RESIDENTIAL SECURITY IN MULTI-FAMILY HOUSING 

PARTICIPANT'S WORKBOOK 

HUD-0050646 
HUD-OOS064b

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

Office of Policy Development and Research

-

Residential Security

in Multi-Family

Housing

-Participant:s Workbook I

,=r:I

I

I

1
Residential Security

in Multi-Family

Housing

Participan~'s_ vyorkbook I

February, 19791

II
The research forming the basis for this y~rkshop was conducted 

pursuant to Grant #H-2225G between the U.S. Department of Housing and 

Urban Development and Temple University. Statements and information 

contained in t~is workshop are those of the grantee who assumes sole 

responsibility for its accuracy and completeness. 

III 
FOREWORD

This workbook is one of eighteen in a housing-management

curriculum developed by HUD in conjunction with Temple University.

It is not easy. The workshops. for which this and the other workbooks are texts. will not be what we used to call Mickey Mouse

sessions. And that, of course, is all to the good. Your time is

valuable. and you are learning for a purpose .. Any course you take

should repay the efforts you must put in.

We believe that the workshops will do exactly that. At the

end. after putting your new learning to practical use, you should

feel not only a sense of satisfaction because of your enhanced

competence, but you should also think of yourself as a housingmanagement professional, capable of dealing skillfully and humanely

with anything the job throws at you.

Your instructor has a text similar to this one (with all the

answers supplied) and a guide to conducting the workshops. The

guide is a good one. stressing that the participants should be

encouraged lito explore, risk, share, and feel." We hope you will.

From there, and with your help. we can go on to reduce many of

the serious problems brought about by inadequate housing management.

~r~ Donna E. Shalala

Assistant Secretary for

Policy Development and Research ~.

IV
...:- ... ... 

PREFACE 

Each workbook in this series presents a number of learning 

objectives targetted to a selected area of management. Successful 

completion of the learning objectives presented in each workbook provides 

a series of building blocks to buttress the spectrum of skills required 

of a housing manager. 

In preparing these workbooks, an attempt has been made to incorporate 

the range of knowledge that housing managers might be required to draw 

upon. Likewise, an attempt has been made to reflect the present state-ofthe-art of housing management. Inevitably, whatever is captured in print 

reflects a body of knowledge and practice up to the point of publication. 

Therefore, the students and instructors making use of these workbooks 

will want to keep alert to new developments that should be integrated 

into the workbook material. Furthermore, like any attempt to codify 

knowledge in a particular field, the material presented in these workbooks 

is open to differences of interpretation and emphasis. We are aware that 

there may be some techniques and procedures described in these workbooks 

with which some experts in the field might disagree. The best test of 

such procedures and techniques will come when they are applied in the 

field by housing management practitioners. Through this process, the 

state-of-the-art will continue to be improved. Instructors in the future 

will undoubtedly want to incorporate such acknowledged improvements into their 

delivery of the workbook material. 

One final point is worth mentioning. An initial impetus for these 

workbooks was the need to upgrade management skills in HUD-related housing. 

However, many of the principles presented should be viewed by students and 

instructors as applicable to multifamily housing management practices in 

the pri vate sector. 
-2­


~.cI410\!LEJJCBEHTS


PROJECT STAFF 

Seymour J. Rosenthal, Director 

Center for Social Policy and Community Development 

Archibald Allen, III, Director


Housing Management Institute


Alex	 Urbanski, Curriculum Speciali~t

Housing r<cmager:~ent Staff


Center for Social Policy and 

Community Development 

School of Social Administration 

Temple University 

of the 

Commonwealth System of Higher rc~caticn

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19122 
- 3 ­

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

RESIDENTIAL SECURITY IN MULTI-FAMILY HOUSING 

INTRODUCTION 5


MODULE I: PLANNING AND ADMINISTERING A SECURITY PROGRAM 7


1. Developing an Operational Definition of Security 9


2. Assessing Security Needs 10


3. Utilizing Community Resources 12


4. Developing Security Program Strategies 13
 ~. Focusing Management's Role in Security Actions 14


6. Evaluating Security Programs 15


7. Obtaining Funds for Security Programs 17


MODULE II: SECURITY DEFINED 19


1. Traditional Definition 20


2. Comprehensive Definition (Two-Track Approach) 20


MODULE II I: HARDWARE (TRACK "A") COMPONENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE


SECURITY SYST8'1 23


1. Protective Devices 25


2. Technological Detection Devices 28


3. Municipal Police Personnel 29


4. Security Personnel 31

- 4 ­


MODULE IV:	 SOFH!ARE (TRAC K II 8") COMPONENTS OF A CCMPREHENSIVE


SECURITY SYSTEM 40


1.	 Individual Self Protection 41


2.	 Resident Attitudes and Standards 43


3.	 Relations Between Residents and Police/Security
 Personnel 45


4.	 Involving the Resident Organizations 45


5.	 Economic Opportunities for Residents 46


6.	 Youth Programs 46


7.	 Occupancy Pol icies and Procedures 46


8.	 Community Assistance in a Comprehensive
 Security System 47


MODULE V:	 DEFENSIBLE SPACE 49


1.	 Creating Territorial Areas 50


2.	 Defining Zones of Transition 51


3.	 Locating Amenities 51


4.	 Creating Surveillance Opportunities 52


5.	 Ccrltroll ing the Grounds 52


6.	 Controlling Interior Public Spaces in Multi­


Family Dwellings 52


MODULE VI:	 TURF RECLAMATION 54


1.	 Establ ishing Neighborhood Val ues 55


2. Setting	 Community Standards 56


3.	 Resolving Security Problems 56


4.	 Enacting a Comprehensive Security Program 57


SELF-EVALUATION	 63

- 5 ­


I. INTRODUCTION 

Traditionally the connotation of the word "security" has been "insecurity," 

focusing generally on criminals and crime. However, security concerns itself 

more than with the effective deterrence of criminal acts, and a security 

system built simply on deterrence cannot be successful. Security involves 

more than planning for and developing a system whereby perpetrators of 

criminal acts are apprehended. Successful security systems plan and develop 

strategies which address both the individual's right to be free from criminal 

victimization and his or her psychological need to feel secure. 

Criminal victimization involves the actual perpetration of a criminal 

act against person or property. It can be analyzed, evaluated, and documented 

because it is objectively measurable (burglaries, murders, assaults, rapes, 

and acts of vandalism are quantifiable). 

The psychological need of the individual to "feel" secure or free from 

fear for safety or insecurity is much more difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, it is just as important as the more quantifiable aspects of security 

to the success of a security program. 

Taken together, these elements encompass the "two-track" approach to 

the development of a total security system. Track "A" is concerned with 

deterring criminal victimization. Track "B" is concerned with creating and 

maintaining a sense of safety through widespread community involvement in 

planning and implementing a security program. 

This workshop focuses on such a two-track approach to security systems. 

Module I of the workshop curriculum expands on traditional notions of security. 

Modules I! and II! discuss Track "A" and Track "B" of a comprehensive security 
- 6 ­


system in detail. Module IV explores the concepts behind the notion of 

"defensible space" - the interrelationships between the layout of physical 

environment and security. Module V discusses "Turf Reclamation," an 

approach to security which is based on strengthening a neighborhood's sense 

of cohesion to enable community members to actively and effectively participate in a security program. Module VI suggests strategies managers can 

employ in planning and administering security programs. Taken together, 

these modules provide the skills and khowledge which housing managers need 

to effectively address security problems. 
- 7 ­


MODULE I

- 8 ­


MODULE I: PLANNING AND ADMINISTERING A SECURITY PROGRAM 

A.	 Introduct ion 

Management's role in security must operate within a comprehensive framework -- one which seeks to address all the problems stemming from crime and 

vandalism and which takes account of the complex interrelationships between 

problems and remedies. The residents of public housing have a wide range of 

security needs. The competent housing manager is both sensitive to this fact 

and is committed to the success of the social service program within his or 

her development. A manager needs several skills to implement a successful 

security program: the ability to accurately determine security needs within 

a development, the ability to locate and effectively utilize community resources to help meet those needs, the ability to develop program strategies 

to meet needs which cannot be met by outside resources, the ability to 

evaluate the effectiveness of the security program, and the ability to obtain 

funds for the security program. 

B.	 ())jectives 

1.	 You will be able to operationally define security. 

2.	 You will be able to list the five steps involved in planning and 

administering a comprehensive security system. 

3.	 You will be able to identify ten variables which must be examined 

in analyzing the facts about security in a community. 

4.	 You will be able to define goals, objectives, and tasks as they 

relate to developing program strategies. 

5.	 You will be able to describe "check," "treat," and "cure " security 

actions and define management's differing role in implementing 

such actions. 

6.	 You will be able to list the five categories of program evaluation. 

7.	 You will be abl e to define the ten major el ements of a proposal. 
- 9 ­


C. Content 

1. Developing an Operational Definition of Security 

Before planning a comprehensive security program to meet resident's security needs, it is important to develop an operational 

definition of security. 

In developing an operational definition of security, management, 

residents, and other key interests should determine for themselves the 

scope of their residential security concerns. The following considerations should be taken into account when formulating a working definition: 

Types of Offenses - Residential security implies the absence of 

vandalism, assault, homicide, mail theft, rape/sex offenses, 

arson, burglary, robbery, automobile theft, purse snatching, 

and drug abuse. 

Location - Managers are generally concerned only with security 

problems that arise within project boundaries. However, some 

offenses within the project may not be viewed as security problems, 

while others beyond project boundaries may be considered residential 

in nature. Commonly, residential security focuses more on crimes 

between strangers rather than on crimes between acquaintances. 

Opinions often vary as to the extent to which crimes of fraud, 

victimless crimes, minor disturbances of the peace, and parking 

violations should be treated as security problems. On the other 

hand, crimes on adjacent or nearby streets may be seen as so 

closely associated with the residential environment as to merit 

treatment as security problems of the project itself. 
- 10 -

Illegal Access - While protection of the individual dwelling unit

against illegal entry is a basic requirement for good security,

residents' security cannot be defined solely in such terms. It

is often difficult to strictly limit access to common interior

and exterior areas.

The Subjective Sense of Security - Fear of crime (or sometimes

the absence of such fear) itself constitutes a serious security

problem. Such fears must be dealt with, even when the actual

danger of becoming a victim of crime is remote.

A good security program will reduce the exaggerated fears of

those who act unreasonably fearful and also build a healthy respect

for personal safety among those who are inappropriately fearless.

2. Assessing Security Needs

a. Making a Preliminary Estimate - At the outset of planning, management should make a preliminary estimate or rough appraisal of

problems, constraints, goals, remedial measures, and further planning tasks. The preliminary appraisal should include problem

analysis by management staff, policy input from administrative

officials, and input from residents.

b. Obtaining and Analyzing the Facts - The fullest possible investigation should be made of the facts bearing upon security problems,

resources, and constraints. Questions which should ordinarily be

answered in detail include the following:

- What is the history of crime in the project?

- What are the relevant characteristics of offenders and victims?
- 11 ­


- What are the probable future trends of crime and vandalism 

within the project? 

- What are the relevant characteristics of the surrounding 

nei ghborhood? 

- What are the social forces at work in the larger community 

which impact project security? 

- What characteristics of the project's residents contribute 

to the encouragement or deterrence of crime and vandalism? 

- What is the nature and degree of resi dents I fear of crime? 

- What specific physical characteristics of the project's 

buildings and grounds contribute to the encouragement or 

deterrence of crime and vandalism? 

- What is the nature and quality of police department services 

to the project and its residents? 

- What is the nature and quality of other protective services 

within the project? 

- How do general management policies and practices affect 

security? 

- What is the potential of the residents' organization for 

assisting with a security program? 

- To what extent does man~gement have in-house technical 

capabilities in security? 

- What additional technical assistance is needed and how can 

it be obtained? 

- What are the options for additional hardware and software 

measures? 

- What are the residents' views on various security measures? 

- How does security relate to the project's finances? 

- To what extent can new security measures be financed from 

sources other than the regular operating budget? 

- What social services are needed in connection with project 

security? 

- How do Federal, State, and local laws and regulations 

affect project security? 
- 12 ­


3. Utilizing Community Resources 

Once a list of residents' security needs has been developed and 

prioritized, the next step in implementing a successful security 

program is to locate resources available in the community at large 

which can help meet those needs. After such agencies are located, 

the manager must then establish an effective working relationship 

and coordinating mechanism with them. (Methods for working with 

local law enfor~ement agencies are discussed in Module II; methods 

far working with supportive social agencies are discussed in 

Module III). 

Most communities have social services available which alleviate 

problems that cause some residents to become involved in crime. 

Information about such services is available through the local 

Health and Welfare Council, supported by the local United Way. 

The mission of the Health and Welfare Council is to provide information and referral; to promote community planning, coordination and development; and to support and carry out research. As 

part of the in format ion and referral servi ce, most Health and 

Welfare Councils publish a Directory of Community Services. This 

Directory lists all the agencies providing social services to the 

local community and indexes them according to type of service 

provided. 

The Housing Manager will find it useful to compil e such information into a list of social services available which would compliment a security program. Such a list should indicate area of 

need, resource, services provided, eligibility requirements, and 

m~thod of contact. 
- 13 ­


4. Developing Security Program Strategies 

Once local law enforcement agencies are effectively being 

utilized~ the manager must then note where gaps in security 

lie. Such gaps will occur where local law enforcement agencies 

are unable to meet residents ' security needs either because 

appropriate services do not exist or~ as is more often the case~

because their service capacity is limited. In such cases the 

manager will have to develop and implement supplemental security 

services within the housing development. 

There are several steps involved in developing a program 

strategy for new security services to meet the needs of residents 

that cannot be met by local law enforcement agencies. Often 

managers find it helpful to consult with planning specialists in 

this process. The first step is to establish program priorities. 

This includes determining priorities among problem areas~ formulating hypotheses about probable causes~ outlining possible 

solutions~ and deciding on which solutions to implement in each 

problem area. Throughout this process~ the manager should be 

clear about the facts and values which influence the development 

of priorities and choice of preferred solutions. 

The next step in developing a program strategy is to set overall 

program goals~ and specific objectives and tasks. In moving from 

goals to objectives to tasks~ tee program planner becomes increasingly specific about how to implement a program strategy. 

Each program strategy generally will have several goals. Goals 
- 14 ­


are general statements of overall program aims. They provide a 

framework for overall program activity which reflects planning 

priorities. Each goal in turn should have several objectives. 

Objectives are specific statements of strategies for solving 

prob1 ems and imp1 ementing goal s. Objectives shoul d be measurab1 e 

and tell who is going to do what to whom. Each objective in turn 

should have several tasks. Tasks are the specific activities which 

must be performed to meet an objective. 

Any comprehensive approach to security requires three types of 

action: 

"Check" - actions which directly deter or control the problem, 

such as locks and security guards. 

"Treat" - actions which directly deter or control the probl em, 

such as diverting youthful energy from vandalism to sports 

activities. 

"Cure" - actions which address the root causes of problems, 

such as improving economic and educational opportunities. 

Comprehensive security actions must be directed to each of these 

three levels simultaneously, with the goal of decreasing check 

actions over time, while increasing treat and cure actions. However, check actions tend to be prerequisite to substantial progress 

at the other two levels. 

5. Focusing Management's Role in Security Actions 

1.	 Management's role in 'Icheck" actions should focus on direct 

protective measures which are fundamental requirements of good 

security and which can be implemented relatively quickly. 
- 15 ­


2.	 Management's role in "treat" actions should be of a secondary 

focus. Outside resources and coordination with other key 

participants are of more importance in managing treat actions. 

3.	 Management's role in "cure" actions in most instances will lie 

in coordinating the efforts of local social service agencies in 

providing programs such as job training and placement, educational opportunities, family counseling, offender rehabilitation, 

health care, and help for the emotionally disturbed. However, 

management can and should take a very strong direct role in one 

vital "cure" action - improving residents· attitudes and helping 

them develop en forcement standa rds. (See materi a1s on turf 

reclamation). Although "cure" actions require long-term efforts 

to be successful, they offer the best chance for satisfactorily 

solving the problems of crime and vandalism. 

6. Evaluating Security Programs 

After goals, objectives, and tasks are set, and before program 

strategies are actually implemented, the manager must develop plans 

for evaluation. Evaluations are done to discover whether and how 

well objectives are being met. Good evaluations should: 

(1)	 identify goal s /Objectives to be eval uated. 

(2)	 measure the degree of change which results from


program activity.


(3)	 determine the cause of observed changes, and 

(4)	 indicate the durability of effects. 
Edward A. Suchman has categorized evaluations according to the type 

of program effects they attempt to measure. 

(1)	 Effort evaluations look at the quantity and quaZity of activity assessing the input of energy rather than output. They look 

at what was done and to what extent it was done. 

(2)	 Perfo~ance evaluations measure the resuZts of effort rather 

than the effort itself. They look at amounts of service 

given rather than attempts to serve. 

(3) Adequacy	 evaluations measure how adequate perfo~ance is reZative 

to totaZ need. Although intensivel'rograms are often highly 

successful with small numbers of clients, they may be thoroughly inadequate for meeting total need. 

(4)	 Efficiency evaluations look at cost/benefits and attempt to 

determine if there are less costly ways of meeting objectives. 

(5) Process	 evaluations look at the whys and wherefores of 

program success in an attempt to make sense from program results. 

For more information about these categories, see Suchman1s book, 

Evaluative Research, (Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1967). 

A good program evaluation will include all five types. This will 

insure that the way in which services were provided was the most costeffective way of providing meaningful services of high quality in an 

amount adequate to meet total need. 

Generally, outside consultants are less biased in evaluating programs. However, they are more costly. Whoever performs the evaluation 

will need a clear statement of program objectives, and a pre-measure 

to insure that measured effects were the result of the~program being 

evaluated and not some other factor. The pre-measure/post-measure 

evaluation measures for intended effects both before and after a service 

is given and then compares the results. 
- 17 ­


7. Obtaining Funds for Security Programs 

Once program strategies have been fully developed and once plans 

for evaluation and coordination have been completed, the planning 

phase of a program is complete. In those cases where funds are 

not available, a proposal must be written to obtain the necessary 

program funds. Often it is the manager who is responsible for 

developing such a proposal. 

Although different funding sources have specific requirements 

for proposals, most proposals generally include the following 

sections: 

(1)	 Introduction - a background description about the 

development's history, goals, and objectives. 

(2)	 Problem Statement - a description of the purpose of the 

proposed program and the problem or problems it will 

address. 

(3)	 Program Goal - the overall goals the proposed program 

wi 11 effect. 

(4)	 Program Objectives - quantified statements about what the 

proposed program will accomplish. 

(5)	 Documentation of Need - statistical backup information that 

indicates that there is a need for the proposed program. 

(6)	 Program Strategies - a description of specific activities 

and tasks which will be included in the program. 

(7)	 Monitoring and Evaluation - a p1 an for keeping track of 

program progress and lor looking at the program at its 

completion to see if the objectives have been met. 

(8)	 Work Schedule - a time line indicating when major tasks 

will start and finish. 

(9)	 Personnel - a description of what staff will be needed 

to operate the program. 

(10)	 Budget - how much money each part of the program will cost. 

Program costs usually include: direct labor costs, including 

fringe benefits; overhead or rent; work material s, such as 

duplication and office supplies; travel; and consultation. 
- 19 ­


MODULE II

- 18 ­


D. Resources 

Fielding, Byron, "Safety and Security in Multiple Family Complexes: 

How to achieve it, How to maintain it," Journal of Housing, (June 1971). 

Newman, Oscar, Architectural Design for Crime Prevention, National 

Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Washington, D.C., 

1973. 

Hiblett, Jack, "HOt'J to Set Up a Building Security Program," College and 

University Busi ness, (August, 1971), pp. 33-34. 

Suchman, Edward A., Eval uative Research, Russell Sage Foundation, New 

York, 1967. 
- 20 ­


MODULE II: SECURITY DEFINED 

A. Introduction 

An effective security program requires the integration of varied 

approaches to solving security problems. This module expands on traditional 

notions of security to develop an operational definition. The importance 

of each element of the comprehensive definition must be understood before 

security problems in multi-family housing can be effectively addressed. 

B.	 Objectives 

1.	 You will be able to differentiate between the elements of 

a 'traditional definition of security and the elements of a more 

comprehensive definition. 

2.	 You will be able to define and measure criminal


victimization.


3.	 You will be able to differentiate between actual


criminal victimization and fear of criminal victimization.


C.	 Content 

1.	 Traditional Definition 

Traditional definitions of security involve systems which concern 

themselves with apprehending criminals. These systems utilize 

police and security forces, technological detection devices, and 

residential protection devices. 

2. Comprehensive	 Definition 

A comprehensive definition of security addresses the individual's 

right to be free from criminal victimization and his or her 

right to feel secure, in addition to the need for apprehending 

criminals. 
- 21 -

(a) Criminal victimization is the actual perpetuation of a

criminal act against person or property. It can be

objectively measured through measures of crime rates.

(b) The psychological need of people to feel secure, although

much more difficult to quantify, is just as important to

the success of a security program. Such psychological

needs must be dealt with extensively in a comprehensive

security system.

ELEMENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE

APPROACH TO SECURITY

TRACK II All HARDWARE

(checking crime)

- Pol ice Personnel

- security guards

- Technological Detection Devices

- walkie-talkies

- television surveillance

equipment

- Hardware

- locks

- bolts

TRACK II 811 SOFTWARE

(creating an atmosphere which deters

crime)

- Utilization of Community

Personnel

- volunteer

- paid

- Turf Reclamation

- establishing neighborhood values

- setting neighborhood

standards

- establishing alternatives to negative

behavi or

- creating neighborhood

satisfaction

- Defensible Space

- ground/structure

modification
- 22 ­


D. Resources 

Revised Curriculum Module for Security in Multi-Family Housing, Center 

for Social Policy and Canmunity Development, Temple University, 

Phil ade1 phi a, Pa. , Apri 1, 1973. 

Fielding, Byron, "Safety and Security in Multiple Family Canplexes: 

How to achieve it, How to maintain it," Journal of Housing, 

(June, 1971), pp. 277-281. 

Post, Richard, "Security Takes More Than Locks and COpS," College 

and University Business, (August, 1971), pp. 33-4. 
- 23- -

MODULE II I
- 24 ­


MODULE III:	 HARDWARE (TRACK IIA II ) COMPONENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE 

SECURITY SYSTEM 

A.	 Introduction 

Hardware ranges from simple deadlock bolts to elaborate closedcircuit television systems with cameras costing as much as $18,000 each. 

Not all hardware is equally effective, and hardware alone cannot offer 

complete protection against criminal victimization. Hardware is helpful, 

however, inasmuch as it can prevent crime by keeping criminals out, can discourage crime by making it too difficult or risky, or can be used to call for 

help once a crime takes place. 

B.	 Objectives 

1.	 You wi 11 be abl e to 1i st the three major components of Track II A"


of a comprehensive security system.


2.	 You will be able to suggest adequate protective devices


for ten of the twenty most vulnerable areas of a multi­


family residence.


3.	 You will be able to list the advantages and disadvantages


of three technological detection devices.


4.	 You will be able to outline the four major steps involved in


obtaining adequate security services from local law


en forcement agenci es.


5.	 You will be able to describe the three major functions of


suppl emental security personnel.


6.	 You will be able to describe three alternate strategies for


organizing suppl emental security personnel.


C.	 Content 

The Two-Track approach ta,vard developing a total security system is 

a systems approach which aims both at deterring criminal victimization 

and at creating and maintaining a sense of safety. 
- 25 ­


To deter criminal victimization, the system must include residential 

protection devices, technological detection devices, and effective police 

and security personnel. 

1.	 Protective Devices 

Such devices include locks, bolts, lights, grills, and screens. In 

a housing complex, different areas are vulnerable to different kinds of 

crime and must be protected with different devices. Core facilities such 

as the heating plant, cooling system, water system, and electrical system 

are especially vulnerable to vandalism. Apartment units are prone to 

burglary and need good unit protective devices. Common areas such as 

lobbies, halls, and laundry rooms are subject to outside intruders. The 

following items list how to maximally protect various areas within a 

housing project. 

(a) Supplies, Meters,	 Boilers - Meters and supplies should be 

locked. Keys to those areas should be controlled. Items 

should be marked for easy identification. 

(b)	 Roof - Skylights should be secured by tamper-proof grills 

or bars. Fire exits should open only from the inside and 

should be equipped with a device which sounds an alarm 

if opened. 

(c)	 Basement - Access from the basement should only be to the 

ground floor. Exits from the basement to the rest of the 

building should be kept locked from the outside. 

Cd)	 Elevators - Elevators are generally considered to be the 

hardest area to protect. They should be provided with 24­

hour vandal-resistant lighting; a convex mirror in an upper 
- 26 ­


back	 corner; an audio-intercom or eeTV, recessed against 

vandalism; and a heavy plastic shield for indicator lights. 

In addition, the elevator waiting areas should be fully 

visible from the lobby or beyond, with no blind corners. 

A guard should be able to stop the elevator if an intruder 

pushes in. Finally, if local codes permit, the emergency 

stop button should be eliminated. 

(e)	 Stairwells - Stairwells should be provided with 24-hour, 

vandal-resistant lighting. Entry from the stairwell to 

the upper halls should be restricted. 

(f)	 Fire Doors - Fire doors should be equipped with panic hardware, 

such as a vertical bolt or crash bar inside, and an automatic 

closing mechanism. An alarm should sound when the door is 

opened. 

(g)	 Entry Door - There preferably should be only one entry door. 

There should also be an intercom system with a buzzer to enable 

residents to control access to the building. All secondary 

doors should be as well protected as the main door and monitored 

in the same way. 

(h)	 Doors - Doors should be least 1-3/4 inch thick, prefer~bly

metal or metal sheathed or at least of solid core wood. Doors 

should be flush to the wall and be equipped with a wide-angle 

lens peephole. If doors are made of sliding glass, they should 

be break resistant and lock from the inside. 
- 27 ­


(i)	 Door Frames - Door frames should be heavy duty, preferably 

metal; solid; flush with the wall; and have tamper-resistant 

connectors. 

(j)	 Door Hinges - Door hinges should be heavy duty and placed on 

the inside of the door. 

(k)	 Locks - Locks should be well made one-inch dead latches, with 

a six-pin brass cylinder. The best lock for security purposes 

is the double-keyed type which requires a key to lock and unlock 

both sides. Spring latches are not recommended. Locks should 

Ce changed for each new tenant. 

(1)	 Windows - Windows need locks, preferably of a key type. Ground 

1evel windows and windows on fi re escapes or over 1edges and 

balconies need security screens, grills, or bars, (removable 

from the inside). 

(m)	 Alanns - Alarms can be either local or central (connected to 

pol ice or other security persons). Alarms are useless unless 

someone hears and responds to them. 

(n)	 Lobby - Lobbies should be provided with 24-hour, vandalresistant lighting. There should be no dark corners or hiding 

places. Access to the lobby should be controlled and doors 

should open out. 

(0)	 Mail boxes - Mail boxes shoul d be constructed of heavy-gauge 

metal, without perforations. Cyl inder locks should be used. 

Access to mail boxes should be controlled. 
- 28 ­

(p)	 Laundry Rooms/Social Areas - Such areas should be near the 

lobby, not in basements. They should preferably have some 

sort of monitoring system. Tokens shoul d be used for 1aundry 

machines instead of cash. There should be a separate area 

for teenage socializing. 

(q) Storage	 Rooms - Storage areas should contain extra strong 

locks and doors; access to such areas shoul d be controll ed. 

(r)	 Office - The office should be visible from the lobby. Its 

safe should be bolted to the floor. Collection windows should 

be equipped with grill s or bars and provided with an alarm. 

Tnere should be a special locked cabinet for master keys and 

other valuables. 

(s) Parking	 Lot - Parking lots need good lighting and some kind of 

monitoring system. They should be in a highly visible area 

and access to them should be restricted. 

(t)	 Fire Escapes - The lowest fire escape ladder should normally 

be 12 feet from the ground. Fire escapes should be visible 

from the ground underneath. 

2.	 Technological Detection Devices 

(a)	 Communication devices, most commonly walkie-talkies, playa 

key role in any security system. Call boxes are another 

communications option and are less expensive. 

(b) Vehicles,	 especially motor scooters, are useful if a project 

is large or has numerous winding paths and streets. 

(1) Vehicles, however, decrease	 personal contact between 

guards and residents. 
- 29	 ­

(2) Vehicles also discourage guards	 from patrolling the 

interi ors of hi grr-ri ses. 

(c)	 Closed-circuit television monitors can be effective but


expensive.


3. Municipal Pol ice Personnel 

(a)	 The Role of the Police Department 

(1)	 The primary responsibility for police services in all 

public housing complexes rests with the local police 

department. 

(2)	 Maximum reliance on local police avoids wasting resources 

and conflicts in operations due to fragmentation of the 

development's security system from police services. 

(3)	 Reliance on other security personnel should be made only 

when it clearly promises to better provide needed protect ion for the project and its resi dents. 

(b)	 The Importance of Deterrence 

(1) Although	 effective as a deterrent, arrests are an inadequate 

measure of police success. Police Department strategy should 

also stress deterrence - a strategy which will either discourage attempts at crime or detect and stop them before they 

can be committed. 

(2) A highly	 visible police presence is necessary for maximum 

deterrence. Police patrols should not be limited to public 

streets. Foot patrol s shoul d al so be encouraged. 
- 30 ­

(c) Obtaining Police Department Services 

Management1s ultimate objective should be to obtain all the 

policing services needed for the property and its residents from 

the police department. If additional services or changes in 

existing services are needed, the following steps are recommended: 

(1)	 Preparation - Demands for additional and/or different services 

must be justified. Before requesting additional police 

services, management should be able to demonstrate having made 

reasonable efforts to remedy security problems through other 

measures. 

(2) Requesting	 Additional/Different Services - Management should 

be forceful in pressing its demands. However, the best 

initial approach is one of amicable persuasion, with promise 

of full coo perat ion on the part of management and the resi de nt 

organization. In meeting with police officials, management 

shoul d be represented by executive 1evelpersonnel. Consultants should be employed if needed. 

(3) Appeals	 to Other Local Officials - If, because of funding 

constraints or other reasons, the police cannot or will not 

satisfy the need for additional or different services, management should make a vigorous appeal to appropriate officials 

in the local government. While it is highly desirable that 

management and police cooperate to the fullest, if there is 

a disagreement, management should press its case. In either 

event, the support of residents and the wider community can 

greatly strengthen management's case. 
- 31 ­

(4) Continuing	 Efforts - If adequate pol ice protection cannot 

re obtained, management may be required to utilize security 

personnel. Even after such measures are inst ituted, however, 

management should continue to try to obtain needed pol ice 

services with the aim of reducing the need for security 

personn el . 

4.	 Security Personnel 

To the extent that adequate police services cannot be obtained from 

the local police department, management should consider the use of 

security personn el . 

(a)	 Planning for Security Personnel - Management shoul d proceed 

slowly in establishing a security force. In fact, the need 

for careful planning increases with the degree of unmet 

pol icing needs. A list of basic questions for planning a 

security force follows: 

(1)	 What are the total policing needs which cannot be met 

by the pol ice department? 

(2)	 What should be the scope of function for security personnel? 

(3)	 What specific types of security personnel should be used? 

(4)	 How should security personnel be organized? 

(5)	 What kind of administration, training and equipment will the 

security personnel requi re? 

(6)	 How will funding considerations affect the choice of options? 

(b)	 Scope of Security Personnel Function - The fundamental issue in 

determining the scope of security personnel function is whether 
- 32 ­


they will be util ized to supplant or to supplement pol ice 

department services. Some large housing authorities have 

organized their own security forces with functions and powers 

tantamount to those of regular police departments, but with 

jurisdiction limited to specific projects. Such forces handle 

all policing services, including patrolling, guarding, apprehension, arrest and investigation. Such operations require enabling 

legislation and/or an agreement with the local governing body, 

and are suitable only for very large housing operations. 

For most projects, large-scale operations of a broad scope 

are neither feasible nor suitable. Most security personnel are 

used to supplement the services of the regular police and to 

provide services which the local police cannot. Security forces 

discussed in this workshop are of this nature. 

Whether a supplemental security force consists of a single 

night watchman or a sizeable force of patrolmen and stationary 

guards, its emphasis should be on non-forceful deterrence, with 

the objective of dissuading potential offenders from attempting 

crimes before they can be committed. Such security forces 

should rely upon municipal police backup for apprehension and 

arrest. 

While the visibil ity of a security presence is important, 

the credi bi 1ity of securi ty personnel is dependent up on thei r 

actual and perceived abil ity to bring force to bear if 

necessary. Therefore they must be able to obtain prompt police 
- 33 ­

department intervention. Security personnel themselves should 

al so have some capacity for using force in emergency situations 

even if only for self-defense. It is preferable that their use 

of	 force be minimal. 

(c)	 Types of Functions of Security Personnel - Security personnel 

can perform three basic types of operational functions: patrolling, stationary guarding, and monitoring electronic alarm and 

surveillance systems. 

(1)	 Patrolling - Patrolling makes maximum use of manpower in 

relatively large areas. Patrolling can range from using a 

single night watchman to using a sizeable 24-hour patrol 

force. HCJl.lever, patroll ing is neither more nor less superior 

to other operational methods. Generally, it does extend a 

personal security presence over a widespread area. "Vertical 

patrolling" in lobbies, elevators, hallways, and fire stairwells is just as important as patrolling exterior public 

spaces. 

(2)	 Stationary Guarding - Stationary guards, either as doormen 

or lobby mon itors, are often used to pravi de security at 

lobby entrances. They may screen entries, perform general 

surveillance, and provide incidental assistance to residents, 

The same technique can be applied at other strategic points 

within buildings and on project grounds. A guard positioned 

at an outdoor station which commands the main exterior 

approaches, recreational areas, and parking lots may be more 
- 34 ­

cost-effective than a number of patrolmen. Protective 

hardware devices can have a crucial impact on the effectiveness of stationary guards. For example, the presence 

of	 unsecured secondary access doors largely defeats the 

effectiveness of lobby guards. 

(3) Monitoring Electronic	 Alarm and Surveillance Systems ­

Monitors of such systems must be able to secure the prompt 

dispatch of police officers or security patrol personnel to 

the scene of an emergency. Stationary guards may also 

double as monitors of surveillance systems. 

(d)	 Ways of Organizing Security Personnel 

There are three basic ways of organizing security forces: 

management-controlled forces, resident patrols, and contracted 

guard services. 

(1)	 Management Controlled Fcrces - Such forces are an integral 

part of management's overall organizational structure. Their 

members are directly paid by management, which has ultimate 

authority in hiring, supervising, and firing. The major 

advantage of such a force is its manageability. Such forces 

can vary considerably both in scope of function and in type 

of function. 

(2) Resident/Tenant	 Patrols - In their purest form, such patrols 

are wholly comprised of volunteer residents of the project. 

They may work independently or under the auspices of the 

residents' association. Management sometimes pays for uniforms 
- 35 ­

and	 equipment and, in some cases, pays patrol supervisors 

for	 their services. The degree of management control will 

depend largely upon its financial support. 

Resident patrols have achieved positive results in a 

number of instances, both in patrolling and in stationary 

guard functions. Usually the impetus for establishing a 

resident patrol comes from residents themselves; however, 

if management discerns a potential receptivity among residents, it should take the lead in encouraging and guiding 

resident participation of this type. 

Resident security patrols can serve as valuable adjuncts 

to police or paid security personnel efforts. Nevertheless, 

they do have potential drawbacks. Lacking effective control, 

management may find its objectives and strategies in conflict 

with those of the security patrol. 

(3) Contract	 Guard Services - These services may be purchased 

by management from commercial agencies. Since such personnel 

are employees of the agency, management's basis for supervision is apt to be tenuous, and its only recourse for poor 

performance may be terminating the contract. It is advisable 

to thoroughlY investigate an agency before contract negotiation. 

(e) Administering, Training, and Eguipping Security Forces 

(1)	 Management control over the security force should be strictly 

maintained, with clearly defined lines of accountability. 
- 36 -

(2) Strong supervision is crucial, particularly for large

security forces. This involves analyzing current security

conditions and planning operations. The supervisor should

assure that personnel stay on the job and perform their

assigned tasks. Sanctions for infractions must be invoked

firmly, fairly and promptly. Supervisors should inspect

and brief patrolmen and guards before each shift and should

make frequent spot-checks during each shift.

(3) Qualifications for supervisors should be especially high

with respect to training, experience, and temperament. The

ideal supervisor has had professional police training and

experience, is able to exercise discipline, has a broad

understanding of social dynamics, and shows some degree of

sensitivity. The chief supervisor must be able to command

respect and work closely with other management personnel,

residents, the police department, and local social service

agencies. Although such individuals can be expected to

command high salaries, it is false economy to seriously compromise these standards.

(4) Personnel selection standards should be stringent, and applicants should be carefully screened. Security personnel must

be able to inspire general confidence and respect, as '.'/ell

as perform the specific tasks assigned to them. Screening

should emphasize eliminating applicants who seem emotionally

unfit or who seem likely to abuse their authority.
- 37 ­


(5)	 Employment of residents for security forces has generally 

brought favorable results. A prime advantage is that 

residents know the project and other residents and tend 

to become strongly committed to their jobs. A possible 

disadvantage is that residents may be subject to undue 

pressures by their neighbors. 

(6)	 Performance standards should be clearly defined and 

thoroughly understood by all security personnel. 

(7)	 Training is essential for all security personnel. A formal 

course of some duration is generally recommended. Training 

should be conducted by qualified professionals and should 

cover: general management structure and operations; physical 

and social characteristics of the project; pol icing techniques and equipment; social aspects of the security guard's 

role; and the purpose, organization, and specific functions 

of the security force. Regular police officers, social 

service professionals, and leaders of the residents' organization, as well as management officers, should participate 

in training sessions. Special attention should be given to 

instructions in the proper use of firearms if they are to 

be issued to security personnel. 

(8)	 The number of security personnel needed for a particular 

project is subject to too many variables to permit use of a 

general formula for manpower estimates. In practice, ratios 

range from between 160 person hours and 80 person hours per 
- 38	 ­

week	 for each 1,000 residents. A single lobby guard 

cannot be expected to provide screening for more than 

about	 200 apartment units. 

(9) Scheduling.	 Maximizing effectiveness of security personnel requires a thorough analysis of the chronological 

pattern of the project's security problems. Concentration 

of services during highest crime hours is the best use of 

costly security manpower. Characteristics and life styles 

of residents are important elements to consider, and 

patterns for elderly projects are apt to differ greatly from 

those for family projects. In some projects, a special 

factor is added on days when social security and welfare 

checks are delivered, bringing increase in mugging and 

mail thefts. 

(10)	 Costs of security personnel are high. Although salary and 

benefits take the largest part of overall costs, equipment 

can require substantial expenditures. Salaries will vary 

according to local wage rates, and the qualifications and the 

duties expected of workers. To obtain personnel with qualifications which are similar to those of municipal police, 

relatively high rates of compensation must be paid. 

(11) Uniforms,	 when worn by patrolmen and stationary guards, 

achieve a highly visible security presence and instill pride 

and confidence. Uniforms may be similar to those usually 

worn by municipal police or may be of a more "civilian" 
- 39 ­

design if such a design will create a better rapport with 

the	 community. In either case, uniforms should be both 

professional and distinctive. Personnel should be required 

to maintain their uniforms and the off-duty wearing of 

uniforms should be prohibited. 

(12)	 Individual equipment should include reliable two-way communication units, and self-defensive weapons, if desired. 

Firearms are the most controversial type of equipment. They 

should be issued only to responsible and well-trained indi­

. viduals when considered necessary for self-defense. 

(13)	 Legal considerations should be checked out in advance by 

management's attorney. State and local laws may impose 

strict requirements for security personnel, and licensing 

may be required. Certain types of communications networks 

are subject to federal regulation. In some cases, management can be held liable for the acts or omissions of 

security personnel. 

D.	 Resources 

Liechenstein, Michael 1., Reducing Crime in .A.partment Dwell ings: A 

Methodology for Comparing Security Alternatives, Rand Institute, 

New York, New York, 1971. 

Loth, David, "Are You Inviting Burglars?" American Legion Magazine, (July 1969), pp. 16-20. 

Moolman, Valerie, Practical ".Jays to Prevent Burglary and Illegal Entry, 

New York, Simon and Schuster, 1970. 

Newman, Oscar, Architectural Design for Crime Prevention, National 

Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Washington, D.C., 

1973. 

Post,	 Richard, "Security Takes Mere Than Locks and Cops," Call ege and 

University Business, (August 1971), pp. 33-4. 
- 40 ­


MODULE IV

- 41 ­


MODULE IV:	 SOFTWARE (TRACK IIB II ) COMPONENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY 

SYSTEM 

A.	 Introduct ion 

No security program can succeed without the support of a large majority 

of a community·s residents. Their role begins with individual responsibility 

for self-protection, and for the individual IS observance of the law and other 

cummunity standards. A major dimension of residents' role is the potential of 

resident organizations to participate in planning and implementing a security 

program. Management should take the lead in bringing residents into a productive relationship with the police, social agencies, and management itself 

in the security program. Gradually, residents can assume a greater degree of 

initiative and responsibility for security with management·s continuing 

support and guidance. 

B.	 Objectives 

1.	 You will be able to list five types of self-protective measures which 

residents can take to lessen their vulnerability tc crime. 

2.	 You will be able to cite four factors which tend to prevent residents 

from speaking out against crime in their community. 

3.	 You will be able to suggest ten community agencies which can assist 

in a comprehensive security program. 

C.	 Content 

1.	 Individual Self-Protection 

The following types of self-protective measures for residents should 

be stressed in any security program. 

(a)	 Informal resident surveillance, linked to a well-understood 

system which will produce a ready response by the police or 

security personnel. 
- 42 ­


(b) Reporting procedures for	 reporting crime, vandalism, or suspicious behavior should be clearly understood by the residents. 

Primary reliance should not be placed upon security personnel 

or other management staff to respond with force or to relay 

reports to the police. 

(c)	 Locking doors is commonly neglected by residents and is a 

significant security problem. 

(d) Residents'	 temporary absences render their dwellings highly 

vulnerable to burglary and vandalism. Residents should take 

measures to lessen the appearance that they are away. Only 

management and a few trusted neighbors should be informed of 

an absence. 

(e)	 Cash and checks should be kept around only to the extent 

necessary. 

(f)	 Admission of strangers calls for extreme caution on the part of 

residents. When lobby doors are kept locked, residents should 

not open the door for persons whom they cannot identify as legitimate callers. Peepholes or chain locks should always be used 

before opening the door of the dwelling unit. Keys to doors 

should be carefully controlled. When keys are lost, locks 

should be changed. 

(g)	 Movement outside, particularly at night, requires due caution, 

especially for women, the elderly, and the disabled. Such residents should be aware of the locations and times of greatest 

danger. Arrangements for escorts may be the best solution. 
- 43 ­

(h) Confrontation with	 criminals should be avoided by residents. 

The safest reaction is usually to yield valuables without a 

struggle. While self-defense may be warranted in some situations, aggressiveness may provoke bodily harm. 

(i)	 Identification of property, especially items which are the most 

attractive targets for theft, facilitates police investigation. 

Minimally, residents should maintain a list of valuable items, 

including descriptions and serial numbers. 

(j)	 Mutual assitance among neighbors can significantly contribute 

to security. A resident who is home all day can watch the 

dwellings of working neighbors; younger residents can accompany 

elderly persons on shopping trips. 

(k)	 Conduct of guests is the responsibility of resident hosts, who 

should make sure that guests both understand and observe 

security procedures and project rules and regulations. 

(1) Supervision	 of children is the responsibility of individual


parents. Parents should make certain that children observe


security procedures and project rules and regulations.


2.	 Resident Attitudes and Standards 

To the extent that residents are apathetic about security or are prone 

to condone or commit crime and vandalism, the foundation of the residen~ial security program is imperiled. Efforts to build a positive 

security climate among residents, though often the most difficult 

aspect of a security program, should take high priority. 

It is important to build a sense of community among residents. Everything which contributes to community cohesion, even ordinary social 
- 44 ­


gatherings, is directly related to security. Anonymity is an 

obstacle to security, and one of the prime aims of a security 

program should be to encourage residents to become acquainted 

with their neighbors. Positive peer group pressures should be 

encouraged. Even when only a small number of community-minded 

residents exist, they can be encouraged to form the cadre of a 

beginning resident leadership. 

(a) Apathy, often the product of	 resignation, should be broken by 

demonstrating that residents' lives can be significantly improved. Such a demonstration in an area other than security 

may serve as an initial catalyst for developing resident 

concern and involvement. 

(b)	 Self-interest is the most powerful motivation for positive 

resident attitudes and standards. Residents' own interests 

should be the primary theme of any security education program 

for resi dents. 

(c)	 Fear of crime may be well-founded, but can seriously impair 

resident participation in a security program. The best approach 

to dealing with such fear is to impart a clear understanding of 

what the actual threat is and the degree of caution which is 

realistically warranted. As various elements of a security 

program are successfully implemented, residents should be made 

aware of them to reverse the cycle of fear and build community 

morale. Both management and the residents' organization should 

systematically combat inaccurate rumors about crime and vandalism. 
- 45 ­


(d)	 Fear of rataliation can significantly hinder resident cooperation, especially in large projects with a hjgh degree of 

anonymity .. Such fear may be well justified. Management must 

provide effective protection against retaliation. Although 

residents may be unwilling to report incidents to the police, 

generally they will report them to management if their a~onymity is assured. 

3. Relations Between Residents and Prnice/Security Personnel 

If and when relations between residents and police or security 

personnel are poor, a comprehensive security program should work 

at building mutual respect and cooperation. Residents, management, 

and police officials should meet to identify the causes of the 

problem and plan a course of action to resolve it. It is essential 

that police/security personnel understand residents and their 

problems and explain their own functions, limitations, and problems 

to residents. 

4.	 Involving the Resident Organizations 

Security should be one of the principle concerns of the resident organization. The resident organization can participate in 

the following ways: 

(a) Planning the security program. 

(b) Developing and conducting resident education programs. 

(c)	 Setting standards for resident conduct. 

(d) Developing a potential for volunteer resident services. 

(e) Supporting management efforts to obtain municipal services. 
- 46 -

5. Economic Opportunities for Residents

A security program can create economic opportunities for residents, both in the sense of full-time jobs within the program itself,

and in the sense of training for advancement into other jobs. Such

opportunities can enhance residents' interest in, and commitment to,

the security program.

6. Youth Proarams .

Most crime and vandalism is committed by young people between the

ages of 15 and 25. An effective security program must give prime

attention to this age group. A comprehensive security program should

stress:

(a) Parental responsibility for supervising children.

(b) Young residents' participation in planning and carrying out

a security program.

(c) Cultivating lines of communication between management and

youth.

(d) Job opportunities for youth.

(e) Recreational cpportunities for youth.

(f) Programs aimed at controlling drug abuse.

(g) Cultivating youth leadership to participate in the

security program.

7. Occupancy Pol icies and Procedures

It is both permissible and advisable for management to adopt

and enforce policies aimed at excluding those individuals or

families who pose a threat of crime or vandalism, either by evicting

existing residents or by rejecting applications for admission. Such
- 47 ­


policies are legal so long as they do not automatically exclude 

a particular class of persons, such as welfare recipients or 

persons with criminal records. Whatever policies are adopted 

should be clearly explained to applicants and existing residents. 

8. Community Assistance in the Comprehensive Security Program 

A residential security program should be closely tied to the 

social service programs of local governmental and non-governmental 

agencies. Such services can help alleviate some of the conditions 

which cause security problems. Management should maintain links 

with appropriate community agencies so that their resources can 

be brought to bear when project staff identifies a resident need~

A staff member should be designated to compile current information 

on social services, to keep residents informed about those services, 

and to make individual referrals as needed. 

(a) Types of Security Related Social Services 

(1) Drug Abuse Programs 

(2) Alcohol Abuse Programs 

(3) Employment Services 

(4) Recreat ional and Cultural Programs 

(5) Child Care Services 

(6) Family Counseling Services 

(7) Physical and Mental Health Services 

(8) Offender Rehabilitation Services 

(9) Shopping Assistance Programs 

(10) Special Services for the Elderly 

(11) Educational Programs 

(12) Special Banking Services 
- 48 ­

(b) Community Planning and Action Committees 

(1) Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (CJCCs) 

(2) Other Community Organizations 

(3) Associations of Owners and Managers 

D. Resources 

Giles, John Warren, liThe Law Says You Are Responsible for Many Acts 

of Your Children,1I New Home Guide, (58), pp. 94,1974. 

Hair,	 Robert A., and Baker, Sam S., How to Protect Yourself Today, 

Stein and Day, New York, 1970. 
- 49 ­


MODULE V

- 50 ­


MODULE V: DEFENSIBLE SPACE 

A.	 Introduct ion 

The concept of defensible space, developed by Oscar Newman, is based 

upon the premise that physical design characteristics can maximize resident 

control of behavior and that residents will maintain a greater sense of 

security if they are better able to define their immediate surroundings as 

belonging to them for more exclusive use. A residential environment defined 

under defensible space guidelines clearly defines all areas as public, semiprivate or private. This is done by modifying grounds and structures with 

fences, landscaping, and redirecting the utilization of space. 

Provision of defensible space mechanisms is best achieved in a project's 

inception; however, a variety of techniques can be used to create defensible 

space in existing residential areas. Defensible space generally emphasizes 

psychological or "symbolic" barriers. 

B.	 Objectives 

1.	 You will be able to define the terms "territorial area ll and II zone


of transition. II


2.	 You will be able to suggest three alternate strategies for creating 

surveillance opportunities. 

3.	 You will be able to suggest two ways of controlling public grounds. 

4.	 You will be able to suggest four ways of controlling interior


public spaces in multi-family dwellings.


C.	 Content 

1.	 Creating Territorial Areas - A project's site should be subdivided 

so that all areas of it are related to particular buildings or clusters 

of buildings. No area should be unassigned or left "pu blic." Grounds 
- 51 ­

should be allocated to specific buildings or clusters of buildings. 

Creating territorial areas can have the effect of assigning responsibility for maintenance and security to certain residents. 

2.	 Defining Zones of Transition 

Boundaries can be real or symbolic. Symbolic barriers do not physically prevent intrusion, but indicate to an entrant that he is entering 

~into a restricted space. Such boundaries can occur in moving from the 

public street to more semi-private lobby to the corridors of each floor 

in a high-rise. Physical features like low walls, shrubs, and changing 

surface textures are indicators of transition zones. Because they 

indicate to an outsider that he is intruding into a private domain, 

they aid in restricting behavior to that which residents find acceptable. 

3. Locating Amenities 

Design and location of recreational and open-space areas should follow 

the needs, capabilities, and expectations of their projected users. 

When outdoor activities are located in areas adjacent to homes, residents tend to assume a further realm of territory and further responsibility. Children one to five years in age are most comfortable playing 

in areas immediately adjacent to their buildings. Play areas for 

children five to twelve years of age should be large enough to accommodate more active play and sufficiently separated from dwellings to 

reduce noise. They should, however, remain in view of most dwellings. 

Play areas for twelve to eighteen year olds should not be located 

immediately adjacent to homes, but should not be located in isolated 

areas. If they are too distant from dwellings they become neglected, 

vandalized, or under-used. They are best bordered on three or four 
-	 52 ­

sides by dwelling units. Green areas unencumbered by play facilities 

are favored by older residents, but are generally sought after by 

seven to fifteen year-olds for use as playgrounds. Such areas should 

therefore be protected by judicious placement of trees and shrubs. 

The best guarantee that these areas will be protected is through the 

provision of sufficient play areas and equipment. 

4.	 Creating Surveillance Opportunities 

Surveillance is a major crime deterrent and contributor to the image 

of a safe environment. By allowing residents to monitor activities in 

those areas adjacent to their dwellings, surveillance opportunities 

allow them to feel more secure in those areas and deter potential 

criminals. Access from public streets to units should be as direct as 

possible. Residents should also be able to scan an area before entering. 

5.	 Controlling the Grounds 

Fencing can be an effective means of limiting access to secondary 

exits and to vulnerable ground level dwellings. Fencing acts as a 

control by requiring entry through a single, limited, highly visible 

area. Even low fences, more symbolic than preventive, can be valuable 

by making any intrusion into the fenced area highly visible. 

6.	 Controlling Interior Public Space in Multi-family Dwellings 

The most vulnerable locations in multi-family buildings are interior 

public spaces -- lobbies, elevators, stairways and corridors. The 

reason is that they are open to the public, but lack the surveillance 

given a public street by police and passers-by. Access to those spaces 

should be limited through the use of a doorman or intercom/door lock 

system. Lobbies can be made more secure by increasing visibility. 
- 53 ­

Residents should be able to see what is happening in the lobby from 

the outside. Hidden nooks and blind curves provide perfect hiding 

spaces. When such features cannot be removed structurally, the use 

of mirrors and improved lighting can ease the situation. Mailboxes 

should be located in highly protected lobby areas. It;s generally 

good to establish a lounge area in lobbies of buildings with high 

proportions of elderly. Such lounges tend to increase security by 

creating additional opportunities for surveillance. Fire exits should 

not permit entry from the outside. Fire doors should exit to areas 

less convenient or desirable than the area outside the main exit. 

D. Resources 

Fried, Marc, and Geicher, Peggy, "Some Sources of Residential Satisfaction in an Urban Slum," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 

(Volume 27), 1961, pp. 305-15. 

Jacobs, Jane, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Vintage


Books, New York, 1961.


Newman, Oscar, Defensible Space: Crime prevention through urban design, 

MacM111 an, New York, 1973. 

Pawley, Martin, Architecture Versus Housing, Praeger, New York, 1971. 

Rainwater, Lee,	 "Fear and the House-as-Haven in the Lower Class ,"


Journal of the American Institute of Planners, (Volume 22), 1966,


pp. 23-37.

- 54 -

MODULE VI
- 55 -

MODULE VI: TURF RECLAMATION

A. Introduction

Turf reclamation is an approach to security taken in response to a

community's feelings of insecurity and fear which result when people give

up the control of their neighborhood to others over whom they have little

or no social control. This approach emphasizes making consistent and continuous attempts to strenghten a neighborhood's sense of self by organizing

community members to actively participate in security programs to regain

control of their neighborhood.

B. Objectives

1. You will be able to list the four major elements of the process

of turf reclamation.

2. You will be able to suggest three relevant objectives for a

security program based on the principles of turf reclamation.

3. You will be able to suggest four strategies for developing a

positive relationship between law enforcement agencies and

residents.

4. You will be able to suggest five strategies for facilitating

mutual assistance among community members.

C. Content

1. Establishing Neighborhood Values

Too often, value standards of behavior in neighborhoods are set by a

minority of non-law-abiding residents. One reason this occurs is

that residents fear retaliation or conflict if they report or speak

out against the crimes they see. This fear of taking action alone

can be reduced or eliminated if one does not work in isolation from

neighbors or friends. Thus, the process of turf reclamation must

begin with sharing one's concern with one's neighbor, who more often
- 56 ­


than not shares the same feelings but has been reluctant to express 

them. 

2.	 Setting Community Standards 

The next step in the process' of "rec l a iming one1s turf" is a bit 

more difficult. Residents must agree to take action and to set 

standards for the neighborhood. The major problem is deciding on 

whose values to accept. This issue has both class and racial 

dimensions. Are middle class people going to tell working class 

people how to act? Are black people going to tell white people how 

to act? Faced with the necessity of dealing with such issues before 

articulating what neighborhood standards should be, most people are 

reluctant to say anything. The process of turf reclamation requires 

that people talk with their neighbors about what kinds of values they 

hold and how to respond when common conditions occur. Most people 

will agree on a number of behaviors which are unacceptable, ranging 

from physical assaults to breaking bottles in the street. The important point is to decide upon values which most, if not all, neighbors will agree to uphold. 

3.	 Resolving Security Problems 

Security in a community is essentially a product of internal resolve. 

In brief, two important elements are required for a successful grip 

on community security and safety. One is personnel who have the 

training and experience to organize a community. The other is an 

organized community. The community organizer functions to give residents the feeling that the larger social system can work, that they 

will be protected, that they will be rewarded, and that things can 
- 57 ­


happen as expected. The key to security lies in its definition. It 

is not just a problem of locks and bolts; it is intimately related to 

people and the need to provide acceptable alternatives both to tolerating and to engaging in anti-social behavior. 

4.	 Enacting a Comorehensive Security Program 

One strategy for the implementation of turf reclamation as a human 

alternative to oppressive security techniques is the use of Ccmmunity 

Security Organizers (CSOs). A pilot security program based on the 

premises of turf reclamation has worked successfully in Pittsburgh. 

Its four principal objectives include: 

(a)	 To organize residents as a human security system to increase 

their awareness of community safety problems and to seek their 

assistance in improving community safety. 

(b)	 To serve as a liaison and facilitate communication between


residents and police.


(c)	 To open communications and develop a relationship between


residents, the police, and other crime-prevention agencies.


(d)	 To mobilize other community resources, thereby encouraging


mutual assistance among agencies and building neighborhood


identity.


The heart of the pilot program was a group of "Community Security 

Organizers" (CSOs). Their function was not to guard entrances or 

to make arrests. Rather they served as a focal point for organizing 

the community to solve its own security problems. They organized 

hall captains to be in charge of security on each floor in high-rise 
- 58 ­


buildings and developed youth patrols to escort women and older 

adults when needed. They relayed and acted on complaints and kept 

records of who obeyed rules and who did not. They made themselves 

visible and accessible, visited around, and encouraged others to 

do the same. In essence, the CSO's got residents involved. 

(a) Goals	 and Objectives of a Turf Reclamation Program - The immediate 

goals should be: to get residents concerned about the security 

problem; to establish a rapport with residents by listening to 

complaints and acting on valid suggestions; and to formulate preliminary rules and schedules for community facilities. 

The mid-term goals should be: to organize meetings among 

residents; to establish residents' councils; to appoint or elect 

patrol captains and plan for a patrol organization; to try to 

find potential leaders among residents; to install proper locks 

and instruct residents in their use; to hold planning sessions 

to plan for proper ground use (defensible space) and other improvements; to institute a liaison between management and residents in 

order to improve the handling of complaints; to acquaint residents 

with some of the more difficult problems confronting management; 

to recruit, hire, and train CSOs; to institute standards that can 

be agreed upon and enforced by residents; to improve the quality 

of maintenance. 

Long-term goals should include: to establish on-going organizations; to establish an on-going liaison mechanism to direct 

the focus of security measures; to create an atmosphere of neighborliness; to foster peer support; to establish regularly scheduled 
- 59 ­

security patrols; to conduct social activities on a continuing 

basis; to establish security measures for particularly vulnerable 

areas like mai1rooms and elevators; to gain the cooperation of 

residents in the eviction of disruptive residents; to encourage 

the cooperation of residents with outside agencies, particularly 

the	 police; to complete installation of appropriate hardware. 

(b) Implementing	 Program Goals/Objectives - To organize and educate 

residents and to encourage them to participate in community 

safety efforts, the following tasks mu~t be performed~

(1)	 Group activities should be organized to give residents a 

feeling of security and competence. Small successes at 

the outset of the program will increase resident participation in later stages and build confidence. 

(2) Responsibility should	 be delegated to individual residents. 

Benefits gained from the increased protection of personal 

property will contribute to the confidence of residents in 

the eso program. 

(3)	 The variety of social programs and the involvement of 

adolescents in security programs should be increased to gain 

support from heads of households. Participation in community 

activities will build family cohesion. 

(4) A community in which residents can take pride should be 

developed to encourage resident participation in programs 

designed to expand and strengthen neighborhood identity. 
- 60 ­

(5)	 Personal difficulties should be alleviated through the


assistance of neighbors, supported by the eso program.


(6)	 Possibilities of employment within the eso program should


be developed for residents to increase their support of


turf building efforts.


(7) Residents ' councils should be organized to assist in


increasing the awareness of fellow residents.


(c)	 To develop the liaison capabilities of the eso between residents 

and management, the following tasks should be implemented: 

(1)	 Resident access to management should be improved. 

(2) Frequent meetings	 between resident groups and representatives 

of the housing authority management should be arranged to give 

residents the opportunity to air complaints, present suggestions, and make management sensitive to the concerns of residents. 

(3) Resident complaints should	 be promptly investigated to demonstrate management interest in safety of residents. Rapid management response to any sort of communication from residents will 

generally improve the resident/management relationship. 

(4)	 Those groups who have special security needs should be helped. 

These include the elderly and families with small children. 

Management should consider residents' input in policy decisions 

to gain resident support for those decisions. Input may be made 

through public hearings, community meetings and resident councils. 
- 61 ­


(d)	 To develop a positive relationship between law enforcement 

agencies and residents, the following tasks should be 

implemented: 

(1) Regular meetings	 between resident councils and police


department representatives should be established to


discuss problems of security within the development.


(2)	 Law enforcement personnel should be involved in neighborhood social activities, such as recreational programs for 

youth. 

(3) Residents	 should be made aware of community services


offered by the police department.


(4)	 The police department should be represented as only one of 

the many components of a community-operated security system. 

This will reduce the tendency of housing development residents to view the police as an oppressive entity. 

(e)	 To facilitate mutual assistance among community members and to 

increase the level of communication between these agencies and 

residents, the following tasks should be implemented: 

(1)	 The increased level of concern among public housing residents for the safety of their neighcorhood should be made 

known to the larger community. It may be useful to contact 

community newspapers to assist in this effort. 

(2)	 Other community agencies should be invited to use development 

facilities, such as playgrounds, recreational rooms and 

meeting areas, in order to increase community exposure to the 

activities of residents of the housing development and to 
- 62 ­

decrease the isolation of the development from the larger 

community. 

(3) Residents should consult with other community agencies to 

see how these agencies have dealt with security problems. 

(4)	 Social activities should include both residents of the 

development and other community groups. 

(5) Residents should	 be made aware of the range of services 

available to them through other agencies. 

(6)	 Residents and/or CSO's should visit community agencies to 

become more aware of available services and to utilize 

them as needed. 

D.	 Resources 

Rosentha 1, Seymour J., "Turf Recl amat ion, II HUD Cha 11 enge, (March 1974), 

pp. 1-3. 

Rosenthal, Seymour J., and Allen, Archiba1d t IITurf Reclamation


Revisited,1I HUD Challenge, (September, 1976).

- 63 ­


SELF-EVALUATION

- 64 ­

SELF-EVALUATION 

1.	 Match the following items with their definitions: 

a. Traditional definition ___________ Addresses the indiviof	security dua1 IS ri ght to be free 

from criminal victimization and to feel 

b.	 Criminal victimization secure, in addition to 

the need for apprehending 

criminals. 

c.	 Track "A" ___________	 Involves systems which 

concern themselves with 

d.	 Comprehensive definition apprehending criminals. 

of security ___________	 The actual perpetration 

of a criminal act against 

e. Track "B"	 person or property. 

___________	 Prnice personnel, technological detection 

devices, hardware. 

_________ Util ization of Community 

Personnel, Turf Reclamation, Defensible Space. 
----

----

------

- 65 ­


2.	 Match the following vulnerable areas of multi-family housing units 

with the appropriate protective device. 

a. Suppl i es, meters, bo i1 ers	 Should be visible from the 

b. Skylights 

c. Basement 

d. Elevators 

e. Stairwell s 

f. Fire doors 

g. Entry doors 

h. Doors 

i. Door frames 

j. Door hi nges 

k. Locks 

1. Windows 

m. Alarms 

n . Lobby 

o. Mail boxes 

p. Laundry rooms 

q. Storage rooms 

r. Office 

s. Parking lot 

t. Fire escapes 

ground underneath; the lowest 

ladder should be twelve feet 

from the ground. 

Individual areas should contain extra strong locks and 

doors; access should be 

controlled. 

_____ Should be constructed of heavy 

gauge metal without perforations; access should be limited 

to such areas; should be protected by cylinder locks. 

Can be either local or central; ------ useless unless someone hears 

and responds to them. 

Should be heavy duty and placed ----- on the insi de of the door. 

_______ Should be equipped with panic 

hardware and an automatic 

closing mechanism; an alarm 

should sound if such doors are 

opened .. 

______ Should preferably only be one 

such door. All such secondary 

doors shou1 d be protected and 

mqnitored just like the main 

door. 

Should be visible from the 

lobby; its safe should be bolted 

to the floor. Collection 

windows should be equipped with 

grills or bars and provided 

wi t han a1arm. 

______ Generally the hardest area to 

protect - should have vandal 

resistant lighting, an alarm 

button, and an audio-intercom. 
----

- 66 ­


• 

Access to this area should be 

only to the ground floor. 

Exits to the rest of the 

building should be locked 

from the outside. 

---- Such items should be locked; 

keys to such areas should be 

carefully controlled. 

Should be provided with 24­ ----- hour, vandal resistant lighting; entry to such areas 

from upper halls should be 

restricted. 

_____ Should be secured by tamperproof grills or bars. 

----- Should be heavy duty, preferably metal; solid; flush with 

the wall; and have tamperresistant connectors. 

----- Those on ground level or over 

ledges, balconies, or fire 

escapes need security screens, 

grills or bars which are 

removable from the inside. 

_____ Shoul d preferabl y be made of 

metal. flush to the wall, and 

equipped with a wide-angle 

lens peephole. 

---- Should be changed for each 

new resident. 

---- Such areas should have no 

dark corners or hiding places; 

access should be monitored. 

Such areas should be near the 

----lobby; tokens should be used 

for machines instead of coins. 

____ Should be highly visible, well 

lit, and not used for teenage socializing. 
- 67 ­


3. Answer True or False to the following items. 

________ a.	 The primary responsibility for police services in all


public housing complexes rests with management.


-------- b. Arrests are an adequate measure of police success. 

-------- c.	 Maximum reliance on local police avoids wasting resources. 

________ d.	 Reliance on supplemental security personnel, hired by 

management, should be made only when it clearly promises 

to better provide needed protection for the project and 

its residents. 

________ e.	 Management need not justify its requests for additional


police services.


_________ f.	 The best initial approach in requesting additional police 

services is one of amicable persuasion, with promise of 

full cooperation on the part of management and the 

resident organization. 

________ g.	 If, because of funding constraints or other reasons, 

police cannot or will not satisfy needed security services, 

management should develop its own security force. 

________ h.	 Patrolling makes maximum use of manpower in relatively large 

areas. 

________ i.	 Management should exercise light control over security forces, 

letting them exercise their professional expertise as they 

see fit. 

j. Security services should be concentrated during highest --------	 crime hours. 
------

-----

- 68 ­


4. Answer True or False to the following items. 

______ a.	 Primary reliance for community surveillance should be 

made on residents themselves. 

------ b.	 Failure of residents to lock their doors is a significant 

security problem. 

______ c.	 Residents should inform management and a few trusted 

neighbors of temporary absences. 

------ d.	 Residents should not readily accede to the demands of 

muggers to hand over valuables. 

e.	 Residents cannot be held accountable for the actions of 

their guests. 

f.	 Residents cannot be held accountable for the actions of 

their chil dren. 

---- g.	 To the extent that residents are apathetic about security 

or are prone to condone or commit crime or vandalism, 

the very foundation of a residential security program is 

imperiled. 

_____ h.	 Apathy about security problems among residents can be 

broken by demonstrating that residents' lives can be 

improved. 

_____ i.	 Residents' own self-interest should be the primary theme 

of any security educational program for residents. 

______ j.	 Fear of victimization and of retaliation on the part of 

residents can seriously impair resident participation 

in a security program. 

----- k.	 Most crime and vandalism is committed by middle-aged males. 

______ 1.	 The social service programs of local community agencies 

are an important part of any security program in that they 

can help alleviate some of the conditions which cause 

security problems. 
•	 - 69 ­


5.	 Fill in each blank with one word. 

a.	 The concept of is based on the 

premise that physical design characteristics can maximize 

resident control over behavior. 

b.	 Creating areas can have the effect of assigning 

responsibility for maintenance and security for certain areas to 

particular residents. 

c.	 Zones of , either real or symbolic, do not physically 

prevent intrusion, but indicate to an entrant that he or she is 

entering into a restricted space. 

d.	 Creating opportunities for allows residents to 

monitor activities in those areas adjacent to their dwellings 

and thus both feel more secure and deter potential criminals. 

e.	 can be an effective means of limiting access to 

vulnerable ground-level dwellings. It acts as a control by 

requiring entry through a single, limited, highly visible area. 
•

•

- 70 -

6. Fill in each blank with one word .

a. is an approach to security which

makes consistent and continuous attempts to strengthen a neighborhood's sense of self by organizing community members to actively

participate in security programs to regain control of their

neighborhood.

b. Too often, value standards of behavior in neighborhoods are set

by a of non-law abiding residents.

c. Setting community standards involves agreeing on the kinds of

behavior ~/hich are to most residents.
• - 71 -

7. Answer True or Fal se to the following items.

______ a. Management's role in security must operate within a

comprehensive framework - one which seeks to address

all the problems stemming from crime and vandalism

and which takes account of the complex interrelationships between problems and remedies.

b. The first step in planning a comprehensive security

program is to set program goals and objectives.

c. Social service resources in the community are

difficult to locate.

d. Security program goals and objectives should be

sufficiently vague so as to enable program

administrators a sufficient degree of latitude

in actually adapting programs to on-site

rea1iti es .

e. Comprehensive security actions must "check," "treat,"

and "cure ."

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