March 2012

Dr Patricia Lundy

1 | P a g e

PREREQUISITES FOR PROGRESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

WRITTEN EVIDENCE OF DR PATRICIA LUNDY, SENIOR LECTURER,

UNIVERSITY OF ULSTER, TO THE COMMISSION OF SECURITY AND

CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION

21st March 2012

Dr Patricia Lundy is grateful to the Helsinki Commission for allowing her to submit

written evidence to its hearing on “Prerequisites for Progress in Northern Ireland”.

The submission is based on empirical research. In August 2005, the former Chief

Constable of the PSNI Sir Hugh Orde granted Dr Lundy permission to conduct

research, and wide and unfettered access to the Historical Enquiries Team (HET)

was permitted. In the context of Northern Ireland, this was unprecedented access to

policing and provides unique insight into a distinctive process. The HET is an

innovative process and a unique concept in policing internationally. The research

raises a number of concerns examined in Part 2 of the current submission.

Background

Since the Good Friday Agreement was signed in 1998 there have been dramatic

changes that have transformed society. Between 1966 and 1999 approximately

3,636 people died as a result of the conflict in Northern Ireland and many more

suffered injury and loss.1 During this period there were widespread and systematic

violations of human rights by state and non-state actors and allegations of collusion

between state agencies and Loyalist paramilitaries. The supposition is systematic

human rights violations would not happen in a liberal democracy, committed to the

rule of law. Northern Ireland demonstrates that this is not confined to

underdeveloped dictatorial regimes and can occur in western highly developed

democracies with a plethora of human rights protections, legislation and institutions

designed to detect and protect victims of such violations within an ostensible

democracy. Indeed this context may constrain acknowledgement of abuse as

government is less willing to accept institutional failure.
2 | P a g e

What are the Benefits of an Independent International Truth Recovery

Process?

Unlike many other “post-conflict” societies, “truth” recovery was not envisaged as

part of the initial Northern Ireland peace deal. To date it has been marked by, what

could be interpreted as, a deliberate fragmented approach by the state that is not

designed to address the past in a comprehensive and holistic way. Whatever the

interpretation of this policy, it has created a vacuum which is filled by almost daily

media reports that drip feed toxic revelations about the atrocities of the past raising

more questions than answers.

Post-conflict the dilemma is whether, and if so, how, to address the legacy of conflict

and address victims’ needs. In the aftermath of conflict, victims often desire ‘truth’,

justice and accountability. However, victims are not a homogenous group, some

desire answers to unanswered questions about the tragic death of their loved ones;

others seek prosecutions; victims’ of state violence frequently prioritise

accountability. Internationally, transitional justice initiatives are promoted as a vital

component in conflict transformation and a prerequisite for sustainable peace. The

United Nations has embraced and employed transitional justice measures and ‘truth’

recovery in particular, in its interventions in “post-conflict” situations. The societal

benefits attributed to ‘truth’ recovery (and especially truth commissions) are well

documented; it is not possible to explore each in detail here. Briefly, “truth” recovery

is important because by acknowledging suffering and wrongdoing and allowing

victims to “tell their story” this will assist the healing process. The logic is by learning

from the mistakes of the past it will prevent a repetition of human rights abuses in the

future — the “never again” maxim. Therefore, “truth” recovery helps consolidate

democracy by establishing respect for human rights and the rule of law. Crucially, it

can help achieve accountability and combat impunity. However, justice and

accountability do not necessarily mean prosecution and imprisonment of those who

have been involved in human rights abuses. This raises the question of amnesty (or

immunity) and its role, if any, in post conflict peace building and justice. Some

commentators have argued that a de facto amnesty exists for members of the

security forces in Northern Ireland. Amnesty is an extremely emotive topic, but

whether we like it or not, society needs to have a conversation about this difficult

topic. These are the dilemmas and challenges of grappling with the past. Despite
3 | P a g e

strong opposition to ‘truth’ recovery within sections of Northern Irish society, the

reality is, ‘truth’ recovery is taking place by means of a plethora of unofficial and

official means. However, this is fragmented, partial and long-drawn-out. Indeed, the

current ‘drip feed approach’ has the potential to undermine, and/or unravel, much

good work and progress already achieved. Finding a satisfactory way to deal with

the past remains the outstanding prerequisite for progress in Northern Ireland.

The Current Position

The UK government has been found in breach of Article 2, the right to life, in a

number of cases in Northern Ireland. In a joint judgment delivered on 4 May 2001 the

court set out the elements which must be adhered to for an investigation to be Article

2 compliant — effectiveness, independence, promptness, accessibility to the family

and sufficient public scrutiny.2In 2002, in response to the above judgments, the UK

Government presented the European Court of Human Rights with a “package of

measures”, which it claimed were necessary steps to address the issues raised in

the Court’s judgment and would ensure future Article 2 compliant investigations. A

key component of the “package of measures” was the Historical Enquires Team

(HET). There is mounting evidence that some aspects of the current ‘package of

measures’ do not have the capacity to effectively investigate some of the more

contentious conflict related deaths in Northern Ireland. A prerequisite for progress, in

the absence of a comprehensive “truth” recovery process, is the current mechanisms

must be capable of delivering impartial and effective investigations. The remainder of

this submission to the Helsinki Commission will discuss recent research, conducted

by Dr Lundy, on the HET.

Part 1:

Research Report (2009): Can the Past be Policed?

The first research report published by Dr Lundy raised a number of concerns about

the HET, including lack of independence and the role of retired RUC officers. The

research found that each stage of the HET process had involvement of significant

numbers of long serving retired RUC officers; this included the Command Team,

senior managers of intelligence and the entire HET Intelligence Unit. The research

further noted; given the very high numbers of retired police officers working in the

HET, a crucial matter seemingly overlooked was who has oversight responsibility.
4 | P a g e

While the issue of independence is extremely important, it is not the focus of this

current submission.

3 Nevertheless, it is important to note that the HET has recently

undergone significant changes to its processes and structural relationship with the

PSNI. It originally reported directly to the Chief Constable; HET now reports directly

to the Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) for Crime Operations. From 2009 HET refers

cases (where realistic evidential opportunities exist) back to the Serious Crime

branch (“C2”) of the Crime Operations Department. This raises a number of

concerns which are reflected in a joint submission by the Committee on the

Administration of Justice (CAJ) and Pat Finucane Centre (PFC) to the Committee of

Ministers (CM) February 2012.4 The submission expressed deep concern that since

CM assessment of the general measures in 20095a number of developments

significantly undermine the HET’s capacity to carry out the work it was deemed

capable of doing. Concerns were expressed about the independence and

effectiveness of the process underpinning reports prepared by the HET. Whilst some

families have received a satisfactory measure of resolution from the HET, CAJ and

PFC do not accept that it is an operationally independent unit of the PSNI and have

some concerns about HET’s capacity to conduct effective independent Article 2

compliant investigations where state actors may have been involved in a death. The

submission “formally requested the reopening of scrutiny by the Committee of

Ministers of General Measures relating to the HET in the ‘McKerr group of cases’.” 6

Part 2:

Research Report (2012): HET Review of Royal Military Police (RMP)

‘Investigations’7

The remainder of this submission will discuss the HET’s review processes and

procedures in Royal Military Police (RMP) investigation cases (hereafter RMP

cases). RMP cases involve the fatal shooting of over 150 civilians by the British army

between 1970 and September 1973.8In November 2011 the HET had completed 36

RMP case reports.

9 This paper sets out research findings based on the analysis of

twenty-four HET reports, relating to seventeen individual RMP cases.

10 The

submission considers a number of issues about the way in which the HET conducts

investigations in RMP cases. Of particular note are apparent anomalies and

inconsistencies in the investigation process where State agencies (in this case the

military) are involved, compared to non-state or paramilitary suspects. This raises
5 | P a g e

questions about the ability of the HET to undertake independent, impartial, effective

investigations in cases involving State agencies.

The following aspects of HET investigations in RMP cases are examined:

‘Pragmatic approach’

Interviews under caution

Pre-interview disclosure

Pre-prepared written statements

Robustness of interviews

Equality of treatment

Editing and changes to reports

Effectiveness of reviews

Tracing, illness verification

Accountability

CONTEXT

The Saville Inquiry revealed that between 1970 and September 1973 an informal

agreement (hereafter Agreement) existed between the Chief Constable of the RUC

and the GOC of the British army about the conduct of investigations in fatal

shootings involving the military.

11 The Agreement specified that soldiers suspected

of involvement in a fatal shooting episode would be questioned by the Special

Investigations Branch (SIB) of the Royal Military Police (RMP); and the RUC would

take responsibility for interviewing civilian witnesses and all other aspects of the

investigation. These arrangements meant that soldiers involved in fatal shooting

incidents were rarely interviewed by the RUC and consequently any opportunity for

independence was negated. An RUC policy at the time directed that the RUC should

forward all available evidence to the RMP prior to an interview taking place with

soldiers. 12 In effect the RMP rarely received witness statements before military

personnel were interviewed. The interviews appear to have been conducted

informally with no assessment of criminal responsibility. The procedure appears to

have been to question soldiers as witnesses, rather than to interrogate them as

suspects, thereby dispensing with the need for formal cautions. The adequacy of
6 | P a g e

RMP investigations was examined in the Saville Inquiry; the following evidence from

a military witness captures the statement-taking process: “It was not a formal

procedure. I always wore civilian clothing and the soldier was usually relaxed. We

usually discussed the incident over sandwiches and tea.”13

In 2003 these arrangements were judicially reviewed in the Kathleen Thompson

case.

14 Sir Brian Kerr, Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, concluded that

investigation into Mrs Thompson’s death was not effective and it is questionable

whether the Chief Constable of the RUC had the legal authority to delegate the

critical responsibility of interviewing soldiers to the RMP.

HET Investigation Practices and Procedures:

The HET has a number of processes and procedures that it adopts in RMP cases.

1. The ‘Pragmatic Approach’

The ‘pragmatic approach’ refers to HET interviews of suspects conducted ‘informally’

or not under caution. The soldier is interviewed as a witness, rather than crossexamined as a suspect, thereby dispensing with the need for formal caution. The

‘pragmatic approach’ appears to be a recent development in HET procedures and as

far as can be established is specific to RMP cases.15 The HET has stated that, ‘the

methods used for identification, tracing and interviewing military personnel are the

same as those employed by the police service’; RMP cases are ‘treated as per the

guidelines of the Police and Criminal Evidence (NI) Order’.

16 There are very clear

codes of conduct and standards that govern criminal investigations. The research

indicates that the HET appears to have departed from the accepted standards in

RMP cases. It is not within the scope of this submission to the Helsinki Commission

to detail numerous examples; the following abstract from recent HET report is

illustrative.

HET procedures in RMP cases are outlined as follows:

“The question as to whether the HET should interview soldiers who were

involved in shooting incidents whilst on duty in Northern Ireland is considered

on a ‘case by case’ basis. Usually, but not exclusively, the determining factor
7 | P a g e

will be around the thoroughness of the original investigation, especially the

way in which interviews were conducted by the military, and whether the

original interviewers had prior knowledge of any allegations that may have

been levelled against the soldiers. Another major consideration is the

evidence that was tendered by the soldiers or their representatives at the

inquest, and most importantly whether there is any evidence available now

that would not have been available to investigators at the time.”

The HET report goes on to say, “this pragmatic approach was adopted

specifically to give the HET maximum opportunity to obtain as much

information as possible for the benefit of [the] family. People who are

interviewed under caution as ‘suspects’ are typically either

extremely guarded in what they say, or exercise their right not to say

anything at all.” [Emphasis in bold added].

Taking into consideration the earlier discussion about the deeply flawed

nature of RMP investigations and Sir Brian Kerr LCJ ruling in the Thompson

case (2003), and acceptance by the HET that clear discrepancies appear in

the statements made, it is unclear why the HET took the decision not to

interview the soldier under caution. The RUC at the time were clearly of the

opinion that the shooting was unlawful and strongly recommended

prosecution of the soldier in question.

It appears that the HET decision to interview the soldier as a witness (and not

as a suspect) fails to challenge and/or reinforces the original procedural

inadequacies. Perhaps with the best of intentions in mind, the HET justify this

approach as; “A classic dilemma’. – no information for the families, or adopt a

pragmatic approach in the pursuit of some answers for them.”

This implies a ‘truth recovery’ process. However, the HET cannot offer the

guarantees and/or incentives deemed necessary to encourage ‘truth recovery’

i.e. immunity or amnesty. In the absence of such guarantees suspects would

run the risk of self-incrimination.

Participating in such a ‘pragmatic process’ does not appear to reveal any

greater level of substantive information than previously available in the
8 | P a g e

original papers. Statements tend to be a repetition of the original argument

advanced in the RMP interview. The process does however offer the soldier

an opportunity to bolster his original statement by plugging any gaps in his

defence and to include some additional descriptive self-serving detail.

Importantly, the research found inconsistencies in HET decision-making to

interview military suspects under caution or ‘informally’.

Tracing and Verification of Illness:

In a number of cases the HET were unable to identify and trace soldiers

responsible for the fatal shooting of civilians and/or key military eyewitnesses.

In some instances, where soldiers have been identified and traced, ill health is

a factor in the decision not to interview the suspect under caution or

otherwise. In one instance the HET state that the suspect (soldier B) “is

suffering from dementia and a heart condition and was unable to assist with

the review.” But the report goes on to give some limited detail about an

interview that seems to have taken place; including soldier B’s expression of

regret. Importantly, it is evident that the verification of illness (i.e. medical

evidence) of soldiers directly involved in fatal shootings in RMP cases is not

always confirmed and/or sought by the HET. The process involved is not

transparent.

It was confirmed in a recent meeting with Dave Cox (HET Director) and other

senior staff that the HET do not always seek verification of illness with regards

to soldiers directly involved in fatal shootings in RMP cases (i.e. medical

evidence).17 In addition, further evidence is provided by a member of the legal

profession who recently received written confirmation from the HET that

medical evidence was not sought in his client’s (RMP) case which involved

the death of an eleven year old boy (copy of letter on file with the author).
9 | P a g e

Issues to be considered include:

In order to comply with Article 2, investigations must be effective and

transparent. In this regard the ‘pragmatic approach’ raises serious concerns.

There are very clear codes of practice, standards and procedures which

govern criminal investigations. The HET appear to depart from the accepted

standards and justify this by calling it a ‘pragmatic approach’. This raises an

issue as to whether the HET is acting outside its authority and powers.

The nature and conduct of ‘informal’ interviews (sometimes conducted in the

soldier’s own home) is not clear.18

The research also found inconsistencies in HET decision-making whether to

interview military suspects under caution or ‘informally’.

More generally, the ‘pragmatic approach’ appears to be a recent development

in HET procedures and as far as can be established is specific to RMP cases.

This raises questions about equality of treatment and procedural impropriety;

some suspects appear to receive more favourable treatment than others.

Differentiation in treatment raises questions about the HET’s impartiality in

conducting investigations into cases concerning State agencies.

Legal advice is required to determine whether a ‘pragmatic approach’ could

prejudice any future prosecution. And/or whether this amounts to an abuse of

process.

Are families aware of the risks (if any) in adopting an “informal/pragmatic”

approach?

Is there full transparency in respect of this process?

How are illnesses verified?

What does the ‘pragmatic approach’ deliver (compared to interviews under

caution)?

In view of these concerns, should RMP investigations be brought to the

attention of the European Court for consideration?

The DPP/PPS decision not to prosecute also raises concerns which require

further scrutiny.

2. Interviews Under Caution

In RMP cases where soldiers are interviewed under caution the investigation

processes and procedures also raise a number of concerns.
10 | P a g e

Pre-interview disclosure:

The HET states in RMP case reports that, “there is a legal obligation placed

upon the HET to serve on those representing an interviewee a pre-interview

disclosure package. This consists of all existing evidential documentation and

other material that is relevant to the case.”

19

Importantly, there is evidence to indicate that the ‘package’ includes

contemporary or new witness statements made by individuals who witnessed

the death/incident but did not make a statement to the police at the time. It is

my understanding that the witnesses, the families, NGOs and/or lawyers who

enabled the new witnesses to come forward, were not informed by the HET

that new statements would form part of a ‘pre-interview disclosure package’ to

solicitors representing soldiers. In a recent meeting with Dave Cox (HET

Director), senior staff and the author it was confirmed that new witness

statements are included in the ‘pre-interview disclosure package’.

20

In response to a Freedom of Information (FOI) request about pre-interview

disclosure the HET made the following point; “Under the Criminal procedures

and Investigations Act 1996, the HET is under no obligation to reveal the

prosecution case to the suspect or their legal representative before

questioning begins. However, the Court of Appeal has held that if the police

do not provide sufficient information to enable a solicitor properly to advise

his client, the solicitor is entitled to advise his client to refuse to answer

questions under caution.” 21 [Emphasis in bold added]

It would appear that the HET has taken, in some cases, a very wide

interpretation of ‘sufficient information’.

It is of considerable concern that there appears to be inequality in treatment

where State agencies (in this case the military) are involved, compared to

non-state or paramilitary suspects. There are examples in paramilitary related

historic cases where suspects have received significantly less fulsome preinterview disclosure.22 There is no clear rationale for this less favourable

differentiation in treatment.
11 | P a g e

Pre-Prepared Statement:

When soldiers are interviewed under caution it is in the presence of their

solicitor, recorded, and generally in his/her offices. The soldiers are voluntary

attendees. Under these circumstances the HET state that “they are treated as

per the guidelines of the Police and Criminal Evidence (NI) Order.”

23

An analysis of HET reports reveals that at the start of interviews soldiers

present the HET with a pre-prepared written statement. These tend to be

carefully crafted detailed statements which have benefited from the wide preinterview disclosure package and several months preparation. Pre-interview

disclosure is likely to have an effect of memory recall and/or jogging memory.

It appears that the value of soldiers’ statements in terms of the level of

additional information revealed (or answering unresolved questions) is limited.

Statements tend to be a repetition of the original argument advanced in the

RMP interview, but with any gaps carefully plugged, and some additional selfserving personal details about the individual. The process offers the soldier an

opportunity to bolster his original statement and defence.

Pre-prepared statements are not uncommon. But the pre-prepared

statements in HET investigations appear to depart from standard practice and

procedures. The statement has the advantage of the full pre-interview

disclosure package (including new/recent witness statements) and weeks or

months in preparation, in advance of a HET formal interview. In cases where

there are conflicting accounts, it would appear that the HET do not withhold

(even recent) witness statements to test the veracity of a soldier’s statement.

Interviews/ Robustness/ Editing:

An analysis of a sample of case reports indicates that some HET interviews

appear to lack robustness and inconsistencies are frequently not adequately

challenged. By way of illustration, the following comment is taken from a

recent HET report:
12 | P a g e

“Soldier A accepted that he shot ‘John’ in the back, but was adamant that he

was turning towards him when he fired. He said the fact that the exit wound

had come out the front of his body at angle supported what he was saying.”

[John is not the victim’s real name]

This statement does not appear to have been challenged and/or followed up

by the HET (i.e. forensic report).

In all of the reports examined, the actual questions put to suspects and

answers during HET interviews are not revealed. The content of interviews is

edited by the HET (and appears to be summarised); this will be addressed

further below. In some instances the extent of the interview amounts to one

page and a half in HET reports. The processes and procedures are not

transparent.

Drafts, Changes to HET Reports:

It is not clear how in one report the wording of an account given by a soldier to

the HET, about his direct involvement in and recollection of a fatal shooting,

changed in a redrafted report. The interview was not under caution and it was

not recorded. The wording in the report is a summary based on a senior

investigating officer’s notes and recollection (or interpretation) of what was

said during the interview. The following direct quotes from the original and

redrafted report show changes which appear to legally bolster the soldier’s

defence.

The direct quotes have been removed to protect the report/victim from being

identified.

It is not clear who directed the changes and what the process or procedures

involved and what explanation there could be for changing it in this manner

whether under caution or otherwise.
13 | P a g e

Questions to be considered:

Interviews under caution raise a number of concerns as indicated above; in particular

that the investigation process and procedures appear to depart from accepted

standards.

Does this amount to abuse of process?

Does it impair the prospect of future prosecutions should a family wish to pursue

this option?

What power does the HET have to depart from accepted procedures and best

practice guidance?

What is the rationale for treating suspects differently by subjecting some to a

more robust process which is compliant with the law and departing from these

standards in other cases?

Are families aware of the risks (if any) in prejudicing future prospects for

prosecution.

Is there full transparency in respect of this process?

Why are there no written policy documents on procedures for identifying, tracing

and interviewing military personnel?

3. Accountability:

To comply with Article 2, investigations must be effective in order to secure

accountability. The research raises questions about the HET process, the

effectiveness of investigations and ability to hold the military to account. There are

individual expressions of regret and/or apologies from individual soldiers in HET

reports.24 And, crucially, victims are frequently vindicated. The symbolism of

apologies is important for many families; it provides a measure of acknowledgement.

However individual expressions of regret or apology should not diminish the

obligation to secure accountability, and responsibility, at an individual and

institutional level.

Conclusion:

There are many more issues raised by the research that require to be discussed but

are outside the scope of the current submission to the Helsinki Commission. The
14 | P a g e

points above are the most salient for current purposes. Of particular note are

apparent anomalies and inconsistencies in the investigation process where the

British military is involved, compared to historic cases where non-state or

paramilitary suspects are involved. This raises questions about the ability, and/or

perception, of the HET to undertake impartial, effective investigations in cases

involving State agencies and the extent to which the families participating in the

process are aware of departures from accepted procedures. The perception of

independence as well as its reality is critical as it impacts directly on the confidence

of those who engage in the HET process. A prerequisite for progress is a clear break

with the injustices of the past. It is vital that State initiated past-focused mechanisms

are impartial, effective and transparent.

1

In Northern Ireland there are differing estimates of the number of people who have died as a result of the

conflict. David McKittrick (ed.), Lost Lives, Mainstream, Edinburgh, 1999, p.1476.

2 Which encompasses the cases Jordan v UK (No. 24746/94); McKerr v UK (No.28883/95); Kelly and Others v UK

(No.30054/96); Shanaghan v UK (No.377715/97).

3

See, Lundy, P. (2009) Can the Past be Policed?: Lessons from the Historical Enquiries Team Northern Ireland,

Law and Social Challenges, Vol.11, pp.133-138 download at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1425445. A copy has

been submitted to the Helsinki Commission.

4

Joint submission by Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) and the Pat Finucane Centre (PFC) in

relation to the supervision of cases concerning the actions of the security forces in Northern Ireland,

Submission no. S376, February 2012, p.3-9. Copy available at http://www.caj.org.uk/

5

In 2009 the Committee of Ministers decided to close its examination of general remedial measures on the

grounds that the HET could bring “a measure of resolution” to victims’ and had “the structure and capacities to

allow it to finalise its work”, see Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2009)44.

6

Joint submission to the Committee of Ministers from the Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ)

and the Pat Finucane Centre (PFC) in relation to the supervision of cases concerning the actions of the security

forces in Northern Ireland, Submission no. S376, February 2012, p.3.

7

For a full discussion of HET investigations in RMP cases see briefing prepared by Patricia Lundy, available from

the author on request.

8

There is some evidence to suggest that RMP investigations might have extended beyond 1973.

9

FOI Request number F-2011-03623, received November 21, 2011, on file author. “36 review summary reports

have been delivered to families.” Each victim’s family receives a HET report detailing the nature of the review

conducted and a response to unresolved questions raised by the family.

10 The sample of 24 HET reports is made up of 12 individual HET case reports completed between 2010 and

2011; a further 5 individual HET case reports completed in 2006-7; the remaining 7 reports are various drafts

of recently completed reports. These reports are part of a much larger sample of HET reports collated by the

author from 2006 to the present and cover all categories of deaths.

11 Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, full transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.bloodysunday-inquiry.org.uk.

12 The ‘RUC policy’ is referred to in most of the HET RMP case reports examined.

13 Witness INQ2052, see also witness INQ1831, INQ3, a full transcript of the proceedings is available at

http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.

14 Mrs Kathleen Thompson mother of six was killed 6 November 1971 by a British soldier of the Royal Green

Jackets in disputed circumstances. See, Kerr.J, In the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland, Queen’s Bench
15 | P a g e

Division (Judicial Review), In the Matter of an Application by Mary Louise Thompson For Judicial Review,

Ref:KERA3639T

15 In over 100 HET reports I have studied - covering all categories of deaths (unionist civilian/ nationalist

civilian/ paramilitary/ security forces) - none refer to a pragmatic approach.

16 Direct quote from FOI Request number F-2011-03623, received November 21 2001, on file author.

17 Meeting, 8 February 2012, held in CAJ Office, also in attendance were Patricia Lundy and Gemma McKeown

(CAJ), minutes of the meeting are on file with the author.

18 It is believed that these interviews are not recorded; but it is not clear.

19 HET Review Summary Report, on file with author. Details of the case are not revealed for reasons of

confidentiality.

20 Meeting with Dave Cox (HET Director), Paul Johnson (SIO) and Neill Kerr, 8 February 2012, held in CAJ Office,

also in attendance were Patricia Lundy and Gemma McKeown (CAJ), minutes of the meeting are on file with

the author.

21 FOI Request number F-2011-03623, received November 21, 2011, on file author.

22 This is based on interviews with a number of solicitors representing paramilitary suspects in recently

examined historic cases; details of these cases are confidential. A more in depth investigation and scrutiny of

comparative cases is recommended.

23 FOI Request number F-2011-03623, received November 21, 2011, on file author.

24 These apologies raise a number of issues that cannot be adequately addressed in this briefing paper.