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WORKING WITH COMMUNITIES TO DISRUPT 

TERROR PLOTS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

INFORMATION 

SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK 

ASSESSMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 17, 2010 

Serial No. 111–58 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

BEN RAY LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

AL GREEN, Texas 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

MARY JO KILROY, Ohio 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

VACANCY

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

STEVE AUSTRIA, Ohio 

I. LANIER AVANT, Staff Director 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND 

TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT 

JANE HARMAN, California, Chair 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

AL GREEN, Texas 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

VACANCY

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

MICHAEL BLINDE, Staff Director 

NATALIE NIXON, Deputy Chief Clerk 

MEGHANN PETERLIN, Minority Subcommittee Lead 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of California, and Chair, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment .................................................................. 1 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment ............................................. 2 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security .. 4 

WITNESSES 

PANEL I 

Ms. Margo Schlanger, Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Department 

of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

Mr. Brett Hovington, Supervisory Special Agent, Head of Community Relations Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 15 

Mr. Leroy Baca, Sheriff, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 18 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 20 

Mr. Omar Alomari, Community Engagement Officer, Ohio Department of 

Safety, Homeland Security Division: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 22 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 24 

PANEL II 

Mr. Mohamed Elibiary, Co-founder, The Freedom and Justice Foundation: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 46 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 48 

Ms. Deborah A. Ramirez, Executive Director, Partnering for Prevention and 

Community Safety Initiative, Northeastern University School of Law: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 53 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 54 

Mr. Clark Kent Ervin, Director, Aspen Institute Homeland Security Program: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 62 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 64 

(1) 

WORKING WITH COMMUNITIES TO DISRUPT 

TERROR PLOTS 

Wednesday, March 17, 2010 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, 

AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Jane Harman [Chair of 

the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Harman, Thompson, Carney, Clarke, 

Richardson, Green, Himes, McCaul, Dent, and Souder. 

Ms. HARMAN [presiding]. Good morning. The subcommittee hearing will come to order. 

We are meeting today to hear how Government, law enforcement 

officials, community engagement advocates, and academic experts 

are working with communities to counter violent extremism. Today’s hearing is entitled ‘‘Working with Communities to Disrupt 

Terror Plots.’’ 

This subcommittee has been probing ways to prevent or disrupt 

terror plots in the United States. Doing so requires accurate, actionable, and timely intelligence. The best intelligence, the best 

warning we may have about individuals plotting an attack on our 

country, comes from people close to them. 

While there have been recent notable cases where families and 

neighbors have provided important information, the Federal, State, 

and local governments have to do more to build relationships based 

on mutual trust and critical communities. 

There are more and more examples of homegrown violent extremism. Think Fort Dix or Fort Hood, the Somali youths from Minnesota, Sharif Mobley, the U.S. citizen who tried to escape custody 

in Yemen, or the recent arrest of ‘‘Jihad Jane’’ which we learned 

about last week. 

I have been warning for years that the next terror attack on the 

United States could be carried out by a tiny blond-haired, blue-eyed 

American female—no, not me. So the question we are considering 

today is how to build better relationships. 

There has been some good news. Last fall it was a Muslim American advocacy group who alerted the FBI to five young men from 

northern Virginia who had traveled to Pakistan with the intention 

of fighting alongside the Taliban. It can’t have been easy for the 

families to turn their sons in, but they did. 
2 

Don’t forget that the first real inkling we had about the wouldbe Detroit bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, came from his father. 

We will hear from one of our witnesses that some in the communities believe that the Government doesn’t really want a respectful 

relationship. It just wants those communities to inform the FBI on 

their friends and neighbors. He will tell us they feel like a suspect 

pool rather than trusted partners. That is a perception that needs 

to be addressed, and I look forward to hearing the views of our witness from the FBI on that. 

Local cops may be in a better position than the Feds to forge real 

ties based on respect and mutual trust, and they also are far more 

familiar with their communities and will notice something strange. 

After all, it was the Torrance, California police department in my 

own district that figured out that a string of gas station robberies 

was connected to a terror plot to target military installations and 

religious sites just a few years ago. Those folks are serving long 

sentences in jail. 

From what I understand, there is no set of best practices that 

tell homeland security or law enforcement officials how they should 

and can engage with communities. A one-size-fits-all approach may 

not work. We may need to tailor our efforts to the communities involved and the missions of the agencies reaching out to them. 

To that end, my sheriff, L.A. County sheriff, Leroy Baca, will testify today. He started the first Muslim American Homeland Security Congress to give the community a chance to discuss their concerns with law enforcement and to improve cultural training for 

sheriff department staff. I would like to know whether any elements of that program could be migrated to the Federal and State 

level. 

On the State level, there is an effort in Ohio to reach out to Muslim American women that we need to hear about. 

At the Federal level, DHS is hosting round tables and discussions with communities across the country. It conducts conference 

calls between Federal leaders and affected communities after situations like the Fort Hood shooting and the Detroit airliner bomber 

attempt. 

Today’s hearing follows one held in December to delve into how 

people who seem like anyone else—those who are capable of interacting socially with friends and colleagues and in many ways are 

athletes and scholars—volunteer or can be recruited to violent extremism. 

We don’t understand that well enough, and until we do, we won’t 

have the best strategies to keep our country and our communities 

safe. 

Let me conclude by observing that there has been a lot of discussion about how best to combat terrorism. The loudest voices say we 

have to treat it as a war. We all want the country to be safe. But 

in my view, the bad guys win if we shred our Constitution in the 

process. 

Welcome to you all, and it is now my pleasure to yield 5 minutes 

for opening remarks to the Ranking Member, Mr. McCaul of Texas. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Madam Chair. 
3 

Examples like Hasan, Zazi, and ‘‘Jihad Jane,’’ which no one 

should ever confuse with you, Madam Chair, showed us homegrown terrorism is, unfortunately, all too real in the United States. 

Despite the efforts of our Federal, State, and local authorities to 

reach out to religious and civic leaders in the Muslim community, 

we do not seem to be making the headway necessary to counter 

radicalization. 

In fact, as the recent case of Zazi illustrates, working with the 

local imam actually backfired on law enforcement when he alerted 

Zazi that he was under Government surveillance. 

The threat of al-Qaeda is not just emanating from a training 

camp in Afghanistan anymore but from within our own communities and hometowns across America. 

Since September 11 we have come to understand that securing 

the homeland requires law enforcement involvement at every level 

of government and that every American has a role and responsibility to help in this fight. 

After both the massacre at Fort Hood just north of my district 

by Hasan, and again recently with ‘‘Jihad Jane’’ from Pennsylvania, we hear after-the-fact reports that classmates and neighbors 

knew that there was a problem with these individuals. 

Working with our communities should be the first line of defense 

to prevent the spread of radicalization and to help protect us all 

from terrorist attacks. The criticism we often hear of Government 

outreach is that they are just discussion groups solely intended to 

listen to grievances or to just share information. 

Far less often, we hear about our efforts to create equal partnerships between the Government and these communities. Certainly, 

both information sharing and addressing legitimate grievances, are 

vital. 

However, I hope in your testimony today you also discuss what 

your organizations are doing to help foster true partnerships with 

equal accountability between these players. 

We must be working together to identify and implement real solutions to counter radical violent ideology and prevent terrorism. I 

look forward to hearing from you about what your solutions are. 

We must also ensure a diversity of thought at the table. For instance, who are we partnering and engaging with? Are we 

strengthening our relationships with those moderate Muslims who 

may already be doing their part, or are we primarily, if not only, 

engaging with groups that have the loudest voices or perhaps even 

extremist ties? 

I hope that through this hearing we will understand which, if 

any, groups may be underrepresented in each outreach effort. I 

hope the witnesses will please give that some thought. 

While our European counterparts have been dealing with the 

threat of radicalization and violent extremism for some time now, 

I think we can all agree that the problem is now in the United 

States as well. 

Western European nations are ahead of the United States, in my 

judgment, in community outreach strategies and in disrupting terror plots because they realize the importance of combating 

radicalization, and they know they cannot arrest their way out of 

the problem. 
4 

The success of our European allies in engaging local religious, 

business, and community leaders has direct links to reporting and 

disrupting terrorist attacks. 

I hope that in your testimony today you will address not only 

your efforts to understand and incorporate best practices from 

around the world, and perhaps right in the United States, but also 

how you have learned from failed programs or missteps. 

Without an organized and concerted effort by Federal, State, and 

local officials to directly confront the issues of radicalization and 

the spread of violent extremism in our own communities, we will 

be derelict in our duty of preventing future terrorist attacks. 

As the past year has shown us, domestic radicalization is a very 

real threat in our National security. I look forward to the testimony 

of the witnesses and to examining these—these vital issues. 

With that, Madam Chair, I yield back. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. McCaul. 

It is now my pleasure to recognize the Chairman of the full committee, Mr. Thompson from Mississippi, for an opening statement. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

This committee is very focused on ensuring that American citizens can live their lives in safety and without fear. Terrorists both 

international and domestic, both foreign-born and homegrown, 

want nothing more than to shatter our security and make us fearful. 

Thanks to the work of our dedicated homeland security and law 

enforcement professionals, with the guidance of this administration 

and the careful oversight of this committee, we can have confidence 

in our security. 

As we have seen in just the past years, cases like Zazi, Headley, 

and Rana, we can stop terrorist plots dead in their tracks. Yet stopping terrorist plots is only one piece of freeing our fellow Americans 

from fear. 

Freedom from fear also means that people should not fear their 

Government and, in particular, should not fear the homeland security and law enforcement organizations that are working to provide 

their security. 

Community engagement efforts offer other ways of freeing us 

from fear. For example, community engagement efforts can vary 

widely. Many focus on helping communities understand homeland 

security or law enforcement policies, practices, and methods. Others help those who execute these policies and methods interact respectfully with the communities with which they deal. 

Fostering this kind of understanding is a sure way to develop— 

free communities from fear. It develops trust with law enforcement, 

confidence that they are also being protected, and a sense of participation and engagement. 

Individuals should also be free from fear that they are subject to 

homeland security or law enforcement scrutiny because of the color 

of their skin or their religion. 

We need look no further than the recent example of Colleen 

LaRose, also known as ‘‘Jihad Jane’’—and it is not our Chair; I 

agree with the comments of both the Chair and Ranking Member— 

to know that terrorists cannot simply be identified by gender, race, 

or national origin. 
5 

We have learned that lesson hard, that terrorists do not fit the 

particular type. Terrorism does not always look the same. Terrorists are not always the usual suspects. 

Community engagement also helps free individuals from fear because it creates a critical dialogue between our homeland security 

and law enforcement agencies and individuals to help protect and 

preserve civil rights and civil liberties. 

For that reason, I am particularly pleased that Margo Schlanger, 

the newly appointed DHS Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 

secretary, is here for her maiden Congressional appearance to 

speak about her community engagement work. 

I hope you and your colleagues on this panel today will highlight 

how your agencies’ community engagements work to free our citizens from the fear that privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties play 

second fiddle to homeland security and law enforcement efforts to 

root out terrorists. 

Thank all the witnesses for appearing before us today, and I look 

forward to your testimony. 

Thank you. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that under 

the committee rules opening statements may be submitted for the 

record. 

I now welcome our first panel of witnesses this morning and our 

first witness, Ms. Schlanger, for her rookie appearance. I didn’t 

know that. 

Let me introduce you all at once and then each of you will summarize your testimony in 5 minutes. 

Ms. Schlanger is the officer for civil rights and civil liberties at 

the Department of Homeland Security, as the Chairman said. She 

took this position on January 25 of this year. Her office is responsible for supporting DHS’ efforts to secure the Nation from threats 

while preserving our freedoms and equality under the law. 

Prior to her appointment, Ms. Schlanger was a professor of law 

at a number of universities, including Michigan, Washington University, and Harvard. She served as a law clerk for Supreme Court 

justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg from 1993 to 1995 and then worked 

as a trial attorney in the U.S. Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. 

Our second witness, Mr. Hovington, is a 23-year veteran of the 

FBI and currently serves as the unit chief of the Community Relations Unit at the FBI’s Office of Public Affairs. In this position, he 

manages the community outreach program and oversees outreach 

efforts conducted by all 56 FBI field offices. 

In addition, Mr. Hovington oversees the FBI Citizens’ Academy 

program, advises senior executives on community outreach issues 

and represents the FBI at National functions and initiatives related to outreach. 

My sheriff, Lee Baca, began his law enforcement career when he 

entered the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department in 1965, before the rest of us were born, ultimately rising through the ranks 

until he was elected sheriff in December 1998. He is now serving 

his third term. 
6 

Sheriff Baca commands the largest sheriff’s department in the 

United States. He leads over 18,000 officers and professional staff 

in the department which protects over 4 million people—very well, 

I might add. Sheriff Baca is also the director of Homeland Security 

Mutual Aid for California District 1. 

In August 2007 Sheriff Baca established the Muslim Community 

Affairs Unit to train the Muslim community on law enforcement 

issues and to train the officers on Muslim culture—important 

point. This is a two-way committee. A lot is learned by the sheriff’s 

department from the engagement with this community. 

Mr. Alomari, our fourth witness, is the community engagement 

officer at the Ohio Department of Public Safety Homeland Security 

Division. Under his direction Ohio has initiated numerous programs to facilitate interaction with large ethnic communities, including the growing Somali population in Ohio. 

Prior to serving in this position, Mr. Alomari worked as a professor at several institutions of higher learning across Ohio, including Ohio State, where he was a lecturer in Islam and Middle Eastern cultures. 

Without objection, your full statements will be inserted in the 

record, but I would urge you to summarize in 5 minutes or less, 

and you will hear my little gavel if you start to go over. It is important for us to be able to ask you questions. I think that is more 

useful for you and for the public that is both sitting here and listening in to this hearing. There is an enormous amount of interest 

in this hearing. 

So I want to thank you again and recognize Ms. Schlanger for 

5 minutes. 

Please turn on your microphone. 

STATEMENT OF MARGO SCHLANGER, OFFICER FOR CIVIL 

RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. SCHLANGER. Thank you. Sorry. It is a sign that I am a rookie. 

Chair Harman, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member McCaul 

and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you today as the Department of 

Homeland Security’s officer for civil rights and civil liberties. 

As you request, my testimony will be about DHS’ engagement 

with diverse ethnic and religious communities and I will focus on 

my office’s activities, although activities happen throughout the Department. I will give particular attention to the outreach and communication with American, Arab, Muslim, Sikh, Somali, and South 

Asian communities. 

Congress established my position, reporting directly to the Secretary, to—and I am quoting from our statute—‘‘ensure that the 

protection of civil rights and civil liberties is appropriately incorporated into Department programs and activities and to review and 

assess information concerning abuses of civil rights, civil liberties, 

and profiling on the basis of race, ethnicity, or religion by employees or officials of the Department.’’ 

My testimony is basically to say that both of these functions are 

improved by and even depend upon our engagement with diverse 
7 

communities. Our engagement efforts involve encouraging all 

Americans in many ethnicities, religions, and so on to take an active role in their Government, to ensure that the Government is responsive to and protects the rights of all Americans. 

I want to be clear that this kind of engagement, soliciting the 

views and explaining policies from communities seeking to address 

complaints and grievances, is a basic part of good and responsible 

Government. 

I do believe that our activities contribute to the Department’s 

mission of countering violent extremism. But the linkage is indirect. We can and should collaborate with community leaders to address this shared problem. But countering violent extremism isn’t 

the main reason that we engage these communities, and it is—it 

is not really the lens through which we view the engagement. 

The point of the engagement is the primary mission of making 

sure that we communicate with and to and hear from these kinds 

of communities, opening up channels of communication. 

The Department continues to evaluate what other activities it 

can undertake to counter violent extremism, and my office plays a 

key role in that policy discussion. 

The work that we do with American, Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and 

South Asian communities is, therefore, part and parcel of a much 

broader effort. But this particular engagement is structured as follows. 

We have community leader roundtables in eight cities around the 

country, and we facilitate broad Government and community representation at those round tables. This is a big category of activities for my office. We convene about 30 of these meetings each 

year. 

The meetings provide opportunities for community leaders to 

learn about significant Government policies, to raise specific issues 

of concern, and it is in a format that promotes accountability for 

answers. The Government participants will be back again the following quarter. 

For our engagement efforts to be sustainable, it is important that 

the grievances be heard, and so we collect inquiries and issues from 

the communities in advance, and we make sure that we have the 

right people at the table to talk about them. We bring back what 

we learn to Department leadership. 

We also run youth roundtables. There are fewer of these, and 

they are not—they are less geographically based. It is a newer initiative but a very important one in light of recent trends in domestic radicalization and domestic violence. We have some events related to this coming up next week, for example, that are—that involve people—young people on campuses in Chicago. 

We also run something that was referred to earlier, a rapid response communication network, which we call the Incident Community Coordination Team. This is a conference call mechanism to 

be able to quickly speak to community leaders involving Federal officials and the community leaders in the event of a situation where 

such contact might be productive. 

The people we speak to are people who can contact and share information with their communities and perhaps assist law enforcement as things unfold. 
8 

We also promote hand-in-hand with the FBI, for whom—which 

we are very grateful for, a prestigious law enforcement internship 

called the National Security Internship for Arabic-speaking college 

students and graduates so that they can come and feel that there 

is a place for them in the FBI and in DHS. That is a very successful—small but successful program. 

There are millions of American Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs, South 

Asians living in thousands of towns and cities, so by necessity Government engagement with these communities is going to have to be 

local. 

So we also facilitate and use—and build capacity for local engagement. We look for information on best practices, and we conduct live and video-based training across the country of State and 

local law enforcement partners. 

This covers both cultural competency relating to American Arab, 

Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities and some—and a developing piece of it, something that we hope to really do more with, 

is a best practices approach to community interaction and outreach. This kind of work is strongly supported by the administration. 

I see I am nearly out of time, so I will just say the one thing that 

I am going to add to this mix, although I am going to augment a 

few of them, is that we want to do frequent issue-specific engagement efforts. 

We had our first such event last week bringing together religious 

leaders from many communities to talk about advanced imaging. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Ms. Schlanger follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARGO SCHLANGER

MARCH 17, 2010 

INTRODUCTION

Chair Harman, Ranking Member McCaul, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today as the Officer 

for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) for the United States Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS). At your request, my testimony will be about DHS’s engagement with diverse ethnic and religious communities, focusing on my office’s activities and giving particular attention to our outreach and communication with 

American Arab, Muslim, Sikh, Somali, and South Asian communities. Other offices 

within DHS—the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, the Transportation Security 

Administration, the Office of Policy, and others—have not only participated in 

CRCL’s engagement activities but also run their own events with these communities. But CRCL’s program in this area is the most extensive, and my testimony 

will emphasize CRCL’s activities. 

Congress established my position, reporting directly to the Secretary, to, among 

other things, ‘‘assist the Secretary, directorates, and offices of the Department to develop, implement, and periodically review Department policies and procedures to ensure that the protection of civil rights and civil liberties is appropriately incorporated into Department programs and activities,’’ and to ‘‘review and assess information concerning abuses of civil rights, civil liberties, and profiling on the basis 

of race, ethnicity, or religion, by employees and officials of the Department.’’ 6 

U.S.C. § 345(a). Both of these functions are improved by—even depend upon—our 

engagement with diverse communities. 

Our engagement efforts involve encouraging all Americans to take an active role 

in their Government, and ensuring that the Government is responsive to and protects the rights of all Americans. I want to be clear that engaging communities— 

soliciting their views, explaining our policies, and seeking to address any complaints 

or grievances they may have—is a basic part of good and responsible Government. 
9 

Although our activities do contribute to the Department’s mission of countering violent extremism; the linkage is indirect. Although we can and should collaborate with 

community leaders to address this shared problem, ‘‘countering violent extremism’’ 

is neither the principal reason we engage these communities nor the lens through 

which we view this engagement. The Department continues to evaluate what other 

activities it can engage in to counter violent extremism, and my office plays a key 

role in that on-going policy discussion. I would also like to note that my office has 

no operational role in disrupting terror plots, and our engagement activities do not 

involve source development or intelligence collection. 

Since starting in my position at DHS on Jan, 25, 2010, I have led a roundtable 

bringing together American Muslim, Arab, Sikh, Somali, and South Asian leaders 

from around the country with officials from DHS and the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), for a very enlightening discussion about the threat posed to 

those communities by terrorist attempts to recruit their members. The next day the 

Secretary’s Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) hosted a session, in which 

I participated, with the same leaders about building a rapid response information 

network to communicate with the community partners in the event of an attack. 

Secretary Napolitano joined us for an hour-long question-and-answer session and 

lent her public support to on-going dialogue involving the Department’s senior leadership. I also led the DHS delegation to a bi-monthly National roundtable involving 

American Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian leaders sponsored by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and chaired local roundtables in Chicago and Detroit involving community leaders and numerous Federal agencies. In addition, I put together 

a session for Transportation Security Administration officials and Jewish, Christian, 

and Muslim religious leaders to discuss Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) scanning machines and religious physical modesty prescriptions. I will also participate 

in what is known as the Transatlantic Initiative, a bi-national exchange involving 

British and American Pakistani and Muslim communities and their governments; 

my office is the U.S. interagency lead on this initiative. 

Gatherings like these provide an excellent opportunity for government officials 

and their agencies to learn about the concerns of diverse communities. The community leaders we engage with likewise learn useful information—for example, our 

Chicago meeting included presentations on the privacy protections included as part 

of TSA’s use of AIT scanners and on CBP’s ‘‘Trusted Traveler’’ program, which facilitates expedited international travel for pre-approved, low-risk travelers through 

dedicated lanes and kiosks. 

This kind of work is strongly supported by the administration, including DHS 

leadership. Secretary Napolitano has established open and responsive Government 

as a top priority for DHS, and these efforts align closely with that priority. As she 

explained in 2009, in written testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, ‘‘It is important to note that such engagement 

with the many key groups with which CRCL holds dialogues—such as Arab and Somali American communities, as well as Muslim and Sikh leaders—is important in 

and of itself as a matter of civil rights protection and smart, effective law enforcement. But by helping communities more fully engage with their government, DHS 

is also preempting alienation and creating buy-in to the broader shared responsibility of homeland security.’’ 

Our engagement efforts build crucial channels of communication, both educating 

us about the concerns of communities affected by DHS activities and giving those 

communities reliable information about policies and procedures. They build trust by 

facilitating resolution of legitimate grievances; they reinforce a sense of shared 

American identity and community; and they demonstrate the collective ownership 

of the homeland security project. I thank you for the opportunity to share with you 

our extensive work in this area. 

THE DHS OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

The DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) carries out four key 

functions to integrate civil rights and civil liberties into Department activities: 

• Advising Department leadership, personnel, and partners about civil rights and 

civil liberties issues, ensuring respect for civil rights and civil liberties in policy 

decisions and implementation of those decisions. 

• Communicating with individuals and communities whose civil rights and civil 

liberties may be affected by Department activities, informing them about policies and avenues of redress, and promoting appropriate attention within the Department to their experiences and concerns. 

• Investigating and resolving civil rights and civil liberties complaints filed by the 

public. 
10 

• Leading the Department’s equal employment opportunity programs and promoting personnel diversity and merit system principles. 

ENGAGEMENT AND OUTREACH

CRCL devotes substantial effort to engage a variety of diverse ethnic and religious 

communities. The work we do with American Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian 

communities is part and parcel of a much broader effort to ensure that all communities in this country are, and feel, active participants in the homeland security effort. An example is our engagement efforts related to DHS immigration and border 

security policies. We hold quarterly meetings with a broad-based non-governmental 

organization (NGO) coalition of National civil rights and immigrant-rights organizations; have established an inter-agency Immigrant Worker Roundtable to bring together DHS components, other Federal agencies, and NGOs; and facilitate an immigration Incident Coordination Call, which provides immigrant community leaders 

with vital information about CBP and ICE enforcement posture during emergencies. 

In the past it has been used only to prevent loss of life by encouraging immigrant 

communities to evacuate dangerous areas during hurricanes by alleviating undue 

fear of enforcement. We also participate in engagement activities of other DHS components; over the past several months, for example, my staff served as the designated facilitators for extended stakeholder meetings about CBP’s Southwest Border activities. We carry out the same types of efforts in non-immigration areas as 

well; for example participated in a workshop last week for faith-based and community groups involved in disaster response and recovery. 

Engagement Activities with American Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian Communities.—CRCL is far from the only DHS office that conducts outreach efforts involving Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities. To provide just a few 

examples, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), has held Naturalization Information Sessions in these communities, and has published its guide ‘‘Welcome to the United States’’ in 14 languages, including Arabic, Urdu, and Somali; 

officials from the Office of Policy and the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs have 

met repeatedly with members of these communities as well. 

But CRCL is the Office within DHS that conducts the most extensive outreach 

efforts involving the many Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities across 

the Nation. We structure these engagement efforts with several types of regular 

events or programs: community leader roundtables; youth roundtables; a rapid response communication network; and promotion of a prestigious law enforcement internship for Arabic-speaking college students and graduates. 

CRCL’s activities serve as a model for constructive engagement between these 

communities and Government, and we strive to facilitate and build capacity for further local engagement. Several other DHS components, as well as States, regional 

fusion centers, and local governments already also conduct outreach and engagement with these communities—we have learned from each other’s experiences and 

want to encourage these efforts where they are not already occurring. 

Of course, as with all outreach efforts, the Government must be careful to choose 

constructive leaders to partner with, and, by the same token, community members 

are careful to meet with Government officials who they believe will be reliable partners responsive to legitimate concerns. 

Roundtables.—First, over the past 4 years, CRCL has established regular roundtable meetings for community and Government leaders in eight regions across the 

country: Detroit, Houston, Chicago, Boston, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Columbus 

(Ohio), and Washington, DC. In addition, CRCL has developed relationships with 

Somali American leaders in San Diego, Seattle, and Lewiston (Maine), and includes 

them in the regular roundtables where possible and in bi-monthly community conference calls. These locations have diverse Muslim, Arab, Sikh, and Somali communities, and we have nurtured broad community participation. 

These roundtable events include not just our office, but also DHS components relevant to the issues placed on the agenda by our community partners, most often 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Government participation also includes U.S. 

Attorneys’ Offices, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), State and local law 

enforcement, and other Federal and local officials. 

The roundtables cover a range of homeland security, civil rights, and other areas. 

With the assistance of our Federal and local Government partners, sessions have 

canvassed (in no particular order): Rules governing remittances to foreign relatives; 

immigration and naturalization policies; access to information about basic Government services in different languages; roles and responsibilities of law enforcement; 
11 

detention of National security suspects; how Government can work with communities to promote civic engagement; services for newly-arrived refugees; crime prevention; how communities can work with Government to counter violent extremism; 

protection of civil rights in employment, voting, housing, and other areas; prosecution of hate crimes; and border searches. 

The meetings provide opportunities for community leaders to learn about significant Government policies, as well as to raise specific issues of concern in a format 

that emphasizes accountability for answers—the Government participants will be 

back again the following quarter. For our engagement efforts to be sustainable, it 

is important that the grievances of these communities be heard by policy decisionmakers, so we collect inquiries and issues from the communities and keep senior 

leadership apprised of the impact of DHS policy and operations. In addition, at the 

Secretary’s request, two DHS Assistant Secretaries have personally attended a number of recent roundtables, and they will attend others in the future. 

Youth roundtables.—Young leaders and youth organizations offer different perspectives than older community leaders. For this reason, CRCL has hosted four 

‘‘Roundtables on Security and Liberty’’ in Washington, DC; Houston; and Los Angeles to connect with 150 young leaders ages 18–25 from American Arab, Muslim, 

Sikh, and South Asian communities. These events offer opportunities for youth to 

share their thoughts with senior DHS leadership and for Government officials to 

learn from a population whose perspectives are invaluable to homeland security efforts. 

Incident Community Coordination Team.—Government contact with Muslim, 

Arab, Sikh, Somali and South Asian community leaders in the hours and days after 

an incident can be extraordinarily helpful, because community leaders can calm tensions, share information with their communities, and perhaps assist law enforcement. Accordingly, my office has established the Incident Community Coordination 

Team (ICCT). This conference call mechanism connects Federal officials with key 

leaders in the event of a situation in which contact would be productive. DHS participant components and offices include TSA, ICE, CBP, USCIS, the Office of Public 

Affairs, and the Office of Intelligence & Analysis. We are joined by the White House 

Office of Public Engagement, the DOJ Civil Rights Division, the FBI, the National 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the Department of State, among others. Community participants include representatives of National organizations, community 

leaders from key cities, and religious and cultural scholars. 

Our ICCT has been used seven times since we established it in 2006, and has 

been an effective device in several ways: 

• It allows participating agencies to get community leaders the information they 

need in the aftermath of an incident. The information shared—which is not 

classified or restricted—is valuable because of its reliability and timeliness. 

• It gives community leaders a channel to speak to Federal officials in a timely 

and effective way. They can share reactions to Governmental policies or enforcement actions, and provide information about hate crimes that should be investigated, about the mood of communities in the aftermath of a homeland security 

incident and, possibly, about how the Government might improve its effectiveness in investigating the incident. 

• It facilitates development of a common understanding about the messages that 

Government and community leaders will send to these communities, the country, and the world. 

Most recently, the ICCT was convened after the Fort Hood incident in November 

2009, and after the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight No. 253 in December 2009. Representatives from DHS, the White House, DOJ’s Civil Rights Division, NCTC, Department of Defense, Department of State, and the FBI provided 

briefings to community leaders, giving them information they could share with their 

communities. Community leaders had an opportunity to ask questions and share reactions to the events. 

National Security Internship Program.—In 2007, in partnership with the FBI, my 

office established the National Security Internship Program to bring Arabic-speaking college students to Washington, DC to intern for a summer at DHS or the FBI, 

and concurrently improve their Arabic language skills at the George Washington 

University. Successful interns are encouraged to apply for permanent jobs at DHS 

or the FBI. This program brings people with both language and cultural skills to 

Government’s policy, law enforcement, and intelligence offices. This internship program is an important part of the partnership between Government and the Arab 

American and Muslim American communities. 
12 

Facilitating Local Engagement 

There are millions of American Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs, and South Asians, living 

in thousands of towns and cities across the Nation. By necessity, Governmental engagement with these communities will have to be local. 

CRCL conducts training for law enforcement personnel on cultural competency relating to American Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities, Islam, and 

some Sikh religious practices. This kind of training is a precondition for honest communication and trust between officers and the communities they serve and protect. 

Topics include: Misconceptions and stereotypes of Arab and Muslim cultures; diversity within Arab and Muslim communities; effective policing without the use of ethnic or racial profiling; and a best practices approach to community interaction and 

outreach. Much of this training is provided live, usually on-site, to Federal, State, 

and local law enforcement officials around the country. But we have also produced 

a training DVD that includes insights from four National and international experts—an Assistant United States Attorney who is Muslim; a member of the National Security Council who is Muslim; an internationally renowned scholar of Islamic studies; and a civil rights attorney who advocates on issues of concern to 

Arab-American and Muslim-American communities. 

It is worth noting, in addition, that it is our community partners—reliably informed by engagement activities about Government policy and practices, and consistently empowered by those same engagement activities to highlight for policymakers their experiences, concerns, and grievances and to obtain reasonable responses—who bear the responsibility to counter radical ideologies that subvert their 

values and may pave a path for their young people towards violence. Radical beliefs, 

after all, are protected by the Constitution. Our proper sphere of concern and intervention is violence, not radicalism. 

NEXT STEPS

I have a number of plans to augment my office’s existing engagement efforts in 

American Muslim, Arab, Sikh, and South Asian communities. Over the next year, 

we plan to add cities for our regularly scheduled roundtables. Conceptually, I have 

three strategic initiatives: 

(1) Frequent issue-specific engagement efforts.—Issue-specific engagement brings 

community leaders to the table who have particular contributions to make on 

specific topics. Our first issue-specific event is focused on AIT scanning technology and religious modesty prescriptions. 

(2) Promoting local engagement efforts.—As discussed in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review released last month, the DHS vision for homeland security is a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other 

hazards, and where American interests, aspirations, and way of life can thrive. 

The American way of life prominently includes our cherished civil rights and 

civil liberties. Even so, our Department—and the Federal Government as a 

whole—cannot possibly do all that needs to be done in this area of endeavor. 

States and local governments are beginning to become active in this area, and 

some are doing terrific work. We must promote more local efforts, by modeling 

constructive engagement; providing in-person and scalable training and training 

materials; coordinating community-oriented activities; and promulgating best 

practices. We need to ensure that our State, local, and Tribal partners have the 

knowledge, methods, skills, and resources to productively engage their communities. 

(3) Youth engagement efforts.—Regardless of faith, race, ethnicity, national origin, or gender, young people communicate differently than older generations; 

they have vastly more exposure to social media tools and real-time on-line information and communication. And because it is youth who are at the frontlines 

when it comes to terrorist recruitment, they are perhaps the most vital audience for a message of inclusion, esteem, and fair treatment. It is our job as a 

Department to welcome young people in American Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and 

South Asian communities to join our Nation’s collective security efforts; we 

must empower them to be connected rather than alienated. We need to demonstrate to our youth that we value their opinions and welcome their ideas, and 

we need to use a variety of communications techniques to convey that message. 

CONCLUSION

Frequent, responsive, and thoughtful engagement with diverse communities is an 

imperative of effective government. Such engagement gathers and shares information, builds trust, informs policy, and enables prompt response to legitimate griev-
13 

ances and needs; it is the right of Americans as the sovereign source of Governmental authority. Engagement with American Muslim, Arab, Sikh, and South Asian 

communities is one instantiation of that imperative, and a crucial method of reinforcing the fundamental tenet that we are fellow citizens facing a common threat. 

Thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify today. I welcome your questions. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Hovington. 

STATEMENT OF BRETT HOVINGTON, SUPERVISORY SPECIAL 

AGENT, HEAD OF COMMUNITY RELATIONS UNIT, FEDERAL 

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

Mr. HOVINGTON. Good morning, Chair Harman, Ranking Member McCaul and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. 

As chief of the Community Relations Unit at FBI’s Office of Public Affairs, I appreciate this opportunity to join my colleagues from 

the Department of Homeland Security, the Los Angeles Sheriff’s 

Office, and the State of Ohio in discussing this very important 

issue, particularly our efforts to build trust and open a constructive 

dialogue with the American Arab, Muslim, Sikh, Somali, and South 

Asian communities, to name a few. 

The FBI’s Community Outreach Program works to enhance public trust and confidence in the FBI, fostering open and transparent 

dialogue. 

Community engagement efforts that build trust help us to open 

doors, facilitating the overall mission of the FBI in keeping the 

communities and the homeland safe. 

If people understand the FBI’s mission and view the FBI as cooperative and trustworthy, they are more likely to report a crime, return a telephone call, or respond positively to being approached by 

an FBI special agent. 

As we see more instances of individuals in the United States 

being radicalized to commit violent acts—and I repeat, to commit 

violent acts—our efforts to build understanding and trust become 

more critical than ever. 

At the headquarters level, the FBI engages a variety of Arab 

American and Muslim organizations. FBI leadership meets with 

leaders of National groups and has found these interactions to be 

mutually beneficial. We look to these organizations to assist us in 

communication with their members and constituents. 

For example, before we implemented our new attorney general 

guidelines for domestic operations last year, we briefed these organizations on the changes and attempted to address their concerns. 

Our intent was to provide them with information to place the FBI’s 

efforts in context when issues arose publicly. 

At the local level, each of our 56 FBI field offices has a community outreach program coordinated by a professional community 

outreach specialist or a special agent community outreach coordinator. 

As we do at the National level, field offices identify and develop 

relationships with community leaders and other individuals who 

have influence in their communities and may be helpful conduits 

of information for the communities that we are obligated to protect 

and serve. 
14 

These leaders make up a network of contacts the field office can 

reach quickly in the event there is a threat or operational activity 

impacting that community. 

This network of contacts is also helpful when the FBI needs public assistance to support on-going investigations, to address concerns about FBI activities reported in the news media, or to provide additional details on information released by the FBI such as 

crime statistics. 

Field offices use various initiatives to develop and maintain their 

liaison with community leaders and groups. Thirty-eight of our 

field offices have established what we call our Community Engagement Councils or Multi-Cultural Advisory Councils that consult 

with field office leadership on areas of interest or concerns in their 

communities. 

Many field offices have held town-hall style meetings to help foster dialogue with the broader community. FBI field offices also 

partner with community outreach programs run by State and local 

law enforcement agencies, which is very critical to the success of 

engaging. 

One of our key initiatives is the FBI Citizen Academy 8- to 10- 

week program that brings together community leaders to learn 

about the FBI mission, jurisdiction, policies, and general overall 

mission. All field offices conduct at least one Citizen Academy per 

year, while some may conduct two or three. A strong effort is made 

to attract a diverse group of participants to these classes. 

Another program is the Community Relations Executive Seminar 

Training, or what we call our CREST. It is a shorter version of our 

Citizen Academy program that is conducted at locations in the community rather than at an FBI facility. 

While not as in-depth as our Citizen Academies, these programs 

provide a vehicle to reach out to communities where trust in the 

Government or the FBI in particular needs to be enhanced. Topics 

discussed vary according to the interests of the group and often include civil rights, hate crimes, and terrorism. 

In the context of countering violent radicalization, a key step is 

to develop relationships within the community based on trust and 

to do so under non-stressful circumstances rather—rather than in 

the aftermath of an incident. We have found CREST to be an important first step in building that process. 

The FBI also continues to adapt our established youth programs 

to help us reach groups of young people, particularly in the Muslim 

communities. Field offices sponsor teen academies which are designed to introduce youth to the FBI. We also have our Adopt-aSchool/Junior Agent special program, which is designed to introduce youth to the FBI and to encourage good citizenship. 

Our community partners have become a bridge to many who 

have viewed the FBI with either contempt or fear. They now come 

through the doors of the FBI and feel free to share their views on 

sensitive issues. 

While we realize we may not always agree at times, or we must 

agree to disagree, our focus continues to be on the fostering dialogue and keeping the conversation going. 

I hope I conveyed the committee’s—the FBI’s strategy to engage 

communities and the methods we use, and I thank again the Chair 
15 

and the Members of the committee for their interest in this important issue. Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Hovington follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRETT HOVINGTON

MARCH 17, 2010 

Good afternoon Chair Harman, Ranking Member McCaul, and distinguished 

Members of the subcommittee. I am happy to join with my colleagues here from the 

Department of Homeland Security and the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Office. 

As chief of the Community Relations Unit of the FBI’s Office of Public Affairs, 

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the FBI’s community outreach and engagement efforts, particularly our efforts to build trust and open a constructive dialogue 

with American Arab, Muslim, Sikh, Somali, and South Asian communities, to name 

but a few. 

The primary purpose of the FBI’s Community Outreach Program is simple: To enhance public trust and confidence in the FBI by fostering the FBI’s relationship 

within various communities. The Community Outreach Program supports the FBI’s 

mission by educating members of the public on how they can help protect themselves and their communities. Our engagement efforts are designed to build trust 

in communities that can assist in opening doors, facilitating the overall mission of 

the FBI in keeping communities and the homeland safe. If the public understands 

the FBI’s mission and views the FBI as cooperative and trustworthy, they are more 

likely to report a crime, return a telephone call, or respond positively to being approached by a FBI Special Agent. 

I have traveled to Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and many parts of the 

United States studying the various engagement strategies of law enforcement agencies. One common thread is the need to have better dialogue not just with communities, but specifically with youth. Recent situations involving young people leaving 

the United States to travel abroad and engage in criminal and nefarious activities 

is one of the concerns facing the United States today. Though violent radicalization 

is a growing concern, the overwhelming majority of Muslim Americans we encounter 

are loyal, law-abiding citizens. 

If we want to stop future generations of youth from choosing the wrong path and 

fighting against our country instead of for it, we must commit to increasing our 

field-based scientific research on the violent radicalization of youth. The only way 

we can effectively address this issue is to fully understand it. Sociologists, political 

scientists, and psychologists can all help us explore conflict between leaders, community members, and youth. 

As a Special Agent, I can attest that an individual’s understanding and perception 

of the FBI can make everything we do easier or harder. As we see more instances 

of individuals in the United States being radicalized to commit violent acts, our efforts to build understanding and trust becomes more critical than ever. 

OUTREACH AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

The FBI engages National and local organizations in the United States that have 

public positions against terrorism and violent radicalization to further a positive 

image of law enforcement. The FBI has established contacts with a variety of National-level Arab-American and Muslim organizations. FBI Director Mueller meets 

with leaders of these groups and has found these interactions to be mutually beneficial. We look to these organizations to assist us in communicating with their members and constituents. For example, to provide an understanding of the FBI’s investigative parameters prior to implementation of the new Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic Operations, we offered these organizations briefings and attempted to address concerns raised by the groups. Out intent was to provide them 

with information to place the FBI’s efforts in context when issues arose publicly. 

Outreach Efforts at the Local Level 

Each of our 56 field offices has a Community Outreach Program coordinated by 

a professional Community Outreach Specialist or Special Agent Community Outreach Coordinator. Our Community Outreach Program has several elements: Building relationships with community leaders; reaching out to youth and the broader 

community; and partnering with various community organizations and other law enforcement outreach efforts. As we do at the National level, field offices identify and 

develop relationships with community leaders and other individuals who have influ-
16 

ence in their communities and may be helpful conduits of information to the community at large. 

These leaders make up a network of contacts the field office can reach out to on 

short notice to deliver a message to their community in the event there is a threat 

or operational activity impacting that community. This network of contacts is also 

helpful when the FBI needs public assistance to support an on-going investigation, 

to address concerns about FBI activities reported in the news media, or to provide 

additional details on information released by the FBI, such as crime statistics. For 

example: • In Detroit, the executive management, including the Special Agent in Charge, 

attends regular meetings in the Muslim communities. They also have individuals from the Muslim Community who participate in the Multi-Cultural Advisory Councils, FBI Citizens’ Academies, and the FBI Teen Academy. • In the fall of 2009, the Assistant Director of the New York Office met with 40 

Muslim community leaders to address the issues and concerns of the community 

following operational activities in the investigation of Najibullah Zazi. This kind 

of dialogue has become part of our set operations plan. 

Field offices use various initiatives to develop and maintain their liaison with 

community leaders and groups. Thirty-eight of our field offices have established 

Community Engagement Councils or Multi-Cultural Advisory Councils that consult 

with field office leadership on areas of interest or concern in the community. 

Another key initiative is the Citizens’ Academy. This effort is an 8- to 10-week 

program that brings together community leaders to learn about the FBI’s mission, 

jurisdiction, policies, and general operations. All field offices conduct at least one 

Citizens’ Academy per year, while some may conduct multiple sessions. A strong effort is made to attract a diversity of members that represent the surrounding communities to these classes. 

After a member of the Turkish-American community graduated from the Knoxville office’s Citizens’ Academy in 2009, the partnership blossomed, and now the 

Turkish community will be hosting a session of this year’s Citizens’ Academy. They 

will also be participating during the next Youth Academy, which will include students from 25 different high schools. 

Another program used to foster relationships within various communities is the 

Community Relations Executive Seminar Training or CREST. While not as in-depth 

as Citizen Academies, this program provides a vehicle to reach out to communities 

where trust in the Government or the FBI in particular needs to be enhanced. Topics addressed in a CREST session vary according to the interests of the group, discussing such areas as civil rights, hate crimes, or terrorism. 

The effectiveness of the CREST program is that it is often the starting point for 

bridging the gaps of trust that may exist between the FBI and a given community. 

In the context of countering violent radicalization, a key step is to develop relationships within the community based on trust and to do so under non-stressful circumstances rather than in the aftermath of an incident. CREST is a first step in 

that building process. 

In addition to the Citizens’ Academy and CREST programs, many field offices 

have held town-hall style meetings to help foster dialogue with the broader community. Some examples of the communities the FBI has engaged in this way are: 

• The Atlanta office held a town hall meeting for the Muslim community at the 

Hamza Center in Alpharetta, Georgia. 

• The Buffalo office partnered with the Muslim Public Affairs Council of Western 

New York to host a town hall meeting with the Special Agent in Charge and 

an Assistant U.S. Attorney present. 

• The New Haven office held town hall meetings with the Pakistani-American 

Public Affairs Committee (PAKPAC). 

• The San Antonio office participated in an open forum for a group of refugees 

from Somalia, Tanzania and Iran, expressing encouragement to those in attendance that local/Federal agencies were available to assist with any concerns or 

issues. 

FBI field offices also partner with community outreach programs run by State and 

local law enforcement agencies. Since 2006, the Dallas FBI office and Arlington Police have held joint quarterly meetings with leaders of the Muslim Community in 

Tarrant County. The meetings are a collaborative effort of the FBI and Arlington 

Police to engage the Muslim community leadership. 

Both the Citizens’ Academy and CREST graduates—along with our local law enforcement partners—are the foundation of a community support network that works 

as a force multiplier for us. By working through this local foundation, we are able 

to model a more traditional community policing effort to combat violent 

radicalization and terrorism. 
17 

SPECIALIZED COMMUNITY OUTREACH TEAM (SCOT)

In November 2008, the Community Relations Unit established a Specialized Community Outreach Team. The team, comprised of Special Agents, Analysts, Community Outreach Specialists, and personnel with language or other specialized skills, 

assists field offices with establishing new contacts in key communities. The pilot 

program focused on establishing contacts in the Somali-American communities of 

Denver, Columbus, Minneapolis, San Diego, Seattle, and Washington, DC. These cities were selected because they were identified as the largest Somali-American communities in the United States. The intent of this new engagement strategy is to use 

the best practices in community outreach and tailor them to assist in efforts to engage communities that are particularly insular or where barriers of fear or suspicion 

of law enforcement exist. In the pilot program field offices were helped to develop 

relationships with organizations and individuals in the Somali community who are 

well-positioned to fill outreach gaps and assist in developing a more positive dialogue with the community. 

OUTREACH TO YOUTH

The FBI continues to adapt our established youth programs to help us reach new 

groups of young people, particularly in Muslim communities. Field offices sponsor 

teen academies which are designed to introduce youth to the FBI. We also have the 

Adopt-a-School/Junior Special Agent program, which is designed to introduce youth 

to the FBI and to encourage good citizenship. Here are just a few examples: 

• As a part of the FBI Adopt-a-School Program, the Phoenix office hosted a Jr. 

Special Agent Program at the Arizona Cultural Academy, an Islamic private 

school. A series of topics presented for the youth were: Making Good Decisions, 

Peer Pressure, Internet Safety, Violence Prevention, Self-Esteem, and Teasing 

and Rumors. 

• The New York office participated in a Pakistani Youth Group event held by the 

Council of People’s Organization (COPO) in Brooklyn. 

• Agents from the San Antonio office delivered an internet safety presentation to 

300 middle school students at a predominately Turkish run school, Harmony 

Science Academy. 

• Agents from the Atlanta office participated in Career Day at Dar-Un-Noor 

School, which is also a part of the Al Farooq Masijid, the largest mosque in Atlanta, Georgia. 

RECOGNIZING OUR PARTNERS

Our community partners have become a bridge to many who viewed the FBI with 

either contempt or fear. They now come through the doors of the FBI and feel free 

to share their views on sensitive issues. We commend our friends for their efforts, 

and we commend the leaders of minority and ethnic communities who have also become friends with the FBI and who are building similar relationships for their communities. 

While we realize we are going to have disagreements with these same communities, we are talking. Sparking that dialogue is essential. The leadership of the 

American Muslim community is working vigorously on many levels to emphasize 

that American Muslims are Americans. The opportunity to cooperate with the FBI 

and other authorities can ensure the safety and security of communities and the 

United States. 

One way we can formally recognize the FBI’s partners across the country is 

through the Director’s Community Leadership Award. In 2009, four recipients of 

this award were Muslim leaders. 2008 Muslim Recipients included: Yahya Hendi, 

Bilal Eksili, Dafer Mohammed Dakhil, and Mohammed Moinuddin. This year’s recipients include five Muslim leaders, including: Dr. Saeed Fahia, Josefina Salma 

Ahmed, Bilah A. Khaleeq, and Mohamed Abdul-Azeez. The fifth recipient, Nawar 

Shora from the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee, provided training to 

community outreach personnel from all 56 field offices at our annual training conference last year. This year’s recipients will be coming to FBI headquarters this 

week to be formally recognized by FBI Director Robert Mueller for their outstanding 

contributions to public safety. 

CONCLUSION

In my remarks I hope I conveyed to the committee the FBI’s strategy to engage 

communities, counter violent radicalization and the methods we use. The process requires building trust within the community, followed by creating strong and open 
18 

partnerships. Achieving these elements we can then seek to positively influence 

change in the community and alter the path towards violent radicalization. 

I thank the Chairman and the Members of the committee for their interest in this 

important issue affecting our Nation and look forward to answering your questions. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much. 

Sheriff Baca. 

STATEMENT OF LEROY BACA, SHERIFF, LOS ANGELES 

COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT 

Sheriff BACA. Thank you. Thank you and good morning. It is a 

delight to be here with all of you. 

Simply this: Without Muslim Americans locally, Nationally, and 

internationally, we are not winning any war against terror. Our 

testimony is designed to bring forth that strong message to—to not 

only Members of this committee but also members of this entire 

Nation. 

Simply, local and international relationships are the strongest 

tools in the war against terror. Information that is relationship-derived is more reliable than information that is twice- or more removed from the original source. 

When the Christmas day terrorist Abdulmutallab’s father reported his son’s extremism, intelligence doesn’t get any better than 

this. My point is where billions of people who—in the world are 

aligned in cooperation with police against terrorism, terrorists will 

be defeated. 

I have four points. I would like to briefly discuss them with you. 

The first, as you have heard through my colleague to the right from 

the FBI, public-trust policing is the goal not only for Muslim Americans but the vast, diverse societies throughout the United States. 

To maintain a safe and free society of terrorist attacks, police 

need to establish public-trust policing techniques that lead to appropriate channels of communication and participation by the public. This brochure I provided you will describe extensively what this 

means. 

But moreover, we have to reach to the point where people are advising police as opposed to police merely advising people. The sheriff’s department has ethnic advisory councils that are European, 

South Asian, Asian, Middle Eastern, Russian, and particularly Iranian and Muslims from various nations which include Pakistan, 

Jordan, the Gulf states, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. 

My second point is Muslim Americans are clearly against terrorism. To further the effort of public safety, Muslim American 

leaders within Los Angeles County formed a nonprofit organization 

called the Muslim American Homeland Security Congress. 

I provided you with a brochure that describes what this organization does and what its educational input is on these various issues 

of relationship building and public safety. 

This organization was formed by the leaders of Muslim groups 

covering 70 mosques. The Shura Council, for example, of Los Angeles has 70 mosques within their environment. The leader of that 

council was part of the forming of this organization that I have alluded to. 

The Council of American Islamic Relations, CAIR, also led in this 

effort. Muslim Public Affairs Council. The Council of Pakistani Af-
19 

fairs. The Iranian American Muslim Association of North America 

participated in this. Various local mosques and Islamic centers 

were involved. 

The organization is an educational organization with a two-way 

road for public safety. As a result, significant activities are engaged 

in with this organization. I might also say that the sheriff’s department—I want to introduce Sergeant Michael Abdeen. 

If you could just stand for a moment. 

He is the outreach Muslim American who goes out with his team 

of five other Muslim Americans in uniform, prays in mosques, engages with children and young teenagers and parents, and helps 

parents solve problems that are not necessarily related to a terrorist threat. How do we survive in the common issues of young 

people getting involved with drugs and other things that are detrimental to their growth? The key here is that we have to have interactive relationships, not only relationships based on professional 

reasons. 

The next point is professional international police diplomacy. I 

have been all over this world in the Muslim countries, trying to 

build a greater sense of appreciation and relationship for their 

strategies, and to point, this document here will explain it thoroughly to you. 

Countries such as Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Jordan, Israel, 

Qatar, Saudi Arabia, all the Gulf states, and we hosted a conference in Beverly Hills last Thursday of all the Gulf states police 

chiefs, major European police chiefs, the police chiefs of Toronto, 

Vancouver, and Montreal, along with Mexico City, Tijuana, and 

Singapore. 

This is significant. Law enforcement in America needs to collaborate with our counterparts outside of our Nation. Cities like Los 

Angeles and New York, which are the capitals, pretty much, of the 

diversity of all the Nation’s countries, are part of this effort. 

The last point, which is No. 4, is interfaith respect. Americans 

of faith will help when asked. The question of peaceful human coexistence worldwide cannot be fully answered without including 

the good will of all faiths towards one another. 

At this time in our history, with billions of dollars being spent 

on the war against terror, our Nation should ask all Americans of 

faith to join with President Obama’s example and be the instrument of good will to Muslims throughout the world. 

There is my belief that the average American has the potential 

to be our best ambassador of good will, but we all have to go forward in our various elected jobs and our official positions in Government to set the example and communicate with mosques worldwide, within our Nation as well, and go to these places and participate in some of the activities they engage in. 

Extremists are what they are. But they will not survive or thrive 

in a world that is not indifferent. Los Angeles County is not indifferent to the assets and virtues of the Muslim American communities locally and those that are worldwide. 

Finally, I would like to thank Janet Napolitano, the Homeland 

Security Secretary, for her effort as well in trying to reach out and 

build a better relationship with Muslim Americans. 

Thank you. 
20 

[The statement of Sheriff Baca follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LEROY BACA

MARCH 17, 2010 

On September 13, 2001, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, fearing a 

backlash against Muslim-Americans, convened a meeting led by then-Governor Gray 

Davis and Mayor James Hahn, Supervisor Zev Yaroslavsky and I, in addition to the 

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department’s Interfaith Council. 

Our core message was to not involve religious assumptions regarding the attacks 

on America during 9/11. We succeeded in keeping 11,000,000 people intact without 

violence. Minor verbal abuse acts, however, were documented by deputies and police. 

Since then, the Sheriff’s Department has worked daily with diverse Muslim-American communities in Los Angeles County. This testimony of our efforts is a model 

that could be helpful as our Nation continues to prevent future terrorism at home 

and abroad. 

Local and international relationships are the strongest tools in the war against 

terror. Information that is relationship-derived is more reliable than information 

twice- or more removed from the original source. When the Christmas day terrorist 

Abdulmutallab’s father reported his son’s extremism, intelligence doesn’t get any 

better than this. Where the billions of people of the world are aligned in cooperation 

with police against terrorism, the terrorists will be defeated. 

Because we need relationships with Muslim communities to better protect all citizens, Americans, particularly elected officials, should not claim Islam supports terrorism. This is counter-productive to trust. It plays into the terrorist strategy that 

the West is against Islam. Moreover, the millions of Iranians who are objecting to 

the apparent fraudulent election in Iran, and the undemocratic behavior of its supreme religious leader(s), are not abandoning Islam as they embrace fair democracy 

for their country. 

Law enforcement alone, however, cannot generate the appropriate intelligence 

and response to terrorist cells without the cooperation and support of all citizens, 

especially the Muslim-American community. Moreover, in America, we are obligated 

to protect all citizens and their respective religions. To effectively detect and manage extremists, police need to have the trust and understanding of Muslim communities who live within and outside the United States, especially those who have experienced terrorist attacks within their homelands. Simply, police need public participation. To accomplish public participation, certain strategies, such as public-trust 

policing, need to be in place everywhere in our Nation. 

PUBLIC-TRUST POLICING

To maintain a safe society free of terrorist attacks, police need to establish publictrust policing techniques that lead to appropriate channels of communication and 

participation with the public. Los Angeles County has aggressively embarked upon 

a public-trust policing program since 9/11. Relationships with all faiths are important to achieve interfaith harmony. Los Angeles County has many interfaith efforts. 

The Sheriff’s Department developed an Interfaith Advisory Council consisting of 

more than 300 rabbis, priests, imams, ministers, monks and faith leaders of all religions. In addition, the Sheriff’s Department also developed a Muslim Community 

Affairs unit, the first of its kind in the Nation, staffed by Muslim-American deputy 

sheriffs. 

Moreover, the Sheriff’s Department has ethnic advisory councils that are European, South Asian, Asian, Middle Eastern, Russian, and particularly Iranian and 

Muslims from various nations including Pakistan, Jordan, the Gulf States, Turkey, 

and Azerbaijan. 

MUSLIM-AMERICANS ARE CLEARLY AGAINST TERRORISM

To further the effort of public safety, Muslim-American leaders within Los Angeles County formed a non-profit organization, the Muslim-American Homeland Security Congress (MAHSC). Islamic organizations that contributed to this effort are the 

Islamic Shura Council which is an umbrella organization covering 70 mosques within Southern California; the Council of American-Islamic Relations (CAIR); the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC); the Council of Pakistan-American Affairs 

(COPAA); Iranian-American Muslim Association of North America (IMAN); and various local mosques and Islamic centers. 
21 

The MAHSC organization works closely with the Muslim Community Affairs Unit 

which consists of Arabic-speaking deputy sheriffs and key leaders of the Sheriff’s 

Department. Together, we engage in community forums and participate in events 

to discuss their concerns with law enforcement. Some of the other functions of the 

Muslim Community Affairs unit include attending community events and functions, 

conduct facility tours to familiarize them with the Sheriff’s Department functions, 

and train Sheriff’s Department staff on cultural diversity issues relating to the Muslim American population. 

PROFESSIONAL INTERNATIONAL POLICE DIPLOMACY

Los Angeles County Police agencies are building strong relationships with the police of Muslim, European, Asian, Central American, and Canadian countries. 

One major reality in the fight against terrorism is that Muslim communities are 

in the best position to discover extremist activities within the United States, as well 

as all countries where Muslims reside, worldwide. The trust-based relationships police develop with their respective communities will more often than not lead to the 

early detection of extremism. 

To further validate the strategy of international public police co-dependence, the 

Sheriff’s Department has embarked upon international police diplomacy efforts. The 

countries of focus, to date, are Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Jordan, Israel, Qatar, 

Saudi Arabia, all Gulf States, Mexico, all Central American states, China, Taiwan, 

South Korea, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Russia, The Netherlands, Canada, Morocco, Singapore, Armenia, and Great Britain. 

Simply, Los Angeles County, like the City of New York, is a capital of all the 

world’s nationalities by heritage or birth. This resource of humanity is an asset in 

discovering extremist behavior. 

INTERFAITH RESPECT

Americans of faith will help when asked. The question of peaceful human co-existence, worldwide, cannot be fully answered without including the goodwill of all 

faiths to one another. At this time in our history, with billions of dollars being spent 

on a war against terror, our Nation should ask that all Americans follow President 

Obama’s example and be the instrument of goodwill to Muslims throughout the 

world. 

It is my belief that the average American has the potential to be our best ambassador of goodwill. However, Senators, Members of Congress, Governors, mayors, 

boards of supervisors, sheriffs, police chiefs, scholars, scientists, and laborers and 

their leaders must set the example with a desire to visit mosques and communicate 

with Muslims, worldwide, in the quest of better understanding Islam. Extremists 

are what they are, but they cannot thrive or survive in a world that is not indifferent. 

Los Angeles County is not indifferent to the assets and virtues of the Muslim communities, locally and worldwide. 

HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL (HSAC)

As a member of the Homeland Security Advisory Council, I would like to commend Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano on her initiative on countering violent extremism. I dedicate myself and the Los Angeles County 

Sheriff’s Department to work with DHS to develop a program similar to that of the 

Sheriff Department’s Muslim community outreach program on a National level. 

ATTACHMENT 1.—LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT CORE VALUES

As a Leader in the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, I commit myself to 

honorably perform my duties with respect for the dignity of all people, integrity to 

do right and fight wrongs, wisdom to apply common sense and fairness in all I do 

and courage to stand against racism, sexism, anti-semitism, homophobia and bigotry 

in all its forms. 
22 

ATTACHMENT 2.—LETTER

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Sheriff Baca. 

Mr. Alomari. 

STATEMENT OF OMAR ALOMARI, COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 

OFFICER, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY, HOMELAND SECURITY DIVISION 

Mr. ALOMARI. Madam Chair, Honorable Ranking Member, thank 

you for inviting me today. It is really indeed an honor to be before 

you here. 

The Ohio Homeland Security established an office in 2005 solely 

dedicated to community engagement. From the beginning, the of-
23 

fice wasn’t established as a community intelligence program, and 

for sure it wasn’t meant to be an information-gathering office. 

It is a program that aims at establishing a long-term relationship 

with citizens and residents of Ohio for the purpose of building 

proactive and strong communities, integrated, confident, and open, 

to reject extremism and violent ideologies that breed terrorism. 

Community engagement broadened the debate on how as a society we can respond to terrorism, at the same time enable first responders to be approachable, increases the public understanding of 

the Government’s efforts to counter violent extremism. 

However, it has a broader perspective. It gives the public the opportunity to voice issues of interest and concerns that inspire citizens to make a difference and, most importantly, it humanizes law 

enforcement to the community and humanizes the community to 

law enforcement. 

This is a cultural capital that benefits all sides. Our work has 

been focused in three areas. One, building relations with civic, 

women, youth, and religious organizations. Consequently, we have 

been building regular town hall meetings—holding regular town 

hall meetings with organizations representing all groups. 

We have formed advisory councils, imams’ councils, youth councils, and women councils. We work in tandem with these communities to invite representatives from private and public sectors to 

address all issues of concern and mutual questions. 

The second thing, we do research, publish, and put informational 

and educational material and literature to the communities and 

first responders. We produced a series of cultural guides—the one 

that I am holding in my hand here—and we are in the process of 

printing and posting two more cultural guides, one on Hispanic and 

Latino cultures, and one on American culture. 

We thought that a lot of communities’ recent residents and refugees lack a lot of information on American culture and system, and 

we are writing to inform and educate the public as well. 

The third area we focus on is we offer training workshops, classes, and seminars on culture competency. Our office developed a 

comprehensive culture competency training program for law enforcement and other first responder agencies. We just completed 

training 3,000 Ohio State highway patrolmen, and we are working 

with different law enforcement agencies to do that. 

We have so many demands for the year 2010. The success or failure of our work is measured by the response we have been getting 

with law enforcement and the communities. For the most part, it 

has been extremely positive. 

I just want to emphasize that community engagement is not the 

answer or the solution to every security problem. It does not replace police work. However, it complements and enhances it, provides a new and effective tool for law enforcement to do their job 

effectively. 

In the last 8 years, security has become globalized and thus it 

requires a new look. It requires comprehensive view and multidimensional approach that is based on collaborative and cooperative efforts with law—between law enforcement and the communities. 
24 

But there are a number of problems that we face to do our job 

effectively. One, there is a conceptual flaw regarding the quality of 

information the Government has been getting on cultures, religions, and the legacy of those communities. Most of the information 

we have been getting comes from media personalities and thus the 

quality of information been compromised. That definitely would affect decision-making. 

Second, culture information some law enforcement have been getting from agencies who really offer training in this area in the 

aftermath of 9/11—not based on research or facts but rather sensationalized and commercialized information. The training contradicts, in a way, what my office, our office, offer to law enforcement in Ohio. 

The third one is lack of financial support. Culture engagement is 

a new field for law enforcement, but we need more Government 

support to expand the work. 

I am a one-person office for the entire State of Ohio. My office 

would not have succeeded without the great support we have been 

getting from DHS Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Office and the 

other officials, of course, in the State of Ohio. 

Thank you so much. 

[The statement of Mr. Alomari follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF OMAR ALOMARI

MARCH 17, 2010 

BACKGROUND

Global terrorism had reached American shores in the early 1990’s when terrorists 

attempted to destroy the World Trade Center. Having failed in their first attempt, 

they tried again and succeeded in 2001 when on 9/11 terrorism claimed the lives 

of almost 3,000 innocent American citizens. Since then terrorism has become part 

of American lexicon. As the threat continues and as new realities arise, various 

steps should be taken to ensure the safety and security of citizens and the homeland. In the fight against terrorism the goal is to tackle the factors that contribute 

to extremism and radicalism which might lead to violence and terrorism. 

Minimizing the factors that contribute to radicalization of vulnerable individuals 

requires collaborative efforts between first responders, law enforcement, and citizen 

groups of all cultural backgrounds. Collaboration should be extensive and inclusive 

of all citizens utilizing consultation, participation, and recommendations. A frank 

and open debate should take place over extremism, violent extremism, and the role 

everyone has to play in fighting this war on one hand, and reducing the contributing 

factors to violent extremism on the other. Moreover, a conducive and empowering 

environment should be established for the purpose of achieving these goals. 

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT OFFICE

OHIO HOMELAND SECURITY

The Community Engagement office was born in 2005 out of a need to establish 

an outreach program to the whole community with a special focus to engage and 

consult with the Arab and Muslims communities because of the role they can play 

in the fight against terrorism and the violent ideologies that breed violence. The 

Ohio Department of Public Safety/Division of Homeland Security recognized the 

need to develop regular lines of communication for the purpose of engaging all communities to help achieve its mission. 

Primary Objective 

To reach out, coordinate, and engage the diverse communities throughout the 

State of Ohio in the mission of Ohio Homeland Security and on matters of importance and concerns to both sides for the purpose of keeping Ohio and her citizens 

safe and secure. 
25 

OHIO HOMELAND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT OFFICE MODEL 

Primary Goal ............................................. Establish trust and legitimacy between 

the law enforcement and the communities. 

Emphasis ................................................... Multilevel trust, genuine relationship between first responders and communities; empowering citizens to share 

information. 

Approach .................................................... Holding regular town hall meetings; 

open dialogue; advisory councils; 

imams’ councils; participation in cultural events. 

Community Engagement .......................... Increase cultural awareness; education; 

media campaigns; forums; active liaisons. 

Law Enforcement ...................................... Increase in cultural competency, increase of communities’ trust in first responders; form partnership with citizens. 

Community input in preventing 

radicalization, and violent extremism.

As trust with first responders increases, 

communities will invest in their security and the security the entire State. 

Desired Outcome ....................................... Communities’ feel confident and comfortable in helping first responders in 

the fight against terrorism. 

Long-term Goals 

1. Form advising councils that represent our communities to help build a society 

based on mutual respect, understanding, and cooperation. 

2. Engage the community to become part of Homeland Security mission of [sic] 

3. Prevention, protection, response, and recovery of acts of terrorism. 

4. Present terrorism awareness programs to the community through public 

speaking, workshops, and training and by engaging schools and workplaces in 

both public and private sectors. 

5. Encourage State-wide cooperation and build partnerships within the community and citizen groups. 

6. Participate in celebration and cultural events observed by our diverse citizens 

and groups. 

7. Nurture a relationship of mutual respect between the community and First 

Responders/Homeland Security. 

8. Hold regular meeting with the members of the community. 

9. Establish a task force representing community-based organizations that include leadership of the largest spectrum of society. 

10. Work as a bridge to promote harmony, cooperation, understanding, and mutual respect among different religious and cultural organization in the State of 

Ohio. 

11. Counter issues of stereotypes and profiling of communities like the Arabs, 

Muslims, and Somalis. 

12. Establish direct lines of communications with the leaders of the diverse 

groups. 

13. Create a working relationship with all mediums of communication to provide accurate information regarding cultural competence. 

14. Offer training workshops to public employees regarding diversity, cultural 

competence, and community engagement. 

15. Create a public speaking program that presents issues relate to the goals 

of the office. 

16. Research, write, post, publish, and make available to first responders literature on religious and cultural issues relate to communities. 

Action Plan 

1. Identify and list all cultural and religious organizations to work with. 

2. Identify and list leadership within these organizations. 
26 

3. Identify important members of these communities in private and public sectors. 

4. Choose contact persons with the necessary background for successful contacts. 

5. Contacts should be personal and slow in order to build trust in mission and 

establish communication and working relationship. 

6. Engage the leadership in as many meetings as possible to keep lines of communication open. Meetings’ agendas should establish major and specific matters 

that are important to both Government and communities. 

7. Explain the mission of the office and the role they play in working with 

homeland security. 

8. Elicit their input, cooperation, and consultation in OHS work. 

9. Coordinate and plan with community organizations to hold town hall meetings in which the largest possible number of communities attends to address 

their issues and concerns and OHS issues and concerns. Meetings should include representatives of various Governmental agencies and any agency of relevance or importance to both sides. 

10. Formalize these councils in appointments and media announcements. 

11. Councils should be divided into work groups to address issues of interest. 

12. Councils should select members among them as contact persons with 24 

hours contact access. 

13. Attend meetings and cultural events celebrated by the communities. 

14. Work closely with the communities to counter profiling and stereotyping. 

15. Enable the communities to represent themselves and make their voice heard 

when and where it’s needed. 

YOUTH LIAISON

General goals.—To engage the youth in a multitude of programs and activities for 

the purpose of preventing violence and terrorism by promoting good citizens less 

vulnerable to extremism and fanaticism. The following are some steps Ohio Homeland Security is taking to help in achieving this goal. They focus on citizenry, service, and leadership: 

1. Engage Muslim youth in civic duties and provide them with a sense of belonging to the larger community. 

2. Provide the youth with a voice in expressing and discussing their issues and 

concerns. 

3. Provide support through coordinating with other youth and service organizations to address issues not addressed by faith-based organizations. 

4. Establish leadership initiative to empower and activate youngsters in political and cultural life. This initiative can be achieved through organizing training programs and by eliciting consultation of specialists in this field. 

5. Create awareness of good citizenry with focus on rights and duties to confirm 

the concepts of ‘‘natural rights,’’ societal obligation, and social contract. 

6. Engage the Arab/Muslim American communities in working with youth. 

7. Engage the youth in discussing and debating ideologies of cultural and religious extremism with focus on alternative views and ramification of each possibility. OHS should develop literature to serve this purpose. Literature should 

include among other things mainstream Islam and its universal appeal. 

8. Establish a list of printed and digital sources with easy and open access to 

serve the youth on a wider range of issues. 

9. Establish a hotline for youth as an empowering tool of communication and 

participation. 

10. Provide educational and informational materials published by a various educational organizations on youth in schools and detention centers. 

11. Engage the youth in anti-drug campaigns and anti-gang activities. 

WOMEN LIAISON

General Goals.—In the workplace and in popular culture, Arab/Muslim American 

women seem to be either misrepresented or under-represented. While women organizations can’t be labeled as homogenous or monolithic, we recognize the importance 

of working with these groups for the important role they play in society and espe-
27 

cially the youngsters. Their role as parents is very important in education and preparing good citizenry. We feel the need to empower women to be active participant 

in issues like health, employment, harassment, discrimination, racism, misogyny, 

domestic violence, and religious issues in a free format. 

Action Plan 

1. Encourage women to participate in civic duties and public service. OHLS 

should coordinate with workplace in public and private sector to address sensitivity to faith-based employment. 

2. Create women task force comprising of members of professional women in 

both public and private sectors. This task force would work as an example of 

success to the general population and as a role model for Arab/Muslim American women. 

3. Support established women organizations and solicit their participation in 

achieving Ohio Homeland Security’s mission. 

4. Affirm equal opportunity employment for women of faith especially when Islamic attire or prayer creates issues in the workplace. 

5. Steer the establishment of issues-based women organizations to attract the 

participation of Muslim/Arab American women so a network of women’s voices 

is heard. 

6. Encourage intellectual and cultural participation for women. Ohio Homeland 

Security helps in providing women a podium for public speaking, writing, and 

publishing. 

7. Work with Arab and Islamic organizations to provide educational research on 

political, cultural, and religious issues. OHS should create a dynamic forum to 

continuously engage women to debate and discuss their issues. 

8. Create a manual detailing Muslim and Arab women past and present contributions to world cultures and civilizations. 

9. Coordinate between Arab/Muslim women organizations and local, National, 

and international women organizations for the purpose of increasing the cooperation and connection with women everywhere. 

10. Work with the popular media to enable women to express their views and 

debate their issues in public forums. 

11. Create various printed and digital resources to inform, communicate, and 

educate women on family, health, and maternal issues. 

12. Facilitate societal awareness and help for women and families who face social, cultural, or personal issues with no recourse. 

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS AND LEADERSHIP LIAISON

General Goals.—Recognizing the importance of communication and information, 

OHS works tirelessly to connect with and activate the Arab/Muslim communities 

throughout the State of Ohio to work closely with first responders to protect these 

communities in specific and the State of Ohio in general by creating effective security measures to prepare for and prevent terrorism. In the aftermath of 9/11, Arab 

and Muslim Americans came under scrutiny in the media, consequently, these communities became isolated, secluded, disconnected. Contacts with Arab and Muslim 

Americans were minimized. Working with community organizations and their leadership should re-connect Arab and Muslim Americans with society on one hand, and 

with first responders on the other. OHS will help in countering profiling, stereotyping, misconception, false information, and coordinate in providing accurate information on the cultures of these communities. 

The following steps are being used to achieve these goals: 

Action Plan 

1. Establish continuous lines of communication with the leadership of Arab/ 

Muslim American organizations. 

2. Develop a list of contacts with the community for the purpose of disseminating information as needed. 

3. Hold periodical and open town hall meeting to enable members of these communities and the law enforcement to ask and answer questions of concern to 

both sides. 

4. Form advisory councils with members representing the A/M communities in 

all cities of Ohio. These councils should advise and recommend to OHLS on 

matters of importance. 
28 

5. Work with communities in providing the correct knowledge of Islam and the 

Arabic culture by initiating educational programs, seminars, workshops, and 

public speaking on these issues. 

6. Advise and recommend to the school systems in Ohio on curriculum and information regarding both the religion and the cultures of the Middle East and 

other cultures. 

7. Encourage the communities to play an active in popular culture as members 

of diverse communities with rights, duties, and roles to play in American society. 

8. Work hard to minimize discrimination against Arab/Muslim Americans in all 

sectors including employment. 

9. Generate an interfaith dialogue among the willing to develop mutual respect, 

awareness, and understanding of all faiths. This should be part of a general 

plan to promote harmony among all communities including minorities and majority and how can they relate to each other. Mosques should be encouraged to 

extend themselves to the community through open house tours and dialogues. 

10. Engage the Arab/Muslim communities in frank and productive discussion on 

extremism and fanaticism. 

11. Develop a public campaign for the purpose of affirming the cultural inclusiveness and the right of every American citizen to ‘‘belong’’ to our society. 

12. Bridge the gap between Arab/Muslim American organizations and other organizations by steering cooperation and close working relationship between the 

diverse communities. 

LAW ENFORCEMENT LIAISON

OHS recognizes that Arab and Muslim American groups have great interest in a 

safer Ohio with proven support for a pluralistic society. Enabling first responders 

in Ohio to use all sources available to fight, prevent, and prepare for acts of terrorism, OHS should establish a dynamic connection with the diverse communities 

including Arab and Muslim Americans. The following steps are being used to 

achieve these goals: 

1. Familiarize the Arab/Muslim communities with law enforcement work, mission, rights, and duties. Exchange of tours and face-to-face meetings between 

the two sides should ‘‘humanize’’ the other and thus minimize misconception, 

stereotyping, and profiling. The image of law enforcement in the Middle East 

is very negative and many immigrants still have the same views even though 

they live in the United States. 

2. Develop cultural and religious awareness seminars and workshops to empower law enforcement with the correct information on do’s and taboos in world 

cultures. 

3. Coordinate with the law enforcement to develop informational public events 

as needed in which representatives of all agencies can educate the public and 

answer questions on law enforcement. 

4. Develop and distribute educational materials to all law enforcement agencies 

to help as a source on working with and interacting with Arab and Muslim 

Americans. 

5. Coordinate with law enforcement to maintain a balance between the fight 

against terrorism and the preservation of civil liberties. 

6. Collaborate with colleges and universities to develop courses on homeland security and certification to law officers throughout the State of Ohio. 

7. Coordinate town hall meetings to enable law enforcement to be part of panels 

to communicate issues and concerns to the Arab/Muslim American communities. 

8. Work as a liaison between the local mosques and law enforcement agencies 

for the purpose of working with the mosques and soliciting the help of imams 

in the fight against terrorism. 

9. Engage the American/Muslim groups and illicit their participation and recommendation in the ways to fight terrorism. 

10. Work with law enforcement and the media to counter negative stereotypes 

of these communities. 
29 

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE WORK ACHIEVED BY THE COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT OFFICE AT

OHIO HOMELAND SECURITY

1. Built a strong relationship with Arab, Muslim, and Somali, Hispanic, Latino, 

and Asian communities among others. This relationship is manifested in regular contacts, dialogue, and exchange of ideas. 

2. Formed Somali Imams’ Advisory Group that opened the mosque to our office 

and enabled us to engage the imams and the congregants in regular discussion 

of issues of interest and concern to both parties. 

3. Connected and still connecting first responders with critical communities by 

involving them in our efforts. First responders’ representatives are always 

present in our town hall meetings offering presentations and engage in a dialogue with members of the communities. 

4. Conduct cultural competence training to first responders, schools, and groups 

in public and private sectors. Our office just completed training 3,000 members 

of the Ohio State Highway Patrol. The same training was conducted for Police, 

Sheriffs, Terrorism Liaison Officers, Fusion Centers, and public and private 

schools. There is 100% increase in the number of workshops requested for the 

year 2010. 

5. Researched, published, and posted cultural guides on Arab, Muslim, and Somali cultures as a cultural reference to first responders and the public. Two 

more guides are in print at the present time, one on American culture and another one on Hispanic/Latino cultures. Both will be published and posted on our 

website: www.homelandsecurity.ohio.gov. 

6. Developed a good working relationship with Somali youth in Ohio. A Somali 

youth forum is planned this year to tackle issues of radicalization, violence, 

drugs, and gangs among members of the ‘‘lost generation’’ in Central Ohio. 

7. Held first interfaith conference for faith-based organizations in the State of 

Ohio to generate dialogue and mutual understanding among people of all religious and spiritual background. 

BENEFITS OF COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

1. Humanize law enforcement to the public and humanizes the public to first 

responders. 

2. Enable law enforcement to explain their work and role in the critical work. 

It also dispels a lot of misconceptions about law enforcement and other first responders. It demystifies and makes them approachable to the public. 

3. Inform the public on the Government’s efforts to counterterrorism. 

4. Allow the public to have an input in the debate. 

5. Empower communities to present their own issues without relying on commercialized or sensationalized media information. 

6. Create an environment conducive to good citizenry; treats citizens on equal 

footing and empowers communities to invest heavily in their efforts to keep 

their communities safe and secure. 

BENEFITS OF COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT TO FIRST RESPONDERS AND THE COMMUNITY

1. Effective tool for law enforcement to connect with various communities, especially Arab/Muslim Americans and Somalis. 

2. Gives law enforcement a direct access to accurate and unfiltered information 

on the culture of the groups they serve away from the images established in 

the popular culture. 

3. Provides law enforcement and the communities an opportunity to establish 

regular dialogue on issues of mutual interest. 

4. Empowers the communities to invest time, effort, and resources in security 

matters. 

5. Enables the Government to bring on-board communities who sometime feel 

excluded from the process or treated as outsiders. 

6. Allows the communities to have an input in decision-making, and partnering 

with first responders on critical issues like security. 

7. Creates trust and confidence among the citizens to work closely with first responders. 
30 

VALUE OF COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT EFFORTS

Community engagement doesn’t replace the traditional law enforcement work. It 

complements and enhances it. It’s another tool available to help advance their work. 

Investigative intelligence is still a very effective way to battle terrorism. However, 

communities that feel alienated or marginalized will be resentful and estranged 

from their citizenry. Proactive and engaging relationship with first responders will 

help build strong communities integrated, confident, open, and resistant to extremism and radicalism. What community engagement brings is trust-building and 

mutual respect between the communities and the first responders. It allows the 

Government to create an environment conducive to good citizenry and gives them 

a voice in the fight against terrorism. 

SOME MAJOR GAPS IN OUR CURRENT EFFORTS AND WAYS TO IMPROVE THEM

1. There are two conceptual flaws that affect our work: One flaw is the information we acquired on different communities like Arabs, Muslims, and their cultures. A good deal of the information came not from academic sources or reputable research but rather from media personalities who for a multitude of reasons commercialized and sensationalized these cultures. Inaccurate knowledge 

and misconceptions created mistrust and resentment to the Government’s efforts to work effectively with these communities. The other flaw is the notion 

that there are no moderate Arabs or Muslims to trust or to work with. Our experience shows otherwise. We have built cooperation and collaboration with numerous Somali and other Muslim communities throughout the State of Ohio. 

These flaws can hinder the work or the direction the Government seeks to fight 

terrorism and the ideologies that breed violence. We need to have another look 

and seek accurate information on the issues from independent sources, we also 

need to work with these communities and consider them part of the solution 

by empowering them to come on board and help us in this fight. After all, these 

communities can exert tremendous influence in their neighborhoods, and affect 

the debate on extremism and violent ideologies. 

2. We need to develop cultural competency training for first responders. One 

major problem we face in our work in Ohio is the conflicting and confusing information first responders are getting from agencies that surfaced the last 8 

years. These agencies present unreliable and un-researched information on 

Arab and Muslim cultures through training workshops offered to Government 

agencies. Many of these workshops contradict most of what our office offer to 

law enforcement. 

3. We need to broaden our approach at this critical time in this continuous war 

to include community engagement as an effective tool for the Government to 

utilize all the resources available including communities’ efforts. Also, we need 

to learn from the experience of other countries targeted by terrorism. Countries 

like England made tremendous advances in its anti-terrorism campaign by 

reaching out and engaging communities like British Muslim citizens. 

4. We need to allocate financial recourses to enable law enforcement to work 

with their respective communities. Ohio is still the only State in the Nation 

that developed an office solely dedicated to engaging and connecting with the 

communities. To succeed in these efforts, first we need to invest in this work, 

and second, we need to financially support and sustain it. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you to all the witnesses for staying within the 5-minute 

limit. It is now time for committee questions, and you can see we 

have quite robust attendance, so we will stick strictly to our own 

5-minute limit. 

I will begin by yielding myself 5 minutes. 

It won’t surprise anyone on this committee or at the witness 

table or in the audience that this subcommittee has been criticized 

and is again criticized today for the way we put on these hearings. 

We try very hard, I would just say to all of you, to have a diverse 

witness panel—we have a panel following you; I think you all know 

this—and to be careful that we are reflecting the many diverse 

views that exist in our country. 
31 

One of the criticisms today says that the committee is seeking 

input from a narrow viewpoint, one that is sympathetic to Islamist 

extremist organizations here in America. 

Well, I will state my own view. That is not my own view. I am 

not sympathetic to extremist organizations in America. I am very 

sympathetic to strategies of outreach that do two things, No. 1, 

build public trust, and No. 2, get that public to come forward and 

help us find bad elements in communities. 

Those bad elements will harm us. I am not sympathetic to the 

bad elements. But I think without building public trust, as Sheriff 

Baca said, we are not going to find the keys to preventing and disrupting plots against us. 

Does anyone disagree with that? 

Sheriff BACA. No. 

Mr. HOVINGTON. No, fully agree. 

Mr. ALOMARI. All agree. 

Ms. HARMAN. All agree. Okay. 

The second point I would make is that as the witnesses in prior 

hearings have said, extreme views are protected by our Constitution. We are not talking about extreme views. We are not talking 

about so-called radicals either on the left or the right of the spectrum. 

We are talking about people who intend to engage in violent behavior. Behavior is not protected—violent behavior—by our Constitution. Only the possession of extreme views is protected under 

our First Amendment. 

So I am not seeking politically correct language, but I am trying 

to articulate, perhaps inarticulately, my view that we are talking 

about violent behavior. Does anyone disagree with that? 

Mr. HOVINGTON. No. 

Sheriff BACA. No. 

Ms. HARMAN. Okay. So Let me ask you about the effectiveness 

of what you are doing. You all have described what you are doing. 

Could each of you tell me, just quickly, going down the row—give 

me an example of something you have prevented by the strategies 

that you are using, if you can do that, or something you have intercepted by the strategies that you are using? 

Let’s start at the left. 

Ms. SCHLANGER. My office is a civil rights office, and we are not 

in the business of developing sources and leads. What we think of 

ourselves as contributing to this—and I think we have been effective at that—is building an infrastructure of communication where 

we are building trust. 

So I am not going to be able to give you—if there has been leads 

that have come out of our engagement efforts, they don’t come to 

me, and I can’t—I can’t tell you about them. 

What I can tell you is that we bring a lot of people together who 

didn’t know each other before, and they do a lot of talking to each 

other that didn’t happen before. That happens in all of the communities that we go in. It is what we are about. 

Ms. HARMAN. Is it fair to say that that talking to each other 

leads to the building of trust, which leads to the ability to come forward—— 

Ms. SCHLANGER. I—— 
32 

Ms. HARMAN [continuing]. To you or others, perhaps more at the 

local level? 

Ms. SCHLANGER. Yes. I think it is fair to say that. I want to say 

also that we—what we try to do is demonstrate the fact that we 

are collaborative actors in the homeland security enterprise. So 

that is a really important thing for us. 

We care about those concerns that get expressed. We bring them 

back, because we are, in fact, collaborating to protect America. 

Ms. HARMAN. Let me just stress the last thing and then go down 

the line. We are all trying to protect America. This is not just a 

feel-good exercise. This is an exercise in protecting America. 

Mr. Hovington. 

Mr. HOVINGTON. Yes, with respect to what the FBI has done— 

with respect to what the FBI has done, we have established a community outreach team comprised of special agents, analysts, community outreach specialists, and personnel with language and 

other specialized skills to really reach out and understand how to 

engage the communities, because the vast communities that we engage with have various dynamics that you have to really understand and be able to relate to. 

Ms. HARMAN. But the question is: Have you been effective? Has 

someone come forward? Have you prevented some harm to America? 

Mr. HOVINGTON. Right. What this specialized team did was actually go out, meet with the Somali American community, and the incident that I am talking about—there was an inaugural threat— 

that we were able to reach back into the community because we 

built these relationships within the community. 

We were able to make a phone call, put together a group of individuals from within the community, and ask for their assistance 

and advise them of what some of our efforts were doing, from an 

investigative standpoint. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. As I recall, that threat, which many of 

us were briefed on at the time, turned out not to be credible after 

the fact, but certainly there was real information to believe that 

something might have happened. Is that correct? 

Mr. HOVINGTON. That is correct. 

Ms. HARMAN. Sheriff Baca. 

Sheriff BACA. Well, first of all, thank you for the question. There 

is a confidentiality part in the answer to any of these questions, 

when you say, ‘‘Well, what specifically have you ferreted out and 

how did you do this?’’ 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, you could describe it generally. 

Sheriff BACA. Okay. What we essentially believe—and this is 

really important to hear—intelligence gathering in itself on a domestic level is still an emerging reality. It is not something that 

has made its case entirely, and I don’t think the theories of intelligence are clear enough, even on the Federal level, vis-a-vis the 

local level. 

Having said that the Joint Regional Intelligence Center that we 

have is proactive. The LAPD and Sheriff’s department have 

counterterrorism units. We are ferreting out a lot of different cases. 

We have had over 450 cases that have evolved from sources within 

the community. 
33 

I don’t want to attribute them to any one aspect of the society. 

Ms. HARMAN. Okay. 

Sheriff BACA. But I will say this, that the theories of information 

gathering versus intelligence gathering is predicated on how well 

you have a relationship with potential sources. That is part of this 

testimony here, that we believe that a safe Muslim society is a 

participatory Muslim society. 

Through the participation, I can assure you that the channels 

of—like the father of Abdulmutallab—are going to happen, and 

they have happened. The problem is we are not going to sit here 

and tell you where, when, and how. 

Ms. HARMAN. I appreciate that. 

I have run over my time, so I don’t mean to be rude. 

Mr. Alomari—— 

Mr. ALOMARI. Yes, Madam—— 

Ms. HARMAN [continuing]. Very briefly? 

Mr. ALOMARI. Yes, Madam Chair, there is a couple things I could 

say. Although I said that our office really is not information-gathering or intelligence-gathering, nonetheless homeland security 

work obviously is to connect the communities with first responders 

and law enforcement. 

One of the things we did very effectively is really to build a 

strong relationship with the mosques. Now we have been holding 

regular town hall meetings with the imams and the mosque, and 

we connect them with law enforcement. As a result of that, there 

is this collaborative and cooperative effort. 

The second thing, really, we are focusing on the Somali youth in 

Ohio based on what happened in Minnesota. We really inspired the 

community, really, to work with us and tackle the issues as a preventive measure, and there is a lot of programs we are really working with—— 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

I apologize to my colleagues for running over my time. 

I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. McCaul. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

The National Intelligence Estimate came out with a report stating that the most effective weapon we have in the war on terror 

is the moderate Muslim. I think that is true both overseas and 

here in the United States. 

Before I ran for Congress, I was chief of the counterterrorism section in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Texas, and that was not too 

long after 9/11. Part of our strategy was to reach out to the Muslim 

community and talk to them. 

What I would like to know—and working with the Joint Terrorism Task Forces—what I would like to know from—particularly 

from the—Agent Hovington and Ms. Schlanger, and the sheriff as 

well, what connection do you have at all with the Joint Terrorism 

Task Forces today? 

Mr. HOVINGTON. There is a separation between—within the 

FBI—our operational side of the house and our community engagement side of the house. But we still have to have a working relationship, because our engagement efforts have to really focus on 

the overall mission of the FBI. 
34 

It is important where we have operations on the ground and we 

are impacting the community—the transparency that is needed 

and the relationships that is needed that go back into a community 

or to explain to the community from an education and awareness 

standpoint what our mission is, and that is very important. 

So we do work with our Joint Terrorism Task Forces, in particular in our field offices, but there is a separation. I just want to 

make sure that that is clear as well. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Okay. Following up on the Chair’s question, have 

you—any of you had a lead come out through community outreach 

which was then forwarded to the JTTFs for a potential investigation? 

Sheriff BACA. Yes. Yes, the Joint Regional Intelligence Center 

that was set up by Chief Bratton and myself is an all-source fusion 

center where we have representatives from airports, sea ports, key 

targeted areas, and Government, and in that organization an FBI 

agent is the head. 

Also, the Joint Terrorism Task Force question—I have deputized 

and Federalized deputies in that task force, as does the Los Angeles Police Department, and in the Joint Regional Intelligence Center, which is the field side of what we are doing below JTTF, we 

have a secret unit in there that literally has JTTF people hooking 

into the Federal sourcing. 

So the key is if anyone were to describe what we do in Los Angeles with cooperation, we, I think, are the epitome of Federal and 

local cooperation with all agencies. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, Sheriff, it sounds like you don’t have that 

sort of wall separation that, say, the bureau and—— 

Sheriff BACA. Not at all. 

Mr. MCCAUL [continuing]. The agencies have. 

Sheriff BACA. It is phenomenal that the—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. Yes. 

Sheriff BACA [continuing]. FBI sent tremendous directors historically to L.A.’s office, and I can say that they don’t hold anything 

back. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I think that is—and I think that is a good model. 

The question the Chair asked as well, an example of a terror plot 

that has been thwarted through community outreach—you mentioned the inauguration. Are there any other specific terror plots 

that have been disrupted? 

Mr. HOVINGTON. Not that I could discuss at this time. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Okay. No, I will take—perhaps in another forum 

we could discuss that. 

There were several warning signs in the Hasan case, and I will— 

with the limited time I have—which occurred just north of my district at Fort Hood, whether it was talking to the radical cleric in 

Yemen, whether it was business cards saying he is a soldier of 

Allah, whether it was his allegiances to the Koran, not the Constitution. 

His colleagues and his classmates saw a sort of radicalization 

process taking place, and yet it seems that this was never reported. 

I think if we are talking about community outreach or getting people to speak up—I mean, there were a lot of flags along the way 
35 

in the Hasan case where this potentially could have been prevented 

or disrupted. Unfortunately, that didn’t happen. 

Can anyone on the panel take on the question of, you know, how 

can we prevent something like that in the future and get people 

that know this radical behavior—get them to step up and talk to 

law enforcement about that? 

Sheriff BACA. Let me say an example. In one of the mosques in 

Los Angeles, right after 9/11, myself and other officials were in the 

mosque, and I was reading a Koran, and a young man walked up 

to me, and he looked at me, and he says, ‘‘You are forbidden to 

touch the Koran.’’ I said, ‘‘Well, since I can’t touch the Koran by 

your standard, why don’t you open up the cover?’’ In it was the 

imam of the mosque writing this message to me about the Koran. 

I said, ‘‘You know, it is guys like you that are jerks that are causing the bad reputation for people who come here to pray. You ought 

to be ashamed of yourself.’’ He walked out of there. 

Now, the key to stopping radicalism is you have to confront it, 

even if it manifests itself in just a simple little act like this. You 

know, the concept of intervention and prevention is not that they 

bought all the tools of the terrorist act but that you challenge their 

thinking at the point when the thinking was emerging. 

That is not quantified in intelligence reports. I have always said, 

and I have said it to the administration, the Obama administration, don’t just tell in intelligence reports what the threats are, tell 

us what the resources are around the threat that we could rely on 

instead of throwing cops into the fray or military into the fray. 

We have to come up with a more sophisticated response, and direct confrontation and revelation is the best. 

The other is the Lodi case, where the FBI sprung the Pakistani 

father and son that went to Pakistan, got radicalized, came back 

to Lodi, a farming community, and they just blew the lid on these 

guys. 

The biggest fear that terrorists have is to reveal that they are 

leaning in that direction. Once that happens, they are dead to the 

cause. I think a lot of that is not discussed in some of the literature. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Sheriff. 

I yield back. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I agree, 

this is an excellent panel. 

Ms. Schlanger, one of the challenges your predecessors had to 

deal with is somehow making your office more than an afterthought. I trust you have been empowered by the Secretary to be 

part of the entire engagement of DHS before policies are developed 

and not have to react after they have been implemented. 

Ms. SCHLANGER. Chairman Thompson, I thank you for the support of our office. 

Yes, I feel very much supported by the Secretary to be where I 

need to be and my staff as well, since I am only one person—for 

us to be where we need to be and do what we need to do to make 

sure that the Department carries out its statutory mission of secur-
36 

ing the Nation without diminishing the civil rights and civil liberties of Americans. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. The other question for our other 

three witnesses is to not just limit this notion of terrorism to the 

Muslim community. I am a southerner. We have a number of 

homegrown terrorists in my neck of the woods. Most of them are 

called Klansmen. 

I want to make sure that when we look at this whole issue of 

terrorism that we look at it in its totality and not just focus on a 

particular group of individuals in this country. What I would like 

to have is each representative kind of give me the broader view of 

your operation with respect to this whole notion of homegrown terrorism. 

Ms. SCHLANGER. We are very much interested in engaging with 

all of the communities that have concerns and issues with DHS activities and with domestic—with the—with the homeland security 

policies as they go forward. That is the way we focus our engagement activities. 

We try very hard to be a resource and available to talk to any 

of those communities that have those kinds of interests. 

Now, we don’t do work with the Klan. We don’t do work with any 

terrorist organization. That is not what our engagement activities 

are about. I know you know that. I just want to say it. 

We work with the community leaders who can be our partners 

in collaborating against that kind of thing, rather than trying to 

engage with people who have crossed over the line into violent extremism and persuade them to change their ways. That is just not 

what my office does. 

But we work hard with communities of all ethnicities, races, religions, to try to deal with their concerns about homeland security 

policy. 

Mr. HOVINGTON. It is very important to make sure that we engage with a number of different communities, because terrorism 

really is just fear, and that fear comes in different shapes, forms, 

and fashion depending on what environment that you are—that 

you are looking at. 

So whether you are talking about gang activity, whether you are 

talking about Klan activity, the bottom line—it is terrorism. That 

is one of the things I—we do at the FBI. We take a look at the various communities. 

I would say it is a customized outreach program. What I mean 

by that is we have 56 FBI field offices that serve, again, across this 

country, and they have to tailor their outreach efforts based on the 

demographics of the area of responsibilities that they serve. That 

is the only effective way to do engagement, because there is not one 

shoe fits all. 

So it takes into consideration exactly, Chairman Thompson, what 

you said about being from the South. Our southern offices have to 

take a look at what is terrorism and what is considered terrorism 

in the South or in a urban city. 

Sheriff BACA. I think your question is an important question. I 

think that those of us in law enforcement are required to uphold 

the highest standards of our Constitution and our Bill of Rights, 

civil rights and human rights. 
37 

In the sheriff’s core values, and everyone remembers it by heart, 

we are against all forms of racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, 

homophobia, and bigotry in all its forms. This is not a thing where 

we can allow any sympathies that deal in the extreme either way. 

Really, just harmony is one of the key elements of what we are 

trying to achieve, as well as interethnic and interracial harmony in 

Los Angeles. Because we are every nation there in this population, 

we are trying to set the bar higher to assure civil rights are respected. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Mr. ALOMARI. From the beginning, Congressman, we really realized that terrorism is terrorism regardless of the terrorist, regardless who is the victim. That is really what we carried in our mission at Ohio Homeland Security. 

Not only that, we went one step further. In working with the fusion center or the FBI or other first responders, we really—in their 

outreach efforts, in their presentations, we work with them closely 

just to include all the groups. 

In our culture competency training program—and I will be more 

than happy to share it with you—really we have a whole section 

really dedicated to all groups that really espouse all these views. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

I yield back, Madam Chair. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

There are three votes on the floor and 8—almost 9 minutes left 

on the first vote. But most people have not yet voted, so we will 

keep this going for a while. 

I would just observe one thing in response to this. I think we 

would all agree that outreach to communities needs to be diverse, 

and I applaud you all for diverse outreach. 

But it is also certainly accurate to say that much of the recent— 

many of the recent arrests and the attempts at acts on our homeland have come from Muslims. That doesn’t mean that the Muslim 

community is a problem, but it does mean that some members of 

the Muslim community are a problem and are potential terrorists. 

I am not shying away from saying that. I just want to be clear personally. 

Mr. Souder. 

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. 

I may be in a slightly unique position on the panel. Somehow I 

have four primary opponents who think I am too liberal, one of 

whom is a—— 

Mr. THOMPSON. If the gentleman will yield, I will be a witness 

that you are not. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. SOUDER [continuing]. One of the—— 

Ms. HARMAN. I was going to agree with them. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. SOUDER. One of them is a former KKK white supremacist activist who has declared. I also have a—my campaign—longtime 

campaign chairman, Zohrab Tazian, is Armenian and has faced, as 

an Arab American, discrimination. It is not that I don’t understand 

the basic premise that my—I believe that without contacts with the 

more moderate community we will not know who—I don’t know 
38 

who is in the mosque who is—who is radical. I believe that is the 

case. 

Now, here is where we really drill down. Are Hamas and 

Hezbollah terrorist organizations? Because almost all—or a high 

percentage of Middle Eastern countries have their stated goal as 

the destruction of Israel. Hamas and Hezbollah are huge organizations that are devoted to that. 

It is not just about whether somebody is a terrorist. It is also 

whether they fund terrorists. It is whether they are aiding and 

abetting and encouraging people to go become terrorists. 

We then move into a very difficult question of protected speech. 

Clearly, while there is protected speech, at some point in this debate there is a substantial difference between protected speech and 

Government officials going to fundraisers for organizations that do 

speech that is radical. 

Sheriff Baca, you have been 10 times to the fundraisers for the 

Council on American Islamic Relations, which even the FBI has 

separated themselves from. 

Sheriff BACA. I will be there 10 more times—— 

Mr. SOUDER. They have been cited by one FBI agent at least as 

a front for Hamas. The question is: At what point do you start giving legitimacy to organizations that fund Hamas? 

Now, in the Ohio Department of Homeland Security, that organization is one of seven listed who have either had ties to the Muslim 

Brotherhood or have been—used extremist rhetoric. 

In your brochure, you specifically list the Hamas positions on the 

occupation of—Israel’s occupation and oppression of Palestinians. 

You cite U.S. support for Israel. You cite the U.S. invasion and occupation of Muslim lands and support for oppressive regimes as arguments why people develop radicalism. 

But by putting those down without the counter arguments that 

you, in fact, then start to fuel whether our tax dollars and a lot 

of people’s tax dollars are, in fact, giving credibility to these organizations by listing them, by listing their arguments—that you, in effect, undermine moderate Muslims who stand up against those organizations. 

I would like to hear both of your explanations. 

Sheriff BACA. Well, I would like to see the brochure. I think your 

accusation is not only false—— 

Mr. SOUDER. That wasn’t yours. That was Ohio’s. 

Sheriff BACA. Well, you said it was mine—— 

Mr. SOUDER. No, no. I said you went to 10 fundraisers, and I 

said—— 

Sheriff BACA. No, but you just said—— 

Mr. SOUDER. No, I did not. I said—— 

Sheriff BACA. I heard you. 

Mr. SOUDER [continuing]. The Ohio Department of—— 

Sheriff BACA. Sir—— 

Mr. SOUDER [continuing]. Homeland Security. 

Sheriff BACA [continuing]. Dialogue here, I heard what you said. 

Now, I am an elected official, too, okay? 

Mr. SOUDER. The tape will show I said Ohio Department of 

Homeland Security did a brochure. 

Sheriff BACA. Well, who are you attacking, me or him? 
39 

Mr. SOUDER. Both. 

Sheriff BACA. Well, sir, let me say this. 

Mr. SOUDER. For different reasons. 

Sheriff BACA. I understand your fears better than you probably 

do. I have been in public office for 12 years and I have been in law 

enforcement for 45. I object to your characterization of me. 

Attacking people personally in public office is what—the very 

thing that helps spur radicalism, because it defeats the strategies 

that you weren’t listening to earlier because you didn’t come on 

time. 

Mr. SOUDER. I was here at the very beginning, sir. 

Sheriff BACA. All right. Well, then you heard what I said. Listen 

to what I say, and if you don’t like it, then we can talk about it. 

But don’t falsely accuse me of supporting—I have been to Israel 

more times than perhaps you have, so—— 

Mr. SOUDER. I asked you: ‘‘Did you go to 10 fundraisers?’’ and 

you said, ‘‘Yes.’’ 

Sheriff BACA. Let me tell you what I want to tell you, since you 

told me what you want to tell me. I am not afraid of what you are 

saying. I have been to Israel more times than you have. I was in 

Gaza when the incursion into the Gaza activity that the Israelis 

got into—I was there. 

Mr. SOUDER. Reclaiming my time—— 

Sheriff BACA. Where were you—— 

Mr. SOUDER. It is my time. 

Sheriff BACA. Where were you—— 

Mr. SOUDER. It is my time, not your time. 

Sheriff BACA [continuing]. Support Israel—— 

Mr. SOUDER. Madam Chair—— 

Ms. HARMAN. Yes. 

Mr. SOUDER [continuing]. It is my time. 

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Souder, I—— 

Sheriff BACA. Where were you—— 

Ms. HARMAN. Excuse me. I would like the witness to have a 

chance to respond, and then I will give you extra time—— 

Mr. SOUDER. Okay. 

Ms. HARMAN [continuing]. To respond to him. 

Sheriff BACA. Where were you when Israel needed an ally in 

local law enforcement? I was there. The security of Israel has always been at the forefront of my thinking. For you to associate me 

somehow through some circuitous attack on CAIR is not only inappropriate, it is un-American. 

I served in the United States Marine Corps. I put my life on the 

line for people to do what you just did to me. But I am not going 

to let you do that here. My record is clear. CAIR is not a terroristsupporting organization. That is my experience. That is my interaction. 

If you want to promote that, you are on your own. 

Ms. HARMAN. Let me let the Ohio witness respond to the comments about his brochure, and we do have a vote on following that. 

Mr. Souder, if you would like to say something briefly, that is fine, 

and then we will recess for the three votes. 
40 

* The information has been retained in committee files. 

Mr. ALOMARI. Yes, I really would like to see the brochures in 

front of me, because I really don’t think that—there was a lot of 

inaccuracies that were stated here. 

But I just want to say that in our brochures when we said—we’re 

trying to explain, as a matter of fact, so many things of what they 

say, and we are very careful to say they cite these reasons as to. 

There was no way that we mention Hamas, as a matter of fact, in 

these brochures you alluded to, Congressman. 

But we wrote about radicalism. We wrote about radical Muslim 

groups, and we explain that. So we definitely feel that we are balanced in presenting both issues. Under no circumstances we are 

sympathizers to any group. 

Ms. HARMAN. Let me suggest, Mr. Souder, that you provide that 

brochure for the record so that we can all see it. 

Mr. SOUDER. I would be happy to provide the brochure.* 

Ms. HARMAN. Would you like to respond? 

Mr. SOUDER. Yes. I made a very precise—and by the way, when 

a Member is questioning, it is his time, not the witness’s time. 

They already had their chance, and they need to understand that. 

Now, No. 1, I did not try to tie Mr. Baca, Sheriff Baca, to anything other than attending 10 fundraisers. Clearly, we disagree on 

CAIR. 

I do not question your patriotism. I do not question your goal 

here. I question the strategy of going to an organization that we 

disagree about. I was not trying to circuitously tie you to Ohio. 

In Ohio, I did not say that you don’t mention that these were the 

arguments that fuel radicalism. My question was much more precise and much more nuanced, and that is when you state what reasons they have without countering in the same brochure the 

counter arguments, you fuel and use the funds and power of a Government to basically give legitimacy to what are, in fact, the positions of Hamas, whether you said it or not. 

It is a nuanced argument. I think it is an important argument 

because what we have seen Europe do—and what we are concerned 

about the United States—in such a desperation to try to get legitimate information to basically throw Israel under the bus and—and 

start to not understand that Hamas and Hezbollah are increasingly 

connecting to other organizations. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Souder. 

We will recess for the duration of the votes. 

I would just like to say, as the Chair of this subcommittee, that 

it is my intention to be respectful to all the Members on this panel 

but also to be respectful to all the witnesses. Questioning is intended to engage you in a dialogue, speaking for me, and I would 

hope we could keep it in that—in that vein. 

These are tough issues. We all understand that. We are under 

lots of criticism all the time from outsiders who think we don’t do 

these hearings right. But it is certainly my intention to have balanced hearings and air the tough issues. 

To the Members, we are going to try to put on a hearing about 

the internet and its role in fomenting violent extremist behavior. 
41 

That is very controversial, but we are going to try to tackle it because it is out there and it is necessary. 

Thank you. The Ranking Member just said good. So everybody 

take a deep breath. We will be back for more questions. I thank 

you again for your participation. 

[Recess.] 

Ms. HARMAN. We will now recess—reconvene the hearing. Thank 

you all. Apologies for the House schedule. 

Mr. Dent is now—of Pennsylvania is now recognized for 5 minutes of questions. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thanks for conducting this 

hearing. 

Last week I, along with the rest of the world, was informed that 

the FBI was holding a Caucasian American woman since October 

on four felony counts, including conspiracy to kill in a foreign country and providing material support to terrorists. As you know, the 

woman I am referring to is Colleen LaRose, a/k/a ‘‘Jihad Jane.’’ 

I was even more shocked when I learned that she actually lived 

just a few blocks from my district office on Main Street in the 

quaint front-porch town of Pennsburg. That is a really lovely community—Norman Rockwell, wonderful place. That is where ‘‘Jihad 

Jane’’ is from, Pennsburg. 

In fact, my sister lives right in that area, close by, Pennsburg 

mail address. Never would I have imagined that homegrown terrorism was lurking literally in my family’s backyard. 

Let me state for the record that I am grateful for the tremendous 

job done by the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force in Philadelphia, 

as well as the invested residents in the surrounding community. 

I had the opportunity for a further briefing during my visit to the 

JTTF last Friday, and I certainly want to thank the FBI for making that opportunity available to me. 

Ms. LaRose was picked up largely because concerned citizens 

saw a YouTube video she posted on the internet and reported it to 

authorities. You know, once again, it was—a concerned, alert citizenry was our best defense in a situation like this. 

I also learned that—we all learned that another woman, Jamie 

Ramirez, a blond Caucasian mother from Colorado, was arrested in 

Ireland in connection with the ‘‘Jihad Jane’’ plot. She, too, was essentially radicalized over the internet, converted to Islam, and 

began posting messages on her Facebook profile page. 

So my questions are really simple. You know, No. 1, how does 

this happen? How do we stop it? I mean, that is really the issue. 

How do we balance the overwhelming desire to have a—a free and 

open internet against the threat of radicalization and homegrown 

terrorism? So I would like each of you to maybe comment on that. 

I think we all recognize the internet is a tool that is being used 

by terrorists to communicate, to recruit, to plan, to plot, to prepare, 

to train, and to—and to execute terror plots. So I would be curious 

to hear your comments. 

Mr. HOVINGTON. Thank you. That is a major challenge for us. 

Again, the internet being a very open environment—and of course, 

a lot of it falling over from universities that operate in that type 

of open environment. 
42 

It is a challenge to identify a lone wolf, and that is one of the 

biggest challenge that we face, and almost, I would say next to impossible without the help of communities and citizens that stand 

up and identify individuals. 

I think that is why it is also very important, in some of the earlier conversations that we had—is to emphasize community engagement is really about engaging ordinary people. It is about taking our 56 FBI field offices that have community outreach programs and making sure that they are reaching at the grassroots 

level. 

National type organizations are great. They are contacts that we 

should maintain contact with to receive information or if—anything 

that they report from the constituents that they have. 

But I think effective outreach has to really go to the arena of individuals identifying and being able to pick up the phone and calling the FBI or calling the State or local municipalities to report 

something that they just feel uncomfortable with. 

That is only going to come through building meaningful partnerships and relationships that are built on transparency and understanding. 

Sheriff BACA. Yes, it is a very important question. I think that, 

you know, our Joint Regional Intelligence Center and other intelligence-gathering mechanisms—we are surfing the net all the time. 

The question about this woman—you know, the characterization 

of what a terrorist is is something that we really need to spend a 

little more time on. My point of this—there are screwballs everywhere and that there are people who are attracted to something for 

reasons that are almost inexplicable. 

Every faith has had these kinds of people, including those that 

want to be a part of something they believe is a faith effort. It is 

very important in terms of just how we discuss the issues of fighting terrorism to not drag a religion into the acts of what human 

beings do. 

Religion has its own purpose and terrorism is not one of them. 

This woman somehow got into this mindset but clearly, I see it like 

the medical doctor at Fort Hood. He is a screwball. You know, he 

lost his brains. I don’t think that anyone would disagree with that, 

that human minds are fragile. 

So we surf the net. We have a decision to make whether you 

want to keep the chatter going or cut it off. What is amazing about 

technology, since America is a forefront leader on it, is that the 

servers for all these internets are coming out of our Nation. If we 

want to shut them off, all we have to do is call the company and 

say, ‘‘By the way, you have got an issue here,’’ and they will—they 

will cut them off. 

But the question is: Should we cut it off? Then what do you do 

with it once you know that it is a possible threat? 

Mr. ALOMARI. Thank you, Congressman. I think this is a really 

wonderful question. I really think that the internet is one of the 

most dangerous tools, obviously, to recruit people. But I think it is 

clear that many of these websites that we see, obviously, they promulgate different views which attracts a lot of folks. 

One thing is missing in the picture, in my estimate, which I mentioned earlier should be part of a comprehensive view, you know, 
43 

to the issue of terrorism, and that is really to empower Muslim 

communities to counter the ideas and ideologies that we see on the 

internet, at least all these unanswered ideologies that we see on 

the internet. 

They often are unanswered. In Ohio, for instance, we really have 

a couple of meetings in which we discussed, for instance, the recent 

fatwa issued by Sheikh ul-Qadri who really condemned suicide 

bombing and violence and terrorism. 

I think the Government should do a better job, really, to connect 

with a lot of Muslim leaders and organizations to help us really in 

this fight. There is a conceptual flaw that there are no moderate 

Muslims there, and I really believe that there are many of them. 

Ms. SCHLANGER. I don’t know if—since the time is out if you 

want to hear from me or not. 

Ms. HARMAN. We would be happy to hear from you. 

Ms. SCHLANGER. Thank you, Madam Chair. One of the things 

that we work very hard to do is cultural competency training for 

local and State law enforcement. I think the reason that that belongs in this mix is because it allows—an appropriately trained law 

enforcement agent can distinguish between what is concerning and 

what is not. 

So we try to be a part of that mix. But I want to agree that it 

is—it is our community partners who can be reliably informed by 

engagement efforts and empowered by them who really bear the responsibility to counter radical ideology, because as the Chair started us off saying, the Government has a business with violence, not 

with non—not with nonviolent radicalism. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Dent. 

The Chair now recognizes Ms. Clarke for 5 minutes. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to thank you for 

such a—such a very interesting hearing today. 

I am from New York, and so all of what has been stated here 

today really resonates with me. We are challenged in New York 

City with having such a very dense and diverse population, and 

how we communicate as New Yorkers to be able to uncover those 

amongst us who may seek to do us harm is always a challenge. 

We have been fortunate that a number of community and civicminded individuals have stepped up to the cause. Comes to mind 

a woman named Ms. Devorah Halberstam, and I don’t know if any 

of you have heard of her, but in 1994 her son was killed in a—an 

attack, a terrorist attack, on the Brooklyn Bridge. 

Ever since his death, she committed her life—and has been honored by New York’s FBI and will be honored here in Washington, 

so much so that she was able to have a law passed in New York 

State addressing comprehensive gun control laws for the State of 

New York. 

That is the type of activism that, unfortunately, an incident 

brings about but I think begins to open up the community to more 

dialogue around how we want to communicate with each other and 

find those who may be homegrown and disillusioned amongst us, 

as well as identify strangers in our midst, which is very hard in 

a place like New York, which is a gateway for individuals who are 

seeking to come to the United States to make it their home. 
44 

So my question for all of you are—is, you know, how can community groups and individuals engage local law enforcement in a consistent manner on their concerns without being seen as undermining their own communities from which they come? 

We have ethnic conclaves in New York, and no one wants to be 

seen as someone who either comes up with false accusations but 

also wants to be able to share information. What tools or what 

would you say the best way for individuals or community organizations to go about doing so? 

We have such an organization called the Council of People’s Organizations in Brooklyn which basically educates local Muslim 

American community leaders and clergy. But what would you say 

are some of the other tools that you have seen that are effective? 

Sheriff BACA. May I answer that? In the testimony that I provided as well as in this brochure—and I hope you have one—— 

Ms. CLARKE. Yes, I do. 

Sheriff BACA [continuing]. Public trust is what we are talking 

about. The concepts of public trust are such that you really need 

to work on the aspect of participation, not just going to lectures 

and meetings. Participation means the police have to learn to take 

advice. Advice can come from various councils, such as the one you 

have described. 

But in Los Angeles, we have Middle Eastern advisory councils. 

We have Iranian—that are made up of Iranians, Pakistanis, Armenians, Lebanese, people from the various ethnic and racial groups, 

including an interfaith council, and the objective, of course, is to exchange ideas and issues and fears and problems. 

A lot of people from the ethnic communities have fear of the police, and the first thing we have to do is knock that down. That 

won’t be done unless the police represent the highest standards of 

America’s laws. 

I mentioned earlier in my testimony it is the Constitution, the 

Bill of Rights, civil rights and human rights. Police that engage 

people in that vein of human rights and civil rights, as well as Bill 

of Rights and the Constitutional guarantees—then the public trusts 

them. 

So the concept of how to engage are multiple faceted concepts. 

But it is religion, ethnic, language, as well as racial. Thank you. 

Mr. ALOMARI. May I? I would like to echo what Sheriff Baca said, 

but I would like to go one step further by saying that one of the 

approaches that really worked for us in Ohio is the fact that we 

did—do not work in the communities only when there is a problem 

or an issue. 

It really is based on a genuine relationship that we built. It is 

dynamic. It is proactive, engaging, and really covers multitude of 

issues. We are really listening to the issues and concerns of the 

communities and we would like them to listen to our concerns and 

issues. 

It took us a long time to build trust because many of the recent 

immigrants and refugees—they come from countries where they 

distrust the Government and law enforcement. So it was a really 

lengthy process for us, and we had to prove ourselves. We succeeded by really giving them a voice. 
45 

One thing we found out right after our office was established— 

we did a survey that we found out that there is a semi-consensus 

in the community that they feel that they have been treated and 

dealt with as outsiders. 

Our program wants to bring them on board. They are included. 

So we had an inclusive approach. So the issue here is in our culture competency training we tell first responders we really suggest 

to build relationship with the mosque, with the organization, with 

the youth, with the women. 

Go there, stop by, say hello. When there is celebration, say congratulations. But do not really just stop there. A multitude of 

issues have to be covered. Thank you. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Ms. Clarke. 

No other Members are—have returned, so I am going to excuse 

this panel. 

I just again want to observe that the discussion here, while it focuses on better understanding of diverse communities, is really intended to help all of us find those few people amongst us who 

would—who intend to do harm to our country. 

One of the corollaries of that is by finding those people within 

diverse communities we keep those communities safe, because we 

remove the few people there who would intend harm to all of us, 

including members in their own community. 

So I just want to make sure we are focused on the intention here. 

This is the Homeland Security Committee. This is the Intelligence 

Subcommittee. It is certainly my view, as I stated at the outset, 

that accurate, actionable, and timely intelligence is the way we prevent and disrupt plots. 

My view is that a very sensible tool in that effort is building 

trust relationships with communities. I think you all agree with 

that, and I want to thank you for you testimony and hope that you 

will continue to work with us as we thread our way through very, 

very difficult issues that raise Constitutional concerns and that 

offer some real opportunities for making real progress in the effort 

to protect the homeland. Thank you very much. You are excused. 

I would like to call the second panel. 

Everybody ready? Thank you all and thank you for your patience. The good news is that Congress is in recess for the St. Patrick’s Day lunch. Happy St. Patrick’s Day, everybody. But that 

means we will have an uninterrupted time to hear from you and 

ask you our questions. 

I now welcome our second panel of witnesses, Mr. Elibiary— 

there he is—is president and CEO of the Freedom and Justice 

Foundation, F&J. The foundation facilitates cooperation between 

State and local law enforcement and the Texas Muslim community. 

In 2005 Mr. Elibiary spearheaded the formation of the Texas Islamic Council, made up of Muslim congregations, with over 100,000 

members, and it is the largest Muslim community in Texas. 

Mr. Elibiary was a 2008 to 2009 fellow at the American Muslim 

Civic Leadership Institute run jointly by the University of Southern California and Georgetown University. 

A National security expert, he has recently consulted with the 

Global Engagement Group at NCTC in the—during the Obama ad-
46 

ministration, is a contributor for counterterrorism issues to national news organizations such as CNN and Fox. 

Professor Ramirez teaches at Northwestern School of Law where 

she lectures on criminal justice, community partnerships, and law 

enforcement. She serves as the executive director of the Partnering 

for Prevention and Community Safety Initiative, PFP. 

PFP fosters communication between law enforcement agencies 

and the American Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities. 

Partnering for Prevention has published best practices studies for 

community engagement as well as case studies of select cities in 

the United States and Great Britain. 

Mr. Ervin—how are you, Clark? 

Mr. ERVIN. Good to see you. 

Ms. HARMAN. Good to see you, too. I understand that someone 

to my left had an old association with you. Is that true? 

Mr. ERVIN. That is exactly right. 

Ms. HARMAN. I won’t reveal what that might be. 

Mr. Ervin is the director of the Aspen Institute’s Homeland Security Program. The Homeland Security Program works to heighten 

public awareness of our Nation’s continued vulnerability to terrorism and to persuade the Nation to take necessary steps to secure our homeland. 

Prior to holding this position, Mr. Ervin served as the first inspector general of the Department of Homeland Security, and a 

very courageous person in that role. He also served previously as 

inspector general in the Department of State. 

In addition to his work for the institute, Mr. Ervin is an on-air 

analyst and contributor for CNN, where his focus is on homeland 

security, National security, and intelligence. 

Without objection, your full statements will be inserted in the 

record. I would ask you to summarize in 5 minutes or less. 

Now I ask Mr. Elibiary to begin. 

STATEMENT OF MOHAMED ELIBIARY, CO-FOUNDER, THE 

FREEDOM AND JUSTICE FOUNDATION 

Mr. ELIBIARY. Thank you very much, Honorable Chair Harman 

and Ranking Member McCaul and the other Representatives who 

will probably be joining us later. 

Basically, my comments are going to focus on system engineering 

challenges that have hampered our communities’ collaboration with 

law enforcement on advance counterterrorism issues, like interdiction, busting up terror plots, and the title of this hearing. 

We feel that the issue of homegrown extremism plots is a serious 

one, but we also caution that it is not a pandemic and that we 

should advance reforms very carefully around this issue. 

First, I would like to say that our group feels very strongly that 

securitizing the relationship between law enforcement and American Muslim community would end up becoming counterproductive 

and could actually replay some of the most troublesome aspects of 

the 1960s and 1970s and today cause some very devastating global 

consequences. 

We have advocated for years that our homeland security policies 

in the CVE, or combating violent extremism, sphere are often 
47 

counter-productive, as I mentioned, and feed into the very alienation that they try to alleviate. 

Two examples of this is that while the Government has publicly 

claimed a desire for partnership with the mainstream American 

Muslim community, law enforcement has been left only offering the 

community a conduit to inform on community members of concern. 

Another example is that while not every radicalization problem 

is a nail, our use of the FBI hammer certainly frames all problems 

as nails in the eyes of many in the community. 

The FBI has been doing a tremendous job, and I am not ragging 

on them or anything, and myself, as the vice president of the FBI 

alumni association for the Dallas and North Texas region, can attest to the hard work that a lot of these men and women have done 

over the years and continue to do to keep us all safe. 

There are, however, structural problems that we need to explore 

if we want to see that higher level of cooperation I mentioned earlier. 

For example, low-hanging fruits—these are potential recruits 

that arrive at this category various different ways, to violent extremism movements. They are a security risk and therefore cannot be 

left unmonitored by law enforcement, especially the FBI. 

When one explores the seemingly shrinking ‘‘radicalization process’’, which I put in quotes, over the previous few years, ending 

with Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab being less than 6 months, one 

can appreciate the pressures that the bureau must conduct its 

work under. 

There is a good deal of anecdotal evidence, however, that some 

bureau field offices, in response to such pressures, have elected to 

increase their surveillance of religious institutions or places where 

this pool might be assumed to congregate, as well as use the technique of agent provocateurs fairly aggressively. 

There are more subtle techniques that can be used to neutralize 

such unacceptable security vulnerabilities, but they do not lie within the FBI. I would strongly recommend that they do not be created within the FBI. 

Because this kind of work essentially is going to be—it needs an 

iron fist inside of a velvet glove. As one who has worked many a 

times with JTTF squads around not just Texas but elsewhere, 

there is a—I am seeing that my time is running down. 

So basically, I will move on to my other points, but this issue we 

can explore later, about where it has worked and where currently 

some examples with the JTTFs are impossible for us to pull off in 

the community. 

I would like to also say that the issue of the moderate and mainstream Muslims needs to be explored because that narrative framing is often counterproductive in getting as many people as—I 

mean, Sheriff Baca mentioned earlier to engage. 

Our goal is countering violent extremism. The counterideological 

work needs to be left up to the community. We need to have more 

confidence in our democratic system and its institutions to be able 

to withstand those challenges from foreign ideologies. 

All right. So in conclusion, what I would like to say is that we 

have—we don’t feel that the Government should adopt a com-
48 

prehensive countering violent extremism strategy or a counter 

radicalization strategy, as it was called several years ago. 

But we do think that there needs to be a lot of micro strategies 

that end up being coordinated, and we identify eight different areas 

where those need to happen. The one critical one that I think you 

guys are going to want to eventually delve into is the interdiction 

issue, which—my time is up now, but we can explore later. Thank 

you very much. 

[The statement of Mr. Elibiary follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MOHAMED ELIBIARY

MARCH 17, 2010 

Honorable Chair Harman, Ranking Member McCaul, and other honorable Representatives, it is truly an honor to testify before your committee today at the invitation of Chairman Thompson. In my testimony before you, I will attempt to share 

a mainstream community assessment, as well as an assessment of the current ‘‘systems engineering’’ challenges subverting more effective cooperation across the various agencies. In closing, I hope to offer some practical suggestions as next steps 

for this committee and Congress to examine. In summary, we feel this hearing’s 

topic is important, very timely, and part of safeguarding our communities. We feel 

the issue of homegrown terrorism plots is a serious one, but would caution that it 

is not a pandemic and we should advance reforms cautiously. 

INTRODUCTION

First let me start out by outlining that our group feels strongly that ‘‘securitizing’’ 

the relationship between law enforcement and the American Muslim community 

would be counter-productive and could actually replay the most troublesome aspects 

of the 1960s and 1970s with more devastating global consequences. I have advocated 

for years that our homeland security policies in the countering violent extremism 

(CVE) sphere are often counter-productive and feed into the very alienation they try 

to alleviate. 

For example, while the Government has publicly claimed a desire for a ‘‘partnership’’ with the mainstream American Muslim community, law enforcement has only 

offered the community a conduit to ‘‘inform’’ on community members of concern. Another example is that while not every radicalization problem is a nail, our use of 

the FBI hammer certainly frames all problems as nails. The FBI has been doing 

a tremendous job, and, as vice president of a non-profit associated with the Bureau, 

I can attest to the hard work of those thousands of men and women keeping us safe. 

There is however structural problems worth resolving if we truly wish to see a higher level of cooperation between the Government and communities in disrupting terror plots. Two examples are: 

1. Low-hanging potential recruits for violent extremist/terrorism movements are 

a security risk and therefore cannot be left unmonitored by law enforcement, 

especially the FBI. When one explores the seemingly shrinking ‘‘radicalization 

process’’ over the previous few years, ending with Umar Farouq Abdulmuttalib 

less than 6 months ago, one can appreciate the pressures the under which the 

Bureau must conduct its work. There is a good deal of anecdotal evidence that 

some Bureau field offices, in response to such pressures, elected to increase 

their surveillance of religious institutions and expand their use of more coercive 

techniques such as Agent Provocateur Informants. More subtle techniques to 

identify and neutralize such unacceptable security vulnerabilities as low hanging potential violent extremism recruits are available, but not within the FBI. 

While these subtle techniques are not being utilized, the mainstream community is left bewildered, confused, and distrustful of enhanced community collaboration on CVE. 

2. Either through a civil liberties office at DHS or a community relations office 

at the FBI, grievance redress is a major hurdle to community relationship-building on advanced CVE efforts. During the recent January 20 meeting with the 

DHS Secretary, mainstream community leadership clearly relayed the grassroots sentiment that not a single category of community grievances with DHS 

has ever been fully ‘‘resolved.’’ Unlike in other Western nations such as the 

United Kingdom (UK), in the United States, there are clear operational policy 

firewalls at major law enforcement agencies and the community relations con-
49 

duits engaging with communities across the country. This divide is not lost 

upon the communities whose assistance is most needed to disrupt terror plots 

and simply feeds the perception that these communities are to be ‘‘managed’’ 

as a ‘‘suspect pool’’ and not ‘‘trusted’’ as true ‘‘partners.’’ 

At the request of our Government I spent the past week in London, at a conference and at U.S. Embassy meetings, analyzing the issue of on-line youth 

radicalization and CVE. It would be a shame for us to not heed the hard lessons 

learned by the U.K. Home Office, and others, in terms of their outreach methods 

in their PREVENT Strategy, which is the CVE portion of the U.K.’s Counter-Terrorism (CT) CONTEST Strategy. 

In spending time with some U.K. Muslim leaders, visiting the London Central 

Mosque and meeting with U.K. Think Tank Radicalization Researchers, the message was clear across the board that Government must first strive to ‘‘do no harm’’ 

and tread very softly. That is the attitude we have consistently shared with various 

intelligence and law enforcement agency officials, including a couple of years ago at 

the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC)-sponsored working conference with 

U.K. intelligence officials, subject matter experts, and select community leaders on 

what Counter-Radicalization lessons the United States can draw from the U.K. Prevent model. We reiterate this cautious tone here today, but would like to remind 

the subcommittee that Congress should not legislate a comprehensive U.S. CVE 

Strategy, because that will surely ‘‘securitize the relationship.’’ However, by doing 

so, we can improve many other issues by promoting the establishment of ‘‘coordinated micro-strategies.’’ 

The U.S. Government deserves some credit for recognizing and moving to address 

several CVE blind spots in the United States’ current CT strategy and the overarching National Security (NS) strategy. Congressional authorization designated the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to be the lead department to counter ideologically-driven violence and stems from the 9/11 Recommendations Reform Act of 

2007 (HB1) and subsequent Presidential Executive Orders. While we strongly advise 

against a Government-wide CVE Strategy, we feel that DHS should establish its 

own CVE Strategy for a number of reasons. 

1. Legally, DHS is currently mandated to, and has previously attempted to, 

craft such a strategy unilaterally without public disclosure and community 

input. 

2. To align the various entities both within and outside DHS, such as fusion 

centers, so they are on an effective, constitutionally compliant course in this 

growing area of law enforcement concern. 

3. To develop the subject matter expertise on CVE sorely needed by the Government on what works and what does not in the United States. 

4. Without an ‘‘official’’ CVE Strategy within DHS, the Department is effectively 

executing a strategy that is unfocused and counter-productive at times. 

Our foundation, as outlined in the November 2009 Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report on Terrorism Information Sharing via the Nationwide Suspicious 

Activities Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI), has been a leading proponent of adopting proven community-oriented policing in the domestic CT sphere. We worked with 

the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s (ODNI) Program Manager for the 

Information Sharing Environment (PM–ISE) on multiple initiatives improving information-sharing, analytical capacity, and community relations. Two upcoming developments along these lines will be a definition of ‘‘radicalization’’ for the State and 

local law enforcement community as well as the ‘‘Building Communities of Trust 

Initiative’’ best-practices recommendations report, both expected to be released by 

April 2010. 

HIGHLIGHTS OF RADICALIZATION DEFINITION

Defining ‘‘radicalization’’ for the law enforcement (LE) community—ODNI’s PM– 

ISE release at National Fusion Center Policy Conference (February 2010) with full 

public release expected by April 2010. 

• William H. Webster, Chairman, Homeland Security Advisory Council: ‘‘tending 

or disposed to make extreme changes in existing views, habits, institutions or 

conditions.’’ 

• Non-conformity to mainstream perspectives is protected by the First Amendment and according to ISE SAR Functional Standard Version 1.5, First Amendment-protected activities should not be considered ‘‘suspicious’’ ‘‘absent 

articulable facts and circumstances that support the... suspicion that the be-
50 

havior observed is not innocent, but rather reasonably indicative of criminal 

activity... ’’. 

• Government communicating an assumption that violent extremism views are 

supported by the minority community creates a public perception that the minority community supports violent extremism and undermines the relationship 

between the community and law enforcement. 

• When First Amendment freedoms (speech and assembly) are unconstitutionally 

used as grounds for launching investigative actions, then effective ‘‘counterradicalization’’ efforts are undermined and the ability of violent extremists to 

target society is actually made easier. 

Effective and constitutionally compliant CVE policy recognizes that there is a division of labor between the United States’ Government (USG) and the community. 

This healthy division of labor is explained by the pie chart below where the Government acts when the ISE functional standard metric is met and the community challenges the ideological struggles associated with violent extremism independently. 

DHS’S CVE POLICY FORMULATION EVOLUTION
51 

ROADMAP FOR MOVING FORWARD

We believe that eight (8) different micro-strategies are needed by the United 

States to effectively address the vulnerabilities recently highlighted by homegrown 

violent extremism cases. 

1. U.S. Violent Radicalization Interdiction Framework.—Currently, there is a nonstandardized ad-hoc protocol covering the point at which the community’s efforts 

end and the Government, primarily through law enforcement, begins. For most communities the only option before them is to call the FBI, which is often not the most 

effective method. In researching this issue, including discussions with community 

leaders and the FBI, CT investigators, as well as our foundation’s experience working on successful and unsuccessful violent radicalization interdiction cases, we believe that such an effort will involve multiple agencies and the coordination of multiple Congressional committees. 

In short, we lack in the United States, a program like the United Kingdom’s 

CHANNEL Project. This is an effort that needs to be an ‘‘iron fist inside a velvet 

glove,’’ and as we previously shared with folks at the NCTC, it requires a degree 

of interagency ‘‘operational coordination’’ that no entity within the Government is 

currently capable of performing. So we are recommending that both DHS and the 

various Muslim mainstream groups around the country continue their engagement 

efforts, but recognize that this issue will need to be addressed sooner or later within 

DHS. 

2. Law Enforcement Information Sharing.—As we shared in the CRS Report referenced above and the three primary offices on this issue (DHS, FBI and PM–ISE), 

we feel that there are some clearly identifiable schisms in the system needing to 

be addressed. Since this issue is not the focus of this hearing, we won’t elaborate 

more here. 

3. Interagency Strategic Communications Working Group.—The United Kingdom’s 

Home Office has a department specifically tasked with coordinating the messaging 

between the various key agencies with a direct impact on CVE work. In the United 

States, we need an inter-agency coordinating entity that would put DOJ–FBI, DHS, 

the Department of State, and other agencies’ public affairs offices on a similar wave 

length. 

4. State-Level Law Enforcement Engagement Strategies.—Across the country, the 

Federal Government has thus far failed State, local, and Tribal law enforcement 

agencies in providing clear guidance on their role in CVE and how best to execute 

that role using community-oriented policing principles. Thankfully, in the near future, the ODNI’s PM–ISE office will be releasing such guidance to State and local 

law enforcement and fusion centers in a report compiling the lessons learned from 

the multi-city ‘‘Building Communities of Trust Initiative.’’ 
52 

5. Effective DHS & DOJ Redress Processes.—As mentioned earlier, the lack of an 

effective redress process leaves a minority community with one of three conclusions 

to draw: That the authorities don’t care, are incompetent or intentionally wish to 

humiliate the community. Any of these conclusions are severely detrimental to 

building up the trust needed to deepen community-law enforcement collaboration on 

advanced CT efforts such as terror plot disruption. 

6. Social Delinquency/Prevention/Integration Programs.—While these programs 

do not directly impact the hard-core radicalized individuals pursuing a terror plot, 

they are essential in creating a healthy eco-system within communities and restraining the growth of violent extremism movements. The United States has a long 

tradition of immigrant integration through a multi-generational identity formulation 

process. It is clear that today at least two factors are slowing down this natural 

process. The first is that with the communications revolution, old world connections 

and politics resonate within the immigrant psyche longer. The second is that our 

country is currently engaged militarily in multiple conflicts overseas with a direct 

threat to the homeland consistently highlighted in the public discourse. 

Both of these challenges will drive the multi-decade developed American Muslim 

identity to expand its narrative within American Muslim communities to include addressing geo-political conflicts across the majority-Muslim regions globally. To 

achieve this, non-Muslim communities and policymakers must support the expansion of the geo-political public discourse space, especially within locations where the 

Muslim identity group might congregate (ex. Mosques). 

We should remember the resilient strength of our democracy and not fear any 

public ideological discussion, because it is when such discussions are shut down 

within brick and mortar locations that they go underground on the internet. Organized communities cannot be reasonably expected to disrupt the counter-ideological 

messaging of violent extremism networks when these communities’ patriotism will 

be called into question. We have a long history in this country of mitigating radical 

ideologies with various youth and immigrant integration programs (ex. Boys Scouts/ 

Girl Scouts, Big Brother/Big Sister, etc.), and we can simply expand such programs 

to include the current generational and cultural breakdown occurring within many 

Muslim families. 

7. U.S. Congress Engagement & Information Sharing.—The Executive Branch’s 

law enforcement agencies driving CVE policy should become more engaged with the 

Legislative Branch and share an annual report not highlighting its successes but 

the self-identified shortcomings in working with communities to counter violent extremism. Such an assessment, while politically sensitive, would aid Congress to 

focus on the hurdles primarily hampering closer community collaboration to disrupt 

terror plots. 

8. U.S. Public’s (Media, Academia, etc.) Engagement.—Congress should work with 

DHS to fund competitive grant programs for academic institutions to conduct factfinding missions at the grassroots level on improving community-law enforcement 

cooperation. Similarly, as with the engagement of Congress (in No. 7), the Executive 

Branch’s inter-agency strategic communications coordination office (in No. 3) should 

share their research with mass media trade associations and journalism schools to 

create a ripple effects beyond the Government’s reach. This would not be ‘‘guidance’’ 

from the Government to the media, but simply a window for the media, and by extension the public, into how our violent extremism enemies capitalize on our messaging. 

CONCLUSION

I’d like to thank the subcommittee once more for inviting me to share our experiences in struggling to find the right formula to advance community-law enforcement 

cooperation in the mutual goal of disrupting terror plots. When we started years 

ago, we were quietly advised that we were attempting to address an issue, homegrown violent extremism, that doesn’t really exist, or worse yet, was part of President Bush’s War on Islam. Though it was a slow slog in the beginning, I feel fairly 

confident that the mainstream American Muslim community assets are slowly shaking off deep-seated fears, stemming from some post-9/11 law enforcement efforts, to 

mobilize with confidence and address the challenges, and improving our country’s 

counter-terrorism architecture in the process. On a daily basis, I see a network- and 

resource-rich community wanting to help make our law enforcement agencies become more effective, but sadly, it is not so easy to connect sometimes with the management of these agencies. Disrupting terror plots is something both law enforcement and the community have proven multiple times is achievable. 

Lastly, I’d like to publicly commend the Council on American Islamic Relations 

(CAIR) for being brave enough to step forward and allow us to facilitate the coopera-
53 

tion with the FBI concerning the recent disappearance case of 5 young men to Pakistan from Alexandria, Virginia. CAIR, like numerous other community groups 

who’ve requested us as a liaison between them and law enforcement on sensitive 

cases, knew of our previous interdiction efforts with American Muslim youth. To 

their credit, despite the overwhelming political assault they’ve weathered since 

9/11, they recognized that the community’s interests are safeguarded when community leaders act with an objective and nuanced understanding of the law enforcement community. The same needs to be achieved from within the law enforcement 

community if we are to truly advance from our current ad-hoc state to one of ‘‘operational coordination’’ between the two communities in disrupting terror plots. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Ramirez. 

STATEMENT OF DEBORAH A. RAMIREZ, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PARTNERING FOR PREVENTION AND COMMUNITY 

SAFETY INITIATIVE, NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL 

OF LAW 

Ms. RAMIREZ. Madam Chair, Members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for giving me the time to testify this morning. 

The best way to obtain community information needed to thwart 

terrorism threats is by applying community policing techniques to 

counter terrorism. Homegrown Muslim terrorists are likely to reside in Muslim communities. Muslim terrorists from abroad are 

likely to conceal themselves in those same communities. 

We are blessed in the United States with a Muslim population 

that, with very few exceptions, is committed to combating terrorism. But we failed to take advantage of this blessing and to develop a systematic strategy to obtain and use community information to thwart terrorism and to fight extremism. 

Our British counterparts, having learned the lessons of the 2005 

bombings, have made enormous efforts to develop such a systematic strategy, which they appropriately call a PREVENT strategy. 

To be blunt, they are miles ahead of the U.S. law enforcement, 

whose efforts in this regard are local rather than National. We can 

learn from the British example. 

The benefits of such a strategy can and should be measured in 

terrorist acts averted and lives spared. The British first reaped the 

benefits of their strategy in April 2008, when members of a U.K. 

mosque went to local law enforcement with information about Isa 

Ibrahim, a student who planned to blow himself up with a suicide 

vest. 

He was arrested. He was convicted. This was the first time that 

a tip from the Muslim community in the United Kingdom led to a 

major terrorism arrest. 

We tasted the fruits of our own community outreach efforts in 

December 2009, when the Council on American Islamic Relations, 

CAIR, put families in touch with the FBI to report that their sons 

had left for Pakistan with the intent to join the fight against America. This tip led to the arrest of the young men in Pakistan and 

spared their lives as well as lives of soldiers. 

Because community information can thwart terrorist threats, it 

is an essential tool to put in the counterterrorism tool box. Yet in 

the United States today, the few community-law enforcement partnerships focused on preventing terrorism, hate crimes, and extremism are all operating independently of each other, without any 

central coordination or collaborative structure. 
54 

There are no National programs to provide the training, protocols, tools, and research necessary to demonstrate to other communities how to begin, nurture, sustain, and strengthen these efforts. 

Nor is there a central clearinghouse for information about such 

efforts, which could be used to disseminate best practices, promising practices, and lessons learned. 

More fundamentally, we lack a National collaborative infrastructure in which to organize these efforts. Some are done by the sheriff’s office, DHS, FBI. We need a single unified structure. 

How could we design a coordinated infrastructure for this purpose? We would need the FBI’s 56 field offices to meet on a regular 

basis with community members to develop local collaborative strategies for preventing terrorism, extremism, and hate crimes. 

In those meetings, bridges of trust and communication need to 

be built. Specifically, we need them to create community message 

centers staffed by agents trained to evaluate the reliability and 

credibility of community information. 

This means we have to train the community members about 

what to be on the lookout for. We have to inform them about who 

to call. We have to designate officers on how to evaluate community information and create protocols for responding to these kind 

of tips. 

To make this work, we need a National training and resource 

center to coordinate and support these efforts, and such a center 

needs to be located in an academic environment that is neutral and 

detached and can provide expertise to both law enforcement and 

the community about how best to collaborate. 

In closing, one may ask, ‘‘Why should we do this?’’ Because if 

there were another attack, all of us would want to say we did everything we could to prevent it. But if we fail in this room to garner the political will to create this infrastructure, we can’t say that. 

[The statement of Ms. Ramirez follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DEBORAH A. RAMIREZ

The best way to obtain the community information needed to thwart terrorist 

threats is by applying community policing techniques to counter-terrorism. Homegrown Muslim terrorists are likely to reside in Muslim communities; Muslim terrorists from abroad are likely to attempt to conceal themselves in these same communities. We are blessed in the United States with a Muslim population that, with 

very few exceptions, are committed to combating terrorism. Yet, we have failed to 

take advantage of this blessing and develop a systematic strategy to obtain and use 

community information to thwart terrorism and fight extremism. Our British counterparts, after the painful lessons learned from the London subway bombings in 

2005, have made enormous efforts to develop such a systematic strategy, which they 

aptly call their PREVENT strategy. To be blunt, they are miles ahead of U.S. law 

enforcement, whose efforts in this regard are local rather than National. We can 

learn from the British example. 

The benefits of such a strategy can be measured in terrorist acts averted and lives 

spared. The British first reaped the benefits of their strategy in April 2008, when 

members of a mosque in the United Kingdom contacted local police and provided 

information about Isa Ibrahim, a student who planned to blow himself up with a 

suicide vest. Ibrahim was arrested and convicted. This was the first time a tip from 

the Muslim community in Great Britain led to a major terrorism arrest. We tasted 

the fruits of the efforts of our own community outreach efforts in December 2009, 

when the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), put families in touch with 

the FBI to report that their sons had left for Pakistan with the intent to join the 

fight against America. This tip led to the arrest of the young men in Pakistan, and 

probably spared both their lives as well as the lives of U.S. and Pakistani soldiers. 
55 

1Professor Deborah A. Ramirez, Northeastern University School of Law, Boston, Massachusetts, d.ramirez@neu.edu. 2Tara Lai Quinlan, Director of Research, Partnering for Prevention and Community Safety 

Initiative, taraquin@aol.com. 3Debbie Ramirez & Tara Lai Quinlan, The Greater London Experience: Essential Lessons 

Learned in Law Enforcement-Community Partnerships and Terrorism Prevention, May 2008, 42. 

Because community information can thwart terrorist threats, it is an essential tool 

to put into the counterterrorism tool box. 

Yet, in the United States today, the few community-law enforcement partnerships 

that are focused on preventing terrorism, hate crimes, and extremism operate independently of each other, without any central coordination or collaborative structure. 

There are no National programs to provide the training, protocols, tools, or research 

necessary to demonstrate how to begin, nurture, and strengthen these community 

efforts. Nor is there a central clearinghouse for information about such efforts, 

which could disseminate promising practices, best practices and lessons learned in 

the United States and abroad. More fundamentally, we lack a National collaborative 

infrastructure in which to organize these efforts. Some of these efforts are being 

made by local police departments, others by DHS, still others by FBI field offices. 

We need a single unified structure. 

How could we design a coordinated National infrastructure to support and nurture these efforts? We need each FBI field office with a Muslim community to meet 

on a regular basis with community members to develop local collaborative strategies 

for preventing terrorism, extremism, and hate crimes. In these meetings, community 

and law enforcement need to build bridges of trust and communication. Specifically, 

we need each of these field offices to create community message centers staffed by 

agents trained to evaluate the reliability and credibility of community information. 

This means training community members about what to look for, informing them 

as to whom to call, designating trained law enforcement officers on how to evaluate 

community information, and creating protocols for responding to important community tips. To make this program work, we need a National training and resource 

center to coordinate and support these efforts, and we need such a center to be in 

partnership with a university and located within a university setting. 

WHY SHOULD WE DO THIS?

(1) Because we stand a greater chance of conducting rational, well-reasoned, 

thoughtful counterterrorism, civil rights, and counterintelligence investigations if we 

have long-standing, trusting relationships with the community. Engagement with 

the community provides law enforcement with valuable information and expertise 

that may not otherwise be available. 

(2) Because a lot of people out there are counting on us to get this right. 

(3) Because all of us in this room are men and women of good will who have spent 

endless hours trying to prevent another attack. If there were another attack on 

American soil, all of us would want to say that we did EVERYTHING, EVERYTHING in our power to prevent it. But if we fail to garner the political will to create 

this infrastructure, we won’t be able to say that. 

ATTACHMENT 1.—THE PARTNERING FOR PREVENTION & COMMUNITY SAFETY INITIATIVE, ‘‘COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS THWART TERRORISM’’ BY DEBORAH RAMIREZ 1

AND TARA LAI QUINLAN 2

MARCH 2010

As law enforcement officials across the globe contemplate ways to prevent terrorist attacks, the gathering of relevant and effective intelligence from reliable 

sources has become even more crucial to counterterrorism work. One of the best 

tools to help stop domestic terrorism in countries like the United States and Great 

Britain is for counterterrorism officials to develop authentic trust relationships with 

communities. When law enforcement works with the community to establish trust 

on a variety of issues—from neighborhood blight, to youth violence to police response times, community members are more likely to come forward to report 

incidences of unusual behavior within the community that they find suspicious or 

potentially dangerous. When the community feels trust and support from law enforcement, community members feel more comfortable acting as law enforcement’s 

‘‘eyes and ears’’ in the community because they possess the knowledge of community 

norms, and the ‘‘linguistic, cultural, and analytical skills’’3 to assess community 

anomalies that law enforcement, as outside observers, might not see. This paper ex-
56 

4Michael Evans & Sean O’Neill, Muslim Leader Meets MI5 Chief to Aid War on Terror, THE 

TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004 available at https://www.timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/0,,1-2-1079809- 

2,00.html. 5 Id. 

6 Id. 

7 Id. 

8 Id. 

9 Id. 

10 Id. 11Minette Marrin, Nicky Reilly, Muslim convert, jailed for 18 years for Exeter bomb attack, 

TIMES ONLINE, Jan. 31, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/ 

article5619151.ece. 12 Id. 13 Id. 14 Id. 15 Id. 16 Id. 17Third Man Quizzed Over Explosion, BBC NEWS, May 28, 2008, available at http:// 

news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uklnews/england/devon/7424769.stm. 18 Exeter Restaurant Bombing: Police Search Muslim Centre And Home In Plymouth After 

Third Arrest, UK NEWS, SKY NEWS, May 29, 2008, http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/SkyNews-Archive/Article/20080641317471.[sic]. 19Police warned about Exeter bomber in 2003, BBC NEWS, Feb. 8 2010, available at http:// 

news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uklnews/england/devon/8505209.stm (hereinafter BBC News Exeter). 20 Id. 

plores some of the instances where community members provided valuable tips to 

law enforcement officials that helped thwart terrorist incidents. 

I. BRITISH EFFORTS TO WORK COLLABORATIVELY WITH MUSLIM COMMUNITIES

After large-scale arrests were made in Britain after October 2000, and very few 

of those individuals were convicted, Britain sought to ensure that there was not a 

backlash against local Muslim communities.4 Iqbal Sacranie, secretary-general of 

the Muslim Council of Britain, met with MI5, the British intelligence agency, to 

pursue a collaborative strategy between the Muslim community and the British 

counterterrorism programs.5 Sacranie raised concerns over the arrests, and stated 

that few of those arrested were charged with any crime, while even fewer were 

eventually convicted of anything.6 Sacranie was concerned that the large numbers 

of arrests could wrongfully lead the public to mistakenly view the Muslim community as a whole as fanatical.7

Sacranie emphasized that Muslims, like every other British communities, wanted 

to ensure that there were no terrorist attacks on British soil.8 He wrote members 

of every mosque in Britain requesting that they use the utmost vigilance ‘‘against 

any mischievous or criminal elements from infiltrating the community and provoking any unlawful activity.’’9 Further, he urged the members of those mosques to 

communicate with authorities and ensure cooperation to avoid the common terrorist 

threat.10

A. Nick Reilly (aka Mohammed Rasheed), Exeter 

Nick Reilly (aka Mohammed Rasheed) is a Muslim convert who suffers from 

Aperger’s Syndrome and has a mental age of approximately 10.11 In May 2008, 

Reilly followed through with instructions he received from Britain-based radicals he 

met with in internet cafes and chat room to set off a nail bomb in Exeter.12 These 

radicals of Pakistani decent advocated violence against Western nations for their 

continued support of Israel.13 On May 22, 2008, Reilly went to Giraffe restaurant, 

ordered a drink, and went to the bathroom to assemble his bomb.14 But his bomb 

went off prematurely in the bathroom stall, and he was the only person injured in 

the attempted attack.15 Counterterrorism officials stated that extremists had taken 

advantage of Rasheed’s low IQ of 83 to groom him for terrorist activities.16

After the incident at Giraffe restaurant, police arrested three men, and detained 

another who cooperated with the police, and searched the Muslim Community Centre in Plymouth.17 In response to the search, the Centre trustees issued a statement 

that ‘‘[w]e are as shocked as everyone by the recent events that have unfolded at 

Exeter and Plymouth. We have been working in partnership with the police and 

community to build the centre and we are now committed to assisting the police 

with their inquiries.’’18

A BBC investigation later revealed that police had received prior warning of the 

Giraffe restaurant attack by a tip from a psychiatrist who had evaluated Reilly.19

During a psychiatric evaluation, Reilly had expressed a desire to study engineering 

to learn to make a bomb.20 The psychiatrist relayed this information to the police, 
57 

21 Id. 22 BBC News Exeter, supra note 35. 23See Face of the ‘nail bomber’: Police were tailing Muslim convert before restaurant attack, 

LONDON EVENING STANDARD, May 23, 2008, http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/article23486974-face-of-the-nail-bomber-police-were-tailing-muslim-convert-before-restaurant-attack.do. 24Jail for ‘Suicide Vest’ Student, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uklnews/ 

8155978.stm (Hereinafter BBC Suicide Vest). 25 Id. 26Duncan Gardham, Terrorist Andrew Ibrahim was turned in by the Muslim community, 

TELEGRAPH TIMES ONLINE, July 18, 2009, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 

5851168/Terrorist-Andrew-Ibrahim-was-turned-in-by-the-Muslim-community.html. Prior to 

Ibrahim’s arrest: he asked a visiting lecturer what were ‘‘the best’’ biological agents for killing 

people, but the university ultimately did not take action; he bought up stocks of hydrogen peroxide from several Boots stores, but staff disregarded their own regulations and did not contact 

the police; at an electric shop he asked about a light bulb with the glass removed, which is a 

key indicator of a detonator; and Ibrahim had even discussed suicide bombing and the ingredients of his bomb with friends, but was not taken seriously. Id. 27 Id. 28 Id. 29Sean O’Neill, Teenager’s plot to blow up town centre—Muslim elders reported former public 

schoolboy to police, The Times London, July 18, 2009, available at http://0- 

infoweb.newsbank.com.ilsprod.lib.neu.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb. 30Gardham, supra note 42. Initially, on April 14 the mosque only provided police with 

Ibrahim’s first name, but submitted his full name 2 days later. Id. 31 BBC Suicide Vest, supra note 39. 32O’Neill, supra note 45. 33 Id. 34 BBC Suicide Vest, supra note 39. 

but the police did not interview Reilly in response to the tip because they felt that 

the remark was a ‘‘one-off’’.21 In a statement, the Devon and Cornwall police they 

stated: 

‘‘Systems such as the government’s Prevent strategy, which have been implemented 

since 2003, look at intelligence like this, but Reilly was not a person of interest and 

gave no other cause for concern. As part of Prevent, should there have been any 

further cause for concern, he would have been part of a review process. From the 

information at that time, there was no indication that Reilly was, or was likely to 

become, capable of making a bomb. Although in hindsight we are always seeking 

to learn as an organisation, we are confident we would not have dealt differently 

with the information as we had it at the time.’’22

At least one source indicates that Reilly was under surveillance prior to the attack, 

but the extent of Muslim community involvement remains unclear.23

B. Isa Ibrahim, Bristol 

In April 2008, student Isa Ibrahim was arrested for planning to detonate a ‘‘suicide vest.’’24 Ibrahim had researched online how to make explosives from household 

products, and had also done reconnaissance at the Broadmead shopping centre in 

Bristol.25

Leading up to his arrest, Ibrahim had engaged in a series of suspicious actions, 

but none of the third parties involved had alerted authorities to his activities.26

When Ibrahim then talked about suicide bombing with members of his mosque, they 

challenged him on his views and alerted authorities.27 After also noticing cuts on 

Ibrahim’s hands, the members of the mosque contacted a local police officer. 28 Detective Chief Inspector Kevin Hazell, of Avon and Somerset police, said: ‘‘The calls 

to us came in when he showed some people the injuries on his hands, including 

marks from shards of glass, which he said were caused when a bottle blew up when 

he was mixing chemicals.’’29 Tipping off the authorities to Ibrahim’s behavior was 

a ‘‘sensitive subject’’ with members of the mosque, but they eventually provided the 

police with Ibrahim’s full name and photograph.30 Police described the incident as 

a landmark ‘‘because it was the first time a tip-off from the Muslim community had 

led to a major anti-terrorism arrest.’’31

When Ibrahim’s apartment was searched by police in April 2008, officers found 

the highly explosive hexamethylene triperoxide diamine (HMTD) in a biscuit tin in 

the refrigerator, a detonator underneath Ibrahim’s sink, and a vest on the bedroom 

door.32 The night before his arrest, Ibrahim had even obtained shrapnel to add to 

the explosives.33 Ibrahim was convicted in July 2009 of making explosives with intent and preparing terrorist acts, and received a minimum sentence of 10 years.34

Following the verdict, the Council of Bristol Mosques released a statement that said, 

‘‘[w]e stress that at all times we must behave honourably and as law-abiding citi-
58 

35 BBC Suicide Vest, supra note 39. 36 Andrea Elliott, Joining the Fight in Somalia, N.Y. Times, July 12, 2009, available at http:// 

www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/07/12/us/20090712-somalia-timeline.html (Hereinafter Elliott Graphic). 37 Andrea Elliott, Joining the Fight in Somalia, N.Y. Times, July 12, 2009, available at http:// 

www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/07/12/us/20090712-somalia-timeline.html (Hereinafter Elliott Graphic). 38 Id. 39 Id. 40 Id. 41 Andrea Elliott, A Call to Jihad, Answered in America, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2009, available 

at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/us/12somalis.html?pagewanted=all (Hereinafter Elliott Article). 42 Id. 43 Id. 44 Id. 45 Elliott Article, supra note 56. Elliott Graphic, supra note 52. 46 Id. 47 Id. 48 Id. 49 Id. 50 Elliott Article, supra note 56. 51 Id. 52 Elliott Article, supra note 56. 53 Id. 

zens. We believe strongly in community ties and community cohesion. Anything falling below these standards is morally and socially unacceptable.’’35

II. UNITED STATES EXAMPLES

A. Missing Somali Youth in Minneapolis 

Since the 1990s the population of Somalis living in the United States has grown 

significantly, with the largest Somali-American community located in Minneapolis, 

Minnesota.36 Beginning in late 2007, reports began to surface about young SomaliAmerican men traveling to Somalia ‘‘to enlist in the Shabaab, an Islamist group battling the country’s government.’’37 There are believed to have been at least 20 departures by young men since 2007, which occurred in at least two waves.38 The first 

wave began in late 2007, 6 months after an Islamic group seized control of Somalia’s 

capital, Mogadishu.39 The men in the first wave were in their 20s to 30s, and had 

all left the United States by the spring of 2008.40 Included in the first wave were 

Shirwa Ahmed, believed to be the first suicide bomber with U.S. citizenship, and 

Zakaria Maruf, a former gang member.41

Zakaria Maruf was well known in the Muslim community in the Twin Cities because he used to drive to and from Abubakar mosque, and some young Somalis recorded Maruf’s call to prayer as a cell phone ringtone.42 During this period, Maruf 

began to reach out to young men through listservs and conference calls ‘‘arranged 

by a teenage boy who distributed 800 numbers and passwords’’ for people to listen 

in.43 Some of these young men ended up leaving the United States for Somalia in 

the second wave.44

This second wave was a younger group of men who had been more successful in 

the United States.45 Most of the men had been raised in the United States and had 

also performed well academically in high school or college.46 Members in this group 

began dropping out of school in August 2008 and November 2008.47 Notably some 

of the departures in the second wave occurred after Shirwa Ahmed died as a suicide 

bomber in October 2008.48

Community members took notice of the departures and became concerned. Community member Abia Ali noticed that two boys that she recognized from her mosque 

came into the travel agency where she worked as an accountant to make travel 

plans.49 Ms. Ali was concerned that the boys were planning on following Zakaria 

Maruf to Somalia, and accordingly she warned the mosque leaders, who then alerted 

the boys’ parents.50 The mosque then summoned a meeting with the mosque’s young 

members, where imam Sheikh Abdirahman Sheikh Omar Ahmed, told the crowd 

‘‘All this talk of the movement must stop... Focus on your life here. If you become a doctor or an engineer, you can help your country. Over there you will be 

a dead body on the street.’’51

After hearing about the young men leaving the country, Somali parents began 

hiding their sons’ passports.52 Some parents pleaded with their departed sons to return home from abroad.53 For example, Mohamoud Hassan’s parents had been trying to convince him to return back home after he already left, but he feared that 
59 

54 Id. 55 Id. 56 Id. 57 Id. 58See Andrea Elliott, Charges Detail Road to Terror for 20 in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 

2009 at A1 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/24/us/24terror.html (Hereinafter Elliott 

Charges). 59See id. (noting that five young Somali men were stopped en route to a wedding in San Diego 

from Nevada); see also Maggie, Lee, After Minneapolis, FBI Eyes Atlanta’s Somalis, NEW AGE 

MEDIA, June 24, 2009, available at http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/ 

viewlarticle.html?articlelid=0c35ffa6e64aac24f1d332f6b32e7d29 (last visited Feb. 22, 2010) 

(noting that recruitment efforts have begun in parts of Atlanta Georgia). 60Zahid Hussain, Siobhan Gorman & Neil King Jr., Students Linked to al-Qaeda, WALL 

STREET JOURNAL, Dec. 11, 2009 at A3. 61 Hussain, supra note 77. 62 Id. 63 Id. 64Waqar Gillani & Jane Perlez, Pakistan Police Say 5 Detained Americans Intended to Fight 

U.S. in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2009. 65 Id. 66 Jerry Markon, Pakistan Arrests 5 North Virginia Men, Probes Possible Jihadist Ties, THE 

WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 10, 2009 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 

2009/12/09/AR2009120901884.html. 67 Id. 68 Hussain, supra note 77. 69 Id. 

he would spend his time in Guantanomo.54 The conversations would be short with 

few responses, but at some point they convinced Hassan to come back to the United 

States and wired him $800.55 However, shortly thereafter, someone phoned them to 

tell them that their son had been shot in the head; some believe to prevent Hassan 

from working with the FBI.56

Members of al Qaeda have reportedly been attempting to recruit youths with U.S. 

or European passports because they could cross borders more freely.57 Since the 

first wave of Somali youths left Minneapolis in 2007, six recruits have been killed 

in Somalia (including Shirwa Ahmed), and four defendants have entered guilty 

pleas.58 But recruiting of United States citizens and nationals of Somali decent in 

the United States continues, and is now believed to have broadened to other States 

including Nevada and Georgia.59

B. Washington, DC Area Students Go Missing in Pakistan 

On December 7, 2009, five American students from the Washington, DC area were 

arrested by Pakistani authorities.60 Pakistan authorities had observed them for 2 

days and then arrested the five men: David Headley, an American of Pakistani descent; Umar Farooq, a Pakistani-American; Aman Hasan Yemer, an EthiopianAmerican; Waqar Hussain Khan, a Pakistani-American; and Ahmed Abdullah Mimi, 

an Ethiopian-American each holding a United States passport.61 The men had been 

staying in a house in Sargodha, Pakistan owned by one of their uncles. When authorities searched the house, they found jihadist literature, and maps of cities and 

installations.62 Evidence in the investigation suggests that some of the men wanted 

to fight U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan.63

Before arriving in Pakistan, the men had been in contact with Pakistani militants 

with connections to al-Qaeda through internet chat rooms and YouTube.64 The militants allegedly told them to come to Pakistan where they could assist them in getting to Afghanistan to fight jihad.65 One of the young men left behind an 11-minute 

video that ‘‘quoted Koranic verses, cited conflicts between Western and Muslim nations and showed wartime footage.’’66

It was the families of these five young men who initially reported them missing, 

fearing that they had gone to Pakistan. The Council on American-Islamic Relations 

put the families in touch with the FBI. The parents showed the FBI and Muslim 

community leaders the 11-minute video. The authorities conducted their investigation with extensive help from the families, whose assistance included turning over 

the men’s writings and computer files.67 Around the same time, in Sargodha a 

neighbor alerted Pakistani authorities after the uncle of one of the men told the 

neighbor that his nephew and four friends had voiced bad intentions.68 After the 

five men were reported missing in the United States, the FBI contacted Pakistani 

officials and shortly thereafter, the men were arrested.69

C. Christmas Day Bomber 

On December 25, 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab boarded an airplane from 

Nigeria (to Amsterdam) to Detroit with 80 grams of high explosive chemicals 
60 

70 Russell Goldman & Huma Khan, Timeline of Terror: Clues in Bomber Umar Farouk 

Abdulmutallab’s Past, Did officials miss important clues in tracking down Nigerian before failed 

plot?, ABC NEWS, Dec. 30, 2009 available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/timeline-terror-cluesbomber-umar-farouk-abdulmutallabs-past/story?id=9449255. 71 Id. 72 CNN, Source: Terror suspect’s father tried to warn authorities, CNN.COM, Dec. 27, 2009, 

available at http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/12/26/airline.attack/index.html. 73 United States v. Abdulmutallab, No. 2:10-cr-20005 (Jan. 6, 2010) (Indictment). Copy of indictment available at http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2010/01/the-abdulmutallab-indictment-.html. 74 CNN, supra note 89. 75 CNN, supra note 89. 76Goldman & Khan, supra note 87. 77 Id. 78 BBC News, Father alerted US about Nigerian plane bomb suspect, BBC NEWS, Dec. 27 

2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8431470.stm (Hereinafter BBC News Nigeria). 79Goldman & Khan, supra note 87. 80Dan Eggen, Karen DeYoung & Spencer S. Hsu, Plane suspect was listed in terror database 

after father alerted U.S. officials, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2009, http:// 

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/25/AR2009122501355.html; Goldman & Khan, supra note 87; CNN, supra note 89. 81 BBC News Nigeria, supra note 95. 82 Id. 83Minette Marrin, Christmas Day bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab offering ‘useful intelligence’ to FBI, TIMES ONLINE, Feb. 3, 2010, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/ 

uslandlamericas/article7013063.ece. 84 Id. 85 Jeff Zeleny & Charlie Savage, Official Says Terrorism Suspect Is Cooperating, N.Y. TIMES, 

Feb. 2, 2010 at A11, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/us/03terror.html. 86 Id. 

strapped to his crotch.70 Abdulmutallab tried to blow up the airplane as it was approaching Detroit, but his detonator failed and instead his pants caught on fire and 

other passengers quickly subdued him.71 The other passengers and crew members 

detained him until the airplane landed.72 In January 2010, Abdulmutallab was indicted on six counts, including one of attempted murder and one of attempted use 

of a weapon of mass destruction.73

Abdulmutallab was granted a multiple-year, multiple-entry tourist visa at the 

U.S. Embassy in London in June 2008, which would last until 2010.74

Abdulmutallab was a student in the United Kingdom at the time the United States 

granted him a visa, and after getting his visa, he traveled to Houston.75 In May 

2009, the United Kingdom denied Abdulmutallab’s application to renew his student 

visa because he listed a non-existent college on his application.76 Later that year 

in August of 2009, he went to Yemen to be trained by an al-Qaeda leader, and was 

admitted into the country because he had a valid U.S. visa in his passport.77

Abdulmutallab’s father, Alhaji Umaru Mutallab was a prominent Nigerian banker 

and had become increasingly alarmed about his son’s political views.78 In November, 

2009, Mutallab went to the U.S. embassy in Nigeria after he received an alarming 

phone call from his son stating that ‘‘it would be their last contact and associates 

in Yemen would then destroy his phone.’’79 Mutallab feared that his son was preparing for a suicide mission in Yemen, stating that he was concerned about his son’s 

‘‘radicalization and associations’’ and that he feared that Abdulmutallab went to 

Yemen to participate in ‘‘some kind of jihad.’’80 Following the November 19, 2009 

warning, information about Abdulmutallab was given to the National Counter-Terrorism Center, and he was also added to the watch-list of more than half of a million individuals, or the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment.81 However, officials believed that Mutallab had not presented enough information to place 

Abdulmutallab’s name on the smaller Terrorist Screening Data Base, which includes 

a smaller no-fly list.82

Once Abdulmutallab was detained by other passengers, and the airplane landed, 

he spoke freely to the FBI.83 However, after he had surgery for his burns and was 

read his Miranda rights he ceased cooperating with law enforcement officials.84 The 

FBI flew two counterterrorism agents to Nigeria ‘‘to gain an understanding of the 

suspect’’ and then located two of Abdulmutallab’s family members.85 The relatives 

agreed to come back with the agents to the United States to get Abdulmutallab to 

cooperate because they ‘‘disagreed with his efforts to blow up American targets.’’86

After meeting with Abdulmutallab for several days, the family members convinced 

him to talk with the investigators. 

An official stated that ‘‘The intelligence gained has been disseminated throughout 

the intelligence community,’’ and further that ‘‘The best way to get [Abdulmutallab] 
61 

87 Id. 88 Id. 89Zeleny & Savage, supra note 102. 90Douglas Waller Sterling, An American Imam, Time Magazine, November 14, 2005. 91 Id. 92 Rebecca C. Dube, Leader Turned Informant Rattles Muslims, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 31, 2006, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0731/p06s01-woam.html. 93 Id. 94 Id. 95 Id. 96 Jackie Bennion, The Radical Informant, FRONTLINE, aired Jan. 30, 2007 on PBS, available at http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/canada602/shaikh.html. 97 Id. 98 Id. 99 Id. 100 Id. 101Dube, supra note 9. 102 Id. 

to talk was working with his family.’’87 Officials confirm that Abdulmutallab has 

provided them with information about people he met in Yemen.88 In addition, Robert S. Mueller III told the Senate Intelligence Committee that Mr. Abdulmutallab 

provided ‘‘valuable intelligence’’ but Mueller did not elaborate further.89

D. ADAMS Mosque, Virginia 

The All Dulles Areas Muslim Society (ADAMS) mosque developed a relationship 

with the FBI in early 2002, when the FBI approached Imam Mohamed Magid and 

several other imams about developing contacts with the Washington-area Muslim 

community. As part of their process of developing mutual trust, Imam Magid invited 

the FBI to the mosque on multiple occasions for dialogues and questions from 

mosque members. While the agents promised to be less heavy-handed in their investigations and more culturally sensitive, the community agreed to provide tips alerting FBI officials if they spotted anything unusual in the community.90

In one instance mosque members alerted Imam Magid to a new member who 

acted unusually—dealing only in cash and listing the ADAMS mosque as his mailing address. The next time Imam Magid saw the new member, he spoke with him 

in his office while the FBI arrived to question him. In the end it turned out that 

the man was going through a messy divorce and had child support payments, and 

did not want to be located because his wages would be garnished.91 This incident 

is just one of the benefits that have flowed from the strong relationship between 

the ADAMS mosque and the FBI’s Washington, DC field office. 

III. OTHER EXAMPLES

E. Mubin Shaikh, Toronto 

Mubin Shaikh is a prominent Muslim leader in Canada. In 2006, it was revealed 

that Shaikh worked with officials in Canada as an informant to thwart a potential 

terrorist attack involving 17 terrorism suspects.92 The 17 suspects were arrested 

after purchasing three tons of ammonium nitrate.93 Police alleged that the men, 

ranging in age from 15 to 43, were planning on blowing up buildings in Toronto and 

then storming Canada’s parliament.94 Shaikh told the Toronto newspaper, ‘‘I don’t 

want Canadians to think that these [suspects] are what Muslims are. I don’t believe 

in violence here. I wanted to help, and I’m as homegrown as it gets.’’95

Shaikh had already worked with the police to help improve awareness in the community; however, he first became involved with the accused group after reading 

about one his friends being arrested.96 He contacted the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and informed them ‘‘I have a solid foundation in Islam. I’m 

born and raised here. Toronto is home. I understand what concerns [the police] 

have. But as a Muslim, I understand what concerns Muslims have.’’97 The CSIS 

agreed to let Shaikh assist in the efforts to infiltrate this group, but after they 

agreed, he also sought the counsel of a spiritual advisor.98 ‘‘I knew that throughout 

my work with the authorities, if I was ever instructed to [entrap or set up the suspects], which I was not, I would not [do it].’’99 If he did, his spiritual advisor threatened to accuse him of hypocrisy.100

Shaikh’s participation in thwarting the potential attack was controversial with 

members in the Muslim community.101 Some in the Muslim community stated that 

they have no issues with reporting suspicious behavior to law enforcement officials; 

however, they draw the line at Shaikh’s level of involvement.102 Others argued that 

instead of working with police, Shaikh instead should have utilized his influence 
62 

103 Id. 104 Id. 105 Id. 106 Id. 

* Available at www.ace.neu.edu/pfp. 

over the men to try to convince them to not go through with the plot.103 However, 

Shaikh informed the Canadian Broadcast Company that the suspects had already 

chosen their path, and that they needed no outside influence from him.104

Shaikh’s involvement also raised some ethical issues regarding the permissibility 

of utilizing prominent members of the community as informants. Professor Natapoff 

of Loyola Law School states that ‘‘There’s a very corrosive effect in urban communities when the government makes snitching a central law enforcement tool.’’105

While informants can be useful for criminal investigations, the use of informants 

makes it easier to slide into ethically dangerous situations.106 Where individuals 

like Shaikh help out the Government, it is possible to erode trust between members 

within the community, and further degrade the level of trust between the community and the Government. This highlights an important concern for communities 

and warrants further discussion. 

CONCLUSION

The best way to obtain the community information needed to thwart terrorist 

threats is by applying community policing techniques to counterterrorism. Homegrown Muslim terrorists are likely to reside in Muslim communities; Muslim terrorists from abroad are likely to attempt to conceal themselves in these same communities. We are blessed in the United States with a Muslim population that, with 

very few exceptions, are committed to combating terrorism. Yet, we have failed to 

take advantage of this blessing and develop a systematic strategy to obtain and use 

community information to thwart terrorism and fight extremism. 

Specifically, we need each of the FBI field offices to create community message 

centers staffed by agents trained to evaluate the reliability and credibility of community information. This means training community members about what to look 

for, informing them as to whom to call, designating trained law enforcement officers 

on how to evaluate community information, and creating protocols for responding 

to important community tips. To make this program work, we need a National 

training and resource center to coordinate and support these efforts, and we need 

such a center to be in partnership with a university and located within a university 

setting. 

ATTACHMENT 2.—A PROMISING PRACTICES GUIDE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY* 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Ervin. 

STATEMENT OF CLARK KENT ERVIN, DIRECTOR, ASPEN 

INSTITUTE HOMELAND SECURITY PROGRAM 

Mr. ERVIN. Thank you, Madam Chair, Mr. McCaul, Ms. Clarke, 

for having me here today to discuss this important topic. 

My main point, and I think the whole point of the hearing, is 

that the business of counterterrorism must be every American’s 

business, not just that of those privileged to serve in Government. 

Average Americans in every community must be the eyes and 

ears of law enforcement officials and intelligence analysts. We ordinary citizens must be Government’s force multiplier. This is especially true for Muslim-Americans, and I would like to associate myself with Ms. Ramirez’ comments. 

The overwhelming majority of Muslim Americans, like all Americans, are loyal and patriotic citizens more than willing to do their 

part to protect and defend us all. If anything, they are even more 

disposed to decry and condemn violent extremists in their own 

community who would do this country harm than we non-Muslims, 
63 

precisely because those extremists are in their community and they 

blacken the name of their community and pervert their faith. 

We must shine the spotlight of National attention on the efforts 

of law enforcement authorities in New York City and Los Angeles 

in particular—I am delighted that Sheriff Baca was here—who embrace the racial/ethnic/religious diversity in their communities and, 

as you said, use it to their advantage by enlisting such minorities 

in their counterterrorism efforts. 

NYPD and LAPD are effective terror fighters in large part because their ranks include men and women who come from these 

communities and know them best. 

Further, these police organizations engage in constant dialogue 

with these communities, hearing their concerns, addressing their 

complaints, soliciting their advice and counsel, and earning their 

trust and good will in the process. 

So when differences arise, as they inevitably will, the positive relationships that have been established over time serve to keep disagreements in perspective and passions cool. 

Such outreach can encourage—can encourage community members to come forward and foil terror plots—and we have heard examples of that, so I won’t add to that further. 

I would also like to commend an effort that we haven’t heard 

about to date this morning, and that is the effort of NYPD to find 

out what the root causes of radicalization are. 

I commend the 2007 report by their intelligence apparatus, 

which identified a number of factors—lack of economic opportunity, 

limited education, strained family ties, a sense of impotence and 

alienation and grievance, a desire to be a part of something bigger 

than themselves and that they consider to be noble. All of this 

leads impressionable minds down the path of terrorism. 

Government, industry, schools, places of worship, and non-profit 

organizations must work together to provide positive alternatives— 

jobs and job training programs, constructive social organizations, 

athletic programs and the like—to counter lives of aimless—aimlessness and anomie. An idle mind is truly the devil’s workshop. 

I would also like to underscore and agree with what else has 

been said today about the fact that Muslims are not—that not all 

Muslims are terrorists, and not all terrorists are Muslims. 

It is as if recent events conspired to prepare us very well for today’s hearing. The two recent cases of Colleen LaRose and Jamie 

Pauline-Ramirez underscore the fact that even blond-haired and 

blue-eyed females can be terrorists, as you yourself said, Madam 

Chair. 

If anyone can be a terrorist, then everyone can fight terrorism. 

Whether it is the TSA Behavior Detection Officer specifically 

trained to spot signs of terror intent at airports; the New Jersey 

electronics store clerk who questions video he is asked to duplicate 

showing men apparently training for jihad and who brings that to 

the attention of authorities, in the process foiling the Fort Dix plot; 

the beauty supply owner noticing the same person repeatedly buying large quantities, unusually large quantities, of hydrogen peroxide; or the mail carrier going about his daily route and noticing 

that the trees in front of a particular house have suddenly turned 

white and wonders whether this might be the result of a bomb pro-
64 

duction lab inside—anyone and everyone, inside Government and 

out, can and must play a role in preventing terror if we are to have 

any hope of preventing it more often than not. 

Thank you very much for having me, and I look forward very 

much to your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Ervin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CLARK KENT ERVIN

MARCH 17, 2010 

Thank you, Chair Harman, Ranking Member McCaul, and Members for inviting 

me to testify today on the very important and timely topic, ‘‘Working with Communities to Disrupt Terror Plots.’’ 

The recent spate of aborted terror plots, especially the Christmas day bombing attempt, all serve to underscore the fact that terrorists remain determined to strike 

the homeland again, and the odds of preventing them from ever succeeding are low. 

To kill, injure, and destroy, terrorists have to ‘‘get it right’’ only once, while those 

in the business of counterterrorism must ‘‘get it right’’ 24/7. My main point today, 

and I think the point of this whole hearing, is that the business of counterterrorism 

must be every American’s business, not just that of those now privileged to serve 

in Government. Our country is too big; and (commendably) too open and free, with 

too many tempting targets, for us to think that Government officials alone can defend us from this omnipresent, and, perhaps even existential, threat. Average Americans in every community must be the eyes and ears of law enforcement officials 

and intelligence analysts; we ordinary citizens must be Government’s force multiplier. 

This is certainly true for Muslim-Americans. The overwhelming majority of Muslim-Americans, like all Americans, are loyal and patriotic citizens, more than willing 

to do their part to protect and defend us all. If anything, they are even more disposed to decry and condemn violent extremists in their own community who would 

do this country harm than we non-Muslims are precisely because those extremists 

are in their community and they blacken the name of their community and pervert 

their faith. We must shine the spotlight of National attention and cast the warm 

glow of approval on the efforts of, for example, law enforcement authorities in New 

York City and Los Angeles who embrace the racial/ethnic/religious diversity in their 

communities and use it to their advantage by enlisting such minorities in their 

counterterrorism efforts. NYPD and LAPD are effective terror fighters in large part 

because their ranks include men and women who come from these communities and 

know them best. These police organizations engage in constant dialogue with these 

communities, hearing their concerns, addressing their complaints, soliciting their 

advice and counsel, and earning their trust and goodwill. When differences arise, 

as they inevitably will, the positive relationships that have been established over 

time serve to keep disagreements in perspective and passions cool. To be commended, too, at the Federal level, are like efforts by the National Counterterrorism 

Center; the Department of Homeland Security; and the Homeland Security Advisory 

Council. 

Such outreach can encourage community members to turn to the authorities when 

they spot signs of radicalism in their midst and can serve to foil terror plots before 

they go too far. We saw an example of that recently when Somali parents in Northern Virginia, concerned about the disappearance of their young sons, confided their 

fears of terror ties to a Muslim organization, which then confided in the authorities, 

ultimately resulting in the arrest of the young men in Pakistan before they could 

carry out acts of terrorism. It is, needless to say, highly unlikely, that the community would have turned to the authorities in this instance had the relationship between the two beforehand been one of mistrust and confrontation rather than trust 

and cooperation. 

Also noteworthy and highly commendable is NYPD’s effort—the 2007 report by 

two of its intelligence analysts, ‘‘Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown 

Threat’’—to determine why and how people become radicalized to the point of becoming terrorists. There must be continual such efforts in communities across the 

country to identify and to counteract the factors—lack of economic opportunity, limited education; strained family ties; a sense of impotence, alienation, and grievance; 

a desire to be a part of something big and noble—which lead naive and impressionable minds down the path of terrorism. Government, industry, schools, places of 

worship, and non-profit organizations must work together to provide positive alternatives—jobs and job training, constructive social organizations, athletic programs, 
65 

and the like—to lives of aimlessness and anomie. An idle mind is truly the devil’s 

workshop. 

It is not just Muslims, of course, who should be alert for signs of terrorism in their 

communities. All of us must be vigilant. First of all, we must underscore the fact 

that, just as not all Muslims are terrorists, so not all terrorists are Muslims. If by 

‘‘terrorists’’ we mean all those who terrorize, then certainly Joseph Stack, who flew 

a small plane into an IRS building in Austin recently, and John Bedell, who wounded two police officers at Pentagon more recently still, then it should be clear to all 

now that terrorists come in all races, ethnicities, and genders, and they can have 

all different kinds of grievances. ‘‘Terrorist’’ is not a ‘‘one size fits all’’ term. And, 

even those terrorists who at least claim to be Muslims can likewise defy stereotypes, 

as the even more recent cases of the female, blond-haired, and blue-eyed ‘‘Jihad 

Jane,’’ Coleen La Rue, and Jamie Pauline-Ramirez highlight. Such cases help make 

the point that terrorist stereotyping is not just politically incorrect; it is simply incorrect. 

If anyone can be a terrorist, everyone can fight terrorism. Whether it’s the TSA 

Behavior Detection Officer specially trained to spot signs of terror intent at airports; 

the New Jersey electronics store clerk who questions video he is asked to duplicate 

showing men apparently training for jihad and brings it to the attention of authorities, foiling the Fort Dix plot; the beauty supply store owner noticing the same person repeatedly buying unusually large quantities of hydrogen peroxide; or the mail 

carrier going about his daily route and noticing that the trees in front of a particular house have suddenly turned white and wonders whether this might be the 

result of a bomb production lab inside, anyone and everyone—inside Government 

and out—can and must play a role in preventing terror if we are to have any hope 

of doing so more often than not. 

We cannot know for sure from the recent spate of incidents whether terror plots 

are increasing in number and seriousness, but it is more than reasonable to draw 

than inference. Since 9/11, both the Bush and Obama Administrations have done 

a commendable job of killing and capturing terrorists. But, the next, and even more 

important step—stopping the terrorist production line at its source—remains very 

much a work in progress. I am grateful for this opportunity to participate in a hearing that, appropriately, is focused on exactly this. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much. 

It will now be time for questioning. We will each take 5 minutes, 

and I yield myself 5 minutes. 

Mr. Elibiary, you used some words that got my attention. 

Securitizing the relationship with minority communities or disparate communities, you said, is counterproductive. Then you said 

what you would hope we would do would be coordinate micro strategies. 

Let me just kind of go there. I don’t think any of us is trying to 

securitize relationships. I think we are trying to build trust—and 

I am asking the panel to comment on this—with law-abiding citizens who are members of diverse communities in our country. 

The point of that is we can learn a lot from that. We can show 

respect to our fellow citizens. But we also can invite, in appropriate 

circumstances, those communities, those parents, those sisters and 

brothers to come forward and alert us to a family member who 

might be a lone wolf terrorist or might be associating with other 

terrorists. 

We do have examples of that in recent time. Most of them are 

in the Muslim community, as Mr. Ervin pointed out, but they don’t 

have to be limited there. 

Does what I just described constitute, by your lights, securitizing 

the relationship with those communities? 

Mr. ELIBIARY. No, it does not, Madam Chair. The securitizing the 

relationship is when—for this category of how do you disrupt terror 

plots, the only conduit available currently for the community to engage with is to offer a tip. So there is only the law enforcement 
66 

channel, and it is really with the FBI. Even if it is offered to local 

law enforcement or fusion centers, it is going to funnel back to the 

JTTF. 

So in this particular case, there is—as I wrote in my prepared 

remarks, the line between where the counterideological work that 

the community would be engaging in and the essentially predictive 

behavior that—standard that law enforcement tries to uphold is— 

there is a gray area in between, and that gray area, as well as 

while a youth, for example, is going through their radicalization 

process, cannot just be to connect with the FBI. Then that is a total 

securitized relationship. 

There is a gap there. It needs to be addressed. It should be addressed outside of the bureau, outside of a law enforcement agency. 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I think many people believe, as Sheriff Baca 

obviously does, that local level policing is the first line of contact, 

or even community organizations, which then trust local level police, not the FBI, so I am not sure I agree with you that there is 

this direct link between locals and the FBI only. 

But at any rate, to continue with this, there was a testy exchange between Mr. Souder and Sheriff Baca. No one missed it. It 

was about CAIR, the organization CAIR, which is—has been controversial. I think no one would argue that. You are all nodding 

your heads, so you agree. 

I am asking you whether you think organizations like CAIR do 

play a vital role and/or whether organizations like CAIR, which 

may be linked to funding, or at least these are the claims, terror 

organizations or terror activities should be cut out somehow of the 

set of organizations that intersect communities and those in communities who are trying to let us know about improper behavior in 

those communities. 

Mr. ERVIN. Well, I will start, Madam Chair. I would say a couple 

of things. I, too, was struck by Mr. Elibiary’s use of the term 

securitized—securitizing this whole subject. 

I guess what I would say in response to that is I completely 

agree with your response to that. I might add that if law enforcement’s only contact with the Muslim community is focused on the 

discrete issue of terrorism, that is one thing. 

That is why I stressed in my statement that not just law enforcement but Government generally, and not just Government but a 

whole range of institutions outside Government must also work to 

do positive things with the community—jobs, economic opportunity, 

positive alternative social organizations. 

I could understand from the Muslim’s community if they perceive 

law enforcement as being solely focused on counterterrorism that 

that would be perceived by some as securitizing. I hope that that 

is helpful, what I have just said there. 

With regard to your specific question on CAIR, I would distinguish between CAIR—I do distinguish between CAIR and Hamas 

and Hezbollah. That was also mentioned. There is no question in 

my mind that Hamas and Hezbollah are terrorist organizations. 

CAIR is not. 

There is no question but that it is a controversial organization. 

There are people in that organization associated with controversial 

views. You made the very important distinction at the—at the be-
67 

ginning of the hearing that we are not here to talk about views, 

however controversial. We are talking about behavior. 

CAIR certainly is an organization that is not engaged in, and is 

opposed to, and has thwarted violent behavior. That is here what— 

that is what we are here to talk about. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. 

My time has expired, and I want to be respectful of others. 

Do you have a short comment, Ms. Ramirez? 

Ms. RAMIREZ. Yes. My short comment is that I do not believe 

CAIR is a terrorist organization, and I also think that it is not an 

accident that families went to CAIR with information that then 

went to the FBI. The community respects CAIR. It is a large, wellrespected grassroots organization. 

Without CAIR at the table or by excluding or demonizing CAIR 

as a terrorist organization, you exclude the grassroots members of 

the community who have the information that is necessary for 

thwarting counterterrorism. 

The FBI does not consider CAIR to be a terrorist organization. 

The FBI field offices regularly meet with CAIR. 

There are individual members of CAIR who have been under 

criminal investigation for criminal behavior. But that is different 

than saying that the entire organization is a terrorist organization. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. 

I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. McCaul. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Welcome to the panel. I wanted to add to Mr. Clark—Mr. Ervin’s 

resume the fact that he served as deputy attorney general under 

Attorney General John Cornyn along with myself, and it is great 

to see a former colleague here today, and—— 

Mr. ERVIN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. Thanks for your service both in the Department of Homeland Security and other aspects as well. 

We heard testimony from the previous panel which I thought 

was sort of interesting. The FBI and DHS seemed to indicate that 

there is a wall of separation, and I don’t like the use of the term 

wall of separation after 9/11, between what they are doing and 

what the Joint Terrorism Task Forces are doing. 

We also heard that—when we asked them can you think of an 

example of a terror plot that has been disrupted through community outreach, the only example I heard was the inauguration, 

which really turned out to be a non-issue. It wasn’t a threat, in— 

in fact. 

Given that being the case, I am just questioning if we are really 

approaching this in the right way. I understand we need to have 

outreach to the community in a non-threatening way to the Muslim 

community, but at the same time it can be very valuable in terms 

of obtaining information and evidence related to a potential terror 

plot and which we can disrupt. 

Mr. Ervin, I know you just recently went out to the NCTC center 

and actually talked to them on this very issue, so this hearing is 

very timely, I think, for your testimony. I just, you know, care if 

you comment on that point. 

Mr. ERVIN. Yes, Mr. McCaul. I am glad you gave me an opportunity to do that. In the interest of time, I didn’t talk about that 
68 

in my statement. But I want to commend, and I think we all 

should, the efforts that the Federal Government—specifically the 

National Counterterrorism Center, and even more specifically Dan 

Sutherland, who heads the Countering Violent Extremism Unit, if 

I can call it that, at NCTC, who formerly, of course, was the first 

director of the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the Department of Homeland Security. 

Commendably, Director Leiter has made this issue, countering 

violent extremism, a central focus of the National Counterterrorism 

Center. The work, as we heard this morning, of the—of Mr. Sutherland continues now at the Department of Homeland Security. We 

heard that Secretary Napolitano has given her full support to that 

office. I think that is commendable. 

So I think that is tremendously important that the Federal Government amplifies the efforts of the local community. That is no 

substitute for the local community, because there is no question 

but that the likelihood is that the interaction between terrorists 

and the government is likeliest, of course, to happen at the local 

level. 

Mr. MCCAUL. What I was struck by—and thank you for that— 

Sheriff Baca seemed to have a different approach than what the 

FBI and DHS were talking about, and he does seem to be able to 

fully integrate this community outreach, which I think he does very 

well, in addition to the law enforcement side of—of the house. 

I think that may be a model, Madam Chair, we should—we 

should look at on the Federal level. 

Ms. Ramirez, appreciate your experience, particularly as an assistant U.S. attorney, as I was at one point in my life, and you 

mentioned a National training and resource center, and also that 

the 56 FBI offices have more of a community coordinator. 

I know that some of the offices do, but I assume from your testimony that not all of them—and can you explain to me what the 

center would do that you are proposing? 

Ms. RAMIREZ. Okay. First of all, some of the—some of the 56 field 

offices do meet regularly with their community—Los Angeles, 

Dearborn, Chicago are examples of that. But all of these efforts are 

ad hoc and uncoordinated. 

What would a National center do? Well, the way in which we 

configured this was through briefings with the FBI. What the FBI 

thought would be useful at the time or might be useful, or at least 

what I think would be useful, is for the offices to be trained with 

their community counterparts, so that instead of—for example, 

many of the things that Sheriff Baca said—and I think his efforts 

are laudatory and ought to be replicated. 

But if we had a National center, he could come and talk to law 

enforcement about how to coordinate the counterterrorism and 

community outreach together. He has a lot of good ideas. He has 

a lot of programs. But they are not shared in any National forum, 

so that each one is operating independently of the other. 

The Dearborn model, which is headed up by the Department of 

Homeland Security in Dearborn, Michigan, also has been in existence since 2001 and has accumulated a lot of information and experience which has no way of being transferred to other areas. 
69 

Then there are many offices that don’t meet at all with their 

counterparts. As a former assistant U.S. attorney, one of the things 

that seemed puzzling to me is that when we went to Dearborn, for 

the first time I saw the hate crimes officers, who have to go in the 

community and enforce hate crimes and give training about hate 

crimes, were at the table with the counterterrorism officers, because after 2001 the counterterrorism agents were complaining 

that they were flying blind in these communities. 

They did not know the communities. They did not have a context 

in which to put the information that they were gathering from the 

community. The people who were doing hate crimes were introducing them to the community. So you had these two parallel 

tracks within the FBI that weren’t talking to each other. 

What the center recommended is that they come together to 

work with the community in parallel, and that does address, to 

some extent, the securitization aspect, because they are not there 

only to get information, but they are there to stand with the community against hate crime and hate speech. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Madam Chair, I think that is a—it is a very interesting idea, and I would like to follow up if we can on this—on this 

idea. 

I see my time has expired. I don’t know if we will have another 

round of questions or not. 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, why don’t you take a few extra minutes? 

That would be fine. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Okay. That would be great. 

Mr. Elibiary, first let me commend you for your work in my home 

State of Texas and your outreach efforts in the Muslim community. 

You mentioned also the JTTF component. Can you comment or 

elaborate on that? I know your opening statement you didn’t have 

an opportunity. 

Mr. ELIBIARY. Thank you very much. A couple of points, if I— 

if you will allow me, in just a few seconds. I wanted to say that 

the LAPD and the NYPD are exceptions to State and local law enforcement. 

As one who has advised the PMISC’s office looking at bridging 

these communities of trust issues and different parts of the law enforcement hierarchy of the agencies, Federal, State and local, the— 

most of your local law enforcement agencies around the country do 

not really do CVE work, don’t really know what their role is. They 

don’t do anything as well as fusion centers but pass on the information to the JTTFs. So my comments were not focusing on those 

exception ones. 

The two examples that I gave of the securitizing, as I heard it 

articulated from community members at the grassroots, are the 

low-hanging fruit one as well as the firewall that I can guarantee 

you and share with you offline which agencies and where they 

exist, if you would like. 

On CAIR, I would like to just share the comments that I shared 

with Director Mueller at the FBI SIOC last year, early last year, 

on this issue. This is our mainstream community position on the 

issue, that CAIR is a community organization. It was totally funded by the community. It is developed over the years by the community and does community civil rights work. 
70 

Now, the founders, leaders, any individuals having association 

problems or have done anything criminal should be indicted. But 

the organization should exist. The organization should be left 

alone. We have a standard in this country for criminal activity, and 

that is the standard we should uphold for CAIR just like everybody 

else. 

Now, last point is the philosophical spectrum in the Muslim community. I think we need to engage with everybody according to the 

metric that Chair Harman mentioned earlier, which is violence. So 

as long as they—they understand and they oppose that kind of activities, I really don’t care what their viewpoints are on anything. 

I engage with all kinds of people, from the most fundamentalist 

to the most progressive in our community, because I have a goal, 

and it is to counter violent extremism, and that is it. 

Now, the JTTF—here is an example of—that we were not able 

to help with. Most mosques around the country, because of the 

post-9/11 magnifying glass that they are under in the media, will 

not allow for any kind of controversial discourse to happen in their 

facilities. 

So therefore, if somebody steps forward and wants to kind of develop their own study circle, so you have, like, an ad-hoc spiritual 

sanctioner—that term is often thrown out there in the analytical 

community—and they get a little group of five or six folks sitting 

around them in a—in a little session, what the mosque will do is 

they will go and say, ‘‘You have to sign up your little study sessions 

on a map,’’ I mean, ‘‘on a calendar,’’ and then slowly weed that 

group, not authorize it, and those folks leave the facility where we 

can engage with them, and they go to somebody’s apartment. 

So in this particular case that I am referencing, the mosque leadership came to me and said, ‘‘We have this issue. This guy is kind 

of painting himself in this particular way and he has gotten a few 

weak-minded individuals around him, and we are concerned it 

could develop into something—some extremism, and eventually 

lead into violence.’’ 

I said, ‘‘Okay.’’ We connected with the field intelligence group 

and the JTTF in the region, and so they had the information of this 

individual and the people around him. Then basically, the mosque 

kind of pushed them out. 

The JTTF supervisor came to me and said, you know, ideally 

now what should have happened is that the community and the 

FBI would have worked together to find out where the weak link 

in that circle would have been, that study circle, and then have 

that individual engaged. 

Then that individual can then raise the flag to the JTTF when 

they start veering away from just the discussion of extremist identity issues and religious discourse, and then we would have a flag, 

an early warning system. But we currently do not. 

We couldn’t help to create that mechanism because, like was 

mentioned earlier, the level of cooperation between the community 

and law enforcement is not up to this level yet. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Perhaps that is why we haven’t seen an example 

of a plot thwarted from this community outreach. The Hasan case 

was screaming, you know, with flags going up and yet no, you 

know, action was taken, and—— 
71 

Mr. ELIBIARY. I can give you an example of one that does—it 

does not come through the community engagement—or the community relations offices. 

The tips that do come in concerning these issues that I am aware 

of have all come in through the channel of either the FIG or the 

JTTF, because there is a deep relationship that either that supervisor or special agent had built up, so there is a personal rapport. 

It is very personality-centric between the two components of the 

community leader and the FBI official. As I mentioned in here, this 

is an ad-hoc system. We can do better—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. No, I think we can do better, and I think you raise 

a very good point. 

Last point—and I have to raise this because I want you to explain this. I was in the Justice Department when the Holy Land 

Foundation was indicted and prosecuted, and there was an article 

in the Dallas Morning News that says Holy Land verdict is another 

U.S. defeat. 

I disagree with that, but I want to give you an opportunity to explain that. 

Mr. ELIBIARY. I appreciate that, Representative McCaul. I have 

written plenty of op-eds and have yet to see an editor allow me to 

publish the title that I put on my pieces. So I have never picked 

a title for any of my op-eds anywhere, including the one I just 

wrote for Fox News. So let me just put that out there. 

Now, here is my view on the Holy Land Foundation. The Holy 

Land Foundation—and of course, I sat through both trials, reviewed the evidence, engaged with the FBI investigators and, of 

course, heard from the community side and the defendants and everything. 

We are using the Al Capone approach a lot of times in these material support cases where we are trying to get people prosecuted 

for one thing because of some other issue we have with them. 

Sometimes it is because of the lack of evidence that is available 

to convict them directly, as well as we have in the Holy Land Foundation trial lumped in a whole bunch of unindicted co-conspirators 

and caused a great deal of damage to community relations between 

law enforcement and the community. 

So those two approaches, I think, are—like I mentioned in my 

comments, you can achieve—we can achieve our end-goal using 

much more subtle and Constitutionally-compliant or considered fair 

approaches, because the community feels it is being treated in a 

certain—to a certain standard that is different than the rest of society, so—and then that is counterproductive, and it is a defeat for 

us long-term as a country to increased cooperation. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Yes, thank you. 

I thank the Madam Chair for being so generous with her time. 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I thank you, Mr. McCaul. Your questions 

were interesting. 

To remind, the focus of this hearing is: How do we find those few 

individuals in—who live amongst us who are intending to commit 

acts of terror against us and prevent and disrupt those plots? That 

is what we are focused on. 

Although we may all have views of different organizations, I did 

ask the question I asked about CAIR because it had come up and 
72 

I didn’t think we had fully aired the situation. It is a controversial 

organization, and there are many, including many in Congress, 

who question its purposes. 

I did hear your testimony that you think it is a valuable community organization, but I also heard your testimony, two of you, who 

said there may be individuals inside of CAIR who have committed, 

possibly, criminal acts and should be prosecuted. So I think that 

is—that is pretty straight up. 

I just want to conclude this hearing by making a couple of comments. First of all, your testimony is very careful and very helpful, 

all of you. I was just looking through it again. 

You know a lot about this subject—and you work in your communities, especially Mr. Elibiary and Ms. Ramirez, and, Mr. Ervin, 

you have a long experience with this, and you still work on the 

same issues—and it will inform us. First point. 

Second point, this whole issue is a minefield. It is a minefield for 

you and it is surely a minefield for us. We are frequent target practice from the left and the right and our selection of witnesses and 

topics are regularly under fire. 

Having said that, we are going to forge ahead. Our whole subcommittee feels, I believe—I think I can speak for Mr. McCaul who 

is very friendly to me today because I gave him so much extra 

time—that we have to figure this out. 

I often say that security and liberty are not a zero-sum game. 

That is not my original idea. Ben Franklin said a variation of that. 

We will either get more of both or less of both. I want more of both. 

I want to find bad guys and have the right approach to getting 

there, and I want to protect our Constitution while we do it. 

It seems to me if all we do is securitize this problem, and round 

up bad guys, and shred our Constitution, we really haven’t protected the society that we love. So getting this right is going to require all of us to take a little heat and work very hard on a path 

forward. I think we have a lot of work to do. 

So I invite you to stay in touch with us. We are going to have 

a hearing in the next month or so on the internet. We are going 

to try to frame the issue carefully and have a balanced set of witnesses. I promise you that we will be criticized for the people we 

select, but we are still going to try to get this right. 

I just want to close with this. I said it at the beginning, and you 

repeated it, Mr. Elibiary, so I know that you heard me, and I hope 

others did, too. Our goal is not to censure radical beliefs. A witness 

in a prior hearing quoted Barry Goldwater, who said that extremism in the pursuit of liberty is no vice. Barry Goldwater is right. 

But if those radical beliefs are converted to an intent to engage 

in violent behavior, we are going after that. That is fair season. 

That is not protected by our Constitution. That harms America’s 

homeland security. That is our mandate, to protect America’s 

homeland from harm. 

So stay tuned. Please think kindly on us, not just on St. Patrick’s 

Day but on every day, because we are forging a difficult path, but 

so are you. Thank you very much for coming. 
73 

The hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:48 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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