alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Cardell RHETT, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wayne SCOTT; et al., Defendants, T. Revell; NFN Gonzalez, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 03-10812.

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 24, 2004.

Cardell Rhett, Jr., Houston, TX, pro se.

Jason E. Magee, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Defendants-Appellants.

Before SMITH, DUHÉ, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

*81PER CURIAM.1

Dr. William Gonzalez and Dr. Tim Re-vell appeal from the district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment in Cardell Rhett, Jr.’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. The district court determined that Rhett had produced sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s determination. *Nerren v. Livingston Police Dep’t,*86 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir.1996).

APPEAL DISMISSED.

1

. Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
135 San Lorenzo Avenue, Suite 770, Coral Gables, Florida 33146

TEL 305.230.4884 FAX 305.230.4844

www.fairlawattorney.com

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO.: 1:22-CV-23074-BLOOM/OTAZO-REYES

OCTAVIO COLLADO,

Plaintiff, COLLECTIVE ACTION 

vs.

450 NORTH RIVER DRIVE, LLC,

D/B/A KIKI ON THE RIVER, 

RJ RIVER, LLC AND 

ROMAN JONES,

Defendants.

______________________________/

PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF FILING CONSENT TO JOIN 

(Sydney Mull) 

 

Plaintiff, Octavio Collado, notices the Court and all parties of the filing of the Consent to 

Join in these proceedings by Sydney Mull.

Dated this 21st day of August 2023. 

s/Brian H. Pollock, Esq.

Brian H. Pollock, Esq.

Fla. Bar No. 174742

brian@fairlawattorney.com

FAIRLAW FIRM

135 San Lorenzo Avenue

Suite 770

Coral Gables, FL 33146

Tel: 305.230.4884

Counsel for Plaintiff(s)

Case 1:22-cv-23074-BB Document 192 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/21/2023 Page 1 of 1
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Ampco-Pittsburgh Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on the date hereof (the Report), each of the undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that to his knowledge:



|1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                    
|------------------------------------
|/s/ Robert A. Paul                  
|Robert A. Paul                      
|Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
|May 10, 2011
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1102 

KAH 15-01200 

PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., CENTRA, LINDLEY, NEMOYER, AND TROUTMAN, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK EX REL. 

QUINCY NOLLEY, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ANTHONY ANNUCCI, ACTING COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK 

STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY 

SUPERVISION, RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT. 

 

WYOMING COUNTY-ATTICA LEGAL AID BUREAU, WARSAW (NORMAN P. EFFMAN OF

COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-APPELLANT.

ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (HEATHER MCKAY OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Wyoming County

(Michael M. Mohun, A.J.), entered June 23, 2015 in a habeas corpus

proceeding. The judgment denied and dismissed the petition. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Petitioner appeals from a judgment dismissing his

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner failed to

preserve for our review his contention that respondent failed to

discharge his responsibility, pursuant to Correction Law § 601-a, to

notify the sentencing court of the alleged discrepancy between the

sentencing minutes and the sentence and commitment order (see

generally People ex rel. Mitchell v Cully, 63 AD3d 1679, 1679, lv

denied 13 NY3d 708). In any event, habeas corpus relief is not

available because petitioner would not be entitled to immediate

release based upon respondent’s alleged failure to comply with the

statute (see People ex rel. Shannon v Khahaifa, 74 AD3d 1867, 1867, lv

dismissed 15 NY3d 868). We decline to exercise our power under CPLR

103 (c) to convert this proceeding into a CPLR article 78 proceeding

to address that unpreserved contention (see Matter of Johnson v

Fischer, 104 AD3d 1004, 1005). 

We likewise reject petitioner’s request that we convert this

proceeding to a CPLR article 78 proceeding and direct that he be

resentenced to correct the alleged discrepancy between the sentencing

minutes and the sentence and commitment order. Although petitioner

sought that relief in his petition, he failed to join the sentencing

court as a necessary party, and respondent had no authority to alter
-2- 1102 

KAH 15-01200 

the sentence and commitment order (see Matter of Reed v Annucci, 133

AD3d 1334, 1335). Because respondent is conclusively bound by that

order and his calculation of the sentence is consistent therewith,

petitioner’s remedy, if any, is an appropriate proceeding before the

sentencing court (see Matter of Jackson v Fischer, 132 AD3d 1038,

1039; People ex rel. Davidson v Kelly, 193 AD2d 1140, 1141).

Entered: December 23, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
No. 11-9150.

#### Pointer *v.*Dormire, Superintendent, Jefferson City Correctional Center.

C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-rari denied.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR Part 52

[EPA-R06-0AR-2007-0526; FRL - -.I

Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; Texas; Revision to

Control Volatile Organic Compound Emissions in the Houston/GalvestonlBrazoria 8-Hour

Ozone Nonattainment Area

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACrION: Proposed rule.

SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposes to approve a revision to

the Texas State Implementation Plan (SIP). The revision adds additional requirements to control

volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions from storage tanks, transport vessels and marine

vessels in the HoustonlGalvestonlBrazoria (HGB) 1997 8-hour ozone nonattainment area, which

consists ofBrazoria, Chambers, Fort Bend, Galveston, Harris, Liberty, Montgomery and Waller

counties. Specifically, this revision subjects owners or operators ofVOC storage tanks, transport

vessels, and marine vessels located in the HGB 1997 8-hour ozone nonattainment area to more

stringent control, monitoring, and recordkeeping requirements. EPA proposes to approve the

SIP revision because it will help lower ozone levels in the HGB area by reducing VOC

emissions. EPA proposes to approve the revision pursuant to section 110 and part D ofthe Clean

Air Act (CM).
2

DATES: Written comments must be received on or before (Insert date 30 days from date of

publication in the Federal Register].

ADDRESSES: Comments may be mailed to Mr. Guy Donaldson, Chief, Air Planning Section

(6PD-L), Environmental Protection Agency, 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 1200, Dallas, Texas

75202-2733. Comments may also be submitted electronically or through hand delivery/courier

by following the detailed instructions in the ADDRESSES section ofthe direct final rule located

in the rules section ofthis Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Carl Young, Air Planning Section (6PD-L),

Environmental Protection Agency, Region 6, 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 700, Dallas, Texas

75202-2733, telephone 214-665-6645; fax number 214-665-7263;

e-mail addressyoung.carl@epa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In the final rules section ofthis Federal Register,

EPA is approving the State's SIP submittal as a direct rule without prior proposal because the

Agency views this as noncontroversial submittal and anticipates no adverse comments. A

detailed rationale for the approval is set forth in the direct final rule. If no adverse comments are

received in response to this action no further activity is contemplated. If EPA receives' adverse

comments, the direct final rule will be withdrawn and all public comments received will be

addressed in a subsequent final rule based on this proposed rule. EPA will not institute a second

comment period. Any parties interested in commenting on this action should do so at this time.
3

For additional information, see the direct final rule which is located in the rules section of

this Federal Register.

Dated:~D

Al Armendariz,

Regional Administrator, Region 6
069P13-2

#### Albert C. Burgess, Jr. v. eBay, Inc., et al.

1. Pit’s *Pro Se*Petition for *Writ of Mandamus*

1. Denied

2. Pit’s *Pro Se*Motion to Proceed *In Forma Pauperis*

2. Allowed

Ervin, J.,

recused
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

DEXCOM, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

AGAMATRIX, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2018-1686

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of California in No. 2:16-cv-05947-SJO-AS, 

Judge James S. Otero.

______________________

JUDGMENT

______________________

SONA DE, Sidley Austin LLP, New York, NY, argued for 

plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by BRADFORD J.

BADKE, CHING-LEE FUKUDA; THOMAS ANTHONY BROUGHAN,

III, Washington, DC. 

 NICHOLAS (NIKA) FREMONT ALDRICH, JR., Schwabe, 

Williamson & Wyatt, Portland, OR, argued for defendantappellee. Also represented by SCOTT D. EADS, JASON ADAM 

WRUBLESKI. 

 ______________________
THIS CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is 

ORDERED and ADJUDGED:

 PER CURIAM (DYK, MAYER, and CLEVENGER, Circuit 

Judges).

AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.

 ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT 

 March 7, 2019 /s/ Peter R. Marksteiner

 Date Peter R. Marksteiner

 Clerk of Court
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h Marilyn Kell y Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathawa y Mary Beth Kell y Brian K. Zahra,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk March 8, 2011

p0228 

# Order

March 8, 2011

141993

POLY BOND, INC. a nd ROBERT LAFAVE, Individually and on behalf of LAMINATE PRODUCTS, INC. and BOLA SYSTEMS, INC., Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v SC: 141993 COA: 290429 Tuscola CC: 07-024023-CK JEN-TECH CORPORATION, d/b/a JEN-LAY, and ROBERT BOWLING, Defendants-Appellants, and

LAMINATE PRODUCTS , INC. and BOLA SYSTEMS, INC., Defendants.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 27, 2010 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
No. 10-10976.

#### Holmes *v.*Washington.

Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998             DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1998             APR-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998             JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                             583                     583
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    2,330                   2,183
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0                       0
<INVENTORY>                                      1,009                     965
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 3,955                   3,768
<PP&E>                                          58,997                  60,427
<DEPRECIATION>                                  46,488                  46,027
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  39,465                  42,316
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           11,487                  11,965
<BONDS>                                          3,500                   3,500
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                        27,360                  27,282
<OTHER-SE>                                     (27,978)                (26,751)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    39,465                  42,316
<SALES>                                            963                     995
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   963                     995
<CGS>                                            1,058                     964
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    1,058                     964
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   627                   7,346
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 137                     297
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (859)                 (7,612)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (859)                 (7,612)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (859)                 (7,612)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (0.03)                  (0.31)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.03)                  (0.31)
        

</TABLE>
#### § 102-75.615 Who is responsible for enforcing compliance with the terms and conditions of property transferred under section 414(a) of the 1969 HUD Act?

HUD maintains responsibility for properties previously conveyed under section 414(a) of the 1969 HUD Act. Property transferred to an entity other than a public body and used for any purpose other than that for which it was sold or leased within a 30-year period must revert to the United States. If the property was leased, then the lease terminates. The appropriate Secretary (HUD or Department of Agriculture) and the Administrator of GSA can approve the new use of the property after the first 20 years of the original 30-year period has expired.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

MATTHIAS HADDOCK,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 13-10686

D.C. No. 3:12-cr-00112-LRHVPC-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Larry R. Hicks, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 20, 2014

San Francisco, California

Before: BERZON and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and BUCKLO, Senior

District Judge.

** 

Matthias Haddock (Haddock) appeals the district court’s sentence of 210

months’ imprisonment premised on Haddock’s guilty plea to one count of receipt

of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2). Haddock contends

FILED

MAR 02 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
that the district court erred in increasing his base offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 2G2.2(b)(5) due to Haddock’s “pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or

exploitation of a minor.” Haddock also asserts that the district court erred in

imposing the mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) and in

admitting the oral and written statements of Haddock’s daughter concerning

Haddock’s sexual abuse. 

The district court’s finding that Haddock “engaged in two or more instances

of sexual abuse” of his daughter was not clearly erroneous, as it sufficiently

considered the documents submitted by Haddock. The district court thus properly

applied U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5) based on the preponderance of the evidence related

to Haddock’s molestation of his daughter. See United States v. Williamson, 439

F.3d 1125, 1140 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the district court may consider

uncharged conduct in ascertaining whether U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 applies). 

We need not and do not address Haddock’s challenge to the district court’s

ruling that his state conviction qualified as a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. §

2252A(b)(1). The district court correctly calculated a sentencing guidelines range

of 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment and articulated that it would have sentenced

Haddock to 210 months’ imprisonment irrespective of the mandatory minimum

sentence. See United States v. Evans-Martinez, 611 F.3d 635, 645 (9th Cir. 2010).

2
The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the oral and

written statements of Haddock’s daughter at the final sentencing hearing. See

United States v. Christensen, 732 F.3d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 2013) (articulating that

“a sentencing judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely

unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from

which it may come”) (citation omitted).

AFFIRMED.

3
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This  schedule  contains  summary  financial   information  extracted  from  the
financial  statements  for Anaren  Microwave,  Inc. filed with Form 10-Q for the
nine months  ended March 31, 1998 and is  qualified in its entirety by reference
to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                           8,685,176 
<SECURITIES>                                    15,602,199 
<RECEIVABLES>                                    6,464,067 
<ALLOWANCES>                                        13,000 
<INVENTORY>                                     10,099,435 
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                41,186,476 
<PP&E>                                          31,614,859 
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (24,091,417)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  48,709,918 
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            3,449,607 
<BONDS>                                                  0 
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0 
<PREFERRED>                                              0 
<COMMON>                                            64,514 
<OTHER-SE>                                      43,928,740 
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    48,709,918 
<SALES>                                         27,034,203 
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                27,034,203 
<CGS>                                           17,179,970 
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   23,077,457
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                         0 
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0 
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  57,202 
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  4,467,752 
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,579,000 
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              2,888,752 
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0 
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0 
<CHANGES>                                                0 
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,888,752 
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                         0.60 
<EPS-DILUTED>                                         0.57 
                                                         
                                                        

</TABLE>
#### § 301-11.605 When should I file my “Statement of Income and Tax Filing Status” for my taxable extended TDY assignment?

You should file your “Statement of Income and Tax Filing Status” for your taxable extended TDY assignment at the beginning of your extended TDY assignment, or as soon as you or your agency realizes that your TDY assignment will incur taxes. You should provide the same information as the sample “Statements of Income and Tax Filing Status” shown in part 302-17, subpart F (one-year process) or subpart G (two-year process) of this subtitle.

[FTR Amdt. 2014-01, 79 FR 49643, Aug. 21, 2014]
125P16

#### State v. Mark Wayne Ballard

1. Defs *Pro Se*Motion for Leave of the Court to File Notice of Appeal (COAP15-832)

1. Dismissed

2. Def’s *Pro Se*Motion for Extension of Time to File Notice of Appeal

2. Dismissed

3. Defs *Pro Se*Motion for Equitable Tolling

3. Dismissed

4. Def’s *Pro Se*Motion to Stay

4. Dismissed 04/06/2016

5. Def’s *Pro Se*Motion for Appointment of Counsel

5. Dismissed as moot