This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST 2 COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE 3 FOR SOUNDVIEW HOME LOAN TRUST 2006 4 EQ ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES, 5 SERIES 2006-EQ2, 6 7 Plaintiff-Appellee, 8 v. No. A-1-CA-36260 9 REBECCA M. RIORDAN, 10 Defendant-Appellant, 11 and 12 DISCOVER BANK, 13 Defendant. 14 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY 15 David K. Thomson, District Judge 16 Johnson Law Firm 17 Thomas Johnson 18 Albuquerque, NM 19 for Appellee 20 Gleason Law Firm, LLC 212 Deirdre Gleason 1 Heath, MA 2 for Appellant 3 MEMORANDUM OPINION 4 GARCIA, Judge. 5 {1} Defendant-Appellant Rebecca Riordan (Def endant) appeals from the district 6 court’s order denying her motion for summaryjudgment premised on lack of standing 7 and granting Plaintiff-Appellee Deutsche Bank National Trust’s (the Bank) motion for 8 summary judgment. We previously issueda notice of proposed summary disposition 9 in which we proposed to affirm. Defe ndant has filed a memorandum in opposition. 10 After due consideration, we remainunpersuaded. We therefore affirm. 11 {2} The pertinent background information was set forth in the notice of proposed 12 summary disposition. We will avoid undue repetition here, and focus instead on the 13 content of the memorandum in opposition. 14 {3} In the memorandum in opposition, Defe ndant argues that the Bank failed to 15 prove it had standing to foreclose because it provided no evidence that the 16 indorsement on the promisso ry note was a blank indorsement as opposed to an 17 anomalous indorsement. [MIO 7-13] SeeNMSA 1978, Section 55-3-205(b) (1992) 18 (“If an indorsement is made by the holder of an instrument and it is not a special 19 indorsement, it is a ‘blank indorsement.’ ”) (emphasis added); Section 55-3-205(d) (“ 203 ‘Anomalous indorsement’ means an indorsement made by a person who is not the 1 holder of the instrument .”) (emphasis added) . Defendant asserts that the Bank was 2 required to provide some evidence that the original lender had not lost its status as 3 “holder” of the promissory note at the time the undated indorsement was made. [MIO 4 9-10] See NMSA 1978, Section 55-1-201(b)(21)(A) (2005) (“ ‘[H]older’ means . . . 5 the person in possession of a negotiable instrume nt that is payable either to bearer or 6 to an identified person that is the person in possession[.]”). We are unpersuaded. 7 {4} For the original lender to have lost its st atus as holder prior to the making of the 8 indorsement here at issue, it would have had to have first ne gotiated the promissory 9 note to another party. SeeNMSA 1978, Section 55-3-201( a) (1992) (“ ‘Negotiation’ 10 means a transfer of possession, whether volunt ary or involuntary, of an instrument by 11 a person other than the issuer to a pers on who thereby becomes its holder.”). Under 12 the Uniform Commercial Code, “if an instrume nt is payable to an identified [party], 13 negotiation requires transfer of possession of the instrument and its indorsement by 14 the holder .” Section 55-3-201(b) (emphasis adde d). The promissory note produced by 15 the Bank was payable to an identifie d party—the original lender. [RP 9] Further, the 16 promissory note contained a single indorsement by the original lender. [RP 15] It 17 follows that the original lender was the hol der of the note at the time the challenged 18 indorsement was made, because there was no evidence of prior negotiation in the form 194 of another indorsement. See § 55-3-201(b). Therefore, we hold that the Bank 1 established a prima facie case that the indorsement was in fact a blank indorsement 2 giving it standing to foreclos e Defendant’s mortgage, which Defendant failed to defeat 3 at summary judgment. To the extent Defendant asserts that she was not obligated to 4 pay the note because it may have been lost or stolen, we reject this argument because 5 Defendant presented no evidence to that effect below. [MIO 12-13] SeeNMSA 1978, 6 Section 55-3-305(c) (2009) (“An obligor is not obliged to pay the instrument if the 7 person seeking enforcement of the instrume nt does not have rights of a holder in due 8 course and the obligor proves that the instrument is a lost or stolen instrument.” 9 (Emphasis added.)) 10 {5} The remainder of the memorandum inopposition reiterates arguments which 11 we addressed in our notice of proposed su mmary disposition. For the reasons stated 12 therein, we remain unpersuaded. 13 {6} Accordingly, for the reasons statedabove and in the notice of proposed 14 summary disposition, we affirm. 15 {7} IT IS SO ORDERED. 16

__________________ ______________ 17 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 18 WE CONCUR: 19

_______________________________ 205 LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge 1

_______________________________ 2 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 3