alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2
 
 
 
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 
 
 In connection with the Quarterly Report of Ampco-Pittsburgh Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), each of the undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:
 
 1.
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 2.
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 s/Marliss D. Johnson
 Marliss D. Johnson
 Vice President, Controller and Treasurer
 May 10, 2010
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                           1,319
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                           7,916
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                   570
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                      2,723
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                           7,736
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                             7,780
<LOANS>                                         82,992
<ALLOWANCE>                                        511
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 105,807
<DEPOSITS>                                      66,564
<SHORT-TERM>                                         0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              1,875
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        24,135
<OTHER-SE>                                      13,233
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 105,807
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  6,662
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                  654
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   692
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                 8,008
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               3,604
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,610
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            4,398
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                       50
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  2,123
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,339
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       1,481
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,481
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.82
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    4.32
<LOANS-NON>                                          0
<LOANS-PAST>                                       423
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                   462
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<RECOVERIES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                  511
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                                 0
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                            511



</TABLE>
# Comments on: 22-1042: In Re ADVANCED NUTRITIONAL SUPPLEMENTS [RULE 36 JUDGMENT], Nonprecedential
434P15

#### Curtis Kantawiti White, Jr. v. North Carolina, Carl F. Fox, Chief Judge

Petitioner’s *Pro Se*Petition for *Writ of Habeas Corpus*

Denied 12/29/2015
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000

<S>                                            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              FEB-03-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 JUL-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                   OCT-28-2000
<CASH>                                         41,876
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  58,814
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    1,045,847
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               1,269,952
<PP&E>                                         739,723
<DEPRECIATION>                                 188,188
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 2,340,699
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          742,447
<BONDS>                                        244,373
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       296
<OTHER-SE>                                     547,666
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   2,340,699
<SALES>                                        920,321
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               934,909
<CGS>                                          689,762
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  689,762
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               281,108
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             24,098
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (60,059)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   22,823
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (37,236)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (37,236)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (1.27)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (1.27)



</TABLE>
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 126 (Thursday, June 29, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 40131]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-16469]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division


Notice Pursuant to The National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act of 1993--National Electronics Manufacturing Initiative 
(``NEMI'')

    Notice is hereby given that, on January 14, 2000, pursuant to 
section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research Production Act of 
1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301 et seq. (``the Act''), National Electronics 
Manufacturing Initiative (``NEMI'') has filed written notifications 
simultaneously with the Attorney General and the Federal Trade 
Commission disclosing changes in its membership status. The 
notifications were filed for the purpose of extending the Act's 
provisions limiting the recovery of antitrust plantiffs to actual 
damages under specified circumstances. Specifically, Agile Software 
Corporation, Armonk, NY; AMR Research, Inc., Boston MA; ChipPCA Inc., 
Santa Clara, CA; Indium Corporation of America, Clinton, NY; Johnson 
Manufacturing Company, Princeton, IA; Nortel Networks, Research 
Triangle Park, NC; Newbridge Networks Corporation, Kanata, Ontario, 
CANADA; and Netfish, Technologies, Inc., Santa Clara, CA have been 
added as parties to this venture. The following members have changed 
their names: Unicam, Inc. to Tecnomatix-Unicam, Inc. Portsmouth, NH; 
and Morton Electronics to Shipley Ronal, Tustin, CA. Also, Industrial 
Computer Corporation (ICC), Atlanta, GA; Micro Module Systems, 
Cupertino, CA; and Hughes Electronics Coporation, El Segundo, CA have 
been dropped as parties to this venture.
    No other changes have been made in either the membership or planned 
activity of the group research project. Membership in this group 
research project remains open, and NEMI intends to file additional 
written notification disclosing all changes in membership.
    On June 6, 1996, NEMI filed its original notification pursuant to 
Section 6(a) of the Act. The Department of Justice published a notice 
in the Federal Register pursuant to section 6(b) of the Act on June 28, 
1996 (61 FR 33774).
    The last notification was filed with the Department on October 8, 
1998. A notice was published in the Federal Register pursuant to 
section 6(b) of the Act on January 29, 1999 (64 FR 4708).

Constance K. Robinson,
Director of Operations Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. 00-16469 Filed 6-28-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-M
§ 302-3.214 May I receive reimbursement for tour renewal travel when my travel is between two places within the United States? You may only receive reimbursement for tour renewal travel when your tours are between two places within the U.S. if you are an employee who is traveling from Alaska or Hawaii, and: ( a ) You will continue to serve consecutive tours of duty within the same state from which you're traveling, and on September 8, 1982 you were: ( 1 ) Serving your tour in one of these areas and have continued to do so; or
( 2 ) En route to a post of duty in Alaska or Hawaii under a written service agreement to serve a tour of duty; or
( 3 ) In the process of performing a tour renewal travel and has since then entered into another tour of duty in Alaska or Hawaii;
( b ) Tour renewal agreement travel for recruiting or retention purposes is limited to two round trips beginning within 5 years after the date the employee first begins any period of consecutive tours of duty in Alaska or Hawaii. Employees shall be advised in writing of this limitation; or
( c ) You are traveling due to your agency's mission to recruit or retain you as an employee to fulfill a position that requires a special skilled employee or to fill a position in a remote area.
*District Judge of the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by

designation.

** Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-11109

JIMMIE CHARLES CROW, JR.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

VERSUS

CHARLES TOMBONE, Warden, and FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION,

SEAGOVILLE, TEXAS,

Respondents-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Northern District of Texas

(3:96-CV-1980-G)

June 9, 1997

Before WIENER and PARKER, Circuit Judges and LITTLE, District

Judge.*

PER CURIAM:**
2

Jimmy Crow, Jr., federal prisoner # 07225-062, appeals an

order dismissing his “Petition for Writ of Mandamus or in the

Alternative a Writ of Certiorari.” 

The procedure relative to magistrate referral used in this

case was not unconstitutional. See Koetting v. Thompson, 995 F.2d

37, 39 (5th Cir. 1993). 

Crow has failed to carry his burden of establishing his

entitlement to a writ of mandamus. See In re American Marine

Holding Co., 14 F.3d 276, 277 (5th Cir. 1994). To the extent that

he contends that his petition for a writ of mandamus should be

liberally construed as an appeal from the denial of his § 2241

motion, this argument is also unavailing. See id. 

AFFIRMED.
§ 60-300.65 Enforcement proceedings. ( a ) *General.* ( 1 ) If a compliance evaluation, complaint investigation or other review by OFCCP finds a violation of the Act or this part, and the violation has not been corrected in accordance with the conciliation procedures in this part, or OFCCP determines that referral for consideration of formal enforcement (rather than settlement) is appropriate, OFCCP may refer the matter to the Solicitor of Labor with a recommendation for the institution of enforcement proceedings to enjoin the violations, to seek appropriate relief, and to impose appropriate sanctions, or any of the above in this sentence. OFCCP may seek back pay and other make whole relief for aggrieved individuals identified during a complaint investigation or compliance evaluation. Such individuals need not have filed a complaint as a prerequisite to OFCCP seeking such relief on their behalf. Interest on back pay shall be calculated from the date of the loss and compounded quarterly at the percentage rate established by the Internal Revenue Service for the underpayment of taxes.
( 2 ) In addition to the administrative proceedings set forth in this section, the Director may, within the limitations of applicable law, seek appropriate judicial action to enforce the contractual provisions set forth in § 60-300.5, including appropriate injunctive relief.
( b ) *Hearing practice and procedure.* ( 1 ) In administrative enforcement proceedings the contractor shall be provided an opportunity for a formal hearing. All hearings conducted under the Act and this part shall be governed by the Rules of Practice for Administrative Proceedings to Enforce Equal Opportunity Under Executive Order 11246 contained in 41 CFR part 60-30 and the Rules of Evidence set out in the Rules of Practice and Procedure for Administrative Hearings Before the Office of Administrative Law Judges contained in 29 CFR part 18, subpart B: *Provided,* That a final administrative order shall be issued within one year from the date of the issuance of the recommended findings, conclusions and decision of the Administrative Law Judge, or the submission of exceptions and responses to exceptions to such decision (if any), whichever is later.
( 2 ) Complaints may be filed by the Solicitor, the Associate Solicitor for Civil Rights and Labor-Management, Regional Solicitors, and Associate Regional Solicitors.
( 3 ) For the purposes of hearings pursuant to this part, references in 41 CFR part 60-30 to “Executive Order 11246” shall mean the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, as amended; references to “equal opportunity clause” shall mean the equal opportunity clause published at § 60-300.5; and references to “regulations” shall mean the regulations contained in this part.
§ 60-741.46 Voluntary affirmative action programs for employees with disabilities. ( a ) The contractor is permitted to develop and implement training and employment for employees with disabilities. Examples include, developing a job training program focused on the specific needs of individuals with certain disabilities such as traumatic brain injury (TBI) or developmental disabilities and utilizing linkage agreements to recruit program trainees. Successful programs such as these have been developed by some contractors and OFCCP desires to make clear they are permissible, though not required. ( 1 ) If a contractor elects to implement a voluntary affirmative action program for employees with disabilities, a description of the program and the policies governing the program, including the name and title of the official responsible for the program, shall be included in the contractor's written affirmative action program. An annual report describing the contractor's activities pursuant to the program and identifying the outcomes achieved should also be included in the contractor's affirmative action program.
( 2 ) Disability-related information from the applicant and/or employee self-identification request required by § 60-741.42 may be used to identify individuals with disabilities who are eligible to benefit from a voluntary affirmative action program for employees with disabilities.
( b ) The contractor shall not use such programs to segregate individuals with disabilities or to limit or restrict the employment opportunities of any individual with a disability.
( c ) The contractor shall not discriminate against an individual with a disability who has participated in a voluntary affirmative action program for employees with disabilities with respect to any term, condition, or benefit of employment, including, but not limited to, employment acts such as compensation, promotion, and termination, that are listed in § 60-741.20.
( d ) These voluntary training and development programs should not result in discrimination against other groups and do not relieve a contractor from liability for discrimination under this act, Executive Order 11246, or the Vietnam Era Vetrans' Readjustment Assistance Act.
# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas**
MEMORANDUM OPINION
N o. 04

- 23

- 00708

- CR Jonathan MARTINEZ , Appellant

v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee From the 186th Judicial District Court , Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2023CR3418 Honorable Kristina Escalona , Judge Presiding
PER CURIAM Sitting: Beth Watkins , Justice Liza A. Rodriguez , Justice Lori I. Valenzuela , Justice Delivered and Filed: September 27, 2023
DISMISSED Appellant Jonathan Martinez entered into a plea bargain with the State pursuant to which he pleaded nolo contendere to aggravated assault wi th a deadly weapon. The trial court imposed sentence in accordance with the agreement and signed a certificate stating this “is a plea

- bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 25.2(a)(2). Appellant filed a notice of appe al, and the district clerk filed a copy of the clerk’s record, which includes the trial court’s Rule 25.2(a)(2) certification and a written plea bargain agreement. See id. R. 25.2(d). We04

- 23

- 00708

- CR

- 2

- must dismiss an appeal “if a certification that shows the defendant h as the right of appeal has not been made part of the record.” Id

. Here, the clerk’s record establishes the punishment assessed by the trial court does not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant. See id. R.
25.2 (a)(2). The record also supports the trial court’s certification that appellant does not have a right to appeal. See Dears v. State , 154 S.W.3d 610, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that court of appeals should review clerk’s record to determine whether trial court’s certificate is accurate). On August 11, 2023, we ordered that this appeal would be dismissed pursuant to R ule 25.2(d) unless an amended trial court certification showing that ap pellant has the right to appeal

wa s made part of the appellate record by September 11, 2023

. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 25.2(d), 37.1; see also Dears , 154 S.W.3d at 614; Daniels v. State , 110 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2003, no pet.). Neither an amended certification nor other response has been filed. We therefore dismiss this appeal. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 25.2(d).

PER CURIAM
DO NOT PUBLISH
crowellrfmoring 

Gerald F. Murphy 

(202) 508-8855 

gmurphy@crowell.com 

Mr. Paul L. Gretch 

Director 

Office of International Aviation 

Department of Transportation 

Room W86-3 16 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE 

Washington, DC 20590 

1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20004-2595 • p 202 624-2500 • f 202 628-5116 

March 28, 2014 

Re: United Airlines, Inc.- Notice of Termination ofCodeshare Services; Dockets 

DOT-OST-2010-0132 (United/Aegean) and DOT-OST-2007-0012 (United/TAM) 

Dear Mr. Gretch: 

The Department granted Statements of Authorization authorizing United 1 to codeShare 

with Aegean and TAM in the above-referenced dockets.

2 Consistent with the Department's 

standard codesharing conditions, United notifies the Department that it will terminate all 

codeshare services with Aegean effective July 12, 2014, and with TAM effective March, 30, 

2014. 

cc: Robert Finamore 

Esta Rosenberg 

Andrew J. Harakas 

Marshall S. Sinick 

Counsel for 

United Airlines, Inc. 

All Parties on the attached Service List 

Common names are used for airlines. 

By Order 2011-3-14, the Department reissued authorities previously issued only 

to United or Continental in the name of "Continental Airlines, Inc. and/or United Air Lines, Inc." 

By Order 2013-4- 11 , the Department reissued the United/Continental authorities on a blanket 

basis to reflect the completion of the United/Continental merger and integration process and 

United's new corporate name of"United Airlines, Inc." effective as ofMarch 31,2013. 

Crowell & Moring LLP • www.crowell.com • Washington, DC • New York • San Francisco • Los Angeles • Orange County • Anchorage • London • Brussels 
SERVICE LIST 

bob.kneisley@wnco.com 

howard.kass@aa.com 

robert. wirick@aa. com 

robert.cohn@hoganlovells.com 

patrick.rizzi@hoganlovells.com 

pmurphy@lopmurphy.com 

jhill@cooley.com 

sascha. vanderbellen@del ta. com 

sam etta. c. barnett@delta.com 

sll unsford@fedex. com 

nssparks@fedex.com 

j richardson@j ohnlrichardson. com 

jcanny@amerijet.com 

kevin.montgomery@polaraircargo.com 

mroller@rollerbauer.com 

rpommer@atlasair. com 

charters@evergreenairlines.com 

agoerlich@ggh-airlaw.com 

slachter@lachter-clements.com 

mlbenge@zsrlaw.com 

pmurphy@lopmurphy.com 

matwood@cozen.com 

jyoung@yklaw.com 

dkirstein@yklaw.com 

john.fredericksen@suncountry.com 

thomas.ting@suncountry.com 

barbara.russell@virginamerica.com 

anita.mosner@hklaw.com 

j ennifer.nowak@hklaw.com 

john.s.duncan@faa.gov 

dwight.moore@ustranscom.mil 

urskr@state.gov
No. 10-11227.

#### Cummins *v.*City of Yuma, Arizona, et al.

C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
#### ROBERT M. CUSHMAN, Respondent, *v.*WILLIAM R. MARTIN, Appellant.

*Tax*— assumption *of*— ■ *liability of person receiving money to pay.*

Appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, entered on the verdict of a jury.

The plaintiff conveyed certain real estate to the defendant’s wife, and covenanted in the deed, that it was free from incumbrance. At that time it was subject to an unpaid tax of $352. The defendant, having applied to the plaintiff for money to pay this tax, received from him two checks for the amount of the tax upon the agreement, that he, defendant, would pay it off within a few days. This, however, he wholly failed to do. In the mean time Mr. Kittredge, from whom the plaintiff purchased the property, and who was liable for the payment of the tax, paid it off.

The General Term *held,*that, as Kittredge was liable for the payment of the tax, he would have been bound to pay the amount of it to the plaintiff, if the defendant had applied the money received by him to its extinguishment, as he agreed to do; and for that reason, as well as the circumstance that the plaintiff was bound by his. deed to the defendant’s wife to pay it, he had sufficient interest in the subject-matter to support the agreement made with him by the defendant; that merely delivering the money to the *246defendant for the payment of the tax, did not extinguish the plaintiff’s covenant against incumbrances contained in his deed. Nothing less than payment, or the acceptance of the amount in satisfaction by the wife of the defendant would be sufficient for that purpose.

It appeared that the defendant’s wife had sold the property to another person, who assumed to pay the taxes upon it, including the tax in controversy in this case. *Held,*that this did not release the plaintiff from liability to her under the covenant in his deed. By a sale of that nature the amount of the taxes to be paid would be deducted from the consideration, and, as between the parties to the conveyance, would be equivalent to a payment of them by the grantor, and could have no effect upon the liability of the person ultimately bound for payment, by reason of such a covenant as the plaintiff made when he conveyed the *property.*

*Charles Jones,*for appellant-, *A. K. Hadley,*for respondent.

Opinion by

Daniels, J.

Davis, P. J., concurred.- Brady, J., concurred, on the ground that defendant’s remedy was against the grantee of his wife, to whom the property was sold subject to the tax.

Judgment affirmed.