J-S02016-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

COURTNEY LAMAR SLADE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 695 MDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 12, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-22-CR-0002936-2018

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: MARCH 17, 2023

Appellant, Courtney Lamar Slade, appeals from the order entered on 

April 12, 2022, which denied his petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief 

Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

We previously summarized the underlying facts of this case:

Appellant and a cohort forcibly entered a home in a 

residential neighborhood at night. Inside the home were two 

adult men, one adult female, and two six-year-old children. 

Appellant and his companion were wearing gloves and 

masks, and both were carrying guns. They held a gun to the 

head of the adult female, and also pointed their guns at the 

two children. Additionally, a scuffle ensued with one of the 

adult male victims, and he was badly beaten by Appellant 

and/or his companion. Appellant and his cohort left the home 

with approximately $900 and gaming equipment. Appellant, 

who had been cut during the altercation with the victim, was 

subsequently identified by DNA evidence obtained from blood 

found inside the home.
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Commonwealth v. Slade, 240 A.3d 935 (Pa. Super. 2020) (non-precedential 

decision) at 1-2.

On October 21, 2019, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to robbery, 

aggravated assault, and burglary;

1 on December 18, 2019, the trial court 

sentenced Appellant to serve an aggregate term of 15 and one-half to 40 years 

in prison for his convictions. N.T. Guilty Plea, 10/21/19, at 1-7; N.T. 

Sentencing, 12/19/21, at 18-19. We affirmed Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence on September 16, 2020. Commonwealth v. Slade, 240 A.3d 935 

(Pa. Super. 2020) (non-precedential decision) at 1-6.

On April 5, 2021, Appellant filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition. The 

PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant during the proceedings 

and counsel eventually filed an amended petition on Appellant’s behalf. Within 

the amended petition, Appellant claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective 

“for failing to seek [a mental health] evaluation to see if [Appellant were] 

competent to stand trial in this matter” and for “advising [Appellant] to take 

an open plea deal instead of taking a plea deal with a negotiated sentence 

that was offered by the Commonwealth.” Amended PCRA Petition, 10/7/21, 

at 7 and 14.

The PCRA court held a hearing on Appellant’s petition on March 18, 2022

and, during the hearing, both Appellant’s trial counsel (hereinafter “Trial 

Counsel”) and Appellant testified. Trial Counsel testified that, when he 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii), 2702(a)(4), and 3502(a)(1), respectively.
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represented Appellant, he was aware that Appellant had been “diagnosed with

being bipolar and having schizophrenia.” PCRA Hearing, 3/18/22, at 4. 

However, Trial Counsel testified that he did not discuss an insanity defense 

with Appellant because “throughout all of my interactions with [Appellant, his 

mental health] didn’t seem like it was an issue that was going to lead us 

anywhere or be something that I felt was going to be productive in terms that 

it wasn’t a concern that I had that he was not competent to stand trial.” Id.

at 5. Further, Trial Counsel testified that, when he represented Appellant: 

Appellant’s mental health did not impede Appellant’s ability to participate in 

his own defense; Appellant’s mental health did not impede Trial Counsel’s 

ability to help prepare Appellant’s defense; and, nothing “st[ood] out to [Trial 

Counsel] in terms of [Appellant] having comprehension issues or anything like 

that.” Id. at 5 and 8-9.

Regarding Appellant’s decision to reject the Commonwealth’s offer of a 

negotiated sentence, Trial Counsel testified:

So, if I recall correctly, negotiations had gone on for quite a 

while between myself and the District Attorney's Office. 

Ultimately, I think where things ended up was, there was an 

offer for [eight] and a half to 20. I talked with [Appellant]

about that, and I explained to him that if he plead[ed] open 

there was certainly a chance that he would get a lesser 

sentence, but there was also a chance that he would get more 

than that. If I remember, I think the guidelines started at 

[six] and a half years. So he, I think, was hoping that if he 

plead[ed] open, he would get something closer to that 

bottom range. I don't recall quite frankly whether I advised 

him one way or the other as far as what I think the best 

option is or what he should do. I explained to him what the

options were, and I let him decide.
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Id. at 6-7.

Appellant testified that Trial Counsel advised him to reject the 

Commonwealth’s offer and to simply enter an open guilty plea. According to 

Appellant, Trial Counsel told him that the trial court “wouldn’t go over the 

[eight] and a half that was offered” by the Commonwealth and would probably 

sentence Appellant to a standard guideline range sentence of six and a half 

years in prison. Id. at 14.

The PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition on April 12, 2022 and 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellant raises two claims on 

appeal:

Whether the [PCRA] court erred in denying Appellant’s PCRA 

petition where he presented a preponderance of the evidence 

that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.

1. Ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to seek a 

mental health evaluation.

2. Ineffective assistance of counsel in advising Appellant

to reject the negotiated plea agreement.

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (some capitalization omitted).

“We review a ruling by the PCRA court to determine whether it is 

supported by the record and is free of legal error. Our standard of review of 

a PCRA court's legal conclusions is de novo.” Commonwealth v. Cousar, 

154 A.3d 287, 296 (Pa. 2017) (citations omitted). However, we afford “great 

deference” to the PCRA court’s credibility determinations. Commonwealth 
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v. Flor, 259 A.3d 891, 910-911 (Pa. 2021). As our Supreme Court has 

explained:

We will not disturb the findings of the PCRA court if they are 

supported by the record, even where the record could 

support a contrary holding. [An appellate court’s] scope of 

review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the 

evidence on the record of the PCRA court's hearing, viewed 

in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.

Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).

To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, the petitioner must plead and 

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence 

resulted from “one or more” of the seven, specifically enumerated 

circumstances listed in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). One of these statutorily 

enumerated circumstances is the “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in 

the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining 

process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken 

place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). 

Counsel is presumed to be effective and “the burden of demonstrating 

ineffectiveness rests on [A]ppellant.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 10 A.3d 

1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010). To satisfy this burden, Appellant must plead 

and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:

(1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the 

particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have 

some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests; 

and, (3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is a 

reasonable probability that the outcome of the challenged 

proceedings would have been different.
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Commonwealth v. Fulton, 830 A.2d 567, 572 (Pa. 2003). As this Court has 

explained:

A claim has arguable merit where the factual averments, if 

accurate, could establish cause for relief. See 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 876 A.2d 380, 385 (Pa. 2005) 

(“if a petitioner raises allegations, which, even if accepted as 

true, do not establish the underlying claim . . . , he or she 

will have failed to establish the arguable merit prong related 

to the claim”). Whether the facts rise to the level of arguable 

merit is a legal determination.

The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable basis 

for his action or inaction is whether no competent counsel 

would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative, 

not chosen, offered a significantly greater potential chance of 

success. Counsel’s decisions will be considered reasonable if 

they effectuated his client's interests. We do not employ a 

hindsight analysis in comparing trial counsel's actions with 

other efforts he may have taken. 

Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.

Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 707 (Pa. Super. 2013) (some 

quotations and citations omitted). “A failure to satisfy any prong of the test 

for ineffectiveness will require rejection of the claim.” Id.

First, Appellant claims that Trial Counsel was ineffective because counsel 

failed to seek a mental health evaluation, which, Appellant claims, would have 

enabled counsel to “consider an insanity defense.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. 

This claim fails.
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In order to prevail on an insanity defense, [an a]ppellant 

must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the 

time he committed the offense, due to a defect of reason or 

disease of mind, he either did not know the nature and quality 

of the act or did not know that the act was wrong.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 17 A.3d 873, 901 (Pa. 2011); see also 

Commonwealth v. Hughes, 865 A.2d 761, 788 (Pa. 2004) (“[a] defense of 

insanity acknowledges commission of the act by the defendant, while 

maintaining the absence of legal culpability”).

During the PCRA hearing, Appellant did not produce any evidence 

(medical or otherwise) that, at the time he committed the offenses, his alleged 

mental illnesses caused him to “not know the nature and quality of the act[s]” 

or caused him to “not know that the act[s were] wrong.” See Smith, 17 A.3d 

at 901; see also N.T. PCRA Hearing, 3/18/22, at 1-18. Therefore, Appellant 

did not satisfy his burden of production to show that his underlying claim is of 

arguable merit. Appellant’s claim thus fails.

Next, Appellant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective “in advising 

Appellant to reject the [Commonwealth’s] negotiated plea” offer. Appellant’s 

Brief at 14. As the PCRA court thoroughly explained, Appellant’s claim on 

appeal fails:

[Appellant’s] underlying claim is that [Trial Counsel] advised 

him against accepting a plea agreement containing a 

negotiated sentence in favor of entering an open plea which 

would be "capped" at an eight and one-half year minimum. 

[Trial Counsel] testified to the following:

So, if I recall correctly, negotiations had gone on for quite 

a while between myself and the District Attorney's Office. 

Ultimately, I think where things ended up was, there was 
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an offer for [eight] and a half to 20. I talked with 

[Appellant] about that, and I explained to him that if he 

plead[ed] open there was certainly a chance that he 

would get a lesser sentence, but there was also a chance 

that he would get more than that. If I remember, I think 

the guidelines started at [six] and a half years. So he, I 

think, was hoping that if he plead[ed] open, he would get 

something closer to that bottom range. I don't recall 

quite frankly whether I advised him one way or the other 

as far as what I think the best option is or what he should 

do. I explained to him what the options were, and I let 

him decide.

[N.T. PCRA Hearing, 3/18/22, at 6-7.]

[Trial Counsel] further testified that he did not recall ever 

informing [Appellant] that the open plea would be "capped" 

in any way. [The trial court] ultimately imposed a sentence 

of [15 and one-half to 40 years in prison]. Understandably, 

[Appellant] regrets his decision to refuse the negotiated plea 

agreement. However, [the PCRA court] credit[s Trial 

Counsel’s] testimony and discern[s] nothing in his counsel 

that fails to adhere to "the range of competence demanded 

of attorneys in criminal cases." 

[Appellant] claims he went to court on the day of his guilty 

plea prepared “to take the 8 and a half.” [N.T. PCRA Hearing, 

3/18/22, at 14. The PCRA court does] not find it credible that 

[Trial Counsel], an experienced criminal defense attorney 

who has represented thousands of defendants, would have 

talked a client, who was intending to plead guilty, out of doing 

so by fabricating a plea agreement. [The PCRA court]

believe[s] it much more likely that matters transpired exactly 

how [Trial Counsel] explained. [Appellant] wanted a 

sentence better than the offered eight and one-half [] years. 

This inference is supported by [Appellant’s] own testimony,

where he explained his understanding that the original offer 

was for either seven [] or seven and one-half [] years.

According to him, the District Attorney later modified that 

offer upward to eight and one-half [years]. Under such 

circumstances, it seems entirely credible that, as [Trial 

Counsel] testified, [Appellant] “was hoping that if he 

plead[ed] open, he would get something closer to” the 

bottom of the standard range of the Sentencing Guidelines. 
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Finding that [Trial Counsel] did not promise [Appellant] the 

sentence would be "capped", and that [Appellant] expressed 

hope of obtaining a lesser sentence than what was being

offered, [the PCRA court] find[s Trial Counsel’s] advice 

completely reasonable and legally correct. [Appellant] was 

not promised a lesser sentence. He was offered the 

opportunity for a lesser sentence through an open plea. He 

chose to pursue that opportunity and cannot now claim 

ineffective assistance because it proved unsuccessful. 

Therefore, [Appellant’s] underlying claim lacks arguable 

merit and his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in this 

regard must fail.

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/12/22, at 4-6 (some citations omitted).

The PCRA court’s credibility determinations and factual findings are 

supported by the record and, thus, are binding on this Court. As such, 

Appellant’s claim on appeal necessarily fails.

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/17/2023