1

Filed 4/12/22; Certified for Partial Publication 4/27/22 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

IAN CZIRBAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

 H048989

 (Monterey County

 Super. Ct. No. SS170589A)

Defendant Ian Czirban appeals from a victim restitution order imposed as a 

condition of probation following his conviction for several business-related crimes. 

Czirban’s crimes came to light after a July 2016 accident that killed Robert Reagan III, 

while he was operating Czirban’s bulldozer in aid of the California Department of 

Forestry and Fire Protection (Cal Fire) at a wildfire in Monterey County. A postaccident

investigation revealed that Czirban did not have workers’ compensation insurance.

The trial court convicted Czirban of procuring or offering a false or forged 

instrument, tax evasion, failure to collect, account for, or pay taxes, and misdemeanor 

failure to secure payment of workers’ compensation insurance. The trial court suspended 

imposition of sentence, placed Czirban on felony probation for three years, and reserved 
2

the issue of victim restitution. Czirban appealed the judgment of conviction to this 

court.

1

 

While that appeal was pending, the trial court ordered Czirban to pay, as a 

condition of his probation, victim restitution in the amount of $70,667.56 to Morgan K.,

Reagan’s partner and the mother of their two children.

2 Czirban now appeals that order. 

(Pen. Code, § 1237, subd. (b).

3

)

Czirban contends the trial court improperly awarded restitution for attorney fees 

because the award rests on a violation of the Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act)

related to a survivors’ benefit paid to Morgan by the State of California. Czirban further 

claims that the restitution award is invalid as a probation condition because the attorney 

fees lack a rational nexus to his misconduct, are excessive, and were unreasonably 

calculated. Additionally, Czirban asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in 

awarding interest.

For the reasons explained below, we reverse the award of $22,485.13 in interest 

and remand to the trial court with directions. In all other respects, the order is affirmed.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Robert Reagan, III died on July 26, 2016, while operating Czirban’s bulldozer at 

the Soberanes wildfire in Monterey County. Reagan was ejected from the bulldozer and 

1 By separate order in this case, we took judicial notice of the record in Czirban’s 

appeal from the judgment (No. H047748). Additionally, on our own motion, we take 

judicial notice of our prior opinion, People v. Czirban (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1073

(Czirban I). (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)

2 To protect the privacy of the victim, we refer to her last name by its first initial. 

We similarly refer to her minor children by their initials. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.90(b)(4).)

3 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

crushed to death by it. An investigation into Czirban’s business (Czirban Concrete 

Construction) commenced after the accident.

4

 

In May 2018, the Monterey County District Attorney charged Czirban with seven 

crimes related to his business conduct: insurance fraud (§ 550, subd. (b)(3); count 1),

workers’ compensation fraud (Ins. Code, § 11760, subd. (a); count 2), two counts of 

procuring and offering a false or forged instrument (§ 115, subd. (a); count 3 [occurring 

on or about March 15, 2016] and count 4 [occurring on or about May 2, 2014]), tax 

evasion (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 2117.5; count 5), failure to collect, account for, or pay 

taxes (§ 2118.5; count 6), and misdemeanor failure to secure payment of workers’ 

compensation insurance (Lab. Code, § 3700.5, subd. (a); count 7). 

After a court trial, the trial court convicted Czirban on counts 4 through 7 and 

found him not guilty on counts 2 and 3.5

In December 2019, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed 

Czirban on felony probation for three years with various conditions. The court also 

reserved the issue of victim restitution and continued the case for a restitution hearing. 

Czirban appealed the judgment of conviction; this court decided that appeal in August 

2021.

6

 (Czirban I, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1078–1079.)

While Czirban’s appeal from the judgment was pending, the trial court proceeded 

to address the issue of victim restitution. In January 2021, the parties stipulated that the 

4 We state the facts and procedural history based on the record in this appeal and 

our prior opinion, which sets forth more fully the trial procedure and facts of Czirban’s 

crimes. (See Czirban, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1078–1086.) 

5 During trial, the court granted the district attorney’s motion to dismiss count 1. 

6

In Czirban’s appeal from the judgment, this court reversed the order of probation 

and remanded the matter for resentencing with directions to modify Czirban’s term of 

probation in accord with current section 1203.1, subdivision (a). (Czirban, supra, 67 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 1095, 1097.) We affirmed the judgment in all other respects. (Id. at 

p. 1098.) 
4

trial court could decide the issue upon written briefs and declarations in lieu of live

testimony. 

In a declaration submitted by the district attorney in support of restitution, Morgan 

K. declared that Reagan was her “significant other” with whom she had lived before the 

July 2016 accident and shared two minor children, C.R. and A.R. In 2015 and 2016, 

Morgan and the children “were financially dependent on [Reagan’s] employment 

income.” Shortly after Reagan’s death, Morgan discovered that Czirban did not have 

workers’ compensation insurance. “Concerned about the lack of insurance benefits for 

A.R., C.R. and [herself], [Morgan] retained legal counsel, Thomas Tusan . . ., in 

approximately September 2016.” Tusan filed claims on behalf of Morgan and her 

children with the Uninsured Employers’ Benefits Trust Fund (UEBTF) “for death 

benefits and recovery of funeral expenses.” “On or about April 8, 2020 – over 3 years 

and 9 months after [Reagan’s] death, [Morgan] signed a Compromise and Release 

Agreement [(C&RA)] in the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board [(WCAB)] action 

Robert Reagan Deceased v. Czirban Concrete Construction, LLC, Et Al. (Case No. 

ADJ10613433).” (Italics added & underlining omitted.)

According to Morgan’s declaration, under the C&RA, Morgan (as Reagan’s 

putative spouse) and her children “were to receive a total payment of $310,218.80 for 

death benefits and funeral expenses, less $47,557.43 in professional fees and cost 

reimbursement to [her] attorney Mr. Tusan.” Other documents in the record indicate that 

the C&RA’s total settlement amount was apparently composed of $305,400.10 for death 

benefits, $3,613.27 for actual funeral/burial expenses, and $1,205.43 for legal costs 

“advanced by [Tusan,] who will be reimbursed.” The C&RA did not include the attorney 

fees Morgan owed Tusan ($46,352). Morgan agreed that the state would pay Tusan his 

attorney fees directly and the settlement amount she and the children received would be 

reduced by the amount paid to Tusan.
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The WCAB thereafter issued an “Order Approving Compromise and Release,” 

based on the terms of the C&RA, and finding the settlement to be “reasonable and fair.” 

The order specified the total amount payable to Morgan and the children, “less 

$1,205.43” in reimbursement for litigation costs to Morgan’s attorney, and “less 

$46,352.00 for reasonable attorney fees.” (Boldface omitted.)

Shortly after issuing the “Order Approving Compromise and Release,” the WCAB 

issued a stay and “Notice of Intent to Approve Compromise and Release,” which stated 

the “notice of intent to order approval of compromise and release is herewith issued,” and

that it would be vacated upon “a written showing of good cause within 20 days.” (Some 

capitalization omitted.) 

After the 20-day period had elapsed without any objection having been filed, the 

WCAB issued an “Order Reinstating Order Approving Compromise and Release” 

(WCAB order). The WCAB order directed the parties “to comply with the provisions of 

that order.” (Capitalization omitted.) The service list for the WCAB order and the 

“Notice of Intent to Approve Compromise and Release” included multiple addresses for 

Czirban individually and for Czirban Concrete Construction. 

In July and October 2020, Morgan received $131,330.68 from the State 

Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF) (on behalf of Cal Fire) and another $131,330.68 

from the UEBTF, for a total of $262,661.36. Morgan also “verified with Mr. Tusan that 

he ha[d] received his fees and costs of $47,557.43.” 

In her declaration in support of her restitution request, Morgan asked the trial court 

for “(a) the $625 in unpaid wages promised to [Reagan] by Mr. Czirban, (b) the 

$47,557.43 in attorney[] fees and costs that [she] paid to Mr. Tusan, and (c) legal interest 

of 10% covering the unpaid death benefits and funeral expenses ($310,218.80) - with that 

interest to be applied to the time frame between [Reagan]’s death on July 26, 2016 and 
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the date of the signing of the C&R[A]: April 8, 2020.”

7

 Morgan stated further that “but 

for Mr. Czirban’s failure to have workers’ compensation insurance, [she] would have 

received the death benefits within a month of [Reagan]’s death, rather than 3 years and 9 

months later.” 

Additionally, the district attorney submitted the declaration of a Cal Fire

employee, Genavina Mabary, regarding Morgan’s and her children’s claims and 

payments made by Cal Fire (through SCIF) to Morgan, her children, and Tusan. The 

district attorney also submitted a declaration by an employee of the California 

Department of Industrial Relations, Cynthia Co, regarding the claims and payments made 

by the UEBTF to Morgan, her children, and attorney Tusan. Co stated that the maximum 

available benefit under the law was $320,000. She also explained how the death benefit 

portion of the total lump sum benefit (i.e., $305,400.10) was calculated under statutory 

formulas governing a situation involving three or more dependents. The death benefit 

calculation used a “Weekly Disability Rate” ($416.65) that was “calculated from 

Reagan’s reported 2015 earnings” and applied that rate to the period from Reagan’s date 

of death through the date his youngest dependent would reach majority “and in 

consideration of the present value.” 

Mabary and Co described the process by which the C&RA was approved in 2020 

by an administrative law judge of the WCAB, as summarized above, and stated that they 

were not aware of Czirban having disputed the C&RA or the WCAB’s determination.

7 We note that, although Morgan requested restitution for legal costs paid to 

Tusan, the record appears to indicate that the $1,205.43 in costs was included in the total 

settlement in addition to the death benefits and funeral expenses she received. That is, 

the $1,205.43 was not deducted from the death benefits and funeral expenses that Morgan 

received from the state under the settlement. Rather, the state reimbursed Tusan directly 

for the unpaid legal costs that he had incurred up to the time of the settlement. By 

contrast, the $46,352 in attorney fees that Morgan owed to Tusan was deducted from her

death benefits and funeral expenses.

On appeal (with a limited exception described post), Czirban does not specifically

challenge the inclusion of costs in the restitution order.
7

In the trial court, Czirban opposed Morgan’s restitution request. Czirban argued 

that “[t]he People failed to prove a factual or legal basis for [the $47,557.43 in attorney 

fees and costs] because they failed to meet their burden of showing that the requested fee 

was reasonable.” Czirban urged the trial court to use the “lodestar” method to determine

the reasonableness of the attorney fees.8 Regarding the request for interest on the 

$310,218.80 lump sum benefit, Czirban argued, inter alia, that “[o]rdering interest on the 

lump sum would amount to a prohibited windfall” because Morgan had received more 

money than she would have through the typical installment payments for a workers’ 

compensation death benefit. Czirban also asserted that the district attorney “failed to 

present a factual basis to determine what the installment payments would have been, a 

fact necessary to calculate the interest accurately.”

On March 26, 2021, by written order,

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the trial court awarded a total of $70,667.56 

in victim restitution payable to Morgan, comprising $625 in unpaid wages, $46,352 in 

attorney fees, $1,205.43 in legal costs, and $22,485.13 in interest.10

The court noted that the attorney fees “were approximately 15% of the total death 

benefit award” and the WCAB judge “specifically identifie[d] $46,352 as ‘reasonable 

attorney fees.’ ” The court also stated that it was “not bound by the ‘Lodestar’ method so 

long as a rational calculation is employed.” The court concluded that the attorney fees 

8

“The lodestar method, or more accurately the lodestar-multiplier method, 

calculates the fee ‘by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel 

by a reasonable hourly rate. Once the court has fixed the lodestar, it may increase or 

decrease that amount by applying a positive or negative “multiplier” to take into account 

a variety of other factors, including the quality of the representation, the novelty and 

complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented.’ ” 

(Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 489.)

9 As explained ante, the trial court’s order indicates the parties stipulated “the 

matter could be heard through briefing and affidavits without the necessity for in[-]court 

testimony.” 

10 The trial court denied restitution requests by Cal Fire and the California 

Department of Industrial Relations for their one-half shares of the $310,218.80 payment 

made to Morgan and her children.
8

and costs were “reasonable and appropriate” and payment of the fees and costs by 

Czirban to Morgan “would serve a rehabilitative purpose” under People v. Lent (1975) 15 

Cal.3d 481 (Lent).

Regarding the award of interest under section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(G)

(hereafter section 1202.4(f)(3)(G)), the court stated that the parties “appear to have 

misunderstood the purpose of” that section when arguing over the requested interest for 

the 45-month period before the benefits settlement. The court explained that, under 

section 1202.4(f)(3)(G), “the principal upon which interest is calculated is the restitution 

order itself. And, as interest, it is designed to account for the time between the date of 

loss (or sentencing) to the date of the restitution order.” The court set the total amount of 

awarded restitution as the principal (i.e., $48,182.43, for unpaid wages, attorney fees, and 

costs) and calculated simple interest based on that principal, at a rate of 10 percent per 

year, between the date of Reagan’s death and the date of the present restitution order (i.e., 

56 months). Using these figures, the court determined the interest due was $22,485.13. 

Czirban timely appealed the restitution order. 

II. DISCUSSION

Czirban contends (1) the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay 

attorney fees because the Labor Code explicitly prohibits the payment of attorney fees 

out of a survivors’ benefit; (2) the order for payment of attorney fees as a condition of 

probation is unreasonable, irrationally calculated, and based on an erroneous legal 

standard; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion when determining the interest award.

A. General Legal Principles

“Under California law, ‘[c]onvicted criminals may be required to pay one or more 

of three types of restitution.’ [Citation.] They may be required to pay a restitution fine 

into the state Restitution Fund, to pay restitution directly to the victim, or to pay 

restitution as a condition of probation. The statutory requirements vary depending on the 
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type of restitution at issue.” (People v. Martinez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1093, 1100 

(Martinez).)

Restitution as a condition of probation is expressly authorized by section 1203.1. 

(See People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121 (Carbajal); § 1203.1, subds. 

(a)(3), (b).) Section 1203.1 “gives trial courts broad discretion to impose probation 

conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety. [Citation.] The court may 

impose upon probationers ‘reasonable conditions, as it may determine are fitting and 

proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the 

breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and 

generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer.’ ” 

(People v. Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 26 (Anderson), quoting § 1203.1, subd. (j).)

“[U]nder section 1203.1, ‘California courts have long interpreted the trial courts’ 

discretion to encompass the ordering of restitution as a condition of probation even when 

the loss was not necessarily caused by the criminal conduct underlying the conviction.’ 

[Citation.] As [our Supreme Court] explained: ‘Under certain circumstances, restitution 

has been found proper where the loss was caused by related conduct not resulting in a 

conviction [citation], by conduct underlying dismissed and uncharged counts [citation], 

and by conduct resulting in an acquittal [citation]. There is no requirement the restitution 

order be limited to the exact amount of the loss in which the defendant is actually found 

culpable, nor is there any requirement the order reflect the amount of damages that might 

be recoverable in a civil action.’ ” (Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 27.)

Additionally, trial courts have authority to impose direct victim restitution under 

section 1202.4. (See People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 651–652 (Giordano).) 

That section “authorizes trial courts to order direct victim restitution for those losses 

incurred as a result of the crime of which the defendant was convicted.” (Martinez, 

supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1101.) “In both sections 1203.1 and 1202.4, restitution serves the 

purposes of both criminal rehabilitation and victim compensation. But the statutory 
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schemes treat those goals differently. When section 1202.4 imposes its mandatory 

requirements in favor of a victim’s right to restitution, the statute is explicit and narrow. 

When section 1203.1 provides the court with discretion to achieve a defendant’s 

reformation, its ambit is necessarily broader, allowing a sentencing court the flexibility to 

encourage a defendant’s reformation as the circumstances of his or her case require.” 

(Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 29; see also Martinez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1101.)

We review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion. (People v. Olguin

(2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.) A reviewing court will not strike a probation condition as 

unreasonable under section 1203.1 unless it “ ‘ “(1) has no relationship to the crime of 

which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, 

and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future 

criminality.” ’ ” (In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118 (Ricardo P.), quoting 

Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) “The Lent test ‘is conjunctive — all three prongs must 

be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.’ ” (Ricardo P., at 

p. 1118.) Furthermore, “[t]he trial court’s discretion under section 1203.1, ‘although 

broad, nevertheless is not without limits; a condition of probation must serve a purpose 

specified in the statute.’ [Citations.] [¶] We determine whether the restitution order, as a 

condition of probation, is arbitrary or capricious or otherwise exceeds the bounds of 

reason under the circumstances.” (Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 31–32.)

Similarly, a direct victim restitution order “is reviewed for abuse of discretion and 

will not be reversed unless it is arbitrary or capricious. [Citation.] No abuse of discretion 

will be found where there is a rational and factual basis for the amount of restitution 

ordered. ‘[T]he standard of proof at a restitution hearing is by a preponderance of the 

evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’ . . . Once the victim makes a prima 

facie showing of economic losses incurred as a result of the defendant’s criminal acts, the 

burden shifts to the defendant to disprove the amount of losses claimed by the victim.” 
11

(People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1542–1543; see also Giordano, supra, 

42 Cal.4th at p. 665.)

We consider questions of statutory interpretation de novo. (People v. Prunty

(2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71.) “ ‘ “ ‘When we interpret a statute, “[o]ur fundamental task . . . 

is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first 

examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not 

examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a 

whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of 

the enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning 

unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not 

intend.” ’ ” ’ ” (Smith v. LoanMe, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 183, 190.) 

B. Violation of Workers’ Compensation Act

Czirban contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering payment of 

attorney fees as restitution because “the Legislature explicitly prohibits the payment of 

attorney[] fees out of survivor benefits.” Czirban maintains that, under Labor Code 

section 4555, the WCAB should have awarded Morgan K. her attorney fees in addition to 

the survivors’ benefit. Czirban contends the trial court’s restitution order for the amount 

of Morgan’s attorney fees rests on an erroneous application of the Workers’ 

Compensation Act (Lab. Code, § 3200 et seq.). 

Czirban asserts that Morgan has the “right” to the full amount of survivors’ 

benefits. He contends this court should vacate the order of restitution and set aside the 

WCAB order deducting attorney fees “with directions to pay” Morgan “her full benefit”

(which would presumably eliminate Morgan’s economic loss). Czirban further argues 

that although he did not object to the restitution order on the specific statutory ground he 

asserts here, the issue is not forfeited because (1) the relevant provisions of the Labor 

Code restricted Czirban’s ability to seek review of the WCAB order until the trial court 
12

imposed the victim restitution order, and (2) this court has inherent authority to review 

the imposition of an unauthorized sentence. 

The Attorney General does not address or directly respond to Czirban’s contention 

that the C&RA and resulting WCAB order contravened Labor Code section 4555 by 

deducting the payment of attorney fees from a survivors’ benefit. Instead, the Attorney 

General counters that Czirban’s claim fails because this court does not have jurisdiction 

to reconsider or set aside the WCAB order, which Czirban could have but did not 

challenge in the WCAB action. The Attorney General argues that even if this court has 

jurisdiction to correct error under the unauthorized sentence exception to the forfeiture 

doctrine, we may not “unilaterally rewrite the terms of the C&RA” which are 

determinative of the rights of the parties to the agreement. 

1. Standards of Review

While an order of victim restitution is typically reviewed for abuse of discretion, 

in accordance with the legal principles articulated above (part II.A., ante), a restitution 

order that is “not authorized by governing law” or which rests upon a 

“ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘demonstrable error of law’ ” constitutes an abuse of the court’s discretion.’ ” ’ ” 

(People v. Brunette (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 268, 276 (Brunette).) Where, as here, the 

“propriety of a restitution order turns on the interpretation of a statute, a question of law 

is raised, which is subject to de novo review on appeal.” (People v. Williams (2010) 184 

Cal.App.4th 142, 146 (Williams).) Accordingly, we independently review the legal basis 

for the restitution award to the extent it is derived from an attorney fees award under the 

Workers’ Compensation Act. (Brunette, at p. 277 [applying “independent review to the 

legality of the restitution award in light of the applicable statutes”].) Furthermore, we 

independently review questions regarding our own jurisdiction. (Kirk v. Ratner (2022) 

74 Cal.App.5th 1052, 1060, citing California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 

53 Cal.4th 231, 252.)
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2. Workers’ Compensation Act

“The California Constitution confers on the Legislature ‘plenary power, unlimited 

by any provision of this Constitution,’ to establish a system of workers’ compensation. 

(Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 4.)” (Greener v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 

1028, 1037 (Greener).) The Workers’ Compensation Act is a “comprehensive statutory 

scheme governing compensation given to employees for injuries sustained in the course 

and scope of their employment. ([Lab. Code,] § 3200 et seq.)” (Koszdin v. State Comp. 

Ins. Fund (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 480, 491 (Koszdin).) The right to workers’

compensation benefits “ ‘is wholly statutory and is not derived from common law.’ ” 

(Ibid.) So, too, “ ‘[t]he right to receive attorney fee awards for securing compensation on 

behalf of workers is also within the broad authority vested in the Legislature over the 

complete workers’ compensation system.’ ” (Ibid.) 

Pursuant to its constitutional authority, the Legislature has conferred rulemaking 

and adjudicatory powers on the WCAB. (Greener, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1038.) This 

delegation includes exclusive jurisdiction of the WCAB over attorney fees associated 

with workers’ compensation actions. (See Id., at pp. 1038–1039; Lab. Code, § 5300, 

subd. (a).) Proceedings that concern the right to attorney fees, and whether they may be 

deducted from the award of benefits or awarded in addition to the benefits, as Czirban 

contends, are thus properly “instituted solely before the Appeals Board [the WCAB].” 

(Greener, at p. 1039.) 

The Legislature also has plenary power to “fix and control” “the manner of review 

of decisions rendered by” the WCAB, “provided [] that all decisions of any such tribunal 

shall be subject to review by the appellate courts of this State.” (Cal. Const., art. XIV, 

§ 4; see Lantz v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 298, 311–312.) In 

accordance with its constitutional authority, the Legislature has limited the scope of 

judicial review of WCAB decisions (see Lab. Code, §§ 5952, 5953) as well as the 

procedural mechanisms for review. Labor Code section 5955 confers jurisdiction upon 
14

only “the Supreme Court and the courts of appeal” to review WCAB decisions.11 (Lab. 

Code, § 5955.) By restricting judicial review of the WCAB decision in this manner, 

“ ‘ “the Legislature has carried out the declared policy of the constitutional provision that 

the [WCAB] be unencumbered by any but proceedings in the appellate courts.” ’ ” 

(Barri v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 428, 436.) 

The California Supreme Court in Greener examined the process established by the 

Legislature for review of an order, decision, or award of the WCAB. It explained that 

Labor Code section 5955 “is part of the legislatively established system for review of 

orders, decisions, and awards of the [WCAB] or a workers’ compensation judge when 

the orders, decisions, and awards are made under provisions of the workers’

compensation law. They are reviewable by the [WCAB] on petition for reconsideration. 

([Lab. Code,] § 5900.)” (Greener, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1040.) Citing Labor Code 

section 5901, which we consider in more detail in our discussions of jurisdiction and 

forfeiture (see part II.B.3, 4, post), the high court confirmed that “[n]o cause of action 

arising out of such orders, decisions, and awards, other than authorized enforcement 

actions, may accrue in any court unless a petition for reconsideration has been made and 

granted or denied by the [WCAB].” (Greener, at p. 1040.) However, the court explained 

that after seeking reconsideration, “a person affected by the order of the [WCAB] may 

seek review of that order, decision or award” in the courts of appeal or California 

Supreme Court. (Ibid., citing Lab. Code, § 5950.) 

We turn to the application of these provisions to the circumstances of this case.

11 The statute states, “No court of this state, except the Supreme Court and the 

courts of appeal to the extent herein specified, has jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct, 

or annul any order, rule, decision, or award of the [workers’ compensation] appeals 

board, or to suspend or delay the operation or execution thereof, or to restrain, enjoin, or 

interfere with the appeals board in the performance of its duties but a writ of mandate 

shall lie from the Supreme Court or a court of appeal in all proper cases.” (Lab. Code, 

§ 5955.)
15

3. Jurisdiction

The Attorney General asserts that Czirban is not entitled to the remedy he seeks 

because this court lacks jurisdiction to compel the WCAB to set aside its order approving 

the C&RA. Czirban rejoins that this court has jurisdiction to review not only the order of 

the trial court but also the decisions of the WCAB. As we explain, neither side is entirely 

correct. While this court has fundamental jurisdiction to review the restitution order and 

also has jurisdiction, under certain conditions, to review orders of the WCAB (Lab. Code, 

§ 5955), our authority over WCAB orders is constrained by and subject to specific 

statutory mechanisms for review. 

We begin by noting that the parties use the umbrella term “jurisdiction” to connote 

two different types of authority—in this case, authority over the trial court’s restitution 

order and authority to set aside a decision of the WCAB pursuant to the Workers’ 

Compensation Act. 

There are “two different ways in which a court may lack jurisdiction.” (People v. 

Ford (2015) 61 Cal.4th 282, 286 (Ford).) First, “[a] court lacks jurisdiction in a 

fundamental sense when it has no authority at all over the subject matter or the parties, or 

when it lacks any power to hear or determine the case.” (Ford, supra, 61 Cal.4th at 

p. 286.) A ruling by a court that lacks such “fundamental” jurisdiction is void. (Ibid.) 

Moreover, “[a] claim based on a lack of fundamental jurisdiction may be raised for the 

first time on appeal.” (Ibid.) 

Second, there are circumstances in which a court has fundamental jurisdiction but 

authority of only a limited scope. “Even when a court has fundamental jurisdiction, [] the 

Constitution, a statute, or relevant case law may constrain the court to act only in a 

particular manner, or subject to certain limitations.” (Ford, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 286–

287.) By way of an example provided by the high court in Ford, “a court with 

fundamental jurisdiction over the parties nonetheless lack[s] the power to enter a 

judgment forfeiting a bail bond prior to the end of the period allowed for the surety to 
16

make an appearance. When a trial court has fundamental jurisdiction but fails to act in 

the manner prescribed, it is said to have acted ‘in excess of its jurisdiction.’ ” (Id. at 

p. 287.) A ruling “in excess of jurisdiction does not negate a court’s fundamental 

jurisdiction to hear the matter altogether” and “is treated as valid until set aside.” (Ibid.) 

Applying those principles here, we note that the trial court’s “order of restitution 

was appealable, as it was made after judgment and affected [the] defendant’s substantial 

rights.” (Ford, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 286; see People v. Vournazos (1988) 198 

Cal.App.3d 948, 953; § 1237, subd. (b).) This court therefore has fundamental 

jurisdiction over—meaning the power to review—the restitution order. 

The Attorney General is nevertheless correct that, even if we were to agree with 

Czirban’s legal argument that the restitution order is premised on a legally improper 

order by the WCAB, we are unable in this appeal to correct any such purported error in 

the manner requested by Czirban, i.e., by “set[ting] aside the WCAB’s order deducting 

[Morgan]’s attorneys fees from her survivors’ benefit.” 

As described above (part II.B.2, ante), the WCAB derives its jurisdiction and 

scope of authority from the state Constitution (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 4) and the 

Workers’ Compensation Act. The Act declares that “[a]ll orders, rules, findings, 

decisions, and awards” of the WCAB are “conclusively presumed to be reasonable and 

lawful, until and unless they are modified or set aside by the [WCAB] or upon a review 

by the courts within the time and in the manner specified in this division.” (Lab. Code, 

§ 5302.) Judicial review of a WCAB decision is available in a Court of Appeal only 

pursuant to the statutory process set forth in the Workers’ Compensation Act. 

Czirban appears to suggest that because this court’s jurisdiction over WCAB 

decisions “is both codified in the Labor Code and is well settled in case law,” we have 

unlimited authority to review the WCAB’s order—in this case the order approving the 

C&RA and ordering the payment of Morgan’s attorney fees out of her settlement of 
17

benefits. However, Czirban fails to address the limits set out in Labor Code sections 

5955 and 5901 to this court’s authority. 

Labor Code section 590112 requires the filing of “a petition for reconsideration” in 

the WCAB action as a prerequisite to a party seeking to challenge a final order or 

decision of the WCAB. (See also Lab. Code, § 5900.) Co’s declaration describing the 

WCAB’s approval of the C&RA in 2020 and the relevant attachments demonstrate that 

notice of the WCAB’s intent to approve the C&RA was served on the parties to the 

WCAB action (including Czirban) prior to the final WCAB order approving the C&RA. 

Thereafter, in September 2020, the UEBTF sent a letter informing Czirban, pursuant to 

Labor Code section 3717, of the WCAB order and award, his liability for the sum 

awarded (directly payable to the UEBTF), and that the remedies against him included 

civil litigation and non-judicial foreclosure against any real property he might own.13 

The letter further stated, “If you wish to contest the award, a petition for reconsideration 

must be filed with the WCAB within the time limit prescribed by law.” Co and Mabary 

both declared they were not aware of Czirban having disputed the C&RA or the WCAB’s 

determination by filing a petition for reconsideration. 

Because he could have filed a petition for reconsideration challenging the 

WCAB’s order approving the C&RA, we reject Czirban’s unsupported assertion that “the 

only vehicle available to [him] for challenging the WCAB’s deduction for attorney[] fees 

12 The statute states in relevant part, “No cause of action arising out of any final 

order, decision or award made and filed by the appeals board . . . shall accrue in any court 

to any person until and unless . . . the person files a petition for reconsideration, and the 

reconsideration is granted or denied.” (Lab. Code, § 5901.)

13 Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, where, as here, there is an action for 

compensation before the WCAB, brought by the dependents of an employee whose 

employer failed to secure payment of workers’ compensation, that action “may be 

resolved . . . by compromise and release . . . as long as the [WCAB] has acquired 

jurisdiction over the employer and the employer has been given notice and an opportunity 

to object.” (Lab. Code, § 3715, subd. (e).)
18

is to first obtain a ruling from this Court on direct appeal.” Furthermore, because an 

approved compromise and release “constitute[s] a liquidated claim for damages” which 

may be pursued by the UEBTF in a civil action against the employer (Lab. Cod, § 3717, 

subd. (a)), we disagree with Czirban’s assertion that his interest in the matter at that point 

was merely hypothetical and he lacked standing to file a petition for writ of mandate. 

(Cf. Chorn v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1382 [“ ‘As a 

general rule, a party must be “beneficially interested” to seek a writ of mandate. (Code 

Civ. Proc., § 1086.)’ ”].)

Labor Code section 5955 restricts judicial review of WCAB orders to the courts of 

appeal or the Supreme Court and authorizes a writ of mandate to issue from those courts 

“in all proper cases.” (Lab. Code, § 5955.) While Czirban is thus correct that he could 

not have challenged the legality of the underlying WCAB order in the trial court due to 

the jurisdictional limits stated in Labor Code section 5955 (see Greener, supra, 6 Cal.4th 

at p. 1044; Koszdin, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 491), he could have filed a petition for 

reconsideration or sought relief via a petition for writ of review in the Court of Appeal

(Lab. Code, § 5955). 

Czirban has neither filed a writ petition in this court, nor suggested how this 

appeal might be a “proper case[]” (Greener, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1044) for extraordinary 

relief. (Ibid. [deciding that mandate relief may be available pursuant to Lab. Code, 

§ 5955 “if plaintiffs are able to satisfy the court in a properly presented petition that the 

criteria for relief by extraordinary relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 have 

been met”].) Therefore, we agree with the Attorney General that Czirban has not 

established that this court has the authority in this appeal to set aside the WCAB order.

For these reasons, we conclude that this court’s jurisdiction over the restitution 

order issued in the criminal case does not provide this court with authority to review the 

WCAB’s order approving the deduction of attorney fees from the C&RA settlement. 
19

Nevertheless, because this court does have jurisdiction over the trial court’s restitution 

order, we will assess the merits of Czirban’s challenges to it. 

4. Attorney Fees as Economic Loss 

Czirban argues that by ordering payment of the attorney fees as victim restitution, 

the trial court contravened both the policy and provisions of the Workers’ Compensation 

Act. He contends the Act required the award of attorney fees to be added to the benefit 

paid to Morgan, rather than deducted from it. Czirban asserts that ,absent the 

unauthorized deduction of attorney fees from Morgan’s survivors’ benefit, she did not 

suffer any economic loss that is compensable as restitution under section 1202.4.14 

The Attorney General, having asserted that this court has no jurisdiction to set 

aside the WCAB order, does not address whether the restitution order contravenes Labor 

Code section 4555 but maintains that even if this court were to reach the merits of 

Czirban’s argument, this court has no authority to alter the terms of the C&RA arrived at 

in a separate proceeding by the parties to that agreement. 

We note, as an initial matter, that Czirban acknowledges he did not object to the 

restitution order on the statutory ground he asserts here. As we discuss further below (see 

part II.D., post), a party’s failure to object in the trial court may preclude that party from 

raising the claim of error on appeal. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 352 (Scott); 

see People v. Garcia (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1214 (Garcia).) Even so, we decide 

the issue is not forfeited on appeal. “[A]n objection may be raised for the first time on 

appeal where it concerns an ‘unauthorized’ sentence, i.e., one that ‘could not lawfully be 

imposed under any circumstance in the particular case.’ ” (People v. Percelle (2005) 126 

Cal.App.4th 164, 179 (Percelle).) 

14 Although Czirban refers to the compensable restitution paid as “direct victim 

restitution” under section 1202.4, the trial court in this matter ordered restitution for 

attorney fees and costs as a condition of probation pursuant to section 1203.1. 
20

Czirban’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering a 

restitution order based upon a statutorily prohibited attorney fee award is a purely legal 

issue appropriate for consideration in the first instance on appeal. (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th 

at p. 354.) Nevertheless, for the reasons explained above, the procedural posture of this 

case does not afford this court authority to review the merits of the order issued by the 

WCAB approving the C&RA. Therefore, we must presume the WCAB order and 

deduction and payment of attorney fees from Morgan’s survivors’ benefit was both

“reasonable and lawful.” (Lab. Code, § 5302.) Consequently, the scope of our review of

Czirban’s challenge is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering 

restitution for the amount of attorney fees that had been deducted from Morgan’s 

survivors’ benefit under the WCAB order.

15

Czirban’s sole argument in this respect is that, but for the allegedly unauthorized 

deduction of attorney fees from Morgan’s survivors’ benefit, there would be no 

“economic loss” compensable as restitution. Since we must “conclusively presume[]” the 

deduction of attorney fees was, in fact, “reasonable and lawful” (Lab. Code, § 5302), we 

consider only whether the trial court had the authority to include these attorney fees in the 

restitution order.16 

As set forth above (see part II.A., ante), section 1203.1 affords trial courts broad 

discretion to impose probation conditions such as are “ ‘fitting and proper to the end that 

justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for 

any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and generally and specifically 

for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer. . . .’ (§ 1203.1, subd. (j).)” 

15 Because Czirban’s claim on appeal regarding the WCAB order does not 

challenge the trial court’s authority to include Tusan’s legal costs in the restitution order, 

we confine our analysis to the order’s inclusion of attorney fees.

16 Because we lack the authority to consider the merits of the WCAB order, 

Czirban’s policy arguments concerning the need to protect Morgan’s “right to full 

survivors’ benefits” to fulfill the purposes of the workers’ compensation scheme are 

irrelevant to our analysis.
21

(Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 26.) The Supreme Court in Anderson explained that 

California courts have long interpreted a trial court’s discretion under section 1203.1 “ ‘to 

encompass the ordering of restitution as a condition of probation even when the loss was 

not necessarily caused by the criminal conduct underlying the conviction.’ ” (Anderson,

at p. 27.) Notably, for purposes of our review here, “ ‘[t]here is no requirement the 

restitution order be limited to the exact amount of the loss in which the defendant is 

actually found culpable, nor is there any requirement the order reflect the amount of 

damages that might be recoverable in a civil action.” (Ibid.) 

The trial court analyzed Morgan’s restitution claim “in light of the broader 

probation goal of rehabilitation,” consistent with statutory and case authority. As the trial 

court noted, pursuant to the WCAB’s order approving the C&RA, the parties to the 

WCAB action deducted $46,352 in attorney fees from the total survivors’ benefit to pay 

Morgan’s attorney fees. There is no question the deduction to pay attorney fees 

diminished Morgan’s recovery of benefits to which she otherwise would be entitled. 

The restitution order requiring Czirban to pay restitution for the amount of 

attorney fees which Morgan and the children did not receive from the C&RA settlement

served both to “compensate the victim of a crime” for the reduction in benefits otherwise 

owed to them under the workers’ compensation scheme and to achieve “the broader 

probationary goal of rehabilitating the defendant.” (Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.4th at 

p. 27.) Therefore, it fell within the trial court’s authority under section 1203.1. 

Consequently, we reject Czirban’s contention that the trial court lacked the statutory 

authority to order restitution for the amount by which Morgan’s settlement was reduced 

for the payment of her attorney fees. 

We turn next to Czirban’s alternative contentions that the trial court abused its 

discretion by ordering restitution for attorney fees, including under the principles of Lent,

supra, 15 Cal.3d 481 and section 1202.4.
22

C. Restitution for Attorney Fees 

Czirban contends the trial court generally abused its discretion by ordering the 

payment of attorney fees because they lack a nexus to his misconduct, do not serve a 

rehabilitative or deterrent purpose, and are excessive.

17 Czirban’s arguments are

grounded on the Lent test, as well as section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(H) and Martinez, 

supra, 2 Cal.5th 1093. 

The Attorney General counters that Czirban forfeited his claim of error by failing 

to object at trial on the grounds he states on appeal and that Czirban’s claim otherwise

lacks merit. 

We agree that Czirban’s current contentions were not properly preserved for our 

review. “An obvious legal error at sentencing that is ‘correctable without referring to 

factual findings in the record or remanding for further findings’ is not subject to 

forfeiture.” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887.) However, a failure to object to 

a probation condition as unreasonable under Lent forfeits the right to challenge the 

condition on that ground on appeal. (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237; Sheena 

K., at pp. 881–882; People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 404, fn. 7.) Similarly, the 

failure to object to the amount or the manner of payment of direct restitution under 

section 1202.4 forfeits the issue for appeal. (People v. White (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 914, 

917.)

We are not persuaded by Czirban that his trial court objection on the ground that 

the district attorney failed to establish Morgan’s factual or legal entitlement to the 

attorney fees “because there is no evidence that the fees were reasonable” (boldface

omitted) adequately preserved his appellate contentions. Czirban’s argument in the trial 

court challenged the evidentiary support for the requested attorney fees. That objection

differs materially from Czirban’s current arguments that the award of attorney fees as a 

17 We note that Czirban’s Lent-based argument does mention the award of legal

costs as well as attorney fees. 
23

condition of probation is invalid under Lent or violative of section 1202.4 because it is 

untethered to his wrongful conduct. These arguments also do not involve obvious legal 

error that is excepted from the forfeiture doctrine.

Moreover, we are not convinced by Czirban’s further argument that his claim of 

error is not forfeited because it asserts a deprivation of his constitutional due process 

rights, in that his probation was conditioned on an award exceeding that which is 

authorized under section 1202.4 “for losses rationally caused by the defendant’s conduct 

and in an amount that is both actually incurred and reasonable.” 

We reject Czirban’s constitutionally based argument against forfeiture on a 

number of grounds. First, a constitutional right may be forfeited by the failure to make a 

timely assertion of the right. (See People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 856

(Trujillo).) Here, Czirban’s failure to challenge the award of attorney fees and costs as 

violative of due process or a constitutionally excessive punishment forfeited any such 

challenge on appeal. (See People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1153; People 

v. Speight (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247; People v. Johnson (2013) 221 

Cal.App.4th 623, 636.) Second, Czirban’s argument that the trial court violated section 

1202.4 and, in turn, violated his due process rights does not render the forfeiture doctrine 

inapplicable to his separate Lent-based challenge to the attorney fees. 

“Lent is an interpretation of the Legislature’s requirement [in section 1203.1] that 

probation conditions be ‘reasonable.’ ” (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1128.) As 

explained above, victim restitution ordered as a condition of probation is distinct from 

direct victim restitution under section 1202.4. (See Martinez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 

pp. 1101–1102.) Given the difference between these two types of victim restitution, an 

argument premised on a violation of section 1202.4 does not preserve a distinct challenge 

based on a violation of section 1203.1. (See Trujillo, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 856; Scott, 

supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 352, fn. 15.) 
24

Finally, section 1202.4 is inapposite here because the attorney fees were awarded 

by the trial court “under the broader, discretionary authority of section 1203.1” 

(Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 31), not under section 1202.4. Because there could be 

no violation of section 1202.4 here, there can be no due process violation premised on an 

allegedly unauthorized restitution award under section 1202.4. Additionally, because 

Martinez concerns the propriety of direct victim restitution under section 1202.4 (see 

Martinez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1102), that decision does not support Czirban’s argument 

that his current claim is cognizable in this appeal. (See People v. Baker (2021) 10 

Cal.5th 1044, 1109.) 

For these reasons, we conclude that Czirban has forfeited his current claim that the

trial court’s order directing payment of attorney fees and costs is unreasonable under 

Lent, excessive, or unauthorized under section 1202.4 and our Supreme Court’s holding 

in Martinez. We thus do not address the merits of Czirban’s arguments and instead turn 

to his next assertion of error, which challenges the amount of the attorney fees ordered

payable in restitution.

Czirban contends the trial court abused its discretion by finding the attorney fees 

were reasonable for a contingent fee in civil litigation (as opposed to a workers’ 

compensation case) and by failing to make its own determination about whether the 

attorney fees were reasonable. He asserts that the trial court improperly deferred to “the 

WCAB’s approval of the fee as reasonable, even though the fee was excessive under the 

WCAB’s own standard.” The Attorney General responds that Czirban’s claim is 

unpreserved and meritless. 

As mentioned ante, at trial, Czirban objected to the award of attorney fees on the 

ground that “[t]here is not a sufficient factual or rational basis for the attorney fee request, 

as a prima facie case is lacking and the People have not established that the fees were 

reasonable” (italics omitted) in relation to the amount of work performed. In addition, 

Czirban urged the trial court to “begin with the lodestar calculation and then make 
25

adjustments upward or downward based on relevant factors, including whether there is a 

contingency fee agreement.” 

On appeal, Czirban maintains that workers’ compensation cases are distinct from 

“a civil proceeding.” He also describes the WCAB’s guidelines for attorney fees in 

workers’ compensation cases, which allegedly limit attorney fees to a maximum of 15 

percent for “very complex cases.” Czirban asserts that his trial counsel’s argument that 

the requested attorney fees were “unreasonable unless supported by substantial evidence 

[] appears also to reflect the policy of the WCAB” and, “[g]iven the contradiction with 

the WCAB policy manual, the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to address 

[Czirban]’s claim that the amount is unreasonable.” 

We are not persuaded that Czirban’s appellate challenge to the trial court’s order

for an alleged misapplication of the correct legal standard regarding the award of attorney 

fees was preserved for our review. Czirban did not argue in the trial court that it had to

follow the attorney fees policy of the WCAB and, if the court did not do so, it would 

contravene the applicable legal standard. In this court, Czirban invokes an alleged legal 

standard that is different from that the trial court was asked to apply and claims the trial 

court abused its discretion by failing to apply the unasserted standard. 

Generally, “[a] party cannot argue the court erred in failing to conduct an analysis 

it was not asked to conduct.” (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435.) Under 

these circumstances, we decide that Czirban’s current contention that the trial court erred 

by failing to follow WCAB policy when it ordered attorney fees is forfeited.

In any event, even assuming that Czirban’s contention asserts a legal error that is 

correctable on appeal without reference to the factual findings in the record, it lacks 

merit. The trial court here cited and applied section 1203.1, Lent, Carbajal, and 

Anderson in its written order, all of which set forth the proper standard for determining 

whether a probation condition ordering restitution may be imposed. That the WCAB has 

a policy manual with guidelines for the fixing of attorney fees does not supplant the 
26

statutory framework governing a court’s imposition of conditions of probation in a 

criminal case. (See People v. Akins (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1387.) Indeed, 

Czirban appears to concede as much by stating, “the WCAB’s regulations do not bind the 

trial court.” For these reasons, we conclude the trial court applied the correct legal 

standard when it found the attorney fees were reasonable. 

We turn next to Czirban’s further argument that the trial court abused its discretion 

“when it deferred to the WCAB’s approval of the attorney fee[s] as reasonable” (boldface

omitted). Even assuming this argument is preserved for appellate review, it lacks merit. 

The record demonstrates that the trial court made its own determination regarding the 

amount of attorney fees it would award and the reasonableness of that amount. The trial 

court explained that the attorney fees were about 15 percent of the lump sum benefit 

provided to Morgan and her children and noted it was not bound by the lodestar method, 

“so long as a rational calculation is employed.” The court also found the attorney fees 

were “much lower than commonly assessed in contingency fee agreements and [] well 

within the realm of reasonable fees.” That the court mentioned the reasonableness 

assessment conducted by the WCAB judge does not support Czirban’s contention that the 

trial court improperly ceded its discretion to determine the amount of reasonable attorney 

fees. Viewing the record in whole, the trial court made an independent determination 

about the attorney fees grounded on its own assessment of the circumstances in this case.

Further, we decide that neither the trial court’s decision to award attorney fees nor 

the amount of attorney fees it deemed reasonable was arbitrary, capricious, or outside the 

bounds of reason. There was no dispute that Morgan paid $46,352 out of her benefits 

settlement to Tusan for his attorney fees. The WCAB judge had endorsed the attorney 

fees as reasonable in the workers’ compensation context, and it was reasonable for the 

trial court to credit that assessment. (See Lab. Code, § 5302.) Moreover, Czirban 

essentially concedes the reasonableness of the $46,352 attorney fees when he notes in his 

briefing that “current cases routinely award 15% of the compensation for attorney[] fees.” 
27

(See, e.g., Hernandez v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 549, 559.) 

Under these circumstances, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court when it 

included the previously paid attorney fees in its restitution order attendant to Czirban’s 

probation.

D. Interest Award

In its restitution order, the trial court ordered Czirban to pay Morgan $22,485.13 in 

interest. The trial court calculated that figure based on $46,352 in attorney fees, 

$1,205.43 in costs, and $625 in unpaid wages that Czirban had promised to Reagan. 

Czirban contends the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay 

interest on the attorney fees because Morgan had not personally paid any money to her 

attorney before she entered the C&RA in 2020, which resulted in the payment made to 

her attorney by the Sate of California. Czirban asserts that the trial court failed to “make 

a judicial determination of compensable interest, as required by section 1202.4” and that 

its order of interest is not supported by substantial evidence. He further contends that

because the lump sum benefit was “adjusted for present value,” any interest on the 

attorney fees covering the same time period would be redundant and an impermissible 

windfall. 

The Attorney General counters that Czirban forfeited his current arguments by 

failing to object on those grounds in the trial court. The Attorney General also maintains 

that Czirban’s arguments are meritless because the award of interest was not duplicative 

and was supported by substantial evidence. 

We again begin our analysis of Czirban’s claim by addressing forfeiture. 

Generally speaking, “[a]n objection to the amount of restitution may be forfeited if not 

raised in the trial court.” (Garcia, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 1218; see also People v. 

Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1075.) However, as stated above, “an objection may be 

raised for the first time on appeal where it concerns an ‘unauthorized’ sentence, i.e., one 

that ‘could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case.’ ” 
28

(Percelle, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 179; see also In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 

1130.) Here, Czirban’s appellate claim asserts a purely legal issue that focuses on the 

statutory requirements of section 1202.4(f)(3)(G). He argues that the trial court could not 

award interest on the attorney fees accruing as of the date of Reagan’s death in 2016,

because the statute requires an economic loss and Morgan did not incur a loss with regard 

to attorney fees and costs until 2020. As there are no facts in dispute with respect to this 

issue, we decline to apply the forfeiture doctrine.

Turning to the merits of Czirban’s claim, section 1202.4(f)(3)(G) provides that 

restitution for economic losses caused by criminal conduct may include “[i]nterest, at the 

rate of 10 percent per annum, that accrues as of the date of sentencing or loss, as 

determined by the court.”18 (§ 1202.4(f)(3)(G).) Generally speaking, “[t]he goal of 

direct restitution is to restore the victim to ‘the economic status quo.’ [Citation.] ‘A 

restitution order is intended to compensate the victim for its actual loss and is not 

intended to provide the victim with a windfall.’ ” (People v. Sharpe (2017) 10 

Cal.App.5th 741, 746; see also In re S.E. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 795, 809–810.) 

“Although a trial court’s ‘allocation of restitutionary responsibility’ is reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion, an order resting upon a ‘ “demonstrable error of law” ’ constitutes an 

18 More fully stated, section 1202.4 provides in relevant part: “(f) Except as 

provided in subdivisions (p) and (q), in every case in which a victim has suffered 

economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the 

defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court 

order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing 

to the court. If the amount of loss cannot be ascertained at the time of sentencing, the 

restitution order shall include a provision that the amount shall be determined at the 

direction of the court. The court shall order full restitution. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (3) To the 

extent possible, the restitution order shall be prepared by the sentencing court, shall 

identify each victim and each loss to which it pertains, and shall be of a dollar amount 

that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic 

loss incurred as the result of the defendant’s criminal conduct, including, but not limited 

to, all of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (G) Interest, at the rate of 10 percent per annum, that 

accrues as of the date of sentencing or loss, as determined by the court.”
29

abuse of the court’s discretion.” (People v. Jennings (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 42, 49; see 

also Brunette, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 276.) To decide whether an error of law 

occurred, we interpret section 1202.4 de novo. (See Williams, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 146.)

Under the plain meaning of section 1202.4(f)(3)(G), interest may begin to accrue

on an economic loss only on the date the victim actually incurs that loss, or on the date of 

sentencing. In the present case, the date of Reagan’s death (July 26, 2016) is the date of 

economic loss for the $625 in unpaid wages. However, the record establishes that Tusan 

was not paid any attorney fees for his work for Morgan until about four years after 

Reagan’s death. Further, the record indicates that Tusan bore the legal costs up to the 

2020 settlement date and was reimbursed by the state (not Morgan) for the costs he 

incurred. 

According to the district attorney’s declarants, Mabary and Co, Cal Fire and the 

UEBTF paid Tusan his attorney fees and costs on or about July 14, 2020, and October 1, 

2020, respectively, with funds from the lump sum settlement. Tusan’s attorney fees were 

deducted from Morgan’s survivors’ benefit before that benefit was paid to her. It is not 

clear from the record whether Tusan’s costs were treated in a similar way (i.e., whether 

they were deducted from Morgan’s survivors’ benefit or added to it), but the record 

establishes that Tusan was not reimbursed for his costs until 2020. 

Because the earliest date Morgan could have incurred an economic loss for either 

the fees or costs was 2020 (not at the time of Reagan’s death), the trial court committed 

an error of law when it aggregated the unpaid wages, attorney fees, and costs and 

calculated interest using a loss date of Reagan’s death for all three categories. Although 

we conclude that the trial court did not err in setting the loss date for the unpaid wages as 

the date of Reagan’s death, to ensure the accuracy of the interest award we vacate the 

entire interest award and order the trial court to separately recalculate the interest owed

on any economic loss incurred by Morgan on the wages, attorney fees, and costs. 
30

Accordingly, we remand the matter to the trial court to recalculate the interest 

award, consistent with this opinion and section 1202.4(f)(3)(G). For the economic loss 

for the $625 in unpaid wages, the interest should accrue from the date of Reagan’s death 

(July 26, 2016). For attorney fees and costs, the trial court should accrue the interest 

either from “the date of sentencing” or the date of any economic loss incurred by 

Morgan. 

III. DISPOSITION

The trial court’s March 26, 2021 restitution order is reversed as to the award of 

$22,485.13 in interest. We remand the matter to the trial court to recalculate the interest 

award consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the order is affirmed.
31

______________________________________

Danner, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________

Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J.

____________________________________

Wilson, J.

H048989

People v. Czirban
1

Filed 4/27/22

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

IAN CZIRBAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

 H048989

 (Monterey County

 Super. Ct. No. SS170589A)

BY THE COURT:

The opinion in this case filed April 12, 2022, was not certified for publication. 

After the court’s review of a request under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1120(a), and

it appearing that the opinion meets the standards for publication under California Rules of 

Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, it is therefore ordered that the opinion be published in 

the Official Reports with the exception of parts II(B)(4), II(C), and II(D).
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______________________________________

Danner, J.

_____________________________________

Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J.

_____________________________________

Wilson, J.

H048989

People v. Czirban
3

Trial Court: County of Monterey

Trial Judge: Hon. Andrew G. Liu

Counsel: Mary Jo Strnad, by appointment of the Court of Appeal under the Sixth 

District Appellate Program, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, 

Donna M. Provenzano, Supervising Deputy Attorney General and 

Victoria Ratnikova, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

H048989

People v. Czirban