United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

REV, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES, APTIVE RESOURCES, LLC,

Defendants-Appellees

DECISIVE POINT CONSULTING GROUP, LLC,

Defendant

______________________ 

2022-1759

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:21-cv-01011-PEC, Judge Patricia E. CampbellSmith.

______________________ 

Decided: January 29, 2024

______________________ 

THOMAS SAUNDERS, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and 

Dorr LLP, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. 

Also represented by JON DAVIDSON LEVIN, Maynard Nexsen PC, Huntsville, AL. 

 ERIC JOHN SINGLEY, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for all defendant-appellee United 

States. Also represented by REGINALD THOMAS BLADES,

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2 REV, LLC v. US

JR., MICHAEL GRANSTON, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY. 

 JOHN PRAIRIE, Wiley Rein, LLP, Washington, DC, for 

defendant-appellee Aptive Resources, LLC. Also represented by JENNIFER EVE RETENER, CARA LYN SIZEMORE. 

 ______________________ 

Before REYNA, TARANTO, and STARK, Circuit Judges.

STARK, Circuit Judge. 

REV, LLC (“REV”) is a veteran-owned small business 

that provides software consulting services to private and 

public entities. In response to a solicitation (“Solicitation”) 

by the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”), REV participated in a bid process in hopes of joining the vendor pool 

for the VA’s Transformation Twenty-One Total Technology-Next Generation (“T4NG”) program. To determine 

who to add to its vendor pool, the VA conducted a two-step 

evaluation of the bids it received. While REV was among 

the successful participants in the first step, REV was eliminated at the second stage, never making it to the competitive range from which awardees were ultimately selected.

REV filed suit against the VA in the Court of Federal 

Claims. Several winning bidders intervened and also became defendants. The Court of Federal Claims granted the 

motions of the VA and the intervenor-defendants for judgment on the administrative record. In doing so, the trial 

court rejected on the merits REV’s critiques of the VA’s 

evaluation of the strength of REV’s own proposal. The 

court then dismissed for lack of standing REV’s challenges 

to the VA’s evaluation of rival bidders’ submissions and the 

VA’s establishment of the competitive range.

REV now appeals only the portion of the judgment 

based on its lack of standing. We agree with REV that because REV showed it had a greater than an insubstantial 

chance of securing an award had certain awardees been excluded from the bid process, which REV alleged they 

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REV, LLC v. US 3

should have been, it has standing. We reverse this portion 

of the judgment and remand for the Court of Federal 

Claims to address the merits of REV’s claims attacking the 

VA’s assessment of competing bids and its establishment 

of the competitive range.

I 

A 

According to the VA’s Solicitation, “T4NG is a MultiAgency, Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ), 

Multiple Award Task Order contract with a base ordering 

period of five years with one five-year option period.” J.A. 

2055. “The program has a ceiling of $22.3B and supports 

Contractor-provided solutions of Information Technology 

(IT), health IT, and telecommunications, to include services 

and incidental hardware/software for customer requirements that vary across the entire spectrum of existing and 

future technical environments.” Id.

As the Solicitation explained, the VA intended to evaluate the offerors1 who submitted bids in two phases. In the 

first phase, referred to as “Step One,” all offerors were required to submit certain deliverables for a sample task 

aptly named “Sample Task 1.” J.A. 2431; see also J.A. 2502 

(describing Sample Task 1). To be eligible at Step One, 

“[o]fferors must [have been] verified in the Vendor Information Pages (VIP) Database as a [Service-Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business] SDVOSB and qualify as a 

small business . . . at the time of Step One Price Volume 

submission.” J.A. 2431. After evaluating the submissions 

for Sample Task 1, the VA would establish a first competitive range and select the most highly rated offerors to proceed to the next phase, “Step Two.” Id.

1 Throughout this opinion we use the terms “offerors” and “bidders” interchangeably.

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4 REV, LLC v. US

At Step Two, the remaining offerors were given another sample task, “Sample Task 2.” J.A. 2432. As in Step 

One, “[e]ligible Offerors must [have] be[en] verified in the 

VIP Database at the time of [their] Step Two proposal submission;” the VA would not “evaluate Step Two proposal 

submissions from ineligible Offerors.” Id. The Solicitation 

explained that following the evaluation of Step Two submissions, the VA would establish another competitive 

range before selecting the awardees. It also specifically advised that “if the Contracting Officer determined that the 

number of proposals that would otherwise be included in 

any competitive range exceeds the number at which an efficient competition can be conducted, the Contracting Officer may limit the number of proposals in the competitive 

range to the greatest number that will permit an efficient 

competition among the most highly rated proposals.” Id. 

The VA intended to “on-ramp seven (7) SDVOSBs to 

replenish the pool of SDVOSB[s],” although the VA also expressly “reserve[d] the right to make additional awards or 

fewer awards if doing so is deemed to be in the best interest 

of the Government.” J.A. 2194; see also J.A. 2431. Award 

decisions were to be “based on the best overall (i.e., best 

value) proposals that are determined to be the most beneficial to the Government, with appropriate consideration 

given” to five factors: Technical, Past Performance, Veterans Employment, Small Business Participation Commitment Factor (“SBPC”), and Price. J.A. 2431. While all of 

these factors would be considered, the VA was explicit that 

“[t]he Technical Factor is significantly more important 

than” the other factors. Id. Ratings on the Technical Factor were based on the Sample Task 1 (“ST1”) sub-factor, 

Sample Task 2 (“ST2”) sub-factor, and Management subfactor, with “[t]he Sample Task Sub-factor[s] [being] significantly more important than the Management Sub-factor.” 

Id.

“To receive consideration for award,” the Solicitation 

continued, “a rating of no less than ‘Acceptable’ must be 

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REV, LLC v. US 5

achieved for the Technical Factor, all Technical Sub-Factors, and the SBPC Factor.” J.A. 2432. The Solicitation 

defined an “Acceptable” rating as “[a] proposal that meets 

all of the Government’s requirements, contains at least 

minimal detail, demonstrates at least a minimal understanding of the problems, and is at least minimally feasible 

(moderate to high degree of risk).” J.A. 3781. Other possible ratings were “Outstanding,” “Good,” “Susceptible to Being Made Acceptable,” and “Unacceptable.” Id.

B 

Consistent with the Solicitation, the VA made the first 

competitive range determination after reviewing offerors’ 

submissions for Sample Task 1. A total of 33 offerors, including REV and defendants-intervenors Aptive Resources, LLC (“Aptive”) and Decisive Point Consulting 

Group, LLC (“Decisive Point”), were part of the first competitive range and proceeded to Step Two. After the VA 

evaluated the submissions for Sample Task 2, all 33 remaining offerors were given an overall technical rating. 

Twenty-four offerors, including REV, received an “Acceptable” rating, eight offerors received a “Good” rating, and one 

offeror received an “Outstanding” rating. The following 

chart shows, in the left-hand column, the overall technical 

ratings received by the 33 offerors in the first competitive 

range, as well as the sub-factor ratings, in the adjoining 

columns. REV is offeror 50. We have added outlining 

around its ratings for ease of reference.

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6 REV, LLC v. US

J.A. 9060 (outlining added).

After assigning these ratings, the VA established a second competitive range, setting the threshold technical rating for inclusion in that range at “Good.” Consequently, 

the second competitive range included only the nine offerors that had received an overall technical rating of “Good” 

or “Outstanding.” REV, which had received only an “Acceptable” technical rating, was excluded.

REV protested its exclusion from the second competitive range to the Government Accountability Office 

(“GAO”). The GAO denied the protest. Several days later, 

the VA’s source selection authority selected for award all 

nine of the offerors that had been included in the second 

competitive range. J.A. 9.

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REV, LLC v. US 7

REV then filed its bid protest in the Court of Federal 

Claims. Aptive and Decisive Point intervened as defendants. 

In its bid protest, REV contended it was the tenth or 

eleventh highest rated bidder and that several bidders 

ranked higher than it should not have been. In REV’s view, 

then, a fair process would have resulted in REV being 

among the top seven bidders and, therefore, ultimately selected to be part of the award pool. More particularly, REV 

argued to the trial court that the VA’s evaluation process 

had been arbitrary and capricious because the VA had: (1) 

failed to consider whether two offerors were ineligible for 

award due to an immitigable organizational conflict of interest, (2) failed to consider offerors’ conformance with the 

Solicitation’s requirements, (3) conducted a faulty past performance evaluation, (4) failed to evaluate proposals 

equally, (5) failed to give REV’s proposal a fair reading, and 

(6) made a flawed competitive range determination.

For ease of analysis, the Court of Federal Claims organized REV’s claims into two categories, addressing them in 

turn. First, the court considered REV’s challenges to the 

VA’s evaluation of REV’s own bid and its complaint that it 

had received disparate treatment during the evaluation 

process. With respect to these issues, the Court of Federal 

Claims found that REV had standing but further held, on 

the merits, that the VA’s evaluation of REV’s proposal was 

neither arbitrary nor capricious. Specifically, the trial 

court found that the VA had “[a]ppropriately [e]valuated 

the [o]fferors’ [p]ast [p]erformance,” “[a]pplied the [e]valuation [c]riteria [e]quitably,” and “[r]easonably [r]eviewed 

[REV’s] proposal.” J.A. 15-17. 

Next, the court addressed REV’s remaining claims, 

which it characterized as challenging “the agency’s actions 

subsequent to [REV’s] elimination” from the process at the 

second competitive stage. J.A. 19. These included REV’s 

allegations that certain awardees, including Aptive and 

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8 REV, LLC v. US

Decisive Point, should have been eliminated from the bid 

process on the grounds that (1) “Aptive made substantive 

revisions to its Sample Task 1 proposal in response to 

Amendment 1 ‘that the Solicitation prohibited,’” (2) “Aptive 

[and four other awardees] failed to submit [their] required 

[contractor teaming agreements] (CTAs) as part of its management proposal,” (3) in establishing the second competitive range, the VA “neither gave meaningful consideration 

to all evaluation criteria nor had any reason to conduct discussions,” and (4) Aptive and Decisive Point had immitigable organizational conflicts of interest. J.A. 19-22. The 

Court of Federal Claims did not decide these contentions 

on the merits because it found REV lacked standing to assert them, as REV could not establish it had been prejudiced by any deficiencies that may have plagued the

process after REV’s own bid had already been eliminated. 

Observing that “the VA’s evaluation of the [rival] proposals, whether inappropriately revised or missing required components, did not affect the VA’s evaluation of 

plaintiff’s proposal,” the court concluded that the “agency’s 

actions subsequent to [REV’s] elimination from the competition” could not have prejudiced REV. J.A. 19-20.

The Court of Federal Claims added that REV “ha[d] 

neither explained how – nor pointed to any record evidence 

that – a change in the VA’s evaluation of Aptive’s proposal 

would have changed how the VA viewed [REV’s] proposal.” 

J.A. 20. According to the trial court, REV “[s]imply stating 

that its proposal ‘was either next in line for admission to 

the competitive range or the second company in line,’ is insufficient under the multi-award circumstances here” because “there was no guaranteed number of awards, and the 

exclusion of one offeror from the competitive range did not 

necessarily ensure the inclusion of another.” J.A. 20. 

Thus, the court concluded, “regardless of the VA’s evaluation of the other proposals, plaintiff cannot establish prejudice sufficient to confer standing, and its claim on this 

point must fail.” Id. Accordingly, the Court of Federal 

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REV, LLC v. US 9

Claims granted the defendants’ motions for judgment on 

the administrative record, denied REV’s cross-motion for 

judgment, and dismissed REV’s suit with prejudice. 

REV timely appealed, challenging only the portion of 

the trial court’s judgment for which the court had held REV 

lacked standing. Defendant Decisive Point declined to participate in the appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

II

We review the Court of Federal Claims grant of judgment on the administrative record without deference. See 

Info. Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 

1312, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We review determinations of 

standing under the Tucker Act de novo. See SEKRI, Inc. v. 

United States, 34 F.4th 1063, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2022). However, underlying factual findings, including prejudice, are 

reviewed for clear error. See CliniComp Int’l, Inc. v. United 

States, 904 F.3d 1353, 1357-59 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In postaward bid protests, we review agency actions according to 

the standard of review set out in the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1491(b)(4). The APA directs a reviewing court to hold unlawful and set aside agency action found to be “arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” as well as action taken “without observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706(2)(A), (D); see also Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. 

Cir. 2001).

Under the Tucker Act, the Court of Federal Claims has 

jurisdiction over actions “by an interested party objecting 

to . . . the award of a contract” by a federal agency. 28 

U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1). “To satisfy § 1491(b)(1)’s standing requirements,” such a plaintiff “must make two showings.” 

CliniComp, 904 F.3d at 1358. “First, [the plaintiff] must 

show that it is an ‘interested party.’” Id. This requirement 

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10 REV, LLC v. US

is a matter of statutory standing only, which is not jurisdictional. See CACI, Inc.-Fed. v. United States, 67 F.4th 

1145, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2023). An “interested party” objecting to a contract award is an “actual or prospective bidder[] 

or offeror[] whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to award 

the contract.” Rex Serv. Corp. v. United States, 448 F.3d 

1305, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (internal emphasis and citation 

omitted). “And [t]o prove a direct economic interest,” such 

a plaintiff “must show that it had a substantial chance of 

winning the contract.” CliniComp, 904 F.3d at 1358 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this way, the “interested 

party” requirement “imposes more stringent standing requirements than Article III.” Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United 

States, 575 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

“Second, the plaintiff must show that it was prejudiced 

by a significant error in the procurement process.” CliniComp, 904 F.3d at 1358 (internal citation omitted). The 

requirement to show prejudice, like the “interested party” 

requirement, is statutory and not jurisdictional. See CACI, 

67 F.4th at 1153 (“[T]he issue of prejudice is no longer jurisdictional unless it implicates Article III considerations.”). “To establish prejudice,” a plaintiff objecting to a 

contract award “must show that there was a ‘substantial 

chance’ it would have received the contract award but for 

the alleged error in the procurement process.” Info. Tech., 

316 F.3d at 1319. Put another way, to show prejudice a 

disappointed bidder needs to show that “it had greater than 

an insubstantial chance of securing the contract if successful on the merits of the bid protest.” Id.

III

To establish statutory standing, and demonstrate it is 

an “interested party” and sustained prejudice, REV must 

show at least a substantial chance it would have been a 

prevailing bidder under the Solicitation had it not been for 

the errors it contends plagued the procurement process. 

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REV, LLC v. US 11

We have previously observed that although the interested 

party inquiry and the prejudice inquiry “may be similar, 

prejudice must be shown either as part of, or in addition to, 

showing a direct economic interest.” CliniComp, 904 F.3d 

at 1358. Hence, while being an interested party and suffering prejudice are separate requirements for standing, 

the same showing may be pertinent to (and may even satisfy) both.2

Here, like the Court of Federal Claims and the parties, 

we will focus on prejudice. The Court of Federal Claims 

found a lack of standing based solely on REV’s failure to 

show prejudice. See J.A. 19 (“Plaintiff Was Not Prejudiced 

by Any Alleged Failure to Exclude Intervenor-Defendant 

Aptive”), 20 (“Plaintiff Was Not Prejudiced by the VA’s Alleged Improper Use of Competitive Range Procedures”), 22 

(“Plaintiff Was Not Prejudiced by the VA’s Addressing a 

Potential Organizational Conflict of Interest”), 23 (“Therefore, plaintiff cannot establish prejudice sufficient to confer 

standing, and its claim on this point must fail.”). On appeal, the Appellees present no argument for finding lack of 

standing that is independent of their contention that REV 

could not have been prejudiced by alleged flaws in the procurement process. In any event, we conclude that REV has 

demonstrated a substantial chance it would have been one 

of the awardees had it not been for the errors it alleges contaminated the procurement process, and it has, thereby,

under the circumstances presented here, shown both prejudice and that it is an interested party.

2 In general, the “direct economic interest” prong of 

the interested party analysis is concerned with a bidder’s 

substantial chance to be successful in the procurement process independent of any error, while the prejudice analysis 

is concerned with the impact the alleged error in the procurement process has on the bidder’s chances of succeeding.

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12 REV, LLC v. US

In assessing whether a party was prejudiced by purported errors in a procurement process, we must assume 

that the party will, if permitted to proceed with its claim, 

prevail on the merits. See Info. Tech., 316 F.3d at 1319 

(“[Bid protestor] has established prejudice (and therefore 

standing), because it had greater than an insubstantial 

chance of securing the contract if successful on the merits 

of the bid protest.”) (emphasis added). This means that our 

analysis assumes that REV would be successful in its challenges to the implementation of the Solicitation. In particular, we presume that the six bidders whom REV targets 

as having been improperly placed ahead of it – for reasons 

including organizational conflicts of interest, failure to submit signed veterans employment certifications, and making improper substantive changes to submissions – should 

have instead been excluded from the second competitive 

range, just as REV claims. Based on this assumption, we 

are persuaded that REV has shown a substantial chance it 

would have been added onto the T4NG IDIQ contract had 

it not been for the problems it alleges affected six other offerors.

The record establishes that the VA rated REV as “Acceptable,” J.A. 9060, which by the VA’s own definition 

means that REV’s proposal met “all of the Government’s 

requirements,” J.A. 3781. It further shows that REV received the tenth or eleventh highest rating overall, among 

the 33 offerors who participated in Step 2. Further, it is 

undisputed that the VA selected the top nine offerors (that 

is, all of the offerors that were included in the second competitive range) to become part of the T4NG pool, after having indicated in the Solicitation that “[t]he Government 

intends to award seven (7) contracts to verified Service-Disabled Veteran Owned Businesses (SDVOSBs).” J.A. 2431 

(emphasis added); see also J.A. 15604. Given that we must 

assume REV would prevail on the merits of its attacks on 

six of the nine offerors rated more highly than REV, resulting in the exclusion of those six offerors, there is a 

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REV, LLC v. US 13

substantial chance that the VA would have selected for the 

pool at least the top seven remaining bidders, a group that 

would have then included REV.3 In this way, REV has 

shown “it had greater than an insubstantial chance of securing the contract if successful on the merits of the bid 

protest.” Info. Tech., 316 F.3d at 1319.

In other words, REV has shown a substantial chance 

that if the number of offerors who were rated “Good” or 

“Outstanding” was only three – as it would have been if the 

six bidders REV attacks actually suffered from the defects 

REV alleges – then the VA might very well have lowered 

the minimum rating for being added to the pool to “Acceptable.” In that scenario, REV would have been in the 

top seven and would, hence, have been in the competitive 

range at Step 2. This logic leads, again, to the conclusion 

that REV has shown a not insubstantial chance of being 

added to the T4NG pool and, hence, standing.

We reach these conclusions based, in part, on our 

agreement with REV that the VA’s decision on where to 

draw the line between those who would remain in the process after Step 2 and those who would not was based on the 

offerors’ relative ratings. The VA did not set the floor at 

“Good” until after it determined how many offerors met or 

exceeded a “Good” rating. Thus, while each offeror was initially evaluated independently, the line drawing that eliminated REV – which is the action REV is challenging; its 

claims are not based solely on what happened after REV 

was no longer part of the process, as the Court of Federal 

Claims mistakenly stated – was based on a relative assessment of the proposals received in Step 2. See, e.g., J.A. 9061 

(“Offerors with an ‘Acceptable’ Technical Factor rating 

were not as strong when compared to other Offerors, as all 

3 To be precise, the resulting group would consist of 

the three offerors who finished ahead of REV and whom 

REV does not challenge, REV, and at least the three others. 

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14 REV, LLC v. US

other Offerors have a Technical rating of ‘Good’ or better

and . . . presented stronger technical proposals.”) (emphasis

added). This reality adds even more weight to the substantiality of REV’s showing: as long as the VA would have adhered to its approach of defining the competitive range by 

a relative calculus, i.e., the top seven or top nine qualified 

finishers, REV would likely have ended up in the pool, absent the procedural flaws about which it complains.4 

We recognize that in the Solicitation the VA reserved 

the right to adjust the number of awards that it ultimately 

issued. See J.A. 2431. But the VA also noted that it would 

exercise this discretion “if it is determined to be in its best 

interests for any reason.” Id. (emphasis added). The record 

reveals no reason why it would have been in the VA’s best 

interest to add fewer than the initially intended number of 

offerors to the pool, which was seven, particularly when the 

genesis of the Solicitation seems to have been the VA’s concern about the small number of eligible SDVOSP bidders 

remaining in the pool, in conjunction with the many contracts remaining to be awarded on what is a massive – $22 

billion – project. See J.A. 10643-44 (contracting officer 

stating “it is anticipated that a large number of the current 

SDVOSB contract-holders will no longer qualify as a 

SDVOSB,” so “to replenish the pool of SDVOSB 

4 This distinguishes the present case from those 

cited by Appellees in which bidders who filed technically 

unacceptable or untimely proposals were found to lack 

standing. See, e.g., Labatt Food Services v. United States, 

577 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Wisconsin Physicians

Services Ins. Co. v. United States, 151 Fed. Cl. 22, 43 

(2020). Unlike in those cases, there is nothing objective – 

like a technical deficiency or untimely submission – that 

rendered REV’s proposal one that “fail[ed] to merit consideration as a finalist.” Wisconsin Physicians, 151 Fed. Cl. 

at 31.

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REV, LLC v. US 15

contractors, VA determined that it would be in its best interest, and in the best interest of the SDVOSB community, 

to issue a competitive solicitation, restricted to SDVOSBs, 

in accordance with the On-ramp clause”); see also 38 U.S.C.

§ 8127 (setting out obligation of agency to make contracting 

opportunities available to small, veteran-owned, and disabled-operated businesses); Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. 

United States, 579 U.S. 162, 165 (2016) (explaining that 

law “requires the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to set more 

specific annual goals that encourage contracting with veteran-owned and service-disabled veteran-owned small 

businesses”).

The government and Aptive criticize REV’s arguments 

for standing as amounting to nothing more than speculation. To Appellees, the VA’s evaluation of the merits of 

REV’s proposal was (and always will be) entirely independent of the VA’s establishment of the second competitive 

range. In their view, REV’s proposal was merely “Acceptable,” the VA chose to require at least a “Good” overall rating, and once the VA made those determinations REV had 

no chance whatsoever of being selected. According to the 

government and Aptive, then, even if REV were to succeed 

in its challenges to six of the nine successful offerors, the 

result would simply be that the VA would go forward with 

just the three remaining offerors, as only those three met 

or exceeded the VA’s threshold requirement of a “Good” rating.

For the reasons we have already given, we are not persuaded by these arguments. We emphasize, once again, 

the purpose of the Solicitation was to “replenish the pool of 

SDVOSB” bidders for the T4NG project. J.A. 2194. Nothing in the record supports Appellees’ supposition that the 

VA, having gone to the trouble of reviewing 94 offerors 

through a two-stage process, and finding (on the assumption that REV is right in its critiques of six highly rated 

bidders) that only three bidders were rated at least “Good,” 

would have been satisfied to add only that minimal number 

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16 REV, LLC v. US

of bidders to the pool rather than to dip into the group of 

additional offerors it had found to be entirely “Acceptable”

and add some of them.5

Accordingly, we conclude that REV has shown prejudice. Thus, REV has standing to be heard on the merits of 

its claims against bidders who were rated more highly than 

REV. We reverse the Court of Federal Claims’ judgment 

for Appellees.

IV

We have considered the Appellees’ remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. Because REV had 

standing to challenge the second competitive range and the 

validity of rival bids, the Court of Federal Claims’ grant of 

judgment to the government and Aptive, and its dismissal 

for lack of standing, is reversed. The case is remanded for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

COSTS

Costs awarded to Appellant.

5 We decline the government’s invitation to evaluate 

the merits of REV’s challenges to the higher-rated offerors. 

The trial court did not reach the merits and the government’s contentions may raise factual disputes. It is also 

possible one or more parties may, on remand, seek to supplement the record. See Oral Arg. at 13:35-14:31 (REV 

counsel stating that record could be reopened to supplement with, for example, testimony of contracting officer).

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