fFOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:	ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:

MARK S. O'HARA	GREGORY W. BLACK

Hostetter & O'Hara	Deckard & O'Brien

Brownsburg, Indiana	Danville, Indiana

	IN THE

	COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

BROWNSBURG CONSERVATION CLUB,     	)

INC.,			)

			)

	Appellant-Petitioner,	)

			)

		vs.	)	No.  32A05-9708-CV-314

			)

HENDRICKS COUNTY BOARD OF ZONING	)

APPEALS, HENDRICKS COUNTY PLANNING 	)

AND BUILDING DEPARTMENT,	)

			)

	Appellee-Respondent.	)

	APPEAL FROM THE HENDRICKS CIRCUIT COURT

	The Honorable Steven R. Nation, Special Judge

	Cause No.  32C01-9505-MI-142

	(Handdown Date)AugustAugust 14, 19898

	OPINIONMEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

RUCKER, Judge

	The Brownsburg Conservation Club (the Club) initiated this appeal after the Hendricks County Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) revoked its variance.  We address the

following restated issues:  (1) did the BZA provide the Club with notice and an opportunity

to be heard prior to revoking the variance, and (2) was the BZA required to support its

decision with written findings.  We reverse and remand.    	

	In 1956 the Club purchased twenty acres of land in Lincoln Township, Hendricks

County.  Since that time the Club has erected a club house and conducted a variety of sports 

activities including the shooting of rifles and pistols.  In May of 1993 the Club was cited for

violation of a county ordinance on the grounds that its then expanded shooting activities

represented a non-conforming use.  We upheld the decision on appeal.  See Brownsburg v. Hendricks County, No. 32A04-9407-CV-281 (Ind. Ct. App. May 15, 1995).  In the meantime the Club requested a variance so that it could expand its facilities to include high-powered

rifle and pistol practice.  In December 1993,  the BZA granted the Club a variance subject to

eighteen "conditions for approval" which included a requirement that all conditions be met

by June 20, 1994.  R. at 111.1   Although the record is not clear as to the exact date, at some point the Club was given until May 1, 1995 to comply with the conditions for approval.  In

a letter to the Club's counsel dated February 22, 1995, counsel for the BZA advised:

As you well know, the conservation club was granted an extension up to and

including May 1, 1995, for the completion of the conditions placed upon their

variance.  I confirmed with the Board members last night that this does mean

that the improvements must be made and completed and be ready for

inspection prior to May 1, 1995.  If they are not completed and ready for

inspection by that date, the conditions of the variance will not have been met

and the variance will be void.

R. at 162.  On May 1, 1995, the BZA held a meeting on the Club's premises.  According to

the BZA the meeting was open to the public, but it was not a public hearing.  Rather, the

purpose of the meeting was to conduct an inspection of the premises in order  "to see if the

conditions of the variance had been met."  R. at 112.  After the meeting concluded the BZA

voted 4 to 1 to rescind the variance because in its view  "the Brownsburg Conservation Club

did not meet the conditions of the variance (safety requirements) based on this on-site

inspection."  R. at 114.  Thereafter the Club filed with the trial court a timely petition for writ

of certiorari. After a hearing, the trial court affirmed the BZA's decision.  This appeal

followed.

	When reviewing a decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals, the trial court must

determine if the board's decision was incorrect as a matter of law.  Board of Zoning Appeals v.  Elkins, 659 N.E.2d 681, 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied.  Also, the trial court may not conduct a trial de novo or substitute its decision for that of the board.  Id.  "The Court of Appeals' review of a trial court's ruling on review of such a decision is governed by the same

considerations.  Unless the Board's decision was illegal, it must be upheld."  Board of Zoning Appeals of Evansville and Vanderburgh County v. Kempf, 6565 N.E.2d 1201, 1203 (Ind.  Ct.  App.  1995), trans. denied.	

	The Club contends the trial court erred in affirming the decision of the BZA because 

(i) it was never given notice or an opportunity to be heard, and (ii) the BZA did not support

its decision with written findings.  We agree.

	A variance affords relief from the enforcement of a zoning ordinance and permits use

of property which the ordinance otherwise forbids.  Hazel v.  Metropolitan Development Commission of Marion County, 154 Ind. App. 94, 289 N.E.2d 308 (1972).  Although the initial grant or denial of a variance rests within the discretion of the board of zoning appeals,

Ind. Code § 36-7-4-918.4;, Ash v. Rush County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 464 N.E.2d 347, 350 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), trans. denied, a zoning board has no inherent authority to revoke a  variance once issued.  Rather, because a zoning board is expressly authorized to impose

reasonable conditions when it first approves a variance, 2  the board has the implied authority to revoke a variance if the conditions have not been satisfied.  Schlehuser v. City of Seymour, 674 N.E.2d 1009, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) ("It is implicit that / when a variance is issued subject to conditions of approval, the variance can be revoked if the conditions are

not met."). 

	In this case the BZA imposed eighteen specific conditions on the variance granted to

the Club.  Those conditions have not been challenged as unreasonable.  The problem,

however, rests in the manner by which the BZA apparently reached the conclusion that the

Club did not satisfy the conditions.  First, characterizing the inspection visit as a "public

meeting" as opposed to a "public hearing" the BZA did not provide the Club with an

opportunity to be heard on the question of whether conditions of the variance had been met. 

Indeed, in its brief the BZA acknowledges that the purpose of the meeting was for the board 

"to inspect, to see, not to listen to Club members explain or neighbors complain."  Brief of

Appellees at 6.  We have no quarrel with the meetings's stated purpose.  However, because

revocation is a severe remedy, this court requires that interested parties are afforded an

opportunity to be heard.  Schlehuser, 674 N.E.2d at 1014. 

	 Second, the BZA did not support its decision with findings of fact.  Citing Ind.  Code

§ 36-7-4-915  the BZA acknowledges that no findings were made in this instance but contends they were unnecessary because no case was heard at the May 1 meeting.  That

statute provides, in relevant part that "[t]he board shall in all cases heard by it make written findings of fact."  Id.  (Eemphasis added).  Regardless of how the meeting is characterized it is clear the BZA concluded that the Club was not in compliance with the conditions.  Indeed, in reaching its conclusion the BZA heard testimony from a witness who was invited to the

meeting by the BZA for the express purpose of providing  expert information concerning the improvements made by the Club.  In addition,  immediately following the meeting the BZA

made a final determination to rescind the Club's variance.  Thus we reject the BZA's narrow

reading of I.C. § 36-7-4-915.  More impraortantlyIn addition, "[f]or reasons that exist independently of statute, boards of zoning appeals are required to set out findings of fact which support their

determination to make possible adequate judicial review of administrative decisions."

McBride v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 579 N.E.2d 1312, 13164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).  In this case the BZA made no findings.  InsteadRather, the trial court entered extensive findings based on the

minutes of  the BZA meeting.  This was error.  Where the BZA fails to state findings of fact

when entering its decision, the trial court may not enter those findings on behalf of the board.

Holmes v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Jasper County, 634 N.E.2d 522, 525 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).  Rather, the court must remand to the board to enter findings of fact in support of its conclusion.  Id.

	We conclude the BZA erred in failing to give the Club notice and an opportunity to

be heard on the question of whether the conditions for approval have been met.  We also

conclude the BZA erred in failing to enter findings of fact to support its decision.  Therefore

we reverse the judgment of the trial court, and remand to the court with instructions that it

remand this action to the BZA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

	Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

+SHARPNACK, C.J., and GARRARD, J., concur.