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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, UNPUBLISHED April 16, 2015

v No. 318049
St. Clair Circuit Court PAUL PETER GROSS, LC No. 13-000715-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: H OEKSTRA , P.J., and M ARKEY and D ONOFRIO , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

A jury convicted defendant of operating or maintaining a metha mphetamine laboratory, MCL 333.7401c(2)(f), possession of methamphetamine, MCL 333.740 3(2)(b)(i), resisting or obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.81d(1), carrying a concea led weapon, MCL 750.227, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, and felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f. The trial court sentenc ed defendant as an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12, to concurrent prison term s of 15 to 30 years each for the operating or maintaining a metha mphetamine laboratory and posse ssion of methamphetamine convictions, 3 years and 10 months to 15 years fo r the resistin g or obstructing c onviction, 4 years and 10 months to 30 years each for the carrying a concealed wea pon and felon-in-possession convictions, and a consecutive tw o-year term of imprisonment fo r the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant now appeals as of right . For the reasons explained i n this opinion, we affirm.

I. BASIC FACTS AND P ROCEDURAL HISTORY

While conducting surveillance, a police officer observed defen dant with his girlfriend, Teresa Monzo, at the home of Lu cas Bartley. Defendant left the home carrying two bags, a black bag and a blue and black backpack, and placed them in a P ontiac Sunfire, which had been borrowed from defendant’s friend, Maria Wlodarczyk. Monzo carr ied a black drawstring bag into the car and entered the driver’s seat, with defendant in t he front passenger seat and Bartley in the rear passenger seat. The police requested that a unifor med officer conduct a traffic stop of the vehicle. After a police cruiser activated its lights to co nduct a stop, the vehicle initially slowed, but then sped up and attempted to flee, resulting in a 34-mile high speed police pursuit. Monzo testified that defendant directed her not to stop, and di rected her where to drive during the chase. During the chase, items were thrown from the vehicl e. In particular, Monzo testified that defendant threw a gun from the vehicle. Monzo admitted purchasing the gun, but she-2- testified that she bought it for defendant because he could not legally purchase a weapon. The pursuit ended when Monzo lost control of the vehicle and struck a curb, damaging a tire in the process. After the vehicle stopped, defendant ran from the veh icle, but was apprehended after a struggle with the police. A gun w as later recovered along the route of the police chase.

The police found equipment and ingredients necessary to make m ethamphetamine inside the bags that defendant placed i n the vehicle. One of those ba gs also contained mail addressed to defendant and a prescription bottle with defendant’s name on it . Additionally, evidence of methamphetamine manufacturing wa s found in Bartley’s bedroom. Wlodarczyk, Monzo, and Bartley all testified that defe ndant produced methamphetamine f or their consumption. Monzo admitted that she assisted defendant in the methamphetamine pro duction by purchasing pseudoephedrine, crushing the pills, holding hoses, and cleanin g the equipment. Monzo acknowledged at trial that she pled guilty to reduced charges p ursuant to a plea agreement that required her to testify against defendant. Monzo admitted thatshe gave several prior police statements that were inconsistent with her trial testimony, but she claimed at trial that those prior
statements were not truthful. Monzo also identified several le tters purportedly written by defendant to her in which he acknowledged his involvement in th e charged crimes. A jury
convicted defendant as noted above, and defendant now appeals a s of right.

II. ADMISSION OF LETTERS

Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discret ion by admitting the letters that Monzo testified were written by defendant. Defendant argues th at the letters were not timely produced, that they were not aut henticated as having been writt en by defendant, and that the trial court unfairly allowed only selected portions of the letters to be introduced, in violation of the rule of completeness.

A. DISCOVERY

Defendant first complains that the letters were not timely pro duced during discovery. A trial court’s decision regarding discovery matters is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Davie (After Remand) , 225 Mich App 592, 597-598; 571 NW2d 229 (1997). Under MCR 6.201, upon request, a prosecuting attorney is required to disc lose any documents or other papers that the prosecutor may introduce at trial, MCR 6.201(A)(6), as well as any written statements made by a defendant, MCR 6.201(B)(3). Parties having a continu ing duty to disclose, meaning that “[i]f at any time a party di scovers additional informationor material subject to disclosure . . . the party, without further request, must promptly notify the ot her party.” MCR 6.201(H). If a party fails to comply with the discovery rules, the trial court has discretion regarding the appropriate sanction to impose, w hich may include the exclusionof the evidence or testimony. See MCR 6.201(J). When determining the appropriate remedy, “th e trial court must balance the interests of the courts, the pub lic, and the parties in light o f all the relevant circumstances, including the reasons for noncompliance.” People v Banks , 249 Mich App 247, 252; 642 NW2d 351 (2002).

In this case, the record discloses that the letters were first given to the prosecutor by Monzo’s defense attorney during defendant’s trial and that the prosecutor promptly provided copies to defendant on the same day. Because the prosecutor di d not possess the letters before-3- trial, and promptly disclosed them when they were received, the re was no discovery violation. Further, although defendant complai ns that he was prejudiced bythe untimely production because he did not have notice of the letters before trial, def endant wrote the letters and as such
defendant cannot claim t hat he was unaware o f or unfairly surpr ised by the evidence. See People v Taylor , 159 Mich App 468, 487-488; 406 NW2d 859 (1987). Consequently , the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to exclude the letters unde r MCR 6.201(J).

B. AUTHENTICATION

Defendant next argues that the l etters were never properly aut henticated. “While a trial
court's decision to admit or excl ude evidence is reviewed for a n abuse of discretion, a preliminary or underlying issue of law regarding the admissibil ity of the evidence, such as
whether a rule of evidence bars admission, is reviewed de novo. ” People v McDade , 301 Mich App 343, 352; 836 NW2d 266 (2013). “The decision whether a let ter has been properly
authenticated for admission into evidence is a matter within th e sound discretion of the trial

court.” People v Ford , 262 Mich App 443, 460; 687 NW2d 119 (2004). An abuse of disc retion occurs when the trial court’s decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled

outcomes. People v Yost , 278 Mich App 341, 353; 749 NW2d 753 (2008).

MRE 901 governs the requirement of authentication as a conditi on precedent to the
admission of evidence. In rel evant part, MRE 901 states:

(a) General Provision . The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is sat isfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims.

(b) Illustrations . By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or ide ntification conforming with the requi rements of this rule:

(1) Testimony of Witness With Knowledge . Testimony that a matter is
what it is claimed to be.

* * *

(4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like . Appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, orother distinctive characterist ics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.

Regarding the application of MRE 901, in McDade , 301 Mich App at 352-353, this Court explained:

An example of authentication or identification that conforms t o the requirements of MRE 901(a) is “[t]estimony that a matter is wha t it is claimed to be.” MRE 901(b)(1). “It is axio matic that proposed evidence n eed not tell the whole story of a case, nor need it be free of weakness or doubt . It need only meet the minimum requirements for admissibility.” People v Berkey , 437 Mich 40, 52;-4- 467 NW2d 6 (1991). Further, “a trial court may consider any evidence regardless of that evidence’s admissibility at trial, as long as the evide nce is not privileged, in determining whether the evidence proffered for admission at trial is
admissible.” People v Barrett , 480 Mich 125, 134; 747 NW2d 797 (2008). [Emphasis in original.]

In the present case, 87 pages worth of letters were sent to Mo nzo, defendant’s girlfriend, through third parties. The lette rs were unsigned and Monzo adm itted that she was not familiar with defendant’s handwriting. But, Monzo testified that she id entified defendant as the letters’
author based on the letters’ con tents. For example, Monzo stat ed that the letters contained information that was known only to defendant, including specifi c intimate details about their relationship. Cf. Ford , 262 Mich App at 461. The letters also contained references t o the writer’s familiarity with details of the charged offenses, such as Monzo’s role as the getaway driver and Bartley’s participati on. Further, the letters conta ined references to circumstances that applied to defendant’s situation, such as his status as an inma te and an upcoming preliminary examination, and the letters identified defendant’s attorney by name, referring to him as “my” attorney. The letters also ac knowledged that the writer, as an inmate, could not pass letter s to other inmates such as Monzo, and therefore described passing le tters through cellmates and
others. The contents of the le tters, viewed in conjunction wit h the surrounding circumstances, were sufficient to support a finding that the letters were auth ored by defendant, as the prosecutor claimed. This was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of authentication under MRE 901 and, contrary to defendant’s argumen ts on appeal, the prosecution wa s not required to subject the letters to fingerprint testing, handwriting analysis, or DNA te sting. Further, the fact that the letters included some information that might have been known to third parties, and that Monzo
admitted that the letters contained some references that were unfamiliar to her, did not compel
exclusion of the letters because evidence need not be free from weakness or doubt to be
admissible. McDade , 301 Mich App at 352. The trial court did not abuse its discr etion in determining that the letters were properly authenticated under MRE 901 for admission into
evidence.

C. RULE OF COMPLETENESS

Defendant also argues that the t rial court violated the doctri ne of completeness by introducing only selective porti ons of the letters, and not all owing him to introduce other portions to provide proper context for the admitted portions. Relevant to defendant’s claim, the “rule of completeness” is c ontained in MRE 106, which states:

When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introd uced by a party, an adverse party may requi re the introduction at that ti me of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairn ess to be considered contemporan eously with it.

MRE 106 allows a defendant to supplement the prosecution’s proo fs with additional writings which in fairness ought to be considered; but this rule does no t have any bearing on the admissibility of the evidence introduced by the prosecutor. People v McGuffey , 251 Mich App 155, 161; 649 NW2d 801 (2002). Thus, the rule is only pertinen t “if defendant sought, but was denied, permission to have a compl ete writing or recorded state ment introduced.” Id.-5- In this case, the record does not support defendant’s contenti on that he was denied an opportunity to introduce additiona l portions of the letters bey ond those portions relied on by the prosecutor. On the contrary, the record discloses that the pro secutor initially offered substantially redacted portions of the letters, limited to thos e portions “that were relevant to prove our point.” Defense counsel complained that what was bei ng offered was “17 pages of basically – a 17 page confession.” Counsel requested that the entire letters be admitted under MRE 106, so that the ju ry could see the stat ements in context. The prosecutor stated that she had no objection to the introduction of the letters in their entire ty. The trial court agreed to admit the letters in their entirety, stating: “I’ll leave it up to the De fense. It will be your choice. Either the
redacted version or the whole ve rsion.” The prosecutor subsequ ently pointed out that several
letters contained refe rences to penalty, defendant’s imprisonme nt, and defendant’s parole status, matters that generally should not be disclosed to a jury. The trial court agreed that it was not necessary or appropriate to pres ent that information to the jur y and stated, “we won’t let the jury see them until both of you have h ad a chance to go over them to gether and redact anything of that nature.” Defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s req uest to redact the letters to remove information referring to penalty or to defendant’s criminal his tory. Ultimately, the prosecutor
introduced a redacted version wit hout references to penalty or defendant’s past criminal history.

In sum, the record discloses tha t the trial court gave defenda nt the option of admitting the letters in their entirety or going with a redacted version. Th e version introduced at trial was redacted to exclude portions referring to penalty or to defenda nt’s prior imprisonment or parole—information that defendant did not argue was necessary f or the jury to hear in order to properly consider the remaining portions in context. Indeed, t hese portions were omitted because of their potential prejudicial effect on defendant and “the ‘doctrine of completeness’ is inapposite where the omitted portions . . . would have been mor e harmful than helpful to the
defense.” People v Hoffman , 205 Mich App 1, 15; 518 NW2d 817 (1994). Thus, there is no merit to defendant’s argument that the rule of completeness was violated. Further, given the prejudicial information contained within the portions of the le tters which were excluded, as well as the other evidence of defendant’s guilt offered at trial, up on examination of the entire cause, it does not appear more probable than not that any potential error was outcome determinative. See People v Lukity , 460 Mich 484, 496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). Defendant is not ent itled to relief
on this basis.

III. ADMISSION OF PRIOR RECORDED STATEMENT

Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by denying hi s request to play Monzo’s March 3, 2013 recorded police interview to impeach her trial te stimony. In particular, the police interviewed Monzo several times, and it was not until her inter view on June 6, 2013 that Monzo gave police a statement consistent with her trial testimony. S he admitted in her trial testimony that she lied to police during he r previous interviews, includi ng on March 3, 2013, and defendant now argues that he should have been able to play the entirety o f the March 3, 2013 interview for the jury.

Relevant to defendant’s appellate arguments, the record indica tes that before Monzo testified, defendant expressed an intent to introduce portions of Monzo’s prior recorded police interviews, if necessary to impeach her trial testimony. Defen se counsel expressly indicated that he only wanted to introduce th e portions that were inconsistent with Monzo’s trial testimony. At-6- that time, defense counsel opposed the prosecutor’s request to admit the recorded interviews in their entirety. The trial court ruled in favor of defendant, c oncluding that only excerpts of the interviews, those portions that were inconsistent with Monzo’s trial testimony and any surrounding statements necessary to demonstrate context, would be admitted. Despite this ruling, defendant later sought to admit Monzo’s entire statemen t from March 3, 2013, but was unable to articulate a cogent reason why it was necessary to ad mit the entire statement. Consequently, the trial court de nied the request, but allowed c ounsel to cross-examine Monzo about her prior statement to determine the scope and necessity of any impeachment evidence. Specifically, at trial, the issue of contention between the par ties on this issue appeared to be that, during redirect examination, Monz o testified that, during the M arch 3, 2013 interview, she “put the gun in defendant’s hand.” 1 During re-cross examination, however, defense counsel successfully clarified this statement. That is, upon questioni ng by defense counsel, Monzo acknowledged that, on March 3, 2 013 she did not tell police tha t defendant was in possession of the gun during the February 27, 2013 car chase, she denied that the gun was in her purse that day, and she did not tell police the gun had been thrown from t he car. Considering Monzo’s testimony, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its d iscretion by denying defendant’s request to play Monzo’s police interview for the jury.

“Under MRE 613, subject to certain restrictions, a witness may be examined concerning a prior inconsistent statement for impeachment purposes.” People v Rodriguez , 251 Mich App 10, 34; 650 NW2d 96 (2002). MRE 613 provides:

(a) Examining Witness Concerning Prior Statement. In examining a witness concerning a prior statement made by the witness, wheth er written or not,
the statement need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to t he witness at that time, but on request it shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel and the
witness.

(b) Extrinsic Evidence of Prior Inconsistent Statement of Witne ss. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inc onsistent statement by a witne ss is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or den y the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the wi tness thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. This provision does no t apply to admissions of a party-opponent as de fined in Rule 801(d)(2).

To impeach a witness with prior inconsistent statements under M RE 613, a party must first lay a proper foundation “by questioning the witness concerning the ti me and place of the statement

1 In particular, in reference to t he March 3, 2013 interview, wh ile attempting to rehabilitate Monzo’s credibility, the prosecutor asked Monzo during redirect : “Isn’t it true that prior to June 6th of 2013, that you actually did put the gun in Defendant’s h and?” Monzo responded in the affirmative. Out of the presence of the jury, the prosecutor l ater explained that, during an
incident unrelated to the car c hase, defendant took the gun fro m Monzo’s purse and threatened to kill himself. Monzo apparently r eferred to this incident when she “put the gun in defendant’s hand” during the March 3, 2013 police interview.-7- and the person to whom it was allegedly made.” Rodriguez , 251 Mich App at 34. “When a witness claims not to remember making a prior inconsistent stat ement, he may be impeached by
extrinsic evidence of that statement.” People v Jenkins , 450 Mich 249, 256; 537 NW2d 828 (1995); People v Claybon , 124 Mich App 385, 399; 335 NW2d 493 (1983).

In this case, defendant sought to admit Monzo’s entire March 3 , 2013 recorded statement without first laying the proper foundation by establishing that Monzo could not recall making a prior inconsistent statement. Therefore, the trial court corre ctly instructed defense counsel to first ask Monzo appropriate questions to determine whether impe achment through the presentation of extrinsic evidence was necessary. After asking Monzo additional questions, and eliciting Monzo’s admission that her police statement on March 3, 2013 was inconsistent with her trial testimony, defense counsel did not further request or argue that admission of the entire March 3 recorded interview was necessary. Indeed, given that M onzo admitted her prior inconsistent statements, proof of these statements through extr insic evidence under MRE 613(b)

was unnecessary, People v Graves , 15 Mich App 244, 246; 166 NW2d 480 (1968), and accordingly, we find no error. 2 Moreover, even assuming that defendant was entitled to admit the prior recorded interview to demonstrate an inconsistency wi th Monzo’s trial testimony or to provide context for her testim ony, it is not more probable than not that the error affected the
outcome of the trial because defendant was able to elicit Monzo ’s admission at trial that she gave prior inconsistent statements inher prior interview. Therefor e, any error was harmless. People v

Benton , 294 Mich App 191, 199, 201-202; 817 NW2d 599 (2011).

V. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Defendant next argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduc t by attempting to introduce testimony that defendant accompanied Monzo when she a ttempted to purchase a gun, and that Monzo appeared to be purchasing the gun on behalf of d efendant. The store clerk who sold the gun to Monzo testified t hat Monzo was with a male comp anion, but the clerk was unable to identify the male companion. T he clerk testified that he th ought that Monzo was purchasing the gun for the male companion b ecause it seemed from the way t he companion looked and acted that he was not capable of purchasing a firearm. Defense couns el objected, and the trial court sustained defendant’s objection to the clerk’s impressions as s peculative, struck the testimony, and instructed the jury n ot to consider it.

2 As a related matter, there is also no merit to defendant’s arg ument that the trial court’s refusal to admit the prior recorded interviews violated his right of co nfrontation, his right to present a defense, and his right to due process and a fair trial. The tr ial court did not deny defendant the opportunity to confront Monzo a nd did not deny him the opportun ity to impeach Monzo with her prior inconsistent statements. R ather, the trial court’s exclu sion of Monzo’s prior recorded interview related to the manner of impeachment. The court perm itted defense counsel to question Monzo about her prior r ecorded statements, and counsel was successful in eliciting Monzo’s admission that her prior statements were indeed inconsi stent with her trial testimony. In short, defendant was not denied the opportunity to present adefense, he had every opportunity for confrontation, and he was notdenied due process or a fair trial.-8- Even though defendant was successful in having the testimony e xcluded and stricken from the record, defendant now arg ues that the prosecutor engag ed in misconduct by attempting to introduce the testimony, which was determined to be inadmiss ible. Although defendant successfully objected to the tes timony at trial, he did not arg ue that the attempted introduction of the testimony constituted prosecutorial misconduct. “[A]n obje ction on one ground is insufficient to preserve an appe llate argument based on a diffe rent ground.” People v Danto , 294 Mich App 596, 605; 822 NW2d 600 (2011). Therefore, defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct is not preserved, and we review this issue for plainerror affecting substantial rights. People v Roscoe , 303 Mich App 633, 648; 846 NW2d 402 (2014).

Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are examined on a case-by-c ase basis, and the prosecutor’s conduct must be examined in context in light of th e entire record. Id. A prosecutor’s good-faith attempt to admit evidence does not cons titute misconduct. People v

Dobek , 274 Mich App 58, 70; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). “The prosecutor is entitled to attempt to introduce evidence that he legitimately believes will be accept ed by the court, as long as that attempt does not prejudice the defendant.” People v Noble , 238 Mich App 647, 660-661; 608 NW2d 123 (1999). Thus, a prosecutor does not act in bad faith if evidence is arguably
admissible. Dobek , 274 Mich App at 70.

In this case, the prosecutor’s theory at trial was that Monzo purchased the firearm for defendant. The store clerk’s testimony indicated that another man was with Monzo when she attempted to purchase the firearm. Although the clerk could no t identify defendant as that man,
Monzo later testified that it was defendant who was with her at the store and, more significantly, testified that she purchased the gun for defendant. In light o f this record, the prosecutor had a good-faith basis for attempting to elicit the store clerk’s tes timony that, based on the clerk’s personal observations of Monzo and the man in the store, Monzo appeared to be purchasing the firearm for her male companion, defendant. See MRE 701. Altho ugh the trial court ultimately excluded the testimony as speculative, the mere fact that the e vidence was excluded does not render the prosecutor’s conduct improper. Because the prosecut or had a good-faith basis for attempting to introduce the evidence, there was no misconduct. Furthermore, because the trial court ultimately excluded the testimony, struck it from the rec ord, and instructed the jury not to consider it, defendant was not prejudiced. Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions, and instructions presumably cure most errors. People v Abraham , 256 Mich App 265, 279; 662 NW2d 836 (2003). The trial court’s exclusion of the evidence a nd order striking it from the record and directing the jury not to consider it was sufficient to cure any prejudice, and protected defendant’s right to a fair trial.

V. POLICE REPORT OF A WEAPON IN THE VEHICLE

Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in allowing O fficer Jeremy Young to testify that he notified other o fficers who attempted to stop d efendant’s vehicle that he had reason to believe that there was a gun inside the vehicle. Def endant argues that this testimony violated a pretrial ruling, was i rrelevant, involved inadmissib le hearsay, and was unduly prejudicial. We reject e ach of these arguments.-9- Before trial, defendant brought a motion in limine to exclude evidence that defendant was under investigation for an unrelated offense involving an assau lt with a firearm. Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the trial c ourt entered a pretrial order that provided:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT testimony concerning Defendant threatening police officers, pos sibly possessing a firearm and/ or being investigated for another criminal complaint will not be admitte d by Plaintiff[] in its case in chief unless and until Defendant opens the door[.]

At trial, Monzo testified that t here was a gun in the vehicle and that she purchased it for defendant. Additionally, defense counsel questioned the manner in which defendant was arrested. Police testimony indi cated that defendant would not show his hands to officers, and that hand strikes occurred to force defendant to open his hands for officer safety. Defense counsel disputed that account of arrest by asking questions abo ut the arresting officers’ size which suggested that the police may have somehow overreacted or employed excessive force. After this testimony, Officer Young testified that before the p olice pursuit began, he advised the other officers that he had reason to believe there was a gun in the vehicle. He explained that he conveyed that information for purposes of officer safety.

Initially, we reject defendan t’s argument that Officer Young’s testimony was not relevant
or should have been excluded becau se it was undul y prejudicial. Generally, all relevant evidence
is admissible. Yost , 278 Mich App at 355. Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. M RE 402.
Relevant evidence is defined a s “evidence having any tendency t o make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.” MRE 401. Evidence is admissib le if it sheds light on any material point in issue. People v Murphy (On Remand) , 282 Mich App 571, 580; 766 NW2d 303 (2009). Even if relevant, evidence may be excluded if the prob ative value is substantially outweighed by the “danger of unf air prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless pr esentation of cumulative
evidence.” MRE 403. See also Benton , 294 Mich App at 200.

Officer Young’s testimony was re levant to explain the manner i n which the police pursuit and arrest of defendant were handled. Defense counsel had ques tioned the manner in which defendant was arrested and suggest ed that the police overreacte d. Police testimony indicated that
defendant would not show his hands , and that hand strikes occur red to force defendant to open his hands for officer safety. The testimony that the officers had been advised that there was reason to believe that a gun was inside the vehicle was relevan t to show that the officers had a legitimate concern for officer safety. Further, the probative value of the testimony was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, par ticularly considering that Monzo had already testified that a gun w as inside the vehicle.

In addition, by questioning whether the officers acted appropr iately when arresting defendant, defendant opened the door to evidence explaining the officers’ conduct, including evidence that the officers had been warned of the possible pres ence of a gun. Therefore, the-10- testimony did not violate the tri al court’s pretrial order, andthe admission of this testimony did not deprive defendant of due process or a fair trial. 3 Lastly, the testimony was not hearsay because it was not introduced for its truth (i.e., to prove tha t defendant possessed a gun), but
rather to show its effect on the other officers’ conduct. See People v Chambers , 277 Mich App 1, 11; 742 NW2d 610 (2007) (“[A] statement offered to show why police officers acted as they did is not hearsay.”). For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Officer Young’s testimony.

VI. EVIDENCE OF MONZO’S M ETHAMPHETAMINE MANUFACTURE

Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discreti on and demonstrated its partiality by allowing the pros ecutor to introduce testimony of defendant’s involvement in methamphetamine production, but not allowing him to present sim ilar testimony from Wlodarczyk to demonstrate that Monzo was also involved in manuf acturing methamphetamine. In particular, the trial court permitted Wlodarczyk to testify that she witnessed defendant’s manufacture of methamphetamine, but sustained the prosecutor’s relevancy objection when defense counsel attempted to question her about Monzo’s involve ment in the manufacture of methamphetamine.

When the trial court’s ruling excludes evidence, it is incumbe nt on the party seeking admission to make an offer of proof, and error may not be predi cated on the exclusion of evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected. MRE 103(a)(2); People v Witherspoon , 257 Mich App 329, 331; 670 NW2d 434 (2003). The trial court excluded Wlodarczyk’s testimony on relevancy grounds. Defendant failed to articulate the relevance of Wlodarczyk’s testimony in the trial court and, on appeal, he si milarly fails to explain the relevance of this testimony. Instead, defendant suggests on ap peal that the trial court’s exclusion of this testimony was simply unf air, and reflected the trial co urt’s partiality, where the prosecution was allowed to prese nt evidence of defendant’s invo lvement in the manufacture of methamphetamine. We disagree. The trial court permitted quest ions regarding defendant’s production of methamphetamine because evidence of defendant’s i nvolvement in manufacturing methamphetamine was relevant to show defendant’s knowing posses sion of equipment or chemicals used for manufacturing methamphetamine, a necessary e lement of the controlled substance charges. See genera lly MRE 404(b). That purpose was not applicable to Monzo,
because she was not on trial. Because defendant failed to esta blish a relevant purpose for Wlodarczyk’s testimony, the trial court did not abuse its discr etion by excluding it. The trial

3 Insofar as defendant’s argumen t regarding Officer Young’s test imony involves a claim that the prosecutor committed misconduct by unfairly attempting to taint the evidence, we can discern no misconduct in the prosecutor’s good faith attempt to admit rele vant evidence. See Noble , 238 Mich App at 660-661. Given that defendant opened the door to the appropriateness of the police offices’ conduct, the prosecutor did not violate the trial court’s order by questioning Officer Young regarding the presence of a gun and defendant cannot now complain that the prosecutor pursued this line of questioning. See People v Horn , 279 Mich App 31, 35; 755 NW2d 212 (2008).-11- court’s principled e videntiary ruling in this regard, grounded in the evidence and the law, does not demonstrate partiality or bias by the trial court. See People v Jackson , 292 Mich App 583, 598-599; 808 NW2d 541 (2011).

Moreover, any error in excluding the testimony was clearly harmless because Monzo testified at trial and admitted that she participated in the ma nufacture of methamphetamine by crushing the pseudoephedrine pills, handling the hoses, and cle aning the hoses and utensils. The prosecutor also elicited testimony that Monzo was familiar with the process because she testified regarding the ingredients that created a horrible odor and how liquid was poured out of the twoliter bottle into another vessel. In light of Monzo’s testimon y and other evidence showing her participation in manufacturing methamphetamine, it is not more probable than not that the exclusion of Wlodarczyk’s cumu lative testimony affected the out come of the trial. See Lukity

, 460 Mich at 496.

VII. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Defendant next argues that the evidence was insufficient to su pport his convictions. In particular, regarding his firearm convicti ons, defendant conten ds that, although a gun was thrown from the vehicle, the police officers could not specifically ti e the gun to defendant. Similarly, regarding defendant’s drug related convictions, defendant maint ains that, while materials for the production of methamphetamine were discovered in the vehicle, there is no evidence linking defendant to the items in question. Related to his conviction for resisting and obstructing a police officer, defendant argues he in no way resisted the poli ce, but rather he merely ran from the vehicle and fell in the snow. More generally, defendant ch allenges Monzo’s credibility in light of her inconsistent statements and the plea bargain she r eceived, and he debates the significance of the evidence pres ented at trial, including, for example, his letters to Monzo and the testimony of Wlodarczyk and Bartley.

A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed de novo. People v Malone

, 287 Mich App 648, 654; 792 NW2d 7 (2010). In examining a suffi ciency challenge, the evidence is reviewed in a light most favorable to the prosecuti on to determine whether a rational
trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of t he crime were proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v Dunigan , 299 Mich App 579, 582; 831 NW2d 243 (2013). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence may constitute proof of the elements of the crime. People v Bennett , 290 Mich App 465, 472; 802 NW2d 627 (2010). It is for the trier of fact to determine what inferenc es may be fairly drawn from the evidence and the weight to be accorded those inferences. Malone , 287 Mich App at 654. Further, this Court will not int erfere with the jury’s assessme nt of the weight of evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Dunigan , 299 Mich App at 582.

Defendant argues that, regardi ng his drug related convictions, there was insufficient evidence to establish his possession of the methamphetamine and methamphetamine chemicals and equipment because there was no credible testimony or physic al evidence, such as his fingerprints, linking those items to him. Possession of metham phetamine requires a showing of dominion or right to exercise control over the drug with knowle dge of its presence and character. People v Meshell , 265 Mich App 616, 621; 696 NW2d 754 (2005). For purposes of operating or maintaining a methamphetamine laboratory, a person shall not ow n, possess, or use a vehicle,-12- building, structure or area for use as a location to manufactur e methamphetamine or, alternatively, a person shall no t own or possess any chemical o r any laboratory equipment that he
or she knows or has reason to know is to be used for purposes o f manufacturing methamphetamine. See id . at 623-624; MCL 333.7401c(1)(a), (b). Regarding the element of possession, in People v Wolfe , 440 Mich 508, 519-520; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), mod 441 Mich 1201 (1992), the Court explained:

A person need not have actual physical possession of a control led substance to be guilty of possessing it. Possession may be eit her actual or constructive. Likewise, possession may be found even when the defendant is not
the owner of the recovered narcot ics. Moreover, possession may be joint, with more than one person actually or constructively possessing a co ntrolled substance. [Internal citations omitted.]

Actual possession occurs when anindividual exercises direct ph ysical control over a thing at a given time. People v Flick , 487 Mich 1, 15; 790 NW2d 295 (2010). Even if an individual d oes not have actual possession, a pe rson nonetheless constructively possesses a thi ng if he knowingly has the power and intention at a given time to exercise dominio n or control over it through direct acts or through the acts of another. Id . at 14-15. “Constructive possession of an illegal substance requires proof that the defenda nt knew of its character.” People v McGhee , 268 Mich App 600, 610; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). In contra st, “a person’s presence, b y itself, at a location where drugs are found is insufficient to prove constructive possessio n.” People v Bylsma , 493 Mich 17, 31-32; 825 NW2d 543 (2012) (quotation marks and footnote omitte d). “Rather, the essential inquiry into possession is whether there is a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the contraband including whether the defendant exercised a dominion and control over the
substance.” Id . (quotation marks and footnote omitted). The possession determination must be examined in light of the totality of the circumstances. Wolfe , 440 Mich at 521.

In the present case, Monzo, Bartley, and Wlodarczyk all testif ied regarding their use of methamphetamine made by defendant and their roles in purchasing pseudoephedrine for defendant to make the methamphetamine. For example, according to Monzo and Ba rtley, on the day of the car chase, defendant cooked methamphetamine in Bartl ey’s bedroom. They then used methamphetamine in the car during the police pursuit. Although defendant argues that these witnesses were not credible, the credibility of their testimonywas for the jury to resolve, and this
Court will not resolve it anew. Dunigan , 299 Mich App at 582. Moreover, in addition to their testimony, defendant was observed carrying two bags from Bartle y’s home to the Sunfire, and those bags contained items used t o manufacture methamphetamine. One bag also contained a letter and prescription bottle be aring defendant’s name, thereb y further linking defendant to the contents of that bag. Defendant also fled from the police, fro m which the jury could infer a consciousness of guilt. People v Unger , 278 Mich App 210, 226; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). In addition, the prosecution introduced several letters written by defendant to Monzo, which contained statements demonstrating defendant’s role in the crim es, including his possession and manufacture of methamphetamine and the laboratory equipment. A ccordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s c onvictions for the methamphe tamine offenses.-13- Both felon-in-possession of a firearm and felony-firearm requi re proof that the defendant possessed a firearm. 4 People v Peals , 476 Mich 636, 640; 720 NW2d 196 (2006). The crime of carrying a concealed weapon requires actual or constructive pos session coupled with the concealment requirement. People v Czerwinski , 99 Mich App 304, 306-307; 298 NW2d 16 (1980). Relevant to these firearm related offenses, Monzo test ified that she purchased a firearm for defendant, that defendant w ould carry the gun in his waistb and or that, when they were together, Monzo would carry it for him in her purse, and that d efendant threw the firearm out the window during the police chase. A police officer testified tha t he saw objects thrown from the passenger side window during the police pursuit, and a firearm was later recovered along the route of the police chase. The s erial number on that gun match ed the serial number on a gun box recovered by police. Contrary t o defendant’s appellate argumen ts, this evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defen dant possessed and carried a firearm after Monzo purchased it, and that he possessed it duri ng the commission of the methamphetamine offenses. Again, the credibility of Monzo’s te stimony was for the jury to
resolve.

To support a conviction for resi sting or obstr ucting a police officer pursuant to MCL 750.81d(1), the prosecutor must demonstrate that (1) the defend ant assaulted, battered, wounded, resisted, obstructed, opposed, or endangered a police officer, (2) the defendant knew or had reason to know that the person that the defendant assaulted, battered, wounded, resisted, obstructed, opposed, or endangered was a police officer perform ing his or her duties, and (3) that
the officer’s actions were lawful. People v Quinn , 305 Mich App 484, 491; 853 NW2d 383 (2014); People v Vandenberg , 307 Mich App 57, 68; 859 NW2d 229 (2014). Physical
obstruction of an officer is unnece ssary; hindering an officer in the process of a criminal investigation is sufficient. People Pohl , 207 Mich App 332, 333; 523 NW2d 634 (1994). For example, prearrest flight that actively interferes with an inve stigation is sufficient. Id . Further, physical contact or violence with the police is unnecessary, an d the failure to abide by police warnings or orders is just as effective in resisting officers a s if physical force was used. People v King , 236 Mich 405, 411-412; 210 NW 235 (1926).

Monzo testified that she advised defendant that the vehicle wa s being pulled over, but he persuaded her to flee from the police, resulting in a high-spee d, 34-mile chase. When the vehicle eventually stopped, defendant then fled from the police on foot . Although Deputy Daman Duva could not specifically recall if he identified himself as a pol ice officer when defendant fled from the Sunfire, he was dressed in a police uniform and he repeated ly ordered defendant to “stop.”

4 For purposes of felony-firearm, the prosecution also must show that the firearm was carried or possessed during the commission or attempted commission of anot her felony. People v Duncan

, 462 Mich 47, 49 n 3; 610 NW2d 551 (2000). To prove felon in po ssession, the prosecutor was required to show that defendant possessed or used a firearm, th at defendant was a convicted felon, and his right to possess a firearm had not yet been rest ored. MCL 750.224f. On appeal, defendant argues only that he did not possess the gun recovered in this case. In any event, it is clear that the possession of the gun in this case occurred duri ng the commission of another felony, and that, given defendant’s stipulation at trial, he wa s ineligible to possess a firearm.-14- Further, the flight on foot was preceded by a lengthy police pu rsuit during which officers had activated their lights and siren s. Moreover, Officer Ed Gerrow testified that he identified himself as a police officer and ordered de fendant to stop, but defendan t did not stop. This evidence was
sufficient to establish that defendant resisted or obstructed a police officer in the lawful performance of his duty. 5

VIII. MOTION TO QUASH

Defendant also argues that no probable cause existed to support his bind over and that the circuit court erred by denying hi s motion to quash. Given our conclusion that sufficient evidence was presented to support defendant’s convictions, we need not c onsider whether there was any
error in the district court’s bind-over decision. People v Bosca , __ Mich App __, __; __ NW2d __ (2015), slip op at 21. That is , even if a magistrate’s deci sion to bind over is erroneous, the error is harmless when sufficient evidence is presented to conv ict at trial. Bennett , 290 Mich App at 481. As discussed, having reviewed the record, we concl ude that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence at trial to convict defendant of the charged offenses. Accordingly, any potential error with the bind over was harmless and this is sue need not be considered further.

VIII. SENTENCING

Finally, defendant argues that resentencing is required becaus e the trial court erred in scoring prior record variables ( PRV) 2 and 4, and offense varia bles (OV) 14 and 19. 6 Defendant preserved these scoring challeng es by raising them in a motion for resentencing. MCL 769.34(10); People v Needham , 299 Mich App 251, 253; 829 NW2d 329 (2013). On appeal, the trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error and must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. People v Hardy , 494 Mich 430, 438; 835 NW2d 340 (2013). The trial court’s application of the facts to the statutory sco ring conditions presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Id . In this case, upon review, we conclude that the trial court properly scored the variables in question and thus defendant is not entitled to resentencing.

PRV 2 addresses prior low seve rity felony convictions. The co urt is directed to score 30 points if the offender has four or more prior low severity felo ny convictions, whereas 20 points

5 Having determined that the evidence was sufficient to support defendants’ convictions, we also reject defendant’s cursory assertion that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed
verdict. See People v Toodle , 155 Mich App 539, 551; 400 NW2d 670 (1986).

6 Aside from his specific challenges to the scoring of these var iables, defendant requests remand for correction of the PSIR and resentencing because he maintain s that many of his misdemeanor convictions may have been obtained without counsel. Contrary t o defendant’s arguments, we see no inaccuracy in the PSIR that needs correcting. Defendant ’s convictions listed in the PSIR either affirmatively report the presence of counsel, or they li st the presence of counsel as
“unknown.” We fail to see how this can be construed as inaccur ate. Further, defendant concedes on appeal that these offenses did not affect the sente ncing guidelines and, consequently, resentencing is not required on th is basis.-15- are to be scored if the offender has three prior low severity f elony convictions. MCL 777.52(1)(a) and (b). For purposes of PRV, a “prior low severi ty felony conviction” refers to a conviction for any of the following, provided that the convicti on was entered before the sentencing offense was committed:

(a) A crime listed in offense class E, F, G, or H.

(b) A felony under a law of the United States or another state that corresponds to a crime listed in offense class E, F, G, or H.

(c) A felony that is not listed in offense class M2, A, B, C, D , E, F, G, or H and that is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of less th an 10 years.

(d) A felony under a law of the U nited States or another state that does not correspond to a crime listed in offense class M2, A, B, C, D, E , F, G, or H and that is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of less th an 10 years. [MCL 777.52(2).]

Defendant argues that his prior convictions for resisting or ob structing a police officer, one conviction dating from 1997 and several from 2000, should not h ave been considered in the scoring of PRV 2 because the crimes were classified as misdemea nors at the time they were committed. See MCL 750.479, as enacted by 1931 PA 328. Defend ant asserts that if these convictions are not scored, he is left with only three prior lo w severity felony convictions, thereby warranting a score of only 20 points, rather than 30 po ints, for PRV 2. In making his argument, defendant concedes, however, that, although these cri mes were classified as a “misdemeanor” in the Penal Code before 2002, they were nonethel ess punishable by two years’ imprisonment. See MCL 750.479, as enacted by 1931 PA 328. Forpurposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which includes the sentencing guidelines, t he labels of “felony” or
“misdemeanor” in the Penal Code do not necessarily govern. See People v Smith , 423 Mich 427, 439, 443-445; 378 NW2d 384 (1985). Rather, the Code of Crimina l Procedure defines a “felony” as “a violation of a pen al law of this state for whichthe offender, upon conviction, may be punished by death or by imprisonment for more than 1 year or an offense expressly designated by law to be a felony.” MCL 761.1(g) (emphasis adde d). Given this definition of “felony,” it follows that a two-year offense labeled as a “misd emeanor” under the Penal Code nonetheless falls within the definition of “felony” for purpose s of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. See Smith , 423 Mich at 439, 443-445. Consequently, for purposes of PRV 2, defendant’s convictions for resisting and obstructing a police officer were felonies punishable by a maximum of less than 10 years. 7 See MCL 777.52(2)(c). As such, the trial court properly counted these offenses as prior low severity felony convictions and, because defendant had more

7 Alternatively, with regards to defendant’s convictions for res isting and obstructing in 2000, with the enactment of 1998 PA 317, the Legislature specificallydesignated resisting and obstructing a peace officer in violation of MCL 750.479 as a cl ass G offense, meaning
defendant’s convictions in 2000 would constitute crimes listed in offense class G. See MCL 777.52(2)(a). In either case, these offenses were properly sco red as prior low severity felonies.-16- than four such felonies, the tr ial court properly scored 30 poi nts under PRV 2. MCL 777.52(1)(a).

PRV 4 addresses prior low severity juvenile adjudications, and provides that five points shall be scored for two prior low severity juvenile adjudicatio ns. MCL 777.54(1)(d). Defendant’s presentence report lists two juveni le adjudications . Defendant does not dispute the adjudications, but argues that they should not have been consid ered because the presentence report indicates that it is unknown whether he was represented by counsel. As defendant observes, convictions and juveni le adjudications obtained in vi olation of the right to counsel may
not be used to enhance a criminal sentence. People v Alexander (After Remand) , 207 Mich App 227, 229-230; 523 NW2d 653 (1994). See also People v Carpentier , 446 Mich 19; 521 NW2d 195 (1994). Once a defendant presents prima facie proof that a prior conviction was obtained without the benefit of counsel, the burden shifts to the prosec ution to establish the validity of the prior conviction, e.g., affirmative record evidence of a waiver of counsel. Carpentier , 446 Mich at 31; People v Moore , 391 Mich 426, 441; 216 NW2d 770 (1974).

In this case, in response to defendant’s motion for resentenci ng, the prosecutor submitted orders of disposition from defe ndant’s juvenile cases that indi cate that defendant appeared in court with his parents and waived an attorney. We agree with the trial court that this evidence
established the waiver of counsel and the validity of defendant ’s juvenile adjudications. Because the prosecutor presented affirmative record evidence that defen dant waived counsel, the trial court did not err in upholding the five-point score for PRV 4. 8

Defendant next challenges his 10-point score for OV 14, which addresses the offender’s role in the crime. The court is directed to assess 10 points i f the offender was a leader in a multiple offender situation. MCL 777.44(1)(a). The court must examine the entire criminal
transaction to determine if the defendant was a leader. MCL 77 7.44(2)(a). In this case, Bartley
and Monzo both identified defenda nt as the primary manufacturer of the methamphetamine. According to Monzo, she purchased the gun at defendant’s behest , and she intende d to stop when the police attempted to pull over their vehicle, but defendant commanded her not to stop and thereafter directed her driving. Given the testimony presented , the trial court did not clearly err in finding that a preponderance of the evidence established def endant’s role as the leader. Thus, the trial court properly scored 10 points for OV 14.

8 Related to PRV 4, defendant also argues that his juvenile conv iction for joyriding, i.e., unlawful use of an automobile, should not have been counted as a low sev erity juvenile adjudication
because the offense was a misdemeanor. Defendant’s PSIR states , however, that the final charge was a class E adjudication for unlawful use of an automobile, and a class E crime constitutes a low severity adjudication for purposes of PRV 4. See MCL 777.5 4(2)(a). In any event, as defendant acknowledges, joyriding is punishable by up to two ye ars imprisonment, MCL 750.414, and as such it constitutes a “felony” for purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and was thus properly scored according to MCL 777.54(2)(c). Se e MCL 761.1(g); Smith , 423 Mich at 439, 443-445.-17- Lastly, OV 19 addresses interference with the administration o f justice, and 10 points are to be scored if the offender “interfered with or attempted to i nterfere with the administration of justice.” MCL 777.49(c). “The phrase ‘interfered with or atte mpted to interfere with the administration of justice’ is br oad,” and it includes acts cons tituting obstruction of justice although it is not limited to those acts. People v Steele , 283 Mich App 472, 492; 769 NW2d 256 (2009). Fleeing from the police contrary to an order to stop c an constitute interference with the administration of justice and is sufficient to support a 10-poi nt score for OV 19. See People v Hershey , 303 Mich App 330, 344; 844 NW2d 127 (2013); People v Ratcliff , 299 Mich App 625, 633; 831 NW2d 474 (2013), vacated on other grounds 495 Mich 876 (2013). Because the
evidence in this case showed that defendant directed Monzo to k eep driving, despite the police sirens and lights, and that he then attempted to flee from the police after a 34-mile police pursuit while ignoring police commands to s top, the trial court appropr iately scored 10 points for OV 19.
Cf. Ratcliff , 299 Mich App at 633.

Affirmed.

/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra /s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio