COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2017COA65

Court of Appeals No. 15CA1394

Lake County District Court No. 14CR32

Honorable D. Wayne Patton, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

William Steven Berry,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART,

AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division II

Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES

Dailey and Berger, JJ., concur

Announced May 18, 2017

Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Jacob R. Lofgren, Assistant Attorney 

General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Elkus Sisson & Rosenstein, P.C., Donald C. Sisson, Reid J. Elkus, Denver, 

Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellant
1

¶ 1 A jury found William Steven Berry guilty of embezzlement of 

public property and first degree official misconduct. He appeals, 

contending that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the 

convictions; (2) the district court erred in defining for the jury

“public property” as used in the embezzlement statute; and (3) the 

embezzlement conviction and felony theft acquittal were 

inconsistent, requiring that the embezzlement conviction be 

vacated.

¶ 2 We affirm Berry’s conviction for first degree official 

misconduct, but, because we conclude that there was insufficient 

evidence to prove the embezzlement of public property charge, we 

vacate that conviction.

I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History

¶ 3 Berry was a sheriff’s deputy when he and two other deputies 

responded to a domestic violence call involving a husband and his 

wife. The wife told the officers that her husband owned four guns 

and she wanted them removed from her home. The officers took the 

guns and put them in the Lake County Sheriff’s evidence locker, 

where the guns remained while the domestic violence charges 

against the husband were pending.
2

¶ 4 After those charges were resolved, the district attorney 

authorized the sheriff to either destroy the guns or return them to 

their rightful owner. Because the owner of the guns (the husband) 

had been deported from the United States, the sheriff could not 

return them to him (even if he were otherwise legally entitled to 

them), so the sheriff planned to destroy them. However, before the 

guns were destroyed, Berry supposedly bought the guns from the 

wife.

¶ 5 Berry saw the wife while he was on duty, in full uniform, and 

driving his patrol car. He followed her in his patrol car to a nearby 

gas station and approached her to discuss buying the guns. When 

she questioned the legality of such a sale, Berry said, “of course [it 

is legal]. I am a representative of the law. If I come to you with this 

offer, it is because I can do it, because it is legal.” The wife agreed 

to sell the guns, including a rare and valuable pistol, to Berry, for 

$500.

¶ 6 After obtaining the guns, Berry gave one of them to the deputy 

in charge of the evidence locker who had released the guns, and 

agreed to sell the pistol to an out-of-state buyer.
3

¶ 7 Both Berry and the wife agreed that Berry paid the wife $500 

for the guns, but the evidence regarding how or from whom Berry 

obtained possession of the guns was inconsistent. Berry argued 

that the wife signed a sheriff’s department release form and then 

sold the guns to him a week later. But the wife testified that she 

never signed the release form, denied that she had ever gone to the 

sheriff’s office to pick up the guns, and testified that she never saw 

the guns after she asked the officers to remove them from her 

home. 

¶ 8 As a result of these events, the People charged Berry with 

embezzlement of public property, felony theft, taking possession of 

a firearm before completion of a firearms transfer background 

check, and first degree official misconduct. The district court 

instructed the jury, over defense counsel’s objection, that “property 

is something owned or possessed.” The jury acquitted defendant of 

felony theft and the background check charge, but found him guilty

of embezzlement of public property and first degree official 

misconduct.
4

II. The Evidence Was Insufficient to Support the Embezzlement 

Conviction

¶ 9 Berry argues that the evidence admitted at trial was, for two 

reasons, insufficient to support a guilty verdict on the 

embezzlement charge. First, he argues that the statute under 

which he was charged — section 18-8-407, C.R.S. 2016 — requires 

proof that the property he converted — the four guns — was owned, 

and not merely possessed, by Lake County, and that there was no 

evidence that Lake County owned the guns. Second, he argues that 

there was no evidence that he converted the guns: he had no 

authorization to remove them from the Sheriff’s Office evidence 

room, and it was undisputed that another deputy actually removed 

them from the evidence room. We agree with Berry’s first 

argument, and therefore do not reach his second.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 10 Berry’s first argument requires us to determine two things. 

Initially, we must determine the meaning of “public property” in 

section 18-8-407(1). That, of course, is an issue of law that we 

decide de novo. Marsh v. People, 2017 CO 10M, ¶ 19. If we 

determine that “public property” in section 18-8-407(1) is limited to 
5

property that is publicly owned, we must then determine whether 

the evidence was sufficient to establish that element.1 That too is 

an issue that we decide de novo. Id. 

B. “Public Property” as Used in Section 18-8-407(1) Is Limited to 

Property Owned by the State or a Political Subdivision Thereof

¶ 11 Section 18-8-407(1) provides as follows:

Every public servant who lawfully or 

unlawfully comes into possession of any public 

moneys or public property of whatever 

description, being the property of the state or 

of any political subdivision of the state, and 

who knowingly converts any of such public 

moneys or property to his own use or to any 

use other than the public use authorized by 

law is guilty of embezzlement of public 

property. Every person convicted under the 

provisions of this section shall be forever 

thereafter ineligible and disqualified from being 

a member of the general assembly of this state 

or from holding any office of trust or profit in 

this state.

¶ 12 Because no statutory provision defines the term “public 

property” as used in section 18-8-407(1), we must determine the 

General Assembly’s intent in using the term by employing 

well-established maxims of statutory construction.

 

1 If we determine that “public property” includes property merely 

possessed by the state, we don’t need to decide whether the 

evidence was insufficient to show that Lake County possessed the 

guns because Berry doesn’t argue that it isn’t.
6

¶ 13 We begin by attributing to the words and phrases used in the 

statute their plain and ordinary meanings. People v. Perez, 238 

P.3d 665, 669 (Colo. 2010). And we consider the words or phrases 

at issue in context — both in the context of the statute of which the 

words or phrases are a part and in the context of any 

comprehensive statutory scheme of which the statute is a part. 

People v. Hill, 228 P.3d 171, 173-74 (Colo. App. 2009); see Krol v. 

CF & I Steel, 2013 COA 32, ¶ 15. By applying these principles, we 

may discover more or less direct clues to the meaning of the 

pertinent words or phrases, while harmonizing that meaning with 

the remainder of the related statutory provisions. See Doubleday v. 

People, 2016 CO 3, ¶ 20 (court must “read the scheme as a whole, 

giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its 

parts”). And if, after applying these principles, we determine that 

the relevant words or phrases are unambiguous, we enforce them 

as written, and we won’t resort to other rules of statutory 

construction. People v. Zapotocky, 869 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Colo. 

1994); People v. Shores, 2016 COA 129, ¶ 16.

¶ 14 But sometimes applying these principles to statutory language 

fails to yield a clear meaning; the language remains susceptible of 
7

more than one reasonable interpretation. See People v. Diaz, 2015 

CO 28, ¶ 13 (“[I]f the statutory language is susceptible of more than 

one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous . . . .”). When that is 

the case, we may, indeed must, employ other rules of statutory 

interpretation. Id.; People v. Jones, 2015 CO 20, ¶ 10. Those rules 

include rules adopted by the General Assembly, see, e.g., § 2-4-203, 

C.R.S. 2016, and those created by the courts, see Jones, ¶ 10. 

Which of these rules sheds light obviously varies from case to case. 

¶ 15 So, does the term “public property” have a plain meaning? 

Considered in isolation, it doesn’t. Or at least its meaning is not 

sufficiently plain to resolve the issue before us.2 This is because, in 

ways relevant to this case, “property” can mean different things. A 

perusal of various dictionaries shows that “property” can mean 

something either owned or possessed — a definition that would 

support the People’s position — or something owned (i.e., something 

 

2 We acknowledge that the division in People v. Gallegos, 260 P.3d 

15, 22 (Colo. App. 2010), applied a definition of “public property” 

from Black’s Law Dictionary in assessing the legal sufficiency of an 

embezzlement charge under section 18-8-407, C.R.S. 2016. That 

definition is “state- or community-owned property not restricted to 

any one individual’s use or possession.” Black’s Law Dictionary 

1254 (8th ed. 2004). But the division didn’t engage in any statutory 

interpretation, nor did it take account of different definitions of 

“property” from other sources. 
8

that someone has the exclusive right to possess, enjoy, and dispose 

of) — a definition that would support Berry’s position. See, e.g., 

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 996 (11th ed. 2004); 

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1818 (2002); The 

American Heritage Dictionary 1405 (4th ed. 2000); Webster’s Third 

New International Dictionary 1818 (1976); Webster’s New 

International Dictionary 1984 (2d ed. 1940).3 Adding the word 

“public” to the term aids little in determining the meaning of 

“property” under the statute because that word merely indicates 

whose property must be converted.

¶ 16 Turning to the context of the language, we see that it gives 

some indication of the meaning of “public property.” Immediately 

following the term “public property” is the modifying or explanatory 

phrase “being the property of the state or any political subdivision 

of the state.” The phrase “property of the state” tends to indicate 

that property subject to the statute is property belonging to the 

 

3 Case law recognizes that dictionary definitions may be helpful in 

determining the meaning of undefined statutory terms. See, e.g., 

People v. Graves, 2016 CO 15, ¶ 33; People v. Janousek, 871 P.2d 

1189, 1196 (1994); People v. Oliver, 2016 COA 180M, ¶ 35. But 

we’re mindful of the limitations and imperfections of such sources. 

See United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1043-44 (7th Cir. 

2012).
9

state. See United States v. Mason, 218 U.S. 517, 521, 531 (1910) 

(applying federal statutes; court clerk not guilty of embezzling 

“public moneys” or “money or other property of the United States” 

because the funds received never “belong[ed] to” the United States)

(citation omitted); Fellers v. State, 136 S.W.2d 217, 217-18 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1940) (embezzlement statute prohibiting an agent from 

embezzling “property of” a principal or employer requires proof that 

the agent received property belonging to the principal). And the 

concept of “belonging to” would, in turn, seem to equate to 

ownership. Cf. United States v. Klinger, 61 F.3d 1234, 1239-40 (6th 

Cir. 1995) (under federal embezzlement statute, “the use of the 

possessive phrasing ‘of the United States’ confirms that federal 

ownership of stolen property is a jurisdictional prerequisite”). 

¶ 17 Also, a person is culpable under section 18-8-407(1) only if he 

“knowingly converts any of such public moneys or property to his 

own use or to any use other than the public use authorized by law.”

(Emphasis added.) This language seems inconsistent with the 

notion that “public property” includes property merely possessed by 

the state; one would ordinarily think of property designated by law 

for a public use as property owned by the government.
10

¶ 18 Nonetheless, we are not quite persuaded that these contextual 

clues give unambiguous meaning to the term “public property.” We 

look then to other interpretive aids. We find former laws on the 

same subject, the objective of the statute, and common law

particularly helpful. See § 2-4-203(1)(a), (d); Martin v. People, 27 

P.3d 846, 851 (Colo. 2001).

¶ 19 Since statehood, Colorado has had a statute criminalizing 

embezzlement of public property by public officials. The earliest 

such enactment applied to the embezzlement of money and tangible 

items, including “property of whatever description it may be, being 

the property of said state, county or corporate body.” G.L. 1877, 

§ 658. It was accompanied by a statute criminalizing the failure of 

a public official to remit money “belonging to this state” to the 

public fund for which the official was holding the money, including, 

in addition to those funds specifically named, “any other fund now 

in being or hereafter to be established by law for public purposes.” 

G.L. 1877, § 659. For many years, these laws remained unchanged 

in any relevant way. See G.S. 1883, §§ 768, 769 (for the first time 

both titled as “Embezzlement”); Mills’ Ann. Stat. §§ 1245, 1246 

(1891); R.S. 1908, §§ 1691, 1692; C.L. 1921, §§ 6735, 6736; C.S.A. 
11

1935, Ch. 48, §§ 100, 101; §§ 40-5-17, -18, C.R.S. 1953; §§ 40-5-

16, -17, C.R.S. 1963. Section 18-8-407 appears to be a direct 

descendent of the first embezzlement statute.

¶ 20 In 1889, the General Assembly adopted additional prohibitory 

statutes relating to the misuse of public money by public officials. 

These statutes addressed using public funds for private purposes, 

lending public money, and contracting to obtain a benefit from 

depositing public money with another. 1889 Colo. Sess. Laws 

297-99; see People v. Schneider, 133 Colo. 173, 176-77, 292 P.2d 

982, 984-85 (1956) (discussing such laws); Moulton v. McLean, 5 

Colo. App. 454, 459-61, 39 P. 78, 80-81 (1895) (same). Our 

appellate courts have recognized that these provisions were enacted 

to carry out article 10, section 13 of the Colorado Constitution, 

which says: “The making of profit, directly or indirectly, out of state, 

county, city, town or school district money, or using the same for 

any purpose not authorized by law, by any public officer, shall be 

deemed a felony, and shall be punished as provided by law.” See 

Schneider, 133 Colo. at 177, 292 P.2d at 985; Moulton, 5 Colo. App. 

at 461, 39 P. at 81.
12

¶ 21 The objective of this constitutional provision is to prohibit the 

misuse of money belonging to the public and which is designated 

for some public purpose. We think this objective at least implicitly 

contemplates ownership of the money or property by the public, 

and not mere custody or possession. And therefore, absent any 

indication to the contrary, statutes enacted to further this objective 

are so limited. The nature and timing of enactment of the 

embezzlement statute from which section 18-8-407 is derived 

indicates that the first embezzlement statute was among those 

statutes.

¶ 22 Now, it is true that section 18-8-407 is not worded precisely as 

it was for the better part of a century.4 But it retains language from 

the older versions relating to the nature of the property: the 

property must be “property of the state.” § 18-8-407 (emphasis 

added). And the current version, like the earlier statutes relating to 

use of public money held by public officials, expressly contemplates 

a “public use” for the property. So we conclude that the cases 

 

4 It appears that the General Assembly adopted the current 

language in 1967. See Ch. 312, sec. 7, § 40-5-16, 1967 Colo. Sess. 

Laws 575 (and limiting the statute to embezzlement of “public 

moneys”); Ch. 121, sec. 1, § 18-8-407, 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 462 

(adding back in “public property”).
13

applying related statutes support the notion that section 18-8-407 

furthers the objective of article 10, section 13 — to prohibit misuse 

of money and property owned by the public.

¶ 23 Our preliminary conclusion that “public property” as used in 

section 18-8-407(1) means property owned by the public finds 

further support in cases addressing misuse of public money. In 

Wright v. People, 104 Colo. 335, 341-42, 91 P.2d 499, 502-03

(1939), the supreme court, applying a related statute (one of those 

adopted in 1889) barring the use of “public funds or moneys” for 

private purposes, held that certain money received by a county 

official wasn’t subject to the statute because it didn’t “belong[] to” 

the county: the money “never was a part of the public funds of the 

county; it belonged to [private individuals].” 

¶ 24 A few years later, in Starr v. People, 113 Colo. 268, 157 P.2d 

135 (1945), the court, applying the same statute, held that fees, 

fines, and penalties collected by public officials were funds subject 

to the statute because the officials were obligated to turn them over 

to the state treasurer. In so holding, the court expressly 

distinguished the facts from those in Wright; in Starr, the money 
14

belonged to the state, while in Wright it did not. Id. at 274, 157 

P.2d at 137.

¶ 25 And in People v. Fielden, 162 Colo. 574, 427 P.2d 880 (1967), 

the court clearly indicated that the same statute applies only to 

funds owned by the government: 

An essential element of the crime of 

“embezzlement” or “criminal conversion”

charged herein is that the property must be 

owned by another and the conversion thereof 

must be without the consent and against the 

will of the party to whom the property belongs,

coupled with the fraudulent intent to deprive 

the owner of the property. 

Id. at 576, 427 P.2d at 881 (citation omitted).

¶ 26 Given the similarity between the statute applied in Wright, 

Starr, and Fielden and section 18-8-407,5 and their shared 

objective, a similar limitation on the application of the latter makes 

sense.

¶ 27 And if these indications weren’t enough, considering the 

common law origin and purpose of the crime of embezzlement 

 

5 The statute applied in Wright, Starr, and Fielden provided that any 

public officer who “convert[ed] to his own use . . . , . . . use[d], by 

way of investment . . . , or . . . ma[d]e way with or secrete[d] any . . . 

public funds or moneys . . . received for safe keeping, disbursement, 

transfer, or for any other purpose” would be subject to five years’ 

imprisonment. C.S.A. 1935, Ch. 48, § 262.
15

confirms that mere custody or possession of money or property is 

insufficient to support an embezzlement charge under section 

18-8-407.

¶ 28 At early common law, larceny was the first “theft” crime. A 

person committed larceny by taking property owned by another 

from the owner’s possession without the owner’s consent. Such a 

“trespass in the taking” was a required element of the offense. 3 

Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 19.1(a), at 57 (2d ed. 

2003). So if one was already in lawful possession of the owner’s 

property, he committed no trespass in the taking — and hence no 

larceny — by later converting it to his own use. To remedy this 

problem, legislatures created the crime of embezzlement, which 

doesn’t require a trespass in the taking. Id. at §§ 19.1(a)-(b), 

19.6(a); see Gill v. People, 139 Colo. 401, 407, 339 P.2d 1000, 1003 

(1959); Phenneger v. People, 85 Colo. 442, 454, 276 P. 983, 987 

(1929) (“Embezzlement is common law larceny extended by statute 

to cover cases where the stolen property comes originally into the 

possession of the defendant without a trespass.” (quoting Moody v. 

People, 65 Colo. 339, 339, 176 P. 476, 476 (1918))).
16

¶ 29 Embezzlement therefore “includes all cases where one intrusts 

the care of his property to another, as his agent, who fraudulently 

appropriates it to his own use, or fraudulently misapplies it. It is 

made to cover a class and kind of larceny where the property stolen 

comes into the hands of the defendant originally with the owner’s 

consent . . . .” Moody, 65 Colo. at 340, 176 P. at 476 (emphasis 

added); accord Lewis v. People, 109 Colo. 89, 97-98, 123 P.2d 398, 

403 (1942). It’s a crime against the owner of the property. People v. 

Feldstein, 174 N.E. 843, 845 (Ill. 1931).

¶ 30 From all of this, we think it necessarily follows that “public 

moneys or public property” in section 18-8-407 means (and is 

limited to) money or property owned by the public (i.e., the state or 

one of its political subdivisions).6

 

6 We therefore apply a meaning of “public property” like that applied 

by the division in Gallegos. One part of the definition applied in 

Gallegos is potentially confusing. That definition is, as noted above, 

“state- or community-owned property not restricted to any one 

individual’s use or possession.” 260 P.3d at 23 (quoting Black’s

Law Dictionary at 1254). But what does “not restricted to any one 

individual’s use or possession” mean? Does it mean that public 

property does not include state-owned property that is used by only 

one public official or employee (such as, say, a computer or 

automobile)? No. As earlier versions of Black’s show, that phrase

is merely another way of saying privately owned property. See 

Henry Campbell Black, Dictionary of Law 963 (1891) (public 
17

¶ 31 Contrary to the People’s suggestion, People v. Skrbek, 42 Colo. 

App. 431, 599 P.2d 272 (1979), does not support their position that 

mere custody or possession of money or property by the government 

is sufficient. In that case, the division applied section 18-8-407. 

The funds at issue were funds distributed by the federal 

government to the state to be used by the state for crime prevention 

and control. The division held that the state’s “qualified ownership” 

of the funds was sufficient to support the charge. Id. at 432, 599 

P.2d at 272-73; see also Price v. People, 78 Colo. 223, 226, 240 P. 

688, 689 (1925) (“[Q]ualified ownership is sufficient to support a 

charge of embezzlement.”) (applying an unspecified public official 

embezzlement statute). We read Skrbek as consistent with the 

notion that public ownership of funds or property is a necessary 

element of a charge under section 18-8-407.

 

property includes “those things which are publici juris, . . . and 

therefore considered as being owned by ‘the public,’ the entire state 

or community, and not restricted to the dominion of a private 

person”); id. at 965 (“publici juris” means “things which are owned 

by ‘the public;’ that is, the entire state or community, and not by 

any private person”).
18

¶ 32 Having determined the meaning of “public property” in section 

18-8-407, we turn to determining whether the firearms at issue fall 

within that meaning.

C. Berry Did Not Convert Any “Public Property”

¶ 33 The People concede that Lake County didn’t own the guns. 

And the People have never alleged that any other public entity 

owned them. There is no evidence of such ownership in the record; 

rather, the evidence shows that the husband owned them. The 

evidence, therefore, even viewed in the light most favorable to the 

People, see Dempsey v. People, 117 P.3d 800, 807 (Colo. 2005), is

insufficient to support Berry’s conviction for embezzlement. We 

vacate that conviction and remand for dismissal of the 

embezzlement charge with prejudice.7

III. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Support the Official Misconduct 

Conviction 

¶ 34 Berry contends that the evidence didn’t sufficiently prove that 

he committed “an act relating to his office but constituting an 

unauthorized exercise of his official function,” an element of first 

degree official misconduct. More specifically, he argues that his 

 

7 Given our resolution of this issue, we need not resolve Berry’s 

other contentions relating to his embezzlement conviction.
19

purchase of the guns, under the evidence presented, was not an act 

relating to his office.

¶ 35 Although there is no Colorado legal authority defining the 

scope of acts that “relate to [an] office,” at least one other state has 

a similar official misconduct statute, and its courts have construed 

the term “relating to his office.”

¶ 36 The New Jersey official misconduct statute provides that a 

public servant is guilty of official misconduct when “[h]e commits an 

act relating to his office but constituting an unauthorized exercise 

of his official functions.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:30-2(a) (West 2016). 

In State v. Schultz, 367 A.2d 423, 430 (N.J. 1976), the defendant 

was a precinct clerk who used “his De facto authority” to cause for 

his personal benefit the cashing of a check made payable, not to 

him, but to the municipal violations bureau. The New Jersey 

Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument that cashing the 

check wasn’t part of his official duties as a precinct clerk because 

the fact that his “duties and authority did not in fact extend to such 

activities is not controlling on the question of whether they were 

done under color of office.” Id.
20

¶ 37 More recently, in State v. Bullock, 642 A.2d 397 (N.J. 1994), 

the defendant, a suspended state trooper, retained his police

identification card, which he then used to detain an alleged drug 

dealer. He also used the card to identify himself as a state trooper 

to another officer. Id. at 398. In affirming the defendant’s official 

misconduct conviction, the court held that “when law-enforcement 

officers commit an act of malfeasance because of the office they 

hold or because of the opportunity afforded by that office, their 

conduct sufficiently relates to their office to support a conviction.” 

Id. at 401.

¶ 38 Like the defendants in the New Jersey cases, Berry committed 

an act relating to his office because he used his office as a sheriff’s 

deputy to facilitate and effectuate the purchase of the guns. Berry 

followed the wife in his police car, spoke to her while in full police 

uniform, and gave her comfort that, because he was a police officer, 

the transaction was lawful.

¶ 39 These facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, support a finding by the jury that Berry used his office 

to facilitate and engage in an unlawful transaction and thus 

committed “an act relating to his office but constituting an 
21

unauthorized exercise of his official function.” Thus, we conclude 

that sufficient evidence supports the official misconduct conviction.

IV. Conclusion

¶ 40 The judgment of conviction for embezzlement of public 

property is vacated, and the trial court is instructed on remand to 

enter a judgment of acquittal on that charge.

¶ 41 The judgment of conviction for first degree official misconduct 

is affirmed.

JUDGE DAILEY and JUDGE BERGER concur.