alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Order entered December 7, 2017 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-16-00560-CR 

No. 05-16-00561-CR 

No. 05-16-00562-CR 

No. 05-16-00563-CR 

MERCEDES M. BIGGURS, Appellant 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 291st Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause Nos. F08-7650-U, F14-70586-U, F14-70971-U, F14-75674-U 

ORDER 

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we GRANT the June 20, 2017 motion of 

Valencia Bush for leave to withdraw as appointed counsel on appeal. We DIRECT the Clerk of 

the Court to remove Valencia Bush as counsel of record for appellant. We DIRECT the Clerk 

of the Court to send a copy of this order and all future correspondence to Mercedes M. Biggurs, 

TDCJ No. 02076732, Murray Unit, 1916 North Hwy 36 Bypass, Gatesville, Texas, 76596. 

/s/ DAVID L. BRIDGES 

 JUSTICE
§ 105-70.034 Evidence. ( a ) The ALJ shall determine the admissibility of evidence.
( b ) Except as provided in this part, the ALJ shall not be bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence. However, the ALJ may apply the Federal Rules of Evidence where appropriate, e.g., to exclude unreliable evidence.
( c ) The ALJ shall exclude irrelevant and immaterial evidence.
( d ) Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or by considerations of undue delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
( e ) Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if it is privileged under Federal law.
( f ) Evidence concerning offers of compromise or settlement shall be inadmissible to the extent provided in Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
( g ) The ALJ shall permit the parties to introduce rebuttal witnesses and evidence.
( h ) All documents and other evidence offered or taken for the record shall be open to examination by all parties, unless otherwise ordered by the ALJ pursuant to § 105-70.024.
§ 302-11.101 Must the title to the property for which I am requesting an allowance for residence transactions be in my name? The title to the property for which you are requesting an allowance for residence transaction must be: ( a ) Solely in your name; or
( b ) Solely in the name of one or more of your immediate family members; or
( c ) Jointly in your name and in the name of one or more of your immediate family members.
#### ELIJAH H. PURDY and others, Respondents, *v.*LOUIS SCHLESINGER and others, Appellants.

Appeal from an order appointing a receiver of the proceeds of a sale, had under a chattel mortgage, of property fraudulently obtained from the plaintiffs in this action by the mortgagor, and alleged in this action to have been mortgaged for the purpose of cheating and defrauding these plaintiffs out of their claim for the purchase-price thereof. After a review of the facts in the case, the court was of the opinion that there was sufficient evidence of fraud in the .giving *79of the mortgage to justify the appointment of the receiver, and affirmed the order.

*T. M.*Tyng, for the appellants.

*Eugene F. Daly,*for the respondents.

Opinion by

Daniels, J.

Present—-Davis, P. J., Brady and Daniels, JJ.

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs besides disbursements.
# Comments on: Federal Circuit Schedules April Session for the Minneapolis-Saint Paul Area
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 18

- 4242

_____________________________ G REGORY A LLEN F OREMAN , Appellant,

v.

S TATE O F F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County

. James M. Colaw , Judge

. October 16, 2019

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

. R OBERTS , B ILBREY , and W INOKUR , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Megan Long, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee
, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody
, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
EXHIBIT 99.1

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

I, Edward P. Smoot, Chief Executive Officer of Anacomp, Inc. (the "Registrant"),
do hereby  certify in accordance  with 18 U.S.C.  1350,  as adopted  pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  the  Quarterly  Report on Form 10-Q of the  Registrant,  to which this
          certification is attached as an exhibit (the "Report"), fully complies
          with the requirements of section 13(a) of the Securities  Exchange Act
          of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and

     (2)  the  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Registrant.



Dated: August 14, 2002                  /s/  Edward P. Smoot
                                        ------------------------------------
                                        Edward P. Smoot
                                        Chief Executive Officer



<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.2


                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

I, Linster W. Fox, Chief Financial Officer of Anacomp,  Inc. (the "Registrant"),
do hereby  certify in accordance  with 18 U.S.C.  1350,  as adopted  pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that,:

     (1)  the  Quarterly  Report on Form 10-Q of the  Registrant,  to which this
          certification is attached as an exhibit (the "Report"), fully complies
          with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities  Exchange Act
          of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and

     (2)  the  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Registrant.


Dated: August 14, 2002                  /s/  Linster W. Fox
                                        ------------------------------------
                                        Linster W. Fox
                                        Chief Financial Officer
§ 302-9.101 In what situations may my agency authorize transportation of a POV to my post of duty? Your agency may authorize transportation when: ( a ) At the time of your assignment, conditions warrant such authorization under § 302-9.140;
( b ) Conditions that once precluded prior authorization have changed to warrant such authorization under § 302-9.170; or
( c ) Subsequent to the time of your assignment, conditions warrant authorization under § 302-9.172 of a replacement POV.
No. 11-9351.

#### Mueller *v.*United States.

C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Natoma

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Bay

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North

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Shorecrest

Bay Point

Miami International Airport

Morningside

Grapeland Heights

Little Havana Dodge Island

Shenandoah

Virginia Key

Auburndale

Liberty City

Silver Bluff

Wynwood

Little River

Downtown

The Roads

Allapattah

Little Haiti

Overtown

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Case 1:22-cv-24066-KMM Document 82-36 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2023 Page 1 of 1
II

Calendar No. 628

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 4191

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 25 (legislative day, MAY 16), 1994

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Governmental Affairs

SEPTEMBER 26 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 12), 1994

Reported by Mr. GLENN, without amendment

AN ACT

To designate the United States Post Office building located

at 9630 Estate Thomas in Saint Thomas, Virgin Islands,

as the ‘‘Aubrey C. Ottley Post Office’’.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

4 The United States Post Office building located at

5 9630 Estate Thomas in Saint Thomas, Virgin Islands,

6 shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Aubrey C. Ottley

7 Post Office’’.
2

•HR 4191 RS

1 SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

2 Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document,

3 paper, or other record of the United States to the building

4 referred to in section 1 shall be deemed to be a reference

5 to the Aubrey C. Ottley Post Office.

Passed the House of Representatives May 23, 1994.

Attest: DONNALD K. ANDERSON,

Clerk.

Calendar No. 628

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 4191

AN ACT

To designate the United States Post Office building

Office’’.Virgin Islands, as the ‘‘Aubrey C. Ottley Postlocated at 9630 Estate Thomas in Saint Thomas,

SEPTEMBER 26 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 12), 1994

Reported without amendment
700 P.2d 74

#### STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Randall W. McKEOWN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15061.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

April 16, 1985.

David Z. Nevin, Boise, for defendant-appellant.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

WALTERS, Chief Judge.

This is a companion case to *State v. Anderson,*108 Idaho 454, 700 P.2d 76 (1985), which we have also decided today. Anderson and Randall McKeown were convicted, upon pleas of guilty, of second degree murder in connection with the death of Christopher Peterman. Peterman died as the result of a prolonged beating he received while incarcerated with five other youths in the Ada County Jail.

*453On this appeal, McKeown contends the charge against him should have been transfered to juvenile court or dismissed. McKeown believes I.C. § 16-1806A, the statute excluding certain crimes from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, violates his due process and equal protection rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Alternatively, McKeown asserts section 16-1806A conflicts with I.C. § 16-1804, another provision of Idaho’s Youth Rehabilition Act (YRA). McKeown argues that I.C. § 16-1804 should have controlled the jurisdiction of the charge against him. McKeown also contends the sentence imposed — an indeterminate term not to exceed twenty-five years — constitutes an abuse of sentencing discretion. We affirm.

In *State v. Anderson, supra,*we held that I.C. § 16-1806A did not violate any constitutional rights of the defendant. Nor did we find an irreconcilable conflict between section 16-1806A and other provisions of the YRA. Likewise, on a nearly identical record in this case, we hold that McKeown’s constitutional rights of due process and equal protection were not infringed when he was charged as an adult. We also hold that McKeown did not have a right under the YRA to be proceeded against as a juvenile. It remains for us to determine whether imposition of an indeterminate twenty-five year sentence in this case constitutes an abuse of discretion.

The mitigating factors presented by McKeown that arguably support a lesser sentence — his relatively young age and the conditions in which the crime occurred— were also present in *State v. Anderson, supra.*The sentencing judge imposed the twenty-five year sentence because a previous “pattern of criminal activity” indicated a need to protect society from McKeown’s future criminal conduct. Previous rehabilitative efforts had met with little success. In short, the judge imposed the term of confinement because it appeared necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution. *See State v. Toohill,*103 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct.App.1982). We have reviewed the sentence under the criteria announced in *Toohill*and find no abuse of discretion.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence are affirmed.

SWANSTROM, J., concurs.

BURNETT, J., concurs in the result.
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

INTUITIVE SURGICAL OPERATIONS, INC.,

Appellant

v.

AURIS HEALTH, INC.,

Appellee

______________________ 

2021-1473

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2019-

01173.

______________________ 

JUDGMENT

______________________ 

JACOB ADAM SCHROEDER, Finnegan, Henderson, 

Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP, Palo Alto, CA, argued 

for appellant. Also represented by ARPITA 

BHATTACHARYYA; FRANK A. DECOSTA, III, Washington, DC;

ROBERT KING HIGH, III, Atlanta, GA. 

 CHING-LEE FUKUDA, Sidley Austin LLP, New York, NY, 

argued for appellee. Also represented by THOMAS ANTHONY 

BROUGHAN, III, RYAN C. MORRIS, Washington, DC; PAUL J.

ROGERSON, Chicago, IL. 

Case: 21-1473 Document: 51 Page: 1 Filed: 03/14/2022
 ______________________ 

THIS CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is 

ORDERED and ADJUDGED: 

 PER CURIAM (DYK, PROST, and REYNA, Circuit 

Judges).

AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.

 

 ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT 

 

March 14, 2022 

Date

/s/ Peter R. Marksteiner

Peter R. Marksteiner

Clerk of Court

Case: 21-1473 Document: 51 Page: 2 Filed: 03/14/2022
# Comments on: 2017-2508: Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services
§ 0.218 Authority of, and delegated to, an individual Commissioner or Commissioners. ( a ) One or more members of the Commission may be designated to preside in a hearing proceeding. The Commissioner or Commissioners designated to preside at such a hearing shall fix the time and place of the hearing and shall act upon all motions, petitions or other matters which may arise while the proceeding is in hearing status.
( b ) One or more members of the Commission may be designated to review an initial decision issued in any hearing case.
( c ) Except for actions taken during the course of a hearing and upon the record thereof, actions taken by a Commissioner or Commissioners pursuant to the provisions of this section shall be recorded in writing and filed in the official minutes of the Commission.
[27 FR 7931, Aug. 10, 1962]
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-6244

DONALD EDWARD SMITH,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; JENNIFER ADKINS, FNP,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (5:19-ct-03332-BO)

Submitted: November 22, 2022 Decided: November 28, 2022

Before HARRIS and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Donald Edward Smith, Appellant Pro Se. Sharon Coull Wilson, Assistant United States 

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, 

for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

USCA4 Appeal: 22-6244 Doc: 15 Filed: 11/28/2022 Pg: 1 of 2
2

PER CURIAM:

Donald Edward Smith appeals the district court’s order dismissing his claim under

Bivens∗ for failure to state a claim and his claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction. We have reviewed the record and discern no reversible error. 

Accordingly, we affirm. Smith v. United States, No. 5:19-ct-03332-BO (E.D.N.C. Feb. 17, 

2022). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED

∗ Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 

(1971).

USCA4 Appeal: 22-6244 Doc: 15 Filed: 11/28/2022 Pg: 2 of 2
§ 301-2.2 What travel expenses may my agency pay? Your agency may pay only those expenses essential to the transaction of official business, which include: ( a ) Transportation expenses as provided in part 301-10 of this chapter;
( b ) Per diem expenses as provided in part 301-11 of this chapter;
( c ) Miscellaneous expenses as provided in part 301-12 of this chapter; and
( d ) Travel expenses of an employee with special needs as provided in part 301-13 of this chapter.
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 879 Introduced in House (IH)]

106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 879

   To amend the Communications Act of 1934 to exempt licenses in the 
    instructional television fixed service from competitive bidding.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 25, 1999

 Ms. Woolsey introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                         Committee on Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend the Communications Act of 1934 to exempt licenses in the 
    instructional television fixed service from competitive bidding.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION. 1. EXEMPTION FROM COMPETITIVE BIDDING.

    Section 309(j)(2) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 
309(j)(2)) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``or'' at the end of subparagraph (B);
            (2) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (C) 
        and inserting ``; or''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
                    ``(D) for stations in the instructional television 
                fixed service.''.
                                 <all>
```
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

September 16, 2009 

d0909 

Order 

 

September 16, 2009 

138467 

STACEY SHEIKO, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v SC: 138467 

 COA: 277766 

Saginaw CC: 06-058921-CL 

UNDERGROUND RAILROAD and 

VALERIE HOFFMAN, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 16, 2008 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
470P14-2

#### N.C. Department of Public Safety v. Carrie J. Tucker

Petitioner’s (Respondent Below) PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 (COA14-1308)

Denied
46540.

#### HAGGINS v. THE STATE.

(380 SE2d 711)

Weltner, Justice.

Haggins was indicted for felony murder, theft by taking, and several other offenses.1 He appeared with appointed counsel and ten*189dered pleas of guilty to the murder and the theft by taking charges. After extensive questioning by the court and advice as to his rights, his pleas were accepted, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment plus a term of years. The remaining counts of the indictment were the subject of a *nolle prosequi*order. Haggins filed a notice of appeal from the convictions, contending that his guilty pleas were not made knowingly and voluntarily.

Decided April 14, 1989.

*Short & Fowler, Thomas S. Bishop,*for appellant.

*H. Lamar Cole, District Attorney, Charles M. Stines, Assistant District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Andrew S. Ree,*for appellee.

We have reviewed the record of the guilty pleas and find that at the time Haggins’ pleas were accepted he was cognizant of all the rights that he was waiving, and of the possible consequences of his voluntary pleas of guilty. *Boykin v. Alabama,*395 U. S. 238 (89 SC 1709, 23 LE2d 274) (1969). There was no error.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*

1

 The crimes were committed on July 31, 1988, and Haggins was indicted on September 29, 1988. His pleas of guilty were tendered and accepted and he was sentenced on November 11, 1988. Notice of appeal was filed on December 12, 1988. This case was docketed in this court on December 28, 1988, and was submitted without argument on February 2, 1989.
No. 11-9454.

#### Hartsfield *v.*United States.

C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 11-9190.

#### Garcia *v.*Bradt, Superintendent, Attica Correctional Facility.

C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 20-0604

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

PRESTON CSOO ROSSBACH,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including February 13, 2023, within which to prepare, 

file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

No further extensions will be granted.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

December 22 2022

12/22/2022

Case Number: DA 20-0604
**Exhibit 32.1**

** **

**ASTREX, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES**

** **

| **Exhibit 32.1** | **Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section  1350,  as Adopted Pursuant to Section  906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002** |
|------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

**CERTIFICATION OFPERIODIC REPORT**

 

I, Michael McGuire, Presidentand Chief Executive Officer of Astrex, Inc. (the “Company”), certify, pursuantto Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

 

1.               TheQuarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the three month period endedJune 30, 2003 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d);and

 

2.               Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| August 8,  2003 |                |
|-----------------|---------------------|
|            |                |
|            |                |
|            | /s/Michael  McGuire |   |
|            | Michael  McGuire    |
|            | President  and CEO  |

 

----
#### § 50-204.8 Use of compressed air.

Compressed air shall not be used for cleaning purposes except where reduced to less than 30 p.s.i. and then only with effective chip guarding and personal protective equipment.
§ 302-7.403 What guidelines must we follow when authorizing transportation of PBP&E as an administrative expense? You have the sole discretion to authorize transportation of PBP&E as an administrative expense and may do so provided that: ( a ) The authorizing official has certified that the PBP&E is necessary for performance of the employee's duties at the new duty station;
( b ) The authorizing official has certified that, if these items were not transported, the same or similar items would have to be obtained at Government expense for the employee's use at the new official station;
( c ) You have acquired evidence that transporting the PBP&E would cause the employees' HHG to exceed the 18,000 pounds net weight allowance; and
( d ) If you have requested it, the employee has provided reasonable documentation of the items requesting to be shipped as PBP&E and the weight of the PBP&E for review by the authorizing official (who is usually an official at the employee's new official station).
Note to § 302-7.403 :
PBP&E transported as an agency administrative expense to an OCONUS location may be returned to CONUS as an agency administrative expense for an employee separating from Government service or returning to the actual place of residence and continuing in Government service.