NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0551n.06 No. 05-6877 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UN I TE D ST AT ES, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. WI L L I E E. J OHNSON, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL F ROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E WE STE RN DI STRI CT OF TEN

NESSEE

BEF OR E: BOG G S, C hie f Judg e , a nd R OG ER S and W HIT E, C ir c uitJudg e s. WHITE , Circuit Judge . Def endant Willie E. J ohnson (J ohnson) pleade d g uilty of possession of coc aine ba se with intent to distribute (Count 1) , 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) , and possession of a f irea rm in further ance of t he drug- traff icking crime alleg ed in count 1 (Count 2), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
. The district cour

t sentence d J ohnson to 15 y ear s’ imprisonment on the coca ine-ba se count and 5 y ear s’ imprisonment on the firea rm count. On a

ppeal, J o h n s o n challenge s the proce dural
re a so na ble ne ss o f h is s e nte nc e and argue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d r e ve rs ibl y by den y inghim allocution. The Gove rnment conce des that the district c ourt err ed by denying J ohnson his right of
a llo c uti on . We va c a te defe nd ant’ s se nte nc e s a nd re mand fo r r e se nte nc ingc on sis te nt w iththi s opinion.- 2 - I As part of

a plea ag ree ment, J ohnson ag ree d to cooperate fully with the United States Attorney ’s offic e, the Violent Crimes Ta sk Forc e, the Bur eau of Alcohol, Tobac co and F irea rms, and other fe dera l, state and loca l law enforce ment ag encie s; the Government ag ree d to consider whe ther the coope ration wa

rra nted its filing a motion to reduc e sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K.1.1 for substantial assistance. A fter se ntencing , the cour t dismiss ed Counts 3 and 4 (possession of a firea rm during and in re lation to the drug traff icking crime a lleg ed in Count 1, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), a nd felon in posse ssion of a firea

rm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) , respe ctively ) pursua nt to the Governme nt’s motion. The pre sentenc e re port (PSR) calculate d J ohnson ’s b ase offense level as 32. Johnson’s classification as a ca

ree r off ender under U.S.S.G. § 4B 1.1(a) resulted in an of fense level of 37 a

nd
a cr iminal hist ory

cate g ory of VI . Following subtr ac t i o n o f t hree points for ac cepta nce of responsibility , J ohnson was lef t with a total offense level of 34, a nd a criminal history cate g ory of VI . Under the 2003 edition of t he Guidelines Manual, J ohnson’s sentenc ing r ang e for Count 1 was 262-327 months, with a statutory minimum sentenc e of 120 months. As to c ount 2, the PSRnoted that J ohnson’s Guidelines ra ng e was the ma

ndatory minimum of 60 months’ imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), to run c onsecutively to any term of imprisonment im p o s ed for Count 1. The PSR c a lc ulate d Joh ns on ’s tot a l se nte nc ingra ng e to b e 32 2- 38 7 mo nth s. The Gove rnment moved for a downwar d depar

ture under § 5K.1.1, for Johnson’s substantial assistance
. At sentenc ing, the Gover nment rec ommended that J ohnson’s offe nse level under Count 1 be re duced f

rom 34 to 30 or 29. The district c ourt ac cepte d the Gover nment’s re commendation543 U.S. 220 (2005). 1 - 3 - for a downwar d depar

ture, a nd stated that it would use as its starting point the minimum sentence for a n offe nse leve l of 29 and a criminal history

cate g ory VI , i.e., 151 months. The c ou rt s en tence d J ohnson on November 17, 2004 (pre

- United States v. Book er ), to 15 1 y ear s’ (180 mo n t h s ) i m p ri sonment for possession of c ocaine base w ith intent to di stribute, and 5 y ear s’ (60 months) imprisonment for possession of a firearm i n fu rt h erance of a dr ug traff icking crime, to be serve d consec utively . Def endant c ontends (and th e Go v er n m en t ag ree s) that at the initial sentencing the district court incorre ctly assumed that the combined Guidelines rang e of 322- 387 months applied only

to Count 1 (cocaine base) and did not include the 60-month sentence for Count 2. John so n a pp e a le d h is s e nte nc e . In th e int e ri m, o n th e Go ve rnme nt’ s mot ion to re mand , th is court va cate d J ohnson’s sentenc e and r emande d for r esente ncing under Booke r . On re sentenc ing, a fter much discussion r eg ardingwhether the cour t had mistakenly

added 60 months to t he sente nce twic e, the district cour t imposed the same sente nce
– fi ft ee n y ear s for po sse ssi on

of c oc a ine ba se wi th in tent to d ist ri bu te , a nd fi ve y e ars fo r p os se ssi on of a fi re arm in further ance of a dr

ug -traf ficking crime, to be serve d consec utively . This appea l ensued.

I Alleg ations of a c omplete denial of the rig ht of allocution are revie wed de novo. United Sta te s v . W olf e , 7 1 F .3 d 6 11 , 6 14 (6 th C ir . 1 99 5) ; United States v. Carter , 355 F .3 d 9 20 , 9 26 n. 3 ( 6th C i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( ac kn o wl ed gi n g W olf e ’s de no v o s t andard, but noting that that standa rd is rese rved f

or alleg ations of complete de nial of allocution, i.e., re view is for plain err or “where the alleg ation is not- 4 -

that there was a

complete de nial [of allocution] but only an inappropriate lim itation”). The F eder al Rules of Criminal Procedure require that befor e imposing se ntence , the cour t must “address the de fe nd ant p e rs on a lly in or de r to p e rm it the de fe nd ant t o s pe a k o r p re se nt a ny inf or ma tio n to mit ig a te the sentenc e.” F ed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A) (ii). “De nial of allocution is rever sible err or.” Carter , 355 F.3d at 926 ( citing United States v. Riascos-Suare z , 7 3 F .3 d 6 16 , 6 27 (6 th C ir . 1 99 6) ); se e als o United States v. Pe laez , 930 F.2d 520, 522- 24 (6th Cir. 1991). The re cord shows that J ohnson was denie d his right of allocution at the De cembe r 5, 2005
rese ntencinghear ing. A lthough the c ourt and Johnson i ntera cted se vera l times, these exchang es
conce rned the initial ca lculation of Johns on’s applica ble Guidelines ra

ng e and the court’s r easons fo r c ho os inga

24 0- mon th t e rm

of imp ri so nme nt. Th e re se nte nc inghe ari ngtr ans c ri pt s ho ws that, immediately

prior to imposing sente nce, the court a nd counsel ha d a leng t h y side-bar discussion (transc r ib e d ) , a f

te r w h ic h th e c o u rt d id n o t inv it e Jo h n s o n to s p e a k p e r s o n a ll y o n h is o w nbehalf
. The Gove rnment conc edes th at t h i s was rever sible err or and that J ohnson’s sentenc e must be
vacated, and the c ase r emande d for r esente ncing
. II Def endant also asser

ts that the district c ourt err ed by mis-calculating a

n appropr iate sente nce rang e under

the Guidelines, a

nd by failing to articu l at e t h e basis for the sentenc e it imposed at
rese ntencing
. . Both sente ncing transcr ipts are longand diffic ult to follow. I t appea rs that by the end of the
rese ntencingproce eding s, the court r ecog nized its ear lier error and understood that the Guide lines rang e for Count 1, without add ing the 60 months for Count 2, was 151 - 188 months. See UnitedJ ohnson filed a Rul e 28(j) additional citation motion i n propria pe rsona dur ing the pendenc y 2 o f t h i s ap p ea l , ci t i n g Gu lly , Kimbrough , and Sp e ar s , supra. The Supreme Court in Sp e ar s vacated a dec ision of t h e E i g hth Circuit that held that the district court had no a uthority to substit ute on policy g rounds a differe nt ratio for the t hen-a pplicable 100:1 cr ack- to-powder sentenc ing r atio. 129 S
. C t
. at 8 4 2
. C l ar i fy i n g Kimbrough , the Sp e ar s Court no te d th a t se nte nc ingjud g e s p os se ss a uth or ity to re je c t c a te g or ic a lly the se nte nc ing ra ng e pr e sc ri be d by the Gu ide lin e s, e ve n in “ a min e -r un c a se wher e ther e ar e no ‘pa

rticular c ircumstance s’ that would ot h er wi se justify a var iance from the Guidelines’ se ntencingrang e.” Id
. at 8 4 4 (q u o t i n g Kimbrough , 12 8 S
. C t. at 576). Sp e ar s rec og nized that dist rict cour ts possess the “author ity to va ry from the c rac k coca ine Guidelines ba sed on a policydisag ree ment with them, and not simply based on an individualiz ed dete rmination that they y ield an excessive se ntence in a par ticular c ase.” 129 S. Ct . at 843. - 5 - Sta te s v . F ra nk lin , 4 99 F .3 d 5 78 , 5 84 (6 th C ir . 2 00 8) (n oti ngthat th e Gu ide lin e s in str uc t th a t a sentenc e for

a count with a ma

ndatory consec utive sentenc e is to be imposed independe ntly of other counts). Howe ver, it does se em that the court s t ru ggl ed t o articulate a r ationale to support the
or ig ina l se ntenc e. I n a

ny e ve nt, be c a

us e thi s c a se mus t be re mand e d f or re se nte nc ing , th e se
a dd iti on a l argume nts ne e d n ot b e a dd re sse d e xce pt t o s ta te th at on re mand the c ourt sh ou ld b e g in the se nte nc ingpr oc e dure ane w, and c le arl y art ic ulate bo th t

he Gu ide lin e s ra nge un der w hic h it is op e ratin g , a

nd the re a so ns fo r ch oo sin g a pa rt ic ula r se nte nc e . Any

argume nts John so n c ho os e s to put fo rt h b as ed on Un ite d S tat es v . G ull

y , 619 F. Supp. 2d 633 (N.D . I owa 2009) , Kimbrough v. United States , 552 U.S. 85 (2007), or Spears v. United States , 1 2 9 S. Ct
. 8 4 0 ( 2 0 0 9 ) , c an be prese nted on re mand. 2 We V AC AT E d e fe nd ant’ s se nte nc e s and REM AN D f

or re se nte nc ingc on sis te nt w iththi s opinion.