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i 

73–442 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–116] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR 

NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE ACTIVITIES 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 8, 2012 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

TIM MORRISON, Professional Staff Member 

STEVE KITAY, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Professional Staff Member 

AARON FALK, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, March 8, 2012, Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Request for National Security Space Activities .................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, March 8, 2012 ........................................................................................ 21 

THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 2012 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE ACTIVITIES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ...................................................................... 4 

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Klinger, Gil I., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Space and Intelligence 7 

Sapp, Betty J., Principal Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office ...... 9 

Schulte, Amb. Gregory L., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Space 

Policy ..................................................................................................................... 6 

Shelton, Gen William L., USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command ........ 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Klinger, Gil I. .................................................................................................... 66 

Sapp, Betty J. ................................................................................................... 75 

Schulte, Amb. Gregory L. ................................................................................. 56 

Shelton, Gen William L. ................................................................................... 28 

Turner, Hon. Michael ....................................................................................... 25 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Letter to Chairman Turner from Hon. David S. Adams, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Dated March 

8, 2012 ............................................................................................................ 87 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 114 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 115 

Mr. Ruppersberger ........................................................................................... 116 

Mr. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 108 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 91 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 

SPACE ACTIVITIES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 8, 2012. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:30 p.m. in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael R. Turner 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. By 1:30 if my ranking member has continued to be 

delayed, I will just break the rules and begin at that time, and I 

do know that she is on her way, but that way at least we can get 

started and get some of the statements on the record. So we will 

start at 1:30 in a moment. 

[Brief recess.] 

Mr. TURNER. All right. It is 1:30, we are going to go ahead and 

begin with just at least the process of receiving statements, and 

then if my ranking member has not at that point made it, we’ll 

hold off on questions and recess, but we will at least go through 

the process of entering statements into the record, and I will begin 

with mine. 

With that, good afternoon, and welcome to the Strategic Forces 

Subcommittee hearing on the fiscal year 2013 budget request for 

national security space activities. Our distinguished witnesses this 

afternoon are General William Shelton, Commander of Air Force 

Space Command; Ambassador Greg Schulte, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy; Mr. Gil Klinger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Space and Intelligence Office; and Ms. 

Betty Sapp, Principal Deputy Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. 

Thank you all for agreeing to appear before the subcommittee 

and for your service. 

I would like to start by congratulating you on the significant accomplishments in the national security space over the past year. 

Due to tremendous efforts of the military, civilians, and contractors 

of the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community, we 

have a number of new critical capabilities in orbit. This could not 

have been accomplished without the launch team’s efforts, which 

continued an impressive record of 49 out of 49 successful EELV 

[Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle] launches. 
2 

The NRO [National Reconnaissance Office] has completed extremely aggressive and successful campaign of six launches in 7 

months, and although we cannot talk here about the capabilities 

that the NRO brings to the fight, the warfighter, the Intelligence 

Community, and policymakers, they are all significant benefits 

from these launches. 

While there have been great strides, this year’s space hearing is 

especially important as we work to understand the significant reductions to the space program and its future impacts on national 

security. It is clear that space capabilities are an essential element 

of our military and intelligence construct. Space will continue to be 

a key enabler of our national security as the U.S. maintains the 

ability to operate in anti-access, anti-denial environments. 

As such, in the new Defense Strategic Guidance, the President 

and Secretary of Defense listed the ability to operate effectively in 

space and cyberspace as a primary mission area of the U.S. Armed 

Forces, yet the fiscal year 2013 budget request for Department of 

Defense space programs was reduced by 22 percent from last year’s 

request. I am concerned that a significant portion of these funding 

cuts are taken from research and development programs. 

For example, the research and development in the evolved advanced extremely high frequency satellite communications program 

is reduced by over 75 percent. This investment is part of a broader 

space acquisition strategy started last year, formerly called evolutionary acquisition for space efficiency designed to reinvest savings 

from a block buy into a stable research and development program 

to lower risks for future programs. 

Further, the Department proposed to terminate two programs 

that pushed the boundaries for small satellites and experimental 

payloads, the Space Test Program and the Operationally Responsive Space office. The Space Test Program has driven innovation 

from the benchtops of defense laboratories across the country to onorbit space capabilities. Many space programs that we rely on 

daily, such as GPS [Global Positioning System], have their origins 

in the Space Test Program. I am not satisfied with the justification 

that has been provided for terminating the Space Test Program. 

The Operationally Responsive Space office was established by 

Congress in the defense authorization process to address the need 

to rapidly reconstitute space capabilities under various threat scenarios and the desire to shorten the lengthy space acquisition cycle. 

The ORS [Operationally Responsive Space] office has responded to 

urgent warfighter needs and delivered critical capabilities. To date, 

I am not satisfied with the Department’s plan to support this important mission after the proposed ORS termination. 

I am pleased to see that the major spacecraft acquisition programs appear to be sufficiently funded in the budget request. Continued investment in core capabilities, such as GPS, AEHF [Advanced Extremely High Frequency], WGS [Wideband Global 

SATCOM], MUOS [Mobile User Objective System], and SBIRS 

[Space-Based Infrared System] cross multiple services in the Department. We must be conscious of the timing of our investments 

and properly align the schedules to deliver the spacecraft, ground 

segment, and user terminals in the most effective manner possible, 

consistent with the needs of the warfighter. 
3 

Assured access to space through our launch program remains another priority for this subcommittee. The price of launch has risen 

significantly in the past couple years, and the committee will continue close oversight as we work to understand the Air Force’s new 

acquisition strategy for the EELV program. As General Shelton 

noted in his written testimony, this strategy will address industrial 

base viability and cost growth while making provisions to leverage 

emerging competition. 

Further, as directed in our fiscal year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, we look forward to the President’s plan for a national rocket propulsion strategy that includes the Department of 

Defense, NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration], 

and Intelligence Community efforts. The GAO [U.S. Government 

Accountability Office] recently released a report on duplication that 

noted the space launch acquisition process for NASA and DOD [Department of Defense] duplicate one another and may not fully leverage the Government’s investment. 

In your opening testimonies we would appreciate hearing about 

collaboration in space launch activities across the Government to 

reduce duplication and leverage investments. 

Regarding space policy, I support the Administration’s decision 

not to sign on to the draft European Code of Conduct for outer 

space activities. However, I am concerned that the stated agreement, with elements of this code of conduct and intention to negotiate something similar, could establish the foundation for a future 

arms control regime that binds the United States without the approval of Congress, which would bypass the established constitutional processes by which the United States becomes bound by 

international law. 

Additionally, I have significant policy and operational concerns 

with the EU [European Union] Code of Conduct with regard to our 

own national security. Earlier today, I received a written response 

from the Administration which was unsatisfactory and leaves no 

choice but to legislate in the National Defense Act. The letters that 

we received will be included as part of the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 87.] 

Lastly, as policymakers, we rely on the assessments provided by 

the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, NASIC, to understand foreign space threats. It is clear that as our dependency on 

space programs increases and threats continue to develop, our 

space situational awareness is critical, and the space constellation 

and ground network must be resilient. 

NASIC is our first line of all-source intelligence analysis on space 

threats to form U.S. policy decisions. There are many aspects to 

this important area of national security, and we look forward to 

working together to reach enduring solutions. 

Thank you again for the panel being with us today. You each 

possess a tremendous amount of expertise and you bring a tremendous amount of credibility also to the information that you provide 

us, as we look to our Nation’s space policies and capabilities, and 

our Nation is better off because of all your services, and I greatly 

appreciate it. 
4 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 25.] 

Mr. TURNER. With that, I would like to recognize and turn to my 

ranking member, Loretta Sanchez. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry for having 

been delayed in getting here. Part of the problem was my schedule 

said it was in 2118, so I walked into a BRAC hearing, quickly 

looked around, and said these are not my kind of people. No, just 

kidding. Missed you, Mr. Chairman, so I knew it couldn’t be our 

meeting. 

First of all, thank you, Chairman Turner, and I’d like to join the 

chairman in welcoming General Shelton, Ambassador Schulte, Mr. 

Klinger, and Principal Deputy Director Sapp to this hearing on the 

fiscal year 2013 budget request for national security space activities. Thank you all again for your service to our country and for 

appearing before our committee. Again, I apologize for my delay. 

Our military superiority and way of life depend on space assets 

for secure communication, navigation, missile warning, weather 

prediction, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, so many 

things. And as we all know, space has become increasingly congested, contested, and competitive. 

Our first priority remains to ensure that we preserve and protect 

our space assets in an increasingly fragile environment, and in this 

context, quite the opposite of my chairman here, I am encouraged 

that the Administration has announced plans to at least enter into 

an international discussion on the Code of Conduct for Space, one, 

of course, that would meet U.S. requirements and establishes a 

norm of recognized responsible behavior. 

It becomes increasingly necessary to promote and to protect the 

peaceful use of space as additional countries gain access to space. 

And as you know, that is one of the areas over the years that I 

have been really cognizant of, not weaponizing space or not doing 

an arms race in space. 

Second, the challenge of protecting our advantage in space is all 

the more difficult in a fiscally constrained budget environment. 

And under the Budget Control Act, we must get our fiscal house 

in order, and we have got to do a lot more with a lot less. 

Reducing costs in the satellite and launch business, while preserving mission assurance, presents unique challenges. So I know 

you all have been working very hard on this, and I thank you for 

your contributions in working towards getting this under control. 

I am pleased that we have made progress in reducing costs 

through a block-buy, fixed-price contract approach for acquisition 

and driving toward increased competition in launch. However, 

using commercially available technology and services and improving synchronization between the procurement of satellites and corresponding ground station capabilities remain important opportunities to drive down the costs and to maximize our efficiency. And, 

sustaining efficient acquisitions and operations requires facilitating 

the development and the testing of these new technologies. 
5 

I am concerned that the Space Test Program, which was crucial 

to the development of GPS and several key communications satellites in the military that our military relies on today, has been 

canceled. So, I would like you to speak to that a bit. 

And, last, I would also like to hear your thoughts about preserving the space industrial base to protect needed satellites, 

ground capability, software and launch vehicles. The required and 

much delayed 1248 report will provide important analysis to reform 

expert control regulation. Progress in this area will help U.S. industry be more competitive while balancing the need to protect sensitive technology. But, we must also always look at the risks to our 

industrial base of updating overly restrictive export control regulations. 

So, I look forward to your testimony on these important budget 

issues, and again I thank you for being before us today, and I yield 

back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. We will begin now with oral statements 

as a summary to the written statements. I will ask that each of the 

panel members limit their comments to a 5-minute period. 

And, we will begin with General Shelton. 

STATEMENT OF GEN WILLIAM L. SHELTON, USAF, 

COMMANDER, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND 

General SHELTON. Mr. Chairman, Representative Sanchez, and 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, it’s an honor to appear before you today as the commander of Air Force Space Command. It’s also my privilege to appear before you alongside these 

colleagues from the national security space business. 

In line with the recently released Department of Defense Strategic Guidance, the men and women of Air Force Space Command 

protect our national interests by maintaining a singular focus, and 

that is providing vital space and cyberspace capabilities to the 

warfighter and to our Nation. Assured access to space and cyberspace is foundational to the conduct of military operations and is 

crucial to the Nation’s ability to project power in areas in which 

our access and freedom to operate are challenged. 

Accordingly, the fiscal year 2013 President’s budget invests in 

programs that enhance the resiliency and effectiveness of our space 

capabilities; namely, missile warning, positioning navigation and 

timing, satellite communications, space situational awareness, and 

space launch. 

There is an overall reduction in funding levels in the space budget, but that is primarily due to fact-of-life programmatic changes. 

First, several programs will ramp down developmental activity as 

they transition to procurement, and this is a good news story. Second, Congress funded two wideband global satellites in fiscal year 

2012, so there is no need to fund a satellite in this year’s budget. 

And, third, there is no longer funding for the Defense Weather Satellite System since this program was canceled in the Fiscal Year 

2012 Appropriations Act. 

In addition to these fact-of-life changes, we made some very difficult budget decisions, leading to cuts to some modernization programs and restructuring our approach to Operationally Responsive 

Space and space tests. 
6 

We are also pursuing acquisition efficiencies through the efficient 

space procurement actions for the Advanced Extremely High Frequency program and the Space-Based Infrared System. 

Finally, we remain committed to working closely with our partners in the National Reconnaissance Office and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to bring stability and predictability to our launch programs. 

I thank the committee for your continued and steadfast support 

of Air Force Space Command and national security space programs, 

and I look forward to your questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of General Shelton can be found in the 

Appendix on page 28.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. Mr. Schulte. 

STATEMENT OF AMB. GREGORY L. SCHULTE, DEPUTY 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SPACE POLICY 

Mr. SCHULTE. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez, subcommittee members, thank you for the opportunity to testify. When 

I testified here 1 year ago, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence had just issued the first ever National 

Security Space Strategy. That strategy aims to protect the advantages we derive from a domain that is increasingly congested, contested, and competitive. 

DOD’s new strategic guidance was informed by our space strategy and reinforces its key tenets. Both documents stress the importance of operating effectively in space, promoting responsible behavior, operating when possible with coalition and allied forces, 

and increasing the resilience of our space-based capabilities. 

I’d like to touch briefly on three important aspects of the space 

strategy. 

First, the National Security Space Strategy and the new Defense 

Guidance both stress the need for resilience in our space capabilities in response to emerging anti-access area denial challenges. Resilience contributes to deterrence of attacks on our space assets. 

Resilience also enables us to continue vital missions, even in a degraded space environment. Resilience is not the property of a single 

system. Rather, it is the ability of the whole architecture to provide 

functional capabilities necessary for mission success despite environmental adversity or hostile action. Resiliency can be achieved in 

a variety of ways. Examples include hosted payloads, commercial 

augmentation, international cooperation, and backup capabilities in 

other domains. 

Promoting responsible behavior in space is a second key aspect 

of our strategy. The Department of Defense is playing the leadership role, including by providing countries and companies across 

the globe with warnings of potential collisions in space. We support 

the State Department’s efforts to work with the European Union 

and other spacefaring countries to develop an international code of 

conduct for space activities. A widely subscribed code can encourage responsible space behavior and single out those who act otherwise, while reducing risk of misunderstanding and misconduct. 

The EU’s draft is a promising basis for an international code. It 

focuses on reducing the risk of creating debris and increasing 

transparency of space operations. It is not legally binding and rec-
7 

ognizes the inherent right of self-defense. It addresses behavior 

rather than unverifiable capabilities, and better serves our interests than the legally binding ban on space weapons proposed by 

others. 

As we participate in the development of an international code, 

the Department is committed to ensuring that it advances our national security. We are also committed to answering your questions 

and keeping you informed. 

Energizing our space industrial base is a third key aspect of our 

new strategy. We can help energize our industrial base by allowing 

U.S. industry to compete internationally for the sale of satellites 

and technologies that are already widely available. 

Last year, the Department of Defense and the State Department 

provided an interim assessment of space export controls. That assessment concluded that commercial communication satellites and 

related components, with a few exceptions, can be moved from the 

U.S. munitions list to the commerce control list without posing an 

unacceptable security risk. The forthcoming final report will identify additional items that we believe could be safely moved. 

Indeed, moving widely available items off the munitions list will 

allow the Government to focus its controls and enforcement on 

those technologies that are most sensitive and most critical to our 

national security. 

This approach, higher fences around fewer items, will require 

new legislation. Your support can help energize our industrial base 

and thereby enhance our national security. Giving our industrial 

base new commercial opportunities is particularly important at a 

time of defense spending constraints. 

In conclusion, the Department continues to implement the National Security Space Strategy. We need your support to deploy 

necessary capabilities, increase their resilience, and protect the industrial base so important to our national security. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schulte can be found in the Appendix on page 56.] 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Klinger. 

STATEMENT OF GIL I. KLINGER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SPACE AND INTELLIGENCE 

Mr. KLINGER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Sanchez, and members of the subcommittee, it is my pleasure to 

be before you today. It’s also my pleasure to be part of this distinguished panel representing the spectrum of disciplines that are key 

to ensuring the success of our space acquisition programs. 

Chairman Turner, you already outlined the number of successful 

launches we have had in recent years. I would just echo some of 

the points that you made that these successes reflect the combined 

efforts of a Government and industry team which has significantly 

improved and modernized our space capabilities across all mission 

areas. The support of Congress has been instrumental in achieving 

all of these successes. 

The environment in which we operate continues to evolve and 

transform. This transition has rippled through our space acquisition system, which historically focused on performance-driven, edge 
8 

of technology and engineering capacity. We consistently look to 

push the edge of the art and science of the possible. 

Acquisition of space capabilities frequently and consistently had 

a first and often unfettered call on the resources of the Defense Department and Intelligence Community as compared to many other 

capability areas. We simply no longer have this luxury. Space capabilities are now integrated and inextricably bound up in the nervous system of U.S. military forces and intelligence capabilities. 

Often, maintenance and continuity of service have become as or 

more important than pushing the envelope to achieve new performance capabilities. In fact, many of our space capabilities have become the dial tone of national security, and like the dial tone of our 

telephones, we take their availability and presence for granted, noticing only when there is an unplanned service interruption. This 

reality places a special responsibility on those of us who work in 

space acquisition to improve the timelines of delivery of new capabilities. 

We also must focus on ensuring our space architectures are sufficiently robust and resilient to operate through natural and manmade threats. To ensure our dial tone is uninterrupted, we are recapitalizing virtually all of our space lines of business, and doing 

so at precisely a time of sharply constrained resources and as the 

Nation remains at war. 

Here are some of the things that we are doing. We are putting 

greater scrutiny on executing oversight earlier in the acquisition 

process so program managers can achieve authority to proceed 

early and then focus their energies on program execution rather 

than coming back to respond to oversight that has more limited 

value. 

We are using fixed-price contracts, more innovative contracting, 

and evolutionary upgrades where those make sense. As only one 

example, by taking advantage of a maturing production line and 

risks that have been well-managed and retired from other programs, we are incorporating contract restructures into our GPS III 

and Advanced EHF–5 and –6 satellite programs. We are pursuing 

a block-buy for Advanced EHF–5 and –6 and developing a plan to 

use the savings to improve the capability of military satellite communications overall. 

In GPS III we’re modifying the acquisition strategy from a costplus to a fixed-price contract. The Air Force is also modifying its 

approach to the follow-on to the first block of GPS III by providing 

on-ramps to add capabilities when mature and affordable. This is 

extremely important as we plan ahead to maintain the resources 

to protect our seed corn of promising technologies. 

We intend to use competition where and when it makes sense: 

when the United States Government has a firm and stable understanding of its requirements; when there is more than one industrial vendor with domain knowledge of the capability that we seek 

to acquire; and when the calculated benefits of the competition outweigh the inevitable costs that sometimes accrue. 

We are stressing affordability even in our ongoing programs. We 

are stressing with our industrial partners to place as much emphasis on engineering for cost control and affordability as we have historically placed on engineering for performance. Let me repeat 
9 

that. We must place as much emphasis on engineering for cost control and affordability as we have historically placed on engineering 

for performance. For us, this is no longer a question of can we do 

something. The question before us now is, how well do we have to 

do something and the proportionality or the degree to which we 

must do it. This is a fundamentally different business model for 

many of us in the space acquisition community. At the same time, 

we must maintain essential industrial capacity and acquisition program stability and evaluate the opportunities to leverage commercial partnerships where prudent. 

Thank you for the opportunity to present the Department’s efforts to achieve a balanced space acquisition process while protecting the stewardship of our resources, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Klinger can be found in the Appendix on page 66.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. Ms. Sapp. 

STATEMENT OF BETTY J. SAPP, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

Ms. SAPP. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today. On behalf of Director Carlson, it is my 

pleasure to appear alongside our mission partners from the Department of Defense to discuss national security space activities. 

I’d like to start with a few words about the state of the NRO 

today. As Chairman Turner mentioned, last year with our Air 

Force mission partners, we executed the most aggressive launch 

campaign in more than 25 years at the NRO, launching six satellites in 7 months. This year with the same determination, the 

same strong partnership with the Air Force launch community, we 

will launch 4 satellites in 5 months. 

Delivering programs on cost and schedule is a matter of critical 

importance to our national security. It is a part of keeping our faith 

with the warfighters in terms of meeting our commitments. Evolutionary acquisition practices have been used successfully for decades by the NRO. Those have helped us meet those acquisition 

commitments. They’ve been fundamental to reaching an all green 

scorecard for NRO acquisition. Yes, today, every single NRO acquisition program is green for cost, schedule, and performance. 

The NRO financial system is also sound. The best evidence of 

this is that for the third year in a row we have sustained a clean 

audit opinion from an outside independent auditor. We are also 

proud of what we do to support our troops in the field. 

Although the specifics of much of what we do cannot be discussed 

in this forum, I can tell you that the NRO has developed and deployed more than 25 reference emitters, which have since been 

used more than 13,000 times. These emitters have greatly improved the capability of CENTCOM, for example, to precisely 

geolocate threats, allowing U.S. and coalition military forces to be 

extremely precise in targeting those threats. 

We not only design and deploy systems to support our troops, but 

also help to train the troops to use them effectively as they go off 

in harm’s way. The men and women of the NRO stationed around 
10 

the globe strive to make a difference for the troops every single 

day. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you today. Again, on behalf of General 

Carlson, I thank you for your continued support of the NRO, and 

I stand ready to answer any of your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sapp can be found in the Appendix on page 75.] 

Mr. TURNER. Alright. Thank you so much. 

General Shelton, thank you again for your being a champion of 

protection of our defense access to GPS. Last year Congress enacted a provision that prohibited the Federal Communications 

Commission, FCC, from giving the commercial company 

LightSquared the authority to proceed on its proposed network 

until the FCC resolved concerns about widespread harmful interference with GPS receivers of the Department of Defense. On February 14th the FCC issued a statement that concluded that there 

is no practical way to mitigate potential interference at this time. 

The Commission is waiting on a response from LightSquared. General Shelton, is this an isolated matter or are there further steps 

needed to ensure DOD’S spectrum continues to be safeguarded in 

the future? 

General SHELTON. Mr. Chairman, first, thank you and the members of this committee for your help in protecting that part of the 

spectrum that GPS depends upon. As we go forward—this is, 

again, a physics problem—that part of the spectrum has to be protected. Whether that is by policy within the FCC, whether that is 

by legislation, there is no question that we have to protect that 

part of the spectrum. 

Mr. TURNER. Good, thank you. The Space Test Program has been 

a national capability since 1965. The program is designed to allow 

engineers and scientists and defense laboratories and universities 

to focus on developing leading-edge, state-of-the-art capabilities 

while the Space Test Program initiates and delivers these payloads 

to orbit. To quote the program office, ‘‘Most DOD space systems flying today started as STP experiments or were directly impacted by 

STP experiments.’’ 

General Shelton, considering the value that this program has 

provided, can you please explain why the program was canceled 

and what the long-term impacts are. 

And, Mr. Klinger, to account for the STP termination, are the 

budgets for the laboratories across the Department being increased 

to account for the expanded mission of launching their payloads? 

General. 

General SHELTON. Mr. Chairman, as we looked at the range of 

things that we do across the space portfolio, and we were asked to 

contribute certainly our share of the $487 billion reduction as part 

of the Budget Control Act, Space Test Program came up as one of 

the things that we might be able to take risk in. The reason for 

that is we have much space research going on in the Air Force Research Laboratory. In fact, we have about $370 million in fiscal 

year 2012 being spent in the Air Force Research Lab for space-related things. 
11 

We also have space-related research going on in Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, DARPA. We also have space research going on in the Naval Research Lab. There is also work 

going on inside the Army. As we looked at that across the board, 

we felt like this was a place where we could take risk and we had 

to contribute, again, our fair share as part of the resource drawdown. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Klinger. 

Mr. KLINGER. Mr. Chairman, to follow up on General Shelton’s 

points, there’s a diversified portfolio of space research capabilities 

going on across the laboratory system in the Department of Defense. If I may, I would like to take for the record your question 

and get back to you with the specific dollar figures so I can give 

you a more accurate answer and picture of the situation. 

Mr. TURNER. That will be fine. However, our experience with 

questions for the record is that they take a tremendous amount of 

time for a response. I would hope that you would be able to provide 

a quick response to that since we are hoping to get one in the hearing. 

Mr. KLINGER. We will do that. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

General Shelton, I have a memorandum that I believe you are 

being provided that is dated December 30, 2011, that states that 

you are interested in the Missile Defense’s Precision Tracking 

Space System space situational awareness possibilities. And, this is 

possibly 24 satellite low-earth orbit constellation, and I would like 

if you could speak for a moment about the space situational awareness benefits perhaps of the Precision Tracking Space System that 

the Missile Defense Agency is looking at. And, I also want to inform you that General O’Reilly, just in a hearing that we had Tuesday, when we inquired to him about this, asked whether or not, 

you know, he would be working directly with you in coordinating 

this, he said, ‘‘Yes, sir, and that is how I responded back to General 

Shelton, exactly that way.’’ Although it was encouraging to me, I 

want to ensure that these two systems, two programs, and certainly our two generals are able to coordinate. So if you could 

please comment on that. 

General SHELTON. Mr. Chairman, there is an exciting possibility 

here if we go forward with the PTSS [Precision Tracking Space 

System] program. That will fly, again, some number of satellites 

yet to be determined, but up to 24. Looking from an equatorial inclination, up above the Earth and not only will it be able, because 

it is an infrared sensor, not only will it be able to see missile 

launches and very accurately report on those, but it will also be 

able to see things flying in space. A wonderful space situational 

awareness sensor, and lots of them in space. 

So, if we can cooperate with the Missile Defense Agency, if it 

takes a nickel more, so to speak, to get that capability on PTSS, 

or maybe even you get it for free because of the inherent capability, 

we just want to make sure that that’s a design parameter that is 

included to the maximum extent possible. We don’t want to drive 

them into a cost position that they don’t want to be in, but we do 

want to do everything we can to make it an affordable capability 

as part of the inherent capability in the system. 
12 

Mr. TURNER. I am not going to ask necessarily did General 

O’Reilly say yes, sir, in response to your memo as he said, but have 

you received a response to the memo that is satisfactory? Do you 

believe that General O’Reilly and the Missile Defense Agency will 

be responding to what clearly is a very important issue that you 

have raised? 

General SHELTON. I do, Mr. Chairman. I did get a response, and 

it is about a three paragraph response but, summarized, said, yes, 

sir. 

Mr. TURNER. Excellent, excellent. Turning now to my ranking 

member, Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. 

General Shelton, Mr. Klinger, Ambassador Schulte, as you know, 

section 1248 of the fiscal year 2010 National Defense Authorization 

Act directed the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State to 

carry out an assessment of the national security risks of removing 

satellites and related components of the United States munitions 

list. That report is now almost 2 years late. 

In the meantime, the U.S. satellite industry, the industrial base 

continues to struggle to keep pace with the global competition in 

what is intensely really an international market. So, a study on the 

health of the space industrial base entitled ‘‘U.S. Industrial Base 

Analysis for Space Systems,’’ conducted by the Tauri Group under 

contract to OSD industrial policy, cites 11 space technologies of 

high risk due to the absence of U.S. suppliers or a single U.S. supplier. Prudent changes to overly restrictive export control regulations could have a significant impact on the health and the sustainability of our United States satellite industry. 

So, can you tell me again when the section 1248 report will be 

delivered and do you think that there will be significant movement 

in our ability to actually get some export going so that we can hold 

onto our lead in this industry? 

Mr. SCHULTE. Representative Sanchez, we share your concern 

about the industrial base, and we are—part of the strategy that we 

have, a key part of it is to energize that industrial base, and there 

are ways you can do that through what you buy and how you buy 

it. And Gil Klinger, Mr. Klinger, has talked about that a little bit, 

but we also believe that space export control reform has to be a key 

part of how we energize our industrial base to allow our industry 

to compete on the international market in the sale of items and 

technologies that are already widely available and therefore would 

not hurt our national security. So, we support export control reform 

that would allow that to proceed. We will need your help in that 

regard. 

We issued the—yes, ma’am, we are late on the 1248 report, perhaps even later than we are sometimes on QFRs. I apologize. We 

had the initial 1248 report come out last year, and in that report 

we indicated a judgment by the Department of Defense and Department of State that commercial satellites and their components, 

with a couple of exceptions, could, in fact, be moved off of the U.S. 

munitions list. We owe you the final report, which is forthcoming, 

and we anticipate that that final report will indicate other items 

in what we call category 15, the space items, that can be moved 

off of the munitions list onto the commerce control list. For that to 
13 

actually happen, it does require legislation. Unlike in any other industry area, this is one where the export control is legislated, so 

we will need your help in that regard. 

But our goal is to allow, with your support, is to allow industry 

to be competitive on the international market in areas where technology is already widely available, and then concentrate our controls, our licensing, and our enforcement on those technologies that 

are truly sensitive, and by building higher fences around higher 

walls, we think—I am sorry, higher fences around fewer items—we 

think we can accomplish two things: help our industry and thereby 

help our national security. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So when you say ‘‘forthcoming,’’ what does that 

mean? 

Mr. SCHULTE. Oh, ma’am, I would like to tell you it is next week. 

It is in coordination at this point. Hopefully it will be here soon. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So forthcoming and it will be here soon; what does 

that mean, Ambassador? Can I expect it in a month, 2 months, 6 

months, 2 years, 4 years? 

Mr. SCHULTE. I would hope closer to the first part of that range. 

Our goal is to get it to you as soon as we can. I should just say, 

if I may, it’s taken longer than anticipated in part because we have 

had to survey all of the items in category 15 and, believe it or not, 

there are hundreds of thousands of items in category 15. So it has 

required a very thorough scrub to make sure that we are presenting the best possible assessment to you, but we do hope that 

report will come to you very soon. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Great, we’d like to see it. I know that our ranking 

member, Mr. Smith, is very interested in this also, and I think that 

he or I would carry legislation to allow some of this to happen. I 

know that he and I were the only ones many, many years ago when 

I think it was maybe our first or second year on this committee, 

and we came in together, where we had the encryption fights and 

he and I were, I think, the only votes to try to loosen up some of 

that encryption because, you know, coming from States like Washington and California where this is predominant, we lose our ability to compete if we don’t have a market for what we’re making. 

Or, if we have an artificial market because we are only supplying 

to our companies or to our defense system, we are still losing our 

creative and competitive and innovative edge. So, I really believe 

that this is a very important issue, and I am sure—I don’t want 

to speak for Mr. Smith because he is not in this hearing—but, I 

know the fight we had many, many years ago on encryption, and 

I believe he feels the same way about this, that there are some 

things that we can make a market for by export that is already out 

there or the equivalent, and we would like to see that be a priority. 

I want to go back to the EU Code of Conduct. Ambassador, you 

know, there is a real, I don’t want to say fear, but there’s definitely 

different ideas of what sitting down and negotiating on this code 

of conduct is about. Can you talk a little to the—maybe to the cost 

and the benefits of entering into negotiations with the EU on the 

EU Code of Conduct, and what are the risks that we run of not 

doing something like that? And, will our military operations and 

needs be protected? 
14 

Mr. SCHULTE. Ma’am, we judge that a code of conduct, not the 

EU code per se, but a code of conduct can actually serve the interests of our national security and strengthen our security. We asked 

the joint staff to conduct an operations assessment of the existing 

EU draft, and then based upon that assessment we came up with 

a mitigation strategy that included some changes to the code, a 

subscription statement if we subscribe at some point, and some internal guidance that in our judgment would make sure that a code 

would be fully supportive of our national security. 

We have briefed the operation assessment and the mitigation 

strategy in detail to your staff. But we judge, you know, the State 

Department, we will be there with the State Department in those 

negotiations, and before a code is finally adopted or agreed to, we 

will conduct another full operations assessment with mitigation 

strategy to make sure it is acceptable to us. 

Some of the concerns we have heard about the code, and they are 

all legitimate, and we have tried to address them. One concern is, 

is this arms control by the back door? This is not arms control. I 

mean, this is a voluntary code. It is not legally binding. In fact, one 

advantage to the code is right now Russia and China have been 

proposing a legally binding arms control agreement that we don’t 

think would serve our national interests, and this allows us to 

change the narrative in the international discussions, and it takes 

us off effectively the defensive, and it has us talking about how do 

we promote responsible behavior. 

Another concern that has been raised about the code is could it 

somehow limit our missile defense capabilities, particularly if we 

wanted to put some in space? And the answer to that is no. The 

code specifically focuses on behavior, not unverifiable capabilities. 

So we have been very careful to make sure that it is in line with 

our practices, it is in line with our planning, and it would support 

our national security. 

If I could, just briefly: one of the benefits is changing the narrative. Another benefit is to encourage all the new entrants into 

the space field to act responsibly, to follow the type of procedures 

we do and make sure they don’t create the debris or they don’t operate matters that risk misunderstanding, again with the objective 

of helping to protect space, which effectively is part of the global 

commons. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I have a lot more questions, but 

I’ll—— 

Mr. TURNER. We will do a second round of questions. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Heinrich. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, Chairman. General Shelton and Mr. 

Klinger, I am deeply concerned about the budgetary cuts to small 

satellite programs such as Operationally Responsive Space and the 

Space Test Program in fiscal year 2013. These relatively small satellite programs require marginal investments, and given the increasingly competitive environment in space and the high cost of 

procuring traditional multibillion-dollar satellites, I fear they are 

penny-wise and pound-foolish cuts. 

It makes no sense to me that the Department, in an attempt to 

lower costs, has proposed terminating a program whose whole pur-
15 

pose was to lower cost. Specifically, the Department’s proposed fiscal year 2013 budget calls for the ‘‘. . . restructure of Operationally 

Responsive Space, ORS, program in order to provide more responsive and timely space capabilities to the warfighter,’’ yet the ORS 

program was terminated. 

Can you please explain to me why this program is being canceled, what plans the Air Force has to sustain the ORS mission, 

and how it intends to provide more responsive and timely space capabilities to the warfighter without the ORS mission and funding? 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. First point I would make is that the 

concept of ORS is not going away. It is continuing, but it is continuing across our programs. As opposed to having a dedicated program office that is going to work ORS and produce individual satellites, we will have ORS concepts spread across all of our satellite 

programs, and I think you will see those concepts come out in the 

future as we look at alternative architectures and things like that. 

There are people still working at Kirtland Air Force Base, working together just like they have been on ORS concepts. The space 

development and test division that’s there will continue to work 

ORS concepts on behalf of all of the Space and Missile Systems 

Center, which is headquartered in Los Angeles. So that linkage, 

which has always been tight, will continue. It is just that we won’t 

have a dedicated office. 

As we looked, again, across our entire portfolio, and we had to 

come up with these Budget Control Act reductions, this was one of 

the victims of the Budget Control Act reductions. But, at the same 

time, the concept still continues to live. So, I think it is a win-win, 

given the environment. 

Mr. HEINRICH. General, as you know, the ORS imaging satellite 

was launched in June of 2011 in response to a requirement in support of U.S. Central Command. It is my understanding that ORS– 

1 has met and exceeded CENTCOM’s [U.S. Central Command] expectations. 

Can you speak a little more on what the warfighter’s response 

has been to this reconnaissance asset? 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. We got a letter from their intelligence 

officer, basically their J2, that said they were extremely impressed 

with the imagery that they had gotten from ORS–1. They were not 

only happy with the responsiveness of it, but they were happy with 

the quality of the imagery that they were getting, and it was a 

warfighting advantage, no question. 

Mr. HEINRICH. I want to quickly reiterate Chairman Turner’s 

concerns about the Space Test Program and sort of follow up with 

a follow-up question to the ones that he raised. 

Did the Air Force coordinate with the affected Government laboratories and organizations that have also benefited from this program over the years, so that they could properly plan for the 

change in fiscal year 2013 budget request? 

General SHELTON. I think that the coordination that maybe we 

would have wanted to occur did not occur, and the reason for that 

was as we got to the final balancing at the end of the President’s 

budget exercise, we flat just didn’t have the time, plus there was 

a lot of closed-door sessions that finalized that submission. That coordination is going on now. We are determining how we will spread 
16 

the work. We are determining how we will gain the same sorts of 

advantages we got from the Space Test Program, albeit by other organizations. 

Mr. HEINRICH. That was not exactly the answer I was hoping for, 

but Mr. Chairman, I will yield back to you. 

Mr. TURNER. We are going for a second round, and I have got a 

couple questions. This one is to General Shelton and Ms. Sapp. On 

December 20th, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Chairman Wolf, and I 

wrote to the Secretary of State inquiring about the status of a 

pending investigation of the suspected illegal export of commercial 

satellite technology to China. I will read you the first paragraph of 

the letter to give you some reference. 

We write to Secretary Clinton stating that ‘‘. . . we seek your 

prompt response on a matter of continuing concern of ours, efforts 

to protect the United States from the increasingly aggressive activity in space of the People’s Republic of China. One important and 

often overlooked part of the U.S. capacity to ensure our security in 

space is the export control regime, specifically the International 

Traffic in Arms Regulation, ITAR, which is the responsibility of the 

Department of State. We are concerned that the Department is not 

moving aggressively enough to punish violations of this regime.’’ 

Are the two of you familiar with this letter? 

General SHELTON. I have seen the letter, yes, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. Good. What I would like to know is, are you familiar with the State Department position that the Department is further—excuse me, are you familiar with the State Department’s position that ‘‘. . . the Department is further troubled by the perception of Thales’ continued lack of cooperation, particularly given the 

SB–4000 C2 was not, in fact, ITAR-free and was exported to China; 

and can China’s counterspace programs benefit from U.S. technology and we not make certain that China isn’t able to obtain that 

technology’’? 

If you would give me your thoughts on both the letter and the 

issue of exporting in violation of ITAR, what that means to the 

Chinese systems. 

General SHELTON. All I was going to say is I’m, really not as familiar with the issue. I am familiar with the letter, but, Mr. Chairman, I couldn’t really comment on the details of the issue. 

Ms. SAPP. I am afraid I could not as well. I have seen the letter, 

but I am not familiar with what has been done in response. 

Mr. TURNER. Can I ask if both of you, upon reading the letter, 

had concerns about the circumstances that were laid, set out in the 

letter? 

General SHELTON. Certainly anything that would offer a comparative advantage would be of concern. 

Mr. TURNER. Ambassador, you were raising your hand, so I will 

call on you. 

Mr. SCHULTE. If that is okay, sir. I am familiar with the letter, 

and we know that the State Department is investigating that case. 

But, the leakage of sensitive technology to countries like China 

has, of course, been foremost in our mind as we thought about export control reform, and so in the 1248 reports that we are providing you, the Department of State and Department of Defense 

are proposing moving from the munitions list to the commerce con-
17 

trol list only space items that are already widely available; and we 

are not proposing removing the Tiananmen Square sanctions that 

would remain in place even with export control reform, meaning 

that items still on the munitions list could not be exported to China 

and also meaning that we would not allow the launch of satellites 

from Chinese launch vehicles. 

Finally, we have also proposed, the Administration has also proposed in the case of China for those items moved off the munitions 

list that we still have restrictive licensing and export controls on 

those. So, we are very conscious of China, and we have developed 

our export control proposals with China very much in mind. In 

fact, we believe that to the extent that we focus on those technologies that are most sensitive, we can increase the focus of our 

export control and enforcement efforts to avoid situations like this 

in the future. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, tell me about the statement of the State Department’s position, ‘‘The Department is further troubled by the 

perception of Thales’ continued lack of cooperation, given that the 

export was, in fact, not ITAR-free, and was exported to China.’’ 

You are in a situation where an export appears to be in violation, 

and you are not getting a whole lot of cooperation, it appears. Tell 

me what the State Department is currently doing and your 

thoughts then on that matter. 

Mr. SCHULTE. Sir, despite being an Ambassador, I shouldn’t try 

to talk for the State Department. I know that they have come, 

Frank Rose, my colleague there, has come to brief your staff, but 

we’re clearly concerned at any leakage of sensitive technology to 

China, and support all enforcement efforts there. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, Ambassador, let’s turn to the issue now of the 

code of conduct. I obviously have constitutional concerns. The whole 

purpose in the Constitution of having Senate confirmation is that 

so one individual would never have the ability, power, or authority 

to internationally bind us by law that would in any way restrict 

our rulemaking, our lawmaking. 

The code of conduct, as I understand it, would, although perhaps 

be proposed as nonbinding, in fact would have regulations that 

would be promulgated and would, in fact, restrict activities that the 

United States is doing. So, there are serious concerns that people 

have with respect to a back door. 

So, my first question is, if Russia and China don’t join, since 

those are two of the states most capable of generating debris in 

outer space, what have we accomplished? And, isn’t it true that one 

of the reasons China didn’t test an ASAT [Anti-Satellite weapon] 

again after 2007, the one that created all the debris, was that the 

international outcry was so great that it didn’t want to risk that 

again, meaning that there was an effect upon Chinese behavior, 

and in 2007 there was no code of conduct. So, your thoughts on 

Russia and China? 

Mr. SCHULTE. Sir, I was actually in Vienna working with the 

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space when the Chinese 

tested, and the Chinese Ambassador, who is my colleague, was 

clearly embarrassed and had no talking points for about a week 

after that happened. 
18 

That said, the Chinese continue to develop a very broad range of 

counter space capabilities, including ones that could cause debris. 

They’ve tested additional systems but in a way that has minimized 

debris. Our concern is that there are more and more countries, including China, that are developing space capabilities, and to protect the long-term sustainability of space we think that a code, not 

the EU’s current code, but that a code, if properly negotiated and 

if we evaluate it and agree it’s acceptable, can actually help to protect the long-term stability of space by encouraging responsibility—— 

Mr. TURNER. Let’s stop there for a second. I love the fact that 

you use the words ‘‘properly negotiated.’’ 

Mr. SCHULTE. Right. 

Mr. TURNER. Please tell me why that would not involve the Senate. 

Mr. SCHULTE. A code of—sir, a code of conduct is a voluntary 

code. An example of that, for example, is The Hague Code of Conduct, which was negotiated by the last administration and subscribed to by them. 

Mr. TURNER. Actually, let’s discuss that because you have used 

that as an example before. You’ve pointed to The Hague Code of 

Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation to suggest that the 

Bush administration favored this nonbinding approach and therefore that it must be fine. You measure the goodness of the policy 

on whether the Bush administration favored it as a course of action, and I am confused. The joint staff analysis we have states 

that if the United States were to make a good-faith effort at implementing the requirements of such a code, your code, the one that 

you want to pursue, there may be adverse operational impacts on 

U.S. military and Intelligence Community space operations. There 

is a straight-up admission that our current operations would be impacted. 

What impact on U.S. military and intelligence operations was 

there from The Hague Code of Conduct? What binding regulations 

were issued on the Department of Defense and IC as a result of 

U.S. subscription to The Hague Code, and can you provide any copies of such regulations that came out of The Hague Code? Apparently when you responded to a staff inquiry on this, you referred 

to an Ambassador Bolton speech. Obviously that is an insufficient 

answer, and we would like you to answer more directly. 

And, what was it that the U.S. was doing in 2002 that it no 

longer did as a result of subscription to The Hague Code? Were we 

proliferating ballistic missiles before the code? But yet, and I want 

to make it very, very clear, the questions are being asked to you 

because when we look at the unclassified excerpt from the Executive Summary of the Joint Staff Operations assessment of the draft 

EU code, it states, ‘‘If the United States were to make a good-faith 

effort at implementing the requirements of the draft code, there 

could be operation impacts on U.S. military space operations in 

several areas.’’ 

So to do your comparison, the code of conduct with respect to 

space has an impact on operations that we are doing, would have 

regulations promulgated under it, and according to your description 

of it, would bypass the Senate, the nonbinding Hague Code had no 
19 

such regulations, impacted no such operations of the United States, 

and, you know, clearly did not result in a shift of any policy or operations of the United States. They are really not comparative, are 

they? 

Mr. SCHULTE. Mr. Chairman, with The Hague Code of Conduct, 

as you said, I am not aware of any regulations that were issued 

afterwards to change our behavior. There was a procedure put in 

place whereby we started to notify the launches of ICBMs [Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles] and SLBMs [Submarine-Launched 

Ballistic Missiles] and space launches. And, by the way, as part of 

that procedure we also put in place a mechanism so that in rare 

exceptions if we thought it didn’t serve our national security interests to make those notifications, we could not make them, and in 

many ways that is sort of—that is similar—— 

Mr. TURNER. So a courtesy rather than a regulation, rather than 

as this statement is, that the code you are advocating for, that it 

would impact U.S. military space operations in several areas? 

Mr. SCHULTE. Well, what we have—so we put in a procedure to 

notify. In a way, that was the only impact, and we made sure there 

is an exception clause. With an International Code for Outer Space 

Activities, we asked the joint staff to conduct that operations assessment, and based upon that we worked with them to come up 

with a mitigation strategy. And part of the strategy is to make sure 

that we make clear in developing the code and in subscribing to the 

code, should we get to that point, that this is a voluntary code and 

that we will carry it out consistent with our national security interests. 

Mr. TURNER. I have to tell you once again, as I said in my opening statement, anything that the Administration does that is a negotiation in the establishment of an international code that is going 

to have an impact on our military operations, I believe, and I think 

we believe, I believe this Congress is going to believe, ought to constitutionally include the Senate. And, it is going to be a subject 

matter that we will be taking up with the National Defense Authorization Act. 

Turning to my ranking member, Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Chairman Turner. General Shelton, 

will sensors that can improve detection of a nuclear detonation be 

incorporated into the SBIRS satellite? Why or why not? What is 

the cost? And when can we expect the report on this issue that is 

due to Congress? 

General SHELTON. Miss Sanchez, I am trying to recall where we 

are in the decision process on that, but I believe we have decided 

that we do not need to include those sensors on SBIRS satellites, 

and that is because we’ve got sufficient capability on other satellites, including GPS satellites that have a very robust nuclear 

detonation detection system on them. As far as the report, when 

the report might be here, I can’t comment on that. Maybe someone 

else on the table here. 

Apparently we are all shaking our heads. We’ll take that one for 

the record if you don’t mind. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay, and if you could get back to me in a timely 

manner, because I do agree with Mr. Turner, when we ask for 
20 

things for the record, we rarely get them. Sometimes we get them 

a couple years later. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. General Shelton and Ms. Sapp, launch is becoming 

much more expensive, and although United Launch Alliance has 

an excellent track record for successful launches, it currently has 

a monopoly on our launch services. New entrants such as SpaceX 

may be able to compete if they can prove reliability and mission assurance. 

I know we had a track that we were going down to try to include, 

hopefully, some sort of competition into the arena. But with the 

current acquisition plan, will it allow new entrants to compete in 

2015 if they can prove mission assurance? And if not, what’s the 

earliest time that the new entrants would be able to compete? 

General SHELTON. Ma’am, our strategy is defined; our acquisition 

approach is still being defined. We have asked United Launch Alliance to provide a matrix of costs that would include anywhere between 6 to 10 boosters over a period of 3 to 5 years, and we are 

looking at that, where the sweet spot might be there not only for 

cost but also in readiness of these new entrants that enter into 

competition. During that period, regardless of what that period is, 

we will continue to track the progress of SpaceX and Orbital and 

others that are building new boosters, to see if some of them might 

be ready for, even during this initial period, to compete for 

launches. 

There are two launches specifically that we have set aside that 

we think people might be able to compete for during that time. If 

that occurs, great, we will use those as certification opportunities 

for them, at least on the path towards certification. But it is really 

up to the new entrants, their technical progress, their ability to 

show that they are ready to take national security payloads. And, 

as we come through that process, we are pretty risk-averse in 

terms of national security payloads, but these two that we have set 

aside we believe that we can take a little bit more risk. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And so the current budget cuts that are projected 

over those next 2 to 3, 4 years, are they not—they are not going 

to impact the schedule? I think you and I sat down, or somebody 

sat down with the whole schedule of where those sweet spots would 

be, so nothing has changed with respect to that because of the 

budget constraints? 

General SHELTON. No, Ma’am. Nothing has changed. We are still 

on track for those two launches for sure, and then we are developing again our acquisition approach to the continuation of the 

EELV. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, General. I have a couple more questions for the record. 

Mr. TURNER. I just have one more question. 

On second thought, we will have questions perhaps for the record 

also. I want to thank you again for both your patience, your participation, and your leadership. And, General, thank you again for 

your work on GPS and ensuring that that will continue to be an 

asset for the Department of Defense. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 2:34 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 8, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 8, 2012 

(25) 

Statement of Hon. Michael Turner 

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Hearing on 

Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Request for National Security Space Activities 

March 8, 2012 

Good afternoon. I want to welcome everyone to the Strategic 

Forces Subcommittee’s hearing on the Fiscal Year 2013 budget request for national security space activities. Our distinguished witnesses this afternoon are: 

• General William Shelton, Commander of Air Force Space 

Command; 

• Ambassador Greg Schulte, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy; 

• Mr. Gil Klinger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 

Space and Intelligence Office; and 

• Ms. Betty Sapp, Principal Deputy Director of the National 

Reconnaissance Office. 

Thank you all for appearing before this subcommittee. 

I would like to start by congratulating you on the significant accomplishments in national security space over the past year. Due 

to tremendous efforts of the military, civilians, and contractors of 

the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community, we have 

a number of new critical capabilities on orbit. This could not be accomplished without the launch teams’ efforts, which continued an 

impressive record of 49 out of 49 successful EELV launches. 

The NRO has completed an extremely aggressive and successful 

campaign of 6 launches in 7 months. And although we cannot talk 

here about the capabilities that the NRO brings to the fight, the 

warfighter, intelligence community, and policymakers are all significantly benefiting from these launches. 

While there have been great strides, this year’s space hearing is 

especially important as we work to understand the significant reductions to the space program, and its future impact on national 

security. 

It is clear that space capabilities are essential elements of our 

military and intelligence construct. Space will continue to be a key 

enabler of our national security as the U.S. maintains the ability 

to operate in anti-access, anti-denial environments. As such, in the 

new Defense Strategic Guidance, the President and Secretary of 
26 

Defense listed the ability to operate effectively in space and cyberspace as a primary mission area of the U.S. Armed Forces. Yet, the 

fiscal year 2013 budget request for Department of Defense space 

programs was reduced by 22 percent from last year’s request. 

I am concerned that a significant portion of these funding cuts 

are taken from research and development programs. For example, 

the research and development in the Evolved Advanced Extremely 

High Frequency satellite communications program is reduced by 

over 75 percent. This investment is part of a broader space acquisition strategy started last year, formerly called Evolutionary Acquisition for Space Efficiency, designed to reinvest savings from a 

block buy into a stable research and development program to lower 

risk for future programs. 

Further, the Department proposed to terminate two programs 

that push the boundaries for small satellites and experimental payloads—the Space Test Program and the Operationally Responsive 

Space office. The Space Test Program has driven innovation from 

the bench-tops of defense laboratories across the country to on-orbit 

space capabilities. Many space programs that we rely on daily, 

such as GPS, have their origins in the Space Test Program. I am 

not satisfied with the justification that has been provided for terminating the Space Test Program. 

The Operationally Responsive Space office was established by 

Congress in the Defense Authorization process to address the need 

to rapidly reconstitute space capabilities under various threat scenarios and the desire to shorten the lengthy space acquisition cycle. 

The ORS office has responded to urgent warfighter needs, and delivered critical capabilities. To date, I am not satisfied with the Department’s plan to support this important mission after the proposed ORS termination. 

I am pleased to see that the major spacecraft acquisition programs appear to be sufficiently funded in the budget request. Continued investment in core capabilities, such as GPS, AEHF, WGS, 

MUOS, and SBIRS, remains one of the top priorities. Yet, as some 

program acquisitions cross multiple services in the Department, we 

must be conscious of the timing of our investments and properly 

align the schedules to deliver the spacecraft, ground segment, and 

user terminals in the most effective manner possible, consistent 

with the needs of the warfighter. 

Assured access to space through our launch program remains another priority for this subcommittee. The price of launch has risen 

significantly in the past couple years, and the committee will continue close oversight as we work to understand the Air Force’s new 

acquisition strategy for the EELV program. As General Shelton 

noted in his written testimony, this strategy will address industrial 

base viability and cost growth while making provisions to leverage 

emerging competition. Further, as directed in our Fiscal Year 2012 

National Defense Authorization Act, we look forward to the President’s plan for a National Rocket Propulsion strategy that includes 

the Department of Defense, NASA, and Intelligence Community efforts. The GAO recently released a report on duplication that noted 

the space launch acquisition processes for NASA and DOD duplicate one another and may not fully leverage the Government’s investment. In your opening testimonies, we would appreciate hear-
27 

ing about collaboration in space launch activities across the Government to reduce duplication and leverage investments. 

Regarding space policy, I support the Administration’s decision 

not to sign onto the draft European Union Code of Conduct for 

Outer Space Activities. However, I am concerned that your stated 

agreement with elements of this Code of Conduct and intention to 

negotiate something similar could establish the foundation for a future arms control regime that binds the United States without the 

approval of Congress, which would bypass the established constitutional processes by which the United States becomes bound by 

international law. Additionally, I have significant policy and operational concerns with the EU Code of Conduct with regard to national security. Earlier today, I received a written response from 

the Administration, which was unsatisfactory and leaves no choice 

but to legislate in the National Defense Authorization Act. The letters will be added as part of the record. 

Lastly, as policymakers, we rely on the assessments provided by 

the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) to understand foreign space threats. It is clear that as our dependency on 

space systems increases and threats continue to develop, our space 

situational awareness is critical, and the space constellation and 

ground network must be resilient. NASIC is our first line of allsource intelligence analysis on space threats to form U.S. defense 

policy decisions. There are many aspects to this important area of 

national security and we look forward to working together to reach 

enduring solutions. 

Thank you again for being with us today. You each possess a tremendous amount of expertise and insight on our Nation’s space 

policy and capabilities, and our Nation is better off as a result of 

your service. I look forward to your testimony. 
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 8, 2012 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 8, 2012 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. 1) General Shelton, if provided with the authorization and appropriation for the Efficient Space Procurement block buy of two Space Based Infrared 

Systems, what are the expected cost savings and the plan to reinvest those savings 

into modernization initiatives for future missile warning satellites? Further, how 

can we be assured those savings don’t become a bill payer as seemed to happen to 

the AEHF savings in the FY13 budget request? 

General SHELTON. 1) The staff of the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense estimates projected savings of $521M 

through implementation of Efficient Space Procurement for Spaced Based Infrared 

Systems (SBIRS) Geosynchronous Earth Orbit Satellites 5 and 6. We applied $289M 

of this savings across the Future Years Defense Program for the SBIRS modernization initiatives. The remaining projected savings were applied to higher DOD priorities. The SMI funding is set at an affordable level to produce and sustain current 

Program-of-Record systems and to invest in affordable alternatives for evolving current capability. The SMI plan is based on strategic guidance, an established architectural path, documented requirements and a solid program execution plan. 

Mr. TURNER. 2) General Shelton, the GAO found that satellites, ground control 

systems, and user terminals in most of DOD’s major space system acquisitions were 

not optimally aligned, leading to underutilized satellites and limited capability provided to the warfighter, in some cases for periods measured in years. What is DOD 

doing to address the synchronization problems, particularly with GPS M–Code user 

terminals, AEHF Family of Beyond the Line of Sight Terminals, SBIRS staring sensor, and Navy MUOS JTRS terminals? Has OSD or the Air Force measured the cost 

in terms of delay or inefficiencies? What is the plan to close these gaps and more 

efficiently plan to fully utilize the resources available? 

General SHELTON. 2) The Air Force coordinates fielding schedules with Combatant 

Commands for all weapons systems. This interaction is critical toward mitigating 

the impact of capability delays, which cannot be quantified in terms of cost alone. 

Air Force Space Command is focused on delivering advanced Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT), protected satellite communications, and missile detection/ 

missile warning capabilities to the warfighter. In November 2011, the DOD approved an incremental acquisition strategy for the next generation of Military GPS 

User Equipment (MGUE) capable of exploiting the newest, most advanced military 

GPS signal. Current GPS enterprise acquisition schedules show the 24th Militarycode capable satellite launching by FY18, with full rate production of the first units 

of Increment MGUE in FY17. 

With the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) program, synchronization 

is improving due to the successful upgrade of the Army’s Secure Mobile Anti-jam 

Reliable Tactical Terminal and the Navy Multi-band Terminal. The Air Force is restructuring the Family of Beyond Line of Sight Terminals program. With this restructure, we are pursuing the highest priority terminals first to ensure protected 

communications for the air (E–4B and E–6B) and ground command post terminals 

with Presidential and National Voice Conferencing capabilities. 

Finally, the first Space Based Infrared Systems (SBIRS) Geosynchronous Earth 

Orbit satellite is undergoing a rigorous operational certification process. Preliminary 

test results show the space vehicle is meeting or exceeding performance requirements. The staring sensor is undergoing preliminary calibrations—at the payload 

level, it is detecting targets 25% dimmer than expected and the data are being 

shared with the research and development and Technical Intelligence communities. 

The DOD funded initiatives, separate from the program of record, will deliver interim capabilities to process the data from the staring sensor in FY15/16. The sensor will contribute to the most stressing missile warning/missile defense performance requirements with full mission operations after acceptance of the final SBIRS 

Increment 2 ground system in FY18. 

Mr. TURNER. 3) General Shelton, what is the purpose and value of the Counter 

Space Technology List (CSTL) developed by the State Department and the Aerospace Corporation? Should the CSTL be integrated into the export control reform 

process? 
92 

General SHELTON. 3) The Counterspace Sensitive Technology List (CSTL) is an 

ongoing research and analytical project, intended as a technical information aid to 

support export licensing and nonproliferation decisions. As such, we understand it 

is a proven reference tool. It was one of the many references used by the members 

of the Category XV Technical Working Group to develop and justify the technical 

performance parameters recommendations in the proposed update to United States 

Munitions List Category XV Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment published as Appendix 1 of the final 1248 Report. The Department of Defense, through 

the Defense Technology Security Administration, and other departments and agencies are working with the State Department to ensure the completeness of the 

CSTL. 

Mr. TURNER. 4) The Operationally Responsive Space office is proposed for termination in the fiscal year 13 budget. Please explain why this program is being cancelled, what plans the Air Force has to sustain the ORS mission and how this will 

provide more responsive and timely space capabilities to the warfighter? 

General SHELTON. 4) We plan to restructure the ORS program to incorporate the 

ORS tenants of responsiveness and resiliency across our space programs, to include 

programs such as the Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite, Space Based 

Infrared Systems, Global Positioning System III Operational Control Segment, 

Space Control Technology Insertion, and Technology Transfer programs. Beginning 

in 2013, we plan to meet warfighter needs for responsive space capabilities through 

programs of record and mechanisms such as the Joint Urgent Operational Needs 

process. 

The Space and Missile Systems Center’s Space Development and Test Directorate 

is sustaining the ORS–1 space vehicle and ground components through the life of 

the system—with approximately $7M/year of Overseas Contingency Operations 

funds. 

Mr. TURNER. 5) The Space Test Program has been a national capability relied on 

by laboratories and universities since 1965. Many critical space-based programs, 

such as GPS, have their origins in technology that was launched on STP missions. 

Please explain why the Department is requesting to cancel this critical program 

that provides the seed corn for future capabilities. Is there any other R&D organization that performs the mission of STP, integrating and launching payloads across 

the Department and coordinating experiments to fly aboard the International Space 

Station? Further, did the Air Force coordinate with the affected Government laboratories and organizations so they could properly plan for this in the FY 13 budget 

request? 

General SHELTON. 5) The Space Test Program funding was eliminated due to 

higher Department of Defense priorities. We are coordinating with affected agencies 

to ensure space experiment work continues under the auspices of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Air Force Research Laboratory and other 

Service research laboratories. 

Mr. TURNER. 6) The Secretary of Defense in the Annual Industrial Capabilities 

Report to Congress, dated September 2011, highlighted DOD’s concern for the U.S. 

Liquid Rocket Propulsion Industrial Base (LRPIB), and specifically the Air Force 

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program’s reliance on Russian engines. 

What are your perspectives on the need to invest in domestic liquid rocket engines 

for use on our critical National Security Space launch missions? What must be done 

and when in order to preserve the critical U.S. liquid rocket engine industrial base 

and the unique science and engineering capability that supports this industrial 

base? 

General SHELTON. 6) The Air Force is operating engines designed decades ago. In 

many instances, these engines are operating near the upper-margin of the performance capabilities—this is a mission assurance concern. 

We are pursuing several avenues to modernize rocket engine technology. First, we 

are looking toward design of an upper stage with increased performance margins. 

Second, the Air Force Research Laboratory is developing next-generation technologies to include a new, domestically produced hydrocarbon main engine for eventual incorporation into the existing launch vehicle fleet. Finally, we are monitoring 

the progress of civilian companies entering the commercial unmanned and manned 

spaceflight markets. 

In addition, both the Air Force EELV acquisition and new entrant strategies contribute to the preservation of the LRPIB and the science and engineering capability 

supporting the industrial base. The steady-state procurement rates of the acquisition strategy fosters efficient execution and enables companies to retain workforce 

expertise, providing stability and predictability to the EELV program, and thus to 

the LRPIB. The New Entrant Strategy encourages competition, which also contributes to the LRPIB. 
93 

Mr. TURNER. 7) Should the launch schedule slip, as has historically been the case, 

how will the excess inventory the Air Force builds up effect competition from New 

Entrants? How much generally are the storage costs per booster, and who pays 

those costs? 

General SHELTON. 7) Most upcoming Air Force launches are recurring flights for 

programs that have already launched satellites supporting their respective missions; 

therefore, these satellites are very similar, if not identical, to their predecessors. 

This reduces the chance of development or production delays, and increases the likelihood these satellites will launch on schedule. We do not foresee a need to store 

launch vehicles. In addition, we are working the Atlas ‘‘white tail’’ concept to provide a common booster core for Atlas rockets, and the Delta Fleet Standardization 

to introduce a common RS–68 engine across all Delta IV variants. These two efforts 

will increase booster assignment flexibility and reduce launch delays. 

Mr. TURNER. 8) What is the status of the new acquisition strategy for the Evolved 

Expendable Launch Vehicle, and what is the specific information that will be gathered to inform the final decision the block buy contract? What are the expected savings from the new strategy? 

General SHELTON. 8) The EELV Acquisition Strategy, approved November 24, 

2011, addresses the challenges of lowering costs while maintaining mission success 

through an annual booster commitment and infusing competition into the program. 

The success of this strategy is based on obtaining accurate information prior to contract award. 

The FY13 Phase 1 Buy request for proposal requires United Launch Alliance to 

price both ranges in periods of performance, three to five years for hardware and 

up to seven years for capability, and quantities of six to ten ‘‘core’’ launch vehicles 

per year with the ability to launch eight to ten missions per year. This approach 

allows the government to balance launch vehicle production rate and length of commitment decisions. It enables the government to secure the best price per launch 

service (includes launch vehicle and associated launch support), and provides stability and predictability for the EELV program. Savings from the new strategy will 

depend on the delivered proposal and the final rate and quantity of launch services 

selected by the Air Force. 

Mr. TURNER. 9) When do you assess that a new entrant will meet the established 

criteria for national security space EELV-class launches? 

General SHELTON. 9) We expect at least one new entrant ready to compete for 

launches in the FY16–17 timeframe. The Air Force conducted a New Entrant Industry Day on December 1, 2011, with 100 attendees representing 15 aerospace companies and their affiliates and five government partners. Breakout sessions involved 

discussions with four potential new entrants. To date, the Air Force has received 

one Statement of Intent (SOI) for certification and we expect additional SOIs later 

this year. We are in the process of evaluating the SOI received and do not have a 

projected certification date yet. 

No new entrant has a demonstrated capability to launch EELV–Class payloads. 

To facilitate the certification of potential new entrants, the Air Force identified two 

opportunities on which new entrants may bid: the Space Test Program–2 and the 

Deep Space Climate Observatory. These EELV-class missions will provide an opportunity for potential new entrants to prove their capability for certification. The certification timeline depends on the new entrants; specifically, their technical 

progress, the quality and sufficiency of the data they provide and a successful flight 

history. The Air Force is committed to certifying new entrants for EELV launches 

as soon as feasible. 

Mr. TURNER. 10) GAO recently released its annual report on duplication, overlap, 

and fragmentation and reported that ‘‘Space launch acquisition processes for NASA 

and DOD are not formally coordinated, duplicate one another, and may not fully leverage the Government’s investment because the Government is not acting as a single buyer.’’ Please identify cost savings opportunities and identify what is being 

done to reduce duplication and leverage investments? 

General SHELTON. 10) The Air Force is collaborating with NASA to find common 

solutions for launch needs. In 2010, NASA and the Air Force conducted a joint study 

to assess the feasibility of a mutual liquid oxygen and kerosene engine for EELV 

and the Space Launch System. The Liquid Propulsion Steering Group was created 

in February 2012 to act as an advisory board responsible for integrating Air Force 

liquid rocket propulsion requirements with the propulsion needs of external organizations and agencies. We are incorporating NASA’s engine requirements for a Cryogenic Propulsion Stage as we explore options for replacing the EELV upper stage 

engine. At the technical level, we are active participants in each other’s design reviews, and DOD and NASA are working together on the FY12 National Defense Authorization Act National Rocket Propulsion Study. 
94 

Mr. TURNER. 11) There are potential program areas where the DOD and NASA 

may have common or similar requirements for evolving space launch capabilities. 

These include high-thrust liquid oxygen—kerosene rocket propulsion systems/boosters for use on next-generation EELV and NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Advanced Booster. How have the DOD and NASA collaborated toward establishing 

common requirements whereby a common liquid booster could be established for use 

on both programs? Are there active efforts between the DOD and NASA to coordinate Research and Development roadmaps so that maximum space launch benefits 

can be obtained? If yes, please describe some examples of these coordinated actions 

and ongoing collaborations. 

General SHELTON. 11) The Air Force continues to collaborate with NASA to find 

common solutions for launch needs. In 2010, NASA and the Air Force collaborated 

on an extensive study to assess the feasibility of a mutual liquid oxygen and kerosene engine for EELV and the Space Launch System. In February 2012, the Liquid 

Propulsion Steering Group was created to act as an advisory board responsible for 

integrating Air Force liquid rocket propulsion requirements with the propulsion 

needs of external organizations and agencies. We are incorporating NASA’s engine 

requirements for a Cryogenic Propulsion Stage as we explore options for replacing 

the EELV upper stage engine. At the technical level, we are active participants in 

each other’s design reviews, and DOD and NASA are working together on the FY12 

National Defense Authorization Act National Rocket Propulsion Study. 

Mr. TURNER. 12) What is DOD doing, or planning to do, to define and assess its 

mission assurance costs and activities, and to what extent will the new acquisition 

strategy protect against overly high launch vehicle prices compared with mission assurance changes/efficiencies resulting from these assessments? Further, please outline how mission assurance for national security space missions differs from commercial space missions. 

General SHELTON. 12) Mission assurance is a rigorous, continuous technical and 

management process employed over the life-cycle of a launch system to ensure mission success. There are two distinct facets to mission assurance. Integrated mission 

assurance is accomplished by the organizations involved in the launch vehicle design, production, testing and launch processing. Independent mission assurance, a 

crucial component of the success of National Security Space launches, is often identified with ‘‘mission assurance costs.’’ This effort includes a number of technical reviews and analyses tailored for each mission, enabling a launch readiness independent assessment. It comprises less than 5% of the launch enterprise total costs, 

yet its value to the overall enterprise is hard to overstate. In fact, the Space Launch 

Broad Area Review, conducted just over ten years ago, recommended we return to 

in-depth mission assurance following a series of launch failures. 

The Air Force will continue to encourage efficiencies without impacting mission 

success. The current launch capability contract, signed June 2011, includes a mission success performance incentive ensuring focus on mission requirements and a 

cost control incentive motivating the contractor to find efficiencies within its operations. 

The principal difference between mission assurance requirements for national security space missions and commercial missions is summarized by the impact realized by a launch failure. Most, if not all, commercial launches are privately insured, 

and launch failures represent lost revenue. National Security Space launches are indemnified by the U.S. Government, and launch failures represent a significant cost 

to the taxpayers, as well as the mission impact of the loss of that particular satellite—a loss that could take many years to overcome. 

Mr. TURNER. 13) Does DOD plan to develop its own price estimates for varying 

block buy quantities and contract lengths, or will it solely rely on the price proposals 

from United Launch Alliance? 

General SHELTON. 13) Yes. The Air Force will follow Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 15 negotiation processes to develop and negotiate fair and reasonable 

prices. Auditors from the Defense Contract Audit Agency will support the Air Force 

negotiation team. In addition, a joint team composed of the National Reconnaissance 

Office Cost Analysis Improvement Group and the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency 

is performing analyses of costs for the RS–68 main engine, RL–10 upper stage engine, systems engineering, program management and launch operations. Data gathered from these reviews will inform the Air Force negotiating position. 

Mr. TURNER. 14) Can you discuss any Department efforts to establish a longerterm plan for MILSATCOM? What is the projected demand in narrowband, wideband, and protected communications and how does the Department plan to meet it? 

What is the Department doing to ensure it is procuring Ku-band commercial satellite communications in the most efficient manner? 
95 

General SHELTON. 14) In the near term, we are maximizing our use of Ku-band 

commercial satellite communications by using the Defense Information Systems 

Agency’s Future Commercial Satellite Communications Services Acquisition contract. In the longer term, we have analyzed future demand for these capabilities 

based on approved Defense Planning Scenarios. We are now executing the third and 

final phase of the Resilient Basis for Satellite Communications in Joint Operations 

Study to determine the best architectures to meet the future demand. The architectures under consideration include combinations of traditional military communication satellite systems and those acquired through innovative commercial lease/buy 

opportunities. 

Mr. TURNER. 15) What is the right balance of organic space capability and commercially leased or hosted capability? How much of our space capability is currently 

being provided by commercial providers? How can we increase the opportunities for 

hosted payloads to save costs and bring capability online more quickly? 

General SHELTON. 15) In accordance with the 2010 National Space Policy, the Air 

Force is pursuing commercial space capabilities to the ‘‘maximum extent possible’’ 

when those capabilities meet our requirements and are cost-effective. We are investigating opportunities to augment military space capabilities such as environmental 

monitoring; Positioning, Navigation and Timing; space-based imagery; and launch 

with commercial services. In addition, the Space and Missile Systems Center’s 

Hosted Payload Office is identifying cost-effective hosting opportunities in the commercial market and developing an efficient business approach and contract vehicle 

for hosted payloads. Their efforts will lead to recommendations for the future. 

Mr. TURNER. 16) As the responsible steward of GPS, what does the Air Force see 

as the future of GPS in a fiscally constrained environment? What alternative methods and technologies are being evaluated to cost-effectively meet the GPS mission? 

General SHELTON. 16) Air Force Space Command is moving forward with cost-efficient strategies while balancing warfighter needs and the mandate to preserve GPS 

as the world’s Positioning, Navigation and Timing gold standard. We are pursuing 

studies in Ground Segment automation and dual manifest launches for manpower 

and launch cost savings. The Department of Defense’s recent GPS Enterprise Modernization Analysis of Alternatives is on-going and will identify cost-effective capability modernization alternatives. In the longer-term, we are tracking innovative 

technology alternatives, such as terrestrial-based augmentation and highly-accurate 

inertial navigation, for potential inclusion into the GPS Enterprise as these technologies mature. 

Mr. TURNER. 17) The Department requested only $2M in FY13 for ‘‘Weather Satellite Follow-On’’ efforts, and projected no money after that in the Five Year Defense 

Plan. While we recognize that the Department is relying on the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program to meet its near-term needs, what is the longer term plan to 

meet this critical mission area? 

General SHELTON. 17) The Air Force is extending Defense Meteorological Satellite 

Program (DMSP) operations until 2025 by transitioning to a single string orbit and 

launching the remaining two DMSP satellites in an on-demand basis. In preparation 

for a follow-on to DMSP, we are validating the future capabilities required and conducting a study to identify the optimum approach for the follow-on program. 

Mr. TURNER. 18) We have heard a lot about the need for resiliency of our space 

systems. How do we measure resiliency of an architecture? Do we have a way to 

model resiliency to evaluate our current systems, their strengths and weaknesses 

and determine what is sufficient? Compare current systems to future concepts? 

What are the most important steps the U.S. needs to take in order to create space 

systems that are resilient to threats? 

General SHELTON. 18) Resiliency of space systems can be measured by an architecture’s ability to resist an attack by avoiding damage or degradation, absorbing 

damage but maintaining structure and key functions and reconstituting to pre-event 

status. 

While the models for measuring resiliency for each space capability area differ, 

the Department of Defense does have a standard framework for assessing a functional architecture. This framework consists of identifying the anticipated threat, 

the minimum and desired levels of mission performance, the risk of not meeting 

these performance levels, the consequence to the mission of not meeting a given performance level and the duration over which a performance shortfall is tolerable. 

In the past, the threats to our spacecraft were not as concerning, so National Security Space programs built robustness into individual systems. Due to the current 

and increasing future threats, our concepts for providing resilient architectures include disaggregating capabilities on multiple satellites, non-traditional orbital regimes, hosting payloads on other satellites and integrating allied nation space and 

cyberspace capabilities. 
96 

Mr. TURNER. 19) Discuss the progress of the Space Protection Program. What 

have been its accomplishments since its establishment in 2008 and, what space protection areas continue to need the greatest attention? What is your assessment of 

how the defense and intelligence community have worked together to support the 

activities of this office? 

General SHELTON. 19) Since 2008, the Space Protection Program (SPP), a joint Air 

Force Space Command and National Reconnaissance Office Program, has energized 

the National Security Space community to implement strategies to improve resiliency and mission assurance. They delivered the Capabilities and Dependencies 

database, enabling United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) to calculate 

the operational consequences of multiple space systems losses. In addition, several 

National Security Space programs have integrated protection capabilities into program baselines. 

This year, marks the culmination of several major efforts. SPP is completing testing of techniques that will allow USSTRATCOM to ensure communications capabilities in a highly contested environment. They are also working with United States 

Pacific Command and USSTRATCOM to incorporate new Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures for enhancing deployed systems survivability. Furthermore, this summer, SPP will complete an effort with multiple Services and agencies to demonstrate 

the effectiveness of various defeat capabilities and laying the groundwork for integrating those capabilities into operational architectures. 

The Department of Defense and Intelligence Community continue to work in close 

coordination to develop and improve mission assurance capabilities. Of note, SPP is 

integrating a set of Title 10 and Title 50 response options involving the entire protection community to endorse performance requirements for the Space Situational 

Awareness architecture in a representative threat environment. The results will be 

delivered in approximately three months. These efforts, along with an associated effort to better define Indications and Warning support to space operations, indicate 

the coordination in the National Security Space community is strong and productive. 

Mr. TURNER. 20) What efforts and long-term planning is the Department engaged 

in to ensure its spectrum continues to be safeguarded in the future? 

General SHELTON. 20) The Air Force is engaged in multiple efforts, internationally 

and nationally, to ensure we continue to provide spectrum access capabilities to the 

Joint fight. At the same time, we recognize spectrum also fuels consumer and business wireless services and provides economic benefits to the Nation. 

Internationally, the Air Force was a key participant and contributor in the United 

States preparation for and attendance at the United Nation’s International Telecommunications Union World Radio Communication Conferences (WRC). At WRC– 

12, significant gains were made regarding spectrum for unmanned aerial systems 

command and control, contributing toward congressionally directed efforts to integrate unmanned aircraft operations into the National Airspace System. The Conference also identified 300 additional megahertz of globally harmonized spectrum for 

radar use to support the development and operation of advanced synthetic aperture 

radars. 

Nationally, the Air Force is heavily involved in the presidentially directed and National Telecommunications and Information Administration led effort to identify 500 

megahertz of additional spectrum for broadband wireless use. Our approach is 

straightforward: if we can prevent impacts to Air Force capabilities, we will not oppose repurposing of spectrum. Preventing impacts is dependent upon the availability 

of alternate spectrum, payment of our costs through the Spectrum Relocation Fund, 

and the time required making the transition. 

We are also working closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Chief 

Information Officer on the development of a Department of Defense Long Term 

Spectrum Strategy to address how the Department will address the continuing pressures on our spectrum access. 

Mr. TURNER. 21) What is the acquisition strategy for the Joint Space Operations 

Center Mission System (JMS) program? How will the strategy leverage existing investments in commercial and Government capabilities? 

General SHELTON. 21) The JMS acquisition strategy leverages existing government off the shelf (GOTS) and commercial off the shelf (COTS) products to the maximum extent possible, producing a very cost-effective procurement process. The JMS 

Program Office conducted market research to identify and assess the existing government and commercial capabilities that meet the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council-approved JMS requirements. No existing COTS solutions exist that will 

fully satisfy these requirements. The program office will procure appropriate COTS 

products that satisfy subsets of these requirements through fixed-price contracts 

and will use Multiple-award Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity contracts to pro-
97 

cure those capabilities needing additional development work to meet the remaining 

requirements. 

Mr. TURNER. 22) What is the purpose and value of the Counter Space Technology 

List (CSTL) developed by the State Department and the Aerospace Corporation? 

Should the CSTL be integrated into the export control reform process? 

Mr. SCHULTE. 22) The Counterspace Sensitive Technology List (CSTL) is an ongoing research and analytical project, intended as a technical information aid to support export licensing and nonproliferation decisions. As such, it has proven to be an 

invaluable reference tool. It was one of the many references used by the members 

of the Category XV Technical Working Group to develop and justify the technical 

performance parameters recommendations in the proposed update to USML Category XV Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment published as Appendix 1 

of the final 1248 Report. DOD, through the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA), and other departments and agencies are working with the State Department to ensure the completeness of the CSTL. 

Mr. TURNER. 23) What is the right balance of organic space capability and commercially leased or hosted capability? How much of our space capability is currently 

being provided by commercial providers? How can we increase the opportunities for 

hosted payloads to save costs and bring capability online more quickly? 

Mr. SCHULTE. 23) The Counterspace Sensitive Technology List (CSTL) is an ongoing research and analytical project, intended as a technical information aid to support export licensing and nonproliferation decisions. As such, it has proven to be an 

invaluable reference tool. It was one of the many references used by the members 

of the Category XV Technical Working Group to develop and justify the technical 

performance parameters recommendations in the proposed update to USML Category XV Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment published as Appendix 1 

of the final 1248 Report. DOD, through the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA), and other departments and agencies are working with the State Department to ensure the completeness of the CSTL. 

Mr. TURNER. 24) We have heard a lot about the need for resiliency of our space 

systems. How do we measure resiliency of an architecture? Do we have a way to 

model resiliency to evaluate our current systems, their strengths and weaknesses 

and determine what is sufficient? Compare current systems to future concepts? 

What are the most important steps the U.S. needs to take in order to create space 

systems that are resilient to threats? 

Mr. SCHULTE. 24) Resilience is the ability of an architecture to support the functions necessary for mission success in spite of hostile action or adverse conditions. 

An architecture is ‘‘more resilient’’ if it can provide these functions with higher probability, shorter periods of reduced capability, and across a wider range of scenarios, 

conditions, and threats. Resilience may leverage cross-domain or alternative government, commercial, or international capabilities. 

This definition and an associated methodology were developed by the Department 

and reviewed by the Defense Space Council. The basic evaluation methodology relies 

on system-of-systems fault analysis against different types and levels of threats. 

This is then supplemented with performance satisfaction analysis to determine the 

degraded level of capability against any adverse circumstance. The on-going Resilient Basis for SATCOM (RBS) Study and Joint Overhead Persistent Infra-Red Space 

Trade Study (JOIST) are the first architectural-level studies to assess resilience. 

As we look to the future, the most important steps we can take to enhance resilience are to adopt a payload-centric acquisition approach, coupled with greater 

international collaboration and smaller, simpler, more affordable, incremental, 

disaggregated mission satellites and hosted payloads. This more diverse, distributed, 

complex targeting approach denies adversaries the benefit of attack and imposes an 

unacceptable cost and complexity on their attack calculus. 

Mr. TURNER. 25) Discuss the progress of the Space Protection Program. What 

have been its accomplishments since its establishment in 2008 and, what space protection areas continue to need the greatest attention? What is your assessment of 

how the defense and intelligence community have worked together to support the 

activities of this office? 

Mr. SCHULTE. 25) The Space Protection Program (SPP) has made important recommendations on how to reduce certain vulnerabilities in key space systems/constellations and identified ways to maintain our strategic advantage. Since 2008, the 

SPP has provided threat assessments, expanding upon intelligence assessments to 

include engineering judgments, technical analysis of suspected threat systems, and 

concepts to mitigate certain threats. In addition, the SPP supported development of 

the National Security Space Strategy, the Space Protection Strategy (SPS), which 

identifies protection priorities, and other key efforts in the department. 
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We remain focused on multiple mission priorities, including efforts to enhance the 

resilience of our Missile Warning, ISR, and Communications architectures. DOD 

worked collaboratively with the Intelligence Community (IC) to establish the SPP, 

and we continue to work with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to assess 

the scope, functions, organization, and resources of the SPP, with a view towards 

building an enduring organization for resilience and mission assurance, increasing 

its effectiveness across the U.S. space enterprise, and integrating a closer working 

relationship among DOD, the IC, and civil agencies. 

Mr. TURNER. 26) What efforts and long-term planning is the Department engaged 

in to ensure its spectrum continues to be safeguarded in the future? 

Mr. SCHULTE. 26) The use of the electromagnetic spectrum continues to be a critical enabler of our warfighting capabilities. We are sensitive to the competing spectrum demands resulting from the Department’s increasing reliance on spectrum-dependent technologies and the rapid modernization of commercial mobile devices on 

a national and international scale. Recognizing that the demand for spectrum will 

continue to increase, the Department has long-term initiatives aimed at using and 

managing our spectrum more efficiently, identifying and investing in spectrally efficient technologies that afford us combat advantages, and advancing the interoperability of spectrum use and management with our coalition partners, and with Federal, State, and commercial entities. 

Mr. TURNER. 27) The GAO found that satellites, ground control systems, and user 

terminals in most of DOD’s major space system acquisitions were not optimally 

aligned, leading to underutilized satellites and limited capability provided to the 

warfighter—in some cases for periods measured in years. What is DOD doing to address the synchronization problems, particularly with GPS M–Code user terminals, 

AEHF Family of Beyond the Line of Sight Terminals, SBIRS starring sensor, and 

Navy MUOS JTRS terminals? Has OSD or the Air Force measured the cost in terms 

of delay or inefficiencies? What is the plan to close these gaps and more efficiently 

plan to fully utilize the resources available? 

Mr. KLINGER. 27) Synchronization of schedules between space and ground components is recognized as an issue that limits some users from fully utilizing on-orbit 

capabilities. Launch schedules are such that the space components are required to 

maintain current capabilities while also affording enhanced capabilities requiring 

expanded ground processing or alternative user equipment in some cases. The Department is currently assessing ways to more efficiently bring ground component 

utility to more optimal levels. The following address the specific systems identified. 

The Air Force is focused on delivering new Positioning, Navigation and Timing 

(PNT) capabilities as quickly and cost effectively as possible. Providing a new PNT 

capability, such as military-code (M-code), to warfighters requires populating the 

GPS constellation with modernized satellites (GPS IIR–M, IIF & III), fielding a control segment capable of providing C2 of new capabilities (OCX), as well as providing 

DOD GPS users with an industrial base to acquire M-code capable GPS receiver 

technology (MGUE). By FY18, the GPS constellation will be populated with the 24th 

M-code satellite, OCX will have transitioned to operations and sufficient development and operational testing and evaluation will have been accomplished to support 

a Full Rate Production decision for fielding MGUE. 

The Department has struggled to deliver the FAB–T program and synchronize 

with the AEHF satellite to take advantage of the new capabilities. The first AEHF 

satellite achieved orbit last year and is completing operational check out. We are 

in the process of restructuring the FAB–T program to reduce continued cost and 

schedule risk and now expect to deliver the first FAB–T in FY15. The restructure 

includes putting an alternate source for the highest priority capabilities, especially 

those on command and control platforms, on contract in 2012 to address development schedule risk. The restructure also includes conversion of the current development contract to a fixed price contract for the development, and fixed price options 

for production. 

Other AEHF terminals, the Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT), Air Force Minuteman MEECN Program Upgrade (MMPU) and Army Secure Mobile Anti-jam Reliable Tactical Terminal (SMART–T), are being fielded now, and will be able to utilize 

the full AEHF capability as soon as it becomes available for operational use. Since 

AEHF and all existing EHF terminals are also compatible with the legacy Milstar 

waveform, the AEHF satellite resources will be utilized when available. The operational cost is some users having to delay the migration to higher data rates and 

use of specific capabilities requiring the higher rates. 

The space component of SBIRS GEO–1 is ahead of the ground in the use of both 

scanning and staring sensors. Scanners represent the legacy detection schema and 

retain a place in future on-orbit architectures. Staring sensors are a more robust 
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capability for which the current ground processing is being expanded and will be 

fully implemented by 2018. During the interim period the scanner data continue to 

be of use as a result of data processing efforts within the USAF. 

Regarding MUOS, in July 2011 the USD(AT&L) directed a Red Team be established to determine the viability and probability of success of fielding the MUOS terminal/waveform capability. A goal of the Red Team was to assess the synchronization of the MUOS satellite and the JTRS ground terminal. The Red Team presented results of the assessment in November 2011 and USD(AT&L) directed they 

be implemented. A directive specifying timelines to accomplish Red Team tasks as 

well as determining service integration responsibilities is currently being reviewed 

by USD(AT&L). 

Mr. TURNER. 28) The Operationally Responsive Space office is proposed for termination in the fiscal year 13 budget. Please explain why this program is being cancelled, what plans the Air Force has to sustain the ORS mission and how this will 

provide more responsive and timely space capabilities to the warfighter? 

Mr. KLINGER. 28) With the successes of the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) 

programs, the Department decided to incorporate the concept of operationally responsive space into the Air Force Space & Missile Systems Center (SMC) to increase 

resiliency, survivability and flexibility across all DOD space programs. 

Transition efforts are underway to fully integrate responsive space principles into 

space architectures and Space Modernization Initiatives to: 

• Develop enablers to ensure resilience, survivability and flexibility 

• Explore space mission augmentation options 

• Incorporate responsiveness into Research and Development (R&D) efforts across 

other platforms 

• Integrate lessons learned from ORS accomplishments. 

By integrating responsive space into the mission area platforms in both R&D and 

acquisition practice, the Department will continue to provide responsive and timely 

space capabilities to the warfighter. 

Additionally, the Joint Staff has an extremely responsive and proven Joint Urgent 

Operational Needs (JUON) and newer Joint Emergent Operational Needs (JEON) 

process which will continue to provide responsive capabilities to Combatant Commander urgent needs. 

Mr. TURNER. 29) The Space Test Program has been a national capability relied 

on by laboratories and universities since 1965. Many critical space-based programs, 

such as GPS, have their origins in technology that was launched on STP missions. 

Please explain why the Department is requesting to cancel this critical program 

that provides the seed corn for future capabilities. Is there any other R&D organization that performs the mission of STP, integrating and launching payloads across 

the Department and coordinating experiments to fly aboard the International Space 

Station? Further, did the Air Force coordinate with the affected Government laboratories and organizations so they could properly plan for this in the FY 13 budget 

request? 

Mr. KLINGER. 29) Current fiscal constraints have resulted in the need to terminate STP in order to reallocate funding to higher priorities. While no other organization currently provides DOD-wide space access services or coordinates DOD experimentation aboard the International Space Station, spaceflight opportunities, both 

dedicated and rideshare, will still be available to the DOD science and technology 

community. Additionally, the DOD Joint Capability Technology Demonstration Program has several space capabilities and launch demonstrations planned. 

DOD organizations will continue to invest in research and development of advanced space technologies, and will develop and fund their own space-access means 

and capabilities. While the desired coordination with affected government laboratories and organizations did not occur due to time constraints during the final balancing of the President’s Budget. The FY13 budget request includes funds for STP 

to operate throughout FY13 and the Department is coordinating an approach to provide future space access for DOD experiments. 

Mr. TURNER. 30) To account for the Space Test Program termination, are the 

budgets for the laboratories across the Department being increased, in the FY13 PB 

and the FYDP, to account for the expanded mission of launching their payloads? If 

so, by how much? If not, how will this ongoing requirement be met in the future? 

Mr. KLINGER. 30) Budgets for DOD laboratories were set independently from the 

STP termination decision. The Air Force Research Laboratories, Naval Research 

Laboratories, Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Defense Advance Research Project Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and other DOD organizations will continue to make significant investments in space related research, including the space access costs. 
100 

Mr. TURNER. 31) The Secretary of Defense in the Annual Industrial Capabilities 

Report to Congress, dated September 2011, highlighted DOD’s concern for the U.S. 

Liquid Rocket Propulsion Industrial Base (LRPIB), and specifically the Air Force 

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program’s reliance on Russian engines. 

What are your perspectives on the need to invest in domestic liquid rocket engines 

for use on our critical National Security Space launch missions? What must be done 

and when in order to preserve the critical U.S. liquid rocket engine industrial base 

and the unique science and engineering capability that supports this industrial 

base? 

Mr. KLINGER. 31) There are several reasons why it is urgent that we readdress 

our current investment in liquid rocket engines. First, the upper stage engine used 

on the Delta IV is no longer in production. We have a stockpile that will last several 

years, but we must restart the line or replace this engine. Atlas V uses a similar 

upper stage that, although still in production, is also scheduled to stop production. 

The Department needs to collaborate with the United Launch Alliance to determine 

the way-ahead. Resolution of continued upper stage liquid rocket engine availability 

is most urgent. 

Second, as you noted, we depend on the Russians to provide RD–180 boost engines for the first-stage of the Atlas V; this approach has obvious concerns. Investment in development of a domestically-produced, hydrocarbon-fueled, staged-combustion boost engine with similar or better performance than the RD–180 would 

eliminate this dependency and give a much-needed injection of capital to our liquid 

rocket engine industrial base. We mitigate this dependency today with a stockpile 

of RD–180 engines to allow us sufficient time to react, if needed. The DOD and 

NASA are collaborating on a study of liquid rocket engine alternatives for both firstand upper-stage that was commissioned by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The 

DOD will use the results of this study to inform budget requests that will be sent 

to the Congress for FY 2014. NASA intends to leverage the results of this study in 

their own roadmap, which will be expressed in the National Rocket Propulsion 

Strategy. 

Mr. TURNER. 32) Should the launch schedule slip, as has historically been the 

case, how will the excess inventory the Air Force builds up effect competition from 

New Entrants? How much generally are the storage costs per booster, and who pays 

those costs? 

Mr. KLINGER. 32) Our analysis of satellite readiness for launch indicates that the 

rate of 6–10 cores per year over 3–5 years that is anticipated under the Air Force 

EELV acquisition strategy is insufficient to meet the expected demand. Although we 

have experienced launch delays in the past, circumstances that led to lower than 

expected launch rates no longer exist. We are entering a period during which several National Security Space programs that involve constellations of satellites are 

now in full-scale production, so we anticipate a full launch manifest for the foreseeable future. 

The Department’s contractor does not produce or store excess launch vehicles. 

They acquire some long-lead materials and stockpile them at their expense, but the 

factory adjusts production to match confirmed deliveries to the launch site as the 

satellites arrive for integration and launch preparation. If an already-ordered 

launch were indefinitely delayed, the factory would adjust production to match the 

revised manifest and any cores already in production for the delayed launch would 

be reassigned to the next suitable mission. 

Mr. TURNER. 33) What is the status of the new acquisition strategy for the 

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, and what is the specific information that will 

be gathered to inform the final decision the block buy contract? What are the expected savings from the new strategy? 

Mr. KLINGER. 33) The EELV acquisition strategy was approved by the Air Force 

Acquisition Executive on November 24, 2011, and the Air Force released a request 

for proposal March 23, 2012 requesting cost proposals that cover a range of launch 

rates and durations. From that data and our own independent analysis, the Department will award the first block-buy contract at the rate, duration, and with termination conditions that, together, offer the most advantageous terms to the Government. Actual savings will not be known until we receive and assess the proposal 

later this summer. 

Mr. TURNER. 34) When do you assess that a new entrant will meet the established 

criteria for national security space EELV-class launches? 

Mr. KLINGER. 34) Only one potential new entrant, the Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX), has stated an intention to qualify for future National 

Security Space (NSS) launch missions, and based on their current DOD- and NASAfunded launches, combined with their commercial launches and assuming the success of these missions, we expect them to achieve certification to compete for future 
101 

NSS missions by 2017. SpaceX has said they will be certified by 2014. Their estimate assumes no anomalies, which would be a first for a new launch vehicle (Falcon 

9D), and this forecast does not take into consideration additional mission assurance 

measures that SpaceX will be required to implement throughout their supply and 

construction chain before they can be awarded an EELV-class launch mission. 

Mr. TURNER. 35) GAO recently released its annual report on duplication, overlap, 

and fragmentation and reported that ‘‘Space launch acquisition processes for NASA 

and DOD are not formally coordinated, duplicate one another, and may not fully leverage the Government’s investment because the Government is not acting as a single buyer.’’ Please identify cost savings opportunities and identify what is being 

done to reduce duplication and leverage investments? 

Mr. KLINGER. 35) As the DOD’s lead for National Security Space (NSS) launches, 

the Air Force manages the NSS launch manifest and launch service acquisitions in 

coordination with NASA to leverage our combined buying power and acquire the 

best contract terms for the U. S. Government (USG). The DOD believes the USG 

launch customer community (DOD, NRO, and NASA) should collectively negotiate 

the number of launch vehicles and services based on the total USG demand to 

achieve an economy of scale. The DOD and NRO, for example, have an existing 

memorandum of understanding and collectively procure launch services with DOD, 

specifically Air Force Space Command, acting as the lead agent. Current policy encourages agencies to use another agency’s contract vehicle if the scope and terms 

of the providing agency’s contract meet the supported agency’s needs. However, 

NASA awarded the Launch Services II contract to meet their specific space launch 

requirements, which are not the same as the NSS requirements. 

Mr. TURNER. 36) There are potential program areas where the DOD and NASA 

may have common or similar requirements for evolving space launch capabilities. 

These include high-thrust liquid oxygen—kerosene rocket propulsion systems/boosters for use on next-generation EELV and NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Advanced Booster. How have the DOD and NASA collaborated toward establishing 

common requirements whereby a common liquid booster could be established for use 

on both programs? Are there active efforts between the DOD and NASA to coordinate Research and Development roadmaps so that maximum space launch benefits 

can be obtained? If yes, please describe some examples of these coordinated actions 

and ongoing collaborations. 

Mr. KLINGER. 36) The Air Force is working with NASA to explore the potential 

of a partnership to develop a new upper-stage, liquid-fueled engine for use in both 

the Air Force’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) and NASA’s Space 

Launch System (SLS). Under the Integrated High Payoff Rocket Propulsion Technology program (or IHPRPT), an Air Force-NASA project, a suite of physics-based 

modeling and simulation tools used to develop upper-stage engines has been deployed for use by the DOD and NASA. IHPRPT also develops components for a 

staged-combustion, hydrocarbon-fueled main booster. The Air Force Research Laboratory at Edwards Air Force Base is scheduled to conduct a demonstration firing 

of a sub-scale prototype of an engine built with these components in FY 2020. 

Building on these efforts, the DOD and NASA are collaborating on a study of liquid rocket engine alternatives for both first- and upper-stage that was commissioned 

by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The DOD will use the results of this study to 

inform budget requests that will be sent to the Congress for FY 2014. NASA intends 

to leverage the results of this study in their own roadmap, which will be expressed 

in the National Rocket Propulsion Strategy that the DOD is co-developing with 

NASA. The National Rocket Propulsion Strategy was directed in Section 1095 of the 

FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act. 

Mr. TURNER. 37) What is DOD doing, or planning to do, to define and assess its 

mission assurance costs and activities, and to what extent will the new acquisition 

strategy protect against overly high launch vehicle prices compared with mission assurance changes/efficiencies resulting from these assessments? Further please outline how mission assurance for national security space missions differs from commercial space missions. 

Mr. KLINGER. 37) Mission assurance activities consume approximately 5% of the 

EELV program budget. Each launch is unique and only those activities that contribute to the reliability of each launch are funded. The Air Force reviews mission 

assurance activities annually to prune away any that do not materially contribute 

to reducing the risk associated with all launch missions. 

The new EELV acquisition strategy seeks to control costs by achieving an economic order quantity, not through elimination of mission assurance measures. 

Commercial space missions are profit driven endeavors. As such, they can buy 

down their financial risk through insurance or negotiate it to the developer by purchasing only assets on orbit. National Security Space (NSS) missions are not profit 
102 

driven, but rather seek to provide unique sensor, navigation, and communications 

capabilities to meet the needs of warfighters in combat or intelligence needs of national policy makers. In a few cases, we have purchased services from commercial 

vendors to fill gaps in NSS capabilities, namely; communications and commercial 

imagery. But, only in those unique instances does an NSS mission begin to resemble 

a commercial model. For most NSS missions, there is no replacement option for the 

unique capabilities provided by the payload, so we impose higher mission assurance 

standards to reduce the risk of launch for these missions. The savings that might 

be realized from reducing mission assurance activities is insignificant compared to 

the opportunity cost of losing a critical NSS payload. 

Mr. TURNER. 38) The defense and intelligence user communities conducted a 

study in 2010 to jointly identify near-term ground investment opportunities that can 

lead to a more unified and interoperable Overhead Persistent Infrared ground architecture. What improvements are being made to capitalize on opportunities for data 

sharing and fusion? Can you identify any areas of improvement for the community 

to work more collectively on OPIR exploitation? 

Mr. KLINGER. 38)—What improvements are being made to capitalize on opportunities for data sharing and fusion? Answer: The on-going acquisition of JOG solutions 

provides a premier example of Intelligence Community (IC) and Department of Defense (DOD) cooperation in transforming OPIR stovepipes into an interoperable 

OPIR enterprise for the National System for Geospatial Intelligence (NSG). JOG solutions will deliver several critical capabilities to take full advantage of the IC and 

DOD’s OPIR systems. Most all of these solutions provide improved data product 

sharing and fusion. 

Commitment and support to JOG at all levels continues to be outstanding. JOG 

acquisition realized a major milestone when the senior leaders of the IC and DOD 

agencies partnering in JOG committed their full support. This strong collaboration 

led to a JOG Memorandum of Agreement, signed by the Directors, National 

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and Missile Defense Agency (MDA), and the 

Secretary of the Air Force on 30 September 2011. The JOG team received PhaseB-equivalent approval from the Joint (Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics and Assistant Director of National Intelligence for Acquisition, Technology, and Facilities) Intelligence Acquisition Board on 5 October 2011. 

Almost all the JOG solutions enable data sharing and fusion. Of the 23, seven 

materiel solutions are receiving initial funding in FY12: Mission Scheduling, OPIR 

Enterprise Mission Management (OEMM), Real-time Transfer Service (RTS), Space 

Based Infrared System (SBIRS) Wideband Data Distribution, Data Standards Development, Fast-Frame Processing for Battlespace Awareness/Space Situational 

Awareness Reporting (BA/SSA), and Joint Operations for BA/SSA. All seven enable 

data sharing and fusion. 

JOG solutions are grouped into three packages with deliveries scheduled for 

FY14, FY17, and FY20. Several solutions provide initial capabilities in early deliveries, with full capabilities in later deliveries. In addition to the seven solutions previously mentioned, the following capabilities also support data sharing and fusion: 

OPIR Real-time Message Formats, Real-time Web Reporting, and Full Frame Processing for Missile Defense, Joint OPIR Data Archive, Cobra Brass-F and SBIRS 

Geolocation Accuracy Improvements, and Enhanced Scene-based Products. 

—Can you identify any areas of improvement for the community to work more collectively on OPIR exploitation? Answer: The IC and DOD communities’ team on establishing joint OPIR policy through the recurring OPIR Working Group. Operationally, the two collaborate though the Joint OPIR Planning Cell. We look forward to 

USSTRATCOM formally approving the implementation of the Joint OPIR Priority 

Framework, which will provide unified priority guidance for DOD and IC tasking 

of OPIR satellites. Additionally, USSTRATCOM and NGA continue to collaborate on 

defining OPIR support to the BA capability, which will further support the acquisition of JOG solutions. 

Summary: JOG represents a major step forward for OPIR development and integration into the NSG. Solutions will provide users with new, high-value capabilities 

and support the delivery of an interoperable OPIR ground architecture for the joint 

IC and DOD community. NGA, Air Force, and MDA collaboration to acquire these 

solutions is outstanding; the team is off to a good start delivering OPIR capabilities 

that better serve all our OPIR users. 

Mr. TURNER. 39) Can you discuss any Department efforts to establish a longerterm plan for MILSATCOM? What is the projected demand in narrowband, wideband, and protected communications and how does the Department plan to meet it? 

What is the Department doing to ensure it is procuring Ku-band commercial satellite communications in the most efficient manner? 
103 

Mr. KLINGER. 39) Question 1: Can you discuss any Department efforts to establish 

a longer-term plan for MILSATCOM? 

Answer: The Department of Defense Fifteen-Year Defense Space Systems Investment Strategy for Fiscal Years 2012–2026, August 16, 2011 is the Department’s 

long-range space systems investment strategy. It is consistent with the FY 2012 

President’s Budget and reflects 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the 2010 National Space Policy and the 2011 National Security Space Strategy. The resilient 

and diversified approach to SATCOM capability acquisition offers operational flexibility in providing near-term surge needs as well as ensuring long-term availability 

of military communications in diverse wartime scenarios. Through ongoing studies 

and AoAs the Department is assessing the MILSATCOM architecture and outlining 

a strategy for development/procurement of long-term MILSATCOM. 

Question 2: What is the projected demand in narrowband, wideband, and protected communications and how does the Department plan to meet it? 

Answer: The Department is currently assessing the projected demand for space 

communications assets. Resource Management Decision 700, 25 January 2011, 

tasked the Executive Agent for Space, in coordination with the Under Secretary of 

Defense (USD) for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, USD (Intelligence), Assistant Secretary of Defense (NII), Joint Staff, United States Strategic Command, Director Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, Director National Reconnaissance 

Office and the Military Services to conduct a study to assess the future of satellite 

communications in context of the National Security Space Strategy. This study encompasses the nuclear, contested and benign operating environments. This study’s 

end-state objective is: 

• A comprehensive cost/benefit (warfighting effectiveness metric) analysis across 

the span of alternatives associated with mitigating the gaps identified in the 

Joint Space Communications Layer Initial Capability Document. 

• Identify preferred alternatives for near and long term needs. 

• Fully consider cost, schedule and performance trades. 

• Include a roadmap for transition from near to long-term solutions. 

Question 3: What is the Department doing to ensure it is procuring Ku-band commercial satellite communications in the most efficient manner? 

Answer: The Future Commercial Satellite Services Acquisition (FCSA) strategy 

(that includes all Ku band commercial satellite communications) has increased competition sevenfold, opening competition to more than 20 satellite vendors. We have 

already seen that this additional competition is providing better pricing. The transition for fixed satellite services (FSS) began last year, and mobile subscription services (MSS) transition begins this year. The government is in a better position today 

than yesterday in competing COMSATCOM requirements. 

Mr. TURNER. 40) What is the right balance of organic space capability and commercially leased or hosted capability? How much of our space capability is currently 

being provided by commercial providers? How can we increase the opportunities for 

hosted payloads to save costs and bring capability online more quickly? 

Mr. KLINGER. 40) As a consumer in the commercial satellite industry marketplace, 

DOD is engaged and proactive in formulating commercial satellite communication 

(COMSATCOM) investment and acquisition strategies to satisfy military operational 

requirements. Commercial leased or hosted capabilities have been an integral part 

of our SATCOM capability for years; leased COMSATCOM provides the predominance of CENTCOM communications, and is anticipated to continue while U.S. 

Forces remain active in the CENTCOM AOR. 

In FY12, the Department directed the replacement of satellite communications 

leases purchased with Overseas Contingency Operations funds with a multiple option-year leases through the Defense Information Systems Agency’s Future Commercial Satellite Communications Services Acquisition (FCSA). FCSA Service Areas 

include: Custom end to end SATCOM solutions (CS2), ‘‘Plug-in’’ subscription services ($/month, $/minute, $/MB), and higher transponder capacity. 

The balance between COMSATCOM and MILSATCOM is based on the uniqueness of certain military requirements. Military requirements span a broad range, 

some of which are typical of commercial uses and some are atypical (e.g., jamming 

protection, anti scintillation, nuclear survivability, communications on the move 

(COTM)). For this reason, DOD space system acquisitions meet military requirements, while commercial space system acquisitions meet market demands, although 

some future commercial offerings may be beneficial to the wideband military market 

(e.g., commercial Ka band for support to disadvantaged users). International Traffic 

in Arms Regulations (ITAR) risks and proper DOD approvals must be considered 

before implementing any of these atypical, military-specific requirements on 

COMSATCOM. 
104 

Hosting DOD payloads on commercial satellites offer great potential to augment, 

diversify, reconstitute DOD capabilities, more frequently, and create resilience in an 

affordable way. However, there are several challenges we must overcome: 

• In order to maximize opportunities in hosted payloads, a common interface 

standard must be instituted on all commercial satellites so that: (1) the DOD 

could rapidly host the payload on commercial launches to orbit locations of interest to the DOD, and (2) the DOD could compete the hosting of the payloads 

across multiple satellite operators. 

• Commercial satellite orbit locations would require clearances to operate at frequencies assigned for military/government operations. In addition, ITAR issues 

may limit launch opportunities to U.S. owned or ‘‘friendly’’ foreign owned companies. 

• Hosted payloads, by their nature, are tenants on a commercial satellite. The 

DOD would need assurances that the hosted payload would not be shut down 

if there were issues such that operating the hosted payload conflicted with the 

other revenue producing payloads on the satellite. Commercial Remote Sensing 

is provided through firm-fixed price Service Level Agreements. The balance between government and commercial systems is, once again, derived from the requirements which are either uniquely time-sensitive, military/intelligence or 

global, unclassified, shareable and delivered on-demand. Several challenges 

highlight the need to reevaluate the balance between government and commercial remote sensing: 

• Foreign industry’s momentum in providing increasingly greater electro-optical 

resolution 

• Foreign government-subsidized synthetic aperture radar and multi-spectral 

capabilities which do not exist in the U.S. commercial space industry 

• Increasing demand for full-motion video, as a result of the proliferation of unmanned aerial systems. 

The future opportunities for commercial remote sensing will depend on the U.S. 

data providers’ ability to remain viable in the market place with an increasing number of competitors, not only from emerging space-faring nations, but with expanding 

capabilities of our Allies. 

Mr. TURNER. 41) The Department requested only $2M in FY13 for ‘‘Weather Satellite Follow-On’’ efforts, and projected no money after that in the Five Year Defense 

Plan. While we recognize that the Department is relying on the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program to meet its near-term needs, what is the longer term plan to 

meet this critical mission area? 

Mr. KLINGER. 41) The Department is moving forward with an analysis of current 

and potential future capability gaps created in the wake of the recent Defense 

Weather Satellite System termination and the upcoming projected end-of-life for the 

DMSP. A Defense Space Council (DSC) study will be accomplished in order to inform a Material Development Decision in late July 2012 and provide input to frame 

an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). The DSC study is also expected to be the basis 

for the Department’s request for funding in FY 2014 to support continued sensor 

development and risk reduction activities initiated with the $125M Congress provided in the FY 2012 NDAA. The AoA will commence late in 4QFY12 and will inform budget submissions for FY 2015 and beyond. 

Mr. TURNER. 42) We have heard a lot about the need for resiliency of our space 

systems. How do we measure resiliency of an architecture? Do we have a way to 

model resiliency to evaluate our current systems, their strengths and weaknesses 

and determine what is sufficient? Compare current systems to future concepts? 

What are the most important steps the U.S. needs to take in order to create space 

systems that are resilient to threats? 

Mr. KLINGER. 42) The Department has defined space resilience. ‘‘Resilience is the 

ability of an architecture to support the functions necessary for mission success in 

spite of hostile action or adverse conditions. An architecture is ‘more resilient’ if it 

can provide these functions with higher probability, shorter periods of reduced capability, and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions, and threats. Resilience may 

leverage cross-domain or alternative government, commercial, or international capabilities.’’ 

The Department has initiated integrating the resilience definition and we’re in 

the early stages of applying an evaluation methodology into space architecture development for overhead persistent infrared, wideband and protected communications, and space control. Promulgating the resilience definition and methodology 

throughout the Department’s processes will enable a common framework to make 

important trades between performance, affordability, and resilience. 
105 

The most important steps that the Department is undertaking to move towards 

space architectures innately more resilient to emerging threats are: 1) continuing 

efforts to enhance the resiliency and effectiveness of critical space-based capabilities, 

2) continuing to work with domestic and international allies and partners, 3) invest 

in advanced capabilities to defend operational capability and improve resiliency in 

space. 

Mr. TURNER. 43) Discuss the progress of the Space Protection Program. What 

have been its accomplishments since its establishment in 2008 and, what space protection areas continue to need the greatest attention? What is your assessment of 

how the defense and intelligence community have worked together to support the 

activities of this office? 

Mr. KLINGER. 43) The Space Protection Program (SPP) has conducted several important analyses addressing certain vulnerabilities across space systems and constellations since its inception in 2008. The program has conducted engineering assessments and technical analysis of suspected threat systems to develop and recommend concepts to mitigate those threats. In addition, the SPP has supported 

analysis of several Air Force programs, making recommendations on technology 

transition and operational development to meet the threat baseline. 

We remain focused on understanding the operating environment and response 

trade space to evolve vital space missions into a more resilient and integrated architecture. OSD is working with the DNI to assess the scope, functions, organization, 

and resources of the SPP to ensure we have an enduring organization for resilience, 

survivability, and space service assurance; and increase effectiveness across the U.S. 

space enterprise with close working relationships among DOD and IC. 

Mr. TURNER. 44) What efforts and long-term planning is the Department engaged 

in to ensure its spectrum continues to be safeguarded in the future? 

Mr. KLINGER. 44) The use of the electromagnetic spectrum continues to be a critical enabler of our warfighting capabilities. We are sensitive to the competing spectrum demands resulting from the Department’s increasing reliance on spectrum-dependent technologies and the rapid modernization of commercial mobile devices on 

a national and international scale. Recognizing that the demand for spectrum will 

continue to increase, the Department has long-term initiatives aimed at using and 

managing our spectrum more efficiently, identifying and investing in spectrally efficient technologies that afford us combat advantages, and advancing the interoperability of spectrum use and management with our coalition partners, and with Federal, State, and commercial entities. 

Mr. TURNER. 45) Is there a requirement for commercial imagery, and if so, what 

is it? How does the Department quantify the amount of commercial satellite imagery needed to support the requirements of the warfighter? How does the Department plan to address these needs? What is the longer-term plan? 

Mr. KLINGER. 45) Yes there is a requirement for Commercial Imagery (CI). From 

the time commercial imagery satellite capabilities first became available, these capabilities have provided a valuable complementary source of imagery products to 

those obtained through National Technical Means (NTM). The current requirement 

includes products for imagery analysis that supplements information from NTM, as 

well as for Foundation Based Operations and Safety of Navigation (FBO/SoN) data. 

FBO/SoN products include data to develop and update aeronautical and maritime 

charts, maps, and other foundation data used both in intelligence reporting and 

operational planning documents. CI systems can fulfill the bulk of the FBO/SoN requirements, while high resolution NTM fulfill the bulk of detailed imagery for analysis supporting intelligence, targeting, and decision making by senior leaders. In reality, both CI and NTM can, and are, used to support the two mission areas to a 

limited extent depending on timeliness, mission and tasking priorities, and other 

operational constraints such as cloud cover. The overall demand for imagery continues to grow, and commercial imagery is an essential means to meet some of the 

demand. The commercial imagery contracts are negotiated to provide imagery volumes based on capacity of the commercial satellites and acceptable return on investment by the Department. 

The Department is currently refining its approach to addressing these needs by 

conducting a joint USD(I)-ODNI led Commercial Imagery Study that assesses satisfaction of the existing demand for Commercial Imagery. The Department will use 

the results from this analysis effort to ensure both DOD and ONDI are making the 

optimized, affordable investment to satisfy the warfighter needs to the greatest degree possible. The final report is due out in late April to OMB. Additionally, the 

Joint Staff J–8 is performing a consolidated ISR Study that includes an assessment 

of Commercial Imagery requirements which will determine to what degree military 

CI requirements are being met today, as well as those anticipated in the near term. 
106 

The longer term plan is for the Department to continue to work closely with the 

DNI to ensure the USG can meet the needs of the warfighter through an optimum 

balance of investments in both NTM and CI. The CI investments in future years 

will be thoroughly analyzed against all other mission priorities within the Department and resourced appropriately. 

Mr. TURNER. 46) What is the purpose and value of the Counter Space Technology 

List (CSTL) developed by the State Department and the Aerospace Corporation? 

Should the CSTL be integrated into the export control reform process? 

Ms. SAPP. 46) The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is not a key participant 

in developing the CSTL; respectfully defer this question to the State Department. 

Mr. TURNER. 47) The Defense Space Council, established last year, was designed 

to provide strategic guidance, planning, and architecture assessment. From the perspective of the NRO, can you describe how the Defense Department and Intelligence 

Community are cooperating, conducting planning, and leveraging investments? 

Ms. SAPP. 47) The NRO continues to collaborate with the Department of Defense 

(DOD) and Intelligence Community (IC) in forums such as the Defense Space Council (DSC). One of the core functions of the DSC is to assess and guide requirements, 

plans, programs, and architectures within the DOD and to promote cooperation between Defense and Intelligence space sectors. This forum, and others such as the 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council, provides the IC and the DOD opportunities 

to synchronize activities of mutual interest. More specifically, there is considerable 

cooperation, planning, and leveraging of investments through the acquisition and 

annual budget processes. The DOD, the Director of National Intelligence and the 

functional managers for signals intelligence (National Security Agency) and 

geospatial intelligence (National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency) routinely work 

closely together to cooperate and conduct planning on those systems in acquisition, 

and proposed future systems to meet intelligence needs. In addition, during the annual budgeting process investment leveraging is performed through joint studies 

and also through jointly funded acquisitions where both the intelligence and defense 

communities benefit from dual investments in key capabilities. 

Mr. TURNER. 48) When do you assess that a new entrant will meet the established 

criteria for national security space EELV-class launches? 

Ms. SAPP. 48) Based on continued interaction with National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration (NASA) and the Air Force, combined with our ongoing efforts 

with several new entrants, the NRO is encouraged by the development and looks 

forward to seeing new entrants compete for launches as early as Fiscal Year (FY) 

2014. This progress is consistent with goals outlined in the new entrant strategy. 

Mr. TURNER. 49) What is the NRO doing to determine the viability and readiness 

of new entrants performing launches for NRO missions? 

Ms. SAPP. 49) In the past year, the NRO completed mission integration and security related studies with two new entrant providers (SpaceX and Orbital Sciences 

Corp). In concert with the Air Force, the NRO is awarding follow-on efforts to one 

new entrant provider (SpaceX) for defining integration requirements for the NRO 

Launch-79 (NROL–79) mission. The NROL–79 launch vehicle is currently scheduled 

for a FY 2017 launch date. 

In addition to these early integration studies, the NRO is also participating, with 

NASA and the Air Force, in new entrant technical design reviews to better understand the new entrant providers’ processes and designs. 

Mr. TURNER. 50) GAO recently released its annual report on duplication, overlap, 

and fragmentation and reported that ‘‘Space launch acquisition processes for NASA 

and DOD are not formally coordinated, duplicate one another, and may not fully leverage the Government’s investment because the Government is not acting as a single buyer.’’ Please identify cost savings opportunities and identify what is being 

done to reduce duplication and leverage investments? 

Ms. SAPP. 50) The Air Force is the executive agent for launch and NRO respectfully defers to them to respond to this question. 

Mr. TURNER. 51) What is DOD doing, or planning to do, to define and assess its 

mission assurance costs and activities, and to what extent will the new acquisition 

strategy protect against overly high launch vehicle prices compared with mission assurance changes/efficiencies resulting from these assessments? Further please outline how mission assurance for national security space missions differs from commercial space missions. 

Ms. SAPP. 51) This question is deferred to the DOD. 

Mr. TURNER. 52) What is the right balance of organic space capability and commercially leased or hosted capability? How much of our space capability is currently 

being provided by commercial providers? How can we increase the opportunities for 

hosted payloads to save costs and bring capability online more quickly? 
107 

Ms. SAPP. 52) This question is deferred to the DOD. 

Mr. TURNER. 53) We have heard a lot about the need for resiliency of our space 

systems. How do we measure resiliency of an architecture? Do we have a way to 

model resiliency to evaluate our current systems, their strengths and weaknesses 

and determine what is sufficient? Compare current systems to future concepts? 

What are the most important steps the U.S. needs to take in order to create space 

systems that are resilient to threats? 

Ms. SAPP. 53) How do we measure resiliency of an architecture? Answer: (U// 

FOUO) Regarding NRO systems, resilience describes how the architecture responds 

to an unexpected disturbance (launch failure, counter space activities, mission disruption, etc.) So, resilience should provide the level of system adaptability to threat 

degradation and loss in terms of quickly NRO capabilities ‘‘bounce back’’ or recovers 

in collection capacity and how long it takes to do so—to include the time it takes 

the constellation to be re-optimized after a given loss or perturbation. 

Do we have a way to model resiliency to evaluate our current systems, their 

strengths and weaknesses and determine what is sufficient? Answer: (U//FOUO) 

The NRO is developing modeling techniques to predict and visualize system performance. Research is ongoing to determine the best combination and use of these 

techniques. Key guiding principles include: interoperability, to support optimizing 

the collective response to threats; resiliency metrics inherently tied to architecture 

performance; and linking predictive awareness and resiliency. 

Compare current systems to future concepts? Answer: (U//FOUO) The NRO is 

pursuing future architecture concepts that are both effective and resilient, while 

also consistent with cost constraints. Comparisons between specific current and future systems are classified, and can be discussed in a different forum. 

What are the most important steps the U.S. needs to take in order to create space 

systems that are resilient to threats? Answer: (U//FOUO) Resiliency from an architecture perspective is by far the most creditable and cost effective approach to maintaining the flow of vital information from national systems. This is a holistic approach where future architectures are a dynamic resilient ‘‘system’’ capable of being 

reorganized to ‘‘buyback’’ mission capability under variable stressing conditions, 

thus preserving essential capability. 

Mr. TURNER. 54) Discuss the progress of the Space Protection Program. What 

have been its accomplishments since its establishment in 2008 and, what space protection areas continue to need the greatest attention? What is your assessment of 

how the defense and intelligence community have worked together to support the 

activities of this office? 

Ms. SAPP. 54) Since 2008, the Space Protection Program (SPP), a joint NRO and 

Air Force Space Command Program, has energized the national security space community to implement strategies to improve resiliency and mission assurance for 

military and national security space architectures. They delivered the Capabilities 

and Dependencies database, enabling United States Strategic Command to calculate 

the operational consequence of multiple space system losses. In addition, several national security space programs have integrated protection capabilities into program 

baselines. 

The Intelligence Community and Department of Defense continue to work in close 

coordination to develop and improve mission assurance capabilities. Of note, SPP is 

integrating a set of Title 10 and Title 50 response options involving the entire protection community to endorse performance requirements for the space situational 

awareness architecture in a threat environment. They will deliver these results to 

the Director of the NRO, and the Commander of Air Force Space Command in three 

months. These efforts, along with an associated effort to better define indications 

and warnings support to space operations, indicate the coordination is strong and 

productive. 

SPP will continue its efforts to better protect our space-enabled capabilities and 

to incorporate protection into the requirements processes and operational plans. 

Mr. TURNER. 55) What efforts and long-term planning is the Department engaged 

in to ensure its spectrum continues to be safeguarded in the future? 

Ms. SAPP. 55) This question is deferred to the DOD. 
108 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 56) Will sensors that can improve detection of a nuclear detonation 

be incorporated into the SIBRS satellite? Why/why not? • What is the cost? • When can we expect the report on this issue that is due to Congress? 

General SHELTON. 56) The Department of Energy conducted a study to assess if 

more affordable United States Nuclear Detonation Detection System (USNDS) space 

and ground architectures are possible. Six options were analyzed, two of which involved hosting USNDS sensors on SBIRS, beginning with Geosynchronous Earth 

Orbit Satellite 7. 

The study out-brief and decision process is underway. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 57) Could you give us your thoughts on the way forward for JMS 

and why this is an urgent need? 

• Why is a developmental path that might be more expensive and take longer to 

develop being pursued when commercial-off-the-shelf capability may provide an 

earlier and cheaper solution? Are there any plans for testing commercial capability? 

General SHELTON. 57) Our legacy Space Situational Awareness processing system, 

the Space Defense Operations Center (SPADOC), is far beyond its useful life expectancy. Its limited capacity impairs our ability to conduct daily operations and it is 

not able to incorporate our next-generation sensors. These factors make the nearterm replacement of SPADOC critical. 

The JMS acquisition strategy leverages existing government off the shelf (GOTS) 

and commercial off the shelf (COTS) products to the maximum extent possible, producing a very cost-effective procurement process. The JMS Program Office conducted market research to identify and assess the existing government and commercial capabilities that meet the Joint Requirements Oversight Council-approved JMS 

requirements. No existing COTS solutions exist that will fully satisfy these requirements. The program office will procure appropriate COTS products that satisfy subsets of these requirements through fixed-price contracts and will use Multiple-award 

Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity contracts to procure those capabilities needing additional development work to meet the remaining requirements. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 58) A piece of cloth that was left in the fuel line by the contractor 

during the manufacturing process led to a 14-month delay in AEHF reaching its intended orbit, which in turn cause delay to the next two AEHF satellite launches. 

While the total contract was worth nearly $8 billion, the contractor’s award fee was 

only reduced by $19 million for this mistake. Prior to this problem, GAO reported 

that AEHF suffered a $250 million cost overrun and 2-year delay in launch due to 

parts quality problems. 

• To what extent is DOD and the Air Force considering using more effective incentives to reduce parts quality problems, especially considering the challenges 

and delays associated with getting the first AEHF satellite to its intended orbit? 

• How does the Air Force quantify the cost of delays in procuring specific capability to the warfighter? 

General SHELTON. 58) Following the launch of AEHF–1, the MILSATCOM Program Office restructured the prime contractor incentive plans for AEHF 1–4 and incorporated similar incentives in the AEHF–5/6 contract to be awarded later this 

year. These incentive plans address lessons learned from the AEHF–1 on-orbit 

anomaly, reflect an increased focus on cost control and account for the shift in program focus as it transitions from development to production. The plans ensure any 

additional costs associated with AEHF parts problems leading to contractor-induced 

schedule delays will have a negative impact to the contractor’s fee. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 59) What will the cost savings be from entering into a fixed-price 

contract to procure two AEHF satellites (as part of its EASE approach) relative to 

the cost of procuring two such satellites separately? If so, what are the anticipated 

savings? 

General SHELTON. 59) In 2009, Air Force Space Command estimated the cost of 

purchasing AEHF Space Vehicle (SV) 5 in FY12 and AEHF SV 6 in FY14 was 

$1.95B per space vehicle. With the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics approved acquisition strategy for an Efficient Space Procurement block-buy of AEHF SV 5/6, the estimated price for each space vehicle is 

$1.55B. This approach has a potential savings of approximately $400M per space 

vehicle. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 60) What do you see as the major challenges ahead? 

General SHELTON. 60) Threats in the space domain are increasing while our ability to maintain and improve foundational space capabilities to meet warfighter requirements is challenged by resource constraints. Threats range from environmental 
109 

factors, such as the increasing volume of orbital debris, to deliberate actions by potential adversaries. Even in a declining budget environment, we must provide a 

foundational level of space capability if our Nation is to preserve its current ability 

to defend U.S. interests globally. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 61) We understand you have asked ULA to provide pricing over a 

range of scenarios from 6 boosters per year for 3 years up to 10 boosters a year for 

5 years. How will the Government ensure that ULA’s pricing is fair, reasonable, and 

accurate, given Defense Contract Auditing Agency and GAO’s findings that ULA’s 

cost information is often erroneous? Is the Air Force conducting an independent review of this information? 

General SHELTON. 61) The Air Force will follow Federal Acquisition Regulation 

Part 15 negotiation processes to develop and negotiate fair and reasonable prices. 

Auditors from the Defense Contract Audit Agency will support the negotiation team. 

In addition, a joint team composed of the National Reconnaissance Office Cost Analysis Improvement Group and the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency is performing 

analyses of costs for the RS–68 main engine, RL–10 upper stage engine, systems 

engineering, program management and launch operations. Data gathered from these 

reviews will inform the Air Force negotiating position. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 62) What contracting structure will the Air Force pursue? Has Air 

Force determined a quantity or duration for the next EELV acquisition, and will 

this decision impact the request for FY13? 

General SHELTON. 62) The EELV Acquisition Strategy, approved November 24, 

2011, restructures the program to address the challenges of lowering costs while 

maintaining mission success and stabilizing the industrial base. It allows for the accumulation of sufficient pricing information supporting the Air Force decision on 

quantity and contract length and is based on multiple phases. The first phase request for proposal was released March 23, 2012. This phase begins in FY13 and involves an annual commitment of launch services with concurrent opportunities to 

certify new entrants. The request for proposal requires the contractor to provide 

prices for a range of quantities, from six to ten cores, over a contract period of three 

to five years. Specific decisions about unit quantities and contract duration are 

scheduled for summer 2012, allowing the Air Force the opportunity to balance contractual commitments with operational requirements, budget, cost reductions and 

the potential for competition. The FY13 Phase 1 Buy contract will include a costplus incentive fee provision for Launch Capabilities and a firm-fixed price provision 

for Launch Services. We project full and open competitions for the follow-on phases. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 63) Can you outline, specifically, the work product that is included 

in so-called mission assurance costs? Are there efficiencies the Air Force can achieve 

in this area? 

General SHELTON. 63) Mission assurance is a rigorous, continuous technical and 

management process employed over the life-cycle of a launch system to ensure mission success. There are two distinct facets to mission assurance. Integrated mission 

assurance is accomplished by the organizations involved in the launch vehicle design, production, testing and launch processing. Independent mission assurance, a 

crucial component of the success of National Security Space launches, is often identified with ‘‘mission assurance costs.’’ This effort includes a number of technical reviews and analyses tailored for each mission, enabling a launch readiness independent assessment. It comprises less than 5% of the launch enterprise total costs, 

yet its value to the overall enterprise is hard to overstate. In fact, the Space Launch 

Broad Area Review, conducted just over ten years ago, recommended we return to 

in-depth mission assurance following a series of launch failures. 

The Air Force will continue to encourage efficiencies without impacting mission 

success. The current launch capability contract, signed June 2011, includes a mission success performance incentive ensuring focus on mission requirements and a 

cost control incentive motivating the contractor to find efficiencies within its operations. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 64) What is the current backlog of Air Force booster cores purchased from ULA for 35 missions that have not yet launched? Given this backlog 

of orders, why have prices increased so significantly? 

General SHELTON. 64) Many factors contribute to the increasing costs of EELV 

boosters. Examples include buying boosters one at a time, production breaks, production rework, subsequent recertification, annual inflation and a reduced supplier 

business base (particularly from propulsion system suppliers). The backlog includes 

all missions from the National Security Space partners. The National Reconnaissance Office, Navy, Air Force, and Australia have 32 rocket booster cores on order 

to support 28 mission launches. This includes Delta IV Heavy missions which require more than one core. Of the 32 cores, 17 are in the production flow for launches 

in FY12 and FY13. Another 9 cores are projected to launch in FY14. The remaining 
110 

cores are projected to fly out by FY16, exhausting the backlog. The backlog does not 

affect the current vehicle pricing as the program’s initial inventory of components 

and smaller follow-on lot quantity buys are being depleted. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 65) What types of ‘‘off-ramps’’ are you considering to the block buy, 

if/when a New Entrant is qualified? 

General SHELTON. 65) To facilitate potential new entrant certification, we identified two missions on which new entrant launch providers may bid: the Space Test 

Program—2 and the Deep Space Climate Observatory. These Evolved Expendable 

Launch Vehicle class-missions will provide an opportunity for potential new entrants to gain satellite launch experience facilitating vehicle certification. Once a 

new entrant is certified, we will compete launch services not covered under the 

FY13 Phase 1 Buy. When this phase expires and new entrants are certified, we intend to conduct future acquisitions in a full and open competition for launch services. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 66) How will the cost of ULA launches versus new entrants be compared given that the Government is funding the ULA overhead? 

General SHELTON. 66) Air Force Space Command is developing the competition 

approach for missions above the FY13 Phase 1 Buy contract amounts. If new entrants are certified when this period expires, the Air Force will conduct a full and 

open competition using an on-orbit pricing approach that aggregates all aspects of 

mission costs into firm-fixed-price contracts. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 67) Should the launch schedule slip, as has historically been the 

case, how will the excess inventory the Air Force builds up effect competition from 

New Entrants? How much generally are the storage costs per booster, and who pays 

those costs? Is the Air Force working with the contractors to decrease the cost of 

storage and ensure that the price is reasonable given the requirements? 

General SHELTON. 67) Most upcoming Air Force launches are recurring flights for 

programs that have already launched satellites supporting their respective missions; 

therefore, these satellites are very similar, if not identical, to their predecessors. 

This reduces the chance of development or production delays, and increases the likelihood these satellites will launch on schedule. We do not foresee a need to store 

launch vehicles. In addition, we are working the Atlas ‘‘white tail’’ concept to provide a common booster core for Atlas rockets, and the Delta Fleet Standardization 

to introduce a common RS–68 engine across all Delta IV variants. These two efforts 

will increase booster assignment flexibility and reduce launch delays. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 68) As you know, Section 1248 of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State to carry 

out an assessment of the national security risks of removing satellites and related 

components from the United States Munitions List. That report is now almost 2 

years late. When will the Section 1248 report be delivered? What month can we expect delivery? What are the risks the U.S. space industrial base of not moving some 

of our Nation’s commercial satellite products off of the U.S. munitions list? Is DOD 

conducting a review of these risks? 

Mr. SCHULTE. 68) The Section 1248 report will be delivered to Congress on April 

18, 2012. The report identifies some categories of satellites that can be moved from 

the U.S. Munitions List (USML) to the Commerce Control List (CCL) without undue 

risk to national security. Further, the report finds that U.S. national security interests would be best served by normalizing controls on satellites and related components, to enable the development of flexible and timely responses to rapid technological changes, consistent with existing authorities for all other strategic trade controls. These changes would facilitate cooperation with U.S. Allies and export control 

regime partners, strengthen the competitiveness of sectors key to U.S. national security, and increase U.S. exports, while maintaining robust controls where appropriate to enhance our national security. Ultimately, implementing the report’s recommendations will help energize the industrial base, a key objective of the National 

Security Space Strategy, and build higher fences around fewer items, the goal of the 

Administration’s Export Control Reform Initiative. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 69) What are the costs and benefits of entering into negotiations 

on the EU Code of Conduct? And what are the risks of not doing so? Will our military operations and needs be protected? 

Mr. SCHULTE. 69) An International Code of Conduct could enhance U.S. national 

security by promoting responsible behavior in a domain that is increasingly congested, contested, and competitive. As more countries and companies field space capabilities, it is in our interest that they act responsibly and that the safety and sustainability of space are protected. A widely subscribed Code could encourage responsible space behavior and single out those who act otherwise, while reducing the risk 

of mishaps, misunderstandings, and misconduct. Debris mitigation standards, guide-
111 

lines for reducing radiofrequency interference, and shared space situational awareness could help protect space and the advantages we derive from its use. 

We are committed to ensuring that any Code would not limit, but rather strengthen, U.S. national security. The EU draft is not legally binding, recognizes the right 

of individual and collective self-defense, and is a good foundation for an International Code. A Code would focus on activities, rather than unverifiable capabilities. The U.S. Government has been closely consulted by the EU on its draft, and 

we will continue to shape an International Code through active participation in 

international discussions. DOD assessed the draft EU Code’s operational impact and 

is developing steps to ensure that a final International Code fully supports U.S. national security interests. We are committed to keeping Congress informed as we 

progress through the long-term Code development process. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 70) What do you see as the major challenges ahead? 

Mr. SCHULTE. 70) We are challenged by a space environment that is increasingly 

congested, with more than 22,000 trackable man-made objects in orbit; contested, 

by an ever-increasing number of man-made threats; and competitive, as the U.S. 

competitive advantage and technological lead in space erode. The National Security 

Space Strategy (NSSS) addresses these challenges, but must be implemented in the 

context of a fourth ‘‘c’’—constrained. As we develop future architectures, the growing 

challenges associated with the budget deserve our attention as much as the growing 

challenges in space. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 71) As you know, Section 1248 of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State to carry 

out an assessment of the national security risks of removing satellites and related 

components from the United States Munitions List. That report is now almost 2 

years late. 

A) When will the Section 1248 report be delivered? What month can we expect 

delivery? 

B) What are the risks the U.S. space industrial base of not moving some of our 

Nation’s commercial satellite products off of the U.S. munitions list? 

C) Is DOD conducting a review of these risks? 

Mr. KLINGER. 71) A) The Section 1248 Report was delivered to Congress on/about 

19 April 2012. 

B) We recognize that it is in our national security interest to maintain a robust 

space industrial base; our goal is to modify the controls placed on those satellites 

and related components that are widely available, while focusing stricter controls 

on those space technologies critical to our national security. 

The rapid pace of technological development in the field of space exploitation 

poses unique challenges and risks to the space industrial base. Therefore, U.S. national security interests would be best served by normalizing controls to enable the 

development of flexible and timely responses to these technological changes, consistent with the President’s existing authority for all other strategic trade controls. 

C) DOD Analysis is based on the Export Control Reform USML rewrite process 

approved by the Deputies Committee. 

a) This systems engineering approach defines the most critical end items, components and technologies that provide the U.S. military its fighting edge 

(e.g., mission systems on airframes), and assesses risk. 

b) Comprehensive deliberations among operators and subject matter experts 

resulted in realistic determinations on what are important for military or 

intelligence operations and what should be controlled on the USML. 

c) Conversely, items that were designed for military end-use but are identical 

to those used in dual-use purposes, or do not provide unique military or intelligence capability, were deemed to no longer require control on the USML 

and were moved to Commerce controls. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 72) A piece of cloth that was left in the fuel line by the contractor 

during the manufacturing process led to a 14-month delay in AEHF reaching its intended orbit, which in turn cause delay to the next two AEHF satellite launches. 

While the total contract was worth nearly $8 billion, the contractor’s award fee was 

only reduced by $19 million for this mistake. Prior to this problem, GAO reported 

that AEHF suffered a $250 million cost overrun and 2-year delay in launch due to 

parts quality problems. 

A) To what extent is DOD and the Air Force considering using more effective incentives to reduce parts quality problems, especially considering the challenges and 

delays associated with getting the first AEHF satellite to its intended orbit? 

B) How does the Air Force quantify the cost of delays in procuring specific capability to the warfighter? 
112 

Mr. KLINGER. 72) A) The Air Force has taken strong steps to apply appropriate 

incentives to the AEHF contract, as well as with other contracts. The most important method is the contract type and incentive. Fixed price contracting reduces the 

government’s financial liability, and the incentive structure motivates the desired 

performance. For AEHF–1, the program manager restructured the remaining fee on 

that effort, eliminating $15 million and shifting incentives to motivate cost performance. Additionally, the contractor conducted a thorough investigation of the root 

cause and applied their best efforts to ensure no propulsion problems will reoccur 

on subsequent satellites. 

B) With respect to warfighter delays, the Air Force coordinates very closely with 

the using Combatant Commands on the fielding schedules for all space and other 

weapons systems. This interaction is critical toward mitigating the impacts of any 

capability delays, which often cannot be quantified in terms of cost alone. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 73) In 2009, the GAO found that satellites, ground control systems, 

and user terminals in most of DOD’s major space system acquisitions were not optimally aligned, leading to underutilized satellites and limited capability provided to 

the warfighter—in some cases for periods measured in years. Examples include: the 

MUOS satellite which relies on the troubled Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) 

program for the new MUOS waveform and radio terminals. The GPS satellites in 

orbit that contain the modernized military M-code signal designed for anti-jamming 

and anti-spoofing but which the warfighter will not be able to take advantage of 

until user terminals go into production. And the SBIRS–GEO satellite was launched 

with a starring and scanning sensor. While the GEO–1 satellite is currently on orbit 

with both sensors, the staring sensor will not be utilized for missile warning and 

missile defense for another six years due to a lag in ground capability. • What improvements are being made to maximize use of the available capacity 

and reduce costs due to inefficiencies? 

Mr. KLINGER. 73) When OSD(AT&L) recertified the SBIRS program in 2005 following a Nunn-McCurdy breach, the Air Force was directed to prioritize development of essential capability to perform the missile warning mission, supported by 

the GEO scanning sensor, over other mission areas. 

SBIRS GEO–1 was launched in May 2011, and upon certification later this year, 

the SBIRS GEO–1 scanning sensor will provide missile warning performance that 

exceeds that of the legacy Defense Support Program (DSP). The SBIRS GEO–1 staring sensor is also undergoing initial sensor calibration. Today Overhead Persistent 

Infra-Red (OPIR) Research & Development (R&D) and Technical Intelligence (TI) 

users are receiving staring sensor data. Consistent with stakeholder direction and 

priorities, fully-calibrated staring sensor operations in support of Missile Warning 

(MW) and Missile Defense (MD) missions have been deferred until the final Increment 2 ground delivery in FY18. The remaining work to operationalize the staring 

sensor for the MW and MD missions is in ground system functionality which provides automated tasking and tuning to meet some of the most stressing ORD requirements. 

While the SBIRS ground development is phased to optimally manage risks within 

budget constraints and established operational priorities, the program is continuing 

to examine options to accelerate increments of staring sensor calibration and mission processing to support Missile Warning and Missile Defense prior to FY18. Additionally, as part of the Air Force, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and Missile Defense Agency Joint OPIR Ground architecture (JOG), the DOD funded initiatives to process SBIRS GEO starer data separately from the SBIRS program of 

record with deliveries planned in FY15/16. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 74) What do you see as the major challenges ahead? 

Mr. KLINGER. 74) The environment in which we operate evolves and transforms: 

while space was not a benign environment during the Cold War, even that threat 

environment has been transformed. U.S. space capabilities are subject to a host of 

new threats including kinetic threats, non-kinetic threats such as jamming, and 

cyber threats originating from both state and non-state actors. 

Our space acquisition system has historically focused on performance driven, 

edge-of-technology and engineering capacity; we consistently looked to push the edge 

of the ‘‘art and science’’ of the possible. We could afford this approach because the 

‘‘addressable market’’ for most of these capabilities was relatively small as compared 

to the overall size of U.S. military forces and intelligence users, and these users 

were often more than not homogenous in their needs and demands. Acquisition of 

space capabilities frequently and consistently had a ‘‘first and often unfettered’’ call 

on the resources of the Defense Department and Intelligence Community as compared to many other capability areas. 

• We simply no longer have this luxury; space capabilities are now integrated and 

inextricably bound up in the ‘‘nervous system’’ of U.S. military forces and intel-
113 

ligence capabilities; users of U.S. national security space capabilities are both 

numerous and diverse in their requirements. Often, maintenance and continuity 

of service have become as or more important than pushing the envelope to 

achieve new performance capabilities. This reality is pressing us to improve the 

timelines of delivery of new capabilities. We also must focus on ensuring our 

space architectures are sufficiently robust and resilient to operate through natural and man-made threats. 

• To ensure continuity of service is uninterrupted, we are recapitalizing virtually 

all of our space ‘‘lines of business’’ at precisely a time of sharply constrained 

resources. We are stressing affordability even in ongoing programs and stressing with our industrial partners to place as much emphasis on engineering for 

cost control and affordability as we have historically placed on engineering for 

performance. 

• For industry, our challenge is to plan for more reliable and stable demand, more 

predictable opportunities for introducing new upgrades to technology, and more 

stability at the prime and second/third tier suppliers. Determining how much, 

what kind of capabilities can we afford to invest in to maintain a viable industrial and technology base, while maintaining continuity of service is a critical 

challenge. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 75) Can you outline, specifically, the work product that is included 

in so-called mission assurance costs? Are there efficiencies the Air Force can achieve 

in this area? 

Mr. KLINGER. 75) Mission assurance activities consume approximately 5% of the 

EELV program budget. Products that result from this work include the following: 

hardware pedigree review reports; quality assurance inspection reports; booster-tosatellite integration inspection, testing, and progress reports; systems engineering 

oversight and reporting for launch vehicle structures, avionics, propulsion systems; 

launch site operations inspections and reports; final flightworthiness certification reports; and business/program management reports. Each launch is unique and only 

those activities that contribute to the reliability of each launch are funded. In addition, the Air Force reviews mission assurance activities annually to prune away any 

that do not materially contribute to reducing the risk associated with all launch 

missions. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 76) What do you see as the major challenges ahead? 

Ms. SAPP. 76) There are multiple challenges ahead. Despite a constrained budget 

environment, system fragility and other external factors, the NRO must continue to 

provide the nation with critical overhead reconnaissance capabilities. To ensure uninterrupted support to operations over the long term, the NRO is implementing an 

organized, considered, and achievable plan to build a robust and adaptable architecture and culture. By working with mission partners, the NRO is laying the foundation for an optimized overhead intelligence collection, collaboration, and synthesis 

construct that will ensure decision advantage for the nation now and in the future. 

Looking Forward: While the challenges the NRO faces are formidable, they are 

by no means insurmountable. Specific initiatives intended to implement the organizational, management, and business process changes necessary to address these 

issues include a decoupling of space and ground systems specifically intended to accelerate the delivery of new capabilities in response to rapidly changing, time-critical user needs. This decoupling will consolidate common functions and processes 

that will translate directly into enhanced technical and operational flexibility and 

reduced costs. 

These changes will also help address the consequences of the acquisition reform 

era of the 1990s. One result of acquisition reform was the loss of a generation of 

project managers and systems engineers. While most of our engineering workforces 

are superbly qualified technically, many lack the extensive hands-on project management experience people previously had in these positions. This loss, coupled with 

the retirement surge in all government agencies, creates a particularly challenging 

workforce environment for the NRO. To address these challenges, we continually 

work to strengthen ties to parent organizations. This includes a focus on engineers, 

project managers, contracting officers, and program control officers to ensure the 

NRO workforce has the specific skills needed to effectively execute its mission. 

Lastly, the NRO has returned to a more disciplined acquisition process that will 

reverse the negative effects of acquisition reform. This places renewed emphasis on 

systems engineering to capture and apply acquisition lessons learned. The NRO is 

collaborating with the Air Force and The National Aeronautics and Space Administration to promote strategies that will stabilize the space industrial base. We are 

collaborating with other space organizations on a strategy that ties the long- term 
114 

health of the space industrial base to the long term viability of our overhead architecture and its ability to support national needs. 

The NRO has a history of resolving seemingly insurmountable technical problems 

to address the nation’s highest priority intelligence needs. The changes being implemented today represent the organization’s comprehensive approach to continuing its 

strong acquisition management performance, and approach to ensure the NRO continues its tradition of excellence. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. FRANKS. 77) We are just beginning to experience a wave of powerful solar 

storms as the sun approaches solar maximum. Without advanced warning systems, 

geomagnetic flux has the potential to disrupt virtually every major public infrastructure system, including power grids, GPS, transportation, and telecommunications 

before we can take any effective protective action. Our Nation currently relies on 

a single, failing satellite to provide these warnings, the Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE), which is more than 10 years beyond its design life. To replace ACE, 

the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in FY2012 is beginning work on refurbishing a decade-old spacecraft, DSCOVR, which the Air Force 

plans to launch. What are the Air Force’s launch procurement plans for DSCOVR? 

When will the RFP be issued? What is the expected timing of the launch? Will this 

launch occur before ACE’s expected demise and during the current solar maximum 

period? 

Mr. KLINGER. 77) The USAF plans to execute DSCOVR launch services via the 

Orbital-Suborbital Program-3 (OSP–3) contract, managed by the Space and Missile 

Systems Center’s (SMC) Space Development and Test Directorate (SMC/SD). The 

OSP–3 RFP is scheduled for release in April 2012, with contract award(s) planned 

for September 2012. The DSCOVR mission has been identified as a commercial new 

entrant launch opportunity and could support potential certification of new launch 

vehicle. DSCOVR is planned for a late FY2014 launch, but specific launch dates are 

dependent upon contractor proposals received in response to the OSP–3 RFP. It is 

unknown when the ACE spacecraft will become non-operational and current NASA 

estimates indicate solar maximum should occur in the spring of 2013. DSCOVR 

launch schedule is driven by the timelines required for satellite refurbishment, 

which will continue throughout FY2013, and launch-vehicle ordering and processing. 

Mr. FRANKS. 78) DSCOVR has only a 2-year satellite design life. Yet, access to 

sustained operational space weather data is critical for defense and national security, as well as our Nation’s economic infrastructure. What is the fallback plan in 

the event of either ACE’s or DSCOVR’s technical failure? Shouldn’t we be planning 

for a DSCOVR follow-on satellite procurement now? 

Mr. KLINGER. 78) The Department of Commerce (DOC) through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has plans to include a commercial 

partner in some of the activities for DSCOVR. NOAA is considering commercial data 

purchase of both solar wind and Coronal Mass Ejection (CME) imagery in the future. The DOD is a member of the National Space Weather Program which has endorsed DSCOVR as a near-term solution given ACE’s age. The DOD currently uses 

the data from ACE to support customers and is supporting the DSCOVR launch in 

order to continue this valuable data being obtained from Lagrange 1. 

Mr. FRANKS. 79) Last year, this committee, in its version of the FY2012 National 

Defense Authorization Act, stated of DSCOVR: ‘‘The committee is also aware of commercial data purchase solutions that could meet the Government’s space weather 

data needs by fiscal year 2014 . . . . The committee encourages the Department of 

Defense to work with the NOAA to consider a competitively acquired commercial 

solution.’’ Are you aware of any plans by the Air Force or NOAA to pursue a commercial solution as a follow-on to DSCOVR? What are your feelings about the commercial industry being able to fulfill this mission requirement? 

Mr. KLINGER. 79) The Air Force is supporting the launch of DSCOVR. The DOD 

participates in the National Space Weather Program and shares the national view 

that space weather data from Lagrange 1 is important. The options for a follow-on 

to DSCOVR are many and varied. All feasible options will be considered in light of 

the current fiscally constrained environment that impacts both the Department of 

Commerce and DOD. 
115 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 80) General Shelton and Mr. Klinger, Operationally Responsive 

Space (ORS) had been a major priority for the Department since 2006. Can you explain why this program is being terminated? What plans if any does the Air Force 

have to sustain the ORS mission? And, on a point I believe is absolutely critical, 

how will this provide more responsive and timely space capabilities to the 

warfighter? 

General SHELTON. 80) We plan to restructure the ORS program to incorporate the 

ORS tenants of responsiveness and resiliency across our space programs, to include 

programs such as the Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite, Space Based 

Infrared Systems, Global Positioning System III Operational Control Segment, 

Space Control Technology Insertion, and Technology Transfer programs. Beginning 

in 2013, we plan to meet warfighter needs for responsive space capabilities through 

programs of record and mechanisms such as the Joint Urgent Operational Needs 

process. 

The Space and Missile Systems Center’s Space Development and Test Directorate 

is sustaining the ORS–1 space vehicle and ground components through the life of 

the system with approximately $7M/year of Overseas Contingency Operations funds. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 81) How will you support the ORS–1 satellite launched only 9 

months ago with the termination of the Operationally Responsive Space Office? 

General SHELTON. 81) Our Space and Missile Systems Center’s Space Development and Test Directorate is the acquisition and sustainment manager for ORS– 

1. ORS–1 sustainment is funded through Overseas Contingency Operations funds, 

at approximately $7M/year. The Directorate is prepared to support the space vehicle 

and ground components and deliver vital capabilities to the warfighter through the 

life of the system. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 82) General, as I mentioned last year, I remain concerned about 

the increasing challenges of U.S. access to space. What options are and should be 

considered to lower the cost of access to space? 

General SHELTON. 82) To reduce the overall cost of access to space in the nearterm, the Air Force is pursuing a strategy based upon procuring a planned number 

of cores and launches each fiscal year and the introduction of competition. Steady 

rate procurement allows the contractor to pursue economic order quantity buys, 

make investments to reduce overall cost and to take advantage of manufacturing 

learning curves. New entrant provisions to compete for Evolved Expendable Launch 

Vehicle class missions will reduce risk and provide the opportunity to decrease program costs. 

Over the long-term, we will continue to explore ways to provide lower cost launch 

capability. We are looking outside the current paradigm to achieve dramatic savings. Along those lines, we are partnering with the Air Force Research Lab in the 

development of next generation technologies and a new domestically produced hydrocarbon main engine. We are also pursuing disaggregated architectures for our 

space systems as well as encouraging commercial providers to find new/innovative 

ways to access space. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 83) What is the Air Force doing to ensure newer entrants like 

SpaceX have access to the space launch business and the ability to compete for DOD 

space launch contracts? 

General SHELTON. 83) The process is in place to provide new entrants the opportunity to compete for National Security Space launches. The Air Force, National Reconnaissance Office and National Aeronautics and Space Administration released 

the New Entrant Certification Strategy in October 2011. It defines the coordinated 

certification strategy for commercial new entrant launch vehicles and it is anchored 

on the existing National Aeronautics and Space Administration model. The United 

States Air Force Launch Services New Entrant Certification Guide also was released in October 2011. The guide provides the Air Force’s risk-based approach to 

certify new entrant launch companies for Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle missions, and it lists the criteria any new entrant must meet. 

To facilitate the certification of potential new entrants, Air Force Space Command 

identified two missions on which new entrant launch providers may bid: the Space 

Test Program—2 and the Deep Space Climate Observatory. These Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle-class missions will provide an opportunity for potential new entrants to gain experience in satellite launch to facilitate vehicle certification. Once 

a new entrant is certified, we will compete the launch services needs not covered 

under the FY13 Phase 1 Buy. When this phase expires and new entrants are certified, we intend to conduct future acquisitions in a full and open competition for 

launch services. 
116 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 84) General Shelton and Mr. Klinger, Operationally Responsive 

Space (ORS) had been a major priority for the Department since 2006. Can you explain why this program is being terminated? What plans if any does the Air Force 

have to sustain the ORS mission? And, on a point I believe is absolutely critical, 

how will this provide more responsive and timely space capabilities to the 

warfighter? 

Mr. KLINGER. 84) With the successes of the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) 

programs, the Department decided to incorporate the concept of operationally responsive space into the Air Force Space & Missile Systems Center (SMC) to increase 

resiliency, survivability and flexibility across all DOD space programs. 

Transition efforts are underway to fully integrate responsive space principles into 

space architectures and Space Modernization Initiatives to: 

• Develop enablers to ensure resilience, survivability and flexibility 

• Explore space mission augmentation options 

• Incorporate responsiveness into Research and Development (R&D) efforts across 

other platforms 

• Integrate lessons learned from ORS accomplishments. 

By integrating responsive space into the mission area platforms in both R&D and 

acquisition practice, the Department will continue to provide responsive and timely 

space capabilities to the warfighter. 

Additionally, the Joint Staff has an extremely responsive and proven Joint Urgent 

Operational Needs (JUON) and newer Joint Emergent Operational Needs (JEON) 

process which will streamline JROC validation to expedite satisfaction of Combatant 

Commander urgent needs. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 85) How will you support the ORS–1 satellite launched only 9- 

months ago with the termination of the Operationally Responsive Space Office? 

Mr. KLINGER. 85) ORS–1 operations and sustainment responsibilities including 

anomaly resolution, processing enhancements, configuration control, and ground 

segment updates, will be assumed by the Air Force Space & Missile Systems Center 

(SMC) through end of satellite life. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUPPERSBERGER 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. 86) Now that ORS–1 has been launched and declared operational, how would you characterize the performance of ORS–1 in fulfilling the Urgent Need it was originally intended to satisfy? Given the plans for ORS funding 

to be discontinued in the President’s Budget Request, how will Urgent Needs be met 

in the future? What process will remain in place to address Urgent Needs? 

General SHELTON. 86) The ORS–1 mission is successful in meeting the United 

States Central Command’s (USCENTCOM) requirements which it was designed to 

satisfy. In a December 2011 memo, the USCENTCOM–Intelligence, Surveillance, 

Reconnaissance (ISR) Director stated, ‘‘CENTCOM is extremely satisfied with ORS– 

1. It has met or exceeded its projected capabilities and additional capabilities and 

applications continue to unfold. ORS–1 provides superb collection considering its design limitations and CENTCOM will continue to rely on its capabilities as an integral component to our ISR architecture and collection plan.’’ 

We plan to restructure the ORS program to incorporate the ORS tenants of responsiveness and resiliency across our space programs, to include programs such as 

the Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite, Space Based Infrared Systems, 

Global Positioning System III Operational Control Segment, Space Control Technology Insertion, and Technology Transfer programs. Beginning in 2013, we plan to 

meet warfighter needs for responsive space capabilities through programs of record 

and mechanisms such as the Joint Urgent Operational Needs process. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. 87) The Space Test Program has a distinguished 45-year 

history of fulfilling a requirement for low-cost access to space for developmental 

technologies and science experiments. Given the plans for dissolution of the Space 

Test Program as envisioned in the President’s Budget Request, how will this ongoing requirement be met in the future? 

General SHELTON. 87) The Space Test Program funding was eliminated due to 

higher Department of Defense priorities. The President’s Budget includes significant 

investment in space research by the Air Force Research Laboratory, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and other Service laboratories. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. 88) As you know, the report directed by Section 1248 of the 

FY10 Defense Authorization was due to the defense congressional committees in 

April 2010—almost 2 years ago. While the Congress received an interim report on 

this topic last summer, it has yet to receive the final report. In the meantime, the 
117 

U.S. satellite industrial base continues to struggle to keep pace with its global competitors in what is an intensely competitive international marketplace. In fact, a November 2011 study on the health of the space industrial base, entitled ‘‘U.S. Industrial Base Analysis for Space Systems,’’ conducted by The Tauri Group under contract to OSD AT&L Industrial Policy, cites 11 space technologies of ‘‘high risk’’ due 

to the absence of U.S. suppliers or a single U.S. supplier, and 17 areas ‘‘at risk’’ 

due to limited suppliers, suppliers with a potential to create bottlenecks, those with 

workforce issues, and anticipated cost increases. As our Nation moves into an era 

of austere Government budgets, it would appear that sustaining our defense industrial base through a period of shrinking budgets and programs is going to be of even 

greater importance. Rather than sustaining portions of this industrial base via the 

expenditure of funds, the satellite sector appears to be one area where regulatory 

change could have a significant impact on the health and sustainability production 

lines of crucial importance to the most exquisite of our national defense systems. 

When will the Section 1248 report be delivered? And, do you agree that moving 

some of our Nation’s commercial satellite products off of the U.S. munitions list 

could have a significant positive impact on the U.S. space industrial base? Do you 

believe that changing the current statute is in fact a national security imperative 

in order to sustain this industrial base? 

Mr. SCHULTE. 88) The Section 1248 report will be delivered to Congress on April 

18, 2012. The report identifies some categories of satellites that can be moved from 

the U.S. Munitions List (USML) to the Commerce Control List (CCL) without undue 

risk to national security. Further, the report finds that U.S. national security interests would be best served by normalizing controls on satellites and related components, to enable the development of flexible and timely responses to rapid technological changes, consistent with existing authorities for all other strategic trade controls. These changes would facilitate cooperation with U.S. Allies and export control 

regime partners, strengthen the competitiveness of sectors key to U.S. national security, and increase U.S. exports, while maintaining robust controls where appropriate to enhance our national security. Ultimately, implementing the report’s recommendations will help energize the industrial base, a key objective of the National 

Security Space Strategy, and build higher fences around fewer items, the goal of the 

Administration’s Export Control Reform Initiative. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. 89) Recognizing the severe constraints of the current fiscal 

environment, and given that some programs must be cut or limited so that others 

can be funded, it appears that numerous small, low-cost, innovative programs have 

been cut to preserve funding for a few big-ticket programs with a history of cost 

overruns. Doesn’t this reward and perpetuate the wrong type of behavior and eliminate the possibility of creating new models of program development and execution? 

Mr. KLINGER. 89) With the challenge to balance $450B in budget cuts across the 

years, all programs, big and small, were individually and collectively assessed. No, 

DOD program escaped thorough examination. Funding was cut from some small and 

large programs where the Department determined adequate risk could be assumed. 

This year, the Department’s space initiatives and efficiencies include increasing, restructuring, and where necessary terminating or delaying programs to better deliver 

critical space capabilities. The Department’s budget proposal continues to pursue 

satellite block buys with incremental funding to avoid costly production breaks, preserve the most critical industrial base capabilities, and reduce non-recurring engineering costs for the procurement of the Advanced Extremely High Frequency 

(AEHF) and Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) replenishment. 

The Department’s Better Buying Power (BBP) initiative establishes and requires 

major programs to be executed within ‘‘Should-Cost’’ estimates with accountability 

and consequences. Additionally, BBP includes contracting initiatives increasing 

block buys or increasing competition, where prudent, to find efficiencies and savings. 

These BBP initiatives have been applied to large critical space programs such as 

AEHF satellites system, SBIRS satellites, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, and 

the much used Global Positioning System in the FY13 budget build. Initiatives are 

already underway to continue to ‘‘reap’’ savings from BPP in large space programs 

as FY14 budget process begins. 

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