alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT 32**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of Analysts International Corporation (the “Company”) onForm 10-Q for the period ended July 3, 2010 as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), the undersigned, Andrew K.Borgstrom, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Randy W. Strobel, ChiefFinancial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)                              The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)                              The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| Dated: August 4, 2010 | By:    | /s/ Andrew K. Borgstrom                |   |
|----------------------------|--------|----------------------------------------|--------|
|                       |   | Andrew K. Borgstrom                    |   |
|                       |   | President and Chief  Executive Officer |   |
|                       |   |                                   |   |
| Dated: August 4, 2010 | By:    | /s/ Randy W. Strobel                   |   |
|                       |   | Randy W. Strobel                       |   |
|                       |   | Chief Financial Officer                |   |

 

----
[Crim. No. 3231.

Second Appellate District, Division One.

November 21, 1939.]

#### THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. LEONA PETERS LOVLEE, Appellant.

*555Bertram H. Ross for Appellant.

Earl Warren, Attorney-General, and L. G. Campbell, Deputy Attorney-General, for Respondent.

DORAN, J. —

Defendant appeals from an order denying her motion for a new trial after conviction of four counts of perjury by the court, a jury trial having been duly waived.

The general nature of the alleged offenses related to the posting of so-called property bail bonds.

Briefly, in substance, the information alleged that defendant appeared on one occasion before the judge of the municipal court of Long Beach, California; on another occasion before a judge of the Superior Court of the State of California, in Los Angeles; on another before a duly qualified and acting deputy county clerk of Los Angeles County, and on another before a duly acting and qualified court commissioner of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, where, upon each occasion, defendant “under oath duly administered” falsely swore and deposed that she was the owner of various items of real property of certain values respectively, whereas in truth she was not the owner thereof nor did such property have the value claimed for it by defendant. It was further alleged that all of the alleged testimony given by defendant before the magistrate in connection with her examination and qualification as a bondsman was for the purpose of deceiving the court and to procure the approval of the bail bond then and there offered by defendant.

The record reveals that upon the day fixed for the pronouncing of judgment, defendant moved for a new trial upon *556three grounds, namely, “that the evidence was insufficient to justify the decision”; “errors of law occurring at the trial”; and “newly discovered evidence”. No affidavits were offered in support of the last-mentioned ground. The motion was submitted without argument and forthwith denied.

It is contended on appeal: first, ‘ ‘ That the information does not state facts sufficient to constitute a public offense”; second, that “The evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction”; and, third, that “The evidence is not corroborated in the manner provided for by law”.

As to the first contention above mentioned, no demurrer was interposed to the information, and, in the circumstances, its sufficiency cannot be considered on appeal. As hitherto declared, “The suggestion in appellant’s brief, of a defect in the information, cannot be considered, since there is no appeal from the judgment. *(People*v. *Turner,*39 Cal. 370; Pen. Code, sec. 1012.) ” *(People*v. *Sanchez,*23 Cal. App. 742 [139 Pac. 820].)

As to the second and third contentions, it is sufficient to note that there is abundant evidence to support the court’s finding of guilt, as well as to supply the necessary corroboration required by law. No abuse of discretion appears from the court’s order denying the motion for a new trial.

The order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial is affirmed.

York, P. J., and White, J., concurred.
#### § 102-75.840 What action must the disposal agency take after an eligible public agency has submitted a plan of use for and an application to acquire a port facility property?

Whenever an eligible public agency has submitted a plan of use for a port facility requirement, the disposal agency must transmit two copies of the plan to DOT. DOT must either submit to the disposal agency, within 30 calendar days after the date the plan is transmitted, a recommendation for assignment of the property to DOT, or inform the disposal agency, within the 30-calendar day period, that a recommendation will not be made for assignment of the property to DOT.
No. 10-11171.

#### Zamudio-Orosco *v.*United States.

C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
§ 60-741.40 General purpose and applicability of the affirmative action program requirement. ( a ) *General purpose.* An affirmative action program is a management tool designed to ensure equal employment opportunity and foster employment opportunities for individuals with disabilities. An affirmative action program institutionalizes the contractor's commitment to equality in every aspect of employment and is more than a paperwork exercise. An affirmative action program is dynamic in nature and includes measurable objectives, quantitative analyses, and internal auditing and reporting systems that measure the contractor's progress toward achieving equal employment opportunity for individuals with disabilities.
( b ) *Applicability of the affirmative action program.* ( 1 ) The requirements of this subpart apply to every Government contractor that has 50 or more employees and a contract of $50,000 or more.
( 2 ) Contractors described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section shall, within 120 days of the commencement of a contract, prepare and maintain an affirmative action program at each establishment. The affirmative action program shall set forth the contractor's policies and procedures in accordance with this part. This program may be integrated into or kept separate from other affirmative action programs.
( 3 ) The affirmative action program shall be reviewed and updated annually by the official designated by the contractor pursuant to § 60-741.44(i).
( c ) *Submission of program to OFCCP.* The contractor shall submit the affirmative action program within 30 days of a request from OFCCP, unless the request provides for a different time. The contractor also shall make the affirmative action program promptly available on-site upon OFCCP's request.
§ 60-1.35 Contractor obligations and defenses to violation of the nondiscrimination requirement for compensation disclosures. ( a ) *General defenses.* A contractor may pursue a defense to an alleged violation of paragraph (3) of the equal opportunity clauses listed in § 60-1.4(a) and (b) as long as the defense is not based on a rule, policy, practice, agreement, or other instrument that prohibits employees or applicants from discussing or disclosing their compensation or the compensation of other employees or applicants, subject to paragraph (3) of the equal opportunity clause. Contractors may pursue this defense by demonstrating, for example, that it disciplined the employee for violation of a consistently and uniformly applied company policy, and that this policy does not prohibit, or tend to prohibit, employees or applicants from discussing or disclosing their compensation or the compensation of other employees or applicants.
( b ) *Essential job functions defense.* Actions taken by a contractor which adversely affect an employee will not be deemed to be discriminatory if the employee has access to the compensation information of other employees or applicants as part of such employee's essential job functions and disclosed the compensation of such other employees or applicants to individuals who do not otherwise have access to such information, and the disclosure was not in response to a formal complaint or charge, in furtherance of an investigation, proceeding, hearing, or action, including an investigation conducted by the contractor, or is consistent with the contractor's legal duty to furnish information.
( c ) *Dissemination of nondiscrimination provision.* The contractor or subcontractor shall disseminate the nondiscrimination provision, using the language as prescribed by the Director of OFCCP, to employees and applicants: ( 1 ) The nondiscrimination provision shall be incorporated into existing employee manuals or handbooks; and
( 2 ) The nondiscrimination provision shall be disseminated to employees and applicants. Dissemination of the provision shall be executed by electronic posting or by posting a copy of the provision in conspicuous places available to employees and applicants for employment.
[80 FR 54977, Sept. 11, 2015]
072P16

#### Christina D’Alessandro v. Adam D’Alessandro

1. Def’s Motion for Temporary Stay (COA15-357)

1. Allowed; Existing Bond Extended 03/07/2016

2. Def’s Petition for *Writ of Supersedeas*

2.
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

In re: LENOVO (UNITED STATES) INC., 

MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC,

Petitioners

______________________

2023-121

______________________

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States 

District Court for the Western District of Texas in No. 6:21-

cv-01169-ADA, Judge Alan D. Albright.

______________________

ON PETITION AND MOTION

______________________

O R D E R

Lenovo (United States) Inc. and Motorola Mobility LLC 

move unopposed to withdraw their petition for a writ of 

mandamus.

Upon consideration thereof,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

Case: 23-121 Document: 10 Page: 1 Filed: 02/23/2023
2 IN RE: LENOVO (UNITED STATES) INC.

The motion is granted. The petition is withdrawn. 

February 23, 2023

Date

FOR THE COURT

/s/ Peter R. Marksteiner

Peter R. Marksteiner

Clerk of Court

Case: 23-121 Document: 10 Page: 2 Filed: 02/23/2023
No. 10-10911.

#### Tillage *v.*United States.

C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
#### § 60-4.10 Severability.

Should a court of competent jurisdiction hold any provision(s) of this part to be invalid, such action will not affect any other provision of this part.

[88 FR 51735, Aug. 4, 2023]
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-6464
BRYAN HOLGATE, Plaintiff - Appellant, versusPATRICIA A. EDGE, Warden, St. Brides Correctional Center; DOCTOR HERBERT; MS. COCHRAN, R.N., Defendants - Appellees.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District Judge. (CA-96-608) Submitted: September 25, 1997 Decided: October 8, 1997 Before LUTTIG, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Bryan Holgate, Appellant Pro Se. Lance Bradford Leggitt, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals the district court's order dismissing the42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) claims against Warden Patricia Edge, dismissing without prejudice the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Dr. Herbert and Ms. Cochran, and dismissing without prejudice theremaining state claims. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Holgate v. Edge , No. CA-96-608 (E.D. Va. Mar. 17, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented inthe materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit
32.1











CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002











In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Ampco-Pittsburgh Corporation (the
“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2009 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), each
of the undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby
certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:





1.
            The Report
      fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and





2.
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the
      Company.






































Robert A.
Paul


Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer


November 6,
2009
#### IN THE MATTER OF THE FORECLOSURE OF THE DEEDS OF TRUST EXECUTED BY GROVER C. BROWN and wife, MARGARET C. BROWN, dated April 1, 1980, Recorded in Book 949 at Page 109, and Book 949 at Page 111 of the Buncombe County Registry

No. 224PA15

Filed 18 March 2016

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals,__ N.C. App._, 771 S.E.2d 829 (2015), affirming an order entered on 9 April 2014 by Judge J. Thomas Davis in Superior Court, Buncombe County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 16 February 2016.

*Bull and Reinhardt, PLLC, by Adam W. Bull, for petitioner-appellee, Executor of the Estate of Merton L. Brown.*

*Wilder Wadford and Christopher Musial for respondent-appellants.*

*JohnR. Dillard for First Choice Title, LLC, d/b/a First Choice Title Company of North Carolina, amicus curiae.*

PER CURIAM.

DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IMPROVIDENTLY ALLOWED.
#### § 0.262 Record of actions taken.

The application and authorization files in the appropriate central files of the Space Bureau are designated as the Commission's official records of actions by the Chief, Space Bureau, pursuant to authority delegated to the Chief. The official records of action are maintained in the Reference Information Center.

[88 FR 21430, Apr. 10, 2023]
#### § 102-72.85 What are the requirements for obtaining a disposal of real property delegation of authority from GSA?

While disposal delegations to Executive agencies are infrequent, GSA may delegate authority to them based on situations involving certain low-value properties and when they can demonstrate that they have the technical expertise to perform the disposition functions. GSA may grant special delegations of authority to Executive agencies for the utilization and disposal of certain real property through the procedures set forth in part 102-75, subpart F of this chapter.
1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SAMSON WOUBETU, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 23-0945 (UNA)

)

PAT HANDY LEGACY SHELTER, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on consideration of plaintiff’s application to proceed in 

forma pauperis and pro se complaint. The Court grants the application and, for the reasons 

discussed below, the dismisses the complaint.

A pro se litigant’s pleading is held to less stringent standards than would be applied to a 

formal pleading drafted by lawyer. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Even pro 

se litigants, however, must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Jarrell v. Tisch, 

656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires 

that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the Court’s 

jurisdiction depends, a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 

to relief, and a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The 

purpose of the minimum standard of Rule 8 is to give fair notice to the defendants of the claim 

being asserted, sufficient to prepare a responsive answer, to prepare an adequate defense, and to 

determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 

(D.D.C. 1977). 
2

Plaintiff, who currently resides at a homeless shelter, alleges that another resident stole 

his pants as well as the cash and keys in the pockets. See Compl. at 1. He further alleges that 

shelter staff refused to help him with this incident and another incident where plaintiff’s Bible, 

books, jacket and papers were stolen. See id. Missing from the complaint is a statement 

establishing a basis for this Court’s jurisdiction. This defect, along with the complaint’s failure 

make a clear statement of claim and demand for relief, warrant dismissal of the complaint for 

failure to comply with the minimum pleading standard set forth in Rule 8(a). 

A separate order will issue. 

/s/

TANYA S. CHUTKAN

DATE: April 20, 2023 United States District Judge
Strafford

No. 80-495

#### Harry Sheldon v. Joyce Sanderson

October 1, 1981

*846*Fisher, Parsons & Moran,*of Dover *(Edward T. Clancy*on the brief), by brief for the plaintiff.

*Taylor, Gray & Keane,*of Portsmouth *(Thomas M. Keane*on the brief), by brief for the defendant.

Per curiam.

The parties were divorced in February, 1979. A decree in accordance with the stipulation of the parties awarded certain jointly-owned real property in Dover to the plaintiff in that action (defendant here), Joyce Sanderson, but the decree contained a provision that “[i]n lieu of a weekly payment for both the Plaintiff and the children, the equity of Harry P. Sheldon in said real estate, approximately ten thousand ($10,000.00) dollars will be used for the education of the children and for the support of the Plaintiff and the children.”

In March, 1980, the plaintiff here, Harry Sheldon, filed a petition alleging that in December, 1979, the defendant had left the State, abandoned the children, refused to provide for the education and support of the children, which the plaintiff was providing, and that the property had been abandoned since December 15, 1979. He prayed that he be allowed to take over the property, sell it and disburse the funds, one-half to the defendant and the other half to him in trust for the benefit of the children until July 25, 1981, when it would be paid to the children in equal shares.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the stipulation and decree was a property settlement not subject to modification. A Master *(Henry P. Sullivan,*Esq.) recommended that the motion be granted, and a decree was entered in accordance with his recommendation. The plaintiff appealed.

This court has held that a property settlement is not subject to modification because of changed circumstances. *Douglas v. Douglas,*109 N.H. 41, 43, 242 A.2d 78, 80 (1968), although reformation may be had for mutual mistake. *See Grabowski v. Grabowski,*120 N.H. 745, 747, 422 A.2d 1040, 1042 (1980). The plaintiff does not allege mistake, but in effect seeks to impose a constructive trust on his equity in the property in order that it be used for the purpose set forth in the divorce decree; *i.e,,*the education and support of the children.

The plaintiffs petition does not seek to modify a property settlement, but rather seeks to enforce the proper use of a lump sum payment for support of the children in lieu of weekly payments. *See Dubois v. Dubois,*121 N.H. 664, 433 A.2d 1277 (1981). Although the stipulation apparently awarded the entire property *847to the defendant, the plaintiffs equity was awarded to her not as a property settlement but rather in lieu of weekly payments for education and support of the children. Because the property was awarded to the defendant in lieu of support payments, the decree is subject to modification. RSA 458:17, :32; *McRae v. McRae,*115 N.H. 353, 354, 341 A.2d 762, 763 (1975). The plaintiff, therefore, was entitled to be heard on the merits of his claim.

*Reversed and remanded.*
15 December 2015

385P15

#### State v. Archimede N. Nkiam

1. State’s Motion for Temporary Stay (COA14-H64)

1. Allowed 11/23/2015

2. State’s Petition for *Writ of Supersedeas*

*2.*

3. State’s Notice of Appeal Based Upon £ Constitutional Question

3.

4. State’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31

4.
#### § 302-9.6 What is the purpose of the allowance for emergency or temporary storage of a POV?

The purpose of the allowance for emergency or temporary storage of a POV is to protect a POV transported at Government expense to your post of duty when the head of your agency determines that the post of duty is within a zone from which your immediate family and/or household goods should be evacuated, or when the employee is not authorized to have a POV at the TCS location under subpart F of this part.

[FTR Amdt. 98, 66 FR 58196, Nov. 20, 2001. Redesignated and amended by FTR Amdt. 2011-06, 76 FR 71889, 71890, Nov. 21, 2011]
§ 51-9.303-1 Form of requests. ( a ) An individual must request access to his record in writing. The Executive Director shall accept by telephone only general inquiries for information regarding systems of records or procedures.
( b ) A written request should be directed to the Executive Director as listed in the public notice describing the system of records. The individual should display clearly on the face of the request letter and on the face of the envelope the legend “Privacy Act Request”, and include the complete name and identifying number of the system as published in the Federal Register; the full name, address, the telephone number of the individual; a brief description of the nature, time, place and circumstances of the individual's association with the Committee; and any other information which the individual believes would facilitate the Executive Director's search for the record.
( c ) An individual who wishes to have a person of his choosing accompany him in reviewing a record must sign a statement authorizing the disclosure of his record in the presence of another individual, if so requested by the Executive Director. An individual who intends to visit the Committee office in order to review a record should make an appointment with the Executive Director at least one week in advance.
No. 10-11259.

#### Davis v. Thaler, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.

C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 11-5027.

#### Andrews *v.*Missouri.

Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.