[Cite as In re H.R.P.T., 2021-Ohio-2285.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

SCIOTO COUNTY 

IN THE MATTER OF: : Case No. 20CA3915 

 : 

H.R.P.T. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT 

 : ENTRY 

________________________________________________________________ 

 

APPEARANCES: 

Matthew F. Loesch, Portsmouth, Ohio, for Appellant-Mother, Jennifer Tackett aka 

Bennett. 

Randall L. Lambert, Ironton, Ohio, for Appellee, Daisy Bennett.

Christopher Tackett, Father.1

________________________________________________________________ 

Smith, P. J. 

{¶1} Jennifer Tackett, the mother of minor child, H.R.P.T., and “Appellant” 

herein, appeals the judgment entry of the Scioto County Common Pleas Court, 

Juvenile Division, entered April 8, 2020. The trial court found that Appellant is an 

unfit and unsuitable parent and that it is in the best interest of H.R.P.T. that legal 

custody be granted to the child’s grandmother, Daisy Bennett, “Appellee.” On 

appeal, Appellant asserts that the trial court’s determination finding her unsuitable 

is against the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence. However, having 

fully reviewed the record, we find the trial court’s decision that Appellant 

1

 Christopher Tackett has not participated in this appeal. 
Scioto App. No. 20CA3915 2

contractually relinquished custody of H.R.P.T. is supported by competent, credible 

evidence and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, we 

find Appellant’s arguments are without merit and the sole assignment of error is 

overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

{¶2} H.R.P.T. was born on September 26, 2012, and at the time of 

the custody hearing was seven years old. Appellant and Christopher Tackett, 

“Tackett,” are H.R.P.T.’s biological parents. Appellee is H.R.P.T.’s maternal 

grandmother. Appellee is a pediatric nurse with a Master’s degree. She has been 

employed providing respite care for one patient for over 20 years. 

 {¶3} Appellant is 39 years old. She has never obtained a high school 

diploma or GED. She is not employed. She does not receive Social Security 

Disability. In addition to H.R.P.T., Appellant and Tackett have an adult daughter, 

Madison Bentley, age 20 and K.T., who is two years older than H.R.P.T. Tackett 

also has two sons. Tackett is not employed. 

{¶4} Appellee filed a pro se Petition for Custody in the Scioto County Court 

of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, on August 27, 2019. Appellee alleged that it 

was in the child’s best interest that Appellee have custody and described 

H.R.P.T.’s parents as follows: 

Mother is unable to care for [H.R.P.T.]. Mother has severe 

back problems, lupus, also mental illness. Father has liver 
Scioto App. No. 20CA3915 3

failure [sic] in a lot of pain. Mother has attacked a 16 yr. old 

niece [sic] choking her and yelling “I’m going to kill you.” 

Police called. This was witnessed by 5 people including 

myself. 

{¶5} Appellee further requested an emergency order, based on the 

above allegations, stating, “I am concerned [H.R.P.T.] is in danger when her 

mother is out of control.” Appellant and Tackett were served copies of the petition 

for custody and ordered to personally appear for a hearing on temporary orders on 

September 5, 2019. 

 {¶6} On September 5, 2019, an attorney on behalf of Appellee filed a notice 

of appearance in the matter. Subsequent to the hearing on temporary orders, the 

trial court found that service was perfected on all parties and the court had 

jurisdiction to proceed. However, based on the testimony adduced at the hearing, 

the trial court did not make temporary orders. The petition for custody was 

scheduled for a full hearing on November 5, 2019. 

{¶7} At the full hearing, Appellee testified that H.R.P.T. was born in 

September 2012. At that time, Appellee lived in a residence on Birch Hollow in 

the Sciotoville, Ohio area with Appellant and Tackett, Shianne, (Appellee’s 17-

year-old granddaughter), K.T., H.R.P.T., and Tackett’s two sons. H.R.P.T. was a 

premature baby and was in the hospital’s neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) for 

three weeks before she came home. 
Scioto App. No. 20CA3915 4

{¶8} Appellee testified Shianne, H.R.P.T., and she moved into a camper 

next to the Birch Hollow residence in January 2013. She testified she moved into 

the camper because “there was a lot of argumentation, cussing people out, um, 

[H.R.P.T.] was not allowed to be around smokers and they smoked in the house. It 

was just not a good environment for [H.R.P.T.] or Shianne at that time.” They 

lived in the camper four to five months. During that time, Appellee took care of 

H.R.P.T., getting up with her in the night for feedings. The parents did not provide 

care for H.R.P.T. While living in the camper, Appellee provided financial support 

for everyone living in the residence and in the camper. 

{¶9} Appellee, Shianne, and H.R.P.T. next moved to a residence on Harding 

Avenue in Sciotoville. They lived there until H.R.P.T. was approximately five 

years old. During that time, the child’s parents and K.T. remained at the Birch 

Hollow residence. Appellant and Tackett did not provide financial support of any 

type for H.R.P.T. Appellee was the sole provider. During this time, Appellee 

continued to financially support Appellant and Tackett. Appellee paid for 

groceries, utility bills, and car repair. Eventually, Appellant, Tackett and K.T. 

came to live with Appellee at the Harding Avenue location. 

{¶10} The group which included Appellee, Appellant, Tackett, H.R.P.T. and 

K.T. next lived in Minford, Ohio in a residence owned by Tackett’s family. 

Appellee continued to pay the utilities and other expenses at the Minford residence. 
Scioto App. No. 20CA3915 5

H.R.P.T.’s parents still did not provide for her financially. H.R.P.T. attended 

school in Scioto County. Appellee testified Appellant would not get out of bed to 

register H.R.P.T. for school and did not drive her to school due to “physical and 

emotional and mental problems.” 

{¶11} Appellee testified that she moved to Oak Hill, Ohio (Jackson County) 

in August 2018. She lived in a modular home with her son, his girlfriend, the 

girlfriend’s three children, Shianne, and H.R.P.T. Despite living in a different 

county, Appellee drove H.R.P.T. to school daily. Appellee was the exclusive 

provider of care and financial support for H.R.P.T. 

{¶12} Appellee testified H.R.P.T. attended first grade at an elementary 

school in Jackson County until Appellant removed her from school on or about the 

day Appellee’s petition for custody was filed. Appellee also continued to pay 

utilities at the Minford residence until the petition was filed. Currently, Appellee 

pays only Appellant’s phone bill and one other bill because they are in Appellee’s 

name. 

{¶13} Appellee testified that two weeks prior to her filing of the petition 

Appellant pulled into the driveway at the Minford residence. Shianne got out of 

the car to get in another one. Appellant ran down the driveway and threw Shianne 

to the ground, choked her, and screamed “I’m going to kill you.” Appellee and 

Tackett managed to free Shianne from Appellant. There were several witnesses 
Scioto App. No. 20CA3915 6

and the police were called. Appellee did not file a report because she wanted 

Appellant to get mental health care. Appellee testified that since that day 

Appellant has threatened Appellee and that is why she took H.R.P.T. out of school. 

{¶14} Appellee also testified to other instances of Appellant behaving in a 

violent manner. A couple of years prior, Appellant slapped Appellee. Another 

time, in the McDonald’s line, Appellant got mad at another driver and threatened 

to beat her up. Appellee stopped her but Appellant was mad and drove erratically, 

almost running over Appellee and scaring K.T. During the years Appellant was 

addicted to drugs, Appellant once tried to choke Appellee. According to Appellee, 

Appellant fights with Tackett and cusses at the children. 

{¶15} Appellee testified Appellant has physical conditions including lupus, 

back problems, and a clotting disorder. Appellant was diagnosed with bipolar 

issues when she was 10 or 11. She was sent to military school for a year. She saw 

a psychiatrist. Recently Appellant has been diagnosed with borderline personality 

disorder. Appellant does not take medication for either mental condition but takes 

Methadone and medication for her back. Appellant has used Methadone for eight 

years. Appellant has applied for Social Security Disability for physical and mental 

issues. 
Scioto App. No. 20CA3915 7

{¶16} Appellee testified she is concerned for the children’s safety because 

Appellant does not supervise them. Appellant stays in bed and takes pain 

medication. She “drifts off” while driving. 

{¶17} Appellee testified K.T. failed third grade. She missed a lot of school 

and is now home-schooled. K.T. isolates herself and likes to play games. She 

loses sleep because she plays games and stays up all night. By contrast, H.R.P.T. 

is a more active child. Appellee has a routine with H.R.P.T. H.R.P.T. does well in 

school and started to read in kindergarten. 

{¶18} At the time of the hearing, Appellee had not seen H.R.P.T. for 60 

days. She did not want to traumatize her more due to the legal situation. Appellee 

sent birthday balloons to H.R.P.T. at school. She has not been allowed to visit. 

She does not know if H.R.P.T. is getting to school on time. 

{¶19} Appellant cross-examined Appellee. Appellant alluded to a sexual 

incident between Shianne and K.T. On redirect, Appellee testified she had no 

direct knowledge of anything other than what Appellant had told her. Children’s 

Services was not contacted. K.T. was not examined and no police report was filed. 

{¶20} Appellant also testified. On direct she testified that H.R.P.T. was 

happy with them and always had been. She was not in a bad or dangerous 
Scioto App. No. 20CA3915 8

environment. Appellant currently resides with Tackett and her three daughters in 

Minford in a home owned by her in-laws.2

{¶21} Appellant acknowledged she was addicted for six to seven years and 

also dated a drug dealer during that time. She also acknowledged a felony 

conviction for misuse of a food stamp card, although she testified someone else left 

it at her home. She completed the terms of her community control in 2013. 

Appellant’s last employment was in 2015 or 2016. She drove Appellee to work 

and Appellee gave her money to do so. Appellant also acknowledged she was 

denied Social Security benefits for lack of medical evidence. 

{¶22} Appellant uses Methadone for her addiction. She rides to a 

Methadone clinic in Chillicothe with a friend. She also has counseling there. 

The trial court asked Appellant why her drug tests did not show Methadone. 

Tackett interjected that his did not either. Both denied masking the drug. 

Appellant testified she takes a very low dose and also takes Gabapentin for back 

pain and Cyclobenzaprine, a muscle relaxer. The court noted these other drugs 

also did not show up on her drug tests. 

{¶23} Appellant admitted she did not file a police report, contact Children’s 

Services, or take K.T. for a medical exam despite the vague allegation of sexual 

2

 The record indicates at times other adults have resided with Appellant and Tackett. 
Scioto App. No. 20CA3915 9

abuse. Appellant testified she did take her to Mahajan Therapeutics to see a 

counselor as a result of the abuse. She does not know if they filed any reports. 

{¶24} Appellant’s oldest daughter, Madison Bentley, testified she has lived 

with her mother most of her life. Madison attended college at Kent State in 2018 

but stayed for only one semester. Since then she has worked at a daycare center. 

 {¶25} Madison testified H.R.P.T. has done well in the last 60 days and is 

“well-taken care of.” She testified the child is worried Appellee would take her 

from Appellant. Madison admitted that she has lived with Appellee most of her 

life and that Appellee paid most of the bills. She admitted Appellee has tried to 

steer her to right decisions. 

{¶26} Madison testified she lived with her boyfriend who was over the age 

of 18 when she was a junior in high school. Her mother did not know where she 

was living because she was free to do as she wanted and she “just didn’t come 

home.” Madison testified her mother didn’t know she was living with the 

boyfriend but “just knew that I wasn’t living with her.” 

{¶27} At the conclusion of the full hearing, the trial court ordered both 

parents to complete a hair follicle test. On November 10, 2019, Appellant and 

Tackett wrote a joint letter to the trial court indicating they were willing to comply 

with the trial court’s request for a hair follicle test but were unable to spare the 

money for the procedure. Appellant explained any funds they had were spent on 
Scioto App. No. 20CA3915 10

the children’s seasonal clothing and gifts. Appellant suggested the court or 

Appellee cover the costs of the test. 

{¶28} On November 25, 2019, Appellant and Tackett wrote another letter to 

the trial court. Appellant and Tackett characterized their home as filled with love 

and based on household routines such as having snacks, doing homework, clearing 

the dinner table, watching shows or plays, and then having bath time. Appellant 

and Tackett, while acknowledging that most of the years of the child’s life they had 

lived with Appellee, and also acknowledging that the child was happy and welladjusted, suggested that Appellee’s petition was filed for the purpose of “using [the 

child] as a weapon,” and trying to “break up” the family. Appellant acknowledged 

that she had made mistakes in her life but stated that she had learned from her 

mistakes and would never put her children in harm’s way. 

{¶29} On January 3, 2020, Appellee’s counsel filed a closing argument. On 

April 8, 2020, the trial court filed the appealed-from judgment entry. Pertinent to 

this appeal, the entry states as follows: 

The Court does not believe the Mother is fit and suitable. The

Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that she 

contractually relinquished custody of this Child when she 

allowed the Petitioner to provide for and support her for her 

entire life and to move away with her for the prior year. * * *

The Court further finds that an award of custody to her, the 

Mother, would be detrimental to the Child. She is unstable, 

provides no support, has no home, has no means, uses very 

poor judgment and sets a bad example, among many other 

shortcomings. 
Scioto App. No. 20CA3915 11

 {¶30} This timely appeal followed. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

I. THE TRIAL COURT DETERMINATION THAT 

THE BIOLOGICAL MOTHER WAS UNSUITABLE 

WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT AND 

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE. 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

{¶31} A trial court has broad discretion in determining custody matters. See

Purvis v. Hazelbaker, 181 Ohio App.3d 167, 2009-Ohio-765, 908 N.E.2d 489, ¶ 9 

(4th Dist.), citing Reynolds v. Goll, 75 Ohio St.3d 121, 124, 661 N.E.2d 1008 

(1996). Consequently, we can sustain a challenge to a trial court's custody decision 

only upon a finding that the trial court abused its discretion. See Davis v. 

Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 418, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997). When applying an 

abuse-of-discretion standard, we are not free to merely substitute our judgment for 

that of the trial court. See In re Jane Doe 1, 57 Ohio St.3d 135, 137-138, 566 

N.E.2d 1181 (1991). 

 {¶32} However, in this appeal, Appellant has challenged the trial court’s 

finding that she contractually relinquished custody of H.R.P.T. to Appellee. The 

Supreme Court of Ohio “ ‘ “has consistently held that the determination of whether 

‘a parent relinquishes rights to custody’ is a question of fact which, once 

determined, will be upheld on appeal if there is some reliable, credible evidence to 
Scioto App. No. 20CA3915 12

support the finding.” ’ ” In re JRA, 4th Dist. Washington No. 13CA18, 2014-Ohio4463, at ¶ 18, quoting In re Mullen, 129 Ohio St. 3d 417, 2011-Ohio-3361, 953 

N.E.2d 302 at ¶ 15, quoting Masitto v. Masitto, 22 Ohio St.3d 63, 66, 488 N.E.2d 

857 (1986). We review whether a custody determination is against the manifest 

weight of the evidence by weighing the evidence and all reasonable inferences, 

considering the credibility of witnesses, and determining whether in resolving 

conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a 

manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial 

ordered. See In the Matter of B.E., 4th Dist. Highland No. 13CA26, 2014-Ohio3178, ¶ 28, citing Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 

N.E.2d 517, ¶ 20. 

LEGAL ANALYSIS 

{¶33} “ ‘ “The right of a parent to the custody of his or her child is one of 

the oldest fundamental liberty interests recognized by American courts.” ’ ” In the 

Matter of E.S.,4th Dist. Pickaway No. 17CA16, 2018-Ohio-1902, at ¶ 25, quoting 

State ex rel. Otten v. Henderson, 129 Ohio St.3d 453, 2011-Ohio-4082, 953 N.E.2d 

809, ¶ 31, quoting In re Thompkins, 115 Ohio St.3d 409, 2007-Ohio-5238, 875 

N.E.2d 582, ¶ 10. Consequently, “[p]arents have a constitutionally protected due 

process right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their 

children, and the parents' right to custody of their children is paramount to any 
Scioto App. No. 20CA3915 13

custodial interest in the children asserted by nonparents.” In re Mullen, supra, 953 

N.E.2d 302, ¶ 11. Nevertheless, a parent's paramount right to custody of his or her 

children is not unlimited. Id. Instead, “ ‘the natural rights of a parent * * * are 

always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is the polestar or 

controlling principle to be observed.’ ” In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 

106, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979), quoting In re R.J.C., 300 So.2d 54, 58 

(Fla.App.1974); accord In re B.C., 141 Ohio St.3d 55, 2014-Ohio-4558, 21 N.E.3d 

308, ¶ 20. 

{¶34} Furthermore, if a parent is unsuitable, the parent forfeits his or her 

paramount right to custody. E.S., supra at ¶ 26, citing In re Perales, 52 Ohio St.2d 

89, 98-99, 369 N.E.2d 1047 (1977). “In a child custody proceeding between a 

parent and a nonparent, a court may not award custody to the nonparent without 

first determining that the parent is unsuitable to raise the child, i.e., without 

determining by a preponderance of the evidence that the parent abandoned the 

child, contractually relinquished custody of the child, or has become totally 

incapable of supporting or caring for the child, or that an award of custody to the 

parent would be detrimental to the child.” Hazelbaker, supra at ¶ 10, citing

Perales, 369 N.E.2d 1047, at syllabus. “The general rule in Ohio regarding 

original custody awards in disputes between a parent and a nonparent is that 

‘parents who are “suitable” persons have a “paramount” right to the custody of 
Scioto App. No. 20CA3915 14

their minor children unless they forfeit that right by contract, abandonment, or by 

becoming totally unable to care for and support those children.’ ” Masitto, supra,

488 N.E.2d 857 (1986), quoting Perales at 97, 369 N.E.2d 1047. 

{¶35} Appellant asserts that the trial court’s determination was 

against the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence. Appellant argues that 

testimony in the trial court record evidences that she is a mother who is over a 

decade clean, and who has raised other children who appeared to be well-adjusted. 

Appellant further argues that the trial court disregarded all the positive evidence 

presented on her behalf and focused on her marijuana and methadone use to justify 

a finding of unsuitability. Appellant concludes that there is scant evidence, if any, 

to support a finding that she contractually relinquished H.R.P.T., or that an award 

of custody would be detrimental to the child. 

{¶36} The Third District considered the issue of contractual relinquishment 

when it affirmed the judgment of the trial court in In re Galan, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 

13-02-44, 2003-Ohio-1298. The appellate court found that the evidence presented 

to the trial court supported findings that the mother had contractually relinquished 

custody of her daughter and that awarding custody to the mother would be 

detrimental to the child. In Galan, “contractual relinquishment” did not involve a 

written agreement or prior custody findings, but instead was evinced in the 

mother’s pattern of acquiescence to others since the child’s birth, primarily the 
Scioto App. No. 20CA3915 15

paternal grandparents, with regard to the physical custody, care and support of her 

minor child. 

{¶37} In Galan, the minor child’s parents were never married. From the 

time of the child’s (Delee) birth until the age of four, she lived with her parents at 

the Galans’ (the paternal grandparents’) home in Fostoria, Ohio. During that time, 

the paternal grandmother Mrs. Galan was the primary caretaker. 

{¶38} At age four, Delee’s mother, Sandra, and Delee left the Galans’ home 

to live with the maternal grandparents in Leipsic, Ohio. There Delee was also left 

in the maternal grandmother’s primary care. One year later, Sandra and Delee 

moved into a one-bedroom apartment but shortly thereafter returned to the 

maternal grandparents’ home. Delee attended kindergarten and part of her firstgrade year in Leipsic. 

{¶39} Sometime thereafter, Sandra met a convicted drug felon and moved 

with him to Toledo, Ohio to live in his mother’s house. In December 1999, Sandra 

placed Delee with the Galan grandparents in Fostoria. In 2001, Sandra returned to 

Leipsic, obtained employment, and planned to keep Delee with her. The Galans 

subsequently initiated a complaint for custody, alleging that the mother had 

voluntarily relinquished custody of the child in December 1999; that the child’s 

contact with her mother had been sporadic; and that it would be in Delee’s best 

interest to remain in the Galans’ custody. 
Scioto App. No. 20CA3915 16

{¶40} At a two-day hearing, the magistrate found by clear and convincing 

evidence that both parents of the child were not suitable custodians and had 

forfeited their parental rights. Sandra raised timely objections. The trial court 

rescheduled the matter for hearing and subsequently found Sandra to be unfit. 

{¶41} On appeal, mother asserted that the court’s findings, pursuant to In re 

Perales, supra, were unsupported by the evidence. In affirming the trial court’s 

decision, the Third District Court noted: 

There is competent, credible evidence to support the assertion 

that Sandra contractually relinquished custody of Delee and 

that if Sandra were to regain custody of Delee it would be 

detrimental to the child. With respect to contractual 

relinquishment of custody, the record reflects that Delee was 

voluntarily placed with the Galans by her mother on December 

3, 1999, when [Mr.Galan] picked Delee up from school in 

Leipsic by agreement. That evening Sandra and [Mrs. Galan] 

had a telephone conversation wherein Sandra placed Delee in 

the Galans’ custody for an indefinite period of time. Both 

parties confirm the existence of the agreement. 

Id. at ¶ 19. 

{¶42} The appellate court further observed: 

Other testimony supports the trial court’s additional finding that 

Delee’s placement with Sandra would also be detrimental to the 

child. Multiple witnesses testified that during the first four

years of Delee’s life when Sandra and her child lived in the 

Galans’ home, [Mrs. Galan] was the child’s primary caretaker. 

When Sandra and Delee moved in with Sandra’s parents, it was 

Sandra’s mother who was Delee’s primary caretaker. The 

record reflects that the only time Sandra was primarily 

responsible for Delee was the brief period when Sandra rented 
Scioto App. No. 20CA3915 17

[the apartment] in Leipsic, before she and the child returned to 

Sandra’s parents’ home. (Emphasis added.) 

Id. at ¶ 20. 

{¶43} Finally, the Galan court observed: 

[T]he evidence that Sandra consistently placed her own needs 

above those of her daughter was also properly considered by the

trial court as indicia of unsuitability. After meeting her 

boyfriend Danny, Sandra moved to Toledo to be with Danny 

uprooting Delee once again. At this time, Delee was a student 

in first grade and was just weeks away from completing the 

second quarter of the school year. Because of her mother’s 

move and the child’s placement in the custody of her paternal 

grandparents, Delee was never able to complete the second 

quarter at St. Wendolyn Elementary. ***[W]itnesses at St. 

Wendolyn’s testified that Sandra never attended a parentteacher conference and that two years passed before the school 

had Sandra’s address. Witnesses also testified that Sandra’s 

visitation, up until the filing of the Galans’ complaint for 

custody was sporadic. 

Id. at ¶ 21. 

{¶44} Upon review of the law in Perales, the Galan court concluded 

the trial court’s decision that Sandra contractually relinquished custody of 

her daughter to the Galans in December 1999 was supported by competent, 

credible evidence. The court also concluded the trial court’s additional 

finding that an award of custody to Sandra would be detrimental to Delee 

was supported by the evidence. The court found no abuse of discretion in 

the trial court’s finding that Sandra was an unsuitable parent. 
Scioto App. No. 20CA3915 18

{¶45} We have fully reviewed the record which includes the transcript of the 

full hearing on November 5, 2019. The trial court set forth a detailed analysis of 

the evidence presented at the full hearing. Upon review of the testimony, we agree 

there is competent, credible evidence to support the trial court’s factual finding that 

Appellant contractually relinquished custody of H.R.P.T. to Appellee. 

{¶46} In the trial court’s discussion of the testimony provided by Appellant, 

Appellee, Tackett, and Appellant’s adult daughter, the trial court observed: 

The Mother does not provide for her children. She allowed 

Petitioner to pay her rent and bills most of the child’s life. * * * 

She allowed the Petitioner to keep, and care for, this child for 

the school year immediately preceding the Petition. She did not 

pay child support and did not contribute to her care. She 

refused to assist in transporting the child to and from school. 

She made excuses of why she was unable to help. The 

transportation allowed the child to finish out the school year 

after a relocation. This, the Court finds, was a contractual 

relinquishment of custody. The Petitioner, who works full time

and who was paying the Mother’s rent, provided all of the 

transportation as well. * * * The Court finds by a 

preponderance of the evidence that she contractually 

relinquished custody of this child when she allowed the 

Petitioner to provide for and support her for her entire life and 

to move away with her for the prior year. 

{¶47} As is evident, the trial court’s summary and finding comports 

with the testimony given at the full hearing and set forth above. As in Galan, the 

record reflects that the only time Appellant has been primarily responsible for 

caring for H.R.P.T. is for a very brief period of time, in this case, 60 days. 

Furthermore, that period occurred only after Appellee’s petition was filed and 
Scioto App. No. 20CA3915 19

Appellant decided to remove H.R.P.T. from her elementary school at the end of the 

first week of the school year. The evidence further demonstrates that Appellant 

has not financially supported H.R.P.T. her entire life. 

{¶48} There is also competent, credible evidence to support the trial court’s 

finding that an award of custody to Appellant would be detrimental to H.R.P.T. In 

the trial court’s discussion, the trial court noted that the mother is “unstable, 

provides no support, has no home, has no means, uses very poor judgment and sets 

a very bad example, among many other shortcomings.” Again, these conclusions 

can be made based upon analysis of the testimony at the full hearing, set forth 

above. And, as in Galan, the record reflects that Appellant has not placed 

importance upon caring for her child, physically or financially, until after 

Appellee’s petition was filed. The trial court’s decision specifically stated: 

The mother is a recovering addict. She was in active addiction

from 2011 to 2017. * * * She maintains sobriety by attending a 

Methadone treatment facility every two weeks. She rides there 

with a friend. The facility is a long distance from her home. 

She goes there even though there is one much closer to her 

home. * * * She could easily ride [to the closer facility] with

[her husband] saving both time and money. * * * She does not 

work, yet is not eligible for disability. * * * She caused this

child, a premature child, to move out of a home to a camper 

parked in the drive because she would rather smoke and use 

drugs. 

{¶49} As indicated, Appellant contends the trial court focused upon 
Scioto App. No. 20CA3915 20

her Methadone and marijuana use and disregarded that she had been a decade 

clean, had raised older children who appeared well-adjusted, and had disregarded 

other positive evidence in the record. We find this characterization disregards the 

sum of the evidence presented at the full hearing. While Appellant may have been 

free of addiction of illegal substances for approximately ten years, the evidence 

does not demonstrate that during that ten-year period Appellant has managed to 

complete her education, find and maintain employment, or participate in active 

parenting. 

{¶50} While Appellant has apparently had two older daughters in her 

custody, K.T. and Madison, well-adjusted may possibly describe only 

one―Madison, who testified at the hearing. K.T. did not attend the hearing. K.T. 

was described as “sweet.” Unfortunately, the evidence also demonstrates that K.T. 

failed third grade; that she isolates herself; and that Appellant does not have a 

routine with K.T. but allows her to stay up late at night playing games. We find it 

doubtful that this evidence suggests a well-adjusted child. 

{¶51} And, while the transcript reflects Madison to be an intelligent and 

articulate 20-year-old woman, we note that Madison has not completed her 

education although it appears she was once enrolled at Kent State. She is currently 

unemployed and not furthering her education. While still a minor, Madison lived 

with her boyfriend who was over age 18 for two months and Appellant apparently 
Scioto App. No. 20CA3915 21

did not trouble herself to find out where her daughter was. Importantly, Madison 

testified that while her mother was addicted for several years, Madison resided 

with her father. The admirable but limited success Madison has made thus far in 

her life may not be fully or fairly attributed to Appellant. 

{¶52} Appellant also claims the trial court disregarded other positive 

evidence in the record. However, Appellant fails to direct us to this evidence and 

we are unable to surmise what that evidence may be. 

{¶53} In conclusion, we find the aforementioned testimony provided at the 

full hearing provides a credible basis for the trial court’s findings. The trial court’s 

decision that Appellant contractually relinquished custody of H.R.P.T. to Appellee 

by failing to provide financial support for the child her entire life and allowing 

Appellee to move away from her for the entire year preceding the petition is 

supported by competent credible evidence. The trial court’s additional finding that 

an award of custody to Appellant would be detrimental to H.R.P.T. is also 

supported by the evidence. These findings cannot be found to be against the 

manifest weight of the evidence.3

 For the foregoing reasons, we cannot say that 

the trial court’s decision granting custody to Appellee was against the manifest 

weight and sufficiency of the evidence. 

3

 “ ‘[T]hough sufficiency and manifest weight are different legal concepts, a finding that a judgment is supported by 

the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes a finding that sufficient evidence supports the judgment..’ ” 

In re L.B., 10th Dist. Franklin Nos.19AP-644, 19AP-645, 2020-Ohio-3045, at ¶ 29, quoting In re C.N., 10th Dist. 

No. 15AP-67, 2015-Ohio-2546, ¶ 9. 
Scioto App. No. 20CA3915 22

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 

JUDGMENT ENTRY 

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be assessed to 

Appellant. 

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the 

Scioto County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Abele, J. and Wilkin, J. concur in Judgment and Opinion. 

 For the Court, 

 __________________________________ 

 Jason P. Smith 

 Presiding Judge 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final 

judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the 

date of filing with the clerk.