[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-11939

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

KENNETH EARL HOOKS, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket Nos. 2:18-cr-00249-LSC-JHE-1,

2:19-cr-00136-LSC-JHE-1

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11939

____________________

____________________

No. 22-11942

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

KENNETH EARL HOOKS, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket Nos. 2:19-cr-00136-LSC-JHE-1,

2:18-cr-00249-LSC-1

____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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22-11939 Opinion of the Court 3

Following a remand for resentencing, Kenneth Hooks 

appeals his total sentence of life imprisonment, imposed after he 

pleaded guilty in two cases pursuant to two written plea 

agreements, to four counts of production of child pornography, 

one count of coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in 

sexual activity, and one count of transportation of a minor for 

sexual purposes. Hooks argues that (1) the district court 

procedurally erred by misconstruing our mandate on remand; 

(2) the district court procedurally erred by failing to adequately 

explain the basis for its sentence and failing to consider his 

arguments in mitigation; and (3) the sentence imposed was 

substantively unreasonable.1 The government, in turn, argues that 

the district court complied with our mandate on remand, and that 

Hooks’s remaining arguments are waived by the sentence-appeal 

waiver in his plea agreements. In response, Hooks argues that the 

appeal waivers are not enforceable because the district court failed 

to adequately explain the waiver to him during the plea colloquy

and he did not understand the implications of the waiver. We 

conclude that the district court complied with our mandate and 

that that the sentence-appeal waivers are valid and enforceable and 

bar Hooks’s sentencing-related challenges. Moreover, 

notwithstanding the waiver, his claims fail on the merits. 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

I. Background

1 Hooks also argues that his case should be reassigned to a different judge on 

remand. 

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During a forensic search of a computer obtained from 

Hooks’s residence pursuant to a search warrant issued as part of an 

investigation into an unrelated incident that occurred in California 

involving Hooks’s girlfriend Sarah Morris, law enforcement 

discovered numerous still images and a ten-minute video depicting 

child pornography. Some of the images portrayed a sleeping 

female prepubescent minor approximately 4 or 5 years old with her 

pajama bottoms pulled back to expose her genitals, and another 

image depicted the sleeping prepubescent female minor’s hand 

touching Hooks’s penis.2

 Other still images depicted Hooks sitting 

in a chair nude, touching the genitals and buttocks of a nude 

prepubescent male approximately 5 or 6 years old—later 

determined to be one of Morris’s sons. The ten-minute video 

depicted Hooks sexually assaulting, both vaginally and orally, a 

teenage female minor. Authorities later determined the teenage 

female was one of Hooks’s daughters, and Hooks and Morris had 

moved the teenager from Mississippi to Alabama to live with them 

at the time of the video. During the video, the teenage female is 

depicted crying, screaming “no,” attempting to resist, and is 

physically restrained by Hooks. Law enforcement determined that 

the images and video in question were produced in Alabama and 

the minor victims resided in Alabama. 

Based on the images involving the prepubescent male 

minor, Hooks and Morris were each indicted in the Northern 

2 In total, 59 images of this female minor in various stages of undress were 

discovered on the computer. 

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22-11939 Opinion of the Court 5

District of Alabama on one count of production of child 

pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e), and 2, 

and one count of coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in 

sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (“Case #1”). 

Hooks was also charged by Information in the Middle 

District of Alabama with three counts of production of child 

pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e), and one 

count of transporting a minor for the purpose of engaging in sexual 

activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (“Case #2”), based on 

the images involving the prepubescent female minor and the video 

of the sexual assault on the teenage female minor. 

Hooks pleaded guilty to all six charges stemming from both 

of his cases, pursuant to a written plea agreement in each case.3

 

The plea agreements reflected that each of the production of child 

pornography counts (four counts in total) carried a statutory 

minimum term of 15 years’ imprisonment and a statutory 

maximum term of 30 years’ imprisonment. The plea agreements 

also reflected that both the enticement of a minor count and the 

transportation of a minor count carried a statutory minimum term 

of ten years’ imprisonment and a statutory maximum term of life 

imprisonment. 

3 Hooks consented to the transfer of Case #2 from the Middle District of 

Alabama to the Northern District of Alabama. 

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Both plea agreements contained identical sentence-appeal 

waivers. The waivers stated as follows: 

In consideration of the recommended disposition of 

this case, I, Kenneth Earl Hooks, hereby waive and 

give up my right to appeal my conviction and/or 

sentence in this case, as well as any fines, restitution, 

and forfeiture orders, the court might impose. 

Further, I waive and give up the right to challenge my 

conviction and/or sentence, any fines, restitution, 

forfeiture orders imposed or the manner in which my 

conviction and/or sentence, any fines, restitution, 

and forfeiture orders were determined in any postconviction proceeding, including, but not limited to, 

a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and any 

argument that (1) the statute(s) to which I am 

pleading guilty is or are unconstitutional or (2) the 

admitted conduct does not fall within the scope of the 

statute(s).

The defendant reserves the right to contest in an 

appeal or post-conviction proceeding any or all of the 

following:

(a) Any sentence imposed in excess of the 

applicable statutory maximum sentence(s); 

(b) Any sentence imposed in excess of the 

guideline sentencing range determined by the 

court at the time sentence is imposed; and 

(c) Any claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

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The defendant acknowledges that before giving up 

these rights, the defendant discussed the Federal 

Sentencing Guidelines and their application to the 

defendant’s case with the defendant’s attorney, who 

explained them to the defendant’s satisfaction. The 

defendant further acknowledges and understands 

that the government retains its right to appeal where 

authorized by statute. 

I, KENNETH EARL HOOKS, hereby place my 

signature on the line directly below to signify that I 

fully understand the foregoing paragraphs, and that I 

am knowingly and voluntarily entering into this 

waiver. 

Hooks signed each page of the plea agreements, including the 

pages containing the sentence-appeal waivers, and he signed the 

paragraph in each agreement stating that he understood the appeal 

waiver and was entering into it knowingly and voluntarily. Hooks 

signed the plea agreement in Case #1 on January 25, 2019, and, 

approximately a month later on February 26, 2019, he signed the 

plea agreement in Case #2. 

At the plea hearing in Case #1, Hooks confirmed that he had 

not had any alcoholic beverages, drugs, or medications that would 

interfere with his ability to understand the proceeding.4 He also 

confirmed that he did not have any physical, mental, or emotional 

impairments that would interfere with his ability to understand the 

4 Hooks had an eighth-grade education. 

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8 Opinion of the Court 22-11939

proceeding. The district court then asked Hooks whether it was 

his initials and signature on the plea agreement, and Hooks 

confirmed that it was and that he had read the document. He also 

confirmed that his lawyer had reviewed the plea agreement with 

him, and that he understood the information in the agreement. 

The district court reviewed the charged offenses with Hooks and 

the potential punishments, including that Hooks faced the 

possibility of life imprisonment, and Hooks confirmed that he 

understood. 

With regard to the sentence-appeal waiver, Hooks 

confirmed that it was his signature under the paragraph 

acknowledging the waiver, and he agreed with the court’s 

statement that by signing the waiver, he acknowledged that he was 

“waiving or giving up [his] right to appeal or file a post-conviction 

petition except under certain circumstances listed above [his] 

signature.” Hooks confirmed that he was pleading guilty freely and 

voluntarily because he was in fact guilty, and the district court 

accepted his plea in Case #1. 

Similarly, at the plea hearing in Case #2, Hooks confirmed 

that he had initialed and signed the plea agreement, read it, and 

discussed it with his counsel. He also confirmed that, although he 

was now taking various prescription medications, he understood 

the proceedings and he was not under the influence of anything 

that would interfere with his ability to understand the proceedings. 

The district court reviewed the charged offenses with Hooks and 

the potential punishments, including that Hooks faced the 

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22-11939 Opinion of the Court 9

possibility of life imprisonment, and Hooks confirmed that he 

understood. With regard to the sentence-appeal waiver, Hooks 

confirmed that it was his signature under the paragraph 

acknowledging the waiver, and he agreed with the court’s 

statement that by signing the waiver, he had “waived or given up 

[his] right to appeal or file a post-conviction petition except in the 

limited circumstances [listed] above [his] signature.” Hooks 

confirmed that he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily 

because he was in fact guilty, and the district court accepted his plea 

in Case #2. 

The district court set a combined sentencing hearing for 

both of Hooks’s cases. Hooks’s applicable guidelines range was life 

imprisonment.5 In terms of Hooks’s background and personal 

history, his presentence investigation report (“PSI”) indicated that 

Hooks’s parents divorced when he was young and he was raised by 

his father. He suffered both physical and sexual abuse by multiple 

members of his family. Hooks’s stepfather confirmed that Hooks 

was raped repeatedly and abused by multiple family members.

Additionally, the PSI indicated that Hooks suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, depression, and anxiety. 

5 Hooks filed a motion for a downward variance, requesting that the district 

court impose concurrent terms of 60 years’ imprisonment in each case. Hooks 

asserted that “[a]s a 36 year old man, who will be 87 if he lives to serve 85% of 

a 720 month sentence, [such a sentence] is sufficient, but not greater than 

necessary to accomplish the stated purposes of sentencing as set forth in 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a).” 

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And at the time of his arrest, Hooks was using methamphetamine 

daily. 

At Hooks’s initial sentencing hearing, the district court 

viewed the video depicting the child pornography and a selection 

of still images presented by the government. Thereafter, the 

defense called forensic psychologist Dr. Sarah Boyd to testify as to 

her evaluation of Hooks. Dr. Boyd testified that Hooks was 

anxious during the evaluation and he cried a lot. While Hooks did 

not make any statements that directly minimized his conduct, he 

indicated that Morris was the “driving force behind why the focus 

would be on younger children, prepubescent children.” Hooks 

expressed remorse and shame during the interview. Dr. Boyd 

explained that, in her expert opinion, Hooks suffered from 

(1) complex post-traumatic stress disorder (CPTSD)—otherwise 

known as developmental trauma—(2) a substance abuse disorder, 

with the primary substance being methamphetamine, and (3) also 

possibly bipolar disorder. She confirmed that Hooks’s CPTSD and 

his substance abuse disorder were likely strong contributing factors 

to his offense conduct because individuals who have been 

victimized themselves sometimes go on to victimize other 

individuals in a similar manner and methamphetamine increases 

impulsivity and sexual interest and impairs judgment. On crossexamination, Dr. Boyd confirmed that she could not give an 

opinion as to whether Hooks would have committed the offenses 

but for his drug use and his traumatic childhood experiences. A 

letter from one of Hooks’s children was also submitted on his 

behalf. 

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Hooks then made a brief statement to the court, apologizing 

for his actions and asking for mercy. The grandmother of the 

minor male victim made an oral statement to the court, asserting 

that Hooks traumatized her grandson, not only by sexually abusing 

him, but also by physically “whipping him with a switch,” “making 

him stay outside,” and being “mean” to him. She explained the 

male minor was in counseling and would “probably be in 

counseling the rest of his life.” The teenage female minor depicted 

in the video submitted a written victim impact statement, stating 

that Hooks and Morris drugged her using a date rape drug and got 

her to use methamphetamines, that Hooks repeatedly raped her, 

and that he made her watch and participate in sexual encounters 

with young boys. 

Before pronouncing Hooks’s sentences, the district court 

stated as follows:

You know, there is not a lot of difference between a 

life sentence and 720 months. There is a little bit of 

difference. But it seems like the majority of the brief, 

the motion, maybe I just read too much into it, was 

that 720 month sentence, you would be very elderly 

and have a chance to get out of prison. Well, the 

prison has opportunities for individuals to get out 

when their health deteriorates and such. But I don’t 

think that a sentence that is under the guideline range 

is appropriate in this case. 

The guideline range is life. The conduct in this case 

was horrendous. It’s always very difficult to see 

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conduct where an individual takes and abuses a child 

in that kind of manner. It’s hard to see it, and I 

couldn’t imagine experiencing it on the child’s side. 

The factors that I am charged with the responsibility 

of enforcing are those in the sentencing statutes. And 

I believe that when you consider the nature and 

circumstances of the offense and your history and 

characteristics, as well as the need to protect the 

public from crimes that you might commit again, 

well, it calls out for a guideline sentence, which is life.

The district court then imposed the statutory maximum of a life 

sentence as to each of the enticement of a minor and transportation 

of a minor counts, and a 30-year sentence as to each of the 

production of child pornography counts, all terms to run 

consecutively. Hooks’s counsel objected to the sentences as “being 

exceptionally unreasonable,” and the district court noted in 

response that “this is a guideline sentence.” The district court also 

noted in its statement of reasons that it imposed a sentence within 

the guideline range. 

Hooks appealed the sentence to this Court, arguing, in 

relative part, that the district court failed to adequately explain the 

reasons for the sentence imposed.6 United States v. Hooks, 829 F. 

App’x 948, 948 (11th Cir. 2020) (Hooks I). On appeal, we concluded 

6 In Hooks’s initial appeal, because the district court ordered the sentences to 

run consecutively, the government noted that “the total sentence arguably 

was imposed in excess of the guideline sentencing range,” which was one of 

the exceptions to the sentence-appeal waivers. Therefore, the government 

stated that it would not seek to enforce the appeal waivers. 

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that “there [was] tension between” the district court’s statements

that it imposed a guideline sentence and the total sentence 

imposed—two consecutive life sentences plus 120 years’ 

imprisonment—“which we [could not] reconcile based on the 

record before us.” Id. at 949. Accordingly, we vacated Hooks’s 

sentences and remanded the case for resentencing. Id. We noted 

that, on remand, “[r]egardless of the sentence imposed, the district 

court must clarify if it is imposing a guidelines sentence or a 

variance. If it imposes a variance, the district court must state its 

reasons for imposing such sentence on the record in order to 

facilitate meaningful appellate review.” Id. at 949 n.1.

On remand, Hooks filed an updated sentencing 

memorandum and a motion for downward variance. Hooks again 

requested a total sentence of 60 years (720-months), arguing that it 

was the “only reasonable sentence in this case.” Hooks argued that 

the sentence would maintain parity between himself, Morris,7 and 

7 Morris pleaded guilty to five counts related to the child pornography, and 

her guidelines range was also life. At her sentencing, the government filed a 

motion for downward departure based on her substantial assistance, pursuant 

to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, recommending concurrent sentences of 197 months’ 

imprisonment in both cases. After hearing testimony from a law enforcement 

officer regarding Morris’s cooperation and thorough efforts to aid the 

prosecution in apprehending and prosecuting Hooks and entertaining 

arguments of counsel and a statement by Morris, the district court granted the 

motion and imposed the government’s recommended sentence to be followed 

by a lifetime of supervised release. The district court noted that but for her 

substantial assistance, Morris “would have received a life sentence . . . because 

the conduct is horrendous.” 

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other similarly situated defendants, and was supported by the 

relevant § 3553(a) factors. Hooks also attached a number of 

documents to his motion, including a follow-up psychological 

assessment by Dr. Boyd. 

The government requested that Hooks “spend the rest of his 

life in prison” so that he would never be “free to prey on children 

again.” It noted that the court could either impose a guidelines 

sentence of life, with all sentences running concurrently, or impose 

the same sentences that it did before, but that such a sentence 

would constitute an upward variance. 

At the start of the resentencing hearing, the district court 

stated that “the Eleventh Circuit remanded with directions that I 

either sentence the defendant concurrently for the two life 

sentences and 120 month sentence, or that if I run them 

consecutive[,] I further explain my decision. So, that’s what we are 

here for.” The following colloquy then occurred:

[Hooks’s counsel]: And your Honor, if I could 

disagree slightly with the court’s interpretation of the 

mandate. Our position at this resentencing is that it’s 

a complete resentencing. We understand that the 

court’s not going to hear evidence that we could have 

presented at the original sentencing hearing, but the 

court can consider evidence of [Hooks’s] 

rehabilitation over the past two years. And the court 

is not limited to the two options of either consecutive 

life sentences—

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[District Court]: I was expressing what I thought the 

Eleventh Circuit, but I certainly understand what you 

are saying. It is a resentencing. . . .[8] I assume what 

you are referring to is I could vary down below the 

guideline range.

[Hooks’s Counsel]: Correct, Your Honor. 

[District Court]: I will listen to anything you have to 

present. Do not go over evidence that we had before. 

I remember the case. 

Hooks’s counsel then called Dr. Boyd as a witness, stating that Dr. 

Boyd was going to supplement the testimony that she provided at 

the initial sentencing hearing. 

Dr. Boyd explained that, at the time of her initial evaluation, 

Hooks had been using large amounts of methamphetamine for 

years, and there was a possibility that he might also have “a 

diagnosis of something like a schizophrenia spectrum disorder or 

bipolar disorder co-occurring with the methamphetamine 

substance abuse disorder.” However, now that Hooks had been in 

jail for some time and no longer had access to methamphetamine, 

it had 

become clear that he does, in fact, have a cooccurring, separate disorder. It has—with mood 

8 During this colloquy, the district court confirmed that neither Hooks nor the 

government had any objection to the PSI as originally calculated, adopted the 

PSI in full, and determined that the guideline range was life imprisonment. 

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features, as well as psychosis type features. It does 

appear to have a fusion of sorts with his trauma 

related symptoms in that a lot of his mood and 

anxiety and psychosis type symptoms are associated 

with preoccupations about victimization, about 

people posing threats perhaps to him or threatening 

him in the facility, and being very hyper vigilant about 

that.

So he does—at this point I think we can say with 

significantly more confidence that there is a separate 

disorder in him; that the mental health symptoms 

that he was experiencing are not solely attributable to 

methamphetamine intoxication or 

methamphetamine effects that tend to be more 

persistent even after someone stops taking the drug. 

She then opined that Hooks’s bipolar disorder could have 

contributed to the underlying offenses because people with bipolar 

experience manic episodes, which can manifest in impulsivity, selfdestructive behavior, and “an increase for many people in risky 

sexual behavior and libido.” She further opined that “the trauma 

history in his life contributed not only to the development of 

bipolar disorder but how it actually manifest[ed] in him in terms of 

including risky sexual behavior, and . . . the kind of fusion between 

trauma related symptoms and mood symptoms.” In her opinion, 

Hooks’s methamphetamine use was “partly a consequence of the 

mental disorder,” and the methamphetamine use increased 

Hooks’s chances of experiencing “mood episode[s].” Thus, both 

his methamphetamine use and his bipolar disorder were “relevant 

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factors in terms of understanding what happened with respect to 

the offense conduct.” She noted that Hooks had been responding 

well to psychiatric medications in jail and was actively engaged in, 

and enthusiastic about, his participation in psychotherapy, 

counseling, and a drug education program. She then detailed 

additional treatments that she thought Hooks would benefit 

from—many of which she explained were not available in 

institutional settings. 

Hooks then made a brief statement to the court, apologizing 

to the court and his victims “for all of the harm and terrible things” 

he did, and stating that he “accept[ed] the responsibility and 

consequences of [his] actions.” He explained that“[i]t was never 

[his] intention[] to harm anyone” and that he had “been battling . . . 

both physical and mental abuse.” He begged the court for 

forgiveness and mercy and to not sentence him to life. 

Hooks’s counsel argued for a 60-year sentence, emphasizing 

that such a sentence was appropriate in light of the 16-year 

sentence Hooks’s codefendant, Morris, received for similar 

conduct. The district court pointed out that Morris cooperated and 

that she also stated that Hooks had provided her drugs, raped her, 

and forced her to do some of the things that she did related to the 

child pornography. Hooks’s counsel stated that those were selfserving statements that she made only after she was arrested and 

after initially lying to police about her involvement. Hooks’s 

counsel also argued that the court should consider the fact that 

Hooks pleaded guilty and saved the government and the victims 

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18 Opinion of the Court 22-11939

from a jury trial and accepted responsibility for his actions. 

Hooks’s counsel further emphasized that the court should consider 

Hooks’s “extreme history of trauma” and mental health and 

substance abuse because “a life without parole sentence doesn’t 

give any weight to the fact that there were reasons why he ended 

up he way he did.” Finally, Hooks’s counsel noted that Hooks was 

“treatable,” citing Dr. Boyd’s testimony and reports. 

The government stated that, although it was a good thing 

that Hooks was no longer using drugs and was getting treatment 

in prison, “he still need[ed] to be accountable for his egregious 

crimes against three innocent children who trusted him.” 

Accordingly, the government requested concurrent sentences of 

life in Case #1 and 60 years in Case #2. 

The district court then sentenced Hooks to concurrent 

terms of life for each count in Case #1 and concurrent terms of life 

in Case #2 as to Counts 1, 2 and 3, and 120 months’ as to Count 4, 

with all the sentences running concurrently with each other. It 

noted that it was inclined to vary upward as it did before based on 

Hooks’s conduct, but in light of government’s position, it would 

impose a guideline sentence. It stated that it had considered the 

§ 3553(a) factors, including “the conduct of this defendant and the 

need to protect society from his offenses, the nature and 

circumstances of the offense, and his history and characteristics.” 

Hooks’s counsel objected to the sentence, arguing that the 

sentence was substantively unreasonable and that the district court 

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failed to adequately explain the reasons for the sentence imposed 

and why it rejected Hooks’s arguments in mitigation. 

In response, the district court stated that the sentence was 

based on Hooks’s conduct and the “way he manipulated . . . the 

victims in this case,” including his own daughter. The court also 

noted the method in which Hooks orchestrated Morris’s 

participation in the criminal conduct. The court noted that it did 

not accept Dr. Boyd’s opinion as to Hooks’s low risk of reoffending. 

And, in any event, Dr. Boyd’s testimony was not “sufficient to 

counter the need to protect society from [Hooks’s] offenses and 

conduct, the need to punish him for his criminal conduct, [and] 

[Hooks’s] absolute ability to manipulate people.” The court then 

explained that Hooks could appeal the sentence, but that he may 

have waived his right to appeal if there was a sentence-appeal 

waiver in his plea agreement, and if he believed the waiver was 

unenforceable he should make that argument on appeal. Hooks 

timely appealed. 

II. Discussion

A. The district court complied with this Court’s mandate

Hooks argues that the district court procedurally erred 

when it misconstrued our mandate on remand “to require a life 

sentence[] be re-imposed and treating the Guidelines sentencing 

range as a mandatory floor.” He maintains that the district court’s 

statements at the start of the resentencing hearing demonstrate 

that it thought that it was precluded from varying downward from 

the guidelines. 

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We review de novo the district court’s interpretation and 

application of our mandate in Hooks I. United States v. Amedeo, 487 

F.3d 823, 829 (11th Cir. 2007). “[A] district court when acting under 

an appellate court’s mandate, cannot vary it, or examine it for any 

other purpose than execution; or give any other or further relief[.]” 

United States v. Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514, 1520 (11th Cir. 1996) 

(quotations omitted). 

Hooks’s claim is belied by the record. The record confirms 

that the district court did not treat the guidelines as a “mandatory 

floor,” nor did it believe it was required to impose a life sentence. 

The record also demonstrates that the district court was well aware 

that it could vary upward or downward from the guidelines range, 

and the district court heard extensive argument from Hooks as to 

why a downward variance of 60 years’ imprisonment from the 

guidelines range of life was appropriate. However, the district 

court did not find Hooks’s arguments persuasive and it denied his

motion for a downward variance, and it explained why it sentenced 

him to a guidelines sentence of life. Accordingly, he is not entitled 

to relief on this claim. 

B. Hooks’s challenges to his sentence are barred by the sentenceappeal waivers in his plea agreements

Hooks argues that his total life sentence is procedurally 

unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately explain 

the basis for the sentence, failed to consider his arguments in 

mitigation, and failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors. Relatedly, 

he argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because 

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there is a disparity between his sentence and the sentence Morris 

received as well as other individuals who have committed the same 

child pornography offenses, and that the § 3553(a) factors 

supported his requested sentence of 60 years’ imprisonment. In 

response, the government argues that Hooks’s sentencing-related 

claims are barred by the sentence-appeal waivers in his plea 

agreements. Hooks, in turn, argues the sentence-appeal waivers 

are unenforceable because the district court did not thoroughly 

explain or discuss the appeal waiver at either plea hearing and, 

based on the court’s questioning, Hooks did not understand 

whether he was waiving his right to appeal his sentence as opposed 

to just his conviction. 

“We review the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de 

novo.” United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008). 

We enforce appeal waivers that are made knowingly and 

voluntarily. See United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th 

Cir. 2006); United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 

1993). To demonstrate that a waiver was made knowingly and 

voluntarily, the government must show that either (1) the district 

court specifically questioned the defendant about the waiver 

during the plea colloquy; or (2) the record makes clear that the 

defendant otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver. 

Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351.

Hooks’s argument that the sentence-appeal waivers are

unenforceable because they were not explained to him adequately 

and he did not understand he was waiving his right to appeal his 

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22 Opinion of the Court 22-11939

sentence is refuted by the record. The appeal waivers in each plea 

agreement were identical and stated unequivocally that, by 

entering the plea agreement, Hooks waived his “right to appeal 

[his] conviction and/or sentence in this case.” Each appeal waiver 

then set forth the exceptions to the waiver, explaining that Hooks 

could appeal if his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum or

exceeded the guidelines range, and that he could pursue 

ineffective-assistance-of- counsel claims. Hooks initialed each page 

of each of the plea agreements, including the appeal waiver, and he 

signed the statement proclaiming that that he “fully under[stood]” 

the waiver and that he “knowingly and voluntarily enter[ed] into 

[the] waiver.” Then, during both plea colloquies, he confirmed 

that he read the plea agreement, that his counsel also read the 

agreement to him, and that he understood it. Additionally, the 

district court questioned Hooks about the appeal-waiver 

paragraph, and he confirmed that, by signing the waiver, he waived 

his right to appeal. Thus, the record conclusively refutes Hooks’s 

contention that he did not understand or knowingly and 

voluntarily enter the appeal waiver.9 

Consequently, the record establishes that Hooks’s sentenceappeal waivers were knowingly and voluntarily made and are 

enforceable. Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351; see also United States v. 

9 We also note that Hooks signed his plea agreements approximately a month 

apart and he had the benefit of two different change-of-plea hearings, and at 

no time did he indicate that he had a question about or otherwise did not 

understand the sentence-appeal waiver. 

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Weaver, 275 F.3d 1320, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001) (enforcing an appeal 

waiver where “the waiver provision was referenced during [the 

defendant’s] Rule 11 plea colloquy and [the defendant] agreed that 

she understood the provision and that she entered into it freely and 

voluntarily”). Hooks’s claims that his guideline sentence is 

procedurally and substantively unreasonable fall squarely within 

the scope of the appeal waiver. Accordingly, Hooks’s claims are 

barred by the appeal waiver. 

C. Alternatively, Hooks’s claims fail on the merits

Even assuming, arguendo, that the appeal waivers were 

unenforceable, Hooks’s claims are meritless. As discussed 

previously, Hooks argues that his total life sentence is procedurally 

unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately explain 

the basis for the sentence, failed to consider his arguments in 

mitigation, and failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors. Relatedly, 

he argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because 

there is a disparity between his sentence and the sentence Morris 

received as well as other individuals who have committed the same 

child pornography offenses, and that the § 3553(a) factors 

supported his requested sentence of 60 years imprisonment. 

We review a sentence for both procedural and substantive 

reasonableness under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. 

See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The burden rests on 

the party challenging the sentence to show “that the sentence is 

unreasonable in light of the entire record, the § 3553(a) factors, and 

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24 Opinion of the Court 22-11939

the substantial deference afforded sentencing courts.” United States 

v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015). 

With regard to his procedural challenges to the sentence, the 

district court explained its reasons for sentencing Hooks to life 

imprisonment, noting that the sentence was warranted due to the 

nature and circumstances of the offense, Hooks’s history and 

characteristics, the need to protect the public from future crimes, 

and the need to adequately punish Hooks. Those reasons 

correspond with the § 3553(a) factors that the district court is 

instructed to consider when determining the appropriate sentence. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Although Hooks may disagree with how 

the district court weighed the relevant factors, the weight given to 

a particular § 3353(a) factor “is committed to the sound discretion 

of the district court,” and it is not required to give “equal weight” 

to the § 3553(a) factors. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254 (quotation 

omitted). Moreover, “[w]e will not second guess the weight given 

to a § 3553(a) factor so long as the sentence is reasonable under the 

circumstances.” United States v. Butler, 39 F. 4th 1349, 1355 (11th 

Cir. 2022). 

The district court also expressly noted that it considered the 

mitigation-related testimony of Dr. Boyd, but that it was not 

persuaded by it. The fact that the district court did not address 

Hooks’s mitigation arguments in further detail does not mean that 

the district court failed to consider them. See Amedeo, 487 F.3d at 

833 (explaining that the district court’s failure to discuss the 

defendant’s mitigating evidence does not “mean[] that the court 

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erroneously ‘ignored’ or failed to consider this evidence in 

determining [the] sentence”). Thus, Hooks is not entitled to relief

on his claim that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable. 

Hooks’s argument that his sentence is substantively 

unreasonable is similarly unpersuasive. Although Morris was 

convicted of some of the same offenses and received a lesser 

sentence, there is no concerning sentencing disparity between 

Hooks and Morris.10 Morris received a lesser sentence based on the 

substantial assistance she provided the government. Furthermore, 

there are potentially mitigating facts in Morris’s case—that Hooks 

provided her drugs, raped her, and forced her to take some of the 

actions she took—that are not present in Hooks’s case. More 

importantly, while Morris may have filmed and helped otherwise 

facilitate the conduct in this case, Hooks was the perpetrator of the 

sexual acts in the images and the video. Thus, Hooks is not

similarly situated to his codefendant. See United States v. Johnson, 

10 Hooks cites to a number of other child pornography-related cases in which 

defendants received lesser sentences. All Hooks has offered regarding those 

cases are the crimes of conviction, the resulting sentences, and a few 

barebones factual allegations; even taken together, that minimal information 

is insufficient for us to make a proper comparison for purposes of evaluating 

any alleged sentencing disparity. See United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018, 1048 

(11th Cir. 2015) (explaining that courts “need[ ] to have more than the crime 

of conviction and the total length of the sentences to evaluate alleged 

disparities” and that “[t]he underlying facts of the crime and all of the 

individual characteristics are relevant”). Thus, Hooks has not carried his 

burden to show specific facts establishing that he is similarly situated to the 

defendants in the referenced cases. Id. 

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980 F.3d 1364, 1386 (11th Cir. 2020) (rejecting disparity claim 

because “[d]efendant ha[d] not carried his burden to show specific 

facts establishing that any codefendants are similarly situated”). 

While the district court imposed the statutory maximum 

sentence in this case, that sentence is within the applicable advisory 

guidelines range and is substantively reasonable in light of the 

§ 3553(a) factors. Hooks’s conduct in this case was particularly 

egregious—Hooks sexually assaulted his own daughter to produce 

child pornography in addition to the other images that involved 

very young children. We have expressed that “the more serious 

the criminal conduct is the greater the need for retribution and the 

longer the sentence should be.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1206 (en banc). 

Further, as we have repeatedly emphasized, “[c]hild sex crimes are 

among the most egregious and despicable of societal and criminal 

offenses.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Sarras, 

575 F.3d 1191, 1220 (11th Cir. 2009)). And “[w]hen child 

pornography is produced in conjunction with the sexual abuse of 

children, as it was here, the harm to the child victims is magnified 

and perpetuated.” Id. at 1208; see also United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 

1179, 1195–96 (11th Cir. 2008) (discussing the impact that child 

pornography has on the victims). As a result, we have frequently 

upheld lengthy sentences in cases involving child sex crimes. See, 

e.g., United States v. Hall, 965 F.3d 1281, 1297–99 (11th Cir. 2020) 

(upholding as reasonable a 480-month sentence for receipt of child 

pornography, which was an upward variance of 300 months from 

the guideline range); United States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218, 1254, 

1264 (11th Cir. 2012) (upholding as reasonable life sentences for 

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engaging in a child exploitation enterprise), abrogated on other 

grounds by Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014); Sarras, 575 

F.3d at 1196, 1220–21 (upholding as substantively reasonable a total 

1,200 month sentence for three counts of knowingly persuading a 

minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct and one count of 

knowingly possessing child pornography); United States v. Johnson, 

451 F.3d 1239, 1240, 1244 (11th Cir. 2006) (upholding as reasonable 

consecutive sentences totaling 140 years for producing and 

distributing child pornography). Under the circumstances of this 

case, we cannot say that the district court’s decision to impose the 

statutory maximum of life imprisonment was an abuse of 

discretion. 

AFFIRMED. 

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