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i 

58–293 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–119] 

AL QA’IDA IN 2010: HOW SHOULD THE 

U.S. RESPOND? 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JANUARY 27, 2010 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

TIM MCCLEES, Professional Staff Member 

ALEX KUGAJEVSKY, Professional Staff Member 

ANDREW TABLER, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, January 27, 2010, Al Qa’ida in 2010: How Should the U.S. 

Respond? ............................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, January 27, 2010 ................................................................................ 35 

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 27, 2010 

AL QA’IDA IN 2010: HOW SHOULD THE U.S. RESPOND? 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Ranking 

Member, Committee on Armed Services ............................................................ 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Clarke, Hon. Richard A., Adjunct Lecturer in Public Policy, Belfer Center 

for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University ................................................................................... 5 

Coll, Steve, President, New America Foundation ................................................. 10 

Zarate, Hon. Juan Carlos, Senior Adviser, Transnational Threats Project, 

Center for Strategic and International Studies ................................................. 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Clarke, Hon. Richard A. ................................................................................... 44 

Coll, Steve ......................................................................................................... 66 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 41 

Skelton, Hon. Ike .............................................................................................. 39 

Zarate, Hon. Juan Carlos ................................................................................. 48 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 79 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mrs. McMorris Rodgers .................................................................................... 89 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 85 

Mr. Skelton ....................................................................................................... 83 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 85 

Ms. Tsongas ...................................................................................................... 85 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 87 

(1) 

AL QA’IDA IN 2010: HOW SHOULD THE U.S. RESPOND? 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, January 27, 2010. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in room 

HVC–210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of 

the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. Today the House Armed Services 

Committee meets to receive testimony on ‘‘Al Qa’ida in 2010: How 

Should the U.S. Respond?’’ 

Our witnesses today: Richard Clarke, currently an adjunct lecturer at Harvard University and previously the national coordinator for security and counterterrorism; Juan Zarate, senior advisor with the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the 

former deputy national security advisor for combatting terrorism; 

Steve Coll, president of the New America Foundation and the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of ‘‘Ghost Wars: The Secret History of 

the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to 

September 10, 2001.’’ 

We welcome you, and we thank our witnesses for being with us. 

Since the attacks on September the 11th, 2001, the United 

States has acted forcefully to disrupt and defeat al Qa’ida [AQ] and 

to eliminate their safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I firmly support our ongoing efforts in Afghanistan. I believe it is vital 

that we succeed there. And I commend the President on his recent 

decision to increase our force levels in that conflict. 

But as the attempted bombing of an airliner over Detroit on 

Christmas Day by an al Qa’ida affiliate reminds us, even as we 

pursue bin Laden and his allies in Afghanistan and Pakistan, al 

Qa’ida has continued to evolve as an organization and inspiration 

to terrorist groups around the world. 

In order for us to combat this evolving threat, I believe we must 

understand the state of al Qa’ida and how it has changed over the 

years. In this effort, the committee’s hearing today with outside experts builds on the classified briefing we held recently in past full 

committee hearings. The Terrorism and Unconventional Threats 

Subcommittee, led by Adam Smith and Jeff Miller, have done great 

work in this area over the years and, I am sure, will continue to 

do so under the leadership of Chairwoman Loretta Sanchez. 

The title of this hearing, ‘‘Al Qa’ida in 2010: How Should the 

U.S. Respond?’’, poses a deceptively simple question that I hope our 
2 

witnesses can help us with. But the real questions are harder: 

What is al Qa’ida today, and how has that organization evolved? 

How can the United States Government, in particular the Department of Defense, take effective action to end the threat posed by 

al Qa’ida, its allies, and its affiliates around the globe? What tools 

do we have, and how should we employ them? How can we undermine their media campaign and attempt to provide an ideology justifying attacks against the United States? 

In short, what actions can we and should we take to minimize 

the chances that we are faced with future attacks like the attempted attack on Christmas? I hope our witnesses can help us 

with these questions. 

By the way, this is a reminder. Today, a Members-only meeting, 

a China briefing, at 2:30 this afternoon in Room 2118, our new old 

committee room. And you will be pleased when you come back and 

see the work that has been done there. 

I turn to our friend, the ranking gentleman from California, 

Buck McKeon, for his comments. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank 

you for holding today’s hearing on al Qa’ida and the continuing 

threat that it poses. 

For nearly two decades, al Qa’ida had waged war against the 

U.S., its citizens, and the modern world. We may not have fully realized the destructive nature of al Qa’ida until the tragic events of 

9/11, but we must not allow our determination and vigilance to 

wane. We can be assured that al Qa’ida remains as relentless and 

as violent as ever, and today’s hearing allows us to better understand al Qa’ida and what must be done to protect our Nation and 

its citizens. 

I would also like to welcome our witnesses. Your insights today 

are extremely important given the influx of additional troops to Afghanistan in support of General McChrystal’s strategy and given 

recent events such as the Christmas Day airline bombing attempt 

and the Fort Hood shootings. We look forward to your testimony. 

We cannot forget that we are a nation at war. Al Qa’ida stormed 

into the public view with the horrific acts of 9/11 but well before 

that time had been plotting and acting against us. The 1993 World 

Trade Center bombing, the 1998 Embassy bombings in Kenya, the 

failed attack against the USS The Sullivans, and the successful attack on the USS Cole in 2000 all presaged what was to come in 

2001. Al Qa’ida had already declared war on us. Only after the 

World Trade Center bombings, the Pentagon, and a Pennsylvania 

field were burning did we fully appreciate that fact. 

I was heartened when, on December 1st, 2009, President Obama 

officially took ownership of the war in Afghanistan and the broader 

war on terrorism during his speech at West Point. He is our Nation’s Commander in Chief and plays the critical role of guiding the 

United States during wartime. 
3 

Al Qa’ida, operating from safe havens in Afghanistan, brought 

war upon our Nation, and our message must be clear: We will not 

back down from those who seek to do us harm. We have denied al 

Qa’ida operating space in Afghanistan but must ensure our efforts 

to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven once again do 

not waver. 

The administration’s decision to support General McChrystal’s 

counterinsurgency strategy is an important step toward stabilizing 

the country and, importantly, in degrading al Qa’ida’s operational 

capability. I am gravely concerned, however, about the announcement of a timeline in conjunction with the decision. We must allow 

events and conditions on the ground to be the basis for any decisions on our Afghanistan strategy, not Washington politics. 

And I have to wonder, has President Obama emboldened our adversaries by revealing a lack of commitment on our part? Or, like 

his proclamation that Guantanamo Bay would close by January 

2010, does this hint to an administration that does not fully understand the ramifications of its actions and statements? 

We must remember, however, that Afghanistan is not the sole 

focus in this struggle. Pakistan is a key partner for us, as al Qa’ida 

has been forced to seek refuge in tribal areas controlled by the extremist Taliban. Pakistani forces have gained important victories 

in their attempt to root out al Qa’ida and its hosts from Waziristan 

and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, but much more 

needs to be done. We must continue to support Pakistani efforts 

through intelligence sharing, operational support and security assistance with vehicles like the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund. 

And we also need to support the Defense Department’s 1206 train 

and equip authority [National Defense Authorization Act Section 

1206 ‘‘Global Train and Equip’’ Program], which it uses elsewhere, 

to ensure our partners in this struggle have improved capabilities 

to meet threats to security and stability. 

Al Qa’ida does not act alone and is a highly adaptable organization. It has leveraged a franchise system to bring like-minded 

groups around the world under its operational umbrella. Al Qa’ida 

in Iraq, al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, and al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula [AQAP] have all sought to further al Qa’ida Central’s goals. 

What al Qa’ida seeks is the time and space to allow its affiliates 

to rise. As in Iraq in 2006–2007 when al Qa’ida took advantage of 

ungoverned space to train, plan, and attack the vulnerable Iraqi 

Government as well as U.S. interests, al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula seeks to gain ground in Yemen, where the government 

forces are fighting not only al Qa’ida but also an extremist Shiite 

insurgency for control of large areas of its country. 

Further, al Qa’ida is more and more willing to step out of the 

spotlight and allow other groups to act as its proxies. Lashkar-eTaiba in Kashmir and al Shabaab in Somalia have helped al Qa’ida 

gain a broader audience and extend its operational reach. Al Qa’ida 

very quickly capitalizes on these groups’ actions in the name of its 

grand strategy. Even in failed or thwarted attacks, al Qa’ida adjusts its message for greatest effect, always seeking to gain new recruits and enhance its brand image as effective and successful. 
4 

Therefore, we must be very aware that a reduction in al Qa’ida’s 

fingerprints on terrorist operations does not necessarily mean that 

the threat of al Qa’ida is diminished. Ideology, radicalization, and 

the media that are available in today’s world provide a volatile mix 

for al Qa’ida to exploit, while complicating our attempts to identify 

and focus on al Qa’ida as an organization. The Little Rock, Arkansas, and Fort Hood shootings and Christmas Day bombing attempt 

all represent an increasing threat: that of radicalized individuals 

who attack either on their own or with minimal operational coordination with an al Qa’ida handler. The hand of al Qa’ida may not 

be nearly visible, but the threat remains. 

The challenges we face are many, but we absolutely must not fail 

to recognize that we are at war, and our enemy will seek any and 

all means to advance its cause. We are not facing common criminals. And this fact was reaffirmed on January 5th when the U.S. 

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the 

right of the U.S. Government to detain combatants. This decision 

reaffirms the belief that the laws of war are the appropriate foundation for, and are needed in, our efforts against terrorists who 

may not wear uniforms, but who are waging war against us. 

I believe the administration would be making a very dangerous 

mistake were it to treat terrorists as common criminals. While al 

Qa’ida operatives may not wear uniforms or follow the Geneva 

Convention, we cannot ignore the fact that al Qa’ida is waging war 

against us and that terrorists are al Qa’ida’s foot soldiers. They do 

not merely break civil laws but advance a strategy that seeks to 

topple governments through terrorism and other means. They cannot be viewed as anything less than prisoners of war. 

One would think that the President’s policy toward Guantanamo 

Bay’s detention facility would reflect the fact that we are at war. 

Yet he seeks to close the facility without a clear plan and return 

many detainees to countries rife with ungoverned spaces and al 

Qa’ida cells. 

The remaining population at Guantanamo Bay does not represent chance battlefield detainees or mere supporters, but hardcore operatives. Given recidivism rates that are 20 percent or higher, the President’s position on detention and prosecution of these 

wartime detainees held there is especially alarming in its incoherence. 

In response to the administration’s irresponsible handling of the 

detainee issue, we have introduced the ‘‘Detainee Transfer and Release Security Act of 2010.’’ This legislation will block transfers 

from Guantanamo to countries with ungoverned spaces, active al 

Qa’ida cells or networks, or confirmed cases of a former Guantanamo detainee who has returned to the fight. Our efforts would 

have blocked the December transfer of seven detainees to Yemen 

and last week’s transfer of two detainees to Algeria. 

America cannot be complicit in allowing former detainees to return to the fight against the United States. Our policies and strategies must reflect the fact that we are at war. We should not simply 

close Guantanamo, and we cannot allow enemy combatants to return to the battlefield. 

In al Qa’ida’s world view, the U.S. should not exist. Therefore, 

in this war, we must seek to defeat our enemy. Measures that fall 
5 

short of that goal, denying al Qa’ida operating space and disrupting 

al Qa’ida operations, must not enter our lexicon or our thought 

process. I take it as a personal responsibility to remind my fellow 

Members, my constituents, and my colleagues throughout the government of what is called for in this great struggle. 

With the fact that we are at war clear, I look forward to our witnesses’ input today. We are faced with an enemy that is adaptable, 

that leverages media extremely well, that promotes a twisted 

version of one of the world’s major religions, and that ultimately 

is willing to outlast us if that is what is required of it. Your testimony will help us gain greater understanding of how to face those 

challenges and how we can best shape our strategy, policy, and actions to ensure that we defeat al Qa’ida in what can only be viewed 

as a war of survival. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I certainly thank the gentleman. 

Again, we appreciate the witnesses testifying today. 

And we will start with Richard Clarke. Thank you again for 

being with us. 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. RICHARD A. CLARKE, ADJUNCT 

LECTURER IN PUBLIC POLICY, BELFER CENTER FOR 

SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY 

SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY 

Mr. CLARKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is always a pleasure 

to respond to your request for testimony or other assistance. 

You asked, What is the status of al Qa’ida, and what should we 

be doing in the way of response to it? These questions have been 

asked a lot since Christmas. I think we need to pause for a minute 

and ask ourselves, What would have happened in this country if 

that detonator onboard that Northwest/Delta flight had worked? 

Because that is really the only difference between a successful attack and the failure that occurred, is whether or not that detonator 

worked. 

And I am afraid that if it had worked, a lot of people would have 

jumped to, perhaps, the wrong conclusion. They would have 

thought that, because one single terrorist was able to penetrate our 

defenses and cause the deaths, perhaps, of 200 Americans in the 

United States, that necessarily would have meant that al Qa’ida 

was resurgent or that there was some failure in the policies of the 

last administration or some failure in the policies of this administration. And the American people would ask themselves why it was 

the case that, over a decade after al Qa’ida became a major issue 

for the United States, that we had not been able to eradicate it. 

I think it is important that we ask ourselves these questions now 

publicly, because the difference between one detonator working and 

one detonator not working suggests to me that we could very well 

have a successful attack. And when we do, if we do, we shouldn’t 

panic and we shouldn’t necessarily jump to the wrong conclusions. 

So, in trying to answer your questions at a very high level, I 

have structured my response in the form of seven propositions. And 
6 

I will try to go through them quickly, but they are available in the 

written testimony. 

The first proposition is that if al Qa’ida does stage a successful 

attack, it doesn’t, in and of itself, indicate whether or not they are 

getting stronger or not; that lone operators will always be a threat, 

whether they are from al Qa’ida or from another organization. 

Modern societies are inherently fragile to lone-operator attacks. We 

saw that with Oklahoma City, where there were just two or three 

people involved. We saw it in the Washington area with the Washington sniper. We are always going to face a threat of lone operators. 

Secondly, many of the groups that we hear about, many of the 

attacks that we see that are labeled as ‘‘al Qa’ida’’ really are not 

al Qa’ida Central. They are groups that had existed for years, in 

some cases for a century, and have been relabeled or have relabeled themselves as al Qa’ida. And two of them, for example, al 

Qa’ida in the Maghreb and al Qa’ida in Mesopotamia, have actually 

imploded in recent years. They lost popular support because of 

their excesses, and they were also successfully suppressed by security forces. 

So I think we need to ask ourselves really, What is al Qa’ida? 

And perhaps the best way of looking at it is to focus on al Qa’ida 

Central, the organization that attacked us on 9/11, the organization 

that, unlike the affiliates, has targeted the far enemy, which is the 

United States. 

And al Qa’ida Central has had its ups and downs. It was certainly very strong prior to 9/11. It was hit badly after our invasion 

of Afghanistan. It had a bit of a resurgence in the last several 

years, but in the last two years, with our increased tempo of operations against their sanctuary in Pakistan and with the Pakistani 

Government finally doing something about that sanctuary, al 

Qa’ida Central is a somewhat reduced threat than it was in the 

past. 

Nonetheless, there are affiliate groups that are of concern, and 

two of them in particular seem to have targeted the far enemy, the 

United States. Al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, based in 

Yemen, consisting largely of Yemenis and Saudis, seems to now 

have its intent on going after the United States, including here in 

the homeland. And certainly the Taliban is engaged in daily combat with the United States. A third group, al Shabaab in Somalia, 

may also be involved in preparing people to attack the homeland. 

Mr. Chairman, I will skip over the other propositions there in the 

testimony, but I think the chief point here is that the eradication 

of al Qa’ida is the work of a generation. It is not something that 

the American people should believe that any administration will be 

able to accomplish, nor should the American people expect that any 

administration will be able to prevent all successful attacks. 

And when and if an attack does come in the United States, despite all of our efforts and despite the fact that we are winning this 

war, we need to be nonpartisan, we need to be analytical, and we 

need not to panic. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Clarke can be found in the Appendix on page 44.] 
7 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Clarke. 

Mr. Zarate. 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. JUAN CARLOS ZARATE, SENIOR ADVISER, TRANSNATIONAL THREATS PROJECT, CENTER FOR 

STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. ZARATE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

McKeon, distinguished members of the committee. I am pleased to 

be with you today to testify, and I thank you for the invitation. 

I think it is an important moment to look at the nature of al 

Qa’ida, particularly given the past series of events over the last 

year, plots uncovered, Christmas Day failed attack, the growing 

role of al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, and, frankly, the continued allure of al Qa’ida’s ideology, including in the homeland. 

Mr. Chairman, al Qa’ida is no longer the same organization we 

faced on September 11, 2001. In many ways, it has been decimated, 

with the core elements of the organization on the ropes. Al Qa’ida’s 

senior leadership is being methodically destroyed, its primary physical safe haven is being undermined, its ideology is being rejected 

within Muslim communities around the world, and, frankly, its 

strategy has yet to produce the results promised. 

At the same time, al Qa’ida has attempted to spur an ideological 

awakening among Muslims around the world to fight the West. 

The allure of this ideology continues to draw adherents and manifests itself in real threats. Some actually argue that al Qa’ida is actually achieving its goal via the establishment of a virtual caliphate. 

Thus, I think there is a paradox in which al Qa’ida as an organization remains in steady decline but the global terrorist threat inspired by this ideology remains a central national security concern 

for the United States. 

This is why I think there has been so much debate, both here 

in Congress and in academic circles, about the nature of al Qa’ida. 

Is it a hierarchical organization, a loose confederation of like-minded terrorists or groups, or simply a metastasized idea with viral appeal? 

Frankly, I think al Qa’ida is a hybrid of those three, a threeheaded beast, if you will, comprised of the al Qa’ida core, as Mr. 

Clarke mentioned, the al Qa’ida regional affiliates and like-minded 

groups, and the al Qa’ida-inspired radicalization and threats that 

we face. 

Al Qa’ida core leadership, largely contained in the AfghanistanPakistan region, has continued to set the strategic direction for the 

movement and has directed attack plotting. At the same time, al 

Qa’ida has aggressively and systematically moved to establish, coopt, and use regional affiliates like al Qa’ida in Iraq, al Qa’ida in 

the Islamic Maghreb, and al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula as 

forward bases for terrorist activity and strategic reach. 

Until the Christmas Day attack, these regional groups confined 

their activities largely to their respective regions. The most troubling revelation on Christmas was that al Qa’ida was trying to hit 

the United States directly from its outpost in Yemen. 

The constellation of terrorist groups that have direct ties, associations, or parallel ideological agendas with al Qa’ida is constantly 
8 

shifting. This, I think, has been facilitated by the safe haven and 

training grounds present in western Pakistan and in other regions 

around the world, like Somalia, Yemen, and the Maghreb. 

Aside from the direct threat to the United States, there is a danger that some subset of these regional organizations or groups 

could evolve into a new global syndicate, even absent AQ core involvement. In addition, one of the more sophisticated of the likeminded groups, like Lashkar-e-Taiba, called ‘‘LT’’ by some, could 

alter its regional focus and become a global leader and successor 

to al Qa’ida, taking up the mantle to defend all Muslims. We have 

seen glimpses of this in the Mumbai attacks and with the uncovered plotting against the Danish newspaper that published the Muhammad cartoons. The mere existence of these groups is dangerous 

and needs to be viewed as a potential next phase in the war on terror. 

In addition, al Qa’ida has identified and nurtured pockets of 

radicalized cells and individuals in western Europe and around the 

world with the capability to carry out deadly attacks under al 

Qa’ida direction under its banner. The long-term threat from al 

Qa’ida comes in the allure of its ideology to individuals who may 

decide to commit acts of terror. Through its propaganda, bin Laden 

and al Qa’ida have created a symbolic brand that identifies al 

Qa’ida as a leader of this movement. This has been amplified by 

the radicalization of individuals via the Internet and via 

ideologues. This ideology, as you all know, preys on discontent and 

alienation while providing a simple narrative that pretends to 

grant meaning and a heroic outlet for the young. 

As you know, the al Qa’ida narrative is simple: The West is at 

war with Islam. Muslims have a religious obligation to engage in 

Jihad to defend fellow Muslims. The U.S. is the head of the snake, 

the far enemy that must be fought along with apostate allies. And 

al Qa’ida is the ultimate vanguard of this movement for all Muslims. To disaffected or troubled individuals, this narrative explains 

in a simple framework the ills around them and the geopolitical 

discord they see on their television sets and on the Internet. 

There are some concerning elements to these recent cases of 

radicalization within the U.S. which I think are important to note. 

Unlike in past cases, some of the individuals involved appear to be 

second- or third-generation Americans who were born into Islam as 

opposed to being converts to the faith. They appear to have acted 

in clusters, as with the American Somalis and Northern Virginia 

Five. And they attempted to join or succeeded in connecting with 

a known terrorist organization abroad. These factors are troubling, 

especially given the effectiveness of al Qa’ida and extremists like 

Anwar al-Awlaki to use the Internet to draw new adherents, including from the West. 

This environment then I think suggests that more individuals 

will be radicalized over time and could take on the global terrorist 

mantle. And the metastasized dimension of the terrorist problem is 

perhaps the most bedeviling since it is diffuse, local, or even personal in nature, and hard to counter. And I think this ideological 

battlefield is where the long war, the generational battle, will be 

fought. 
9 

Mr. Chairman, if I could just quickly lay out what I think— 

which is presented in my written testimony—should be the U.S. response to al Qa’ida. 

We should pressure al Qa’ida on all fronts, without a doubt. It 

is essential that AQ core be dismantled. The core of al Qa’ida is the 

heart of the global Sunni terrorist movement. And though its destruction ultimately will not end terrorism or the allure of its ideology, it is a key and important step to disabling the global terrorist network. 

The U.S. and the international community has to deny physical 

safe haven to terrorist groups. We need to shift the momentum 

against the Taliban in Afghanistan. We need to enable the Pakistanis to continue their fight against the Pakistan Taliban and al 

Qa’ida in the tribal regions. We must continue our support to 

Yemen to root out al Qa’ida elements. Along with regional partners, we should help defend the fledgling transitional federal government in Somalia. And we must ensure that the Iraqi Government is able to solidify security against AQI [al Qa’ida in Iraq] and 

other violent extremist groups. 

We also need an all-out offensive in the ideological battle, with 

a concentration on networking and empowering grassroots countermovements against al Qa’ida. Importantly, all quarters in Muslim 

communities are now openly challenging al Qa’ida. 

And although the United States is not a central protagonist in 

this battle within Islam, it has a key role to play. Aside from promoting democracy, defending our policies and values, and demonstrating that the West is not at war with Islam, the United 

States should be actively countering this narrative and the violent 

extremist ideology. The goal should be to help foment and network 

a global grassroots countermovement through the credible voices 

emerging to counter al Qa’ida in both the physical and virtual 

worlds. 

At the end of the day, this opposition must be organic and come 

from within Muslim communities. And I think Muslim Americans 

then have a special responsibility to stand up against this ideology. 

We need to continue to build a layered defense against strategically significant terrorist attacks. This requires a continual renewal 

of our commitment to intelligence gathering and prevention as the 

primary principles guiding our homeland defense. We should redouble our efforts to improve identity management, to include integration of biometric-based technologies. In addition, we should continue to extend our borders with initiatives like the Container Security Initiative that should expand the notion of expanding our 

borders beyond our shores. 

And importantly—and this is something my colleagues have argued for—we must push government agencies to imagine the unimaginable, by continuing to invest resources and energy to prevent terrorist groups from developing, acquiring, or using weapons 

of mass destruction [WMD]. This, then, also extends to investment 

of resources and creating resiliency in our critical infrastructure, to 

include our cyber infrastructure. 

Lastly, our efforts to defeat al Qa’ida, I believe, require a longterm legal framework to address the 21st-century threat. There is 

still no established consensus about how to hold suspect terrorists 
10 

and insurgents in a seemingly endless global conflict in which the 

theaters of conflict range from recognized war zones in ungoverned 

havens to city centers and suburban neighborhoods. 

Whatever form this takes, I think the United States needs to establish transparent rules for justifying continued detention while 

protecting basic individual rights, and it will need to gain some degree of international legitimacy. I think this can only be achieved 

if the President and Congress commit the capital and credibility to 

establishing such a system that can then be defended in the U.S. 

courts and in the court of public opinion. 

Mr. Chairman, al Qa’ida and the movement it represents is an 

enemy that is morphing in structure and adapting to changing geopolitical landscapes, but one that retains the same radical vision 

and ideology and devotion to the use of terrorism. We must hasten 

the demise of al Qa’ida while containing the post-al Qa’ida terrorist 

threat and the violent ideology that it has spawned. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Zarate can be found in the Appendix on page 48.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Coll. 

STATEMENT OF STEVE COLL, PRESIDENT, NEW AMERICA 

FOUNDATION 

Mr. COLL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

McKeon, members of the committee, for this opportunity to testify. 

I agree with the previous speakers about virtually everything 

they had to say. I will try to briefly offer a few complementary angles of vision. 

I agree also with my predecessor that al Qa’ida presents a paradox today. Its political and ideological support in the Muslim 

world has been declining, and yet it remains resilient as a source 

of disruptive terrorist violence. 

And part of the explanation lies in the complexity of what we 

mean by ‘‘al Qa’ida.’’ It has evolved to a point where it is really several things at once. It is a specific organization with 21 years of 

history in the same emir and deputy emir who were appointed at 

the first meetings in Peshawar in the summer of 1988. That organization remains intact, and it manages through the same shura 

committees that it began with. It is also a network of like-minded 

groups, a network that was really formally organized in the 1990s. 

It has evolved and changed shape, but it is still around as originally conceived. And al Qa’ida is also a movement, an ideology, a 

brand. 

As a political movement, I think al Qa’ida is failing. Multiple 

polls have described the decline in public support for its tactics 

throughout the Islamic world since about 2005. One recent, particularly rigorous poll found that support for al Qa’ida-directed attacks against American civilians in the U.S. homeland is virtually 

negligible across a diverse array of heavily populated Muslim-majority countries. In Pakistan, for example, where anti-American 

feeling has reached a fever pitch, only nine percent supported such 

attacks against U.S. civilians. In Indonesia, the number was about 

five percent. 
11 

It is common to observe that bin Laden’s poll ratings have fallen 

because al Qa’ida-inspired violence has taken so many Muslim civilian lives since 2001. But the data actually suggests that citizens 

in Islamic countries, as elsewhere, overwhelmingly disapprove of 

all indiscriminate violence against civilians, no matter who carries 

it out and no matter what the cause. 

Despite its growing isolation, however, al Qa’ida remains resilient and dangerous, in large part because its central and original 

organization and its leadership remains in the field. And I think 

we should be cautious about declaring that central organization 

disabled. 

My colleague Peter Bergen has documented that one easily observed measure of the degree of activity of central al Qa’ida is 

available in its media operations through As-Sahab, the number of 

releases it puts out from year to year. In 2008, those operations 

seem to have come under severe pressure and have been reduced, 

but this year they have bounced back again, despite the pressure 

that U.S. military activity and drone attacks have obviously placed 

on the leadership and the impact that has had. 

And this succession of small- to modest-sized plots—many of 

them, fortunately, unsuccessful—have produced a pattern of opensource evidence that clearly implicates support from al Qa’ida technicians or leaders in Pakistan or elsewhere along the border. All 

of these plots make clear that the group retains enough breathing 

space to launch operations that could, as Mr. Clarke pointed out, 

but for the operation of a single detonator, claim hundreds of lives 

in an instance. 

I think the Flight 253 plot did bring to the floor a pattern of evidence about al Qa’ida’s specific resilience in Yemen that has been 

accumulating for some time. The group’s presence and connections 

there, of course, date back two decades. The resilience that presented itself on Christmas is probably traceable to the period immediately after Saudi Arabia’s crackdown on al Qa’ida in 2003, 

when Yemen started to reemerge as a refuge and a regional haven. 

In the Pakistan and Afghanistan region, al Qa’ida’s like-minded 

allies, I think, are far more robust than they are in Yemen. The 

number of sworn al Qa’ida members operating along the AfghanPakistan border probably is only a few hundred, but the Afghan 

Taliban’s allied fighting forces, though largely regional, are not exclusively regional in their focus, and number, of course, in the 

many thousands. And the Pakistani Taliban are equally estimated 

to number in the thousands. 

Perhaps the most potent of these groups in the Pakistan-Afghan 

region is Lashkar-e-Taiba, which has been mentioned a couple of 

times before. It is an India-focused group, but along with splinters 

like Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and various cells 

that spin off from those, they have been able to recruit very talented operatives from educated classes and urban centers. I think 

this makes them distinctive in comparison to the Afghan Taliban, 

for example. Lashkar’s ranks include scores of volunteer doctors 

and postgraduate professionals. 

If one of these sub networks did find the time and space to reform and plot an attempt of the Mumbai type, it could create far 
12 

more destructive effects than is typically available to these single 

operators and small groups that al Qa’ida has been organizing. 

In my own judgment, I think Mumbai is actually the most serious warning in the succession of plots, along with the 2006 attempted planes bombing conspiracy in Britain, simply because of 

its scale and what it tells you about the geographical space and the 

unmolested time that the Mumbai organizers had to carry off a 

very creative and complicated attack. I think that is a risk we 

should be mindful of, even though it doesn’t necessarily involve the 

direct targeting of the U.S. homeland. 

Let me conclude by stepping back from that observation just to 

say that I think, in a strategic or global sense, al Qa’ida seems to 

be in the process of defeating and isolating itself. Its political isolation in the Muslim world has set the stage for the United States 

and allied governments, with persistence and concentrated effort, 

to finally destroy central al Qa’ida’s leadership along the AfghanPakistan border. 

That achievement, as the previous speakers have pointed out, 

would not end terrorism or end the problem of radical Islamist violence, but it would provide justice for the victims of 9/11, and it 

would also contribute to freedom of maneuver for the United States 

and its allies as they continue this generation-long campaign. It 

would also end the debilitating and destabilizing narrative of the 

hunt and escape that has elevated the reputations of bin Laden 

and his deputy, al-Zawahiri, for so long. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Coll can be found in the Appendix on page 66.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Coll. 

Mr. McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. I will pass. 

The CHAIRMAN. Who is next? Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing. 

And I want to thank our witnesses. 

Gentlemen, I have listened, hopefully very attentively, to what 

each of you have said. What I think I find missing is, you know, 

if you were given a free hand, if you were the Commander in Chief 

and you had a Congress that would cooperate with you unflinchingly, what would you do different than we are doing right now? 

Mr. CLARKE. Congressman, I think implicit in your question is 

that we should be doing something different. And what I am trying 

to say is that you should not, just because there was an almost successful attack over Detroit, conclude that we are not being successful. I think we are being successful. 

And I think the administration, long before the incident in Detroit, the administration focused on the growing threat in Yemen 

and was acting successfully against that threat in Yemen. It wasn’t 

getting a lot of press attention, but there was a very effective U.S. 

Government activity for most of last year in Yemen. And we were 

significantly destroying the leadership of al Qa’ida in the Arabian 

Peninsula long before the media even learned what ‘‘AQAP’’ stood 

for. 

So don’t conclude automatically that we need to do something 

different. And don’t conclude that, if we were only doing the right 
13 

things, al Qa’ida will disappear overnight. This is the work of a 

generation. We are well on track to eliminating al Qa’ida Central 

as a significant threat. We have greatly improved our homeland security. It will never be perfect; don’t expect it ever will be. Don’t 

expect we will ever be able to stop every attack. 

I think if you were to look at all of the things that the administration is doing and other allied governments are doing, the area 

that probably needs the most reinforcement is the ideological counterweight that my colleagues have talked about. It is really not 

something the United States Government can do overtly. It is best 

done by Muslim governments. 

And Muslim governments have actually done a very good job. 

Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates 

[UAE], other countries, have really done a very effective job of creating an ideological counterweight domestically inside their country. That wasn’t always the case, but I think it is now. 

They are doing it without U.S. involvement, which is great because U.S. involvement probably wouldn’t help. But there are 

things the United States can do. And if there were one area where 

I would strengthen our efforts, it would be in the somewhat fuzzy 

and hard-to-define area of creating an ideological counterweight. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Sir. 

Mr. ZARATE. Congressman, it is a great question. I agree with 

Mr. Clarke, but I think there are three areas where we can continue to improve, in particular to deal with the movement. 

And I think Mr. Clarke is right to point out that we shouldn’t 

throw the baby out with the bath water, in terms of assuming that 

we have failed because of what happened on Christmas Day. I 

think people have short memories. And I think we have, over the 

last eight years, disrupted numerous plots. Mr. Coll mentioned the 

August 2006 Atlantic airline plot, which would have been a devastating attack, which, with help from the Pakistani Government 

and the U.K. Government, we were able to disrupt with great effect. And so I would say we have done a very good job. 

And, as Mr. Coll indicated as well, al Qa’ida is self-imploding. 

The very nature of its exclusionary ideology and its violent tactics 

is not only an inherent part of their DNA in terms of what they 

do and what they want to do as an organization, but it is also inherently alienating to the very constituencies that they are trying 

to attract. 

And I think the grand lesson from Iraq with the Al Anbar awakening is the fact that the Iraqis themselves, in the heart of what 

is supposed to be al Qa’ida’s core constituency, rose up physically 

against al Qa’ida and have largely rejected al Qa’ida, which I think 

to a certain extent was the beginning of the end for al Qa’ida, an 

existential threat. 

But three areas I would suggest some attention: dealing with 

safe havens to avoid these regional groups or militant insurgencies 

from becoming regional problems or even global platforms. That entails not just dealing with the current problems like Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, but looking beyond the horizon to potential problems in places like Bangladesh, northern Nigeria, and 

other parts where there is already sectarian tension, where there 

are forces of radicalization trying to act like leeches to exacerbate 
14 

those conflicts, and where you have the potential for al Qa’ida to 

really make hay in places like that. So I think we need to be forward-looking. 

Countering the narrative is huge. And I think the U.S. does have 

a role to play in terms of working with the private sector, with 

credible voices. Groups like the Quilliam Foundation in London, exextremists who have come out now fighting against their former 

mates, who are literally organizing against radicalization. These 

are the kinds of groups we need to support, network without tainting. 

And then, finally, the legal framework. I think we need to end 

what has largely become a political football with respect to how we 

treat this problem for the long term. Because it is a long-term problem. This isn’t just a problem of Guantanamo; it is a problem with 

the legal framework long-term. And we need to resolve that. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the gentlemen. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Perhaps because I am a scientist, but I think that numbers really do have significance. In a recent briefing before this committee, 

I asked the four experts their estimate of how many radical 

Islamists they thought there were in the world that disliked us and 

would hurt us if they could. Two of them said, order of magnitude 

10,000; a third one said 100,000; and the fourth one said, in terms 

of our ability to count them, essentially an infinite number. 

We have about a bit less than 200 in Guantanamo Bay, with a 

20 percent recidivism rate. That would mean that if those 20 percent return to the battlefield, that would increase the number from 

10,000, 100,000, or essentially an infinite number to a number that 

really is lost in our estimate. 

But I know we are not dealing with a practical reality world 

here; we are dealing very largely with emotion and political issues. 

And so I know that the importance of these 40 is hugely more than 

the infinitesimal number that they would add to the international 

radical Islamists who hate us, would wish us ill and would hurt us 

if they could. 

I was impressed with a statement that Admiral Olson made before this committee: ‘‘Special operation forces must focus on the environmental dynamics and root causes that create today’s and tomorrow’s threats and adversaries. Furthermore, a solution is often 

as diverse as the threat and requires an approach that is integrated with the long-term work of civilian agencies, especially the 

State Department and USAID [United States Agency for International Development], to foster U.S. credibility and influence 

among relevant populations.’’ 

In this committee, we focus primarily on military. In terms of a 

percentage of the effective weapons that we have to fight against 

these international threats, how large do you think the military is 

as compared with the others which Admiral Olson mentioned before this committee? 

Mr. CLARKE. Congressman, I think, obviously, in Afghanistan, 

the United States military is our principal weapon in fighting 
15 

against the Taliban. If you can put Afghanistan aside—and that is 

asking a lot—but if you consider the rest of the world where the 

threats exist, I think the military is a valuable tool, probably of 

equal importance with the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigations] 

and law enforcement cooperation, probably of equal importance 

with the State Department and AID, but I don’t think it is primarily a military issue. 

And I think the dialogue that has occurred over the last 10 

years, at least, about whether it is a military issue or a law enforcement issue misses the point. It is not a military or a political 

issue or a sociological issue. It is all of the above. And the only way 

for us to combat it effectively is to use all the weapons available 

to the United States. And, certainly, some of our military is a valuable weapon on some occasions in some environments. But it is not 

an either/or situation. Law enforcement plays a very, very critical 

role, as does intelligence. And, as you suggest, going after the root 

causes is also valuable in some countries. 

So we need to tailor our response depending upon where we are 

operating, and we need to use everything we’ve got. 

Mr. ZARATE. Congressman, I am a huge fan of Admiral Olson 

and the special operations community. And I think, as we look forward to the nature of asymmetric warfare, we are going to be relying more and more on special forces in environments of concern 

and interest, both in preparation of the battlefield and in trying to 

determine what national resources we can bring to bear. 

I would just say we need to remember some important lessons 

over the last eight years where we have been successful. If you look 

at southeast Asia, where all of the experts in 2001 and 2002 were 

expecting the second front in the War on Terror to emerge, given 

al Qa’ida’s presence there, their deep ties to local groups like 

Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf Group, there has been incredible success, I think, in not only disrupting those networks but disrupting their regional and global reach. And part of that has been 

the work of the special ops community; part of it has been the work 

of locals. And I think that is a good formula to look at in the future. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Clarke, let me ask you, what would victory against al Qa’ida 

look like? 

Mr. CLARKE. Mr. Chairman, I think if we look out maybe 20 

years from now, if we are lucky, and there isn’t an al Qa’ida, there 

isn’t a structured organization known as al Qa’ida, and, more importantly, if the violent Islamic ideology represented by al Qa’ida 

is significantly on the wane, then I think we would be able to declare victory. 

The ideology is never going to go away. It has been around for 

a thousand years. It comes and goes. There are waves in Islamic 

history of this sort of deviant, distorted strain of Islam, just as 

there were in Christianity for hundreds of years. So I think it is 

always going to be there. But if we can make it a small minority 

view in the Islamic world and if we can eliminate the structured 

organization, then I think we can declare a success. 
16 

But we will never be in a situation where there are no violent 

Islamic cells anywhere in the world. For us, we need to determine 

success in part by eliminating organizations that threaten the 

United States, that see as their primary purpose going after what 

they call the ‘‘far enemy.’’ Those are the ones that should be our 

highest priority. 

The CHAIRMAN. How do you get at the Islamists who will always 

have a violent streak in them? 

Mr. CLARKE. Well, I think what has proven so effective so far is 

to have respected imams in the community explain in the mosque 

on Fridays why the things that are being said by al Qa’ida are lies, 

why they are distortions, to do that at the community level 

throughout the Muslim world. That is being done in a lot of countries, and it is being done quietly but, I think, very effectively. 

We now also, however, need to bring that message into the Internet and into the cyberspace. Because we have seen all too often 

that individuals have been recruited remotely. People who have 

never been to an al Qa’ida meeting, never been to a rally, never 

been to anyplace where a group assembled were nonetheless converted. 

And this is very frightening. It is very frightening to our Muslim 

friends that really well-done Internet appeals have touched a responsive chord in many Muslim youth. And then, having been converted on the Internet, they then go out and try to find organizations, try to find a way of affiliating and actually plugging in to al 

Qa’ida. 

We do not yet, as far as I know, have in any country an effective 

cyberspace presence of the ideological effort that is the counterweight to al Qa’ida. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Snyder. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this excellent hearing. 

I applaud all three of you. You know, our etiquette here is that 

two witnesses are chosen by the majority and one by the minority, 

and it is always a good sign when we can’t tell which is which. And 

I applaud you for your analysis and your thoughtful efforts to try 

to help your country. 

I am reminded of Mr. Jim Saxton, former Member, who also 

worked very hard in a nonpartisan manner, and he pushed for a 

panel that was established on terrorism. We had a meeting in July 

of 2000, and this is what he said in his opening statement: ‘‘As a 

further example, the relatively new terrorist group, al Qa’ida, headed by Usama bin Laden, may foreshadow a new trend toward relatively self-sufficient terrorist organizations that sustain themselves and operate independently of a state sponsor.’’ That was a 

year and a half before the 2001 attacks. We are now a decade later, 

and I appreciate your ongoing efforts here. 

The second point I wanted to make was, I think you, Mr. Coll, 

talked about we need to not make any provocative mistakes or acts. 

And I think a couple of you referred to the Abu Ghraib experience 

and the photographs. At that time, I had a couple of Egyptian interns that were with me for a couple of weeks. And one of them 

was a young woman who liked America a lot, liked Americans, excellent English language skills. And I asked her what she thought 
17 

about those photographs that came out when they were first released. She was very polite, she said, ‘‘I wasn’t there. I don’t know 

what happened. It may be able to be explained.’’ She said, ‘‘But 

when I saw those photographs, I felt like it was me on the floor 

of that prison cell.’’ And here, this was a young woman in America, 

likes America. So you put yourself in the position of somebody who 

may not be very pro-American and a young male, you can understand your admonition, Mr. Coll, to avoid mistakes and provocative 

acts. 

Mr. Zarate, I think you, in your statement, more completely than 

the other two witnesses, talk about some of these other areas 

around the world and make some, I think, very good suggestions. 

You specifically mention Algeria and Morocco. And it gives me a 

chance to say something about the good work that Ambassador 

Christopher Ross is doing to try to resolve the issues between the 

Polisario in Morocco, because until that conflict gets resolved, it is 

going to be very, very difficult for Morocco and Algeria to come together and that region to get settled. 

And, of course, our attention doesn’t get on these intractable conflicts that have been going on for several decades. But I think your 

statement today as to why we need not ignore these conflicts that, 

unfortunately, we sometimes get used to when, in fact, the people 

in the area very much want to resolve them and we need to help 

them. And I, again, applaud Chris Ross’ efforts. 

The question I wanted to ask is—and maybe I will use Flight 253 

for the question. What is that group trying to accomplish? I think 

you, Mr. Coll, said it has very little strategic significance. Have 

their goals changed? What are they trying to accomplish? 

What we have said in the past is the goal of al Qa’ida is to get 

the United States to remove its troops from Muslim lands and stop 

supporting Israel. I would like to hear from the three of you briefly, 

what do you think the goal was with that attack and other attacks 

at this stage? 

Mr. COLL. Well, I think al Qa’ida leaders explained their reasoning repeatedly, and they want to hold the United States directly 

to account for what they regard as its aggressive policies in the 

Muslim world. Bin Laden always uses the phrase ‘‘raid’’ to describe 

what we would correctly see as mass murder, but he sees it in this, 

sort of, narrative of both political and millenarian violence that he 

imagines himself leading. 

The group in Yemen is a little bit more muted about their own 

particular ideology. But when you read into the preachers around 

what we understand to be the group that recruited and equipped 

the Flight 253 attacker, it is the same narrative of direct violence 

against the United States that is associated both with political but 

also millenarian narratives. 

Mr. ZARATE. Congressman, in terms of the actual attack, this is 

the manifestation of al Qa’ida’s strategy to try to use the regional 

outpost. And the outpost in Yemen is the most dangerous because 

you have seasoned al Qa’ida members, long ties to bin Laden and 

the core group, directing their attention to the West. 

This has been the intention of al Qa’ida for some time, but they 

pressed this in 2005, 2006. And, if you recall, the Zawahiri-Zarqawi 

letter from 2005 that laid this strategy out in the context of al 
18 

Qa’ida in Iraq. But that is precisely what they have been trying to 

do in the Maghreb and in Yemen. And, unfortunately, this is a 

manifestation of that very strategy. 

But I would say, in terms of long term, what al Qa’ida has in 

mind is long-term conflict with the U.S. They have in mind the notion of bankrupting us, bleeding us of blood and treasure, thinking 

of the model of the Soviets in Afghanistan. And I think that is really driving bin Laden and al Qa’ida’s thinking these days. And any 

kind of attack that disrupts us, that forces us to, you know, fight 

amongst ourselves and to spend resources is a victory for them, in 

their minds. 

Mr. COLL. If I could just add very briefly, I do think they want 

us to overreact. They have talked about that a fair amount, and 

that is part of the way they get us toward this strategy of what 

they imagine are leading us to bankruptcy. 

Mr. CLARKE. Sir, I think their ultimate goal, as they have declared it, is to replace the governments in the Islamic countries, to 

overthrow the Government of Saudi Arabia, overthrow the Government of Egypt. That is their ultimate goal. And they seek to get 

us out of the region by increasing the pain upon us, because they 

believe we are propping up those governments. 

What is interesting is that their long-term goal, overthrowing the 

Government of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, replacing those governments with al Qa’ida governments, is as far away from ever happening as it could possibly be. The chances of them ever achieving 

their ultimate goal are close to zero. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you all for your work. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, given the high recidivism rates that we have observed, is transferring detainees to other countries an acceptable 

risk when they can easily return to al Qa’ida’s ranks, either because of a lack of effective monitoring or because of inadequate 

legal and prison systems? 

Mr. ZARATE. Congressman, I think it is something we have to be 

worried about, and worried about even more so with the present 

population of Guantanamo, which represents a more hardened 

group of terrorists and folk connected to al Qa’ida. We have seen 

in the past the numbers vary from, you know, anywhere from 7 

percent to 20 percent. But I think recidivism rates would likely go 

much higher if some of these individuals are released without the 

proper security constraints on the back end. 

And I think that is critical. We have got to be sure if we are 

transferring individuals. The Bush administration did so, as I was 

a part of, over 530 such individuals transferred out of Guantanamo. You have got to be sure that you have the right security 

measures on the back end. And, unfortunately, what we have seen 

in the past is those security measures aren’t foolproof, and we have 

seen members return to the battlefield. So we have to be very cautious about this. 

Mr. COLL. If I could just add, I think it is important to manage 

these risks with eyes on the strategic context. 
19 

There have been two administrations, on a bipartisan basis, that 

have come to the view that the provocation that Guantanamo represents outstrips the benefits of its specific location as a detention 

center. President Bush announced his desire to close the facility for 

that reason, and President Obama has followed. 

Both Presidents and their staffs have wrestled with the extraordinary complexity of the case files and the risks associated with 

those case files. But I do think it is important to understand that 

the strategic goal here is to create a context in which al Qa’ida continues to isolate itself in the Muslim world. Guantanamo is a factor 

in the provocative narrative that al Qa’ida has sought to exploit. 

Mr. CLARKE. Congressman, I think there are two separate issues 

here. One is, should we be releasing these people at all and, if so, 

with what criteria; and, two, if we keep them, where do we keep 

them. I think they are very separate issues. 

And, obviously, I think the first question answers itself, as Juan 

suggested, we have been releasing them for several years now. We 

have learned something in the process. I think some of the initial 

prisoners that were released in the Bush administration turned out 

they shouldn’t have been released. I think we have learned that 

there are countries, such as Yemen, that probably can’t handle it 

right now, and, therefore, we have to be very careful. But there 

have been other cases that have been quite successful. So it has 

been, in both of the last two administrations, something that was 

considered on a case-by-case basis. I think we have to continue to 

do that, learning from our past mistakes. 

The second issue of, if we are going to keep some number of 

them, is it important that they be kept in Cuba. I have never understood the logic that says there is some value of having them in 

Cuba as opposed to someplace else. I do think that having them in 

Cuba has become a tool that the al Qa’ida propaganda machine 

uses against us. Is it going to solve the world’s problems to take 

that one talking point away from al Qa’ida? No, it is not. But I 

don’t see why we should continue to hand them a propaganda point 

by continuing to keep Guantanamo open. I think moving them to 

someplace else would probably have some minor value that is probably worth doing. 

Mr. MCKEON. I think, you know, there have been references to 

the past administration, this administration. I am not trying to 

make this a political issue at all. To me, it is just a rational issue 

or a economic issue. Because when we had briefings here before the 

holidays, in three briefings we were told how much it was going to 

cost to move the detainees to Illinois and to New York, and we 

were talking over a half-billion dollars. Given our economic situation, it is hard for me to see how that could possibly be justified. 

But back to the point of where we transfer them, if they are 

going to be transferred, is it unreasonable to require that a receiving country not be a state sponsor of terrorism, that it be able to 

secure and exercise control over its territory, such that terrorist 

groups do not enjoy a safe haven and that confirmed cases of Guantanamo detainees released to its custodies are being returned to 

terrorism? That is my concern. 
20 

Mr. CLARKE. Well, sir, I think we need to develop criteria. And 

I think probably both the last two administrations had criteria; we 

need to keep adjusting them. 

As to whether or not the country receiving them is on the state 

sponsor list or not, there are probably some countries on the state 

sponsor list that would probably be pretty good places to send 

them. I think certainly the Government of Syria, which has been 

on the state-sponsored list, the Government of Syria is about as opposed to al Qa’ida as we are and has proven that over and over 

again. They are unlikely to release al Qa’ida people. 

But, the other criteria you have mentioned, whether or not they 

are able to hold them, would suggest that places like Yemen, which 

is not on the state sponsor list, probably shouldn’t be receiving 

them right now. 

Mr. ZARATE. Congressman, I think we need to learn lessons and 

adjust our criteria accordingly. I think we have learned some lessons from those we have already released. And I think the criteria 

needs to take into account the shifting international security context. I think the Obama administration was wise to withhold transferring further Yemenis, given the situation in that country. So I 

think that is very important. 

If I could just mention very quickly on the Guantanamo question 

again, I think the underlying issue with Guantanamo, for which it 

is a symbol, is the question of how we hold individuals in this longterm battle. And if we are going to have a preventive detention 

model, in many ways the locale, the venue doesn’t matter. The 

issue is whether or not we can legitimately defend the system by 

which we hold such individuals, especially if they are not going to 

be held to account in a recognizable court of law. 

And so I think one of the things this administration really needs 

to grapple with, and it is part of my testimony, is how do you frame 

that legal framework and how do you defend it. And part of that 

defense may be going back and looking at the fact—and I have 

heard this from my friends at Amnesty International—that Guantanamo is actually a fairly good place to be held as a detainee, with 

the facilities that have been built, with Attorney General Holder 

going down and saying it is a prison that is being well run. 

And so this may be a time to reflect on whether or not we defend 

the very notion of Guantanamo as part of a preventive detention 

model that we have to defend for the long term. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, let me start out by saying—and I am hearing just 

a little bit of a thread here in most of the testimony that talks 

about taking away talking points from al Qa’ida. 

And I think, Mr. Clarke, in your written testimony, your six 

points said that completing the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces 

from Iraq is an important component on the ideological front. And 

I understand that. I just would remind all of us, in 2001, there 

were no U.S. combat forces in Iraq or Afghanistan. There was no 

Gitmo. And yet the U.S. was brutally and viciously attacked by al 

Qa’ida Central, I believe as you referred to it. 
21 

And it occurs to me that one of the reasons that we are having 

this discussion about al Qa’ida is not because they are so powerful; 

it is because they have demonstrated an intensity of ideology that 

overwhelms us just by their commitment to do us harm. And it occurs to me that there are two primary components to the threat 

that they compose. Number one is that intent, and number two 

would be their capacity to carry it out. And I feel like this notion 

that we better take away their talking points is kind of dangerous 

because it belies what we already know about their intractable intent. 

So let me start there, but my question is that we have to focus 

on this thing called capacity. And nothing, of course, I don’t think, 

concerns any of us more than al Qa’ida or groups with that mindset 

gaining access to weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclearyield weapons. 

So what can we do today—and I am hoping the entire panel will 

discuss this. I understand we are not in a closed session, so you 

will have to adjust accordingly. But what can we do today to prevent the proliferation of WMD in places like Pakistan, Iran, and 

North Korea to eliminate the possibility of a nuclear-armed al 

Qa’ida? 

I just am so convinced that that wipes all other issues off the 

table if terrorists gain access to even one nuclear weapon, because 

then the response of the free world that follows, everything is a 

completely new world. 

So what are we doing to focus on preventing the capacity of al 

Qa’ida to do us harm, especially them gaining access to nuclear capability? 

And I will start with you, Mr. Coll. 

Mr. COLL. I think the single most important goal in that respect 

ought to be to create conditions in which Pakistan stabilizes and 

is able and increasingly is willing to take the steps necessary to 

eliminate extremist ideology from Pakistani soil and to stop using 

extremist groups as a proxy for Pakistani regional foreign policy 

goals. 

And in order to create conditions for Pakistan to stabilize in that 

way, it is going to be necessary, at least in the medium run, to create conditions for normalization between India and Pakistan so 

that they don’t embark on a nuclear arms race that only exacerbates the dangers to the entire world of a nuclear arsenal in Pakistan that is vulnerable to an insider threat over time. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Zarate. 

Mr. ZARATE. Congressman, on your first point, I couldn’t agree 

more. I think we have to be careful not to give al Qa’ida hecklers 

veto over our policies, because I think they do have a centuries-long 

view of their grievances that shift with the political winds. And I 

think we see that time and again with the statements coming out 

of bin Laden and al Qa’ida, now focused on our support for Israel; 

in the past, our military presence in other conflicts. And so, if it 

is not one excuse, it is going to be another, and I think we need 

to be careful. Although, we shouldn’t be handing them free gifts, 

from a propaganda perspective. 
22 

On the WMD front, I am actually quite proud of the work we did 

on this. I think we laid out a very powerful six-part strategy. It is 

laid out in the 2006 national strategy for combatting terrorism. 

But two quick points. I agree with Mr. Coll that, on the nuclear 

front, the center of gravity is Pakistan, where we have seen Pakistani scientists in the past associated in helping al Qa’ida. And I 

think we have to be very careful with the dimensions of capacity 

and expertise that al Qa’ida could gain from the Pakistani nuclear 

complex. 

On the bio side, I think we have to worry very diligently about 

the expansion of biolabs around the world, in some places in 

ungoverned or undergoverned parts of the world. That is dangerous 

as we look at, potentially, toxins and pathogens used by terrorist 

groups. 

Mr. CLARKE. Congressman, the WMD issue is the classic lowprobability, high-impact analytical problem. And it raises the question, as all of those kinds of problems do, how do you spend your 

dollar, how do you spend your time? Because you could spend the 

whole gross national product dealing with this issue. 

The place that I think deserves more attention on the nuclear 

issue, putting aside biological and chemical, on the nuclear issue 

the place that I think deserves more attention is not the security 

of weapons, because that has attention, but the security of nuclear 

material. There are hundreds of tons of enriched uranium around 

the world that are not properly audited, accounted for, and secured. 

We haven’t done a good job on that issue, and that is where I 

would put that attention. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you. I would agree with that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Three quick points and then one question. 

First of all, definitely, I want to thank Mr. Zarate and Mr. 

Clarke for making a couple points that I think are very critical that 

we ought to move past. I mean, first of all, Mr. Clarke’s point about 

the choice between this being a law enforcement issue and a military issue. It is no choice at all; it is both, and a lot of other things 

in between. And we shouldn’t waste too much time debating that. 

We should debate how do to each piece of it best and making sure 

that we don’t miss any of them. 

And then, also, both of you made the point, on the issue of the 

detainee policy, we have been, you know, obsessed with where we 

hold them, when, in fact, I think the larger and more difficult 

issues is how do we hold them and who do we hold and who don’t 

we hold and what are the criteria. And we have the issue of the 

people who we are not going to try in any court but we have to 

hold. How do we justify that policy and defend it? And I think that 

should be the focus of that debate. And I hope, from your mouths 

to God’s ears, if you will, that hopefully we will continue to move 

in that direction. 

And then on the propaganda point, I agree with Mr. Franks that 

we should not be at all concerned with how al Qa’ida is going to 

react to whether or not Guantanamo is open, where we try people, 

what our policies are in Afghanistan. There are, however, other 
23 

voices in the Muslim world that we better pay attention to. Jordan, 

you know, a strong ally, our policies will impact their ability to continue to have their citizens agree with us. Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan—many places look at our policies, whether it is Abu 

Ghraib, Guantanamo, what goes on in Afghanistan, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And these are allies that we should care about, 

and I hope we don’t forget about that point. 

My question has to do with the Taliban and al Qa’ida and how 

close they are. There are many different, you know, varieties of the 

Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It seems to me critical to 

success there would be separating them off from al Qa’ida. We are 

not going to eliminate the Taliban in Afghanistan or in Pakistan. 

What do you think about the relationship right now between the 

Taliban and al Qa’ida in both Afghanistan and Pakistan? I understand that we are talking about a complex set of groups here, but 

what can we do to separate them so that if the Taliban has some 

degree of influence anywhere that doesn’t automatically mean that 

al Qa’ida does? Is that have even possible? 

Mr. Coll, if you will. 

Mr. COLL. I think the relationship that is probably closest between al Qa’ida and the Pakistani Taliban, particularly the 

Mehsud nexus of the Pakistani Taliban. There are also long historical ties that must be continuing between the Haqqani network, 

which is sort of a semi-independent element of the Afghan Taliban 

in al Qa’ida. 

In a strategic sense, al Qa’ida is clearly enabling both Taliban by 

distributing insight into tactics, bomb-making, and media operations. Think of just the oxymoron of the phrase ‘‘Taliban media 

operations.’’ In the 1990s, that basically involved covering up oil 

paintings in Kabul ministries, and today they are putting out many 

more videos than even al Qa’ida is. So al Qa’ida clearly has an effect on these groups. 

How to separate them, ultimately it requires a strategy that persuades many Taliban leaders that their interests are regional and 

local and political, that they are territorial, and that our —— 

Mr. SMITH. How are we doing on that front, and what can we be 

doing better? 

Mr. COLL. I think we are just beginning to construct a strategy 

in Afghanistan, and we are way behind in building a partnership 

with the Pakistani Government that would lead to an effective approach to their western frontier and domestic insurgency. 

Mr. ZARATE. I would agree with Mr. Coll’s assessment. But I 

would say that, in terms of Pakistan, the Pakistani Government 

has to have a different view for the long-term commitment they 

have to the tribal areas. We saw, for example, in 2006, the peace 

deal with the tribes in North Waziristan and South Waziristan 

which eliminated the pressure that al Qa’ida was under at the time 

and the incentives that the tribes actually had then to work with 

the central government in Pakistan. There was a withdrawal of 

forces, a withdrawal of checks of enforcement of that deal. And I 

think that is what gave al Qa’ida some breathing space at the time 

and some other terrorist groups some breathing space in western 

Pakistan. 
24 

We are now, as we see with Secretary Gates going to Islamabad, 

pushing the Pakistanis to make their way back into North 

Waziristan, which I think is the next important battle space. And 

I think part of this is physical pressure; part of it is negotiation 

with purse and other goodies that the tribals like, including influence; and I think part of this is a political solution on the other 

side of the border in Kabul. 

Mr. CLARKE. I would agree with all of that. But I think, in answer to your question, what should we be doing, I think General 

McChrystal probably is doing it on the Afghan side. And that is to 

say that he understands the Taliban on the Afghan side are not 

monolithic and bits of them can be broken off through a combination of coercion and bribery, to be blunt about it. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for testifying today and for your service to our 

country in varying capacities. 

It seems that we have a real concern with failed states who are 

in governable areas that have a population of Sunni Muslims and 

some of them having a view of life that is susceptible to al Qa’ida. 

How do we deal with that effectively? Because it seems to be that 

perhaps in Afghanistan we haven’t dealt with it. And some of you 

have said that it has kind of bled this country dry. 

But how do we—we have not simply Afghanistan, but we have— 

and there are ungovernable areas of Pakistan, we have Somalia as 

a failed state, and we have problems with Yemen in some ungovernable areas there that have al Qa’ida elements now. 

I mean, how can we best protect our national security interests 

in those areas and not bleed this country financially? 

Yes? 

Mr. ZARATE. I think you have hit the nail on the head because 

I think we can’t be all things to all people and we can’t have boots 

on the ground, for both the symbolic reasons that we have talked 

about here but also for resource reasons. 

I think we need to devise strategies like we did in southeast 

Asia, where you have the local authorities, with capacity-building, 

taking on the fight themselves, both the hard edges of the fight and 

the soft edges. And you look at things that the Indonesians have 

done, the Malaysians, with Australian help, with U.S. help, that 

has been incredibly effective. 

If you look at Yemen, I think there is a much greater role for 

Saudi Arabia and the UAE [United Arab Emirates] and Gulf states 

that have in their interest not to have an al Qa’ida safe haven in 

their backyard. I think there is a greater role there. In the 

Maghreb, having Algeria and Morocco work more closely together, 

that is something we tried to achieve over many years. That is critical. 

So I think the regional partners have to take the leading role, 

with the U.S. and other capable western countries providing support and capacity. That is the only way you are going to contain 

these problems and then start to deal with them in the long term, 
25 

which involves development aid, assistance, economic investment, 

all of which we can’t do on our own and all of which the local authorities and countries and interested parties, whether they are 

tribal or otherwise, have the most primary interest in affecting. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Anyone else? 

Mr. CLARKE. I think that is right. I think we can do a lot with 

a small footprint. I think we are demonstrating that now in Yemen. 

We have tried in Somalia. Somalia is a difficult problem. But I 

think there are ways to extend central government into some of 

these ungoverned regions through a combination of development 

aid and security aid. And we can use U.S. special operations forces 

and others in small numbers to help achieve that. I think it is a 

big mistake to think that we only can help these people by putting 

in a large American aid footprint or a large American military footprint. In fact, that is probably counterproductive. 

What is interesting is, in places like Yemen, it is not so much 

a problem that there isn’t enough money to do the development 

aid. There is plenty of money pledged by the Saudis, the United 

States, the UAE, and others. The problem has been institution 

building in the central government so that it can use the money 

that has been pledged. And that is something where we ought to 

be able to do a better job. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Coll? 

Mr. COLL. I think all of those approaches that Mr. Clarke and 

Mr. Zarate have outlined are necessary. I think it is important, 

though, to look at the record of where success has really been 

achieved and taken hold. 

And southeast Asia, I think, is the best example. I traveled in 

Indonesia this summer, and I was struck by the extent to which 

the capacity building and the extraordinary success of the Government of Indonesia, the Government of Malaysia, even the Government of Philippines to a degree has had, is a product of regional 

economic integration. I mean, these are middle-income countries 

that are moving ahead in such a confident way that they are able 

to muster a national capacity to defeat insurgent groups and to 

control ungoverned spaces in a way that just wasn’t imaginable 20 

years ago. 

So, ultimately, in the Arab world and in Africa, that kind of momentum, as distant as it looks in a place like Somalia or Yemen, 

is essential. American USAID or boots on the ground is no substitute for national capacity that is built from regional economic 

momentum. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Let me be specific and say Somalia, I mean, where 

we really are talking about a failed state that has no capacity at 

this time, we have issues of piracy in terms of, you know, pirates 

having safe harbor there because it is a failed state. We have 

issues, certainly, of al Qa’ida having a presence there. How do you 

deal with the situation where there is no capacity? 

Mr. ZARATE. Somalia is perhaps the most bedeviling of the safe 

haven problems, for all the reasons I think most folks know well. 

I think part of it is doing precisely what we have tried to do, which 

is to come up with a political solution where fractious parties within Somalia have a vested interest in building the power of a central 

government or some semblance of a central government. 
26 

We are getting there, I think, with the Djibouti process that has 

been supported by the U.S. and other partners. Part of it is having 

the AU [African Union] and regional countries like Kenya and 

Ethiopia, which are not well liked in some instances, for obvious 

reasons, take greater ownership and, frankly, help contain the 

problem while the political process develops and where you have 

the capacity. 

But that is a fractious society, a violent society, and one where 

al Qa’ida has found allies like al Shabaab for some time. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. TAYLOR. [Presiding.] The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman 

from California, Mrs. Davis, for five minutes. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here today. 

As you know, we are about to start the discussions for the defense budget for 2011. And I am wondering how you would 

prioritize our defense spending in relation to al Qa’ida. Or should 

we be looking away from more conventional forces? How do we balance the threats that al Qa’ida poses as we look to those issues? 

Mr. CLARKE. Well, again, putting aside Afghanistan, which is 

where we are directly using our military to confront al Qa’ida and 

its affiliates like the Taliban, putting aside that, which I think 

needs to be fully and adequately funded, both on the defense side 

and on the foreign ops side, probably at least as important on the 

foreign ops side, I think we need to look at whether or not the Special Forces Command is adequately sized. It has been very strained 

over the last few years because of, first, its successes in Iraq and 

now being used extensively in Afghanistan, perhaps in Yemen and 

elsewhere. That is probably the place where, on the military budget, the greatest contribution can be made. 

Mr. ZARATE. I would agree with that. I think we need to look to 

see where we have resources that apply to the asymmetric threat. 

And I think SOCOM [Special Operations Command] is one example 

where we have programs that can be applied. 

I think programs that allow us to build capacity with foreign 

counterparts—I know the special operations community has built a 

very important and good global and network of special operation 

forces around the world, including with some Arab allies. And so, 

building that capacity to deal with problems as we have seen in 

Yemen or in Somalia or in the Maghreb becomes very important 

so that we don’t have to put boots on the ground and we have good 

and capable allies that are willing and able to do it. So I think that 

is important. 

And, finally, I know this may be outside the purview of this committee, but finding a way, perhaps through 1206 funding, to blend 

the funding that goes to State and DOD [the Department of Defense] for these longer-term development aid and assistance programs in environments where you have incipient conflicts that 

need both a security component and a development aid and assistance component. I think that is critical. And I don’t think, as a bureaucracy, we have really figured that out as a U.S. Government. 

And we have struggled with it. I am sure Dick did in his time in 

the White House. I did, as well. 
27 

Mr. COLL. My colleagues know the programmatic pieces much 

better than I, but I would step back and just make two quick observations. 

First, to reenforce the notion of SOCOM’s enabling capacity. 

When you look out over 20 years, one hopes that the stress that 

special forces have been under in Iraq and Afghanistan will ebb, 

but the challenge of enabling regional and local capacity will persist. 

And, secondly, if—I would scrutinize the strategic communications efforts of the Defense Department in this budgeting cycle, because I do think there is an opportunity and a need to reset, on 

a nonpartisan, serious basis, American thinking about strategic 

communication and where the dollars are going and whether they 

are effective and how to leverage them successfully. This, again, is 

a 20-year challenge that is not going to go away, and it would be 

a good time to start thinking about how to spend effectively to support that goal. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

I think that one of the lessons that we have learned in the last 

number of years is how to be more efficient, in some ways, across 

agencies. But I also am wondering if you could, you know, maybe 

just point out where are we the most inefficient in trying to work 

better together to preserve our security in a way that doesn’t bankrupt us, bleed us the way that we are seeing today. 

Mr. CLARKE. Where are we most inefficient? I would have to say, 

if you look across in terms of the budget where are we spending 

money probably least effectively, it is probably in AID, in the foreign ops budget because they tend to go after very large projects, 

which take a long time and aren’t immediately seen by the people 

in the recipient countries, necessarily, as beneficial. 

To the extent that AID has moved in the direction, which it has, 

of smaller projects that deliver quick hits, quick victories, the way 

the DOD money has done so well, I think that is probably the place 

where we could be more efficient. 

Mr. ZARATE. I couldn’t agree more. I think one of the challenges 

for the U.S. Government is aligning our development aid and assistance long-term with our short-term national security needs 

without doing damage to those long-term goals. So we haven’t figured that out yet. And I think Dick is absolutely right, in terms 

of the lack of efficiencies. 

I would, for example, echo what Mr. Coll said in terms of strategic communications. I think that was something that we left unfinished in the prior administration, figuring out both bureaucratically and programmatically how you deal with this new war, 

this asymmetric, Internet-based war in terms of STRATCOM [Strategic Communications] strategy and structure. So that is important. 

Finally, I would just say, Congresswoman, I think we, as a government, need to start thinking more creatively about how we engage, align, and work with private-sector actors. I think we don’t 

do it well enough. And what you have facing us is an enemy made 

up of non-state actors, cells, networks. What we haven’t figured out 

is how to align those good guys on the good side of the ledger to 
28 

work against those very networks at the local level. And I don’t 

think we are very good at that yet. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Before the Chair recognizes the gentleman from 

Pennsylvania, we have been called for two votes, one 15-minute, 

one 5-minute. It is Chairman Skelton’s intention to recognize Mr. 

Shuster, then break for the votes and come back. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania for 

five minutes. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. 

Is it Mr. Zarate? 

Mr. ZARATE. Zarate. 

Mr. SHUSTER. My Spanish is a little off. 

You brought up the concern I have about how do we try these 

terrorists, and it has become a political football. I believe it has become a political football because, in my district in rural Pennsylvania, the truck driver, the average American, the average citizen 

in my district is asking me, why are we giving these people the 

same rights that American citizens have when they are not? 

The underwear bomber, I understand after 50 minutes of interrogation they read him his Miranda rights, and he took the advice 

of the Miranda rights and shut up and waited for his attorney to 

get there. 

So that is the reason it is political football, I believe. I think 

there is an accepted, credible system out there, and that is the 

military tribunals. So I would like to hear your comments on what 

you think the solution—do we have the solution in place? 

Mr. ZARATE. Congressman, I agree with you. I think one of the 

challenges that this administration faces—and it perhaps is of their 

own making, and I think to a certain extent it is, especially with 

the Khalid Sheikh Mohammed decision, to bring him to New York 

and some of his compatriots to face trial in New York—is the lack 

of clarity as to what exactly is the legal structure and paradigm 

being applied. 

Because what you will have in that context is, in essence, a 

tiered legal system. For the worst of the worst, they are getting the 

most protections under U.S. law, the same protections you and I 

would get in a civilian court, while there are lower-level al Qa’ida 

individuals who will not face trial at all, will have no due process 

as we understand it in a civilian court, with no explanation as to 

why that system makes sense or is in concert with the rule of law. 

So I think the first thing that needs to happen is a framework 

that explains these tiers and explains exactly why they are being 

the applied. I am not against fundamentally—I was a former prosecutor, terrorism prosecutor—to using the criminal legal system. 

But it is one tool of many and shouldn’t necessarily be the first 

point of entry for these individuals. 

And I think it goes to the nature of what we are facing. I think 

we have to make some choices. If we want intelligence from terrorists we capture, like the Christmas Day bomber, then you don’t 

Mirandize him and you don’t put him immediately into the criminal legal system. But it doesn’t mean you can’t prosecute him later, 

as we did, for example, with Jose Padilla. 
29 

Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Clarke, I wondered what your thoughts were. 

What do you believe al Qa’ida’s view is on the situation where we 

are bringing him into our Federal courts and giving him the rights 

of the American citizen? Do you think that is something they are 

smiling about when they see that? Does that help their cause? 

Mr. CLARKE. I don’t think they give it two seconds’ thought, and, 

frankly, I am not sure we should either. You know, the difference 

between the military tribunals, which you suggest wouldn’t have 

Mirandized the prisoner, and the civil criminal process has been 

exaggerated. It is really not that different, in terms of their rights. 

I think we have successfully prosecuted a very large number of 

terrorists under the Bush administration and under the Clinton administration in the Federal civil system with very, very high success rates. And I just don’t understand why people are afraid of 

using the Federal civil system, civil court system, the criminal 

court system, which has proven to be so effective. 

Mr. SHUSTER. I would submit, I think the folks in my district are 

saying because it will take months and months, if not years, and 

millions of dollars of money that need to go out to fight terrorism. 

Mr. CLARKE. So will the military system, sir. 

Mr. SHUSTER. What is that? 

Mr. CLARKE. So will the military tribunal system, sir. It will take 

just as long and cost just as much. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Well, I guess time will show us what the facts are 

on that. 

Mr. CLARKE. We already have historical data that would suggest 

that. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Right. 

The next question I have is—and I see my time is running short, 

so if you don’t have an opportunity to answer, if you could give us 

something in writing. It is something concerning Sheikh Abu 

Yahya al-Libi—I keep hearing his name—who I have heard him 

called ‘‘bin Laden, Jr.,’’ and the most effective propagandist they 

have in getting these young people to come to their cause. 

So I wondered if all three of you might—again, he is going to 

gavel me down here in 40 seconds. So I will start with you, Mr. 

Coll, and if you have any views on him and what your thoughts 

are, if you could comment. 

Mr. COLL. I would be happy to come back in writing on that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 79.] 

Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Zarate. 

Mr. ZARATE. Abu Yahya al-Libi is one of the most prominent clerics that al Qa’ida has. He has become prominent in terms of his 

sermons and his Internet presence. He has gained fame because he 

escaped from Bagram, and that has created more to his mythos as 

a leader in al Qa’ida. And I think he is an important figure that 

needs to be killed or captured. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Clarke, any thoughts on that? 

Mr. CLARKE. Yes, I would agree with Juan on that. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Pennsylvania. 
30 

I would remind Members that we have approximately six minutes to make the vote, but it is very much Chairman Skelton’s intention to return after those votes. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. [Presiding.] Our hearing will resume with Mr. 

Heinrich, please. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank our guests for being here today. 

I have one question I want to direct first at Mr. Coll, and then 

feel free, the rest of you, to chime in as well. 

But I wanted to ask you, Mr. Coll, one of the fundamental limiting factors to our success in Afghanistan, which is obviously related to this whole issue in a deep way, is just the willingness of 

the Afghan Government to do some of the fundamental reforms, 

the anticorruption measures and other things that are necessary. 

And I wanted to get your—as somebody who has written about 

many of these players in Afghanistan for a long time, I wanted to 

get your take on how you would characterize the willingness of the 

Karzai government today to make some of the changes that we 

need to see to realize our goals in Afghanistan. 

Mr. COLL. Well, all the evidence is that it is inadequate, and it 

is certainly one of the major strategic risks facing U.S. policy in Afghanistan. 

Having said that, the better news is that the Afghan Government 

is larger than President Karzai. I have long worried about the extent to which, out of necessity and expediency both, we have tended 

to make him an indispensable figure and run everything through 

his office. You see now in the relationship between parliament and 

the President the potential for a sounder, more broadly based approach to the limited role that the Kabul government actually has 

to play. But it is important because of the credibility that it provides for international policy in Afghanistan. 

And I recognize, as well, that General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry and others have a vision that is based on the idea 

that there are many more actors in Afghanistan who can turn 

things around than those just in the Kabul ministries. So, working 

through effective governors at the provincial and even sub-provincial level will be critical to achieving the, sort of, stability that will 

allow Afghanistan security forces to deploy and U.S. forces to pull 

back. 

Mr. ZARATE. Congressman, just to piggyback, I think it is a very 

good point. With relation to that, I think a big question that the 

Afghan Government has and that our policy confronts is the question of the center versus the locality, how much we rely on local 

and tribal partners in the first instance versus the focus on Kabul 

and the central government and, in particular, from a security perspective, whether or not we begin to rely more heavily on local security militias. 

I think that becomes a very important policy question for not 

only folks here in Washington but also in Kabul. You have had experiments that have worked well in Wardak province and other 

places, but it is not clear that that model will work everywhere in 

Afghanistan. And we have to be careful about diffusing the security 

of the country. 
31 

And so I think there are some very important inflection points 

here with respect to Kabul’s ability to control its own security. 

Mr. HEINRICH. As a follow-up question, are there opportunities 

that we are missing to engage the wider government, the broader 

government, that we should be taking advantage of to make sure 

that all our eggs aren’t in that Kabul basket? 

Mr. COLL. I think it is critical that U.S. policy in Afghanistan approach these political equations with as much energy and creativity 

and resources as it is approaching the military equation. And I 

think you have described it, framed it correctly, which is that a 

successful policy of national reconciliation and political reintegration that complements the security piece in Afghanistan over the 

next three to five years has to be more broadly based than the 

presidential palace. 

Now, you can achieve that broader base through lots of different 

mechanisms. You can turn to parliament, you can use loya jirgas 

and other institutions, traditional institutions. You can do it regionally, as well as nationally. But you have to do it. And it also 

has to be reinforced by regional diplomacy that brings to bear pressure on these factions in Afghanistan that are otherwise not likely 

to participate in such a reconciliation program. 

And I think there has always been an articulation of this vision 

in U.S. policy, but now bringing it to bear successfully, it is hard, 

it is going to be a zig-zag, it is always going to be incomplete. But 

if it is not made a priority, then it won’t succeed. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Kratovil. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. Mr. Chairman, first, let me thank you for allowing folks to come back so we had an opportunity to ask a few questions. 

Let me just follow up on Mr. Heinrich’s question. His question 

sort of went to the issue of, how do we make that policy in Afghanistan better? My question is a little bit different. 

Given the facts related to this Christmas Day incident and given 

what we know is going on in Yemen and the problems there, what 

impact does that have on your view of the strategy at all in Afghanistan, in terms of putting more troops on the ground? 

Any of you or all of you. 

Mr. COLL. It has no impact on my view, in the sense that I think 

that, as I believe it was Mr. Clarke pointed out, understanding that 

there were problems outside of the Pakistan-Afghan region predated the Christmas attack and robust activity was under way, it 

just wasn’t publicized. 

I think that the reason the President made the right decision in 

Afghanistan has to do with core al Qa’ida, which, as we talk about 

earlier, remains resilient and, while under pressure and diminished, still able to facilitate the transfer of bomb-making techniques, still able to participate in robust media operations, and still 

able to assist the destabilization of both the Pakistan and Afghan 

Governments. 

Mr. COLL. So it is a resilient danger that needs to be addressed 

directly. And I think that that is the rationale, ultimately, for the 

policy in Afghanistan. 
32 

Mr. CLARKE. I think Steve is right. They are very different situations, and they call for very different kinds of responses. In Afghanistan, things obviously got out of control. And we, therefore, now 

need a very large military force there, at least for the short term. 

In Yemen, we are able to work through an existing government, 

give it military support, give it intelligence support, and hopefully 

give it development, economic support. 

There will be other places around the world where al Qa’ida will 

pop its head up or affiliated groups will pop their heads up. And, 

at least initially, these small footprint solutions, like what we are 

doing in Yemen, are the appropriate response. 

Mr. ZARATE. Congressman, the only thing I would add—and I 

agree with both my colleagues here—is that there is a demonstration effect to our policy. And so, shifting the momentum of the 

Taliban in Afghanistan becomes important, in terms of the global 

posture that the U.S. has, in part, for our friends and allies, as 

they understand we are resolute and are willing to fight for what 

we believe in and to work with them. That becomes very important 

with Pakistan, I think, in the long term. 

And I also think in terms of the enemy, it becomes important. 

We don’t want to play into their hands, and we don’t want to needlessly spend blood or treasure, but, at the same time, we need to 

be resolute. And I think one of the lessons of Iraq is that it was 

one of the first times that we had, when bloodied, stood up to al 

Qa’ida and surged. And I think that was a devastating lesson to 

our enemies, and I think that is something we should keep in mind 

in Afghanistan. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. We had testimony several months ago—and I am 

trying to remember the gentleman’s name—in talking about Afghanistan, what we are going to do in Afghanistan. And his point 

was, of course if we are squeezing in one place, it would bleed out 

into another. 

One of you mentioned what has happened in Yemen as a result 

of the crackdown in Saudi Arabia. Can’t we simply expect that to 

happen, based on the crackdown in Afghanistan? 

Mr. COLL. Well, the Government of Pakistan is certainly concerned about spillover effects. Their version of what has happened 

after 9/11 emphasizes the consequences to Pakistan of the migration of al Qa’ida from Afghanistan into Pakistan as a result of U.S. 

military action there. 

But I think my response to that argument that you referred to, 

which has been part of a very healthy American discourse about 

U.S. policy choices in Afghanistan, this notion that you squeeze the 

balloon and Yemen pops up and Somalia pops up, is that there is 

no territory that means to al Qa’ida what the Afghan-Pakistan border means to al Qa’ida. And the role of the core leadership and networks that are located there is distinct from any other expression. 

That doesn’t mean these other expressions aren’t dangerous. But in 

order to achieve any definition of success against al Qa’ida, that 

core organization needs to be disabled and destroyed. And I do 

think it is a distinct problem. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. Okay. 

Mr. ZARATE. I would just agree. I would say that al Qa’ida core 

will make their last stand in the Afghan-Pak border region. You 
33 

are not likely to see a grand al Qa’ida caravan to some other locale, 

the way we saw, for example, the move from Sudan to Afghanistan 

in the past. 

That doesn’t mean the regional affiliates or radicalized cells and 

individuals won’t be a problem in the future. They will. But it 

doesn’t mean that there is the balloon effect that people talk about. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. Okay. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Let me ask Mr. Clarke, we have had some homegrown, domestic 

radicalization from Zazi, the Major Hasan, David Headley, and the 

Northern Virginia Five. What do you make of this? 

Mr. CLARKE. I think it is remarkable we don’t have more. When 

you think of it, you know, we are a nation of 300 million people. 

And there have clearly been attempts by al Qa’ida and similar 

groups to radicalize populations in the United States, including 

prison populations. And, so far, I think we have done a fairly good 

job in the United States on both the ideological front and the intelligence front. What I mean by that is, I think the American-Muslim 

community—or communities, I should say—have been very good in 

waging the ideological war within their own communities against 

al Qa’ida and against what it believes in. And we have been very 

successful. 

And it has been remarkably different in Europe. If you look at 

England, you look at Germany, you look at France, those Islamic 

communities have been more successfully radicalized than those in 

the United States. 

I think it is logical to expect that this is going to happen; we are 

going to have these onesies and twosies of people, individuals who 

are radicalized in part through Internet outreach, radicalization on 

the Web, at least initially, and in part through the occasional radical imam like al-Awlaki, who has now moved to Yemen but was 

in northern Virginia and elsewhere. 

I think it is largely, though, sir, Mr. Chairman, I think it is a 

good-news story that so little of it has happened and that the FBI 

has done a relatively good job in tracking what problems there 

have been here. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you. 

Any comments from the other two gentlemen? 

Mr. ZARATE. Mr. Chairman, I would just repeat what I said in 

my testimony, which is I don’t think we should overreact in terms 

of the number of cases we have seen over the past year. I think 

we have seen a fairly consistent element of a domestic 

radicalization problem that hasn’t reached a crisis or tipping point, 

as Dick mentions. You know, you have had Derrick Shareef, Sadiqi, 

the Fort Dix plot, the Torrance cell. You know, over the last eight 

years, we have had numerous cases where the FBI and others have 

done very good work in disrupting. So I don’t think we should 

make any grand conclusions. 

Two things we should watch, though, is the clustering, the fact 

that you have groups of individuals within communities, like the 

American Somalis, that are drawn to the ideology; and, secondly, 

the continued attempts to reach the foreign terrorist organizations 

themselves. And I think that is a bit different, and it is the kind 
34 

of thing that we need to watch very carefully. Because that presents a very different kind of danger than the onesies and twosies 

that Mr. Clarke talked about. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Coll? 

Well, gentlemen, this has been an excellent hearing, and we certainly appreciate your being with us. And we feel that we have 

learned a great deal. And we look forward to seeing you again. 

[Whereupon, at 12:28 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

JANUARY 27, 2010 

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JANUARY 27, 2010 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JANUARY 27, 2010 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. COLL. Abu Yahya Al-Libi is the nom de guerre of a Libyan-born jihadi who 

has fought in and around Afghanistan since at least the early 1990s. He became 

a celebrity after his escape from Bagram Prison outside of Kabul in 2005. Some analysts have praised his communication skills; he has some education and has been 

able to exploit in propaganda stories about chatting with American prison guards 

at Bagram as well as his daring escape. It is doubtful that any al Qa’ida leader will 

ever gain the global reputation that Osama Bin Laden enjoyed at the height of his 

popularity, but Libi does represent a charismatic example of the generation of 

jihadis shaped by the battlefield and prison narratives that followed the September 

11 attacks and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. [See page 29.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JANUARY 27, 2010 

(83) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON 

Mr. SKELTON. Should the United States engage countries such as Yemen using 

security cooperation alone or should U.S. policy be broader and focus on development and reform irrespective of the host-nation commitment to U.S. policy and cooperation on counterterrorism issues? 

Mr. CLARKE. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SKELTON. You have been working counterterrorism issues for decades, and 

serving at very senior levels of the U.S. government has given you perhaps a unique 

vantage point in terms of organizational changes in the federal government that 

have occurred since 9/11. Can you provide us with an overview of how our government—and in particular the Department of Defense—has been working together in 

light of the continually evolving threat posed by al Qa’ida? Where and what do we 

need to improve? What types of inefficiencies still exist that could potentially be exploited by our enemies? 

Mr. CLARKE. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SKELTON. How do you assess the risk that Americans fighting alongside 

groups like al Shabaab in Somalia will return to the United States intent on attacking the homeland? 

Mr. ZARATE. The al Shabaab and the jihadi battlefield in Somalia continue to attract radicalized recruits and support from around the world, including individuals 

from the United States. Unfortunately, a series of recent cases, including announcements on August 5, 2010, by the Attorney General of new arrests in the United 

States for terrorist support to al Shabaab, underscore this festering problem. The 

pipeline of Americans, both non-African converts to Islam and American-Somalis, to 

fight in Somalia with al Shabaab raises the direct concern that such fighters and 

radicalized individuals will be trained and then redeployed to commit attacks in the 

United States. This has been a central concern of U.S. counterterrorism officials 

since 2005. 

There are three key factors that raise concerns that the al Shabaab will serve as 

a platform for deployment of Westerners to attack in the homeland: 

• The al Shabaab’s view that it forms part of al Qa’ida’s global network as well 

as continued interaction between al Qa’ida elements in East Africa with the al 

Shabaab make it likely that al Shabaab will try to project force and its influence beyond Somalia—either on its own or at the prompting of al Qa’ida elements. The al Shabaab’s July 2010 suicide attacks in Kampala are troubling because they demonstrate the group’s willingness to attack beyond the borders of 

Somalia against a perceived enemy. In addition, the al Shabaab seems particularly willing to try to bait U.S. intervention and reaction, which makes their 

potential actions against U.S. interests more variable and less susceptible to deterrence. 

• With the presence of Americans and other Westerners in al Shabaab training 

camps who could travel relatively easily back to the United States, there is 

greater opportunity for the al Shabaab to deploy an individual or group to the 

United States to commit an act of terror. The reality that the first American 

suicide bomber in October 2008, Shirwa Ahmed, was an American-Somali who 

attacked a site in Somalia serves as a clear warning that Americans can be 

radicalized and deployed as suicide attackers. With others following in his footsteps in Somalia and the failed Times Square car bomb, the concerns about a 

possible American committing an act of terror in the Homeland have only 

grown. 

• Events over the last 18 months have perhaps taught the al Shabaab a lesson. 

To project force into the United States—even with a failed attack (as seen vividly in the Detroit airline incident and the bungled Times Square car bomb)— 

may be a success. With perceptions of U.S. overreaction to the Detroit and 

Times Square events, groups like al Shabaab may now believe that disruption 

vice destruction in the United States is a worthy goal. They also may have 

learned the lesson from regional groups and allies of al Qa’ida, like al Qa’ida 
84 

in the Arabian Penninsula and the Pakistan Taliban, that deployment of just 

one operative for an attack can raise the group’s profile and inject fear into 

American society—and could perhaps lure the United States into a direct military confrontation. 

These factors combined with the continued allure of Somalia as a perceived battlefield make it likely that the al Shabaab—on its own or as a proxy for al Qa’ida— 

will attempt to deploy an operative into the United States for an attack. Fortunately, there are counterweights to this possibility. The al Shabaab is under increasing pressure within Somalia, and its recruits—Westerners or otherwise—have been 

concentrated on maintaining and expanding control of territory in Somalia. In addition, within the United States there is intense focus by law enforcement and the 

intelligence community on this potential—since 2006—and the recent cases revealed 

publicly demonstrate law enforcement’s continued focus on any pipeline—human or 

financial—to Somalia. Finally, the Somali-American community in urban areas like 

Minneapolis have begun to recognize that they have a problem in their midst and 

have cooperated with law enforcement to try to prevent the radicalization of SomaliAmerican youth. 

Mr. SKELTON. If we are seeing al Qa’ida-affiliate threats spread from South Asia 

to the Arabian Peninsula, where do you believe is the next potential region of instability and what specifically can we do to address this evolving threat? 

Mr. ZARATE. I have described the evolving violent Sunni extremist problem as a 

terrorist Hydra—with AQ Core (made up of the senior leadership and cadre of historical al Qa’ida present largely in Western Pakistan); AQ affiliates and allies (to 

include groups like al Qa’ida in the Arabian Penninsula, al Qa’ida in the Islamic 

Maghreb, al Qa’ida in Iraq, al Shabaab, the Pakistan and Afghan Taliban, Islamic 

Jihad Union); and AQ-inspired individuals and cells all operating in a global battlefield. The most dangerous manifestations of regional expansion for al Qa’ida lie in 

the relationships with regional organizations that have ideological, historical, and 

logistical ties to AQ Core as well as small groups of radicalized individuals who are 

committed to the strategic goals and actions defined and prompted by al Qa’ida. 

Aside from Afghanistan and Pakistan and all the groups operating in those countries (including Lashkar-e-Taiba, Haraka ul Jihad I Islami (HUJI), and HUJI–Bangladesh), the United States needs to worry about physical safe haven in numerous 

parts of the world which provide the opportunity for Sunni terrorist allies to recruit, 

train, mingle, and strategize together. The arc from Yemen through Somalia and 

East Africa to Southern Sudan and the Maghreb provides the most important and 

dangerous arc of instability and opportunity for our terrorist enemies. The growing 

radicalization in Central Asia—to include southern Russia and western China—is 

of concern especially with organizations like the Islamic Jihad Union and the East 

Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) operating aggressively in the region and beyond. The problem of extremism in the Gulf, Iraq, Egypt, and the Levant needs to 

be watched carefully, though al Qa’ida has had difficulty in establishing bases in 

the countries of this region after crackdowns in the post 9/11 period. Finally, the 

problems of ‘‘pocket havens’’—small communities of radicalized individuals who are 

susceptible to recruitment and enlistment on their own or by organized terrorist 

groups—need to be treated seriously. These pockets can be found in refugee camps 

(e.g., Palestinian camps in Lebanon), particular villages (e.g., Tetuan in Morrocco), 

and in urban environments among disaffected minorities (e.g., certain Muslim subcommunities in Europe and North America). 

The most important thing that can be done is to empower and enlist regional and 

local actors to take up the task of disrupting active al Qa’ida and terrorist activity 

while also trying to prevent and counteract the radicalization of susceptible populations. This model will look different in each instance depending on the environment and how the threat is materializing, but the key remains local engagement 

and cooperation by security and law enforcement agencies, aid agencies, and credible community voices. The United States can always be helpful by providing information, capacity, and relevant enablers. The example of Southeast Asia’s success in 

addressing the terrorist threat is informative, with capable and willing countries 

working together with the assistance of Australia and the United States to disrupt 

terrorist cells, prevent radicalization, build collective capabilities and defenses, and 

to engage in counterinsurgency efforts where needed. 

Mr. SKELTON. In your written testimony, you talk about how al Qa’ida’s public 

support is declining and how they have essentially politically isolated themselves 

since 2005. In addition to the policy options you discuss, how specifically can the 

United States take advantage of this downward trend in the popularity of al Qa’ida 

and what strategies would you recommend? 

Mr. COLL. The best strategy is to work through others in the Islamic world—particularly to help highlight the narratives of Muslim and other civilian victims of al 
85 

Qa’ida’s indiscriminate bombing, and to publicize polling data that documents the 

abhorrence that most Muslims feel toward suicide bombing. Directing financial support, through proxies if possible, to civil society and human rights groups in Muslim-majority countries who help victims of terrorist violence is one specific idea that 

would push in this direction. Direct arguments made by American officials are less 

likely to be effective. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

Mr. SMITH. Should the United States engage countries such as Yemen using security cooperation alone or should U.S. policy be broader and focus on development 

and reform irrespective of the host-nation commitment to U.S. policy and cooperation on counterterrorism issues? 

Mr. CLARKE. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. In your testimony you talked about the effective use of U.S. Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) to build national capacity of our foreign counterparts and 

partners. With this in mind, and considering high-priority regions of concern, where 

should SOF concentrate their efforts geographically to enhance partnerships and 

limit or mitigate threats posed by AQ and AQ affiliates? 

Mr. ZARATE. The U.S. Special Forces (SOF) and the relationships and capacities 

they have built and continue to build around the world are critical to our long-term 

counterterrorism success. Counterterrorism operations around the world will often 

depend directly on the discipline and effectiveness of small units able to target and 

disrupt terrorist activity surgically. SOF helps to build that worldwide capacity and 

network that is advantageous to U.S. interests. 

The SOF’s resources are best spent with countries that are aligned with U.S. interests, have the willingness to engage in the terrorism fight, and will be important 

to local and regional disruption of emerging terrorist threats. Those special forces 

from countries that have been active with the United States in war zones like Afghanistan and Iraq are prime candidates as force-multiplying partners in building 

further global capabilities. 

The most critical of the special forces engagements globally will come with countries that can serve as regional enablers for their neighbors to address existing and 

future threats. In East Africa, this includes work with Ethiopian, Kenyan, and 

Ugandan forces. In the Middle East, this means continuing to build the capabilities 

of strong partners like Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, 

and Iraq. In Southeast Asia, this means working collectively with Australian special 

forces to build the capabilities of Singaporean, Thai, and Indonesian forces. With 

our special forces and existing capable allies, we need to be building credible partners in key parts of the world where al Qa’ida and its allies have potential footholds 

to ensure it cannot gain safe haven or expand its global reach. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. In your testimony you talked about a need to reset strategic communications on a nonpartisan basis. What specific strategic communications strategies would you offer policy makers as we consider the morphing AQ threat of 2010 

and beyond? 

Mr. COLL. The most important priority is to conceive of strategic communications 

policy so that it fits with the media technologies of our time. To date, American strategic communications thinking has remained rooted in the ‘‘broadcast tower’’ or oneto-many paradigm of the Cold War era. Anyone who keeps a Facebook or Twitter 

account will recognize that many-to-many is the new paradigm. Innovators at the 

State Department such as Alec Ross, Secretary of State Clinton’s adviser on how 

digital technology creates opportunities for diplomacy, offers an example of the new 

thinking that the government requires. The next step is to think about how models 

of many-to-many communication can be distributed to reinforce Muslim public opinion that is already hostile to al Qa’ida and its tactics. This will require some risktaking that public diplomacy thinkers have so far found difficult. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS 

Ms. TSONGAS. One of the most disturbing aspects of al Qa’ida’s demonstrated elasticity and adaptability is its use of the Internet to attract new followers and facilitate radicalization. The Internet has allowed al Qa’ida to reach out beyond the con-
86 

straints of regional borders and the geographical locations of its training camps to 

spread the extremist mindset and encourage newcomers to act on the ideology’s call 

to violence. 

This ability to harness the Internet is especially concerning due to the emerging 

threat of ‘‘homegrown’’ terrorist and domestic radicalization. In fact, the Center for 

Strategic and International Studies ‘‘Transnational Threats Update’’ that came out 

last month (Volume 7, Number 9, Nov-Dec 2009), stated that the threat of domestically radicalized recruits ‘‘has manifested itself as a possibility in more than 20 

cases since 9/11, and at least a dozen in the past year.’’ 

And Mr. Coll wrote last week in a piece for the New American Foundation titled 

‘‘Threats’’ (January 18, 2009) that al Qa’ida ‘‘has evolved into a jihadi version of an 

Internet-enabled direct-marketing corporation structured like Mary Kay, but with 

martyrdom in place of pink Cadillacs.’’ 

As the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs reported 

in its 2008 Staff Report on violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat, one of the primary drivers of the expanding al Qa’ida threat 

to our homeland is the use of the Internet to enlist individuals to joint in violent 

extremism without ever really affiliating with a terrorist organization. 

So as we look forward and try to analyze what the U.S. should do to better prevent future terrorist attacks and ultimately defeat and eliminate al Qa’ida, understanding the emerging threat of the Internet in radicalization is a critical aspect. 

Mr. Zarate, given your extensive experience in providing and advising strategic 

direction for combating terrorism, can you provide your opinion as to the way forward to preventing al Qa’ida from harnessing the power of the Internet to spread 

radical and violent Islamic ideologies and recruit from inside the borders of the U.S. 

Can you address both the technological and the communication aspects of addressing this threat? Do we have the necessary cultural understanding and communication skills to counteract the propaganda produced by al Qa’ida and its affiliates? 

If not, how do we develop the necessary skill sets? 

Mr. ZARATE. The Internet has become a global accelerant to al Qa’ida’s cause, giving it reach well beyond its geographic bounds and creating the sense of a global, 

virtual caliphate that is attractive to adherents around the world. The allure of the 

al Qa’ida-inspired narrative and radicalization is growing stronger in Western countries among disaffected individuals. The approach to the Internet is complicated for 

the United States given our constitutional devotion to First Amendment principles 

and the necessary openness of communication via the Internet. 

There are three key avenues of engagement on the Internet for the United States: 

• The United States and allies should be monitoring closely and exploiting the 

communications and virtual interactions of suspect individuals and groups online. Intense monitoring and disruptive actions that result should create a sense 

of mistrust among violent Islamist extremists online that will help mute or restrict their use of the Internet as an all-purpose recruitment, training, funding, 

and deployment tool. 

• The United States should educate and leverage the private sector, including the 

Internet Service Providers when appropriate, to police the Internet and to filter 

Web sites that run counter to legal and contractual obligations. 

• Most importantly, the United States should enlist, encourage, and enable private sector actors and foreign counterparts to counter the messages and presence of extremists online. There should be a form of cyber-privateering that empowers certain groups and individuals to counter the enemy’s extremist 

ideologies, through direct theological and moral challenge, satire and humor, 

and the availability of alternate positive channels for those who may be searching for meaning and identity online. 

There are limitations to what the U.S. Government can do—based on law and effectiveness. There is not enough expertise in the U.S. Government to do this all; the 

U.S. Government is not a credible voice in these online extremist venues and among 

susceptible populations; and there are constitutional limits to what the U.S. Government can do if its message could affect or be seen as directed toward U.S. citizens 

or a U.S. audience. Importantly, these limitations point to the need for others—foreign governments and non-state actors and networks—to be engaged online to 

counter the violent Islamist extremist ideology and related communities emerging. 

Fortunately, we are beginning to see just this, with American Muslims beginning 

to counter extremist messages online with videos, Web sites, and blogs. 
87 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. The President has recently announced the suspension of all Guantanamo Bay detainees being released to Yemen. However, detainees are still being released to marginal countries, with two being released to Algeria just last week. Historical data also points to the fact that one in five released detainees returns to terrorist activities. Algeria’s neighbor, Libya, has been on the State Department’s list 

of nations which sponsor terrorism, and it is arguable that conditions in the region 

are ripe for a resurgence of terrorist activity. Given this, shouldn’t we take a good 

hard look at to which countries we allow detainees to return? Additionally, should 

the list of nations with ‘‘State Sponsored’’ terrorism be updated and expanded to include those nations which provide terrorists with a safe haven? 

Mr. CLARKE. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. WILSON. Much attention has been given, and rightfully so, to al Qa’ida’s 

growth in the Middle East, Arabian Peninsula, and North Africa. However, many 

countries in South America are exhibiting signs of being ripe for the growth of terrorist movements: heavy narcotics trades, governments largely seen as illegitimate 

and growing unemployment. What are the opportunities to ensure we are not 

caught blindsided by the growth of terrorism in this region? 

Mr. CLARKE. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. WILSON. In recent years, separatist groups, such as Somalia’s al Shabaab, 

have pledged their support to al Qa’ida. Arguably, their pledge comes from financial 

and armament motivation, as opposed to aligned religious ideologies. With the increase in separatist movements in Northern Africa, in places such as Sudan, Eritrea, and Algeria, and domestic unrest with the al-Houthi rebellion in Yemen, what 

measures are, or may be taken, to prevent the spread of al Qa’ida’s reach to these 

movements? 

Mr. CLARKE. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. WILSON. The President has recently announced the suspension of all Guantanamo Bay detainees being released to Yemen. However, detainees are still being released to marginal countries, with two being released to Algeria just last week. Historical data also points to the fact that one in five released detainees returns to terrorist activities. Algeria’s neighbor, Libya, has been on the State Department’s list 

of nations which sponsor terrorism, and it is arguable that conditions in the region 

are ripe for a resurgence of terrorist activity. Given this, shouldn’t we take a good 

hard look at to which countries we allow detainees to return? Additionally, should 

the list of nations with ‘‘State Sponsored’’ terrorism be updated and expanded to include those nations which provide terrorists with a safe haven? 

Mr. ZARATE. The problem of returning detainees held in Guantanamo (GTMO) in 

a manner that both protects U.S. national security interests and upholds our obligations to protect the individuals’ human rights has bedeviled both the Bush and 

Obama Administrations. The problem has grown more acute with the remaining 

population in GTMO comprising a more dangerous population of terrorist operatives 

than the original collection of GTMO detainees. Because of the nature of the remaining population, the recidivism rates are likely to be much higher than past released detainees. In addition, from past transfers of GTMO detainees, we know that 

security guarantees and rehabilitation programs are not fool-proof and that some of 

the returned detainees will decide to return to the battlefield. 

This reality then puts a premium on the U.S. Government’s risk calculus tied to 

each release and the level of confidence we have in the ability and willingness of 

a host government to constrain the former detainees’ ability to rejoin the fight or 

serve as an inspirational recruiter for terrorist causes. The United States should 

therefore review carefully the state of a recipient country’s security, the status of 

al Qa’ida-related groups or cells in that country, the vulnerability of the community 

in which the detainee will be returned, and the capability of that country to adhere 

to its security and human rights agreements. This calculus, especially after the attempted attack on December 25th, has forced the Obama Administration to halt all 

but one of the GTMO transfers to Yemen. 

The question of whether countries that provide terrorists safe haven should be 

listed as state sponsors of terror is an important one. Certainly, those countries that 

actively support or are willfully blind to the use of their territory by known and recognizable terrorist organizations should be candidates for listing as state sponsors 

of terror. The level of knowledge and complicity of senior elements in the government for such safe haven must play into that determination. 
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This, however, is different from the situation in which terrorists are taking advantage of the weaknesses or geography of a country, whose government attempts to 

control its territory or does not have the means to do so effectively. If there is a 

willingness to control territory and to deny safe haven, then that government should 

not be considered a state sponsor of terrorism. Even so, there needs to be open recognition of those parts of the world that present terrorist and transnational illicit 

networks the physical space to organize and mingle, as well as a recognition that 

sovereign states may not be able to police their territory. Because of the importance 

of safe haven to international security, there needs to be a renewed focus not just 

by host governments but by regional actors and the international community to help 

deny safe havens with capacity building, active measures to quarantine or fill safe 

havens with government controls, and a new international legal framework and understanding of the need to deny safe haven. 

Mr. WILSON. Much attention has been given, and rightfully so, to al Qa’ida’s 

growth in the Middle East, Arabian Peninsula, and North Africa. However, many 

countries in South America are exhibiting signs of being ripe for the growth of terrorist movements: heavy narcotics trades, governments largely seen as illegitimate 

and growing unemployment. What are the opportunities to ensure we are not 

caught blindsided by the growth of terrorism in this region? 

Mr. ZARATE. The problem of Sunni or Shia-based terrorism in South America cannot be ignored. At a minimum, there is a potential that human smuggling networks 

and transnational organized criminal networks (to include drug cartels and gangs) 

could be used by terrorist organizations, like al Qa’ida or Hizballah, to gain entry 

of operatives undetected into the United States. There is also the potential that diaspora communities in South America could serve as covers for operatives to recruit, 

train, raise funds, and deploy against U.S. interests. Tied to this problem is the 

reach of transnational criminal networks—with the logistics and funding to help 

those willing to pay—and the permissive environment created by regimes like Venezuela and Nicaragua to allow nefarious actors to operate. These dangers are exacerbated by an increasing Iranian presence in the region thanks to commercial, financial, and governmental relationships with Venezuela. 

These potential dangers require the United States to monitor vigilantly the 

transnational networks that could be used to smuggle terrorists, the suspect individuals who may be embedded in diaspora communities, and any signal of growing 

radicalization of Latin American populations. Most importantly, this requires building and maintaining awareness, capacity, and cooperation with key governments 

and related authorities in the region since most of the work of detecting suspect terrorist and criminal activity will fall to local and national authorities. 

Mr. WILSON. In recent years, separatist groups, such as Somalia’s al Shabaab, 

have pledged their support to al Qa’ida. Arguably, their pledge comes from financial 

and armament motivation, as opposed to aligned religious ideologies. With the increase in separatist movements in Northern Africa, in places such as Sudan, Eritrea, and Algeria, and domestic unrest with the al-Houthi rebellion in Yemen, what 

measures are, or may be taken, to prevent the spread of al Qa’ida’s reach to these 

movements? 

Mr. ZARATE. It is critical to constrain the global reach of al Qa’ida by preventing 

or breaking its connections with local and regional groups that could be ideologically 

aligned and used as strategic footholds globally. It is also important to distinguish 

between groups like the al-Houthis in Yemen, who are Shia, from the global Sunni 

extremist movement led by al Qa’ida, as well as distinguishing local grievances with 

no violent Islamist extremist connections from the broader global movement. 

Constraining al Qa’ida’s reach requires numerous steps, to include the following: 

• Pressuring the AQ Core to the extent that they are not able to provide strategic 

or tactical guidance or support to their regional networks or potential allies; 

• Preventing the financial ties that often bind such groups; 

• Decapitating the leadership of regional groups with the deepest and historical 

ties to AQ Core, while preventing and interdicting the injection of key leadership or guidance to the regional affiliates; 

• Assisting regional governments to attack the infrastructure of the local or regional affiliates (thereby forcing them to focus on survival and local issues 

versus AQ’s global agenda); 

• Messaging by credible voices about the foreign nature of AQ, the antithetical 

and destructive agenda and interests of the AQ-led movement, and the likely 

losing strategy of garnering more attention from security authorities by associating with AQ; and 

• Through local authorities, identifying and pacifying existing sectarian or local 

conflicts that could be exploited by al Qa’ida to radicalize and recruit adherents 
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and create a new battlefront (e.g., the Christian/Muslim conflict in Nigeria; tensions in Southern Thailand). 

Mr. WILSON. The President has recently announced the suspension of all Guantanamo Bay detainees being released to Yemen. However, detainees are still being released to marginal countries, with two being released to Algeria just last week. Historical data also points to the fact that one in five released detainees returns to terrorist activities. Algeria’s neighbor, Libya, has been on the State Department’s list 

of nations which sponsor terrorism, and it is arguable that conditions in the region 

are ripe for a resurgence of terrorist activity. Given this, shouldn’t we take a good 

hard look at to which countries we allow detainees to return? Additionally, should 

the list of nations with ‘‘State Sponsored’’ terrorism be updated and expanded to include those nations which provide terrorists with a safe haven? 

Mr. COLL. The United States should not return prisoners to countries with documented records of torture and prisoner abuse. As to ‘‘state sponsors’’ of terrorism, 

whether it is that legal mechanism or another comparable one, it is important for 

the United States to make transparent and reasonable judgments about what the 

capacity of weak governments is to prevent their sovereign territory from becoming 

a sanctuary, and to hold governments accountable to a reasonable standard of action. It would be foolish to make policy on the basis of wishful thinking about the 

capacity of weak governments; equally, it would be foolish to appease or accommodate states that are doing less than they can to prevent terrorists from operating 

on their territory. 

Mr. WILSON. Much attention has been given, and rightfully so, to al Qa’ida’s 

growth in the Middle East, Arabian Peninsula, and North Africa. However, many 

countries in South America are exhibiting signs of being ripe for the growth of terrorist movements: heavy narcotics trades, governments largely seen as illegitimate 

and growing unemployment. What are the opportunities to ensure we are not 

caught blindsided by the growth of terrorism in this region? 

Mr. COLL. Mexico provides an example of how instability and political violence 

caused by non-state actors can affect the interests of the United States even where 

terrorism against American citizens or interests is not at issue. Promoting the 

strength of democratic Latin American governments and ensuring equitable economic growth through trade, public investment, safety nets, and middle-class formation will provide the best opportunities for sustainable stability in the region. 

Mr. WILSON. In recent years, separatist groups, such as Somalia’s al Shabaab, 

have pledged their support to al Qa’ida. Arguably, their pledge comes from financial 

and armament motivation, as opposed to aligned religious ideologies. With the increase in separatist movements in Northern Africa, in places such as Sudan, Eritrea, and Algeria, and domestic unrest with the al-Houthi rebellion in Yemen, what 

measures are, or may be taken, to prevent the spread of al Qa’ida’s reach to these 

movements? 

Mr. COLL. Each of the cases mentioned here is distinctive and complex. Each 

must be examined in its specific setting. Promoting democracy, human rights and 

the rule of law as core American principles should be the bedrock foundation of finetuned regional strategies. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MCMORRIS RODGERS 

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. In December 2009 President Obama spoke at West 

Point and stated that ‘‘our overarching goal remains . . . to disrupt, dismantle and 

defeat al Qa’ida in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future. To meet that goal . . . we must deny al 

Qa’ida a safe haven. We must reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government.’’ If Guantanamo Bay detainees are brought into 

the U.S. to stand trial, aren’t we giving al Qa’ida a platform and opening ourselves 

up to risk of al Qa’ida taking a deeper interest and striking here in the United 

States? 

Mr. CLARKE. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. Last week in Afghanistan, a suicide bomber attempted 

to gain access to the Afghan Central Bank, leaving half a dozen Taliban members 

and 5 Afghanis dead, including 3 security guards. From this attack on an Arab financial institution, can we surmise that terrorist groups and the Taliban are fighting separately and each are in need of financing? What steps does Afghanistan need 

to have in-place to protect its financial interests against extremist groups? 

Mr. ZARATE. The attack on the Afghan Central Bank is less a reflection of the 

need for financing by the Taliban and more a symbolic attempt to hit one of the 
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key institutions of the central government—one that has garnered much support 

from the United States and the international community. Criminal ventures play 

a part in filling the Taliban’s coffers, but the various factions of the Taliban and 

its leadership have multiple sources of funding—from the narcotics trade and hostage-taking to extortion and foreign donors. They will continue to use all means to 

fund their activities and the insurgency. 

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. What can the U.S. do to assist Afghanistan, but especially Pakistan and Yemen, to improve their own efforts in preventing or stemming 

the flow of illicit funds to the al Qa’ida terrorist network? 

Mr. ZARATE. Disrupting the flow of terrorist funds in active war zones or in less 

developed economies can often prove difficult, since the most effective tools the U.S. 

Government has to affect the flows of illicit funds through the international financial system are less effective in these contexts. That said, there are a number of 

things that can be done to help build the capacity of countries like Afghanistan, 

Yemen, and Pakistan to prevent the flows of funds to terrorist groups and actors— 

and steps the U.S. Government can take on its own. 

In the first instance, the United States must work directly with the host governments to apply financial regulatory scrutiny and enforcement resources on those individuals and entities—including charities—that have already been identified as 

serving as funding conduits for al Qa’ida, the Taliban, and related terrorist groups. 

Second, the United States can assist by creating targeted information and analysis for action. Over the past few years, the United States has done this well by 

creating field-based financial intelligence analysis units (‘‘threat finance cells’’) in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Importantly, this also requires monitoring of cash flows into these countries—via 

couriers—as well as value transfer via the hawala system. This requires capable 

and willing customs officials and regulators who understand how cash is moved and 

how the hawaladars operate. These officials and their governments must then be 

willing to enforce effectively (and without corruption) relevant reporting and financial oversight laws. 

Creating asset forfeiture laws that provide bonuses and asset sharing for effective 

interdictions and application of the law can help incentivize and decrease the risks 

of corruption, if the programs are administered well. The United States and foreign 

entities, like the World Bank and IMF, have helped establish the framework for 

these efforts. In addition, the use of mobile banking and automatic deposits increases the security and transparency of payments and undermines the ability of 

corrupt or nefarious actors to use the flow of paper money to fund their activities. 

These efforts should dovetail with attempts to bring formal financial services into 

developing and poor economies. The advent of mobile banking technologies, as seen 

in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia, will help communities and individuals who had 

previously relied on informal methods of holding and moving money take an evolutionary leap toward formal banking. This trend will give authorities a better chance 

at monitoring, tracking, and disrupting the flow of some illicit transfers while ensuring that individuals have access to necessary banking services. 

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