1

AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

Nigeria’s Pernicious Drivers of 

Ethno-Religious Conflict

BY CHRIS KWAJA 

A PUBLICATION OF THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

◆ Nigeria’s statutory framework grants local officials the authority to extend or deny basic rights to 

citizens in their jurisdictions, thereby creating incentives for the politicization of ethnicity and escalating 

intercommunal violence.

◆ Ineffective state responses to repeated ethnic clashes have highlighted a lack of political will to address 

this violence.

◆ While currently concentrated in central Nigeria, the systemic drivers to identity conflict have the potential 

to spread elsewhere in the country and will require fundamental institutional reforms to resolve.

HIGHLIGHTS

NO. 14 / JULY 2011

victims were killed or seized by Muslim or Christian 

youth gangs at impromptu roadside checkpoints and 

taxi and bus stations, their bodies later found in nearby 

shallow graves.1

Several major attacks in 2010 saw new, increasingly lethal tactics. During 4 days of fighting in January, up to 500 people were killed and some 18,000 

displaced, many into neighboring states. Local organizations collected over 150 text messages circulated prior to the violence, revealing an orchestrated 

Communal clashes across ethnic and religious 

faultlines in and around the city of Jos in central Nigeria have claimed thousands of lives, displaced hundreds of thousands of others, and fostered a climate of 

instability throughout the surrounding region.

While large-scale violence has occurred periodically over the past decade, in recent years attacks have 

become more frequent, widespread, and efficient. Over 

200 people were killed and nearly 100 more went missing during near daily attacks in January 2011. Many 

In extreme cases, rival communities may perceive that their security, perhaps their very survival, can be ensured 

only through control of state power. Conflict in such cases becomes virtually inevitable.

—“The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa,” 

Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, 1998
2

effort to stoke tensions. In March, a single attack left 

another 300 to 500 dead. In August, five men were 

arrested while attempting to smuggle rocket launchers, grenades, AK–47s, and large quantities of cash 

into Plateau State, of which Jos is the capital. On 

Christmas day, twin car bombs in Jos killed nearly 80 

and wounded more than 100. Signaling a dangerous 

new turn to this conflict, the violent Islamist group 

Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the explosions. The group had previously only been active in 

northern Nigeria.

The conflict in Jos is often characterized as 

inter-religious or inter-ethnic, mainly between the 

Christian-dominated ethnic groups of the Anaguta, 

Afizere, and Berom, and the predominantly Muslim 

Hausa and Fulani groups. But, as is often the case 

with identity conflicts in Africa, these are socially 

constructed stereotypes that are manipulated to trigger and drive violence in Jos.2

 They veil deeper institutional factors within Nigerian law that are abused 

and exploited to deny citizens access to resources, 

basic rights, and participation in political processes—

factors that, left unaddressed, have the potential to 

trigger violence across the country.

Government responses to the conflict are widely 

perceived as ineffective. At least 16 public commissions have been launched to examine the conflict 

and identify solutions, and many other studies have 

been conducted by independent groups. But there 

is little political will to act on these findings. Recommendations go largely unheeded. Nor have organizers and perpetrators of attacks been prosecuted. 

Federal and state governments have regularly worked 

at cross-purposes. While civil society groups have become increasingly engaged, this has had a polarizing 

effect in some cases.

UNDERLYING CAUSES

Situated on the northern edge of the so-called 

middle belt in central Nigeria where the country’s 

predominantly Muslim northern half blends with the 

generally Christian south (see map), Jos is a relatively 

new city. It was established as a mining transportation 

camp in 1915 because of its proximity to nearby tin 

and columbite deposits. With a mild climate, high 

quality soil, abundant water resources, extensive grazing lands, and economic opportunities, it attracted 

migrants from around Nigeria and currently has a 

population of nearly 1 million. The city remains a 

key supplier and commercial center in the national 

livestock trade and is the site of the National Veterinary Research Institute. Before being destroyed 

during communal clashes in 2002, the Jos Central 

Market was one of West Africa’s biggest on account 

of its proximity to a high-traffic rail juncture between 

northern and southern Nigeria. The city’s diverse 

population once exemplified the Plateau State slogan, 

“the home of peace and tourism.” Schools were often 

intermixed, and business was conducted regardless of 

religious or ethnic affiliation.3

This began to change in the early 1990s following 

an adjustment in the distribution of indigeneship certificates. In Nigeria, indigenes are “original” inhabitants 

of a local government area, or members of those ethnic 

groups that trace their lineage back to the area. All 

others are considered “settlers,” or migrants. The distinction was initially intended to allay concerns among 

minority groups who feared that their traditional customs and authority structures would be overwhelmed 

and eroded by the expansion of larger ethnic and religious groups. However, in practice, the classification 

has often been used to determine who “belongs” to a 

particular locality, which in turn determines whether 

citizens can participate in politics, own land, obtain a 

job, or attend school.4 Accordingly, the indigeneship 

certificate is now a defining document in the day-today lives of many Nigerians.Chris Kwaja is a Lecturer and Researcher in the Centre 

for Conflict Management at the University of Jos, Nigeria.

“the ethnic or religious 

dimensions of the conflict 

have subsequently been 

misconstrued as the primary 

driver of violence when, in fact, 

disenfranchisement, inequality, 

and other practical fears are the 

root causes”
3

Such differentiations are grounded in national 

law. The Nigerian constitution, adopted in 1999, 

and the Federal Character Commission, a statutory 

body established to ensure equity in the distribution of resources and political power in the country, 

recognize the validity of indigene certificates. These 

bodies also accept the authority of local officials 

to issue the certificates to constituents whom officials deem qualified—a practice that first originated 

in the 1960s. This authority dramatically elevates 

the importance of and competition over districting 

and local elections. Elected officials, in turn, have a 

strong incentive to use the certificates as a tool to 

consolidate local ethnic majorities. Indeed, many 

are accused of stirring tensions, supporting violent 

actors, and perpetuating the selective distribution 

of indigene certificates, including the Governor of 

Plateau State, Jonah Jang, whose political campaigns 

have seemed to vilify Muslims and certain Christian 

ethnic groups.5 This has resulted in sharp differences 

in intergroup inequality, intercommunal animosity, 

and social fragmentation.

Defining indigeneship is extraordinarily arbitrary. For instance, a Hausa, Igbo, or Yoruba—groups 

that tend not to be originally from Jos—could legally be deemed a settler and denied a certificate even 

though his family has lived in Jos for generations. 

Were this same individual to return to areas where 

his ethnic group predominates, local officials could 

similarly deny certificates on account of his birth 

and connections in Jos. Children of inter-ethnic and 

inter-religious parents face similar double-standards.

But for many years, this was not a problem. 

Certificates were generally easy to obtain for Plateau 

MAPPING NIGERIA’S DIVERSITY

Source: Ulrich Lamm. Modified by author.

Source: Ulrich Lamm. Modified by author.
4

State residents and caused few concerns. However, 

during the late 1980s falling government revenues, 

increasing economic pressures, and steadily increasing migration to one of Nigeria’s fastest growing 

regions prompted some local authorities to revise 

indigene certificate policies. In 1990, several local 

jurisdictions in Plateau, including Jos, began to restrict the distribution of indigene certificates.6

 Under Nigerian law, the modifications were perfectly 

legal, but the action seemed to deny indigeneship 

eligibility disproportionately to many Muslims 

and ethnic groups from northern Nigeria. These 

groups in turn lobbied for assistance from national 

authorities. In 1991, General Ibrahim Babangida, 

the (northern-born) military ruler of Nigeria, announced that Jos would be divided into three Local 

Government Areas (LGAs) in what many perceived 

as a thinly disguised effort to gerrymander the region 

in favor of his local allies who would then control 

certificate distribution. Some groups, particularly 

Christians, feared this decision was designed to exclude them from political office.

As uncertainty mounted over access to indigeneship certificates, community relations deteriorated. Yet 

violence did not immediately break out. Babangida’s 

successor as military ruler, General Sani Abacha, dissolved all democratic structures and in 1994 directly 

appointed military governors, who then selected local 

government officials. Abacha’s appointments prompted local protests and counterdemonstrations in Jos. 

Fears and tensions reached a breaking point, leading 

to the first violent communal clashes and deaths. Ever 

since, local elections and political appointments have 

been viewed as winner-take-all contests.

The ethnic or religious dimensions of the conflict have subsequently been misconstrued as the 

primary driver of violence when, in fact, disenfranchisement, inequality, and other practical fears are 

the real root causes. Capitalizing on such conditions, many political rivals have instrumentalized 

the ethnic and religious diversity of Jos to manipulate and mobilize support. Each outbreak of violence 

worsens suspicions and renders communal reconciliation more difficult, deepening the cycle and further 

incentivizing polarization. The heads of the Christian Association of Nigeria and the Nigerian National Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs issued a 

joint statement in 2010 denouncing local politicians 

in Jos for exploiting communal tensions for personal 

gain.7 A study commissioned by the Office of the 

President in 2003 similarly concluded that while 

ethnic plurality plays a role in the conflict, “underpinning these sources of antagonism and triggers are 

deeper systemic issues at the center of which is the 

relationship between political power and access to 

economic resources and opportunities.”8

Similar indigeneship tensions have emerged 

elsewhere in Nigeria. Reflecting a widespread concern over the potential expansion of these disputes, 

20 Nigerian citizens filed a joint legal case in March 

2011 against the federal and 16 state and local governments regarding discrimination on the basis of 

indigeneship.9 The plaintiffs argue they are being 

denied fundamental rights protected by the Nigerian 

constitution as well as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the International Covenant 

on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the 

Universal Declaration of Human Rights. All are 

long-time residents of the jurisdictions against which 

they are filing claims, some with family roots going 

back generations.

Indigeneship has also sparked deadly communal 

conflict in Kaduna State in northern Nigeria and 

the oil-rich southern Delta State. As in Plateau, 

these conflicts have been described as inter-religious 

or inter-ethnic, though the material ramifications of 

losing indigeneship are the real drivers of violence. 

The conflict in Jos, however, is more violent, likely 

as a result of how intensely indigeneship has been 

seized by political rivals to mobilize support in these 

closely divided jurisdictions. According to 2011 voter registries, the Christian-dominated ethnic groups 

made up approximately 200,000 while predominantly Muslim groups number roughly 150,000 out of 

“since communal violence first 

emerged in 1994, few charges 

have been brought against 

perpetrators and no credible 

prosecutions have been pursued”
5

“a governance vacuum in Jos is 

worsening; increasingly fearful 

and suspicious communities are 

turning toward nonstate actors”

429,179 registered voters in Jos North LGA—the 

central district of the greater Jos area.

G O V E R N A N C E S H O R T C O M I N G S 

EXACERBATE TENSIONS

To deter attacks and protect the people in Jos, an 

already extensive national police presence has regularly been augmented by military deployments. Yet 

on multiple occasions security agencies have failed 

to prevent and respond to known threats and early 

signs of pending attacks. The worst outbreaks of communal clashes in 1994, 2001, 2004, 2008, and 2010 

(see table) were typically preceded by days of simmering tensions and conspicuous mobilization. Prior to 

fighting that resulted in thousands of deaths in 2001, 

“everyone on the streets of the town sensed the tension and the threat of danger hanging heavily in the 

air long before the events. . . . Something dreadful was 

about to happen.”10 During incidents in 2010, separate 

attacks began and ended at roughly the same time on 

the same day, suggesting they were preplanned.11

Prevention and response are further undermined 

by poor intergovernmental coordination and insufficient means of information-sharing. For instance, in 

March 2010, Plateau State Governor Jonah Jang informed the commanding officer of an armored division 

of the Nigerian army deployed to Jos of an impending 

attack on the Dogo Na Hawa village through text message. The governor later claimed a text was necessary 

as the officer refused to respond to his phone calls. A 

subsequent attack left more than 300 dead.

Part of the problem is disconnected lines of authority. Police and the armed forces are centralized 

at the federal level, and all related security requests 

must be channeled to the national capital for consideration. This poses serious challenges for early 

Year Proximate Trigger Extent of Violence

1994 Appointments of local government 

leaders prompt protests and 

counterdemonstrations.

Four killed. Several city markets, an 

Islamic school, and places of worship 

destroyed.

2001 Appointment of local administrator of 

welfare allowances leads to weeks 

of demonstrations. Tensions rise, 

resulting in violence.

An estimated 1,000 to 3,000 killed. 

Violence expands across Plateau 

State. Attacks by youth groups in 

Muslim and Christian neighborhoods, 

on mosques and churches, and at the 

University of Jos. Sporadic attacks 

continue through 2002–2003, killing 

hundreds and destroying 72 villages.

2004 National elections held but postponed 

in Plateau State. Local officials are 

appointed, resulting in disputes.

More than 1,000 killed in attacks 

against Muslim and Christian villages 

from February to May, and 250,000 

are displaced. Federal government 

removes state governor and appoints 

temporary replacement.

2008 Local government elections—the first 

in Jos since 2002—are scheduled 

then delayed three times. Disputes 

emerge over party nominees

and results.

Nearly 800 killed in gang attacks and 

riots from November to December.

2010 A dispute over reconstruction of a 

home destroyed by clashes in 2008 

leads to violence in January and 

reprisals in March and throughout 

the year.

January: Up to 500 residents killed 

over 4 days in January. Many villages 

and homes destroyed.

March: Up to 500 killed in an 

overnight attack.

December: Nearly 80 killed following 

twin car bombs. Hundreds more die in 

frequent intermittent attacks.

LARGE-SCALE COMMUNAL CLASHES IN AND AROUND JOS
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response and management of internal security at 

the state and local levels. Following attacks, finger 

pointing and blame trading within the security sector 

and across the government are common. This is compounded by episodes in which some of the perpetrators of the ethnic violence are seen wearing military 

or police uniforms.

Justice and accountability have also been lacking. Since communal violence first emerged in 1994, 

few charges have been brought against perpetrators, 

and no credible prosecutions have been pursued. 

The highly connected individuals and politicians 

involved in fomenting tensions are equally effective 

in using their influence to protect perpetrators of violence. With each passing incident of violence that 

results in few arrests and no prosecutions, citizens’ 

confidence in law enforcement, judicial institutions, 

and government, in general, diminish.

While on-the-ground response has remained 

poor, government offices at the state and national 

levels have launched numerous studies of the violence in Jos, but with little effect. After one clash 

in 2008, five separate commissions of inquiry were 

announced. Yet few if any of the resulting policy prescriptions have been implemented. Some commission 

reports have never even been made public. Reflecting 

the growing impatience and diminishing expectations 

of many Nigerians, one newspaper editorial described 

such commissions as a “ritual of instituting inquiries 

and receiving reports that always end up in the archives.”12 With their proliferation, these committees 

have lost credibility and been politicized. Recent 

commissions have been unable to obtain testimony 

from key sources and attract high-profile members. 

Some commissions have been overtly one-sided.

As a result, a governance vacuum in Jos is 

worsening. Increasingly fearful and suspicious 

communities are turning toward nonstate actors. 

Citizens rely almost entirely on these groups for 

protection, humanitarian assistance, and reintegration of displaced persons in the aftermath of 

conflicts, which further amplifies the polarization 

resulting from indigeneship disputes.

Some community organizations seem intent to 

hasten this polarization. Several faith-based organizations—Christian and Muslim alike—and many youth 

groups such as the Berom Youth Movement, Anaguta 

Youth Movement, Afizere Youth Movement, and 

the Jasawa Development Association have played 

key roles in spreading exclusionary ideologies and 

violence. In the absence of credible and accountable 

state authorities, their influence and appeal among 

citizens of Jos can only be expected to grow.

M I T I G AT I N G F U T U R E C O N F L I C T I N 

PLATEAU STATE

Entrenched institutional factors are at the heart 

of the accelerating distrust and violence in Plateau 

State. Left unchecked, this pattern is likely to expand 

to a growing number of Nigeria’s 36 states. Fundamental changes will be required to reverse the incentives feeding this violence.

Eliminate indigene/settler classifications in 

government decisionmaking. The legal basis for indigeneship in the Nigerian constitution and Federal 

Character Commission should be eliminated. Originally envisioned as a means to protect traditional customs, cultures, and governance structures, the notion 

of indigeneity has been warped and politicized. Today, 

it provides an institutionalized incentive for political 

opportunists to build power on the basis of exclusion. 

In Jos, it has led to thousands of deaths and severe 

intercommunal hostility. The concept of indigeneship inherently divides Nigerians and undermines the 

democratic form of government that Nigeria aspires 

to uphold. Indeed, it undercuts the very notion of 

what it means to be Nigerian.

Disentangling indigeneship from Nigerian law 

will be difficult. It will likely require amendments to 

the Nigerian constitution and other legal codes. To 

the extent such categories ever had value, in an increasingly mobile, modern, and urban society, they 

are now outdated. Likewise, increasingly popular halfmeasures should be dismissed. Clearer definitions of 

“indigenes” or supplemental “residency certificates” 

“the concept of indigeneship 

inherently divides Nigerians 

and undermines the democratic 

form of government that Nigeria 

aspires to uphold”
7

for so-called settlers will not eliminate the two-tiered 

notion of citizenship that the indigene/settler dichotomy perpetuates. Indigeneity should end or conflict 

in Jos is likely to worsen—as well as emerge in other 

Nigerian cities and states.

Strengthen, coordinate, and deconflict security 

institutions. Strengthening security forces’ capacity 

to proactively detect early warning signs and respond 

to intercommunal tensions can help better contain 

outbreaks of violence. This will require a cohesive intelligence capability that can provide local and state 

law enforcement units with near-time information. 

At the same time, federal forces must remain engaged 

at the local level to protect minorities. However, 

clear lines of authority and means for coordination 

between the local, state, and federal levels need to be 

put into practice. Similarly, means for investigating 

allegations of security sector participation in ethnic 

violence are required to ensure accountability.

Progress in Lagos State could inspire innovative 

reforms in Plateau. Lagos established a state security 

trust fund that serves as a point of coordination between business and state officials to identify security 

threats and coordinate responses with police authorities. It also mobilizes funds and resources to support 

local policing. Helicopters, vehicles, and other advanced equipment have been purchased to enhance 

police effectiveness and incentivize quick response 

and information-sharing. Other policing initiatives in 

Lagos have successfully integrated some youth groups 

in community policing and monitoring efforts.

Make protection of minority rights a priority. In 

order to reconcile Plateau’s polarized ethno-religious 

identity groups and build support for peacebuilding 

initiatives, all sides must have confidence that basic 

rights will be protected and that an institutionalized 

means to investigate alleged violations is available. 

This will require the engagement of a trusted, independent, external actor.

The National Human Rights Commission 

is positioned to play such a role. In March 2011, 

President Goodluck Jonathan signed into law 

amendments aimed at empowering the previously 

hamstrung commission. Its capacity, budget, and 

authority should now be expanded in order to fulfill this broader mandate. It would do well to emulate successes achieved by Ghana’s Commission for 

Human Rights and Administrative Justice, which 

has contributed significantly to social reconciliation. This commission is wholly independent from, 

though collaborates with, the security services. This 

arrangement facilitates greater cooperation from citizens who are more inclined to report violations and 

abuses to the trusted human rights commission. Additionally, Nigeria’s human rights commission must 

have the authority to initiate and conduct investigations, issue subpoenas, access state and national 

leaders, pursue charges, and other prerogatives in 

order to cut through political stonewalling.

Such an expansive mandate will require the appointment of leaders with unquestionable integrity 

and insulation from political pressures. To foster this, 

leadership appointments should be subject to peer review from respected civil society entities such as the 

Nigerian Bar Association. Indeed, given that some 

politicians and politically connected individuals will 

likely be the subjects of investigations, the commission will need to remain consciously disentangled 

from politics.

Establish community-based, state-supported 

peacebuilding committees. The Plateau State 

government, in collaboration with federal counterparts, should establish community-based interethnic and -religious peacebuilding committees to 

facilitate dialogue and implement conflict mitigation strategies.

The Plateau State government should model 

these committees on those in Kaduna State, where 

the government proactively involves the population in forums for dialogue such as the Committee 

on Inter-Religious Harmony chaired by the governor. The committee is designed to identify potential 

conflict flashpoints as well as devise steps to avert 

or resolve them. It also works to ensure the speedy 

repatriation, rehabilitation, and palliative compensation of displaced persons and monitors the flow 

of small arms.

Such a committee in Plateau could lay the foundation for sustainable stability by emphasizing reconciliation and fostering a climate of political inclusiveness. It could also bear immediate results by providing 

a means for government-community engagement and 
8

AFRICA CENTER FOR 

STRATEGIC STUDIES

Director: Ambassador William 

M. Bellamy (Ret.)

National Defense University

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Fort Lesley J. McNair

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Phone: + 1 202-685-7300

Web site: www.africacenter.org

AFRICA CENTER 

REGIONAL OFFICE 

IN DAKAR

Regional Manager: 

Elisabeth Feleke

Phone: 221 33 869 61 00

Email: FelekeE@ndu.edu

AFRICA CENTER 

REGIONAL OFFICE 

IN ADDIS ABABA

Regional Manager:

Brad Anderson

Phone: 251 11 517 4000 

Email: AndersonBG@state.gov

AFRICA SECURITY BRIEFS

Editor: Joseph Siegle, Ph.D.

Phone: + 1 202-685-6808

Email: Sieglej@ndu.edu

The Africa Security Briefs series presents research and analysis 

by ACSS experts and outside scholars with the aim of advancing 

understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For more information on ACSS, visit the Web site at 

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AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

http://www.africacenter.org

facilitating more timely interventions that can prevent localized incidents from escalating to large communal clashes. Over the long-term, such an initiative 

can help inculcate a shared sense of Nigerian identity.

CONCLUSION

In many respects, the spiraling insecurity in Jos 

is anything but a local communal conflict. Its root 

causes and impacts encapsulate many of Nigeria’s 

biggest political challenges. Unclear and discriminatory legal codes fuel conflict, warp political dynamics, and undermine democratic progress. Governance 

shortcomings create vacuums in which citizens are 

forced to turn to self-help solutions such as ethnic 

associations or vigilante groups. A modern economy 

conducive to local entrepreneurship and appealing 

to foreign investors remains impossible while the 

free flow of people, goods, and ideas is restricted by 

indigeneship and resulting instability. Resolving the 

conflict in Jos will require looking past the symptoms 

of Nigeria’s ethnic and religious divisions to focus on 

the institutionalized inequities that encumber not 

only stability in Plateau State but also progress in 

Nigeria as a whole.

NOTES

1

 Shuaibu Mohammed, “Buildings Burn, Death Toll Mounts 

in Central Nigeria,” Reuters, January 30, 2011.

2

 Clement Mweyang Aapengnuo, Misinterpreting Ethnic Conflicts in Africa, ACSS Africa Security Brief No. 4 (Washington, 

DC: NDU Press, April 2010).

3

 Abubakar Sokoto Mohammed, “The Impact of Conflict 

on the Economy: The Case of Plateau State of Nigeria,” Overseas 

Development Institute, 2004.

4

 “‘They Do Not Own This Place’: Government Discrimination Against ‘Non-Indigenes’ in Nigeria,” Human Rights Watch, 

April 2006.

5

 Philip Ostien, “Jonah Jang and the Jasawa: Ethno-Religious 

Conflict in Jos, Nigeria,” Muslim Christian Relations in Africa, August 2009, 19.

6

 Human Rights Watch; see also Jane Krause, “Explaining 

Nigeria’s Christmas Killings,” OpenDemocracy.net, January 3, 

2011; “Plateau: Home of Pieces and Terrorism,” Sahara Reporters, 

July 15, 2010.

7

 “Jos Bombing: Politicians ‘Fuel Nigeria Unrest,’” BBC, December 28, 2010.

8 Strategic Conflict Assessment: Consolidated and Zonal Reports (Abuja, Nigeria: Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, 

March 2003), 160.

9

 “Nigeria: Constitutional challenge to indigene-settler 

divide heard March 14, 2011,” Institute for Human Rights and 

Development in Africa, March 14, 2011.

10 Umar Habila Dadem Danfulani and Sati U. Fwatshak, 

“Briefing: The September 2001 Events in Jos, Nigeria,” African 

Affairs 101, no. 403 (April 2002), 248.

11 Adam Kigazi, The Jos Crisis: A Recurrent Nigerian Tragedy, 

Discussion Paper No. 2 (Abuja, Nigeria: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 

Nigeria, January 2011), 27.

12 “The Presidential Panel Report on Jos Crises,” Daily Trust, 

September 2, 2010.