# FILED
October 20, 19 95 Cecil Crowson, Jr . App ellate C ou rt Clerk IN THE COU RT OF A PPEA LS OF TENN ESSEE EASTERN SECTION A T KNOXVILLE

ESTATE OF

LOWELL KENNE TH ) BLOUN T PROBA TE REED, DECEASED. ) ) GINGER REED and DAVID REED, ) ) Claimants/Appellees, ) v. ) NO. 03A01-9507- PB-00230 ) ROSIE LEE CLARK REED, ) ) Executri x/Appellant

. ) AFFIRMED.

Duncan V. Crawford, Mar yvil le, For the A ppellant. Robert N. Goddard, Maryville, for the Appellees.

O P I N I O N

INMAN, Se nior Jud ge
Lowell Kenn eth Reed and Car olyn Margaret W. Reed were di vorced in 1978. The judgment incorporated a Proper ty Settlement Agreement w hich, as pert inent here, included this prov ision:

(7) The Party of the Second Part ag rees to pay to the Par ty of the First Part as alimony, pending the sale of th e home as reflected in Paragraph (1), locat ed at 1206 Lenore Lane, Maryv ille, Tennessee, 37801, One Hundred Sixty-six Dollars and 29/100 ($166.29), said payments due and payableafter entry of the Final Dec ree on the 5th of each and ever

y month thereafter

until said home is sold. Upon the sale of the house , the Party of the Second Part ag rees to pay as alimony

to the Party

of the First P art an amount commensurate with the comfortable li ving of the Party of the F irst Part for the remainder of her life or

until she remarries. It is contempl ated between theparties that this is to include rent or mortgage pay ment, utiliti es and phone expense. In addition there to, the Party of the Second Part, recog nizing that the Par

t [s ic] of the First P art has foregoneher education i n order to further the Pa rty of the Second Part, expressly agrees to pay all expensesfor the Party

of the First P art to attend a college of her

choice until she obtains an undergraduat e degree, equivalent to a B.S. or a B.A., said e xpenses to i nclude, wi thout limitati on, tuition, book s, room and board and subsistence allowance not exceedi ng One Hundre d2 Dollars ($100) per mont h. In the e vent the P arty of the First Part is employed, full time or par t time, whi le work ing towards her undergraduatedegree, the P arty of the Sec ond Part wi ll reduce the subsistence allowance c ommensurate wi th the income of the Par ty of the First Par

t. It is ag reed to by t he Party of theSecon d Part that any and all life i nsurance poli cies obtained by the Party of the Second Part through any source, as of the date of filin g the Complai nt f or A bsolute Divorce, September 8, 1978, s hall be maintai ned in full force and effect, without any encumbrances thereon, and thepremium shall be maintained by the Party of the S econd Part. It i s further agreed that the designated beneficiaries as of said d ate, September 8, 1 978, shall remain as of said date, unless an d until the Party of the Fi rst Part remarries, then, in such event, the Par ty of the First Part shall b e removed as designat ed beneficiary on said insur

ance policies

and substituted thereon shall be the children on th e parties, e ach to share equa lly. There wa s in effec

t on S epte mber

8, 19 78, a

pol icy of in suranceon th e li fe of Lowell Re ed. His w ife, Caroly n Margare t Reed, was the principa l beneficiary

. Their three chi ldren wer e secondary

beneficiaries. In 1984 Marg aret Reed remarried which terminated her right as principal benef iciary; however, on January 25, 1989, the insur

ed changed the benefic iaries to "C arolyn M . Reed, former spouse, wi th all chil dren, includi ng adopted, as s econdary benefic iaries." In 1991 the i nsured remar rie d and on J anua ry 31, 1 992 c hang ed th e ben efic iar iesof hi s li fe insurance pol icy to hi s second w ife and oldest son. The insured was killed in a traffic accide nt on June 27, 1993. The policy remained in effect and afforded coverage of $160,000.00 whic h was paid on September 8, 1993 to R osie Clark Reed, the surv iving widow , and Bobby R eed, the olde st so n, in acco rdan ce with the p olicy. In proper cour

se the wil l of Lowell Kenneth Reed was duly pr obated, and on January 20, 1994, Ginger Reed and Dav id Reed, the other two chil dren, filed a claim again st th e est ate f or th e pro ceed s of the i nsur ance polic y, or al tern ative ly, for a judgment ag ainst the estate

. The executri x, who is the surv iving spouse of Lowell Reed, excep ted to the claim on th e grou nd th at th e pol icy of insu ranc e was in tend ed on ly as an alte rnat ive source of funds for the pay ment of alimony and child support , both of whic h had long ceased t o be an obligation of the insured, and that the enforc ement of the contractual pr

ovision w

ould be unconsci onable and again st public pol icy. F ollowing a hearing theclaim wa s sustained, and a judgment was entered agai nst the3

executrix for $107,840.00, repr

esenting two-thirds of the proceeds of the poli cy. The executri x appeals, p resenting for review the followi ng issues, in haec verba: "S peci fica lly, when a div orce decree requires an ex-husband t o maintain a ter m li fe insurance policy on his life and to designate his children as beneficiaries t hereon: A. Is such a pr

ovision i n the nature of a child support obli gation and/or securi ty for a chi ld support obl igation? B. When the decree contains no ter mination of this l ife insurance pr

ovision, does the prov ision termin ate upon the cessation of the ex-husband' s child suppor t obligati ons and/or should a court of equi ty provide a

reasonable ter mination time? C. When the decree contains no t ermination of this life insurance provision, and when the obligation und er this provisi on would cont inue indefinitel y in favor of adult children for whom the ex-husband no long er has any duty of support, should a court refuse to enforce the pr ovision?" The executrix

argues that the quoted provision in the divorce judgment, w hen considered in its enti rety, int ended only to require t he defen dant h usband to insure the sup port of his chi ldren duringtheir minori ty in the ev ent of his earli er death. I f read literall y, she arg ues, the oblig ation to prov ide life insur ance conti nued for the remainder

of the life of the defenda nt for the benefit of adult children, an unreasonable and uni ntended result. We cannot agree. W hat the appellant overlooks is the contractual nature of th e obligation. It is couched in the clearest of languag e, and provi des that if the w ife remarries she
ceases to be a beneficiar y and the chi ldren ofthe p arties w ill be subst ituted as beneficiaries. This contractual obligation is binding. Penland v. Penland , 521 S.W.2d 222 (Tenn. 1975); Wendell v. Sovran Bank, 780 S.W.2d 372 (Tenn. Ct. App. 198 2). The agreement of

the defendant husband, now the deceased, appr

oved by t he trial judge, is a clear and unambi guous contrac tual oblig ation whic h cannotbe construed
as merely se curity for the child s upport oblig ation. Se e Good rich v. M ass. Mutual

, 240 S.W.2d 263 (Tenn. Ct. App . 1951). The cour ts are bound toenforce the plainly expressed agreement of the parties. Our review is de novo

on the record, w it h no presumption of correctness. Union Carbide Cor

p. v. Huddlest

on, 854 S.W.2d 87 (Tenn. 1993). We agree with the conclusion of the Probate Court and affirm the judgment with costs asses sed to the4

appellant.

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_ W illiam H. I nman, Senior Ju dge CONCUR:

___________________________________ Don T. Mc Murray, Jud ge

___________________________________ Charles D. Susano , Jr., Jud ge