[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 12-13651

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D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-20848-CMA-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

EDDIE TALLEY, JR.,

MARCUS TALLEY,

Defendants-Appellants.

________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida 

_________________________

(April 2, 2014)

Before ANDERSON and GILMAN,* Circuit Judges, and JOHNSON,** District 

Judge.

____________

*Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by 

designation.

**Honorable Inge Prytz Johnson, United States District Judge for the Northern District of 

Alabama, sitting by designation.

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PER CURIAM:

In this two-defendant criminal appeal, Appellants Marcus and Eddie Talley 

raise thirteen issues between them. We reject all of them and affirm their 

convictions and sentences. 

The premise of the prosecution was that Appellant Marcus Talley recruited 

young men to rob banks in order to fund his Urban Guerilla Syndicate (“UGS”). 

Marcus told the young men that the UGS’s objective was to take over the 

government because African-Americans were not treated right. Robbing banks 

would fund the movement; Marcus told the young men that snitches “would get 

handled,” which one of the young men took to mean they would be killed. Marcus 

told one of these robbers-turned-witnesses that UGS needed money to hire 

lawyers, judges, and crooked cops to help UGS members who were arrested. There 

was substantial evidence of Eddie’s participation in the bank robberies – i.e., from 

the testimony of the three cooperating coconspirators, and from evidence obtained 

in a search of Eddie’s residence (“the Mansion”). Eddie himself also testified.

A search of the Mansion pursuant to a search warrant recovered PVC pipe 

parts, spools of different colored wires, several magazines and boxes of 

ammunition for different types of firearms, a loaded handgun, and two gun boxes. 

Another search turned up “Fast Orange” hand cleanser, like the type Eddie used to 

remove dye from Jeffrey St. Louis’s hands after the Bank of America robbery. 

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After Marcus was arrested and while he was being held in an interrogation room, 

he talked to the detective, Robert Lanier, who was “babysitting” him. Marcus told 

Lanier about his belief that the banks were in control of the United States and how 

he recruited youths already involved in petty crime to rob the banks. He said he 

wanted to take over the United States and the way to do that was to take over the 

banks.

After Marcus’s attorney questioned Marcus’s competency to stand trial, the 

Magistrate Judge ordered an evaluation and held an evidentiary hearing. Marcus 

claimed to be the Messiah and denied the court’s jurisdiction at his pretrial 

detention hearing. The Government filed reports of Dr. Lisa Feldman based on her 

evaluation and review of his records. Marcus was treated in 1992, when his family 

had him committed for what Dr. Feldman considered substance-induced psychosis. 

In 1996, Marcus told several doctors and family members that it was revealed to 

him that he was the Messiah. He was diagnosed over the next ten years by various 

psychologists and psychiatrists with paranoid schizophrenia. He was found 

incompetent in 1998, and in 1999, Dr. James Larson concluded that “[t]he 

prognosis is for a life-long course of mental illness and gradual deterioration over 

time.” He was released from medical custody in 2007 although Dr. Larson 

acknowledged at the time that Marcus might not be delusional. Most of the 

previous explorations of Marcus’s mental health had been conducted in the context 

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of previous criminal charges against Marcus.

Dr. Feldman testified that she performed psychological tests that indicated 

Marcus suffered from no cognitive impairment and the results were consistent with 

malingering. She also stated, though, that the symptoms he exhibited were a 

product of his personality disorder. She challenged the conclusions in the medical 

history during the 10-year period of diagnosed incompetency, stating that Marcus 

“appreciates” that maintaining his Messiah stance was his best option for being 

released. In his 1997 and 2007 evaluations, there were statements that he might be 

attempting to present himself as being in more psychological distress than he was 

actually in. She further cited evidence dating back to 1992 indicating that his 

behavior was due to cocaine use and not mental illness; subsequent evaluations 

merely re–referenced his behavior without distinguishing its possible causes. 

Further, she noted that Marcus did not persist in his messianic claims when talking 

to non-mental health evaluators. She faulted earlier evaluations for failing to 

address findings that he understood the charges against him. She also cited his 

recorded conversation with his wife in 2010 where he referred to himself by his 

proper name and gave cogent instructions on how to assist with his legal defense. 

Finally, she pointed to his instructions to others to “act crazy” to avoid prison.

At the hearing, police officer Lanier testified that Marcus appeared calm 

and intelligent and never referred to himself as the Messiah, Jesus Christ, a savior,

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or a deity. However, Lanier also testified that he thought that Marcus should be 

“Baker Acted,” meaning involuntarily committed because he was not being 

rational. After the hearing, the Magistrate Judge issued a report, finding that 

Marcus “has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against 

him and that he has a sufficient present ability to consult with his attorney within a 

reasonable degree of rational understanding.”

The district court, Judge Jordan, ordered another competency evaluation and 

held an additional hearing. The new evaluator, Dr. Richard Frederick, wrote that 

there was no “compelling evidence to support a conclusion that he has ever had 

any active mental disorder since the time of his original prosecution in 1996/97.” 

Dr. Frederick testified that Marcus’s schizophrenia diagnosis could be explained 

by cocaine use and was never seriously re-examined. He noted that Marcus’s 

outbursts were nothing remarkable and that he seemed to consult with his lawyer in 

a cooperative manner. At the hearing, Marcus stated that the hearing was not 

necessary and expressed his desire to present the truth about the oppression of 

African-Americans that led to his understanding that he was the Messiah. The 

district court agreed with the Magistrate Judge’s report, crediting the new 

evaluator’s testimony that Marcus was malingering and concluding that Marcus 

was competent. 

On March 1, 2012, the case was transferred to Judge Altonaga. Judge 

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Jordan’s ruling came out two weeks later and Judge Altonaga did not order a new 

competency ruling. On March 22, Judge Altonaga held a hearing on Marcus’s 

motion for a continuance. At the hearing, Marcus asked to dismiss his attorney 

and proceed pro se. Defense counsel had advised the court that he thought an 

insanity defense was warranted but Marcus opposed it, seeking instead to assert a 

political defense based on the racial caste system, persecution, oppression, and 

tyranny in the United States. Judge Altonaga therefore held a colloquy pursuant to 

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975), to determine Marcus’s 

ability to represent himself. Marcus referred to himself as the “One” and talked of 

his current incarnation. But he acknowledged that “the legal personality involved 

in this particular situation is Marcus Talley.” Marcus stated that he had read a 

great deal (apparently in institutions) and understood that he was accused of 

robbing banks. He described the government’s burden and asked for stand-by 

counsel’s assistance on evidentiary rules. The court advised him that it would be 

better to use an attorney and explained why, but did not offer substituted appointed 

counsel. Marcus stated that “no one was willing to accept his defense” and that the 

attorneys he had met were not willing to use it. The district court found that 

Marcus knowingly invoked his right to proceed pro se and represent himself. 

However, the judge also elicited Marcus’s assurance that he would use stand-by 

counsel at appropriate times.

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The Talleys proceeded to trial two weeks later and were convicted of all 

counts. The district court sentenced Marcus to 384 months’ imprisonment, after 

the court determined that his criminal history was underrepresented due to his

having earlier charges dismissed because of mental illness. The court also gave an 

obstruction of justice enhancement because she found he was feigning illness at the 

competency hearing. The district court enhanced Eddie’s sentence for obstructing 

justice by testifying and proclaiming his innocence, denying facts such as his 

provision of fake bombs to the participants. The district court found that Eddie 

lied on the witness stand, and sentenced Eddie to 269 months’ imprisonment.

We first address Eddie’s challenges to his conviction and sentence. Then we 

address the challenges of Marcus.

I. EDDIE TALLEY

A. Has Eddie Demonstrated Plain Error as a Result of the Admission Without a 

Limiting Instruction of Marcus’s Confession and Radical Beliefs?

Eddie argues that he was severely prejudiced when the Government 

introduced inflammatory evidence relating only to Marcus. First, he states that 

Marcus’s confession to Detective Lanier was hearsay evidence against him. He 

does not argue that Marcus said anything about him in the confession; rather, the 

confession was that Marcus used misguided young men to rob banks as a means of 

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taking over the United States. He states that he was entitled to a contemporaneous 

instruction that the confession was not admissible against him. He points to 

prejudice in the form of witnesses testifying that Marcus and Eddie acted in 

tandem. He argues that the prejudice was exacerbated by the admission of other 

evidence related solely to Marcus, in the form of the radical and violent ideology 

that Marcus espoused. He asserts this evidence was irrelevant to his own guilt 

because there was no evidence that Eddie shared Marcus’s views. The challenged

evidence was about the UGS, Marcus’s initiation of the young men into the group, 

his threats against snitches, and documents and pamphlets that Marcus produced. 

Eddie argues the effect was magnified by Marcus’s questions during voir dire, 

when he asked potential jurors if they thought George Washington was a criminal 

for standing up to tyranny and his description of political prisoners.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides a defendant in a 

criminal trial the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him” and to 

cross-examine them. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206-07, 107 S. Ct. 

1702, 1707 (1987). This right is violated when a facially incriminating statement 

of a nontestifying co-defendant is offered into evidence at a joint trial, even if the 

jury is instructed to consider the statement as evidence only against the defendant 

who made the statement. Bruton v. United States, 391 US. 123, 126, 88 S. Ct.

1620, 1622 (1968). In Richardson, however, the Supreme Court distinguished 

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Bruton when a non-testifying co-defendant’s statement did not incriminate the 

defendant on its face and the statement became incriminating only when linked 

with other evidence. 481 U.S. at 208–209, 107 S. Ct. at 1707–1708. In such 

situations, the jury is deemed to follow limiting instructions that the co-defendant’s 

statement is to be considered by the jury only against the co-defendant and not 

against this defendant (Eddie here). Id.

Here, there was no limiting instruction, so there is error. However, Eddie 

did not object below so we review for plain error. To prevail under the plain error 

standard, an appellant must show: (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain; (3) 

it affected his substantial rights; and (4) it seriously affected the fairness of the 

judicial proceedings. United States v. Pena, 684 F.3d 1137, 1151 (11th Cir. 2012). 

Because Marcus’s confession did not implicate Eddie at all, its mere existence as 

evidence in the case did not adversely affect Eddie’s substantial rights. However, 

Eddie argues that the three witnesses/participants had been seriously impeached

and that Marcus’s confession -- demonstrating that in fact Marcus had done what 

he was accused of doing -- made their testimony more believable. We cannot 

conclude that this adversely affected Eddie’s substantial rights. As the 

Government points out, the wires and cleanser found at Eddie’s house corroborated 

the three witnesses’ stories. While there were some differences between the 

participants’ stories, all of the things that Eddie points to in his brief as differences 

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are fairly minor. The three witnesses said almost the same thing, i.e., that Eddie 

gave them the bombs, was involved in the planning, and let them meet at his 

houses; he also called the police off when the participants were discovered at his 

uninhabited house. Finally, the confession had limited probative value against 

Eddie because it did not implicate him at all. Given the strength of the evidence

against Eddie, Eddie has not shown that his substantial rights were affected.

Turning to the pamphlets, again we review for plain error. There is no 

indication that the jury considered the pamphlets against Eddie and the 

Government put on extensive evidence about Eddie’s different motive, namely 

money. Therefore, there was no error.1

B. Eddie’s Challenge to the Admission of Prior Bad Acts

Eddie argues that the district court improperly allowed in evidence regarding 

completely unrelated bad acts that he supposedly performed. However, the 

Government points out that Eddie opened the door to this evidence by placing his 

character at issue by calling a character witness. Before Eddie called the witness, 

the Government announced its intention to cross-examine the witness about 

“specific instances that demonstrate that [Eddie] is deceiving others, particularly 

his wife.” All of this was also set forth in the Government’s Rule 404(b) pretrial 

notice. Eddie’s attorney responded “[I]t is all fair game.” Therefore, there is no 

 1 We reject as meritless Eddie’s arguments about the prosecutor’s closing 

arguments.

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error.

C. Specific Instruction about Cooperating Witnesses

Eddie argues that the district court erred when it failed to instruct the jury 

about the caution it should use when considering the testimony of the three 

cooperating witnesses. Each of these witnesses, he asserts, had much to gain by 

testifying against Eddie in terms of sentence reductions. He cites the pattern jury 

instruction that the court did not give but also cites the testimony of each of the 

witnesses about what they hoped to gain from their testimony. 

Eddie did not request the instruction so we review for plain error. “Jury 

instructions will not be reversed for plain error unless the charge, considered as a 

whole, is so clearly erroneous as to result in a likelihood of a grave miscarriage of 

justice, or the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings.” United States v. Starke, 62 F.3d 1374, 1380–81 (11th Cir. 

1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). We accord district courts broad 

discretion in formulating jury instructions; district courts are not required to use the 

Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, and this court has repeatedly approved 

jury instructions that do not exactly track the language of the pattern instructions. 

United States v. Veltmann, 6 F.3d 1483, 1492 (11th Cir. 1993). Here, there was no 

error in the district court’s failure to give the accomplice instructions. During jury 

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selection, the court instructed the jury that in deciding whether to believe a witness, 

it should consider whether the witness had a particular reason not to tell the truth or 

had a personal interest in the outcome of the case. The jury was informed at the 

start of each of the cooperating witnesses’ testimony that each had pleaded guilty 

and hoped to receive favorable sentencing, and each was cross-examined about it. 

The district court’s instructions to the jury substantially covered the issue with 

respect to the jury’s consideration of witness testimony generally (although not 

specifically highlighting the testimony of accomplices). Finally, Eddie’s attorney 

highlighted their status in closing and the district court reminded the jury after 

closing to consider whether any witness had a personal interest in the outcome of 

the case. Thus there was no plain error.

D. Eddie’s Obstruction Enhancement

Eddie argues that the district court erred when it imposed a sentencing 

enhancement for obstruction of justice that was not accompanied by any specific 

finding of a statement reflecting willful, material perjury. The court based the 

enhancement on Eddie’s attempt to portray himself as someone who would have 

no reason to associate with teenage criminals. Eddie points to cases where we 

have reversed for district courts’ failure to make specific findings, and he argues 

that just trying to present oneself as a respectable person does not reflect willful 

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perjury. He points to the commentary at U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, which cautions that not 

all inaccurate statements or testimony necessarily reflect a willful attempt to 

obstruct justice.

From the transcript, it is clear that the court accepted the prosecution’s

extensive argument about all of the lies Eddie told. After the Government finished 

listing them, the court stated:

I also agree with the government that this defendant obstructed 

justice. I could not have been more amazed at the number and the 

extent of this defendant’s lies uttered in his testimony before the jury. 

I have sat through many trials over 15-plus years, and I have never 

witnessed a defendant in a criminal case take the stand and lie so 

blatantly over and over and over again. And not about just tangential 

matters. But -- and indeed, this defendant and his brother tried to 

portray themselves as markedly different -- two completely different 

characters. One, the -- the not-so-sane litigant representing himself, 

professing to be a Messiah and seeking to overthrow the government. 

And the other, the well-respected community and family man who 

would have no reason to associate with these teenage criminals. And 

some of the testimony that was impeached was uttered by this 

defendant in direct examination seeking to portray himself in that light 

to the jury. So it was material, it was not tangential.

Doc. 300 at 22-23. From our review of the transcript, we agree that Eddie’s lies 

were not casual or misstatements; they were calculated to get himself acquitted of 

the charges and the district court did not err in applying the enhancement.

II. MARCUS TALLEY

A. Competency

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Marcus challenges the district court’s finding of fact that he was competent 

to stand trial. We have carefully studied Marcus’s arguments in his brief, the 

relevant opinions in the court below, and the relevant parts of the record. We 

cannot conclude that the findings of fact by Judge Jordan in Docket 199 are clearly 

erroneous. While it is true that Marcus has a considerable history of mental health 

evaluations, including some past diagnoses of mental illness, this issue was 

considered with exceeding care in the court below. There were two extensive 

evaluations, one by Dr. Feldman and another by Dr. Frederick. There were two 

evidentiary hearings, and two opinions finding that Marcus was competent to stand 

trial. 

Judge Jordan’s findings are amply supported by the evaluations and opinions 

of Drs. Feldman and Frederick. Dr. Feldman, a Bureau of Prisons’ forensic 

psychologist, examined Marcus after his arrest. Because of Marcus’s lack of 

cooperation, only a certain number of tests were administered, but Dr. Feldman did 

review Marcus’s records. Dr. Feldman thought one of the prior tests indicated 

malingering and thought that it was likely Marcus was feigning incompetence but 

she could not rule out the possibility that he was suffering from a legitimate mental 

illness. Dr. Feldman thought that Marcus had the capacity to assist with his 

defense if he was motivated. 

Judge Jordan ordered another evaluation when Marcus requested a de novo 

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review of his competency. Dr. Frederick, a psychologist at the U.S. Medical 

Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri, performed the evaluation and 

delivered a battery of tests. He determined that Marcus was malingering. He 

based part of his diagnosis on the fact that Marcus’s symptoms seemed to 

disappear when he was out of a mental health center. But he also based his opinion 

on the battery of tests he administered, his face-to-face meetings with Marcus, and 

his observations of Marcus over a two-month period. Dr. Frederick’s testing 

indicated psychosis but the validity factors signaled that Marcus was attempting to 

give the impression of mental illness. Judge Jordan also noted that Dr. Frederick’s 

diagnosis would explain some of the earlier statements about the possibility of 

malingering and the fact that medications had no effect on Marcus. We thus reject 

Marcus’s challenge.

B. Self-representation

Marcus also argues that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated 

when the district court permitted him to proceed pro se at trial with standby 

counsel. Judge Altonaga conducted a more than adequate Faretta hearing. The 

district judge had before her the aforesaid evaluations by Drs. Feldman and 

Frederick. She had before her the record of the proceedings with respect to 

competency, which had occurred before the case was assigned to her, and thus she 

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knew that both the Magistrate Judge and Judge Jordan had conducted evidentiary 

hearings and found that Marcus was competent to stand trial and was malingering. 

With respect to Marcus’s reliance upon Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 128 S.

Ct. 2379 (2008), we can assume arguendo, but need not decide, that a higher 

standard might govern the issue of competency to waive counsel and proceed pro 

se at trial in this case, as opposed to that articulated in Dusky v. United States, 362 

U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct. 788 (1960). We need not articulate any precise standard for this 

case because the record amply supports the district court’s conclusion under any 

reasonable standard that Marcus was competent to waive counsel and to proceed 

pro se as he did. This is true especially in light of the fact that Marcus did not 

preserve this issue below, and therefore our review is pursuant to the plain error 

analysis. 

Judge Altonaga had two psychiatric reports before her indicating that 

Marcus was capable of understanding the charges against him and could assist 

counsel if he wanted to, but was malingering. These reports also informed the 

Judge that Marcus talked about his case rationally and coherently with family or 

others when he was not aware that he was being evaluated with respect to mental 

health issues. The findings of competence to stand trial by the Magistrate Judge, 

and the even more recent finding of competence by Judge Jordan, were very 

current. Moreover, the actions of Marcus, upon which he now relies in arguing

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that Judge Altonaga should have been alerted to order still more psychiatric 

evaluations, are actions identical to those so carefully considered by the Magistrate 

Judge and Judge Jordan, and found to be malingering. Not only did Judge 

Altonaga provide the warnings and elicit the understandings indicated in Faretta, 

but she secured assurances that Marcus would use his stand-by counsel 

appropriately. We cannot conclude that the district court erred in permitting 

Marcus to proceed pro se with stand-by counsel.2

C. Failure to Grant a Continuance

Marcus argues that the district court erred in failing to order a continuance. 

However, he does not dispute the Gorvernment’s contention that Marcus did not 

himself request a continuance at the hearing during which the Faretta colloquy 

occurred, which was after his attorney withdrew the previously filed motion for 

continuance. Nor does Marcus dispute the Gorvernment’s contention that he did 

not ask for a continuance immediately before trial, during the discussion about his 

not having civilian clothing. We cannot conclude that the district court abused its 

discretion in failing to sua sponte grant a continuance.

 2 Marcus’s argument that the district court should have appointed a new and 

different stand-by counsel is without merit. The record is clear that his only dissatisfaction with 

his existing appointed counsel was counsel’s disagreement with the unwise defense strategy 

upon which Marcus was insisting.

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D. Juror No. 4

Marcus argues for the first time on appeal that the district court erred in 

refusing to discharge juror No. 4 for cause. The juror had expressed discomfort 

because she lived in the same area as the Defendants. However, questioning of the 

juror elicited her statement that she could fulfill her oath as a juror and try the case 

fairly to both sides. After the prosecutor and Eddie’s attorney indicated that the 

juror need not be stricken for cause, the judge asked Marcus, who replied “I am all 

right.” We thus cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion.

E. Expert witnesses

Marcus argues that the district court erred when it summarily denied his 

request to subpoena witnesses to support his mens rea defense and his explanation 

of his urban guerrilla evidence. He asserts that it denied the request without 

permitting a proffer of the evidence that would have been obtained and without 

permitting him to make the application in an ex parte fashion.

The Constitution guarantees criminal defendants “a meaningful opportunity 

to present a complete defense.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324, 126 

S. Ct. 1727, 1731 (2006). Here, Marcus was able to introduce documents relevant 

to the testimony regarding his ideology, cross-examine cooperating witnesses 

about the ideology, and argue the substance of his opinions to the jury. The court 

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offered Marcus the opportunity to enter into evidence documents written by the

witnesses he sought to subpoena. Initially, the court ruled that Marcus’s Ninth 

Amendment reservation of rights was not a legal defense to the charges so the 

items would not be admitted. After the Government introduced Marcus’s 

comments to Detective Lanier, the court reconsidered and allowed Marcus to enter 

sections of the Federalist Papers and other treatises regarding Marcus’s perception 

of the Government’s relationship to banks and to money. Marcus presented a 

composite exhibit (with assistance of standby counsel), of which the court allowed 

portions into evidence. Thus, Marcus was not denied the opportunity to present his 

defense.3

Having rejected all challenges to the convictions and sentences,4

we 

AFFIRM.

 3 We reject Marcus’s argument that the Government failed to prove that Bank of 

America was FDIC-insured as wholly without merit.

4 Any arguments of Defendants not expressly mentioned are rejected without need 

for discussion.

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