IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

June 20, 2018 Session

MIKE SNODGRASS v. AHA MECHANICAL CONT. LLC

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County

No. CT-005346-14 Robert Samual Weiss, Judge

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No. W2017-01401-COA-R3-CV

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The trial court denied Appellant, employee, relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 

and employee appeals. Because the trial court’s judgment does not clearly show that it 

applied the correct legal standard in deciding the case, we vacate and remand.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court

Vacated and Remanded

KENNY ARMSTRONG, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN 

STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., and ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., joined.

Steven Wilson and Matt Gulotta, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Mike 

Snodgrass.

John A. Irvine, Jr., Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, AHA Mechanical Contractors 

LLC.1

OPINION

Donna and Mike Burlon are the owners of AHA Mechanical Contractors, LLC 

(“AHA,” or “Appellee”). AHA is in the business of constructing and servicing HVAC 

systems. On February 20, 2012, AHA hired Mike Snodgrass (“Appellant”), with whom 

the Burlons had been friends for approximately ten years. Mr. Snodgrass was initially 

hired as a salesman for AHA under a verbal agreement with the Burlons. Specifically, 

the parties agreed that Mr. Snodgrass would be paid for forty hours of work per week 

plus two percent commission on any new sales Mr. Snodgrass made. Mr. Snodgrass was 

 

1 By order of May 9, 2018, this Court denied Appellee’s motion to accept a late-filed brief.

07/05/2018
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initially paid an hourly rate of $7.50. By the time his employment was terminated, Mr. 

Snodgrass’ hourly rate had increased to $17.00 per hour.

In addition to Mr. Snodgrass, AHA employed three technicians and two office 

staff. These employees were required to clock in and out each day. Mr. Snodgrass did 

not punch his time on the clock. There is dispute between the parties as to whether AHA 

did not require Mr. Snodgrass to log his time or whether he simply refused to do so. 

Regardless, AHA had no record of his working time from approximately February of 

2012 until June of 2012.

In June of 2012, AHA provided Mr. Snodgrass with a company vehicle, which 

was equipped with a GPS tracking system. Mr. Snodgrass was aware of the GPS, but 

testified that he did not realize AHA was using the device to track his working hours. 

Mr. Snodgrass was fired from AHA after the GPS monitor on his company vehicle 

indicated that he would frequently travel to dead end streets and vacant lots where AHA 

had no business dealings. Despite growing concern over his idle time, AHA continued to 

pay Mr. Snodgrass for forty hours of work per week. On or about May 6, 2013, AHA 

terminated Mr. Snodgrass’ employment.

On September 16, 2013, Mr. Snodgrass filed a complaint for breach of contract 

and promissory estoppel against AHA in the General Sessions Court for Shelby County. 

In his complaint, Mr. Snodgrass claimed that AHA failed to pay him certain 

commissions. Mr. Snodgrass amended his complaint on January 16, 2014, to add a claim 

that AHA violated his right to overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 

U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (“FLSA”). In response, AHA filed a counter-complaint against Mr. 

Snodgrass, alleging overpayment of wages. On November 13, 2014, AHA agreed for 

Mr. Snodgrass to obtain a judgment in the general sessions court for the full jurisdictional 

amount, and AHA’s counter-complaint was dismissed with prejudice. AHA appealed to 

the Circuit Court for Shelby County (the “trial court”). 

The trial court heard the case on March 9, 2017. On June 12, 2017, the trial court 

entered its judgment, finding that Mr. Snodgrass was not entitled to relief. Specifically, 

the trial court’s judgment provides, in pertinent part, that:

1. [Mr. Snodgrass] failed to meet his burden of proof to establish he was 

entitled to overtime for his work in excess of 40 hours per week, in that he 

failed to ever request overtime pay during the time he worked for the 

company and the fact that the company paid him 40 hours per week 

regardless, including days that he did not work.

2. [Mr. Snodgrass] failed to meet his burden on the wage and hour claim, 

as there was proof from the GPS records indicating that he was not 

working. . . .
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Mr. Snodgrass appeals. He raises three issues for review as stated in his brief:

1. The trial court erred in denying judgment for [Appellant] based on its 

finding that [Appellant] could not prove he actually worked during “idling 

time” as shown by AHA’s recordkeeping of his working hours.

2. The trial court erred in holding that [Appellant] waived his right to claim 

overtime pay under the FLSA against AHA because he did not complain

about not being paid overtime at the time of his employment.

3. Whether the trial court erred in holding any earned overtime was 

cancelled out by alleged overpayments made to [Appellant] by AHA.

Because this case was tried by the court sitting without a jury, we review the trial 

court’s findings of fact de novo with a presumption of correctness, unless the evidence 

preponderates against those findings. McGarity v. Jerrolds, 429 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 2013); Wood v. Starko, 197 S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). This 

Court conducts a de novo review of the trial court’s resolutions of question of law, with 

no presumption of correctness. Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685, 691-92 (Tenn. 2014); 

Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tenn. 2013).

The issues raised in this appeal trigger application of the Fair Labor Standards Act 

(“FLSA”). The FLSA sets the minimum wage and overtime standards for most 

employers in the United States. Generally, an employee must be compensated at or 

above the statutory rate for the first forty hours per week of work, and at one and one-half 

times the employee’s regular wage for overtime. There are exemptions to these 

requirements, and an employer seeking an exemption bears the burden of proving that it 

is applicable. Douglas v. Argo-Tech Corp., 113 F.3d 67, 70 (6th Cir. 1997). Exemptions 

are construed narrowly against an employer seeking to assert an exemption. Auer v. 

Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997) (citing Arnold v. Ben 

Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392, 80 S.Ct. 453, 4 L.Ed.2d 393 (1960)).

A plaintiff generally has the burden of proving that his or her employer violated 

the FLSA. However,

where the employer’s records are inaccurate or inadequate . . . an employee 

has carried out his burden if he proves that he has in fact performed work 

for which he was improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient 

evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and 

reasonable inference. The burden then shifts to the employer to come 

forward with evidence of the precise amount of work performed or with 

evidence to negative the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from 

the employee’s evidence. If the employer fails to produce such evidence, 

the court may then award damages to the employee, even though the result 

be only approximate.
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Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687-88, 66 S.Ct. 1187, 90 L.Ed. 

1515 (1946) (quoted and reaffirmed in United States Dep't of Labor v. Cole Enters., 

Inc., 62 F.3d 775, 779 (6th Cir.1995)), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated 

in Carter v. Panama Canal Co., 463 F.2d 1289, 1293 (D.C.Cir.1972). In Mt. Clemens, 

the district court awarded employees overtime compensation under the FLSA. 328 U.S. 

at 685-86. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court, finding that it was the 

employees’ burden “to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they did not receive 

the wages to which they were entitled ... and to show by evidence rather than conjecture 

the extent of overtime worked, it being insufficient for them merely to offer an estimated 

average of overtime worked.” Id. at 686.

On grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Circuit imposed an 

improper standard of proof that had “the practical effect of impairing many of the 

benefits” of the FLSA. Id. The Supreme Court stated the correct liability and damages 

standard, to-wit: an employee bringing suit has the “burden of proving that he performed 

work for which he was not properly compensated. The remedial nature of this statute and 

the great public policy which it embodies . . . militate against making that burden an 

impossible hurdle for the employee.” Id. at 686-87. The Supreme Court further 

explained that “where the employer’s records are inaccurate or inadequate and the 

employee cannot offer convincing substitutes . . . an employee has carried out his burden 

if he proves that he has in fact performed work for which he was improperly 

compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that 

work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.” Id. at 687. The employee’s burden of 

proof on damages can be relaxed, the Supreme Court explained, because employees 

rarely keep work records, which is the employer’s duty under the Act. Id. Once the 

employee satisfies his or her relaxed burden to establish the extent of uncompensated 

work, “[t]he burden then shifts to the employer to come forward with evidence of the 

precise amount of work performed or with evidence to negative the reasonableness of the 

inference to be drawn from the employee’s evidence.” Id. at 687-88.

The Sixth Circuit quoted and applied the Mt. Clemens standard in Herman v. Palo 

Group Foster Home, Inc., concluding that the employees had met their burden on 

liability because “credible evidence” had been presented that they had performed work 

for which they were improperly compensated. 183 F.3d 468, 473 (6th Cir.1999). 

Recognizing the Mt. Clemens burden shifting paradigm, the Sixth Circuit further held 

that “Defendants did not keep the records required by the FLSA, so the district court 

properly shifted the burden to Defendants to show that they did not violate the Act.” Id. 

The end result of this standard is that if an “employer fails to produce such evidence, the 

court may then award damages to the employee, even though the result be only 

approximate.” Id. at 472 (quoting Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 688).

From our review of the trial court’s judgment, supra, we cannot determine 

whether the trial court applied the correct standard or burden of proof in this case. The 
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trial court states that Mr. Snodgrass “failed to meet his burden of proof to establish he 

was entitled to overtime . . .” insofar as Mr. Snodgrass “failed to . . . request overtime pay 

during” the term of his employment with AHA. The fact that Mr. Snodgrass did not 

request overtime pay does not, ipso facto, mean that he is not entitled to it. The trial 

court cites no authority for its position that an employee’s failure to request overtime pay

is fatal to his or her claim for it. Other than Mr. Snodgrass’ failure to request overtime 

pay, the trial court cites no evidence to support its conclusion that Mr. Snodgrass failed to 

meet his initial burden. Furthermore, it is undisputed that AHA did not keep adequate 

records of Mr. Snodgrass’ time. Even if we concede that Mr. Snodgrass was recalcitrant 

in his refusal to clock in and out, the FLSA places the burden of proper time keeping 

squarely on the employer. While acknowledging that, “for the first three months of [Mr. 

Snodgrass’] employment, no records were kept [by AHA],” the trial court’s order fails to 

negate, or even reference, the burden shifting paradigm set out in Mt. Clemens. 

A trial court speaks through its orders. Palmer v. Palmer, 562 S.W.2d 833, 837 

(Tenn.Ct.App.1977). Here, and for the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment does 

not clearly indicate that it applied the correct legal standard in this case. In this regard, 

the judgment fails to comply with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01 (“In all 

actions tried upon the facts without a jury, the court shall find the facts specially and shall 

state separately its conclusions of law and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment.”). 

Because we cannot determine whether the trial court applied the proper standard and 

burden of proof in this case, we vacate the judgment and remand for such further 

proceedings as may be necessary. We take no position as to the ultimate outcome of the

case. Our holding, does not preclude the trial court from allowing the parties to present 

additional proof on remand. However, the trial court must evaluate the evidence under 

the applicable standard, applying the correct burden(s) of proof, and the trial court’s order 

must reflect that it has done so.

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand 

the case for such further proceedings as may be necessary and are consistent with this 

opinion. Costs of the appeal are assessed one-half to the Appellant, Mike Snodgrass and 

his surety, and one-half to the Appellee, AHA Mechanical Contractors, LLC, for all of 

which execution for costs may issue if necessary.

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KENNY ARMSTRONG, JUDGE