COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-16-00220-CR

CHRISTOPHER PATRICK FARR APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 2 OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 1433221D

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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I. INTRODUCTION

A jury convicted Appellant Christopher Patrick Farr of assault on a family 

or household member by impeding breathing or circulation, found both 

allegations contained in the habitual offender notice true, and sentenced him to 

eighty years’ confinement. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.42(d), 

22.01(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2016). In three issues, Farr argues that the trial court 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

abused its discretion by overruling his objection to an improper commitment 

question during the State’s voir dire and by sustaining the State’s objection to a 

line of questioning that was intended to reveal the complainant’s potential bias 

and motive to lie. We will affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

Farr began a relationship with Deborah Brown sometime in March 2015. 

Brown lived with her brother, and Farr stayed over quite a lot, but in September 

2015, Brown’s brother asked her to leave. Farr and Brown eventually ended up 

living at the house of a friend—Ricky Griffith.

Farr and Brown’s dating relationship took a “terrible turn” around midOctober 2015. Farr became angry at Brown while they were driving and 

assaulted her multiple times, explaining that she needed “discipline.” Farr

discovered that Brown had reported the incident to police, and for the next seven 

days, he kept Brown detained in their bedroom, refusing to let her out of his sight 

and forcing her to use a bucket as a toilet.

On the seventh day, “everything just went totally crazy,” according to 

Brown. Farr—who had been awake for a number of days, was talking 

uncontrollably, and was convinced that Brown was cheating on him—allowed 

Brown to leave the bedroom and to use the bathroom in the house. When Brown 

walked by Griffith’s room and said “hey” to someone, Farr became angry, rushed 

over to her, and began hugging her so tightly that she had difficulty breathing. 
3

Farr then put his hands around Brown’s throat and began choking her, causing

her to pass out and to wet her pants.

When Brown awoke, she was in her bedroom and Farr was crying, 

explaining that he did not want to hurt her but that he had to discipline her. Farr 

then put his knee on Brown’s chest and began choking her again, until someone 

banged on the door and said to stop because the police were on their way. The 

police arrived and arrested Farr.

III. COMMITMENT QUESTION

Farr argues in his first issue that the trial court reversibly erred by 

overruling his objection to an improper commitment question that the State posed 

during its voir dire. The following exchange took place:

[Prosecutor]: . . . If you believe it happened beyond a 

reasonable doubt and you believe the victim, are you going to 

require any sort of injuries or visible injuries before you find 

somebody guilty of the offense?

[Prospective Juror]: No, because a certain amount of time 

has passed. It may not be possible.

[Prosecutor]: Yeah. You don’t know when the offense really 

happened in relation to the offense. But what if it had just 

happened? Bruises come up immediately?

[Prospective Juror]: Not always.

[Prosecutor]: You may or may not see something, right?

[Prospective Juror]: Some people bruise easy. Some people 

don’t.

[Prosecutor]: Okay. Thank you sir. Anybody here in this first 

section thinking - - well let me take it a step further. I showed y’all 

the elements of the offense earlier, right? I went through all those 
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things, the Defendant, certain date, all that kind of stuff. Given that 

that’s what we have to prove, there may be a lot of things that you 

might want to see, and a big one is police reports. I’m going to tell 

y’all, we’re not allowed to admit the police reports into evidence. 

Okay? So you’re not going to see police reports unless something 

really whacky happens. We may not have medical records. The 

victim doesn’t want the Defendant prosecuted, do you think she’s 

going to go to the hospital?

Prospective Jurors: No.

[Prosecutor]: Maybe not, right? May not have photographs. 

We may not have visible injuries, all these other things. This is 

where CSI makes my job very difficult.

We may just have a witness testifying as to what happened to 

her. But your job is to evaluate the credibility of that witness and 

decide whether you believe her.

Is that good enough for y’all? Anybody feeling like they might 

need something more? Of course you need evidence, but testimony 

is evidence. Okay? When I ask this question to a lot of jurors, they 

say well, Tim, I need proof. Testimony is proof. The question 

becomes, do you believe that testimony. So is there anybody here 

in this first section thinking Tim, I’m going to need something more, 

or I can judge this case and decide whether I believe a person 

beyond a reasonable doubt without the medical records, without a 

videotape of the offense, without DNA and the CSI effect?

[Defense Counsel]: I’m going to object. This is an improper 

commitment question, Your Honor.

The Court: That’s overruled.

[Prosecutor]: Anybody here in this first section going to 

require more than what the law requires us to prove in those 

elements? Anybody? [Emphasis added.]

We review a trial court’s ruling on an allegedly improper commitment 

question during voir dire for an abuse of discretion. Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 

36, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
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Whether a voir dire question constitutes an improper commitment question

involves several considerations. See Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 179‒84 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2001). First, the trial court must determine whether the question 

is a commitment question. Id. at 179. “Commitment questions are those that 

commit a prospective juror to resolve, or to refrain from resolving, an issue a 

certain way after learning a particular fact.” Id.

Second, if the question is a commitment question, the trial court must then 

determine whether it is a proper commitment question. Id. at 181. “When the 

law requires a certain type of commitment from jurors, the attorneys may ask the 

prospective jurors whether they can follow the law in that regard.” Id. Thus, a

commitment question is proper if one of the possible answers to the question 

gives rise to a valid challenge for cause. Id. at 182.

Finally, if the question does give rise to a valid challenge for cause, then 

the court must determine whether the question “contain[s] only those facts 

necessary to test whether a prospective juror is challengeable for cause.” Id.

(explaining that additional facts supplied beyond what is necessary to sustain a 

challenge for cause render improper what otherwise would have been a proper 

question).

Here, the challenged question was a commitment question because it

inquired whether the prospective jurors could convict the defendant based on a 

particular set of facts—the testimony of the complaining witness. See id. at 179.
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Although the question required a commitment, it was nevertheless proper. 

Generally, the testimony of a single eyewitness can be enough to support a 

conviction. Aguilar v. State, 468 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). 

Although a juror is free to determine what constitutes a reasonable doubt, and 

may require more than the testimony of a single witness before finding a fact 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the State may properly challenge a

prospective juror when the juror would hold the State to a higher standard than 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Coleman v. State, 881 S.W.2d 344, 360 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1096 (1995). Indeed, a prospective juror may 

be challenged for cause if he possesses “a bias or prejudice against any phase 

of the law upon which the State is entitled to rely for conviction or punishment.” 

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.16(b)(3) (West 2006).

Considering the extent of his comments in context, the prosecutor inquired 

whether the prospective jurors could evaluate the complainant’s credibility and 

convict a defendant based on her testimony alone—if the testimony was 

sufficient to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—or whether 

anyone would additionally require the State to corroborate the complainant’s 

testimony with other evidence, such as a videotape or DNA evidence. Because, 

under these circumstances, the law does not require such corroborating 

evidence to otherwise sustain a conviction, demanding that it be introduced 

would effectively hold the State to a higher burden of proof and, consequently, 

give rise to a valid challenge for cause for possessing “a bias or prejudice against 
7

any phase of the law upon which the State is entitled to rely for conviction or 

punishment.” See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.16(b)(3); Delacerda v. 

State, 425 S.W.3d 367, 382 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) 

(reasoning that a prospective juror who could not convict a defendant in the 

absence of “physical evidence,” even if the State otherwise proved the elements 

of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, was subject to valid challenge for 

cause); Fierro v. State, 969 S.W.2d 51, 59 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.)

(reasoning that prospective juror was subject to challenge for cause because he 

“require[d] a higher level of proof of intoxication than the law requires by being 

unable to convict in the absence of a breath test”); see also Harris v. State, 122 

S.W.3d 871, 880 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d) (“[T]he State is 

permitted to determine whether a prospective juror will require evidence the law 

does not require to convict a defendant.”).

Finally, although the prosecutor injected a few facts into the question, he 

did so only insofar as he was attempting to determine whether any members of 

the venire panel would hold the State to a higher burden.2 See Harris, 122 

S.W.3d at 881.

We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Farr’s 

objection to the State’s proper commitment question at voir dire. We overrule his 

first issue.

 

2The prosecutor’s comments were ultimately proved to be prescient. In his 

opening statement, defense counsel said, “There is no physical evidence that 

[Brown] was ever choked, just her word.”
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IV. EVIDENTIARY RULING

In his second and third issues, Farr argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion by prohibiting him from questioning Brown about the circumstances 

surrounding the apparent theft of his vehicle after he was arrested. Farr 

contends that he was denied his right to confrontation as guaranteed by the Sixth 

Amendment and that the excluded evidence was relevant to show that Brown 

had a “potential bias and motive to lie.”

The following exchange took place during trial:

[Defense Counsel]: All right. Do you have any idea why 

Ricky Griffith would run away when the cops showed up?

[Brown]: No, sir.

[Defense Counsel]: You don’t? After all this happened, I 

think you said [Farr] had a vehicle, right, that he was driving around 

in?

[Brown]: Ricky Griffith?

[Defense Counsel]: No, I mean - - I’m sorry, not - - [Farr] had 

a vehicle?

[Brown]: Yes.

[Defense Counsel]: Okay. And it was parked, I don’t know, 

the place on Arch Street the day he was arrested?

[Brown]: Yes.

[Defense Counsel]: And did you take his vehicle?

[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, I’m going to object to relevance at 

this point.

The Court: All right. That’s sustained.
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[Defense Counsel]: Did Ricky Griffith take that vehicle?

[Brown]: Ricky Griffith? No.

[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, I’m going to object to this whole 

line of questioning about this vehicle.

The Court: All right. Let me see y’all a minute. Let’s take 

about a 10 minute break, Ladies and Gentlemen.

(Open court, Defendant present, no jury)

The Court: All right. Why are we going in this direction? 

What are we talking about?

[Defense Counsel]: Well, he left - - his vehicle was left there 

at - - he’s reported that - - he reported it stolen, but it was taken 

away by somebody. Only two people were there, her and Ricky 

Griffith. He made a statement that - - he’s not here to be crossexamined. What’s motive for him making that statement? Taking 

the vehicle could be.

The Court: Who made the statement?

[Defense Counsel]: Ricky Griffith on the 911 tape.

[Prosecutor]: What statement did he make?

[Defense Counsel]: Well, isn’t he [the] one that called on 

911?

[Prosecutor]: He is, yeah.

[Defense Counsel]: Yeah.

[Prosecutor]: What statement are you saying he made?

The Court: I didn’t hear anything about a car or anything.

[Defense Counsel]: Well, he didn’t say anything about a car, 

but he made the statement being - - he was being - - there was an 

assault going on and if he had the guy taken off, arrested, you could 

take his vehicle.
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The Court: I still - -

[Defense Counsel]: These aren’t the nicest people in the 

world.

The Court: I understand, but I don’t.

[Defense Counsel]: If one goes to jail, they divide up all their 

property.

The Court: But I still don’t know the relevance of all this.

. . . .

The Court: Her being assaulted.

[Defense Counsel]: Is to show - - is to show that that 911 call 

could have been motivated by Mr. Griffith wanting to take [Farr’s]

vehicle. He was - -

The Court: You got me. I’m lost here. I don’t see where that 

has anything to do - -

[Prosecutor]: And beyond that it’s getting into speculation 

about what Ricky Griffith was thinking and that’s not relevant. I 

mean, it’s speculation for this witness anyway.

[Defense Counsel]: Well, I was going to ask her what 

happened to the vehicle, if she knows.

[Prosecutor]: How is that relevant to the assault?

The Court: See, that’s what we’re talking about. I need the 

relevance to the assault. Taking a vehicle has no relevance to the 

assault.

[Defense Counsel]: Well, there’s - - what’s the motive to tell 

the false story is that they wanted his vehicle.

The Court: No, I don’t see where we’re even close to that,

[Defense Counsel]. What else have you got?
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Defense counsel later made the following offer of proof outside the jury’s 

presence:

Okay. Defendant makes this Bill of Exceptions. Defendant - -

it’s previously been ruled that the subject of the motor vehicle owned 

by the Defendant was irrelevant to this case. Defendant was 

attempting to show the motor vehicle was taken from property on 

Arch Street when he was arrested, probably by Ricky Griffin (sic) 

and to show a motive for Ricky Griffin (sic) to make the 911 call, one 

of the 911 calls leading to Defendant’s arrest. . . .

Farr lodged no Confrontation Clause objection, nor was such a complaint 

apparent from the context of the above exchanges. Therefore, he failed to 

preserve his second issue for appellate review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); 

Paredes v. State, 129 S.W.3d 530, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (holding that 

Confrontation Clause argument was not preserved). We overrule Farr’s second 

issue.

As for Farr’s relevance contention, insofar as Farr’s argument on appeal 

(that the evidence was admissible to show that Brown had a potential bias and 

motive to lie) does not comport with the contention that he raised at trial (that 

Ricky Griffith had a motive to call 911), his third issue is also forfeited. See Clark 

v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (requiring argument on 

appeal to comport with objection made at trial). But even if Farr’s third issue was

preserved, the evidence demonstrates that Griffith called 911, not Brown. Thus,

the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Griffith’s purported interest in

obtaining Farr’s vehicle was not relevant to whether Farr had choked Brown. 

See Tex. R. Evid. 401. Further, the trial court could have also exercised its wide 
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discretion to limit Farr’s cross-examination of Brown on the basis that the 

excluded evidence was, at most, only marginally relevant and did not necessarily 

indicate that Brown had a reason to testify falsely. See Irby v. State, 327 S.W.3d 

138, 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1142 (2011) (“The 

constitutional right to cross-examine concerning the witness’s potential bias or 

prejudice does not include ‘cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, 

and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’”) (quoting Delaware v. Van 

Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435 (1986)). We overrule Farr’s 

third issue.

V. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Farr’s three issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Bill Meier

BILL MEIER

JUSTICE

PANEL: MEIER, GABRIEL, and SUDDERTH, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: March 23, 2017