Filed 4/1/15 In re T.J. CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and pa rties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for pu blication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered publi shed for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re T.J. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B255545 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. DK00800)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
N.M. et al., Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Carlos Vazquez, Judge. Affirmed. Aida Aslanian, under appointment by th e Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant N.M. Joseph T. Tavano, under appointment by th e Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Ronnie L. Richard D. Weiss, County Counsel, Da wyn R. Harrison, Assistant County Counsel, Jeanette Cauble, Deputy Count y Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

________________ _______________2 N.M. (mother) and Ronnie L. (father) a ppeal from orders declaring N.M.’s daughter a dependent of the court, removing five younger children from father’s custody, and directing N.M. to partic ipate in sexual abuse awareness counseling, contending the orders are unsupported by substa ntial evidence. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROC EEDINGS BELOW The family in this case comprises mother, father, T. J., mother’s 16-year-old daughter from a prior relationship, and mothe r’s and father’s five younger children. Although father was not T.J.’s natural pare nt, he had known her since she was eight months old and was her only fa ther figure, beginning when she was eight years old. On June 28, 2013, T.J. informed a matern al aunt that in De cember 2012 she was sleeping in her bedroom with only a T-shirt on and awoke to find father between her legs rubbing her vagina. She kicked him and told him to leave, which he did, telling her not
to inform mother. On June 25, 2013, father came to her room again and asked her to remove her panties. She refused and told him to leave, which he did, again asking her not
to tell mother. The maternal aunt informed mother, who evic ted father from their home. Three weeks later, mother permitted father to return to the home. She did not inform police, but installed cameras in the home and locked T.J.’s bedroom door at night, confining her there with her consen t, when father was present. In September 2013, a second maternal a unt learned of the abuse and called police and the Department of Children and Fam ily Services (DCFS or the department). When interviewed, T.J. reported the two in stances of abuse and added that father, who had a medical marijuana license, often provi ded her with marijuan a and alcohol. In subsequent interviews with so cial workers, T.J. elaborated that in the December 2012 incident, she woke to find father under her sh irt between her legs, with his mouth on her vagina. In the June 2013 inci dent, father was “rubbing on” her and told her to take off her pants, but she refused and wrapped herself in blankets. T.J. said mother initially
believed her but later doubted her claims. When mother was interviewed, she stated she had not known of the abuse before
her sister informed her in June 2013 and was skeptical that it actually occurred. She3 reported she and T.J. were at odds over T.J.’s drug use and lifestyle, and T.J. was motivated by a desire to live with an aunt in Los Angeles. Father consistently denied he had ever a bused T.J. or provided drugs or alcohol to her. None of T.J.’s siblings reported knowi ng of the abuse or drugs or alcohol, and none showed any sign of abuse or neglect. DCFS petitioned the juvenile court under Welfare and In stitutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b), (d) and (j), 1 for orders declaring all th e children dependents of the court. The petition as ultimately sustained alleged father sexually abused T.J., and mother knew of the abuse but failed to protec t her, both of which enda ngered her physical health and safety. There was no finding this e ndangered T.J.’s sibli ngs. (The allegation that it did was ultimately strick en by the juvenile court.) Th e petition also alleged father provided marijuana and alcohol to T.J., wh ich endangered both he r and her siblings. There was no finding mother knew or reasonably should have known about the marijuana or alcohol. (The allegation was stricken by the court.) At the detention hearing, all of the childre n except T.J. were ordered released to
mother on the condition that fath er not reside with them. At a long, contested jurisdiction hearing, T.J. testified father molested her in
December 2012 and asked her if he could do it again in J une 2013, while rubbing her hip
and buttocks. She stated she asked him several times to leave, which he eventually did. He also gave her marijuana multiple times a nd alcohol four times. When mother found out, she kicked father out of the house, but permitted him to return a few weeks later
because she needed his help with the other children. Mother testified T.J. would often lie, and she believed she was lying about these
events because mother and da ughter were having difficulties a nd T.J. wanted to live with an aunt in Los Angeles. Mother admitte d she did not call the police when she was informed of the abuse, but she installed ca meras in the home and put a lock on T.J.’s
bedroom door.

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.4 The juvenile court found that T.J. was cr edible. She had a good, open relationship with father and no motive to make up what “even to a young person ” would obviously be “every explosive and very damaging allegatio ns.” “She made some very difficult admissions on the witness stand about her drug use and about some th ings that did not necessarily present her in a—as a complete i nnocent.” On the other hand, the court found the mother was not credible, as she was intent on protecting father and “went to great lengths to try to portray a situation where it would have been completely impossible for [father] to have committed the act that was i nvolved in the sexual allegation . . . .”
The court amended and su stained the petition and de clared all the children dependents. It found father’s willingness to provide marijuana and alcohol to T.J. endangered her siblings because “if he was so willing to give—if he was willing to give drugs and alcohol to a minor under—in his ow n household, the court can really find no
distinction in this case between the [siblings] and [T.J.] in te rms of being at risk.” The court also found mother failed to protect T.J. from father’s sexual predation, stating that “on some level she must have had some suspic ion or belief or at least believed [T.J.] to
some extent—at least to the ex tent enough to kick out he r male companion out of the home. [¶] But then what did she do? She doesn’t call the police. She allowed him to come back installing cameras which she indicated which was just to make [T.J.] feel
better . . . .”
The court ordered that T.J. be removed from the parents. It ordered that her siblings remain in mother’s custody, with ongoing departme nt supervision, but ordered
that father not remain in th e home, finding “by clear and co nvincing evidence that there is a substantial danger if the children were to be returned to [father’s] care, that there are no reasonable means by which the children’s physic al and emotional health can be protected without removing the children fr om his care.” The court further ordered mother, at her attorney’s suggestion, to par ticipate in sexual abuse awareness counseling and father to complete a parenting class and participate in sexual abuse counseling. The court ordered that father remain out of the home, but then granted him unlimited, unmonitored visitation rights.5 Mother appeals from th e jurisdictional finding that she failed to protect T.J. and the order that she participate in counseling. Father appeals from the order removi ng T.J.’s siblings from his care.
DISCUSSION Mother contends the finding that she failed to protect T.J. and the order that she undergo counseling were unsupported by subs tantial evidence. Fa ther contends the removal order as to T.J.’s siblings wa s unsupported by substantial evidence. As a preliminary matter, the department argue s we need not entertain either appeal because jurisdiction based on the action of one parent suffices to defeat the jurisdiction challenge of the other, and neither parent obj ected to the dispositional orders at the time
of trial. It is true that when jurisdiction is supported by substantial evidence on any ground, the appellate court need not consider the sufficiency of evid ence supporting other bases for jurisdiction. ( In re Shelley J . (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 330 [“Section 300 contemplates that jurisdiction may be based on any si ngle subdivision”]; Randi R. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 67, 72; see In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875-876.) And because neither parent challenges jurisdiction as to T.J. based on father’s actions, we need not review the juri sdiction finding based on mother’s acts. We will nevertheless do so, as a court’s finding th at a parent has endangered her child may have far reaching consequences including but not limited to a potential impact on future dependency proceedings. ( In re D.P . (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 898, 902; In re Drake M

. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 7 62-763.) We will also revi ew the challenged disposition orders, as a contention that a judgment is unsupported by substantial evidence may be made for the first time on appeal. ( Tahoe Nat’l Bank v. Phillip s (1971) 4 Cal.3d 11, 23, fn. 17.)
A. Standard of Review At a jurisdictional hearing, a juven ile court must base its findings on a preponderance of evidence. ( In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App. 4th 1426, 1432.) A disposition order that removes a child from the physical custody of a parent, on the other6 hand, must be founded on clea r and convincing evidence both that a substantial danger exists “to the physical health, safety, protec tion, or physical or emotional well-being of
the minor if the minor were returned home ,” and that no reasona ble means exist “by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without remo ving the minor from the minor’s parent’s or guardian’s physi cal custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) “On appeal, the ‘substantial evidence’ test is the appropriate standard of review for both the jurisdictional and di spositional findings. [Citation.] The term ‘substantial
evidence’ means su ch relevant evidence as a reasona ble mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it is ev idence which is reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.” ( In re J.K. , supra , 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433.) “In making this determination,
all conflicts are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing pa rty, and issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. [Citation.] In depend ency proceedings, a
trial court’s determination will not be disturbed unless it exce eds the bounds of reason.” ( In re Ricardo L. (2003) 109 Cal.A pp.4th 552, 564.) B. Mother’s Appeal
Mother contends insuffic ient evidence supports the fi nding that she failed to protect T.J. because it is undisputed she took protective actions that were effective from June to September 2013 in pr eventing further sexual abuse. She removed father from the home for a time, then permitted him to retu rn only after installi ng cameras and getting T.J. to agree to be confined to her room at night behind a locked door. She cannot be faulted for failing to call the police, mother argues, becaus e T.J. hysterically asked her not to, and police involvement was unnecessa ry to T.J.’s protection—she handled the situation. Mother argues methods that actua lly work are evidence of proper protection.
Mother’s evidence establishe s she protected T.J. from ac tual harm from June to September 2013, as there was no further abuse. But she did not remove the risk of harm during that time. A child co mes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under subdivision (b) of section 300 if he or she “has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illn ess, as a result of th e failure or inability7 of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protec t the child . . . .” (§ 300, subd. (b), italics added.) The juvenile court had before it evidence that father remained in the home after
June 2013 and had access to T. J. there. A bedroom door locked at night would not completely separate two people who live in the same household and lead relatively
normal lives. Mother informed no one in authority that father abused T.J., which arguably left him free to do so again. An d she sought no counseling for T.J., admittedly tempering her response to th e abuse according to her sk epticism that it had actually
occurred and her need to have father in th e home to help with the other children. Given these facts, the juvenile court ha d ample evidence from which to conclude mother failed to protect T. J. from “a substantial risk” of serious physical harm.
Mother contends the order that she un dergo sexual abuse co unseling is unfounded because T.J. no longer lives in the home— she has moved in w ith an aunt—and no finding was made that sexual abuse affected the remaining children. Again, these are arguments to be made in the trial court, not on appeal. The trial
court heard evidence that moth er knowingly permitted a sexual predator to live in close proximity with her 16-yea r-old daughter, in part because it was necessary that he do so to help with the other children. The court coul d reasonably conclude from this fact alone
that mother would benefit from se xual abuse awareness counseling. C. Father’s Appeal
Father contends that the removal order as to T.J.’s siblin gs was unfounded, as evidenced by the juvenile court’s inconsiste nt order that he be granted unlimited,
unmonitored visitation. We agree the orders are inconsistent, and the visitation order implies the court found father presented no danger to the children. But an implied finding cannot trump an express contrary finding. The trial court expressly found no mean ingful distinction between T.J. and her siblings when it came to father’s willingness to distribute drugs to minors. Father’s providing marijuana and alcohol to a minor indicated he had the means8 and willingness to do so and sa w nothing wrong with doing so. The court found this endangered T.J.’s siblings. Although the court’s order that father enjoy unlimited, unmonitored visitation was somewhat inconsistent with its finding that he would pose a danger to them if allowed to live in the home, it did not completely contra dict the finding. The court reasonably could
have concluded father’s diminished status as a visitor rather than custodian (at least for the time being) would convince him of the impropriety of giving drugs to minor children and persuade him to discontinue the practi ce. We therefore conclude the order was supported by substantial ev idence and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION The jurisdictional and dispos itional orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CHANEY, Acting P. J.

We concur:

JOHNSON, J.

BENDIX, J. *

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Cour t, assigned by the Ch ief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.