```

[House Report 106-39]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

106th Congress                                             Rept. 106-39
1st Session             HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES              Part 1
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     

 
    DECLARATION OF POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES CONCERNING NATIONAL MISSILE
                           DEFENSE DEPLOYMENT

                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                                   ON

                                 H.R. 4

                             together with

                    ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

                                     

                                     

 March 2, 1999.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                          -----------------------

                     U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
69-006                       WASHINGTON : 1999

                   HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                       One Hundred Sixth Congress

               FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina, Chairman
BOB STUMP, Arizona                   IKE SKELTON, Missouri
DUNCAN HUNTER, California            NORMAN SISISKY, Virginia
JOHN R. KASICH, Ohio                 JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South 
HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia             Carolina
JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah                SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania            OWEN PICKETT, Virginia
JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado                LANE EVANS, Illinois
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey               GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
STEVE BUYER, Indiana                 NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
TILLIE K. FOWLER, Florida            MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri            PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama               ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland         SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,           THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
    California                       VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
J.C. WATTS, Jr., Oklahoma            JIM TURNER, Texas
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas                ADAM SMITH, Washington
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana          LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia             JAMES H. MALONEY, Connecticut
VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee              MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida             CIRO D. RODRIGUEZ, Texas
WALTER B. JONES, Jr., North          CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
    Carolina                         ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina       ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JIM RYUN, Kansas                     ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
BOB RILEY, Alabama                   BARON P. HILL, Indiana
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada                  MIKE THOMPSON, California
MARY BONO, California                JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
STEVEN T. KUYKENDALL, California
DON SHERWOOD, Pennsylvania
                    Andrew K. Ellis, Staff Director
                 Heather Hescheles, Research Assistant

                                  (ii)

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Purpose and Background...........................................     1
Legislative History..............................................     3
Committee Position...............................................     3
Fiscal Data......................................................     4
  Congressional Budget Office Estimate...........................     4
  Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate......................     4
  Committee Cost Estimate........................................     4
Oversight Findings...............................................     5
Constitutional Authority Statement...............................     5
Statement of Federal Mandates....................................     5
Roll Call Vote...................................................     5
Additional views of Congressman Bob Stump........................     7
Additional views of Congressman John Spratt......................     8
Additional views of Congressman Silvestre Reyes..................    11
Dissenting views of Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney...............    12
106th Congress                                             Rept. 106-39
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 1st Session                                                     Part 1
_______________________________________________________________________

DECLARATION OF POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES CONCERNING NATIONAL MISSILE 
                           DEFENSE DEPLOYMENT

                                _______
                                

                 March 2, 1999.--Ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________

    Mr. Spence, from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                    ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS

                         [To accompany H.R. 4]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on Armed Services, to whom was referred the 
bill (H.R. 4) to declare it to be the policy of the United 
States to deploy a national missile defense, having considered 
the same, report favorably thereon without amendment and 
recommend that the bill do pass.

                         PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND

    H.R. 4 would commit the United States to the deployment of 
a national missile defense (NMD) system as a matter of policy. 
The bill reflects the committee's belief that the American 
people must be protected against the threat of a limited 
ballistic missile attack.
    The Administration's current policy commits the United 
States to the development--but not deployment--of a national 
missile defense system, and is predicated on the belief that 
the United States will have adequate warning time during which 
to deploy NMD in response to emerging ballistic missile 
threats. Although the Administration has proposed additional 
funding to support a national missile defense deployment in its 
Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), it does not plan to make a 
deployment decision until June 2000 at the earliest.
    The committee notes there is an increasing body of evidence 
to suggest that the proliferation of ballistic missiles and the 
weapons of mass destruction they can carry poses a growing 
threat to the United States, and that missile threats from 
rogue states such as North Korea or Iran may emerge sooner than 
anticipated by the intelligence community. In this connection, 
the committee notes the establishment in the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201) of 
an independent and bipartisan Commission to Assess the 
Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. That 
commission--chaired by former Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld and commonly known as the ``Rumsfeld Commission''--
unanimously concluded in July 1998 that the threat posed to the 
United States by nations seeking to acquire ballistic missiles 
and weapons of mass destruction ``is broader, more mature and 
evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and 
reports by the intelligence community.'' Consequently, the 
commission emphasized that the United States might have 
``little or no warning'' before a ballistic missile threat 
materializes. This possibility, the commission observed, would 
result from the expanding access to detailed open source 
technical information; the availability of foreign assistance, 
primarily from Russia and China, to rogue states seeking to 
develop their own ballistic missiles; and the use of deception 
and denial techniques intended to thwart U.S. efforts to 
accurately assess the nature and pace of other nations' 
ballistic missile programs.
    Several recent events have underscored the Rumsfeld 
Commission's findings. On July 24, 1998, Iran conducted the 
first flight-test of its Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic 
missile. Only months before, the intelligence community had 
forecast that the missile's initial flight-test would not occur 
for at least another year. Iran's accelerated development 
effort was facilitated by foreign assistance from Russia and 
North Korea. With additional assistance from these countries, 
Iran is also developing an intermediate-range ballistic 
missile--the Shahab-4--and, according to the Rumsfeld 
Commission, will be able ``to demonstrate an 
[intercontinental]-range ballistic missile * * * within five 
years of a decision to proceed. * * *''
    On August 31, 1998, North Korea launched a variant of its 
Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile in an attempt to place a 
satellite into orbit. The missile had a third stage, flight 
profile, mission, and range that were not anticipated by the 
intelligence community. With a third stage, the intelligence 
community estimates that the missile could strike portions of 
the United States, including Alaska, Hawaii. North Korea also 
continues its development of a longer-range Taepo Dong-2 
ballistic missile that could travel up to 10,000 kilometers--
sufficient to place much of the continental United States at 
risk.
    As a December 1998 CIA report to Congress noted, Russia and 
China have continued to be the primary suppliers to rogue 
states and potential U.S. adversaries of key nuclear, chemical, 
biological, and ballistic missile technologies. The committee 
believes that this kind of technology transfer will increase 
the long-range ballistic missile threat to the United States.
    The committee welcomes the Administration's recent 
acknowledgment that the ballistic missile threat to the United 
States is more serious than previously estimated. Secretary of 
Defense Cohen stated on January 20, 1999, that the Rumsfeld 
Commission had presented a ``sobering'' report demonstrating 
that ``there is a growing threat and * * * it will pose a 
danger not only to our troops overseas, but also to Americans 
here at home.'' The committee also notes the Administration's 
recognition that additional budget resources are required to 
support deployment of a national missile defense. Nonetheless, 
technology development and funding levels proposed over the 
FYDP do not support the Administration's original ``3-plus-3'' 
NMD program, which was predicated on the ability to deploy a 
system three years after a decision to do so. Moreover, 
Secretary Cohen has acknowledged that, under current 
Administration plans, an initial NMD deployment would not occur 
before 2005. The committee believes that the pace at which the 
ballistic missile threat is evolving suggests that the United 
States faces an increasingly dangerous period of vulnerability 
to ballistic missile attack. Consequently, the committee 
considers it prudent to establish deployment of national 
missile defenses as U.S. policy.
    The committee notes that H.R. 4 does not address the legal 
status or constraints of, or U.S. rights with respect to, the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty signed with the Soviet 
Union in 1972. The committee notes that Congress, in the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public 
Law 105-261), expressed its sense that ``any national missile 
defense deployed by the United States must provide effective 
defense against limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic 
missile attack for all 50 States.'' The director of the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization recently stated, and the 
committee agrees, that to provide an effective defense of all 
50 states an NMD architecture would require revisions to the 
ABM Treaty. The Secretary of Defense also stated recently that 
he would support modification of the ABM Treaty to allow for 
the deployment of an effective, limited national missile 
defense. The Secretary correctly noted that if such revisions 
cannot be negotiated, the U.S. has the legal right to withdraw 
from the ABM Treaty.
    The committee believes that the ballistic missile threat to 
the United States warrants a categorical commitment to the 
deployment of a national missile defense system. H.R. 4 
establishes this commitment as a matter of national policy. The 
committee believes this to be an important step toward assuring 
that all Americans are protected against the threat of limited 
ballistic missile attack.

                          legislative history

    On February 4, 1999, H.R. 4, to establish the deployment of 
a national missile defense system as the policy of the United 
States, was introduced with 59 co-sponsors and referred to the 
committees on Armed Services and International Relations. On 
February 25, 1999, the Committee on Armed Services held a mark-
up session to consider H.R. 4. The bill was reported favorably 
by a record vote of 50-3. The record vote can be found at the 
end of this report.

                           committee position

    On February 25, 1999, the Committee on Armed Services, a 
quorum being present, approved H.R. 4 by a vote of 50 to 3.

                              fiscal data

    Pursuant to clause 3(d)(2)(A) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the committee attempted to 
ascertain annual outlays resulting from the bill during fiscal 
year 2000 and the four following fiscal years. The results of 
such efforts are reflected in the cost estimate prepared by the 
Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 402 
of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, which is included in 
this report pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the 
Rules of the House.

                  congressional budget office estimate

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the cost estimate prepared by 
the Congressional Budget Office and submitted pursuant to 
section 402(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is as 
follows:

                                                 February 25, 1999.
Hon. Floyd Spence,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 4, a bill to 
declare it to be the policy of the United States to deploy a 
national missile defense.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Raymond Hall.
            Sincerely,
                                          Dan L. Crippen, Director.

               congressional budget office cost estimate

    H.R. 4 would state that it is U.S. policy to deploy a 
national missile defense. CBO estimates that the bill, by 
itself, would have no budgetary impact. Because it would not 
affect direct spending or receipts, pay-as-you-go procedures 
would not apply. Any budgetary impact would stem from separate 
implementing legislation or from annual authorization and 
appropriation bills. How the costs of implementing the policy 
enunciated in H.R. 4 would compare with costs likely to be 
incurred under current law would depend on the systems and time 
frame required by subsequent legislation.
    Section 4 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act excludes from 
the application of that act any legislative provisions that are 
necessary for national security. That exclusion might apply to 
the provisions of this bill. In any case, the bill contains no 
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates.
    The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Raymond Hall. 
This estimate was approved by Paul N.Van de Water, Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

                        committee cost estimate

    Pursuant to clause 3(d) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the committee generally concurs with 
the estimate contained in the report of the Congressional 
Budget Office.

                           oversight findings

    With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, this legislation results from 
hearings and other oversight activities conducted by the 
committee pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X.
    With respect to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives and section 308(a)(1) of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, this legislation does not 
include any new spending or credit authority, nor does it 
provide for any increase or decrease in tax revenues or 
expenditures. The fiscal features of this legislation are 
addressed in the estimate prepared by the Director of the 
Congressional Budget Office under section 402 of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
    With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the committee has not received a 
report from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight 
pertaining to the subject matter of H.R. 4.

                   constitutional authority statement

    Pursuant to clause 3 (d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the committee finds the authority 
for this legislation in Article I, section 8 of the United 
States Constitution.

                     statement of federal mandates

    Pursuant to section 423 of Public Law 104-4, this 
legislation contains no federal mandates with respect to state, 
local, and tribal governments, nor with respect to the private 
sector. Similarly, the bill provides no unfunded federal 
intergovernmental mandates.

                              record vote

    In accordance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, a record vote was taken with 
respect to the committee's consideration of H.R. 4. The record 
of this vote can be found on the following page.
    The committee ordered H.R. 4 reported to the House with a 
favorable recommendation by a vote of 50 to 3, a quorum being 
present.
    Offset Folios - to 10 here

               ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CONGRESSMAN BOB STUMP

    Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, I could not be in attendance 
for the Committee's consideration and markup of this important 
legislation. I was chairing a Joint House/Senate Veterans 
Affairs Committee hearing to receive the annual legislative 
presentation of Military Order of the Purple Heart, Fleet 
Reserve Association, The Retired Enlisted Association, Gold 
Star Wives of America, and the Air Force Sergeants Association. 
Had I been present, I would have voted in support of H.R. 4.
    This bipartisan bill before us today sends a clear and 
convincing message to the world that the United States will no 
longer be vulnerable to foreign attack and will respond 
accordingly to defend our nation and its citizens. The growing 
threat of a ballistic missile attack on our homeland is a clear 
and present danger. Failure to deploy an effective defense 
capability soon will most assuredly threaten our interests 
worldwide and our security at home.
                                                         Bob Stump.

              ADDITIONAL VIEWS BY CONGRESSMAN JOHN SPRATT

    I introduced this bill last year with my colleague, Curt 
Weldon, and I sponsor it again this year, not because I think 
we have a National Missile Defense (NMD) system ready to 
deploy, but because I think it's worth pursuit. Of course, any 
system worth deploying has to work, and by referring to 
``limited'' strikes, this bill means that the objective system 
will have to take out up to 20 oncoming warheads. We are a long 
way from defending against a deliberate attack by a well-armed 
adversary, particularly if the oncoming reentry vehicles (RVs) 
are mixed with decoys and chaff, requiring target 
discrimination; and particularly if the number of RVs exceeds 
200. The Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO) long ago 
concluded that when the number of RVs enters this range, the 
radiation, heat, and electro-magnetic effects generated by 
taking some of them out will make guidance of the remaining 
interceptors precarious, if not impossible. There is legitimate 
concern about how Russia may react to this push for NMD 
deployment. In truth, the system this bill calls for will not 
defend us against a massive attack by a nation with an arsenal 
as large and diverse as Russia's, not at least in the near 
future. It should defend us against rogue or accidental attacks 
and some unauthorized attacks, and Russia should have no 
objection to that.
    The system we refer to seems to be within our reach, but it 
is not yet within our grasp. Secretary Cohen beefed up BMD 
recently and gave his backing to NMD, but he warned that the 
technology is, in his words, ``highly challenging'' and 
``highly risky.'' The Theater Missile Defense (TMD) programs, 
the Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and the 
Navy's Upper Tier, are not comparable on a one-to-one basis to 
NMD, but when the THAAD interceptor is 0-5 in testing, and 
Upper Tier is 0-4, we should be wary of presuming that a 
ground-based interceptor can travel thousands of miles into the 
exo-atmosphere and hit an RV four feet long.
    That's why I said when we introduced this bill that I 
support it as much for what it does not say, as for what it 
does say. It does not say what will be deployed, when it will 
be deployed, or where it will be deployed, and I want to 
emphasize those points:
    This bill does not mandate a date certain for deployment. 
We should not rush technology development, and we should not 
settle for a substandard system just to say we have deployed 
something. Rather, we should only deploy a system that has 
proven itself through rigorous testing. I have opposed NMD 
bills in the past that legislated Initial Operational 
Capability (IOC) dates and deployment dates. In 1991, the 
Senate imposed on us in conference a ``Missile Defense Act'' 
which made it a national ``goal'' to deploy a missile defense 
system by 1996. It is now 1999, and nothing has been deployed, 
which shows the folly of legislating a deployment date.
    This bill is also silent on the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty. Everyone knows that we are developing a ground-
based system, which can be treaty-compliant. This bill leaves 
open the number of interceptors and where they may be deployed, 
as it should. We do not want to push NMD so hard that we derail 
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II and doom START 
III. Unlike past bills, this bill does not dictate terms that 
the Administration must negotiate with the Russians, and it 
should not. For now, compliance with the ABM Treaty is 
important to ratifying START II and negotiating START III. If 
we are concerned about the threat of nuclear attack, or about 
the risk of unauthorized or accidental attacks, or about the 
cost of maintaining our strategic forces at START I levels, 
both treaties are important--probably a lot more important to 
our near-term security than a limited missile defense. These 
treaties are also important for the long run if the warheads 
deployed on both sides, in the U.S. and Russia, are to be 
lowered to levels where national missile defense can complement 
deterrence.
    There is another key point I want to make clear. I am not 
supporting this bill because I think Congress needs to stiffen 
the resolve of this Administration. This Administration has put 
a billion dollars each year into developing a ground-based 
system, and for the last several years, Congress has generally 
acquiesced in that level of spending. This year the President's 
budget includes funds for deploying an NMD system, funds that 
amount to a plus-up of $6.6 billion for a total of $10.5 
billion over FY 1999--FY 2005. That sounds like a system taking 
shape to me. In fact, that's one reason I support deployment as 
our objective. At this level of spending, we should be thinking 
about a deployable system, and not more viewgraphs to go on the 
shelf.
    One aim of this bill is to focus NMD on attainable 
objectives. Since President Reagan's speech on March 23, 1983, 
this country has spent nearly $50 billion on ballistic missile 
defense, much of it in pursuit of myriad systems, tried and 
abandoned. We have explored exo-atmospheric interceptors, endo-
atmospheric interceptors, terminal interceptors, boost phase 
interceptors, Brilliant Pebbles, a neutral particle beam, and 
at least five types of laser. Our failure to field a missile 
defense system is due more to a lack of focus than a lack of 
funding.
    Finally, I sponsor this bill in the hope that we can put 
BMD on a more bipartisan footing. TMD enjoys bipartisan 
support; NMD has been a political totem. Now that the 
technology is taking shape and showing promise, NMD needs to 
stand the test of any weapons system. If we can develop a 
system that can prove itself, in rigorous testing, capable of 
holding this country harmless against a limited missile attack, 
I think we should build it. It would give us a defense against 
rogue attacks and a working system to learn from and build 
upon. It would allow us to reap a return on the investment of 
nearly $50 billion already spent on ballistic missile defense, 
and it would complement TMD and exploit the investment in SBIRS 
Low and SBIRS High (Space-Based Infrared Sensors) that we will 
make anyway for TMD and other missions.

                                                John M. Spratt, Jr.

           ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE SILVESTRE REYES

    I want to congratulate my colleagues, Curt Weldon and John 
Spratt, for drafting this bi-partisan bill which establishes 
that it is the policy of this nation to deploy a national 
missile defense (NMD) system. I also want to thank Chairman 
Spence and Ranking Member Skelton for bringing the bill before 
the House Armed Services Committee for our consideration in an 
expedited manner.
    I support this bill both for what it says and for what it 
does not say. This bill does not say when an NMD system must be 
deployed. This bill does not say how an NMD system must be 
deployed. This bill does not say where an NMD system must be 
deployed. Chairman Weldon and Congressman Spratt have 
intelligently left those decisions for the future.
    What this bill does say is that it is the policy of this 
nation to deploy an NMD system. My colleagues and I understand 
that the threat from ballistic missiles is here and now. On 
August 31, 1998, when the North Koreans tested their Taepo Dong 
1, the reality of the threat to this nation became brutally 
clear. Even the Secretary of Defense is now admitting that the 
threat is real.
    I hope that the President will support this bi-partisan 
bill. We need to send a message to our citizens, to our troops, 
to our allies and especially to our enemies that we are serious 
about national missile defense.
    I regret that I was unable to participate in the mark-up of 
this important bill, but I had pressing business back in my 
district. Two years ago, I was appointed to the Transatlantic 
Learning Community-Migration Group, an organization of 25 
international immigration experts. The TLC-Migration Group 
brings together elected officials, journalists and researchers 
from Western Europe and North America who meet in each other's 
countries to learn about practical policies that facilitate 
immigration and integration in local settings and how best 
practices can be transferred between Europe and North America. 
I am the only Member of Congress to have been selected to 
participate in the TLC-Migration Group, and I was hosting them 
in El Paso during the mark-up.
    If I had been present at the mark-up, I would have voted in 
favor of the bill and look forward to supporting it when it is 
considered on the floor of the House.
                                                   Silvestre Reyes.

           DISSENTING VIEWS OF CONGRESSWOMAN CYNTHIA McKINNEY

    Ladies and gentleman, I would like to speak in opposition 
to the proposal before the Committee.
    As a Member of Congress for over 6 years now, I have been 
asked to make a number of very difficult decisions. 
Fortunately, this is not one of those occasions.
    The decision to vote against making it the policy of the 
United States--mandating deployment of a system that does not 
now work, that may in fact, never work--is quite easy.
    Why the rush to mandate deployment before it is 
successfully tested? Like all of the members of this committee, 
I am concerned about the security of the United States and her 
citizens.
    Over the past several weeks we have heard testimony from 
the heads of all the uniformed services.
    They have all given compelling and professional testimony 
on real emerging threats to our armed forces, from laser 
technology to sophisticated attacks on our Command, Control, 
Communication, Computer and Intelligence systems. And every one 
of them has spoken of the immediate need to provide adequate 
pay and benefits for our most important military asset--our 
people in military service.
    Yet our first vote in this committee is not to provide a 
livable wage for our troops and their families, our priority it 
seems, is to pass into law a requirement that the United States 
build a ``Maginot Line'' in space.
    Why the rush? Earlier this month, General Shelton, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said in an Interview with 
Sea Power Magazine: ``The Chiefs question putting additional 
billions of taxpayers'' dollars into fielding a system now that 
does not work or has not proven itself . . .''.
    Why the rush ladies and gentlemen. The latest estimate from 
the Congressional Budget Offices of the cost of deploying and 
operating a National Missile Defense System ranged from $31 
billion to $60 billion. The tremendous costs along with the 
consistent technical failures prompted one analyst to write: 
``The only thing that seems certain is that the missile defense 
program will intercept large amounts of taxpayers money.''
    The costs come on top of the some $40 billion we've already 
spent in the 16 years since President Reagan first announced 
his star wars plan.
    That's a lot of cash. Particularly when one considers that 
any state or ``rogue group'' with the sophistication to build 
an intercontinental ballistic missile, can probably figure out 
how to drive a truck or a smugglers boat, a far more likely 
threat.
    I know that much has been made in recent weeks that the 
citizens of the United States are defenseless against an attack 
of even a single nuclear weapon. But that argument is false. 
Our real security lies in continuing the steady progress we 
have made under both Republican and Democratic Administrations 
to reduce the nuclear threat through arms control agreements. 
And it is that very progress that a star wars system is most 
likely to shoot down and kill.
    Former Senator Dale Bumpers, in a recent editorial in the 
Los Angeles Times eloquently outlined that concern. He wrote: 
``As presently conceived, the system would be a clear violation 
of the U.S.-Russian Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. This 
treaty has been the solid foundation of all arms control 
efforts for the past 27 years. If we violate it, in spite of 
strong Russian objections, we virtually assure not only the end 
of arms reduction efforts but we jeopardize the very positive 
progress of the U.S.-Russia Cooperative Threat Reduction 
program.''
    Folks, if we were really concerned about our Armed Forces, 
we would RUSH to address the fact that thousands of American 
Service men and women have to depend on food stamps to provide 
for their families. Star Wars can wait.
                                                  Cynthia McKinney.

                                

```