COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Bumgardner and Senior Judge Overton 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

TANYA DIONNE EDWARDS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0773-99-2 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 MAY 16, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 

George F. Tidey, Judge 

 Wayne R. Morgan, Jr., for appellant. 

 Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

 In a bench trial, the circuit court convicted Tanya Dionne 

Edwards, appellant, of grand larceny, forgery, and uttering a 

forged instrument. On appeal, appellant contends that the 

evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. We 

disagree, and affirm. 

 "On appeal, 'we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom.'" Archer v. 

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) 

(citation omitted). 
 So viewed, the evidence proved that appellant's twin 

sister, Tonya Edwards (Tonya), was working as a caretaker for 

the sister of Laura Robelen. Robelen and her sister lived 

together. Tonya stole three checks from Robelen. She cashed 

one check at a bank in the presence of appellant. The check was 

made payable to "Tanya Edwards" and was endorsed "Tanya 

Edwards."1 Tonya used appellant's identification to cash the 

check. 

 Appellant contends that the Commonwealth's evidence proved 

nothing more than her presence at the bank when Tonya cashed the 

check. On the contrary, the evidence, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, proved that the check was made 

payable to "Tanya Edwards," was endorsed "Tanya Edwards," that 

appellant allowed Tonya to use appellant's identification to 

cash the check, and that appellant stood next to Tonya when 

Tonya cashed the check. This evidence was sufficient to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant, at a minimum, was a 

principal in the second degree to the commission of these 

crimes. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 265, 269, 

343 S.E.2d 465, 468 (1986) ("A principal in the second degree is 

a person who is present, aiding and abetting, by helping some 

way in the commission of the crime."). 

 1

 Tonya testified that the check was made payable to her. 

However, the trial court stated that it believed otherwise. 

Furthermore, the check, which was entered as an exhibit, clearly 

shows that it was made payable to and endorsed Tanya, not Tonya. 

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 Furthermore, we reject appellant's contention that the 

trial court erred in convicting her because the evidence is 

susceptible of two interpretations--one innocent and one not. 

Appellant's "innocent" interpretation is that she was merely 

present while Tonya cashed the check and that she did not know 

that Tonya was cashing a stolen check when she lent her 

identification to Tonya. However, this interpretation of the 

evidence springs solely from the testimony of appellant and 

Tonya. The fact finder rejected that testimony. "In its role 

of judging witness credibility, the fact finder is entitled to 

disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the accused [and her 

witnesses] and to conclude that the accused is lying to conceal 

his guilt." Marable v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10, 

500 S.E.2d 233, 235 (1998). Having rejected appellant's 

evidence as not worthy of belief, no "innocent" interpretation 

of the evidence remained before the court. 

 Affirmed.

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