No. FC-23-90015

In the Judicial Council of the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

____________________________________________

In re Complaint No. 23-90015 

(Complaint Against Circuit Judge Pauline Newman)

____________________________________________

RULE 20(A) RESPONSE TO THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE’S REPORT 

AND RECOMMENDATION

___________________________________________

Gregory Dolin

Counsel of Record

Andrew Morris

John J. Vecchione

Mark Chenoweth

NEW CIVIL LIBERTIES ALLIANCE

1225 19th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 869-5210

Greg.Dolin@ncla.legal

August 31, 2023 Counsel for the Hon. Pauline Newman
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND........................................................... 3

II. AT ALL RELEVANT TIMES THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE LACKED FACTUAL

PREDICATES FOR ORDERING MEDICAL EXAMINATION ...................................... 23

A. THE FACTUAL RECORD AT THE TIME OF THE FIRST ORDER REQUIRING

MEDICAL EXAMINATION DID NOT SUPPORT SUCH A DEMAND .................. 23

1. The Statistical Data Do Not Support the Suspicion That Judge Newman

Has Suffered Cognitive Decline............................................................................ 24

2. Baseless Allegations Concerning Judge Newman’s Health Issues Cannot

Justify a Forced Medical Examination ................................................................. 32

3. Personal “Observations” of Committee Members Do Not Provide

Sufficient Basis to Order a Medical Examination............................................... 37

B. THE FACTUAL RECORD AT THE TIME OF THE SECOND AND THIRD ORDERS

REQUIRING MEDICAL EXAMINATION ALSO DOES NOT SUPPORT THE

ORDERS REQUIRING MEDICAL EXAMINATION............................................... 39

1. The Subsequent Orders Are Irreparably Tainted by the Improper April 7

Order ........................................................................................................................ 41

2. The Deposition of Judge Newman’s Career Law Clerk Is Devoid of Any

Facts and Therefore Irrelevant.............................................................................. 43

3. Affidavits of Judge Newman’s Former Chambers Staff Do Not Provide

Any Support for the Committee’s Demands....................................................... 45

4. Affidavits of Other Court Employees Do Not Show that the Request for

Medical Testing Is Reasonably Necessary............................................................ 50

C. ANY RESIDUAL QUESTIONS WERE RESOLVED BY DR. ROTHSTEIN’S

EXAMINATION ..................................................................................................... 55

D. DR. CARNEY’S REPORT FURTHER CONFIRMS THAT JUDGE NEWMAN DOES

NOT SUFFER FROM ANY MENTAL DISABILITY................................................ 57

III.THE COMMITTEE HAD NO BASIS TO REQUEST A VIDEO-TAPED INTERVIEW

WITH JUDGE NEWMAN ............................................................................................. 59

IV.THROUGHOUT THE PROCEEDINGS, JUDGE NEWMAN HAS OFFERED TO

COOPERATE ............................................................................................................... 61

V. JUDGE NEWMAN HAD “GOOD CAUSE” NOT TO COOPERATE BECAUSE THIS

PROCEEDING VIOLATES HER RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW ....................... 66
iii

A. MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL SUFFER FROM IRRECONCILABLE

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.................................................................................... 69

1. That Members of the Judicial Council Are Not Likely to Be Actually

Called as Witnesses Is Irrelevant........................................................................... 71

2. “Narrowing” the Inquiry Does Not Eliminate the Problem of Actual

Bias or Risk of Bias................................................................................................. 78

B. THIS INVESTIGATION HAS BEEN MARKED BY RULINGS THAT ARE UNFAIR,

CONTRADICTORY, AND PROVIDE SHIFTING RATIONALES FOR PREVENTING

JUDGE NEWMAN FROM HEARING CASES ......................................................... 80

1. The Chief Judge Improperly Removed Judge Newman from the April

2023 Sitting of the Court........................................................................................ 80

2. The Chief Judge and Other Members of the Committee Predetermined

that Judge Newman Must Take Senior Status..................................................... 84

3. The Judicial Council, in Violation of Basic Procedures, Voted to

Preclude Assigning New Cases to Judge Newman............................................. 84

4. The March 24 Order Was Procedurally and Substantively Flawed. ........ 90

5. The Special Committee Improperly Placed the Burden of Investigating

the Credentials of Selected Medical Providers on Judge Newman................... 91

6. The Special Committee’s Denial of Judge Newman’s Request for Access

to Full Data Set Is Another Procedural Irregularity ........................................... 92

7. The Special Committee’s Heavy Reliance on Information It Obtained by

Questioning Clerks and Other Court Employees Violates Due Process in

Several Respects...................................................................................................... 94

C. THE COMMITTEE’S ARGUMENTS AGAINST TRANSFER DO NOT WITHSTAND

SCRUTINY AND ARE DEVOID OF MERIT .......................................................... 99

D. THE FAILURE TO TRANSFER THIS MATTER PROVIDES SUFFICIENT “GOOD

CAUSE” TO RESIST THE COMMITTEE’S DEMANDS ........................................ 103

VI.THE RECOMMENDED SANCTION IS UNPRECEDENTED, EXCESSIVE, AND

CONTRARY TO THE GOVERNING STATUTE ......................................................... 105

A. THE SANCTION RECOMMENDED BY THE COMMITTEE IS EXCESSIVE AS

COMPARED TO SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON OTHER JUDGES FOUND TO HAVE

ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT............................................................................. 105

B. THE SANCTION RECOMMENDED EXCEEDS THE COUNCIL’S STATUTORY

AUTHORITY........................................................................................................ 112
iv

C. THE SANCTION RECOMMENDED IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL........................... 115

D. IF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL IS TO UPHOLD THE RECOMMENDATION IN

TOTO, JUDGE NEWMAN SHOULD BE CREDITED WITH THE TIME SHE HAS

ALREADY SERVED IN A SUSPENDED STATUS ................................................. 119

CONCLUSION................................................................................................................. 119
1

INTRODUCTION1

These proceedings began after Chief Judge Kimberly Moore accused her longtime colleague, the longest-serving judge on the Federal Circuit and a “heroine of the 

patent system,”2 Circuit Judge Pauline Newman, of being no longer mentally fit to 

continue her service as an active Court of Appeals judge. Were the committee formed 

to investigate these baseless allegations actually interested in ascertaining the truth of 

the matter—that Judge Newman, despite her age, is in no way disabled—it could have 

done so months ago. Instead, Chief Judge Moore and the committee she appointed 

have been interested in one thing and one thing only—keeping Judge Newman off the 

bench via the exercise of raw power unconstrained by statutory requirements, 

constitutional limits, any notions of due process, conflict of interest rules, or even basic 

fairness. Yet, even now, if Judge Newman’s colleagues who are members of this Judicial 

Council truly wish to assure themselves of Judge Newman’s continued ability to carry 

out her duties, it is not too late to change course and engage in a process unmarred by 

factual and procedural errors or the personal animosity that has been plainly evident 

during these proceedings.

*****

1

Judge Newman requests that this matter be set for argument. See Rule 20(a). Additionally, pursuant 

to Rule 23(b)(7), Judge Newman requests that this filing be made publicly available.

2 Kimberly A. Moore, Anniversaries and Observations, 50 AIPLA Q. J., 521, 524-25 (2022).
2

On March 24, 2023, Chief Judge Moore “identified a complaint,” which (as will 

be further discussed below) was predicated on provable falsehoods. It alleged that 

Judge Newman was suffering from mental and/or physical disability that is 

incompatible with continued service as an active circuit judge. 

The process that this complaint launched was fatally flawed from the very 

beginning, given that Judge Newman was sanctioned by being removed from hearing 

cases even before any investigation began. Over time, the allegations in the complaint 

have morphed from mental and physical disability to misconduct for refusal to 

cooperate with the probe, despite Judge Newman’s numerous attempts to resolve the 

issue in a truly cooperative and collaborative fashion. As the nature of the allegations 

against Judge Newman transmogrified, and despite Judge Newman’s numerous 

attempts at having them addressed, procedural flaws have only mounted, undermining 

confidence in the integrity of the process and the ability of this Judicial Council to 

resolve the complaint.

Furthermore, not only do both the process itself and the proposed sanctions run 

afoul of governing statute, they also violate the Constitution because they usurp 

Congress’s sole power of impeachment.

For these reasons, and the ones that follow, the Council should reject the Special 

Committee’s Report and Recommendation. Moreover, because the process cannot be 

salvaged by further proceedings before this body, the Council should request that the 
3

Chief Justice transfer this matter to another Circuit. And before proceeding further, 

Judge Newman reiterates that despite everything that has occurred thus far, while she 

remains willing to engage in a truly cooperative and collaborative process, pure 

submission will not be forthcoming now, a year from now, nor at any time in the future. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This process began before it formally began. On February 14, 2023, the office

of the Chief Judge improperly excluded Judge Newman from panel assignments for the 

April 2023 sitting of the Court. Report and Recommendation of the Special Committee 

of July 31, 2023 (hereinafter “Report”) at 79. At the time, as the Report candidly 

acknowledges, id., Judge Newman was not behind in her opinions enough to allow her 

exclusion from panel assignments under previously promulgated rules. Yet, the Chief 

Judge decided not to assign Judge Newman to the April calendar anyway.

3

 This ultra 

vires action was a culmination of involuntary reductions in sittings that Judge Newman 

experienced during the preceding several months.

During February and March of 2023, Judge Newman sat on panels and authored 

several opinions. Toward mid-March, the attempt to force Judge Newman off the 

bench began in earnest.

On March 7, 2023, the Chief Judge held a conversation with Judge Newman 

3 The Report’s admission that the “Chief Judge’s chambers” was responsible for excluding Judge 

Newman from the April calendar sitting stands in sharp contrast with the Chief Judge’s indignant 

protestations during the July 13, 2023 hearing, see post, that any claim that the Chief Judge decides on 
4

advising her that the Chief Judge had “probable cause to believe” that Judge Newman 

suffers from a disability. According to the Chief Judge’s own words, the basis for this 

“probable cause to believe” that Judge Newman suffered from a disability was, inter alia, 

statements by other judges on this court relayed to her, i.e., members of this Judicial 

Council. See March 24 Order at 2. Judge Moore offered to resolve the identified issue 

“informally” by demanding that Judge Newman resign or at least take senior status 

under 28 U.S.C. § 371. The Chief Judge explained that the requirement to step down 

from active duty was “non-negotiable.”4 This visit was followed by similar visits from 

Judge Sharon Prost and Judge Richard Taranto, all of whom were subsequently assigned 

to sit on the Special Committee.5 

The next day, i.e., March 8, 2023 (again, before any formal or informal proceedings 

panel assignments is “[c]ompletely false” and that “[t]he Chief Judge has no input whatsoever.” Tr. 

of Hearing at 41:23-42:13. Either the Chief Judge does have input, as stated in the Report, or she 

doesn’t as she protested in the hearing. Both statements cannot simultaneously be true.

4

In recent exchanges, Chief Judge Moore and other members of the Special Committee disputed this 

account of the meetings in Judge Newman’s chambers. Of course, the very existence of a factual 

dispute going to a key question in the case necessarily precludes those with personal knowledge of 

disputed facts from serving as adjudicators of the dispute. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 

§ 455(b)(1); Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 3(C)(1)(a); ABA Model Code of Judicial

Conduct R. 2.11(A)(1), 2.11(A)(6)(c).

5 On March 9, 2023, Judge , a member of the Judicial Council, appeared at Judge 

Newman’s residence and also attempted to convince Judge Newman to retire.
5

against Judge Newman began), the Judicial Council allegedly6 met and voted to remove 

Judge Newman from hearing any cases indefinitely. Judge Newman, though herself a 

member of the Judicial Council, and at the time not subject to an investigation, was not 

even given notice of this meeting, much less invited to address the Council, participate 

in deliberations, or vote on an action that was supposedly taken “for the effective and 

expeditious administration of justice within the circuit.” 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1). 

Suspending an active judge from hearing cases indefinitely without first conducting an 

investigation was unprecedented in the history of the American judiciary, and no statute 

empowered the Judicial Council to do it. 

When Judge Newman refused to resign as demanded by the Chief Judge, the 

Chief Judge prepared a formal order launching the present investigation. It should be 

noted that no colleague of Judge Newman ever filed a formal complaint alleging 

misconduct or incapacity, even though all of Judge Newman’s colleagues have worked 

with her and are aware of her capabilities. Instead, the Chief Judge unilaterally 

converted these expressions of “concern” from unnamed sources into a formal 

complaint, while denying that she is the real complainant. The Chief Judge provided a 

draft of the order “identify[ing] a complaint” to Judge Newman on March 17, 2023. 

6

If a formal meeting occurred, there was no notice of such meeting, nor were any minutes provided 

to Judge Newman despite repeated requests. The Report now acknowledges that the Council’s 

decision “was not memorialized in a written order.” Report at 77.
6

She then threatened to launch a full-scale investigation unless Judge Newman agreed to 

an “informal resolution,” see March 24 Order at 6, so long as such a “resolution”

included Judge Newman relinquishing her lifetime appointment as an active-duty Judge. 

Because Judge Newman continued—and continues—to refuse to be coerced into 

resignation, on March 24, 2023, the Chief Judge formally entered the order and 

appointed a “special committee,” consisting of herself, Judge Prost, and Judge Taranto, 

i.e., the very judges who already attempted unsuccessfully to pressure Judge Newman

to resign, to investigate the allegations made by Chief Judge Moore herself. 

The March 24 Order made at least four baseless factual claims. First, the Order 

alleged that “in the summer of 2021, Judge Newman, at the age of 94, was “hospitalized 

after suffering a heart attack.” Id. at 1. Second, the Order alleged that Judge Newman

“under[went] coronary stent surgery.” Id. Third, the Order stated that “on May 3, 

2022, Judge Newman fainted following an argument and was unable to walk without 

assistance.” Id. Finally, the Order claimed that as a result of these alleged maladies, 

Judge Newman’s “sittings were reduced compared to her colleagues.” Each and every 

one of these original allegations that ostensibly provided the genesis of the investigation 

is demonstrably false, and even the Special Committee no longer presses any of them. 

See, e.g., Report at 81-82. To this day, the Committee has not provided any information 

as to the basis for the claims made in the March 24 Order, so it appears that these claims 
7

were simply fabricated out of whole cloth.7 

In short order, and without waiting for any responses, affidavits, and the like, the 

Chief Judge and the Special Committee entered a slew of new orders. On April 6, 2023, 

Chief Judge Moore issued a new and virtually unprecedented order expanding the scope 

of the special committee’s investigation into Judge Newman’s alleged “disability” and 

“misconduct” to include questions about internal operations of Judge Newman’s 

chambers. The April 6 Order contained no allegations of harassment or other similar 

conduct. Rather, the order alleged that Judge Newman failed to maintain confidentiality 

of an employment dispute between herself and a (now former) staff member. The 

alleged breach of confidentiality stemmed from Judge Newman using the “‘

email list—which includes all judges, chambers staff, and other judicial employees (95 

individuals in all),” rather than replying by using each judge’s individual email address. 

April 6 Order at 5-6. No one alleged that the email list was used with any 

malice or purpose of disclosing confidential information, rather than as an honest 

mistake. For that matter, at the time the email was sent, it was not even conveyed to 

7 The Committee feigns offense at this allegation, see Report at 81, but it still steadfastly refuses to 

disclose any basis for the allegations made in Chief Judge Moore’s complaint of a “heart attack” or 

“cardiac stents” or the rest. Even now, when the Committee has explained it did not mean “heart 

attack” in a “technical” sense, see, e.g., Tr. of July 31 Hearing at 19:9-13, it has not disclosed the basis 

for its belief that any “cardiac event” occurred in the relevant time period. Absent such basic 

information, Judge Newman has no choice but to conclude that the allegation was indeed fabricated.
8

Judge Newman that a formal confidential Employment Dispute Resolution Process had 

yet begun.

The April 6 Order is particularly noteworthy because it reproduces an email from 

Chief Judge Moore to Judge Newman that unequivocally states that Judge Newman has 

been suspended “pending the results of the investigation into potential 

disability/misconduct” and that Judge Newman “will not be assigned any new cases 

until the[] [disciplinary] proceedings are resolved.” Id. at 4. Although after Judge 

Newman filed suit8challenging the unlawful suspension the reason for suspending 

Judge Newman was changed, it is important to recognize that Chief Judge Moore’s 

email conceded this unlawful basis for it. 

On April 7, 2023, the special committee issued an order directing Judge Newman 

to undergo neurological and neuropsychological examinations. At this point, the 

Special Committee had yet to speak to any of Judge Newman’s staff (for example, the 

deposition of her career law clerk occurred on April 12, nearly a week after the April 7 

Order, whereas the affidavit by another one of her law clerks was not executed until 

April 19, 2023). Nor had any of the other episodes which the Special Committee 

recounts in its Report yet occurred. In other words, as of April 7, 2023 when Judge 

Newman was ordered to undergo unwanted (and unnecessary) medical testing, the 

8 Newman v. Moore, No. 1:23-cv-01334-CRC (D.D.C. filed May 10, 2023).
9

Committee had no objective evidence of disability beyond Judge Newman’s alleged 

delays in publishing her opinions. It is therefore not surprising that the April 7 Order 

listed no bases whatsoever for its demand. The April 7 Order also provided no 

explanation as to the scope or means of the proposed testing, the use of the test results, 

the basis on which the various medical providers were chosen by the special committee, 

nor the qualifications of these providers.

Furthermore, as the Special Committee was well-aware, Judge Newman was still 

unrepresented by counsel at that point. Despite this lack of representation, the 

committee directed Judge Newman to respond to the request “by 3:00 pm on April 11, 

2023,” (i.e., within four days of the issuance of the order) and further threatened that 

“[r]efusal to comply ... may result in the Committee seeking to expand the scope of the 

investigation to include an inquiry into whether the subject judge’s non-cooperation 

constitutes misconduct ....” April 7 Order at 2-3. On April 13, 2023, the special 

committee made good on its threat, and Chief Judge Moore expanded the investigation 

into Judge Newman on the basis “that Judge Newman[’s] [] fail[ure] to cooperate 

constitute[d] additional misconduct.” April 13 Order at 2.

Following the issuance of these orders, the Special Committee required Judge 

Newman’s chambers staff to appear for interviews, going so far as to subpoena Judge 

Newman’s career law clerk, even though there was absolutely no indication that the law 

clerk would refuse to appear in response to a simple request. The Special Committee 
10

was aware that Judge Newman and her law clerks had long-standing plans to attend the 

Thirtieth Annual Intellectual Property Law & Policy Conference that was held at 

Fordham University School of Law in New York City on April 13-14, 2023. When 

Judge Newman’s staff requested that the Committee accommodate these long-standing 

commitments and agree to hold the requested interviews upon their return, the 

Committee refused this simple request. Indeed, the subpoena to Judge Newman’s 

career law clerk was served upon her less than 48 hours before her attendance was 

demanded. The same lack of basic courtesy and procedural protections was shown to 

other members of Judge Newman’s chambers.

On April 12, 2023, the Committee deposed Judge Newman’s career law clerk, 

but it obtained no additional substantive information, as the law clerk (despite threats 

from the Chief Judge) repeatedly invoked her Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. At about the same time, the Special Committee also interviewed another 

one of Judge Newman’s law clerks, yet, possibly because that law clerk provided no 

derogatory information about Judge Newman, the Special Committee apparently kept 

no record of any kind (or at least did not provide one to Judge Newman) of that

interview. All members of Judge Newman’s staff who were interviewed were expressly 

told not to share even the very fact of their interview with anyone, including Judge 

Newman. The substance of these formal or informal interviews, as well as the identity 

of the witnesses that the Committee has spoken to, was not shared with Judge Newman 
11

until June 1, 2023. 

On April 17, 2023, the Special Committee issued another order, this time

directing Judge Newman to “provide hospital records, medical, psychiatric or 

psychological, and other health-professional records that relate to the” alleged heart 

attack, cardiac stent placement, and fainting episode that were “described in the second 

paragraph of the Order dated March 24, 2023.” April 17 Order at 1. As was true with 

the March 24 Order, the April 17 Order did not state a basis for even believing that the 

alleged episodes even took place (much less that medical records related to these alleged 

episodes existed). Indeed, as the Special Committee presently admits, see Report at 81-

82, it has no credible information that the episodes “described in the second paragraph 

of the Order dated March 24, 2023,” i.e., a heart attack, a cardiac stent procedure, 

and/or a fainting spell ever took place. The April 17 Order also did not offer any 

explanation for the relevance of these records (assuming their existence) to Judge 

Newman’s (or any other judge’s) ability to perform judicial functions, nor did it explain 

how exactly a committee made up of members of federal judiciary, none of whom have 

any medical training, were planning to evaluate these records. 

In the same order the Special Committee also “require[d] production of hospital 

records and medical, psychiatric or psychological, or other health-professional records 

of any treatment or consultation in the last two years regarding attention, focus, 

confusion, memory loss, fatigue or stamina.” April 17 Order at 2. Once more, no 
12

explanation was provided for why a particular timeframe was chosen, what use of these

records would be made, or who would be examining them. Finally, the Special 

Committee “request[ed] that Judge Newman sit down with the Committee for a videotaped interview.” Id. Neither the scope nor the length nor the purpose of the interview 

was outlined. The Order directed a response to the outlined requirements by “[b]y 9:00 

am Friday, April 21, 2023,” (i.e., within three days of the issuance of the Order), and it

again threatened that “[r]efusal to comply with this Order without good cause shown 

may result in the Committee seeking to expand the scope of the investigation.” Id. 

Again, it is worth noting that, though Judge Newman had retained NCLA just a few 

days prior, the firm had not yet entered an appearance and was in no way ready to 

evaluate the propriety of the Special Committee’s ever-increasing demands. 

On April 20, 2023, Chief Judge Moore issued yet another order, again expanding 

the scope of the investigation, listing “new matters.” The first matter centered on 

“Judge Newman’s alleged conduct toward her chambers staff member.” April 20 Order

at 1. The Order alleged that Judge Newman “retaliated” against one of her employees 

because following that employee’s complaints to Chief Judge Moore, Judge Newman 

chose not to include this employee “in chambers’ communications, including workrelated emails.” Id. at 2. The second matter “relate[d] to Judge Newman’s alleged 

conduct toward one of her law clerks.” Id. at 7. In essence, Chief Judge Moore found 

that “there is probable cause to believe that Judge Newman has engaged in conduct 
13

prejudicial to the effective and expedidious [sic] administration of the business of the 

courts” because she demanded that her law clerk either engage in assignments given to 

him or resign. Id. at 8. With respect to these two matters, no explanation was provided 

of the legal basis for limiting a judge’s complete discretion to decide how work is 

distributed inside her chambers.

The third matter “relate[d] to Judge Newman’s alleged conduct towards the 

Court’s IT Department.” Id. The Order alleged that in conversation with the IT 

department “Judge Newman sounded annoyed, agitated, paranoid and upset,” and that 

a phone call with Judge Newman was “bizarre and unnecessarily hostile toward Judge 

Newman’s chambers staff member.” Id. at 8-9. Even assuming the veracity of these 

perceptions by IT staff (none of which Judge Newman was ever able to test through 

cross-examination or otherwise), the incidents referred to occurred on April 17 and 18, 

i.e., after the investigation into Judge Newman began, and after a number of

confrontational emails from the Chief Judge, thus fully explaining why Judge Newman 

would sound “annoyed, agitated, ... and upset.” Perhaps even more importantly, these 

incidents occurred after the Committee entered its orders requiring medical 

examinations and surrender of medical records; thus, these events did not and could 

not have served as a basis for the orders of April 7 and April 17, 2023.

On April 21, 2023, Judge Newman, now represented by counsel, responded to 

the committee’s prior orders. In the letter addressed to Chief Judge Moore and copied 
14

to all other members of the Special Committee, Judge Newman raised several

objections to the process that had unfolded to that point. Most importantly, Judge 

Newman pointed out that neither Chief Judge Moore nor the Judicial Council had 

authority to order an interim suspension of Judge Newman from participating in the 

work of the Court and on that basis she requested her immediate reinstatement to the 

argument calendar. Judge Newman also requested that Chief Judge Moore invite the 

Chief Justice to transfer the matter to a judicial council of a different circuit as 

contemplated by Rule 26.

On May 3, 2023, the Special Committee responded to Judge Newman’s letter, by 

“reissuing its orders regarding medical evaluation and testing and medical records and 

establishing new deadlines for compliance.”9 May 3 Order at 2.10 The Order repeated 

the various allegations previously described, but again failed to explain the relevance of 

the medical records requested, the scope or means of the proposed testing, the use of 

the test results or medical records, the basis on which the various medical providers 

were chosen by the Special Committee, or the qualification of these providers. 

9 The May 3 Order did not clarify whether resetting the deadlines for compliance also meant that the 

April 13 Order expanding the investigation into Judge Newman on the basis “that Judge Newman[’s] 

[] fail[ure] to cooperate constitute[d] additional misconduct” was vacated. The Order also omitted a 

request for a video-taped interview.

10 Simultaneously, the Special Committee issued a Gag Order forbidding Judge Newman and her 

counsel from disclosing any information about the investigation. After Judge Newman filed suit, see 

Newman v. Moore, No. 1:23-cv-01334-CRC (D.D.C. filed May 10, 2023), the Committee significantly 

narrowed the Gag Order. See May 16, 2023 Order.
15

Furthermore, the Order rejected Judge Newman’s suggestion that she and the Special 

Committee “engage in negotiation as to the scope of the requests as provided by the 

Commentary to Rule 13.” Id. at 7-8. Finally, the Order denied Judge Newman’s request 

for a transfer “without prejudice to refiling after Judge Newman has complied with the 

Committee’s orders concerning medical evaluation and testing and medical records.” 

Id. at 9. The Special Committee did not explain then or at any point in the future up to 

the present day, why or how the provision of medical records or submission to medical 

testing would affect its analysis under Rule 26.11 The Order set a May 10, 2023, 9:00 

am deadline for Judge Newman to reply to its demands. Id. at 13-14. None of the 

orders filed on May 3, 2023,12 acknowledged, much less addressed, Judge Newman’s 

argument that her suspension from judicial office “pending the results of the 

investigation into potential disability/misconduct” was illegal and not authorized by any 

statute or rule of procedure. The orders simply ignored her request to be immediately 

restored to the argument calendar.

11 On the same date, a third order, in the name of the Judicial Council, also denied, without any 

explanation, Judge Newman’s request to transfer the matter to another judicial council without 

prejudice to re-filing after Judge Newman has complied with the Special Committee’s requests for 

medical records and the evaluation and testing ordered by the Special Committee. 

12 Although three orders were issued on May 3, see supra nn.10-11, the references to the “May 3 Order,” 

except where otherwise noted, are to the Special Committee’s Order requiring medical testing and 

production of records.
16

On May 9, 2023, Judge Newman responded to the Special Committee.

13

 The 

letter objected to the request for medical records on the basis that the committee did 

not (and is unlikely to be able to) explain the relevance of the requested records or the 

scope of their use. May 9 Letter to the Special Committee at 3-4. On similar grounds, 

Judge Newman objected to the request for medical testing. Id. at 4-5.14 At the same 

time, Judge Newman indicated that she was willing to discuss the request with the 

Special Committee in a cooperative manner as contemplated by the commentary to 

Rule 13(a), which instructs “the Special Committee [to] enter into an agreement with 

the subject judge as to the scope and use that may be made of the examination results.” 

Id. at 4-5. The May 9 Letter renewed the request for the matter to be transferred to the 

judicial council of another circuit, once again explaining that since Chief Judge Moore 

was in effect a complainant in this matter and that since all of Judge Newman’s 

colleagues are potential witnesses to her ability to competently carry out her judicial 

duties, it is inappropriate for any of them to also serve as adjudicators. Id. at 5-6. Finally, 

the May 9 Letter reiterated Judge Newman’s demand to be immediately restored to the 

case assignment calendar. Id. at 6.

13 Due to a glitch in the email system, the letter was not delivered to the Federal Circuit until the 

morning of May 10, 2023, which was still within the timeframe set by the Committee’s May 3 Order. 

14 The May 9 Letter objected to the special committee’s gag order on First Amendment grounds and 

as an alternative, formally requested the public release of various orders and letters pursuant to Rule 

23(b)(7) of the Conduct Rules. The Rule 23(b)(7) request was eventually granted on May 16, 2023. 
17

In response to the May 9 Letter, on May 16, 2023, the Special Committee issued 

an order reiterating the request for medical records, medical testing, and a video-taped 

interview, and for the first time explained the relevance and the scope of its demands. 

May 16 Order at 4-6. Nevertheless, the Special Committee again rejected Judge 

Newman’s requests to at the very least participate in the selection of providers or 

negotiations as to the type and scope of testing. Id. at 20-21. The Special Committee

again failed to explain on what basis the selected medical providers were chosen or what 

qualifications they might have that are relevant to their ability to evaluate Judge 

Newman’s mental health. The Special Committee once again denied the request for a 

transfer and once again entirely ignored Judge Newman’s objection to the Judicial 

Council’s unlawful suspension of her pending the outcome of the investigation. Id. at 

26. The Special Committee set a deadline of 9:00 am on May 23, 2023, to respond to

its requests. Id. at 25.

On May 20, 2023, Judge Newman requested a short extension of time to respond 

to the May 16 orders. In support of the request, lead counsel for Judge Newman 

explained that he was out of the country and visiting Israel until June 1, 2023, in order 

to attend to family and religious obligations. On May 22, the Special Committee denied 

the requested extension of time, and instead reset the deadline to 9:00 am on May 26, 
18

2023.15 On May 25, Judge Newman responded to the Special Committee’s May 16 

Order, declining the requests but once more offering to resolve the issue in a 

cooperative, collegial, and collaborative way. Specifically, Judge Newman wrote that 

she is willing “to undergo necessary testing, provide necessary records, and meet with 

a Special Committee provided that she is immediately restored to her rights and duties 

as a judge and further provided that this matter is promptly transferred to a judicial 

council of another circuit, which is unmarred by the prior unlawful decisions ....” May 

25 Letter to Special Committee at 3 (cleaned up).

The following day, “the Committee ... requested that the scope of the 

investigation be expanded to investigate whether Judge Newman has failed to cooperate 

in violation of the Rules and whether her failure to cooperate constitutes misconduct.” 

May 26 Order at 1. In an order issued the same day, Chief Judge Moore granted the 

Committee’s request and once again ordered the expansion of the investigation. Id.

However, less than a week later, on June 1, 2023, the Committee issued a new 

order narrowing the scope of its investigation. The new order stated that “[i]n light of 

the practical constraints that Judge Newman’s [alleged] refusal to cooperate places on 

the Committee’s ability to proceed” it will not, “at this time” pursue the allegations 

regarding Judge Newman’s mental or physical disability. June 1 Order at 2, 4. Instead, 

15 May 26, 2023, fell on a major Jewish festival of Shavuot (“Feast of Weeks”). In order to avoid a 

conflict with counsel’s religious obligations, Judge Newman had to file a response on May 25, 2023. 
19

the Committee announced that its “investigation will focus on the question whether 

Judge Newman’s refusal to cooperate with the Committee’s investigation constitutes 

misconduct,” id. at 3, and accordingly directed Judge Newman to, by July 5, 2023, 

“submit a brief limited to addressing the question whether Judge Newman’s refusal to 

undergo examinations, to provide medical records, and to sit for an interview with the 

Committee ... constitute [sic] misconduct and the appropriate remedy if the Committee 

were to make a finding of misconduct ...,” id. at 6. The Committee scheduled oral 

argument on the matter for July 13, 2023. On June 1, the Committee, for the first time, 

provided Judge Newman with various affidavits regarding Judge Newman’s behavior, 

which in its view supported the Committee’s decision to require that Judge Newman 

undergo a mental fitness evaluation. Id. at 5. At the same time, the Committee 

cautioned that because it is narrowing its investigation to the issue of Judge Newman’s 

alleged failure to cooperate with the Committee’s investigation, “there are no witnesses 

who could have relevant testimony bearing on the narrow issue of [the alleged] 

misconduct,” id., and that “additional factual development” is not required, id. at 4.

On June 20, 2023, in response to Judge Newman’s earlier request for clarification 

of the June 1 Order, the Committee issued a new order reiterating that “the only subject 

[Judge Newman] should address in the brief due on July 5 (and at the hearing on July 

13) is whether Judge Newman’s refusal to comply with the Committee’s orders seeking

(i) neurological and neuropsychological testing, (ii) medical records, and (iii) an
20

interview constitutes misconduct.” June 20 Order at 4.

Consistent with the Committee’s directive, on July 5, Judge Newman filed a letter 

brief explaining that a) she did not fail to “cooperate,” i.e., “work together” to resolve 

the matter, b) the Committee did not make a prima facie case for the need for the 

evaluations in the first place, c) she had good cause to refuse to meekly submit to the 

Committee’s imperious demands because all of the members of the Committee had not 

only a risk of bias, but have shown actual bias, and d) no sanctions are warranted for 

Judge Newman’s standing on principle to defend her constitutional guarantees of due 

process and appointment for life to judicial office.

On July 13, 2023, the Committee held a hearing.16 Over Judge Newman’s 

objection, the hearing was closed to the public. See June 1 Order at 6, June 20 Order at 

5-9. During the hearing, and for the first time, the Committee members suggested that

when the Committee wrote multiple times in multiple orders that Judge Newman had a 

“heart attack” it did not really mean a “heart attack” but instead meant something else. 

The Committee continued to insist that the other nebulous “cardiac event” which the 

Committee did not define was relevant to determining whether the request for Judge 

Newman to undergo medical testing was proper. Also for the first time, the Committee

16 It should not go unsaid that the hearing was conducted in an extraordinarily and uniquely hostile 

fashion. None of the attorneys appearing at the hearing has ever before experienced such level of 

hostility and disrespect from any judge at any level of the judiciary.
21

suggested that the request for a “video-taped interview” was in reality an opportunity 

for a conversation where Judge Newman could point out the factual errors in the 

Committee’s own documents. 

On July 31, 2023, the Committee issued its Report and Recommendations. The 

Report mostly rehashed claims and statements made in prior orders, but also rejected 

evidence proffered by Judge Newman, including a statement from a qualified 

neurologist that Judge Newman’s “cognitive function is sufficient to continue her 

participation in her court’s proceedings,” and a statistical analysis of Court members’

productivity conducted by Dr. Ronald Katznelson. Ron D. Katznelson, Ph.D., Is There

a Campaign to Silence Dissent at the Federal Circuit?, available at

https://ssrn.com/abstract=4489143.

17

The Committee publicly released the Report without awaiting Judge Newman’s 

response or seeking Judge Newman’s consent on August 4, 2023.

18

 On August 14, 

2023, once Judge Newman’s lead counsel (of which 

the Committee was well aware), he submitted a request to the Committee for: a) release 

17 An updated version of the paper was published on August 28, 2023.

18 This action stands in sharp contrast with the Committee’s treatment of Judge Newman’s own 

request to release her brief which was submitted on July 5, but which the Committee refused to release 

for a whole month, despite multiple requests to do so. See July 5 Brief at 1 n.1; July 12 Letter at 1 n.1; 

Hearing Tr. at 5:7-13. The Committee appears to believe that one set of rules applies to the Committee 

and another set to Judge Newman. This is yet further evidence of the Committee’s bias when serving 

as accuser and adjudicator and its failure to adhere to basic norms of due process. 
22

of data regarding Judge Newman’s productivity going back to 2018, and b) permission 

to share the confidential and redacted data with a consulting expert who could verify 

and test the accuracy of the data on which the Committee relied. On August 17, 2023, 

the Committee denied the request as “untimely, waived, and unjustified” and ultimately 

irrelevant to the question of Judge Newman’s cooperation. August 17 Order at 4-8. 

The Committee asserted that the record had “closed,” August 17 Order at 6-8, but cited 

no authority for this odd proposition. The Rules for Judicial Conduct and Judicial

Disability Proceedings afford a subject judge an opportunity to “send a written response 

... [and] to present argument, personally or through counsel,” R. 20(a), and nowhere 

do the rules limit subject judges to the “record” developed by the Committee. Thus, 

yet again, and as has been the case throughout these proceedings, the Committee is 

cutting procedural corners and violating Judge Newman’s due process rights. The 

Committee’s refusal to permit Judge Newman to put the misleading record it compiled 

in an appropriate and full light undermines whatever claims of reasonableness the 

Committee may have had (and, as explained below, it had none) for its demands. 
23

II. AT ALL RELEVANT TIMES THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE LACKED FACTUAL

PREDICATES FOR ORDERING MEDICAL EXAMINATION19

A. THE FACTUAL RECORD AT THE TIME OF THE FIRST ORDER REQUIRING MEDICAL

EXAMINATION DID NOT SUPPORT SUCH A DEMAND

Throughout its Report, the Committee mixed and matched facts and dates in a

way that obscures the predetermined outcome at which the Committee (and the Judicial 

Council) arrived as early as April 7, 2023, if not a month earlier. It is important to be 

clear as to what evidence was before the Committee, and at what time, in order to 

determine whether the Committee made even a prima facie case that Judge Newman 

needs to undergo a medical evaluation.

The first order requiring Judge Newman to submit to a medical evaluation was 

entered on April 7, 2023. At the time, the only information before the Committee was:

a) the record of Judge Newman’s allegedly “extraordinary delays” and allegedly reduced

productivity, b) allegations of a “heart attack,” “cardiac stent,” and a fainting spell, all 

of which allegedly resulted in Judge Newman’s “sittings [being] reduced compared to 

her colleagues,” and c) ill-defined “direct observations of Judge Newman’s behavior,” 

April 7 Order at 1, including by the members of the Committee. None of these “facts,” 

19 Because the Committee conceded that “Judge Newman need not supply such records to the 

Committee itself but only to the neurologist whom the Committee has selected to conduct an 

evaluation of Judge Newman,” May 16 Order at 6, the propriety of the order to produce the records 

rises and falls with the propriety of the order to submit to the neurological and neuropsychological 

examination. Furthermore, it makes no sense to demand non-existent medical records for nonexistent events and then deem someone non-cooperative for not providing them. 
24

either alone or in combination, are even remotely adequate to justify a forced medical 

examination.

1. The Statistical Data Do Not Support the Suspicion That Judge

Newman Has Suffered Cognitive Decline

Throughout its investigation the Committee has spent an inordinate amount of 

time delving into Judge Newman’s alleged tardiness in opinion writing, voting, and the 

like. According to the Committee, see, e.g., Report at 1, 5, these delays can serve as 

evidence of cognitive decline. But there are two fundamental problems with the data.

First, and most fundamentally, in order to show that the data indicates a decline

in Judge Newman’s cognitive abilities, one necessarily must show that there has been 

some change between the time when everyone agrees that Judge Newman was not 

disabled and the present day. If between that earlier point in time and present there is 

a marked slowdown in productivity as measured either in terms of number of the 

opinions or their speed, then it might raise questions as to why such a slowdown has 

occurred. In contrast, a snapshot in time without such a comparison tells us nothing 

about a “decline” in Judge Newman’s mental acuity. At most (and only assuming that 

the data is properly analyzed), it tells us that Judge Newman is simply a slow writer. 

The Special Committee, whose members have degrees in disciplines like engineering 

and have engaged in advanced studies of mathematics, surely knows that this is the only 

correct way to analyze the data. Yet, the Committee merely chose to look at a snapshot 
25

between 2020 and 2023 in order to determine whether further investigation is 

warranted.

The data that the Committee chose to rely on shows, according to the 

Committee, that Judge Newman is an outlier in terms of both the number of opinions 

published, and the speed at which she publishes them. Aside from the fact that a 

snapshot-in-time does not and cannot show a decline in Judge Newman’s ability, the data 

itself doesn’t actually show what the Committee purports it shows.

First, the Court’s own data, as stated in one of the provided affidavits, shows 

that between October 1, 2020 and September 30, 2021 (when there were no concerns 

about Judge Newman’s abilities to discharge her duties), it took Judge Newman 249.11 

days to publish an opinion.20 According to the same affidavit, between October 1, 2021 

and March 24, 2023 (when concerns about Judge Newman’s abilities began to be 

voiced), it took Judge Newman 198.75 days to publish an opinion. That is an over 25% 

increase in speed during the time that Judge Newman allegedly became less able to fulfill 

the duties of her office. This fact alone is sufficient to refute the allegations leveled 

against Judge Newman, and, given this fact, any demand for forced medical testing is 

perforce unreasonable.

20 The affidavit does not seem to differentiate between majority and separate opinions, even though it 

is self-evident that a concurring or dissenting opinion, which by definition responds to the majority 

opinion, will take more time to prepare because one must first read the majority opinion.
26

The Committee rejects this conclusion by arguing that “[t]he obvious reason for 

the improvement after October 2021 is that [Judge Newman’s] caseload was 

substantially reduced in this period.” Report at 105. This, of course is far from obvious. 

As an initial matter, if the Committee is correct and Judge Newman’s mental 

deterioration began sometime around the summer of 2021, see, e.g., March 24 Order at 

1, then one would expect that even with a reduced workload, the statistics would show 

that Judge Newman’s productivity continued to deteriorate rather than improve. At 

the very least, given that in the Committee’s account there were two opposing forces 

affecting Judge Newman’s productivity (reduced sittings which should have permitted 

for faster opinion writing on the one hand, and alleged mental deterioration which 

ought to have exacerbated delays, on the other hand), there should not have been 

marked improvement in speed. Yet, the Committee simply pooh-poohs the 25% 

increase in the pace of opinion production without any statistical or other analysis. It 

falls into a trap that every first-year law student is taught to avoid—it just calls the 

conclusion “obvious,” as if the adjective alone substitutes for legal or mathematical 

analysis.

In contrast, data analysis conducted by Dr. Ronald Katznelson and submitted to 

the Committee by Judge Newman shows that there has been no decrease in Judge 

Newman’s speed between 2018-2020 (i.e., a timeframe during which no one claims that 
27

Judge Newman was disabled) and 2020-2022 (the period on which the Committee is 

focusing).21 Katznelson, supra at 57. 

Second, the data relied on by the Committee simply do not differentiate between 

majority and dissenting opinions. Even taken at face value, the data show that Judge 

Newman takes 146 days longer than other judges to issue opinions. However, decisions 

that include “dissents have an average pendency that is 143 days longer than the average 

pendency of majority/unanimous opinions.” Katznelson at 19. Given that Judge 

Newman dissents in over half her cases, see id. at 4, her delays are in large part explained

by the need for the extra time it takes to issue a split decision. 

The Committee argues data relied on by Dr. Katznelson does not present the 

full picture because it doesn’t account for: a) the date the case was assigned to a given 

judge, and instead looks only at the time the briefing was complete; b) the instances of 

case-reassignments which are not publicly known; and c) per curiam opinions which do 

not have the name of the authoring judge released. Report at 56-58. All three critiques 

are entirely devoid of merit.

21 In fact, the average pendency of cases in which Judge Newman authored a majority opinion decreased

in the latter time period from an average of 612.3 days (as measured from the filing of a case to the 

circulation of the publication of the opinion) to 534.4 days. However, the decrease was not statistically 

significant. The point nevertheless remains—Judge Newman’s speed of writing has remained steady 

throughout, and therefore her “excessive delays” (even if they exist) cannot possibly serve as evidence 

of deterioration of her mental state. 
28

With respect to the issue of the appropriate start date to calculate the pendency 

of the appeal, it should be fairly self-evident that unless Judge Newman gets assigned 

cases earlier than her colleagues (which is entirely implausible) then whether one begins 

counting at the time of docketing, the time the briefing is completed, or at any other 

time up until the dates of assignment to each individual judge, the variation in pendency 

ought to remain constant.22 What Dr. Katznelson’s expert data analysis shows is that—

contrary to the Special Committee’s non-expert statistical analysis—Judge Newman is 

not an outlier.

With respect to case-reassignments, the Special Committee’s claim is both 

baffling and outrageous. The Committee lists three cases which were assigned to Judge 

Newman and then, after long periods of pendency reassigned to other judges: 

 and 

. The Committee’s misleading presentation of these cases 

leaves one with an impression that Judge Newman simply did not produce an opinion 

22 As Dr. Katznelson explains, “for Judge Newman to appear an outlier with longer net authorship 

time consistent with the data in Figure 3 [which shows her performance to be in the middle of the 

range of other active judges], the total [administrative] pre-assignment delays for cases later assigned 

to her should have been disproportionately and materially shorter than those for her colleagues. There 

is no evidence that the procedures of the Federal Circuit could have resulted in specifically expediting 

the assignment of cases only to Judge Newman.” Katznelson, supra at 36. Aware of this explanation, 

the Committee never answers this simple challenge and does not provide any statistical evidence to 

the contrary. Nor does it explain how such putative evidence using the “the exact information” 

available to the Committee in any full statistical analysis of pendency for all active judges, would 

produce materially different results, somehow establishing Judge Newman’s pendency performance 

as a statistically significant outlier. 
29

in them, resulting in the cases being reassigned to another judge. But that is simply 

false. In both and , Judge Newman circulated a draft opinion, which 

was not joined by either of the other two judges on the panel. The opinions were then 

reassigned because Judge Newman’s views could not command a majority, and not 

because of excessive delays. The same is true regarding two additional cases mentioned 

in the original March 24 Order— , where 

Judge Newman ended up writing a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting 

in part and , where Judge Newman ended 

up writing a dissent. But the fact that Judge Newman’s views may be idiosyncratic is 

not evidence of any mental or physical disability. It is simply evidence of idiosyncratic 

views. And such evidence cannot possibly be a basis for ordering a forced medical 

evaluation. 

The Committee also misses the mark with its allegations that Judge Newman 

does not shoulder her share of the burden when it comes to per curiam opinions which, 

according to the Court’s statistics constitute nearly a third of the Court’s output.23 First, 

as Dr. Katznelson’s analysis shows, panels on which Judge Newman served were least 

likely to issue per curiam opinions as compared to any other panel of the Court. 

23 The claim that 31.6% of the Court’s opinions are per curiam seems to be at odds with the publicly 

available data. According to the publicly available data, between 2016 and 2022, only 19% of decisions 

were issued per curiam and another 26% were summary affirmances without an opinion under Fed. Cir. 

R. 36. See Katznelson, supra at 31.
30

Katznelson, supra at 27-28. Because Judge Newman’s panels are least likely to agree to 

a per curiam disposition, it follows that Judge Newman is likely to write fewer per curiam

opinions than other judges.24 Furthermore, data show that panels on which Judge 

Newman served were most likely to resolve cases through a Rule 36 disposition than any 

other set of panels.25 Because a Rule 36 disposition results in no opinion at all, it is 

therefore not surprising that Judge Newman would have fewer opinions overall than 

other judges.

Finally, the Committee’s allegations that Judge Newman has sat on fewer panels 

than her colleagues is particularly galling for at least two separate reasons. First, the 

assertion in the March 24 Order that in the summer of 2021 (following an alleged “heart 

attack”) Judge Newman’s “sittings were reduced compared to her colleagues,” is 

manifestly false. To the contrary, Judge Newman sat on more panels than any of her 

colleagues save for two. The Committee attempts to disregard this obvious 

contradiction between reality and its claims by pointing out that in the summer of 2021 

24 As Dr. Katznelson again explains, “[b]ecause authored dissenting opinions [generally] do not issue 

in cases that are per curiam, the higher the share of dissents among the judge’s authored opinions, the 

fewer panel decisions in which the judge participates can be per curiam to begin with. Taken to the 

limit, a judge that dissents in all panels she serves cannot be the author of any [] per curiam opinion—

a manifest constraint that has nothing to do with productivity.”

25 In some sense Rule 36 dispositions and non-controversial per curiam dispositions are “substitute 

goods.” As a result, it is not surprising that Judge Newman is least likely to be on panels disposing of 

cases via a per curiam opinion and most likely to be on panels utilizing the Rule 36 mechanism, whereas 

Judge Raymond Chen shows the same pattern in reverse.
31

arguments were held remotely and telephonically, Report at 53, but one is hard-pressed 

to understand the relevance of the mode of the session in which oral argument was held 

to the question of how many such sessions Judge Newman participated in. The 

Committee’s allegation was and remains simply false, and therefore it cannot be relied 

on as a reason for forcing Judge Newman to undergo medical examination.26

Second, although Judge Newman’s sittings were reduced beginning sometime in 

2022, that reduction is attributable entirely to decisions by someone other than Judge 

Newman. For years, when judges of the Court were asked as to their availability to sit 

during the next available month, Judge Newman has sent an identical message which 

reads that she “is available to sit 2-3 days, or as needed.”27 The email is always sent to 

the Chief Judge’s chambers who then “provides to the clerk’s office a list of judges that 

are available for each day of an argument session.” Fed. Cir. IOP 3.1.28 That Judge 

Newman was not assigned to the number of panels which she indicated both willingness 

and desire to sit on, is an issue that must be rightly taken up with the Chief Judge rather 

26 The Report recasts the March 24 Order which dealt with “reduced sittings” into allegations of lower 

productivity. Aside from the fact that such a bait-and-switch manner of litigation is highly improper, 

the number of sittings that any given judge undertakes is controlled by the Chief Judge. See Report at 

78-79.

27 A version of such an email is reproduced as Exhibit 7 to the Committee’s Report.

28 In light of the clear language of Internal Operating Procedure 3.1, Chief Judge Moore’s assertion

that that any claim that the Chief Judge decides on panel assignment is “[c]ompletely false” and that 

“[t]he Chief Judge has no input whatsoever,” Tr. of Hearing at 41:23-42:13, is simply baffling.
32

than with Judge Newman herself. But the Chief Judge may not decline to assign Judge 

Newman to equal number of panels as other judges and then turn around and complain 

that Judge Newman has not served on the same number of panels as other judges.

Thus, the statistical data did not provide any basis for the Committee’s April 7, 

2023 Order.

2. Baseless Allegations Concerning Judge Newman’s Health

Issues Cannot Justify a Forced Medical Examination

The April 7 Order demanding that Judge Newman submit to unwanted medical 

examination also relied on false allegations about Judge Newman’s health issues,

including a “heart attack” that she allegedly suffered in the summer of 2021, which in 

turn allegedly necessitated the placement of cardiac stents, as well as an episode of 

fainting on May 3, 2022. However, neurological and neuropsychiatric exams are not 

warranted merely because a person has suffered a myocardial infarction—the proper 

medical term for a “heart attack.” To be sure, a myocardial infarction can lead to 

neurological sequelae. See, e.g., Moneera N. Haque and Robert S. Dieter, Neurologic 

Complications of Myocardial Infarction, 119 Handbook of Clinical Neurology 93 (2013). But 

the mere fact of a prior myocardial infarction would not, in and of itself, form any basis 

to suspect neurological deficits. In any event, as Judge Newman has represented to the 

Committee on numerous occasions, the allegations are not true. Judge Newman did not 

have a “heart attack,” did not have “cardiac stents,” and did not faint on May 3, 2022. 
33

At no point did the Committee even disclose what information led them to 

believe that Judge Newman suffered these events.29 There appear to be no factual bases 

for these allegations. Absent such bases, the allegations cannot possibly serve as a 

reason to order further medical tests. The Committee seeks to recast its early allegations 

of a “heart attack” and claims that it referred to a “‘cardiac event’ that Judge Newman 

had suffered in the summer of 2021.” Report at 82 (citing May 16 Order at 4-5). There 

are several problems with this belated attempt to prop up a prior baseless allegation.

First, at the time of the April 7 Order, the Committee proceeded on the claim of 

a non-existent “heart attack” as a basis for ordering medical testing. The question is 

whether the Committee had a reasonable basis to order such a test. It did not. If the 

predicates for such an order did not exist at the time, then it follows that the order itself 

was improper. Second, the Committee did not establish that Judge Newman had a 

“cardiac event” (whatever that entirely unscientific and medically hollow term happens 

to mean) in 2021 or at any point thereafter. In fact, as with the original allegation of a 

“heart attack,” the Committee doesn’t even disclose any bases for believing that such 

an event occurred. Instead, the Committee appears to believe that the process 

contemplated by the Disciplinary Rules allows for baseless allegations to be made,

29 The source of this information is also important in evaluating other information that that the 

Committee received subsequent to the April 7 Order. If the source of the information could be so 

egregiously wrong about such an important fact, then any other information that such a source may 

have supplied about Judge Newman should be treated with particular suspicion as well. 
34

which it turn trigger an obligation by the subject judge to prove a negative (or at the 

very least to disclose otherwise private medical information simply because a formal 

process has been launched). See Report at 82 (faulting Judge Newman for “refus[ing]

to say whether she suffered any ‘cardiac event’” in 2021 in response to the Committee’s 

questions which themselves had no basis). Third, the term “cardiac event” is entirely 

devoid of meaning and can mean anything from a fatal ventricular fibrillation to 

transient myocardial ischemia caused by little more than a temporary coronary artery 

spasm or eating a heavy meal. See, e.g., Nestor Lipovetzky, Heavy Meals as a Trigger for a 

First Event of the Acute Coronary Syndrome: A Case-Crossover Study, 12 Isr. Med. Ass’n J. 728 

(2004), https://tinyurl.com/ycyzns2k. Requiring Judge Newman to disprove illdefined, unfounded claims about her physical condition is improper.

To shore up its claim about Judge Newman’s alleged “cardiac event,” the 

Committee latches onto a statement in Dr. Ted Rothstein’s report discussing Judge 

Newman’s pacemaker and pre-existing “sick sinus syndrome.” Report at 82. The 

Committee makes much of the fact that “syndrome can result in ‘confusion’ and 

‘dizziness or lightheadedness,’” and that it can “lead[] to other organ damage such as 

brain and kidney function.” Report at 96 (internal citations omitted). But the 

Committee’s reliance on this pre-existing condition is misplaced for two reasons.
35

First, the Committee doesn’t seem to understand that sick sinus syndrome can 

lead to these outcomes if untreated. Of course, many conditions, if untreated, can lead 

to neurological damage. Indeed, a common malady such as “hypertension is a risk 

factor for cognitive impairment and dementia through multifactorial mechanisms 

including vascular compromise, cerebral small vessel disease, white matter disease 

(leukoaraiosis), cerebral microbleeds, cerebral atrophy, amyloid plaque deposition, and 

neurofibrillary tangles.” Devin Loewenstein and Mark Rabbat, Neurological Complications 

of Systemic Hypertension, 177 Handbook of Clinical Neurology 253 (2021). Yet, no one 

would take seriously the suggestion that the mere fact that an Article III judge has 

hypertension is sufficient cause to obligate that judge to submit to forced 

neuropsychological testing.30 Judge Newman is successfully treating her sick sinus 

syndrome with a pacemaker, thus avoiding all of the consequences that could befall 

someone who has not so treated this disease. Accordingly, the mere fact that the 

condition from which Judge Newman suffers could, if untreated, cause “confusion” or 

other neurological symptoms, is simply insufficient to establish that at any point in time 

this disease did cause Judge Newman to experience these symptoms.

30 Indeed, given that hypertension is one of the most common conditions affecting Americans, odds 

are that a number of judges on the Federal Circuit have been diagnosed with hypertension, and have 

used medication or other interventions to control the disease. The same thing is true about Judge 

Newman and her reliance on a pacemaker to treat her sick sinus syndrome. 
36

Furthermore, Judge Newman was diagnosed with sick sinus syndrome and had 

the pacemaker installed years ago—long before any allegations of mental decline.31 Thus,

this is not “a matter of parsing terminology rather than relevant substance.” Report at 

82. To the contrary, the Committee’s allegations of a “heart attack” or for that matter

any other “cardiac event” in 2021 are entirely unsubstantiated. Absent such 

substantiation, they cannot be used as a basis for requiring Judge Newman to undergo 

unwanted medical testing. It is, of course, not Judge Newman’s burden to refute 

various unsubstantiated and baseless allegations. Merely because the Committee 

asserted that Judge Newman had cardiac problems doesn’t obligate Judge Newman to 

prove the Committee wrong. It is the Committee (or the Chief Judge) that has the 

initial burden of production, not Judge Newman. It failed to meet that burden. 

Because no evidence (either as of April 7, 2023, or even today) suggests that 

Judge Newman’s long-standing and well-managed sick sinus syndrome had any 

exacerbation or failure in management in 2021, the Committee’s attempt to justify the 

March 24 and April 7 Orders by jerry-rigging the definitions and timings of a “heart 

attack” (or “cardiac condition”) must fail. And absent these allegations, the Committee 

31 It is for this reason that Judge Newman objected to a misleading redaction of the transcript of the 

July 13 Hearing. Judge Newman does not have a new cardiac condition with an onset or deterioration 

date of 2021. Rather, she has a long-standing but fully managed cardiac condition that has no impact 

on either her fitness for the bench or even her daily activities.
37

was left with nothing at all (save for its own personal, non-expert “observations”) to 

justify requiring Judge Newman to submit to unwanted medical evaluations.

3. Personal “Observations” of Committee Members Do Not

Provide Sufficient Basis to Order a Medical Examination

It is not disputed that none of the members of the Committee (or for that matter 

the Judicial Council) has any training or expertise with neurology, psychiatry, or geriatric 

medicine. Any “personal observations” by Judge Newman’s colleagues (except perhaps 

in extreme circumstances) cannot serve as a basis for ordering unwanted medical 

examinations if for no other reason than the recognition that individuals lacking 

appropriate training are unable to differentiate normal but perhaps unusual behavior 

from abnormal behavior. 

Second, the Committee doesn’t even bother to say what those observations were, 

thus making it impossible to evaluate whether these “observations” would or should 

suggest to a reasonable observer that further investigation is warranted. 

Third, the alleged “personal observations” stand in sharp contrast to what others 

have observed in the same timeframe. For example, Professor David Hricik of Mercer 

University School of Law wrote that on March 23-24, i.e., the same month that Chief 

Judge Moore initiated the present complaint, he “saw Judge Newman (with Judge 

Lourie and former Judge O’Malley) speak at the USPTO .... Judge Newman was 

eloquent, coherent, cogent, and spoke passionately about various topics, including 
38

section 101 (which requires a bit of mental agility, I would say).” David Hricik, An 

Opinion on Chief Judge Moore’s Reported Unprecedented Effort to Remove Judge Newman, PatentlyO.com (April 14, 2023), https://tinyurl.com/2e8sfue8.

32

 Others, including law

professors, former judges of this Court, and presently serving judges on other courts 

have reported much the same. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Chief Judge Moore Said to Be Petitioning 

to Oust Judge Newman from Federal Circuit, IPWatchdog.com (April 12, 2023), 

https://tinyurl.com/2efyshuc (“Numerous staff and colleagues with knowledge of the 

complaint filed against Newman have contacted IPWatchdog to both confirm the filing 

of the complaint and to vehemently oppose the allegations being made about Judge 

Newman’s competence.”).

To put it simply, ill-defined, unsubstantiated “feelings” by non-expert observers 

which are in turn readily contradicted by others who are not nearly as enmeshed in the 

process cannot justify ordering an unwanted neurological examination. Nor can these 

“feelings” be combined with other deficient bases in hopes that adding many zeros 

together will result in a number greater than zero.

In short, at the time the Committee made its first request for neurological and 

neuropsychological testing, it had no factual support to justify the request. It follows 

32 The video of the remarks is available at https://tinyurl.com/3v8jn7sf. 
39

that Judge Newman had “good cause” to resist the imposition of medical testing when 

no legitimate basis for such testing existed. 

B. THE FACTUAL RECORD AT THE TIME OF THE SECOND AND THIRD ORDERS

REQUIRING MEDICAL EXAMINATION ALSO DOES NOT SUPPORT THE ORDERS

REQUIRING MEDICAL EXAMINATION

Admittedly, by the time the Committee issued its second (May 3, 2023) and third

(May 16, 2023) orders, it was in possession of additional information beyond what has 

been described above. Nevertheless, at the end of the day these “new” orders suffer 

from the same basic problem—lack of reasonable basis to support the requirements 

therein—as did the original order.

Prior to delving into the specifics of these affidavits and depositions, two key 

points should be noted. First, the Committee’s assertions that employees’ accounts of 

events are “not challenged,” August 17 Order at 8, is only “true” because Judge 

Newman was never given any opportunity to challenge them. There was never an 

opportunity to cross-examine affiants or for that matter present affidavits from other 

witnesses, including Judge Newman herself. Indeed, the June 1 Order specifically stated 

that the appropriate course of further actions “can be determined based upon the paper 

record established by the Committee’s orders and Judge Newman’s filed responses, 

along with any legal argument Judge Newman wishes to submit to justify her responses 

or otherwise establish ‘good cause shown’ for her actions. There are no percipient fact 
40

witnesses to additional events that are relevant to the misconduct determination.” June 

1 Order at 4. Thus, the Committee itself foreclosed any avenue to “challenge” the 

employees’ accounts, even though Judge Newman vigorously contests the 

mischaracterizations contained therein.33 To now suggest that the evidence is “not 

challenged” is little more than a sleight of hand unworthy of Article III judges.

Second, the Committee appears not only to discount, but affirmatively hide the 

information that would contradict the accounts on which it relies. Thus, the interview 

of one of Judge Newman’s law clerks, though it took place, is not documented 

anywhere. The only plausible inference from this must be that the information obtained 

through that interview did not fit with, but instead undermined the Committee’s 

narrative. See Tendler v. Jaffe, 203 F.2d 14, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (“[T]he omission by a 

party to produce relevant and important evidence of which he has knowledge, and 

which is peculiarly within his control, raises the presumption that if produced the 

evidence would be unfavorable to his cause.”). But even absent the information that 

the Committee did not provide to Judge Newman and chose not to rely on—

33 Additionally, and as explained in the July 5 Letter Brief, because “[m]ost of the testimony and 

information gathered by the Committee prior to and in the course of its investigation comes from 

employees of the Federal Circuit ... [whose] ability to continue working in normal conditions depends 

on their continued good relationship with Chief Judge Moore and other judges of the Court,” there is 

no way to “be sure that the key evidence that is presented to [the Committee and Judicial Council] is 

in any way reliable, rather than tainted by the allegiances and personal concerns of employeeswitnesses.” July 5 Letter Brief at 7. 
41

information that presumably is favorable to Judge Newman—the record compiled by 

the Committee remains woefully inadequate to require unwanted medical testing.

1. The Subsequent Orders Are Irreparably Tainted by the

Improper April 7 Order

Although by the time the Committee issued its subsequent orders it managed to 

gather more information (though it should be noted that Judge Newman has not had 

the opportunity to question any of the witnesses on whose affidavits the Committee

has relied), this new information does not cleanse the prior improper order, so

subsequent orders are merely an attempt to justify a decision made early on and never 

reconsidered. In light of the decision that was made early on, and before investigation 

had even began, to remove (without so much as a notice to her) Judge Newman from 

the bench, and given that the April 7 Order was entirely devoid of any factual basis, the 

subsequent orders cannot be taken at face value and must instead be viewed through 

the prism of earlier improper decisions. It is a well-settled principle of administrative 

law,34 that subsequent data can’t be used to justify prior decisions. See Dep’t of Com. v. 

New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575 (2019) (setting aside Secretary’s decision to add a 

citizenship question to the decennial census when evidence showed “that the Secretary 

34 It should be remembered that the Judicial Council is an administrative and not a judicial body. See 

Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 86 n. 7 (1970) (“We find nothing in the legislative history to 

suggest that the Judicial Council was intended to be anything other than an administrative body 

functioning in a very limited area in a narrow sense as a ‘board of directors’ for the circuit.”). 
42

began taking steps to reinstate a citizenship question about a week into his tenure, but 

it contain[ed] no hint that he was considering VRA enforcement [on which he 

subsequently relied] in connection with that project,” and when “[t]he Secretary's 

Director of Policy ... saw it as his task to ‘find the best rationale’” to justify a decision 

already made.”). 

The orders of May 3 and May 16 cannot be viewed as new decisions made on 

the basis of newly available evidence. As an initial matter, the orders themselves state 

that the Committee is not taking a new action but is merely “reissuing its orders 

regarding medical evaluation and testing and medical records and establishing new 

deadlines for compliance.” May 3 Order at 2.35 Next, the allegations of medical issues 

facing Judge Newman (whether a “heart attack” or a “cardiac condition” or fainting 

spell) did not become any more true or any better substantiated by May 16, 2023 than 

they were on March 24 or April 7, 2023. Nor did the data regarding alleged delays 

become any more complete or reliable, since at no point (up to the present day) did the 

Committee inquire whether Judge Newman’s speed of opinion writing in 2020-23 was

in any way materially different than her speed prior to 2020 (e.g., from 2018 to 2020). 

Thus, all of the deficiencies (both procedural and substantive) of the April 7 Order 

35 The same Order also states that it is being issued not on the basis of any new evidence, but only “in 

the hope that Judge Newman will now cooperate with its investigation.” Id.
43

continued to be present in the two subsequent orders. The additional affidavits from 

various Court staff on which the Committee chose to rely, do not save the May 3 and 

May 16 Orders from their patent inadequacies.

2. The Deposition of Judge Newman’s Career Law Clerk Is

Devoid of Any Facts and Therefore Irrelevant

In issuing its May 3 and May 16 Order, as well as in its Report, the Committee 

relied in large part on the deposition of Judge Newman’s career clerk. See, e.g., May 3 

Order at 6, May 16 Order at 3, Report at 5, 41. In the deposition (which itself was 

conducted with violations of basic norms of due process),36 the career clerk asserted 

her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. The Committee admits 

that it was unable to obtain any useful information from the deposition. See, e.g., May 

16 Order at 3 (noting that the career clerk “refuse[d] to answer basic questions about 

her role and responsibilities in chambers.”). Having obtained no useful information 

from the deposition, the Committee, in a bizarre turnaround, insists that these 

assertions of privilege, which were made on advice of career clerk’s own counsel, see 

Report at 41, are somehow indicative of Judge Newman’s mental state. See, e.g., Report at 

41 (“Further concerns, potentially extending to Judge Newman’s case handling and 

36 The deposition is noteworthy for multiple threats directed at the career clerk by Chief Judge Moore 

to the point that it caused the career clerk’s attorney to call attention to that fact and object to such 

behavior. See, e.g., Deposition Tr. at 11:14-12:3. It is precisely because of such threats (whether explicit 

or implicit) that the reports of other Court staff cannot be uncritically credited.
44

functioning more generally, were raised when the Committee sought information from 

Judge Newman’s permanent clerk.”). The assertion is self-evidently ludicrous. 

As the Committee recognizes, Judge Newman’s career clerk was represented by 

her own counsel and acted on advice of counsel. See Report at 41. Judge Newman had 

no input whatever into the career clerk’s testimony and was never asked to direct her 

career clerk to answer questions in any particular way nor could she do so even if she 

wanted to because whether properly or improperly, the career clerk was asserting her 

own rather than Judge Newman’s rights. Additionally, the Committee expressly directed 

the career clerk not to “talk about this proceeding with others going forward, [because 

to do so] would be an act of misconduct.” Deposition Tr. 26:22-24. See also id. at 27:1-

29:19. Since the career clerk was not even permitted to share the fact of her appearance 

before the Committee with Judge Newman or anyone else, it is hard to understand how 

Judge Newman could have affected her career clerk’s decision not to provide 

information to the Committee, and it is equally hard to understand why the career 

clerk’s decision can in any way be construed as raising concerns regarding “Judge 

Newman’s case handling and functioning more generally.” Report at 41.37

37 If the Committee thought that the career clerk’s assertions of privilege were baseless, it could have 

sought to compel her to testify. See 28 U.S.C. § 356(a); § 332(d)(2). Furthermore, even if Judge 

Newman could or wished to provide guidance to her career clerk as to how to deal with the 

Committee’s questions, doing so would potentially raise a specter of improper interference with 

witnesses—something that Judge Newman has no interest in being accused of.
45

The April 12, 2023 deposition thus adds nothing to the shell of the record that 

the Committee had on April 7, 2023, so it does not provide any additional support for 

the requirement that Judge Newman undergo medical testing.

3. Affidavits of Judge Newman’s Former Chambers Staff Do

Not Provide Any Support for the Committee’s Demands

The Committee also relies on two affidavits provided by Judge Newman’s 

former staff members to justify its requirement that Judge Newman submit to medical 

testing. Neither of the affidavits can actually support the Committee’s action.

One of the affidavits is provided by Judge Newman’s former law clerk. 

However, it is entirely devoid of any information that could even remotely shed light 

on Judge Newman’s mental or physical health. Instead, the affidavit suggests that it 

was the law clerk who had experienced mental and physical health problems as a result 

of the various pressures brought about by the investigation. See Law Clerk Affidavit at 

¶ 14 (stating that in light of the ongoing investigation he “informed Judge Newman that 

working in her chambers was hurting [his] ability to complete my work, taking a toll on 

[his] mental health, and harming [his] relationships at the court.”), id.

¶ 16 (“I also reiterated that I would still feel uncomfortable given my proximity and 

potential exposure to matters concerning the investigation.”). 

It is, of course, not surprising that a young attorney, just at the beginning of his 

career, and without protections afforded by Article III would “feel uncomfortable” if 
46

he were involved in any way in a sensitive investigation of almost any type. It is also 

not surprising that such an involvement would “tak[e] a toll on [his] mental health.” 

And these outcomes are even more likely when the person conducting the investigation 

(here, Chief Judge Moore) has taken a threatening and accusatory tone with anyone 

who has not provided information that would bolster the Chief Judge’s case. See ante

n.36 (citing Deposition Tr. at 11:14-12:3). But these effects on Judge Newman’s law

clerk are not a result of Judge Newman’s actions, but rather the result of an unpleasant 

situation (created by Chief Judge Moore) that the law clerk involuntarily found himself 

enmeshed in.

The Committee also cites two other issues mentioned in this affidavit. First, it 

notes that the law clerk alleged that “Judge Newman disclosed to [him] and other 

members of chambers that had .” 

Law Clerk Affidavit at ¶ 2. Second, the law clerk alleged that because Judge Newman’s 

paralegal “informed the Chief Judge” of this event, id., Judge Newman stated that the 

paralegal “could not be trusted.” Id. at ¶ 4. From this the Committee draws an inference 

regarding Judge Newman’s mental state. The inferences are odd to say the least. First 

off, Judge Newman is under no legal obligation to refrain from disclosing 

 about to anyone else. She is not her 

provider, it is not a matter of internal judicial deliberations, or the like. True enough, it 

may make good sense not to speak of such matters, but there is no requirement to avoid 
47

doing so. What is much more inappropriate is for a member of the chambers staff to 

report these perfectly legal (even if in someone’s view, inadvisable) conversations to 

anyone outside the chambers, including the Chief Judge. And when the intra-chambers 

confidentiality is breached, it makes perfect sense for the judge to lose trust in the 

person breaching confidentiality. Second, whether someone does or does not “trust” 

another person simply does not turn on any legal issue or one’s mental state. “Trust” 

is little more than a “gut feeling” and a judge, like any person, is permitted to lose trust 

in her staff, attorneys, colleagues, treating physicians, or anyone else. Absent clinical 

paranoia or similar problems, loss of “trust” is simply not evidence of anything at all 

beyond the fact that the two people will have a difficult time working together.

The affidavit of Judge Newman’s former paralegal is equally devoid of any 

information that would justify the Committee’s orders. Judge Newman’s paralegal 

spends significant time complaining about after-hours phone calls from other chambers

staff, and the Committee treats this allegation (which is vigorously disputed) as evidence 

of Judge Newman’s inability to manage her own chambers. See, e.g., Report at 40. 

However, what the Committee terms “inability to manage staff in her chambers” is, in 

reality, Judge Newman’s choice as to how to run her chambers.38 It is entirely Judge 

38 The Federal Circuit’s own Employment Dispute Resolution Plan, which the Committee repeatedly 

cites, see, e.g., Report 39-40, only prohibits “wrongful” conduct such as “discrimination; sexual, racial, 

and other discriminatory harassment; abusive conduct; and retaliation.” See Employment Dispute 

Resolution Plan for the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, ¶ II.A, 

https://tinyurl.com/8b7nahps (emphasis added). There are no allegations that either Judge Newman 
48

Newman’s prerogative to determine when to work and when to expect assistance of 

her chambers staff. As members of the Committee and Judicial Council know full well, 

it is the judge’s staff that must adjust their schedule to that kept by the judge, and not 

the other way around. Leaving aside obvious red lines such as criminal activity or sexual 

harassment, Judge Newman (like the Chief Judge) is free to run her chambers as she 

sees fit. The fact that Judge Newman’s paralegal found the arrangement not to his 

liking is no one’s problem but his own. Like any American when faced with working 

conditions that are legal but disliked by the employee, he had a choice to quit—a choice 

by the way, that Judge Newman offered to him. The Chief Judge’s interference in Judge 

Newman’s chambers operations is unprecedented and nothing short of outrageous. 

or any of her staff discriminated, harassed, or abused her paralegal. The only complaint is that the 

schedule within the Judge’s chambers was not keyed to a 9-5 workday. Keeping odd work hours, and 

even requiring one’s staff to adhere to those hours, is not “wrongful,” nor is it “abusive.” The EDR 

plan explicitly excludes from its definition of “abuse” “duty assignments and changes to duty 

assignments[, and] office organization.” Id. ¶ II.D. 

Because Judge Newman’s paralegal did not complain about any activities covered by the EDR plan, it 

necessarily follows that he was not retaliated against for his protected disclosures. See id. ¶ II.E 

(“Retaliation is a materially adverse action taken against an Employee for reporting wrongful

conduct....”) (emphasis added). It also follows that there was no call to provide him with any 

alternative work arrangements. Indeed, the Federal Circuit’s EDR plan permits an employee to ask 

for and the Chief Judge to grant “an alternative work arrangement” only if an “Employee alleges 

egregious conduct by a supervisor, Unit Executive, or Judge that makes it untenable to continue working 

for that person.” Id. ¶ IV.B.4 (emphasis added). Even assuming, arguendo, that Judge Newman’s failure 

to put a stop to late night phone calls was “wrongful” within the meaning of the EDR plan, or to stop 

trusting an employee who disclosed intra-chambers communications, it certainly is not “egregious 

conduct” that would permit the Chief Judge to provide Judge Newman’s former paralegal with “an 

alternative work arrangement,” over Judge Newman’s objections. That the Chief Judge did so is yet 

another instance of cutting procedural corners. In turn, Judge Newman’s refusal to accept the 

arrangement that was imposed on her in violation of the strictures provided by the EDR plan, and 

require that her staff member either report for duty in chambers or resign, was entirely appropriate. 
49

The later attempt to use the difference of opinion as to the best way to operate one’s 

chambers as basis for an unwanted mental health exam is doubly so—especially when 

the problems were at least partly caused by that interference.

In his affidavit, Judge Newman’s former paralegal made a number of other 

allegations regarding Judge Newman’s ability to remember things and organizational 

capabilities. Suffice it to say that these allegations are not only vigorously disputed, but 

are supported by no one else in Judge Newman’s chambers—not even the 

aforementioned law clerk who resigned from Judge Newman’s staff during the course 

of the investigation. It is worth noting, that the former paralegal’s replacement is a 

person who had previously worked with Judge Newman for years and thus would be 

in a good position to testify about any changes that may or may not have occurred in 

Judge Newman’s behavior, memory, cognition, and the like. The fact that the 

new/returning judicial assistant has in no way confirmed the story weaved by Judge 

Newman’s former paralegal speaks volumes. The fact that the Committee has chosen 

not to seek this information betrays the simple fact that the Committee made its 

decision regarding the medical examination on April 7, and it has spent subsequent 

weeks looking for any justification to shore up its predetermined conclusion. 

It should also not go unsaid that, as the committee acknowledges, Judge 

Newman’s former paralegal “successfully sought employment at the Court outside 
50

Judge Newman’s chambers.” Report at 43. Of course, the success or failure of this 

search depended (in large part) on the Chief Judge. This fact alone counsels caution in 

taking the affidavit of Judge Newman’s former paralegal at face value—not because he 

committed perjury or the Chief Judge suborned such, as no one is making that 

allegation—but because it was in his interest to present facts in such a light as to align 

them with what he may have perceived the Chief Judge to want.

39

4. Affidavits of Other Court Employees Do Not Show that the

Request for Medical Testing Is Reasonably Necessary

The Committee attempts to justify its request for medical testing by referencing 

several affidavits which recount various staff having had difficulties in dealing with 

Judge Newman. As with other affidavits relied on by the Committee, there was no 

opportunity to test the strength or veracity of these allegations, even though there is 

every reason to doubt them. 

As Judge Newman has explained in her previous submission, the testimony and 

information gathered by the Committee prior to and in the course of its investigation 

comes from employees of the Federal Circuit. These individuals’ ability to continue 

working in normal conditions depends on their continued good relationship with Chief 

Judge Moore and other judges of the Court. For example, it is hard to imagine that the 

39 Again, this doesn’t mean that the Chief Judge actually wanted facts to be presented in a particular 

way. But it is not an unreasonable concern that Judge Newman’s former paralegal may have thought

that she did and that he needed to act in such a way as to remain in the Chief Judge’s good graces.
51

Clerk of the Court, even if he could not be easily fired, could long continue with his 

duties were the judges of the Court to lose complete confidence in him. Again, we do 

not suggest that Chief Judge Moore or other members of the Judicial Council explicitly 

exerted pressure on any of the witnesses to provide false or misleading testimony. 

However, it is entirely possible, indeed (given what is known about human psychology) 

likely, that witnesses may have structured and shaded their testimony to more perfectly 

align with what they may have perceived their superiors wanted to hear. See, e.g., Dellums 

v. Powell, 660 F.2d 802, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“In contrast to a witness at trial, a police

officer making out-of-court statements is not subject to the rigors of cross-examination 

or the threat of a perjury conviction. Unlike a judge, a police officer is not insulated 

from the political process or from pressures to please superiors.”); cf. Chicago & R.I.R. 

Co. v. Still, 19 Ill. 499, 507-08 (1858) (a neutral trier of fact must be able “to judge of the 

effect that bias or prejudice, a fear of losing employment, a desire to avoid censure, a 

fear of offending or a desire to please employers, or any other circumstances in 

testimony, operating, in the opinion of the jury, to warp the judgment and pervert the 

truth, has upon the human mind....”). Thus, one simply cannot be confident that the 

key evidence that is presented to them is in any way reliable, rather than tainted by the 

allegiances and personal concerns of employees-witnesses.

The Committee rejects these concerns as “insubstantial.” Report at 75. As an 

initial matter, Judge Newman need not show that the affidavits were actually tainted; 
52

rather the test is whether there is a significant possibility that “bias or prejudice, a fear 

of losing employment, a desire to avoid censure, a fear of offending or a desire to please 

employers, or any other circumstances in testimony, operating ... to warp the judgment 

and pervert the truth” exists. Still, 19 Ill. at 507-08. Second, while dismissing Judge 

Newman’s concerns as “insubstantial,” the Committee simultaneously argues that the 

proximity of the witnesses to the Chief Judge and the Committee members is what 

allowed these complaints to be brought forward in the first place. Id. at 87-89. It is 

hard to square those two assertions with one another. Either proximity to the Chief 

Judge does have an effect on one’s testimony or it doesn’t. Finally, given the incredible 

difference in treatment between Judge Newman’s career clerk who did not provide 

evidence which would have supported the Committee’s agenda and of Judge Newman’s 

former paralegal (i.e., the career clerk was threatened with career-ending consequences, 

whereas the paralegal was given, on an expedited basis, a new and desirable job at the 

Court), the message to the rest of the staff could not have been clearer—the Committee 

appreciates and wishes to receive only specific type of information. 

Leaving these concerns aside, the affidavits, even if taken at face value, simply 

do not suggest that Judge Newman is suffering from any mental decline. At most (and 

even if taken at face value) they show that Judge Newman may have difficulty adjusting 

to new technology—a phenomenon entirely unexceptional when older, though fully 

competent individuals, are asked to adopt new technology, and that she was 
53

extraordinarily frustrated, as anyone would be, when the Chief Judge and this Committee 

launched an entirely unjustified attack on her competence and position as a duly 

appointed Article III judge.

It bears repeating that the events that the Committee cites as evidence of Judge 

Newman’s inability to comprehend certain matters occurred in the midst of this 

investigation, during which the Committee has treated Judge Newman in the most 

appalling manner. It is not surprising and not evidence of any mental problems that 

Judge Newman may have reacted with more anger, frustration, irritation, or annoyance. 

But this is an entirely appropriate affect in the face of deeply personal, hurtful, and baseless 

accusations by the very people that Judge Newman has for decades considered to be 

trusted friends and colleagues. See, e.g., Michael Shapiro, Doctor Who Examined 96-YearOld Judge Slams Suspension, Report, BloombergLaw.com (Aug. 8, 2023) (quoting Dr. Ted 

Rothstein’s view that Judge Newman’s behavior is explained by the fact that she “is 

very anxious and concerned about the way she’s been treated [because she believes that]

she’s been mistreated by the powers that might be.”). The Committee may believe that 

Judge Newman has overreacted or treated some staff more harshly than was 

necessary.40 Whether or not that is so, these incidents occurring in the middle of the 

40 At the same time, even assuming that Judge Newman has proven to be a difficult person to work 

with, and assuming that her behavior has caused “emotional stress and discomfort, including loss of 

sleep and heightened anxiety,” as described in one of the affidavits, that doesn’t even approach 

probable cause to believe that Judge Newman is mentally or physically disabled. 
54

Committee’s unjustified actions which have taken an enormous toll on Judge Newman 

do not provide any evidence of an alleged mental decline that supposedly began around 

the summer of 2021, i.e., years prior to the events complained of. Because Judge 

Newman’s response to the events was, from the psychological perspective, entirely 

appropriate, there is no reason to suspect any mental health problems or to require 

psychological testing. 41

In an utterly bizarre statement, the Committee also attempts to use the 

submission of Judge Newman’s counsel which responded to the various allegations by 

Court staff as further evidence “that there are reasonable grounds to have concerns 

about her cognitive state.” Report at 106 (“In the Committee’s view, the fact that Judge 

Newman would make such an argument [that concerns raised by staff are little more 

than “petty grievances”] only confirms that there are reasonable grounds to have 

concerns about her cognitive state.”). Although it is well settled that “each party is 

deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have notice of all 

facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney, Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 

626, 634 (1962) (internal quotations omitted), the rule does not go so far as to suggest 

that attorney’s choice of argument is indicative of a client’s mental state. Making this 

41 To the extent that in her interaction with any Court staff Judge Newman may have, during these 

extraordinarily stressful times, overstepped some bounds, she is more than willing to meet with any 

staff, apologize where apology is needed, and work to smooth over any problems that may have arisen. 
55

jump shows that the Committee will twist available facts into a predetermined 

conclusion. 

C. ANY RESIDUAL QUESTIONS WERE RESOLVED BY DR. ROTHSTEIN’S

EXAMINATION

Assuming, arguendo and dubitante, that the Committee did at one point in time

have legitimate reasons to request that Judge Newman undergo a neurological and 

neuropsychological examination, these reasons should have dissipated following Judge 

Newman’s evaluation by Dr. Ted Rothstein—a full Professor of Neurology at the 

George Washington Medical Center, author of dozens of publications, and an expert in 

dementia.42 See Attachment A, Declaration of Ted L. Rothstein, M.D. 

Following the examination, which revealed no significant cognitive deficits, Dr. 

Rothstein concluded that Judge Newman’s “cognitive function is sufficient to continue 

her participation in her court’s proceedings.” The Committee refused to give Dr. 

Rothstein’s report any weight. Report at 98, 104. In doing so, the Committee, 

composed of individuals with no medical or psychological training whatever, 

42 It is true that at the July 13 hearing, the Committee was told that “the Committee could choose to 

credit or not credit as it wishes.” Report at 98 (quoting Hearing Tr. at 26:15-18). Of course, that is 

always true. No one can force the Committee to credit a particular piece of evidence. And at that point 

in the proceedings, because the hearing, at the Committee’s direction, was meant to focus on Judge 

Newman’s cooperation, rather than the presence of the disability, Dr. Rothstein’s report was indeed 

a “background” matter. Id. The Committee’s rejection of Dr. Rothstein’s report, however, is not 

based on any contrary medical evidence, but solely on the Committee’s own, non-expert and 

erroneous understanding of Dr. Rothstein’s examination and conclusions. 
56

juxtaposed its own Google search with Dr. Rothstein’s decades of experience. Id. at 

99-103. The Committee also blatantly mischaracterized Dr. Rothstein’s findings

claiming that Judge Newman “failed 80% of the memory questions on the test.” As 

Dr. Rothstein explained this claim is “a distortion” and he objected to the “very 

inappropriate the way in which [his] opinion was altered to say something [he] didn’t 

say.” Shapiro, BloombergLaw.com, supra; see also Attachment A. 

If the Committee were interested in actually assuring itself that Judge Newman 

is perfectly competent and able to continue in her duties, it could easily have held a 

hearing under Rule 14, and heard from Dr. Rothstein live. It could have questioned 

him about the thoroughness of his examination. But the Committee declined to hold 

any such hearing. See, e.g., June 1 Order at 4-5. Instead, the Committee engaged in 

guesswork (and guessed wrong) as to the thoroughness of Dr. Rothstein’s examination. 

The Judicial Council should not make the same mistake, and to help it avoid making 

the same error, Judge Newman is providing an affidavit from Dr. Rothstein that 

explains his qualifications and his examination of Judge Newman in greater detail. See

Attachment A. 

In light of this expert opinion on one hand, and non-expert complaints (however 

laden they may be with scientific-sounding terms), only one rational conclusion exists—

there is no reasonable basis to suspect any mental or physical disability on Judge 
57

Newman’s part, much less reason sufficient to require her to submit to unwanted 

medical examinations.

D. DR. CARNEY’S REPORT FURTHER CONFIRMS THAT JUDGE NEWMAN DOES NOT

SUFFER FROM ANY MENTAL DISABILITY

Though Judge Newman does not believe that additional testing is necessary or

indicated, in the interest of laying to rest any remaining concerns regarding her abilities 

to continue in her position, she submitted to an expert evaluation by a forensic 

psychiatrist—a specialist with a particular expertise of evaluating individuals’ “fitness 

for duty.”43

Dr. Carney, after having been provided with all of the prior Committee orders 

along with supporting affidavits, Judge Newman’s medical records, description of a 

position and duties of a federal appellate judge, conducted a full-blown, hours-long 

examination of Judge Newman.44 The examination included both qualitative and 

quantitative components. According to Dr. Carney, Judge Newman “is a fluent, 

43 Fitness for duty evaluations are traditionally done by psychiatrists. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Dep’t of 

Homeland Sec., 975 F.3d 1342, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (describing mental health component of the 

fitness for duty examinations conducted by psychiatrists). Yet the Committee, without explaining its 

reasoning, directed Judge Newman to be examined by a neuropsychologist who is not a physician. 

44 Judge Newman’s willingness to undergo this examination, even though there is no evidence of 

deterioration in the quality of her opinions, or any decrease in the speed of their production, and even 

though a previous examination already found her to be fully able to continue with her duties, indicates 

that she is entirely willing to cooperate with a proper process, and that she is not afraid of having her 

mental acuity tested. This stands in sharp contrast with the position taken by the Committee, which 

appears to be concerned that if it were to transfer this matter to the judicial council of another circuit, 

its work might not stand up to independent scrutiny.
58

engaging, strong-willed, highly accomplished and unusually cognitively intact 96-yearold woman with chronic medical issues that appear well-controlled at the current time, 

with no evidence of current substantial medical, psychiatric, or cognitive disability.” 

Regina M. Carney, M.D., Report of Independent Medical Examination of Pauline Newman, 

Attachment B at 5. Dr. Carney specifically opined that “Judge Newman demonstrated 

no substantial emotional, medical, or psychiatric disability that would interfere with 

continuation of her longstanding duties as a Judge in the U.S. Court of Appeals.” Id. 

Dr. Carney’s opinion was based on “three-hour clinical evaluation of Judge Newman 

performed by me on August 25, 2023, including administration of The Modified MiniMental State Examination (3-MS),” id. at 1, on which Judge Newman scored 98 out of 

a possible 100 points, id. at 5.

45

In light of the considered opinions of now two independent expert practitioners,

both of whom have found that Judge Newman is fully competent and entirely capable 

of continuing in office, the Committee, even if it ever had a legitimate basis to question 

Judge Newman’s competence, has no further basis for requiring additional testing or 

continuing to question Judge Newman’s abilities. Absent such bases, and in the face of 

45 The original 3-MS test score sheet and the Clinical Dementia Rating worksheet are attached to Dr. 

Carney’s report as Exhibit 1.
59

evidence of Judge Newman’s full competency, these proceedings should be brought to 

a close and Judge Newman restored to the bench. 

III. THE COMMITTEE HAD NO BASIS TO REQUEST A VIDEO-TAPED

INTERVIEW WITH JUDGE NEWMAN

In its April 17 Order the Committee “request[ed] that Judge Newman sit down

with the Committee for a video-taped interview.” April 17 Order at 2.46 No explanation 

or justification was given for this request (which was made weeks prior to any of the 

events described in various affidavits which the Committee relied on at later points in 

time). Nor was the subject matter or the scope of the interview defined in any way. 

Much like the April 7 Order to submit to an unwanted medical examination, this early 

order was apparently based solely on evidence of Judge Newman’s alleged delays, 

“personal observations,” and baseless claims of prior “heart attack” and a fainting spell. 

This brief has already discussed why these “facts” are insufficient to make any demands 

of Judge Newman. See ante II.A. The April 17 unexplained request for a video-taped 

interview of indefinite scope, covering unspecified topics, and having no identified 

purpose lacked any reasonable basis.

46 NCLA began to represent Judge Newman only days earlier and had not yet made an appearance. 

The Committee knew that Judge Newman was not yet represented before the Committee, yet it 

imposed a four-day deadline to respond to its ill-defined request. It should be noted that Judge 

Newman did respond by April 21, though after the 9:00 am deadline established by the Committee. 

See April 21 Letter (hand delivered to the Court). Yet, the Committee could not resist claiming that 

“Judge Newman failed to respond.” See May 3 Order at 3. 
60

The request for the interview was omitted from the May 3 Order, see May 3 Order 

at 13-14; but renewed two weeks later in the May 16 Order, see May 16 Order at 23-24, 

25. But the May 16 Order was equally short on specifics. Once again, no topics of the

interview were specified and no scope of the interview was defined. Furthermore, it 

was and remains unclear what possible new information the Committee could garner 

from such an interview. As an initial matter, all three members of the Committee had 

previously met with Judge Newman right before launching this investigation. See March 

24 Order at 2. The Committee members thus had ample opportunity to speak with 

Judge Newman, albeit not on camera. It is hard to understand what additional 

information the Committee members could have gathered from an interview and what 

purpose, other than the ratcheting up of antagonism which the Committee has 

displayed toward Judge Newman (and some of her staff and counsel), it would achieve.

Indeed, the Committee itself (incorrectly, see post) argued that a transfer of this 

matter to another circuit’s judicial council is not warranted because of “the relative 

ignorance of judges in another circuit of local circumstances and personalities” putting 

those judges “in a poor position to persuade a judge whom they do not know well to 

take the action they believe is necessary.”

47

 May 3 Order at 10 (internal quotations 

47 Of course, it does not appear that the local judges’ familiarity with local personalities has been of 

any help in resolving the present dispute and persuading Judge Newman to do what the Committee 

members believe is necessary. To the contrary, the closeness of everyone to the dispute has appeared 

to only harden everyone’s positions.
61

omitted). The obvious implication is that the judges of the Federal Circuit are not 

ignorant of Judge Newman’s “circumstances and personalit[y]” and that Judge Newman 

is “a judge whom [other Federal Circuit judges (including the members of the 

Committee)] do [] know well.” Given this professed knowledge, there is no legitimate 

need for further interviews especially when the process has, at the hands of the 

Committee, become so hostile.48 

IV. THROUGHOUT THE PROCEEDINGS, JUDGE NEWMAN HAS OFFERED TO

COOPERATE

Even assuming, contrary to evidence, that the Committee did have reasonable

bases to request that Judge Newman submit to the requested medical examination, thus 

requiring Judge Newman to “cooperate,” see Rule 4(a)(5), Judge Newman has 

discharged this duty by offering, on several occasions, to reach mutually acceptable 

solutions that would address the Committee’s concerns regarding her alleged potential 

disability. After all, that is an issue that has to be resolved—is Judge Newman mentally 

and physically able to continue in office to which she was nominated, confirmed, and 

duly appointed, and in which she has served with distinction for almost 40 years or isn’t 

she? In order to resolve that one and only question before the Committee, Judge 

Newman stated that she was willing 

48 Even in its Report, the Committee doesn’t actually explain why an interview is “required.” It merely 

claims that it’s “advisable.” Report at 2. However, the Committee has never explained, even in a 

cursory fashion why the interview is “advisable.” 
62

to undergo necessary testing, provide necessary records, and meet with 

a Special Committee provided that she is immediately restored to her 

rights and duties as a judge and further provided that this matter is 

promptly transferred to a judicial council of another circuit, which is 

unmarred by the prior unlawful decisions and which is willing to

“work[] or operat[e] together” with Judge Newman, including on 

selecting medical providers and setting the appropriate parameters of 

any examination.

May 25 Letter at 3 (emphasis in original). Prior to that offer, Judge Newman wrote that 

she “will not fail to cooperate with any investigation that is conducted consistent with 

the limits that the Constitution, the Judicial Disability Act of 1980 [“Disability Act”], 

and the Rules for Judicial Conduct and Judicial Disability Proceedings [“Conduct 

Rules”] place on such investigations.” April 21 Letter at 2 (emphasis added). Of course, 

proceeding consistent with the Judicial Disability Act, and the Constitution, would 

require restoring Judge Newman to the bench for the pendency of any investigation. 

Inexplicably, the Special Committee has preferred to violate the law just to keep Judge 

Newman from sitting on panels rather than conduct a lawful investigation while she 

remains on the bench.

Judge Newman has consistently offered, and indeed implored, the Committee 

(and the Judicial Council) to work in a cooperative, collegial, and collaborative way to 

resolve any doubts about her competency. From offering to submit to any medical 

testing if the matter were transferred to another circuit’s judicial council, to offering to 

work with the Committee to mutually agree on providers who would conduct the 
63

testing, see April 21 Letter at 2, May 9 Letter at 4-5, May 25 Letter at 3, Judge Newman 

has sought avenues to resolve this matter in a way that vitiates any concerns about her 

health (however unfounded those concerns may be), while respecting her due process 

rights and the overall constitutional structure of the judiciary.

In fact, the reasonableness of Judge Newman’s proposal receives significant 

support from the Committee’s and the Judicial Council’s own orders. The Committee’s 

May 3 Order denied Judge Newman’s request for a transfer, but did so “without 

prejudice to refiling after Judge Newman has complied with the Committee’s orders 

concerning medical evaluation and testing and medical records.” May 3 Order at 10 

n.1. That same day, the Judicial Council issued a parallel order to the same effect. May

3 Order of Judicial Council. However, neither the Committee nor the Judicial Council 

explained how Judge Newman’s medical examinations and records could have any 

relevance to a decision on transferring this investigation. And in fact, nothing about 

the medical testing or records is relevant to the question of which judicial forum should

resolve this matter. So, if it is reasonable for Judge Newman to request a transfer after

she submits to medical testing, then it is equally reasonable for her to request a transfer

before she submits to that testing. Accordingly, the Committee’s and Judicial Council’s 

own orders confirm that Judge Newman’s proposals to condition her medical testing on 

a transfer were entirely reasonable.
64

The Committee, however, appears to believe that “cooperation” means 

unquestioned submission and obeisance to its demands. See Report at 92-93 (asserting 

that “cooperation” means acting “in compliance” and “doing what someone asks you 

to do”); id. at 93 (“[N]othing in the Rules requires the Committee to negotiate with 

Judge Newman to reach a compromise solution on every investigative request the 

Committee makes. To the contrary, Rule 13 unequivocally states that ‘[a] Special 

Committee should determine the appropriate extent and methods of its 

investigation.’”). Of course the Committee did not attempt to reach any compromise 

on any investigative request. Rather, and as discussed above, the Committee made up 

its mind both on the mode of investigation and the likely outcome thereof early, and 

from that point on, it used the available information in a way to fit those predetermined 

conclusions. This, together with the fact that throughout the process the Committee 

(and the Judicial Council) have been cutting procedural corners, changing rationales to 

justify its prior actions, and plainly exhibiting barely disguised hostility to Judge 

Newman, some of her chamber staff, and her counsel, are sufficient reasons to at the 

very least pause before blindly accepting the Committee’s demands. Judge Newman 

accordingly rejects the proposition that the only way for her to discharge her duties 

under Rule 4 is to unquestionably comply with any and all of the Committee’s demands 

no matter the factual or legal concerns raised by such mandates. That having been said, 

Judge Newman always was, and still remains willing to “work together” to bring this 
65

matter to a speedy resolution. Multiple avenues remain open to the Judicial Council to 

do so. For example, the Judicial Council can accept the results of Dr. Katznelson’s 

statistical analysis that shows that Judge Newman’s performance and speed of opinion 

writing from 2020 on is no different than her performance from 2018 to 2020. If the 

Judicial Council were to accept this basic fact (a fact that the Committee for reasons 

unknown chose not to even investigate), it would have to conclude that no factual 

predicate for the investigation ever existed in the first place. The Judicial Council can 

also choose to credit two independent examinations conducted by qualified experts both 

of which attest to Judge Newman’s continued mental and physical vigor. Or the Judicial 

Council can choose to request, under Rule 26, that the Chief Justice transfer the matter 

to a judicial council of another circuit. All of these are plausible cooperative ways to 

resolve the dispute. What the Committee and the Judicial Council cannot do is insist 

that the only appropriate response from Judge Newman to a demand that she “jump” 

is to ask “how high.”

These offers of cooperation, even assuming their insufficiency, make proceedings 

under Rule 4(a) wholly improper to begin with, because they show that it has always 

been in the power of the Committee to ensure that Judge Newman underwent 

appropriate medical examinations. All the Special Committee had to do was transfer 

this matter to another circuit and permit Judge Newman to hear new cases until that 

circuit makes its decision about her future. The availability of this option to the 
66

Committee is key because the governing “[r]ules contemplate that judicial councils will 

not consider commencing proceedings under Rule 4(a)(5) except as necessary after other 

means to acquire the information ... have been tried or have proven futile.” Rule 4(a)(5), cmt. 

(emphasis added). Those other means are readily available to this tribunal, and have 

been for quite some time. The Committee has simply chosen not to avail itself of them

in order to keep Judge Newman from returning to the bench. Consequently, the 

Committee did not even meet the threshold for launching proceedings under Rule 

4(a)(5), much less for imposing any sanction on Judge Newman. Because the tribunal 

has chosen not walk through this open door, Rule 4(a)(5) prohibits it from concluding 

that Judge Newman failed to cooperate.

V. JUDGE NEWMAN HAD “GOOD CAUSE” NOT TO COOPERATE BECAUSE

THIS PROCEEDING VIOLATES HER RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW

Rule 4(a)(5) expressly authorizes a judge to refuse to cooperate with an investigation 

if she has “good cause” for her refusal. Here, good cause exists because this proceeding 

violates Judge Newman’s Fifth Amendment right to due process of law. Contrary to 

the Committee’s protestations, this proceeding is being conducted by judges who have 

multiple conflicts of interest, and not surprisingly in light of those conflicts, it has been 

marked by judicial acts that are fundamentally unfair. In several important respects, 

this proceeding has denied Judge Newman basic procedural protections.
67

The Commentary to Rule 4 states that “it is not possible to ... anticipate all 

circumstances that might ... constitute good cause,” but it is established that an 

improperly constituted tribunal is a sufficient “good cause” for resisting that tribunal’s 

demands. See, e.g., Axon Enter. v. FTC, 598 U.S. 175 (2023). As the Supreme Court 

explained just a few months ago in Axon, the harm of “being subjected” to 

“unconstitutional agency authority” is a “a here-and-now injury.” Id. at 191 (quoting 

Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2196 (2020)).

Judge Newman is suffering just such an injury, because she is being forced to defend 

herself in a proceeding that is biased and unfair. It is axiomatic that due process 

requires, at a minimum, a “neutral decisionmaker.” See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 

509 (2004). This requirement is so fundamental it applies even to enemy combatants. 

Id. (And in all forums including, for example, administrative agencies. Withrow v. 

Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975).) A fortiori, it applies to a disability proceeding for an 

Article III judge. The investigation also violates the statutory command that any judge 

“shall ... disqualify himself ... [w]here he has ... personal knowledge of disputed 

evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (emphasis added). 

In fact, this tribunal has already admitted it is relying in part on its own knowledge of 

local circumstances and personalities. See May 3 Order at 10. These circumstances and 

personalities are central to the disputed evidentiary facts in this matter. That prior 

personal knowledge should, therefore, disqualify this panel from hearing this matter. 
68

This requirement for a neutral decisionmaker is part of a broader right to a fair 

proceeding, see In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 139 (1955) (to ensure fairness, “no man 

can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an 

interest in the outcome”), because ‘[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement 

of due process,’” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009) (quoting In 

re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136). “The Court has stressed that ‘any tribunal permitted by 

law to try cases and controversies not only must be unbiased but also must avoid even 

the appearance of bias.’” Mobility Workx, LLC v. Unified Pats., LLC, 15 F.4th 1146, 1164 

(Fed. Cir. 2021) (Newman, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part) (quoting 

Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968)). 

As this submission explains, Judge Newman had numerous reasons to conclude 

that this proceeding violated her right to due process of law. Her conclusion is more 

than sufficient to provide the required “good cause”: Several objective, knowledgeable 

commentators have stated that, because of the obvious conflicts of interest, this matter 

should be transferred to another circuit. These observers include two former chief 

judges of this circuit and a former chief judge from another circuit, all of whom took 

the unusual step of publishing public criticisms of this Court and expressing the strong 

view that this investigation should be transferred. See Paul Michel, Chief Judge Moore v. 

Judge Newman: An Unacceptable Breakdown of Court Governance, Collegiality and Procedural 

Fairness, IPWatchdog.com (July 9, 2023), https://tinyurl.com/z2xcb2kk; Randall R. 
69

Rader, The Federal Circuit Owes Judge Newman an Apology, IPWatchdog.com (July 12, 2023), 

https://tinyurl.com/255amrnj; Edith H. Jones, Federal Judges Deserve Due Process, Too, 

Wall St. J. (Aug. 15, 2023). Judge Newman can hardly be deemed guilty of noncooperation for agreeing with them. To the contrary, she should be relieved from 

litigating in an unconstitutional tribunal without being forced to litigate in that tribunal 

to a final decision. See generally Axon, 598 U.S. 175.

A. MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL SUFFER FROM IRRECONCILABLE CONFLICTS

OF INTEREST

As explained above, the March 24 Order that initiated this investigation relies on 

information provided by judges of this court based on their personal interactions with 

Judge Newman. The Order states that “judges and staff have brought to my attention

concerns about Judge Newman’s inability to perform the work of an active judge based 

on their personal experience. Judges and staff have reported extensive delays in the 

processing and resolution of cases.” March 24 Order at 2 (emphasis added). The Order 

goes on: “It has been stated that Judge Newman routinely makes statements in open court 

and during deliberative proceedings that demonstrate a clear lack of awareness over the issues 

in the cases.”49 Id. And, it states, “half of the active judges of the court hav[e] expressed their 

concerns about Judge Newman.” Id. at 5-6. 

49 At no point did the Committee identify even one such statement illustrating Judge Newman’s lack 

of awareness of issues before the court, despite audiotaped oral arguments being readily available.
70

The Order thus places the personal knowledge of various judges at the 

foundation of this investigation. In fact, some of the most important information about 

Judge Newman’s ability to decide cases is available only from other judges. For instance, 

information about Judge Newman’s conduct during case deliberations is only available 

to judges because only they are present during those sessions.

The Committee again relied on the personal observations of its members when 

it issued its April 7 Order, which is at the center of the alleged non-cooperation: It was 

the first order requiring Judge Newman to obtain additional medical evaluations. One 

of the express bases for the Order is the Committee’s own “direct observations of Judge 

Newman’s behavior.” April 7 Order at 1. 

Judges of this Court possess unique personal knowledge about other relevant 

matters as well. For example, each of the three members of the Special Committee had 

a separate conversation with Judge Newman in March 2023, in which each attempted 

to persuade her to resign or accept senior status. See ante. Whether these conversations 

occurred in the way Judge Newman describes them or in some other manner is 

important because it was Judge Newman’s refusal to resign or take senior status—that 

is, her refusal to succumb to threats—that led to the Chief Judge’s issuance of the 

formal order launching this investigation. See March 24 Order at 5-6.
71

The Committee’s Report contends that the judges’ extensive personal knowledge 

is not relevant to this investigation, arguing that it “quickly determined that testimony 

from judges about interactions with Judge Newman—particularly interactions related 

to the process of deciding cases—should be excluded from the Committee’s inquiry 

because that information was unnecessary and because information regarding delays in 

case processing would be more objective if obtained from the Clerk’s Office data.” 

Report at 70 (emphasis in original). The Committee further contends that “there are 

no witnesses needed in this proceeding as it has been narrowed” to the question of noncooperation. Id. at 75. But the Special Committee did not purge this matter from its 

reliance (in the March 24 and April 7 Orders) on evidence provided by judges of this 

Court by recasting this matter as relating solely to whether Judge Newman 

“cooperated” with the Committee. This investigation remains the fruit of the same tree 

planted in the March 24 Order, and that tree rested in significant part on evidence 

provided by these judges. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).

1. That Members of the Judicial Council Are Not Likely to Be

Actually Called as Witnesses Is Irrelevant

The reason the Committee’s explanation doesn’t pass muster is two-fold. First, 

whether the Committee chooses to rely on judges’ witness statements is simply 

irrelevant. Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1), a judge is obligated to recuse himself whenever 

he has “personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” 
72

The statute does not require that a judge be personally called as a witness, merely that 

he has knowledge of the disputed facts. The Committee itself attests that its own 

members, as well as other members of the Judicial Council do in fact have such 

knowledge. See March 24 Order at 2, 5-6; April 7 Order at 1. There is good reason for 

the broad prohibition. The personal knowledge that members of the Judicial Council 

possess is relevant not only to their roles as actual or potential witnesses, but also to

their roles as adjudicators as they already have formed some opinions regarding Judge 

Newman’s abilities that prevent them from giving her a fair hearing. The fact that “half 

of the active judges of the court” purportedly expressed concern to the Chief Judge 

means that at least half the members of this Judicial Council have pre-conceived views 

about this matter based on their own personal knowledge. And given these preconceived views, the risk is too high that any new evidence that contradicts those views 

would be heavily discounted. It is a well-known psychological phenomenon that 

individuals process new information through the lens of their pre-existing knowledge 

and biases—effects known as “confirmation bias” and “anchoring bias.” See, e.g., 

Duncan v. Bonta, 19 F.4th 1087, 1122 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (Berzon, J., concurring), 

vacated on other grounds by 142 S. Ct. 2895 (2022) (“Cognitive biases ranging from 

confirmation bias to anchoring bias, can cloud a judge’s analysis.”). Any new data 

received by Judicial Council members is thus likely to be processed through the lens of 
73

prior knowledge, beliefs, or impressions. This is not a matter of bad intent, but of basic 

human psychology.

Other judicial councils have recognized this inherent risk. For example, in the 

Adams case, when fellow district judges complained about Judge Adams’s behavior, 

none of his colleagues from the same district participated at the “Special Committee” 

stage, nor in the final deliberations of the judicial council. See In re Complaint of Judicial 

Misconduct, No. 06-13-90009 (6th Cir. June 27, 2018) at 1 and 3 n.3. Similarly, when a 

complaint was lodged against a district judge in the Central District of Illinois, the Chief 

Judge of that district recused herself. See infra n.65. And when a district judge in 

Montana was investigated, even the circuit judge whose chambers were in the same 

courthouse as the subject judge’s chambers, recused himself. See infra n.64. 

Additionally, since the publication of the Implementation of the Judicial Conduct 

and Disability Act of 1980, Report to the Chief Justice of the Judicial Conduct and 

Disability Act Study Committee, 239 F.R.D. 116 (Sept. 2006) (“Breyer Report”), every 

single complaint of misconduct against a circuit judge that was not summarily dismissed 

has been transferred to another circuit’s judicial council for investigation.50 See, e.g., In 

50 The Conduct Rules were adopted in response to the Breyer Report. Prior to the Breyer Report,

there was no formal mechanism to request a transfer, though Illustrative Rules did suggest that such 

a transfer, as well as “intercircuit assignment procedures under 28 U.S.C. § 291(a)” may be available. 

See Illustrative Rules Governing Complaints of Judicial Misconduct and Disability, R. 18(g) (Admin. Office of 

the Courts, 2000).
74

re Charges of Judicial Misconduct, No. 21-90142-JM (resolution of the complaint against 

Circuit Judge William Pryor of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit by 

the Judicial Council of the Second Circuit); In re Complaints under the Judicial Conduct and 

Disability Act, Nos. 10-18-90038-67, 10-90069-107, 10-90109–122 (resolution of the 

complaint against Circuit Judge (by then-Justice) Brett M. Kavanaugh of the U.S. Court 

of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit by the Judicial Council of the Tenth 

Circuit); In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, Nos. 18-90204-jm, 18-90205-jm, 18-90206-

jm, 18-90210-jm (resolution of the complaint against Circuit Judge Maryann Trump 

Barry of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit by the Judicial Council of the 

Second Circuit); In re Charges of Judicial Misconduct, No. DC-13-90021 (resolution of the 

complaint against Circuit Judge Edith Jones of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 

Circuit by the Judicial Council of the District of Columbia Circuit); In re Charges of Judicial 

Misconduct, No. 12-90069-JM (resolution of the complaint against Circuit Judge Boyce 

F. Martin of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit by the Judicial Council of

the Second Circuit); In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 575 F.3d 279 (2009) (resolution 

of the complaint against Chief Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski of the U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Ninth Circuit by the Judicial Council of the Third Circuit). As Professor Arthur 

Hellman noted, “over the last few years, chief judges have consistently followed the 

practice of requesting a transfer when serious allegations have been raised about a judge 

of the court of appeals.” Arthur D. Hellman, An Unfinished Dialogue: Congress, the 
75

Judiciary, and the Rules for Federal Judicial Misconduct Proceedings, 32 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 341, 

404 (2019) (emphasis added). See also Jones, supra (“To obviate unethical conflicts and 

provide objectivity, the normal application of judicial misconduct rules requires that a 

matter about a circuit-court judge be transferred to another circuit’s chief judge and

Judicial Council.”). In refusing to seek a transfer of this matter, the Judicial Council for 

the Federal Circuit stands alone, and it stands athwart Congressional design in crafting 

the Disability Act.

The Committee rejects this recounting of the precedent, but it is unable to cite a 

single instance where a complaint against a circuit judge was kept within that judge’s local 

judicial council. The best that the Committee can do is state that many complaints were 

not transferred while acknowledging that the data it relies on simply does not 

differentiate between “proceedings against district court [and] circuit judges.” Report 

at 90 n.27. But such a differentiation is crucially important, precisely because when it 

comes to a district judge, there may be no members of that judge’s court on the judicial 

council, or if there are such members, they can easily recuse themselves. See infra nn.64-

65. But the same isn’t true when the judge being investigated is herself a member of

the relevant circuit court.

These concerns that apply to all circuits are not the only ones present in this case. 

As the Katznelson study shows, members of the Judicial Council stand to materially 
76

benefit should Judge Newman be removed from the bench. See Katznelson, supra. As 

Dr. Katznelson explains, given Judge Newman’s high rate of dissent, were she replaced 

by a less dissent-prone judge, the work of her colleagues would be reduced by over 5%. 

It is irrelevant that Judge Newman’s colleagues may or may not be purposefully 

attempting to remove her from the bench for the sole purpose of having to do less 

work. As the Supreme Court explained, the Due Process Clause abhors procedures 

that “offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge.” Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 

510, 532 (1927) (emphasis added). The Due Process Clause is offended when a 

decisionmaker has a strong “motive” to reach a particular result. Id. at 533-34. And 

whatever the intentions of the Judicial Council members might be, it cannot be seriously 

debated that they will have an easier time accomplishing their work if a colleague who 

forces them to respond to criticism (as dissents always do) were removed from the 

Court. This “possible temptation” is, in and of itself, sufficient basis for all the 

members of the Judicial Council to recuse themselves. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(4), 

(b)(5)(iii).

Finally, keeping the investigation in this Circuit not only means overlooking the 

conflicts that affect at least half the judges on the Judicial Council, it also provides a 

disincentive for knowledgeable witnesses to come forward if they disagree with the preordained outcome of this matter. The Federal Circuit is a specialized court with a 

specialized bar. See Daniel R. Cahoy & Lynda J. Oswald, Complexity and Idiosyncrasy at the 
77

Federal Circuit, 19 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 216, 226 (2018). Many, if not most, of 

the attorneys who litigate before this Court practice only in the areas that are within this 

Court’s exclusive jurisdiction. In other words, the very livelihood of these attorneys 

depends on being able to maintain good standing and a trusted reputation with judges 

of the Court when it comes to representations made in their various cases. Given this 

reality, attorneys who could serve as witnesses regarding Judge Newman’s conduct 

during oral argument (and perhaps in other settings) are actually placed in a position 

that is not that different from the Court’s employees. In other words, the attorneys 

who regularly practice before this Court may be reticent about coming forward with 

their impression of Judge Newman’s conduct or opinion quality, which in turn will have 

the effect of undermining Judge Newman’s ability to mount a defense against these 

unwarranted charges in this forum. This reticence is already evident from the fact that 

multiple law firms with patent practices declined to be involved in this matter in any 

capacity citing “conflict of interest.” None of this would be a problem were the matter 

transferred and the investigation conducted by a judicial council of another circuit. 

Attorneys providing testimony could remain anonymous and thus not worry about 

whether their involvement in this matter would affect their ability to continue practicing 

in the Federal Circuit. 

The Committee rejects this concern by pointing out that had the matter gone to 

a hearing under Rule 14, Judge Newman “would have had the benefit of compulsory 
78

process to obtain any critical testimony.” Report at 75. But this misses two important 

points. First, the current reticence of witnesses to come forward puts additional 

burdens on Judge Newman (including having to submit to unwanted medical 

examination) that she otherwise would not have had to carry. The same reticence also 

limits the Committee’s ability to see the full picture before deciding whether ordering 

medical examinations is appropriate. See Rule 14, cmt. (requiring the Committee to 

consider “evidence representing the entire picture.”). Second, even if Judge Newman 

could compel witnesses to appear before the Committee, it is quite likely that the 

testimony provided by those witnesses, in light of legitimate potential concerns about 

effects on their careers, would be anything but limited and reluctant.51

2. “Narrowing” the Inquiry Does Not Eliminate the Problem of

Actual Bias or Risk of Bias

The fact that the investigation has been “narrowed” to the issue of “failure to 

cooperate” on which “no witnesses [are] needed” does not address whether the Judge 

51 Additionally, any evidence that might contradict one’s own pre-existing views is likely to get short 

shrift. See Duncan, 19 F.4th at 1122. Instead of seeing weaknesses and shades of grey in the testimony, 

in such a situation, the decisionmaker can actually become more entrenched in the initial position. See, 

e.g., Enide Maegherman, et al., Law and Order Effects: On Cognitive Dissonance and Belief Perseverance, 29

Psychiatry, Psychology and L. 33, 34 (2022) (“[J]udges who had been given more incriminating

information prior to trial were more likely to convict the defendant than judges who were given the

same case file, but less incriminating prior information. Therefore, judges also appear to be prone to

belief perseverance despite the need for impartiality.”); id. (“One way in which people try to escape

cognitive dissonance is to adopt, and adhere to, one of the beliefs, while refuting or downplaying the

other.”).
79

Newman had “good cause” for any such failure. It is precisely because the present 

investigation ignores basic norms of due process of law, including failure to recuse by 

those with “personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts,” that Judge Newman has 

taken the position that she has taken. The “narrowing” of the investigation does not 

obviate the need to confront these issues. 

Indeed, the Committee itself spends pages recounting Judge Newman’s 

interactions with Court personnel in order to establish that it had reasonable basis to 

order medical testing. It also uses the proximity of the personnel to the Committee as 

a reason to deny transfer. Report at 87-89. Yet, at the same time the Committee’s 

efforts to avoid relying on judges’ personal knowledge has led to the conspicuous 

omission from its Report of the most directly relevant observations of Judge Newman’s 

ability to decide cases. The Committee’s Report relies on extensive statements from 

Court personnel, but entirely ignores the personal knowledge of this Court’s judges. 

Surely judges’ observations of Judge Newman’s conduct during judicial conferences are

more probative about her judicial competence than an IT employee’s observation about 

whether Judge Newman knew she should reboot the fax machine. See Spec. Comm. 

Report at 86 (citing affidavits). And this information from court personnel adds 

nothing at all to the question whether Judge Newman has “cooperated” with the

Committee. Yet the Report is larded with pages upon pages of observations from court 

employees about office procedures and Judge Newman’s interactions with selected 
80

staff, while it is devoid of any information about judicial conferences or academic events 

where she actually discussed cases and doctrine. But the Committee cannot 

simultaneously claim that interactions with Court staff are relevant to its determination 

while the knowledge of the Court’s own members is irrelevant. There can be only one 

reason for relying on statements by Court staff (all of which post-date the Committee’s 

initial order for a medical examination) but putting the judges’ own knowledge offlimits—the Committee’s wishes to avoid having judges become witnesses at all to avoid 

having to transfer this case to another forum. 

This failure to consider centrally important evidence cannot be squared with the 

Committee’s obligation “to present evidence representing the entire picture,” Rule 14, 

cmt., or with the basic requirements of “the right to a fair hearing as guaranteed by the 

Due Process Clause.” Gardner v. Fla., 428 U.S. 908, 909 (1976).

B. THIS INVESTIGATION HAS BEEN MARKED BY RULINGS THAT ARE UNFAIR,

CONTRADICTORY, AND PROVIDE SHIFTING RATIONALES FOR PREVENTING JUDGE

NEWMAN FROM HEARING CASES

1. The Chief Judge Improperly Removed Judge Newman from

the April 2023 Sitting of the Court

On February 14, 2023, the Chief Judge excluded Judge Newman from panel 

assignments for the Court’s April 2023 sitting. Report at 79. The Chief Judge did not 

confer or even communicate with Judge Newman before taking this step. According 

to the Chief Judge, she excluded Judge Newman because Judge Newman was 

82

suggestion to hold action on the case pending the enactment of the referenced bill. To 

that end, the Court waited until the President formally signed the bill into law on August 

 2022, , and then, on August , 2022,

 The parties submitted requested briefs on September , 2022. Id., 

 It thus follows, that at a minimum all of the time between June , 2022 

and September 2022 (totaling 87 days) should be excluded from days chargeable to 

Judge Newman. Doing so, would have hit the 365-day mark on March 

2023, long after the February paneling decisions would have been set.

With respect to the Committee’s assertions are equally problematic. The 

Committee asserts that the case was assigned to Judge Newman on February 2022, 

and therefore would have hit the 365-day mark on February , 2023. But the 

Committee is misstating facts. was not even formally submitted until March 

2023. True enough, on February , 2023, Judge Newman pre-assigned to herself, 

but the assignment was not finalized and formalized until after the date of submission.52 

Accordingly, was not delayed past the 365-day deadline in February 2023.

52 Indeed, the pre-assignment memorandum acknowledges that it is only effective “absent objection.” 

Attachment C. That no objection was actually made doesn’t make the memorandum any less tentative. 
83

However, even assuming that the Committee’s timeline is correct and Judge 

Newman’s one is wrong, there was still no basis to deny her panel assignments for the 

April 2023 calendar. As the Committee itself acknowledges, the paneling decisions for 

the April sitting were made on February 14, 2023, and (the case that allegedly put 

Judge Newman in violation of CP #3) did not hit the 365-day mark until the next day. 

To get around this uncomfortable fact, the Committee Report asserts that “[t]here is 

no bright line date on which the time periods in CP #3 are applied, and the Chief 

Judge’s chambers appropriately relied on the email from Judge Newman’s chambers in 

concluding that Judge Newman did not anticipate issuing the opinion before 

paneling was finalized and that she was subject to CP #3.” Report at 79. This statement 

is stunning on multiple levels. First, if it is true that there is no “bright line date on 

which the time periods in CP #3 are applied,” then it is not a rule of procedure at all, 

but a delegation of nearly unfettered authority to the Chief Judge to simply “intuit” 

whether or not her colleagues will or won’t file opinions by some date known only to 

the Chief Judge. Second, it is simply unbelievable that a judicial officer instead of 

waiting for an established deadline to pass, simply assumes that a filing will not be timely 

made and then rules accordingly. This is yet another example of the Chief Judge and/or 

the Committee attempting to fit data into a predetermined outcome, and therefore yet 

another example of bias or at the very least risk of bias. 
84

2. The Chief Judge and Other Members of the Committee

Predetermined that Judge Newman Must Take Senior Status

As the Chief Judge herself recounts in the March 24 Order, on March 7, 2023, 

the Chief Judge informed Judge Newman she had “probable cause to believe” that 

Judge Newman suffers from a cognitive disability. The Chief Judge offered to resolve 

this concern “informally,” demanding that Judge Newman resign or at least take senior 

status under 28 U.S.C. § 371. March 24 Order at 2, 5. The Chief Judge, and other 

members of this Committee told Judge Newman it was “non-negotiable” that she step 

down from active status if she wished to resolve this matter informally. The 

predetermination that Judge Newman relinquish her judicial office (in whole or in part)

infected every subsequent step that followed, and it casts significant doubts on the 

objectivity of the Committee, as well as any other judges who urged Judge Newman to 

take senior status. 

3. The Judicial Council, in Violation of Basic Procedures, Voted

to Preclude Assigning New Cases to Judge Newman

On March 8, the Judicial Council voted “unanimously” to preclude the 

assignment of new cases to Judge Newman. June 5 Order at 1. This “Order” was highly 

irregular, resting on a series of procedural violations that are virtually unheard of in a 

serious judicial process. The basis for the order was thereafter stated in the Chief 

Judge’s email to Judge Newman, which was reproduced in the Chief Judge’s Order of 

April 6, 2023. See April 6 Order at 4. In her email, the Chief Judge stated that Judge 
85

Newman has been suspended “pending the results of the investigation into potential 

disability/misconduct” and that Judge Newman “will not be assigned any new cases 

until the[] [disciplinary] proceedings are resolved.” Neither the Disability Act, nor the 

Conduct Rules, however, provide for an interim suspension of a judge pending 

adjudication of the complaint. Though this problem was repeatedly pointed out to the 

Committee and the Judicial Council, no action was taken until Judge Newman filed suit 

and sought injunctive relief. See Newman v. Moore, supra. Furthermore, the March 8 

Order, which according to the Chief Judge was entered and would remain in effect 

“pending the results of the investigation” was actually entered weeks before any 

investigation began. 

On June 5, the Judicial Council suddenly changed the justification and 

explanation for the March 8 Order. Gone were the claims that the order was entered 

“pending the results of the investigation,” and instead the Council claimed that its 

decisions were made “under the Council’s statutory authority to ‘make all necessary and 

appropriate orders for the effective and expeditious administration of justice within its 

circuit.’” June 5 Order at 4-5 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1)). But even taking this new, 

retrofitted justification at face value, the March 8 Judicial Council’s action still shows 

either actual bias or too high of a risk of bias to permit the continuation of this process 

within this forum. 
86

To begin with, the Judicial Council did not notify Judge Newman about the vote, 

even though she was and is a member of the Judicial Council. Nor did it provide her 

with an opportunity to be heard. The lack of notice and the opportunity to be heard 

violates the most basic principles of due process of law. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 

67, 80 (1972) (“For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process 

has been clear: ‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in 

order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.’ It is equally 

fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard ‘must be granted 

at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 

Wall.) 223, 233 (1864)). This exclusion of Judge Newman from a Judicial Council vote

also violated governing law. For example, the Disability Act commands that “[e]ach 

member of the council shall attend each council meeting unless excused by the chief judge of 

the circuit.” 28 U.S.C. § 332(a)(6) (emphasis added). Chief Judge Moore did not excuse 

Judge Newman from participating in the vote, and no legal basis existed to exclude her 

from it. The Committee now suggests that “[t]he Judicial Council properly operated 

on the view that Judge Newman would be recused in any decision on that matter.” 

Report at 79. It cites no authority for the proposition, nor can it because it is triply 

wrong.53

53 The Committee’s attempt to analogize the situation to one covered by Rule 25 of the Conduct Rules 

fails. Given that the plain language of Rule 25(b) did not apply, no legal basis existed to use “analogy” 
87

First, the decision whether or not to recuse belongs to each judge herself and not 

to her fellow members of the court or the judicial council. See, e.g., Miles v. Ryan, 697 

F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2012); 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (“Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge

of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality 

might reasonably be questioned.”) (emphasis added). The Judicial Council’s 

assumptions about what Judge Newman would do had no place in the proceedings. 

Second, as the Judicial Council itself asserted in the June 5 Order, the issue that was 

considered by the Council was not whether or not Judge Newman ought to be 

sanctioned, but how to best administer the business of the court. June 5 Order at 5 

(“This is not a censure but rather a decision made for the effective and expeditious 

administration of the business of the court.”). But if so, then Judge Newman would 

not have been “a judge in his own case,” but rather, like every other judge at that 

meeting, a “judge” in the case of her judicial council. Therefore, any comparison to the 

“analogous situation when a judge is the subject of a misconduct or disability complaint 

under the Act and the Rules,” id. at 79, is entirely misplaced. Third, even assuming, 

arguendo, and contrary to the Judicial Council’s own orders, that it was the case of Judge 

to deny Judge Newman her clear legal right to notice about the Judicial Committee vote. Indeed, the 

existence of this Rule 25(b) provision disqualifying a “subject judge” after a complaint has been filed 

against her provides dispositive textual evidence that a judge cannot be excluded before a complaint has 

been filed against her. An elementary principle of statutory construction holds, of course, that where 

a draft includes a provision in one context and excludes the provision when addressing a different 

context, the provision is not equally applicable in both situations.
88

Newman (rather than the case of “effective and expeditious administration of the 

business of the court”) that was being considered on March 8, it cannot possibly explain 

why notice and opportunity to be heard (and indeed post-factum minutes of the 

meeting) were not provided to Judge Newman. Had she been told about the meeting, 

Judge Newman might have been able to furnish evidence that claims being made about 

her to justify the Council’s action were erroneous.54

In yet another breach of basic procedure, the Judicial Council did not put its 

resulting “Order” in writing—even though excluding a sitting Article III judge from 

hearing new cases is as consequential a vote as a Judicial Council can possibly take. 

Incredibly, it appears that no Judicial Council document memorialized the meeting, the 

discussion, or the vote that took place. Conducting the business of a judicial council in 

this manner appears to be entirely unprecedented in history. Finally, in the culmination 

of this real-life parade of horribles, the Judicial Council did not even tell Judge Newman 

about its Order until the next month. See April 6 Order at 4. In effect, the Judicial 

Council supposedly issued an “Order” that was unwritten and undisclosed. 

54 It appears that at least some judges have taken on faith information provided to them by the Chief 

Judge. Thus, Judge , in his email to Judge Newman which was sent after the March 8 

meeting and vote, explicitly stated that though much of the information he has considered about Judge 

Newman’s performance is second hand, he had no reason to doubt it. Perhaps, had Judge and 

other judges been presented with a fuller picture, they would have reason to doubt the information 

provided by the Chief Judge, and vote accordingly. 
89

The Committee is essentially playing a “heads-I-win, tails-you-lose” game with 

Judge Newman. It cites Rule 25(b) in an effort to justify keeping Judge Newman in the 

dark about the March 8 vote both before and after it occurred. At the same time, the 

Committee denies Judge Newman the procedural protections she should have received 

if the Disability Act and the Conduct Rules really had applied. The Disability Act would 

have imposed numerous requirements and limitations on the Judicial Council. To name 

a few, (i) it would not have authorized the Judicial Council to take any action at all until 

a formal complaint was initiated, 28 U.S.C. § 353(a); (ii) it would have required the 

Judicial Council to notify Judge Newman of the complaint against her, 28 U.S.C. § 

353(a) & 354(a)(4); and (iii) it would have required the Judicial Council to withhold any 

conclusion until a special committee conducted an investigation, reached a conclusion, 

and submitted a report, 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(1). The same statute also would have 

restricted the permissible sanction, stating that any restriction on a judge’s ability to hear 

cases must be limited to a “time certain.” 28 U.S.C. § 354 (a)(2)(A)(1). Neither the 

Committee nor the Judicial Council as a whole followed any of these procedures, and 

they did not limit the sanctions against Judge Newman (even if the Council refuses to 

term them as such, see June 5 Order at 5) to a “time certain.” See generally id. (failing to 

state any temporal limit on Judge Newman’s suspension). The Report’s treatment of 

the March 8 Order only sows more confusion about the Order’s actual basis, and 

therefore only increases the perception of actual bias or the risk thereof. 
90

4. The March 24 Order Was Procedurally and Substantively

Flawed.

As already explained ante, the March 24 Order which serves as the basis for this 

investigation, suffers from significant factual errors. However, it was also improperly 

issued.

Rule 11(f) of the Conduct Rules requires that the subject judge be given an 

opportunity “to respond to the complaint either orally or in writing if the judge was not 

given an opportunity during the limited inquiry.” The Committee suggests that such 

an opportunity “was not required because ... Judge Newman had already been provided 

a copy of the order identifying the complaint on March 17 during the limited inquiry 

conducted by the Chief Judge.” Report at 12, n. 4. But that’s plainly wrong. The 

question was not whether Judge Newman was given notice of the impending 

investigation, but whether she was given an opportunity to respond to the charges. No such 

opportunity was provided. Indeed, the Chief Judge herself recounts that she was only 

interested in meeting with Judge Newman to resolve the complaint “informally” which 

only meant through Judge Newman’s resignation. A forced resignation is not an 

“opportunity to respond.” Perhaps, had such an opportunity been provided, the March 

24 Order could have avoided the factual errors, and there would be no predicate for 

the investigation in the first place.
91

5. The Special Committee Improperly Placed the Burden of

Investigating the Credentials of Selected Medical Providers on

Judge Newman

The Committee ordered Judge Newman to submit to testing by two medical 

providers without ever disclosing their qualifications or the methods of their selection.55

The Rules, however, limit the Committee to the “use of appropriate experts.” Rule 

13(a). Judge Newman continuously objected to submitting to the testing “by providers 

with unknown qualifications and provenance.” July 5 Letter at 14. In other words, 

Judge Newman objected to the fact that the Committee failed to establish that the 

experts it selected are “appropriate.” In its Report, the Committee argues that Judge 

Newman was “offered the opportunity to discuss the professionals recommended by” 

the Committee’s consultant, Report at 94, and that she could have “done an internet 

search with the names of the doctors who were provided to her” so as to assure herself 

of “their credentials,” id. at 94 n.30. 

However, it is not Judge Newman’s burden to verify that the providers selected 

by the Committee are appropriate. Rather, it is the Committee’s burden to establish 

that its request is reasonable both in substance and in the mode of execution. It is “an 

elementary, routine, important, and familiar principle of legal procedure,” August 8 

55 The first time the Committee explained how these providers were chosen was in the Report. See

Report at 93 n.29. 
92

Order at 6, that “the party requesting an order of the tribunal has the burden of 

persuasion as to the requested order.” Aqua Prod., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1351 

(Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Taranto, J., joined by, inter alia, Prost C.J., dissenting from the 

judgment). 

The Committee failed to establish that the experts it selected are “appropriate.” 

It continuously failed to state why the providers were selected in the first place (other 

than stating that the Committee’s consultant—an out-of-the-area physician—

recommended them), or why these providers, neither of whom is a psychiatrist, are 

qualified or even preferred to evaluate Judge Newman. And yet, having failed to meet 

these elementary burdens of production and persuasion, the Committee blames Judge 

Newman for failing to blindly follow the Committee’s every request. This is yet another 

improper attempt to vitiate Judge Newman’s procedural rights and to shift the burden 

of proving her continued competence onto Judge Newman, rather than having the 

Committee carry the burden of establishing Judge Newman’s incompetence.

6. The Special Committee’s Denial of Judge Newman’s Request

for Access to Full Data Set Is Another Procedural Irregularity

On August 14, 2023, Judge Newman’s counsel submitted a request to the 

Committee for (a) release of data regarding Judge Newman’s productivity going back 

to 2018, and (b) permission to share the confidential and redacted data with a consulting 

expert who could verify and test the accuracy of the data on which the Committee 
93

relied. Counsel made this request , of which the 

Committee was aware in advance. Following the delay occasioned by the 

, counsel began in earnest to craft arguments in response to the 

Committee’s 111-page report. 

On August 17, 2023, the Committee denied the requested materials, stating that 

the request came too late.56 The Committee asserted, once again, without citing to any 

authority whatever, that the record had “closed,” and added that the requested data was 

irrelevant to the question of Judge Newman’s cooperation. August 17 Order at 4-8.

This order was arbitrary, unfair, and finds no support in the Conduct Rules or 

the Disability Act. Nothing either in the Conduct Rules or the Disability Act suggests 

that the “record closes” at the Committee stage. The Committee is not a trial-like 

tribunal, with the Judicial Council serving as an appellate body. To the contrary, the 

Judicial Council is the only authority that can act on matters of judicial disability in the 

first instance.57 Contrary to the Committee’s assertion, the Conduct Rules afford a 

subject judge an opportunity to “send a written response ... [and] to present argument, 

56 The Committee noted that the request came after “approximately half the time had expired for 

Judge Newman to prepare any response” to its Report. It is not clear what relevance this fact may 

have, as the counsel did not ask the Committee to conduct any analysis on an expedited basis. Counsel 

was ready to have its own expert do so. Besides which, the first half of the response period was always 

going to be devoted to . That was the reason for the extension request in the first place. 

57 The Rules provide for appellate-like review before the Committee on Judicial Conduct and 

Disability, and if necessary, the Judicial Conference. See R. 20(a).
94

personally or through counsel,” R. 20(a), and nowhere do the rules limit the subject 

judge to the “record” developed by the Committee. 

Moreover, the Order is inconsistent with the Committee’s own actions as it itself 

had continued to add new evidence after the date the Committee appears to treat as the 

date the record closed, which apparently was May 16, 2023. See Report at 23 & 24 n.10 

(identifying affidavits added after that date).

The Committee’s decision to deny Judge Newman’s request (which was made 

only in response to the Committee’s rejection of a proper statistical analysis done by 

Dr. Katznelson, see Report at 58 n. 20) while having no legal basis for such a denial, is 

yet another instance of procedural corner-cutting in service of arriving at a 

predetermined conclusion. 

7. The Special Committee’s Heavy Reliance on Information It

Obtained by Questioning Clerks and Other Court Employees

Violates Due Process in Several Respects

Although the Special Committee stated in a June 1, 2023 Order that “there are 

no witnesses who could have relevant testimony bearing on the narrow issue of [the 

alleged] misconduct,” id. at 4, its report includes several affidavits from court 

employees. It cites these affidavits to show Judge Newman has not properly managed 

employees and did not understand certain IT matters. The Special Committee has never 

explained—and could not do so if it tried—why this information from court employees 

is relevant to whether Judge Newman has properly “cooperated” with the investigation. 
95

The Special Committee nonetheless included these affidavits in an effort to prove that 

Judge Newman suffers cognitive deficiencies that prevent her from properly deciding 

cases. Notably, the report does not contain any of the evidence that is obviously more 

relevant to that issue: testimony from the judges who have worked directly with her on 

deciding cases.

In any event, these affidavits raise several concerns. Some of them do not even 

support the conclusion that Judge Newman has any cognitive limitations at all. Most 

conspicuously, this includes the affidavits from the employees who work most closely 

with Judge Newman—her law clerks. See ante II.B.3. 

More broadly, not one of the employee statements was subject to cross 

examination, which the Committee did not permit even though Judge Newman has a 

right to do so. See Rule 15(c) (“The subject judge must be given the opportunity to 

cross-examine special-committee witnesses, in person or by counsel.”). Crossexamination could have been very helpful to a neutral finder of fact. These witnesses 

had strong incentives to provide statements that would be helpful to their employer, 

and the record indicates that their employer was quite forceful in its interactions with 

employees.

To properly interpret the statements from court personnel, it is instructive to 

begin with the transcript from the only deposition in the record. This is the only 

information we have about the Committee’s interaction with the employees whose 
96

statements it relies on. The transcript is from the deposition of Judge Newman’s career 

law clerk. The Committee set an intimidating tone from the beginning of its interaction 

with this law clerk. It served her with a subpoena, at a recruiting event for law clerks, 

in front of dozens of other attorneys and law clerks, and did so even though it had no 

reason to believe the career clerk would decline a simple request for an interview. The

subpoena required the witness to appear for a deposition in only 48 hours. By contrast, 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require “reasonable” notice, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), and 

identify a presumptive notice period of 14 days. Consistent with this initial procedural 

gambit, the deposition transcript shows that the Special Committee’s questioning 

during the deposition was unmistakably intimidating, leading even the witness’s counsel 

to object to the questioning by Judges Moore and Prost as “threatening.” Dep. Tr. at 

12:3. When the witness asserted her Fifth Amendment rights in response to questions, 

the Chief Judge threatened her with a misconduct charge, warning that “refusing to 

cooperate with this proceeding could result in a misconduct charge.” Id. at 11:15-18. 

The Chief Judge followed up with a threat that the clerk could lose her job—“could be 

terminated for misconduct.” Id. at 11:23-12:1. Even when it came to a simple request 

for the members of the Committee to ask questions one at a time, so as to permit the 

witness to answer, the Chief Judge refused. Id. at 5:11-6:4.

The Special Committee’s intimidating approach in this deposition casts some 

doubt on the reliability of the statements the same Special Committee obtained from 
97

other Court employees. This is significant because the Special Committee’s Report 

relies so heavily on statements from the Court’s employees. This concern that court 

personnel were not comfortable speaking freely is consistent with information 

indicating that other potential witnesses were too intimidated to speak up at all. Some 

were willing to speak only to an outside publication, IP Watch, which wrote:

There is a reason why few in the industry are speaking out publicly on 

behalf of Judge Newman. Everyone I speak with is afraid of 

retribution, and specifically fearful of retaliation from Chief Judge 

Moore. There is real fear that anyone who might stand up for Judge 

Newman would draw the ire of Chief Judge Moore, and every firm 

that does any form of litigation is prohibiting attorneys from saying 

anything publicly on this matter. 

Gene Quinn, The Campaign Against Judge Newman Underscores the Downfall of the Federal 

Circuit, IPWatchdog.com (May 8, 2023), https://tinyurl.com/2p934ywe.

This concern brings up another defect in the Committee’s approach. Although 

the rule governing the “Conduct of Special Committee Hearings” requires the Special 

Committee “to present evidence representing the entire picture,” Rule 14, cmt., the 

Committee has failed to acknowledge any evidence that would contradict its conclusion. 

In fact, it appears that when evidence did not support the foregone conclusion, the 

Special Committee simply omitted it. As explained ante (see II.B), the Committee 

interviewed three of Judge Newman’s law clerks, but included only two resulting 

statements in its Report. The most plausible inference from this omission is that the 

information obtained through that interview undermined the Committee’s chosen 
98

conclusion. See Tendler, 203 F.2d at 19.

Moreover, various sources indicate that evidence supporting Judge Newman is 

abundant. Several experienced observers have attested to Judge Newman’s mental 

sharpness. On April 12, 2023, IPWatchdog.com wrote about this investigation as 

follows: “Numerous staff and colleagues with knowledge of the complaint filed against 

Newman have contacted IPWatchdog to both confirm the filing of the complaint and 

to vehemently oppose the allegations being made about Judge Newman’s competence.” 

Gene Quinn, Chief Judge Moore Said to Be Petitioning to Oust Judge Newman from Federal Circuit

IPWatchdog.com (April 12, 2023). Similar evidence exists from public appearances 

Judge Newman made this past March and April. The impression of Prof. David Hricik 

has already been noted, but the members of the Judicial Council are free to listen to the 

audio recording of the conference for themselves.58 In the same vein, former Chief 

Judge Michel noted the “clarity” of a talk Judge Newman gave at a Fordham Law School 

Conference in April. Nor based on his review of audio recordings of oral arguments 

did he appreciate any perceptible change in Judge Newman. Michel, supra. 

Yet the Special Committee’s report does not indicate any awareness that 

witnesses supporting Judge Newman’s competence even exist, much less indicate that 

the Committee interviewed or even sought out any such witnesses. It appears that the 

58 See supra n.32.
99

Committee limited its so-called “investigation” to compiling statements from 

employees who would support the position of their employer. It did not even attempt 

to obtain any evidence that might not support its foregone conclusion. This one-sided 

behavior is yet another reason why the proceedings violate Judge Newman’s rights and 

why a transfer is warranted.

C. THE COMMITTEE’S ARGUMENTS AGAINST TRANSFER DO NOT WITHSTAND

SCRUTINY AND ARE DEVOID OF MERIT

The Committee’s (technically, the Chief Judge’s) justification for refusing to 

transfer this matter rests mostly on the argument that keeping the investigation within 

the confines of the Federal Circuit is more efficient. 

In its May 3 Order, the Committee stated that transfer is inappropriate because 

judges outside of the Federal Circuit would be “in a poor position to persuade a judge 

whom they do not know well to take the action they believe is necessary.” May 3 Order 

at 10. The implication is that the Special Committee believes that its job is to persuade 

Newman to take an action they believe to be necessary. In other words, this very 

language betrays that the Committee and other members of the Judicial Council have

already made up its mind that it’s necessary for Judge Newman to retire. See also March 

24 Order at 2 (noting that “[o]n March 9, 2023, another judge [who is not member of 

the Special Committee] met with Judge Newman to articulate concerns and urged her 

to consider senior status.”). But it’s irrelevant whether the Judicial Council members 
100

believe that it is time for Judge Newman to step down. What matters is whether she is 

sufficiently mentally and physically fit to continue in office which has been entrusted to 

her. There is no possible relevance that “personalities” have to this clinical question.

The Report also recounts how, because the Committee and the Court staff are 

co-located, the “Court’s staff could raise concerns based on their interactions with 

Judge Newman in an almost real-time fashion.” Report at 89. Even if true, the 

argument proves nothing. If the matter were transferred, nothing whatsoever would 

prevent anyone from raising any concerns with the Chief Judge (or other judges) about 

Judge Newman’s behavior “in an almost real-time fashion,” and nothing would 

preclude the Chief Judge (or other judges) from forwarding memoranda of those 

conversations or affidavits submitted by the staff to whatever judicial council that the 

Chief Justice would designate to handle the matter. Indeed, the Committee itself stated 

that “given modern communications methods, the Committee does not believe that a 

7-hour time difference presents a substantial barrier” to communications between

parties. May 22 Order at 3. But if in the Committee’s view Judge Newman and her 

counsel are not impeded even by a large time difference, it is hard to understand why 

the Court staff would be impeded if they had to email with any concerns they have not 

to a cafc.uscourts.gov address, but, instead to a ca2.uscourts.gov address. 

Second, it is not at all clear what does ability to lodge a constant stream of 

complaints has to do with the question of Judge Newman’s mental or physical disability. 
101

According to the Committee, as evidenced by the April 7 Order, the alleged delays alone

are a sufficient probable cause to suspect a disability and request medical examination. 

If that is so, then additional complaints are irrelevant. In other words, if all physicians 

agreed that Judge Newman is mentally and physically as agile as ever, surely the fact that 

certain staffers viewed or continue to view her behavior as unnecessarily hostile would 

have no bearing on the question of her disability.

59

 

Furthermore, even assuming that the gathering of the information from the 

Court staff was necessary to really assure oneself that medical testing is, at this stage, 

appropriate, the evidence has been gathered and the only question now is the evaluation

of that evidence. The ability of one to evaluate the mostly written evidence (provided 

in the form of affidavits) in no way depends on the proximity of the evaluator to the 

witness. 

What the Committee is really objecting to is the fact that a neutral decisionmaker 

may not agree with its own determinations. Report at 91-92. If, however, the 

Committee is convinced that its work has been properly conducted, it should welcome 

confirmation from others and not attempt to shield it from such. The Committee 

argues that transferring the matter now would be “grossly inefficient,” and that its 

59 Of course, if it were found that Judge Newman were abusive to Court staff, a different complaint 

could be lodged—one that focused on that issue. But at issue here is solely the question of Judge 

Newman’s alleged disability and lack of cooperation with the Special Committee’s investigation.
102

conduct of the investigation, in contra,st was quite “efficient.” Id. at 87. Leaving aside 

the dubiousness of the claim given that the Committee has not been able to receive an 

answer to the question which prompted this investigation—an answer that, as Judge 

Newman indicated, would have been more readily forthcoming in a more neutral 

forum—the Committee seems to confuse “efficiency” with due process of law. Soviet 

courts were extraordinarily efficient, but they can hardly be accused of being 

procedurally regular. Due process guarantees necessarily mean that there will be some 

lack of efficiency. As the Supreme Court wrote more than half a century ago:

Procedural due process is not intended to promote efficiency or 

accommodate all possible interests: it is intended to protect the 

particular interests of the person whose possessions are about to be 

taken.

“The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve 

legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in 

constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher 

values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the 

Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that 

they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry 

from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may 

characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps 

more, than mediocre ones.”

Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 92 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972)). 

When the question at hand is essentially involuntary removal of a duly appointed 

Article III judge from the functions of her judicial office, some inconvenience and lack 
103

of efficiency is not just to be tolerated, but welcomed. That the Committee sees it 

differently, is its own separate cause for concern.

D. THE FAILURE TO TRANSFER THIS MATTER PROVIDES SUFFICIENT “GOOD CAUSE”

TO RESIST THE COMMITTEE’S DEMANDS

At the end of the day, it is not and never was possible for Judge Newman to 

receive a fair process from the Judicial Council of the Federal Circuit, even if the Judicial 

Council members attempted their very best to provide such a process. Judge Newman’s 

participation in this process would have simply legitimated, without warrant, 

proceedings that do not and cannot comport with constitutional and statutory 

requirements. All of these concerns were ignored when Judge Newman brought them 

to the Special Committee’s attention. In these circumstances, it was and remains 

entirely justifiable for Judge Newman to decline to submit to the Special Committee’s 

demands. There is no good reason for the Judicial Council to retain this matter, and a 

host of good reasons to transfer it. As the tribunal is wrongfully constituted, Judge 

Newman has no choice but to object. 

Indeed, submitting to the Special Committee’s demands would vitiate Judge 

Newman’s right to avoid a proceeding before a tribunal that is unable to adjudicate the 

matter consistent with the requirements of the Due Process Clause and statutory 

commands. See Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345 (2006) (“It is not mere avoidance of a trial, 

but avoidance of a trial that would imperil a substantial public interest that counts.”); cf.
104

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Without question, a trial conducted by 

Article III judges against an Article III judge, but one that would violate both 

constitutional and statutory commands “would imperil a substantial public interest” in 

maintaining confidence in the judiciary generally and disciplinary processes in particular, 

given that “an unconstitutional potential for bias exists when the same person serves as 

both accuser and adjudicator in a case,” Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 8 (2016). 

This, in turn, would “imperil a substantial public interest” in having cases resolved by 

judges whose character and fitness to serve are not impugned by dubious findings. 

Any proceedings that might result in what essentially amounts to a forced 

retirement of an Article III judge against her will would “imperil a substantial public 

interest” in judicial independence that is guaranteed by the existence of a purposefully

difficult constitutional method of removing judges—impeachment by the House of 

Representatives and conviction by a supermajority in the Senate. See U.S. Const. art. I, 

§ 2, cl. 5; id. § 3, cl. 6; id. art. II, § 4. So, any proceedings that undermine Congress’ sole

role in removing Article III judges from the bench “imperil[s] a substantial public 

interest” in maintaining the constitutional structure of government.

The good news, however, is that the Judicial Council still has an opportunity to 

fix the problem, as it still can order a transfer of this matter. Should it choose to take 

that course, it is more likely than not that the issue would be quickly resolved.
105

VI. THE RECOMMENDED SANCTION IS UNPRECEDENTED, EXCESSIVE, AND

CONTRARY TO THE GOVERNING STATUTE

For all of the foregoing reasons, Judge Newman takes the position that she

should not be subject to any sanction because a) she was not in violation of the 

Disability Act or the Conduct Rules, and b) because this Judicial Council should not 

continue to exercise jurisdiction over the matter. However, even if the Judicial Council 

disagrees with some or all of the foregoing arguments, it should reject the sanction 

recommended by the Committee.

The Committee recommended that Judge Newman be subject to a period of 

suspension for one year at both panel and en banc levels, with a possibility of renewing 

the sanction indefinitely.60 Report at 109-11. The recommendation is without basis in 

precedent and violates the statute.

A. THE SANCTION RECOMMENDED BY THE COMMITTEE IS EXCESSIVE AS

COMPARED TO SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON OTHER JUDGES FOUND TO HAVE

ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT

Throughout its Report, the Committee cites heavily to the case of Judge John R.

Adams of the Northern District of Ohio, who was ordered by the Judicial Council of 

the Sixth Circuit to submit to a mental health exam. See generally In re Complaint of Judicial 

60 The Committee also suggested that it may be willing to lift the sanction sooner “[i]f Judge Newman 

undergoes the specified medical examinations, produces the specified medical records, and sits for an 

interview.” Report at 110-11. As stated in the beginning of this brief, Judge Newman will not, under 

any circumstances, submit to these baseless demands, either now or in the future. 
106

Misconduct, No. 06-13-90009 (Judicial Council of the Sixth Circuit Feb. 22, 2016), aff’din-part and vacated-in-part by In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 17-01 (C.C.D. April 

14, 2021). On appeal, the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability affirmed the 

Judicial Council’s order requiring mental health examination, but vacated the previously 

imposed sanction and remanded for further proceedings.61 Despite the affirmance, and 

following the remand of the case to the Judicial Council of the Sixth Circuit, Judge 

Adams persisted in his refusal to submit to a forced psychiatric examination. In 

response, the Special Investigation Committee in that case recommended only a sixmonth suspension from being assigned new cases.

62

 The Committee here recommends a 

sanction that is twice as long (and renewable). Indeed, the length of the sanction 

understates its severity because in Adams, with Judge Adams being a district court judge 

and, unlike Judge Newman, not having had to endure a suspension pendente lite, he would 

have retained a rather full docket even had the suspension been put into effect. In 

contrast, Judge Newman who has been precluded from hearing cases since April 2023, 

61 Unlike with Judge Newman, Judge Adams was never prevented from being assigned cases during the 

pendency of the dispute. 

62 Ultimately, the Judicial Council of the Sixth Circuit rejected even this short suspension and 

eventually dismissed the case. The Committee argues that “the circumstances here are not like Adams

where the behavior that gave rise to the ordered medical examinations abated and eliminated the 

reasonable basis for ordering them.” Report at 109. Although in light of the evaluations by Drs. 

Rothstein and Carney this statement is incorrect, even if it were taken at face value, the fact remains 

that the Committee is recommending a sanction that is twice as heavy as the one recommended in the 

Adams case. The Committee never explains why it chooses to depart from precedent so drastically. 
107

and is not assigned to hear cases until at least November 2023, i.e., Judge Newman has 

already been suspended for seven months, and thus, unlike Judge Adams will have no 

work left at all. Thus, the sanction that the Committee proposes is in actuality more than 

twice as harsh as that which was considered for Judge Adams. The Committee relies

heavily on the Adams case for the rest of its conclusions (citing it over fifty times in its 

Report), but it does not bother explaining why such difference in treatment between 

Judge Adams and Judge Newman is warranted at the sanctions stage.

Nor do other cases where any suspension was imposed support the Committee’s 

recommendation. A search of prior decisions from various other judicial councils 

revealed only a few instances of suspensions, and all of them were a result of grave 

misconduct. For example, the Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit ordered a one-year 

suspension of District Judge Walter S. Smith, Jr. after concluding that he engaged in

“inappropriate and unwanted physical and non-physical sexual advances” coupled with 

“allow[ing] false factual assertions to be made in response to the complaint.” In re 

Complaint of Judicial Misconduct Against United States District Judge Walter S. Smith, Jr., No. 

05-14-90120 at 1 (Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit, Dec. 3, 2015). Similarly, when

the Judicial Conference concluded that District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, among 

other violations, perjured himself in his criminal proceedings and should be referred to 

the House of Representatives for an impeachment inquiry, the Judicial Council of the 

Fifth Circuit precluded Judge Porteous from hearing any cases “for two years ... or 
108

until Congress takes final action on the impeachment proceedings, whichever occurs 

earlier.” In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct Against United States District Judge G. Thomas 

Porteous, Jr., No. 07-05-351-0085 at 4 (Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit, Sept. 10, 

2008). At the same time, it should be noted that prior to the referral of Judge Porteous 

for impeachment proceedings, the Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit only barred him 

from hearing “bankruptcy cases or appeals or criminal or civil cases to which the United 

States is a party” but permitted him to “continue [the rest of] his civil docket and 

administrative duties until it is determined that he must devote his time primarily to his

defense.” In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct Against United States District Judge G. Thomas 

Porteous, Jr., No. 07-05-351-0085 at 6 (Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit Dec. 20, 

2007).

63

Absent such extraordinarily egregious, bordering on or actually criminal conduct, 

judicial councils have not resorted to suspensions of such durations. Indeed, even when 

judges have committed significant and obvious violations of the Canons of Conduct, 

the maximum punishment appears to be a six-month suspension from having new cases 

assigned. See, e.g., In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 12-90026 and 12-90032 

(Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit, Mar. 15, 2013) (ordering that the then-Chief 

63 Only once the impeachment proceedings began did the Judicial Council, in recognition of the fact 

that Judge Porteous was spending all of his time on that matter, suspend him from hearing cases, but 

made clear that the suspension would end as soon as the impeachment proceedings ended and will 

not last more than two years in any event.
109

District Judge for the District of Montana Richard Cebull be assigned no new cases for 

180 days following Judicial Council’s finding that Judge Cebull repeatedly used the Court’s 

email system to send extraordinarily racist and obviously political messages);64 In re 

Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 06-13-90009 (6th Cir. June 27, 2018) (recommending 

a six-month suspension for Judge Adams following his refusal to submit to medical 

testing). The Judicial Council of the Seventh Circuit took an equally careful approach 

when it concluded that District Judge Colin S. Bruce of the Central District of Illinois 

“frequently had ex parte communications with the Office” of the United States 

Attorney which “involved draft plea agreements, jury instructions, or docketing issues”

and other matters regarding pending trials. See In re Complaints Against District Judge Colin 

S. Bruce, Nos. 07-18-90053, 07-18-90067 at 4-6 (Judicial Council of the Seventh Circuit

May 8, 2019).65 Despite the finding that “Judge Bruce ... violate[d] Canon 3 and judicial 

norms” and that his behavior undermined the public’s confidence in the judicial system, 

id. at 9-10, the Judicial Council of the Seventh Circuit ordered only a public reprimand 

and a suspension of only the criminal docket (and only that which was handled by the 

64 It should be noted that Circuit Judge Sydney R. Thomas (whose chambers are in Montana) recused 

himself from participation in this matter. This action is consistent with an argument that Judge 

Newman has been making throughout these proceedings. See ante Part V. (Circuit Judge Richard C. 

Tallman also recused himself. The reasons for this action are unclear.)

65 Again, it is worth pointing out that Judge Sara Darrow, who at the time served as a Chief Judge of 

the Central District of Illinois—the same court on which Judge Bruce sat—recused herself from the 

matter. 
110

Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Central District of Illinois) for a period of one year, 

id. at 11. Similarly, the Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit, upon concluding that thenDistrict Judge Samuel G. Kent engaged in “sexual harassment toward an employee of 

the federal judicial system” accepted his voluntary four-month leave of absence, coupled 

with a public reprimand as an appropriate sanction. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct 

against United States District Judge Samuel B. Kent, No. 07-05-351-0086 at 2 (Judicial Council 

of the Fifth Circuit Sept. 28, 2007).66 

Indeed, even in extraordinarily serious cases of misconduct, judicial councils of 

various circuits have eschewed wholesale long-term suspension of judges from their 

judicial duties. For example, upon finding that then-Judge Carlos Murguia “(1) sexually 

harass[ed] Judiciary employees; (2) engage[ed] in an extramarital sexual relationship with 

an individual who had been convicted of felonies in state court and was then on 

probation; and (3) demonstrate[d] habitual tardiness for court engagements,” and “was 

less than candid with the Special Committee,” the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit 

“publicly reprimanded Judge Murguia” and imposed several private restrictions none 

66 When further allegations against Judge Kent came to light, the Judicial Council stayed its hand 

pending the criminal investigation which ultimately resulted in Judge Kent’s criminal conviction. 

Following the conviction, the Judicial Council referred the matter to the Judicial Conference for its 

determination as to whether Judge Kent should be referred to the U.S. House of Representatives for 

impeachment proceedings. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct against United States District Judge Samuel 

B. Kent, No. 07-05-351-0086 at 2 (Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit May 27, 2009). Impeachment

was obviated by Judge Kent’s resignation from the bench.
111

of which amounted to removing him from hearing cases. In re Complaints Under the 

Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, No. 19-02 at 5-6 (C.C.D. March 3, 2020).

The Committee’s recommendation departs from these precedents where only 

the most egregious misconduct resulted in suspending judges from hearing some or all 

of the cases on their docket. The Committee justifies its recommendation by claiming 

that Judge Newman attempted to “bring the mechanism Congress established for 

addressing judicial disability to a grinding halt simply by flouting the rules and refusing 

to cooperate,” and “thwart[ed] the Committee’s investigation.” Report at 110. Nothing 

could be further from the truth. Judge Newman’s prior submissions and offers of 

cooperation would easily address any questions of judicial disability if only the 

Committee itself were willing to also act in a cooperative and collaborative manner. 

Nor did Judge Newman “thwart” the Committee’s investigation (which had no basis to 

begin with). To repeat, the central, and indeed the only question that ultimately needs 

to be resolved is whether or not Judge Newman is disabled. (She is not). That can be 

easily accomplished in the hands of a neutral adjudicative body. However, it appears 

that the Committee is afraid that referring the matter to a neutral body would result in 

reevaluation of its own work and exposure of its own mistakes. See Report at 91 

(expressing concern that “a transferee circuit could choose to start the entire process 
112

over.”).67 Thus, the Committee’s recommendation has no basis in precedent or fact. 

Furthermore, even assuming that Judge Newman’s behavior did “thwart” the 

Committee’s efforts, that finding would still be insufficient to impose a year-long 

suspension. As discussed above, when Judge Adams “thwarted” the investigation into 

his alleged disability, the committee investigating him recommended only a six-month 

suspension. Similarly, when investigating the matter of Judge Murguia, the Tenth 

Circuit Judicial Council concluded that he “was less than candid with the Special 

Committee,” i.e., impeded the Committee’s efforts to investigate the allegations, yet, the 

Judicial Council chose to impose no suspension at all. In short, once again, the Federal 

Circuit stands alone in its heavy-handed approach to this matter. The Judicial Council 

should, therefore, reject the Committee’s sanction recommendation.

B. THE SANCTION RECOMMENDED EXCEEDS THE COUNCIL’S STATUTORY

AUTHORITY

The Committee recommends that “Judge Newman not be permitted to hear any 

cases not yet assigned to an authoring judge, at the panel or en banc level” for one year 

67 Of course, such a “do-over” would only be necessary if the transferee circuit were convinced that 

the proceedings up to this point were marred with impropriety. Furthermore, any “inefficiencies” 

caused by “a transferee circuit ... start[ing] the entire process over” are entirely the Chief Judge’s, the 

Committee’s, and the Judicial Council’s fault. This matter could have (and should have) been 

transferred months ago, which would have eliminated the worries about work going to waste. 
113

“subject to consideration of renewal if the refusal to cooperate found here continues 

after that time.” Report at 109. This proposal is unlawful for two separate reasons.

First, the Committee is without authority to bar Judge Newman from 

participating in the en banc sessions of the Court. The governing statute and rules (to 

the extent they are constitutional, see infra) permit the Judicial Council to direct that “on 

a temporary basis for a time certain, no further cases be assigned to the judge whose conduct 

is the subject of a complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(2)(A)(i); see also Rule 20(b)(2)(D)(ii). 

In the Federal Circuit, cases are “assigned” to panels, and judges are assigned to those 

panels in accordance with the procedures established by statute, Federal Circuit Rules 

and Internal Operating Procedures. See 28 U.S.C. 46(b); Fed. Cir. R. 47.2(b); Fed. Cir. 

IOP 3.1. 

Section 46(b) explicitly explains how judges should be “assigned” to panels, and 

how cases should be distributed to those panels. In contrast, Section 46(c) explicitly 

states that “[a] court in banc shall consist of all circuit judges in regular active service.” 

28 U.S.C. § 46(c). Thus, at the en banc level, the judges are not “assigned” to a particular 

case, but sit by operation of law. The Judicial Council does not have authority (nor can 

it be delegated such) to rewrite a statute that explicitly commands a particular result. 

Thus, at least insofar as the Committee’s recommendation concerns Judge Newman’s 
114

potential participation (or a prohibition on such participation) in en banc matter, it 

directly contradicts the clear command of 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) and must be rejected.

Second, the Committee is attempting to use the proposed sanction as a tool of 

coercion rather than as a tool of remediation. Neither the Disability Act not the 

Misconduct Rules vest such power in the Committee. Rule 20 explicitly states that the 

Judicial Council is empowered only to “take remedial action to ensure the effective and

expeditious administration of the business of the courts.” 

There is a fundamental difference between “coercive” and remedial actions. As 

the Third Circuit explained, 

Remedial or compensatory actions are essentially backward looking, 

seeking to compensate the complainant through the payment of 

money for damages caused by past acts of disobedience. Coercive 

sanctions, in contrast, look to the future and are designed to aid the 

plaintiff by bringing a defiant party into compliance with the court 

order or by assuring that a potentially contumacious party adheres to 

an injunction by setting forth in advance the penalties the court will 

impose if the party deviates from the path of obedience.

Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, 545 F.2d 1336, 1344 (3d Cir. 

1976) (footnotes omitted). See also United States v. Dowell, 257 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir. 

2001) (“Coercive sanctions seek to induce future behavior by attempting to coerce a 

recalcitrant party or witness to comply with an express court directive. Remedial 

sanctions, by contrast, are backward-looking and seek to compensate an aggrieved party 

for losses sustained as a result of the contemnor’s disobedience.”) (internal citations 
115

and quotations omitted); In re Bradley, 588 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2009) (differentiating 

between “coercive” and remedial civil contempt and noting that “remedial civil 

contempt is backward-looking.”).

The sanction proposed by the Committee is not “backward-looking” and 

targeted at Judge Newman’s alleged past misconduct. Rather, the Committee is asking 

the Judicial Council to endorse a coercive sanction so as “to induce future behavior by 

attempting to coerce [Judge Newman] to comply with” the Committee’s demands. 

Because the Committee’s remit is limited only to sanctioning judges for past conduct, 

rather than attempting to directly compel some future conduct, the Committee’s 

recommendation that the proposed suspension be subject to renewal must be rejected.

C. THE SANCTION RECOMMENDED IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

The judicial office to which every Article III judge is appointed consists of more

than just an ability to draw life-time salary from the United States Treasury. The 

appointment to office carries with it the power to exercise the functions of that office. 

Indeed, the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, in its 1993 

Report, recognized that “[u]nder Article III, federal judicial office has two 

consequences. First, a judge is legally eligible to exercise judicial power, because the 

judicial power of the United States is vested in courts made up of judges. Second, a 

judge is entitled to receive undiminished compensation.” National Commission on 
116

Judicial Discipline and Removal, Report, 152 F.R.D. 265, 287 (1993).68 See also United 

States v. United Steelworkers of Am., 271 F.2d 676, 680 n.1 (3d Cir.), aff’d, 361 U.S. 39 (1959) 

(distinguishing between “hold[ing] office” and receiving compensation). If the ability 

to “exercise judicial power” means anything, it must mean the ability to perform routine 

judicial functions such as hearing cases, and ruling on the controversies brought before 

the court.

Both historical and modern practices confirm the consistent understanding that,

absent impeachment process, judges cannot be suspended from office either as a result 

of misconduct or disability. Having examined historical precedent and practice,

Professor Walter Pratt concluded that “[t]he entire history of good behavior tenure, 

both in England and in America, denies the possibility of removal for disability.” Walter 

F. Pratt, Judicial Disability and the Good Behavior Clause, 85 Yale. L.J. 706, 718 (1976). And

while Congress is entitled to create new mechanisms of judicial discipline and/or ways 

to start an impeachment process, Congress is not free to effect a removal of a judge 

through means other than impeachment.

68 The Committee concluded that any suspension of a judge’s salary or benefits in the absence of 

impeachment would violate the Constitution. 152 F.R.D. at 354 (“[T]ermination of salary would 

violate the Constitution absent resignation or removal.”). At the same time, despite recognizing that 

“federal judicial office has two consequences,” id. at 287, the Committee incongruously concluded 

that Congress can tread (or authorize judicial councils to tread) on the first of those consequences—

ability to “exercise judicial power.” The two conclusions are inconsistent with each other and only 

the former one is correct. 
117

Congress could not, by mere statute, create a mechanism that would divest a 

President from any of his powers even in the face of obvious disability. Recognizing 

this limit on its own authority Congress proposed, and the States ratified, the TwentyFifth Amendment. See S. Rep. 88-1017 at 6-7 (1964). The same limitation applies to 

Congressional ability to authorize new ways of judicial removal through mere statute 

because the original Constitution does not differentiate between methods of removing 

a President and an Article III judge, leaving the impeachment mechanism as a sole 

option to accomplish either. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 4; Federalist 79; Joseph Story, 2 

Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 790 at 258 (Hilliard, Gray 

1833) (Fred B. Rothman & Co reprint ed. 1991) (stating that judicial officers are civil 

officers within the meaning of Article II). 

The understanding that judges cannot be removed from their judicial duties has 

continued to the present day and is supported by the contemporaneous practices of 

various judicial councils. As the report of the committee chaired by Associate Justice 

Stephen Breyer stated, since 1980, when the Disability Act became law, and until 2006, 

when the report was filed, the committee found “no instances in which the council 

ordered a suspension in the assignment of new cases.” Breyer Report, 239 F.R.D. at

143.69 The fact that in twenty-six years not a single federal judge was involuntarily 

69 The Breyer Committee identified a single case of misconduct where an accused judge, as part of a 

“settlement” “agreed to go on administrative leave for at least six months, during which he would 

undergo behavioral counseling, and to waive any doctor–patient privilege so that his doctor could 
118

suspended from her judicial functions as punishment for any misconduct strongly 

suggests that judicial councils uniformly view this option as constitutionally suspect.

The Breyer Report finding is consistent with the understanding of constitutional 

limitations on judicial discipline that prevailed in Congress prior to the enactment of 

the Disability Act. Since publication of the Breyer Report, and as discussed above there 

have been at several instances of Judicial Council suspension or attempted suspension 

of Article III judges. None of those instances, however, undermine the present 

argument because in almost all of them, subject judges agreed with the sanction 

imposed.

70

 There appears to be not a single case where a judge was wholly removed 

from hearing cases when the subject judge opposed such a sanction. The fact that in 

forty-three years since the passage of the Disability Act years not a single federal judge 

had been involuntarily suspended from her judicial functions as punishment for any 

misconduct strongly suggests that judicial councils uniformly view this option as 

constitutionally suspect. The Judicial Council of the Federal Circuit should not become 

the first one to impose an involuntary suspension on a member of its court. 

consult with the special committee’s expert.” 239 F.R.D. at 196. The Breyer Committee noted that 

this was a “voluntary corrective action.” A similar action was taken by Judge Kent when a complaint 

was lodged against him. See In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct against United States District Judge Samuel 

B. Kent, No. 07-05-351-0086 at 2.

70 Indeed, Judge Richard Cebull, see supra, initiated a complaint against himself, and though he defended

himself against the charges of racism, he did not oppose the imposition of remedial measures including 

a prohibition on new cases being assigned to him.
119

D. IF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL IS TO UPHOLD THE RECOMMENDATION IN TOTO, JUDGE

NEWMAN SHOULD BE CREDITED WITH THE TIME SHE HAS ALREADY SERVED IN

A SUSPENDED STATUS

Judge Newman has been suspended from hearing cases since April 2023 and,

given the Court’s scheduling procedures, she will not be assigned cases until the 

November 2023 sitting of the Court at the earliest. In other words, Judge Newman has 

already experienced a suspension of seven months, which in and of itself is longer than 

almost any other suspension from judicial functions in the history of the United States.

Chief Judge Moore represented to Judge Newman that her suspension began as 

a result of the vote by the Judicial Council and will last through the entire pendency of 

the investigation. April 6 Order at 4. Both the Chief Judge and the Judicial Council 

should be held to their representation that the suspension was and is related to the 

investigation rather than any other matter. Consequently, this suspension that has 

always been termed as a disciplinary matter (at least until Judge Newman filed suit in 

the District Court) should be taken into account in imposing additional discipline on 

Judge Newman. 

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Judicial Council should reject the 

Committee’s Report and bring this matter to a speedy conclusion. The reports of two 

qualified medical professionals put to rest any doubts about Judge Newman’s 

competency. Even if the Judicial Council does not terminate the matter, it should 
120

certainly reject the Committee’s recommended sanction as contrary to law and 

precedent. 

In the alternative, the Judicial Council should request that the matter be 

transferred to another circuit’s judicial council. Absent either of these actions, the 

matter will remain at an impasse, because Judge Newman does not foresee a set of 

circumstances under which she will submit to the Committee’s baseless demands.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Gregory Dolin

Gregory Dolin

Andrew Morris 

John J. Vecchione

Mark Chenoweth

NEW CIVIL LIBERTIES ALLIANCE

1225 19th St. NW, Suite 450

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 869-5210

Greg.Dolin@NCLA.legal

August 31, 2023
Attachment A
No. FC-23-90015

In the Judicial Council of the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

____________________________________________

In re Complaint No. 23-90015 

(Complaint Against Circuit Judge Pauline Newman)

____________________________________________

DECLARATION OF TED L. ROTHSTEIN, M.D.

___________________________________________

August 31, 2023
Page 1 of 3

DECLARATION OF TED L. ROTHSTEIN, M.D.

1. I, Ted J. Rothstein, M.D., am over the age of 18 and make this Declaration in support of

Judge Pauline Newman’s Response to the Judicial Council in her case before it.

2. I am a Neurologist practicing in Washington D.C. I am affiliated with the George

Washington University Hospital. I received a medical degree from Virginia

Commonwealth University School of Medicine.

3. I have practiced medicine for more than 30 years. I am Board Certified in Neurology. I

served an internship at the Queens Hospital in Honolulu, Hawaii, and completed Residency

in Neurology at University of Washington in Seattle, Washington.

4. I became Board Certified in Neurology in 1975 and am both a Fellow of the American

Academy of Neurology and Stroke Fellow of the American Heart Association.

5. I have 32 peer reviewed publications in scientific journals and 100 presentations in my field.

6. My most recent publication is Cortical Grey Matter Depletion Links with Neurological Sequelae in

Post COVID-19 “Long Haulers,” in BMC Neurol. 2023 Jan 17;23(1):22.

7. I make this Declaration based on personal knowledge as to my background, and

information gleaned from examining Judge Newman on June 21, 2023. I produced a report

based upon that examination on June 21, 2023, and it is attached as Exhibit 1 to this

Declaration.

8. My examination of Judge Newman was, except as to adjust to her then broken wrist,

complied in all respects with the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (“MoCa”) test that is

standard for assessing cognitive function.

9. Before administering the MoCa examination I took an oral medical and neurological history

of Judge Newman. I also reviewed the analysis of Professor Andrew Michaels of the

University of Houston on her representative opinions. At the time of my examination, she

was under investigation by the Judicial Counsel for “medical impairments.” My test

demonstrated she had the cognitive function to continue to function as a judge in the

court’s proceedings.

10. It has been suggested that the MoCa test was inconclusive or unscientific because Judge

Newman could not draw a clock at a particular time given her broken wrist.

11. The MoCa is a 30-point test and failure to draw a clock does not impede conclusions that

can be drawn from the 3 points not testable. Moreover, a variety of elements are tested on

MoCa, and spatial orientation is the only one that could not be evaluated on clock drawing.

12. Impaired wrist function does not preclude testing of cognitive function.
Page 2 of 3

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 

Executed On: August 29, 2023 /s/ Ted L. Rothstein

Ted L. Rothstein, M.D.
Exhibit 1

to the Declaration of 

Ted L. Rothstein, M.D.


Attachment B
Regina Carney, M.D.

1870 SW 52nd Terrace

Plantation, FL 33317

615-636-5792

Independent Medical Examination

In the Matter of: Judge Pauline Newman

Introduction and Reason for Evaluation and Opinion

My name is Dr. Regina Carney. I am an adult forensic psychiatrist employed full-time by the Miami

Veteran’s Administration Medical Center, and working independently as a consultant on legal cases 

involving individuals with known or suspected psychiatric conditions. My credentials are more fully

described on the curriculum vitae attached hereto as Exhibit 1 I have published the articles and chapters

listed on Exhibit “A” hereto, focusing on cognitive disorders including Alzheimer’s Disease and other 

dementias. I have testified as an expert witness during the past 4 years at trial or at deposition in the case

listed in Exhibit 1.

I received my B.S. degree in biology from Duke University and my M.D. from Stony Brook University

Medical Center in New York. I completed my residency in General Psychiatry at Vanderbilt University

Medical Center in Nashville, Tennessee and completed a fellowship in forensic psychiatry at the University

of Miami Miller School of Medicine in Miami, Florida. Previously, I served in the following positions: 1)

Inpatient Staff Psychiatrist for the Mental Health and Behavioral Science Service at the Bruce W. Carter

VA Medical Center; 2) Supervising Attending Physician for the Adult Outpatient Psychiatry Clinic at the

University of Miami Miller School of Medicine; 3) Medical Director for the Miami Dade Forensic

Alternative Center at the University of Miami Miller School of Medicine; and 4) Assistant Professor at the

University of Miami Miller School of Medicine.

I am board-certified in both Adult Psychiatry and Forensic Psychiatry by the American Board of Psychiatry

and Neurology. Attached as Exhibit A is my current CV. Dr. Gregory Dolin, a Senior Litigation Counsel with

the New Civil Liberties Alliance and an attorney for Judge Newman, retained me to review and evaluate

Judge Pauline Newman, a 96-year-old Judge in the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, who lives in

Washington, D.C. The fees for my services are borne by Judge Newman and not NCLA.

The findings of this preliminary report are based in part on a three-hour clinical evaluation of Judge

Newman performed by me on August 25, 2023, including administration of The Modified Mini-Mental

State Examination (3-MS).

Other records reviewed and considered in the opinion include:

1) Primary Care Medical Records from One Medical Group for Judge Pauline Newman, dated 02/26/2021-

06/14/2023

2) (Enclosed within above) Cardiology Medical Records from Scott Shapiro, MD, PhD, including an

Echocardiogram performed 05/26/2023

3) Statement of Clinical Impression of Ted L Rothstein, MD, Neurologist, summarizing Clinical Evaluation

and Findings from Examination dated 06/21/2023
Page 2 of 6

3) Publicly available proceedings at: https://cafc.uscourts.gov/home/the-court/notices announcements/

4) Law360 Article by Andrew Michaels. “Judge Newman's Recent Dissents Show She Is Fit For Service,”

(06/06/2023)

5) Social Science Research Network Manuscript by Ron D. Katznelson, Ph.D. “Is There a Campaign to

Silence Dissent at the Federal Circuit? (August 28, 2023).”

6) Description of duties of a United States Circuit Judge

Informed Consent

Judge Newman was informed that a confidential doctor-patient relationship did not exist due to the

nature of the evaluation process, and that although an opinion would be rendered, medical treatment

would not be provided. She agreed to pay the associated fees for this evaluation. The contract and fee

structure were reviewed. Notably, Judge Newman carefully considered the contract and autonomously

commented on the open-ended nature of the arrangement. She requested and her attorney executed an

addendum to ensure costs beyond a reasonable, specific sum would be mutually agreed upon before

being incurred. Judge Newman was informed that a report of the results of the evaluation would be

provided to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in regard to the current investigation. Judge

Newman indicated that she understood this information and agreed to undergo the evaluation. She

provided written consent for disclosure of information to and from the non-public sources named in the

records reviewed.

History of Present Complaint

Judge Newman presented for this evaluation on August 25, 2023 in association with an ongoing complaint

and action filed with the U.S. Court of Appeals by Chief Judge Kimberley Moore, under the Judicial Conduct

and Disability Act. The complaint filed by Chief Judge Moore states that concerns exists within the court

that Judge Newman “has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration 

of the business of the courts” and/or “is unable to discharge all the duties of office by reason of mental

or physical disability.” The complaint detailed allegations of decreased work output with significant and 

habitual delays in “processing and resolution of cases” (resulting in re-assignment of some cases), an

episode of fainting during a hearing followed by Judge Newman’s inability to ambulate independently, 

and potential “impairment of cognitive abilities (i.e., attention, focus, confusion and memory) that render 

Judge Newman unable to function effectively in discharging case- related and administrative duties. It has

been stated that Judge Newman routinely makes statements in open court and during deliberative

proceedings that demonstrate a clear lack of awareness over the issues in the cases.” There was also an

allegation of “inappropriate behavior in managing staff” and a disclosure of sensitive medical information 

to staff.

Judge Newman was suspended from hearing further cases beginning in April of 2023, “pending resolution 

of this investigation.” 

Evaluation and Observations

Judge Pauline Newman arrived 30 minutes early for the evaluation. She was professionally dressed,

appropriate for the weather (mentioning it was likely to rain), and her grooming and hygiene were

unremarkable, with no obvious areas of deficit. Demeanor was calm and cooperative. She had eyeglasses

Page 4 of 6

Judge Newman expressed understanding that individuals experiencing cognitive decline often exhibit

impaired insight into their deficits. She was open to reflection on the particular threat to one's identity

when a highly distinguished career—one requiring intellectual prowess and fine attention to detail and

context—is brought into question by the prospect of cognitive decline. Unrelated to this discussion, but

brought up at a different point in the evaluation, Judge Newman indicated that she was aware that her

cataracts were impairing her vision. She noted that she had voluntarily allowed her driver’s license to

expire as she felt this condition made it unsafe for her to drive.

Medical History

Judge Newman was able to recount her own medical history accurately, including “a pacemaker due to

what they call sick sinus syndrome, around 2018,” a fractured right wrist a few months ago,

She stated that outside of the surgery to implant the pacemaker,

she has had no other surgeries.

She denied episodes of confusion or getting lost. She denied any instances of seizures, traumatic brain

injury, or noting loss of memory. She recalled a single event of syncope in April of 2023, “I think of 

dehydration. I was not admitted.”

She denied having balance problems. She explained that she fractured her wrist while sprinting to take a

photo of cardinals seen outside her apartment, where she lives alone.

In terms of past psychiatric history, she reported “none! To my amazement, even in this turmoil—well

perhaps that's the fatal flaw—it's not getting to me.” She stated that her mood remains upbeat (“maybe 

some good will come of this”), and her sleep is sufficient and restorative. She denies any personal history

of anxiety, depression, mania, psychosis, or misuse of alcohol or other substances, and denied any family

history of the same. Judge Newman reported that her mother had lived to be well into her late 90s with

no cognitive difficulties.

Current Function in Independent Activities of Daily Living

Judge Newman lives alone in a two-story apartment in Washington, D.C. She has no significant other or

children, but stays in contact with her sister’s family and her friends. She remarked that she has been

grateful to be a generally very healthy individual. She walks around the city for transportation. She

reported that during the COVID public health emergency, she was advised to avoid large crowds due to

her advanced age, and thus requested assistance with getting food. However, she stated that she herself

prepares her own food. Since the announcement of the end of the public health emergency she has

resumed going to the grocery store.

She stated that she has employed an individual to assist her with cleaning her apartment for many years;

“I’m not much of a homemaker.” She pays her own bills, and at the initiation of this evaluation, produced

a check that she filled out accurately and completely for the retainer fee.
Page 5 of 6

Cognitive Evaluation

Given Judge Newman's advanced educational attainment and exceptional verbal fluency, the possibility

of some degree of successful concealment of an underlying cognitive defect was examined. A quantitative

examination of cognition was thus performed at the end of the interview. The Modified Mini-Mental

Status Exam (3-MS) was administered; this test was chosen specifically to avoid re-testing (“learning”) 

effects related to the recently administered Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MOCA). Having personally

administered the 3-MS several hundreds of times to individuals of varying cognitive abilities, my

experience is that the examination usually requires 20 to 30 minutes to complete. The 3-MS is given in a

highly standardized manner, with scripted prompts for the items. It is scored on a 100-point scale.

Judge Newman was able to read, write with her right hand, and reply appropriately to complete the

examination. Judge Newman completed the 3-MS in 11 minutes, with a final score of 98 out of 100. She

missed 2 points for generating only eight four-legged animals in 20 seconds, out of a possible 10. She was

dismayed to hear of this result and scolded herself for not thinking of barnyard animals as a category. She

scored perfectly on the word recall items, retaining all 3 words after both immediate and delayed time

periods. The original 3-MS scoresheet is attached as Exhibit 1.

Summary and Opinion:

In summary this is a fluent, engaging, strong-willed, highly accomplished and unusually cognitively intact

96-year-old woman with chronic medical issues that appear well-controlled at the current time, with no

evidence of current substantial medical, psychiatric, or cognitive disability. She is ambulatory, provides a

complete and accurate personal, social, occupational, and medical history, and is fully oriented to time,

place, date, situation and the nature of the current investigation. She reports no history of, or current,

psychiatric or cognitive issues including anxiety, depression, or substance use disorders. She appears to

show remarkable resilience; while she noted feeling “defensive” about the investigation, she did not note

persistently anxious or depressed mood. She expressed a positive worldview, and chatted

extemporaneously with the interviewer regarding a recent advance in the treatment of alcoholism that

she had read about.

In my medical and professional opinion, Judge Newman demonstrated no substantial emotional, medical,

or psychiatric disability that would interfere with continuation of her longstanding duties as a Judge in the

U.S. Court of Appeals.
Page 6 of 6

Sincerely,

/s/

Regina Carney, M.D.

Diplomate, American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology

Diplomate, Forensic Psychiatry, American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology

Associate Program Director, Forensic Psychiatry Fellowship

Voluntary Assistant Professor, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences

Leonard M. Miller School of Medicine at the University of Miami Adjunct Assistant Professor

Alpha Omega Alpha Teaching Faculty

Herbert Wertheim College of Medicine at Florida International University

Medical Director of Inpatient Psychiatric Services (09/2018-09/2022)

Medical Director of Outpatient Substance Use Disorder Clinic (09/2022-current)

Miami Veteran Affairs Medical Center

1201 NW 16th Street, Room A110

Miami, FL 33125

Phone: 615-636-5792 (cellular)

Email: rcarney0305@gmail.com
Exhibit 1

to the 

Report of Independent 

Medical Examination 

of Pauline Newman

by

Regina M. Carney, M.D.

7. Now please count from 1 to 5.

ASSIST ONLY ONCE IF NEEDED. DOES NOT COMPREHEND TASK SCORE O ON 

BACKWARD TASK AND GOTO ITEM 8 

RECORD: V 

I 

✓ 

2 

✓ 

3 

✓ 

4 

✓ 

5 

Now I would like you to count backwards from 5 to 1.

CORRECT .... ........ ........................ ('.j> 

I OR 2 ERRORS ................................ 1 

RECORD: v' ✓ ✓ ____.,,..___ ,/ :,:3 ERRORS/CAN'T DO .................. 0 

5 4 3 2 REFUSED .................................... ? 

8. Please spell the word "World." DOES NOT COMPREHEND TASK SCORE O ON 

ASSIST ONLY ONCE IF NEEDED. BACKWARD TASK AND GO TO ITEM 9 

RECORD: _,L_ ✓ / ____£_ ./ 

w 0 R 

•. 

L D 

Now please spell "World" backwards. 

RECORD: V _______L _,L ✓ ✓ �g��ci'r?.:.°.F

.���E��·�·�°-��:. l.J 

D L R 0 w REFUSED ........ ..... ....................... ? 

9. What were the three words that I asked you to remember? (SHIRT, NICKEL, HONESTY)

IF THE SUBJECT DOES NOT GIVE ALL CORRECT ANSWERS, PROMPT AS NEEDED:

RECORD: V 

(SHIRT) (NICKEL) (HONESTY) 

A) SPONTANEOUS RECALL ............. 3 B) SPONTANEOUS RECALL .............. 3 C) SPONTANEOUS RECALL.. .............. 3

I) One of the words was something you

wear.

RECORD __ 2 

2) SHOW CARD. HAVE S. READ AND

MAKE SELECTION. SHOES, SHIRT,

SOCKS ................................................... ! 

CIRCLE WORD. 

3) IF STILL INCORRECT RESPONSE,

PROVIDE CORRECT ANSWER

(shirt). 

1) One of the words was some money.

RECORD __ 2 

2) SHOW CARD. HA VE S. READ

AND MAKE SELECTION. PENNY,

NICKEL, DOLLAR ................................. 1 

CIRCLE WORD. 

3) IF STILL INCORRECT RESPONSE,

PROVIDE CORRECT ANSWER

(nickel). 

1) One of the words was a good personal

quality or virtue.

RECORD _________ 2 

2) SHOW CARD. HA VE S. READ AND

MAKE SELECTION. HONESTY,

CHARITY, MODESTY ............................. I 

CIRCLE WORD. 

3) IF STILL INCORRECT RESPONSE,

PROVIDE CORRECT ANSWER

(honesty). 

NO RECALL/CAN'T DO ..................... 0 NO RECALL/CAN'T DO ...................... 0 NO RECALL/CAN'T DO ........................ 0 

REFUSED .............................................. 7 REFUSED .... ........................................... ? REFUSED ................................................ 7 

Form Name: AD 3MS 

Revised: 8116/06 

SCORE FOR SHIRT"············· 

SCOREFOR NICKEL � ............ ,3 

SCORE FOR HONESTY........ 3

JLoutofl6 




5 1-l 1 RT 

N!c(cf-l 

l-io (\JES-r\/
CLOSE YOUR EYES 


Exhibit 2

to the 

Report of Independent 

Medical Examination 

of Pauline Newman

by

Regina M. Carney, M.D.
REGINA MARIA CARNEY, M.D.

CURRICULUM VITAE 

Date Prepared: August 24, 2023 

I. PERSONAL

Name: REGINA MARIA CARNEY, M.D. 

Personal Phone: (615) 636-5792

E-mail Address: rcarney0305@gmail.com 

Current Position: Medical Director, Inpatient Psychiatry 

II. HIGHER EDUCATION

Institution: Degree: Date: 

Department of Psychiatry and Fellowship, 10/2011-08/2012 

Behavioral Sciences Forensic Psychiatry 

Jackson Health System/ 

University of Miami Miller School of Medicine 

Miami, Florida 

Department of Psychiatry Residency, 07/2007-07/2011 

Vanderbilt University Medical Center General Psychiatry 

Nashville, Tennessee 
Carney, Regina M. 

Page 2 

Departments of Internal Medicine Intern, 07/2003-12/2003 

and Pediatrics Internal Medicine-Pediatrics 

Chandler Medical Center 

University of Kentucky 

Lexington, Kentucky 

(Moved to Kentucky, attended resident orientation 06/2003) 

Stony Brook University Medical Center M.D. 08/1999-05/2003 

Stony Brook, New York With Recognition in Research

Duke University B.S., Biology 08/1994-05/1998 

Durham, North Carolina Minors in Chemistry and Spanish 

Highland High School High School Degree 08/1990-06/1994 

Highland, New York With Valedictory Honors 

Medical Licensure and Board Certification Status:

Florida Medical License 01/2012-01/2024 

American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology 

Adult Psychiatry Board Certification 09/2014-12/2024 

American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology 

Forensic Psychiatry Board Certification 09/2017-12/2027 

Certified Florida Adult Forensic Examiner (Criminal Court Evaluations) 

Basic Life Support for Healthcare Providers expires 10/2023 

III. EXPERIENCE

09/2022 – present Medical Director Outpatient Substance Abuse Clinic Medical Director 

09/2018 – 09/2022 Medical Director, Acute Inpatient Psychiatric Unit (4AB) 

08/2015 – 08/2018 Staff Psychiatrist, Acute Inpatient Psychiatric Unit (4AB) 

Mental Health and Behavioral Science Service 

Bruce W. Carter VA Medical Center 

Miami, Florida 

07/2019 – present Associate Program Training Director 

Forensic Psychiatry Fellowship 

Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences 

University of Miami Miller School of Medicine 

Miami, Florida 

09/2012 – 08/2015 Assistant Professor 

Medical Director, Miami Dade Forensic Alternative Center 
Carney, Regina M. 

Page 3 

Supervising Attending Physician, Adult Outpatient Psychiatry Clinic 

Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences 

University of Miami Miller School of Medicine 

Miami, Florida 

07/2011 – 05/2016 Genomic Convergence in Alzheimer Disease

Alzheimer Disease Sequencing Project

Associate Scientist 

John P. Hussman Institute for Human Genomics 

University of Miami Miller School of Medicine 

Miami, Florida 

07/2009 – 06/2011 Metabolic Dysregulation in Major Depression: Dyslipidemia,

Inflammation, and Oxidative Stress 

Resident Research Project 

Faculty Mentor and Primary Investigator: Richard C. Shelton, M.D. 

Vanderbilt University Medical Center 

01/2004 – 06/2007 Genomic Convergence in Alzheimer Disease

Post-doctoral Fellowship 

Center for Human Genetics 

Duke University Medical Center 

06/1998 – 07/1999 Genetics of Parkinson Disease

Clinical Research Coordinator 

Center for Human Genetics 

Duke University Medical Center 

IV. PUBLICATIONS

JOURNAL PUBLICATIONS 

Refereed Journals: 

1. Rajabli F, Benchek P, Tosto G, [...], Naj AC. Multi-ancestry genome-wide meta-analysis of

56,241 individuals identifies LRRC4C, LHX5-AS1 and nominates ancestry-specific loci

PTPRK, GRB14, and KIAA0825 as novel risk loci for Alzheimer disease: the Alzheimer

Disease Genetics Consortium. 2023 July. doi: 10.1101/2023.07.06.23292311.

2. Cukier HN, Duarte CL, Laverde-Paz MJ, Simon SA, Van Booven DJ, Miyares AT,

Whitehead PL, Hamilton-Nelson KL, Adams LD, Carney RM, Cuccaro ML, Vance JM,

Pericak-Vance MA, Griswold AJ, Dykxhoorn DM. An Alzheimer’s disease risk variant in

TTC3 modifies the actin cytoskeleton organization and the PI3K-Akt signaling pathway in
Carney, Regina M. 

Page 4 

iPSC-derived forebrain neurons. 2023 July. Neurobiology of Aging. doi: 

10.1016/j.neurobiolaging.2023.07.007 

3. Heath L, Earls JC, Magis AT, Kornilov SA, Lovejoy JC, Funk CC, Rappaport N, Logsdon

BA, Mangravite LM, Kunkle BW, Martin ER, Naj AC, Ertekin-Taner N, Golde TE, Hood L,

Price ND, Alzheimer’s Disease Genetics Consortium. Manifestations of Alzheimer’s

disease genetic risk in the blood are evident in a multiomic analysis in healthy adults aged 18

to 90. Scientific Reports. 2022 April; 12(1):6117. doi: 10.1038/s41598-022-09825-2

4. Bellenguez C, Küçükali F, Jansen IE, [...], Lambert JC. New insights into the genetic

etiology of Alzheimer’s disease and related dementias. Nature Genetics. 2022 April; 54(4):1-

25. doi: 10.1038/s41588-022-01024-z.

5. Kunkle B, Schmidt M, Klein H-U, [...],, Kukull WA. Novel Alzheimer Disease Risk Loci

and Pathways in African American Individuals Using the African Genome Resources Panel:

A Meta-analysis. JAMA Neurology. 2020 October; 78(1). doi:

10.1001/jamaneurol.2020.3536.

6. Reiman EM, Arboleda-Velasquez JF, Quiroz YT, Huentelman MJ, Beach TG, Caselli RJ,

Chen Y, Su Y, Myers AJ, Hardy J, Paul Vonsattel J, Younkin SG, Bennett DA, De Jager PL,

Larson EB, Crane PK, Keene CD, Kamboh MI, Kofler JK, Duque L, Gilbert JR, Gwirtsman

HE, Buxbaum JD, Dickson DW, Frosch MP, Ghetti BF, Lunetta KL, Wang LS, Hyman BT,

Kukull WA, Foroud T, Haines JL, Mayeux RP, Pericak-Vance MA, Schneider JA,

Trojanowski JQ, Farrer LA, Schellenberg GD, Beecham GW, Montine TJ, Jun GR;

Alzheimer’s Disease Genetics Consortium. Exceptionally low likelihood of Alzheimer’s

dementia in APOE2 homozygotes from a 5,000-person neuropathological study. Nature

Communications. 2020 February; 11(1):667. doi: 10.1038/s41467-019-14279-8.

7. Ma Y, Jun GR, Chung J, Zhang X, Kunkle BW, Naj AC, White CC, Bennett DA, De Jager

PL; Alzheimer’s Disease Genetics Consortium, Mayeux R, Haines JL, Pericak-Vance MA,

Schellenberg GD, Farrer LA, Lunetta KL. CpG‐related SNPs in the MS4A region have a

dose‐dependent effect on risk of late–onset Alzheimer disease. Aging Cell. 2019

Aug;18(4):e12964. doi: 10.1111/acel.12964. Epub 2019 May 29.

8. Kunkle BW, Grenier-Boley B, Sims R, Bis JC, Damotte V, Naj AC, Boland A, Vronskaya

M, van der Lee SJ, Amlie-Wolf A, Bellenguez C, Frizatti A, Chouraki V, Martin ER,

Sleegers K, Badarinarayan N, Jakobsdottir J, Hamilton-Nelson KL, Moreno-Grau S, Olaso

R, Raybould R, Chen Y, Kuzma AB, Hiltunen M, Morgan T, Ahmad S, Vardarajan BN,

Epelbaum J, Hoffmann P, Boada M, Beecham GW, Garnier JG, Harold D, Fitzpatrick AL,

Valladares O, Moutet ML, Gerrish A, Smith AV, Qu L, Bacq D, Denning N, Jian X, Zhao Y,

Del Zompo M, Fox NC, Choi SH, Mateo I, Hughes JT, Adams HH, Malamon J, SanchezGarcia F, Patel Y, Brody JA, Dombroski BA, Naranjo MCD, Daniilidou M, Eiriksdottir G,

Mukherjee S, Wallon D, Uphill J, Aspelund T, Cantwell LB, Garzia F, Galimberti D, Hofer
Carney, Regina M. 

Page 5 

E, Butkiewicz M, Fin B, Scarpini E, Sarnowski C, Bush WS, Meslage S, Kornhuber J, White 

CC, Song Y, Barber RC, Engelborghs S, Sordon S, Voijnovic D, Adams PM, Vandenberghe 

R, Mayhaus M, Cupples LA, Albert MS, De Deyn PP, Gu W, Himali JJ, Beekly D, 

Squassina A, Hartmann AM, Orellana A, Blacker D, Rodriguez-Rodriguez E, Lovestone S, 

Garcia ME, Doody RS, Munoz-Fernadez C, Sussams R, Lin H, Fairchild TJ, Benito YA, 

Holmes C, Karamujić-Čomić H, Frosch MP, Thonberg H, Maier W, Roshchupkin G, Ghetti 

B, Giedraitis V, Kawalia A, Li S, Huebinger RM, Kilander L, Moebus S, Hernández I, 

Kamboh MI, Brundin R, Turton J, Yang Q, Katz MJ, Concari L, Lord J, Beiser AS, Keene 

CD, Helisalmi S, Kloszewska I, Kukull WA, Koivisto AM, Lynch A, Tarraga L, Larson EB, 

Haapasalo A, Lawlor B, Mosley TH, Lipton RB, Solfrizzi V, Gill M, Longstreth WT Jr, 

Montine TJ, Frisardi V, Diez-Fairen M, Rivadeneira F, Petersen RC, Deramecourt V, 

Alvarez I, Salani F, Ciaramella A, Boerwinkle E, Reiman EM, Fievet N, Rotter JI, Reisch JS, 

Hanon O, Cupidi C, Andre Uitterlinden AG, Royall DR, Dufouil C, Maletta RG, de Rojas I, 

Sano M, Brice A, Cecchetti R, George-Hyslop PS, Ritchie K, Tsolaki M, Tsuang DW, 

Dubois B, Craig D, Wu CK, Soininen H, Avramidou D, Albin RL, Fratiglioni L, Germanou 

A, Apostolova LG, Keller L, Koutroumani M, Arnold SE, Panza F, Gkatzima O, Asthana S, 

Hannequin D, Whitehead P, Atwood CS, Caffarra P, Hampel H, Quintela I, Carracedo Á, 

Lannfelt L, Rubinsztein DC, Barnes LL, Pasquier F, Frölich L, Barral S, McGuinness B, 

Beach TG, Johnston JA, Becker JT, Passmore P, Bigio EH, Schott JM, Bird TD, Warren JD, 

Boeve BF, Lupton MK, Bowen JD, Proitsi P, Boxer A, Powell JF, Burke JR, Kauwe JSK, 

Burns JM, Mancuso M, Buxbaum JD, Bonuccelli U, Cairns NJ, McQuillin A, Cao C, 

Livingston G, Carlson CS, Bass NJ, Carlsson CM, Hardy J, Carney RM, Bras J, 

Carrasquillo MM, Guerreiro R, Allen M, Chui HC, Fisher E, Masullo C, Crocco EA, DeCarli 

C, Bisceglio G, Dick M, Ma L, Duara R, Graff-Radford NR, Evans DA, Hodges A, Faber 

KM, Scherer M, Fallon KB, Riemenschneider M, Fardo DW, Heun R, Farlow MR, Kölsch 

H, Ferris S, Leber M, Foroud TM, Heuser I, Galasko DR, Giegling I, Gearing M, Hüll M, 

Geschwind DH, Gilbert JR, Morris J, Green RC, Mayo K, Growdon JH, Feulner T, Hamilton 

RL, Harrell LE, Drichel D, Honig LS, Cushion TD, Huentelman MJ, Hollingworth P, Hulette 

CM, Hyman BT, Marshall R, Jarvik GP, Meggy A, Abner E, Menzies GE, Jin LW, 

Leonenko G, Real LM, Jun GR, Baldwin CT, Grozeva D, Karydas A, Russo G, Kaye JA, 

Kim R, Jessen F, Kowall NW, Vellas B, Kramer JH, Vardy E, LaFerla FM, Jöckel KH, Lah 

JJ, Dichgans M, Leverenz JB, Mann D, Levey AI, Pickering-Brown S, Lieberman AP, Klopp 

N, Lunetta KL, Wichmann HE, Lyketsos CG, Morgan K, Marson DC, Brown K, Martiniuk 

F, Medway C, Mash DC, Nöthen MM, Masliah E, Hooper NM, McCormick WC, Daniele A, 

McCurry SM, Bayer A, McDavid AN, Gallacher J, McKee AC, van den Bussche H, 

Mesulam M, Brayne C, Miller BL, Riedel-Heller S, Miller CA, Miller JW, Al-Chalabi A, 

Morris JC, Shaw CE, Myers AJ, Wiltfang J, O'Bryant S, Olichney JM, Alvarez V, Parisi JE, 

Singleton AB, Paulson HL, Collinge J, Perry WR, Mead S, Peskind E, Cribbs DH, Rossor M, 

Pierce A, Ryan NS, Poon WW, Nacmias B, Potter H, Sorbi S, Quinn JF, Sacchinelli E, Raj 

A, Spalletta G, Raskind M, Caltagirone C, Bossù P, Orfei MD, Reisberg B, Clarke R, Reitz 

C, Smith AD, Ringman JM, Warden D, Roberson ED, Wilcock G, Rogaeva E, Bruni AC, 

Rosen HJ, Gallo M, Rosenberg RN, Ben-Shlomo Y, Sager MA, Mecocci P, Saykin AJ, 

Pastor P, Cuccaro ML, Vance JM, Schneider JA, Schneider LS, Slifer S, Seeley WW, Smith 
Carney, Regina M. 

Page 6 

AG, Sonnen JA, Spina S, Stern RA, Swerdlow RH, Tang M, Tanzi RE, Trojanowski JQ, 

Troncoso JC, Van Deerlin VM, Van Eldik LJ, Vinters HV, Vonsattel JP, Weintraub S, 

Welsh-Bohmer KA, Wilhelmsen KC, Williamson J, Wingo TS, Woltjer RL, Wright CB, Yu 

CE, Yu L, Saba Y, Pilotto A, Bullido MJ, Peters O, Crane PK, Bennett D, Bosco P, Coto E, 

Boccardi V, De Jager PL, Lleo A, Warner N, Lopez OL, Ingelsson M, Deloukas P, Cruchaga 

C, Graff C, Gwilliam R, Fornage M, Goate AM, Sanchez-Juan P, Kehoe PG, Amin N, 

Ertekin-Taner N, Berr C, Debette S, Love S, Launer LJ, Younkin SG, Dartigues JF, Corcoran 

C, Ikram MA, Dickson DW, Nicolas G, Campion D, Tschanz J, Schmidt H, Hakonarson H, 

Clarimon J, Munger R, Schmidt R, Farrer LA, Van Broeckhoven C, C O'Donovan M, 

DeStefano AL, Jones L, Haines JL, Deleuze JF, Owen MJ, Gudnason V, Mayeux R, EscottPrice V, Psaty BM, Ramirez A, Wang LS, Ruiz A, van Duijn CM, Holmans PA, Seshadri S, 

Williams J, Amouyel P, Schellenberg GD, Lambert JC, Pericak-Vance MA; Alzheimer 

Disease Genetics Consortium (ADGC),; European Alzheimer’s Disease Initiative (EADI),; 

Cohorts for Heart and Aging Research in Genomic Epidemiology Consortium (CHARGE),; 

Genetic and Environmental Risk in AD/Defining Genetic, Polygenic and Environmental Risk 

for Alzheimer’s Disease Consortium (GERAD/PERADES),. Genetic meta-analysis of 

diagnosed Alzheimer's disease identifies new risk loci and implicates Aβ, tau, immunity and 

lipid processing. Nat Genet. 2019 Mar;51(3):414-430. doi: 10.1038/s41588-019-0358-2. 

Epub 2019 Feb 28. 

9. Chauhan G, Adams HHH, Satizabal CL, Bis JC, Teumer A, Sargurupremraj M, Hofer E,

Trompet S, Hilal S, Smith AV, Jian X, Malik R, Traylor M, Pulit SL, Amouyel P, Mazoyer

B, Zhu YC, Kaffashian S, Schilling S, Beecham GW, Montine TJ, Schellenberg GD,

Kjartansson O, Guðnason V, Knopman DS, Griswold ME, Windham BG, Gottesman RF,

Mosley TH, Schmidt R, Saba Y, Schmidt H, Takeuchi F, Yamaguchi S, Nabika T, Kato N,

Rajan KB, Aggarwal NT, De Jager PL, Evans DA, Psaty BM, Rotter JI, Rice K, Lopez OL,

Liao J, Chen C, Cheng CY, Wong TY, Ikram MK, van der Lee SJ, Amin N, Chouraki V,

DeStefano AL, Aparicio HJ, Romero JR, Maillard P, DeCarli C, Wardlaw JM, Hernández

MDCV, Luciano M, Liewald D, Deary IJ, Starr JM, Bastin ME, Muñoz Maniega S,

Slagboom PE, Beekman M, Deelen J, Uh HW, Lemmens R, Brodaty H, Wright MJ, Ames D,

Boncoraglio GB, Hopewell JC, Beecham AH, Blanton SH, Wright CB, Sacco RL, Wen W,

Thalamuthu A, Armstrong NJ, Chong E, Schofield PR, Kwok JB, van der Grond J, Stott DJ,

Ford I, Jukema JW, Vernooij MW, Hofman A, Uitterlinden AG, van der Lugt A, Wittfeld K,

Grabe HJ, Hosten N, von Sarnowski B, Völker U, Levi C, Jimenez-Conde J, Sharma P,

Sudlow CLM, Rosand J, Woo D, Cole JW, Meschia JF, Slowik A, Thijs V, Lindgren A,

Melander O, Grewal RP, Rundek T, Rexrode K, Rothwell PM, Arnett DK, Jern C, Johnson

JA, Benavente OR, Wasssertheil-Smoller S, Lee JM, Wong Q, Mitchell BD, Rich SS,

McArdle PF, Geerlings MI, van der Graaf Y, de Bakker PIW, Asselbergs FW, Srikanth V,

Thomson R, McWhirter R, Moran C, Callisaya M, Phan T, Rutten-Jacobs LCA, Bevan S,

Tzourio C, Mather KA, Sachdev PS, van Duijn CM, Worrall BB, Dichgans M, Kittner SJ,

Markus HS, Ikram MA, Fornage M, Launer LJ, Seshadri S, Longstreth WT Jr, Debette S;

Stroke Genetics Network (SiGN), the International Stroke Genetics Consortium (ISGC),

METASTROKE, Alzheimer's Disease Genetics Consortium (ADGC), and the Neurology
Carney, Regina M. 

Page 7 

Working Group of the Cohorts for Heart and Aging Research in Genomic Epidemiology 

(CHARGE) Consortium. Genetic and lifestyle risk factors for MRI-defined brain infarcts in a 

population-based setting. Neurology. 2019 Jan 16;92(5):e486-503. doi: 

10.1212/WNL.0000000000006851. Online ahead of print. PMID: 30651383 

10. Cukier HN, Kunkle BK, Hamilton KL, Rolati S, Kohli MA, Whitehead PL, Jaworski J,

Vance JM, Cuccaro ML, Carney RM, Gilbert JR, Farrer LA, Martin ER, Beecham GW,

Haines JL, Pericak-Vance MA. Exome Sequencing of Extended Families with Alzheimer's

Disease Identifies Novel Genes Implicated in Cell Immunity and Neuronal Function. J

Alzheimers Dis Parkinsonism. 2017 Aug;7(4). pii: 355. doi: 10.4172/2161-0460.1000355.

Epub 2017 Jul 31.

11. Kunkle BW, Vardarajan BN, Naj AC, Whitehead PL, Rolati S, Slifer S, Carney RM,

Cuccaro ML, Vance JM, Gilbert JR, Wang LS, Farrer LA, Reitz C, Haines JL, Beecham

GW, Martin ER, Schellenberg GD, Mayeux RP, Pericak-Vance MA. Early-Onset Alzheimer

Disease and Candidate Risk Genes Involved in Endolysosomal Transport. JAMA Neurol.

2017 Sep 1;74(9):1113-1122. doi: 10.1001/jamaneurol.2017.1518

12. Sims R, van der Lee SJ, Naj AC, Bellenguez C, Badarinarayan N, Jakobsdottir J, Kunkle

BW, Boland A, Raybould R, Bis JC, Martin ER, Grenier-Boley B, Heilmann-Heimbach S,

Chouraki V, Kuzma AB, Sleegers K, Vronskaya M, Ruiz A, Graham RR, Olaso R,

Hoffmann P, Grove ML, Vardarajan BN, Hiltunen M, Nöthen MM, White CC, HamiltonNelson KL, Epelbaum J, Maier W, Choi SH, Beecham GW, Dulary C, Herms S, Smith AV,

Funk CC, Derbois C, Forstner AJ, Ahmad S, Li H, Bacq D, Harold D, Satizabal CL,

Valladares O, Squassina A, Thomas R, Brody JA, Qu L, Sánchez-Juan P, Morgan T, Wolters

FJ, Zhao Y, Garcia FS, Denning N, Fornage M, Malamon J, Naranjo MCD, Majounie E,

Mosley TH, Dombroski B, Wallon D, Lupton MK, Dupuis J, Whitehead P, Fratiglioni L,

Medway C, Jian X, Mukherjee S, Keller L, Brown K, Lin H, Cantwell LB, Panza F,

McGuinness B, Moreno-Grau S, Burgess JD, Solfrizzi V, Proitsi P, Adams HH, Allen M,

Seripa D, Pastor P, Cupples LA, Price ND, Hannequin D, Frank-García A, Levy D,

Chakrabarty P, Caffarra P, Giegling I, Beiser AS, Giedraitis V, Hampel H, Garcia ME, Wang

X, Lannfelt L, Mecocci P, Eiriksdottir G, Crane PK, Pasquier F, Boccardi V, Henández I,

Barber RC, Scherer M, Tarraga L, Adams PM, Leber M, Chen Y, Albert MS, Riedel-Heller

S, Emilsson V, Beekly D, Braae A, Schmidt R, Blacker D, Masullo C, Schmidt H, Doody

RS, Spalletta G, Jr WTL, Fairchild TJ, Bossù P, Lopez OL, Frosch MP, Sacchinelli E, Ghetti

B, Yang Q, Huebinger RM, Jessen F, Li S, Kamboh MI, Morris J, Sotolongo-Grau O, Katz

MJ, Corcoran C, Dunstan M, Braddel A, Thomas C, Meggy A, Marshall R, Gerrish A,

Chapman J, Aguilar M, Taylor S, Hill M, Fairén MD, Hodges A, Vellas B, Soininen H,

Kloszewska I, Daniilidou M, Uphill J, Patel Y, Hughes JT, Lord J, Turton J, Hartmann AM,

Cecchetti R, Fenoglio C, Serpente M, Arcaro M, Caltagirone C, Orfei MD, Ciaramella A,

Pichler S, Mayhaus M, Gu W, Lleó A, Fortea J, Blesa R, Barber IS, Brookes K, Cupidi C,

Maletta RG, Carrell D, Sorbi S, Moebus S, Urbano M, Pilotto A, Kornhuber J, Bosco P,

Todd S, Craig D, Johnston J, Gill M, Lawlor B, Lynch A, Fox NC, Hardy J; ARUK
Carney, Regina M. 

Page 8 

Consortium, Albin RL, Apostolova LG, Arnold SE, Asthana S, Atwood CS, Baldwin CT, 

Barnes LL, Barral S, Beach TG, Becker JT, Bigio EH, Bird TD, Boeve BF, Bowen JD, 

Boxer A, Burke JR, Burns JM, Buxbaum JD, Cairns NJ, Cao C, Carlson CS, Carlsson CM, 

Carney RM, Carrasquillo MM, Carroll SL, Diaz CC, Chui HC, Clark DG, Cribbs DH, 

Crocco EA, DeCarli C, Dick M, Duara R, Evans DA, Faber KM, Fallon KB, Fardo DW, 

Farlow MR, Ferris S, Foroud TM, Galasko DR, Gearing M, Geschwind DH, Gilbert JR, 

Graff-Radford NR, Green RC, Growdon JH, Hamilton RL, Harrell LE, Honig LS, 

Huentelman MJ, Hulette CM, Hyman BT, Jarvik GP, Abner E, Jin LW, Jun G, Karydas A, 

Kaye JA, Kim R, Kowall NW, Kramer JH, LaFerla FM, Lah JJ, Leverenz JB, Levey AI, Li 

G, Lieberman AP, Lunetta KL, Lyketsos CG, Marson DC, Martiniuk F, Mash DC, Masliah 

E, McCormick WC, McCurry SM, McDavid AN, McKee AC, Mesulam M, Miller BL, 

Miller CA, Miller JW, Morris JC, Murrell JR, Myers AJ, O'Bryant S, Olichney JM, Pankratz 

VS, Parisi JE, Paulson HL, Perry W, Peskind E, Pierce A, Poon WW, Potter H, Quinn JF, 

Raj A, Raskind M, Reisberg B, Reitz C, Ringman JM, Roberson ED, Rogaeva E, Rosen HJ, 

Rosenberg RN, Sager MA, Saykin AJ, Schneider JA, Schneider LS, Seeley WW, Smith AG, 

Sonnen JA, Spina S, Stern RA, Swerdlow RH, Tanzi RE, Thornton-Wells TA, Trojanowski 

JQ, Troncoso JC, Van Deerlin VM, Van Eldik LJ, Vinters HV, Vonsattel JP, Weintraub S, 

Welsh-Bohmer KA, Wilhelmsen KC, Williamson J, Wingo TS, Woltjer RL, Wright CB, Yu 

CE, Yu L, Garzia F, Golamaully F, Septier G, Engelborghs S, Vandenberghe R, De Deyn PP, 

Fernadez CM, Benito YA, Thonberg H, Forsell C, Lilius L, Kinhult-Stählbom A, Kilander L, 

Brundin R, Concari L, Helisalmi S, Koivisto AM, Haapasalo A, Dermecourt V, Fievet N, 

Hanon O, Dufouil C, Brice A, Ritchie K, Dubois B, Himali JJ, Keene CD, Tschanz J, 

Fitzpatrick AL, Kukull WA, Norton M, Aspelund T, Larson EB, Munger R, Rotter JI, Lipton 

RB, Bullido MJ, Hofman A, Montine TJ, Coto E, Boerwinkle E, Petersen RC, Alvarez V, 

Rivadeneira F, Reiman EM, Gallo M, O'Donnell CJ, Reisch JS, Bruni AC, Royall DR, 

Dichgans M, Sano M, Galimberti D, St George-Hyslop P, Scarpini E, Tsuang DW, Mancuso 

M, Bonuccelli U, Winslow AR, Daniele A, Wu CK; GERAD/PERADES, CHARGE, ADGC, 

EADI, Peters O, Nacmias B, Riemenschneider M, Heun R, Brayne C, Rubinsztein DC, Bras 

J, Guerreiro R, Al-Chalabi A, Shaw CE, Collinge J, Mann D, Tsolaki M, Clarimón J, 

Sussams R, Lovestone S, O'Donovan MC, Owen MJ, Behrens TW, Mead S, Goate AM, 

Uitterlinden AG, Holmes C, Cruchaga C, Ingelsson M, Bennett DA, Powell J, Golde TE, 

Graff C, De Jager PL, Morgan K, Ertekin-Taner N, Combarros O, Psaty BM, Passmore P, 

Younkin SG, Berr C, Gudnason V, Rujescu D, Dickson DW, Dartigues JF, DeStefano AL, 

Ortega-Cubero S, Hakonarson H, Campion D, Boada M, Kauwe JK, Farrer LA, Van 

Broeckhoven C, Ikram MA, Jones L, Haines JL, Tzourio C, Launer LJ, Escott-Price V, 

Mayeux R, Deleuze JF, Amin N, Holmans PA, Pericak-Vance MA, Amouyel P, van Duijn 

CM, Ramirez A, Wang LS, Lambert JC, Seshadri S, Williams J, Schellenberg GD. Rare 

coding variants in PLCG2, ABI3, and TREM2 implicate microglial-mediated innate 

immunity in Alzheimer's disease. Nat Genet. 2017 Sep;49(9):1373-1384. doi: 

10.1038/ng.3916. Epub 2017 Jul 17. PMID: 28714976 

13. Kunkle BW, Carney RM, Kohli MA, Naj AC, Hamilton-Nelson KL, Whitehead PL, Wang

L, Lang R, Cuccaro ML, Vance JM, Byrd GS, Beecham GW, Gilbert JR, Martin ER, Haines
Carney, Regina M. 

Page 9 

JL, Pericak-Vance MA. Targeted sequencing of ABCA7 identifies splicing, stop-gain and 

intronic risk variants for Alzheimer disease. Neurosci Lett. 2017 May 10;649:124-129. doi: 

10.1016/j.neulet.2017.04.014. Epub 2017 Apr 8. PMID: 28400126 

14. Jun GR, Chung J, Mez J, Barber R, Beecham GW, Bennett DA, Buxbaum JD, Byrd GS,

Carrasquillo MM, Crane PK, Cruchaga C, De Jager P, Ertekin-Taner N, Evans D, Fallin MD,

Foroud TM, Friedland RP, Goate AM, Graff-Radford NR, Hendrie H, Hall KS, HamiltonNelson KL, Inzelberg R, Kamboh MI, Kauwe JSK, Kukull WA, Kunkle BW, Kuwano R,

Larson EB, Logue MW, Manly JJ, Martin ER, Montine TJ, Mukherjee S, Naj A, Reiman

EM, Reitz C, Sherva R, St George-Hyslop PH, Thornton T, Younkin SG, Vardarajan BN,

Wang LS, Wendlund JR, Winslow AR; Alzheimer's Disease Genetics Consortium, Haines J,

Mayeux R, Pericak-Vance MA, Schellenberg G, Lunetta KL, Farrer LA. Transethnic

genome-wide scan identifies novel Alzheimer's disease loci. Alzheimers Dement. 2017

Jul;13(7):727-738. doi: 10.1016/j.jalz.2016.12.012. Epub 2017 Feb 7. PMID: 28183528

15. Cuccaro ML, Carney RM, Zhang Y, Bohm C, Kunkle BW, Vardarajan BN, Whitehead

PL, Cukier HN, Mayeux R, St George-Hyslop P, Pericak-Vance MA. SORL1 mutations in

early- and late-onset Alzheimer disease. Neurol Genet. 2016 Oct 26;2(6):e116. eCollection

2016 Dec. PMID: 27822510

16. Cukier HN, Kunkle BW, Vardarajan BN, Rolati S, Hamilton-Nelson KL, Kohli MA,

Whitehead PL, Dombroski BA, Van Booven D, Lang R, Dykxhoorn DM, Farrer LA,

Cuccaro ML, Vance JM, Gilbert JR, Beecham GW, Martin ER, Carney RM, Mayeux R,

Schellenberg GD, Byrd GS, Haines JL, Pericak-Vance MA, for the Alzheimer’s Disease

Genetics Consortium. ABCA7 Frameshift Deletion Associated with Alzheimer’s Disease in

African Americans. Neurol Genet. 2016 May 17;2(3):e79. doi:

10.1212/NXG.0000000000000079. eCollection 2016 Jun. PMID: 27231719

17. Ridge PG, Hoyt KB, Boehme K, Mukherjee S, Crane PK, Haines JL, Mayeux R, Farrer LA,

Pericak-Vance MA, Schellenberg GD, Kauwe JSK; Alzheimer's Disease Genetics

Consortium (ADGC). Assessment of the genetic variance of late-onset Alzheimer's disease.

Neurobiol Aging. 2016 May;41:200.e13-200.e20. doi:

10.1016/j.neurobiolaging.2016.02.024. Epub 2016 Mar 3. PMID:27036079

18. Karch CM, Ezerskiy LA, Bertelsen S; Alzheimer’s Disease Genetics Consortium (ADGC),

Goate AM. Alzheimer's Disease Risk Polymorphisms Regulate Gene Expression in the

ZCWPW1 and the CELF1 Loci. PLoS One. 2016 Feb 26;11(2):e0148717.

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148717. eCollection 2016. PMID: 26919393

19. Kohli MA, Cukier HN, Hamilton-Nelson KL, Rolati S, Kunkle BW, Whitehead PL, Züchner

S, Farrer L, Martin ER, Beecham G, Haines JL, Vance JM, Cuccaro ML, Gilbert JR,

Schellenberg GD, Carney RM, Pericak-Vance MA. Segregation of a rare TTC3 variant in an
Carney, Regina M. 

Page 10 

extended family with late-onset Alzheimer’s disease. Neurol Genet. 2:e41; doi: 

10.1212/NXG.000000000000004. Jan 2016. 

20. Ghani M, Reitz C, Cheng R, Vardarajan BN, Jun G, Sato C, Naj A, Rajbhandary R, Wang

LS, Valladares O, Lin CF, Larson EB, Graff-Radford NR, Evans D, De Jager PL, Crane PK,

Buxbaum JD, Murrell JR, Raj T, Ertekin-Taner N, Logue M, Baldwin CT, Green RC, Barnes

LL, Cantwell LB, Fallin MD, Go RC, Griffith PA, Obisesan TO, Manly JJ, Lunetta KL,

Kamboh MI, Lopez OL, Bennett DA, Hendrie H, Hall KS, Goate AM, Byrd GS, Kukull WA,

Foroud TM, Haines JL, Farrer LA, Pericak-Vance MA, Lee JH, Schellenberg GD, St

George-Hyslop P, Mayeux R, Rogaeva E; Alzheimer’s Disease Genetics Consortium.

Association of long runs of homozygosity with Alzheimer disease among African American

individuals. JAMA Neurol. 72(11):1313-23. doi: 10.1001/jamaneurol.2015.1700. Nov 2015.

21. Kunkle BW, Jaworski J, Barral S, Vardarajan B, Beecham GW, Martin ER, Cantwell LS,

Partch A, Bird TD, Raskind WH, DeStefano AL, Carney RM, Cuccaro M, Vance JM, Farrer

LA, Goate AM, Foroud T, Mayeux RP, Schellenberg GD, Haines JL, Pericak-Vance MA.

Genome-wide linkage analyses of non-Hispanic white families identify novel loci for

familial late-onset Alzheimer's disease. Alzheimers Dement. S1552-5260(15)00224-1. doi:

10.1016/j.jalz.2015.05.020. [Epub ahead of print]. Sep 2015.

22. Ebbert MT, Boehme KL, Wadsworth ME, Staley LA; Alzheimer's Disease Neuroimaging

Initiative; Alzheimer's Disease Genetics Consortium, Mukherjee S, Crane PK, Ridge PG,

Kauwe JS. Interaction between variants in CLU and MS4A4E modulates Alzheimer's disease

risk. Alzheimers Dement. S1552-5260(15)02866-6. doi: 10.1016/j.jalz.2015.08.163. [Epub

ahead of print] Oct 2015.

23. Mukherjee S, Walter S, Kauwe JS, Saykin AJ, Bennett DA, Larson EB, Crane PK, Glymour

MM; Adult Changes in Thought Study Investigators; Religious Orders Study/Memory and

Aging Project Investigators; Alzheimer's Disease Genetics Consortium. Genetically

predicted body mass index and Alzheimer's disease-related phenotypes in three large

samples: Mendelian randomization analyses. Alzheimers Dement. S1552-5260(15)00184-3.

doi: 10.1016/j.jalz.2015.05.015. [Epub ahead of print] Jun 2015.

24. Østergaard SD, Mukherjee S, Sharp SJ, Proitsi P, Lotta LA, Day F, Perry JR, Boehme KL,

Walter S, Kauwe JS, Gibbons LE; Alzheimer’s Disease Genetics Consortium; GERAD1

Consortium; EPIC-InterAct Consortium, Larson EB, Powell JF, Langenberg C, Crane PK,

Wareham NJ, Scott RA. Associations between potentially modifiable risk factors and

Alzheimer disease: a Mendelian randomization study. PLoS Med. 12(6):e1001841;

discussion e1001841. doi: 10.1371/journal.pmed.1001841. Jun 2015.

25. Hohman TJ, Bailey JN, Reitz C, Jun G, Naj AC, Beecham GW, Liu Z, Carney RM, Vance

JM, Cuccaro ML, Rajbhandary RA, Vardarajan BN, Wang LS, Valladares O, Lin CF, Larson
Carney, Regina M. 

Page 11 

EB, Graff-Radford NR, Evans D, De Jager PL, Crane PK, Buxbaum JD, Murrel JR, Raj T, 

Ertekin-Taner N, Logue MW, Baldwin CT, Green RC, Barnes LL, Cantwell LB, Fallin MD, 

Go RCP, Griffith P, Obisesan TO, Manly JJ, Lunetta KL, Kamboh MI, Harrie NC, Lopez 

OL, Bennett DA, Hardy J, Hendrie HC, Hall KS, Goate AM, Lang-Walker R, Byrd GS, 

Kukull WA, Foroud TM, Farrer LA, Martin ER, Pericak-Vance MA, Schellenberg GD, 

Mayeux R, Haines JL, Thornton-Wells TA; Alzheimer's Disease Genetics Consortium. 

Global and local ancestry in African Americans: implications for Alzheimer's disease risk. 

Alzheimer's Dement. S1552-5260(15)00190-9. doi: 10.1016/j.jalz.2015.02.012. [Epub ahead 

of print] Jun 2015. 

26. Jun G, Ibrahim-Verbaas CA, Vronskaya M, Lambert JC, Chung J, Naj AC, Kunkle BW,

Wang LS, Bis JC, Bellenguez C, Harold D, Lunetta KL, Destefano AL, Grenier-Boley B,

Sims R, Beecham GW, Smith AV, Chouraki V, Hamilton-Nelson KL, Ikram MA, Fievet N,

Denning N, Martin ER, Schmidt H, Kamatani Y, Dunstan ML, Valladares O, Laza AR,

Zelenika D, Ramirez A, Foroud TM, Choi SH, Boland A, Becker T, Kukull WA, van der Lee

SJ, Pasquier F, Cruchaga C, Beekly D, Fitzpatrick AL, Hanon O, Gill M, Barber R,

Gudnason V, Campion D, Love S, Bennett DA, Amin N, Berr C, Tsolaki M, Buxbaum JD,

Lopez OL, Deramecourt V, Fox NC, Cantwell LB, Tárraga L, Dufouil C, Hardy J, Crane PK,

Eiriksdottir G, Hannequin D, Clarke R, Evans D, Mosley TH Jr, Letenneur L, Brayne C,

Maier W, De Jager P, Emilsson V, Dartigues JF, Hampel H, Kamboh MI, de Bruijn RF,

Tzourio C, Pastor P, Larson EB, Rotter JI, O'Donovan MC, Montine TJ, Nalls MA, Mead S,

Reiman EM, Jonsson PV, Holmes C, St George-Hyslop PH, Boada M, Passmore P,

Wendland JR, Schmidt R, Morgan K, Winslow AR, Powell JF, Carasquillo M, Younkin SG,

Jakobsdóttir J, Kauwe JS, Wilhelmsen KC, Rujescu D, Nöthen MM, Hofman A, Jones L;

IGAP Consortium, Haines JL, Psaty BM, Van Broeckhoven C, Holmans P, Launer LJ,

Mayeux R, Lathrop M, Goate AM, Escott-Price V, Seshadri S, Pericak-Vance MA, Amouyel

P, Williams J, van Duijn CM, Schellenberg GD, Farrer LA. A novel Alzheimer disease locus

located near the gene encoding tau protein. Mol Psychiatry. doi: 10.1038/mp.2015.23. [Epub

ahead of print]. Mar 2015.

27. Wang LS, Naj AC, Graham RR, Crane PK, Kunkle BW, Cruchaga C, Murcia JD, CannonAlbright L, Baldwin CT, Zetterberg H, Blennow K, Kukull WA, Faber KM, Schupf N,

Norton MC, Tschanz JT, Munger RG, Corcoran CD, Rogaeva E; Alzheimer's Disease

Genetics Consortium, Lin CF, Dombroski BA, Cantwell LB, Partch A, Valladares O,

Hakonarson H, St George-Hyslop P, Green RC, Goate AM, Foroud TM, Carney RM,

Larson EB, Behrens TW, Kauwe JS, Haines JL, Farrer LA, Pericak-Vance MA, Mayeux R,

Schellenberg GD; National Institute on Aging-Late-Onset Alzheimer’s Disease (NIALOAD) Family Study. Rarity of the Alzheimer disease-protective APP A673T variant in the

United States. JAMA Neurol. 72(2):209-16. Feb 2015.

28. Wetzel-Smith MK, Hunkapiller J, Bhangale TR, Srinivasan K, Maloney JA, Atwal JK, Sa

SM, Yaylaoglu MB, Foreman O, Ortmann W, Rathore N, Hansen DV, Tessier-Lavigne M;

Alzheimer's Disease Genetics Consortium, Mayeux R, Pericak-Vance M, Haines J, Farrer
Carney, Regina M. 

Page 12 

LA, Schellenberg GD, Goate A, Behrens TW, Cruchaga C, Watts RJ, Graham RR. A rare 

mutation in UNC5C predisposes to late-onset Alzheimer's disease and increases neuronal cell 

death. Nat Med. 20(12):1452-7. Dec 2014. 

29. Ramirez A, van der Flier WM, Herold C, Ramonet D, Heilmann S, Lewczuk P, Popp J,

Lacour A, Drichel D, Louwersheimer E, Kummer MP, Cruchaga C, Hoffmann P, Teunissen

C, Holstege H, Kornhuber J, Peters O, Naj AC, Chouraki V, Bellenguez C, Gerrish A;

International Genomics of Alzheimer's Project (IGAP); Alzheimer's Disease

Neuroimaging Initiative (ADNI), Heun R, Frölich L, Hüll M, Buscemi L, Herms S, Kölsch

H, Scheltens P, Breteler MM, Rüther E, Wiltfang J, Goate A, Jessen F, Maier W, Heneka

MT, Becker T, Nöthen MM. SUCLG2 identified as both a determinator of CSF Aβ1-42

levels and an attenuator of cognitive decline in Alzheimer's disease. Hum Mol Genet.

23(24):6644-58. Dec 2014.

30. Naj AC, Jun G, Reitz C, Kunkle BW, Perry W, Park YS, Beecham GW, Rajbhandary RA,

Hamilton-Nelson KL, Wang LS, Kauwe JS, Huentelman MJ, Myers AJ, Bird TD, Boeve BF,

Baldwin CT, Jarvik GP, Crane PK, Rogaeva E, Barmada MM, Demirci FY, Cruchaga C,

Kramer PL, Ertekin-Taner N, Hardy J, Graff-Radford NR, Green RC, Larson EB, St GeorgeHyslop PH, Buxbaum JD, Evans DA, Schneider JA, Lunetta KL, Kamboh MI, Saykin AJ,

Reiman EM, De Jager PL, Bennett DA, Morris JC, Montine TJ, Goate AM, Blacker D,

Tsuang DW, Hakonarson H, Kukull WA, Foroud TM, Martin ER, Haines JL, Mayeux RP,

Farrer LA, Schellenberg GD, Pericak-Vance MA; Alzheimer Disease Genetics Consortium,

Albert MS, Albin RL, Apostolova LG, Arnold SE, Barber R, Barnes LL, Beach TG, Becker

JT, Beekly D, Bigio EH, Bowen JD, Boxer A, Burke JR, Cairns NJ, Cantwell LB, Cao C,

Carlson CS, Carney RM, Carrasquillo MM, Carroll SL, Chui HC, Clark DG, Corneveaux J,

Cribbs DH, Crocco EA, DeCarli C, DeKosky ST, Dick M, Dickson DW, Duara R, Faber

KM, Fallon KB, Farlow MR, Ferris S, Frosch MP, Galasko DR, Ganguli M, Gearing M,

Geschwind DH, Ghetti B, Gilbert JR, Glass JD, Growdon JH, Hamilton RL, Harrell LE,

Head E, Honig LS, Hulette CM, Hyman BT, Jicha GA, Jin LW, Karydas A, Kaye JA, Kim

R, Koo EH, Kowall NW, Kramer JH, LaFerla FM, Lah JJ, Leverenz JB, Levey AI, Li G,

Lieberman AP, Lin CF, Lopez OL, Lyketsos CG, Mack WJ, Martiniuk F, Mash DC, Masliah

E, McCormick WC, McCurry SM, McDavid AN, McKee AC, Mesulam M, Miller BL,

Miller CA, Miller JW, Murrell JR, Olichney JM, Pankratz VS, Parisi JE, Paulson HL,

Peskind E, Petersen RC, Pierce A, Poon WW, Potter H, Quinn JF, Raj A, Raskind M,

Reisberg B, Ringman JM, Roberson ED, Rosen HJ, Rosenberg RN, Sano M, Schneider LS,

Seeley WW, Smith AG, Sonnen JA, Spina S, Stern RA, Tanzi RE, Thornton-Wells TA,

Trojanowski JQ, Troncoso JC, Valladares O, Van Deerlin VM, Van Eldik LJ, Vardarajan

BN, Vinters HV, Vonsattel JP, Weintraub S, Welsh-Bohmer KA, Williamson J, Wishnek S,

Woltjer RL, Wright CB, Younkin SG, Yu CE, Yu L. Effects of multiple genetic loci on age

at onset in late-onset Alzheimer disease: a genome-wide association study. JAMA Neurol.

71(11):1394-404. 2014.
Carney, Regina M. 

Page 13 

31. Logue MW, Schu M, Vardarajan BN, Farrell J, Bennett DA, Buxbaum JD, Byrd GS,

Ertekin-Taner N, Evans D, Foroud T, Goate A, Graff-Radford NR, Kamboh MI, Kukull WA,

Manly JJ; Alzheimer Disease Genetics Consortium. Two rare AKAP9 variants are

associated with Alzheimer's disease in African Americans. Alzheimers Dement. 10(6):609-

618.e11. 2014.

32. Gross AL, Sherva R, Mukherjee S, Newhouse S, Kauwe JS, Munsie LM, Waterston LB,

Bennett DA, Jones RN, Green RC, Crane PK; Alzheimer's Disease Neuroimaging Initiative;

GENAROAD Consortium; AD Genetics Consortium. Calibrating longitudinal cognition in

Alzheimer's disease across diverse test batteries and datasets. Neuroepidemiology. 43(3-

4):194-205. doi: 10.1159/000367970. 2014.

33. Beecham GW, Hamilton K, Naj AC, Martin ER, Huentelman M, Myers AJ, Corneveaux JJ,

Hardy J, Vonsattel JP, Younkin SG, Bennett DA, De Jager PL, Larson EB, Crane PK,

Kamboh MI, Kofler JK, Mash DC, Duque L, Gilbert JR, Gwirtsman H, Buxbaum JD,

Kramer P, Dickson DW, Farrer LA, Frosch MP, Ghetti B, Haines JL, Hyman BT, Kukull

WA, Mayeux RP, Pericak-Vance MA, Schneider JA, Trojanowski JQ, Reiman EM;

Alzheimer's Disease Genetics Consortium (ADGC), Schellenberg GD, Montine TJ.

Genome-wide association meta-analysis of neuropathologic features of Alzheimer's disease

and related dementias. PLoS Genet. 10(9):e1004606. 2014.

34. Benitez BA, Jin SC, Guerreiro R, Graham R, Lord J, Harold D, Sims R, Lambert JC, Gibbs

JR, Bras J, Sassi C, Harari O, Bertelsen S, Lupton MK, Powell J, Bellenguez C, Brown K,

Medway C, Haddick PC, van der Brug MP, Bhangale T, Ortmann W, Behrens T, Mayeux R,

Pericak-Vance MA, Farrer LA, Schellenberg GD, Haines JL, Turton J, Braae A, Barber I,

Fagan AM, Holtzman DM, Morris JC; 3C Study Group; EADI consortium; Alzheimer's

Disease Genetic Consortium (ADGC); Alzheimer's Disease Neuroimaging Initiative

(ADNI); GERAD Consortium, Williams J, Kauwe JS, Amouyel P, Morgan K, Singleton A,

Hardy J, Goate AM, Cruchaga C. Missense variant in TREML2 protects against Alzheimer's

disease. Neurobiol Aging. 35(6):1510.e19-26. 2014.

35. Nelson PT, Estus S, Abner EL, Parikh I, Malik M, Neltner JH, Ighodaro E, Wang WX,

Wilfred BR, Wang LS, Kukull WA, Nandakumar K, Farman ML, Poon WW, Corrada MM,

Kawas CH, Cribbs DH, Bennett DA, Schneider JA, Larson EB, Crane PK, Valladares O,

Schmitt FA, Kryscio RJ, Jicha GA, Smith CD, Scheff SW, Sonnen JA, Haines JL, PericakVance MA, Mayeux R, Farrer LA, Van Eldik LJ, Horbinski C, Green RC, Gearing M, Poon

LW, Kramer PL, Woltjer RL, Montine TJ, Partch AB, Rajic AJ, Richmire K, Monsell SE;

Alzheimer Disease Genetic Consortium, Schellenberg GD, Fardo DW. ABCC9 gene

polymorphism is associated with hippocampal sclerosis of aging pathology. Acta

Neuropathol. 127(6):825-43. 2014.
Carney, Regina M. 

Page 14 

36. Carney RM, Kohli MA, Kunkle BW, Naj AC, GilbertJR, Züchner S, Pericak-Vance MA.

Parkinsonism and distinct dementia patterns in a family with the MAPT R406W mutation.

Alzheimers Dement, 10(3):360-5. 2014.

37. Ruiz A, Heilmann S, Becker T, Hernández I, Wagner H, Thelen M, Mauleón A, RosendeRoca M, Bellenguez C, Bis JC, Harold D, Gerrish A, Sims R, Sotolongo-Grau O, Espinosa

A, Alegret M, Arrieta JL, Lacour A, Leber M, Becker J, Lafuente A, Ruiz S, Vargas L,

Rodríguez O, Ortega G, Dominguez MA; IGAP, Mayeux R, Haines JL, Pericak-Vance MA,

Farrer LA, Schellenberg GD, Chouraki V, Launer LJ, van Duijn C, Seshadri S, Antúnez C,

Breteler MM, Serrano-Ríos M, Jessen F, Tárraga L, Nöthen MM, Maier W, Boada M,

Ramírez A. Follow-up of loci from the International Genomics of Alzheimer's Disease

Project identifies TRIP4 as a novel susceptibility gene. Transl Psychiatry. 4:e358. 2014.

38. Sherva R, Tripodis Y, Bennett DA, Chibnik LB, Crane PK, de Jager PL, Farrer LA, Saykin

AJ, Shulman JM, Naj A, Green RC, GENAROAD Consortium, Alzheimer's Disease

Neuroimaging Initiative, Alzheimer's Disease Genetics Consortium. Genome-wide

association study of the rate of cognitive decline in Alzheimer's disease. Alzheimers Dement.

10(1):45-52. 2014.

39. Ridge PG, Mukherjee S, Crane PK, Kauwe JS, Alzheimer’s Disease Genetics Consortium.

Alzheimer's disease: analyzing the missing heritability. PLoS One;8(11):e79771. 2013.

40. Lambert JC, Ibrahim-Verbaas CA, Harold D, Naj AC, Sims R, Bellenguez C, DeStafano AL,

Bis JC, Beecham GW, Grenier-Boley B, Russo G, Thorton-Wells TA, Jones N, Smith AV,

Chouraki V, Thomas C, Ikram MA, Zelenika D, Vardarajan BN, Kamatani Y, Lin CF,

Gerrish A, Schmidt H, Kunkle B, Dunstan ML, Ruiz A, Bihoreau MT, Choi SH, Reitz C,

Pasquier F, Cruchaga C, Craig D, Amin N, Berr C, Lopez OL, De Jager PL, Deramecourt V,

Johnston JA, Evans D, Lovestone S, Letenneur L, Morón FJ, Rubinsztein DC, Eiriksdottir G,

Sleegers K, Goate AM, Fiévet N, Huentelman MW, Gill M, Brown K, Kamboh MI, Keller L,

Barberger-Gateau P, McGuiness B, Larson EB, Green R, Myers AJ, Dufouil C, Todd S,

Wallon D, Love S, Rogaeva E, Gallacher J, St George-Hyslop P, Clarimon J, Lleo A, Bayer

A, Tsuang DW, Yu L, Tsolaki M, Bossù P, Spalletta G, Proitsi P, Collinge J, Sorbi S,

Sanchez-Garcia F, Fox NC, Hardy J, Deniz Naranjo MC, Bosco P, Clarke R, Brayne C,

Galimberti D, Mancuso M, Matthews F; European Alzheimer's Disease Initiative (EADI);

Genetic and Environmental Risk in Alzheimer's Disease; Alzheimer's Disease Genetic

Consortium; Cohorts for Heart and Aging Research in Genomic Epidemiology, Moebus S,

Mecocci P, Del Zompo M, Maier W, Hampel H, Pilotto A, Bullido M, Panza F, Caffarra P,

Nacmias B, Gilbert JR, Mayhaus M, Lannefelt L, Hakonarson H, Pichler S, Carrasquillo

MM, Ingelsson M, Beekly D, Alvarez V, Zou F, Valladares O, Younkin SG, Coto E,

Hamilton-Nelson KL, Gu W, Razquin C, Pastor P, Mateo I, Owen MJ, Faber KM, Jonsson

PV, Combarros O, O'Donovan MC, Cantwell LB, Soininen H, Blacker D, Mead S, Mosley

TH Jr, Bennett DA, Harris TB, Fratiglioni L, Holmes C, de Bruijn RF, Passmore P, Montine

TJ, Bettens K, Rotter JI, Brice A, Morgan K, Foroud TM, Kukull WA, Hannequin D, Powell
Carney, Regina M. 

Page 15 

JF, Nalls MA, Ritchie K, Lunetta KL, Kauwe JS, Boerwinkle E, Riemenschneider M, Boada 

M, Hiltuenen M, Martin ER, Schmidt R, Rujescu D, Wang LS, Dartigues JF, Mayeux R, 

Tzourio C, Hofman A, Nöthen MM, Graff C, Psaty BM, Jones L, Haines JL, Holmans PA, 

Lathrop M, Pericak-Vance MA, Launer LJ, Farrer LA, van Duijn CM, Van Broeckhoven C, 

Moskvina V, Seshadri S, Williams J, Schellenberg GD, Amouyel P. Meta-analysis of 74,046 

individuals identifies 11 new susceptibility loci for Alzheimer's disease. Nat Genet. 

45(12):1452-8. 2013. 

41. Reitz C, Mayeux R, Alzheimer’s Disease Genetics Consortium. TREM2 and

neurodegenerative disease. N Engl J Med 17;369(16):1564-5. 2013.

42. Reitz C, Tosto G, Vardarajan B, Rogaeva E, Ghani M, Rogers RS, Conrad C, Haines JL,

Pericak-Vance MA, Fallin MD, Foroud T, Farrer LA, Schellenberg GD, George-Hyslop PS,

R Mayeux R, the Alzheimer’s Disease Genetics Consortium. Independent and epistatic

effects of variants in VPS10-d receptors on Alzheimer disease risk and processing of the

amyloid precursor protein (APP). Transl Psychiatry 3, e256. 2013.

43. Kohli MA, John-Williams K, Rajbhandary R, Naj A, Whitehead P, Hamilton K, Carney

RM, Wright C, Crocco E, Gwirtzman HE, Lang R, Beecham G, Martin ER, Gilbert J,

Benatar M, Small GW, Mash D, Byrd G, Haines JL, Pericak-Vance MA, Züchner S. Repeat

expansions in the C9ORF72 gene contribute to Alzheimer's disease in Caucasians. Neurobiol

Aging. 34(5):1519.e5-12. 2013.

44. Reitz C, Jun G, Naj A, Rajbhandary R, Vardarajan BN, Wang L-S, Valladares O, Lin C-F,

Larson EB, Graff-Radford NR, Evans D, De Jager PL, Crane PK, Buxbaum JD, Murrell JR,

Raj T, Ertekin-Taner N, Logue M, Baldwin CT, Green RC, Barnes LL, Cantwell LB, Fallin

MD, Go RCP, Griffith P, Obisesan TO, Manly JJ, Lunetta KL, Kamboh MI, Lopez OL,

Bennett DA, Hendrie H, Hall KS, Goate AM, Byrd GS, Kukull WA, Foroud TM, Haines JL,

Farrer LA, Pericak-Vance MA, Schellenberg GD, Mayeux R, for the Alzheimer Disease

Genetics Consortium. Variants in the ATP-binding cassette transporter (ABCA7),

apolipoprotein E ε4,and the risk of late-onset Alzheimer disease in African Americans.

JAMA. 309(14):1483-1492. 2013.

45. Cruchaga C, Kauwe JS, Harari O, Jin SC, Cai Y, Karch CM, Benitez BA, Jeng AT, Skorupa

T, Carrell D, Bertelsen S, Bailey M, McKean D, Shulman JM, De Jager PL, Chibnik L,

Bennett DA, Arnold SE, Harold D, Sims R, Gerrish A, Williams J, Van Deerlin VM, Lee

VM, Shaw LM, Trojanowski JQ, Haines JL, Mayeux R, Pericak-Vance MA, Farrer LA,

Schellenberg GD, Peskind ER, Galasko D, Fagan AM, Holtzman DM, Morris JC; GERAD

Consortium; Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging Initiative (ADNI); Alzheimer Disease

Genetic Consortium (ADGC), Goate AM. GWAS of cerebrospinal fluid tau levels

identifies risk variants for Alzheimer's disease. Neuron. 78(2):256-68. 2013.
Carney, Regina M. 

Page 16 

46. Miyashita A, Koike A, Jun G, Wang L-S, Takahashi S, Matsubara E, Kawarabayashi T,

Shoji M, Tomita N, Arai H, Asada T, Harigaya Y, Ikeda M, Amari M, Hanyu H, Higuchi S,

Ikeuchi T, Nishizawa M, Suga M, Kawase Y, Akatsu H, Kosaka K, Yamamoto T, Imagawa

M, Hamaguchi T, Yamada M, Moriaha T, Takeda M, Takao T, Nakata K, Fujisawa Y,

Sasaki K, Watanabe K, Nakashima K, Urakami K, Ooya T, Takahashi M, Yuzuriha T,

Serikawa K, Yoshimoto S, Nakagawa R, Kim J-W, Ki C-S, Won H-H, Na DL, Seo SW,

Mook-Jung I, The Alzheimer Disease Genetics Consortium, St. George-Hyslop P, Mayeux

R, Haines JL, Pericak-Vance MA, Yoshida M, Nishida N, Tokunaga K, Yamamoto K, Tsuji

S, Kanazawa I, Ihara Y, Schellenberg GD, Farrer LA, Kuwano R. SORL1 is genetically

associated with late-onset Alzheimer's disease in Japanese, Koreans and Caucasians. Plos

One, 8(4): e58618. 2013.

47. Holton P, Ryten M, Nalls M, Trabzuni D, Weale ME, Hernandez D, Crehan H, Gibbs JR,

Mayeux R, Haines JL, Farrer LA, Pericak-Vance MA, Schellenberg GD; Alzheimer's

Disease Genetics Consortium, Ramirez-Restrepo M, Engel A, Myers AJ, Corneveaux JJ,

Huentelman MJ, Dillman A, Cookson MR, Reiman EM, Singleton A, Hardy J, Guerreiro R.

Initial assessment of the pathogenic mechanisms of the recently identified Alzheimer risk

loci. Ann Hum Genet. 77(2):85-105. 2013.

48. Zou F, Chai HS, Younkin CS, Crook J, Pankratz VS, Allen M, Carrasquillo MM, Rowley

CN, Nair AA, Middha S, Maharjan S, Nguyen T, Ma L, Malphrus KG, Palusak R, Lincoln S,

Bisceglio G, Georgescu C, Kolbert CP, Jen J, Haines JL, Mayeux R, Pericak-Vance MA,

Farrer LA, Schellenberg GD, Alzheimer’s Disease Genetics Consortium, Petersen RC,

Graff-Radford NR, Dickson DW, Younkin SG, Ertekin-Taner N. Brain expression genomewide association study (eGWAS) identifies human disease-associated variants. PloS Genetics

8(6):e1002707. 2012.

49. Whitcomb DC, LaRusch J, Krasinskas AM, Klei L, Smith JP, Brand RE, Neoptolemos JP,

Lerch MM, Tector M, Sandhu BS, Guda NM, Orlichenko L, Alzheimer's Disease Genetics

Consortium, Alkaade S, Amann ST, Anderson MA, Baillie J, Banks PA, Conwell D, Coté

GA, Cotton PB, DiSario J, Farrer LA, Forsmark CE, Johnstone M, Gardner TB, Gelrud A,

Greenhalf W, Haines JL, Hartman DJ, Hawes RA, Lawrence C, Lewis M, Mayerle J,

Mayeux R, Melhem NM, Money ME, Muniraj T, Papachristou GI, Pericak-Vance MA,

Romagnuolo J, Schellenberg GD, Sherman S, Simon P, Singh VP, Slivka A, Stolz D, Sutton

R, Weiss FU, Wilcox CM, Zarnescu NO, Wisniewski SR, O'Connell MR, Kienholz ML,

Roeder K, Barmada MM, Yadav D, Devlin B. Common genetic variants in the CLDN2 and

PRSS1-PRSS2 loci alter risk for alcohol-related and sporadic pancreatitis. Nat Genet

44(12):1349-54. 2012.

50. Jun G, Vardarajan BN, Buros J, Yu CE, Hawk MV, Dombroski BA, Crane PK, Larson EB,

Alzheimer's Disease Genetics Consortium, Mayeux R, Haines JL, Lunetta KL, PericakVance MA, Schellenberg GD, Farrer LA. Comprehensive search for Alzheimer disease

susceptibility loci in the APOE region. Arch Neurol. 69(10):1270-9. 2012.
Carney, Regina M. 

Page 17 

51. Allen M, Zou F, Chai HS, Younkin CS, Crook J, Pankratz VS, Carrasquillo MM, Rowley

CN, Nair AA, Middha S, Maharjan S, Nguyen T, Ma L, Malphrus KG, Palusak R, Lincoln S,

Bisceglio G, Georgescu C, Schultz D, Rakhshan F, Kolbert CP, Jen J, Haines JL, Mayeux R,

Pericak-Vance MA, Farrer LA, Schellenberg GD, Alzheimer's Disease Genetics

Consortium, Petersen RC, Graff-Radford NR, Dickson DW, Younkin SG, Ertekin-Taner N.

Novel late-onset Alzheimer disease loci variants associate with brain gene expression.

Neurology 79(3):221-8. 2012.

52. Coppola G, Chinnathambi S, Lee JJ, Dombroski BA, Baker MC, Soto-Ortolaza AI, Lee SE,

Klein E, Huang AY, Sears R, Lane JR, Karydas AM, Kenet RO, Biernat J, Wang LS,

Cotman CW, Decarli CS, Levey AI, Ringman JM, Mendez MF, Chui HC, Le Ber I, Brice A,

Lupton MK, Preza E, Lovestone S, Powell J, Graff-Radford N, Petersen RC, Boeve BF,

Lippa CF, Bigio EH, Mackenzie I, Finger E, Kertesz A, Caselli RJ, Gearing M, Juncos JL,

Ghetti B, Spina S, Bordelon YM, Tourtellotte WW, Frosch MP, Vonsattel JP, Zarow C,

Beach TG, Albin RL, Lieberman AP, Lee VM, Trojanowski JQ, Van Deerlin VM, Bird TD,

Galasko DR, Masliah E, White CL, Troncoso JC, Hannequin D, Boxer AL, Geschwind MD,

Kumar S, Mandelkow EM, Wszolek ZK, Uitti RJ, Dickson DW, Haines JL, Mayeux R,

Pericak-Vance MA, Farrer LA; Alzheimer's Disease Genetics Consortium, Ross OA,

Rademakers R, Schellenberg GD, Miller BL, Mandelkow E, Geschwind DH. Evidence for a

role of the rare p.A152T variant in MAPT in increasing the risk for FTD-spectrum and

Alzheimer's diseases. Hum Mol Genet. 21(15):3500-12. 2012.

53. Carney RM, Shelton RC. Agomelatine for the treatment of major depressive disorder.

Expert Opin Pharmacother. 12(15):2411-9. 2011.

54. Naj AC, Jun G, Beecham GW, Wang L, Vardarajan BN, Buros J, Gallins PJ, Buxbaum JD,

Carlson CS, Crane PK, Larson EB, Bird TD, Boeve BF, Graff-Radford NR, De Jager PL,

Evans D, Schneider JA, Carrasquillo MM, Ertekin-Taner N, Younkin SG, Cruchaga C,

Kauwe JSK, Nowotny P, Kramer P, Hardy J, Huentelman MJ, Myers AJ, Barmada MM,

Demirci FY, Baldwin CT, Green RC, Rogaeva E, St George-Hyslop P, Alzheimer Disease

Genetics Consortium, Cantwell LB, Dombroski BA, Beekly D, Lunetta KL, Martin ER,

Kamboh MI, Saykin AJ, Reiman EM, Bennett DA, Morris JC, Montine TJ, Goate AM,

Blacker D, Tsuang DW, Hakonarson H, Kukull WA, Foroud TM, Haines JL, Mayeux R,

Pericak-Vance MA, Farrer LA, Schellenberg GD. Common variants in MS4A4/MS4A6E,

CD2AP, CD33 and EPHA1 are associated with late-onset Alzheimer's disease. Nat Genet.

43(5):436-41. 2011.

55. Jun G, Naj AC, Beecham GW, Wang LS, Buros J, Gallins PJ, Buxbaum JD, Ertekin-Taner

N, Fallin MD, Friedland R, Inzelberg R, Kramer P, Rogaeva E, St George-Hyslop P,

Alzheimer's Disease Genetics Consortium, Cantwell LB, Dombroski BA, Saykin AJ,

Reiman EM, Bennett DA, Morris JC, Lunetta KL, Martin ER, Montine TJ, Goate AM,

Blacker D, Tsuang DW, Beekly D, Cupples LA, Hakonarson H, Kukull W, Foroud TM,

Haines J, Mayeux R, Farrer LA, Pericak-Vance MA, Schellenberg GD. Meta-analysis
Carney, Regina M. 

Page 18 

confirms CR1, CLU, and PICALM as Alzheimer disease risk loci and reveals interactions 

with APOE genotypes. Arch Neurol 67(12):1473-84. 2010. 

56. Beecham GW, Martin ER, Li Y-J, Carney RM, Slifer MA, Gilbert JR, Haines JL, PericakVance MA. Genome-wide association implicates a chromosome 12 risk locus for late-onset

Alzheimer disease. Am J Hum Genet. 84(1):35-43. 2009.

57. Carney RM, Slifer MA, Lin PI, Gaskell PC, Scott WK, Potocky CF, Hulette CM, WelshBohmer KA, Schmechel DE, Vance JM, Pericak-Vance MA. Longitudinal follow-up of lateonset Alzheimer disease families. Am J Med Genet B Neuropsychiatr Genet. 147B(5):571-8.

2008.

58. Liang X, Schnetz-Boutaud N, Bartlett J, Allen MJ, Gwirtsman H, Schmechel DE, Carney

RM, Gilbert JR, Pericak-Vance MA, Haines JL. No association between SNP rs498055 on

chromosome 10 and late-onset Alzheimer disease in multiple datasets. Ann Hum Genet.

72(Pt 1):141-4. 2008.

59. Liang X, Martin ER, Schnetz-Boutaud N, Bartlett J, Anderson B, Züchner S, Gwirtsman H,

Schmechel D, Carney R, Gilbert JR, Pericak-Vance MA, Haines JL. Effect of heterogeneity

on the chromosome 10 risk in late-onset Alzheimer disease. Hum Mutat. 28(11):1065-73.

2007.

60. Liang X, Schnetz-Boutaud N, Bartlett J, Anderson BM, Gwirtsman H, Schmechel D, Carney

R, Gilbert JR, Pericak-Vance MA, Haines JL. Association analysis of genetic

polymorphisms in the CDC2 gene with late-onset Alzheimer disease. Dement Geriatr Cogn

Disord. 23(2):126-32. 2007.

61. Carney RM, Wolpert CM, Ravan SA, Shahbazian M, Ashley-Koch A, Cuccaro ML, Vance

JM, Pericak-Vance MA. Identification of MeCP2 mutations in a series of females with

autistic disorder. Pediatr Neurol. 28(3):205-11. 2003.

Non-Refereed Journals: 

1. Fernandez C, Levitt EJ, Carney RM. Acute onset of psychosis and personality changes

in a woman with newly identified lung malignancy and urinary tract infection: A case report.

Florida Medical Student Research Journal. 2020 April.

ABSTRACTS: 

1. Healey J, Salinas J, Bryant C, Cortes E, Sabbag S, Carney R, Padilla V. Severe Adverse

Events Committee (SAVE): Findings of a Pilot Project for Resident Safety. 2020 Annual

Meeting, American Psychiatric Association, Philadelphia, PA, April 25 – 29, 2020.
Carney, Regina M. 

Page 19 

2. Carney RM, Kunkle BW, Whitehead PL, Vardarajan B, Mayeux RP, Gilbert JR, Haines JL,

Pericak-Vance MA. Known and novel mutations in SORL1, PSEN1, and PSEN2 genes are

found in multiplex Alzheimer’s disease families with varying age of onset and pathological

presentations. 12th International Conference on Alzheimer's & Parkinson's Diseases (AD/PD

2015), Nice, France. March 18 – 22, 2015.

3. Carney RM, Kohli MA, Kunkle B, Martin ER, Beecham GW, Gilbert J, Pericak-Vance MA.

Clinical characteristics of late onset Alzheimer disease in an extended family with a missense

variant in TTC3. Alzheimer’s Association International Conference on Alzheimer’s Disease

(AAIC 2014), Copenhagen, Denmark. 2014.

4. Kohli MA, John-Williams K, Rajbhandary R, Naj A, Whitehead P, Hamilton K, Carney

RM, Wright C, Crocco E, Gwirtzman HE, Lang R, Beecham G, Martin ER, Gilbert J,

Benatar M, Small GW, Mash D, Byrd G, Haines JL, Pericak-Vance MA, Züchner S. Large

repeat expansions in the C9ORF72 gene contribute to a spectrum of neurodegenerative

disorders including Alzheimer disease. American Society of Human Genetics Annual

Meeting, San Francisco, CA, 2012.

5. Carney RM, Kohli MA, Naj AC, Beecham GW, Hamilton KL, Haines JL, Gilbert JR,

Züchner S, Pericak-Vance MA. Parkinsonian symptoms and lack of prominent frontal

atrophy in a family with early-onset dementia and the MAPT R406W mutation. Alzheimer’s

Association International Conference on Alzheimer’s Disease (AAIC 2012), Vancouver,

British Columbia, Canada. 2012.

6. Beecham GW, Slifer MA, Martin ER, Li Y-J, Carney RM, Gilbert JR, Haines JL, PericakVance MA. Genomic convergence of late-onset Alzheimer disease candidate genes.

Alzheimer’s Association International Conference on Alzheimer’s Disease (ICAD 2008),

McCormick Place, Chicago, IL. 2008.

7. Beecham G, Martin E, Li Y-J, Carney RM, Slifer M, Gilbert J, Haines J, Pericak-Vance

MA. Genome-wide association for late-onset Alzheimer disease (LOAD) confirms risk locus

on chromosome 12. American Society for Human Genetics Annual Meeting, San Diego, CA.

2007.

8. Turner SD, Liang X, Martin ER, Schnetz-Boutaud N, Bartlett J, Anderson BM, Züchner S,

Gwirtsman H, Schmechel D, Carney R, Gilbert J, Pericak-Vance MA, Haines JL.

Examination of sortilin-related receptor SORL1 in late-onset Alzheimer disease. American

Society for Human Genetics Annual Meeting, San Diego, CA. 2007.

9. Carney RM, Gaskell PC, Scott WK, Slifer MA, Hulette CM, Welsh-Bohmer KA,

Schmechel DE, Vance JM, Pericak-Vance MA. Clinical follow-up of multiplex late-onset

Alzheimer disease families. American Society for Human Genetics Annual Meeting, Salt

Lake City, UT. 2005.
Carney, Regina M. 

Page 20 

10. Cuccaro M, Donnelly S, Cope H, Wolpert C, Carney R, Abramson R, Hall A, Wright H,

Gilbert J, Pericak-Vance MA. Autism in African American (AA) families: phenotypic

findings. American Society for Human Genetics Annual Meeting, Salt Lake City, UT. 2005.

11. Carney RM, Vance JM, Dancel RD, Wolpert CM, DeLong GR, McClain C, von Wendt L,

Gilbert JR, Donelly SL, Ravan SA, Abel HL, Abramson RK, Wright HH, Zoghbi HY,

Cuccaro ML, Pericak-Vance MA. Screening for MECP2 mutations in females with autistic

disorder. 10th International Congress of Human Genetics, Vienna, Austria. 2001.

12. Ashley-Koch A, Carney RM, Dancel RD, Wolpert CM, Delong GR, Donnelly SL, Ravan

SA, Abel HL, Abramson RK, Wright HH, Zoghbi HY, Cuccaro ML, Gilbert JR, Vance JM,

Pericak-Vance MA, Identification of MECP2 mutations in two females with autistic disorder.

International Meeting for Autism Research (IMFAR), San Diego, CA. 2001.

V. PROFESSIONAL

Development Courses: 

Virtual Aspiring Supervisors Program (vASP). 12 week course, with didactic, interactive, and 

reflective modules using the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Leadership Competency 

Model and the VA Leadership Development Framework at the First Line Supervisor level. 

Completed June, 2021. 

Media Appearances: 

“¿Que Sucede en La Mente de Ariel Castro?” Interview for Expert Commentary, Primer Impacto 

(Spanish language primetime newshow), Univision, May 15, 2013.

Professional Presentations: 

“The Future of Alzheimer: The Role of Genomics.” Opening Presentation; Alzheimer’s 

Association, Southeast Florida Chapter; Regional Education Conference, FIU Kovens 

Conference Center, North Miami, Florida, May 15, 2014.

“Psychiatric and Judicial Collaboration: Working to Address the Overrepresentation of JusticeInvolved People with Mental Disorders.” Workshop; American Psychiatric Association; 167th

Annual Meeting, New York, New York, May 3, 2014. 

“Alzheimer’s Disease and African-Americans.” Presentation and panel; First Annual Legacy

Black Healthcare Symposium, Miami, Florida, December 3, 2013.

“Identifying Places to Make Connections between the Courts and the Community.” Panel; 

Judicial-Psychiatric Leadership Forum. APA Institute on Psychiatric Services; Judges’ 

Leadership Initiative for Criminal Justice and Behavioral Health/Psychiatric Leadership Group 

for Criminal Justice, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, October 13, 2013. 
Carney, Regina M. 

Page 21 

Teaching Achievements and Activities: 

Faculty Resident Supervisor to: 

2022-2023: Kendyl Stewart, MD (PGY-3) 

2021-2022: Jessica Healey, MD (PGY-4), Amy Waters, MD (PGY-4), Kristi 

Wintermeyer, MD (PGY-5), Natalie Martinez Sosa (PGY-5) 

2020-2021: Jessica Healey, MD (PGY-3), Amy Waters, MD (PGY-3), Julie Guzzardi, 

MD (PGY-5) 

2019-2020: Ghaith Shukri, MD (PGY-1), Connie Spelius Perez, MD (PGY-1), Ahmed 

Valdes, MD (PGY-1), Dennis Valerstain, MD (PGY-1), Mousa Botros, MD 

(PGY-5), Lisa Oliveri, MD (PGY-5) 

2018-2019: Gregory Hutton, MD (PGY-3), Durim Bozhdaraj, MD (PGY-5) 

2017-2018: Elizabeth Perkins, MD (PGY-2), Matthew Stark, MD (PGY-2), Francis 

Smith (PGY-5) 

2016-2017: Michelle Benitez, MD (PGY-5), Lance Amols, MD (PGY-5) 

2015-2016: Eva Diaz, MD (PGY-3); Sana Qureshi, MD (PGY-5/Forensic Fellow) 

2014-2015: Stephanie Friedman, MD (PGY-2) 

2013-2014: Aly Diaz de Villegas, MD (PGY-2) 

2012-2013: Suraya Kawadry, MD (PGY-2) 

Faculty Research Mentor to Dr. Sana Qureshi, PGY-4, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral 

Sciences, University of Miami Miller School of Medicine, Miami, Florida. “Outcomes of 

Treatment at the Miami-Dade Forensic Alternative Center versus State Hospitalization.” Winner, 

Best Resident Research Poster, June 2015. 

“Chronic Suicidality.” Faculty Discussant with Drs. Shumaia Rahman and Joshua Delaney, 

PGY-2, Morbidity and Mortality (M&M) Conference, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral 

Sciences, University of Miami Miller School of Medicine, Miami, Florida, February 20, 2019. 

“ECT—Clinical Use and Legal Issues.” Faculty Discussant with Drs. Areej Alfaraj and Elizabeth 

Perkins, PGY-2, Morbidity and Mortality (M&M) Conference, Department of Psychiatry and 

Behavioral Sciences, University of Miami Miller School of Medicine, Miami, Florida, February 

14, 2018. 

“Management of a Patient Making Threats of Mass Murder.” Faculty Discussant with Dr. 

Matthew Stark, PGY-2, Morbidity and Mortality (M&M) Conference, Department of Psychiatry 

and Behavioral Sciences, University of Miami Miller School of Medicine, Miami, Florida, 

August 2, 2017. 

“Inpatient Assault Against Staff.” Faculty Discussant with Dr. Samantha Saltz, PGY-2, 

Morbidity and Mortality (M&M) Conference, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral 

Sciences, University of Miami Miller School of Medicine, Miami, Florida, January 28, 2015. 
Carney, Regina M. 

Page 22 

Faculty Project Advisor to Award Recipient Ms. Shawntira Johnson, University of Miami Miller 

School of Medicine MS-III, Diverse Medical Scholars Program, United Health 

Foundation/National Medical Fellowships, for a service project on the Miami-Dade Forensic 

Alternative Center at Jackson Behavioral Health Hospital, January – May 2014. 

“Competency and Capacity.” Instructor, PGY-4 Core Curriculum in Forensic Psychiatry, 

Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, University of Miami Miller School of 

Medicine, Miami, Florida, 2013-present. 

“Violence Against Staff by Psychiatric Inpatients.” Faculty Discussant, Ethics Rounds, 

Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, University of Miami Miller School of 

Medicine, Miami, Florida, October 13, 2013. 

“Suicide.” Instructor, Summer Scholars Program (for Miami area high school students), 

Coordinated by Ana Campo, MD, through the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral 

Sciences, University of Miami Miller School of Medicine, Miami, Florida, 2013-2016. 

"Advanced Psychopharmacological Approaches to Mood and Anxiety Disorders: A Consultation 

Case Series." Grand Rounds, Department of Psychiatry, Vanderbilt University Medical Center, 

Nashville, Tennessee, June 23, 2011. 

Committees: 

PGY-1 Milestones and Promotion Committee, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral 

Sciences, University of Miami Miller School of Medicine, Miami, Florida, 2015-2022. 

PGY-3 Milestones and Promotion Committee, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral 

Sciences, University of Miami Miller School of Medicine, Miami, Florida, 2013-2015.

Ad Hoc Committee on Florida Guardianship; Florida Medical Association’s Council on Healthy 

Floridians, March 2013-present. 

Honors: 

1. Four Time Most Outstanding Faculty Teaching Award: Miami VA Department of Mental

Health and Behavioral Sciences. Selected by PGY-1 through PGY-4 Psychiatry Residents,

Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, University of Miami Miller School of

Medicine, Miami, Florida, 2018-2020, 2022.

2. Three-time Award for Excellence in Teaching: Outstanding Voluntary Faculty in an Inpatient

Setting. Florida International University Herbert Wertheim College of Medicine, Department

of Psychiatry and Behavioral Health. consecutive award winner, 2016-2017, 2022.
Carney, Regina M. 

Page 23 

3. Travel Fellowship Award, Alzheimer’s Association International Conference, July 14-19,

2012, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.

4. Fellowship Travel Award, Workshop on Clinical Trials in Psychopharmacology, American

Society of Clinical Psychopharmacology, April 27 - 29, 2010, New York, New York.

5. Medical Degree with Distinction in Research, Stony Brook University School of Medicine,

2003.

6. Howard Hughes Undergraduate Research Award, Duke University, 1998.
Attachment C