alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
(logo)ERNST & YOUNG LLP              One Houston Center      Phone: 713 750 1500
                                     Suite 2400              Fax:   713 750 1501
                                     1221 McKinney Street  
                                     Houston, Texas 77010-2007



           Report on Management's Assertion on Compliance with Minimum
                      Servicing Standards Set Forth in the
             UNIFORM SINGLE ATTESTATION PROGRAM FOR MORTGAGE BANKERS



    Chairman of the Board
    Transworld Mortgage Corporation



    We have examined management's assertion that Transworld Mortgage Corporation
    (the "Corporation")  complied with the minimum servicing standards set forth
    in the Mortgage Bankers  Association of America's UNIFORM SINGLE ATTESTATION
    PROGRAM FOR MORTGAGE BANKERS (USAP) during the year ended December 31, 1995,
    included in the accompanying report titled REPORT OF MANAGEMENT.  Management
    is responsible for the Corporation's compliance with those requirements. Our
    responsibility is to express an opinion on management's  assertion about the
    Corporation's compliance based on our examination.

    Our  examination  was made in accordance  with standards  established by the
    American  Institute  of  Certified  Public  Accountants  and,   accordingly,
    included  examining,  on a test   basis,  evidence  about the  Corporation's
    compliance with those  requirements  and performing such other procedures as
    we  considered   necessary  in  the  circumstances.   We  believe  that  our
    examination  provides a reasonable  basis for our opinion.  Our  examination
    does not provide a legal determination on the Corporation's  compliance with
    specified requirements.

    In our opinion,  management's  assertion that the Corporation  complied with
    the aforementioned  requirements  during the period ended December 31, 1995,
    is fairly stated, in all material respects.                                 

                                                            /s/Ernst & Young LLP

    March 1, 1996



   

   


       Ernst & Young LLP is a member of Ernst & Young International, Ltd.
#### § 0.387 Other national security and emergency preparedness delegations; cross reference.

For authority of the Chief of the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau to declare a temporary communications emergency, see § 0.191(o).

[71 FR 69037, Nov. 29, 2006]
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<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                          13,714
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   62,599
<ALLOWANCES>                                       510
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                78,716
<PP&E>                                          17,149
<DEPRECIATION>                                  11,293
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504 P.2d 494

#### STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Calvin Edward JOHNSON, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 424.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department B.

Dec. 21, 1972.

Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Louis A. Moore, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.

Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public Defender, by James H. Kemper, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant.

HAIRE, Chief Judge,

Division 1.

The defendant, Calvin Edward Johnson, pled guilty to second degree burglary with a prior conviction. He received a sentence of not less than eight nor more than ten years in the Arizona State Prison. On appeal the defendant has been represented by appointed counsel, and a brief has been filed in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).

The Anders brief states as an arguable question presented, “Did the trial court adequately establish on the record that the defendant understood the nature of the charges against him ?” In our opinion this question is not arguable — the record clearly reflects that the defendant did understand the nature of the charges against him. The record made at the preliminary hearing, and at the time of the acceptance of the guilty plea, which was the result of an open plea bargain, demonstrates that the guilty plea was entered voluntarily and intelligently, with full knowledge of the consequentes of the plea and the waiver of constitutional rights involved.

In addition to the Anders brief filed by defense counsel, defendant *in propria persona*has filed a document in this Court in which he complains of the alleged unfairness of the law which allows an increase in the possible maximum sentence upon the allegation and proof of a prior felony conviction. In this connection, we have carefully reviewed the record and find that the defendant was thoroughly advised of the consequences of the admission of a prior felony conviction before the trial judge granted the state’s motion to add the prior conviction allegation and before accepting the defendant’s admission of the prior conviction.

*554The Court has searched the record for fundamental error as required by A.R.S. § 13-1715, and has found none.

The judgment of conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court are affirmed.

EUBANK and JACOBSON, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>


                    TIME WARNER ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY, L.P.
                             FINANCIAL DATA SCHEDULE

     This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
financial statements of Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P. for the six
months ended June 30, 1999 and is qualified in its entirety by reference to
such financial statements.

</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0000893657
<NAME>                        TIME WARNER ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY, L.P.
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000,000

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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-1999

<CASH>                                            117
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   3,115
<ALLOWANCES>                                      476
<INVENTORY>                                     3,361
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                4,223
<PP&E>                                         10,142
<DEPRECIATION>                                  3,840
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 22,889
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           4,745
<BONDS>                                         6,535
<COMMON>                                            0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                             627
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<OTHER-SE>                                      5,711
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   22,889
<SALES>                                         5,994
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                5,994
<CGS>                                           2,929
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   2,929
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                273
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 1,134
<INCOME-TAX>                                       55
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             1,079
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                    1,079
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       0




</TABLE>
Searched for **http://www.ssa.gov/international/Agreement_Pamphlets/finland.html**

 

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Look Up URL in general Internet Archive web collection.
Sullivan

No. 79-324

#### Anthony and Ruth Golub d/b/a Jones Food Shop v. Gordon Colby, Trustee for the Estate of Ira Colby

September 3, 1980

*Clauson, Struckoff & Kelley,*of Hanover *(K. William Clauson*orally), for the plaintiffs.

*Stebbins & Bradley P.A.,*of Hanover *(Nicholas D. N. Harvey, Jr.,*orally), for the defendant.

BOIS, J.

On March 23, 1977, a fire of undetermined origin destroyed a building in which plaintiffs had leased space to operate a small food shop. They sought damages against the defendant-landlord claiming both negligence and a breach of warranty. Plaintiffs took a voluntary nonsuit as to the negligence count and now appeal the Superior Court’s *(BfiClerico,*J.) granting of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the breach of warranty count. We affirm.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the court erred in granting defendant’s motion on the grounds that “New Hampshire law recognizes no implied warranty of safety in the rental of business premises.”

The plaintiffs argue that the factors considered by this court in *Kline v. Burns,*111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971), in a residential setting, are also appropriate and applicable to commercial leases. They rely principally on *Reste Realty Corporation v. Cooper,*53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969), which seemed to imply a warranty of fitness to a commercial lease. They also find “indirect” support for their position in various articles and cases involving residential leases and/or statutes relating to housing standards. *See, e.g.,*RSA ch. 48-A.

We are not persuaded by the plaintiffs’ arguments. A review of *536the authorities cited does not lend support to their position. Moreover, we note that the New Jersey courts, in decisions subsequent to *Reste Realty Corporation v. Cooper supra,*have held that a covenant of habitability is implied in residential leases, but not in business leases. *Van Ness Industries v. Claremont Painting,*129 N.J. Super. 507, 324 A.2d 102 (1974); *Kruvant v. Sunrise Market, Inc.,*112 N.J. Super. 509, 271 A.2d 741 (1970); *see Berzito v. Gambino,*63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973); *Marini v. Ireland,*56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).

Based upon the facts of this case, we decline to extend, to commercial leases, the implied warranty of habitability found to exist in residential leases. *See Kline v. Burns supra; cf. Albert M. Greenfield & Co., Inc. v. Kolea,*475 Pa. 351, 380 A.2d 758 (1977) (destruction by fire of commercial property without fault of either party ends all contractual obligations).

*Affirmed.*

All concurred.
#### IN THE MATTER OF JULIUS W. WILLIAMS.

(Supreme Court Disciplinary No. 640)

(380 SE2d 54)

Decided April 5, 1989.

*William P. Smith III, General Counsel State Bar, Paul B. Co*
      *146
      *hen, Assistant General Counsel State Bar,*for State Bar of Georgia.

*145Per curiam.

Julius W. Williams, respondent, has submitted a petition for voluntary discipline, admitting violations of Standards 4, 44, and 45 of Bar Rule 4-102 while engaged in representing a client in a real-estate investment matter. Williams requested a nine-month suspension of his license to practice law. The special master appointed by this court recommended the same: a nine-month suspension of the respondent’s license. The Review Panel of the State Disciplinary Board adopted the recommendation of the special master as its recommendation. After examining the record, we accept the recommendation of the Review Panel.

Accordingly, wé hereby order that Julius W. Williams be suspended from the practice of law for nine months, effective May 1, 1989. He is ordered to notify his clients of his suspension and to take all necessary action to protect their interests.

*All the Justices concur.*
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

REGION VII
901 NORTH 5TH STREET KANSAS CITY, KANSAS 66101

September 23, 2011

Anthony Tate

4301 North 33 Street
Omaha, Nebraska 68111

RE: SAID: 34012

4301 North 33 Street
Lead-Based Paint (LBP) Assessment

Dear Owner/Resident:

A Lead Based Paint assessment was recently performed on your property by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency as part of the Omaha Lead site investigation. The purpose of this assessment is to determine whether a significant quantity of LBP is present on the exterior surface of structures, where deteriorating paint conditions (peeling, flaking, cracking, etc) exist that might increase lead concentrations in the yard above acceptable levels.

Enclosed are the LBP assessment sheets for 4301 North 33 Street. The EPA has developed paint stabilization eligibility criteria that involve measuring the amount of deteriorated LBP on a structure and calculating the concentration of lead in soils around the home that would result if all of the identified deteriorated paint were to fall to the ground and uniformly mix with the soil under certain assumptions. During the LBP assessment, the areal extent of the deteriorated paint observed on structure surfaces was estimated and the lead content in the deteriorated paint was measured using an X-Ray Fluorescence instrument.

The data obtained during the LBP assessment was used to estimate the increase in soil lead concentration that would result if all of the deteriorating paint identified in the assessment were to fall to the ground and mix with surface soil within six feet of the foundation of the structure. For purposes of this calculation, the deteriorating LBP on a structure is assumed to fall onto the ground surface within six feet of the foundation and be uniformly mixed with the top one inch of soil. The estimated lead concentration in the soil potentially caused by the deteriorating LBP provides a measure of the severity of LBP deterioration on individual structures. The EPA uses these criteria to rank properties based on the potential for recontamination of soil to occur. Paint stabilization is being offered at only those households with the most severe LBP problems, particularly where children under the age of seven reside.

The LBP assessment performed by the EPA using the above criteria indicated that your house IS NOT eligible for paint stabilization.If you have any questions or concerns, please contact the EPA Public Information Center at (402) 731-3045.

Sincerely,

Pauletta R. France-Isetts Project Coordinator Environmental Protection Agency

Enclosures
Para información en español, llame al EPA Information Center (402) 731-3045.Omaha Lead Site LBP Assessment

LEGEND: H 

### - N 

### - P 

## - 01 

### - 34012 Samples Analyzed

(Wood, concrete, etc.) Area

~5-4~ ftz

l3

, Rq ft'
Order entered June 27, 2019

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-17-01270-CV

REGINA DELL BROWN AND GWENDOLYN GABRIEL, Appellants

V.

MERRY OUTLAW, Appellee

On Appeal from the 116th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-13-06513

ORDER

We GRANT John D. Nation’s March 19, 2019 unopposed Motion to Withdraw as 

Counsel for appellant Gwendolyn Gabriel. We DIRECT the Clerk of the Court (1) to remove 

Mr. Nation as counsel for Ms. Gabriel in this cause number and (2) to send future

communications in this case to Ms. Gabriel at 1160 South Joe Wilson, Cedar Hill, Texas 75104.

/s/ BILL PEDERSEN, III

JUSTICE
**Exhibit
      23.1**


**CONSENT
        OF REGISTERED INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS**
 
 
 We
        hereby
        consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
        on
        Forms S-8 (Nos. 333-133053 and 333-130178) of NextPhase Wireless, Inc. of
        our
        report dated July 13, 2007, relating to the March 31, 2007 consolidated
        financial statements, which appears in this From 10-KSB.
 
 
 
 /s/KMJ Corbin & Company LLP
 KMJ
        Corbin & Company LLP
 
 
 Irvine,
        California
 July
        13,
        2007
# Comments on: Notice of Court closure on November 27, 2020
# Comments on: 21-2215: EIS GMBH v. NOVOLUTO GMBH [RULE 36 JUDGMENT], Nonprecedential
No. 10-11050.

#### Tellez-Araujo *v.*United States.

C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH 

	NO. 2-04-188-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF J.E.H., A CHILD

	----------

	FROM THE 322ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

	----------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1

	----------

	Karen M.H. is attempting to appeal the trial court’s oral ruling granting grandparent visitation, access, and/or possession to J.E.H.  Appellant’s notice of appeal is premature because the trial court has not signed an order granting the visitation.  See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a).  A trial court’s oral pronouncement and docket entry are not an acceptable substitute for a written order.  Emerald Oaks Hotel/Conf. Ctr., Inc. v. Zardenetta, 776 S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding); McCormack v. Guillot, 597 S.W.2d 345, 346 (Tex. 1980) (orig. proceeding).  A prematurely filed notice of appeal is not effective until the appellate deadline is triggered and therefore does not vest this court with jurisdiction over the appeal.  See Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(b), 27.1(a).

	On July 6, 2004, we notified appellant that her appeal was subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction unless she furnished the court a copy of the signed order by July 26, 2004.  No signed order has been tendered or filed.  Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.  Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).

								PER CURIAM

PANEL D:	CAYCE, C.J.; LIVINGSTON and DAUPHINOT, JJ.

DELIVERED: August 19, 2004
§ 105-68.630 May the General Services Administration impute conduct of one person to another? For purposes of actions taken under this rule, we may impute conduct as follows: ( a ) *Conduct imputed from an individual to an organization.* We may impute the fraudulent, criminal, or other improper conduct of any officer, director, shareholder, partner, employee, or other individual associated with an organization, to that organization when the improper conduct occurred in connection with the individual's performance of duties for or on behalf of that organization, or with the organization's knowledge, approval or acquiescence. The organization's acceptance of the benefits derived from the conduct is evidence of knowledge, approval or acquiescence.
( b ) *Conduct imputed from an organization to an individual, or between individuals.* We may impute the fraudulent, criminal, or other improper conduct of any organization to an individual, or from one individual to another individual, if the individual to whom the improper conduct is imputed either participated in, had knowledge of, or reason to know of the improper conduct.
( c ) *Conduct imputed from one organization to another organization.* We may impute the fraudulent, criminal, or other improper conduct of one organization to another organization when the improper conduct occurred in connection with a partnership, joint venture, joint application, association or similar arrangement, or when the organization to whom the improper conduct is imputed has the power to direct, manage, control or influence the activities of the organization responsible for the improper conduct. Acceptance of the benefits derived from the conduct is evidence of knowledge, approval or acquiescence.
§ 302-15.10 How long may my agency pay under this part? Your agency may pay: ( a ) For transfers within the United States for a period not to exceed one year from your effective date of transfer, with up to a 1-year extension, under the same conditions required in § 302-11.21 of this chapter; or
( b ) From the time you transfer to a foreign area post of duty until you: ( 1 ) Transfer back to an official station in the United States; or
( 2 ) Complete a service agreement at your post of duty and remain there, but do not sign a new service agreement; or
( 3 ) Separate from Government service.
[FTR Amdt. 98, 66 FR 58196, Nov. 20, 2001, as amended by FTR Amdt. 2011-01, 76 FR 18344, Apr. 1, 2011]
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 3 (Wednesday, January 5, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 460-461]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-166]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

[FEMA-3142-EM]


Texas; Amendment No. 1 to Notice of an Emergency Declaration

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice amends the notice of an emergency for the State of 
Texas (FEMA-3142-EM), dated September 1, 1999, and related 
determinations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: December 10, 1999.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Madge Dale, Response and Recovery 
Directorate, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC 20472, 
(202) 646-3772.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that the incident 
period for this emergency is closed effective December 10, 1999.


[[Page 461]]


(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) 
are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 83.537, Community 
Disaster Loans; 83.538, Cora Brown Fund Program; 83.539, Crisis 
Counseling; 83.540, Disaster Legal Services Program; 83.541, 
Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 83.542, Fire Suppression 
Assistance; 83.543, Individual and Family Grant (IFG) Program; 
83.544, Public Assistance Grants; 83.545, Disaster Housing Program; 
83.548, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program)
Robert J. Adamcik,
Deputy Associate Director, Response and Recovery Directorate.
[FR Doc. 00-166 Filed 01-04-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6718-02-P