alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
** **

**Exhibit 99.1**

** **

**ASTREX, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES**

 

**Exhibit 99.1 Certification Purauantto 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,  as AdoptedPursuant to**

**Section 906 of the Sarbaanes-OxleyAct of 2002**

**CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT**

 

I, Michael McGuire, President and Chief ExecutiveOfficer of Astrex, Inc. (the “Company”), certify, pursuant to Section 906 ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

 

1.                   The QuarterlyReport on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the quarterly and six month periodsended September 30, 2002 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or78o(d); and

2.                   The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| November 11, 2002 |   |              |
|-------------------|--------|-------------------|
|              |   |              |
|              |   | s/Michael McGuire |
|              |   | Michael McGuire   |
|              |   | President and CEO |

 

 

----

 

 

**ASTREX, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES**

 

**Exhibit 99.1 Certification Purauantto 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,  as Adopted Pursuantto**

**Section 906 of the Sarbaanes-OxleyAct of 2002**

**CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT**

 

I, Joseph Looney, Chief Financial Officer ofAstrex, Inc. (the “Company”), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

 

1.               The QuarterlyReport on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the quarterly and six month periodsended September 30, 2002 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or78o(d); and

2.               The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| November 11, 2002 |   |                    |
|-------------------|--------|-------------------------|
|              |   |                    |
|              |   | s/Joseph Looney         |
|              |   | Joseph Looney           |
|              |   | Chief Financial Officer |

 

 

2

----
Editorial Note on Part 1
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 1 appear at 63 FR 54077, Oct. 8, 1998.

§ 1.1216 Sanctions. ( a ) *Parties.* Upon notice and hearing, any party to a proceeding who directly or indirectly violates or causes the violation of any provision of this subpart, or who fails to report the facts and circumstances concerning any such violation as required by this subpart, may be subject to sanctions as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, or disqualified from further participation in that proceeding. In proceedings other than a rulemaking, a party who has violated or caused the violation of any provision of this subpart may be required to show cause why his or her claim or interest in the proceeding should not be dismissed, denied, disregarded, or otherwise adversely affected. In any proceeding, such alternative or additional sanctions as may be appropriate may also be imposed.
( b ) *Commission personnel.* Commission personnel who violate provisions of this subpart may be subject to appropriate disciplinary or other remedial action as provided in part 19 of this chapter.
( c ) *Other persons.* Such sanctions as may be appropriate under the circumstances shall be imposed upon other persons who violate the provisions of this subpart.
( d ) *Penalties.* A party who has violated or caused the violation of any provision of this subpart may be subject to admonishment, monetary forfeiture, or to having his or her claim or interest in the proceeding dismissed, denied, disregarded, or otherwise adversely affected. In any proceeding, such alternative or additional sanctions as may be appropriate also may be imposed. Upon referral from the General Counsel following a finding of an *ex parte* violation pursuant to § 0.251(g) of this chapter, the Enforcement Bureau shall have delegated authority to impose sanctions in such matters pursuant to § 0.111(a)(15) of this chapter.
[62 FR 15858, Apr. 3, 1997, as amended at 76 FR 24383, May 2, 2011]
076A16

#### Daniel and Lisa Holt, Administrators of the Estate of Hunter Daniel Holt; Steven Grier Price, Individually; Steven Grier Price, Administrator of the Estate of McAllister Grier Furr Price; Steven Grier Price, Administrator of the Estate of Cynthia Jean Furr v. North Carolina Department of Transportation

1. Pits’ Motion to Dismiss Appeal

1.-

2. Pits’ Motion to Withdraw Motion to Dismiss Appeal

2. Allowed
#### § 304-3.2 What is the purpose of this part?

The purpose of this part is to establish Governmentwide policy and guidance for acceptance by a Federal agency of payment for travel expenses from a non-Federal source for employees to attend meetings. It describes how such payments must be accepted by the agency for travel of agency employee(s) and/or the employee's spouse for official Government travel. Except as provided in § 304-3.13 of this part, advance agency approval is required to receive such payments.

[FTR Amdt. 2003-02, 68 FR 12604, Mar. 17, 2003, as amended by FTR Case 2022-05, 89 FR 12257, Feb. 16, 2024]
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

EFRAIN ARMENTA-AGUILAR, a.k.a.

Efrain Sanchez-Armenta, Jose SanchezArmenta,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Nos. 14-50218

 14-50219

D.C. Nos. 3:14-cr-00012-DMS

 3:09-cr-02325-DMS

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Dana M. Sabraw, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 21, 2015** 

Before: CANBY, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

Efrain Armenta-Aguilar appeals from the district court’s judgments and

challenges the 27-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for

attempted reentry of a removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, and the 12-

FILED

JUL 27 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
month-and-one-day consecutive sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised

release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Armenta-Aguilar contends the district court procedurally erred in imposing

his illegal reentry sentence by failing to (i) justify the 12-month upward variance,

and (ii) explain its rejection of his mitigating arguments. We review for plain

error, see United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir.

2010), and find none. Contrary to Armenta-Aguilar’s contentions, the district

adequately explained the sentence and its rejection of his mitigating arguments. 

See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

Armenta-Aguilar next contends that the alleged procedural errors rendered

his attempted reentry sentence substantively unreasonable, and that his aggregate

sentence of 39 months and one day is greater than necessary to meet the goals of

sentencing. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing ArmentaAguilar’s sentences. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The

sentences are substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances

and applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, including ArmentaAguilar’s extensive immigration history, failure to be deterred, and breach of the

court’s trust. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; United States v. Simtob, 485 F.3d 1058,

1062-63 (9th Cir. 2007).

AFFIRMED.

2 14-50218 & 14-50219
NAUTICAL CHART 12205

CAPE HENRY

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VIRGINIA - NORTH CAROLINA -

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regarding these educational courses, contact the following sources:
USPS - Local Squadron Commander or USPS Headquarters, Post Office
Box 30423, Raleigh, N.C. 27612, 919-821-0281.
A USCGAUX - 5th Coast Guard District, Federal Building, 431 Crawford St.,
} Portsmouth, VA 23704-5004, Tel. 804-398-6208 or USCG Headquarters (G-BAU),
( Washington, D.C. 20593-0001.
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LITIGATION FILE a - Le cee tec ort
12205 | EDITION 23 : 19905 :
No. 11-1104.

#### Doal *v.*Department of Defense et al.

C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 11-5053.

#### Reed *v.*Donahoe, Postmaster General.

C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 10-11256.

#### Cooper *v.*Virginia.

Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
§ 50-203.3 Answer. ( a ) The respondent shall have the right, unless otherwise specified in the complaint and notice, within twenty (20) days after date of issuance of the formal complaint, to file an answer thereto. Such answer shall not be limited to a mere denial of the charges. It shall specifically deny or admit each of the charges, and, if the answer is in denial of any one of the charges, it shall contain a concise statement of the facts relied upon in support of the denial. Any charges not specifically denied in the answer shall be deemed to be admitted and may be so found by the administrative law judge, unless the respondent disclaims knowledge upon which to make a denial. If the answer should admit any charge but the respondent believes there are reasons or circumstances warranting special consideration, such reasons and circumstances should be fully but concisely stated.
( b ) Such answer shall be in writing, and signed by the respondent or his attorney or by any other duly authorized agent with power of attorney affixed.
( c ) If no answer is filed, or if the answer as filed does not warrant a postponement of the hearing, such hearing will be held as scheduled.
( d ) The original and two copies of the answer shall be filed with the Chief administrative law judge, Department of Labor, Washington, D.C.
( e ) In any case where formal complaints have been amended, the respondent shall have the right to amend his answer within such time as may be fixed by the administrative law judge.
[11 FR 14493, Dec. 18, 1946. Redesignated at 24 FR 10952, Dec. 30, 1959, as amended at 61 FR 19987, May 3, 1996]
No. 11-499.

#### Ryan *v.*United States.

C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of *Wood*v. *Milyard, ante,*p. 463.
16Y 

OFFICE OF THE A-ITORNEY GENERAL OF TRXAR 

AUSTIN 

Eonorable George H. Bhemsr4 

coaptroller of Publlo Amounts 

Auetin, Texar 

Dear sir: apinion HO. 040 

Rsr F?ayment of 

the order o 

warrant8 in 

In yous letter OS ya 

the dairy Sor the,Auatin state 

LherarmW 

0 of any other 

Artlola 4586,, Ve~mnta OlrU~Statutea, read0 aa 

follwzrt 

"All warrants on the Stat0 Trmwmy ahall 

be genema warranw, an4 aihald be on an aqml 

bsels with oaoh other Oacaspt that in the event 
Honorable George H. Sheppard, Page 2 

of 0 question an4 the neaeasity arlslng a6 

to the priority of meat of any suoh uarrant, they&all be EL in order of' their 

aerfal number auoh ruTrant to be numbered 

at all timer In the orber of reoelving the 

acoounto in the Cozptrollar'e otfiae. . . .I 

Under pour statesent of fmts, in thla situatton 

there aan be no question and neaesaity arising 88 to the 

priority of payment? of warrantrr, for the righta 0r no parson6 othemise entitle4 ta priority of paymnt of warrant0 

held by then OILI be in any aa::ner prejudloed by euoh a tramaotlon. You are therefore advlae4 that, fn our opin5.on. you 

may aooept this warrant for deposit, and the Treemaser ~111 

be authorized to "pay" the same "ahead of call" by edjusting 

ix&f3 aocountta aaaordlngly. 

Thltr opinion, or oourse, is not to be oonetrued am 

approving such a transaotion in any situation other than one 

of the i4entloal type pre8ented for examination la your letter. 

Ycure very truly 

Al’T3RRFX GENlPZAL OF TEXAS 

AppROVEi;~~ 2, 1940 

RwFrGa .u 

A~~~~EY GENERAL 0" WXAS
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

**JAMES MITCHELL,**

**Petitioner**

**v.**

**COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DELAWARE COUNTY,** 

**Respondent :** 

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**: No. 1 MM 2016** 

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW **, this 7th day of March, 2016, the Application for Lea ve to File Original** 

**Process is** GRANTED **, and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Extr aordinary** 

**Relief is** DENIED

**.**

**Justice Eakin did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.**
#### § 60-300.64 [Reserved]
§ 101.1413 License term and construction requirements. ( a ) The MVDDS license term is ten years, beginning on the date of the initial authorization grant.
( b ) As a construction requirement, MVDDS licensees must make a showing of substantial service at the end of five years into the license period and ten years into the license period. The substantial service requirement is defined as a service that is sound, favorable, and substantially above a level of mediocre service which might minimally warrant renewal. At the end of five years into the license term and ten years into the license period, the Commission will consider factors such as: ( 1 ) Whether the licensee's operations service niche markets or focus on serving populations outside of areas serviced by other MVDDS licensees;
( 2 ) Whether the licensee's operations serve populations with limited access to telecommunications services; and
( 3 ) A demonstration of service to a significant portion of the population or land area of the licensed area.
( c ) The renewal application of an MVDDS licensee is governed by § 1.949 of this chapter.
[69 FR 31746, June 7, 2004, as amended at 82 FR 41549, Sept. 1, 2017]
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                             <C>
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          FEB-01-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             FEB-04-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               NOV-02-1996
<CASH>                                            5263
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                     7037
<ALLOWANCES>                                       100
<INVENTORY>                                     103284
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                118887
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<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  143288
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<BONDS>                                          18107
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                            90
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<CGS>                                           137106
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   137106
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  3311
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                1399
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   1970
<INCOME-TAX>                                       768
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               1202
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                      1202
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .13
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .13
        

</TABLE>
No. 11-9254.

#### Broden *v.*United States.

C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-7848

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

LEROY DAVIS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior District

Judge. (CR-95-120-F, CA-98-748-5-F)

Submitted: February 21, 2002 Decided: March 5, 2002

Before WILKINS, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Leroy Davis, Appellant Pro Se. Rudolf A. Renfer, Jr., Assistant

United States Attorney, Thomas B. Murphy, Assistant United States

Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Leroy Davis appeals the district court’s order denying his

motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2001). We have

reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no

reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district

court. See United States v. Davis, Nos. CR-95-120-F; CA-98-748-5-F

(E.D.N.C. Sept. 5, 2001). We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED
FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT J UNE 11 2007 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

N o. 06- 1451 8

D. C. Docket N o. 05-00741 CV -O RL -31-KR S PATRICK E. MAHONEY, SR., Pl ai nti ff -Appe lla nt,

ve rs us NOKIA, INC., De fendant-Appellee.

Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the Mi ddl e D ist ri ct

of F lor ida
(J un e 11, 200 7) Before DU BIN A a nd BLA CK, Circuit Judges, and RE ST AN I, * Judg e. PE R CU RIA M:

_____________________________ *Honora ble J ane A . Restani, Chief J udg e, United States Court of Interna tional Trade , sitti ng by desig nation.I n his brief on a ppeal, Ma honey attempts to challeng e thre e additional order s of the district 1 court: (1) the district c ourt’s order denying Mahoney ’s sur-re ply motion; (2) the district court’s orde r g iving e ffe ct to Mahoney ’s stipulation of dismi ssal; and (3) the district court’s orde r den y i ng Mahoney ’s motion for a pr otective or der. We c onclude that we either la ck jurisdiction to reviewany of these or ders on the g round that they wer e not de signa ted in Mahoney ’s notice of appea l or, they a re oth e rw ise wi tho ut m e ri t. Al tho ug h th is w a s n ot t

he ba sis of

the dis tr ic t c ou rt ’s g ra

nt o f s umm a ry

jud g me nt, “ [t]his 2 court may

aff irm the district court whe re the judgme n t en t er ed is corr ect on a ny leg al g round reg ardle ss of the g rounds addr essed, a dopted or re jected by the district court.” Bonanni Ship Supply, Inc. v . United States , 959 F.2d 1558, 1561 ( 11th Cir. 1992).

2 Ap p el l an t , P at ri ck E. M ah o n ey, S r. (“Ma h o n ey”) , a p p ea l s t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s
gr an t of sum m ar y j udgm en t i n f

av or of N oki a, I nc . ( “ N oki a” ), in thi s F am ily a nd Medical L eave A ct (“ FML A” ) ca se. 1 A ft er r ev ie w ing the r ec or d, r ea din g th e pa rt ie s’ br ie fs , a nd h av ing the be ne fi t of or al a rg um en t, w e af

fi rm the dis tr ic t c our t’ s gr an t of sum m ar y j udgm en t
on t he gr ound

tha t M ah one y

w as not a n “ el igi ble ” em

plo y ee a t t he ti m e tha t he requested FML A le ave. 2 AFFIRMED.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED December 17, 2004 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-40272 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus CRISTOBAL SANCHEZ-PENA, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 7:03-CR-22-1

-------------------- Before KING, Chief Judge, and DeMOSS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Cristobal Sanchez-Pena (“Sanchez”) pleaded guilty to illegally re-entering the United States after having been deported, a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), and his sentence was enhanced pursuant to the “aggravated felony” provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b). The district court sentenced him to 33 months in prison and to three years of supervised release. Sanchez contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence of his deportation. He arguesNo. 04-40272 -2- that his 1998 deportation proceeding violated the Due Process Clause because the immigration judge erroneously informed him that he was ineligible for discretionary relief from deportation under former § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Sanchez concedes that his contention is foreclosed by this court’s case law, but he raises the claim to preserve it for further review. An immigration judge’s error in informing an alien of eligibility for forms of discretionary relief under the INA does not violate the alien’s right to due process. United States v. Lopez-Ortiz , 313 F.3d 225, 230-31 (5th Cir. 2002) . The district court did not err by denying Sanchez’s motion to suppress evidence of his deportation. For the first time on appeal, Sanchez argues that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because it does not require the fact of a prior felony or aggravated-felony conviction to be charged in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. As Sanchez concedes, this argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224 (1998), and Almendarez-Torres was not overruled by Apprendi

. See United States v. Sarmiento-Funes , 374 F.3d 336, 346 (5th Cir. 2004). Sanchez also argues that the Supreme Court’s holding in Blakely v. Washington , 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), should be applied to sentences determined under the United States SentencingNo. 04-40272 -3- Guidelines. He concedes that this argument is foreclosed by this court’s recent opinion in United States v. Pineiro , 377 F.3d 464, 465 (5th Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed (U.S. July 14, 2004) (No. 04-5263), but he raises it to preserve it for possible further review.

AFFIRMED.
#### § 301-31.6 Where must I and/or my family obtain lodging?

Your agency designates the area where you and/or your family should obtain lodging. It may be within your official station or at an alternate location.