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57–976 PDF 2010

ARE FEDERAL AND POSTAL EMPLOYEES SAFE AT

WORK?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL WORKFORCE,

POSTAL SERVICE, AND THE DISTRICT

OF COLUMBIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 16, 2010

Serial No. 111–69

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

PETER WELCH, Vermont

BILL FOSTER, Illinois

JACKIE SPEIER, California

STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio

JUDY CHU, California

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois

RON STROMAN, Staff Director

MICHAEL MCCARTHY, Deputy Staff Director

CARLA HULTBERG, Chief Clerk

LARRY BRADY, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL WORKFORCE, POSTAL SERVICE, AND THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts, Chairman

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah

ANH ‘‘JOSPEH’’ CAO, Louisiana

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

WILLIAM MILES, Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on March 16, 2010 ............................................................................ 1

Statement of:

Goldstein, Mark, Director, Physical Infrastructure, U.S. Government Accountability Office; Steven Miller, Deputy Commissioner for Services

and Enforcement, Internal Revenue Service; Sue Armstrong, Acting

Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Infrastructure Protection and

Gary Schenkel, Director, Federal Protective Service, National Protection and Programs Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security;

and Guy Cottrell, Deputy Chief Postal Inspector, U.S. Postal Inspection

Service ............................................................................................................ 17

Armstrong, Sue .......................................................................................... 39

Cottrell, Guy .............................................................................................. 51

Goldstein, Mark ......................................................................................... 17

Miller, Steven ............................................................................................ 34

Schenkel, Gary .......................................................................................... 40

Kelley, Colleen, national president, National Treasury Employees Union;

Jon Adler, national president, Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association; and David Wright, president, Local 918, American Federation

of Government Employees ............................................................................ 70

Adler, Jon ................................................................................................... 79

Kelley, Colleen ........................................................................................... 70

Wright, David ............................................................................................ 86

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Adler, Jon, national president, Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, prepared statement of ..................................................................... 82

Armstrong, Sue, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Infrastructure Protection and Gary Schenkel, Director, Federal Protective Service, National Protection and Programs Directorate, U.S. Department

of Homeland Security, prepared statement of ............................................ 42

Chaffetz, Hon. Jason, a Representative in Congress from the State of

Utah, prepared statement of ........................................................................ 10

Connolly, Hon. Gerald E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Virginia, prepared statement of .............................................................. 15

Cottrell, Guy, Deputy Chief Postal Inspector, U.S. Postal Inspection Service, prepared statement of ............................................................................ 53

Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Maryland, prepared statement of ............................................................ 107

Goldstein, Mark, Director, Physical Infrastructure, U.S. Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of ................................................. 19

Kelley, Colleen, national president, National Treasury Employees Union,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 72

Lynch, Hon. Stephen F., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Massachusetts:

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 8

Prepared statement of Mr. Thompson and a DOD employee ................ 2

Miller, Steven, Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement, Internal Revenue Service, prepared statement of ......................................... 36

Wright, David, president, Local 918, American Federation of Government

Employees, prepared statement of .............................................................. 88

(1)

ARE FEDERAL AND POSTAL EMPLOYEES

SAFE AT WORK?

TUESDAY, MARCH 16, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL WORKFORCE, POSTAL

SERVICE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m. in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen F. Lynch

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Lynch, Norton, Cummings, Connolly,

and Chaffetz.

Staff present: William Miles, staff director; Jill Crissman, professional staff; Rob Sidman, detailee; Dan Zeidman, deputy clerk/legislative assistant; Howard Denis, minority senior counsel; and Alex

Cooper, minority professional staff member.

Mr. LYNCH. Good afternoon. The Subcommittee on the Federal

Workforce, Postal Service, and District of Columbia hearing will

now come to order. I apologize for the brief delay. We have a lot

going on here today. Members will be coming in and leaving periodically. Unfortunately, we seem to schedule everything at the

same time here in light of the work that needs to be done.

I want to welcome my friend and ranking member, Mr. Chaffetz

from Utah, and members of the subcommittee hearing, witnesses,

and all those in attendance.

In light of the recent attacks and violent outbursts against Federal workers and facilities, I have called today’s hearing to examine

Federal and Postal employee workplace security.

The Chair, ranking member, and the subcommittee members will

each have 5 minutes to make opening statements, and all Members

will have 3 days to submit statements for the record.

I would also like to ask unanimous consent that the testimony

of Congressman Benny Thompson, who is our chairman of the

Committee on Homeland Security, and that of a DOD employee, be

submitted for the record.

Hearing no objection, so ordered.

[The prepared statements of Mr. Thompson and the DOD employee follow:]

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Mr. LYNCH. Ladies and gentlemen, in recent weeks we have witnessed several brutal attacks and violent outbursts against Federal

workers and facilities, which is why I have called today’s hearing.

Tragically, in 2010, alone, a U.S. court security officer in Las

Vegas, and an IRS manager in Austin, TX, have lost their lives,

while several law enforcement personnel, including a deputy U.S.

Marshall and members of the Pentagon Force Protection Agency,

have been injured in the line of duty.

Given the rise of anti-Government feeling, as notably reported in

the Southern Poverty Law Center’s 2009 Report entitled, ‘‘The Second Wave,’’ I believe that, as chairman of the subcommittee, I have

a duty to examine how well positioned Federal agencies and the

Postal Service are for similar events.

Today’s hearing will also allow us to discuss what agencies are

doing to provide comprehensive training and guidance to employees

on how to respond to such threats and scenarios. It is one thing

to hear about agencies wrestling with how to afford purchasing expensive security countermeasures, but it is quite a different matter

to listen to Federal employees recount the lack of emergency preparedness of a particular office. It may be that an emergency plan

exists, but if the individual workers aren’t familiar with it and are

not even practicing any type of evacuation drills, then what type

of outcome can we expect if and when disaster strikes.

An important item to note here is that the Federal and Postal

employees warrant our respect. For some to look at the violence directed against IRS employees and to try to justify that deliberate

intent to murder other human beings is simply inexcusable and unacceptable. Our Nation’s public servants deserve nothing less than

our full support, and to know that all of us, from the President to

Congress, are grateful for their work and assistance in helping us

govern our Nation.

More importantly, our Federal employees need to know that we

will do everything possible to keep them safe while they are at the

workplace and away from their families.

Today’s hearing will provide us with the opportunity to hear

from the IRS and its employee representatives concerning both the

immediate and long-term impact of the February 18th attack in

Austin. Additionally, we will hear from the Department of Homeland Security about its ongoing activities in the Federal building

security area, as well as from the U.S. Postal Service’s Inspection

Service.

It is my hope that the testimony and feedback we receive from

today’s witnesses will provide the subcommittee with precise guidance and direction.

Again, I thank each of you for being with us this afternoon and

I look forward to your participation.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Stephen F. Lynch follows:]

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Mr. LYNCH. I now yield 5 minutes to our ranking member, Mr.

Chaffetz.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for

holding this important hearing. I appreciate all of those witnesses

that have come to testify today.

Needless to say, we want to make sure that every Federal employee and the public who is engaging with the Federal Government at all times is as safe as possible. People should deserve and

expect to work in a safe environment. We need to constantly evaluate the standards and procedures, so I think this hearing is particularly appropriate at this time. I look forward to hearing the discussion.

For those very few but important men and women who have

been on the wrong end of this violence, our hearts, thoughts, and

prayers go out to those people.

We need to continue to strive to improve and make the workplace as safe as we can, but also accessible, at the same time.

I look forward to this hearing. I thank, again, the chairman for

holding it and yield back the balance of my time.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Jason Chaffetz follows:]

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Mr. LYNCH. I thank the gentleman.

I would now like to yield 5 minutes to Ms. Eleanor Holmes Norton, the Congresswoman from the District of Columbia, who has

also been at the forefront of this issue, because of the number of

Federal facilities in her District, for a long, long time.

Ms. Norton.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am especially appreciative that you have called this hearing so soon after the attacks

in Austin and right here in the National Capital Region, first with

the IRS in Austin, and here in this region at the Pentagon.

Mr. Chairman, in post-9/11 America there has to be a renewed

appreciation for Federal workers and the kind of hammering of

civil servants stopped. They recognize how important was the work

of those who are spread across our Government. It is very disturbing to see the uptick in attacks on Federal employees once again.

Mr. Chairman, during the last 10 years or so, the Federal Protective Service was literally drained of employees, and it got so bad

that we asked and the Appropriations Committee mandated that a

certain floor of Federal Protective Service guards and officers be retained. There was the notion that all you needed was security

guards, you didn’t even need a Federal Protective Service, even

though that is the oldest of the police forces in the Federal Government. It was very disconcerting.

Mr. Chairman, I chair a subcommittee with jurisdiction over

Federal construction and leasing, and have some jurisdiction over

the Federal Protective Service in that regard, and I am a member

of the Homeland Security Committee, and if I may say so, Mr.

Chairman, the so-called Interagency Security Committee is something of a joke. This is a committee that is supposed to sit and coordinate security for Federal buildings, sites, and employees.

But to show you just how ineffective is the protection of Federal

workers, take a building like the new Transportation, not so old,

maybe about 5 years old, the new Transportation Department.

That is not a high security building. Mr. Chairman, when my staff,

with their congressional tags on, have gone to that building, they

can’t get in there. Somebody in the agency has to stop her work

and come down in order for them to enter the premises, even

though these people have the credentials of the U.S. Capitol on

them.

That is what you have at one end, in a building that we do not

think Al Qaeda is much looking for. At the other end, we have

more sensible security in some other parts of the Government. How

could this be? The reason it is this way, Mr. Chairman, is that security gets decided on the premises. No matter what they tell you,

it is some GS–9 somewhere who sits with a committee and decides

who will come into this agency or not, and the rest of it.

And if it goes up to the Secretary and the Secretary says, that

is fine with me, well then even staff from the Capitol can’t get in.

If it is someone who has a more even sense of security and what

it means, maybe they will. But I can tell you this, Mr. Chairman:

I have seen security in buildings that I think Al Qaeda would be

far more interested in entering that do not have the security of the

Transportation Department.

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We have had hearings ourselves on it. I would like very much for

my subcommittee, for the Homeland Security Committee, and you,

Mr. Chairman, to get together so that we can, in a concerted way,

make the Federal Government protect Federal employees by having one standard that is minimal and then tailor it to other parts

of the Government which may require more or less.

Again, I very much appreciate the respect you show for the safety of Federal employees by holding such a prompt hearing here this

afternoon.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. Certainly we are looking for best practices to be adopted.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.

Connolly, for 5 minutes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank you, Chairman Lynch, and thanks so

much for holding this very important hearing.

Last year we have witnessed a rise in violent rhetoric by extremist groups in America; therefore, we must consider not only those

infrastructure improvements to protect Federal employees, to protection Federal employees from terrorism, but also the manner in

which we may exercise justification of violence from public discourse.

Less than 1 month ago, Andrew Joseph Stack intentionally

crashed his small plane into a Federal building in Austin, TX that

included offices of the Internal Revenue Service filled with Federal

employees. This terrorist attack killed Vernon Hunter, a Federal

employee who previously served two terms overseas in the Armed

Forces.

Incredibly, some political figures offered a tacit defense of that

terrorist attack. One such individual was recorded as saying, ‘‘I

think if we had abolished the IRS back when I first advocated it,

he wouldn’t have had a target for his airplane.’’ Previously, he told

the Conservative Political Action Conference that he empathized

with the terrorist who flew his plane into the Federal building in

Austin. This defense of terrorism is remarkable, because under this

logic the victims of terrorism bear the responsibility of the terrorist

attack.

This implicit figure’s reprehensible defense of terrorism is consistent with the disturbing trend of violent, anti-government extremism we have seen in our country all too often. According to the

Southern Poverty Law Center, the slaughter engineered by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, men steeped in the conspiracy

theories and white hot fury of the American radical right, marked

the opening shot on a new kind of domestic political extremism, a

revolutionary ideology whose practitioners do not hesitate to carry

out attacks directed at entirely innocent victims, people selected essentially at random, to make a political point.

Since 1995, there have been over 75 violent attacks by domestic

terrorists like Timothy McVeigh and Andrew Joseph Stack, including the 1996 bombing at the Atlanta Olympics by anti-abortion fanatic Eric Rudolph and the 2009 murder of a guard at the Holocaust Museum by anti-Semite James von Brunn. It would be reprehensible enough for anyone to endorse violence generally, but

even worse is endorsement of violence in response to non-violent

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policies with which one might disagree, such as the terrorist attack

against the IRS to express tax grievances.

Terrorism can never be condoned. Violence against Federal workers and installations is never acceptable. Those who, for cheap political pandering, find themselves justifying it most assuredly have

the blood of its innocent victims, like Vernon Hunter, on their

hands.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Gerald E. Connolly follows:]

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Mr. LYNCH. I thank the gentleman.

The committee will now hear testimony from today’s witnesses.

It is the standard policy of this committee that all witnesses who

are to offer testimony shall be sworn. Could I ask you to all stand

and raise your right hands?

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. LYNCH. Let the record indicate that all the witnesses have

each answered in the affirmative.

What I will do is I will offer a brief introduction of each of our

witnesses, and then we will afford each an opportunity to testify

for 5 minutes.

First of all, Mr. Mark Goldstein is the Director of Physical Infrastructure Issues at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Mr.

Goldstein is responsible for the Government Accountability Office

work in the areas of Government property and telecommunications,

and has held other public sector positions, serving as deputy director and chief of staff to the District of Columbia Financial Control

Board, and as a senior staff member of the U.S. Senate Committee

on Governmental Affairs. Mr. Goldstein is also an elected fellow of

the National Academy of Public Administration.

Mr. Steven Miller is Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement, providing direction and oversight for all major decisions

affecting the four taxpayer-focused Internal Revenue Service divisions: wage and investment, large and mid-sized business, all business, self-employed and tax-exempt and government entities. He is

also responsible for the IRS Criminal Investigation Division, which

investigates income tax evasion, the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility, which administers the laws governing the practice of

tax professionals before the IRS, and the IRS whistleblower office,

which receives information on tax cheating.

Ms. Sue Armstrong was named the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary in September 2009 of the Office of Infrastructure Protection,

a division of the National Protection and Programs Directorate at

the Department of Homeland Security. In this capacity, she supports the Assistant Secretary in leading the coordinated national

effort to reduce the risk to the Nation’s critical infrastructure and

key resources posed by acts of terrorism, and increasing the Nation’s preparedness and rapid recovery in the event of an attack,

natural disaster, or other emergency.

Mr. Gary W. Schenkel was appointed Director of the Federal Protective Service, a Division of the National Protection and Programs

Directorate at the Department of Homeland Security, in March

2007. A retired Marine Corps lieutenant colonel, Schenkel has significant leadership and experience in a wide range of arenas, including organizational transformation efforts, security planning for

public facilities, logistical planning and execution, and business administration.

Mr. Guy Cottrell joined the Postal Service in 1987 as a letter carrier in New Orleans, LA. In 2008 Mr. Cottrell was asked to come

to National Headquarters to lend his expertise and leadership to

the Chief Postal Inspector’s role as Chief Security Officer of the

Postal Service as Inspector in Charge of the Secretary and Crime

Prevention Communications Group. In 2009, Mr. Cottrell was seVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:05 Sep 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\57976.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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lected as Deputy Chief Inspector, Headquarters Operation, with

oversight of all Postal Service national security programs.

Welcome to all of our witnesses.

Mr. Goldstein, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.

Let me just explain that box in the middle of the table will show

green while your time is proceeding. It will show yellow when it

is time to wrap up, and then red when you should probably stop

offering testimony.

Mr. Goldstein.

STATEMENTS OF MARK GOLDSTEIN, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; STEVEN MILLER, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER FOR SERVICES AND ENFORCEMENT, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE;

SUE ARMSTRONG, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,

OFFICE OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION AND GARY

SCHENKEL, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE, NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; AND GUY

COTTRELL, DEPUTY CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR, U.S. POSTAL INSPECTION SERVICE

STATEMENT OF MARK GOLDSTEIN

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Good afternoon, and thank you for the opportunity to discuss GAO’s recent work on the Federal Protective

Service and its efforts to protect Federal facilities. Recent events,

including last month’s attack on Internal Revenue Service offices in

Texas and the January 2010 shooting in the lobby of a Nevada

Federal courthouse demonstrate the continued vulnerability of Federal facilities and the safety of Federal employees who occupy

them. These events also highlight the continued challenges involved in protecting Federal real property and reiterate the importance of the Protective Service’s efforts to protect the over 1 million

Government employees and members of the public who work in

and visit the nearly 9,000 Federal facilities.

This testimony is based on past GAO reports and testimonies

and discusses challenges FPS faces in protecting Federal facilities

and tenant agencies’ perspectives of FPS’s services. To perform this

work, GAO visited a number of Federal facilities, surveyed tenant

agencies, analyzed documents, interviewed officials from Federal

agencies and contract guard companies.

Over the past 5 years, we have reported that FPS faces a number of operational challenges protecting Federal facilities, including

the following: First, FPS’ ability to manage risk across Federal facilities and implement security countermeasures is limited. FPS assesses risk and recommends countermeasures to the General Services Administration and their tenant agencies; however, decisions

to implement these countermeasures are frequently made by GSA

and tenant agencies who have, at times, been unwilling to fund the

countermeasures.

Additionally, FPS takes a building-by-building approach to risk

management, rather than taking a more comprehensive strategic

approach in assessing risks among all buildings in GSA’s inventory

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and recommending countermeasure priorities to GSA and tenant

agencies.

Second, FPS has experienced difficulty ensuring that it has a sufficient staff, and its inspector-based work force approach raises

questions about protection of Federal facilities.

While FPS is currently operating at its congressionally mandated

staffing level of no fewer than 1,200 full-time employees, the agency has experienced difficulty determining its optimal staffing level

to protect Federal facilities. Additionally, until recently FPS’ staff

was steadily declining, and as a result critical law enforcement

services have been reduced or eliminated.

Third, FPS does not fully ensure that its contract security guards

have the training and certifications required to be deployed to a

Federal facility. We found that FPS guards had not received adequate training to conduct their responsibilities. Specifically, some

guards were not provided building-specific training, such as what

actions to take during a building emergency or evacuation. This

lack of training may have contributed to several incidents where

guards neglected assigned responsibilities.

Fourth, GSA has not been satisfied with FPS’ performance, and

some tenant agencies are unclear on FPS’ role in protecting Federal facilities. According to GSA, FPS has not been responsive and

timely in providing security assessments for new leases. About onethird of FPS’ customers could not comment on FPS’ level of communication on various topics, including security assessments, a response that suggests a division of roles and responsibilities between FPS and its customer is unclear. Some 82 percent did not

use FPS for primary law enforcement response.

FPS is taking steps to better protect Federal facilities. For example, FPS is developing a new risk assessment program and it has

recently focused on improving oversight of its contract guard program.

While GAO is not making any new recommendations in this testimony, we note that FPS has not completed many related corrective actions to our previous reports. We look forward to continued

progress from DHS in the near future.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy

to answer questions you and the subcommittee may have. Thank

you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Goldstein follows:]

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Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Goldstein.

Mr. Miller, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for an opening

statement.

STATEMENT OF STEVEN MILLER

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Chairman Lynch, Ranking Member

Chaffetz, and Congresswoman Norton. Thanks for the opportunity

to testify on IRS workplace safety and security, particularly in the

wake of the senseless attack last month on the IRS building in

Austin, TX, that took the life of Vernon Hunter.

We are dedicated to ensuring safety and the well-being of our

100,000 employees, no matter what their job is nor where they are

located. The IRS work force is our most valuable resource, and no

violent act is going to deter us from doing our jobs with dignity and

respect for the American public.

At the IRS security is managed by our Office of Physical Security

and Emergency Preparedness, which manages at a national level,

ensuring we have consistent implementation of security policies

and procedures. For 2010, we will spend just over $100 million on

security at IRS offices. There are over 700 such facilities.

As required under an Executive order, we utilize the Interagency

Security Committee [ISC] standards, to determine what security to

provide at a given facility. Depending upon the applicable security

level under the standards, we will provide a variety of security

tools, including highly visible guards and K–9s, explosive and intrusion detection systems.

We also employ access control systems such as turnstiles, card

key access, proximity cards, and lock and key control systems.

Physical barriers include bollards, crash fencing, barriers, planters,

and pop-up barriers. Screening measures focus on magnetometers,

hand-held wands, and x-ray machines. We also have a detailed incident reporting system that is available and up and running 24/

7, 365 days of the year that reports and tracks on these incidents.

Mr. Chairman, the IRS employs a combination of strategies to

plan, implement, and evaluate our security processes, and we promote security and awareness for all IRS employees. Our employees,

in fact, are our partners in ensuring security, workplace safety and

security.

In this regard, we conduct periodic evacuation drills and shelter

and place exercises which heighten employee emergency readiness.

If you watched any of the coverage in Austin, you saw that among

the things that went right down there—and some things did, in

fact, go right, Mr. Chairman—our drills proved their worth. People

did get out of the building on a timely basis and we lost only one

life.

We also issue recurring communications regarding security and

safety to reinforce processes and to raise awareness, including annual security awareness fairs that are held across the country, and

we maintain an IRS internet Web site that provides updated information on IRS physical security and emergency preparedness programs.

From what I know today, Mr. Chairman, it is unlikely that there

is anything we could have done to prevent the attack in Austin.

Nonetheless, following that attack we took a series of immediate

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steps to enhance our security posture both in Austin and across the

country while we assess our long-term security needs and whether

they have changed over time. This increased vigilance includes 24/

7 guard service in all 11 IRS Austin offices. There is also additional

security at IRS facilities across the country, including additional

guard service at this time.

In conclusion, this area remains a top concern for the IRS, and

we will be taking a hard look at what we can do in both the short

and long term to ensure the safety of our folks. Nothing is more

important to Treasury Secretary Geithner, Commissioner Shulman,

nor myself.

Thanks. I will be happy to take any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]

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Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Miller.

Ms. Armstrong, you are now welcome to offer testimony for 5

minutes.

STATEMENT OF SUE ARMSTRONG

Ms. ARMSTRONG. Thank you, Chairman Lynch, Ranking Member

Chaffetz, and Congresswoman. It is a pleasure to appear before you

today to discuss the work of the Interagency Security Committee.

The Interagency Security Committee was created as a direct result

of the Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal

Building in 1995, the worst domestic-based terrorist attack in U.S.

history.

The mission of the Interagency Security Committee is to develop

standards, policies, and best practices for enhancing the quality

and effectiveness of physical security in and the protection of the

over 300,000 non-military Federal facilities in the United States.

The Department of Homeland Security’s Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection chairs the Interagency Security Committee,

which is composed of senior executives from 45 member departments and agencies that contribute to the publication of innovative

products to increase the security of Federal facilities, to protect

Federal employees and the visiting public.

For example, in March 2008 the Interagency Security Committee

developed and published the facility security level determinations

for Federal facilities, which defines criteria and processes facilities

should use to determine their facilities security level. In June 2009,

per recommendation from the Government Accountability Office,

the Interagency Security Committee developed the use of physical

security performance measures, the first Federal policy guidance on

performance measures for physical security programs and testing

procedures.

In addition, the Interagency Security Committee is currently in

the final stages of a comprehensive, multi-year effort to integrate

15 years of standards, lessons learned, and countermeasures for

threats to federally owned and leased facilities. These documents

will comprise the most comprehensive standards for Federal facilities created to date.

The Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection also oversees the work of the Office of Infrastructure Protection, which conducts vulnerability assessments on the Government facilities sector. These assessments identify security gaps and provide the foundation for risk-based implementation of protective programs. The

Office of Infrastructure Protection also distributes the infrastructure protection report series, which provides protection information

tailored to address issues faced by Federal buildings such as large

Government office buildings and Federal courthouses, and my colleague from the Federal Protective Service will describe the department’s role in protecting these facilities in greater detail.

I appreciate the opportunity to address the committee on this important issue and I look forward to answering any questions you

might have.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you.

Mr. Schenkel, you are welcome to offer testimony for 5 minutes.

40

STATEMENT OF GARY SCHENKEL

Mr. SCHENKEL. Thank you, Chairman Lynch, Ranking Member

Chaffetz, Congresswoman Norton. It is a pleasure to appear before

you today to discuss the actions of the Federal Protective Service

as the Federal Protective Service undertakes to ensure the safety

and security of Federal Government buildings.

The Federal Protective Service performs fixed post access control

screening functions, roving patrols at 9,000 General Services Administration owned and leased facilities. In fiscal year 2009 the

Federal Protective Service responded to 35,812 calls for service, including 1,242 protests and organized disturbances, made 1,646 arrests, conducted 1,115 criminal investigations, processed 272 weapons violations, and prevented the introduction of 661,724 prohibited

items into Federal facilities, all with the significant assistance of

our contract guards known as protective security officers.

FPS was transferred at the start of the fiscal year to the National Protection and Programs Directorate, a component within

DHS whose core mission is national resiliency that ranges from

physical infrastructure protection to cybersecurity. While we are focused on ensuring a smooth transition of the organization, we believe this new structure will better position us within the department to receive the necessary support and meet our critical responsibilities moving forward.

Primary among the Federal Protective Service’s core mission requirements is the facility security assessment. The facility security

assessment identifies existing and potential threats to Federal facilities and their occupants. The Federal Protective Service takes

an all-hazards approach to facilities security assessment and evaluates the risk against possible mitigation measures built into our

new risk assessment and management program. Those mitigating

countermeasures are then presented to each facility’s security committee, with recommendations on which countermeasures should be

implemented, including the development of an occupant emergency

plan.

The Federal Protective Service systematically measures the effectiveness of our countermeasures through a variety of systematic

progress, such as annual countermeasure effectiveness inventories,

scheduled guard post and guard vendor inspections, and one of our

most visible means, Operation Shield.

Operation Shield conducts unannounced inspections to measure

the effectiveness of contract guards in detecting the presence of unauthorized persons, potentially disruptive or dangerous activities in

or around Federal facilities, and the guards’ ability to prevent the

introduction of prohibitive items or harmful substances into those

facilities.

Operation Shield also serves as a visible, proactive, and random

measure that may be used as a deterrent to disrupt the planning

of terrorist activities.

In addition, the Federal Protective Service routinely provides security awareness training for employees which includes presentations on how to avoid becoming a victim of theft or violence, and

we have also developed active shooter training, explaining what

employees should do when faced with a violent situation and how

to respond when law enforcement arrives.

41

FPS has taken several actions and initiatives to address major

areas identified by the Government Accountability Office, including

human capital management, finance, guard contract oversight. FPS

continues to develop additional information collection and analysis

tools.

FPS addressed the current GAO report regarding contract guard

oversight and lapses in screening procedures by determining the

cause of the lapses and recommending measures to prevent reoccurrence: increasing the frequency of guard posts and performance

of protection security officers formerly referred to as contract security officers; requiring additional training in magnetometer and xray, including contract modification requiring the viewing of an

FPS-produced training video that addresses screening for improvised explosive devices; ensuring that all protective security officers

are compliant with certifications and qualifications, as stated in

contract, by incorporating the certification system into our risk assessment management program or RAMP; developing and initiating a 16-hour magnetometer x-ray training program provided to

protective security officers by Federal Protective Service inspectors

titled the National Weapons Detection Program, which has begun

in January 2010.

As a result of the covert testing working group, FPS developed

covert testing program which enhanced and complemented the ongoing efforts to improve oversight and improve the attentiveness

and professionalism of the protective security officer. This current

program further achieves FPS’ strategic goals of effectively and efficiently securing Federal facilities and keeping their occupants

safe.

These are just some of the many ways the Federal Protective

Service contributes to the safety and security of Federal buildings

and their occupants.

I look forward to the opportunity to answer any questions you

may have, and I thank you and the committee for holding this important hearing.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Armstrong and Mr. Schenkel follows:]

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Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Schenkel.

Mr. Cottrell, welcome. You are now recognized for 5 minutes for

an opening statement.

STATEMENT OF GUY COTTRELL

Mr. COTTRELL. Good afternoon, Chairman Lynch, Congressman

Chaffetz, and Congresswoman Norton. My name is Guy Cottrell,

Deputy Chief Inspector for the U.S. Postal Inspection Service. I am

pleased to be here with you today to discuss safety and security

practices at the Postal Service.

While I am a postal inspector, please note that in today’s testimony I am providing information that reflects security strategies

across many different functions within the Postal Service.

I will begin with the Inspection Service. Our mission is to protect

the Postal Service and its employees, secure the Nation’s mail system, and ensure public trust in the mail. Postal inspectors are Federal law enforcement officers who carry firearms, make arrests,

and serve Federal search warrants and subpoenas. There are approximately 1,400 postal inspectors nationwide and abroad who enforce more than 200 Federal laws involving the use of the U.S. mail

and the postal system. The Inspection Service maintains a security

force staffed by roughly 650 uniformed postal police officers who

are assigned to critical postal facilities across the country. The officers provide perimeter security, escort high-value mail shipments,

and perform essential protective functions.

The Postal Service has a number of ways we provide security for

our employees and buildings. The Postal Service has a cross-functional program to comprehensively review a building’s security.

Program helps postmasters and installation heads achieve and

maintain compliance with policies governing all aspects of security.

The review includes comprehensive onsite observations, document

reviews, and interviews of facility personnel. At the conclusion of

each assessment, a plan is developed to address any issues identified in that review.

Emphasizing the key role that each employee plays in each other’s safety is one of our prime strategies. Special emphasis has

been placed on developing employee communications safety materials. For example, each week at facilities nationwide, managers

are required to give safety stand-up talks. Simple tips to employees

such as reporting the condition of fences or public access to the

workroom floor all contribute to employee safety.

We will shortly begin an educational campaign aimed specifically

at our letter carriers.

A major component of the Postal Service’s workplace violence

prevention program is the district threat assessment team. Threat

assessment teams use cross-functional team approaches to assess

threatening situations and to develop risk abatement plans to minimize the potential risk of future violence.

The Postal Service has established an agency-wide continuity

program. The continuity program deals with issues that arise prior

to, during, and after an event relative outstanding the employee’s

safety and welfare. This program is tested and exercised on an annual basis.

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Our plan calls for the notification of all employees of a facility

that an event has occurred and where each employee is to report.

We have a toll-free number for all Postal Service employees to use

in the event of an emergency to receive information about facility

closings and operating status.

We are updating the computer program which will identify critical postal facilities in the path of approaching storms, provide

floodplain modeling, and real-time storm updates, as well as estimate anticipated impacts on postal assets.

The Inspection Service routinely works with other local and Federal law enforcement agencies. We also participate in training exercises. This ensures that postal employees, equipment, and procedures are ready to manage an emergency without interrupting operations.

The Inspection Service conducts and evaluates training on procedures for emergency management personnel and other essential

staff. This promotes preparedness, improves response capabilities,

assures that all systems are appropriate, and determines the effectiveness of our command, control, and communications processes.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify about some of the Postal

Service’s initiatives on safety and security. I would be pleased to

answer any questions this subcommittee may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cottrell follows:]

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Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Cottrell.

I now yield myself 5 minutes.

Director Goldstein, I had an opportunity to read your report from

I think it was June 2009 where you did an assessment of the Federal Protective Service, and it was very, very helpful. I am not sure

if it was a fair point in time to take a snapshot, however.

I know that up until 2007 the Federal Protective Service was in

the process of scaling down, downsizing. And then Congress, in

2008, said stop downsizing, start hiring. We came in with a minimum staffing requirement of, I think, 1,400. So then FPS had to

reverse what they were doing and start hiring, which they were not

prepared to do, and that is when you took the snapshot, so there

is some difficulty here transitioning from one function to the other,

one policy to the other.

I am just wondering if you have had a more recent opportunity

to do that analysis. I know you had folks, or perhaps you, yourself,

went to various facilities and did this assessment. You talked to

customers. You talked to a lot of people. I thought the report was

fairly comprehensive in terms of the number of districts that you

had reached out to, but is there a more recent assessment that you

have made in terms of the readiness of the Federal Protective Service and its ability to meet Congress’ more recent mandate?

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, we have done a number of approaches over the years. In 2008, we issued a report which was sort

of our more recent baseline report which, again, to reveal a lot of

the issues that were coming about as a result of the downsizing

that the agency was undergoing.

As you mentioned, since then a floor has been placed at 1,250 individuals, about 950 of whom must be law enforcement officers.

We have done additional work since that time. We issued a report on human capital planning at the Federal Protective Service.

We did testimony, preliminary findings, which you are referring to

from last summer in which we did a variety of things, including

some penetration testing of Federal buildings, as well as looking at

the contract guard program.

We will shortly issue a final report looking at those issues to a

number of committees of Congress that requested that work. So we

are continuing to do work on the agency, and there are some additional reports that Congress has requested that we also do, including taking a look at the transition into NPPD, as well as taking

a look at RAMP and whether RAMP will be a successful program

in helping the agency.

So we have continuing work on the way.

Mr. LYNCH. One of the problems that I have in assessing systemwide Federal security is that, for example, here on Capitol Hill, the

legislative branch, we have the Capitol Police. We sort of have our

own security system that we operate, as does the Federal court system. They sort of have the marshals inside the building, they have

FPS outside. We have the Capitol Police. It is really sort of organic.

DOD does their own thing, and so it is tough to take one measurement.

Is there a study or review that you are undertaking now that

would help me with that, or are you just responding as requested

from these different committees?

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Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Most of our time up until now we have focused

on the Federal Protective Service because of the GSA properties,

but we have received recent requests from the House Homeland Security Committee to examine just what you are suggesting, which

is more broadly taking a look at how security of Federal property

across the entire spectrum is managed, who is responsible for it,

how it interacts, how they coordinate, what kind of challenges they

face. So we will be getting that work soon, sir.

Mr. LYNCH. All right. I guess what I am asking, Are there gaps

in what we are requesting in order to get a good sense of what is

going on and what the entire picture is here in the Federal Government?

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. We have recently received a number of requests

from House Homeland Security which I think fills a lot of those

gaps, but I will be happy to take a look at what we do have in that

we are supposed to work on and talk with your staff about some

of those gaps. Yes, sir.

Mr. LYNCH. That would be helpful. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.

Goldstein.

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Chaffetz, our ranking member, for

5 minutes.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Goldstein, if we could start, you used the word confusion

when you are talking about the interaction with local law enforcement responding to situations in Federal buildings. Can you expand on that just a little bit more, because there are multiple jurisdictions that often would respond to some sort of incident, but explain to us a little bit more what you meant by confusion that was

out there.

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes, sir. I would be happy to.

Several years ago in 2008, when we began discussions with the

Federal Protective Service on their relationships with local police,

at that time they explained to us that as they were decreasing the

size of FPS they would be relying more on local law enforcement

and entering into memorandums of understanding with local law

enforcement around the country to assist them in times of emergency.

Over time, they realized that those MOUs probably would not be

sustainable because many local law enforcement entities have

enough of their own problems going on and would not wish to enter

into such agreements, and that ultimately is what they found.

What they told us at the time is that they were continuing, however, to develop relationships with local law enforcement and that

they had sort of more informal and ad hoc relationships to help

them in times of emergency, and that I suspect is true. We often

see local law enforcement responding to the scene when situations

occur.

However, what has concerned us is we have done interviews in

the course of our audit work in which we have spoken to precinct

commanders, for instance, in a major metropolitan area literally

within sight of level four Federal buildings, major level four buildings, who had no idea of when the last time they saw an FPS officer was, what kind of relationship existed with that building a

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block or two blocks away, and what their responsibility would be

in an occurrence.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Let’s do that. My guess is, my sense based on

what the chairman was also asking, this is something we would

like to explore further and learn a lot more about.

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes, sir. We would be happy to explore that with

the staff.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. That would be great.

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Can you help me, particularly Mr. Schenkel, understand, at least over the last 24 to 36 months, 2 to 3 years, what

is the trend and the number of people that are working and helping to secure?

Mr. SCHENKEL. It has been very positive. When we got the relief

as a result of the 2008 omnibus bill, we were able to hire an additional 150 FPS inspectors. In addition to that, we were able to revamp the training curriculum at the physical security training program, our in-house academy down at the Federal Law Enforcement

Training Center.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Again, I am sorry to cut you off. I have only got

just 5 minutes and I want to touch on two other subjects. If you

could provide us on the committee some additional details as to

where that staffing is going for both the physical infrastructure

and some of the other issues, that would be great.

And then if you could also, you mentioned the confiscation of

600,000-plus prohibited items?

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I would love to see what is on that list and if

there is a detail as to how many knives or how many this or that.

Mr. Chairman, I am concerned about this, not only in these facilities but also at airports, as well. I think we need to look at what

are we going to do about it. Is there enough of a deterrent, if you

will, to try to get or bring these items in? I am sure a lot of these

happen accidentally, but we are not talking about oversized shampoos here, is my guess. My guess is we are talking about something

that is a little bit more nefarious in its nature.

I recognize the demand on the security personnel to have to be

right all of the time, but I worry that these numbers are so huge.

And I have heard similar things at the TSA, as well, so I would

like to explore that and get additional information about that as we

move forward, because that is just not acceptable to have so many

prohibited items trying to be pushed and moved through the system. Obviously, there is room for error along the way.

My time is concluding here, so I yield back the balance of my

time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Eleanor

Holmes Norton for 5 minutes.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Schenkel, you are perhaps, I am sure—I should not even say

perhaps—aware of Mr. Goldstein’s testimony some months back

where the GAO used testers who were able to smuggle bomb parts

into, I think it was perhaps as many as 10 Federal facilities, take

them into a men’s room, and, if necessary, assemble them. Can you

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tell this subcommittee today that has been corrected, since it is at

least a year old, I think, that testimony was offered?

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, ma’am. We have taken dramatic steps as a

result of that. We have taken a number of steps as a result of the

penetration test that the GAO conducted, to include we initiated a

gap analysis to identify where those problems came from. We revamped the x-ray magnetometer training. We have initiated the

national weapons detection program, which is an additional 16

hours of magnetometer and x-ray training for all of our protective

security officers.

We have also instituted the Covert Testing Working Group,

which I mentioned in my initial testimony, where our individual

criminal investigators, with a standardized uniform policy and a

standardized uniform testing kit.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Schenkel, we have a call into my office from

someone who called himself a Federal Protective Services employee

who said to us that the FPS plans to eliminate its HAZMAT program. Of course, these are the programs that monitor dangerous

packages and provide training for such monitoring. Is the FPS

planning to eliminate its HAZMAT program?

Mr. SCHENKEL. No, ma’am, it is not.

Ms. NORTON. Is it still the case that we have a proliferation of

guards who remain stationary and cannot leave their posts, even

to assist a Federal Protective Service officer?

Mr. SCHENKEL. It depends on the building and the responsibilities of that post.

Ms. NORTON. Who decides that, Mr. Schenkel?

Mr. SCHENKEL. It is a combination of the facilities security committee that writes the post orders and the relationships——

Ms. NORTON. The facility security committee within each building?

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. NORTON. That is my problem, Mr. Schenkel. You know, if

you are very highly qualified employee at HHS, you don’t know a

hill of beans about security. The delegation of so much of security

to internal committees almost guarantees that what Mr. Goldstein

found will happen.

Mr. Schenkel, we know and there has been testimony that these

guards not only can’t leave their posts; they believe if they do leave

their posts, even to engage in a chase on their own or assisting an

FPS officer, they may face liability. Is that the case? Have they

been told that if you leave your post, somebody is coming in with

a gun, he runs, should the guard, not the FPS officer—you have

a proliferation of guards, not FPS officers—should that guard run

after that person who is trying to run away with a gun or with

whatever he has in his hand?

Mr. SCHENKEL. That is an identified training gap that we take

on the responsibility for. We have to ensure that those guards are

aware that they are not on their own personal liability when

those——

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, what is so scary about testimony

after testimony is this has been the case ever since guards have

been used. This is not the case, Mr. Goldstein. I mean, this could

61

have been corrected many years ago, but this policy of not leaving

your post has been the policy all along, has it not, Mr. Goldstein?

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is my understanding, ma’am.

Ms. NORTON. How is it that, with the Congress having said you

should have no fewer than 1,200 officers, Mr. Goldstein reports

that the FPS officers are on something called reduced hours? Why

would they be on reduced hours?

Mr. SCHENKEL. I am not aware of that, ma’am. If anything, they

are on extended hours.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Goldstein, you say in your testimony, you report reduced hours. That is where I got it from.

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes, ma’am. What we are referring to is during

the period of time certainly that the Federal Protective Service was

reducing its personnel, its officers, the law enforcement security officers and the remaining patrol officers, FPS made a decision that

in most places there would not be weekend hours, there would not

be hours that——

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Schenkel, if there are Federal employees in a

building during weekend hours, is there Federal Protective Service

there during those hours?

Mr. SCHENKEL. It depends on the location, ma’am.

Ms. NORTON. And, again, who decides that, Mr. Schenkel?

Mr. SCHENKEL. It is a combination of the needs of the facilities,

if they are isolated facilities, and/or of the region of they are in a

regional facility. There is 24/7 covered here in——

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Schenkel, isn’t it true that the internal committee is who basically is making these decisions, not your officers?

Mr. SCHENKEL. In some cases, but not in all cases.

Ms. NORTON. I think this is a very serious proposition, Mr.

Chairman, that security is in the hands of civilians who happen to

be sitting on these committees and who, given the power, is going

to use it as they see fit. Is that not the case, Mr. Goldstein?

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. We have found a number of weaknesses with the

building security committees, now called facilities security committees. They are made up of representatives from the tenant agencies. Usually the largest tenant agency in the individual building

serves as the Chair.

I have attended a number of these meetings over the years, just

to see how they operate, and, while I think they are well intentioned, and they certainly should have an advisory role, we have

been concerned that you have a very balkanized, fragmented approach to the security of GSA’s portfolio when every building gets

to make significant decisions about how security is managed, as opposed to FPS being allowed to do a portfolio-wide approach that is

based on risk management principles.

Ms. NORTON. You know, as competent and dedicated as, for that

matter, a Member of Congress may be who is my colleague, I don’t

want a Member of Congress deciding security for entry into this

building.

Mr. Chairman, may I just say finally in closing that the time has

come, I think, for the committees who have been concerned about

this to mandate that security be in the hands of trained security

officials, and I would like very much to work with you, the ranking

member, and to ask the members of the Homeland Security ComVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:05 Sep 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\57976.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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mittee and the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee,

which also has some jurisdiction over FPS employees, to all get together. Maybe if we gang up on this problem we can get better security for Federal employees.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. I think that is a great suggestion about

a joint effort, maybe joint hearings going forward. That is a great

idea.

The Chair now recognizes the distinguished gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, for 5 minutes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Schenkel, you talked about the Federal Protective Service

conducting sort of fixed-post and roving patrols of Federal facilities.

Are there other things preventively that the Federal Government

can or should do, the FPS in particular, to try to anticipate and/

or prevent possible terrorist attacks?

Mr. SCHENKEL. Sir, FPS takes an integrated approach that we

actually start using international and national intelligence resources. We have access to that through our regional intelligence

agents. They provide a threat picture, a threat analysis, if you will,

of each facility. That is coupled with local law enforcement and we

get the predictions and threat analysis also from them and take

that approach even further.

We employ certain countermeasures that could be cameras, intrusion detection systems. Obviously, our most visible countermeasure is the armed contract protective security officer, and certainly our most professional and most proficient is our armed Federal Protective Service law enforcement security officer.

Mr. CONNOLLY. You make reference to the MOUs with local law

enforcement, but Mr. Goldstein, if I understood your testimony, you

raised some concerns about the sustainability of those MOUs, given

the already heavy burdens borne by local law enforcement. Are

those MOUs, with all the good intentions of the world, something

we can count on to help protect our Federal employees?

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It is my understanding that, because of the difficultly arising from gaining commitments out of local law enforcement, that there are few, if any, MOUs that are actually in place,

and that I think Mr. Schenkel can tell you that generally what

they strive to do is create relationships with local law enforcement

in some of the major metropolitan cities where risks are higher.

But, again, we found some concerns, even in places where they had

done that, that, while they have tried to do that, the communication and interaction necessary to ensure collaboration wasn’t always in place.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Schenkel, did you want to comment on that?

Mr. SCHENKEL. Mr. Goldstein is correct. It is difficult to get an

MOU with a metropolitan law enforcement agency. Having come

from one myself, I understand that difficultly because of the liability issues. However, we have not had a single instance in FPS, at

least during my tenure, that we have had any difficultly in coordinating or occupying a facility when there is a threat. We have normally developed a command and control situation where FPS will

take command and control of the situation of a Federal facility

when local law enforcement responds.

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Mr. CONNOLLY. Are the rules of engagement fairly clear between

the FPS and the local law enforcement agencies? I can think of

some events right here in the national capital region where the

lines of authority become an issue in terms of whose turf are you

on and whose the primary responsibility for X, Y, and Z in terms

of security. I won’t name what, but it can sometimes be an issue.

Is that an issue sometimes for the FPS?

Mr. SCHENKEL. That will continue to be an issue wherever any

law enforcement or two units operate together; however, in our

case, because 80 percent of our facilities are leased facilities, there

is an obligation by local law enforcement to respond just as a local

fire department is required to respond, and we coordinate those activities either through Federal Protective Service officers on the

ground or through our mega centers, our communication and dispatch centers that all 9,000 of our buildings are tied in to.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Miller, in your testimony you indicated that

there really was not much we could have done to prevent the attack in Austin, if I understood your testimony.

Mr. MILLER. I believe that is right, sir.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I assume you meant by that physically once

someone decided to take his airplane and flying into the building,

there just wasn’t much we could do.

Mr. MILLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CONNOLLY. You were talking about the physical ability to restrain that individual once he got in his airplane?

Mr. MILLER. That is what I was speaking of, sir.

Mr. CONNOLLY. But are there other things—you heard me in my

opening statement. One of the concerns I have is that there are

some people in the media and even in political life who have, presumably unwittingly, nonetheless empowered some people who

might be on the edge emotionally anyhow, to think it is OK, if it

is a Federal agency you don’t like, to fly an airplane into a building. Are there things outside of the physical challenge once someone decides to do something we can or should be doing or anticipating to try to ameliorate or mitigate any possibility of such attacks?

Mr. MILLER. I would think, Congressman, that there are others

at this table and otherwise that would be better. Obviously, there

is tracking of intelligence and Internet catch and all of that. That

sort of isn’t within the IRS’ purview, and I think we would look to

other experts for that sort of explanation and help.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I know my time is up, Mr. Chairman. If I might

ask if there is anyone else at the table who wanted to respond to

that.

[No response.]

Mr. LYNCH. No takers.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you.

Mr. LYNCH. All right. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.

First of all, Mr. Miller, my condolences for the loss of life.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. LYNCH. I know Vernon Hunter was a Vietnam veteran, two

tours of duty, very close to retirement, so there is a human dimension here that sometimes gets lost in all of this.

Let me ask you, Ms. Armstrong and Mr. Miller, after the incident

in Austin, as Mr. Connolly pointed out and you confirmed, there

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was a certain unforseeability, this was so bizarre, I understand the

evacuation and the post-attack procedures seemingly went very

well. Were there any changes that you adopted, Mr. Miller, in

terms of the way you are doing business at the IRS within some

of your facilities? Was there a reassessment that you did following

that event?

And, Ms. Armstrong, I understand that the Interagency Security

part of this, its function is to make sure best practices are adopted

across agencies.

Mr. Miller, is there anything that you did or the IRS did in response?

And Ms. Armstrong, was any of that translated across agency

lines?

Mr. MILLER. Sir, I can speak to the IRS, Mr. Chairman. What

we did almost immediately was increase the amount of security at

all of our facilities until we were certain, during the weekend and

a little later than that, because this happened late in the week on

a Thursday, until we were sure that this was not a series of, the

first of a series.

We then have continued additional guard service and additional

security awareness and security at all the facilities, especially in

Austin, but across the country, as well.

We are in the process of doing what you are suggesting, which

is reassessing exactly where we are today, what is the general

threat level with respect to IRS facilities, and do we have in place

the processes and security we need to ensure the safety of our

folks.

Ms. ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir. In terms of the actual incident in Austin, itself, as the Office of Infrastructure Protection we monitor all

such incidents as they relate to Government facilities or a whole

host of different types of issues that impact critical infrastructure,

so we monitored the incident, reported again to the point of is this

a series of attacks, up to the national operations center and our

Secretary.

In terms of the Interagency Security Committee, this incident

and other recent incidents are certainly part of the ongoing dialog

that the committee is having about how it gets to the final stages

of a couple of years of work to put together a ground-breaking compendium of standards for physical security at Federal buildings.

The Congresswoman mentioned the facilities security committee.

That is actually the third piece of our work, the first two pieces

being the physical security criteria for Federal buildings and then

a design basis threat piece so that 31 different types of threat can

be considered as a facility considers countermeasures.

What we are hoping to do with the facilities security committee

is take 15 years worth of lessons learned on what is not working

in terms of Federal Security Committee composition, training, and

guidance, and have the Federal Protective Service and GSA cochair the working group that looks at the whole issue of Federal

Security Committees, how they work, what guidance they need,

what training they need, and who needs to be on them to make effective security decisions at Federal buildings.

Mr. LYNCH. OK. Let me just followup on that. I understand that

the Interagency Security Committee is sort of a facilitator across

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agency lines, and I know it is responsible for coordinating security

in all the non-DOD executive branch agencies, which is fairly expansive. You are talking millions of employees.

Ms. ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir.

Mr. LYNCH. And I also understand that you have one employee,

one staff person, the ISC, that handles all of that. Now, at one

point there was only one employee to do all of that. Have you increased staffing to get this thing done in light of the threat that

is out there?

Ms. ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir. As you know, the Interagency Security

Committee chair came to the Office of Infrastructure Protection in

fiscal year 2008, and since then we have been resourcing it out of

hide, if you will. We do have one Federal employee and a team of

contractors who do the staff work of the ISC. But the ISC is a 45-

member interagency body, and other Federal agencies provide subject matter expertise, personnel, brain power, and do the actual

work of the committee. So we coordinate, but the whole interagency

contributes in terms of resources.

Mr. LYNCH. OK. I am just interested in seeing that properly resources. If there is a weak link in this chain, it is probably that,

so it is tough enough with so many players here. You definitely

need somebody coordinating all that. For now we will leave it to

the agencies to properly resource that, but we will keep an eye on

it.

I now recognize the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Chaffetz, for 5

minutes.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you.

First, Mr. Chairman, if I could, with all due respect to Mr.

Connolly, I could use some help with the clarification in both the

opening statement and in the questioning as to the source of where

potentially some of this terrorism and acts of violence are coming

from.

Mr. LYNCH. You are not allowed to ask other Members questions.

We brought in five witnesses here, and you can ask them. I guess

that is why we have the witnesses here. So if you want to sort of

probe that with the witnesses, because I think Mr. Connolly was

asking folks or citing that. So if you want to ask the witnesses

about that, that would certainly be relevant.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I appreciate it.

Mr. LYNCH. And I understand the sensitivity here, and I have

tried not to impugn or imply any particular source. I am actually

working from the side of protecting the Federal employees within

those facilities, and not working from the point of the folks that

might be motivated to do something like this.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Coming into this hearing, that wasn’t my intention, either. It is just the idea of the suggestion that there was any

Member of this body that would suggest or condone or even encourage somebody, I just wanted to make sure that he had that opportunity to help clarify. But we will move on here.

There was a suggestion in David Wright, who is the President

of the Federal Protective Service Union, in his comments that the

Federal Protective Service having been ‘‘slashed to the point of ineffectiveness.’’ I wanted to give the FPS an opportunity to kind of

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respond to that assertion that it had been slashed to the point of

ineffectiveness. Would you care to comment?

Mr. SCHENKEL. I can’t agree entirely with President Wright in

regards to that. What I can say is that we had to refocus our protection mission, based on the available resources that we had. We

got involved in some things through mission creep, as I would call

it, that got us distracted from the facilities that we were charged

to protect. Consequently, we had to revamp our strategic plan and

focus on the protection of the facilities. It is a challenge. It is a constant maneuvering of resources that we have that are available. As

the threat changes, we have to keep maneuvering those limited resources where possible.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thanks. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you.

The Chair recognizes Ms. Eleanor Holmes Norton for 5 minutes.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Armstrong, as you can see, the Interagency Security Committee bugs me. And I do want to make it clear that when Mr.

Schenkel talks about the gap—and I think he is candid in reporting

a gap—the gap should be labeled for what it is. It is a gap between

burdensome and unnecessary security on the one hand and lax security on the other.

The example that I offered before at the Department of Transportation—and let me tell you how this plays out. This is a fairly

new facility. It is located along N Street Southeast. There are 20

million tourists and visitors who come to the District of Columbia.

If you go along that street, we are just filling it out with the kinds

of shops that you might expect and will be there over the years.

Imagine yourself as a visitor to our city and you say, well, there

is a Federal building, Johnny. We can go to the bathroom there.

And I am telling you that because an interagency committee has

some kind of hubris of self-importance, that taxpayer who paid for

that building cannot enter that building because somebody has decided—and we understand that the center of authority is in this

committee—that a taxpayer can’t get into that building unless the

taxpayer knows a staff person who can come down and give the OK

for the person to enter the building. Do you consider that appropriate, that kind of entry requirement for ordinary, law-abiding

citizens to be appropriate?

Ms. ARMSTRONG. Well, I think the key there is what is the agency, what is the——

Ms. NORTON. I am giving you an example and I would like you

to answer my example, not depending on the agency. I have given

you a low security agency and I am asking you whether you consider it appropriate that a taxpayer with a child, or without a child,

cannot get into that building to use the facility or, for that matter,

to go to the cafeteria. Do you consider that appropriate?

Ms. ARMSTRONG. Well, I think it is appropriate to have security

practices and procedures in place that would prevent the unauthorized entry of an unauthorized person into a Federal facility.

Ms. NORTON. And you don’t consider the taxpayer I am talking

about an unauthorized person, would you?

Ms. ARMSTRONG. Well, I don’t know the actual person that you

are talking about.

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Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, this is what I mean. I have given

you a hypothetical. You refuse to give me an answer to my hypothetical. Ordinary citizen with a child, should that ordinary citizen

be able to enter the Department of Transportation building in

order for the child to use the facilities? Yes or no?

Ms. ARMSTRONG. I would have to say no, ma’am.

Ms. NORTON. For what reason, Ms. Armstrong?

Ms. ARMSTRONG. For purposes of protecting the employees at

that building.

Ms. NORTON. In which way would this taxpayer be considered a

risk to the employees in that building?

Ms. ARMSTRONG. Well, if he were the ex-husband of a woman

that he had abused and is using a ruse to try to get past security

to get to her, then security——

Ms. NORTON. You see, Mr. Chairman, what I mean. Meanwhile,

if this is the way you do security, Ms. Armstrong, I don’t want you

in charge of my security. I want somebody who, as Mr. Goldstein

said, has taken a risk assessment and has decided is there a risk

that a parent entering the building poses, a security threat, or is

there a more serious risk.

Let me ask you, Mr. Schenkel, particularly in light of that answer, according to Mr. Goldstein’s testimony—and I am reading—

in 2008, FPS transitioned to an inspector—understand FPS, oldest

Federal police force in the United States—the FPS transitioned to

an inspector-based work force—this is page 6—eliminating the police position, and is relying primarily on FPS inspectors for both

law enforcement and physical security activities, which has hampered its ability to protect Federal officials. In essence, this testimony from Mr. Goldstein says that the Federal Protective Service

is no longer a police force, it is an inspector-based work force.

Since 2008, have you right-sided the agency so that the Federal

Protective Service is today a police force and not an inspector-based

force?

Mr. SCHENKEL. The inspectors are police officers.

Ms. NORTON. I understand exactly that. These are people who

were patrolling before, who were looking for people like the bomb

makers that Mr. Goldstein said, who were looking to prevent criminal activity. They were switched to a new position called an inspector position. My question to you is: have you switched any of these

inspectors back to patrolling buildings and to being police officers,

as they always were before this transition?

Mr. SCHENKEL. In some regions the inspectors do take the active

patrol.

Ms. NORTON. What is your intent? Is your intent that the Federal Protective Service do engage in these patrols and not be an inspector-oriented-based work force as it had become?

Mr. SCHENKEL. It is a matter of resources, ma’am. We had to get

the facilities——

Ms. NORTON. If it is a matter of resources, why aren’t the resources put on the police part of the protective service as opposed

to the inspector part of the protective service?

Mr. SCHENKEL. Because 80 percent of our facilities are protected

by local and State law enforcement agencies, and with the resources that we have available——

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Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. That is just not true.

Local police forces do not protect Federal facilities. I just want to

say for the record, Mr. Schenkel, that is untrue. The D.C. Police

Department will not, in fact, protect Federal—and there has already been testimony here they all think they have liability. Let

me tell you what else, Mr. Schenkel: they all have a lot to do protecting their own cities. So for you to sit here and say we depend

upon the D.C. police force and the Fairfax police force to protect

Federal facilities is quite an outrage.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LYNCH. I thank you.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.

Connolly.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know

we want to get on to some other witnesses, as well. I just have one

question.

Ms. Armstrong, what does the Interagency Security Committee

do to preempt or prevent violence against Federal facilities? Is it

all on the physical structural side of hardening facilities, or do we

get into other kinds of strategies in the preemption and prevention?

Ms. ARMSTRONG. We do get into the prevention area and we, in

fact, have a working group on workplace violence working on

issuing a compendium of best practices.

Mr. CONNOLLY. And presumably you are also plugged into some

kind of stream of intelligence in terms of possible known threats

or purported threats?

Ms. ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir. We use the Homeland Infrastructure

Threat and Risk Analysis Center [HITRAC], which is part of the

Office of Infrastructure Protection and the Office of Intelligence

and Analysis at DHS, to help with the design basis threat that we

will be issuing soon.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you.

Ms. ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you.

I yield myself 5 minutes.

Mr. Cottrell, this sort of gets to Ms. Eleanor Holmes Norton’s

issue. You have a situation where, with the Postal Service, the public is actually invited into the building, not for the bulk mail facilities but the regular post offices, even the large GMF facility at

South Station. They have a big section there where they invite the

public in, obviously. How do you handle that balance between

maintaining security as you need to, taking in packages from the

public, as well, and yet maintaining the security for your personnel?

Mr. COTTRELL. It is a challenge, Mr. Chairman, but to balance

being a retail facility as well as a Government facility and protect

employees, we rely on training—training our supervisors and employees how to recognize and react to potentially violent encounters.

We don’t experience many breaches of security into the back

rooms of facilities, but, as you stated, we do have several, well, we

have thousands of retail facilities where sometimes unhappy cusVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:05 Sep 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\57976.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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tomers can come in and attack or assault our employees. So it is

really an awareness training of what to watch for and making sure

our employees know who to contact and the steps to take if such

an incident does occur to try to de-escalate or report an incident.

Mr. LYNCH. I also know that there is, at some level, some coordination between the U.S. Postal Service and DHS. I was involved

with the installation of some of the new technology that was put

in place after the anthrax attacks here at the Brentwood facility

and elsewhere, I think in New York, but how has that coordination

worked out? Was that a one-time event or is that something that

is ongoing?

Mr. COTTRELL. It is ongoing. We participate in the ISC, the

Interagency Security Committee, and, truthfully, the anthrax attacks, really. The Postal Service learned a lot of valuable lessons

about liaisoning with other Federal, State, and local agencies so

that folks know what to do. That is part of our annual training is

to work and liaison with these other agencies.

Mr. LYNCH. OK. You know, we have one more panel to come up

here. I think all of you know we didn’t have much time to put this

hearing together. I appreciate the thoroughness of your written testimony.

I will leave the record open so if some Members who were in another hearing, I know Budget Committee is meeting right now, as

well, and some of our Members are on that committee. But I want

to thank you for your willingness to come before Congress and to

offer your suggestions to possible solutions. We will be working on

this going forward, probably in coordination with the Committee on

Homeland Security, Mr. Thompson, so you may receive some requests in writing for testimony, further testimony, and to answer

further questions.

Thank you for your testimony here today, and I wish you a good

day.

All right. Panel two. First of all, let me welcome you to this hearing. I appreciate your willingness to come before this subcommittee

with your testimony. What I will do is I will read a brief introduction of our witnesses, and then we will open it up for questions

after you are sworn.

Colleen Kelley is the president of the National Treasury Employees Union, the Nation’s largest independent Federal sector Union,

representing employees in 31 different Government agencies. Ms.

Kelley, a former IRS revenue agent, was first elected to the Union’s

top post in August 1999.

Jon Adler has been the national president of the Federal Law

Enforcement Officers Association since November 2008. He began

his career in law enforcement in 1991 and has served as Federal

criminal investigator since 1994. His experience includes working

a wide variety of investigations and enforcing most of the Federal

criminal statutes.

Mr. David Wright is the president of the American Federation of

Government Employees, Local 918, the National Federal Protective

Service Union. Mr. Wright is also a veteran Federal Protective

Service Officer and Inspector for over 20 years.

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It is the custom within this committee to ask all those who are

to offer testimony to be sworn, so may I please ask you to rise and

raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. LYNCH. Let the record reflect that each of the witnesses has

answered in the affirmative.

Ms. Kelley, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for an opening

statement.

STATEMENTS OF COLLEEN KELLEY, NATIONAL PRESIDENT,

NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION; JON ADLER, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ASSOCIATION; AND DAVID WRIGHT, PRESIDENT,

LOCAL 918, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

STATEMENT OF COLLEEN KELLEY

Ms. KELLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member

Chaffetz, and members of the committee. I am very pleased to be

here on behalf of NTEU to discuss Federal employee workplace

safety and security issues.

As you know, on Thursday, February 18th, in what authorities

believe was an intentional suicide attack, a pilot with a perceived

grudge against the Government, in general, and the IRS, in particular, crashed his small plane into a building housing almost 200

IRS employees and NTEU members in Austin, TX.

As has been noted, the attack took the life of Vernon Hunter, a

27-year IRS employee, a beloved husband, father, grandfather, and

U.S. veteran. Vernon’s wife, Valerie, works for the IRS, as well,

and was also in the Echelon building when the plane hit. They

both have been long-time NTEU members, and I share in the sorrow that this tragic loss has caused for their family and for so

many others.

I know many of you saw pictures on TV of the Austin IRS building engulfed in flames and probably wondered, as I did, how so

many people were able to escape, but I am guessing that many

thought about it for a brief time and understandably moved on to

other things. I think hearing what went on immediately after the

attack may help to increase the urgency of preventing this from

happening again and ensuring that employees know what to do if

it does.

Treasury Secretary Geithner, IRS Commissioner Shulman, and I

visited with the affected employees shortly after the attack and we

heard incredible stories of terror and heroism that I would like to

share with you.

Upon impact, the burning fuel from the plane quickly filled the

air with black smoke, making it impossible for many in the building to see anything, yet employees near exits delayed their own escape so others could follow their voices and find their way out. Employees who were outside the building went back in to help evacuate disabled employees who worked in the mail room. An IRS employee with a disability told her co-worker to leave her on the

fourth floor because she could not walk down the stairs. He insisted she climb on his back, saying he had carried soldiers that

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way when he was in the service. He carried her on his back down

the four flights to safety.

Andrew Jackson and Morgan Johnson and four others were

trapped on the second floor of the building, unable to get to the exit

because of the smoke, flames, heat, and debris. They crawled on

their hands and knees, breathing through clothing they had dampened with water, looking for a way out. Morgan shouted through

a broken window and got the attention of Robin DeHaven, who was

an employee of a glass company who was miraculously passing by

with a 20-foot ladder on his truck.

Robin, who was later dubbed Robin Hood by those that he rescued, stopped and he tried to reach the trapped employees, but the

ladder could not reach to the window that had already been broken. Andrew remembered a 4-foot metal crowbar that was used for

property seizures that was kept in the office. After a few attempts

and several gashes to his hand and his wrist, Andrew and the others succeeded in breaking a window through which they could get

out and reach the ladder, clearing the glass and helping each other

down Robin DeHaven’s ladder to safety.

Mr. Chairman, I have included in my written testimony several

detailed suggestions on improving safety and security for the Federal work force, including increased staffing and training for the

Federal Protective Service. NTEU is also requesting that the IRS

undertake and include employees in a comprehensive review of

safety and security measures at all of its facilities around the country, many of which have no guard or armed presence at all. And

we want to make sure that IRS employees have access to any information on taxpayers who may pose a threat to their safety as they

perform their duties.

But I would also like to urge this committee to take the lead not

just on the issue of physical safety, but on the issue of holding public officials to a responsible level of discourse when it comes to the

Federal Government and those who work for it. I have to say that

I was shocked to hear comments from elected officials that expressed empathy for the man responsible for the horrific attack in

Austin that took the life of a wonderful patriotic American who was

carrying out the laws that this Congress writes.

I am not asking for limitations on free speech rights, but I am

asking for members of this committee and this Congress to forcefully denounce this kind of irresponsible rhetoric before it contributes to more misguided violence against Federal workers who are

just doing their jobs.

Mr. Chairman, I know that you and other members of this committee have spoken out forcefully on this issue, and I very much

appreciate that. I also appreciate the strong statement of support

from President Obama. And NTEU appreciates the fact that the

House passed a bipartisan resolution authored by Congressman

Doggett of Texas supported by members of this subcommittee with

you, Mr. Chairman, as an original coauthor, condemning the attack

in Austin. I thank you for that and I thank you for holding this

important hearing. I hope it will encourage others to join in these

efforts, and I would be happy to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Kelley follows:]

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Mr. LYNCH. Thank you.

Mr. Adler, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF JON ADLER

Mr. ADLER. Thank you. Chairman Lynch, Ranking Member

Chaffetz, and distinguished members of the committee, on behalf

of the 26,000 membership of the Federal Law Enforcement Officers

Association, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you

today.

My name is Jon Adler and I am the National President of

FLEOA. I am proud to represent Federal law enforcement officers

from over 65 different agencies, including FPS, IRS criminal investigation, Treasury IG, Postal Inspection, and Secret Service. My

statement includes specific comments from members from these

agencies, as well as others.

In the course of my 19 years in Federal law enforcement, I

served as a first responder at Ground Zero on September 11, 2001,

and in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina hit. From these two

catastrophic events, I witnessed the devastation terrorism and acts

of nature can have on the safety and security in a Government

workplace. From these horrific events, there was a lot to be

learned. It is our collective responsibility to apply this knowledge

and not let it rest like an old gun trapped in an unworn holster.

We can learn a lot from the feedback I received from seasoned

law enforcement officers employed by a diverse group of agencies.

Their comments reflect both the employee and protective perspective. Here are some examples: Regarding GSA, GSA had a program

they called first impressions where they attempted to blend security screening into the aesthetics of the building. This pushed back

the security screening from the immediate area of the entry to the

facility into the building lobby. The Israeli security procedure is to

identify the threat before it reaches and enters the protected facility. All new security screening stations need to be constructed and

existing ones retrofitted with the protection of the security officers

in mind.

Regarding IRS, IRS employees work in GSA-owned or leased

space which FPS has statutory authority to protect, which includes

uniformed law enforcement response and criminal investigations.

IRS agencies do not pass any information along to FPS regarding

persons who have threatened an IRS facility or employee. Their

withholding of threat information puts the facilities, their employees, and any citizen in the facility at risk. IRS has not prepared

their special agents for responding to situations such as what happened in Vegas or Austin.

Frankly, with all the training IRS employees receive, it is shameful that IRS has not implemented a workable plan to respond to

incidents like the one in Austin. I believe it is time for IRS criminal

investigation to create a program or training course that addresses

terrorist type attacks against IRS. The fact that IRS is unwilling

to refer to violent tax evaders as tax protesters shows their lack of

commitment to workplace threats.

Regarding the Postal Service, I watched automatic lawn sprinkling equipment installed while denied request for less than $5,000

worth of security improvements in the same facility. I have witVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:05 Sep 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\57976.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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nessed longstanding security specifications minimized or outright

eliminated for perimeter facing, investigative observation, robbery

countermeasures, vehicle breaking countermeasures, etc., where, if

the Inspection Service is even consulted, the decision is pre-ordained to lower or eliminate the existing standards. There are post

offices in desperate need of bullet-resistant screen lines but go unfunded due to their cost.

Regarding courthouse and probation, there are six judicial districts where the chief judges will not allow qualified probation and

pretrial officers to be armed and defend themselves in the work

force. It is mind boggling that we have officers go through 40 hours

of firearms training and not be allowed to carry a firearm. It is not

uncommon for offenders and their associates to loiter outside public

buildings before or after meetings or interviews with officers, and

this poses a risk for the officers, the workers, and the community.

Several Federal courthouses have no security presence after

hours on weekends or holidays. Employees’ only protection is their

access card and their PIN. It is a total joke. The bottom line is,

without a security presence the officers and their employees are

vulnerable to an attack.

FLEOA member recommendations include: FPS is available to

assist in GSA-owned and leased space with occupant emergency

planning and exercises and active planning and awareness training, which I believe Director Schenkel hit on.

The Secret Service uses a continuity of operations plan in all of

its offices to address emergency response, evacuation routes, relocation, and contact information. Each office is equipped with emergency equipment, and every employee is given a co-op card with

pertinent emergency information. Other agencies may benefit from

adopting all or some of this system. Each agency should run unannounced security tests aimed at improving layers of protection and

not punishing those who don’t succeed.

Set up an interagency task force with experienced law enforcement officers to address building and equipment vulnerabilities,

threat assessment, and response protocols, threat information sharing, and human capital needs.

Agency heads should provide Congress with a list of their security needs to ensure funding for appropriate staffing levels, training, and functional security equipment. In turn, each agency head

must commit to spending funds for specific security needs, with the

expectation of enhanced security measures, the general Government employee audience must embrace the implementation of new

technology such as the advanced imaging technology now being

used by TSA.

In closing, I will offer that the best playbook or operational plan

accomplishes nothing when it is layered with dust. All agencies

should practice emergency response protocols and periodically test

their defense systems. With the appropriate level of funding, agency staffing, equipment, and training needs will be met. It is imperative that the agency have the means to take proactive measures

to improve workplace security and emergency response capabilities.

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We all need to claim ownership of this challenge, and we all need

to commit to its success.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Adler follows:]

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Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Adler.

Mr. Wright, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF DAVID WRIGHT

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Chaffetz, and

members of the subcommittee, Mr. Chairman, as president of the

FPS Union, it has never given me pleasure to bring attention to

this crisis. Indeed, I have dedicated the last 24 years of my life trying to make this agency the best law enforcement Homeland Security agency in the country, but when our members see every day

how serious the problems are, I am obligated to speak out.

Over the past 2 years, the Federal Protective Service has been

investigated, analyzed, and studied. The GAO has performed six

studies since 2008 addressing different aspects of FPS, and all concluded that the agency is rife with serious problems, each of which

is impairing the ability of FPS to perform its critical homeland security mission. Taken together, the GAO analyses paint a portrait

of an essentially dysfunctional agency.

The mission of the FPS is to protect approximately 9,000 high,

medium and low-security Federal buildings and properties around

the country. These buildings include everything from Social Security offices, Federal courthouses, Federal congressional offices, and

agency headquarters. Hundreds of thousands of Federal employees

work in these buildings, and millions of Americans visit every day.

Time and again, Federal buildings and employees have been

demonstrated to be targets. Recent events in Washington, DC, Austin, Las Vegas, and even Kansas City serve as a wake-up call to

both the administration and Congress that the time for discussion,

studies, years of reports that highlight the same failures has

ended. Action is required now, and not after the next major terrorist attack.

Regarding manpower, in the period following the terrorist attack

on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, it was

determined that the minimum number of FPS personnel necessary

to perform its mission was 1,480. Since the Department of Homeland Security was stood up in 2003, the FPS has seen its total

number of inspector and police officer positions drop from 1,017 in

2003 to 830 at the beginning of 2010, an 18.4 percent reduction.

Over the same period, U.S. Parks Service increased its security

personnel by 45.5 percent. The Veterans Health Administration increased its security personnel over 35.9 percent. Even within DHS,

security personnel increased over the 7-year period of 230.5 percent. The result of this resource starvation is that FPS security

services have been slashed to the point of ineffectiveness. No longer

do FPS police officers operate on a 24-hour patrol basis, even when

responsible for protecting level four high-security facilities. No

longer does the agency have the personnel necessary to adequately

oversee private guards due to a lack of manpower.

All of this has occurred in a post-9/11 environment that has

made anti-terrorism efforts the highest of priorities in the White

House and Congress. As a result of the extremely limited resources

provided to FPS, the agency has been in disarray, leaving employees in certain of their jobs, contract guards, routinely unsupervised,

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and managers operating fiefdoms free of any central control of direction.

Mr. Chairman, I believe we are on borrowed time when it comes

to this very large gap in our national homeland security safety net.

Contract guard issues, every day Federal protective officers put

their lives on the line to accomplish their critical homeland security

mission, to make sure facilities are protected and contract guards

are correctly trained and proficient in their duties. Despite these

efforts, FPS does not have sufficient staff to accomplish these vital

tasks.

One glaring example is the monitoring and training of contract

guards. In 2001, there were 5,000 contract guards and FPS was authorized over 1,450 personnel. By 2009, there were 15,000 contract

guards, but FPS was authorized only 1,225 total personnel. A

threefold increase in guards coupled with a 16 percent cut in FPS

staff is a recipe for failure.

No one should have been surprised to discover shortfalls in contract guard management, performance, and ability to detect weapons and explosives. Clearly, OMB should have increased the resources for monitoring rather than imposing a cut.

In conclusion, I would like to thank the members of the committee for holding this hearing. I hope that it will serve as the beginning of a process that will lead to comprehensive FPS reform legislation this year. I know that Senator Lieberman has announced his

intention to introduce such legislation soon, and we urge the House

to do so, as well.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wright follows:]

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Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Wright.

I now yield myself 5 minutes.

President Kelley, you had an opportunity to go to the IRS facility

in Austin. You had a chance to talk to the employees. First of all,

my condolences to your organization for that loss.

Ms. KELLEY. Thank you.

Mr. LYNCH. What were the suggestions, recommendations,

urgings that you heard there in terms of trying to address that situation on the ground? Were there any concrete recommendations

that came out of at least a preliminary investigation?

Ms. KELLEY. In the immediate aftermath, Mr. Chairman, there

really have not been. The focus has been more on what happened

that day and how so many were able to get out successfully. For

example, when we were there and met with the employees, they

thanked their co-worker who had been responsible for fire drills.

And everybody knows whoever runs the fire drills, somebody is always trying to hide to not have to actually practice. And they made

it a point of thanking her, because they knew what to do that day.

So there really has been more thought to now getting them situated. They just returned to work last Monday in other buildings

until there is a new replacement building for them to move to.

So now the conversations are more leaning toward what can be

done, you know, what are they concerned about, what should we

pay attention to for the future, especially in the new site that they

will be moving to. So as that develops, we will be working very

closely with the IRS in an effort to put plans in place that make

those suggestions reality.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you.

We are sort of doing an informal assessment across the board for

IRS facilities, and I notice that there are—and I am not sure which

level. I know you have different levels of sensitivity and security

that are required. But I did notice that there were about 275 facilities that had no protection whatsoever, not even security guards.

I am just curious, you know, each of you, what your thoughts are

on that. I think that might be a function of this 1,250 minimum

staffing requirement, that you just don’t have enough folks. I know

there is also an additional 15,000 private security guards that are

hired as contractors to do some of the, I guess, basic security outside the building, that type of thing. Your thoughts on the manning

requirement and also the status of having at least 275 IRS facilities that don’t have any security whatsoever.

Ms. KELLEY. I will say for my part that employees would say

there are too many IRS facilities without some guard presence. I

am sure that Mr. Wright knows better than I the number that

have FPS presence. Most of them that I am aware of, some of the

larger buildings have FPS, but the majority of them have contract

guards rather than FPS.

Like I said, this is an issue for employees. Many of them believe

their facility and the situation that they are in warrants a guard.

It comes down to resources. It is an issue we are always debating

the IRS with over the money, because there is a cost attached to

it, definitely. But it is an issue that has been long a point of disagreement between us over how much is needed.

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Obviously, as someone had asked before, the Austin attack was

not going to be prevented by having guards or FPS there, but it

highlights, when things like that happen it makes you think about

the things that can be controlled and the need for a focus and a

recognition that there need to be resources to adequately protect

these buildings.

Mr. LYNCH. Mr. Adler, same question.

Mr. ADLER. Yes. I agree. Colleen is exactly right. It is a resource

issue. And in this instance, it is a matter of response. If you don’t

have a physical presence, if you put 2 people on a playing field to

go against an 11 with a full bench, as well, you can’t play. You are

at a tremendous disadvantage and people are at risk.

So what do you do? I think one of the disputes, I represent IRS

special agents as well as TIG, or Treasury IG special agents, and

they have a little ongoing dispute as to who responds to certain situations. So if you don’t have perimeter or building security but in

certain instances you may have special agents in there, well, guess

what, they are responsible and they own it and they need to be

trained to respond. They can’t have any doubt. You can’t play who

is in charge when it hits the fan.

One of the issues that needs to get addressed and needs to be

resolved is who claims ownership and what training is in play to

respond.

Colleen is absolutely right: we are not concerned, well, we can’t

prevent a plane. That is beyond our Superman and Superwoman

abilities. You can’t prevent a plane from flying into a building. But

what happens in a situation like what happened in the Las Vegas

courthouse, only now it is an IRS facility? And instead of one elderly person with mental issues coming in with a shotgun, you have

more highly skilled, trained terrorists coming in with assault weapons? Well, what do we do? We should have an answer. We can’t

make this up when it happens. We need to get it done and planned

for now.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you.

Mr. Wright.

Mr. WRIGHT. Yes, sir, this kind of delves back into the ISC and

the facilities security committees. The ISC is not codified. They are

not the authority. They come up with recommendations, and once

those recommendations reach the field it is up to an FPS inspector,

when we are dealing with our buildings, our properties that we are

responsible for, it is up to that inspector to take those recommendations, make those recommendations to the facilities security committee, which is mainly staffed by lay personnel. Very rare that

you get a good security-wise person on those committees.

So what happens, the reason you would have a number of properties, IRS properties that have no security personnel onsite is the

recommendations have likely been made, they have been presented

to the Facility Security Committee. That committee has to weigh

that recommendation against their yearly budget, usually their operating budget. Sometimes they have security funds, sometimes

they don’t. Generally, these things get voted down. There is no authority at this time to mandate any building in any sector of the

Government to provide security.

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I know of a case now of a very major Federal building where a

GSA type is the head of the Security Committee and you would be

very surprised how lacking that is. I would be glad to tell you

about it behind closed doors, because it just does not happen.

Mr. LYNCH. All right. Thank you very much.

I now yield 5 minutes to the ranking member, Mr. Chaffetz.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you.

Ms. Kelley, there are many great acts of heroism that happened

in Texas, and for that we are eternally grateful and thankful. I am

sure we will never hear all of the stories of people who reacted the

right way at the right time and woke up that morning and had no

idea that was going to happen, so for that we are so grateful, and

obviously saddened for the loss of anybody who should never have

had to go through that, nor should their family. It is just absolutely

and totally inexcusable.

It is still early, but, based on what you have known or have seen

or have heard, at least at this point, what is it in Texas that could

have or should have happened that maybe didn’t happen, because

the results were in many ways miraculous, but at the same time

there is always things you want to learn and share and grow from.

So can you give us a little insight as to that perspective?

Ms. KELLEY. No. Again, the focus has been on whether it was the

luck or just everyone acting together, just the pulling together. I

mean, I really have not heard of anything that day someone said

I wish this or I wish that. And the IRS has been very, very responsive and very, very understanding. They have been wonderfully

supportive to these employees since the attack.

So, like I said, in looking forward I will tell you when the Austin

attack happened, even though it was an airplane, IRS employees

from around the country felt very, very vulnerable because what

they realized was it could have been their building. If the anger

was at the IRS, it could have been any IRS building. And it reminded them of things that maybe are more within the control,

whether it is about the need for armed guards, whether it is about

lighting that isn’t working in parking lots, whether it is about cipher locks not working or fire alarms not properly working in the

building, things that you identify and you pursue and then something else happens and you kind of lose sight of it. So events like

this bring all that back into focus.

But really I have talked to many of these employees and to our

local chapter president there, and they have not identified anything

that went wrong that day. I mean, it really was a miracle. It was

one life too many, but it was a miracle that there were not more.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And point well taken. I guess we should always

continue to probe and understand and look at all the different scenarios, so I would obviously concur with that thought and hope

that we continue to expand that.

I guess, Mr. Chairman, one of the points I guess I would take

away from that is we should also highlight everything that went

right. You can never plan for everything. There is no end to the

creativity of these nuts who want to create terror, but at the same

time there are a lot of things that went well, and I think we should

also highlight and explore and note those, as well.

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And perhaps, Mr. Adler or Mr. Wright, you can help me understand where your perception of the FPS, but also the difference between the contractors, if you will, as opposed to those. And help me

understand the difference in where you see the fundamental flaws.

Either one.

Mr. ADLER. And you are referring, just to clarify, to the FPS inspector versus the contract uniform?

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Yes. The specific concerns about contracting that

out. I have real concerns about doing that.

Mr. ADLER. Just from my perspective—and I am going to defer

to Mr. Wright—but just, again, by way of background and training,

the inspectors go through a different process. The contracting system obviously involves a private company which doesn’t place the

same emphasis on what it would take to become an inspector,

whether it is going through the Federal Law Enforcement Training

Center or certain agency-specific training modules. So certainly we

place more reliance, if you will, on the inspector, the Federal uniform component within FPS.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Wright.

Mr. WRIGHT. The Federal Protective Service inspectors and police

officers go through the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

Nowadays we are up to 24 or 26 weeks of training. The contract

security guards are private guards. They have commitments to

their companies.

The other thing that needs to be stated in regards to these private guards is they get their authority basically State to State or

more likely city to city. There is no Federal authority for a private

guard. So in Kansas City, MO, where I come from, the Kansas City

Police Department and the St. Louis Police Department have pretty good private watchmen commissions, and they do give the authority to arrest.

Fifty miles up the road in St. Joseph, MO, the first requirement

to get a commission there in St. Joseph is that they have a commission in Kansas City. Then 60 miles to the east in Chillicothe, MO,

the way you get a commission license is to show your St. Joseph

license.

So this goes city to city, building to building, region to region.

There just is no common sense there, and that is why one of our

recommendations is let’s get Federal security guards or Federal police officers, much like you have here at Capitol Police, give these

individuals the authority, give them the training, and let them do

their job.

That being said, this is not to denigrate any of our contract

guards. We have a lot of great veterans coming back and they are

being picked up by these private companies, and no denigration at

all to those troops, either.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. All right.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you.

The Chair now recognizes Ms. Eleanor Holmes Norton for 5 minutes.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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My condolences, particularly to you, Ms. Kelley, and my thanks

to you and to Mr. Adler and Mr. Wright for your service to the

United States.

Mr. Wright, I find your charts amazing.

Mr. WRIGHT. Yes.

Ms. NORTON. The charts at the rear of your testimony that rather much point up, I think, the difficulties that we are having with

security for Federal employees.

You point to what you call the exponential growth of security and

law enforcement staff in virtually every agency except the Federal

Protective Service, including a Government-wide growth for the

last seven or so years of 56.5 percent, whereas FPS, alone, shows

negative growth of 18.4 percent.

Mr. WRIGHT. Correct.

Ms. NORTON. Now, you cite some of these agencies. Doesn’t this

show that with this huge growth, that first these agencies know

they are living post-9/11, so if they can’t get it from FPS aren’t we

in effect forcing outsourcing to whatever contract guards they

choose, without any relationship to any central security authority

of the U.S. Government?

Mr. WRIGHT. Yes. Just this year, alone, I have heard of agencies

coming forward and proposing to hire their own 083 police officers,

and actually Social Security is probably the best security-minded

agency out there that are our clients, but they have looked into hiring their own 083 police force.

Ms. NORTON. So what we have here, Mr. Chairman, I think, is

agencies deciding that, since FPS has been shrinking, since the

Federal Government has not been requiring Government-wide security, since we have outsourcing authority, let’s set up multiple

police forces replicating what the FPS is supposed to do Government-wide, without any central connection to minimum standards

for these almost always contract guards and not people who are,

as one of you has testified, police officers who go to be trained at

the same place where our best police officers in the Federal Government go.

So what we are talking about, I want to just get in the record,

multiple police forces popping up, agency by agency, at the agency’s

discretion, just leaving the whole idea of a Government-wide Federal police force out there to flounder. Is that not the case?

Mr. WRIGHT. Much of that, Ms. Norton, is the way that FPS is

funded. We are funded through a security fee of charges per square

foot. At this point it is up to $0.66 a square foot. What happens

is these agencies see all this money flowing to FPS.

Ms. NORTON. So how do they pay for the outsourced police forces

that they set up without any expertise of their own?

Mr. WRIGHT. I don’t know.

Ms. NORTON. See, here you have FPS saying you have to have

it per square foot, and they say, OK, since nobody is compelling me

to use them, who cares about those standards? Let’s just hire our

own independent police force and make our own standards.

How anybody can tell me that is going to protect the IRS or any

other agency, I don’t know, but I think it important to note that

we are not here talking about what FPS does or shouldn’t do; we

are talking about the existence of auxiliary police forces, or I

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should say alternative police forces in agencies where at will they

can decide who they are, what their standards are, with virtually

no Federal oversight through the FPS or, for that matter, through

the Department of Homeland Security.

What’s the relationship, Mr. Adler or Mr. Wright, of the FPS to

the local police forces of a particular city or county?

Mr. ADLER. It varies. I think Director Schenkel hit on it. But in

my experience what I have seen, there can be a commonality, there

can be a camaraderie, but ultimately most local law enforcement,

first of all, they are not allowed to carry within a Federal facility.

Most of them aren’t familiar with the layout. So if you rang the

alarm and they came, they might find the front door but they may

not be familiar with the layout.

I think the role of local law enforcement, to put it in proper perspective, is really to arrive on the scene quickly to provide perimeter security, crowd control, but really it is incumbent upon the police officers, the law enforcement components within the building

working for the agencies to respond and prevent the situation from

going from bad to worse.

Ms. NORTON. And I think that is important for the record, Mr.

Chairman, since Mr. Schenkel said they depend on local police

forces. The notion that busy police forces should do anything but

what they would do anyway if there was something on the outside

of the business is very disconcerting to hear.

Mr. Chairman, if I could just conclude by noting that in Mr.

Wright’s testimony—and ask him if he knows what these cities

are—he says that at a minimum—it is under FPS structural problems—at a minimum, around-the-clock protection by Federal law

enforcement officers should be provided in the 18 to 22 cities with

the greatest concentration of employees—meaning Federal employees—and facilities.

I think you say that 24-hour service is only provided in two cities. What are those cities?

Mr. WRIGHT. Can I approach that off the record? I am not sure

it is appropriate to say in a public setting.

Ms. NORTON. Yes. Could you make sure that the chairman understands that?

Mr. WRIGHT. Yes. I think you will be very surprised as to who

doesn’t have it.

Ms. NORTON. Yes. Make sure the chairman gets that in camera

so we can understand that. I just think that we know what those—

almost anybody could guess what those 18 cities, 18 of 22 cities

with the greatest concentration are, and everybody would know

that those are the cities that we regard as most targeted, and what

your testimony here today has informed us is that we have to get

on the stick.

What happened to IRS with extraordinary sadness from all of us

was a kamikaze event of the kind that perhaps no police force of

any kind could have deterred, but it certainly ought to be a shot

across our so-called bow to remember that this is not the kind of

attacks we should be expecting, especially in IRS offices.

I work very closely with the IRS here. I have found IRS employees to be among the most collegial, the most customer oriented employees in the U.S. Government. But if you are out here in this reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:05 Sep 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\57976.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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cession paying taxes, lost your job, house gone, and you can’t find

anybody else to be mad at, there is always your local IRS employee,

and we have a duty to protect these employees every day of the

week that they are on duty.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.

Connolly, for 5 minutes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Kelley, welcome. I am sorry I was stuck up here the other

day, and I thank you for your kind introduction in my absence. In

your prepared statement you made reference to the fact that you

were shocked at some statements by certain public officials after

the tragedy in Austin. Would you elaborate?

Ms. KELLEY. There was a Member of the House of Representatives who—I don’t have the quotes in front of me, so I would not

want to misquote. I am sure most have seen them in the press, and

I would be glad to provide them. And when I issued statements,

and also to a Member of the Senate, and when I issued statements

expressing shock and disappointment and looking for an apology,

they were not forthcoming. Those apologies have never been forthcoming.

I think that it is outrageous that anyone would make statements

like those that have been made, much less someone, you know,

anyone in a public position that should be supporting Federal employees who are just trying to do their jobs.

Mr. CONNOLLY. If you want to provide more for the record?

Ms. KELLEY. I will be glad to do that.

Mr. CONNOLLY. It would be welcome. Thank you.

Mr. Adler, could you elaborate a little bit? You spoke fast, and

although I am originally from Boston, I have lived in the south so

long now I have trouble sometimes following a fast presentation,

but you were making a point between the difference between, if I

understood your testimony, GSA’s first screen versus, say, the

Israeli approach to security. Could you just elaborate on that a little bit?

Mr. WRIGHT. Yes. We have been addressing this in the TSA

venue, as well. The concept of taking proactive steps in the law enforcement security arena, to not simply sit back and become reactionary, become a duck in a barrel, if you will, and pray the barrel

is durable enough to withstand the attack, be proactive, but, of

course, it is very convenient for me to come here and say we should

be proactive. You need resources to accomplish that. You need

human beings in uniforms with training and capability and authority to do it.

Out of respect to Director Schenkel, he is making do with what

he has, whether it is setting MOUs with local law enforcement or

anyone else. Ideally, we would have enough. You know, we are

talking about whether we have police officers or inspectors. I would

like all of the above. I would love to have police officers at every

law enforcement or Federal Government facility, but that would enable us to take a more proactive approach, to have the proper

equipment like cameras and so forth so we can monitor the area,

have the plain clothes contingent out there who know and are

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trained in behavioral actions and just things, little indicators we

can pick up.

I know firsthand FPS does an excellent job of that at 26 Federal

Plaza in New York. That is the sort of thing that we do want to

have happen but, once again, the starting point is having the resources to engage in that type of proactive investigative security

law enforcement activities.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Although, as Mr. Miller of the other panel indicated, all of that, if we did everything you just said, it still would

not have prevented the terrorist attack in Austin.

Mr. ADLER. Correct. There are two aspects we are talking about

here for this hearing. One is prevention, the other is response. We

have to concede. Colleen mentioned the plane coming into the

building. We concede that. Then we are defined how we respond.

So, taking it from initially, the Israeli approach will minimize the

prevention side of things, but, and as we all know, human error

will occur. Something will get in, whether it is an active shooter

or an explosive device. The question then is: what are we trained

and capable of doing in response? That was the other side of what

I was trying to present.

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. Thank you. In your testimony you also

said, if I heard you correctly, that the IRS puts both the public and

its own employees at risk. What were you referring to?

Mr. ADLER. I was referring to quotations that were sent to me.

I received a lot of emails. I requested input. I have 65 agencies we

represent. Each one has an agency representative. So when the

email goes out, they have input. What that was reflecting was I

think it is a lot of frustration among my CID special agent members who are concerned that they want to passionately get involved, they listen to what Colleen describes, and they feel as if

they have to make it up at game time.

You can’t wing it; you have to plan for it and you have to step

up and recognize IRS is always going to be a threatened component

by virtue of what they do, so you have to commit resources to training the special agents who are there, who are the first responders,

to make sure they are not going to make it up when it happens,

to make sure they don’t have to rely upon somebody who takes the

initiative and heroic ability to help in a fire drill or put someone

on their back. They should plan, and that will minimize, or actually it will increase their effectiveness in responding to one of these

types of attacks.

Mr. CONNOLLY. And in what little time I have left, Mr. Wright,

you talked about the FPS being dysfunctional, citing some studies

that would say that. If you have a series of recommendations, I

would welcome seeing them. One quick question: do you have a

view about the relative merits between, say, a Federal guard, Federal employee, versus contract security?

Mr. WRIGHT. As stated earlier, private guards have basically a

mish-mash of authority across the United States. Every city, every

State is different. The benefits to having a Federal guard, our more

likely recommendation is Federal police officers like you have here

at the Capitol, they are FLETC trained and they have that Federal

authority to immediately stop and detain threats or take action

against individuals that enter the property.

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What we see now—and I will be glad to share later on the

record—a major city where it has been documented—now, I have

always had the anecdotal evidence over the years that private

guards are afraid to put their hands on anyone. We have documented cases of individuals running from FPS police officers and

guards standing by. And just here in the last couple of days I received some very disturbing information where it has been absolutely documented in our operation shield efforts across the country

that these guards are witnessing threats or witnessing our attempts to penetrate. We are witnessing these guards say, I can’t

do anything. I have to stop. If I see something on that x-ray screen

that looks threatening, I am not going to stop that individual, I am

going to call FPS or in some cases I am going to call the company

first. So that is a problem. Federal officers would have that authority right here, right now, stop that individual, take him down, and

do what has to be done. You have a lot of private officers out there

that are afraid for their own liability.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.

I want to thank the members of the panel for your willingness

to come before the Congress and offer your suggestions and offer

your testimony.

I am going to leave the record open for 3 days for those Members

who are on other committees and haven’t had an opportunity to

ask questions, but other than that we appreciate your testimony

here today and we bid you good day.

[Whereupon, at 4:21 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings and additional information submitted for the hearing record follow:]

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