JUSTICE ASSETS 

FORFEITURE FUND

Transparency of 

Balances and Controls 

over Equitable Sharing 

Should Be Improved

Report to Congressional Requesters

July 2012

GAO-12-736

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-736, a report to 

congressional requesters 

July 2012 

JUSTICE ASSETS FORFEITURE FUND

Transparency of Balances and Controls over 

Equitable Sharing Should Be Improved 

Why GAO Did This Study

Every year, federal law enforcement 

agencies seize millions of dollars in 

assets in the course of investigations. 

The AFF was established to receive 

the proceeds of forfeiture and holds 

more than $1 billion in assets. DOJ 

uses the proceeds from forfeitures 

primarily to cover the costs of forfeiture

activities. DOJ also shares forfeiture 

proceeds with state and local agencies 

that participate in joint investigations 

through its equitable sharing program. 

GAO was asked to review (1) AFF’s 

revenues and expenditures from fiscal 

years 2003 through 2011 and DOJ’s

processes for carrying over funds for 

the next fiscal year, and (2) the extent 

to which DOJ has established controls 

to help ensure that the equitable 

sharing program is implemented in 

accordance with established guidance. 

GAO analyzed data on AFF revenues, 

expenditures, and balances;

interviewed DOJ officials; and 

analyzed a sample of 25 equitable 

sharing determinations, which included 

5 determinations from each relevant 

DOJ agency. GAO’s analysis of the

samples was not generalizable, but 

provided insight into DOJ’s decisions. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that, among other 

things, DOJ clearly document how it 

determines the amount of funds that 

will need to be carried over for the next 

fiscal year, develop guidance on how 

components should make adjustments 

to equitable sharing determinations, 

and ensure that the basis for equitable 

sharing determinations is documented 

and subjected to review and approval. 

DOJ concurred with GAO’s 

recommendations.

What GAO Found

Annual revenues into the Assets Forfeiture Fund (AFF) from forfeited assets 

increased from $500 million in 2003 to $1.8 billion in 2011, in part due to an 

increase in prosecutions of fraud and financial crimes cases. Expenditures in 

support of forfeiture activities such as equitable sharing payments to state and 

local law enforcement agencies and payments to victims also increased over the 

same 9-year period, growing from $458 million in 2003 to $1.3 billion in 2011. 

The Department of Justice (DOJ) uses the difference between revenues and 

expenditures in any year to help cover anticipated expenses in the next fiscal 

year. Because the AFF uses fund revenues to pay for the expenses associated 

with forfeiture activities, DOJ carries over funds at the end of each fiscal year to 

ensure it has sufficient resources to cover expenses that may not be covered by 

the next year’s revenues. When determining the amounts to carry over, DOJ 

reviews historical data on past program expenditures, analyzes known future 

expenses such as salaries and contracts, and estimates the costs of any 

potential new expenditures. However, DOJ has not documented the process for 

determining the amount of funds needed to cover anticipated expenditures in the 

next fiscal year in its annual budget justifications. Providing more transparent 

information as part of the AFF’s annual budget process would better inform

Congress’ oversight of the AFF. Further, after DOJ obligates funds needed to 

cover program expenses, any remaining AFF funds identified at the end of a 

fiscal year may be declared an excess unobligated balance. DOJ has the 

authority to use these balances for any of the department’s authorized purposes. 

Per Office of Management and Budget guidance, in recent years, DOJ used 

these excess unobligated balances to help cover rescissions. Rescissions cancel 

the availability of DOJ’s previously enacted budget authority, making the funds 

involved no longer available for obligation. For example, in fiscal year 2011, DOJ 

used excess unobligated balances to help cover a $495 million AFF program 

rescission.

DOJ has established guidelines for making equitable sharing determinations, but 

controls to ensure consistency and transparency could be improved. For 

example, DOJ agencies responsible for making equitable sharing determinations 

may make adjustments to sharing percentages when work hours alone do not 

reflect the relative value of an agency’s contribution to an investigation. If a state 

or local law enforcement agency contributed a helicopter or a drug-sniffing dog to 

an investigation, its sharing percentage might be adjusted upward from what it 

would be based on work hours alone. However, DOJ’s guidance does not include 

information regarding how decisions about these adjustments to sharing 

determinations should be made. This is particularly important given that these 

determinations represent DOJ’s overall assessment of each agency’s unique 

contributions and are a key component of how DOJ determines how much to 

award to each agency. Furthermore, key information that serves as the basis for 

equitable sharing determinations—such as the work hours contributed by each of 

the participating agencies in an investigation—is not subject to review by 

approving authorities. Developing guidance regarding how these decisions are to 

be made, documenting the basis for these decisions, and subjecting them to 

review and approval would help ensure the consistency and transparency of 

equitable sharing determinations.

View GAO-12-736. For more information, 

contact David C. Maurer at (202) 512-9627 or 

maurerd@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

Letter 1 

Background 5

AFF Revenues and Expenditures Have Increased since Fiscal Year 

2003, and DOJ’s Process for Carrying Over Funds Could Be More 

Transparent 11

DOJ Could Enhance Controls and Oversight Mechanisms for Its 

Equitable Sharing Program 25

Conclusions 38

Recommendations for Executive Action 40

Agency Comments 40

Appendix I Equitable Sharing 43

Appendix II Assets Forfeiture Fund Expenditure Categories 46

Appendix III Results of Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section 

Compliance Reviews Completed as of December 2011 50

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 52

Tables

Table 1: AFF’s Expenditures across All Fiscal Years by Type of 

Expenditure 15

Table 2: Total Funds Available for Use in Fiscal Year 2010 19

Table 3: Funds Reserved to Cover AFF’s Annual Rescissions for 

Fiscal Years 2003 through 2011 24

Table 4: Results of Compliance Reviews of Equitable Sharing 

Participants 50

Figures

Figure 1: DOJ Asset Forfeiture Program Participants 7

Figure 2: AFF’s Revenue Totals for Fiscal Years 2003 through 2011 12

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

Figure 3: Total Forfeiture Program Expenditures from Fiscal Years 

2003 through 2011 14

Figure 4: Funds Carried Over at the End of the Fiscal Year to Cover 

Solvency, Equitable Sharing, and Third-Party Payments in 

the Next Fiscal Year 20

Figure 5: Process for Identifying Excess Unobligated (Super 

Surplus) Balances 23

Figure 6: Process for Making Equitable Sharing Determinations 28

Figure 7: Equitable Sharing Payments across the United States in 

Fiscal Year 2011 44

Abbreviations

AFF Assets Forfeiture Fund

AFMLS Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section

AFMS Asset Forfeiture Management Staff

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

CATS Consolidated Asset Tracking System

DAG Deputy Attorney General

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DOJ Department of Justice

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

OIG Office of Inspector General

OMB Office of Management and Budget

RICO Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

TFF Treasury Forfeiture Fund

USAO United States Attorney’s Office

USMS United States Marshals Service

VOCA Victims of Crime Assistance

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Page 1 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

July 12, 2012 

Congressional Requesters: 

Every year, federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies seize 

millions of dollars in assets that are forfeited through the Department of 

Justice’s (DOJ) Asset Forfeiture Program. Forfeited assets can include, 

but are not limited to, businesses, cash, bank accounts, automobiles, 

boats, airplanes, jewelry, art objects, and real estate.1 A primary goal of 

the program is preventing and reducing crime through the seizure and 

forfeiture of assets that were used in or acquired as a result of criminal 

activity. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 established the 

Assets Forfeiture Fund (AFF) within DOJ to receive the proceeds of 

forfeitures and the AFF currently holds more than $1 billion in assets.2

Revenues generated from forfeitures are used to fund program-related 

expenses including payments to victims and lienholders, the costs of 

storing and maintaining forfeited assets, and certain law enforcement 

activities, such as the payment of awards for information leading to asset 

forfeiture.3 After funds have been obligated for program expenses in the 

current fiscal year, any unobligated funds that remain in the AFF at the 

end of the fiscal year are then carried forward to the next fiscal year.4

 

1

Once a seized asset is officially forfeited, it becomes the property of the U.S. 

government. DOJ also seizes illegal drugs and counterfeit items that have no resale value 

to the federal government. These items are typically held by the agencies until they are 

approved for destruction. According to DOJ, forfeited firearms generally must be 

destroyed in a way that prevents them from ever being put back together and used. 

Specifically, at the end of each fiscal year, DOJ carries over funds to 

ensure it has resources to cover expenses that may not be covered by 

the next year’s anticipated revenues. Those funds determined to be in 

excess of these requirements (excess unobligated balances) may be 

2

Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 310, 98 Stat. 1976, 2052 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 

§ 524(c)).

3

These authorized uses of these revenues are enumerated in 28 U.S.C. §524(c)(1). The 

amount of fund revenues that can be spent on certain types of expenses, such as the 

purchase of evidence of a drug offense, is to be specified in annual appropriations acts, 

but revenues can be used without limitation for all other authorized purposes. Before 

1985, the costs of forfeiture activities were paid out of agency operational funds.

4

Obligated balance refers to the amount of obligations already incurred for which payment 

has not yet been made. Unobligated balance is the portion of obligational authority that 

has not yet been obligated. 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

declared as Super Surplus and, after congressional notification, can be 

used at DOJ’s discretion for a variety of purposes.5

All federal law enforcement agencies within DOJ participate in the Asset 

Forfeiture Program including the United States Marshals Service (USMS); 

the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); the Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA); and the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) as well as other agencies not part of DOJ such as the 

Department of Defense Criminal Investigative Service. Often, state and 

local law enforcement agencies participate in joint investigations with 

DOJ’s law enforcement agencies. In return, state and local law 

enforcement agencies can receive a portion of the proceeds of forfeited 

assets resulting from these investigations in the form of cash or property 

through DOJ’s equitable sharing program.6

1. How, if at all, have the AFF’s revenues and expenditures changed 

from fiscal years 2003 through 2011 and to what extent does DOJ 

have processes in place to ensure transparency when carrying over 

funds for the next fiscal year?

From fiscal years 2003 

through 2011, DOJ has shared over $3.2 billion in cash and property with 

more than 9,200 state and local law enforcement agencies. You 

expressed interest in the management of the AFF and oversight of the 

equitable sharing program. Thus, this report addresses the following 

questions:

2. To what extent has DOJ established controls to help ensure that the 

equitable sharing program is implemented in accordance with

established DOJ guidance?

To determine how the AFF’s revenues and expenditures from fiscal year 

2003—the year in which the AFF was removed from GAO’s high-risk 

list—through fiscal year 2011 had changed, we analyzed DOJ data on 

 

5

These Super Surplus balances may be allocated at the discretion of the Attorney General 

for “...any Federal law enforcement, litigative/prosecutive, and correctional activities, or 

any other authorized purpose of the Department of Justice” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

524(c)(8)(E). 

6

21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A) and (e)(3), 18 U.S.C. § 981(e)(2) authorize the Attorney 

General to share federally forfeited property with participating state and local law 

enforcement agencies.
 

Page 3 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

revenues and expenditures by fiscal year.7 We used information on 

revenues and expenditures contained in the department’s financial 

accounting systems. We interviewed DOJ officials regarding information 

in the financial accounting systems to discuss trends and anomalies in 

the revenues and expenditures over this 9-year period. As part of our 

review we also determined the extent to which DOJ has processes in 

place to ensure transparency when carrying over funds for the next fiscal 

year. We reviewed information on unobligated and excess unobligated 

balances from DOJ’s annual Congressional Budget Justifications to 

Congress, available through DOJ’s public website and also contained in 

the AFF’s financial accounting systems.8

To assess the reliability of DOJ’s financial accounting system for 

providing revenues, expenditures, and excess unobligated balances data, 

we reviewed relevant documentation and conducted interviews with 

knowledgeable DOJ agency officials to understand how DOJ collects, 

categorizes, and tabulates the information and the actions it takes to 

ensure its consistency, accuracy, and completeness. We determined 

information on the financial accounting system provided by DOJ to be 

sufficiently reliable for presenting the total revenues, expenditures, and 

excess unobligated balances for fiscal years 2003 through 2011.

Specifically, we assessed the 

extent to which the Congressional Budget Justifications outlined the 

processes for carrying over funds for the next fiscal year. We also 

reviewed prior GAO reports on the importance of transparency in federal 

budget submissions to Congress. We interviewed DOJ officials from the 

Asset Forfeiture Management Staff responsible for oversight of the AFF 

regarding their processes for carrying over funds at the end of the fiscal 

year. Further, we analyzed data on the AFF’s excess unobligated 

balances from fiscal years 2003 through 2011, and interviewed officials 

about how excess unobligated balances have been used since 2003, 

including how these balances have been used to cover the cost of annual 

rescissions over this time period.

 

7

We first reported on the Department of Justice’s Asset Forfeiture Program as a high-risk 

area in 1990 because of shortcomings in the management of and accountability for seized 

and forfeited property. In 2003, actions taken by DOJ resulted in the AFF being removed 

from GAO’s high-risk list. See GAO, High-Risk Series, An Update, GAO-03-119 

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1, 2003). 

8

After revenues to cover program expenses have been carried over, any funds that 

remain in the AFF at the end of the fiscal year may be identified as excess unobligated 

balances.
 

Page 4 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

To determine the extent to which DOJ has established controls to help 

ensure that the equitable sharing program is implemented in accordance 

with established guidance, we analyzed the most current guidance 

provided to DOJ agencies, including the 2009 Guide to Equitable Sharing 

for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies and the 2008 Asset 

Forfeiture Policy Manual, which is also provided to all DOJ agencies. In 

the course of our review, DOJ officials informed us that they are in the 

process of updating the 2008 Asset Forfeiture Policy Manual and 

provided us with a copy of the revised chapter on equitable sharing, 

which we also analyzed. We interviewed officials from DOJ’s Asset 

Forfeiture Management Staff responsible for managing the AFF, and 

officials from the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section 

responsible for establishing the policies and procedures of the fund. In 

addition, we discussed equitable sharing guidance, policy, and related 

issues with headquarters officials from DOJ’s law enforcement agencies, 

including ATF, DEA, FBI, and USMS. We also compared DOJ’s equitable 

sharing guidance against criteria included in Standards for Internal 

Control in the Federal Government.9

To determine the extent to which DOJ ensures that agencies responsible 

for making equitable sharing decisions follow DOJ guidance, we also 

reviewed a nonprobability sample of 25 equitable sharing determinations 

completed during fiscal year 2010. Specifically, we selected the last 5 

equitable sharing determinations approved in fiscal year 2010 by each of 

the three DOJ law enforcement agencies responsible for making 

equitable sharing decisions, the last 5 determinations that were reviewed 

and approved by the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section in 

fiscal year 2010, and the last 5 determinations that were subject to review 

and approval by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in fiscal year 2010.10

 

9

GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

We also 

interviewed officials from six local law enforcement agencies in two states 

to get their perspectives on the equitable sharing program. We selected 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

10We received sample equitable sharing determinations from each of the DOJ agencies 

responsible for making equitable sharing recommendations. These were the Asset 

Forfeiture Money Laundering Section, ATF, DEA, FBI, and the United States Attorney’s 

Office. Although the results of our review of equitable sharing determinations cannot be 

generalized to all equitable sharing determinations, we gained a critical understanding of 

how each of the DOJ agencies makes sharing recommendations as well as the process 

for reviewing and approving final equitable sharing determinations. 
 

Page 5 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

agencies from these two states because they are two of the states that 

received the largest amounts of equitable sharing dollars in fiscal year 

2011. While the views of these local law enforcement agencies cannot be 

generalized to the population of equitable sharing participants, these 

interviews provided insight into the views of select local law enforcement 

agencies on the equitable sharing program. As part of our review of the 

equitable sharing program, we also analyzed information on equitable 

sharing payments by state and by fiscal year. To assess the relationship 

between equitable sharing payments and the population of a state, and 

per capita equitable sharing payments and arrest rates, we reviewed 

equitable sharing payments data from fiscal years 2003 through 2011 

provided by DOJ, U.S. Census Bureau data for the U.S. population in 

2010, and FBI’s annual uniform crime data on arrest rates for 2010, which 

were the most current data available at the time we did our analysis. We 

interviewed FBI officials to assess the reliability of the FBI uniform crime 

data. In the course of the interview we determined that the arrest data for 

Washington, D.C. and Illinois did not capture the entire area, but 

determined the data for all other states was sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of our review. Consequently, we excluded Washington, D.C. 

and Illinois from our analysis. Because it was out of the scope of our 

work, we did not attempt to determine other factors that could explain the 

relationship between equitable sharing funds and population or arrests.

We conducted this performance audit from April 2011 through July 2012 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.11

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The Asset Forfeiture Program has three primary goals: (1) to punish and 

deter criminal activity by depriving criminals of property used or acquired 

through illegal activities; (2) to enhance cooperation among foreign, 

federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies through the equitable 

sharing of assets recovered through this program; and, as a by-product, 

 

11 During the course of our work, we experienced delays in obtaining certain data and 

documents from DOJ. This information was critical to the completion of our work.

Background
 

Page 6 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

(3) to produce revenues in support of future law enforcement 

investigations and related forfeiture activities. A number of federal law 

enforcement organizations participate in the AFF, including USMS, which 

serves as the primary custodian of seized and forfeited property for the 

program. See figure 1 for the Asset Forfeiture Program participants.
 

Page 7 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

Figure 1: DOJ Asset Forfeiture Program Participants
 

Page 8 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

DOJ’s Asset Forfeiture Management Staff (AFMS) is part of DOJ’s 

Justice Management Division and is responsible for managing and 

overseeing all financial aspects of the AFF, review and evaluation of 

asset forfeiture program activities, internal controls and audit functions, 

information systems, and other administrative functions related to the 

fund. The Asset Forfeiture Money and Laundering Section (AFMLS) is 

part of DOJ’s Criminal Division and is responsible for legal aspects of the 

program, including civil and criminal litigation and providing legal advice 

to the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. AFMLS is responsible for establishing the 

Asset Forfeiture Program’s policies and procedures, coordinating 

multidistrict asset seizures, acting on petitions for remission in judicial 

forfeiture cases, and coordinating international forfeiture and sharing. 

AFMLS also oversees the AFF’s equitable sharing program. United 

States Attorneys’ Offices (USAO) are responsible for the prosecution of 

both criminal and civil actions against property used or acquired during 

illegal activity.

USMS serves as the primary custodian of seized property for the Asset 

Forfeiture Program. USMS manages and disposes of the majority of the 

valued property seized for forfeiture. In serving as the primary custodian 

of the majority of assets managed by the fund, USMS manages all valued 

assets that are not considered evidence, contraband, or targeted for use 

by individual law enforcement agencies. ATF enforces the federal laws 

and regulations relating to alcohol, tobacco, firearms, explosives, and 

arson by working directly and in cooperation with other federal, state, and 

local law enforcement agencies. While USMS is the primary custodian 

over valued assets, ATF maintains custody over assets seized under its 

authority, including firearms, ammunition, explosives, alcohol, and 

tobacco. DEA implements major investigative strategies against drug 

networks and cartels. DEA maintains custody over narcotics and other 

seized contraband. The FBI investigates a broad range of criminal 

violations, integrating the use of asset forfeiture into its overall strategy to 

eliminate targeted criminal enterprises.

There are several agencies outside the Department of Justice that also 

participate in the DOJ Asset Forfeiture Program. Non-DOJ participants 

include the United States Postal Inspection Service, the Food and Drug 

Administration’s Office of Criminal Investigations, the United States 

Department of Agriculture’s Office of the Inspector General, the 

Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and the Department 

of Defense Criminal Investigative Service.

Roles and Responsibilities 

of Asset Forfeiture 

Program Participants
 

Page 9 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

There are two types of forfeiture: administrative and judicial, and they 

differ in a number of ways, including (1) the point in the proceeding, 

generally at which the property may be seized; (2) the burden of proof 

necessary to forfeit the property; and (3) in some cases, the type of 

property interests that can be forfeited.

Administrative forfeiture allows for property to be forfeited without judicial 

involvement. Although property may be seized without any judicial 

involvement, seizures performed by federal agencies must be based on 

probable cause.12 In administrative forfeitures, the government initiates a 

forfeiture action and will take ownership of the property provided that no 

one steps forward to contest the forfeiture. Specifically, the administrative 

forfeiture procedure requires that those with an interest in the property be 

notified and given an opportunity to request judicial forfeiture 

proceedings. See below for an example of an administrative forfeiture.

Example of Administrative Forfeiture

DEA initiated a task force investigation into a drug-trafficking organization. Task force 

officers received information from a confidential source that the drug-trafficking 

organization was using a van with hidden compartments to transport methamphetamine 

and drug proceeds, and a drug detection dog gave a positive alert to the presence of 

drugs in the van. Officers obtained and executed a search warrant on the vehicle, 

which resulted in the discovery and seizure of 149 kilograms of cocaine and $1,229,785 

in U.S. currency. Because no party filed a claim contesting the forfeiture, the currency 

was administratively forfeited by DEA pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1609.

Source: DOJ.

Judicial forfeiture, both civil and criminal, is the process by which property 

may be forfeited to the United States by filing a forfeiture action in federal 

court. In civil forfeiture, the action is against the property and thus does 

not require that the owner of the property be charged with a federal 

offense. The government must only prove a connection between the 

property and the crime. By contrast, criminal forfeiture requires a 

conviction of the defendant before property is subject to forfeiture.

 

12Probable cause for an administrative forfeiture is defined as a reasonable ground for 

belief of guilt, supported by less than prima facie proof, but more than mere suspicion. 

Types of Forfeiture
 

Page 10 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

Example of Civil Forfeiture

After obtaining a search warrant, agents searched a residence and the adjoining land 

on a 50-acre farm. Agents found firearms and ammunition, along with 60 pounds of 

processed marijuana. Agents also found approximately 4,000 marijuana plants growing 

outside in the adjacent field, along with approximately 2,500 plants being processed.

While the owner of the farm will be subject to prosecution, because the land was used 

for illegal activities, a separate civil forfeiture action was filed against the property. The 

farm where the marijuana plants were located was seized and will be forfeited under 

civil forfeiture proceedings.

Source: U.S. Attorney’s Office.

Example of Criminal Forfeiture

According to the United States Attorney, two Philadelphia-based corporations operated 

an Internet enterprise that facilitated interstate prostitution activities. The defendants 

allegedly developed and operated an Internet website and created an online network 

for prostitutes, escort services, and others to advertise their illegal activities to 

consumers and users of those services.

The case was investigated by state police, FBI, and the Internal Revenue Service 

Criminal Investigations Division. The investigation found that defendants received fees 

in the form of money orders, checks, credit card payments, and wire transfers from 

users of the website. The funds the defendants allegedly received were the proceeds of 

violations of federal laws prohibiting interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprises, 

specifically prostitution, and aiding and abetting such travel. The money-laundering 

conspiracy charge alleges that the defendants engaged in monetary transactions in 

property of a value greater than $10,000 derived from those unlawful activities.

The defendants entered guilty pleas to the money-laundering conspiracy charge and 

agreed to serve a probation term of 18 months and to pay a $1,500,000 fine. In 

addition, under the terms of the plea agreement, the defendants agreed to the criminal 

forfeiture of $4.9 million in cash derived from the unlawful activity, as well as forfeiture 

of the domain name, all of which represent property used to facilitate the commission of 

the offenses.

Source: U.S. Attorney’s Office.

The asset forfeiture process involves a number of key steps, including 

necessary planning in advance of the seizure, seizing and taking custody 

of the asset, notifying interested parties, addressing any claims and 

petitions, and equitable sharing with state and local law enforcement 

agencies. According to DOJ, enhancing cooperation among federal, 

state, and local law enforcement agencies is one goal of the equitable 

sharing program. For more information on how agencies qualify for 

equitable sharing, see appendix I.
 

Page 11 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

From fiscal years 2003 through 2011, AFF revenues and expenditures 

increased, with annual revenues doubling in fiscal year 2006, due in part 

to an increase in forfeitures resulting from fraud and financial crimes 

investigations. DOJ estimates anticipated revenues and expenditures 

based on prior years’ trends and then carries over funds to help cover 

operational expenses and other liabilities in the next fiscal year, including 

reserves needed for pending equitable sharing and third-party payments. 

However, the transparency of DOJ’s process for carrying over these 

funds could be enhanced. Once all expenses have been accounted for 

and unobligated funds deemed necessary for next year’s expenses have 

been carried over to the next fiscal year, DOJ then reserves funds to 

cover annual rescissions.13

In the 9-year period from fiscal years 2003 through 2011, AFF revenues 

totaled $11 billion, growing from $500 million in fiscal year 2003 to $1.8 

billion in fiscal year 2011. Since 2006, an increase in the prosecution of 

fraud and financial crime cases has led to substantial increases in AFF 

revenue.14

 

13A rescission is a law that “cancels the availability of budget authority previously enacted 

before the authority would otherwise expire.” GAO, A Glossary of Terms Used in the 

Federal Budget Process, 

For example, a money laundering case in fiscal year 2007 

involved the misappropriation of funds by the founder of a television cable 

company, Adelphia Communications, and resulted in over $700 million in 

forfeited assets. As a result of the increase in forfeitures resulting from 

money laundering and financial crimes investigations, in 2006, revenues 

doubled those of previous years, and for the first time in the AFF’s history, 

total annual revenues grew above $1 billion to approximately $1.2 billion. 

Since 2006, the AFF’s annual revenues have remained above $1 billion, 

GAO-05-734SP (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 1, 2005). Budget 

authority refers to authority provided by federal law to enter into financial obligations that 

will result in immediate or future payments involving federal government funds.

Cancellation of this authority makes the funds involved no longer available for obligation.

14DOJ’s 2007-2012 Strategic Plan highlights the Asset Forfeiture Program under several 

of the department’s strategic objectives, including combating public and corporate 

corruption, fraud, economic crime, and cybercrime, and reducing the threat, trafficking, 

use, and related violence of illegal drugs. As outlined in the Strategic Plan, prosecutors 

only recently have had the legal tools to directly forfeit the proceeds of white collar crime. 

DOJ’s Asset Forfeiture 2008-2012 Strategic Plan also describes the enhanced focus on 

financial investigations. 

AFF Revenues and 

Expenditures Have 

Increased since Fiscal 

Year 2003, and DOJ’s 

Process for Carrying 

Over Funds Could Be 

More Transparent

AFF’s Revenues More than 

Tripled from Fiscal Years 

2003 through 2011
 

Page 12 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

with the highest revenues of $1.8 billion reported in 2011.15

Figure 2: AFF’s Revenue Totals for Fiscal Years 2003 through 2011

Figure 2 

shows the fund’s revenue growth over time from fiscal years 2003 

through 2011.

Moreover, according to DOJ officials, in addition to an increase in the 

prosecution of fraud and financial crime cases, the increase in revenues 

can also be attributed to an overall increase in the number of forfeiture 

cases together with higher-value forfeitures. Across all fiscal years, 

forfeited cash income constituted 76 percent or more of the AFF’s 

revenue sources. Forfeited cash income includes cash/currency, as well 

as financial instruments such as money orders, bank accounts, brokerage 

accounts, and shares of stock. The second, and much smaller, source of 

revenue is the sale of forfeited property including automobiles, boats, 

airplanes, jewelry, and real estate, among others. In fiscal year 2011, 

revenues from forfeited cash income and the sale of forfeited property 

together accounted for over 84 percent of the total revenues. Other 

 

15The large growth in revenues in fiscal year 2007 is attributed to the large case deposits 

such as the Adelphia Communications investigations, which resulted in approximately 

$728 million, or 44 percent of the total revenues.
 

Page 13 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

sources of income may include transfers from the Treasury Forfeiture 

Fund (TFF), and transfers from other federal agencies.16 Additionally, 

since fiscal year 2006—when the AFF’s revenues from fraud and financial 

crime cases increased—large-case deposits (forfeitures greater than $25 

million) of forfeited cash income have contributed an average of 37 

percent to total revenues.17 For example, in 2007, DOJ reported a total of 

six large deposits that totaled $842 million, or slightly over 50 percent of 

the AFF’s total revenues in that fiscal year. These forfeitures of assets 

greater than $25 million involved investigations of misappropriation of 

funds, including corporate fraud and the illegal sales of pharmaceutical 

drugs. The types of assets that were seized in these investigations were 

primarily forfeited cash income.

From fiscal years 2003 through 2011, AFF expenditures totaled $8.3 

billion. As revenues have increased, there has been a corresponding 

increase in expenditures in support of asset forfeiture activities. 

Specifically, expenditures increased from $458 million in fiscal year 2003 

to $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2011. Figure 3 shows the expenditures from 

fiscal year 2003 through 2011, including the large growth in expenditures 

beginning in 2007.

 

16Transfers from the TFF or other federal agencies include DOJ’s share of forfeited assets 

resulting from investigations initiated by a non-DOJ law enforcement agency. Over this 9-

year period, these sources of income have not, individually, exceeded more than 4 

percent of revenues, and combined have not exceeded 9 percent. One exception is in 

fiscal year 2011, when the other sources of income totaled nearly 16 percent of total 

revenues due to the transfer of funds from the TFF, which totaled approximately $270 

million, or 15 percent of revenues.

17Prior to 2006, DOJ officials did not maintain data on large-case deposits because there 

were few to no forfeitures of this size and scope.

AFF’s Expenditures on 

Forfeiture Activities Also 

Increased
 

Page 14 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

Figure 3: Total Forfeiture Program Expenditures from Fiscal Years 2003 through 

2011

Revenues resulting from forfeitures are used to pay the forfeiture 

program’s expenditures in three major categories:

1. payments to third parties, including payments to satisfy interested 

parties such as lienholders, as well as the return of funds to victims of 

large-scale fraud;

2. equitable sharing payments to state and local law enforcement 

agencies that participated in law enforcement efforts resulting in the 

forfeitures; and

3. all other program operations expenses that include a total of 13 

expenditure categories such as asset management and disposal, the 

storage and destruction of drugs, and investigative expenses leading 

to a seizure.

Table 1 shows the AFF’s expenditures across all fiscal years, including 

payments to third parties, equitable sharing, and all other program 

operations expenses.
 

Page 15 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

Table 1: AFF’s Expenditures across All Fiscal Years by Type of Expenditure 

Dollars in millions

Fiscal year

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Third-party interests $44 $49 $82 $66 $558 $248 $173 $333 $376

Equitable sharing payments 218 268 271 324 400 437 396 388 445

All other program operations expenses 196 287 215 268 292 409 512 569 491

Total expenditures $458 $604 $568 $658 $1,250 $1,094 $1,081 $1,290 $1,312

Source: GAO analysis of DOJ data.

Equitable sharing payments to state and local law enforcement agencies 

have generally increased since fiscal year 2003; in fiscal year 2003, 

equitable sharing payments totaled $218 million, and in fiscal year 2011, 

equitable sharing totaled $445 million.18

Equitable sharing has generally increased from 2003 through 2011; 

however, as a percentage of total expenditures, equitable sharing has 

Moreover, when compared with 

DOJ grant programs, equitable sharing is one of the largest DOJ 

programs providing funds to recipients in order to support state and local 

law enforcement activities. For example, in fiscal year 2010, the Victims 

of Crime Assistance (VOCA) Program was DOJ’s largest grant program; 

DOJ distributed approximately $412 million in funds through the VOCA 

program. By way of comparison, equitable sharing in fiscal year 2010 

provided a total of $388 million in equitable sharing payments to state and 

local law enforcement agencies. According to state and local law 

enforcement officials we met with, because most of their departmental 

budgets go toward personnel costs, the equitable sharing program is 

extremely important because it helps fund equipment, training, and other 

programs that they may otherwise not be able to afford. For example, one 

local law enforcement agency stated that salaries make up 96 percent of 

its annual budget. As a result, equitable sharing dollars allow them to 

purchase equipment they could not otherwise buy with the limited 

available annual budget. See appendix I for the total equitable sharing 

payments made to each state in fiscal year 2011.

 

18When compared with all 15 expenditure categories in the AFF, equitable sharing was 

the largest expenditure category in all fiscal years except in 2007, when third-party 

payments were the largest expenditure category due to an increase in fraud and financial 

crimes cases that involved a larger proportion of payments to lienholders and victims. 
 

Page 16 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

decreased from 48 percent of total expenditures in 2003 to 34 percent in 

2011. This percentage decrease began in fiscal year 2006, when another 

expenditure category—payments to third parties including lienholders and 

victims—increased from 10 to 44 percent of total expenditures. DOJ 

officials attribute the shift among these major expense categories in part 

to the increase in the prosecution of fraud cases with significant numbers 

of victims. Moreover, because large-case deposits are generally the result 

of fraud and financial crime cases, they typically have a greater proportion 

of payments to victims than equitable sharing, a fact that may also 

contribute to the overall percentage decrease in equitable sharing.19 For 

example, in fiscal year 2007, as a result of a non-prosecution agreement 

with Adelphia Communications, over $700 million in cash and stocks was 

forfeited and liquidated.20

In addition to equitable sharing and third-party payments to victims and 

lienholders, the AFF is used to pay for a variety of program operations 

expenses. According to DOJ, the primary purpose of the AFF is to 

provide a stable source of resources to cover the costs of the Asset 

Forfeiture Program, including the costs of seizing, evaluating, 

inventorying, maintaining, protecting, advertising, forfeiting, and disposing 

of property seized for forfeiture.

In fiscal year 2012, the net proceeds from these 

forfeitures, which totaled approximately $728 million, were returned to 

victims.

21

 

19No funds are shared with state and local law enforcement partners until victims or other 

third parties have been fully compensated for their financial losses, and forfeiture costs 

have been recovered. 

Among the program operations 

expenses covered by the AFF are costs associated with storing, 

maintaining, and disposing of forfeited assets. The AFF also funds caserelated expenses including costs of managing paperwork, costs 

associated with the prosecution of forfeiture cases, costs associated with 

20 Non-prosecution agreements generally require companies to comply with a set of terms 

for a specified duration in exchange for prosecutors deciding not to prosecute. These 

terms have included restitution to victims, forfeiture of criminal proceeds, and monetary 

penalties, among other things. 

21Under current regulations, the department must advertise each administrative seizure 3 

consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. Judicial forfeitures are 

advertised on http://www.forfeiture.gov. In addition, the department must also incur the 

cost of providing personal notice, by certified mail or other means, to all individuals or 

entities identified as having a potential legal interest in the property.
 

Page 17 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

the execution of forfeiture judgments, and the costs of advertising.22 The 

AFF also funds a variety of investigative expenses associated with 

forfeiture, including payments to reimburse any federal agency 

participating in the AFF for investigative costs leading to seizures. Other 

investigative expenses may include awards for information, purchase of 

evidence, and costs to fund joint task force operations. For additional 

details regarding expenditure categories, see appendix II.

At the end of each fiscal year, DOJ carries over funds in order to help 

ensure it has sufficient resources to cover all AFF expenses that may not 

be covered by the next year’s revenues; however, the process DOJ uses 

to determine how much to carry over each year is not documented or 

outlined in its Congressional Budget Justifications. While DOJ officials 

stated that they cannot predict how much revenue will result from 

forfeitures in any given year, they attempt to estimate their anticipated 

revenues based on prior years’ trends. They then carry over funds 

needed to cover anticipated expenses for the coming year including funds 

needed to cover the costs of pending equitable sharing and third-party 

payments as well as funds needed to ensure the Asset Forfeiture 

Program’s solvency—including the anticipated costs associated with 

continuing forfeiture activities—at the start of the next fiscal year. Similar 

to the growth in revenues and expenditures, the funds DOJ carries over 

to cover these authorized expenses at the end of each fiscal year have 

grown since 2003. For example, at the end of fiscal year 2003, DOJ 

carried over approximately $365 million both to maintain solvency and to 

cover anticipated equitable sharing and third-party payments in fiscal year 

2004. In comparison, in fiscal year 2011, DOJ carried over a total of $844 

million to cover these expenditures. Additionally, DOJ officials 

emphasized that because revenues from fraud and financial crime cases 

have increased, the funds needed to make third-party payments, 

including payments to victims, have also increased. The flow of funds into 

and out of the AFF is complex and involves an interaction among 

revenues, expenditures, and funds carried over to manage the AFF. The 

following illustrates how DOJ used revenues, expenditures, and carryover 

funds to manage the AFF in fiscal year 2010:

 

22Program operational expenses for managing the paperwork associated with forfeiture, 

include costs for data entry, data analysis, word processing, file control, file review, quality 

control, case file preparation, and other process support functions.

DOJ Carries Over Funds 

Needed to Cover 

Anticipated Expenditures 

in the Next Fiscal Year, but 

Transparency Could Be 

Improved
 

Page 18 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

• At the start of fiscal year 2010, DOJ carried over a total of $634 million 

in funds from fiscal year 2009 to maintain the program’s solvency and 

for pending equitable sharing and third-party payments. These funds 

were used at the start of fiscal year 2010 to continue operations, such 

as paying expenses for asset storage, and to cover pending equitable 

sharing and third-party payments. In addition to the $634 million, $207 

million was reserved to cover DOJ’s fiscal year 2010 rescission. This 

rescission was proposed in the President’s budget, and later passed 

by Congress and enacted into law. As a result, at the start of fiscal 

year 2010, DOJ carried over a total of $841 million in funds from fiscal 

year 2009, as shown in table 2 below.

• In the course of fiscal year 2010, a total of approximately $1.58 billion 

was deposited into the AFF, including revenues received from 

forfeitures.23

• Based on the total of $841 million that was carried over from fiscal 

year 2009 plus the $1.58 billion deposited into the AFF in fiscal year 

2010, DOJ then had approximately $2.42 billion in total available 

resources in fiscal year 2010. Of these resources, DOJ obligated 

$1.45 billion in fiscal year 2010 and carried over $975 million into 

fiscal year 2011 to maintain solvency and reserves and to cover the 

proposed fiscal year 2011 rescission.24

• While DOJ had obligated $1.45 billion for the three main expenditure 

categories; equitable sharing, third-party interests, and all other 

program operations expenses, DOJ’s actual expenditures in fiscal 

year 2010 totaled $1.29 billion. The difference of $0.16 billion in fiscal 

year 2010 represents funds that had been obligated, but had not yet 

been spent. According to DOJ officials, there may be a lag between 

the funds obligated in a fiscal year and the actual expenditures, and 

 

23The total deposited in the AFF includes the revenues resulting from forfeitures, prior 

year rescissions restored to the AFF, current year rescission, and recovery/refund of prior 

year obligations. If obligations are ultimately lower than anticipated, funds previously 

obligated are “refunded” to the AFF. These funds are referred to as “recoveries/refunds of 

prior year obligations.” 

24According to DOJ officials, they had originally planned to carry over approximately $724 

million into fiscal year 2011, but the actual amount carried over ($975 million) was higher 

due to the unpredictable dynamics of fund deposits. Specifically, according to DOJ 

officials, while DOJ makes some determinations about what is required for carryover, the 

actual carryover can differ from the anticipated levels due to the timing of deposits into the 

fund.
 

Page 19 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

therefore, it is not uncommon for the total obligations to be higher than 

the expenditures in a given fiscal year. Table 2 shows the total funds 

available for use in fiscal year 2010.

Table 2: Total Funds Available for Use in Fiscal Year 2010

Dollars in millions

Carryover from fiscal year 2009a $841

 Plus deposits into the AFF during fiscal year 2010 1,580

Total resources 2,420

Less total obligations for fiscal year 2010 -1,450

Total funds carried over for fiscal year 2011b $975

Source: GAO analysis of DOJ data.

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding. 

a

This amount includes funds to maintain solvency, cover pending equitable sharing and third-party 

payments, and funds needed to cover the fiscal year 2010 rescission. 

b

According to DOJ officials, they had originally planned to carry over approximately $724 million into 

fiscal year 2011, but the actual amount carried over ($975 million) was higher due to the 

unpredictable dynamics of fund deposits. 

In order to identify the funds that will need to be carried over to cover 

anticipated expenses for the coming year, DOJ officials stated that they 

use reports generated from its asset-tracking system to identify pending 

equitable sharing and third-party payments.25 These reports provide DOJ 

with information to determine carry over funds needed for the 

disbursements that must be paid in the next fiscal year.26

 

25DOJ’s Consolidated Asset Tracking System (CATS) is used to track the life cycle of 

forfeited assets from seizure to disposition. 

In addition, DOJ 

carries over funds needed to ensure the Asset Forfeiture Program’s 

solvency at the start of the next fiscal year. According to DOJ officials, 

they consider a number of factors when calculating the funds needed to 

maintain solvency, such as historical data including information on the 

costs of past contracts, salary costs, and other expenses; known future 

expenses including salaries and contracts; and the costs of any potential 

new expenditures.

26DOJ officials noted that they may have large victim pay-outs and expenses in the 

coming year that cannot be anticipated. 
 

Page 20 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

DOJ officials explained the general factors they consider when carrying 

over funds needed to cover anticipated expenditures in the next fiscal 

year, but they do not specify in the AFF’s Congressional Budget 

Justifications how they determine the total amounts carried over each 

year. Specifically, the Congressional Budget Justifications do not include 

information on how DOJ calculated the amounts carried over nor do they 

explain the significant variations from one year to the next in the amount 

of funds carried over for solvency. For example, in fiscal year 2007, DOJ

carried over $188 million based on its estimates of what it needed to 

cover solvency. The amount carried over to cover solvency then 

increased to $402 million in fiscal year 2009 and decreased to $169 

million by fiscal year 2011. Figure 4 shows the variation in carryover 

funds retained in the AFF at the end of each fiscal year to cover solvency, 

equitable sharing, and third-party payments from fiscal years 2003 

through 2011.

Figure 4: Funds Carried Over at the End of the Fiscal Year to Cover Solvency, Equitable Sharing, and Third-Party Payments in 

the Next Fiscal Year

Note: The funds carried over to maintain AFF solvency include start-of-year operational expenses 

such as asset storage. 
 

Page 21 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

DOJ officials stated that a number of cost drivers may change the funds

needed for solvency from year to year. These cost drivers include salaries 

for government employees, information systems costs, asset 

management and disposal contracts, and contracts for administrative 

support staff, among other things. According to DOJ, these categories 

comprise recurring operational costs of the Asset Forfeiture Program.

While these expenses are generally funded by AFF revenues, DOJ 

carries over funds to ensure it has sufficient resources that may not be 

covered by the next year’s revenues. Moreover, additional funds may 

need to be carried over to account for any number of program 

uncertainties.27

Our prior work has emphasized the importance of transparency in federal 

agencies’ budget presentations to help provide Congress the necessary 

information to make appropriation decisions and conduct oversight.

For example, the AFF could be responsible for making 

payments related to pending judicial actions, in the event that DOJ were 

to lose a forfeiture case in court. Therefore, DOJ may carry over more 

funds from one fiscal year to the next in order to cover these types of 

liabilities. DOJ officials stated that they estimate needed carryover funds 

by reviewing the cost drivers, as well as by assessing the risk that 

revenues may be less than projected. DOJ officials further noted that 

planning for AFF carryover and the actual carryover can differ due to the 

unpredictable dynamics of the fund. According to DOJ officials, there is 

no documented process used to determine the amount of funds that are 

carried over at the end of each fiscal year.

28

 

27According to DOJ officials, program uncertainties may include several risk factors such 

as uncertain revenue streams, unanticipated program expenses, pending congressional 

actions on rescissions, and pending judicial actions prior to final order of forfeiture.

The 

department provides a yearly budget justification to Congress that details 

the estimated revenues, expenses, and carryover requirements for the 

upcoming fiscal year as well as AFF-related performance information.

Officials further noted that the Congressional Justification includes 

discussions of the various categories of fund expenses, but does not 

include a detailed discussion of the process used to estimate the amounts 

carried over. Without a clearly documented and transparent process that 

demonstrates how DOJ determines the amounts that will be carried over 

each year, it is difficult to determine whether DOJ’s conclusions regarding 

28GAO, Veterans Disability: More Transparency Needed to Improve Oversight of VBA’s 

Compensation and Pension Staffing Levels, GAO-05-47 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 

2004). 
 

Page 22 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

the amounts that need to be carried over each year are well founded.

Providing more transparent information as part of the AFF’s annual 

budget process would better inform Congress’ oversight of the AFF, by 

making it easier to evaluate whether the funds carried over to maintain 

Asset Forfeiture Program solvency and cover pending equitable sharing 

and third-party payments adequately reflect the AFF’s needed resources.

After revenues needed to cover expenses in the current and upcoming 

fiscal years have been carried over, DOJ reserves funds to cover 

rescissions. After these funds have been reserved, any funds determined 

to be in excess of these requirements (excess unobligated balances) may 

be declared as Super Surplus. While these Super Surplus balances may 

be used at DOJ’s discretion for a variety of purposes, in recent years, 

these balances have been used as a means to supplement the funds 

reserved to cover yearly rescissions proposed in the President’s budget, 

and later passed by Congress and enacted into law.29

 

29Prior to 2008, these excess unobligated balances were also used to fund departmental 

priorities. However, because rescissions from the AFF have been greater than the existing 

balance since fiscal year 2008, the funds have been unavailable for departmental priorities 

in recent years. 

Figure 5 provides a 

description of the process for identifying Super Surplus balances in any 

given fiscal year.

Since 2003, DOJ Has 

Retained Excess Balances 

in the AFF to Cover Yearly 

Proposed Rescissions, and 

These Rescissions Have 

Since Accumulated to Over 

Half a Billion Dollars
 

Page 23 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

Figure 5: Process for Identifying Excess Unobligated (Super Surplus) Balances

Rescissions are legislative actions to reduce an agency’s budgetary 

resources. For example, in fiscal year 2010, $387 million was rescinded 

from the AFF, and in fiscal year 2011, the enacted rescission totaled $495 

million. Rescinded funds are generally taken from an agency and 
 

Page 24 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

returned to the Treasury before they are obligated. However, per Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, rescinded funds from the AFF 

have not been returned to the Treasury. Instead, DOJ has treated the 

funds as unavailable for obligation for the remainder of the fiscal year for 

which the rescission was enacted.30 At the beginning of each new fiscal 

year, DOJ would have made the rescinded funds available for obligation 

again, also in response to OMB guidance, had a new rescission not been 

enacted. With the enactment of a new rescission for the subsequent fiscal 

year, however, DOJ has continued to treat the rescinded funds as 

unavailable for obligation. For example, the $387 million that was 

rescinded from the AFF in fiscal year 2010 was treated as unavailable for 

obligation in fiscal year 2010, and was then used again to cover part of 

the enacted $495 million rescission in fiscal year 2011. To make up the 

difference needed to meet the $495 million rescission in fiscal year 2011, 

DOJ used unobligated balances in the amount of $233 million.31

Table 3: Funds Reserved to Cover AFF’s Annual Rescissions for Fiscal Years 2003 through 2011 

Table 3 

shows the enacted rescissions for each fiscal year, as well as the 

unobligated balances used by DOJ in order to meet the rescissions.

Dollars in millions

 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

1 Enacted rescission $51 $62 $102 $102 $170 $240 $285 $387 $495 

2 Funds maintained in the AFF from previous 

rescissionsa 45 51 62 102 102 170 240 285 387 

3 Unobligated balances reserved to help cover 

rescissionb

 

$23 $12 $40 $1 $68 $70 $45 $207 $233 

Source: GAO analysis of DOJ data.

Notes: Rows 2 and 3 generally add up to the total enacted rescissions (as represented in row 1). 

However, in fiscal years 2003, 2010, and 2011, DOJ reserved funds greater than the enacted 

rescission. According to DOJ officials, DOJ believed that future rescissions would increase and so a 

greater amount was reserved to ensure that DOJ could meet proposed future rescissions. 

a

 Funds from the prior years’ rescission were used to help cover the new year’s rescission. 

b According to DOJ officials, unobligated and excess unobligated balances (Super Surplus) are used 

to help cover the annual rescissions. 

 

30See OMB Circular No. A-11, Sec. 20 & App. F (2011).

31For fiscal years 2003, 2010, and 2011, DOJ officials reported that the unobligated 

balance reserved to cover the rescission was higher than needed in those fiscal years 

because a portion of the balances was reserved to cover current and future rescissions. 
 

Page 25 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

One effect of these rescissions is to reduce the department’s 

discretionary spending in the year in which the rescission was enacted. 

This could ultimately decrease the size of the federal deficit, provided the 

decreased spending from the rescission is not offset by increased 

spending elsewhere. For example, in fiscal year 2012, DOJ’s 

discretionary budget authority was reduced to $27.4 billion, due in part to 

the $675 million enacted AFF rescission.

DOJ has established guidelines and oversight mechanisms for the 

equitable sharing program, but additional controls could enhance the 

consistency and transparency of the program. Moreover, DOJ has 

recently started conducting reviews of state and local law enforcement 

agencies that participate in the equitable sharing program to determine 

the extent to which they are complying with program policies as well as 

bookkeeping, accounting, and reporting requirements.

DOJ has established written guidelines governing how state and local law 

enforcement agencies should apply for equitable sharing.32

 

32Within DOJ, AFMLS is responsible for oversight of the equitable sharing program.

Specifically, 

according to the guidelines, state and local law enforcement agencies 

must submit an application for equitable sharing in which they outline 

identifying information for their agency, information on the asset that was 

forfeited, how they intend to use the asset (or the proceeds of the asset), 

DOJ Could Enhance 

Controls and 

Oversight 

Mechanisms for Its 

Equitable Sharing 

Program 

DOJ Has Established 

Guidelines for Making 

Equitable Sharing 

Determinations, but 

Additional Controls Could 

Improve Consistency and 

Transparency

Guidelines Governing the 

Equitable Sharing Process
 

Page 26 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

and the number of work hours their agency contributed to the 

investigation.33

In addition, DOJ has established mechanisms governing how DOJ 

agencies should make equitable sharing determinations. Specifically, the 

field office for the DOJ agency that served as the lead federal agency in 

the investigation is responsible for making an initial recommendation 

regarding the percentage of the proceeds of the forfeited asset that each 

participating agency should receive. According to forfeiture statutes 

governing the transfer of forfeited property to state and local law 

enforcement agencies, equitable sharing determinations must bear a 

reasonable relationship to the degree of direct participation of the 

requesting agency in the total law enforcement effort leading to the 

forfeiture.34

DOJ has also established mechanisms for ensuring that equitable sharing 

recommendations are reviewed and approved by the appropriate 

authorities within DOJ depending on the amount and type of forfeiture. 

Specifically, once state and local law enforcement agencies complete the 

application for equitable sharing, DOJ’s written guidelines state that the 

field office for the DOJ agency that served as the lead federal agency in 

the investigation should document its sharing recommendations for each 

As a general rule, recommendations made by the field office 

are to be based on a comparison of the work hours that each federal, 

state, and local law enforcement agency contributed to the investigation. 

However, according to DOJ guidelines, further adjustments to sharing 

percentages may be made when work hours alone do not reflect the 

relative value of an agency’s participation in an investigation. For 

example, if a state or local law enforcement agency contributed additional 

resources or equipment to an investigation, its sharing percentage might 

be adjusted upward from what it would be based on work hours alone.

 

33The amount of equitable sharing revenues shared with state and local law enforcement 

agencies is based on the degree of the agencies’ direct participation in the investigation. 

For example, if one agency contributed three officers to an investigation, it might receive a 

greater portion of the equitable sharing proceeds than an agency that contributed only one 

officer’s time to the investigation. The application for equitable sharing is titled Application 

for Transfer of Federally Forfeited Property and is commonly referred to by DOJ officials 

and state and local law enforcement agencies as the DAG-71.

34See 21 U.S.C. §881(e)(3); 18 U.S.C. §981(e).
 

Page 27 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

of the agencies that participated in the investigation.35

• For administrative forfeitures less than $1 million, agency 

headquarters officials are responsible for reviewing and approving the 

final sharing determination.

The field office is 

then required to forward both the application forms completed by state 

and local law enforcement agencies and sharing recommendations to 

investigative agency headquarters officials for review. The review process 

differs depending on the amount and type of the forfeiture, as follows:

• For judicial forfeitures less than $1 million, agency headquarters 

officials are to forward the recommendation to the USAO for final 

approval.

• In any administrative or judicial forfeiture where the total appraised 

value of all forfeited assets is $1 million or more, in multidistrict cases, 

and in cases involving the equitable transfer of real property, the 

agency headquarters officials forward the recommendation to the 

USAO for review, which is then submitted to AFMLS officials for

review.

o Where the investigative agency, the USAO, and AFMLS concur in 

a sharing recommendation, the Assistant Attorney General makes 

the final equitable sharing determination.36

o Where the investigative agency, the USAO, and AFMLS do not all 

concur in a sharing recommendation, the Deputy Attorney General 

(DAG) determines the appropriate share.

Figure 6 shows the steps involved in making equitable sharing 

determinations.

 

35DOJ’s recommendations are documented in the Decision Form for Transfer of Federally 

Forfeited Property, which is commonly referred to by DOJ officials and state and local law 

enforcement agencies as the DAG-72.

36By delegation dated August 26, 2011, the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal 

Division delegated his authority to determine equitable sharing matters between $1 million 

and $5 million to the Chief of AFMLS, where the seizing agency, USAO, and AFMLS all 

agree on the proposed sharing allocations. 
 

Page 28 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

Figure 6: Process for Making Equitable Sharing Determinations

While DOJ has established guidance indicating that adjustments to 

sharing percentages may be made when a state or local law enforcement

agency’s work hours alone do not reflect the value of its participation in 

an investigation, DOJ has not developed guidance regarding how to apply 

the qualitative factors that may warrant departures from sharing 

percentages. DOJ agencies currently make adjustments to sharing 

percentages based on a number of qualitative factors regarding the 

additional assistance or contributions state or local law enforcement 

agencies may have made during an investigation. According to DOJ’s 

written guidelines, DOJ agencies must take these factors into account 

when determining whether to adjust an equitable sharing percentage 

beyond a strict work hour allocation. For example, according to DOJ 

guidelines, the deciding authority should consider such factors as the 

inherent importance of the activity, the length of the investigation, whether 

an agency originated the information leading to the seizure, or whether an 

Guidance for Making 

Adjustments to Equitable 

Sharing Percentages 
 

Page 29 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

agency provided unique and indispensable assistance, among others. In 

addition, DOJ’s Equitable Sharing Guidelines state that each agency may 

use judgment when determining how these qualitative factors should be 

used to adjust sharing percentages.

In the course of our review, DOJ officials provided examples of these 

qualitative factors. For example, if a state or local law enforcement 

agency provided a helicopter, drug-sniffing dog, or a criminal informant to 

an investigation, DOJ would consider these contributions to be unique or 

indispensible assistance. In one case we reviewed, a local law 

enforcement agency that participated in a joint investigation with federal 

agents would have received 7.4 percent in equitable sharing based on the 

work hours it contributed to the investigation. However, the agency also 

provided information obtained from a confidential source that led to the 

seizure and provided a helicopter for aerial surveillance. As a result, its 

final sharing determination was adjusted upward from 7.4 percent to 12 

percent. If the net proceeds of the forfeiture are $1.6 million once all 

investigative and forfeiture-related expenses have been paid, the 

resulting equitable sharing payment made to the law enforcement agency 

will increase from $118,400 to $192,000.37

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for 

significant events to be clearly documented in directives, policies, or 

manuals to help ensure operations are carried out as intended. AFMLS 

officials report that they have established “rules of thumb” based on 

historical knowledge or precedent when applying these qualitative factors 

to equitable sharing adjustments that are subject to their review, but have 

not issued guidance to the DOJ agencies. Further, headquarters officials 

for each of the DOJ agencies emphasized that they follow the guidelines 

issued by DOJ when making adjustments to sharing percentages. 

However, as previously discussed, these guidelines outline the qualitative 

factors that may be considered when making adjustments to sharing 

percentages, but they do not include any additional information regarding 

how qualitative factors should be used to adjust sharing percentages. As 

a result, agency headquarters officials stated that field office staff use 

 

37In the cases we reviewed, the net proceeds had not yet been determined. Until the asset 

has been sold, and all forfeiture expenses—such as storage and advertising—have been 

paid, DOJ does not know the net proceeds that will ultimately be paid in each case. For 

this reason DOJ agencies identify a percentage (as opposed to a dollar amount) when 

making equitable sharing recommendations. 
 

Page 30 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

their own judgment when determining how qualitative factors should be 

used to adjust sharing percentages. AFMLS officials state that 

adjustments to equitable sharing percentages based on qualitative factors 

should be made on a case-by-case basis because each investigation is 

unique and the facts and circumstances of each case must be considered 

in totality before making adjustments to sharing determinations. While we 

recognize the inherently subjective nature of evaluating each agency’s 

unique contributions to a case based on facts and circumstances, 

additional guidance regarding how to apply the qualitative factors could 

help to improve transparency and better ensure consistency with which 

these qualitative factors are applied over time or across cases. This is 

particularly important given that these determinations represent DOJ’s 

overall assessment of each agency’s unique contributions to an 

investigation and are a key component of how DOJ makes decisions 

about how much to award each agency.

Documentation of Work Hours

DOJ’s written guidance also requires the DOJ agencies that are 

responsible for making equitable sharing determinations to use work 

hours as the primary basis for calculating sharing percentages; however, 

agencies do not consistently document the work hours each agency 

contributed to the investigation. According to DOJ officials, the work hours 

contributed by each of the local, state, and federal law enforcement 

agencies involved in the investigation should be added together by the 

DOJ agency leading the investigation to arrive at a total. Each law 

enforcement agency’s individual work hours are then divided by the total 

in order to determine each agency’s equitable sharing percentage. DOJ’s 

guidance states that every agency participating in the investigation should 

report work hours on either the application for equitable sharing or on the 

equitable sharing decision form. While state and local law enforcement 

agencies record their work hours on their applications for equitable 

sharing, we found that the DOJ agencies did not consistently record their 

own hours or the total hours contributed by all participating agencies. Of 

the 25 equitable sharing determinations we reviewed, 5 included 

supplemental memos provided by the DOJ agencies detailing the work 

hours provided by all of the agencies involved in the investigation. 

However, these memos are not required under existing DOJ guidance 

and were provided in only those investigations subject to AFMLS review.

For the remaining 20 determinations, DOJ agencies did not document this 

information. Specifically, although work hours serve as the primary basis 

of calculating equitable sharing determinations, in 20 of the 25 

determinations we reviewed, neither the work hours contributed by DOJ 

Transparency of Equitable 

Sharing Determinations
 

Page 31 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

agencies nor the total number of work hours contributed by all of the 

agencies involved in the investigation were recorded in the documents 

provided to agency headquarters officials for review. According to DOJ 

agency headquarters officials responsible for reviewing and approving 

equitable sharing determinations, they rely on agents in the field to 

calculate sharing percentages and as a result, they do not verify the work 

hours contributed by each agency involved in the investigation. In the 

absence of documented work hours, it is unclear how deciding authorities 

could verify whether equitable sharing determinations involving millions of 

dollars in assets were calculated in accordance with established 

guidance.

Documentation of Rationale for Making Adjustments to Sharing 

Determinations

DOJ’s guidance does not explicitly require DOJ agencies to record the 

rationale for making adjustments to sharing percentages when work 

hours alone do not reflect the value of an agency’s participation in the 

investigation. In the 25 equitable sharing determinations we reviewed, 

state and local law enforcement agencies often reported basic information 

regarding their agency’s role in a particular investigation in their 

applications for equitable sharing, but DOJ’s rationale for making 

adjustments to sharing percentages was not consistently documented in 

each investigation. Specifically, agencies did not consistently document 

whether they believed the state or local law enforcement agency made 

additional contributions that warranted departures from standard sharing 

percentages. Of the 25 determinations we reviewed, 5 included 

supplemental memos provided by the DOJ agencies indicating whether 

adjustments from standard sharing percentages were warranted. In 3 of 

these 5 AFMLS determinations, adjustments to sharing percentages were 

made based on the additional contributions of the state and local law 

enforcement agencies involved in the investigation and the memos 

detailed the rationale for making the adjustment in each case. However, 

these memos are not required under existing DOJ guidance and were 

provided in only those investigations subject to AFMLS review. For the 

remaining 20 investigations, DOJ did not document this information.

Moreover, because work hours were not documented in these cases, it 

was not possible to determine whether further adjustments were made 

based on additional contributions made by each of the agencies involved 

in the investigation.

According to DOJ agency headquarters officials responsible for reviewing 

and approving equitable sharing determinations, they rely on agents in 
 

Page 32 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

the field to calculate sharing percentages and, as a result, they do not 

attempt to verify the adjustments that are made based on each agency’s 

additional contributions to the investigation. Specifically, agency 

headquarters officials reported that the field is responsible for confirming 

state and local law enforcement’s contributions to a case through a 

variety of means including face-to-face meetings, telephone 

conversations, and e-mails. For example, one agency official noted that 

although the rationale for making adjustments to sharing percentages is 

not included in the documents provided to headquarters for review and 

approval, the field office is most familiar with the investigation and the 

contributions that each state and local law enforcement agency may have 

made in a given case. Therefore, headquarters considers the field office 

to be the best source of information for how qualitative factors should be 

taken into account when adjusting sharing percentages. Agency 

headquarters officials further noted that it is rare for them to question 

equitable sharing recommendations made by the field or to ask for more 

information regarding the rationale for adjustments to sharing 

percentages. While the field office may have firsthand knowledge of the 

contributions of state and local law enforcement agencies in a given 

investigation, in the absence of the rationale for adjustments to sharing 

percentages being documented, there is limited transparency over how 

and why agencies make adjustments to sharing determinations when 

work hours alone do not accurately represent an agency’s contribution to 

an investigation.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that 

transactions should be promptly recorded to maintain their relevance and 

value to management in controlling operations and making decisions. 

This applies to the entire process or life cycle of a transaction or event 

from the initiation and authorization through its final classification in 

summary records. In addition, control activities help to ensure that all 

transactions are completely and accurately recorded. In the absence of 

consistently documenting work hours and the rationale for making 

adjustments to sharing percentages, it is unclear how the equitable 

sharing deciding authorities could evaluate the nature and value of the 

contributions of each of the agencies involved in the investigation. 

Establishing a mechanism to ensure that this information is documented 

by all DOJ agencies responsible for making equitable sharing 

determinations could enhance the transparency of equitable sharing 

decisions.
 

Page 33 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

Monitoring of Equitable Sharing Decisions

In the absence of documenting work hours or the rationale for making 

adjustments to sharing percentages, deciding authorities have limited 

means to verify the basis for equitable sharing decisions. Agency 

headquarters officials responsible for reviewing and approving equitable 

sharing determinations report that they review equitable sharing 

applications and decision forms to ensure that they are complete and that 

sharing determinations appear reasonable. However, headquarters 

officials for each of the DOJ agencies reported that they rely on field 

office staff to ensure that equitable sharing percentages were calculated 

correctly based on the work hours and the qualitative factors that each 

federal, state, and local law enforcement agency contributed to the 

investigation. However, because the information that serves as the basis 

for equitable sharing recommendations—including work hours and the 

qualitative factors used to make adjustments to sharing percentages—are 

not subject to review by agency headquarters officials, DOJ does not 

have reasonable assurance that the equitable sharing determinations are 

made in accordance with the established guidance. According to 

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, controls should 

generally be designed to ensure that ongoing monitoring occurs in the 

course of normal operations. Such monitoring should be performed 

continually and ingrained in the agency’s operations. This could include 

regular management and supervisory activities, comparisons, 

reconciliations, or other actions. Developing a mechanism to verify the 

work hours and qualitative factors that serve as the basis for equitable 

sharing determinations could improve DOJ’s visibility over equitable 

sharing determinations and help promote confidence in the integrity of the 

equitable sharing program. Agency headquarters officials have reported 

that altogether, DEA, ATF, and FBI reviewed a total of 52,034 equitable 

sharing requests in fiscal year 2011, and 113 of these requests went to 

AFMLS for review and approval. As a result, agency headquarters 

officials note that they have limited resources to verify the basis for each 

and every equitable sharing determination. We recognize that in the face 

of these limited resources, it may not be practical for agency 

headquarters officials to review all of the information used in support of all 

equitable sharing determinations. However, a spot check approach would 

allow headquarters officials to assess the extent to which equitable 

sharing decisions are made in accordance with established guidelines to 

help address resource constraints.
 

Page 34 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

DOJ has established requirements governing the permissible uses of 

equitable sharing funds. Specifically, DOJ’s guidelines state that equitably 

shared funds or assets put into official use shall be used by law 

enforcement agencies for law enforcement purposes only. Some of the 

permissible uses of equitable sharing funds include training, facilities, 

equipment, travel and transportation in support of law enforcement 

activities, as well as paying for the costs of asset accounting and auditing 

functions.38 Examples of impermissible uses of equitable sharing funds 

include payments to cover the costs of salaries or benefits and non-law 

enforcement education and training.39

DOJ’s guidelines further state that equitable sharing funds must be used 

to increase or supplement the resources of the receiving state or local law 

enforcement agency and should not be used to replace or supplant the 

appropriated resources of the recipient. This means that equitable sharing 

funds must serve only to supplement funds they would normally receive 

and must not be used as a substitute for funds or equipment that would 

otherwise be provided by the law enforcement agency. For example, if 

DOJ’s guidelines also state that 

agencies should use federal sharing monies prudently and in such a 

manner as to avoid any appearance of extravagance, waste, or 

impropriety. For example, tickets to social events, hospitality suites at 

conferences, or meals outside of the per diem are all considered 

impermissible uses of shared funds.

 

38The same restrictions apply to equitably shared assets such as vehicles that are put into 

official use. DOJ guidelines state such property must be used for law enforcement 

purposes only.

39According to DOJ’s equitable sharing guidelines, the reason that equitable sharing funds 

should not be used to pay for salaries and overtime is to protect the integrity of the asset 

forfeiture and equitable sharing programs. Specifically, DOJ wants to ensure that the 

prospect of receiving equitable sharing monies does not influence, or appear to influence, 

law enforcement decisions.

DOJ Has Established 

Requirements Governing 

the Use of Equitable 

Sharing Funds and Began 

Conducting Compliance 

Reviews of These Agencies 

in 2011

Requirements Governing the 

Uses of and Controls over 

Equitably Shared Funds and 

Property
 

Page 35 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

city officials were to cut the police department’s budget by $100,000 as a 

result of the police department’s receiving $100,000 in equitable sharing 

funds, DOJ would consider this to be an example of improper 

supplantation, which is not an allowable use of equitable sharing funds.

In addition to establishing requirements governing the permissible uses of 

equitably shared funds and property, DOJ has also established 

bookkeeping, internal controls, reporting, and audit requirements that 

state and local law enforcement agencies must follow in order to 

participate in the equitable sharing program. For example, state and local 

law enforcement agencies must establish mechanisms to track equitably 

shared funds and property, implement proper bookkeeping and 

accounting procedures, maintain compliance with internal controls 

standards, and meet defined reporting standards. Among other things, 

DOJ’s equitable sharing guidance calls for participating agencies to avoid 

commingling DOJ equitable sharing funds with funds from any other 

source, maintain a record of all equitable sharing expenditures, and 

complete annual reports known as Equitable Sharing Agreement and 

Certification Forms. These Equitable Sharing Agreement and Certification 

Forms require agencies participating in the equitable sharing program to 

report annually on the actual amounts and uses of equitably shared funds 

and property.40

In addition to the requirements outlined by DOJ, state and local agencies 

that receive equitable sharing funds must also comply with the Single 

Audit Act as outlined by OMB guidance.

Among other things, agencies must detail the beginning 

and ending equitable sharing fund balance, and the totals spent on 

specific law enforcement activities (e.g., training, computers, weapons, 

and surveillance equipment). In submitting the form each year, agencies 

must certify that they will be complying with the guidelines and statutes 

governing the equitable sharing program.

41

 

40AFMLS maintains a compliance database that tracks whether agencies have submitted 

their Equitable Sharing Agreement and Certification Forms for the current fiscal year. 

Agencies that are not in compliance are not eligible to receive equitable sharing funds.

The Single Audit Act requires 

state and local governments and nonprofit organizations that expend a 

cumulative total of $500,000 or more in federal awards in a fiscal year to 

complete a Single Audit. According to DOJ officials, based on these 

41Office of Management and Budget, “Audits of States, Local Governments and Non-Profit 

Organizations,” A-133, June 27, 2003.
 

Page 36 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

requirements, the substantial majority of equitable sharing participants 

are required to comply with the Single Audit Act.42

In April 2011, during the course of our review, AFMLS began conducting 

compliance reviews of state and local law enforcement agencies 

participating in the equitable sharing program to determine the extent to 

which they are complying with established requirements. Specifically, 

AFMLS established a Compliance Review Team and began conducting 

regular compliance reviews of equitable sharing participants in April 

2011.

Under a Single Audit, 

an auditor must provide his or her opinion on the presentation of the 

entity’s financial statements and schedule of federal expenditures, and on 

compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and provisions of contracts 

or grant agreements that could have a direct and material effect on the 

financial statements.

43 According to AFMLS officials, the Compliance Review Team was 

established in order to ensure that there were adequate controls and 

oversight mechanisms of the equitable sharing program in place. AFMLS 

officials stated that the resources needed to establish the Compliance 

Review Team did not become available until December 2010, at which 

point AFMLS initiated a pilot of the compliance review program. Among 

other things, in selecting equitable sharing participants to include in 

compliance reviews, AFMLS monitors news briefs regarding potential 

misuse of asset forfeiture funds among equitable sharing participants and 

also responds to referrals from the DOJ Office of Inspector General (OIG) 

and from the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices.44

 

42The Single Audit Act, enacted in 1984 and amended in 1996, is intended to, among 

other things, promote sound financial management, including effective internal controls, 

with respect to federal awards administered by state and local governments and nonprofit 

organizations. Single Audit Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-152, § 1(b), 110 

Stat. 1396, 1396. As part of the Single Audit, auditees must prepare a Schedule of 

Expenditures of Federal Awards in order to show the activity of all federal awards 

programs within the period covered by the auditee’s financial statements.

AFMLS officials noted that, thus 

far, they have not yet found any instances of intentional abuse of funds in 

the course of their compliance reviews that were not already identified 

43AFMLS officials reported that pilot testing of the compliance review process was started 

in December 2010, but the compliance review team did not start on a full-scale basis until 

April 2011. 

44DOJ’s Office of Inspector General also conducts audits of equitable sharing participants 

and completes approximately 3 or 4 audits of state and local law enforcement agencies 

each year. Since 2010, DOJ OIG has completed a total of 10 audits of equitable sharing 

participants. 

Compliance Reviews of 

Equitable Sharing Participants
 

Page 37 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

beforehand either through news reports or referrals from the U.S. 

Attorneys’ Offices.45

AFMLS has established guidelines for conducting compliance reviews of 

equitable sharing participants in order to determine the extent to which 

agencies are following established equitable sharing guidelines. Among 

other things, they select a sample of the agency’s expenditures in order to 

substantiate the agency’s records and to confirm that the expenditure was 

consistent with established DOJ guidelines. AFMLS also determines 

whether the agency has established an appropriate system of internal 

controls for tracking and recording equitable sharing receipts and 

expenditures. Further, AFMLS determines whether the agency was 

subject to Single Audit requirements and if so, whether the Single Audit 

including reporting on equitable sharing funds was completed as required.

As of December 2011, AFMLS had completed a total of 11 onsite audits 

of approximately 9,200 state and local law enforcement agencies that 

participate in the equitable sharing program.46

 

45An example of a misuse of funds that was identified beforehand includes a case in 2011 

involving a sheriff that allegedly used $10,000 in equitable sharing funds for personal use. 

The money in the account was to be used for vehicles, equipment, and specialized 

training, but the prosecutor noted during an opening statement at trial that the sheriff had 

used the money “like a personal checking account.” 

AFMLS reports it currently 

has limited staff (eight total) and resources to conduct compliance 

reviews of equitable sharing participants. As a result, AFMLS reported 

conducting risk assessments in order to select agencies for compliance 

reviews. In addition to monitoring news briefs regarding the potential 

misuse of funds among equitable sharing participants, some of the issues 

that AFMLS considers as part of these risk assessments include the 

amount of each agency’s equitable sharing expenditures, whether a state 

or local law enforcement agency has reported spending a significant 

amount of money in a sensitive area, and whether a small law 

enforcement agency that may be unfamiliar with the equitable sharing 

program suddenly received a large equitable sharing payment. The 11 

compliance reviews completed in 2011 revealed that participants do not 

consistently follow requirements to properly account for equitable sharing 

receipts and expenditures, do not consistently comply with the allowable 

46Of the 9,200 state and local law enforcement agencies that participate in the equitable 

sharing program, approximately 4,500 agencies receive equitable sharing payments in 

any given year. 
 

Page 38 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

uses of equitable sharing funds, and do not consistently complete Single 

Audits as required. AFMLS identified one or more areas for corrective 

action in 9 of the 11 compliance reviews.47

AFMLS has established a mechanism to systematically track and analyze 

the results of these reviews. Specifically, the findings from each 

compliance review are entered into a tracking report, and follow-up with 

each agency is completed to ensure that corrective actions are taken. 

AFMLS officials noted that they may follow up with an agency multiple 

times to ensure that items identified for corrective action are addressed. 

According to AFMLS, tracking frequencies and trends identified in the 

course of compliance reviews is an important tool in risk evaluations for 

both future audit selections and return audits to specific participants with 

particularly troublesome problems. Further, AFMLS officials have stated 

that they plan to use the results of compliance reviews in order to identify 

larger trends that may need to be addressed across all equitable sharing 

participants. For example, AFMLS has found through these reviews that 

equitable sharing recipients are not consistently reporting equitable 

sharing expenditures on Single Audits. AFMLS has reported that it is 

currently working with both equitable sharing recipients and the auditor 

community to address this issue. AFMLS’s approach to conducting 

compliance reviews of equitable sharing participants is consistent with 

standards for internal control, which state that monitoring should assess 

the quality of performance over time and ensure that the findings of audits 

and other reviews are promptly resolved.

Two of the state and local law 

enforcement agencies were determined to be in full compliance with all of 

the equitable sharing requirements. In May 2012, AFMLS officials 

reported that all of the agencies had fully addressed the corrective actions 

identified by AFMLS. See appendix III for the results of the 11 compliance 

reviews AFMLS has completed as of December 2011.

With more than $1 billion in forfeited assets deposited into the AFF every 

year since 2006, the Asset Forfeiture Program generates substantial 

revenue for the Department of Justice. These funds are used to cover 

annual operating expenses, to compensate crime victims, or are shared 

with state and local law enforcement agencies that participate in 

investigations resulting in forfeiture. The significant amounts of money 

 

47All 11 agencies complied with at least one of the requirements evaluated by AFMLS.

Conclusions
 

Page 39 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

involved as well as the sensitive nature of asset forfeiture mean it is 

imperative to be vigilant in maintaining the transparency of the program. 

Since the Asset Forfeiture Program’s operations are supported by annual 

revenues, DOJ faces a challenging task estimating future revenues and 

expenditures each year. The AFF’s annual revenues have consistently 

exceeded annual expenditures, allowing DOJ to cover annual rescissions 

and to reserve funds for the next fiscal year. This allows DOJ to ensure 

that the AFF has sufficient resources at the start of each fiscal year to 

cover solvency and pending equitable sharing and third-party payments. 

However, the AFF’s Congressional Budget Justification does not clearly 

outline the factors that DOJ considers when determining the total 

amounts that need to be carried over each fiscal year. As part of the 

AFF’s annual budget process, documenting how DOJ determines the 

funds that need to be carried over at the end of each year and providing 

additional details on that determination to Congress would provide more 

transparency over the process and would help Congress make more 

informed appropriations decisions.

In addition, the authorization to share federal forfeiture proceeds with 

cooperating state and local law enforcement agencies is one of the most 

important provisions of asset forfeiture. DOJ has established guidelines 

stating that adjustments to equitable sharing percentages should be 

based on qualitative factors; however, additional guidance regarding how 

to apply these factors could help to improve the transparency and better 

ensure consistency with which adjustments to sharing percentages are 

made over time or across cases. Additionally, there are gaps in the extent 

to which key information that serves as the basis for equitable sharing 

decisions is documented. In the absence of documenting the work hours 

used to calculate initial equitable sharing percentages—the primary 

means to determine each agency’s share of forfeiture proceeds—it is 

unclear how equitable sharing deciding authorities could verify the relative 

degree of participation of each of the agencies involved in the case. 

Similarly, documenting information on DOJ’s rationale for making 

adjustments to sharing percentages could help to improve transparency 

over whether equitable sharing decisions are being made in accordance 

with DOJ’s guidance. Additionally, establishing a mechanism to verify that 

equitable sharing determinations are made in accordance with 

established guidance would provide DOJ with greater assurance that 

there are effective management practices in place to help promote 

confidence in the integrity of the equitable sharing program.
 

Page 40 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

We are making four recommendations to the Attorney General.

To help improve transparency over the AFF’s use of funds, we 

recommend that the Attorney General provide more detailed information 

to Congress as part of the AFF’s annual budget process, clearly 

documenting how DOJ determines the amount of funds to be carried over 

into the next fiscal year.

To help improve management controls over the equitable sharing 

program, we recommend that the Attorney General direct AFMLS to take 

the following three actions:

• Develop and implement additional guidance on how DOJ agencies 

should apply qualitative factors when making adjustments to equitable 

sharing percentages.

• Establish a mechanism to ensure that the basis for equitable sharing 

determinations—including the work hours contributed by all 

participating agencies and the rationale for any adjustments to sharing 

percentages—are recorded in the documents provided to agency 

headquarters officials for review and approval.

• Develop a risk-based mechanism to monitor whether key information 

in support of equitable sharing determinations is recorded and the 

extent to which sharing determinations are made in accordance with 

established guidance.

We provided a draft of this report to DOJ for its review and comment. 

DOJ did not provide official written comments to include in our report. 

However, in an e-mail received on June 21, 2012, the DOJ liaison stated 

that the department appreciated the opportunity to review the draft report 

and that DOJ concurred with our recommendations. DOJ further noted 

that the department will develop a plan of corrective action in order to 

address the recommendations. DOJ also provided us written technical 

comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Attorney General, selected 

congressional committees, and other interested parties. In addition, this 

report is also available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any further questions about this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512- 9627 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments
 

Page 41 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix IV.

David C. Maurer

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues
 

Page 42 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

List of Requesters

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley

Ranking Member

Committee on Judiciary

United States Senate

The Honorable Lamar Smith 

Chairman 

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr. 

Ranking Member 

Committee on the Judiciary 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Jim Sensenbrenner

Chairman

The Honorable Bobby Scott 

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security 

Committee on the Judiciary 

House of Representatives

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf

Chairman

The Honorable Chaka Fattah

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies

Appropriations Committee

House of Representatives

The Honorable Louie Gohmert

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Equitable Sharing 

Page 43 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

State and local law enforcement agencies typically qualify for equitable 

sharing by participating directly with Department of Justice (DOJ) 

agencies in joint investigations leading to the seizure and forfeiture of 

property. Agencies may either receive a portion of the proceeds resulting 

from the sale of the forfeited asset or may request that a forfeited asset 

such as a vehicle be put into official use. Any property other than 

contraband or firearms may be transferred to a state or local agency for 

official use provided that it is used for law enforcement purposes. State 

and local law enforcement can receive equitable sharing payments after 

working on a joint case with one or more federal law enforcement 

partners or after participating in a case carried out by a federal law 

enforcement task force. Approximately 83 percent of all equitable sharing 

determinations are the result of joint investigations.

State and local law enforcement agencies can also qualify for equitable 

sharing by requesting that federal partners adopt a case initiated at the 

state or local level. An adoptive forfeiture occurs when local police 

officials effectively hand a case over to federal law enforcement officials 

provided that the property in question is forfeitable under federal law. 

According to DOJ officials, many state and local law enforcement 

agencies will make seizures pursuant to their state laws. However, they 

may reach out to federal law enforcement agencies to adopt a forfeiture if 

they don’t have a state or local statute that allows them to carry out a 

forfeiture. For example, in a particular case, there may be large amounts 

of cash involved but no drugs found or seized. Federal statute allows for 

the forfeiture of assets based on illegal activity even if there are no drugs 

seized, whereas the state or local statute might not allow for this type of 

forfeiture. Alternatively, state and local law enforcement agencies may 

request that DOJ adopt a forfeiture in those cases where federal 

coordination or expertise is needed in the case. Our analysis shows a 

slight decrease in adoptive versus non-adoptive equitable sharing 

payments since 2003. In 2003, adoptions made up about 23 percent of all 

equitable sharing payments, while in 2010, adoptions made up about 17 

percent of all equitable sharing payments. According to DOJ, as more 

states have established their own forfeiture laws, they may rely less on 

DOJ to adopt forfeiture cases and may instead pursue forfeitures under 

state law when appropriate. Figure 7 shows the equitable sharing 

payments made to each state in fiscal year 2011.

Appendix I: Equitable Sharing
Page 44 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

Interactive Graphic Directions: Place mouse over each state name for the total equitable sharing payments made to that 

state in fiscal year 2011.

Source: GAO analysis of DOJ data. 

Appendix I: Equitable Sharing 

: 

Ill.
Appendix I: Equitable Sharing 

Page 45 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

Our analysis shows a strong positive association between the equitable 

sharing payments made to each state and the state’s total population. 

However, our analysis found no correlation between per capita equitable 

sharing payments and arrest rates, once we corrected for population size. 

It is important to note that a number of other factors may influence the 

amount of equitable sharing payments a state receives in a given year. 

For example, if a state or local law enforcement agency participated in a 

joint investigation that resulted in a very large forfeiture, the agency might 

receive a significant amount of equitable sharing dollars, even if no 

arrests were made in conjunction with the case. Alternately, an agency 

may work several cases that generate multiple arrests, but no forfeitures, 

so no equitable sharing payments would be made. Finally, differences in 

equitable sharing between states may be influenced by whether state and 

local law enforcement agencies decide to pursue forfeitures under their 

state laws versus those cases where federal involvement may be 

warranted.
Appendix II: Assets Forfeiture Fund 

Expenditure Categories 

Page 46 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

1. Third-Party Payments:

Third-party payments are payments to satisfy third-party interests, 

including lienholders and other innocent parties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 524(c)(1)(D); payments in connection with the remission and 

mitigation of forfeitures, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1)(E).

2. Equitable Sharing Payments:

These funds are reserved until the receipt of the final forfeiture orders 

that result in distributions to the participants. Equitable sharing 

payments represent the transfer of portions of federally forfeited cash 

and proceeds from the sale of forfeited property to state and local law 

enforcement agencies and foreign governments that directly assisted 

in targeting or seizing the property. Most task force cases, for 

example, result in property forfeitures whose proceeds are shared 

among the participating agencies. 

All other program operations expenses

3. Asset Management and Disposal:

According to DOJ, the primary purpose of the Assets Forfeiture Fund 

(AFF) is to ensure an adequate and appropriate source of funding for 

the management and disposal of forfeited assets. Also, funding is 

required for the assessment, containment, removal, and destruction of 

hazardous materials seized for forfeiture, and hazardous waste 

contaminated property seized for forfeiture. The United States 

Marshals Service (USMS) has primary responsibility for the storage 

and maintenance of assets, while the Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 

and Explosives (ATF) are responsible for the disposal of toxic and 

hazardous substances.

4. Case-Related Expenses:

Case-related expenses are expenses associated with the prosecution 

of a forfeiture case or execution of a forfeiture judgment, such as 

advertising, travel and subsistence, court and deposition reporting, 

courtroom exhibit services, and expert witness costs. In appropriate 

cases, the services of foreign counsel may be necessary.

Appendix II: Assets Forfeiture Fund 

Expenditure Categories
Appendix II: Assets Forfeiture Fund 

Expenditure Categories 

Page 47 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

5. Special Contract Services:

The AFF uses contract personnel to manage the paperwork 

associated with forfeiture, including data entry, data analysis, word 

processing, file control, file review, quality control, case file 

preparation, and other process support functions.

6. Investigative Expenses Leading to Seizure:

Investigative expenses are those normally incurred in the 

identification, location, and seizure of property subject to forfeiture.

These include payments to reimburse any federal agency participating 

in the AFF for investigative costs leading to seizures.

7. Contracts to Identify Assets:

Investigative agencies use these funds for subscription services to 

nationwide public record data systems, and for acquisition of 

specialized assistance, such as reconstruction of seized financial 

records. According to DOJ, these resources are used to identify 

assets during the investigative stage of the case, where such 

research will enhance effective use of the asset forfeiture sanction.

DOJ officials note that if the government can improve upon the 

identification of ill-gotten assets, the nature of the criminal wrongdoing 

can be better demonstrated and reinforced before the jury. Such 

evidence results in greater penalties for criminals who may have 

avoided such penalties in the past by successfully concealing such 

assets.

8. Awards for Information Leading to a Forfeiture:

The Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997,1

9. Automated Data Processing:

amended the 

Justice Fund statute to treat payments of awards based on the 

amount of the forfeiture the same as other costs of forfeiture. 

Therefore, the amount available each year for expenses for awards 

no longer had to be specified in annual appropriations acts.

Recurring costs include telecommunications support, system and 

equipment maintenance, user support and help desk, software 

 

1

Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. A, § 114, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-22 (1996). 
Appendix II: Assets Forfeiture Fund 

Expenditure Categories 

Page 48 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

maintenance, user training, equipment, and data center charges in 

support of the Consolidated Asset Tracking System (CATS). All asset 

forfeiture activity for each asset is recorded in CATS. According to 

DOJ, CATS enables access for more than 1,000 locations to a central 

database to perform full asset forfeiture life-cycle tasks more 

efficiently. The system provides current information to field personnel 

on the status of cases, integrates financial analysis capabilities into 

the inventory management process, provides the estimation of 

program income and expenses, and provides the capability for agency 

and department managers to review and assess program activity.

10. Training and Printing:

This category funds expenses for training personnel on aspects of the 

federal forfeiture program as well as other training necessary to 

maintain the competency of federal and contractor personnel 

dedicated to performing federal forfeiture functions. Printing costs 

reflect the continuing need to provide current legal advice and 

support. Expenses include updating and distributing manuals and 

pamphlets directly related to forfeiture issues, policies, and 

procedures.

11. Other Program Management:

This category includes several types of expenses in support of the 

overall management of the Asset Forfeiture Program, including 

management analysis, performance assessment, problem analysis, 

requirements analyses, policy development, and other special 

projects designed to improve program performance. This funding is to 

provide travel and per diem funds for temporary duty assignments 

needed to correct program deficiencies. Other activities funded under 

this heading include the annual audit of the financial statements of the 

Assets Forfeiture Fund and the Seized Asset Deposit Fund by an 

independent accounting firm and special assessments and reviews.

This category also finances the Asset Forfeiture Money Laundering 

Section (AFMLS), Asset Forfeiture Management Staff (AFMS), and, 

since 2001, USMS headquarters administrative personnel and nonpersonnel costs associated with the forfeiture program. In addition, 

the AFF funds Deputy U.S. Marshal salaries to enhance the legal and 

fiduciary responsibilities that are inherent in the seizure of personal 

and real property during the pendency of a forfeiture action.
Appendix II: Assets Forfeiture Fund 

Expenditure Categories 

Page 49 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

12. Storage, Protection, and Destruction of Controlled Substances:

These expenses are incurred to store, protect, or destroy controlled 

substances.

13. Joint Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Operations:

Under 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1)(l), the AFF has authority to pay for 

“overtime, travel, fuel, training, equipment, and other similar costs of 

state or local law enforcement officers that are incurred in a joint law 

enforcement operation with a federal law enforcement agency 

participating in the Fund.” 

14. Awards for Information and Purchase of Evidence

Awards payable from the AFF directly support law enforcement efforts 

by encouraging the cooperation and assistance of informants. The 

AFF may also be used to purchase evidence of violations of drug 

laws, Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO), and 

criminal money laundering laws. According to DOJ, payment of 

awards to sources of information creates motivation for individuals to 

assist the government in the investigation of criminal activity and the 

seizure of assets.

15. Equipping of Conveyances:

This category provides funding to equip vehicles, vessels, or aircraft 

for law enforcement functions, but not to acquire them. Purchased 

equipment must be affixed to and used integrally with the 

conveyance. This funding is used for emergency and communications 

equipment, voice privacy and surveillance equipment, armoring, and 

engine upgrades and avionic equipment for aircraft. According to 

DOJ, it is only through AFF resources that many of these surveillance 

vehicles are available to the field districts that need them. DEA uses 

various surveillance techniques, including stationary and mobile 

platforms to conduct surveillance and gather intelligence, the 

cornerstone of cases against most major drug violators. In addition, 

evidence obtained through the use of such surveillance often provides 

the audio and video documentation necessary for conviction.
Appendix III: Results of Asset Forfeiture and 

Money Laundering Section Compliance 

Reviews Completed as of December 2011 

Page 50 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

DOJ’s Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section completed a total 

of 11 compliance reviews of equitable sharing participants in 2011. Table 

4 shows the results of the 11 compliance reviews.

Table 4: Results of Compliance Reviews of Equitable Sharing Participants

Results of 11 compliance 

reviews Example of finding Recommendation by AFMLS

Four agencies did not complete 

Annual Equitable Sharing 

Agreement and Certification 

Forms on time.

AFMLS found that one agency submitted its 

Equitable Sharing Agreement and Certification 

Form late for 2 consecutive years. In 2009, the 

form was submitted 126 days after the end of 

the fiscal year and in 2010, the form was 

submitted 118 days after the end of the fiscal 

year.

Per section X.A of the Guide to Equitable 

Sharing for State and Local Law Enforcement 

Agencies, state and local law enforcement 

agencies must submit the Equitable Sharing 

Agreement and Certification Form within 60 

days after the end of the agency’s fiscal year. 

The law enforcement agency should submit the 

Equitable Sharing Agreement and Certification 

Form within the time frame specified.

Five agencies did not complete 

Annual Equitable Sharing 

Agreement and Certification 

Forms accurately.

AFMLS found differences between one agency’s 

fiscal year 2010 equitable sharing general ledger 

and its fiscal year 2010 Equitable Sharing 

Agreement and Certification Form. Specifically, 

AFMLS found the total the agency reported 

spending on communications and computers 

was understated by $1,097.18. Similarly, AFMLS 

found that the total spent on electronic 

surveillance equipment was overstated by 

$4,376.20.

The police department should restate its fiscal 

year 2010 Equitable Sharing Agreement and 

Certification Form to reflect the differences 

noted.

Six agencies did not complete 

Single Audits (or document 

equitable sharing funds in the 

Single Audit’s schedule of federal 

expenditures) as required.

AFMLS found that although one of the city’s 

financial statements was subject to Single Audits 

under OMB A-133, the city police department’s 

equitable sharing activity was not reviewed and 

reported on the Single Audit’s schedule of 

federal expenditures.

Per section X.B of the Guide to Equitable 

Sharing for State and Local Law Enforcement 

Agencies, agencies that received federally 

shared cash, proceeds, or tangible property are 

required to perform an audit consistent with the 

Single Audit Act Amendments of 1996 and 

OMB Circular A-133. Equitable Sharing 

Program activity should be reviewed and should 

be included on the schedule of expenditures of 

federal awards for fiscal year 2011 and future 

years as part of the city’s annual audit. 

Appendix III: Results of Asset Forfeiture and 

Money Laundering Section Compliance 

Reviews Completed as of December 2011
Appendix III: Results of Asset Forfeiture and 

Money Laundering Section Compliance 

Reviews Completed as of December 2011 

Page 51 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

Results of 11 compliance 

reviews Example of finding Recommendation by AFMLS

Three agencies did not comply 

with AFMLS guidelines regarding 

permissible uses of equitable 

sharing funds.a

In the course of one compliance review, AFMLS 

found that the law enforcement agency used 

$2,000 in equitable sharing funds to pay a legal 

settlement related to injuries suffered by an 

individual who was involved in a car accident 

with a vehicle driven by a police department 

official. AFMLS determined the use was 

impermissible and required the agency to 

reimburse the equitable sharing account for the 

amount of the settlement. 

Per section VIII of the Guide to Equitable 

Sharing for State and Local Law Enforcement 

Agencies, equitably shared funds shall be used 

by enforcement agencies for law enforcement 

purposes only. As legal settlement expenses 

are not listed in the guide as a permissible use, 

the police department should reimburse the 

equitable sharing account for the amount of the 

settlement. 

Three agencies did not employ 

adequate internal controls over 

equitable sharing transactions 

and balances. 

In the course of AFMLS’s review of one 

agency’s equitable sharing transactions, the 

reviewers found that 21 out of 30 invoices in 

support of purchases made with equitable 

sharing funds contained no evidence of approval 

prior to payment.

Per section IX of the Guide to Equitable Sharing 

for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 

all participating agencies must implement 

standard accounting procedures and internal 

controls to track equitably shared monies and 

tangible property. The law enforcement agency 

should ensure that approval control is being 

performed. This approval can be evidenced by 

a signature or initial on the final invoice 

received from each vendor. 

Three agencies did not have 

appropriate bookkeeping and 

accounting procedures in place.

AFMLS determined that one law enforcement 

agency was improperly commingling equitable 

sharing funds with other funds in its accounting 

system. 

The law enforcement agency should include 

expenditures of DOJ equitable sharing funds in 

the summary of shared monies spent section of 

the Equitable Sharing Agreement and 

Certification Form. Additionally, per section 

IX.A.1 of the Guide to Equitable Sharing for 

State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 

law enforcement agencies must establish a 

separate revenue account or accounting code 

for the proceeds of the program. The law 

enforcement agency should establish and 

maintain a separate accounting code to track 

DOJ equitable sharing funds. 

Source: GAO’s analysis of DOJ data.

Notes: Some agencies had more than one violation, which is why violations do not total to 11. 

a

While AFMLS found that these three agencies did not strictly comply with the permissible use of 

funds as outlined in the Guide to Equitable Sharing for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, it 

did not identify any instances among these three agencies of intentional misuse or abuse of equitable 

sharing funds. 
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 52 GAO-12-736 Asset Forfeiture

David C. Maurer, (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Sandra Burrell and Dawn Locke 

(Assistant Directors), Sylvia Bascope, Samantha Carter, Raymond 

Griffith, Mike Harmond, Shirley Hwang, Valerie Kasindi, and Jeremy 

Manion made key contributions to the report. Also contributing to this 

report were Lydia Araya, Benjamin Bolitzer, Frances Cook, Katherine 

Davis, Richard Eiserman, Janet Temko, Mitchell Karpman, Linda Miller, 

Jan Montgomery, Bintou Njie, Robert Lowthian, Cynthia Saunders, and 

Jerry Seigler.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(440970)
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