SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3459-19

ROBBINSVILLE EDUCATION

ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ROBBINSVILLE BOARD OF 

EDUCATION,

Defendant-Respondent.

____________________________

Argued August 2, 2021 – Decided August 16, 2021

Before Judges Mawla and Rose.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-2447-19.

Sanford R. Oxfeld argued the cause for appellant 

(Oxfeld Cohen, PC, attorneys; Sanford R. Oxfeld, of 

counsel and on the brief; Jesse Humphries, on the 

brief).

Matthew J. Giacobbe argued the cause for respondent 

(Cleary Giacobbe Alfieri Jacobs, LLC, attorneys; 

Matthew J. Giacobbe, of counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-3459-19

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Robbinsville Education Association (Association) appeals from 

a March 26, 2020 Law Division order affirming an arbitration award entered in 

favor of defendant Robbinsville Board of Education (Board). We affirm.

Pursuant to paragraph 14.1 of a collective negotiations agreement (CNA), 

the parties agreed as follows:

Healthcare Coverage: The Board shall provide 

healthcare coverage . . . equal to the New Jersey School 

Employees' Health Benefits Program (SEHBP) Direct 

15.[1] As required by [New Jersey] law under the 

provisions of Chapter 78, P.L. 2011,[2]employees are 

required to pay a contribution toward the cost of health 

benefits coverage based on a specified percentage of 

the medical and prescription drug plan premiums. The 

Board . . . assumes the balance of the costs per this 

[a]greement. 

In 2018, the Board proposed a change to the health benefit administration 

by implementing a "Difference Card" that Association members could use to 

pay for medical services for the 2018-19 school year. The prior school year, the 

Board provided three health plans including one through Aetna, which had a 

1 The Direct 15 health plan has a fifteen-dollar co-pay.

2 Chapter 78 codified as N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28c, collectively with N.J.S.A.

18A:16-17.1(a), governs the provision of health care coverage for school board 

employees, the percentage of contribution by employees to their medical 

coverage, and negotiation of these obligations by means of a CNA. 
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fifteen-dollar co-pay in accordance with paragraph 14.1 of the CNA. The plan 

cost the Board $4,448,201. However, in May 2018, Aetna advised the Board 

the cost for the same plan for 2018-19 school year would increase by nine 

percent to $4,848,491. As a result, the Board discontinued the fifteen-dollar copay plan and maintained three plans with Aetna each requiring a fifty-dollar copay. It then contracted with Difference Card to provide Association members 

with credit cards to pay the thirty-five-dollar difference between their fifteendollar co-pay under the CNA and the fifty dollars required by the less expensive

Aetna plan. The new plan cost the Board $3,032,318; the Difference Card 

charged the Board $844,718 to cover the difference in co-pays; and the Board's 

total cost for providing insurance was $3,877,036 for the 2018-19 school year.

The Association filed a grievance and request for binding arbitration with 

the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC). Pursuant to the parties' 

agreement, PERC designated an arbitrator who considered the evidence and 

heard testimony from Alexander DeVicaris, a New Jersey Education 

Association (NJEA) field representative, on behalf of the Association, and 

Joseph Columbo, an insurance broker, on behalf of the Board. The arbitrator 

issued a detailed twenty-two-page written decision, and at the outset framed the 

question presented as follows: "Did the Board violate Article 14.1 of the parties' 
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[CNA] or the related statutes with regard to the Chapter 78 contributions the 

employees were required to pay toward their health benefits in the 2018-2019 

school year? If so, what shall be the remedy?"

The Association argued the Board violated the CNA and the law because 

Difference Card was not an insurance carrier or health care provider and instead 

issued a "carrier neutral" credit card, which did not provide medical benefits, to 

pay claims. The Association also argued the cost paid to Difference Card was 

not chargeable to its members because it was not a fixed insurance premium, but 

could increase depending on the cost of the claims in a given year. The 

Association claimed the Board should pay twenty percent of the Board's cost for 

the Difference Card, or $168,944. 

The Board argued it violated neither the CNA nor the statute because the 

co-pay remained at fifteen dollars and the amount paid by the Difference Card 

represented a portion of the insurance premium, which happened to be selfinsured. The Board claimed the Difference Card was a form of self-insurance 

as defined by Section 39 of Chapter 78, which states: 

As used in this section, "cost of coverage" means the 

premium or period charges for medical . . . plan 

coverage . . . provided under the . . . [SEHBP]; or the 

premium or periodic charges for health care . . . 

provided pursuant to P.L.1979, c.391 (C.18A:16-2 et 

seq.), [N.J.S.A. 40A:10-16] et seq., or any other law by 
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a local board of education, local unit or agency thereof 

. . . when the employer is not a participant in the . . .

[SEHBP].

[N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28c.]

The arbitrator recounted the testimony of both witnesses, noting 

DeVicaris testified that a Difference Card employee, who did not testify, told 

him Difference Card was not a healthcare provider. The arbitrator stated: 

But even if I credit that remark it only means that the 

Difference Card itself did not provide medical benefits. 

That's true to a certain extent; the Difference Card itself 

was not paying to keep the employee co-pay at [fifteen 

dollars]. Rather, it was facilitating – or administering 

– that result on behalf of the Board by letting the 

employee health providers use its credit card to cover 

the balance of the [fifty dollar] co-pay. Consequently, 

I find that [the non-testifying witness'] remark does not 

mean that the Board did not provide a medical benefit 

by paying the co-pay difference so that the employees' 

health care plan would remain at the [fifteen dollar] copay. 

. . . [T]he cost to maintain and/or to lower the copay must be part of the overall premium or cost of the 

overall health benefit plan. Based thereon I find that 

the [thirty-five dollars] the Board paid the Difference 

Card towards the co-pay was part of the medical benefit 

that the Board was required to provide for the 

employees as part of their overall medical benefits. 

Even DeVicaris recognized that the co-pay is part of a 

health plan[']s medical expense. 
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The arbitrator concluded although the Difference Card was not an 

insurance carrier or provider, "it did provide a medical benefit paid by the 

Board." Furthermore, citing Article 14.1 of the CNA, the arbitrator noted it did 

not require the Board to provide insurance solely through a carrier. Rather, the 

"Article only requires a contribution to the cost of health coverage based upon 

a percentage of the medical and prescription drug plan premiums." Canvassing 

the exhibits entered into evidence, the arbitrator could find no requirement that 

insurance be provided only through a carrier. 

The arbitrator concluded the Difference Card was a form of selfinsurance. He stated: 

I see very little difference between the Board paying 

Aetna a higher cost – or premium – to provide a [fifteen 

dollar] co-pay plan and the Board paying the Difference 

Card a cost – or premium – to maintain a [fifteen dollar] 

co-pay plan for the employees. In both situations it is 

the Board that pays a cost to a company – as part of its 

overall health benefit premium – to provide the 

employees with the [fifteen dollar] co-pay benefit. 

The Arbitrator also credited Columbo's testimony, which stated the 

Difference Card acted as a form of third-party administrator of benefits and was 

a form of self-insurance because it employed actuaries to determine its rates by 

considering "the group claims experience and how much is needed to cover the 

full cost of the claims plus the [Difference Card's] expenses." The arbitrator 
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noted DeVicaris testified "he was unfamiliar with self-insurance plans; and he 

certainly did not dispute Columbo's testimony."

The arbitrator rejected the Association's argument the Difference Card 

was a form of health savings account, noting such accounts are created by 

employees because of the benefits of funding an account with pre-tax earnings, 

and are not funded by employers. The arbitrator also found the fact that the cost 

of the Difference Card could fluctuate based on the claims it processed did not 

mean it was not a form of self-insurance because its purpose was to "provid[e] 

the employees the required lower co-pay."

The arbitrator concluded as follows: 

Thr[ough] the Difference Card the Board is providing 

part of the contractually required coverage. . . . The 

Board alone – in part due to the language in Article 14.1 

of the parties' [a]greement – is responsible for any 

increase in co-pay claims the Difference Card may 

subsequently charge the Board. Absent a negotiated 

agreement on this point, the employees are not required 

to pay contributory shares on any such increase.

Addressing the statute, the arbitrator concluded as follows:

Combining the premium for the Aetna [fifty 

dollar] co-pay fully-insured plan and the premium for 

the Difference Card co-pay self-insured plan for 

purposes of determining an employee's required 

Chapter 78 contribution seems consistent with the 

[CNA] and the law. [See] . . . N.J.S.A. 40A:10-21.1(d) 

which provides in pertinent part: 
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This section shall apply when the health 

care benefits are provided through self 

insurance, the purchase of commercial 

insurance or reinsurance, an insurance fund 

or joint insurance fund, or in any other 

manner or any combination thereof. 

[(Emphasis added).] 

[The highlighted language] fits what happened 

here. The Board found another way, another manner, 

in which to provide the [fifteen dollar] co-pay at a lower 

cost, but that self-insured cost combined with the fully 

funded cost for the Aetna [fifty dollar] co-pay plan 

resulted in the combined premium upon which the 

employee contributory share was determined.

The arbitrator denied in part the grievance concluding the Board did not 

violate the CNA by including the Difference Card in its overall health benefits 

premium. However, the arbitrator held that if the Difference Card claims for 

2018-19 were less than the $844,718 premium paid, the Board had to 

immediately notify the Association of the sum refunded to the Board and 

negotiate "how best to return the employees['] contributory share from such 

money [and] . . . the negotiable aspects of [the CNA, including] the use of the 

Difference Card plan for the 2019-2020 school year." 

The Association filed an order to show cause and verified complaint 

asking the Law Division judge to vacate the arbitrator's award and "determine 

that no staff member should have been required to make Chapter 78 
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contributions on the cost of the Difference Card." The trial judge reviewed the 

parties' submissions and heard oral argument on the order to show cause. 

As part of the Association's submissions, it included a certification from 

an NJEA associate director of research and economic services who did not 

testify before the arbitrator. The certification opined the arbitrator made "most 

of the correct factual findings, [but had] misconstrued the law," namely, Chapter 

78, in concluding the Difference Card was a form of self-insurance. The affiant 

certified he reviewed the Difference Card website, which stated: "The 

Difference Card works like a credit card to offset copays and deductibles" and 

therefore was not a form of medical insurance premium. Additionally, citing 

the website, he noted Difference Card did not hold itself out as a third-party 

administrator of health benefits. The certification concluded this information 

was "directly contrary to the arbitrator's ruling." 

The Board's counsel objected to the judge's consideration of the 

certification on hearsay grounds pursuant to Rule 1:6-6 and because the affiant 

was present at the arbitration, but never called to testify. The trial judge 

concluded he would consider the factual assertions made because they were 

derived from the Difference Card website, which did not require testimony, but 
10 A-3459-19

would not consider the legal arguments raised by the affiant because the 

Association's counsel could articulate them. 

Association counsel argued the judge should vacate the arbitration award 

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(a) because the arbitrator's finding that the 

Difference Card was a form of insurance premium chargeable to Association 

members constituted a mistake of law. Counsel also argued the award should 

be vacated under N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(d) because the arbitrator failed to consider 

Chapter 78 despite identifying the statute in the issue to be arbitrated. 

The trial judge rejected the Association's arguments. He concluded the 

arbitrator's finding the Difference Card was a form of insurance premium was 

supported by the record and

fits within the terms of the statute and since its cost of 

coverage, it also fits within the terms of the contract. I 

don't know how else to see it [except as] periodic 

coverage for medical. That's what it was. It was for a 

set period, 2018/2019, it is for medical and it's for the 

coverage.

The trial judge rejected the arguments made in the certification from the 

NJEA associate director, namely that the Difference Card website states it is not 

a form of insurance. The judge stated: 

I'm not constrained to have to do what the Difference 

Card says and neither was the arbitrator. They can 
11 A-3459-19

claim whatever they want in their advertisements and 

for their business model.

The fact of the matter is essentially it's a selfinsurance. They administer it for the . . . Board and I 

take it that the . . . Board is probably not that expert in 

things like invoices and billing codes and all the things 

that need to be done to be able to sort these things out. 

So[,] it makes sense that they got somebody else to do 

it. 

The judge entered the order affirming the arbitration award.

I.

Recently, our Supreme Court framed the principles guiding our review. 

Writing for the Court, Justice Pierre-Louis stated:

To foster finality and "secure arbitration's speedy and 

inexpensive nature," reviewing courts must give 

arbitration awards "considerable deference." [Borough 

of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 213 

N.J. 190, 201 (2013)] (quoting Middletown Twp. PBA 

Loc. 124 v. Twp. of Middletown, 193 N.J. 1, 10 

(2007)). "[A]rbitration is 'meant to be a substitute for 

and not a springboard for litigation.' Arbitration should 

spell litigation's conclusion, rather than its beginning." 

N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Loc. 196, IFTPE, 190 N.J. 283, 292 

(2007) (quoting Loc. No. 153, Off. & Pro. Emps. Int'l 

Union v. Tr. Co. of N.J., 105 N.J. 442, 449 (1987)).

The interpretation of a labor agreement "is a 

question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator's 

construction which was bargained for; and so far as the 

arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the 

contract, the courts have no business overruling him [or 

her]" based solely on differences of interpretation. E.
12 A-3459-19

Rutherford PBA, 213 N.J. at 202 (quoting Weiss v. 

Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey, 143 N.J. 420, 433 

(1996)). Accordingly, an arbitrator's award resolving a 

public sector dispute will be accepted so long as the 

award is "reasonably debatable." Id. at 201-02.

Under the reasonably debatable standard, a court 

"may not substitute its own judgment for that of the 

arbitrator, regardless of the court's view of the 

correctness of the arbitrator's position." Ibid. (quoting

Middletown Twp. PBA, 193 N.J. at 11). Put 

differently, if two or more interpretations of a labor 

agreement could be plausibly argued, the outcome is at 

least reasonably debatable. See id. at 206; PBA Loc.

11 v. City of Trenton, 205 N.J. 422, 430 (2011). "Thus, 

even if the remedy the Arbitrator fashioned was not the 

preferred or correct outcome, a reversal would be 

contrary to the deferential standard for reviewing 

arbitral decisions." E. Rutherford PBA, 213 N.J. at 

206.

[Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent 

Ass'n, Loc. 67, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op. at 11-

12) (second and third alterations in original).]

In pertinent part, the New Jersey Arbitration Act also permits a court to 

vacate an arbitration award in any one of the following cases: "[w]here the 

award was procured by . . . undue means" or "[w]here the arbitrators exceeded 

or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award 

upon the subject matter submitted was not made." N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8.

The Association raises the following arguments: (1) because the issue 

before the arbitrator concerned the statutory interpretation of Chapter 78, we
13 A-3459-19

should exercise de novo review because the dispute is "a purely legal issue;" (2)

the trial judge erred by failing to vacate the award pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:24-

8(a) and (d); (3) the arbitration award is invalid because the arbitrator failed to 

decide the issue presented, namely, whether the Board had violated Chapter 78; 

and (4) the trial judge erred because the Difference Card is not health insurance 

that is chargeable to Association members under Chapter 78. We address these 

arguments in turn.

We decline to exercise a de novo review because the arguments raised by 

the Association are not "purely legal." Even if this were so, as we have 

expressed, our scope of review is narrow and requires us to consider whether 

the arbitration award is reasonably debatable. Contrary to the Association's

argument, neither the arbitrator nor the trial judge ignored Chapter 78 or 

misapplied the law. The arbitrator made detailed findings explaining how the 

Difference Card satisfied the Board's obligation to provide the insurance 

coverage required by Chapter 78 and the requirement that the Board and the 

Association enter into negotiations in the event of a premium refund from the 

Difference Card. For these reasons, a de novo review is unwarranted.

The Association argues the award should be vacated pursuant to N.J.S.A. 

2A:24-8(a) because the award was procured by "undue means," namely, the 
14 A-3459-19

arbitrator committed mistakes of fact and law. In this regard, the Association 

urges us to consider the certification it submitted to the trial judge from the 

NJEA representative, which purported to explain why the Difference Card was 

not a form of Chapter 78 compliant medical insurance. However, the 

certification was produced four months after the arbitrator's ruling and the 

Association could have adduced testimony from the affiant during the arbitration 

proceedings, but did not. Notwithstanding the failure to have the affiant testify, 

the judge did consider the factual assertions made in the post-arbitration 

certification. We discern no error on the part of the trial judge and the 

certification does not prove the sort of mistake envisioned under N.J.S.A. 

2A:24-8(a) to warrant vacation of the arbitration award. 

The balance of the arguments raised by the Association urging us to vacate 

the award on grounds of mistake challenge the arbitrator's finding that the funds 

paid to the Difference Card constituted a form of self-insurance. The 

Association argues the arbitrator ignored DeVicaris's testimony, which 

explained that Difference Card was not a form of insurance. Citing the 

Department of Education and Aetna's definitions of health insurance premiums, 

namely, "the payment made to maintain a health insurance policy" and "regular 

payments to keep [a] health care plan active," the Association argues the 
15 A-3459-19

arbitrator erred because the Difference Card "does not match" such definitions 

and "the Difference Card serves absolutely no purpose in maintaining an active 

health insurance policy." The Association also asserts the arbitrator ignored the 

Difference Card's own representations that it was carrier neutral and was not a 

health insurance provider. 

Again, we discern no error requiring our intervention under N.J.S.A. 

2A:24-8(a). Initially, we note the arbitrator did not ignore any evidence, 

including DeVicaris's testimony. Rather, it is evident the arbitrator found 

Columbo's testimony and the Board's evidence more persuasive. Moreover, 

contrary to the assertions made in its brief, the Association's challenge is rooted 

in its disagreement with the arbitrator's factual findings and conclusions of law. 

In Borough of Carteret, the Supreme Court confronted a similar scenario. 

There, the CNA stated senior firefighters were entitled to an acting captain's pay 

when they performed the duties of a fire captain. ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 2). 

However, the Borough avoided paying the higher pay by creating a lieutenant 

position within the fire department. Id. at ___ (slip op. at 4-5). At the ensuing 

arbitration hearing, the Borough presented testimony that the firefighter's union 

agreed to waive the captain's pay if the Borough created the lieutenant position. 

Id. at ___ (slip op. at 6). The union presented testimony that there was no such 
16 A-3459-19

agreement. Both parties agreed the lieutenants were performing a captain's duty. 

Ibid.

The arbitrator sided with the union and found the Borough had violated 

the CNA and awarded back pay at the captain's rate. Ibid. The arbitrator's 

written opinion addressed both witnesses' testimony and explained why the 

arbitrator had decided to credit the testimony of the union's witness over the 

Borough's. Id. at ___ (slip op. at 7). The trial court upheld the award and denied 

the Borough's request to vacate it pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(d). Id. at ___

(slip op. at 8). 

We reversed and vacated the arbitrator's award holding the arbitrator had 

"engrafted" language into the CNA and the agreement's plain language showed 

it did not apply to lieutenants. Ibid. Moreover, as explained by the Supreme 

Court,

[t]he Appellate Division was persuaded by the Civil 

Service Commission's job descriptions for fire 

personnel. It noted that absent from the job description 

for firefighters was any provision suggesting that a 

firefighter must assume captain's duties when a captain 

is not scheduled. Consequently, when a firefighter 

performs captain's duties, the firefighter is performing 

work beyond his or her job description. According to 

the court, that is why [the CNA] provides for greater 

compensation in those instances. The Civil Service 

Commission's description of fire lieutenants, by 

contrast, expressly directs that a lieutenant "[act] in the 
17 A-3459-19

place of a Fire Captain in his/her absence." The 

Appellate Division found nothing in the record to 

support the FMBA's argument that lieutenants should 

receive acting captain's pay "for performing work 

within their job description."

Finding that the difference between firefighters' 

and fire lieutenants' job descriptions created 

uncertainty as to [CNA's] application to lieutenants, the 

Appellate Division concluded that the arbitrator should 

have given greater consideration to the parties' past 

practice; namely, that for four years, lieutenants in the

Carteret Fire Department regularly assumed captains' 

responsibilities without demanding pay beyond that to 

which they were ordinarily entitled.

[Id. at ___ (slip op. at 8-9) (third alteration in original).]

The Supreme Court reversed, reinstated the award, and held as follows: 

Although the Appellate Division's conclusion is 

arguably plausible in its own right, the court improperly 

substituted its own judgment for that of the arbitrator in

vacating the arbitral award. We find that the arbitrator's 

award is supported by a reasonably debatable 

interpretation of the disputed provision, and therefore, 

the award should have been upheld on appeal. 

. . . .

As our precedent indicates, affirming an 

arbitrator's award is not a comment on the viability of 

opposing interpretations of a disputed labor agreement, 

"[n]or is it a conclusion that the arbitrator's 

interpretation is the best one. That is not the standard. 

What is required is that the arbitrator's interpretation 

finds support in the Agreement . . . ." PBA Loc. 11, 

205 N.J. at 432. Here, we find that it does.
18 A-3459-19

[Id. at __ (slip op. at 2-3, 16) (alterations in original).]

The same principles apply here. The arbitrator explained his reasons for 

deciding in Board's favor, having considered all the evidence, testimony, and 

legal arguments presented. Although the arbitrator could have reached the 

outcome the Association desired based on the same record, it is not our role to 

second guess the result because it is reasonably debatable. 

The Association claims the Arbitrator violated N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(d)

because "Chapter 78 is included in the statement of the issue to be decided by 

the arbitrator as well as in the [CNA] by reference and by failing to read both 

together, the arbitrator imperfectly executed his powers so that a final award 

was not issued." We disagree. 

The trial judge found the arbitrator did address Chapter 78, stating "that 

the money was charged for medical for a given . . . period . . . [and] in fact[] fits 

within the terms of the statute . . . ." The judge concluded as follows:

So[,] Section 39 of Chapter 78 says that the premium of 

periodic charges for medical and that's what I'm saying 

. . . and that's where we've defined it as the cost of 

coverage. So the premium is . . . what it costs. The 

period is 2018/2019 and it's for medical. The other 

three elements were met and that's why I find that it 

meets that statute.
19 A-3459-19

This argument and the Association's remaining argument that the record 

does not support a finding the Difference Card was a form of health insurance 

chargeable under Chapter 78 lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion 

in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.