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S. Hrg. 112–517 

FROM EARTHQUAKES TO TERRORIST ATTACKS: 

IS THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION PREPARED 

FOR THE NEXT DISASTER? 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, 

THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE AND 

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY 

AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DECEMBER 7, 2011 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

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(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

NICHOLAS A. ROSSI, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

JOYCE WARD Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL 

WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

LISA M. POWELL, Majority Staff Director 

JESSICA K. NAGASAKO, Professional Staff Member 

ERIC TAMARKIN, Counsel 

RACHEL R. WEAVER, Minority Staff Director 

JENA N. MCNEILL, Professional Staff Member 

AARON H. WOOLF, Chief Clerk 

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY AND 

INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas, Chairman 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

JON TESTER, Montana 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

AMANDA FOX, Professional Staff Member 

JOHN VOCINO, GAO Detailee 

BRANDON BOOKER, Minority Staff Director 

KELSEY STROUD, Chief Clerk 

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(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statement: Page 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 1 

Senator Pryor .................................................................................................... 2 

Prepared statement: 

Senator Pryor .................................................................................................... 33 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 7, 2011 

Steward D. Beckham, Director, Office of National Capital Region Coordination, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ........................................................................................................ 5 

Dean S. Hunter, Deputy Director, Facilities, Security, and Contracting, U.S. 

Office of Personnel Management ........................................................................ 7 

William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Team, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office .............................................................. 9 

Richard Muth, Executive Director, Maryland Emergency Management Agency, State of Maryland ........................................................................................... 11 

Hon. Terrie L. Suit, Secretary of Veterans Affairs and Homeland Security, 

Commonwealth of Virginia .................................................................................. 13 

Paul A. Quander, Jr., Deputy Mayor for Public Safety and Justice, District 

of Columbia ........................................................................................................... 15 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Beckham, Steward D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 35 

Hunter, Dean S.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 40 

Jenkins, William O., Jr.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 46 

Muth, Richard: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 70 

Quander, Paul A., Jr.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 15 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 91 

Suit, Hon. Terrie L.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 85 

APPENDIX 

Questions and responses for the Record from: 

Mr. Beckham ..................................................................................................... 106 

Mr. Hunter ........................................................................................................ 115 

Mr. Muth ........................................................................................................... 118 

Ms. Suit ............................................................................................................. 125 

Mr. Quander ..................................................................................................... 131 

Background .............................................................................................................. 143 

Statement submitted by David F. Snyder for the Record .................................... 151 

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(1) 

FROM EARTHQUAKES TO TERRORIST 

ATTACKS: IS THE NATIONAL CAPITAL 

REGION PREPARED FOR THE NEXT 

DISASTER? 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 7, 2011 

U.S. SENATE,

JOINT HEARING WITH THE OVERSIGHT OF

GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE,

AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE

AND THE AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER

RECOVERY AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m., in 

Room SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. 

Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, and Hon. Mark L. Pryor, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs, 

presiding. 

Present: Senators Akaka and Pryor. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. I call this joint hearing of the Subcommittee on 

Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and 

the District of Columbia and the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster 

Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs to order. 

I want to welcome our witnesses today. I want to say aloha and 

thank you for being here. Today, we will examine the National 

Capital Region’s (NCRs) preparedness and response to natural and 

manmade disasters. 

The NCR is a region defined by statute including the District of 

Columbia, Maryland, Virginia, 11 local jurisdictions, three 

branches of the Federal Government, and over 5 million residents. 

More than 20 million tourists visit the NCR every year, and 

340,000 Federal employees work in the area. So this is the size of 

that area. 

This is an appropriate time to explore the NCR’s emergency preparedness and response capabilities as we celebrate the 70th anniversary of the surprise attacks on Pearl Harbor and we recently 

marked the tenth anniversary of September 11, 2001 attacks. Both 

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2 

tragic events tested our Nation’s preparedness, and September 11, 

2001, exposed shortfalls in this region’s readiness. 

The OGM Subcommittee’s oversight of NCR’s preparedness has 

spanned several Congresses. In partnership with my former colleague and dear friend Senator Voinovich, we held a series of hearings on this issue in 2005, 2006, and 2007, focusing largely on the 

region’s poor strategic planning. 

This hearing will help us evaluate the NCR’s latest strategic 

planning activities. The responses to recent emergencies, including 

the January 26, 2011 snowstorm that led to many hours of gridlock, and the East Coast earthquake in August have renewed concerns that the NCR still faces serious challenges in disaster preparedness and response 10 years after September 11. 

I was particularly troubled that the public, including Federal employees, received very little guidance in the immediate aftermath 

of the earthquake. I look forward to discussing how we can improve 

regional situational awareness and information sharing. 

NCR members must be able to communicate with each other, 

make informed decisions, and provide clear, consistent information 

to the public. Additionally, it is important for family members to 

be able to connect in the crucial hours after an unexpected event. 

Coordinating so many jurisdictions is challenging. However, it is 

essential that the region operates as a cohesive and unified body 

during emergencies. 

A Washington Post editorial argued for creating a regional structure with authority to direct incident response. NCR officials have 

recommended improvements within the existing framework. Recently, Senator Pryor and I requested that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) review whether the NCR’s current system for preparedness and response is effective and efficient. I look 

forward to discussing how the NCR can be best prepared to protect 

the millions of people who live and work in the NCR and to preserve the many national treasures located here. 

I commend the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) for revising its dismissal and closure guidance in response to the January 

2011 snowstorm and working with partner agencies and the Council of Governments (COGs) to get their input. These changes should 

help avoid future widespread gridlock, improve safety for Federal 

employees and others, and enhance continuity of Government operations. I also commend the Council of Governments for its review 

of the snowstorm and practical recommendations to improve coordination and information sharing. 

While today’s hearing focuses on the Washington, D.C. area, the 

issues of preparedness and response are important for regional coordination in cities and States across the country. I would like to 

thank the members of the NCR for all of their hard work to keep 

us safe from harm. 

Let me now recognize Senator Pryor for his opening statement. 

Senator Pryor. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRYOR 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to 

start today by recognizing that today’s hearing coincides with the 

70th anniversary of the surprise attacks on Pearl Harbor and reH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

3 

flect on that fateful day about the heroism that still inspires us 

today. But, Mr. Chairman, if you could, I know that you were actually an eyewitness to that event. 

Senator AKAKA. Yes. 

Senator PRYOR. Would you mind telling the Subcommittee here 

in just a couple of minutes about your recollections about that? 

Senator AKAKA. Yes. Well, thank you, Senator Pryor. It was on 

Sunday, December 7, 1941. In Hawaii at that time, there were 

scattered clouds. It was a pretty nice day and we were getting 

ready for church. I was in a boarding facility there in the hills 

above Pearl Harbor, and about, oh, I would say about 7:45, we detected some commotion down at Pearl Harbor and immediately 

heard some blasts. So we looked out of our windows and could see 

Pearl Harbor clearly. 

I must tell you, I saw them torpedo the battleships that were 

moored there and watched them sink in place, some of them, and 

also a squadron of Japanese planes flew over us. And we looked up 

and I was so surprised. They were green in color and they had 

those rising suns on the wings, so we knew it was from Japan. By 

then, the radio was beginning to report what was happening there, 

that Pearl Harbor was being attacked and that people should stay 

home. So that squadron that flew over us bombed and strafed 

Kanoehe Marine Station over the mountains. That was the beginning of a new era for the world and our Nation. 

The school that I was attending at that time was a military type 

of school. We were activated and sent up into the mountains for 

about a month, because we got information that there may be paratroopers landing in the hills and we had to protect the water systems. So, in a sense, immediately, we were engaged. 

What I did not know until later, when I read it, is immediately, 

the military government took over, and so Hawaii went under martial law and General Walter Short was placed as military Governor. I remember his first announcement was, ‘‘All citizens in Hawaii will obey the commands of military officers,’’ and that was the 

beginning. 

It was quite a sight, and for days, Virginia just burned. Black 

smoke kept rising for days out of those battleships. But our country 

did respond, and it took us some time, but we fought and won the 

war. The war changed this country and ultimately made it better, 

as well as the rest of the world. 

So thank you for giving me that opportunity. I do not usually 

talk about this, nor do I tell people about what I just told you, but 

that is what happened to me. 

Senator PRYOR. Well, thank you for sharing that. The reason I 

wanted you to do that is because, obviously, that is an event that 

shaped the world and shaped United States history, but it also 

helped to shape you as a man and as a Senator—— 

Senator AKAKA. Yes. 

Senator PRYOR [continuing]. So thank you for your service and 

thank you for sharing. 

I have a longer opening statement that I will submit for the 

record, but Washington, D.C. has gone through some recent weather events and other things and we see continued gridlock in communications. We see gridlock in traffic. It just raises questions 

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4 

about are there leadership gaps here? Is there bureaucratic fragmentation that needs to be addressed, without knowing who is responsible in an emergency? It is a good time for us to sit back and 

ask these sometimes hard questions about what is going on in the 

D.C. region. 

Now, I will say that the emergency responders work tirelessly to 

keep the Capitol itself safe and keep the Capital Region safe from 

harm, and they deserve our recognition for their great service. The 

size of this metropolitan area and the multiple State and local governments that have to be coordinated is quite a challenge, and also 

the unique threats to this area present a challenge, and we understand that, but I think this is part of our oversight, to ask these 

questions. 

But there is a huge risk in not being prepared. The Federal Government in Washington, D.C. obviously is the nerve center, command and control for all the Nation’s military, all of our diplomatic 

missions, all of our government, all of our emergency response all 

over the country in the event that we have another September 11, 

2001, or Pearl Harbor type of event, heaven forbid that we do. This 

area is absolutely critical to keeping things going around the country and around the world as we need them to. 

So we also have to understand that in this very difficult budget 

cycle and this economy, with revenues being down and we are seeing layoffs, we are seeing tightening of belts in the various public 

entities, from the Federal Government on down to local government, we understand that it is a time to also look at efficiencies 

and try to make sure that we eliminate any inefficiencies, any 

wasted steps, and try to make sure that we squeeze every single 

dollar we can for preparedness and get us over the finish line like 

we want to. 

So today, we are talking about improving coordination here in 

the National Capital Region for emergency preparedness, but we 

also need to keep our eye on the larger ball of preparedness around 

the Nation. One example in our region would be Memphis, Tennessee, which is a big metropolitan area. It has the heaviest population in that little region of the country. But Memphis and that 

area has a very large impact on Eastern Arkansas, Northern Mississippi, Western Tennessee, and even the southern parts of Kentucky, Illinois, Missouri, down in there, because they all sort of 

touch down in that area. And so if something terrible were to happen in Memphis, because it is such a huge transportation and 

media and health services center, it would clearly have an impact 

on the rest of the region. 

In October, our two Subcommittees collaborated on a Government Accountability Office request asking for further examination 

of the National Capital Region’s current system of an all hazards 

preparation. Today’s hearing will serve as a jumping off point for 

GAO. It will also help us determine what we can do and Congress 

to ensure that our Nation’s cities are equipped to respond effectively to emergencies. 

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I look forward to hearing from 

the witnesses. 

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5 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Beckham appears in the appendix on page 35. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Pryor. I look forward to hearing from our panel of witnesses, also, and I want to 

say mahalo, thank you, again, for your participation. 

We have Steward Beckham, the Director of the Office of National 

Capital Region Coordination at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); Dean Hunter, Deputy Director of Facilities, 

Security, and Contracting at the Office of Personnel Management; 

Bill Jenkins, Director of the Homeland Security and Justice Team 

at the Government Accountability Office; Richard Muth, Executive 

Director of the Maryland Emergency Management Agency; Terrie 

Suit, Secretary of Veterans Affairs and Homeland Security for the 

Commonwealth of Virginia; and Paul Quander, Deputy Mayor for 

Public Safety and Justice for the District of Columbia. 

It is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear in all witnesses. 

I would ask that each of you stand and raise your right hand. 

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give 

this Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. BECKHAM. I do. 

Mr. HUNTER. I do. 

Mr. JENKINS. I do. 

Mr. MUTH. I do. 

Ms. SUIT. I do. 

Mr. QUANDER. I do. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. Let it be noted for the 

record that the witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

Before we start, I want you to know that your full written statement will be part of the record, and I would also like to remind you 

to please limit your oral remarks to 5 minutes. 

Mr. Beckham, will you please proceed with your statement. 

TESTIMONY OF STEWARD D. BECKHAM,1 DIRECTOR, OFFICE 

OF NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION COORDINATION, FEDERAL 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. BECKHAM. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Akaka, 

Ranking Member Johnson, Chairman Pryor, and Ranking Member 

Paul, and other distinguished Members of the Subcommittees. I am 

Steward Beckham, Director of the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency’s Office of National Capital Region Coordination (ONCRC). 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before both Subcommittees 

today to discuss the way FEMA coordinates with our local, State, 

and Federal partners in the National Capital Region. 

NCRC was established by Congress in the Homeland Security 

Act of 2002. Along with other preparedness offices, NCRC was 

transferred to FEMA after passage of the Post-Katrina Emergency 

Management Reform Act (PKEMRA), in 2007. NCRC’s mission is 

to oversee and coordinate Federal programs for and relationships 

with State, local, and Federal authorities. My office works closely 

with Federal, State, local, and private sector partners to enhance 

preparedness in the National Capital Region. 

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6 

My participation with the NCR Senior Policy Group (SPG), is one 

example of NCRC’s engagement with stakeholders. As the NCRC 

Director, I represent the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

and FEMA. As you will hear from my colleagues, Richard Muth 

and Terrie Suit, the SPG is comprised of the Homeland Security 

Advisors and Chief Emergency Managers for Virginia, Maryland, 

and the District of Columbia. 

The SPG plays a key role in sustaining a coordinated regional 

approach to homeland security and strengthening integrated decisionmaking and planning. Other partners include the Joint Federal 

Committee, which is comprised of members from the Legislative, 

Executive, and Judicial Branches, the Emergency Preparedness 

Council, the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, 

and many other NCR officials. NCRC actively engages with chief 

administrative officers, public health officials, first responders, 

emergency managers, leaders from the private sector, and nonprofit communities and other stakeholders in support of homeland 

security efforts. 

With NCR partners, NCRC plans, leads, or participates in exercises, drills, and events that occur with frequency in this region. 

Consistent with our statute, NCRC provides the technical support 

to State and local partners. Interoperability, and regional risk are 

two examples. 

Additionally, NCRC provides NCR-specific situational awareness 

to NCR partners through the FEMA-NCR Watch Desk. The NCR 

Watch Desk is the sole source of NCR-specific situational awareness at DHS. The Watch Desk links Federal, State, and local partners. This includes selected Federal agencies that are strategically 

located but that would otherwise not be a part of the homeland security or emergency management information system. The above 

efforts bolster information exchange and integrated planning. 

In accordance with the National Response Framework, emergencies are managed locally. During a disaster, the States and the 

District maintain their sovereign authorities and work with FEMA 

Region III to obtain direct assistance for unmet needs or other aid 

approved by the President under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster 

Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. During an incident, FEMA’s 

operational entities have lead for the agency. If needed, NCRC is 

able to augment FEMA Region III and support the Federal Coordinating Officer by providing enhanced situational awareness and 

consequence analysis capabilities, coordination with NCR partners 

and agency representatives through NCR Operation Centers. 

Unfortunately, sometimes non-Stafford Act incidents take on a 

greater significance because of the sheer amount of commuter traffic within the National Capital Region. This occurred during the 

winter storms when Federal Government operations in the NCR 

were officially suspended. Federal agencies follow the guidelines set 

by the Office of Personnel Management to ensure the safety of 

their employees. NCRC and State and local partners worked with 

OPM and provided input as the agency developed its newly released guidelines. The decision to close Federal Government operations in the region rests with OPM. 

The Subcommittee has asked me to say a few words about the 

NCR’s Homeland Security Strategic Plan, which was created by the 

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1The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter appears in the appendix on page 40. 

NCR, the Emergency Preparedness Council (EPC). The EPC includes elected and appointed officials from Federal, State, and local 

government as well as private sector and nonprofit leaders. I participate along with these other leaders. 

During 2010, NCR partners updated the Strategic Plan. The 

NCR Strategic Plan, along with other State, local, and national 

plans serves as a road map for strengthening capabilities to realize 

the NCR’s vision for a safe and secure region. Major goals included 

in the NCR Strategic Plan are enhanced interoperable communications, enhanced information sharing and situational awareness, including the communication of accurate, timely information with the 

public, the enhancement of critical infrastructure protection and 

further development of core capabilities such as mass care and coordinated alert and warning systems. 

In drafting the 2010 Strategic Plan, NCR partners built on the 

principles agreed to in developing the 2006 strategic plan. The four 

principles are inclusion of NCR partners, provision of a variety of 

forms for stakeholder involvement, respect for jurisdictional authority, and assuring the preparedness needs are reflected across 

all jurisdictional boundaries. There was a thorough process to provide extensive input and review by subject matter experts in the 

public, private, and nonprofit sectors. NCR leaders on the Emergency Preparedness Council, which is responsible for the Strategic 

Plan, as well as the SPG and chief administrative officers provided 

input at all stages of the process. 

In conclusion, FEMA will continue to support and collaborate 

with our regional partners to prepare for, prevent, protect against, 

respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards. Building on decades of regional collaboration, Federal, State, local, and regional 

partners remain committed to a common vision of working together 

toward a safe and secure NCR. 

Chairmen Akaka and Pryor, Ranking Members Johnson and 

Paul, and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions 

that you may have at the conclusion of these remarks. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Beckham. 

Mr. BECKHAM. Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Hunter, will you please proceed with your 

statement. 

TESTIMONY OF DEAN S. HUNTER,1 DEPUTY DIRECTOR, FACILITIES, SECURITY, AND CONTRACTING, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 

Mr. HUNTER. Good afternoon, Chairman Akaka, Chairman Pryor, 

Ranking Member Johnson, Ranking Member Paul, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittees. My name is Dean Hunter 

and I am the Deputy Director for Facilities, Security, and Contracting at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management. In this position, I have primary responsibility for security and emergency management at OPM. 

Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to appear before you 

today to discuss OPM’s role in hazards affecting the operational 

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8 

status of the National Capital Region as well as our partnerships 

with FEMA and other Federal, State, and local emergency management entities. 

By law, individual Federal agencies possess the authority to 

manage their workforces and to determine the appropriate response during emergencies. Nonetheless, in order to facilitate a 

consistent and coordinated approach on a region-wide basis, Federal, State, and local authorities have traditionally looked to OPM 

to determine the operating status of the Federal Government 

across the D.C. area. OPM maintains a 24-hour operations center 

to actively monitor unfolding events. 

As emergencies arise, our standard protocols include participation in conference calls hosted by the Metropolitan Washington 

Council of Governments (MWCOG) in order to develop situational 

awareness, facilitate the exchange of information, and coordinate 

communications and response efforts among Federal, State, and 

local agencies and other stakeholders. Participants in these structured calls typically include over 100 Federal, State, and local partners in all applicable disciplines, including weather, transportation, 

emergency management, law enforcement, utility companies, and 

school districts. 

The collaborative feedback of this network of stakeholders drives 

OPM decisions during emergencies. Ultimately, OPM’s decision 

serves to carefully balance the safety and security of the Federal 

workforce and the public with the need to maintain the continuity 

of government operations. 

Once made, a rapid dissemination of the OPM decision takes 

many forms, from direct notification to media outlets, to posting on 

the OPM webpage and call-in line, notification to COG, Chief 

Human Capital Officers (CHCO), the White House and Congress, 

to e-mail alert notifications to subscribed employees, Washington 

Area Warning Alert System (WAWAS) notification, and updating 

social media, including Twitter and Facebook. 

We review and update our dismissal and closure policies on an 

annual basis in order to continue to ensure that we are able to 

make the most well informed and timely decisions. For example, 

Federal offices in the National Capital Region were closed for four 

consecutive days during the historic snowstorm of February 2010. 

Partly in response, last year, we updated our policies to add ‘‘Unscheduled Telework’’ as a new operating status option for agencies 

to provide their employees the ability to telework and maintain 

continuity of operations. 

This year, we participated in an interagency review effort with 

our partners in COG to examine potential emergency management 

improvements in the National Capital Region. The resulting COG 

report, issued on November 9, details a number of recommendations to improve regional coordination and communication, including the establishment of a Regional Incident Coordination (RIC) 

Program as well as a Virtual Joint Information Center (VJIC) to 

provide consistent messaging. 

Our collaboration with COG and the Chief Human Capital Officers also led to the incorporation of additional options to our D.C. 

Dismissal Guide, including shelter in place, an early dismissal with 

a fixed final departure time, and an immediate departure option. 

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9 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins appears in the appendix on page 46. 

We do not contemplate issuing these announcements very often, 

but have added them to our tool kit to illustrate the full range of 

potential emergency situations that agencies might face, which will 

help agencies plan for emergency situations. 

We are committed to making operating status decisions as far in 

advance as feasible in order to reduce uncertainty and minimize 

demands upon transportation infrastructure. It will always remain 

our goal to have employees home safely prior to the onset of a dangerous condition. 

For anticipated late afternoon weather events, OPM will consider 

the most strategic options. For example, OPM could use unscheduled leave/unscheduled telework at the beginning of the day to reduce traffic into the city and, if necessary, followup with a staggered departure announcement with a final departure time after 

the workday has begun if conditions deteriorate sooner than originally forecast. 

OPM maintains a strong working relationship with FEMA’s Office of National Capital Region Coordination. Working together, we 

have developed a strategic plan and concept of operations plan for 

catastrophic events as well as two tabletop emergency preparedness training exercises. We are expanding our efforts in the coming 

year to develop a Web-based preparedness course and an NCR Federal Workforce Preparedness brochure. We will continue to leverage those relationships and utilize the lessons learned from each 

of them to improve decisionmaking and communication in the interest of enhancing the safety of the Federal workforce and the 

public. 

Thank you for this opportunity. I am happy to address any questions you might have. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. Jenkins, will you please proceed with your statement. 

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM O. JENKINS, JR., 1 DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. JENKINS. Thank you, Chairman Akaka and Chairman Pryor. 

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing on the 

status of efforts to enhance disaster preparedness in the National 

Capital Region. My statement today focuses on the NCR’s latest 

Strategic Plan, issued in 2010. 

Basically, preparing for disasters requires identifying risk and 

potential consequences and identifying what needs to be done, by 

whom, and how well it should be done. For example, this includes 

identifying, first, the nature of the risk faced in specific geographic 

areas; second, the types and scale of the potential consequences 

arising from these risks; third, the desired outcomes in addressing 

those consequences; fourth, the capabilities needed to achieve those 

desired outcomes, including command and control; fifth, who 

should fund, develop, and maintain specific capabilities; and sixth, 

metrics for assessing whether needed capabilities are available for 

deployment. 

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10 

Well crafted and executed operational plans are critical to effective disaster preparedness and response, but sound strategic planning is also critical. A coordinated strategy to establish and monitor the achievement of regional goals and priorities is fundamental 

and can provide a guide and framework for operational planning. 

We compared the NCR’s 2010 Strategic Plan and its supporting 

documents with six desirable characteristics we have identified for 

strategic plans to support complex undertakings, such as NCR preparedness. We reviewed the content of the plan and its associated 

documents, such as investment plans, but we did not evaluate 

whether or how well NCR has fostered and implemented or coordinated its capability efforts. Work remains in completing the plans, 

tasks, milestones, and metrics for implementing the Strategic Plan 

and we are initiating work on the NCR’s preparedness in response 

to a request from these two Subcommittees. 

Overall, we found that the Strategic Plan generally addressed 

each of the six characteristics and is more comprehensive than its 

2006 predecessor. 

Briefly, with regard to each characteristic, we found, first, the 

purpose, scope, and methodology of the plan is reasonably clear. It 

focuses on investments in new and existing capabilities, primarily 

those funded by Urban Area Security Initiatives (UASI) grants, 

and the support of NCR jurisdictions’ execution of their own operational plans. 

Second, problem definition and risk assessment. The plan generally addresses the particular problems and threats identified for 

the region. It clearly updates and prioritizes goals from the previous version and the NCR says it will be making decisions soon 

about the timing and methodology of the next risk assessment. 

Third, goals, subordinate objectives, and activities and performance measures. The strategy describes what it is intended to 

achieve and steps over the next 3 to 5 years to do that. However, 

the performance plan to monitor progress is not yet complete and 

NCR officials said that subject matter experts are currently completing progress reports on the metrics to be used for each of the 

strategy’s initiatives. 

Fourth, resources, investments, and risk management. The strategy includes information and processes designed to help address 

what it will cost to implement the strategy, including the investments needed and the sources and types of resources to support 

them. The strategy includes 16 investment plans that are currently 

out for NCR partner comment. We did not evaluate how well each 

investment plan’s content is designed to achieve the objectives it is 

intended to support. 

One concern we have is the Strategic Plan’s principle focus on 

UASI grant resources. Beginning in our 2004 report on the NCR, 

we have expressed the need for the NCR to explicitly and fully consider the totality of resources available within the region to achieve 

preparedness objectives. Moreover, the plan does not identify or explicitly consider in-kind resources that may be available from the 

Department of Defense, the National Guard Bureau, or the Department of Health and Human Services. 

Fifth, organizational roles, responsibilities and coordination. The 

Strategic Plan’s Governance Appendix details the roles and responH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

11 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Muth appears in the appendix on page 70. 

sibilities of the various NCR organizations involved in all hazard 

preparedness. For example, the Emergency Preparedness Council 

is described as the body providing oversight of the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan and the Strategic Plan to identify and address readiness gaps. 

Finally, sixth, integration and implementation. The strategy addresses how it is intended to integrate with the various NCR jurisdictions, strategies, goals, objectives, and activities and their plans 

to implement the strategy. An appendix describes how NCR’s strategic plan aligns with national, State, and local strategies with the 

goal of identifying common goals, objectives, and initiatives to be 

implemented by the region. 

In conclusion, a well defined, comprehensive Homeland Security 

Strategic Plan whose implementation is tracked and measured is 

an essential component of effective preparedness. The ultimate 

value of a Strategic Plan, no matter how well done, is its usefulness as a guide for policy and decisionmakers in setting priorities, 

allocating resources, and balancing risk and resource limitations. 

Having developed a generally good Strategic Plan, the NCR now 

faces the challenge of effectively implementing it and we will be following the NCR’s efforts as it does so. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I would be pleased 

to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Jenkins. 

Mr. Muth, will you please proceed with your statement. 

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD MUTH,1 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

MARYLAND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, STATE 

OF MARYLAND 

Mr. MUTH. Good afternoon Members of the Subcommittee. It is 

an honor to be invited here today to discuss our shared commitment to ensure the National Capital Region is prepared for emergencies. My name is Richard Muth and I am the Executive Director 

of Maryland Emergency Management Agency. 

I bring nearly 40 years of experience at both the local and State 

level to bear on these issues. I have been the State Director for 

Emergency Management for about 4 years. Previous to that, I 

spent 33 years at the local level, first as a firefighter, emergency 

medical technician, and then retiring as the Baltimore County 

Emergency Manager to come to the State. The reason I state that 

is I am not your academic on this Subcommittee. I am kind of the 

rubber-hits-the-road type of guy here. 

The Maryland Emergency Management Agency is the lead agency for coordinating emergency preparedness planning, response, 

and recovery during and after significant events, and that is for the 

entire State of Maryland. Local police, fire, and emergency medical 

personnel are almost always the first to respond to emergencies. 

When they exhaust their capabilities or need additional resources, 

they turn to the State. We coordinate the Maryland State and local 

agencies while also working with our regional partners in the District of Columbia and Virginia. 

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12 

We work not just during disasters, but every day with our local 

jurisdictions and our regional partners to improve the National 

Capital Region’s response. We do this based on a strong regional 

strategic plan, through everyday interactions and exercises and 

standing regional work groups, as well as by supporting innovative 

communications and technology tools. 

The first moments of any emergency event that occurs without 

warning are inherently chaotic and confusing. Initial confusion 

often leads to cascading effects as the individual decisions aggregate into a broad, far-reaching consequence. That is what happened 

during the earthquake. Initial confusion led to the public reaction 

and resulted in congested roads, slow transit, and tied-up networks, et cetera. 

Public safety radio communications, however, were not impacted 

during either the January 26 storm or the earthquake. This is a 

result of significant effort in the region to ensure that our first responders have interoperable and redundant communications systems no matter the situation. 

Our focus in Maryland is and will continue to be to build a resilient community. A resilient community has three primary elements: Resilient systems and utilities, resilient community planning, and a resilient citizenry. Resilient utilities quickly come back 

online after disruption because of redundancy. A resilient communications network is both redundant and robust for first responders. A resilient citizenry has been educated on what to do and can 

support emergency responders by keeping themselves safe and out 

of harm’s way. 

Since January of last year, we have made changes that we believe will continue to improve our capabilities. We have invested in 

the Virtual Joint Information Center that will improve our coordinated and public messaging, invested in regional situation awareness, including the new Regional Information Center, and we continue to invest significant time, effort, and funds to build resilient 

communications for our responders. 

We have not stopped our efforts there. Other critical systems 

have been improved, as well. Maryland has expanded the availability of shared video cameras from 45 in 2009 to just under 600 

today. In August, we launched a new Public Emergency Management Mapping System called OSPREY, to get needed information 

to the public during an emergency, and just in the past quarter, 

it has had over a quarter-of-a-million hits. 

Everyone in the region also uses a single incident management 

software, WebEOC, that allows us to seamlessly share information, 

and that system is constantly being improved. 

I wanted to talk a little bit about the evacuation comments that 

come up from time to time. For the first time in recent memory, 

Maryland had a mandatory evacuation of the barrier islands of 

Ocean City during Hurricane Irene, and we also had a hospital and 

two nursing homes evacuate. This successful, orderly, and proactive 

evacuation of approximately a quarter-of-a-million people took just 

under 24 hours to complete. An evacuation of the District or the 

NCR would be exponentially more complicated and a significantly 

more time consuming effort, even if prior notice is available. One 

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13 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Suit appears in the appendix on page 85. 

thing to keep in mind is evacuation is an option of the last resort, 

not an option of the first resort. 

Maryland, together with regional partners, has developed an integrated model for evacuation plans that is being used not just 

throughout the National Capital Region, but also in other States to 

create fully coordinated plans. New state-of-the-art computer models are being used to validate, test, and improve these plans. 

To conclude, I would like to urge a shared investment in the 

foundations of preparedness, building this resilient community I 

mentioned and its citizenry. The region, the State of Maryland, and 

the Nation should look for ways to educate young people in how to 

be ready for an emergency. We should work to engage private businesses in preparedness and for their support during a response. 

Maryland is already working toward those goals. My agency on 

January 1 will be launching the Maryland Office of Resiliency. We 

must educate our citizens and engage them in their own preparedness. A prepared public will help to lift the heavy burden placed 

on emergency workers, whether during a snowstorm or a terror attack, by keeping themselves safe. 

Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Muth. 

Ms. Suit, please proceed with your statement. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. TERRIE L. SUIT,1 SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS AND HOMELAND SECURITY, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

Ms. SUIT. Chairman Akaka, Chairman Pryor, on behalf of Governor McDonnell and the Commonwealth of Virginia, I want to 

thank you for the opportunity to testify here before you today. 

Virginia shares an outstanding relationship with our partner jurisdictions and responders in the National Capital Region. I would 

like to recognize our outstanding public servants, the area’s first 

responders, who are among the finest in the Nation. They responded in an exemplary manner on September 11, 2001 when Arlington, Virginia, was attacked at the Pentagon by terrorists, and 

they continue to respond every day to the emergencies in this region. We could not be prouder of them. 

Virginia is home to nearly 48 percent of the NCR’s citizens. Our 

local counties and cities have what is called a manager form of government as opposed to an elected executive or a strong mayoral 

chair. These managers are the appointed administrative officers 

and are vested with the authority necessary to manage the operations of their respective jurisdictions. Our emergency professionals 

follow the National Incident Management System (NIMS) during 

emergency events. With the exception of Arlington, highways as 

well as secondary roads in Virginia are managed by the State 

through the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT). 

Virginia works with our NCR partners to accomplish strategic 

planning and training through multiple organizations, such as the 

NCR Senior Policy Group, the Chief Administrative Officers 

(CAOs) Homeland Security Executive Committee, the NCR Emergency Preparedness Council (EPC), the Regional Emergency SupH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

14 

port Function (RESF) Committees—there are 16 of those—and the 

Regional Programmatic Working Groups, five, all of which collaborate to assist the SPG and the CAOs with the evaluation and the 

updating of the NCR Strategic Plan. We spend a lot of time together here in the capital. 

NCR preparedness is ongoing. Virginia has recently completed 

our updated evacuation plan for Northern Virginia, and participants in this planning included both local, Federal, and District 

partners. Considerable planning has been done to prepare for both 

subsequent attacks on the Pentagon, to include annual exercises 

with participants from across the region, and other potential emergencies. NCR health partners have collaborated on response plans 

for biological, radiologic, and chemical events. 

NCR decisionmakers coordinate in advance of and during emergencies through numerous information sharing platforms. These include e-mail, text alert, conference calls facilitated via RICCS as 

well as information sharing tools such as WebEOC, the Metropolitan Area Transportation Operations Coodination (MATOC), which 

is transportation related, and common operating pictures through 

VIPER and RITIS. These are geospatial pictures. The Washington 

Area Warning and Alert System provides a ‘‘when all else fails’’ 

means for communications to over 200 facilities. 

To facilitate face-to-face decisionmaking, Virginia has colocated 

our regional decisionmakers for the Virginia Department of Transportation, Emergency Management, and State Police in a 24/7 operations center at the Fairfax, Virginia Public Safety Tactical Operations Center (PSTOC). 

In addition to daily use radios, we have two strategic radio 

caches in the NCR. Each cache contains over 500 portable radios, 

satellite communications capabilities, and interoperability devices 

that can connect NCR jurisdictions as well as Federal entities. 

General preparedness messaging is ongoing. Virginia is currently 

engaged in our Winter Preparedness Campaign and citizens can 

learn how to prepare for the season by accessing 

www.readyvirginia.gov, and this information is available to all of 

the NCR residents. For commuters, this is the time to prepare vehicles and acquire appropriate winter wear. Most importantly, commuters need to be prepared to stay in place when travel conditions 

are projected to be unsafe. 

Transportation capacity is always an issue in the NCR. On a normal workday, the workforce has a staggered commute. In an emergency, the workforce tends to leave all at once, which creates gridlock. Staying in place is critical for managing through current and 

preventing subsequent emergencies, and staying in place means 

that citizens need to plan in advance for the care of loved ones, 

know the emergency plans for their children’s schools and care centers, and share their own plans with care providers and loved ones 

in advance in case the phone and cell service in the region is interrupted. These are all the messages that we are constantly putting 

out and aggressively putting out today. Citizens need to monitor 

weather and commuting conditions. 

The NCR Public Information Officer (PIO) Committee has established the NCR Virtual Joint Information Center, which just went 

live 2 days ago. This is at www.capitalregionupdates.gov, and this 

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15 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Quander appears in the appendix on page 91. 

is a single web stop for the public to access all current NCR event 

information and to sign up for text and e-mail alerts. 

Emergencies are localized events. The vast geography of the NCR 

means it may be sunny in one part of the area but snowing in another, and that is why bottom-up incident management is the national standard. Responders and emergency officials on the ground 

are empowered with delegated authorities from their principals to 

make the public safety decisions necessary to protect our citizens. 

This is NIMS. This is the National Response Framework. All of our 

responders are Incident Command System (ICS) trained and that 

is how we manage incidents, from the bottom up. 

Every incident provides the opportunity for lessons learned. The 

events of January and the earthquake have helped to change policy, and we embrace the new policies that OPM has committed to 

enact going forward. 

By abiding by the National Response Framework and employing 

the National Incident Management System, we are able to successfully manage our events, and understanding these systems, avoiding policy decisions that will confuse or conflict with this doctrine 

is critical to our ability to continue to effectively respond to emergencies. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to testify today. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Ms. Suit. 

Mr. Quander, will you please proceed with your statement. 

TESTIMONY OF PAUL A. QUANDER, JR.,1 DEPUTY MAYOR FOR 

PUBLIC SAFETY AND JUSTICE, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

Mr. QUANDER. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Akaka and 

Chairman Pryor. My name is Paul Quander. I serve the District of 

Columbia as the Deputy Mayor for Public Safety and Justice. In 

that role, it is my responsibility to provide direction, guidance, support, and coordination to the District’s public safety agencies to develop and lead interagency public safety initiatives that improve 

the quality of life in the District of Columbia. 

As the Nation’s Capital, we share our borders with the Commonwealth of Virginia and the State of Maryland. In the 68.3 square 

miles that we call home, there are 40 bridges and numerous tunnels and overpasses. There are 1,500 miles of public roads in the 

city. All three branches of our Federal Government are located 

within the boundaries of the city. Additionally, the District hosts 

45,300 businesses, 17 colleges and universities, and four military 

installations. According to the 2010 U.S. Census, the District of Columbia has over 601,000 residents and our population increases 

every day. New construction projects continue and signs of growth 

and vitality show themselves every day. 

Each day, we welcome between 600,000 and 1,000,000 people— 

commuters, visitors, and students—into the District on our roads 

and our rails. These commuters come into the city from Maryland, 

Virginia, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Delaware every day. 

Further, the city hosts more than 15 million visitors annually, according to information gathered from Destination D.C. and the National Park Service (NPS). 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

16 

One of the many agencies that I provide oversight to is the D.C. 

Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency (HSEMA), 

whose mission is to support and coordinate homeland security and 

emergency management efforts, ensuring that the District of Columbia’s all hazards emergency operations are prepared to protect 

against, plan for, respond to, and recover from natural and manmade hazards. This is accomplished by developing plans and procedures to ensure emergency response and recovery capabilities for 

all emergencies, coordinating emergency response allocation for 

emergencies in disaster incidents, providing training for all emergency responders, and coordinating all major special events and 

street closings. 

In addition and in furtherance of this mission, HSEMA also provides public awareness and outreach programs as well as a 24-hour 

emergency operations center which has special capabilities and 

serves as one of the region’s central points of communication during regional emergencies. 

One of the agency’s unique capabilities is that it serves as the 

Regional State Administrative Agency (SAA), for the Homeland Security Grant Program for the National Capital Region. HSEMA has 

served in this role since 2007. From 2007 through 2011, HSEMA 

has been responsible for administering more than $471 million to 

jurisdictions within the NCR. Historically, most of the funding has 

been in UASI which, as you know, provides funding to address the 

unique planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercise 

needs of high-threat, high-density urban areas. This funding has 

provided the NCR with the opportunity to provide meaningful support to jurisdictions, allowing us to ensure that as a region we are 

addressing our challenges and preparing and equipping the boots 

on the ground, our first responders. 

As we transition to discuss regional issues, we are not able to do 

so without speaking of the collaboration that the National Capital 

Region enjoys because of the work of the Metropolitan Washington 

Council of Governments. The MWCOG provides an opportunity for 

partners from across the region to discuss and strategize around 

regional issues. These issues, from City Council Administrative 

Homeland Security, Emergency Preparedness Council, the National 

Capital Regional Senior Policy Group, and others. 

As a practical matter, the District of Columbia could not do what 

it does each day in serving its constituents and stakeholders if it 

did not have a strong relationship with partners within our borders, to include our Federal partners. Each day, we work with any 

number of entities from the National Park Service and the Park 

Police to the FBI, and Secret Service, to the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the National Capital Region Coordination of FEMA and the Office of Personnel Management. Effective 

coordination and relationship building cannot wait for a crisis. It 

must be developed and nurtured on an ongoing basis. 

Likewise, we work on a daily basis with our colleagues from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia, the State of Maryland, and cities and 

counties from each jurisdiction that make up the National Capital 

Region. Aside from the regularly scheduled calls that the Senior 

Policy Group has to discuss regional issues, the District’s repH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

17 

resentatives and the Director and Deputy Director of HSEMA attend monthly meetings. 

One of the issues and one of the goals that we have reached has 

been mentioned earlier, and that is the MATOC program and 

strengthening our multi-agency coordination among transportation 

agencies. The District, in our 24-hour, 365-day Joint All Hazards 

Center, we have combined our Traffic Management Center function 

as an improvement so that we can coordinate services. 

The District and its partners are involved in training and exercise activities from planning through execution. We have several 

members who have a seat on the Regional Exercise and Training 

Oversight Panel. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks and I look forward to 

responding to any questions that you may have. Thank you for the 

opportunity to present this testimony. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Quander, for your 

statement, and to all of you, thank you very much for your statements. 

Mr. Hunter, you testified before a House Subcommittee in October that OPM had communication challenges in coordinating with 

NCR partners after the August 23 earthquake which resulted in 

the delayed announcement on the operating status of the Federal 

Government. My question to you is, would you please further explain these problems and whether they have been resolved. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We initially had difficulties in our communications capabilities from both our Government Emergency Telecommunications System (GETS) cards, to operate on traditional landline phones, as well as our wireless priority for cell service. Those difficulties were fairly short lived. As 

my colleague, Ms. Suit, mentioned, we were able to obtain some situational awareness through the Washington Area Warning Alert 

System during that point in time. We were able to also make contact with D.C. HSEMA as well as FEMA’s Office of National Capital Region Coordination. So while we did have some initial difficulties in communication and we are working in an after-action capacity with FEMA and other agencies to look at how to strengthen 

those capabilities, we did have success through the Washington 

Area Warning Alert System. 

But if I could add, one of the things that we noted in dealing 

with the earthquake, as also my colleague, Mr. Muth, testified, is 

that in the initial response to any no-notice event, it is very chaotic. And through the fog, you will need to take some time to develop some level of situational awareness. That hampered our capabilities from the standpoint that we did not have immediate damage assessments, nor were we fairly certain at the initial onset exactly what had happened. So it takes time to gather that information and to make that decision. 

One of the things that we noted and we have strengthened in our 

D.C. Dismissal Guide Policy is that need for individual agencies to 

be able to act when there is an immediate need for the safety and 

security of their employees. They have that authority, and to not 

wait for OPM’s decision when they need to proceed immediately. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. 

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18 

This next question is for the five other witnesses as a followup 

question. It took nearly an hour and a half after the earthquake 

for NCR decisionmakers to participate in a regional conference call. 

The question is, were other NCR decisionmakers having trouble 

communicating, and what lessons were learned about NCR communication and coordination after the earthquake? Mr. Beckham. 

Mr. BECKHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Because the August 23 

event not only occurred or affected the National Capital Region, it 

also impacted other parts of Virginia and Maryland, as well, and 

I will leave it to my colleagues to restate this, but they had responsibilities that were statewide and were probably or most likely engaged in dealing with their particular leadership at the State level 

as well as their personnel to do the assessments not only in the 

National Capital Region, but the other parts of Maryland and Virginia. 

As Mr. Hunter did state, there was communication. He mentioned WAWAS. We also had our WebEOC operational as well as 

the fact that all Emergency Operations Centers were able to talk 

to each other at that time. The Regional Information and Coordination Communication System (RICCS), was also operational and was 

transmitting messages back and forth to all of the distribution on 

that system, including all of us here at the table, so that we did 

have our situational awareness and we were sharing information 

through that type of media. 

The conference call that you mentioned, I believe a page went 

out to the COG, which is the manager of the conference call, and 

they designated the time when everybody would be available, and 

as you mentioned, an hour and a half after the incident is the time 

when everybody could get together and answer any questions or resolve any issues that were occurring. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Mr. Jenkins. 

Mr. JENKINS. We have not looked at that issue. We are going to 

look at this issue and a number of others in response to the Committee’s request, including the after action reports and lessons 

learned. But we have not looked at that issue at this point. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Muth. 

Mr. MUTH. It is interesting. As we are going back through this, 

in my mind, I was reminded that it took me a while to even figure 

out myself what was going on, as never experiencing that before. 

And our initial reaction at the State was to make sure all those nuclear power plants and other critical infrastructures were safe and 

up and running. So that took our initial attempt probably an hour 

or longer to even start. 

And being that—we have the responsibility for the whole State, 

so at no time did we say, OK, let us see what is going on in the 

NCR. We were monitoring traffic and everything else from Maryland’s side, as I am sure Virginia was doing, as D.C. was. But from 

my office, speaking on my office alone, Emergency Management, we 

were not concentrating on the NCR at that point when that earthquake hit. So it may be that we need to work on identifying somebody that immediately concentrates on that piece. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Ms. Suit. 

Ms. SUIT. When you say the decisionmakers, we abide by NIMS, 

by ICS. The decisionmakers are the boots on the ground during an 

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19 

emergency. We do not micro-manage the emergency response from 

the top down. The decisionmakers had the authorities necessary, 

already vested with them, to do what they needed to do during the 

initial response. They receive those authorities through code, 

through an Executive Order, and through both our State Virginia 

Emergency Response Plan, our Operations Plan—we call it the 

COVEOP—as well as the Local Emergency Operations Plan. So the 

people responding are not waiting for a decisionmaker on high to 

say it is OK to do this or to do that. They are acting. They are 

doing what they need to do. 

From a managerial level, we have colocated our decisionmakers 

for transportation, emergency management, and safety, public safety, with the State Police at the PSTOC in Fairfax. That is where 

I was also located. And so we were talking face-to-face. And I was 

also immediately communicating with the Governor. As you are 

aware, the earthquake was centered in Mineral, Virginia, and so 

we had a lot going on. 

I did know it was an earthquake. I went to high school in San 

Diego and immediately dove under my desk when an earthquake 

started. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Mr. Quander. 

Mr. QUANDER. When an event takes place like the earthquake, 

the event is first local, that local response where we have to assess 

the damage and respond immediately to the pressing issues. Once 

that is done, then we can inform our regional partners what issues 

we face and then we can take a look at the region, what is happening. 

But as Ms. Suit indicated, it is from the bottom up. We have to 

respond to the emergency. We have to address that emergency. 

Then we take a look at where we are in our respective jurisdictions 

and then where are we regionally. How are we responding. But we 

first have to put out the fire and then we deal with the other 

issues. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Senator Pryor. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to start down on this end of the table with the State 

and the District people, if I could, Mr. Chairman, and that is last 

January we had a snowstorm, and I am curious from all of your 

perspectives if that is a fair comparison to our preparedness in a 

terrorist event or if that is an apples and oranges comparison. Mr. 

Muth. 

Mr. MUTH. Certainly. I do not think it is a comparison. First of 

all, what we experienced, what you experienced, was up and down 

the whole East Coast. So it was not the NCR that was gridlocked. 

It was the whole East Coast that was gridlocked. 

The reason for that was the storm in the morning was ice. They 

salted the roads. There was an increase in the temperatures. We 

had storms come through in the afternoon that were not of a frozen 

type that washed all the salt off. Before everything had a chance 

to be reapplied, it refroze again. It just happened to freeze again 

right at rush hour. So you had this perfect storm, no pun intended, 

that was all coming together at the same time. 

So I do not think a snowstorm and all its inherent problems that 

come along with that really can be a comparison to evacuations in 

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20 

any other term. I think each one is its own and has to be assessed 

on its own. That would be my thoughts. 

Senator PRYOR. Yes, that is why I said it. Ms. Suit. 

Ms. SUIT. I would absolutely agree. I was on 395 and had the 

misfortune of watching the plane go into the Pentagon and then 

was in the traffic for about 4 hours making my way out of the NCR 

that day. 

In the snowstorm, you had the added situation of the weather. 

We had people abandoning their vehicles, which is extremely problematic for our highway personnel, to get up there, get tow trucks 

and move those vehicles. I would not compare the two at all. 

What I would say is that we have had an opportunity to review 

what took place and to establish new policies, and I applaud OPM 

for embracing two things, an earlier decision and not bringing the 

workforce in when we have bad weather projected, but also embracing a strategy of staying in place. In any event it is safer for 

the public, for our citizens to stay in place. If we have a terrorist 

attack, if we have any kind of contamination, leaving the building 

exposes them to much higher levels of contamination and of unsafe 

situations than staying in place, and that is the biggest message 

that we need to really get out there with our citizens. Stay. Wait. 

Wait for more information. Do no harm. Stay where you are until 

we get you more additional information. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Quander. 

Mr. QUANDER. I concur, but I also realize, as we all do, that disasters are rarely announced, and because of the events in January, 

because of the circumstances almost being a perfect storm, it 

caused severe problems for us. But we, I believe, have learned from 

that. When traffic does not move, citizens cannot get to where they 

need to be. They cannot get home. They cannot take care of their 

children. They cannot take care of their other responsibilities. So 

it has an impact. 

Although there may be different reasons, different scenarios, the 

result is the same, and we need to learn, and I think we have 

learned. We have made changes and improvements. And I think we 

have to look at the take-aways from January. What are we doing 

differently now? What are the changes? And that is the significance, I believe. 

Senator PRYOR. Ms. Suit, let me followup on one thing you said 

about stay in place, and Mr. Quander alluded to it there, and that 

is the issue—one of the issues would be your children being in 

school. I know that what you are saying is staying in place is rational, it is the right policy and all those things, but when it is a 

parent and their child or children, they are going to try to get to 

those children, and that is just human nature and we understand 

that. 

So how should we handle that? Would you recommend, or have 

you all considered trying to work with the schools to sort of have 

safe places in school, communicate that to the parents, that if there 

is some event, they are going to be safe at school? I mean, what 

do you do? How does that piece of the puzzle fit in? 

Ms. SUIT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are several things we 

are doing. One, we utilized the Catastrophic Planning Grant Funds 

to do a very, very comprehensive study through the University of 

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21 

Virginia of citizens in the NCR. It was about, 2,500 or 2,600 citizens who were surveyed for 30 minutes on their behavior, their 

projected behavior during an incident, and the incident was a dirty 

bomb incident. What we found was that they will stay in place if 

they have confidence that their children are safe. 

So through those catastrophic grants, we are now doing a followon phase two pilot program of working with select businesses in 

the District and working with them on having a program in place 

for their employees to be prepared and understand things like what 

is their school preparedness plan? What is going on with their children? After the earthquake, when those businesses were surveyed, 

we found that because of that pilot program and the ongoing training, their response was they waited until after 5 o’clock and had 

the best commute of their lives. 

And so it does work. It takes extra effort. It takes more intense 

training. We are already putting out just in our broad general preparedness messaging, know your children’s school plans. Communicate your plan to family members in advance so that if phone 

service is out, they know you are safe and you are not rushing to 

get together. But that is huge cultural, behavioral changes and it 

will take time. 

Senator PRYOR. I am going to ask the panel a good question, but 

it is kind of unfair how I am going to ask it because I am going 

to ask the five of you a question about Mr. Beckham’s shop, and 

that is basically the question will be is how—ONCRC’s placement 

in FEMA is designed to help create efficiency and better communication, more streamlined, et cetera, and I do not want to ask Mr. 

Beckham this because I want to hear from you guys, how is that 

working? Is it beneficial to you all to have his office in FEMA 

where it is and doing the various functions it does? Go ahead. 

Mr. MUTH. From my perspective, they were already in place 

when I came aboard at the State level, so I have no knowledge of 

how it was before that. But my interaction since I have been there 

in the just about 4 years has been very positive in that it provides 

an immediate conduit, if you will, to other information that we 

might need from FEMA within that NCR region. 

So I think they are now where they belong in life, it really does 

not matter to me. I think it kind of makes sense that they are in 

FEMA and they are dealing directly with us. We certainly get a lot 

of information pushed from that office almost daily on things that 

are happening and occurring. So I would have to say, from Maryland’s perspective, anyway, it has been a positive interaction. 

Senator PRYOR. Anybody else? Ms. Suit. 

Ms. SUIT. I think we could utilize them more than we do, and 

that is probably more on my shoulders, reaching out to them, having them help us with introductions and coordination with Federal 

agencies that we do not have relationships with already, and we 

need to push that more within our Virginia decisionmaking area. 

As far as where they are located, the only way I can answer that 

is just from my own experience as being a member of a bureaucracy. Bureaucracies are very chain of command oriented. They are 

very rank oriented. And when you are at a certain level, then your 

peers work with you based on you being at that level. I think that 

if ONCRC was reporting directly to the Secretary, they would have 

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22 

probably more gravidas with the other Federal agencies. But I 

think because of the people at ONCRC, because of the relationships 

they have and the reputation they have, that they have that 

gravidas personally while they may not have the optimal amount 

positionally. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. 

Mr. QUANDER. I agree with that assessment, but I will go further. We have had great access and great benefit as a result. 

Where the group sits, I am not sure as to the optimum position. 

But it has been effective. 

As an example, last week, we conducted a tabletop exercise and 

Mr. Beckham and his team participated and assisted in making 

sure that other Federal agencies, we had business groups there and 

it was an exercise that was a severe weather event. And so we had 

more than 200 individuals that participated. So when you have 

that type of partnership and you actually can make things happen, 

it is a benefit. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Beckham, are you satisfied with all those answers? [Laughter.] 

Mr. BECKHAM. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would mention, as I said in 

my opening statement, yes, we did start with the Office of Homeland Security when Governor Ridge stood it up right after September 11. We continue to have access to the DHS Office of the 

Secretary through the Assistant Secretary for Intergovernmental 

Relations Office, also the Under Secretary of Management’s Office. 

We report through the Protection and National Preparedness Directorate, which is run by Deputy Administrator Manning. However, I must point out, while he has the administrator function for 

our office, we also report to Craig Fugate, the FEMA Administrator, Deputy Administrator Serino, as well as the Chief of Staff 

on a regular basis on a variety of issues, depending on what the 

issues are. 

I am fortunate that—I have been there 2 years—I inherited a 

staff that has the legacy and the institutional history of working 

in this program and have been able to leverage their relationships 

and been able to reach out to the various partners throughout the 

National Capital Region, both on the Federal and on the State 

level. Players do change with election cycles and what have you, 

but they are all committed to the mission. They have all been experts in—if they did not have particular expertise, they were not 

afraid to reach out and get it, and I think it has made it a beneficial experience. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Jenkins, GAO was instrumental in helping 

my Subcommittee to examine the NCR’s strategic planning efforts 

by providing recommendations to the region during the Subcommittee’s 2005 and 2006 hearings on this topic. Would you comment on 

what improvements have been made between the NCR’s 2006 

Homeland Security Strategic Plan and its current plan. 

Mr. JENKINS. There were two 2006 plans. The first one was, in 

a word, terrible, and then the second one really tried to address 

these six characteristics that I talked about and we did sort of outline, in broad fashion, roles and responsibilities. The big difference, 

I think, in the 2010 plan is they have taken that foundation and 

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gotten much more specific in the various areas in terms of trying 

to identify the goals, have subordinated objectives that match those 

goals, as well as initiatives that would help them achieve the objectives. 

So it is much more structured. It is much more systematic than 

it was before. It is much more specific, as well, and they are, in 

terms of the initiatives they are taking, they are on the right track 

in terms of trying to develop, give responsibility to somebody and 

some group for achieving different objectives and setting measures 

for how they are going to achieve those. So I think they have made 

considerable progress since 2010. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Mr. JENKINS. Since 2006. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Mr. Hunter and Mr. Beckham, I am concerned about protecting 

Federal employees during emergencies. As we saw with the earthquake, we must be prepared for unexpected events. In this area, 

acts of terrorism are a constant threat, as well. So I am asking you 

to please discuss what efforts your offices have made to prepare 

Federal employees in the D.C. area for unexpected emergencies, 

such as a tornado or radiological dirty bomb. Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. First, we at OPM conducted a press 

conference just last week to roll out our new procedures, our new 

D.C. Dismissal Guide, and, in fact, FEMA was a partner with us 

at that press conference as well as the District of Columbia. So we 

provided information through the press conference itself, but we 

also did a webcast for Federal employees, as well, and the focus of 

the webcast is just not to lay out the new policies associated with 

our new D.C. Dismissal Guide but also to reiterate to our Federal 

employees that this really is a partnership, that we need their assistance to make this work, from developing a family plan to making sure that they have telework agreements in place and that they 

have found alternative ways to come and go into the city. 

So in addition to the press conference itself and the webcast, together with Steward’s group and the Office of National Capital Region Coordination, we have worked through the Joint Federal Committee during the course of the last year to do some training exercises for emergency managers and to, again, to have them take 

that information back to Federal employees. 

We are participating with FEMA on NCRC in developing a webbased training program, as well as a Federal preparedness brochure in the coming year. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Mr. Beckham. 

Mr. BECKHAM. Just to elaborate on what Dean just said, in the 

Federal Preparedness Program, it is an initiative in partnership 

with him, that OPM has started in our office, and the main focus 

of that initiative is to get DHS employees to have individual and 

family preparedness efforts underway and maintained and exercised so that if they have responsibilities in their employment, in 

their Federal employment, they do not have to worry about their 

family members, their children or adult day care or adult care 

issues that they may have. 

The hope is that once we get the program up and running and 

we reach out to DHS, we would envision having it extended to the 

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entire Federal family so that they can go through this web-based 

training and be able to identify those types of issues that they need 

to shore up in their own personal lives so that they cannot only 

take care of themselves, but make sure that their families are safe, 

as well. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Hunter, as has been discussed, OPM recently announced 

sheltering in place as an operating status option to protect the Federal workforce during severe weather events or emergencies. The 

term ‘‘shelter in place’’ may suggest that employees would need to 

stay in their offices for a prolonged period of time. Would you 

please discuss how OPM intends the sheltering in place to be used. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We implemented the 

shelter in place option to our D.C. Dismissal Guide to add an additional option to our tool kit. There has been much play about how 

we would invoke that during a snow emergency, but I would like 

to emphasize that it really has a broader role, and we have talked 

about terrorism capabilities here, but particularly for chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological types of threats, this could be an option that we would put in for a longer-based capacity. 

It is also important to note that individual agencies typically 

have their own building based shelter in place plans as a result of, 

or incorporated into their Occupant Emergency Plans. 

So, again, the intent is for this to be used really in extreme circumstances along the lines of chemical or biological threats. But we 

do see that there could be a very short-term utility for a snow 

event. But I would also want to caveat that with, again, it would 

be our intent to have people home before we got to those extreme 

circumstances. 

We would lean forward very proactively the day before a storm, 

perhaps, to announce an unscheduled leave, unscheduled telework 

policy whereby we bring less people into the city in the first place. 

We would perhaps follow that up if a storm occurred during the 

day with a staggered departure with a final departure time, for instance, having people leave no later than 3 p.m. And after that 

point in time, if in consultation with our colleagues in the emergency management capacity and law enforcement, if there was a 

need for us to request people to be off of the roads so that the 

transportation entities could keep the roads clear in a snowstorm, 

we would do that, but again, it would be on a very temporary, 

short-term basis. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. 

As a followup question to Ms. Suit, you use the phrase ‘‘staying 

in place’’ rather than sheltering in place. Is there a difference between Virginia’s policy and OPM’s revised policy? 

Ms. SUIT. No, and actually, OPM at the recent Emergency Preparedness Council meeting also was more apt to use the phrase 

‘‘stay in place.’’ I think the media has co-opted that a bit into the 

sheltering in place. Sheltering in place is not as well received with 

the public and we find from a standpoint of a public message and 

crafting public messaging, sheltering in place does not have the 

same comfort level with the public as staying in place. Staying in 

place has more of a temporary connotation, an hour, 2 hours, 6 

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hours, long enough for the emergency to pass. Sheltering in place 

does insinuate in the mind of the public longer times. 

Now, I will say this. In the event of a radiological event, and we 

just had a report released on Monday from our working group here 

in the NCR on radiological and nuclear detection issues, we had a 

huge study that was done and this is brand new information, and 

that study does go into great depth as far as the number of hours 

and possibly days to stay in place, or shelter in the event of going 

beyond 6 hours, in place and how much more lives that will save 

by staying where they are as opposed to getting out and becoming 

exposed. 

And so this is all information that we are obtaining and acquiring, greatly in part because of the grants that you all have given 

us. They are working. They are informing our policies going forward and now we will take this information and incorporate that 

in the future into our strategic plan and additional things and investments that we make in the NCR and messaging going forward. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Senator Pryor. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

Let me start with Mr. Beckham. I know it is hard enough to try 

to coordinate with all the various governmental entities that you 

have to deal with, and I know you have a myriad of them in this 

region that all need to interface and interconnect somehow, and it 

sounds like you are doing a great job there. But my question is, are 

you also trying to coordinate with the business community? 

Mr. BECKHAM. Yes, sir, and as was pointed out again in some of 

the testimony, first of all, talking about the Emergency Preparedness Council, the Director of the Metropolitan Washington Board 

of Trade sits on that council and represents the business community and their interests and their points of view. I cannot speak to 

how he disseminates the information from the Preparedness Council, but I do know that they have monthly meetings and I actually 

attended one when I first got here and they bring that information 

out to their membership. 

Another group we meet with, while not necessarily business, is 

the Consortium of Universities. We meet with the emergency managers and the preparedness officials with that organization and attend some of their training and exercises, and they are very engaged in those efforts that we have going here in the National Capital Region. 

We also worked with the Golden Triangle Business Improvement 

District (BID), which is in the center of the District, and used the 

work that we are doing with them as a model to hopefully reach 

out to the other BIDs around the District and use that to have 

them do some of the Occupant Emergency Planning and make sure 

that they have their workforces coordinated if there had to be a release for whatever reason and that they do not put additional 

stress on the transportation assets of the National Capital Region. 

Senator PRYOR. Great. That is great. 

Mr. Hunter, let me ask you a similar question. When OPM does 

the various things that you do, when you set your policies and all 

that, do you consult with the business community to try to coordinate with them in any way? 

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26 

Mr. HUNTER. As Mr. Beckham mentioned, during our policy revision this year, we coordinated our policy with the Washington 

Board of Trade and members associated with the Emergency Planning Committee. We recognize that the private sector often follows 

our lead from how they develop their own policies, so we did coordinate that policy in conjunction with the EPC and COG. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. And do you do just the policy coordination, 

or do you also, when you have to make a decision that day on 

whether something closes or whatever and you actually make the 

call, do you try to coordinate with them at that point, or do they 

just key off of the decisions that you are making? 

Mr. HUNTER. They key off the decisions. They are typically not 

involved in the COG calls. 

Senator PRYOR. Yes. The reason I was asking is we talked a 

minute ago, one of the witnesses talked about sort of a phased 

leaving of the city or coming into the city or whatever effort during 

or after an event, probably, and I just did not know if you try to 

coordinate with the business community, because if you look at 

their numbers, Even though government is a huge industry here in 

this area, the private sector is quite a bit larger with a lot more 

people in this area. 

Let me ask about the ready.gov program. On the ready.gov Web 

site, it talks about make a plan and try to have a plan for yourself. 

What is the experience with that? Are people making plans? And 

if there is something going on, whether it is an earthquake or a 

snowstorm or whatever it happens to be and maybe the communication is not real clear in the beginning and everybody is unsure 

about really what is happening, are they sticking with their plan? 

Do we know? Mr. Beckham, maybe you might be best for this. 

Mr. BECKHAM. Obviously, ready.gov is a program that was rolled 

out nationally as well as in the NCR, but to the statistical request 

that you have, we would have to get back to you with the effectiveness of that program at this point. 

Senator PRYOR. All right. Let me ask you about this, as well, 

then. The August earthquake, like September 11, 2001, and other 

types of incidents like that, not just in this area but elsewhere, in 

those type of events, often the region’s telecommunication system 

is just very quickly congested. It is not inoperable, but it is just so 

jammed that it is not—not very many people are able to get on it, 

or, I should say, a lot of people are not able to get on it. Do you 

feel like the D.C. area has sufficient capacity in an emergency to 

keep all the lines of communication open or are we going to continue to see sort of a clogged telecom capacity here? 

Mr. BECKHAM. I understand that there was some overloading of 

the cell phone system here in the National Capital Region, but one 

of the messages that we are going to push out, and we are pushing 

out, is many folks use text messaging and Twitter, which require 

less bandwidth. I am not an expert on this—— 

Senator PRYOR. Right. 

Mr. BECKHAM [continuing]. But we are going to push out that if 

you want to get in communication with folks, using Twitter or text 

messaging capacity, you will have a better success rate of pushing 

your message forward. 

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27 

There was some congestion, as I mentioned, in the cell phone 

towers, but I think about an hour to an hour and a half or so after 

that, it began to reduce and it was back to a near-normal state. 

Senator PRYOR. Yes. One of the things we did on our Subcommittee—Mr. Chairman, that would be on this half of the table 

over here—but one of the things we did on our Subcommittee is 

that we had a hearing on social media and the impact that social 

media has in these events now. I thought it was very interesting. 

When you look around the country at some things that have happened recently, whether it is ice storms or tornadoes or whatever 

it may be, floods, people are wanting to communicate and really 

have that two-way communication all instantaneously which can be 

an amazing asset in a situation like that. So the people, if they 

have access to the bandwidth they need, et cetera, they are going 

to respond and they are going to participate and they are going to 

communicate and that is a very good thing. 

Did you have something you wanted to add? 

Ms. SUIT. Just two things. Going back to your original answer 

about the plans, there was a survey that was done of the New York 

area after Katrina and we found that they went from 17 percent 

to 19 percent, only a 2-percent rise in the number of families that 

had an emergency plan. We expected that it would have gone up 

higher because of Katrina. So that is a little bit of information. I 

mean, it is the New York area, not the whole Nation, but it gives 

you a little information. 

What we have also found is that by doing the more intense work 

directly with the business community like we are doing through 

the Catastrophic Planning Grant, we raise that to 80 to 90 percent 

of the participants of that training. So the more we can use those 

Catastrophic Grant funds and other grant funds as well as our own 

investments to go into those kinds of more intensive, direct training programs, the more we see success in that area. 

And as far as bandwidth, bandwidth is finite. I mean, right now, 

we have the big issue taking place right here that I am sure you 

all are weighing in on with the D Block. Our public safety responders desperately need that extra bandwidth for public safety, and 

then the ability also to allow the private sector to lease back some 

of that space for use. But it is finite. The more you have smart 

phones and people downloading videos and doing games, that all 

uses up that same space and it cuts us off. And people have a natural tendency to go straight to the mobile phone when they want 

to communicate as opposed to defaulting to text messaging, which 

uses up much less space. 

And finally, it used to be we all had landlines at home. Now, 

even at home, you are going over the Internet for the most part 

with your communications. So the culture has changed and we 

have to change with it in how we respond from a policy standpoint. 

Senator PRYOR. I do not know the difference in the numbers in 

New York versus New Orleans, but one of the things I learned in 

Katrina, again, as part of the Committee’s work after Katrina, was 

that a lot of folks, a very high percentage of people down there, do 

have a plan because this is kind of ingrained in them from the beginning that you live in this certain area and it is prone to X, Y, 

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and Z happening. It is going to vary region to region, and just 

given the experience and the expectations in that area. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. That is all I have. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Mr. Hunter, I have been a strong supporter of increasing the use 

of telework in the Federal Government and I applaud OPM’s efforts to implement my Telework Enhancement Act. As you stated, 

building a strong telework culture is important to making sure that 

government operations continue during emergencies. Will you 

please elaborate on how OPM is working to make sure agencies 

have integrated telework in their continuity of operations plans. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In updating our policy, 

our D.C. Dismissal Guide Policy, we provided additional information on incorporating telework. But I also want to point out that 

we have been working with the interagency community, both 

FEMA, GSA, the National Archives and Record Administration, to 

work toward an update of Federal Continuity Directive 1, to provide additional guidance on not only the training of employees for 

telework but also testing those capabilities and exercising them on 

a frequent basis. 

And we also have some encouraging news from the Employee 

Viewpoint Survey that we recently have received the results from 

that has showed us that in the National Capital Region, we have 

about 18 percent of people, Federal respondents, that indicated 

that they are teleworking at least once a week, and 47 percent 

have indicated that they have the capability to telework at least 

some of the time. So we see that this has very positive implications 

for us on the emergency planning side. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for that response. 

My last question is for the panel. A recent Washington Post editorial argued that the reluctance of area jurisdictions to cede power 

in decisionmaking to a central authority has hampered the NCR 

during a crisis and could exact a terrible price in the future. There 

is no one entity or person with the ability to make regional decisions when an emergency involves multiple NCR jurisdictions, and 

the multiple authorities have complicated communication among 

decisionmakers and the public. So what I would like to ask you is 

how do you respond to these concerns and how will you make sure 

that there is a seamless response to the next regional emergency? 

Mr. Muth. 

Mr. MUTH. Thank you. First of all, we have—I am not sure I 

agree with that editorial. We have very robust mutual aid plans 

that are used every day, in and out of the Capital and Maryland 

to Virginia and vice-versa, that are very well versed and very robust. 

The resources that we are, I assume, we are talking about are 

resources that belong to local governments or State Governments, 

and to say that somebody would have overall authority to strip 

those from a State or a county and reassign those would be an interesting concept, to say the least. I think you might be infringing 

on the States’ rights there. 

I think we have a very refined Incident Command System, as 

Terrie and others have mentioned today, and that allows for that 

expansion of the Incident Management System, if necessary. So 

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where if we have something on the border, we do not necessarily 

worry about whose it is. We just go and do it and then we work 

on that Incident Command System as it grows. 

So is there one regional person in charge? No, there is not, and 

that is because you have independent governments that are involved in this whole thing. That does not mean that the governments cannot all work together in an emergency, and I think they 

absolutely would. I think there is still a long way to go to refine 

that and to make that operational and just not from the planning 

stage, because that is where it is right now. 

But I think it is there, and I still have to reiterate, going back, 

that Montgomery and Prince George’s County are responding into 

D.C. every day and vice-versa and it works seamlessly. Nobody 

knows about it because it works seamlessly and it is there. It does 

not change just because there is an emergency. It is still the same 

system, the same process, et cetera. 

I think the only area where it may be worth looking at a little 

bit more is the non-traditional first responder equipment and getting more into public works, snowplows and those types of things, 

which generally are not thought of as a mutual aid response, in 

and out continuously. 

But the last thing I will add to that is that we all at State and 

local governments have very finite resources. Those are already 

taxed and engaged in whatever we are dealing with statewide, 

NCR being one of our parts of the State. And so there is no cache 

of equipment sitting somewhere like there is with radios to say 

that in a regional emergency, we will bring this cache of snowplows 

together and operators. It is all equipment that is used every day 

and it is already being used during an event. 

So I think the process needs to be working down the line, but if 

Washington calls for assistance from us, we are going to jump in 

and help Washington if at all possible. That is the way we do it 

every day and we will continue to do that. Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Ms. SUIT. Mr. Chairman, I would answer that by saying that 

there is not one central decisionmaker in any disaster, any emergency situation. We use NIMS. We use ICS. The writer of that article needs to go online to FEMA’s Web site and take ICS–100, and 

then they need to follow that on and take NIMS–700. They need 

to learn ICS and incident management and how the National Response Framework is designed. It works. 

It worked at the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. When that 

plane hit the Pentagon, I was able to get a cell phone call out, one 

call out to the Governor. At that time, it was Governor Gilmore. 

I got the call out to his office. I said, I am on the highway. I have 

just watched a plane go into the Pentagon. By the time we hung 

up, Arlington County fire trucks were already at the Pentagon. Jim 

Schwartz, the Assistant Fire Chief, took incident command of that 

situation at the Pentagon. That is how ICS worked. 

It was not mandated then. It was not required for grant usage 

then. Now, it is required. Now, we make sure everyone is NIMS 

compliant or they cannot receive a dime of Federal Homeland Security money. That doctrine works, and folks that criticize that bottom-up response do not understand it. They need to go in. They 

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need to learn how we do emergency management. The Governor’s 

office becomes involved with messaging, with guidance, with 

issuing emergency declarations, but we never manage the emergency on the ground from a central decisionmaker’s office from on 

high. That is not how emergencies work. 

And I would further say that the District is not unique. NCR is 

not unique. When we are dealing with a hurricane in Hampton 

Roads, we are dealing with the evacuation of the North Carolina 

Outer Banks up through the Virginia highway system. We are 

dealing with the largest Naval base in the world. We are dealing 

with one of the largest ports in this country and working with the 

Coast Guard on whether or not to shut down that port and when 

to move bridges and when to allow people to evacuate. It is always 

unified, working together in these decisionmaking cross-cutting 

manners with our Federal partners, our local partners, and our 

intrastate and interstate partners. 

So NCR is not unique in that. But if we all work through the National Response Framework and we understand it, and we do not 

make policy changes to confuse it, we will be OK. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Quander. 

Mr. QUANDER. From the District’s perspective, a centralized decisionmaker is not the point. It is an operational issue. It is from the 

bottom up. It is using the system, the NIMS system that we have, 

and we operationalize it. That is how you address the issues. 

One of the things that—the Mayor announced today that the District has undertaken and has completed a system of cabling, fiber 

optics, that will increase the capability within the District of 100 

gigabytes bandwidth. It will be the largest usage or availability of 

bandwidth anywhere in the world, more so than Silicon Valley, 

more so than in New York, anyplace in the country, anyplace in 

the world. So agencies will be able to tie into a greater resource 

that will be available—that is available now. We did not have that 

in the past. We have that now. So we will be able to communicate 

more by using some of the electronic means and less on cell phones 

when we are able to communicate and get our messaging out. 

One of the other things that we are doing, again, not from who 

makes the decision but what we are doing, we spoke about developing family plans. We spoke about teleworking. We spoke about 

public awareness. We spoke about involving the business community. These are the things that we need to do to make sure that 

when we know that we have to act, we will know how to act, and 

that is where our focus really needs to be, not on who makes the 

call. That is really not the focus. It is following the plan, bottom 

up, using NIMS, and that is where we are going to see our greatest 

success. Thank you, sir. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Quander. 

Any other comments? Mr. Beckham. 

Mr. BECKHAM. Yes, sir. I concur with my colleagues and just 

want to mention that Secretary Suit mentioned that under the ICS 

system, it is designed for the smallest incident all the way up to 

the very large incident. ICS is designed not only for cross-functional purposes, but for cross-jurisdictional purposes and it can always expand into a unified command, which would bring in all of 

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those decisionmakers, again, as I mentioned, whether it is function 

related or jurisdictionally related. 

Senator AKAKA. Any other further comments? Mr. Jenkins. 

Mr. JENKINS. Mr. Chairman, I would just make one sort of fundamental point when I read the Post editorial, is that if you look 

at the NCR itself, the NCR is not an operational entity. It is a coordination entity, and there could be issues in how they coordinate 

and how they make decisions, but as the other witnesses point out, 

part of the problem with having a single person in control is that 

it assumes that the NCR is an operational entity in and of itself, 

which it is not. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Just to add to what my colleagues said, I think 

what is equally important rather than having a single decisionmaker is to make sure that we are all operating with the same set 

of facts or from a common operating perspective. I think that is 

really key and I applaud the District of Columbia for some of their 

efforts with COG to look at how we are going to implement the concept of Regional Information Center and how we might share that 

type of information. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. 

I would like to thank all of our witnesses for being here today 

and for your excellent responses. It is clear that the NCR has improved its emergency coordination considerably since September 

11, 2001. However, serious challenges still remain. I look forward 

to working closely with my colleagues in the Senate and with the 

NCR stakeholders to improve regional coordination and make sure 

that the millions of residents and visitors to the NCR are safe. This 

has been, I feel, a good hearing and thank you again so much for 

your contributions. 

The hearing record will be open for 2 weeks for additional statements or questions other members may have. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:14 p.m., the Subcommittees were adjourned.] 

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