In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: May 17, 2021

S21A0438. THOMAS v. THE STATE.

 PETERSON, Justice.

Drexton Thomas appeals his convictions for malice murder and 

other offenses in connection with the shooting death of Jeffrey 

Douglas, Sr., and the aggravated assault of Jeffrey Douglas, Jr. 

(hereinafter, “Junior”).1 He argues that: (1) the evidence was 

 1 The crimes occurred on June 28, 2013. In September 2013, a Fulton

County grand jury indicted Thomas for malice murder (Count 1), three counts 

of felony murder (Counts 2-4), two counts of armed robbery (one against 

Douglas (Count 5) and one against Junior (Count 10)), aggravated assault with 

a deadly weapon against Douglas (Count 6), one count of possession of a 

firearm by a convicted felon (Count 7), two counts of aggravated assault 

against Junior (Counts 8 (pointing a gun at Junior) and 9 (hitting Junior with 

the gun)), and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of

a felony (Count 11 for felonies committed against Douglas and Count 12 for 

felonies against Douglas’s son). After an October 2015 trial, a jury found 

Thomas guilty on Counts 1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 11, and 12, and not guilty on Counts 2, 

5, and 10. Counts 4 and 7 were initially bifurcated but dismissed following the 

trial. In an order entered on November 6, 2015, the trial court sentenced 

Thomas to serve life in prison on Count 1, two concurrent twenty-year terms 

on Counts 8 and 9, and two five-year suspended terms for Counts 11 and 12 to 

run concurrently with each other but consecutively with the remaining counts. 
2

insufficient to support his convictions as a matter of federal due 

process, (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 

motion for a new trial as the “thirteenth juror,” (3) the trial court 

abused its discretion in denying Thomas’s motion for a mistrial 

based on a courtroom outburst, (4) his inculpatory custodial 

statement was obtained in violation of his Miranda2 rights, (5) his 

trial counsel was ineffective, and (6) he is entitled to a new trial on 

the basis of cumulative prejudice. The evidence was sufficient to 

support Thomas’s convictions and thus his due process and 

thirteenth-juror claims fail, the trial court properly handled the 

courtroom outburst, Thomas was given Miranda warnings before 

beginning his interview and the State was not obligated to give them 

again after a two-hour break, Thomas has shown no prejudice from 

any alleged ineffectiveness, and there are not multiple errors from 

 

Count 3 was vacated by operation of law. The trial court initially entered a 

sentence on Count 6, but later issued a corrected sentence merging Count 6 

with Count 1. Thomas filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later 

amended. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Thomas’s motion on 

January 30, 2019. Thomas timely appealed; his case was docketed to this 

Court’s term beginning in December 2020 and submitted for a decision on the 

briefs.

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).
3

which to accumulate prejudice. We affirm.

The trial evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the 

verdicts showed the following. Thomas and Douglas had known each 

other for years before June 2013. On June 27, 2013, the day before 

the shooting, Thomas and Douglas had an argument because 

Douglas believed that Thomas had been sending Douglas’s drug 

customers to other dealers. The next day, Douglas, his girlfriend 

Geraldine Thompson, and others were at Douglas’s house.

Thompson’s daughter and Junior were outside when Thomas 

suddenly came walking up the driveway, pointed the gun at Junior, 

pistol-whipped him, took his money, and at one point fired a shot. 

Thomas instructed Junior to “go get your daddy” because “that’s who 

I want anyway.” Thomas backed away from Junior after a woman 

called out to Thomas, pleading for Thomas not to kill Junior. 

Douglas came to the door and ushered Thompson’s daughter

and Junior inside the house. Douglas tried to shut the door on 

Thomas, who was approaching, but Thomas stopped the door from 

closing with his foot. Thomas shot Douglas as Douglas was 
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attempting to run into the kitchen. Douglas fell to the ground, and 

Thomas rolled him over and took money out of Douglas’s pockets.

Thomas left the scene while threatening those present that he would 

be back if anyone reported what he did. 

By the time the paramedics arrived, Douglas was dead.

Douglas had been shot in the back and was not seen with any 

weapons prior to the shooting. Thompson had been inside the house 

during the incident, heard the commotion outside, witnessed 

Thomas shoot Douglas, and told the police that Thomas was the 

shooter.

Thomas was later arrested and, after being informed of his 

Miranda rights, confessed to two detectives that he shot Douglas. 

Although Thomas initially said to one detective that he shot Douglas

because Douglas and Junior pulled a pistol on him and threatened 

him, he told another detective that he did not see Douglas with a 

weapon but assumed Douglas had one because Douglas and Junior
5

had pulled a weapon on him earlier that day.3 Thomas told the 

second detective that he shot Douglas because he was “pissed” and 

wanted payback for having a gun pulled on him. Video recordings of 

the interviews were played for the jury. Thomas told the detectives 

that he threw the gun used to shoot Douglas in a sewer drain, but 

the police could not find it there.

1. Thomas argues that the evidence was insufficient to support 

his conviction. His claim fails.

When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, we must 

determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). In 

making that determination, “we view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict, and we put aside any questions about 

conflicting evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight of the 

evidence, leaving the resolution of such things to the discretion of 

 3 A defense witness testified that there was a separate argument on the 

morning of the shooting and claimed that Douglas had pulled a gun on him and 

Thomas that morning.
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the [jury].” Wilkerson v. State, 307 Ga. 574, 574 (837 SE2d 300)

(2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). “As long as there is some 

competent evidence, even if contradicted, to support each fact 

necessary to make out the State’s case, the jury’s verdict will be 

upheld.” Scott v. State, 309 Ga. 764, 766 (1) (848 SE2d 448) (2020)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

Here, Junior testified that Thomas pointed a gun at him. See 

Rich v. State, 307 Ga. 757, 759 (1) (a) (838 SE2d 255) (2020) (“[T]he 

testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a 

fact[.]” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Thomas admitted 

hitting Junior with the weapon. Multiple eyewitnesses said that 

Thomas shot Douglas. And Thomas admitted that he shot Douglas 

in anger. Douglas was shot in the back and had no weapons on him. 

After assessing the credibility of the eyewitnesses and reviewing a 

video recording of Thomas’s interviews, the jury was authorized to 

reject any claims that Thomas shot Douglas in self-defense or with 

an irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation, and to 

find beyond a reasonable doubt that Thomas was guilty of the crimes 
7

of which he was convicted. See Corley v. State, 308 Ga. 321, 322 (1) 

(a) (840 SE2d 391) (2020) (“[Q]uestions about the existence of 

justification are for a jury to decide[.]”); Anderson v. State, 248 Ga. 

682, 683 (3) (285 SE2d 533) (1982) (“Whether or not a provocation, 

if any, is such a serious provocation as would be sufficient to excite 

a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion in a reasonable person, 

reducing the offense from murder to manslaughter, is generally a 

question for the jury.”).

2. Thomas next argues that the trial court failed to fulfill its 

role as the “thirteenth juror” by failing to grant his motion for a new 

trial. To the extent Thomas argues that the trial court failed to 

exercise its discretion as the “thirteenth juror,” the record shows 

otherwise. In denying Thomas’s motion for new trial, the trial court 

cited the correct legal standards, weighed the evidence, and found 

that the evidence overwhelmingly supported Thomas’s guilt. See

Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707, 714-715 (4) (b) (739 SE2d 332) 

(2013) (trial court’s language that evidence was not “sufficiently 

close” to warrant new trial shows that court exercised its 
8

discretionary authority to not grant a new trial).

To the extent Thomas argues that the trial court exercised its 

discretion improperly, his argument presents nothing for us to 

review. Only trial courts have discretion to sit as the thirteenth 

juror. See Wilson v. State, 302 Ga. 106, 109 (II) (d) (805 SE2d 98)

(2017). When asked to review the refusal to grant a new trial on such 

grounds, our review is limited to the Jackson v. Virginia standard, 

and we have already explained that the evidence was sufficient 

under that standard.

3. During the trial, one of Douglas’s other sons, seated in the 

courtroom gallery, screamed at Thomas, “You killed my daddy, man. 

You killed my motherf***ing daddy, man.” Thomas argues that the 

trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based on this 

courtroom outburst, because multiple members of the jury indicated 

that the outburst caused them concern. We disagree.

A trial court generally has broad discretion in deciding whether 

to grant a mistrial, and great deference is afforded to a court’s 

determination that a mistrial was not necessary. See Blake v. State, 
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304 Ga. 747, 750 (2) (822 SE2d 207) (2018). The measures a trial 

court takes in response to a courtroom outburst are within the 

court’s discretion unless a fair trial is not possible without a new 

trial. See Thompson v. State, 304 Ga. 146, 154 (10) (816 SE2d 646) 

(2018); Green v. State, 300 Ga. 707, 710 (2) (797 SE2d 863) (2017).

Generally, a trial court does not abuse its discretion when it takes 

“prompt, thorough, and curative action.” Thompson, 304 Ga. at 154 

(10) (citation and punctuation omitted). When juries are given 

curative instructions following such outbursts, they “are presumed 

to follow [them] in the absence of proof to the contrary.” Jones v. 

State, 305 Ga. 750, 755 (3) (827 SE2d 879) (2019). 

Here, in response to the outburst, the trial court removed the 

relatives of the victim from the courtroom, checked with the jurors 

as to how they felt, and received reassurance from all of them that 

the outburst would not impair their ability to be fair and impartial. 

Even the jurors who specifically said they were concerned by the 

outburst expressed a desire to continue serving. After denying 

Thomas’s motion for a mistrial, the trial court told the jury that the 
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man who had made the outburst was excluded from the courthouse 

and instructed the jury to disregard the outburst. Under these 

circumstances, Thomas has failed to show that the trial court abused 

its discretion in denying a mistrial. See Thompson, 304 Ga. at 154-

155 (10) (holding the trial court’s curative instruction sufficient 

where the court gave a lengthy curative instruction after a witness 

under cross-examination said repeatedly, “Y’all done killed 

somebody,” and “Y’all going to hell”); see also Messer v. State, 247 

Ga. 316, 323-325 (6) (276 SE2d 15) (1981) (concluding that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to declare a mistrial 

and instead giving a curative instruction after the father of the 

victim lunged at the defendant and screamed, “You’ll pay,” “You’re 

liable,” and “You’re going to get it”).

4. Thomas claims that the trial court erred in admitting his 

custodial statements from the second custodial interview because he 

was not re-advised of his Miranda rights and the detective who 

conducted that interview deployed “extremely coercive, combative 

and threatening conduct” in the interview. We disagree.
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The record shows that Thomas had been advised of his 

Miranda rights prior to his first interview with one detective, and 

there was a break of about two hours between that interview and 

the second interview. There is no dispute that the second interview 

was merely a continuation of the first. Without more, the two-hour 

break between the two interviews did not require Thomas to be readvised of his Miranda rights. See Mangrum v. State, 285 Ga. 676, 

678-679 (3) (681 SE2d 130) (2009) (“[T]he lack of a Miranda warning 

after [a two-hour] break is of no consequence, as [appellant] was 

advised of and waived his Miranda rights before the first interview 

and the second interview was part of a continuous series of 

interviews.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Williams v. State, 

244 Ga. 485, 488 (4) (b) (260 SE2d 879) (1979) (“[T]he state was 

under no duty to repeat the Miranda warnings given the day before 

where, as here, the interviews were part of a continuing 

interrogation.”).

Turning to the coercion argument, the video recording of the 

interview plainly contradicts Thomas’s assertions. Thomas points to 
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no portion of the video recording to show that the second detective 

was coercive. The detective spoke calmly and never raised his voice 

or threatened Thomas in any way during the interview. Nothing in 

the video recording suggests “excessively lengthy interrogation, 

physical deprivation, brutality, or other such hallmarks of coercive 

police activity” that could render Thomas’s statements involuntary. 

Drake v. State, 296 Ga. 286, 291 (3) (766 SE2d 447) (2014) (citation 

and punctuation omitted).

5. Thomas also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for

not renewing the motion for mistrial based on the courtroom 

outburst and thereby not preserving the issue for appeal. We 

disagree.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

Thomas must show both that his trial counsel’s performance was 

deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced his defense. 

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 

LE2d 674) (1984). “To establish deficient performance, an appellant

must overcome the strong presumption that his or her counsel’s 
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conduct falls within the broad range of reasonable professional 

conduct and show that his counsel performed in an objectively 

unreasonable way considering all circumstances and in the light of 

prevailing professional norms.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2)

(770 SE2d 610) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). To 

establish prejudice, an appellant must show that “there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 694. Thomas must prove both prongs of 

the Strickland test, and if he fails to prove one prong, “it is not 

incumbent upon this Court to examine the other prong.” Smith, 296 

Ga. at 733 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). “In reviewing a 

ruling on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we defer to the 

trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we

apply the law to the facts de novo.” State v. Spratlin, 305 Ga. 585, 

591 (2) (826 SE2d 36) (2019).

Here, the trial court considered the merits of Thomas’s motion 

for mistrial, denied the motion, told Thomas’s counsel that she could 
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renew the motion “if something else happens,” and then gave the 

jury a curative instruction. Thomas does not allege on appeal that 

something else happened at the trial that required trial counsel to 

again move for a mistrial based on the courtroom outburst, but 

argues that trial counsel potentially failed to preserve the issue by 

failing to renew the motion. See Hartsfield v. State, 294 Ga. 883, 886 

(2) (757 SE2d 90) (2014) (concluding that the defendant waived 

challenge to denial of motion for a mistrial where he failed to renew 

his motion following the trial court’s admonishment of prosecutor

and curative instruction). But even assuming that trial counsel’s 

failure to renew the motion was deficient performance, Thomas fails 

to establish prejudice. Because we have concluded that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a 

mistrial, electing instead to take adequate curative measures, 

Thomas does not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the 

outcome would have been different if trial counsel had renewed the 

motion for a mistrial. See Hartsfield, 294 Ga. at 887 (3) (a) (because 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for mistrial 
15

where curative instruction was adequate, there was no prejudice 

from trial counsel’s failure to renew motion). 

6. Lastly, Thomas argues that he is entitled to a new trial on 

the basis of cumulative prejudice. We disagree. 

We recently recognized a new cumulative error rule in State v. 

Lane, 308 Ga. 10 (838 SE2d 808) (2020), whereby courts are “to 

consider collectively the prejudicial effect of trial court errors and

any deficient performance by counsel — at least where those errors 

by the court and counsel involve evidentiary issues.” Id. at 14 (1). 

But this cumulative prejudice analysis does not apply when, as here, 

there are not multiple errors to consider cumulatively. See Beck v. 

State, 310 Ga. 491, 499 (3) n.5 (852 SE2d 535) (2020). 

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.