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SSI Monograph

NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR QUESTION: 

SENSE OF VULNERABILITY, 

DEFENSIVE MOTIVATION, AND 

PEACEFUL SOLUTION

Kwang Ho Chun

December 2010

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ii

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ISBN 1-58487-476-7
iii

FOREWORD

Why have efforts to dismantle the North Korean 

nuclear program failed so far? What can be done in 

order to achieve a peaceful and long-lasting resolution 

to this conundrum? To answer these questions, this 

monograph scrutinizes and refutes two prevailing 

academic-cum-policy approaches to the North Korean 

nuclear questions: the use of coercive tools within a 

general framework of containment and bypassing the 

regime in Pyongyang, and engaging the Korean people with the hope that they will gain enough power 

to transform North Korea into a democratic nuclearfree country. Dr. Kwang Ho Chun argues that neither 

of these can provide any meaningful solution to the 

North Korean nuclear questions. Instead, he suggests 

that engaging the regime in Pyongyang and forgoing endeavors to forcefully push democracy in North 

Korea are inseparable prerequisites to a peaceful and 

lasting solution to this problem.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

KWANG HO CHUN is an International Scholar 

at the Department of Political Science at Kyung Hee 

University. Since September 2007, he has taught at the 

Defence Studies Department as a lecturer. He was previously a lecturer at Unite de science politique et des 

relations internationales, Universite Catholique de 

Louvain, Belgium. Dr. Kwang holds a B.A. and M.A. 

from Kyung Hee University, Seoul, Korea, an M.A. 

in European studies and a Ph.D. in international relations from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium. 

iv
v

SUMMARY

With little faith in reaching a peaceful and sustainable solution to the nuclear question through engagement and negotiations with the regime in Pyongyang, 

some scholars argue that nuclear nonproliferation 

can be forced on North Korea only through the use of 

coercive tools within a general framework of containment. Other scholars, alarmed by the catastrophe that 

might result from a vigorous attempt to confront and/

or topple the regime in Pyongyang, suggest bypassing 

it and engaging the North Korean people, hoping that 

they will gain enough power to transform North Korea into a democratic nuclear-free country. Indeed, to 

a great extent, current American policy toward North 

Korea reflects both stances.

North Korea’s history indicates that Pyongyang’s 

sense of vulnerability is directly related to the developmental status of its nuclear program. This deviates 

from Nicholas Eberstadt’s claim that the regime’s rationale behind the program has been predominantly 

and persistently offensive since its initiation. On the 

other hand, this supports Joachim Krause and Andreas Wenger’s claim that the predominant rationale 

behind Pyongyang’s nuclear program is deterring 

what it perceives as a threat to the survivability of its 

regime--namely, to a large extent, American power. 

On the basis of this finding, it can be argued that if 

North Korea’s perceived vulnerability can be significantly reduced, it is more likely to give up its nuclear 

arms program.

How, then, can Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability 

be significantly reduced? The observation herein suggests that Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability has been 
vi

more influenced by its perception of its adversaries’ 

hostility than its perception of its allies’ guarantee for 

its security. During the 1960s, Pyongyang perceived 

that its allies had strong interests in guaranteeing 

North Korean security, but its perception of the continuous hostility from its adversaries increased its 

sense of vulnerability, which resulted in its continuous pursuit of developing a nuclear program. Despite 

the decreasing guarantee by Moscow and Beijing for 

Pyongyang’s security since the late 1960s, Washington’s progressive approach toward Pyongyang had so 

significantly reduced its sense of vulnerability from 

the late 1980s to the mid-1990s as to persuade North 

Korea to sign the Agreed Framework in 1994. This indicates that the key to reducing North Korea’s sense of 

vulnerability and to bringing it back into compliance 

with international nonproliferation regimes is in the 

hands of its adversaries rather than those of its traditional allies. In this sense, it can be assumed that China 

is not bluffing when it claims that it lacks the necessary leverage to push North Korea into an internationally agreed solution to the nuclear problem. America’s 

calling for China to put more pressure on North Korea 

may thus not yield a significant breakthrough in efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. The 

key factors determining Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability, and hence the future of its nuclear program, 

are U.S. projects and, more importantly, the manner 

in which its messages are perceived by North Korea.

In this sense, the two previous U.S. administrations’ 

policies toward the North Korean nuclear question 

can provide invaluable lessons to the contemporary 

U.S. Government. The 1994 Framework Agreement 

manifested, among other attributes, tolerance towards 

diversity, a theme borrowed from President Richard 
vii

Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s foreign policy during 

the 1970s. President Bill Clinton, who included in the 

agreement the normalization of relations between 

Washington and Pyongyang, signaled the de facto acceptance of the totalitarian regime in Pyongyang, a 

clear divergence from his goal of spreading liberalism 

and democracy, which he had pursued since coming 

to office. Hence, the reasoning of the 1994 agreement 

was not to first wrest from North Korea its strategic 

deterrent and then proceed with toppling its regime. 

On the contrary, the purpose was to incorporate North 

Korea, as it is, into the international community, with 

the hope that time would yield a change in the nature 

of the regime as it mingles with the other members of 

the international community, particularly the United 

States. In other words, the purpose was not to convey 

the sense that the United States was planning to topple or coerce the regime in Pyongyang into a change 

of nature, but to patiently lure it, by its own consent, 

into such a change.

The Bush administration, seemingly, took an important step toward reducing Pyongyang’s sense of 

vulnerability by expressing its willingness to give assurances to the security of North Korea, to respect its 

sovereignty, and to take steps toward the normalization of relations—all in return for North Korea’s total 

nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, overshadowing 

and contradicting those promises and guarantees are 

the North Korean Human Rights Act, which strives to 

promote democracy in North Korea at the expense of 

the totalitarian regime, and the ensuing appointment 

of a special envoy on human rights in North Korea. 

Without resolving these contradictions, Washington 

will continue to project through its foreign policy ambiguous intentions, hindering a significant change in 

North Korea’s sense of vulnerability. 
From these experiences, the contemporary U.S. 

Government must learn that engagement with the 

current regime in Pyongyang and forgoing endeavors 

to promptly and forcefully push democracy in North 

Korea are inseparable prerequisites to a peaceful and 

long-lasting solution to the North Korean nuclear 

question.

viii
1

NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR QUESTION:

SENSE OF VULNERABILITY, 

DEFENSIVE MOTIVATION, AND 

PEACEFUL SOLUTION

Kwang Ho Chun

INTRODUCTION

North Korea’s nuclear development has been one 

of the gravest threats to the security of not only the 

Korean peninsula, but also the Asian region and the 

world as a whole. The international community and 

the United States have thus made continuous efforts 

to end North Korea’s nuclear program. The United 

States, in particular, has tried to address the proliferation challenges posed by North Korea through various 

policies, including military cooperation with its allies 

in the region and a wide range of sanctions. However, 

these efforts have not yet succeeded. Why have these 

efforts failed so far? How can a long-lasting and peaceful solution to the North Korean nuclear question be 

achieved? 

These questions are highly relevant to understanding why North Korea has pursued a nuclear program. 

The more we understand about the motivation behind 

North Korea’s drive for a nuclear program, the greater 

chance we have to find a peaceful and perfect solution 

to the North Korean nuclear question. This monograph 

therefore seeks to elucidate the motivation for North 

Korea’s nuclear program, and to consider whether it 

is possible to achieve a peaceful and long-lasting solution to the North Korean nuclear question, and, if it 

is, how to accomplish this goal. This monograph does 

so by providing a historical review of North Korea’s 

nuclear program. 
2

The main finding revealed herein is that North Korea’s nuclear program has been driven by the country’s 

intention to use the possession of nuclear weapons 

as a deterrent against a perceived risk of attack. The 

historical narrative of North Korea’s nuclear development since the 1950s has proved this defensive motivation for North Korea’s nuclear weapon build up, 

indicating that Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability has 

been positively related to the developmental status of 

North Korea’s nuclear program. Based on this finding, 

the author opines that some hard-line policies, built 

upon the assumption of North Korea’s offensive motivation, cannot provide any meaningful solution to the 

North Korean nuclear question. Instead, he suggests 

that engagement with the current regime in Pyongyang and forgoing any endeavors to push promptly 

and forcefully for democracy in North Korea can offer 

a peaceful and long-lasting solution.

The monograph begins by considering the relationship among developing nuclear weapons, Pyongyang’s motivations, and its sense of vulnerability. It 

then provides the history of the relationship between 

North Korea’s sense of vulnerability and its development of a nuclear program. It concludes by considering the possibility of a peaceful solution to the North 

Korean nuclear question.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MOTIVATION, AND 

SENSE OF VULNERABILITY

Let us start with a fundamental but thus far unanswered question: Why has North Korea pursued a 

nuclear program since the mid-1950s? The technical 

school of proliferation holds that, “[T]he availability of nuclear weapons in itself constitutes sufficient 
3

motive for pursuing them. If states can acquire the 

bomb, this line of thinking goes, they will.”1 However, 

an examination of past efforts to prevent nations with 

nuclear aspirations from pursuing nuclear armament 

provides many cases of success. South Korea, Taiwan, 

Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa are all examples 

of states that abandoned their nuclear armament efforts.2

 This indicates that availability of technology 

and resources alone does not necessarily lead a nation 

to pursue vigorously a nuclear armament course. 

An alternative explanation is provided by the motivational school of proliferation. According to Michael 

J. Mazarr, the motivational school holds that:

[D]espite the pressures of a near-anarchic world system, states do not pursue the development of nuclear 

weapons without a reason. The associated costs, both 

financial and political, establish a presumption against 

acquiring nuclear arsenals. It is only when a state’s 

perceived vulnerability or desire for attention or prestige overcomes that presumption that proliferation 

will take place.3

There have been two contradicting perspectives on 

the motivation for North Korea’s developing nuclear 

weapons. The first ascribes a continuous and predominantly offensive rationale to North Korea’s nuclear 

program, whereas the second argument sheds light on 

North Korea’s perceived need to deter its adversaries 

from seeking to violate its sovereignty and topple its 

regime. 

Nicholas Eberstadt puts emphasis on North Korea’s desire to retrieve its lost pride. From his perspective, the North Korean nuclear program is not merely a deterrent, designed to warn the United States 

against any attempt to forcefully change the regime in 
4

Pyongyang, or an instrument used to blackmail the 

international community to get food and fuel; it is primarily a tool designed to “fulfill a grand ideological 

vision: the reunification of the now-divided Korean 

peninsula.”4

 He argues:

[The purpose of this nuclear program] is to settle a 

historical grievance, namely the failure of the famous 

June 1950 surprise attack against South Korea [due 

to American intervention]. . . . The total mobilization 

war states that Pyongyang has painfully erected over 

the decades (at the cost of, inter alia, the North Korean 

famine of the 1990s) is a response to this grievance and 

an instrument for fulfilling this vision . . . [of] unconditional annexation of present-day South Korea.5

Eberstadt contends that the North Korean statecraft 

has built on the very vision of “an ongoing war”6 to 

reunify the peninsula under the regime in Pyongyang 

and that the regime has seen the nuclear program as 

a vital tool to realize such a vision—a tool never to be 

given away, at least until this goal is accomplished. 

This line of analysis thus presents us with pessimistic 

prospects for resolving peacefully the political tension 

surrounding the issue. 

In contrast to Eberstadt’s argument, Joachim 

Krause and Andreas Wenger present us with a different analysis regarding North Korea’s motivation 

to acquire a nuclear-weapons capability, taking their 

cue from Scott Sagan’s three models to explain why 

countries strive to acquire nuclear armaments. These 

consist of: 

the “security model,” according to which states build 

nuclear weapons to increase national security against 

foreign threats, especially nuclear threats; the “domestic politics models,” which envisions nuclear weapons 
5

as political tools used to advance parochial domestic 

and bureaucratic interests; and the “norms model,” 

under which nuclear weapons decisions are made because weapons acquisition . . . provides an important 

normative symbol of state’s modernity and identity.7

Based on the security model, Krause and Wenger 

ascribe a predominantly defensive rationale to North 

Korea’s nuclear program. They point to the importance of Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability in driving 

North Korea’s nuclear weapons program: 

North Korea perceives itself as threatened by other 

countries, such as the U.S., which have an important 

military presence in the region. It is believed that the 

possession of nuclear weapons can be used as a deterrent against a perceived risk of attack.8

The process by which a country evaluates its vulnerability has received much attention in literature 

dealing with armament, disarmament, and the causes 

of war. It is presented as an outcome of a calculated 

process in which a national leadership’s perception 

of its adversaries’ intentions toward it and its perception of its adversaries’ capability to carry out offensive 

intentions are measured against its self-perceived capability to thwart such danger.9

 George Kennan, and 

later Secretary of State Henry Kissinger relying on 

Kennan, provide a similar definition of what creates 

and precipitates perceived vulnerability: “[T]he combination of hostility with the ability to do something 

about it.”10 Hence, the concept of a state’s sense of vulnerability consists of two dimensions: its perception 

of the hostility of its adversaries and its perception of 

its capability to deter its adversaries from fulfilling 

their aggressive intentions. 
6

It is also essential to consider alliances when measuring a state’s sense of vulnerability. Allying with 

other nations is the most prevalent method used in 

realpolitik to deter an adversary from attacking.11 Nevertheless, the existence of alliances with powerful nations, such as the Soviet Union and China in North 

Korea’s case, is not a sufficient cause for reducing a 

state’s sense of vulnerability. The key thing to affect 

a state’s sense of vulnerability is its perception of its 

allies’ interest in reacting against an attack of its adversaries. When a state detects a thaw between its allies and its adversaries, it tends to perceive its allies’ 

interest in reacting against an adversary’s attack as 

decreasing and this, in turn, is likely to increase the 

country’s sense of vulnerability.

On the basis of these insights, indicators to measure Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability in each era 

mentioned above are: 1) the number of its adversaries’ 

perceived proclamations and/or acts of conciliation 

toward North Korea; 2) the number of its adversaries’ 

proclamations and/or actions perceived by North Korea as a challenge to its sovereignty; and 3) the number of its allies’ perceived proclamations and/or acts 

of conciliation toward its adversaries. The first indicator listed is expected to have a negative relationship 

with North Korea’s sense of vulnerability, whereas 

the second and third indicators are expected to have a 

positive relationship with it. 
7

A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF NORTH KOREA’S 

PERCEIVED VULNERABILITY AND ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM 

The Height of the Cold War (1950-68).

This time frame can be divided into two consecutive periods. During the 1950s there was an increase 

in North Korea’s sense of vulnerability. This reflected 

American attempts during the Korean War to overthrow the newly inaugurated communist regime and 

the introduction of U.S. nuclear weaponry into the 

peninsula in 1957. North Korea’s increasing sense of 

vulnerability throughout this period led to the initiation of its nuclear program. Between the late 1950s 

and the late 1960s, North Korea’s sense of vulnerability decreased slightly. Though the American threat 

remained in the background, there were no substantial proclamations or actions from either Washington or Seoul to be perceived as a challenge to North 

Korean sovereignty. Moreover, with the Cold War at 

its height, Pyongyang’s allies were perceived as more 

committed than ever to guaranteeing its security. 

The Korean War was the first opportunity for North 

Korea to evaluate Washington’s intentions regarding 

its regime. The war, initiated by the North, which was 

as eager as the Syngman Rhee regime in the South to 

take control of the whole Korean peninsula, taught 

Pyongyang some valuable lessons. Although U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson excluded the peninsula 

from his January 1950 announcement of the defense 

perimeter that marked Washington’s vital strategic 

outposts in the Pacific,12 the North soon came to realize 

that it had underestimated the political-psychological 
8

importance of the peninsula to the decisionmakers in 

Washington. Not only was the United States willing to 

commit a huge military force into the peninsula in order to block the Northern attack and to protect Rhee’s 

regime, but it was actually planning to seize the opportunity to proceed with a rollback of North Korean 

forces so as to reunify the whole peninsula under the 

regime in Seoul.13 This was perceived as a grave threat 

to North Korea. Following the Inchon landing on September 15, 1950, the North could not balance and repel 

the combined American-South Korean forces by itself. 

It needed help.

Pyongyang’s allies provided it with another valuable lesson. Allies, even brotherly ones like China, 

were first and foremost driven by their own interests. 

Joseph Stalin, then leader of the Soviet Union, who 

was the liberator of the Northern half of the peninsula 

and gave his consent to the June 25, 1950, invasion, 

offered no substantial support to the North following the outbreak of the conflict. Based on American 

intelligence sources, Bruce Cumings points out that, 

“[T]here is no evidence of an upturn in Soviet military 

shipments to North Korea after June 25; if anything, 

a decrease was registered.”14 Moreover, Stalin explicitly ordered Soviet ambassador to the United Nations 

(UN) Jacob Malik not to attend the Security Council 

meeting that dealt with the issue of Korea, which 

meant there would be no veto against U.S. plans for 

dealing with the situation on the peninsula under UN 

auspices. For Cumings, this Soviet behavior suggests 

that the shrewd Stalin may have hoped to pit American Soldiers against Chinese forces and thus to weaken 

MaoTse Tung and make him more submissive, even at 

the cost of abandoning the regime in Pyongyang to 

the threat of American military power.15
9

While China, unlike the Soviet Union, did commit 

its forces in an effort to halt the U.S./UN advance to 

the Yalu River, this was also driven by China’s own 

interests. Cumings claims, based on retrieved North 

Korean and Chinese documents, that China entered 

the Korean War not out of fear of the American march 

toward the Yalu River, but rather as a response to the 

American rollback strategy that endangered the existence of an ally regime. As a bonus, Beijing was also 

toying with the notion of taking over the Soviets’ position as the major patron of the infant state.16 Other 

scholars who examined the rationale behind Mao’s intervention in the war give more credit to his fear that 

North Korea would become a northern gate to China 

for American imperialism and to his perception of the 

Korean battleground as a test case for Communism in 

its fight against intruding Capitalism along the southern gate of China (i.e., Vietnam).17

In any case, both the Soviet Union and China were 

unwilling to risk an outbreak of a global conflict. As 

panic caused by the successful counterattack and the 

southward movement of the North Korean-Chinese 

forces spread throughout Washington, President Harry Truman warned that “the United States may use 

[in Korea] any weapon in its arsenal,”18 thus hinting at 

the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons. This put 

Stalin on alert. Cumings wrote:

According to a high official in the KGB at the time, 

Stalin expected global war as a result of American defeat in northern Korea; fearing that consequence, he 

favored allowing the United States to occupy all of 

Korea: “so what? Let the United States of America be 

our neighbors in the Far East . . . we are not ready to 

fight.” Unlike Stalin, the Chinese were ready to fight, 

but only down to the middle of the peninsula, rather 

than to start World War III.19
10

The war ended with the July 1953 armistice that 

put the struggling forces along the opposite sides of 

approximately the same line that separated them in 

June 1950. Notwithstanding this, North Korea’s sense 

of vulnerability was increased by American aggressive policies toward the peninsula in the aftermath 

of the Korean War. Just 4 years after the armistice, 

the United States introduced nuclear artillery shells, 

mines, and missiles in Korea, and kept increasing their 

number periodically. 

The lessons Pyongyang drew from its allies’ behavior during the Korean War, and from the continuous 

perceived American challenge to its sovereignty in its 

aftermath, became clearly expressed in the emerging 

post-war Juche ideology that emphasized self-reliance 

in defense, as in other fields. Kim Jung-il, current leader of North Korea, illustrates this point in his book On 

the Juche Idea of Our Party: “Of course, one may receive 

aid in national defence from fraternal countries and 

friends. But it is impossible to depend on others for the 

defence of one’s own country.”20 From the late 1950s, 

North Korea started to send scientists to Soviet institutions to study nuclear technology. After receiving 

Soviet and Chinese assistance, the North established a 

research complex at Yongbyon and assembled a twofour megawatt Soviet IRT-2M research reactor next to 

it in 1965.21 Nevertheless, no significant breakthrough 

was made during the 1960s with regard to obtaining 

nuclear weapons-production capability. There was 

no need to rush, as international and regional developments during the 1960s slightly decreased Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability. 

The 1960s saw the Cold War at its height. The Soviet Union was catching up with American nuclear and 

missile capabilities, and China successfully achieved 
11

a nuclear capability of its own.22 The unquestionable 

supremacy of American technology and weapons, 

which characterized the 1950s, was giving way to a 

more balanced power equation between East and 

West, contributing to North Korea’s confidence in its 

allies’ capability to balance the United States. Tension 

rose from time to time between Pyongyang and its patrons, who tried to meddle in internal North Korean 

politics and stall the solidification of former North 

Korean leader Kim Il-sung’s regime at the expense of 

their proxies. Despite this, however, and despite being 

caught from time to time in the middle of the SinoSoviet quarrel, there were no major surface cracks in 

the hostile attitude of both Beijing and Moscow toward Washington.23 On the contrary, tension reached 

new heights between the United States and the Soviet 

Union, a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and 

the entry of U.S. forces to Vietnam in 1965.

Moreover, during the 1960s there were no substantial proclamations or actions, either by the United 

States or the Republic of Korea (ROK), which could 

have been perceived as a challenge to North Korean 

sovereignty. Perhaps it was a result of the U.S. fear of 

entanglement in a second front, in addition to Vietnam, while having to cope simultaneously, in budgetary terms, with Soviet endeavors for strategic military 

parity. In South Korea, the toppling of the belligerent 

Syngman Rhee Regime was followed by the coming to 

power, after a short interim parliamentary republic, of 

Park Chung-hee, whose main goal, at least during the 

1960s, was to reform and build the ill-treated South 

Korean economy. However, the picture of global 

politics soon began to change, which corresponded to 

changes in North Korea’s sense of vulnerability. 
12

Détente and Rapprochement (1969-89).

During this time frame, the designated indicators reflect a sharp increase in North Korea’s sense 

of vulnerability. North Korea’s strategic allies were 

approaching its traditional adversaries through arms 

control negotiations, treaties, and mutual visits, replacing political considerations with economic ones. 

On top of that, Park Chung-hee began to pursue more 

aggressive military goals that might change the strategic balance of power between the Koreas in favor of 

the South. A sharp increase in North Korea’s sense of 

vulnerability drove it to achieve a major breakthrough 

in its nuclear program that enabled it to produce nuclear weapons.

The increasingly thawing atmosphere between 

Washington, Moscow, and Beijing also increased 

Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability. The rudiments 

of change in the nature of Washington and Moscow’s 

relations from hostility to coexistence and cooperation 

started to appear during John Kennedy’s presidency 

and came to maturity during Richard Nixon’s tenure. 

The détente initiated in 1969 created an environment in 

which, according to Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, “visits, cultural exchanges, trade agreements, 

and joint technological ventures replaced threats, 

warnings, and confrontations.”24 The détente continued to characterize U.S.-Soviet relations throughout 

the 1970s and 1980s, with a brief interlude during 

the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan (1979-85). The 

détente manifested itself during that period in major 

confidence-building measures between the two: the 

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Treaty (SALT I, 1972), 

the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM, 1972), SALT 

II (1979), and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces 

Treaty (INF, 1987).25
13

In addition to the thawing relations with Moscow, 

the United States pursued a rapprochement with China. It was Nixon’s national security advisor and later 

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger who brought a 

rapprochement between the United States and China. 

Kissinger, as a realist, held that China, though communist, did not pose a challenge to the United States 

since it lacked economic as well as military capabilities 

to challenge Washington. On the contrary, he believed 

on the basis of his multidimensional concept of power 

that China played an important role in balancing the 

Soviet Union on the ideological level. Unlike former 

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Kissinger did 

not see all communist states as part of one big octopus 

threatening the West. Having an eye to the bad blood 

running between Moscow and Beijing, especially 

along their Manchurian border, he determined to end 

China’s isolation for the sake of global order.26 Mao 

responded to the American initiative with a similarly 

realistic understanding. “’The leaders of China were 

beyond ideology in their dealings with us,’ Kissinger 

recalled. ‘Their peril had established the absolute primacy of geopolitics.’”27 The new era of improved relationship between the two states was soon reflected 

in reciprocal state visits of their leaders (Nixon and 

Ford to China, 1972 and 1975, respectively, and Deng 

Xiaoping to the United States in 1979 and 1982), in exchanging ambassadors (March 1979), and in a booming trade exchange that, as early as 1987, was fourfold 

in comparison with the Sino-Russian trade exchange.28

The trade volume between the two countries continued to increase from $9,790 million in 1987 to $20,043 

million in 1990.29

With Pyongyang watching the thaw between 

Washington and its allies, Moscow and Beijing, with 
14

suspicion and fear, its sense of vulnerability was reinforced by the policies taken by its adversaries, particularly Seoul, which began to pursue an aggressive 

military enhancement. Although the United States 

remained as the largest threat to North Korea, the 

U.S. administration was transforming its security 

policy toward the peninsula so as to avoid any direct 

clash with North Korea. Behind this was Nixon and 

Kissinger’s conviction that the United States should 

avoid a second Vietnam, their fear that American 

forces might get entrapped in a similar situation on 

the Korean peninsula, and Kissinger’s multipolar concept of the balance of power. The U.S. administration 

thought that the stability of the peninsula could be 

maintained through a regional, as well as global, balance of power, which could be constructed through 

an American-Chinese rapprochement. Falling into 

the trap of North Korean provocations would have 

only jeopardized this rapprochement. Moreover, that 

would have been self-defeating and contrary to the retrenchment policy of an administration that believed 

in a strong economy as the key to all other ingredients 

in the calculus of power. From this perspective, the 

Nixon administration carried out a policy of restraint 

in its dealings with North Korea in order to reduce the 

possibility of any clash with Pyongyang, disregarding 

South Korean protests. 

It is not certain that this change in U.S. security 

policy toward the peninsula reduced Pyongyang’s 

sense of vulnerability, but it is certain that this change 

increased that of Seoul. Nixon’s administration continued Johnson’s policy of projecting weakness toward

Pyongyang, dealing too gently with incidents such as 

the seizure of the USS Pueblo on April 23, 1968, and 

forcing Seoul not to respond to the North’s attack on 
15

the Blue House on April 21, 1968. What was worst of 

all, the U.S. administration committed a greater sin—

reducing the number of U.S. troops on the peninsula.30 The withdrawal of the 7th U.S. Infantry Division 

from South Korea and the pull back of the 2d Infantry Division from the front line in 1971 were carried 

out despite fierce South Korean protests against the 

American disregard of previous assurances the United 

States had given to the Park Chung-hee regime. Park 

claimed that Nixon had assured him that the retrenchment policy would not be applied in the Korean Peninsula, and, on the contrary, that Nixon had vowed to 

strengthen the U.S. forces in the South. Fearing that 

such a withdrawal would invite North Korean miscalculations, Seoul tried but failed to reach a compromise 

with Washington that would prevent the pull out of an 

entire division. Perhaps the utmost disregard of South 

Korean fears of the potential danger embodied in the 

planned withdrawal was manifested in Washington’s 

answer to Park’s plea to take note of the anxiety in the 

South, a feeling of déjà vu reminiscent of the pull out 

of U.S. troops that preceded the Korean War. Washington bluntly responded, as if explaining the facts of 

life to an infant, that there were no grounds for South 

Korea’s concern, since the bipolar system of the 1950s 

had since turned into a multipolar one.31

From Park’s point of view, Seoul could no longer 

rely solely on its bilateral alliance with the United 

States in order to guarantee its national security. One 

of the initiatives that Park took in order to cover for 

what Seoul perceived as conventional inferiority, 

in comparison to the North Korean Army, was the 

buildup of a nuclear capability. A South Korean general, reflecting on the period, remembered that President Park, “decided upon a secret ‘Master Plan’ for 
16

producing nuclear weapons in 1970 following President Nixon's announcement of possible U.S. force 

withdrawals from Korea under the ‘Guam Doctrine’.”32 Park’s June 1975 statement that “South Korea 

would and could develop its own nuclear weapons if 

the U.S. nuclear umbrella is withdrawn,” was heard 

in Pyongyang as well.33 While, in the face of American 

pressure, the South Korean nuclear adventure ended 

with Park’s January 1977 announcement that South 

Korea would not develop nuclear arms,34 it contributed to raising the sense of vulnerability north of the 

38th parallel. It faced Pyongyang with a future scenario, although not imminent, that required preparation.

The aforementioned increase in Pyongyang’s 

sense of vulnerability was followed by upgrades in 

its nuclear program that would enable the production of nuclear weapons. Pyongyang modernized its 

Soviet research reactor in 1974, bringing it to a capacity of eight megawatts, and began to build a second 

reactor with a capacity of five megawatts. Moreover, 

Pyongyang succeeded in persuading Moscow to supply it with a 50-megawatt and a 200-megawatt graphite reactor, “which would be installed at Yongbyon 

in the early 1980s and would become the focus of the 

world’s concern.”35 In 1987, after its completion, the 

5-megawatt reactor began operating with a capability of producing seven kilograms of plutonium per 

year—enough to manufacture a single atomic bomb 

a year. The 50-megawatt and 200-megawatt installations were estimated to produce, after completion, a 

sufficient amount of plutonium for the annual production of 30 atomic bombs.36
17

The Collapse of the Communist Bloc and Its Aftermath: From the Late 1980s to the Framework Agreement.

During this time frame, the aforementioned indicators reflected an overall reduction in North Korea’s 

sense of vulnerability. Though its allies continued to 

tighten their relationship with its adversaries, those 

adversaries were initiating conciliatory gestures and 

acts that conveyed acceptance of the Kim Il-sung regime. Following these developments, North Korea 

was willing to freeze its nuclear program.

On the verge of its collapse, in September 1990, the 

Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with 

the ROK, thus projecting a clear disengagement from 

Cold War patterns, which had been manifested in a 

leaning-to-one-side policy on the Korean issue.

The collapse of the communist block, which was 

followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union, left Moscow with an economic catastrophe to deal with. Thus 

Russia, then under the control of President Boris Yeltsin, in dire need of economic recovery, put the promotion of its trade relations at the top of its foreign 

relations agenda and was willing to derogate prior 

political commitments to achieve this aim. Hence, 

Russia and South Korea signed a treaty in November 

1992 with the purpose of enhancing mutual trade and 

market economy principles. The warming of MoscowSeoul relations was followed by a change in Russia’s 

attitude toward the North Korean nuclear program, 

discouraging rather than encouraging it. Yeltsin preferred to shun the 1961 treaty of friendship between 

the Soviet Union and North Korea, did not renew it 

in 1996, and replaced it with a much less obligatory 
18

amity pact.37 Moreover, 20 years after the breakthrough 

in Chinese-U.S. relations, a similar breakthrough 

came in Chinese-South Korean relations. The bilateral 

relationship, established in 1992, put a focus on trade 

relations, which grew annually during the 1990s at a 

20-percent rate, making China South Korea’s top trading partner and South Korea one of the major foreign 

investors in the Chinese economy.38

To North Korea’s misfortune, its allies’ perceived 

neglect of ideology in favor of trade, as a guide for foreign policy, was only part of a much larger transformation in world politics during the 1990s. The post-Cold 

War era gave birth to a new structure of the global 

system. No longer was it a bipolar system in which 

the Soviet Union and the United States balanced each 

other. Instead, an emerging uni-multipolar system 

left the United States as the only superpower with the 

economic and military clout to play a hegemonic role 

on the global level and in the multipolar subsystems.39

The Clinton administration was pursuing an active 

engagement policy in world affairs with the purpose of enforcing international regimes, improving 

human rights, and enlarging the liberal-democratic 

community.40 From those perspectives, North Korea 

occupied the center of American attention.

From the Clinton administration’s point of view, 

not only did North Korea disregard the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) it had signed in December 

1985, but it also ignored what Washington saw as 

U.S. appeasement efforts. Though the United States 

withdrew all its nuclear warheads from the peninsula, 

Pyongyang refused to carry out its December 1991 

agreement with South Korea for making the peninsula nuclear-free, and it turned its back to the January 1992 Safeguards Agreement it had signed with the 
19

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).41 The 

picture could look quite different from the North Korean point of view. The withdrawal of U.S. nuclear 

weapons from the peninsula did not diminish the 

American nuclear threat to the North. If Pyongyang 

was to follow America’s lead, it would have had to 

give up its most valuable strategic asset, required 

to make up for its conventional inferiority. The war 

in Iraq clearly illustrated how vulnerable a regime, 

considered by the United States as a dictatorial one, 

could be without a sufficient deterrent. Pyongyang’s 

reluctance to carry out its previous obligations was 

followed by stick-and-carrot diplomacy on the part of 

Washington, trying to coerce North Korea into giving 

up the military aspects of its nuclear program.42

However, there was another aspect of Pyongyang’s relationship with its adversaries that had been 

absent in previous time frames. Following the ousting 

of the military junta in South Korea from power and 

the initiation of an open-door policy to the North in 

1988, trade volume between the South and the North 

increased dramatically, growing from $18.7 million 

in 1989 to more than $176 million in 1994.43 Following the South Korean pattern, the George H. W. Bush 

administration initiated, for the first time since the armistice of 1953, a direct dialogue between American 

and North Korean diplomats. The two sides first met 

in Beijing in December 1988 and continued the talks 

at the consular level for the next 4 years. Eventually, 

the dialogue led to the first visit of a North Korean 

top official, party secretary Kim Yong Soon, to the 

United States, where he met with Under Secretary of 

State Arnold Kanter for discussions about the nuclear 

issue.44 However significant this tacit recognition of 

the authority of the regime in Pyongyang north of the 
20

38th Parallel was, it did not bring about an immediate reduction in the developmental status of the North 

Korean nuclear program. 

Eventually, it was an increase in North Korea’s defiance that brought its American adversary to propose 

a package deal attractive enough to substantially lower Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability, encompassing 

the possibility that its American adversary would be 

transformed into a cooperative partner. North Korea’s 

refusal, on February 10, 1993, to allow the IAEA to inspect two suspected sites, followed by the announcement on March 12, 1993, of its intention to withdraw 

from the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT),45 forced 

President Clinton to consider two options presented 

to him by the Pentagon and former President Carter, 

respectively. The Pentagon’s operational plan 5027, 

designed to destroy North Korea’s nuclear installations, entailed the probability of a high cost in human 

lives. Carter’s Track II diplomatic efforts focused on 

breaking the deadlock with North Korea by lowering 

its sense of vulnerability.46 Clinton chose the latter.47

Thus, it was the American guarantee of the safety of 

the regime in Pyongyang, wrapped up in a series of 

gestures as manifested in the Framework Agreement, 

that enabled its signature. Pyongyang “committed itself to give up nuclear-arming in return for replacement of its nuclear reactors (with two light water 

reactors), a supply of fuel oil, security guarantees, an 

end to the American economic embargo, and gradual 

diplomatic normalization.”48

FOLLOWING THE 1994 FRAMEWORK 

AGREEMENT

The high expectations that followed the signing

of the Framework Agreement were not fulfilled. The 
21

project suffered many setbacks because of mutual 

suspicions and mistrust. Pyongyang was reluctant 

and hesitant to accept South Korean modeled light 

water reactors. The American Congress, for its part, 

was uncooperative in appropriating the necessary 

funding for U.S. obligations as agreed upon in the 1994 

framework, though Washington’s economic role in 

funding the project was a symbolic one in comparison 

with Seoul’s, which promised to bear the lion’s share 

of the costs, estimated at around $4.5 billion.49 In 2001, 

the reactors’ project was 5 years behind schedule.50

As the Framework Agreement was experiencing 

major setbacks, another issue inflamed the reemerging 

mutual mistrust. The American rhetoric surrounding 

the negotiations that dealt with North Korea’s missile 

development and deployment program and its missile 

proliferation activity was aggressive and demanding. 

It conveyed the impression that the United States was 

interested in scraping off another layer of North Korean strategic defense even before the implementation 

of the nuclear bargain had marked substantial progress. The 1998 Rumsfeld Report depicted Pyongyang’s 

violations of the Missile Technology Control Regime 

(MTCR), with an emphasis on its development of the 

long-range Taepodong I and II missiles, as a national 

threat. It also pointed out that North Korea’s August 

1998 ballistic missile test-fire of the Taepodong I over 

Northeastern Japan “served as a major catalyst for 

the [U.S.] NMD [National Missile Defense] effort.”51

Pyongyang had a different perspective regarding the 

NMD, especially after pledging in September 1999 a 

moratorium on missile tests for as long as the missile 

negotiations with the United States continued. Scott 

Snyder points out that: 
22

The North Korean media has been unusually sensitive 

to high-level U.S. administration characterizations of 

North Korea as a threat and as a rationale for NMD. 

North Korean officials have reacted negatively to the 

perceived double standard of continued U.S. NMD 

testing while they have pledged Moratorium on North 

Korea’s Missile tests.52

The tension between Washington and Pyongyang 

was aggravated further with the coming to power 

of George W. Bush. It did not take long for the new 

administration, which placed at the center of its foreign policy the active promotion of liberal political 

institutions and democratic values,53 to come head to 

head with the regime in Pyongyang. In his State of the 

Union address on January 29, 2002, President Bush 

depicted the North Korean regime in a diabolic manner, alongside the Iraqi and Iranian regimes: 

North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and 

weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens ... States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of 

the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, 

these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.54

Still, both countries continued to comply partially 

with the 1994 agreement, and North Korea continued 

to keep its plutonium project in deep freeze. This situation was not to last long. In late 2002, less than a year 

after the State of the Union address, as a result of U.S. 

intelligence evidence presented to it by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, North Korea was compelled 

to admit that it had developed in secrecy—probably 

since 199655—a different nuclear project, one based 

on enriched uranium. Consequently, the Framework 
23

Agreement, already dysfunctional due to the setbacks 

in its implementation, was put on hold.56 Nevertheless, Washington had knowledge about Pyongyang’s 

enriched uranium track at least since 1998, as reported 

to Congress by Larry A. Niksch of the Congressional 

Research Service on August 27, 2003.57 Clinton, in 

his memoirs, denies Niksch’s claim that his administration knew about the uranium track since 1998.58

However, let us presume for a moment that Niksch59

reported the truth to Congress. In such a case, why 

didn’t President Clinton deactivate the Agreement? 

We may find the answer in his memoirs:

Some people said this development [producing high 

enriched uranium] called the validity of our 1994 

agreement into question. But the plutonium program 

we ended was much larger than the later [uranium] 

laboratory effort. North Korea’s nuclear program, had 

it proceeded, would have produced enough weaponsgrade plutonium to make several nuclear weapons a 

year.60

Indeed, a data analysis conducted by the Institute 

for Science and International Security reveals that 

North Korea stopped discharging plutonium from 

its 5-megawatt reactor with the coming into force of 

the Framework Agreement (see Table 1). Moreover, 

it reveals that, prior to October 1994, Pyongyang had 

separated less than 20 percent (0-10 kg) of its present 

stock of separated plutonium (20-53 kg, as of mid2006). This means that while up to the collapse of the 

Framework Agreement North Korea did not have any 

nuclear weapons, or possessed two at most, it might 

currently hold between four and 13 nuclear bombs.61

Thus, the mere presence of the Framework Agreement, though mutilated by the setbacks in its imple-
24

mentation, contributed to a significant decrease in the 

developmental status of North Korea’s nuclear program during the late Clinton era.

Table 1. North Korean Plutonium Production 

and Separation, as of Mid-2006.

Though a mechanism known as the Six-Party Talks, 

which include the United States, China, Russia, Japan, 

South Korea, and North Korea, was launched in an attempt to resolve the deadlock over the nuclear issue, it 

has failed so far to persuade North Korea to discontinue its uranium project and its renewed development 

of the plutonium project. It is only plausible, though, 

that U.S. efforts would encounter fiercer North Korean resistance, since these talks are overshadowed 

by an increase in North Korea’s sense of vulnerability. North Korea’s inclusion in the axis of evil and the 

breakdown of the Framework Agreement were followed by other proclamations and actions perceived 

as challenges to its sovereignty. Prominent among 

Comments

* It is assumed that each nuclear weapon would require 4-5Kg of separated plutonium.

** This quantity includes up to 1-2 kilograms of plutonium produced in the IRT reactor prior to 1994 service. (See text.)

*** The upper bound of the number of weapons is higher than the sum of the individual upper bounds, because particular periods list more plutonium than needed to give the upper bound for that period.

Source: David Albright and Paul Brannan, "The North Korean Plutonium Stock Mid-2006," Institute for Science and 

International Security (ISIS), June 26, 2006, p.10.
25

these actions is the North Korean Human Rights Act. 

Passed by the Senate in September 2004, it authorizes 

funding for programs to promote human rights, democracy, and a market economy inside North Korea 

and for increasing the availability of information 

sources that are not controlled by the North’s regime. 

It calls on other countries to join Washington in ensuring that humanitarian aid will be delivered only by

way of monitored transparent channels, and it states 

that any future nonhumanitarian aid will depend on 

the progress in human rights.62 The act and its innuendo, the need to change the North Korean regime or 

its nature, were soon followed by Secretary of State 

Condoleezza Rice’s denouncement of Pyongyang as 

an, “outpost of tyranny,”63 and by the appointment of 

Jay Lefkowitz as a special envoy on human rights in 

North Korea.

All in all, during George W. Bush’s presidency, 

the renewed increase in North Korea’s sense of vulnerability gained much momentum. This increase 

had started during Clinton’s presidency because of 

the setbacks in implementing the Framework Agreement and the controversy over Pyongyang’s missile 

program. However, although during Clinton’s late 

years in office Pyongyang was secretly initiating a 

new nuclear project based on uranium enrichment, it 

refrained from reactivating its larger plutonium project until President Bush deactivated the Framework 

Agreement.

The time period from 2005 to 2009 demonstrates 

the dramatic ups and downs of the North Korean nuclear resolution. There were two weddings and two 

funerals during this period. Hopeful progress had 

been made with the 2005 Joint Statement and the 2007 

Beijing Agreement. In the September 2005 Joint State-
26

ment of the Six-Party Talks, North Korea committed 

to “abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the 

Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 

and to IAEA safeguards.”64 At the Six-Party Talks held 

in Beijing in February 2007, North Korea did pledge 

to give up its nuclear weapons capabilities. Following 

this, it provided a U.S. delegation with about 18,000 

pages of documentation detailing the operations 

of two of its primary plutonium-related facilities at 

Yongbyon in May 2008 and submitted a declaration of 

its nuclear holdings on June 26, 2008, which indicated 

that it had extracted a total of around 30kg of plutonium and used 2kg. However, these hopeful promises 

became immediately overshadowed by North Korea’s 

two nuclear tests in October 2006 and May 2009.

Two changing factors, related to North Korea’s 

two adversaries, had resonated with this North Korean nuclear roller coaster: the Bush administration’s 

ambivalent approaches toward the North Korean 

nuclear issue and the emergence of the conservative 

administration in South Korea. With the start of its 

second term, the Bush administration sought to use its 

sticks and carrots for North Korea in a more balanced 

manner. However, with hindsight, this approach was 

no more than ambivalent. In the face of North Korea’s 

Foreign Ministry announcement on May 11, 2005, that 

it had finished the retrieval of 8,000 spent fuel rods 

from its Yongbyon reactor,65 the United States had an 

unprecedented number of bilateral talks with North 

Korea within the Six-Party Talks framework in July 

2005, which would eventually lead to the 2005 Joint 

Statement. On the other hand, the United States used 

financial sanctions to put more pressure on the North. 

Under Executive Order 13382, issued on June 29, 
27

2005, by President Bush,66 the U.S. Treasury Department announced that it was freezing the U.S. assets of 

three North Korean entities responsible for weapons 

of mass destruction (WMD) and the missile program 

and barring its citizens and companies from doing 

business with them. Just 4 days before the agreement 

on the 2005 Joint Statement, the United States froze 

U.S.$25 million in North Korean accounts in the Banco Delta Asia (BDA), which was accused of helping 

North Korea launder funds and distribute counterfeit 

U.S. currency. These and subsequent U.S. financial 

sanctions increased Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability, deteriorating North Korea’s cash-flow problems. 

They served consequently as a stumbling block for 

the resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem in 

general and the Six-Party Talks in particular. Pyongyang boycotted the Six-Party Talks, demanding the 

lifting of the freeze of the BDA’s fund. Just 1 month 

after the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) project to build two light water 

reactors (LWR) in North Korea was formally terminated in June 2006, Pyongyang test-fired seven ballistic missiles, including its longest-range missile, the 

Taepodong-2, breaking its voluntary moratorium on 

flight testing longer-range missiles, which it had observed since 1999. On October 9, 2006, North Korea 

conducted an underground nuclear test. It is quite reasonable to argue that North Korea conducted missile 

and nuclear tests to end the U.S. financial sanctions 

and urge Washington to make a deal with Pyongyang. 

Kim Yong Nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, made sure that North Korea was considering U.S. policy toward the country as 

the main factor for determining its nuclear testing. He 

said, “[T]he issue of future nuclear tests is linked to 
28

U.S. policy toward our country . . . If the United States 

continues to take a hostile attitude and apply pressure 

on us in various forms, we will have no choice but to 

take physical steps to deal with that.”67

The United States took the lead in the passage of 

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 

1718 against the North, but at the same time it began 

to take a softer policy toward North Korea. In the 2007 

Beijing Agreement, the United States committed to 

providing, in phase, heavy fuel oil to North Korea in 

parallel with Pyongyang’s gradual dismantling of its 

nuclear program. It also agreed to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and not 

to apply the Trading with the Enemy Act to North Korea. In April 2007, the United States agreed to unfreeze 

the U.S.$25 million in the North Korean BDA account 

with the condition that these funds would be used 

only for humanitarian purposes. With Pyongyang’s 

involvement with a Syrian nuclear facility reinforcing 

the Bush administration’s fundamental mistrust of 

North Korea, however, the United States demanded 

excessive verification measures that went beyond the 

agreed commitments of the Six-Party Talks. This issue of verification had begun to serve as a major cause 

for U.S.-North Korean conflict and mutual mistrust. 

With the United States and the North failing to make 

a breakthrough on this issue, the North launched the 

so-called Unha-2 rocket, a modified version of its Taepodong-2 ballistic missile, in April 2009 and conducted the second nuclear test in May 2009. 

North Korea’s rocket launch and nuclear test in 

2009 was also catalyzed by the inauguration of the 

conservative administration in South Korea. After the 

election of conservative president Lee Myung-Bak in 

2007, the South Korean administration immediately 
29

denounced the so-called Sunshine Policy of reconciliation with North Korea adopted by its two predecessors and even proclaimed the possibility of not being 

bound by two declarations made by the North-South 

Summits in 2000 and 2007. Given the growing importance of the economic relationship with South Korea 

in the North’s economy, this posed a greater threat to 

the North. Additionally, in March 2009, South Korean 

Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan indicated the country would participate formally in the Proliferation 

Security Initiative in response to the expected North 

Korean rocket launch. 

CONCLUSION

With little faith in reaching a peaceful and sustainable solution to the nuclear question through engagement and negotiations with the regime in Pyongyang, 

some scholars argue that nuclear nonproliferation can 

be enforced on North Korea only through the use of 

coercive tools within a general framework of containment. On the other hand, other scholars, alarmed by 

the catastrophe that might result from a vigorous attempt to confront and/or topple the regime in Pyongyang, suggest bypassing it and engaging the North 

Korean people in the hope that they will gain enough 

power to transform North Korea into a democratic, 

nuclear-free country. Indeed, current American policy 

toward North Korea reflects to a great extent both 

stances.

However, the problem is that these approaches are 

built upon the assumption of North Korea’s offensive 

rationale for developing nuclear weapons. North Korean history indicates that Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability has a positive relationship with the devel-
30

opmental status of its nuclear program. This deviates 

from Eberstadt’s claim that the regime’s rationale behind the program has been predominantly and persistently offensive since its initiation. On the other hand, 

this supports Krause and Wenger’s claim that the predominant rationale behind Pyongyang’s nuclear program is deterring what it perceives as threats to the 

survivability of its regime—namely, to a large extent, 

American power. On the basis of this finding, it can be 

argued that if North Korea’s perceived vulnerability 

can be significantly reduced, it is more likely to give 

up its nuclear arms program.

Then how can Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability be significantly reduced? The observations of this 

study suggest that Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability 

has been more influenced by its perception of its adversaries’ hostility than by its perception of its allies’ 

guarantee of its security. During the 1960s, Pyongyang 

perceived that its allies had strong interests in guaranteeing North Korean security, but its perception of the 

continuous hostility from its adversaries increased its 

sense of vulnerability, which resulted in its continuous 

pursuit of a nuclear program. Despite the decreasing 

guarantee by Moscow and Beijing for Pyongyang’s security since the late 1960s, Washington’s progressive 

approach toward Pyongyang had reduced its sense of 

vulnerability so significantly during the period from 

the late 1980s to the mid-1990s that the North was 

willing to sign the Agreed Framework in 1994. This 

indicates that the key to reducing North Korea’s sense 

of vulnerability and bringing it back into compliance 

with international nonproliferation regimes is in the 

hands of its adversaries rather than those of its traditional allies. In this sense, we may thus assume that 

China is not bluffing when it claims that it lacks the 
31

necessary leverage to push North Korea into an internationally agreed upon solution to the nuclear problem. America’s call for China to put more pressure on 

North Korea may not yield a significant breakthrough 

for the North Korean nuclear resolution. The key factors to determining Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability and, hence, the future of its nuclear program, are 

what the United States projects and, more importantly, the manner in which its messages are perceived by 

North Korea.

In this sense, the two previous U.S. administration’s policies towards the North Korean nuclear 

question can provide invaluable lessons to the contemporary U.S. Government. The 1994 Framework 

Agreement manifested, among other things, tolerance 

toward diversity, a theme borrowed from Nixon and 

Kissinger’s foreign policy during the 1970s. President 

Clinton, who included in the agreement the normalization of relations between Washington and Pyongyang, signaled the de facto acceptance of the totalitarian 

regime in Pyongyang, a clear divergence from his goal 

of spreading liberalism and democracy, which he had 

pursued since he came to office. Hence, the reasoning of the 1994 Agreement was not to first wrest from 

North Korea its strategic deterrent and then proceed 

with toppling its regime. On the contrary, the purpose 

was to incorporate North Korea, as it is, into the international community, with the hope that time would 

yield a change in the nature of the regime as it mingles 

with the other members of the international community, particularly the United States. In other words, the 

purpose was not to convey the sense that the United 

States was planning to topple or coerce the regime in 

Pyongyang into a change of nature, but to patiently 

lure it, by its own consent, into such a change.
32

The Bush administration seemingly took an important step toward reducing Pyongyang’s sense of 

vulnerability by expressing its willingness to give assurances to the security of North Korea, to respect its 

sovereignty, and to take steps toward the normalization of relations—all in return for North Korea’s total 

nuclear disarmament.68 Nevertheless, overshadowing 

and contradicting those promises and guarantees is 

the North Korean Human Rights Act, which strives to 

promote democracy in North Korea at the expense of 

the totalitarian regime, and the ensuing appointment 

of a special envoy on human rights in North Korea. 

Without resolving these contradictions, Washington 

will continue to project ambiguous intentions through 

its foreign policy, hindering a significant change in 

North Korea’s sense of vulnerability. 

From these experiences, the contemporary U.S. 

Government must learn that engagement with the 

current regime in Pyongyang and the forgoing of 

endeavors to promptly and forcefully push democracy in North Korea are inseparable prerequisites to 

a peaceful and long-lasting solution to the North Korean nuclear question.

ENDNOTES

1. Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in 

Nonproliferation, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995, p. 16.

2. Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with 

North Korea, Seoul, Korea: Societal Critics, 1999, p. 4.

3. Mazarr, p. 16.

4. Nicholas Eberstadt, “North Korea’s Weapons Quest,” The 

National Interest, No. 80, Summer 2005, pp. 49-50.
33

5. Ibid. p. 50.

6. Ibid.

7. Joachim Krause and Andreas Wenger, eds., Nuclear Weapons into the 21st Century: Current Trends and Future Prospects, Bern, 

Switzerland: Peter Lang AG, European Academic Publishers, 

2001, p. 229. 

8. Ibid. p. 230.

9. John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, 2d Ed., New 

York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978, pp. 227, 231.

10. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 31, 285.

11. John T. Rourke, International Politics on the World Stage, 9th 

Ed., Columbus, OH: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2003, p. 20.

12. Available from web.mala.bc.ca/davies/H323Vietnam/Acheson.htm.

13. Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History, 

New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1997, pp. 276-278.

14. Cumings, p. 266.

15. Ibid.

16. Cumings, pp. 283-284.

17. Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993, p. 216; Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s military romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953, Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995, p. 91.

18. Cumings, p. 289.
34

19. Ibid.

20. Jung-il Kim, On the Juche Idea of Our Party, Pyongyang, 

North Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1985, p. 53.

21. Mazarr, pp. 28-29, available from www.globalsecurity.org/

wmd/world/dprk/nuke.htm.

22. Gaddis, pp. 182-185, available from www.globalsecurity.

org/wmd/world/china/nuke.htm.

23. Mazarr, pp. 21-24.

24. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation, 9th Ed., Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/

Thomson Learning, 2004, p. 118.

25. Rourke, p. 375.

26. Gaddis, pp. 274-288.

27. Gaddis, p. 285.

28. Aron Shai, China in International Affairs, Tel-Aviv, Israel: 

Zemora-Bitan, 1990, pp. 152-163.

29. Available from www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.

html.

30. Wokhee Shin and Youngho Kim, “Entrapment vs. Abandonment: South Korea-U.S. Alliance in Transition, 1968-1972,” 

unpublished paper, pp. 1-20.

31. Ibid.

32. Mazarr, p. 26.

33. Tae-Hwan Kwak and Wayne Patterson, “The Security 

Relationship between Korea and the United States, 1960-1984,” 

in Yur-Bok Lee and Wayne Patterson, eds., One Hundred Years of 

Korean-American Relations, 1882-1982, Tuscaloosa, AL: University 

of Alabama Press, 1986, p. 110.
35

34. Kwak and Patterson, pp. 110-111.

35. Mazarr, pp. 28-29, available from www.globalsecurity.org/

wmd/world/dprk/nuke.htm; Gavan McCormack, Target North Korea: 

Pushing North Korea to the Brink of Nuclear Catastrophe, New York: 

Nation Books, 2004, p. 151.

36. Larry A. Niksch, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, August 27, 

2003, available from www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/IB91141.pdf.

37. Available from www.missouri.edu/~polswww/papers/pp000

314.pdf.

38. Available from www.apcss.org/Publications/SAS/Asia

BilateralRelations/China-SouthRelationsRoy.pdf.

39. Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace 

in a Multipolar Asia,” in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, 

and Steven E. Miller, eds., East Asian Security, Cambridge, MA: 

The MIT Press, 1996, pp. 3-4.

40. Kegley and Wittkopf, pp. 88, 513.

41. Sigal, p. 5.

42. Ibid.

43. Suk Hee Kim, North Korea at a crossroads, Jefferson, NC: 

McFarland & Company Inc., 2003, pp. 105-106.

44. Kyung-Ae Park, “explaining North Korean negotiated cooperation with the U.S.,” Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 7, July 1997, 

p. 624.

45. Available from www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/dprk_

nuke.htm.

46. McCormack, p. 154.

47. We may learn about Clinton’s reasoning regarding this 

decision from the prior experiences of Presidents Eisenhower 

and Kennedy. The former rejected the idea of a preventive strike 
36

against the Soviet nuclear program “because he feared the Red 

Army would respond by invading U.S. allies in Europe” and because he feared that even if victorious, the cost of the war would 

be much more than the United States could handle. Kennedy 

ruled out a preventive air strike against China’s nuclear program, 

since he feared an outbreak of a colossal war, especially after the 

Soviets rejected his “secret request for their assistance.” Scott D. 

Sagan, “How to Keep the Bomb From Iran,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 

85, No. 5. September/October 2006, p. 48.

48. Sigal, p. 6.

49. Available from www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/

nuke-agreedframework.htm.

50. Joel S. Wit, “North Korea: The Leader of the Pack,” The 

Washington Quarterly, Winter 2001, p. 88.

51. Scott Snyder, “Pyongyang’s Pressure,” The Washington 

Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3, Summer 2000, p. 165.

52. Snyder, p. 168.

53. Jonathan Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4, Spring 2005, p. 112.

54. Transcript of Bush’s State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002, available from archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/01/29/bush.speech.txt/.

55. Hwang Jang-Yop, a senior North Korean official who 

defected in 2007, revealed a deal struck in the summer of 1996 

between Pakistan and North Korea for the supply of highly enriched uranium (HEU) technology to North Korea in return for 

sharing with Pakistan long-range missile technology. See Larry A. 

Niksch, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, April 7, 2006, pp. 8-9.

56. Available from www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_11/nkoreano

02.asp.
37

57. Larry A. Niksch, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, August 27, 

2003, available from www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/IB91141.

pdf.

58. William Jefferson Clinton, My Life, New York: Alfred A. 

Knopf, 2004, p. 625.

59. American intelligence assessed that only between 2005 to 

2007 would North Korea be able to start producing around two 

nuclear bombs a year from HEU. See Niksch, CRS Issue Brief for 

Congress, April 7, 2006, pp. 8-9. Indeed, according to American examination, North Korea used a plutonium-fueled device in its October 9, 2006, nuclear test. “This suggests to some analysts that the 

DPRK’s uranium enrichment programme . . . has not yet matured 

enough to produce sufficient fissile material for a nuclear test device.” See Robert Karniol and Joseph Bermudez, “UN slaps sanctions on North Korea,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 25, 2006, 

p. 5. However, during Clinton’s presidency, it was assessed that 

North Korea already had an ability to produce nuclear weapons 

through the plutonium track and indeed might have produced 

one or two. Moreover, renewed and successful efforts to complete 

its 50- and 200-megawatt facilities would have enabled North Korea to produce around 30 nuclear bombs a year, 15 times more 

than it could have produced through HEU.

60. Clinton, p. 625.

61. David Albright and Paul Brannan, “The North Korean 

Plutonium Stock Mid-2006,” Institute for Science and International 

Security (ISIS), June 26, 2006, pp. 1-11. See also Table 1.

62. Available from www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/human

itarian/CanKor_VTK_2004_10_18_us_north_korean_human_right_

act.pdf.

63. “U.S. positive of bilateral contact with N. Korea,” Yonhap 

News, May 2, 2005; Kwangtae Kim, “Seoul’s allies play down N.K. 

missile launch,” Yonhap News, May 2, 2005.

64. Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, 

Beijing, China, September 19, 2005, available from www.fmprc.gov.

cn/eng/zxxx/t212707.htm.
38

65. “N.K. completes retrieval of fuel rods from Yongbyon 

plant,” Yonhap News, May 11, 2005, Factiva [online].

66. National Archives and Records Administration, ‘The President: Executive Order 13382, “Blocking Property of Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters,” Federal 

Register, Vol. 70, No. 126, Friday, July 1, 2005, available from www.

treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/legal/eo/whwmdeo.pdf.

67. Naoko Aoki, “N. Korea’s No. 2 says more nuke tests up to 

U.S. policy,” Kyodo News, October 11, 2006, Factiva [online]. 

68. Joo-hee Lee, “N.K. pledges to scrap all nuclear programs,” 

The Korean Herald, first page, September 20, 2005.
39

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