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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51840

In the Matter of Jane Doe I and Jane

Doe II, Children Under Eighteen (18) 

Years of Age.

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STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 

HEALTH & WELFARE, 

Petitioner-Respondent,

v.

JANE DOE (2024-20),

Respondent-Appellant.

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Filed: August 22, 2024

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 

District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Andrew Ellis, Magistrate. 

Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed. 

Paul R. Taber, III, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Jessica L. Partridge, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

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LORELLO, Judge 

Jane Doe (2024-20) appeals from the judgment terminating her parental rights. We affirm. 

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Doe is the mother of the minor children involved in this action who were born in 2017 and 

2018, respectively. In December 2022, Doe, the children, and the children’s father gathered at the 

home of the paternal grandmother to celebrate Christmas. Doe left the residence that afternoon 

and did not return. The following day, the father was unable to locate Doe to resume care of the 

children. At that time, the father was unable to care for the children because he was living in a 
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halfway house that did not allow visitors or children. Consequently, the father called law 

enforcement and reported the situation. Based on an investigation, which revealed concerns about 

Doe’s active substance abuse, evidence of neglect of the children by both parents and Doe’s 

violation of an active no-contact order relative to father, law enforcement removed the children 

into foster care. Following their removal, the children underwent hair follicle testing to determine 

whether they had been exposed to illicit drug use. Both children tested positive for high levels of 

methamphetamine.

Thereafter, the magistrate court approved case plans for both parents and awarded 

temporary legal custody of the children to the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare. 

Ultimately, the magistrate court suspended the Department’s obligation to make further reasonable 

efforts toward reunification with either parent. The Department filed a petition to terminate Doe’s 

parental rights. Following the termination trial, the magistrate court found, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that Doe neglected the children and that termination is in the children’s best 

interests. Accordingly, the magistrate court terminated Doe’s parental rights.1 Doe appeals.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the 

decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243,

245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences 

in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated. 

Id. The substantial evidence test requires the trial court’s findings to be supported by clear and 

convincing evidence. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and 

convincing evidence is generally understood to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved 

is highly probable or reasonably certain. Roe v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 

(2006). Further, the trial court’s decision must be supported by objectively supportable grounds. 

Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.

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 The magistrate court also terminated the father’s parental rights. The decision terminating

the father’s parental rights is not at issue in this appeal.
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III.

ANALYSIS

Doe challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the magistrate court’s finding

that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interests. The Department responds 

that substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s termination decision. We 

hold that substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s decision to terminate

Doe’s parental rights.

A. Statutory Basis for Termination

A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her 

child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341, 

343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the 

Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, family 

life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of due 

process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383, 

386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a 

parent-child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Idaho Code Section

16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the parent-child relationship when 

it is in the child’s best interests and any one of the following five factors exist: (a) abandonment; 

(b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between the child and a presumptive 

parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities for a prolonged period that 

will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or (e) the parent is incarcerated 

and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each statutory ground is an 

independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117.

In this case, the magistrate court terminated Doe’s parental rights because she neglected 

the children. Idaho Code Section 16-2002(3)(a) defines “neglect” as any conduct included in 

I.C. § 16-1602(31). Section 16-1602(31)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a child is neglected 

when the child is without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or 

control necessary for his or her well-being because of the conduct or omission of his or her parents, 

guardian, or other custodian or their neglect or refusal to provide them. Neglect also exists where 
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the parent has failed to comply with the court’s orders or the case plan in a Child Protective Act 

case and the Department has had temporary or legal custody of the child for fifteen of the most 

recent twenty-two months and reunification has not been accomplished by the last day of the 

fifteenth month in which the child has been in the temporary or legal custody of the Department. 

I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b). 

The magistrate court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Doe neglected the 

children by failing to comply with her court-ordered case plan tasks. One of the tasks of Doe’s 

case plan ordered her to follow all the substance abuse treatment recommendations made in her 

comprehensive diagnostic assessment. The magistrate court found that Doe did not engage in any 

substance abuse treatment, did not maintain total abstinence from all nonprescribed mood-altering 

substances, and failed to comply with random urinalysis testing. Further, Doe failed to participate 

in the twelve-step meetings required by her case plan, failed to obtain a sponsor, and did not 

provide the Department proof of addressing her medical issues. It was not until two weeks prior 

to trial on the Department’s petition to terminate Doe’s parental rights that she began participating 

in treatment after she qualified for the Partial Hospitalization Program (PHP) at Moonlight 

Mountain Recovery. Once she was enrolled in the program, Doe complied with random urinalysis

testing and resided in a sober living home affiliated with her program.

Another task of Doe’s case plan required her to engage in consistent visitation and contact 

with her children. Over the sixteen months prior to trial, Doe missed approximately fifty percent 

of her scheduled visits. Between the months of August 2023 and November 2023, Doe failed to 

attend any visits. Doe failed to provide an explanation for why she missed so many visits “other 

than for a time she had an outstanding arrest warrant and was convinced that she would be arrested 

if she presented at [the Department’s] offices for the visits.” Additionally, the children’s foster 

parents testified at trial that the children had approximately fifty medical appointments while in 

foster care. Of those fifty appointments, Doe attended two. Accordingly, the magistrate court 

found that Doe failed to consistently engage in visitation with her children.

Doe was also ordered to demonstrate a minimum of thirty days of sobriety as part of her 

case plan. Upon demonstrating said period of sobriety, Doe was ordered to engage in and complete 

protective parenting education as well as a safety plan and relapse prevention plan addressing the 

concerns that led to her children entering foster care. The magistrate court found that Doe “never 
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demonstrated thirty days of sobriety” and, as such, “was unable to engage in and complete” a 

protective parenting course. The magistrate court also found that Doe did not obtain or maintain 

stable housing and failed to achieve reunification by the last day of the fifteenth month in which 

the children were in the Department’s custody. The magistrate court noted that, at the time of trial, 

Doe was “living in a sober living facility associated with Moonlight Mountain Recovery” which 

she was required to leave upon completion of the thirty-day program. Doe testified she planned

to move into housing at the Women and Children’s Alliance after she fulfilled “a jail sentence of 

100 days at the Community Transition Center in Ada County.”

Additionally, the magistrate court found that Doe neglected the children as defined in I.C.

§ 16-1602(31)(a). More specifically, the magistrate court found that Doe failed to prioritize the 

children’s needs over her own. The children entered foster care with “developmental delays in 

education,” and both children were “assessed to be approximately two years behind in their reading 

and writing skills.” When the children were placed into foster care, one of them was described as 

“sickly, malnourished and needed additional care and attention.” Prior to their removal, one child 

had not seen a doctor in over a year while the other had not seen a doctor in three years. The 

magistrate court further found that one of Doe’s children had “considerable special medical needs 

that [Doe] was neglecting prior to the children’s removal into care including growth hormone 

deficit, hypotonia, and global developmental delays.” Moreover, even though the child was five 

years old at the time of trial, the magistrate court found she had “the bone structure of a two year 

old.” The magistrate court found that Doe failed to ensure said child “participated in a specialized 

genetic testing to ascertain the best course of treatment for her conditions.”

On appeal, Doe has not challenged these findings and, thus, we will not presume they are 

erroneous. See Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 164 Idaho 883, 892, 436 P.3d 1232, 1241 

(2019). These findings provide substantial and competent evidence for the magistrate court’s 

conclusion that Doe neglected the children.

B. Best Interest of the Children

Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must next 

determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship. 

Tanner v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). When 

determining whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider the 
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parent’s history with substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the 

unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the 

child is placed in protective custody, the improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s 

efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. Doe 

(2015-03) v. Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare 

v. Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that it is in the best interests 

of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective grounds. Idaho Dep’t 

of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 956-57, 277 P.3d 400, 403-04 (Ct. App. 2012). 

In this case, the magistrate court found that termination of Doe’s parental rights is in the 

children’s best interests. According to the magistrate court, the tragedy of this case is that everyone 

involved agrees that, when Doe visits the children, her “interactions are exceptional.” There was 

no dispute at trial that Doe loves her children and that those feelings are reciprocated. Further, the 

children “have consistently maintained hope and a strong desire to reunite with their parents.” The 

magistrate court noted that its decision “to terminate parental rights will have a devastating 

emotional impact on both [children], which will likely take many years of professional counseling 

help to address.” Nevertheless, the magistrate court found that “it is necessary and in the children’s 

best interests to terminate” Doe’s parental rights.

The children are “special needs children with broad developmental delays.” The magistrate 

court found that, prior to the children’s removal from Doe’s care, “these special medical needs 

were grossly neglected--[one child] had not seen a doctor in a year and [the other] had received no 

medical attention in three years.” The children entered foster care in a sickly, malnourished 

condition and were years behind in their educational development, which the magistrate court 

found reflected the depth of Doe’s “addiction to methamphetamine and the resulting inability to 

meet” her parental responsibilities for her children. The magistrate court further found that nothing 

had changed over the sixteen months leading up to the trial while the children were in foster care. 

While Doe denied to both the magistrate court and the Department that she was actively using 

controlled substances, she qualified for the highest level of inpatient substance abuse treatment 

just two weeks prior to trial. Because Doe’s addiction remained as untreated and present as it was 

at the time of the children’s removal into foster care, the magistrate court determined that returning 
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the children to Doe’s care would have the same catastrophic results which prompted the children’s 

removal in the first place.

The magistrate court summarized Doe’s argument as a general plea to give her credit for 

the progress she made in the two weeks prior to trial and to give her another chance. However, 

the magistrate court found that Doe had “long exhausted her ‘second chances’ in the Child 

Protection case” and determined it could not “ignore her sixteen month history of dishonesty about 

her circumstances, her many excuses for non-performance, and her overall refusal to do the hard 

work necessary to reunite with her children.” The magistrate court was not persuaded by Doe’s 

“‘death bed conversion’ of embracing” her case plan a mere two weeks prior to the termination 

trial. As such, the magistrate court remained convinced that Doe was not sincere in pursuing 

meaningful change. Further, the magistrate court found that Doe had not demonstrated a 

fundamental understanding of what her children will need to recover from their deficits and 

achieve their highest physical, emotional, and educational potential. At a minimum, the magistrate 

court determined the children “need adult caregivers who are not in and out of jail, who can provide 

a stable, sober home.” The magistrate court found that Doe failed to show she could provide those 

basic necessities for the children and determined that, “without those necessities, [the children’s] 

fundamental physical and emotional wellbeing are in jeopardy.” For these reasons, the magistrate 

court determined that, “despite the emotional trauma that will inevitably follow from severing this 

legal relationship,” it was necessary to terminate Doe’s parental rights and “free the children for 

adoption by a forever family that can meet the children’s needs.”

On appeal, Doe challenges the magistrate court’s basis for finding that termination of her 

parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Specifically, Doe argues the magistrate court’s 

finding that termination of her parental rights is in the best interests of the children is not supported 

by clear and convincing evidence because the magistrate court “downplayed her recent 

engagement with substance abuse treatment, as well as evidence that she had previously 

maintained her sobriety for a period of approximately twenty years.” Doe attempts to bolster her 

argument by noting her enrollment in Moonlight Mountain Recovery’s PHP. However, the 

magistrate court was aware of Doe’s participation in the program and noted that, “from its 

experience working with parents battling addiction, a person does not qualify for PHP unless they 

are actively using controlled substances.” As a result, the magistrate court determined that Doe’s 
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testimony in which she reported being sober since early 2023 was not credible. Additionally, a 

review of the record shows the magistrate court considered Doe’s reported period of sobriety

(twenty years) and nevertheless found that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate her 

parental rights. Doe’s argument on appeal, therefore, seeks to have this Court reweigh the evidence 

presented at trial. This Court will not reweigh the evidence. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. 

Doe (2017-5), 162 Idaho 400, 407, 397 P.3d 1159, 1166 (Ct. App. 2017). Our review is limited 

to whether substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s decision. See, e.g., 

Doe, 148 Idaho at 245-46, 220 P.3d at 1064-65 (noting review is whether substantial and 

competent evidence supports decision). Such evidence exists in this case. 

Doe further asserts the magistrate court erred in finding that termination of her parental 

rights is in the children’s best interests because it “minimized the emotional harm the children will 

suffer as a result of its decision.” In support of her argument, Doe cites portions of the transcript 

where witnesses acknowledged the strong bond Doe had with the children as well as reports from 

the Department which stated Doe was “really lovely” with the children during her visits. However,

as discussed above, a review of the record shows that the magistrate court considered the 

aforementioned evidence and nevertheless found that termination of Doe’s parental rights is in the 

best interests of the children. As such, Doe’s argument on appeal once again seeks to have this 

Court reweigh the evidence presented at trial; a task this Court will not do. See Doe (2017-5), 162

Idaho at 407, 397 P.3d at 1166. The magistrate court’s findings are supported by substantial and 

competent evidence and support its conclusion, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the 

best interests of the children for Doe’s parental rights to be terminated. Doe has failed to show 

that the magistrate court erred in finding that terminating her parental rights is in the children’s 

best interests.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Substantial, competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s determination that Doe 

neglected the children and that termination of her parental rights is in the best interests of the 

children. Doe has failed to show error in the magistrate court’s decision to terminate her parental 

rights. Accordingly, the judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights is affirmed.

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge TRIBE, CONCUR.