? 

Dr. ROBYN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. Congress requested an independent overseas basing assessment in 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. As a foundational document, shouldn’t the Department complete the overseas basing assessment before 

a BRAC authorization is provided? 

Dr. ROBYN. Even a significant reduction of our footprint overseas will not achieve 

the needed cuts to overall infrastructure. To eliminate the excess capacity that results from force structure reductions, the Department will need to close and realign 

installations in the United States as well as overseas—hence our request for a parallel, BRAC process. It makes sense to look at our domestic and overseas bases at 

the same time so that the two reviews can inform one another. The Department 

took this approach in 2004–2005, and it would be no less useful now given the major 

strategic realignment underway. 

Mr. FORBES. Considering BRAC 2005 will not realize a payback on the $35 billion 

investment until 2018, 13 years after the start of the initial investment, can the Nation afford to exacerbate a potential sequestration deficit in 10 years by moving forward with another round of BRAC? 

Dr. ROBYN. Of all the efficiency measures that the Department has undertaken 

over the years, BRAC is perhaps the most successful and significant. The first four 

rounds of BRAC generated $8 billion in annual, recurring savings; total savings 

from those four rounds is $100 billion. The comparable figure for BRAC 2005 is $4 

billion. The annual recurring savings for all five rounds ($12 billion) represents the 

additional costs that the Department would incur every year for base operating support, personnel and leasing costs had we not had BRAC. It represents what the Department would spend to buy 300 Apache attack helicopters, 124 F/A–18E/F Super 

Hornets, or four Virginia class submarines. 

Because BRAC is a key priority, the Department will apply the resources necessary to support both a robust and thorough BRAC analysis and an efficient and 

effective implementation process. BRAC begins generating savings almost immediately, and those savings will partially offset its initial costs. BRAC will generate 

recurring savings far in excess of the upfront investment. 

The 2005 round took place during a period of growth in the military, and it reflected the goals and needs of that time—aligning our infrastructure with our military strategy so as to maximize war fighting capacity and efficiency. These efforts 

contributed significantly to the Department’s effectiveness; but they necessarily required substantial investments. Because the focus of the BRAC 2005 round was not 

on saving money and space, it is a poor gauge of the savings that the Department 

can achieve through another BRAC round. The prior BRAC rounds—which reduced 

capacity and paid off in a relatively few years—represent a better gauge of such 

costs and savings. In those rounds one-time costs range from $2.7 billion to $6.6 billion and the annual recurring savings ranged from $1 billion to $2.7 billion. 

Mr. FORBES. With the exception of the Air Force, the other Service Chiefs have 

generally indicated that they do not anticipate any major reductions as a result of 

a future BRAC authorization. Why would the Administration request broad authority for an additional BRAC authorization when significant excess infrastructure does 

not appear to exist across the Department? 

Dr. ROBYN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. With greater transparency, the BRAC implementation costs have increased. In retrospect what additional methods should the BRAC process have builtin to increase cost accuracy? 

Dr. ROBYN. The costs of the BRAC 2005 round increased for a number of reasons, 

but a change in the degree of transparency was not among them. By way of background, BRAC 2005 was by far the largest round undertaken by the Department. 

The BRAC Commission made 222 recommendations, resulting in 24 major closures, 

24 major realignments and 765 lesser actions. These actions affected some 125,000 
96 

military personnel at more than 800 locations across the United States. The cost 

of implementation totaled $35.1 billion, including $24.7 billion for military construction and another $10.4 billion to move personnel and equipment, outfit facilities and 

carry out environmental clean-up. Although the implementation cost far exceeded 

that of any prior round, so too do the savings ($4 billion a year). 

The cost of the 2005 round was far more than expected: the up-front investment costs ($35.1 billion) exceeded the Department’s original estimate by fully 67 percent. 

However, that increase was largely due to deliberate decisions by the Department 

(principally the Army) to expand the originally envisioned scope of construction and 

recapitalization—either to address deficiencies in our enduring facilities or to expand the capabilities they provide. In one case—namely, the reconfiguration of medical facilities in the National Capital Region—Congress added requirements that, 

while meritorious, increased the cost of construction and outfitting by $1 billion. In 

sum, BRAC 2005 served as a needed engine of recapitalization for our enduring 

military facilities (military construction accounted for 70 percent of BRAC 2005 upfront investment costs in contrast to only 33 percent of those costs in prior rounds). 

There are two other significant and related reasons for the increase in projected 

implementation costs. The Department decided to delay the implementation of 

BRAC 2005 because of competing budgetary priorities (in prior rounds, the implementation had always occurred early in the six-year window). That decision was expensive in and of itself because delay adds to the cost of inflation. In addition, delay 

meant that many of the large military construction contracts were competed in 2007 

and early 2008, just when construction costs spiked because of the rise in construction activity following Hurricane Katrina and because of an increase in the global 

demand for critical construction materials such as steel and concrete. 

Mr. FORBES. According to GAO and DOD the 2005 BRAC round is supposed to 

bring about military transformation and increased jointness. How are you seeing 

these results? 

Dr. ROBYN. Of all the efficiency measures that the Department has undertaken 

over the years, BRAC is perhaps the most successful and significant. BRAC 2005 

enabled the Department to reset its infrastructure to accommodate the return of 

forces from Europe and Korea; restructure its medical platforms; markedly increase 

joint basing and other cross-Service efforts; accommodate the Army’s 

modularization; and revitalize the Army’s reserve and guard infrastructure. These 

efforts were needed, and they have contributed significantly to the Department’s effectiveness. 

One of the singular achievements of BRAC 2005 has been the increase in 

jointness. The examples range from our Joint Bases themselves to the various consolidation and co-location efforts. Under BRAC 2005, 26 installations were consolidated into 12 Joint Bases. The Department felt that joint operation would enhance 

the military value of the installations, making them a DOD-wide asset. Joint Bases 

represent a fundamental change in our approach to installation management. Although these bases have been operating for only a short time, we are already beginning to see the expected economies of scale from consolidation. Perhaps even more 

important, joint bases are proving to be incubators for problem-solving and innovation: faced with inconsistent Service rules and requirements, Joint Base commanders are implementing new, cross-cutting business processes out of necessity. 

Mr. FORBES. Is BRAC an appropriate vehicle for military transformation? 

Dr. ROBYN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. The 2006 International Agreement between the United States and 

the Government of Japan requires that the Government of Japan make ‘‘tangible 

progress’’ on the construction of a Marine Corps Air Station Futenma replacement 

facility in northern Okinawa. In the FY12 NDAA, this progress was stipulated as 

an element that needed to be met before moving forward on additional construction 

on Guam. As a result of discussions with the Government of Japan in January 2012, 

the Administration has decided to drop the ‘‘tangible progress’’ requirement required 

in the 2006 agreement. 

a. What is the impact associated with not obtaining ‘‘tangible progress’’ at the 

Futenma replacement facility and moving forward with the Guam realignment process? 

b. Will the removal of ‘‘tangible progress’’ influence affect progress in developing 

a Futenma Replacement Facility that the Third Marine Expeditionary Force considers critical to current and future operations? 

c. Has the readiness posture of PACOM been negatively affected by competing priorities? If so, what would PACOM need to better resource readiness requirements? 

General BISHOP. Strategically, there is a sound basis for establishing an operational Marine presence on Guam, and we will start moving Marines to Guam at 

the first opportunity. By delinking tangible progress on the Futenma Replacement 
97 

Facility (FRF) from the movement of Marines to Guam, both of these important initiatives can proceed independently, as circumstances permit. 

Both the U.S. and Japanese governments have reaffirmed on more than one occasion that the FRF is the only operationally and politically viable alternative. Since 

Japan faces a domestic political imperative to reduce the U.S. military footprint in 

Futenma, Japan’s incentive to develop the FRF remains. Until the FRF is constructed, U.S. Marine Corps aviation will continue to operate out of the Marine 

Corps Air Station Futenma. 

The readiness posture of U.S. Pacific Command has been enhanced under the new 

defense strategy. We have reviewed our strategic defense posture in Asia—beginning with the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review—in order to achieve a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable force 

structure in the region. 

Mr. FORBES. How will the decision to withdraw two BCTs from Europe impact our 

ability to meet operational and training requirements? 

General BISHOP. The two Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) remaining in Europe 

will meet adequately our operational and training requirements. To maintain the 

interoperability gains of the last decade, we also believe that we need to assist the 

NATO Response Force (NRF) strategically. To this end, we will be allocating a 

CONUS-based BCT and brigade headquarters staff support to the NRF. This allocation will provide approximately two short-duration training opportunities per year. 

We believe this will best support NATO and help build critical partner capacity. 

Mr. FORBES. If the number of U.S. forces stationed in EUCOM is reduced, will 

EUCOM still maintain building partnership capacity mission in Europe and still 

provide substantial rotational troops to an overseas contingency operation? At what 

troop level does conducting both of these missions become impossible? 

General BISHOP. U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) assesses that the new 

force level following planned reductions is sufficient for assigned missions, including 

building partner capacity and having the flexibility to conduct out-of-area contingency operations if necessary. 

Mr. FORBES. What is your estimate on the cost and savings associated with BRAC 

2005? 

Mr. LEPORE. DOD’s fiscal year 2011 BRAC budget submission shows that the cost to implement the BRAC 2005 recommendations was about $35.1 billion as we stated 

in our March 8, 2012 testimony. Further, our analysis of DOD’s data shows net annual recurring savings are expected to be about $3.8 billion, while the 20-year net 

present value savings are about $9.9 billion, based on DOD’s fiscal year 2011 BRAC 

budget submission. We plan to issue our final report related to BRAC 2005 costs 

and savings in May of this year. 

Mr. FORBES. If Congress were to consider another round of BRAC, how can Congress ensure that a quicker payback is provided? What are the limiting factors? 

Mr. LEPORE. Congress has a role early in the BRAC process in codifying the criteria that DOD and the BRAC Commission use to evaluate BRAC recommendations. 

If Congress authorizes a future BRAC round, and if minimizing payback time were 

a key goal of that round, amending the criteria used to evaluate BRAC recommendations to include the extent and timing of potential costs and savings as 

part of the primary criteria may help to achieve that goal. Although anticipated savings resulting from BRAC implementation remained an important consideration, the 

Secretary of Defense made it clear at the outset for the 2005 BRAC round that military transformation was the primary goal. To facilitate that goal, the selection criteria used to develop and evaluate the candidate recommendations made enhancing 

military value the primary selection criteria and included as ‘‘other’’ or secondary 

criteria the ‘‘extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number 

of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for 

the savings to exceed costs.’’ Thus, the choices that DOD makes in terms of selecting 

the goals of the round, the reasons for doing another BRAC, and the selection criteria can help to determine the nature of the candidate recommendations that DOD 

forwards to the BRAC Commission for approval. If saving money is a key goal of 

a future BRAC round, should Congress authorize such a round, it is a fair question 

to ask DOD what goals they propose and how the selection criteria will help to 

achieve those goals. 

There are two limiting factors associated with payback periods. One limitation 

that could affect Congress’ ability to ensure that a future BRAC round provides a 

quicker payback period involves the accuracy of DOD and BRAC Commission cost 

and savings estimates. If the expected costs increase, or the expected savings decrease during the BRAC implementation timeframe, the payback period would be 

longer than DOD or the BRAC Commission originally estimated. Another limitation 

is the indicator used to assess payback. We believe that the 20-year net present 
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value of BRAC recommendations is a key indicator of the net result from up-front 

implementation costs and the resulting savings because it takes into account the 

time value of money; that is, net present value considers when a dollar amount, 

such as savings, is received during the 20 year period. As a result, annual savings 

and other dollar amounts receive different weights depending on when they occur, 

reflecting the fact that savings received further into the future are less valuable 

than savings received sooner. In payback period analysis, savings for different years 

would be treated the same. For the 2005 BRAC round, both DOD and the BRAC 

Commission calculated the net present value savings over a 20-year period ending 

in 2025 that we believe provides a more comprehensive analysis of expected savings 

in comparison to the payback calculation. 

Mr. FORBES. DOD’s estimates of the cost to implement its BRAC recommenda- tions have increased by $15 billion to date. What is GAO’s assessment as to why 

estimates increased? 

Mr. LEPORE. GAO found that, compared to the BRAC Commission’s 2005 esti- mate, the cost to implement the 2005 BRAC round has grown by about $14.1 billion 

using DOD’s fiscal year 2011 BRAC budget submission data submitted to Congress. 

In 2007, officials told us that the large volume of BRAC-related military construction combined with ongoing reconstruction following hurricane Katrina could have 

contributed to increased construction costs for building materials and labor. This 

may have contributed to the overall increase in implementation costs. Further, according to a recent OSD analysis of the increase in one-time implementation costs, 

about $10 billion of the increase was attributable to military construction costs as 

DOD identified the need for new and renovated facilities over the fiscal years 2006 

through 2011 implementation period. In a March 2010 testimony, the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Installations and Environment characterized the military construction for BRAC 2005 as a major engine of recapitalization. Other increases in costs were for inflation and program management. We plan to issue our 

final report related to BRAC 2005 costs and savings in May of this year and provide 

further details regarding reasons for cost increases and specific examples. 

Mr. FORBES. In your assessment, has the Department been able to provide accurate forecasts to gaining installations that coincide with community infrastructure? 

Has the Department’s inaccurate forecasts of installation loading led to an over 

building in the communities to support the new force structure? What lessons 

learned can be provided as to discussions with the local communities? 

Mr. LEPORE. A) As we reported in June 2008, some communities surrounding 

DOD growth installations had begun to identify infrastructure needs to help support 

expected personnel growth, but planning efforts were hampered by a lack of consistent and detailed planning information. At the time of our review, over half of 

the communities we surveyed expressed concerns about the completeness of the personnel data they received from DOD. For example, some communities expressed 

that they had not received reliable information on such issues as the number and 

ages of dependent children expected to accompany incoming service members and 

attend school in the community. As a result, these communities were concerned 

about their ability to effectively plan and obtain financing for critical infrastructure 

projects such as school construction. Although the consistency of personnel relocation data DOD provided had improved somewhat at the time of our review, we made 

a recommendation to DOD addressing this issue as explained in part C of this question. 

B) GAO has not conducted a review of the impact of BRAC recommendations on 

communities affected by DOD growth since June 2008, and we did not assess the 

extent to which inaccurate forecasts may have led to overbuilding in that report. 

However, in that June 2008 report, we concluded that, although the long-term outlook for communities surrounding growing DOD facilities is generally encouraging, 

the very real challenges many communities face to accommodate an influx of military personnel requires carefully targeted investments and judicious use of local, 

state, and federal resources. While communities unable to provide needed infrastructure improvements in a timely manner could face overcrowded schools, congested roadways, and overburdened public services, some communities could make 

substantial investments or incur large debts only to find that new residents would 

be longer in coming or fewer in number than expected. Hence, accurate, detailed, 

and timely planning information is vital to both maximize the efficient use of resources and to ensure the highest quality of life possible for relocating DOD personnel and their families. 

C) We further reported in June 2008 that high-level leadership attention was 

needed to better coordinate and leverage federal resources to assist communities affected by DOD activities. Because communities surrounding these locations play a 

vital role in providing support to the military, it has been long-standing DOD policy 
99 

that DOD should take the leadership role within the federal government in helping 

communities adapt to the effects of various defense program activities. DOD chairs 

the President’s Economic Adjustment Committee, which consists of 22 federal agencies and is charged with ensuring that communities that are substantially and seriously impacted by DOD actions are aware of available federal economic adjustment 

programs. This Committee is also responsible for identifying problems that states 

and communities face as a result of defense actions; assuring interagency and intergovernmental coordination and adjustment assistance; and serving as a clearinghouse to exchange information among federal, state, regional, and community officials in the resolution of community economic problems. Within DOD, the Office of 

Economic Adjustment, a field activity under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics, provides administrative support 

for the Committee in addition to its duties to provide technical and planning assistance to affected communities. We recommended in our June 2008 report that the 

Secretary of Defense, as chair of the President’s Economic Adjustment Committee, 

should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to holding regular meetings of the full executive-level Committee and by serving 

as a clearinghouse of information for identifying expected community impacts and 

problems as well as identifying existing resources for providing economic assistance 

to communities affected by DOD activities. This clearinghouse would provide a centralized source for information from all military services regarding personnel planning information, as well as information regarding any resources available at the 

federal, state, local, and private-sector levels that can help address potential infrastructure gaps at the affected communities. In addition, this information should be 

updated at least quarterly and made easily available to all interested stakeholders 

at the local, state, and federal levels. At the time of our report, DOD had left the 

workings of the Committee to its Office of Economic Adjustment. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. You indicated there were about 20,000–25,000 people who work 

at the Pentagon. What is the breakdown of that figure between military, civilians, 

and contractors? 

Dr. ROBYN. The Washington Headquarters Service (WHS) reports that there are 

approximately 20,750 personnel working in the Pentagon. The breakdown is: 8,700 

civilians, 6,750 military and 5,300 contractors. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Do you believe that public-private competition requirements, 10 

U.S.C. 2461 and the current moratorium on such should apply to work performed 

by civilians that may transfer to another base as a result of a BRAC action and 

would then be performed by a contractor who is performing the same service at the 

receiving base? 

Dr. ROBYN. When a BRAC recommendation relocates a function from one installation to another, the function is assumed by the organization at the receiving location. As part of this process, the Department looks at the capacity of the receiving 

location to determine whether the relocation of that function also requires the transfer of personnel. In the case where the receiving location is performing the function 

via contract, it is unlikely that a transfer of personnel would be required. Because 

the statutory BRAC process determined how and where the function would be performed, there is no action to take under section 2461. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Do you support efforts to get better accounting and visibility into 

contracted services, as required by law? 

Dr. ROBYN. In November 2011, the Department submitted a comprehensive plan 

to the defense committees to document contractor full time equivalents (CFTE) that 

complies with requirements set forth in title 10 for the inventory of contracts for 

services. The plan included both short- and long-term actions. As delineated in that 

plan, the Department issued guidance on December 29, 2011, directing the preparation of the fiscal year 2011 inventory of contracts for services. That guidance was 

a significant step forward in meeting the requirements of title 10, as it broadened 

the scope of responsibility to all Components of the Department that rely on contracted support, and delineated the requirements for reviewing contracted services 

in accordance with the statutory requirements. Based on this guidance, we are 

working with all DOD organizations towards completion of a more accurate and 

comprehensive data set to be submitted this summer. 

Additionally, together with the staff of the Department’s Chief Management Officer, we are working towards implementing the Army’s ‘‘Contractor Manpower Reporting Application’’ across the entire DOD-enterprise, in order to leverage estab-
100 

lished processes, lessons learned, and best practices to comply with the law in the 

most cost efficient, effective, and consistent manner. 

Ms. BORDALLO. In your opening remarks, you stated that the Department will be 

forced to use existing authorities to begin the realignment and closure process in 

the absence of the Congress passing new BRAC authority. Could you tell us in the 

absence of BRAC authority what criteria would be used for determining which bases 

you would realign or close and what internal deliberation processes you are using 

within the Department to make crucial decisions about closing or realigning assets? 

Dr. ROBYN. Strategic and fiscal imperatives leave the Department no alternative—we must close and realign military bases here in the United States. Thus, 

if Congress does not authorize additional BRAC rounds for this purpose, the Department will be forced to use its existing authorities to begin to support our new defense strategy. Should this course of action be necessary, a plan and exact methodology will be developed. Rest assured that decisions will only be made after careful 

analysis of the CONUS installation inventory against all relevant factors to include 

any force structure changes. With a goal of long-term cost reduction, we will assess 

the costs and savings of each proposed action and identify those with the highest 

payback. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Are there any areas that you plan to review from an inter-service 

standpoint, and if so, what are those areas? For those areas, what steps are you 

taking to ensure that each military service takes interservice concerns into consideration when downsizing personnel or making decisions about programmatic changes? 

Dr. ROBYN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. Recent changes in depot law have instructed that the Department 

establish organic (government-owned) depot maintenance capacity for new weapons 

systems within 4 years of fielding. Although the Department has scaled back modernization plans in some areas, there are a number of new systems in various stages 

of the procurement process. How will the Department account for these programs 

when making decisions about base closures and/or realignments? 

Dr. ROBYN. The Department has asked Congress to authorize two BRAC rounds 

using the same process as it authorized for the 2005 round. BRAC is a statutory 

process under which the Secretary of Defense develops recommendations for closures and realignments based on a 20-year force structure plan and statutory selection criteria. In the analysis the Department must make military value the primary 

consideration, consider all installations equally, and all data submitted for use in 

the analysis must be certified as accurate and complete. The Department will carefully and fully consider all applicability statutory requirements as it undertakes the 

BRAC analysis, as noted above. 

Statutory Selection Criteria: Military Value Criteria: 1. The current and future 

mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the 

Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and 

readiness. 

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces 

throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use 

of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential 

receiving locations. 

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total 

force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training. 

4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications. 

Other Criteria: 

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of 

years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the 

savings to exceed the costs. 

6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations. 

7. The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving 

communities to support forces, missions, and personnel. 

8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Title 10 requires depot core workload to be conducted by government employees at a level that ensures efficiency with the goal to generally be one 

of cost effectiveness since this workload is funded through working capital funds. 

How will the Department consider the impact on hourly rates when evaluating industrial facility locations for closure or realignment? 
101 

Dr. ROBYN. The Department will carefully and fully consider all applicability statutory requirements as it undertakes the BRAC analysis. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Title 10 grants the Department waiver authority for core requirements and for 50/50 requirements for depot maintenance. Since a waiver request 

should be very rare, will the Department assure the Committee that it will assume 

compliance with the law without waivers when evaluating locations for closure or 

realignment? 

Dr. ROBYN. The Department will carefully and fully consider all applicability statutory requirements as it undertakes the BRAC analysis. 

Ms. BORDALLO. During development of BRAC goals, what consideration will be 

given to ensuring the preservation of the organic defense industrial base as a critical component of national defense? 

Dr. ROBYN. The Department’s January 2012 strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. 

Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense states, ‘‘. . . the Department 

will make every effort to maintain an adequate industrial base . . .’’ This document 

will inform our goal development and decision making. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Does the Department plan to look at Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated facilities as possible locations for closure or realignment? 

Dr. ROBYN. Yes. The BRAC statute requires the Department to treat all installations equally, and that includes Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated facilities. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY 

Mr. COURTNEY. In your testimony, you said that ‘‘If Congress does not authorize 

additional BRAC rounds, the Department will be forced to use its authority to begin 

to close and realign bases’’ and that if the Pentagon is forced ‘‘to operate outside 

the BRAC process, it is severely constrained in what it can do to help local communities.’’ Please explain the existing authorities the Department would plan to use 

outside of the BRAC process should a new round(s) not be authorized. Please outline 

any limitations that currently exist in the use of such authorities. In addition, 

please describe the process by which the Department would identify which facilities, 

commands, or other activities to close or realign under these authorities. 

Dr. ROBYN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. COURTNEY. In your testimony, you say that ‘‘techniques used to analyze various capacity measures in 2004 indicated that the Department had 24 percent excess capacity overall’’ and that ‘‘because BRAC 2005 eliminated only about three 

percent of the Department’s capacity, we believe we have significant excess capacity 

today.’’ This seemingly suggests that the Department today has 21 percent excess 

capacity, but based on a 2004 estimate. Will the Department be conducting an updated estimate to support the request for two new BRAC rounds? 

Dr. ROBYN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. COURTNEY. In regards to GAO’s work on a ‘‘Lessons Learned’’ report to be 

released later this year, please describe whether the review will include any examination of the DOD’s internal process for collecting, evaluating and scoring the data 

it collects to judge installations against the BRAC criteria. 

Mr. LEPORE. In our ongoing work to report lessons learned related to the 2005 

BRAC round, we intend to determine whether opportunities exist to improve the development of candidate BRAC recommendations by DOD and the review of BRAC 

recommendations by the BRAC Commission. For that aspect of the work, we plan 

to examine a variety of different processes both DOD and the Commission used to 

assess and evaluate the candidate recommendations, to include DOD’s analytical 

cost comparison model that calculated the costs, savings, and return on investment 

of candidate realignment and closure actions. 

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