CLD-364 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 13-2502

___________

BEZALEL GROSSBERGER a/k/a BEN GROSS

v.

PATRICK RUANE; MARION RUANE

Ben Gross,

Appellant

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 3-11-cv-03728)

District Judge: Honorable Anne E. Thompson

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction and 

Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

August 1, 2013

Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 19, 2013)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Bezalel Grossberger appeals from an order modifying the language of a prior 

filing injunction barring him from any further filings in this matter absent permission of 
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the District Court. For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the District 

Court’s order.

I.

In June 2011, Grossberger commenced a pro se civil rights action against 

Defendants Patrick and Marion Ruane over an unconsummated property transaction, for 

which he sought relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1985. The Ruanes moved to 

dismiss the complaint, because Grossberger’s claims were barred by the applicable 

statute of limitations, and he failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 

The District Court dismissed and closed the case. Grossberger v. Ruane, No. 11-3728, 

2011 WL 6257178 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2011) (also found on as Dist. Ct. ECF No. 16). The 

same day, Grossberger filed a motion to amend the complaint. The District Court denied 

the motion, finding that an amended complaint would be futile. He then filed a motion 

for reconsideration, which was denied as untimely filed. Days later, he moved to 

reinstate the complaint, which the District Court also denied. He appealed, and this Court 

affirmed. Grossberger v. Ruane, 491 F. App’x 309 (3d Cir. 2012). Upon receiving this 

Court’s judgment, Grossberger filed another “motion to reopen” in the District Court. 

The District Court denied his request again. 

After six separate attempts to argue the same meritless claims, the Court decided, 

sua sponte, to “preclude[ him] from filing any further motions or pleadings in this matter 

without the [District Judge’s] express written permission.” Dist. Ct. Ord. 3, Sept. 25, 

2012, ECF No. 35. Grossberger then moved for a clarification of the injunction, and took 
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the opportunity to continue rearguing his claims. Two days later, he also filed another 

appeal, which we dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as untimely filed, C.A. No. 12-4381. 

The District Court granted his motion and issued an opinion explaining its authority to 

enjoin Grossberger’s future filings. See Dist. Ct. Op., Jan. 2, 2013, ECF Nos. 40 & 41. 

In May, in response to an inquiry from the Ruanes, the District Judge issued a 

letter, explaining how the Court would receive and consider Grossberger’s future filings. 

Grossberger responded to that letter, and filed another appeal. On July 1, 2013, the 

District Court entered an order modifying the original filing injunction. Grossberger filed 

an amended notice of appeal with this Court to include a challenge to that subsequent 

order.

II.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review the District Court’s 

issuance of filing injunctions for abuse of discretion. In re Packer Ave. Assocs., 884 F.2d 

745, 746-47 (3d Cir. 1989).1

III.

A pre-filing injunction is an exception to the general rule of free access to the 

courts and its use against a pro se plaintiff must be approached with caution. See In re 

Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1982). However, a District Court may enjoin a pro se 

 

1

The case was originally listed for possible jurisdictional defect because it appeared that 

Grossberger was appealing from a non-order. However, because he later filed an 

amended notice of appeal, it is now clear that he is seeking review of the District Court’s 

subsequent final order.
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litigant from future filings so long as the injunction complies with three requirements: 

(1) the litigant must be continually abusing the judicial process; (2) the litigant must be 

given notice of the potential injunction and an opportunity to oppose the court’s order; 

and (3) the injunction must be narrowly tailored to fit the specific circumstances of the 

case. Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1038 (3d Cir. 1993). 

IV.

We agree that the filing injunction was warranted based on Grossberger’s filing 

record in this case. Since his case was closed in December 2011, Grossberger has filed a 

dozen or so motions, separate briefs, letters, and appeals, repeatedly arguing the same 

issues. Based on the same facts, he has also asserted new claims of fraud and sought to 

disqualify the District Judge several times. None of Grossberger’s repetitious filings 

have presented a meritorious basis for reopening his case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); 

Brown v. Pa. R.R. Co., 282 F.2d 522, 527 (3d Cir. 1960) (standard for 60(b) relief on the 

basis of fraud); Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 255 (3d Cir. 2008) (requiring 

a showing of “extraordinary circumstances” under the catch-all of Rule 60(b)). 

Grossberger has also taken several opportunities to appeal the District Court’s judgments. 

Although he did not seek review of the original dismissal order, we have now twice 

reviewed the denials of his motions to reopen the case, which we affirmed, C.A. No. 12-

2725, or dismissed, C.A. No. 12-4381. 

It is clear that Grossberger is unhappy with the District Court’s decision to dismiss 

his case, and apparently he has made it his goal to change the Court’s mind. But in the 
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process, he has “established a pattern of groundless and vexatious litigation.” Chipps v. 

United States Dist. Ct. for the Middle Dist. of Pa., 882 F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 1989). 

Grossberger’s filings are not only numerous, they are also without any merit. In re 

Oliver, 682 F.2d at 446. Moreover, he relentlessly continues to file repetitive motions 

even after his case has been closed. See Dist. Ct. Ord., Dec. 14, 2011, ECF No. 16 

(showing the case was closed more than a year and a half ago).

Furthermore, Grossberger has now had ample opportunity to respond to the 

injunction. Initially, the District Court failed to give Grossberger proper notice. But after 

the original injunction was entered, Grossberger filed objections. Mot. Clar. 1-2, Nov. 

26, 2012, ECF No. 38. Accordingly, the District Court addressed his concerns, ECF No. 

40, and modified the injunctive order, ECF No. 55, which is now in place. This occasion 

to respond was sufficient to comport with due process requirements. Gagliardi v. 

McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987) (explaining that there must be “some 

occasion” for the litigant to respond). 

Lastly, the injunction was limited to non-prescreened motions or other litigation 

documents submitted by or on behalf of Grossberger against the Defendants named in 

this action. We agree that is narrowly tailored to fit the circumstances of this case. See

Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329, 332 (3d Cir. 1990) (allowing the district courts to 

issue an injunction that requires a litigant to obtain approval before making further 

filings); Chipps, 882 F.2d at 73 (limiting scope of injunction to a specific case, when the 

vexatious litigant’s abuse was confined to that case).
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V.

For these reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order because no 

substantial question is raised on appeal. See Local Rule 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. The District 

Court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining Grossberger from filing additional motions 

or litigation documents in this matter without prescreening by the Court.