IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-50274

ROBERTO GARCIA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS; SAN ANTONIO POLICE DEPARTMENT; CITY 

OF SAN ANTONIO; JULIO ORTA, San Antonio Police Officer, #1079, 

Individually and in his Official Capacity; CHIEF WILLIAM MCMANUS, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:16-CV-1175

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and JONES and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Roberto Garcia was arrested for a DWI and detained for sixteen months 

before the charges were dismissed. After his release, Garcia filed a lawsuit pro 

se in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting federal 

constitutional and related state law claims. The district court determined that 

Garcia’s claims accrued when he was arrested and were time-barred under the 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 19, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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relevant statute of limitations. On appeal, Garcia asks the court to find that 

his claims accrued when the charges against him were dismissed and are

timely.

I. 

Garcia alleges that he was arrested without probable cause on July 17, 

2014 after police officers found him sleeping in a car parked on the side of the 

road on private property. He claims Officer Julio Orta had no evidence to 

substantiate his suspicion that Garcia had been driving while intoxicated but 

arrested Garcia anyway. The morning after his arrest, Garcia was brought 

before a magistrate who set his bond at $75,000, which Garcia could not afford. 

Garcia alleges that his continued detention was based on a false police report, 

which stated that Garcia had driven a vehicle while intoxicated, even though 

Officer Orta had not witnessed such behavior. Garcia also alleges that a video 

showing that his car was on private property and was not moving when officers 

arrived on the scene was purposefully withheld. According to Garcia, these 

actions were undertaken (1) to retaliate against him for an earlier lawsuit 

Garcia filed against “a brother officer” and (2) to benefit from the San Antonio 

Police Department’s policy of offering financial incentives to officers who make 

at least one alcohol-related arrest each shift.

On December 4, 2015, after months in detention, the charges against 

Garcia were dismissed for lack of probable cause. Less than a year later, on 

November 21, 2016, Garcia filed this lawsuit against the City of San Antonio, 

the San Antonio Police Department, Officer Orta, and Chief William 

McManus. Defendants-Appellees filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), which the district court granted 

in their favor. Garcia timely appealed the dismissal of his Fourth Amendment 

claim, and the court appointed him counsel. 

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II.

The court reviews de novo the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(c). 

Aly v. City of Lake Jackson, 453 F. App’x 538, 539 (5th Cir. 2011). To survive a 

motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (internal citation omitted); see also Gentilello 

v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 543–44 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that the standard for 

deciding a Rule 12(c) motion is the same as for deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion). 

This said, a pro se complaint will be “liberally construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

III.

In its order granting Defendants-Appellees’ Rule 12(c) motion, the 

district court held that Garcia’s federal claims were barred under the relevant 

statute of limitations. Quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007), the 

district court explained that “[f]or a § 1983 claim seeking damages for false 

arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where criminal proceedings 

follow the arrest, the statute of limitations ‘begins to run at the time the 

claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process.’” Because Garcia was 

arrested on July 17, 2014––and because the statute of limitations for § 1983 

lawsuits filed in the Texas federal court is two years––Garcia’s § 1983 claims 

filed on November 21, 2016 were time-barred. The district court also rejected 

Garcia’s argument that equitable tolling should apply when a false arrest claim 

relates to a “§ 1983 prosecution claim,” relying on Mapes v. Bishop, 541 F.3d 

582, 583–84 (5th Cir. 2008). Finally, the district court declined to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over Garcia’s remaining state law claims for 

malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress, 

dismissing them without prejudice.

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The district court correctly determined that Garcia’s claim seeking 

damages for his arrest without probable cause is time-barred. Wallace, 549 

U.S. at 397; Mapes, 541 F.3d at 584. A detention instituted in the absence of 

legal process is akin to the tort of false arrest and accrues upon arrest. Mapes, 

541 F.3d at 584. Garcia argues that a different accrual rule should apply. Since 

his arrest did not require a warrant, Garcia contends, he was arrested 

pursuant to wrongful legal process––not without legal process. This is 

incorrect. Legal process commences when “a judge (or grand jury) first makes 

a reliable finding of probable cause.” Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 

919 (2017) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975)). Arrests 

made without arrest warrants can be lawful, but they are not made subject to 

“legal process” under this definition. The Supreme Court’s decision in Manuel 

supports this conclusion. There, the Court considered the claims of a petitioner 

who was arrested without a warrant after a search of his person uncovered 

allegedly illicit pills. Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 919. Though the arrest may not 

have required a warrant, legal process did not kick in until the petitioner 

appeared before a magistrate judge. Id. at 919–20; cf. Winfrey v. Rogers, 901 

F.3d 483, 492–93 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that an arrest supported by an arrest 

warrant commenced legal process because the warrant was premised on a 

judge’s probable cause finding). 

In Garcia’s case, a judge first made a probable cause finding when Garcia 

appeared in court the morning after his arrest. This is the point at which legal 

process commenced. Logically, then, Garcia’s arrest the night before took place

without legal process. Consequently, his claim for false arrest accrued when he 

was arrested and, therefore, is time-barred.

Our analysis does not end here because Garcia also alleges that he was 

unlawfully detained for sixteen months after legal process commenced when 

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he appeared before the magistrate judge. The Fourth Amendment protects 

against pretrial detention instituted pursuant to wrongful legal process. 

Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 919–20. Legal process “goes wrong” when a probable 

cause determination is baseless, such as when “a judge’s probable-cause 

determination is predicated solely on a police officer’s false statements.” Id. at 

919. Garcia’s complaint alleges that he “was brought before a magistrate 

judge,” and, based on Officer Orta’s “false police report that [Garcia] drove a 

vehic[le] while intoxicated which [Officer Orta] had never witnessed,” Garcia 

“was given a $75,000 bond.” Garcia then “lost years and months illegally 

detained” until “the prosecutor dismissed the alcohol related charge on Dec. 4, 

2015.” These allegations, construed liberally, sufficiently state a claim for 

pretrial detention pursuant to wrongful legal process under the Fourth 

Amendment. Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 919.

This court has previously addressed the timeliness of a complaint filed 

by an individual who was detained pursuant to wrongful legal process.

Winfrey, 901 F.3d at 492. In Winfrey, legal process commenced when the 

plaintiff was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant that was based on 

“reckless misstatements and omissions” in an officer’s probable cause affidavit. 

Id. The court determined that claims for detention pursuant to the “wrongful 

institution of legal process” are more akin to malicious prosecution than false 

arrest, so such claims accrue when criminal proceedings end in a plaintiff’s 

favor. Id. at 493. Though somewhat distinct in its facts, Winfrey’s integrated 

analysis of Wallace and Manuel applies here as well: Garcia’s claim for 

detention caused by the wrongful institution of legal process accrued when 

criminal proceedings ended in his favor on December 4, 2015. Because Garcia 

filed his complaint less than two years later, this claim was timely. 

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For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM IN PART and VACATE IN PART 

the district court’s dismissal of the case under Rule 12(c). We AFFIRM the 

dismissal of Garcia’s challenge to his arrest, but we VACATE the district 

court’s dismissal of Garcia’s challenge to his sixteen-month detention after his 

appearance before the magistrate judge. We hold that this claim was timely. 

As such, this case is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

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