United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

GOOGLE LLC, YOUTUBE, LLC,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2020-1543

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of California in No. 5:13-cv-01317-EJD, 

Judge Edward J. Davila.

-------------------------------------------------

PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

FACEBOOK, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2020-1553

______________________ 

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2 PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of California in No. 5:13-cv-01356-EJD, 

Judge Edward J. Davila.

-------------------------------------------------

PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS LLC,

Plaintiff

v.

EMC CORPORATION, VMWARE, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2020-1554

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of California in No. 5:13-cv-01358-EJD, 

Judge Edward J. Davila.

______________________ 

Decided: August 12, 2021

______________________ 

LAWRENCE MILTON HADLEY, Glaser Weil Fink Howard 

Avchen & Shapiro LLP, Los Angeles, CA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by JOEL LANCE 

THOLLANDER, McKool Smith, PC, Austin, TX.

 CYNTHIA D. VREELAND, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale 

and Dorr LLP, Boston, MA, argued for all defendants-appellees. Defendants-appellees EMC Corporation, VMware, 

Inc. also represented by JONATHAN COX, PETER M.

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PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 3

DICHIARA, MARK CHRISTOPHER FLEMING; ELIZABETH 

BEWLEY, Washington, DC.

 MATTHIAS A. KAMBER, Keker, Van Nest & Peters LLP, 

San Francisco, CA, for defendants-appellees Google LLC, 

YouTube, LLC. Also represented by DAN L. BAGATELL, Perkins Coie LLP, Hanover, NH.

 HEIDI LYN KEEFE, Cooley LLP, Palo Alto, CA, for defendant-appellee Facebook, Inc. Also represented by 

REUBEN HO-YEN CHEN, LAM K. NGUYEN, MARK R.

WEINSTEIN. 

 ______________________ 

Before LOURIE, PROST*, and REYNA, Circuit Judges. 

PROST, Circuit Judge. 

PersonalWeb Technologies appeals a decision by the 

United States District Court for the Northern District of 

California granting judgment on the pleadings for appellees Google LLC, YouTube, LLC, Facebook Inc., EMC Corporation, and VMware, Inc. That decision held various 

claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,802,310 (“the ’310 patent”), 

6,415,280 (“the ’280 patent”), and 7,949,662 (“the ’662 patent”) ineligible for patenting, and therefore invalid, under 

35 U.S.C. § 101.1 PersonalWeb Techs. LLC v. Google LLC, 

No. 5:13-CV-01317, 2020 WL 520618, at *14 (N.D. Cal. 

Jan. 31, 2020). We affirm. 

* Circuit Judge Sharon Prost vacated the position of 

Chief Judge on May 21, 2021.

1 The claims are: ’310 patent claims 24, 32, 81, 82, 

and 86; ’280 patent claims 15, 16, 31, and 32; and ’662 patent claim 33.

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4 PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

BACKGROUND

I 

PersonalWeb’s asserted patents, which share a specification and drawings, claim priority from an application 

filed in 1995. We assume general familiarity with the patented subject matter, as we have discussed the ’310 patent

in prior opinions.2 See Pers. Web Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., 

848 F.3d 987 (Fed. Cir. 2017); PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. 

Apple, Inc., 917 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2019). In brief, the 

patents relate to data-processing systems that assign each 

data item a substantially unique name that depends on the 

item’s content—a content-based identifier. ’310 patent 

col. 1 l. 44–col. 2 l. 5, col. 3 ll. 50–58, col. 6 ll. 20–24. These 

identifiers are generated by a mathematical algorithm, 

such as a cryptographic hash or “message digest” function. 

Id. at col. 12 l. 21–col. 13 l. 9. The identifier changes when 

the data item’s content changes. Id. at col. 35 ll. 55–63. 

The patents claim using such identifiers to perform various 

data-management functions. Claim 24 of the ’310 patent, 

for example, sets forth a method for using content-based 

identifiers to control access to data. The method generally 

proceeds in three steps: (1) receiving a request containing

a content-based identifier for a data item, (2) comparing 

the content-based identifier to a plurality of values, and 

(3) granting or disallowing access to the data item based on 

the comparison: 

24. A computer-implemented method implemented 

at least in part by hardware comprising one or 

more processors, the method comprising: 

(a) using a processor, receiving at a first computer 

from a second computer, a request regarding a particular data item, said request including at least a 

2 For simplicity, all citations to the shared specification are to the ’310 patent. 

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content-dependent name for the particular data 

item, the content-dependent name being based, at 

least in part, on at least a function of the data in 

the particular data item, wherein the data used by 

the function to determine the content-dependent 

name comprises at least some of the contents of the 

particular data item, wherein the function that was 

used comprises a message digest function or a hash 

function, and wherein two identical data items will 

have the same content-dependent name; and

(b) in response to said request: 

(i) causing the content-dependent name of 

the particular data item to be compared to 

a plurality of values;

(ii) hardware in combination with software 

determining whether or not access to the 

particular data item is unauthorized based 

on whether the content-dependent name of 

the particular data item corresponds to at 

least one of said plurality of values, and

(iii) based on said determining in step (ii), 

not allowing the particular data item to be 

provided to or accessed by the second computer if it is determined that access to the 

particular data item is not authorized.

’310 patent claim 24. 

The relevant ’280 and ’662 patent claims reflect a similar pattern but are geared toward different data-management functions. Specifically, the ’280 patent claims use

content-based identifiers to retrieve data items, and the 

’662 patent claims use content-based identifiers to mark 

duplicate data items for deletion. E.g., ’280 patent 

claim 31; ’662 patent claim 33. The disclosed systems are 

“intended to work with an existing operating system.” 

’310 patent col. 6 ll. 25–32. 

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6 PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

II

PersonalWeb sued the appellees for patent infringement in the Eastern District of Texas. After claim construction, the cases were transferred to the Northern 

District of California. That court stayed the cases pending 

resolution of several inter partes reviews (“IPRs”) at the 

Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”), which challenged 

various claims. In six IPRs filed by EMC and VMware, the 

Board held all challenged claims unpatentable (including

’280 patent claims 26 and 38, as well as ’662 patent 

claim 30). In doing so, the Board found that using hashbased identifiers for data management was disclosed in the 

prior art. J.A. 3426 (addressing ’280 patent); J.A. 3462–63

(addressing ’662 patent). We affirmed all six Board decisions. Pers. Web Techs., LLC v. EMC Corp., 612 F. App’x 

611 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Board also held various ’310 patent claims unpatentable in a separate IPR filed by Apple 

Inc. On appeal, we affirmed the Board’s claim construction 

but remanded for it to reassess obviousness under proper 

procedural constraints. PersonalWeb Techs., 848 F.3d 

at 994. Along the way, we noted that a prior-art reference 

“discloses a system for using content-based identifiers in 

performing file-management functions, such as backing up 

files.” Id. at 989. On review of the Board’s remand decision, we reversed the Board’s finding that a particular limitation was inherently disclosed in the prior art, but we did 

not disturb our earlier observation that content-based 

identifiers were known. PersonalWeb, 917 F.3d at 1380–83 

(reiterating that “none of the parties disagreed” that the

prior-art identifier “corresponded to the claimed contentbased identifier”). 

After the stay was lifted, the appellees moved for judgment on the pleadings that the remaining asserted claims 

were ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The district court 

granted the motion. PersonalWeb, 2020 WL 520618, 

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PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 7

at *14.3 PersonalWeb appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 

DISCUSSION

The Patent Act defines patent-eligible subject matter 

as “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 

composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 

thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court has held 

that “this provision contains an important implicit exception: [l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 

ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 

573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)). 

This exception reflects the “‘concern that patent law not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future 

use of’ these building blocks of human ingenuity.” Id.

(quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 

Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 85 (2012)). To assess patent eligibility, 

we apply the two-step framework set forth in Mayo and further detailed in Alice. At step one, we “determine whether 

the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept” such as an abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 218. At 

step two, “we consider the elements of each claim both individually and as an ordered combination to determine 

whether the additional elements transform the nature of 

the claim into a patent-eligible application.” Id. at 217 

(cleaned up). 

Patent eligibility is a question of law that may involve 

underlying questions of fact. Simio, LLC v. FlexSim Software Prods., Inc., 983 F.3d 1353, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 

But “not every § 101 determination contains genuine 

3 The district court also declined to convert the motion into one for summary judgment. PersonalWeb, 

2020 WL 520618, at *7. PersonalWeb does not challenge 

that aspect of the district court’s decision. 

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8 PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

disputes over the underlying facts material to the § 101 inquiry.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 

(Fed. Cir. 2018). Indeed, that inquiry “may be, and frequently has been, resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) or (c) motion 

where the undisputed facts, considered under the standards required by that Rule, require a holding of ineligibility 

under the substantive standards of law.” SAP Am., Inc. v. 

InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (collecting cases). We apply the procedural law of the regional 

circuit, here the Ninth Circuit, which reviews Rule 12(c) 

motions de novo. Allergan, Inc. v. Athena Cosms., Inc., 

640 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Or. Nat. Desert 

Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 550 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 

2008)). The governing standard is “functionally identical” 

to that for a motion to dismiss. Dworkin v. Hustler Mag. 

Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989). The standard is 

“whether the complaint at issue contains ‘sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim of relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Harris v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 

1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). We review the district court’s 

ultimate patent-eligibility conclusion de novo. Simio, 

983 F.3d at 1359. 

I 

We start at step one. Because “all inventions embody, 

use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas,” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (cleaned 

up), we must decide “whether that patent-ineligible concept is what the claim is ‘directed to,’” ChargePoint, Inc. v. 

SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 765 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

(quoting Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 

1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). To do so, we evaluate “the 

‘focus of the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the claim’s ‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.” Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Erie 

Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting

Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 

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PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 9

1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Here, the answer is yes. The 

claims are directed to an abstract idea. 

PersonalWeb contends that the claims are directed to 

“a substantially unique, algorithm-derived, content-based 

identifier for all data items in a networked computer, 

which allows a computer within a network containing diverse computing and storage systems to locate and distribute data without knowing either the file system of any 

device within the network or the conventional name of any 

data item.” Appellant’s Br. 23. The district court, on the 

other hand, concluded that the patents are directed to a 

three-step process: “(1) using a content-based identifier 

generated from a ‘hash or message digest function,’ 

(2) comparing that content-based identifier against something else, [that is,] another content-based identifier or a 

request for data; and (3) providing access to, denying access 

to, or deleting data.” PersonalWeb, 2020 WL 520618, 

at *10. We adopt the district court’s view, which closely 

tracks the claim language. See ChargePoint, 920 F.3d 

at 769 (“[T]he § 101 inquiry must focus on the language of 

the Asserted Claims themselves . . . .” (quoting Synopsys, 

Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1149 

(Fed. Cir. 2016)); Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the 

claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated 

settlement . . . .” (emphasis added)). The district court’s description, for example, mirrors the progression of ’310 patent claim 24 (reproduced above), on which PersonalWeb 

relies, Appellant’s Br. 24. 

Although PersonalWeb criticizes the district court’s 

“summary of the asserted claims into a three-step process,” 

Appellant’s Br. 31 (internal quotation marks omitted), this 

formulation is not meaningfully distinguishable from what

PersonalWeb said in opposing the § 101 motion:

The asserted claims all recite (1) dividing the data 

into sequences of bits, (2) calculating content-based 

identifiers using the data in the data items, . . . 

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10 PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

(3) comparing the identifiers against a plurality of 

other identifiers in the network, and (4) using the 

results to identify, access, authorize access, or 

manage the number of copies of data items within 

the network.

. . . 

Each asserted claim recites using content-based 

values as a name or identifier for a data item: in 

the ’310 patent, to control access to data items; in 

the ’280 patent, to retrieve and deliver copies of 

data items; and in the ’662 patent, to mark copies 

of data items for deletion. 

J.A. 6572, 6581. Because we must “focus here on whether 

the claims of the asserted patents fall within the excluded 

category of abstract ideas,” we agree with the district court. 

Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo 

Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (emphasis added). We therefore conclude that the claims are 

directed to the use of an algorithm-generated contentbased identifier to perform the claimed data-management 

functions, which across the three patents include controlling access to data items (the ’310 patent), retrieving and 

delivering copies of data items (the ’280 patent), and marking copies of data items for deletion (the ’662 patent). 

These functions are mental processes that “can be performed in the human mind” or “using a pencil and paper.” 

CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 

1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (cleaned up) (quoting Parker v. 

Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978))—a telltale sign of abstraction. Appellees’ “library” example is instructive: “Librarians often locate books based on a ‘call system’ where they 

assign books unique identifiers based on call numbers, 

which change dependent on a book’s volume, etc.” PersonalWeb, 2020 WL 520618, at *12. Such content-based identifiers may be used to control access to books (e.g., 

authorize borrowing depending on book content), retrieve 

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PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 11

books (e.g., locate books on shelves based on their content), 

or purge duplicate books (e.g., discard duplicates identified

by their content). The claims do this in a computer environment, but that doesn’t transfigure an idea out of the 

realm of abstraction. See BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., 

Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 

2016) (“An abstract idea on ‘an Internet computer network’ 

. . . is still an abstract idea.”). The claims’ focus, therefore, 

is abstract. And our cases confirm this. As explained below, each component of the claims’ three-step progression 

reflects a concept we have already described as abstract. 

First is the use of a content-based identifier. We said

that was abstract in Erie. There, we addressed claims to 

“search [a] database using an index,” in which “every record in the database is associated with one or more descriptive terms” organized using “category tags” for “grouping of 

similar terms” and “domain tags” for “grouping of similar 

categories.” Erie, 850 F.3d at 1326. We noted the same

pen-and-paper analogue: “a hardcopy-based classification 

system (such as library-indexing system)” in which “classifiers organize and cross-reference information and resources (such as books, magazines, or the like) by certain 

identifiable tags, e.g., title, author, subject.” Id. at 1327. 

We similarly described content-based identifiers as abstract in Secured Mail Solutions LLC v. Universal Wilde, 

Inc., 873 F.3d 905, 910–11 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (abstract idea 

of using a “unique identifier . . . to communicate information about the mail object, i.e., the sender, recipient, and 

contents of the mail object”), and Intellectual Ventures I 

LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 

2016) (abstract idea of “receiving e-mail (and other data 

file) identifiers, characterizing e-mail based on the identifiers, and communicating the characterization”). The 

claims’ use of content-based identifiers, therefore, is abstract. 

Generating such identifiers via a known algorithm is 

no less abstract. “[W]e have treated analyzing information 

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12 PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category.” Elec. Power 

Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 

2016) (collecting cases)). For instance, the identifiers 

claimed in Symantec were created “using a mathematical 

algorithm.” 838 F.3d at 1313. And in RecogniCorp, LLC v. 

Nintendo Co., we explained that “[a] process that started 

with data, added an algorithm, and ended with a new form

of data was directed to an abstract idea.” 855 F.3d 1322, 

1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017). That, too, holds true here. 

Second is the step of comparing the content-based identifier against other values. That is also abstract. For example, the Symantec claims required “determining . . . 

whether each received content identifier matches a characteristic of other identifiers.” 838 F.3d at 1313. There, as 

here, this is the “abstract idea of 1) collecting data[] [and]

2) recognizing certain data within the collected data set.” 

Id. at 1314–15 (quoting Content Extraction, 776 F.3d 

at 1347). That’s a mental process. 

Third is the data-management function, which varies 

across the three patents. Each such function is abstract. 

Controlling access to data items (the ’310 patent) is abstract, as “[c]ontrolling access to resources is exactly the 

sort of process that ‘can be performed in the human mind, 

or by a human using a pen and paper,’ which we have repeatedly found unpatentable.” Ericsson Inc. v. TCL 

Commc’n Tech. Holdings Ltd., 955 F.3d 1317, 1327 

(Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372)); 

id. (noting that “[t]he idea . . . is pervasive in human activity,” for example, “in libraries (loaning materials only to 

card-holding members)”). So is retrieving data items (the 

’280 patent). E.g., Erie, 850 F.3d at 1327 (“abstract idea of 

creating an index and using that index to search for and 

retrieve data” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Content 

Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347 (“abstract idea of . . . collecting 

data”). So too is marking data for deletion (the ’662

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PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 13

patent), which is just another way to “classify[] data.” Erie, 

850 F.3d at 1327; e.g., Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1314 (“[I]t was 

[a] long-prevalent practice for people . . . to look at an envelope and discard certain letters . . . based on characteristics of the mail.”). These are all mental processes and are 

all abstract. 

True, the step-one inquiry “looks to the claim[s’] ‘character as a whole’ rather than evaluating each claim limitation in a vacuum.” Ericsson, 955 F.3d at 1326 (quoting 

Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 

(Fed. Cir. 2016)). But these claims “are clearly focused on 

the combination of those abstract-idea processes.” Elec. 

Power, 830 F.3d at 1354. Stringing together the claimed

steps by “[a]dding one abstract idea . . . to another,” RecogniCorp, 855 F.3d at 1327, amounts merely to the abstract 

idea of using a content-based identifier to perform an abstract data-management function—whether controlling access to data, retrieving data, or marking data for deletion. 

See, e.g., Secured Mail, 873 F.3d at 911 (“[E]ach step of the 

process uses an identifier . . . to communicate information 

about a mail object.”). 

Some of our cases are particularly analogous and instructive. One of the Symantec claims included three steps 

like the claims here (and in the same order): (1) “creating 

file content IDs using a mathematical algorithm,” (2) “determining . . . whether each received content identifier 

matches a characteristic of other identifiers,” and (3) “outputting . . . an indication of the characteristic of the data 

file based on said step of determining.” 838 F.3d at 1313. 

Likewise, one of the Erie claims required (1) “identifying a 

first XML tag that is associated with the first term,” followed by (2) “determining whether a first metafile corresponds to the first XML tag,” followed by (3) several datamanagement functions, including “combining the first set 

of XML tags into a key” used to “locate records” and “deliver[] the records.” 850 F.3d at 1327. There’s no relevant 

difference in the claims here. The claims as a whole, then, 

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14 PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

are directed to a medley of mental processes that, taken 

together, amount only to a multistep mental process. 

PersonalWeb asserts that the claims are not abstract 

because they offer a solution “necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.” 

Appellant’s Br. 24 (quoting DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Not 

so. Both the solution (names based on content) and the 

problems (access to, retrieval of, and redundancy control of 

information) have long predated computers. PersonalWeb 

contends that the claims are not abstract because they 

claim “a new way of locating and distributing data in a 

computer network” that promises efficiency benefits, Appellant’s Br. 24, but “[t]he fact that an identifier can be 

used to make a process more efficient . . . does not necessarily render an abstract idea less abstract,” Secured Mail, 

873 F.3d at 910. Here, the asserted efficiency improvements are not different in kind from those that would accrue in the library analogue—for example, using contentbased identifiers to purge duplicate books. 

Ultimately, “the focus of the claims is not on . . . an improvement in computers as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use computers as tools.” 

Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 

1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017). In other words, the claims focus on 

“mere automation of manual processes using generic computers.” Id. That fails step one. 

II

Onward to step two. Here we undertake “a search for 

an inventive concept—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the 

ineligible concept itself.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (cleaned 

up). According to PersonalWeb, the claims contain an inventive concept because they “recite an application that 

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PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 15

makes inventive use of cryptographic hashes—a use that 

was neither conventional nor routine prior to the patents.” 

Appellant’s Br. 12; see also id. at 38–39 (describing “using 

content-dependent cryptographic hashes in place of conventional names”). But that’s not something “more,” let 

alone anything “significantly more,” than the abstract idea 

itself. Alice, 573 U.S. at 218. 

Indeed, the purported improvements that PersonalWeb sets forth just restate the abstract ideas discussed

above. See Appellant’s Br. 43 (“[T]he claims of the ’310 patent capture the improvement of using the content-based 

identifier to ‘enforce[] use of valid licenses . . . by refusing 

to provide access to a file without authorization.’” (third alteration in original) (quoting ’310 patent col. 31 ll. 9–12)); 

id. (“The claims of the ’280 patent capture the improvements of ‘provid[ing] transparent access to any data item 

by reference only to its identity’ and ‘verify[ing] that data 

retrieved from another location is the desired or requested 

data, using only the data identifier.’” (alterations in original) (quoting ’280 patent col. 4 ll. 10–45)); id. (“The claims 

of the ’662 patent capture the improvements of ‘stor[ing] at 

most one copy of the data item’ and ‘maintain[ing] a desired 

level of redundancy of data items.’” (alterations in original) 

(quoting ’662 patent col. 4 ll. 4–21)). That is all abstract. 

And even accepting PersonalWeb’s view that these particular uses are not well-known, routine, or conventional, “[a] 

claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.” SAP, 

898 F.3d at 1163 (quoting Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1151). 

So, “[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?” Mayo, 

566 U.S. at 78. As to the subject-matter question, not 

much. The district court had it right: there is “nothing ‘inventive’ about any claim details, individually or in combination, that are not themselves abstract ideas.” 

PersonalWeb, 2020 WL 520618, at *13. The district court 

was also right that “[u]sing a generic hash function, a 

server system, or a computer does not render these claims 

non-abstract.” Id. “[O]ur precedent is clear that merely 

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16 PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

adding computer functionality to increase the speed or efficiency of the process does not confer patent eligibility on 

an otherwise abstract idea.” Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Cap. 

One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015); e.g., 

OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 

(Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[R]elying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is insufficient 

to render a claim patent eligible.”). PersonalWeb’s claims 

merely “automate or otherwise make more efficient traditional . . . methods.” OIP, 788 F.3d at 1363. “[T]heir innovation is an innovation in ineligible subject matter.” SAP, 

898 F.3d at 1163. That fails step two. 

Last, PersonalWeb argues also that “fact questions created by the specification’s disclosure” made judgment on 

the pleadings “improper.” Appellant’s Br. 51 (quoting 

Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1370). While we agree that “the 

most relevant and dispositive evidence before the district 

court was the set of patents themselves,” Appellant’s 

Br. 50, we disagree that this could have precluded judgment on the pleadings here. “What is needed is an inventive concept in the non-abstract application realm.” 

SAP, 898 F.3d at 1168. None of PersonalWeb’s “improvements in the specification” fit that bill. Appellant’s Br. 51. 

Instead, they “lie[] entirely in the realm of abstract ideas, 

with no plausibly alleged innovation in the non-abstract 

application realm.” SAP, 898 F.3d at 1163. Judgment on 

the pleadings, therefore, was appropriate. 

CONCLUSION

We have considered PersonalWeb’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. The claims are ineligible for patenting. We therefore affirm the judgment of 

invalidity. 

AFFIRMED

Case: 20-1543 Document: 68 Page: 16 Filed: 08/12/2021