COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Bumgardner and Lemons 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

WILMERT JACK PRUETT 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0771-98-3 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 MARCH 30, 1999 

TOWN OF TAZEWELL 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TAZEWELL COUNTY 

Donald R. Mullins, Judge 

 Robert M. Galumbeck (Dudley, Galumbeck & 

Necessary, on brief), for appellant. 

 George R. Brittain, II (Robert B. Altizer; 

Gillespie, Hart, Altizer & Whitesell, P.C., on 

brief), for appellee. 

 

*Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication.

 Wilmert Jack Pruett was convicted in a bench trial for 

operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants 

in violation of § 16-2 of the Code of the Town of Tazewell 

(Tazewell Code). Pruett contends that Tazewell's DUI ordinance is 

invalid because it violated provisions in the town's charter by 

(1) exceeding the charter's $500 limit imposed on municipal fines, 

see Tazewell Code § 2-246, and (2) violating the charter's 

requirement that an ordinance be confined to a single subject, see

Tazewell Code § 3-8. Because the General Assembly expressly 

authorized all municipal corporations, including Tazewell, to 

adopt ordinances proscribing the operation of a motor vehicle 

while under the influence of intoxicants, Code § 46.2-1313, and 

expressly provided that the penalty for such offense shall conform 
to the penalty in the state statute, we find Tazewell's ordinance 

to have been validly enacted by virtue of the specific legislation 

rather than its general authority granted under its charter. We 

also find that the enactment of § 16-2 of the Tazewell Code did 

not violate the town's charter requirement that an ordinance be 

confined to a single subject. Accordingly, we affirm the trial 

court's ruling that the town ordinance is not invalid on either 

ground. 

I. IMPACT OF TAZEWELL CODE § 2-246 ON TAZEWELL CODE § 16-2

 Pursuant to Virginia Code § 46.2-13131 the Town of Tazewell 

passed an ordinance, Code § 16-2, which incorporated Virginia Code 

§§ 18.2-266 through 18.2-273, proscribing operation of a motor 

vehicle while intoxicated. By so doing, the Town Council made 

operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated within the town's 

boundaries a violation of the Tazewell Code. Among the Virginia 

Code sections that Tazewell adopted is Virginia Code § 18.2-270 

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Code § 46.2-1313 provides: 

Ordinances enacted by local authorities 

pursuant to this article may incorporate 

appropriate provisions of this title, of 

Article 9 (§ 16.1-278 et seq.) of Chapter 11 

of Title 16.1, and of Article 2 (§ 18.2-266 

et seq.) of Chapter 7 of Title 18.2 into such 

ordinances by reference. Nothing contained 

in this title shall require the readoption of 

ordinances heretofore validly adopted. Local 

authorities may adopt ordinances 

incorporating by reference the appropriate 

provisions of state law before the effective 

date of such state law; provided that such 

local ordinances do not become effective 

before the effective date of the state law. 

The provisions of this section are 

declaratory of existing law. 

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which fixes the maximum penalty for driving while intoxicated at 

$2,500. Pruett contends that Tazewell Code § 16-2, which 

incorporates the $2,500 penalty provisions of Virginia Code 

§ 18.2-270, violates Tazewell Code § 2-246, a provision of the 

town charter which limits the power of the town "[t]o prescribe 

penalties for the violation of any town ordinance, rule or 

regulation, not exceeding five hundred dollars or twelve months' 

imprisonment in jail, or both." Tazewell Code § 2-246. We 

disagree. 

 Significantly, in Code § 46.2-1313 the Virginia General 

Assembly expressly granted localities the power to adopt by 

incorporation Code § 18.2-266 et seq., the state statutes 

prohibiting driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated.2 The town 

incorporated the driving while intoxicated statutes pursuant to 

the Commonwealth's specific grant of authority in Virginia Code 

§ 46.2-1313. See Tazewell Code § 16-2. Virginia Code § 46.2-1313 

provides that local government "may incorporate appropriate 

provisions . . . of Chapter 7 of Title 18.2 into such ordinances 

by reference." See Commonwealth v. Howell, 20 Va. App. 732, 734, 

460 S.E.2d 614, 615 (1995) ("Under Code § 46.1-188 [replaced by 

Code § 46.2-1313], localities were given the authority to 

'incorporate appropriate provisions of Article 2 (§ 18.2-266 et 

 2

Code § 15.1-132 offers an alternative statutory grant of 

power to adopt Code § 18.2-266 et seq. Although Title 15.2 

repealed Title 15.1, Code § 15.2-101 specifically states that the 

repeal of Title 15.1 will not affect the powers of any locality 

regarding any ordinance adopted prior to December 1, 1997. Code 

§ 15.1-132 authorized Tazewell to enact Tazewell Code § 16-2 in 

1994, and pursuant to the express language of Code § 15.2-101, 

Code § 16-2 remains in effect. 

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seq.) of Chapter 7 of Title 18.2 into such ordinance by 

reference.'"); Commonwealth v. Rivera, 18 Va. App. 103, 107, 442 

S.E.2d 410, 412 (1994) (stating that § 15.1-132 (repealed) and 

§ 46.1-188 (replaced by § 46.2-1313) "expressly allow local 

authorities to enact local ordinances prohibiting driving a motor 

vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and the incorporation 

by reference of appropriate provisions of state law into such 

local ordinances"). 

 Pruett's argument that the $500 limitation applies to 

Tazewell's DUI ordinance fails to appreciate that Tazewell Code 

§ 2-246, viewed in context is part of a separate enumeration of 

power to enact ordinances independent of the specific grant of 

power under which Tazewell was acting. "[A] fundamental rule of 

statutory construction requires that courts view the entire body 

of legislation and the statutory scheme to determine 'the true 

intention of each part.'" Virginia Real Estate Bd. v. Clay, 9 Va. 

App. 152, 157, 384 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1989) (citations omitted). 

The $500 limitation described in § 2-246 applies specifically to 

penalties prescribed pursuant to § 2-246 which is part of the 

town's "Power to regulate the health, safety and welfare of the 

town." Tazewell Code § 2-4. The town's "Power to regulate the 

health, safety and welfare" as articulated in Tazewell Code § 2-4 

exists independent of, and in addition to, powers granted in other 

sections of its charter or specifically granted to municipal 

corporations by the state. Because the town did not rely upon 

Tazewell Code § 2-246 for authority to enact Tazewell Code § 16-2, 

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the $500 limitation of Tazewell Code § 2-246 has no bearing on the 

town's authority to enact Tazewell Code § 16-2. Moreover, Code 

§ 2-1 of Tazewell's charter expressly provides that in addition to 

the town's general grant of powers in its charter, there is 

conferred on and vested in the Town . . . all 

other powers which are now or may hereafter be 

conferred upon or delegated to towns under the 

Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth

. . . and no enumeration of powers in this 

Charter shall be held to be exclusive but 

shall be in addition to this general grant of 

power. 

(Emphasis added). 

 Because Virginia Code § 46.2-1313 grants authority for 

localities to incorporate the Virginia Code provisions 

criminalizing and fixing penalties for driving while intoxicated, 

the town's incorporation of Virginia Code § 18.2-266 et seq. is 

not governed by the $500 limitation on prescribing penalties under 

Tazewell Code § 2-246. Accordingly, Tazewell Code § 16-2 does not 

violate the prohibition of prescribing penalties in excess of $500 

as provided in Tazewell Code § 2-246. 

II. SINGLE SUBJECT REQUIREMENT OF TAZEWELL CODE § 3–8

 The town's charter requires that the town council confine 

all ordinances to a single subject. See Tazewell Code § 3-8. 

Pruett contends that Tazewell Code § 16-2 violates this 

prohibition because it incorporates and adopts statutory 

provisions from Titles 16.1, 18.2, and 46.2, three different 

titles of the Virginia Code which address several subject 

matters. 

 For the reasons set forth in Part I, Tazewell, in enacting 

Code § 16-2, was acting under authority expressly granted by the 

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Commonwealth in Code § 46.2-1313 and was not acting under its 

general grant of authority in its charter to enact ordinances. 

Code § 46.2-1313 expressly empowers towns, including Tazewell, to 

enact an ordinance incorporating the appropriate provisions of 

the Motor Vehicle Code and the DUI provisions of Code § 18.2-266 

et seq. and Article 9 (Code § 16.1-278 et seq.) of the Juvenile 

Code to enable Tazewell to deal with juvenile offenders. The 

state statute expressly authorized the Town of Tazewell to adopt 

these provisions as its ordinance regulating misdemeanor motor 

vehicle violations and infractions. 

 Moreover, Code § 16-2 does not violate the single subject 

prohibition of Tazewell's charter. "'[T]he primary objective of 

statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to 

legislative intent.'" Zamani v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 59, 

63, 492 S.E.2d 854, 856 (1997) (quoting Crews v. Commonwealth, 3 

Va. App. 531, 535-36, 352 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1987)). The language of 

Tazewell Code § 3-8 is: 

 Except in dealing with questions of 

parliamentary procedure the council shall act 

only by ordinance or resolution, and all 

ordinances except ordinances making 

appropriations, or authorizing the 

contracting of indebtedness or issuance of 

bonds or other evidence of debt, shall be 

confined to one subject. Ordinances making 

appropriations or other obligations and 

appropriating the money to be raised thereby 

shall be confined to those subjects 

respectively. 

 To determine the intent of the legislature in enacting this 

provision in Tazewell's charter, we look by analogy, to the 

similar provision in the Virginia Constitution: "No law shall 

embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its 

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title." Va. Const. art. IV, § 12. Commenting on this similar 

language in the Virginia Constitution, the Virginia Supreme Court 

observed that: 

 "[H]istorically, [these provisions] were 

designed to prevent several abuses in the 

legislative process: (1) log-rolling, 

whereby two or more blocs (which might 

separately be minorities in the legislative 

body) combine forces on a bill containing 

several unrelated features, no one of which 

by itself could command a majority; [and] (2) 

lack of notice to legislators who, but for 

the one object requirement, might be unaware 

of the real contents of the bill . . . ." 

See State Bd. of Health v. Chippenham Hosp., 219 Va. 65, 74, 245 

S.E.2d 430, 435-36 (1978) (quoting The Constitution of Virginia: 

Report of the Commission on Constitutional Revision, 148 (1969)). 

We find that Article IV, Section 12 of the Virginia Constitution 

and Tazewell Code § 3-8 share the same legislative purpose. 

Therefore, we look to prior constructions of the constitutional 

provision to shed light on Tazewell's charter provision. 

 In construing Article IV, Section 12 of the Constitution of 

Virginia, our Supreme Court said: 

 "When the title is general, as it may 

be, all persons interested are put upon 

inquiry as to anything in the body of the act 

which is germane to the subject expressed; 

but when the title is restrictive, and 

confined to a special feature of a particular 

subject, the natural inference is that other 

features of the same general subject are 

excluded." 

Chippenham Hosp., 219 Va. at 70-71; 245 S.E.2d at 433 (quoting 

Fidelity Ins. v. Shenandoah Valley R.R. Co., 86 Va. 1, 6, 9 S.E. 

759, 761 (1889)). Further, the Court observed that "'[i]f the 

title be not misleading and if those things are done which are 

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germane to it, that is enough.'" Id. at 71, 245 S.E.2d at 434 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Dodson, 176 Va. 281, 305-06, 11 S.E.2d 

120, 131-32 (1940)). 

 Here, nothing in the body of the ordinance was outside the 

scope of the ordinance's title: "Ordinance Adopting Certain 

Provisions of the Code of Virginia." Thus, the title fairly 

noticed all councilpersons as to the contents of the ordinance. 

Additionally, the three code sections incorporated by reference 

in Tazewell Code § 16-2 share a common function. Article 2, 

Chapter 7, Title 18.2, proscribes and sets the penalties for 

driving while intoxicated; Title 46.2 sets forth general 

provisions regarding regulation of motor vehicles including 

suspension and revocation of licenses; and Article 9, Chapter 11, 

Title 16.1, concerns dispositions of the juvenile and domestic 

relations district courts which, among other things, instructs 

the courts in penalizing juveniles for driving infractions. 

 Tazewell Code § 16-2, which deals exclusively with motor 

vehicle offenses, confined itself to a logical subject matter 

reflected in both the body of the ordinance and the title by 

which the town passed the ordinance. Its drafting does not 

portend abuse of the legislative process. Accordingly, we find 

that it complies with the requirements of Tazewell Code § 3-8, 

the provisions limiting ordinances to a single subject. 

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CONCLUSION

 The Council of the Town of Tazewell did not violate its 

charter in enacting § 16-2. Accordingly, Pruett's conviction for 

violating Tazewell Code § 16-2 is affirmed. 

Affirmed. 

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