SIGAR Audit-12-4 Security/ANSF Vehicle Accountability

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

DOD Improved Its Accountability for Vehicles Provided 

to the Afghan National Security Forces, but Should 

Follow Up on End-Use Monitoring Findings

January 12, 2012
SIGAR Audit-12-4 Security/ANSF Vehicle Accountability Page i

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

January 12, 2012

The Honorable Leon E. Panetta

Secretary of Defense

General James N. Mattis

Commander, U.S. Central Command

General John R. Allen

Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, and 

Commander, International Security Assistance Force

Lieutenant General Daniel P. Bolger

Commanding General, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/ 

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan

Vice Admiral William E. Landay, III

Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency

This report discusses the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction’s (SIGAR) audit of vehicles provided with U.S. funds to the Afghan National Security 

Forces (ANSF). This report includes one recommendation to the Commanding General, Combined 

Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) to establish a system to track and follow up on 

findings identified in end-use monitoring vehicle inspections as well as require status updates by the 

parties involved to ensure resolution.

A summary of this report is on page ii. When preparing the final report, SIGAR obtained comments from 

CSTC-A, which concurred with the recommendation. These comments are reproduced in appendix II. 

SIGAR conducted this performance audit under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended;

the Inspector General Act of 1978; and the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008.

Steven J Trent

Acting Special Inspector General

for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGAR Audit-12-4 Security/ANSF Vehicle Accountability Page ii

SIGAR

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGAR Audit-12-4 January 2012

DOD Improved Its Accountability for Vehicles Provided to 

the Afghan National Security Forces, but Should Follow 

Up on End-Use Monitoring Findings

What SIGAR Reviewed

A key objective of coalition efforts in Afghanistan is to build the country’s capacity to provide for its own security by 

training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Through December 2010, the Combined Security 

Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) had provided more than 52,000 vehicles, including light tactical vehicles and 

High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles, worth approximately $4.0 billion for the ANSF; and has plans to provide

thousands more purchased primarily with the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. The United States has provided most of 

these vehicles using an adaptation of the Foreign Military Sales program, a government-to-government program for 

selling U.S. defense equipment, services, and training to foreign entities. TACOM Life Cycle Management Command 

(TACOM LCMC) procures most vehicles for the ANSF. Vehicles are transported to Afghanistan by contractors for the 

U.S. Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC). SIGAR’s objectives were to (1) determine whether 

CSTC-A could account for the vehicles it provided to the ANSF and (2) assess CSTC-A’s oversight for the vehicles 

provided. To accomplish these objectives, SIGAR reviewed vehicle purchase and delivery documentation, documented a 

random sample of vehicles, physically inspected vehicles, and interviewed CSTC-A and ANSF officials. SIGAR conducted 

work at CSTC-A headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan; TACOM LCMC in Harrison Township, Michigan; and in Washington, 

D.C.; from December 2010 to December 2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

SIGAR suspended work from January 2011 to April 2011 to allow TACOM LCMC to collect vehicle identification data and 

CSTC-A to conduct a vehicle inventory. 

What SIGAR Found

While TACOM LCMC and CSTC-A were able to account for nearly all vehicles provided to the ANSF, CSTC-A did not 

regularly file claims for damages or missing equipment. TACOM LCMC provided records for about 17,800 Afghan 

National Army (ANA) and 8,900 Afghan National Police (ANP) vehicles shipped between October 2007 and December 

2010. Of these, CSTC-A provided evidence of the disposition of about 99 percent of the ANA vehicles and 100 percent of 

the ANP vehicles. To prepare for SIGAR’s audit, CSTC-A conducted a nationwide inventory of U.S-provided vehicles and 

found that it was providing fuel to the ANA for destroyed vehicles. As a result, CSTC-A had saved about $370,000, as of 

November 2011, by reducing ANA fuel deliveries by 200,000 liters. Overall, SIGAR estimates that for fiscal year 2012, 

CSTC-A will save almost $5 million by reducing fuel deliveries to the ANA. Also, CSTC-A had not previously submitted

claims for vehicles damaged or equipment and parts lost or stolen during transit and, therefore, CSTC-A was not 

reimbursed by the transportation contractors. Rather, CSTC-A paid separately for repairs and the replacement of 

missing equipment and parts. Once SIGAR identified this issue in May 2011, CSTC-A took steps to submit claims by filing 

transportation discrepancy reports. Doing so will help ensure the United States is not expending funds unnecessarily for 

repairs and the replacement of missing equipment and parts. As of November 2011, SDDC had approved 10 claims 

valued at over $339,000. CSTC-A has 39 additional claims in process totaling $250,000. 

CSTC-A generally met oversight requirements for end-use monitoring (EUM) of U.S.-provided vehicles. During SIGAR’s

May 2011 fieldwork, CSTC-A conducted a vehicle-specific EUM inspection and reviewed property books, procedures, 

vehicle location, and operational status. Following SIGAR’s fieldwork, CSTC-A instituted additional EUM requirements 

for vehicles, including reviews of ANA and ANP property books and maintenance records, and accounting for destroyed 

vehicles. While CSTC-A EUM has identified issues regarding ANSF vehicles, it did not have a system in place to ensure 

that EUM findings were addressed. For example, at two ANA locations, the EUM team noted vehicle repairs were 

taking over a year, but CSTC-A did not have any record if this matter was resolved.

What SIGAR Recommends

Because CSTC-A took steps during the course of SIGAR’s audit to conduct an inventory of ANSF vehicles and file 

transportation discrepancy reports, SIGAR is not making any recommendations addressing these matters. However, to 

enhance oversight of vehicles provided by the United States, SIGAR recommends that the Commanding General, 

CSTC-A, establish a system to track and follow up on vehicle issues identified in EUM inspections, including status 

updates by the parties involved to ensure resolution of the findings. CSTC-A provided comments on a draft of this 

report and concurred with the recommendation, noting that it had already taken steps to address it.

For more information contact: SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 545-5974 or sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil
SIGAR Audit-12-4 Security/ANSF Vehicle Accountability Page iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background ...................................................................................................................................................2

CSTC-A Accounted for Vehicles Provided to the ANSF, but Did Not Regularly File 

Reports for Damage and Loss.................................................................................................................5

CSTC-A’S EUM of ANSF Vehicles Met Requirements, but Additional Follow Up is 

Needed ...................................................................................................................................................9

Conclusion...................................................................................................................................................11

Recommendation........................................................................................................................................11

Comments...................................................................................................................................................11

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology.........................................................................................................12

Appendix II: Comments from the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined 

Security Transition Command-Afghanistan..........................................................................................14

TABLES

Table 1: TACOM LCMC-Procured Vehicles Shipped to Afghanistan from October 

2007 to December 2010.........................................................................................................................3

Table 2: Projected Disposition of Vehicles With UIIs Procured and Shipped to 

the ANSF from October 2007 to December 2010 ..................................................................................7

FIGURES AND PHOTOS

Figure 1: Transportation Discrepancy Report Process.................................................................................4

Photo 1: Radio Missing from ANP Bus.........................................................................................................8
SIGAR Audit-12-4 Security/ANSF Vehicle Accountability Page iv

ACRONYMS

ANA Afghan National Army

ANP Afghan National Police

ANSF Afghan National Security Forces

CSTC-A

DCMA

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan 

Defense Contract Management Agency

DOD Department of Defense

DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency

ECOD estimated cost of damage

EUM end-use monitoring

FMS Foreign Military Sales

GAO Government Accountability Office

MOD Ministry of Defense

MOI Ministry of Interior

SDDC Surface Deployment and Distribution Command

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

TACOM LCMC TACOM Life Cycle Management Command

TDR Transportation Discrepancy Report

UII unique item identifier
SIGAR Audit-12-4 Security/ANSF Vehicle Accountability Page 1

DOD Improved Its Accountability for Vehicles Provided to the Afghan National 

Security Forces, but Should Follow Up on End-Use Monitoring Findings

A key objective of coalition efforts in Afghanistan is to build the country’s capacity to provide for its own 

security by training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Between fiscal years 

2005 and 2011, the U.S. Congress appropriated about $39.5 billion for the Afghanistan Security Forces 

Fund for training and equipping the ANSF, which includes the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan 

National Police (ANP). As part of this effort, through December 2010, the United States had provided 

more than 52,000 vehicles to the ANA and ANP worth approximately $4.0 billion and has plans to 

provide thousands more purchased primarily with the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund.

The United States has provided most of these vehicles using an adaptation of the Foreign Military Sales 

(FMS) program,1 a government-to-government program for selling U.S. defense equipment, services, 

and training to foreign entities. The FMS program is managed by the Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency (DSCA), which tasks military departments and Department of Defense (DOD) agencies to 

implement FMS cases. The U.S. Army Security Assistance Command implements FMS cases for almost 

all vehicles, and the U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command (TACOM LCMC) procures most 

vehicles for the ANSF. Vehicles are transported to Afghanistan by contractors managed by the U.S. 

Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC).2

 The Combined Security Transition 

Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A)3

Following audit reports by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the DOD Office of the 

Inspector General that identified serious deficiencies in the accountability of equipment provided to 

Iraq,

in Kabul, Afghanistan, is the U.S. entity responsible for planning, 

programming, and implementing U.S. training and equipping efforts for the ANSF, including accounting 

for the receipt and issuance of all U.S.-provided vehicles to the ANSF once the vehicles arrive in 

Afghanistan. CSTC-A also utilizes contractors to assist with the delivery and the maintenance of vehicles.

4 Section 1228 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act required the President to 

implement, within 180 days, a program of registration and monitoring for defense articles provided to 

Iraq.5

 In January 2009, DOD issued a memorandum applying these requirements to Afghanistan6

 1

Throughout this report, we refer to this adaptation of FMS as “pseudo-FMS.”

in 

2

SDDC is the Army Service Component Command of the U.S. Transportation Command and is a major subordinate 

command to Army Materiel Command. The command also partners with the commercial transportation industry 

as the coordinating link between DOD surface transportation requirements and the capability industry provides.

3

CSTC-A is a joint command with the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan. Because CSTC-A distributes and manages 

all U.S. funding to support the ANSF, this report refers to CSTC-A. 

4

GAO-07-771, Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure that U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces, 

July 31, 2007; and SPO-2008-1, Assessment of the Accountability of Arms and Ammunition Provided to the Security 

Forces of Iraq, July 3, 2008. While SPO-2008-1 was issued in July 2008, DOD Office of Inspector General briefed 

DOD and congressional committees on its findings in November and December 2007. 

5

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1228, 122 Stat. 377-378 (January 

28, 2008).
SIGAR Audit-12-4 Security/ANSF Vehicle Accountability Page 2

response to a GAO report citing lapses in accountability of weapons provided to the ANSF.

7

We initiated this audit to determine how DOD implemented vehicle tracking requirements in 

Afghanistan. Specifically, our objectives were to (1) determine whether the CSTC-A could account for

the vehicles it provided to the ANSF and (2) assess CSTC-A’s oversight for the vehicles provided. In 

January 2011, we agreed to delay our fieldwork in Afghanistan because CSTC-A reported that it could 

not readily provide the documentation required to address our questions and was in the process of 

conducting a nationwide vehicle inventory in conjunction with the ANA and ANP. 

The 

memorandum required that DOD keep detailed records of the origin, shipping, and distribution of all 

items transferred to the ANSF and required a program of monitoring most vehicles provided to the ANA 

and ANP.

To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed vehicle purchase and delivery documentation and 

interviewed TACOM LCMC, CSTC-A, SDDC, and ANSF officials. We limited our scope to vehicles ordered 

and shipped by TACOM LCMC from October 2007 through December 2010, nearly 31,000 of the more 

than 52,000 vehicles purchased by CSTC-A. Based on vehicle identification data provided by TACOM 

LCMC, we randomly selected 289 vehicles for the ANA and 289 vehicles for the ANP in order to reach 

general conclusions about CSTC-A’s ability to account for vehicles purchased by the United States.8

 The 

sample was selected from the almost 27,000 vehicles (out of nearly 31,000) for which TACOM LCMC 

could provide a unique item identifier (UII).

9

 In Afghanistan, we examined CSTC-A records and met with 

officials at CSTC-A headquarters, examined documentation indicating the transfer and location of each 

vehicle in our sample, and conducted physical checks of selected vehicles at ANA and ANP depots near 

Kabul and at an ANA base near Mazar-e-Sharif. We also discussed vehicle accountability with officials 

from the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI)10

BACKGROUND

and with contractors 

involved in building the ANSF’s capacity to account for and maintain its vehicles. We conducted work in 

Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan; TACOM LCMC in Harrison Township, Michigan; and in 

Washington, D.C.; from December 2010 to December 2011 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. We suspended work from January 2011 to April 2011 to allow TACOM 

LCMC to collect vehicle identification data and for CSTC-A to conduct a vehicle inventory. See appendix I 

for a more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology.

According to TACOM LCMC data, it procured and shipped nearly 31,000 vehicles to the ANSF between 

October 2007 and December 2010. Most vehicles purchased were light tactical vehicles, mainly Ford 

Ranger pickup trucks. Other vehicles included High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles; medium 

tactical vehicles, such as water and tanker trucks; heavy tactical vehicles, such as fire trucks; and 

construction and material handling vehicles, such as forklifts and cranes. Table 1 shows the number of 

vehicles procured and shipped to the ANA and ANP by TACOM LCMC during the period. 

 6

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs Memorandum, “Registration and Monitoring of Defense 

Articles in Afghanistan,” January 29, 2009.

7

GAO-09-267, Lack of Systemic Tracking Raises Significant Accountability Concerns about Weapons Provided to 

Afghan National Security Forces, January 30, 2009.

8

Each sample has a 95 percent confidence with a margin of error of plus or minus 5 percent. This interval would 

contain the actual population value for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn. 

9

For purposes of this report, we use UII to include vehicle identification numbers or other numbers used to identify 

an individual vehicle. 

10The MOD has authority over the ANA; the MOI has authority over the ANP.
SIGAR Audit-12-4 Security/ANSF Vehicle Accountability Page 3

Table 1: TACOM LCMC-Procured Vehicles Shipped to Afghanistan from 

October 2007 to December 2010

Vehicle Type Quantity Shipped for 

ANA

Quantity Shipped 

for ANP

Total Shipped

Light tactical vehicles 10,010 7,851 17,861

High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles 4,990 775 5,765

Medium tactical vehicles 4,855 456 5,311

Construction and material handling vehicles 1,002 221 1,223

Heavy tactical vehicles 321 280 601

Total 21,178 9,583 30,761

Source: SIGAR analysis of TACOM LCMC data.

The U.S. government provided the majority of the vehicles for the ANSF through an adaptation of the 

FMS program, referred to as “pseudo-FMS,” which is overseen by DSCA. CSTC-A prepares the FMS 

documentation, submits it on behalf of MOD and MOI, and uses the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund to 

purchase the equipment. CSTC-A also acts as the receiving authority; that is, equipment is shipped to 

CSTC-A in Afghanistan before ownership is transferred to the ANA or ANP. Once a vehicle is transferred

to the ANSF, CSTC-A conducts routine end-use monitoring (EUM) to help ensure U.S.-provided 

equipment is used in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act.11

The procurement process begins with an initial requirements determination by the ANA and ANP with 

the assistance of CSTC-A, which results in a list of personnel and equipment requirements known as a 

tashkil. Once the tashkil is approved by MOD or MOI, respectively, CSTC-A and TACOM LCMC prepare a 

draft Memorandum of Request, which outlines new purchase requirements, including the item 

description, number to be purchased, estimated cost, justification, and destination. The memorandum

is submitted to the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command, the entity responsible for implementing 

FMS cases for the U .S. Army, and to DSCA for approval. Once the memorandum is approved, TACOM 

LCMC writes the Letter of Offer and Acceptance, which itemizes the defense articles and, when 

implemented, becomes the official offer by the U.S. government. Funding is then provided to TACOM 

LCMC to make contractual obligations to procure the vehicles. Other than light tactical vehicles and 

some construction vehicles, the vehicles are produced in the United States. When the vehicles are 

ready for shipment, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), the DOD entity responsible for 

contract administration, accepts the vehicles on behalf of the U.S. government.

 For 

vehicles, routine EUM means that CSTC-A is required to report incidents of misuse that it observes while 

carrying out other security assistance duties, but vehicles are not regularly inspected.

After DCMA accepts the vehicles, they are transported by a SDDC contractor from the factory to 

Afghanistan.12

 11Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (September 4, 1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq. 

The Arms Export Control Act (Pub. L. No. 90-629, as amended) mandates a program that gives the President 

authority to control the import and export of defense articles and services.

 Most vehicles transit through Karachi, Pakistan, where they are prioritized and loaded on 

12The carriers contracted to ship U.S goods to Afghanistan are American President Lines, Maersk Line Limited, 

Hapag Lloyd, American Cargo Transport, American Roll On Roll Off, Liberty Global Logistics, Central Gulf Lines, and 

Farrell Lines.
SIGAR Audit-12-4 Security/ANSF Vehicle Accountability Page 4

trucks by the SDDC contractor. According to CSTC-A, vehicles take approximately 75 to 100 days from 

the time they come off the production line to the time they arrive in Afghanistan. Once they arrive in 

Afghanistan, CSTC-A receives, processes, and prepares the vehicles for transfer to the ANA and ANP.

During transit from the manufacturer to Afghanistan, vehicles can sustain damage and losses due to 

poor handling, pilferage, theft, damage, vandalism, and improper packaging. DOD Transportation 

Discrepancy Reports (TDRs) are used to document any shipping discrepancies, and to claim 

reimbursement from the commercial carriers for the discrepancies. In the case of vehicles provided to 

the ANSF, CSTC-A is responsible for completing the TDRs and submitting them to SDDC, which serves as 

the DOD TDR program manager for assisting CSTC-A and other components in resolving transportation 

discrepancies. See figure 1.

Figure 1: Transportation Discrepancy Report Process

Source: SIGAR analysis of SDDC Ocean Cargo Clearing Authority South West Asia – Quality Assurance Customer Advisory, 

April 11, 2011.

Following several audit reports by GAO and the DOD Office of Inspector General identifying deficiencies 

in the registration and EUM for defense articles provided to Iraq, DOD, as required by Congress, 

established requirements intended to improve accountability for defense articles provided by the 

United States to Iraq and Afghanistan.13 In January 2008, Section 1228 of the 2008 National Defense 

Authorization Act required the President to implement a program of registration and EUM for defense 

articles provided to Iraq. In response to the January 2009 GAO report citing significant lapses in 

accountability of weapons provided to the ANSF,14

 13See DODIG D-2009-099, Afghanistan Security Forces Fund Phase III – Accountability for Equipment Purchased for 

the Afghanistan National Army, August 12, 2009; and DODIG D-2009-100, Accountability for Equipment Purchased 

for the Afghanistan National Police, September 22, 2009.

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security 

Affairs signed a memorandum requiring DSCA to develop a registration and monitoring program for 

Afghanistan similar to the Section 1228 requirements for Iraq. In March 2009, CSTC-A established a 

program office to comply with the memorandum and, in October 2009, DOD issued an instruction that

14See GAO-09-267.
SIGAR Audit-12-4 Security/ANSF Vehicle Accountability Page 5

formalized registration and EUM requirements in Afghanistan, including defining certain vehicles as 

lethal defense items that require additional oversight.

15 Also in October 2009, Section 1225 of the fiscal 

year 2010 National Defense Authorization Act mandated the establishment of a registration and EUM

program in Afghanistan and codified DOD’s Afghanistan policy into law.16

CSTC-A ACCOUNTED FOR VEHICLES PROVIDED TO THE ANSF, BUT DID NOT REGULARLY FILE 

REPORTS FOR DAMAGE AND LOSS

TACOM LCMC provided UIIs for over 86 percent of vehicles ordered and shipped to Afghanistan from 

October 2007 to December 2010, and CSTC-A was able to account for the disposition or location of 

nearly all of these vehicles. CSTC-A also used the results of its inventory of ANA vehicles to reduce fuel 

distribution for destroyed vehicles. However, CSTC-A did not regularly file claims for vehicles damaged 

or equipment and parts lost or stolen during transit. As a result, CSTC-A did not receive reimbursement 

for damage and loss from the SDDC transportation contractors. Instead, it paid separately for vehicle 

repairs and the replacement of missing equipment and parts. Since we identified this issue in May 2011,

CSTC-A has improved its process for filing the necessary reports for reimbursement.

Recent Inventories Accounted for Nearly All Vehicles and Provided Opportunities for Fuel 

Savings

According to TACOM LCMC data, CSTC-A ordered about 21,200 vehicles for the ANA and about 9,600 

vehicles for the ANP between October 2007 and December 2010. TACOM LCMC’s records had UIIs for 

about 84 percent (17,800) of the ANA vehicles and 93 percent (8,900) of the ANP vehicles.17

CSTC-A tracks vehicles provided to the ANSF by recording the UIIs for each vehicle and by requiring 

documentation recording the transfer of accountability to the ANA or ANP. DOD Instruction 5000.64 

requires DOD to maintain accountability of all property purchased with an acquisition cost of more than 

$5,000. After arriving in Afghanistan, the vehicles are in the possession of CSTC-A and, therefore,

CSTC-A is required to maintain accountability until the vehicles are transferred to the ANSF. The 

instruction further requires that all property records be kept current and that CSTC-A provide a 

complete record of all transactions, that reflect current status and location until the property is formally 

 Based on 

projections from our random sample, CSTC-A had documentation on the location or disposition for 

about 99 percent (17,600) of the 17,800 ANA vehicles and 100 percent of the 8,900 ANP vehicles. For 

those vehicles transferred to the ANSF, CSTC-A documented the transfer for 95 percent (15,100) of ANA 

vehicles and 100 percent of ANP (8,800) vehicles. In addition, CSTC-A used the results of its inventory of 

ANA vehicles to review fuel distribution to the ANA and began to reduce fuel deliveries as the result of 

vehicles that had been destroyed. As of November 20, 2011, CSTC-A had saved approximately $370,000 

by reducing fuel deliveries by 200,000 liters. Overall, for the ANA during fiscal year 2012, we estimate 

CSTC-A will save nearly $5 million by reducing fuel deliveries by approximately 2.68 million liters.

 15DOD Instruction 4140.66 was signed on October 15, 2009, and updated September 7, 2010. The instruction 

defines vehicles fitted or modified to accommodate Category I and Category II items on the U.S. Munitions List as 

lethal items. Category I includes firearms, close assault weapons, and combat shotguns. Category II includes .50 

caliber mortars and cannons.

16Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2523-2525 (2009).

17TACOM LCMC was not required to record UIIs for vehicles and did not formally begin recording UIIs for vehicles 

until August 2009. However, we were able to identify UIIs for these vehicles using a combination of receiving 

documentation and existing UII lists. We used this data to randomly select 289 ANA and 289 ANP vehicles to test 

CSTC-A’s accountability for vehicles provided to the ANSF.
SIGAR Audit-12-4 Security/ANSF Vehicle Accountability Page 6

transferred. Furthermore, FMS policy requires a U.S. representative delivering equipment to a foreign 

nation to keep documentation showing when, where, and to whom the delivery was made and report 

this information to the military organization responsible for procurement. Once TACOM LCMC procures 

and DCMA accepts the vehicles, TACOM LCMC forwards the UII information to CSTC-A for entry into an 

electronic database. When the vehicles arrive, CSTC-A reconciles the UIIs to shipment records and 

inventories the equipment, preparing for transfer to the ANSF.18

In January 2011, CSTC-A requested 4 months to work with the ANSF to conduct an inventory of all 

U.S.-provided ANA and ANP vehicles. Senior CSTC-A leadership informed us that this inventory was a 

command priority. According to CSTC-A officials, this was the first time that the ANSF had tracked

vehicles by UIIs and reconciled ANA and ANP property books to the vehicle inventory by UII. Although 

MOI had an inventory planned before we announced this audit in November 2010, a senior CSTC-A 

official credited our audit with enabling CSTC-A to put more emphasis on vehicle accountability.

As a result of CSTC-A’s nationwide inventory and document reconciliation efforts, CSTC-A accounted for 

the location and disposition of nearly all of the vehicles we identified from TACOM LCMC’s data. On the 

basis of our data analysis and tests of inventory records, CSTC-A accounted for over 99 percent19

(17,600) of the 17,800 ANA vehicles procured and 100 percent of 8,900 ANP vehicles procured and 

shipped to the ANSF from October 2007 to December 2010. Our results are projections based on the 

results of a random sample of ANA and ANP vehicles. We also conducted limited testing of CSTC-A’s 

system for tracking the current location of vehicles. We selected 34 vehicles from several ANA and ANP 

sites and found that CSTC-A’s records were accurate regarding their locations.20 Table 2 shows the 

projected disposition of the 26,701 vehicles for which TACOM LCMC could provide UIIs.21

 18Most ANA vehicles are delivered to Depot 2, a U.S.-operated receiving point for vehicles near Kabul, run by ANA 

personnel with the assistance of U.S. military and contractor personnel. The primary receiving and storage area 

for ANP vehicles is the Coprin lot, located in Kabul and operated by a contractor to maintain property records for 

vehicles received at the lot, process them for delivery, and help transfer them to the ANP.

19In the ANA sample, CSTC-A could not account for two High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles of the 289 

sample vehicles. CSTC-A provided documentation that (1) one of the vehicles was shipped to Afghanistan, but 

CSTC-A had no evidence of its receipt, and (2) the second vehicle was received at Depot 2, but CSTC-A had no 

documentation that the vehicle was issued.

20While vehicles issued to the ANP are to specific geographic locations, vehicles issued to the ANA are by unit and 

therefore may not be consistently located in a single area, but rather a region. Therefore, if CSTC-A records 

matched the unit of issuance, SIGAR noted CSTC-A as having knowledge of the vehicle’s location.

21These projections are based on the results of our randomly selected sample of 289 vehicles each for the ANA and 

ANP from approximately 17,800 vehicles for the ANA and 8,900 vehicles for the ANP for which TACOM could 

provide UIIs. We could not conduct similar testing for about 4,100 U.S.-procured vehicles for which UII number 

records were not available. The ANA projections have a margin of error of plus or minus 890 vehicles and the ANP 

projections have a margin of error of plus or minus 450 vehicles at the 95 percent confidence level.
SIGAR Audit-12-4 Security/ANSF Vehicle Accountability Page 7

Table 2: Projected Disposition of Vehicles With UIIs Procured and Shipped to the ANSF from October 

2007 to December 2010

Service 

Ordered

Issued Awaiting 

Issuance

In Transit to 

Afghanistan

Destroyed in 

Route

Unaccounted Total

ANA 15,792 1,598 184 61 123 17,758

ANP 8,819 93 31 0 0 8,943

Total 24,611 1,691 215 61 123 26,701

Source: SIGAR analysis of a sample of ANA and ANP vehicles.

CSTC-A provided documentation for nearly all the vehicles it had transferred to the ANA or ANP. 

According to DSCA’s Security Assistance Management Manual, the United States retains custody of 

defense articles until delivery to the recipient country, and DOD policy requires that the consignee 

acknowledge receipt and acceptance in writing. For Afghanistan, a Form 9 is used to officially document 

receipt and acceptance by the ANSF. CSTC-A reported that its inventory accounted for 97 percent of

MOD Form 9s for vehicles issued to the ANA and 100 percent accountability for MOI Form 9s for the 

ANP. CSTC-A used the 4-month vehicle inventory period to reconcile its own data and to create 

databases to record the formal transfer information from MOD and MOI Form 9s, which created a way 

to quickly and easily identify a transfer by UII.

Following our fieldwork in May 2011, CSTC-A used the results of the ANA inventory to review fuel 

distribution to the ANA. In October 2011, CSTC-A began to reduce fuel distribution to accommodate for 

vehicles it found had been destroyed. CSTC-A estimated that 1,400 destroyed vehicles were never 

removed from ANA property books, resulting in CSTC-A providing fuel to the ANA for vehicles that were 

not being used. As of November 20, 2011, CSTC-A had reduced deliveries by 200,000 liters and saved 

approximately $370,000. Further reductions are expected by CSTC-A after it completes the fuel 

distribution reduction for the ANA and conducts a similar review of ANP vehicles. For the ANA, we 

estimate that in fiscal year 2012, CSTC-A will save almost $5 million for approximately 2.68 million liters 

of fuel.

CSTC-A Did Not Regularly File for Reimbursement of Vehicle Damage and Losses Occurring 

During Transit but Has Taken Steps to Do So 

Before June 2011, CSTC-A did not file complete claim reports for reimbursement of vehicle damage and 

losses occurring during transit and, therefore, was not reimbursed by the responsible carrier. Instead, 

CSTC-A paid a contractor to make repairs and replace missing parts. However, once we identified this 

issue in May 2011, CSTC-A began working with SDDC to file timely and accurate reports to seek 

appropriate reimbursement from the responsible carrier and has submitted TDRs valued at more than 

$530,000 to SDDC for processing. In November 2011, CSTC-A issued a comprehensive TDR standard 

operating procedure and established formal mechanisms to record key information to claim 

reimbursement.

According to the SDDC’s TDR process, once damage is identified, CSTC-A is required to annotate the 

damage on the delivery receipt and notify the carrier within 7 calendar days to request inspection by the 

carrier and relevant information. An investigation is then required to determine responsibility for 

damage and the actual loss to the government. Information on the vehicle, to include the 

transportation control number, the estimated cost of damage (ECOD), and any evidence of damage such 
SIGAR Audit-12-4 Security/ANSF Vehicle Accountability Page 8

as photographs are required to be submitted to SDDC to allow for claims processing and payment 

requests to the carrier.

While CSTC-A had submitted some TDRs, it was unable to recover funds due to incomplete submissions. 

SDDC provided us with 182 TDRs submitted from February 2009 through July 2010, which represented 

at least 357 vehicles.22

In February 2009, a CSTC-A officer indicated to SDDC that TDRs were difficult to complete because 

nobody was in charge of the TDR process at CSTC-A and CSTC-A did not have a standard operating 

procedure that would have helped ensure that TDRs were submitted, as appropriate. Furthermore, 

CSTC-A officials stated they did not have the personnel available to determine ECODs and process the 

paperwork necessary for submitting a complete TDR. GAO recently reported similar concerns on TDRs 

for pilferage and damage to U.S. military supplies and equipment transiting to Afghanistan and was told 

by officials from several military units that the TDR process is time-consuming and complex.

 We found evidence that CSTC-A was reimbursed $325 for one of these TDRs. 

We found that the most common reasons that TDRs were rejected were because they lacked a 

transportation control number, ECOD, or shipping documentation.

23

Photo 1: Radio Missing from ANP Bus

 As a 

result of TDRs being continually rejected, CSTC-A stopped submitting TDRs to SDDC in January 2011. 

However, vehicles continued to arrive with damage and missing parts. Between December 2010 and 

June 2011, CSTC-A noted 1,267 instances of damaged equipment arriving at Depot 2 for the ANA. 

Examples of the damage reported for ANA vehicles included broken mirrors, missing vehicle parts, 

empty toolboxes, and missing fuel. CSTC-A did not have similar historical information for the ANP.

Source: CSTC-A.

 22TDRs may contain claims for more than one vehicle, and TDRs submitted by CSTC-A did not always indicate the 

number of vehicles damaged and contained in the claim.

23GAO-12-138, DOD Has Made Progress, but Supply and Distribution Challenges Remain in Afghanistan, 

October 2011.
SIGAR Audit-12-4 Security/ANSF Vehicle Accountability Page 9

Because CSTC-A did not use the TDR process, it relied on two local maintenance contractors to repair 

the vehicles or replace missing parts.

24

Once we pointed out CSTC-A was not submitting TDRs, CSTC-A took steps to address the reporting of 

vehicle damage and losses. In May 2011, we attended a meeting between CSTC-A and SDDC personnel

in Kabul. We also shared our findings with senior CSTC-A leadership, who concurred with the need for 

CSTC-A to complete TDRs. Since then, SDDC assigned a liaison officer to CSTC-A and arranged for biweekly meetings with SDDC. In November 2011, CSTC-A issued a standard operating procedure and 

formalized the TDR process. The standard operating procedure provides guidance on staff

responsibilities and specific timeframe requirements. Furthermore, CSTC-A established vehicle 

inspections and an ECOD process with its maintenance contractors to provide valid estimates of 

damages for TDRs.

 We attempted to obtain data regarding the total value of the 

TDRs submitted since 2008, but because CSTC-A did not record ECODs, reliable estimates of the value of 

damages were unavailable. 

As a result of these changes, CSTC-A improved the submission of complete, accurate, and timely TDRs, 

increasing its chances for reimbursement. Between June and November 2011, CSTC-A completed 

10 TDRs valued at over $339,000, and SDDC submitted them to the carrier for payment. CSTC-A 

submitted another 15 TDRs valued at over $191,000 that are awaiting SDDC approval. CSTC-A has 

24 TDRs in process, valued at almost $59,000.

CSTC-A’S EUM OF ANSF VEHICLES MET REQUIREMENTS, BUT ADDITIONAL FOLLOW UP IS 

NEEDED

While CSTC-A met routine EUM requirements for U.S.-provided vehicles, CSTC-A does not have a system 

in place to ensure that it addresses findings identified by its monitoring teams. During our May 2011 

fieldwork, CSTC-A conducted a vehicle-specific EUM that included reviewing property books, 

procedures, vehicle storage, vehicle location, and operational status. Following our fieldwork, CSTC-A 

instituted additional EUM requirements for vehicles. 

CSTC-A Is Required to Conduct Routine EUM of Vehicles

The CSTC-A Security Assistance Office is responsible for conducting routine EUM of vehicles provided to 

the ANSF. According to the Security Assistance Management Manual, vehicles fall under routine EUM, 

which is conducted in conjunction with other security assistance duties with no specified timelines. 

Section 1228 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act increased the oversight for some FMS 

items by calling for a EUM program for lethal defense articles and services. In its response to this 

requirement, DOD included vehicles designed or modified to accommodate weapons. Many of the 

vehicles provided to the ANSF are considered lethal defense items, including light tactical vehicles and 

High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles. CSTC-A’s EUM standard operating procedure provides 

guidance for routine EUM and, for lethal defense articles, CSTC-A is required to conduct a visit to at least 

one site or facility per quarter. During these visits, CSTC-A is required to (1) verify that the end-use of 

lethal defense articles is in compliance with the purposes for which they were furnished as established 

by the FMS case; (2) inspect and cross-reference property books, hand receipts, and appropriate 

documentation of losses, transfers, destruction, or damage; (3) conduct installation physical security 

 24In fiscal year 2011, CSTC-A had two maintenance contracts—one valued at $36 million for ANA vehicles and one 

valued at $62 million to operate 26 ANP maintenance sites throughout Afghanistan. Both contractors also repaired

vehicles that arrived with damage or missing parts.
SIGAR Audit-12-4 Security/ANSF Vehicle Accountability Page 10

inspections and spot check inventories of lethal defense articles; (4) reconcile all data with ANSF and 

coalition personnel; (5) take photographs of the visit; and (6) make appropriate notation of any 

discrepancies. 

CSTC-A Met Routine EUM Requirements but Follow Up on Findings Is Needed

We reviewed CSTC-A EUM reports from January 2010 through March 2011 and found that CSTC-A met 

routine EUM requirements within its standard operating procedures. While CSTC-A’s requirement is 

one site visit per quarter, CSTC-A completed 15 EUM reports between January 2010 and March 2011.25

During our fieldwork in May 2011, CSTC-A conducted a vehicle-specific EUM with checks beyond routine 

EUM requirements. Following our fieldwork, CSTC-A instituted a vehicle specific checklist, which 

requires CSTC-A EUM teams to validate the ANSF’s accountability and use of vehicles. As a result, 

CSTC-A EUM teams now review property books and maintenance records; reconcile property book 

entries; and inspect vehicles on hand and spot check their accuracy in the property books, including, 

accounting for destroyed vehicles.

During this timeframe, CSTC-A visited 44 locations and inspected vehicles at 28 of these locations. 

While CSTC-A’s vehicle monitoring has found some issues, it did not have a system to track these 

findings to ensure that they were addressed. During the period January 2010 through March 2011, 

CSTC-A EUM teams identified the following issues with vehicles:

• A March 2010 EUM trip to the Kandahar ANP headquarters found a lack of records for issued 

vehicles.

• In an August 2010 trip to an ANA facility in Paktiya, ANA personnel reported to CSTC-A that 

vehicles were frequently being used without permission and senior ANA leadership issued 

vehicles for unofficial business. The use of vehicles for other than official business is a direct 

violation of the conditions under which they were provided. The EUM team recommended that 

the mentors assist the ANA personnel in establishing an internal vehicle tracking system to 

ensure authorized use and accountability.

• During the same August 2010 trip, ANA personnel at two different facilities reported to CSTC-A 

that vehicle repairs were taking over a year and that the contractor had taken little or no action 

to rectify the delays. The EUM team recommended that the appropriate CSTC-A offices 

investigate these delays.

• In a December 2010 trip to an ANP substation in Kandahar, the EUM team found a number of 

badly damaged or destroyed vehicles. U.S. mentors assigned to the ANP substation noted a 

general lack of tracking and accountability. Furthermore, destroyed vehicles were not removed 

from the property books, which resulted in the substation receiving surplus fuel allocations. The 

EUM team recommended that the vehicles be removed from the property books.

Although appropriate offices and CSTC-A leadership were notified of issues such as these, CSTC-A had no 

process in place to follow up with these offices to ensure they were corrected. According to CSTC-A, 

because these vehicle inspections were conducted under routine EUM there was no requirement for 

 25In February 2011, DSCA conducted its first compliance assessment of CSTC-A and gave it a rating of 

“Satisfactory,” the highest rating possible. DSCA noted that CSTC-A had implemented a monitoring program for all 

lethal defense articles provided to the ANSF in accordance with the guidelines set forth in DOD Instruction 4140.66 

and kept detailed records of the origin, shipping, and distribution of defense articles.
SIGAR Audit-12-4 Security/ANSF Vehicle Accountability Page 11

any additional monitoring. However, given some of the issues identified by EUM teams, CSTC-A should

monitor and assess whether they are being addressed.

CONCLUSION

As the U.S. military transfers responsibility to the ANSF to provide for Afghanistan’s security, providing 

vehicles to the ANSF is a critical component of CSTC-A’s equipping mission and the overall transition 

strategy. While CSTC-A was able to account for nearly all vehicles shipped between October 2007 and

December 2010, it did not ensure that it properly filed for damages and losses that occurred during 

shipping to Afghanistan. Doing so would help ensure that the United States is not expending funds 

unnecessarily for repairs and for the replacement of missing equipment and parts. Once we identified 

this issue, CSTC-A made significant progress in filing claims to receive reimbursement for damage and 

pilfered items. In addition, although CSTC-A improved its oversight of U.S. provided vehicles, CSTC-A did 

not have a system to ensure that EUM findings are addressed.

RECOMMENDATION

Because CSTC-A took steps during the course of our audit to inventory ANSF vehicles and file TDRs, we 

are not making any recommendations addressing these matters. To enhance steps taken to improve 

oversight of vehicles provided by the United States, we recommend that the Commanding General,

CSTC-A:

1. Establish a system to track and follow up on vehicle issues identified in EUM inspections, 

including status updates by the parties involved to ensure resolution of the findings.

COMMENTS

CSTC-A provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are reproduced in appendix II. In its 

response, CSTC-A concurred with the recommendation and noted that it has instituted a process to 

track and follow-up on EUM findings. In addition, DSCA provided technical comments, which we have 

incorporated, as appropriate. 
SIGAR Audit-12-4 Security/ANSF Vehicle Accountability Page 12

APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report provides the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction’s (SIGAR) review of accountability of U.S.-provided vehicles to the Afghan National 

Security Forces (ANSF). We initiated this audit to determine how the Department of Defense (DOD)

implemented vehicle tracking requirements in Afghanistan. Specifically, our objectives were to 

(1) determine whether the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) could account 

for the vehicles it provided to the ANSF and (2) assess CSTC-A’s oversight for the vehicles provided.

Overall, to address these objectives, we met with officials from the Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency (DSCA), TACOM Life Cycle Management Command (TACOM LCMC), CSTC-A, the Afghan Ministry 

of Defense (MOD), and the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI). We reviewed applicable legislation and

DOD, DSCA, and CSTC-A guidance and related documents regarding asset accountability and oversight. 

To determine CSTC-A’s ability to account for vehicles purchased for the ANSF, we developed a random 

sample of vehicles provided to the ANSF. In discussions with CSTC-A, we agreed to define vehicles as 

equipment that is self-propelled. 

• Based on data provided by TACOM LCMC, we compiled detailed information on 30,761 vehicles 

from Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases for the ANSF from October 2007 to December 2010. We 

identified the types, quantity, and shipment dates by reviewing information provided by TACOM 

LCMC. For each FMS case, we compiled lists of unique item identifiers (UII) using FMS case 

records and shipping and receiving documentation. However, TACOM LCMC was not required 

to record UIIs for vehicles and did not formally begin recording UIIs for vehicles until August 

2009. Nevertheless, we identified UIIs for 26,701 vehicles using a combination of receiving 

documentation and existing UII lists, which we assembled into a single spreadsheet.

• We selected 289 vehicles for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 289 vehicles for the Afghan 

National Police (ANP), for a total of 578 vehicles. We based this selection on creating individual 

samples for the ANA and ANP with a 95 percent confidence interval (i.e., plus or minus 

5 percentage points). This interval would contain the actual population value for 95 percent of 

the samples we could have drawn. The ANA projections have a margin of error of plus or minus 

890 vehicles and the ANP projections have a margin of error of plus or minus 450 vehicles at the 

95 percent confidence level. 

We determined that the computer processed data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 

report by verifying the UIIs in our sample of 578 vehicles with CSTC-A records and physical verification. 

To determine whether CSTC-A could identify the location or disposition of a vehicle issued to the ANA or 

ANP, we relied on CSTC-A transfer documentation. For vehicles that had arrived in Afghanistan, but 

were still in U.S. possession, we physically validated that the vehicle was at the holding facility. For 

vehicles that were still in transit to Afghanistan, we relied on shipping reports provided by CSTC-A. To 

address CSTC-A’s use of transportation discrepancy reports (TDR), we requested all CSTC-A TDRs 

submitted to the U.S. Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), reviewed each 

TDR, and identified whether or not CSTC-A had complied with SDDC guidance. 

To assess CSTC-A’s oversight of the U.S. provided vehicles, we reviewed end-use monitoring (EUM) 

reports for the period January 2010 through March 2011. For each report, we determined whether 

CSTC-A met the criteria contained in its EUM standard operating procedures and whether CSTC-A 
SIGAR Audit-12-4 Security/ANSF Vehicle Accountability Page 13

conducted routine EUM of vehicles. During our fieldwork in May 2011, CSTC-A conducted a EUM 

inspection at an ANA facility and walked us through the process. 

We assessed internal controls over CSTC-A vehicle accountability and oversight procedures through 

interviews, site visits, and tests with our random sample of 578 vehicles purchased for the ANSF. The 

results of our assessment are included in the body of this report.

We conducted work in Washington, D.C.; TACOM LCMC in Harrison Township, Michigan; and Kabul and 

Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, from December 2010 to December 2011. To allow time for TACOM LCMC 

to gather UII information and for CSTC-A to conduct a nationwide inventory of U.S. provided vehicles,

we suspended our work from January 2011 to April 2011. We conducted our work in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. These standards require that we plan and perform 

the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. This audit was conducted under 

the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended; the Inspector General Act of 1978; and the 

Inspector General Reform Act of 2008. 
SIGAR Audit-12-4 Security/ANSF Vehicle Accountability Page 14

APPENDIX II: COMMENTS FROM THE NATO TRAINING MISSION-AFGHANISTAN/COMBINED

SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN
SIGAR Audit-12-4 Security/ANSF Vehicle Accountability Page 15

(This performance audit was conducted under the audit project code SIGAR-031A).
SIGAR’s Mission The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance oversight of programs for 

the reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent 

and objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use

of taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide 

accurate and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and 

recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and 

other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and 

funding decisions to:

• improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction 

strategy and its component programs;

• improve management and accountability over funds 

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their 

contractors;

• improve contracting and contract management processes;

• prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and

• advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan.

Obtaining Copies of SIGAR 

Reports and Testimonies

To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGAR’s Web site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all publically 

released reports, testimonies, and correspondence on its Web 

site.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Afghanistan 

Reconstruction Programs

To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting allegations 

of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and reprisal contact 

SIGAR’s hotline:

• Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud

• Email: hotline@sigar.mil

• Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300

• Phone DSN Afghanistan 318-237-3912 x7300

• Phone International: +1-866-329-8893

• Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378

• U.S. fax: +1-703-604-0983

Public Affairs Public Affairs Officer

• Phone: 703-545-5974

• Email:sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil

• Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs

2530 Crystal Drive,

Arlington, VA 22202