alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1401 H Street, NW, Suite 1075, Washington, DC 20005 (202) 326-5154 Fax (202) 898-4810

August 25, 2014

The Honorable Susan Kurland

Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs

U.S. Department of Transportation

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE

Washington, D.C. 20590

Re: Establishment of Slot Exemption Proceeding at Ronald Reagan 

Washington National Airport Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. Section 41718(b), 

DOT-OST-2000-7182

Dear Secretary Kurland:

On August 22, JetBlue Airways Corporation (“JetBlue”) informed the Department 

that JetBlue was adding new Jacksonville, Florida (“Jacksonville”) service from Ronald 

Reagan National Airport (“DCA”).1 Yet, instead of withdrawing from the instant 

Proceeding, JetBlue reaffirmed its claim that it should receive another slot pair for 

service to Jacksonville from DCA. 

Unfortunately for JetBlue, it cannot escape its own comments previously filed in this 

case:

 “JetBlue’s application will introduce competition on a significant route where 

American has a monopoly.”

2

 “In Department proceedings, the introduction of competition in a monopoly 

market has been a primary justification for the award of slot exemptions.”

3

 “The American monopoly service inflicts a significant cost on the traveling public 

in the form of higher fares and reduced service.”4

As the quotes above demonstrate, JetBlue repeatedly emphasized that the Department 

should award the slot exemptions to it to provide competition on a monopoly route. 

With JetBlue’s new service announcement, it is clear that the Jacksonville to DCA route 

no longer satisfies JetBlue’s own criteria for an award of AIR-21 slot exemptions. 

 

1

American Airlines, Inc. (“American”) moves for leave to file an unauthorized document. JetBlue’s 

August 22, 2014, submission reopened the record in this matter and American is compelled to narrowly 

respond to the information JetBlue filed. 

2 Application of JetBlue Airways Corporation, March 25, 2014, Docket DOT-OST-2000-7182, at p.20.

3

Id.

4

Id.
The Honorable Susan Kurland

August 25, 2014

Page 2 of 2

Meanwhile, Islip, Long Island MacArthur Airport (“Islip”) lost its daily, nonstop 

service to DCA on July 2, 2014; and will be without service to the nation’s capital if the 

Department does not award the AIR-21 slot exemptions in this proceeding to American. 

It ignores both the statutory standard and historical Department practice to suggest that 

Jacksonville – an airport with robust competitive nonstop daily service to DCA – should 

be awarded the slot exemptions in this proceeding over a community that has no 

nonstop service to DCA.

American encourages the Department to dismiss JetBlue’s application and award 

the slot exemptions to American.

Sincerely,

Howard Kass

Vice President – Regulatory Affairs

Abigail Donovan 

Director, Congressional and Federal Affairs 

cc: Service List
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

DALI WIRELESS INC., 

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

CORNING OPTICAL COMMUNICATIONS LLC, 

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2023-1249

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of California in No. 3:20-cv-06469-EMC,

Judge Edward M. Chen.

______________________

O R D E R

The parties having so agreed, it is ordered that:

(1) The proceeding is DISMISSED under Fed. R. App. 

P. 42 (b).

Case: 23-1249 Document: 11 Page: 1 Filed: 03/27/2023
DALI WIRELESS INC. V. CORNING OPTICAL COMMUNICATIONS 

LLC

2

(2) Each side shall bear their own costs.

FOR THE COURT

March 27, 2023

Date /s/ Peter R. Marksteiner

Peter R. Marksteiner 

Clerk of Court

ISSUED AS A MANDATE: March 27, 2023

Case: 23-1249 Document: 11 Page: 2 Filed: 03/27/2023
<PAGE>   1
   
                                                                  EXHIBIT 23.2
                              BK ASSOCIATES, INC.
                            1295 Northern Boulevard
                           Manhasset, New York 11030
                      (516) 365-6272 - Fax (516) 365-6287
    

                              CONSENT OF APPRAISER

We consent to the use of our reports included herein and to the references to
our firm in the Airplanes Limited and Airplanes U.S. Trust Report on Form 10-K
for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1997.


Date: June 26, 1997                    BK ASSOCIATES, INC.
                                      


                                      By: /s/ John F. Keitz
                                          ------------------
                                          Name: John F. Keitz
                                          Title: President
§ 51-10.110 Self-evaluation. ( a ) The agency shall, by August 24, 1987, evaluate its current policies and practices, and the effects thereof, that do not or may not meet the requirements of this part, and, to the extent modification of any such policies and practices is required, the agency shall proceed to make the necessary modifications.
( b ) The agency shall provide an opportunity to interested persons, including handicapped persons or organizations representing handicapped persons, to participate in the self-evaluation process by submitting comments (both oral and written).
( c ) The agency shall, until three years following the completion of the self-evaluation, maintain on file and make available for public inspection: ( 1 ) a description of areas examined and any problems identified, and
( 2 ) a description of any modifications made.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-1103

HADAROU SARE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

CHRISTINA NIKIFORIDOU, in her official capacity at the University of Maryland 

College Park and under her individual capacity; CHENCHEN HANDLER, in her 

official capacity at the University of Maryland College Park and under her individual 

capacity; MARUKO KOGURE, in her official capacity at the University of 

Maryland College Park and under her individual capacity; DAN SCHORR, in his 

official capacity at the University of Maryland College Park and under his individual 

capacity; HOSOM FATHY, in her official capacity at the University of Maryland 

College Park and under her individual capacity; UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 

AT COLLEGE PARK,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. 

Julie R. Rubin, District Judge. (1:23-cv-02675-JRR)

Submitted: May 21, 2024 Decided: May 24, 2024

Before WYNN and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

USCA4 Appeal: 24-1103 Doc: 29 Filed: 05/24/2024 Pg: 1 of 3
2

Hadarou Sare, Appellant Pro Se. Andrew M. Dansicker, LAW OFFICE OF ANDREW 

M. DANSICKER, LLC, Hunt Valley, Maryland; Megan Marie Jenkins, ECCLESTON & 

WOLF, PC, Hanover, Maryland; Lillian Lane Reynolds, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY 

GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

USCA4 Appeal: 24-1103 Doc: 29 Filed: 05/24/2024 Pg: 2 of 3
3

PER CURIAM:

Hadarou Sare seeks to appeal various orders the district court entered in the 

underlying consolidated federal actions, including the district court’s order denying Sare’s

motion to remand one of the underlying actions to the state court from which it was 

removed. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 

and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); 

Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949). The orders Sare

seeks to appeal are neither final orders nor appealable interlocutory or collateral orders. 

See, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 74 (1996) (“An order denying a motion to 

remand, standing alone, is obviously not final and immediately appealable as of right.” 

(cleaned up)). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We deny Sare’s 

motion for an order of default, see 4th Cir. R. 34(b) (“Appellee is permitted, but not 

required, to file an informal response brief within 14 days after service of appellant’s 

informal brief.”), and his motion to add additional defendants to this appeal. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED

USCA4 Appeal: 24-1103 Doc: 29 Filed: 05/24/2024 Pg: 3 of 3
#### § 60-3.9 No assumption of validity.

A. *Unacceptable substitutes for evidence of validity.* Under no circumstances will the general reputation of a test or other selection procedures, its author or its publisher, or casual reports of it's validity be accepted in lieu of evidence of validity. Specifically ruled out are: assumptions of validity based on a procedure's name or descriptive labels; all forms of promotional literature; data bearing on the frequency of a procedure's usage; testimonial statements and credentials of sellers, users, or consultants; and other nonempirical or anecdotal accounts of selection practices or selection outcomes.

B. *Encouragement of professional supervision.* Professional supervision of selection activities is encouraged but is not a substitute for documented evidence of validity. The enforcement agencies will take into account the fact that a thorough job analysis was conducted and that careful development and use of a selection procedure in accordance with professional standards enhance the probability that the selection procedure is valid for the job.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SANDRO MELVIN CARRILLOCOCOM,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 12-73209

Agency No. A088-450-111

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 13, 2014** 

Before: CLIFTON, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

Sandro Melvin Carrillo-Cocom, a native and citizen of Belize, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal

from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum

and withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We

FILED

MAY 23 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, Nagoulko v. INS, 333

F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 2003), and de novo claims of due process violations,

Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000). We deny the petition for

review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that the threats,

rock-throwing, and economic deprivation Carrillo-Cocom experienced on account

of his membership in the Freemasons, even considered cumulatively, did not rise to

the level of past persecution. See Nagoulko, 333 F.3d at 1016 (discrimination,

harassment, and physical encounters without any significant physical violence did

not compel finding of past persecution). Substantial evidence also supports the

agency’s determination that Carrillo-Cocom failed to demonstrate a well-founded

fear of future persecution on account of his Freemason or political party

membership. Id. at 1018. We reject Carrillo-Cocom’s contention that the BIA’s

decision lacked sufficient clarity, see Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.

2000) (requiring error and prejudice to prevail on a due process claim), and we

reject his contention that the IJ and BIA overlooked key evidence in the record, see

Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 921-22 (9th Cir. 2006). Accordingly,

Carrillo-Cocom’s asylum claim fails.

Because Carrillo-Cocom failed to meet the lower standard of proof for

2 12-73209
asylum, his claim for withholding of removal necessarily fails. See Zehatye v.

Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

3 12-73209
**EXHIBIT 31.2****CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL AND ACCOUNTING OFFICER**Section 302 CertificationI, Arnaldo F. Galassi, certify that:     1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of VendingData Corporation;     2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light ofthe circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;     4. The small business issuer’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have: a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly duringthe period in which this report is being prepared;  b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness ofthe disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and  c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuer’sfourth fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely tomaterially affect, the small business issuer’s internal control over financialreporting; and     5. The small business issuer’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuer’sauditors and the audit committee of the small business issuer’s board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions): a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operationof internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the small business issuer’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial data information; and  b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employeeswho have a significant role in the small business issuer’s internal control overfinancial reporting.        Date:  April 12, 2007 By:  /s/Arnaldo F. Galassi    Arnaldo F. Galassi,    Chief Financial Officer
#### Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, et al. v. Spohn, et al.

(Decided November 3, 1916.)

Appeal from Harrison Circuit Court.

Wills — Instruction—A devise by a testator to bis wife of bis bouse and lot and “wbat money I bave in bank,” is not broad enough to include a vested interest in an insurance policy. (For original opinion, see 170 Ky. 721.)

WADE H. LAIL and GRUBBS & GRUBBS for appellants.

ED. C. O’REAR and M. C. SWINFORD for appellees.

Opinion of the. Court by

William Rogers Clay, Commisioner

Modifying original opinion and overruling petition for rehearing.

*91In our original opinion we addressed ourselves to the question whether or not John H. W. Spohn, upon the death of his mother, took a vested interest in the policy which he could transmit by will to his widow. In considering this question we did not examine the will with care, but rather assumed that the proceeds of the policy passed under the will. It is suggested on petition for rehearing and modification that the interest of the testator in the policy is not embraced in his will. The will is as follows: “I give what money I have in bank and house and lot on Pearl street to my wife.” True, the word “money” is often used in wills in a very broad and elastic sense, and, when read in the light of proper evidence, is given meanings to conform to the testamentary intent. Apple v. Allen, 56 N. C. 120. "When so construed, it has been held to include money due reversionary interests in personalty, ground rents, bonds and notes, personal property in general, and even the entire personal and real property of the testator. Decker v. Decker, 121 Ills. 341, 12 N. E. 750 ; In re Egan, 1 Ch. 688, 68 L. J. Ch. 307; Strawbridge’s Estate, 5 Pa. Dist. 692, 18 Pa. Co. Ct. 485; Hinckley v. Primm, 41 Ill. App. 579; In re Miller, 48 Cal. 165. If the will' in question exhibited an intent on the part of the testator to devise all of his property to his wife, the fact that in describing his property he omitted some portion thereof, would not defeat such intent. As a matter of fact, the testator did not use any words indicating a purpose to devise all of his property to his wife. He did not even devise to her all of his money, but only what money he had in . bank. Though giving full effect to the elastic sense in which the word money is often used in wills, we conclude that the clause “what money I have in bank” is not broad enough to include the testator’s interest in the policy in. question. It follows that the testator’s wife takes by descent and not under his will, and is entitled, therefore, to only such interest in the policy as the statute now gives.

In other respects we see no reason to change the conclusions reached in our original opinion.

Wherefore, the original opinion is modified, as herein indicated, and the cause remanded for proceedings consistent herewith. In other respects the petition for rehearing is overruled.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM 
ANACOMP, INC.'S MARCH 31, 1998 FORM 10-Q QUARTERLY REPORT AND IS QUALIFIED 
IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                 OCT-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                         34,855
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  72,579
<ALLOWANCES>                                   5,744
<INVENTORY>                                    26,757
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               140,797
<PP&E>                                         44,776
<DEPRECIATION>                                 11,774
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 343,819
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          103,436
<BONDS>                                        254,137
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       140
<OTHER-SE>                                     (14,835)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   343,819
<SALES>                                        66,659
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               117,593
<CGS>                                          49,656
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  123,544
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             7,957
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (13,755)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   2,100
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (15,855)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (15,855)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (1.14)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (1.14)
        

</TABLE>
#### § 109-40.110-2 Minority business enterprises.

Minority business enterprises shall have the maximum practical opportunity to participate in the performance of Government contracts. DOE shall identify transportation-related minority enterprises and encourage them to provide services that will support DOE's transportation requirements.
#### ALFRED S. TALLMADGE, Appellant, *v.*HORACE WHITMAN, Respondent.

*Referee’s report*— - *appeal without ease or exceptions.*

Appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendant entered upon the report of a referee.

No case or exceptions were prepared, the appeal being taken from the judgment.

The court at General Term said: “ There can be no review of a judgment entered upon the report of a referee, unless an exception to his decision has been taken. (Code, §§ 268-272; 3 Wait’s Pr., 317, 318, 324-330.) Where exceptions have been taken a case or exceptions must be settled by the referee. (Rule 41; *People*v. *Alb. and Sus. B. B. Oo.,*57 Barb., 204 and note.) These indispensable proceedings have been omitted in this case.”

*Theo. Arnold,*for the appellant. *H. O. SoutJmorth,*for the respondent.

Opinion by

Gilbert, J.;

Barnard, P. J., and Dykman, J., concurred.

. Appeal dismissed and judgment affirmed, with costs.
§ 302-7.14 What methods of transporting and paying for the movement of HHG, PBP&E and temporary storage are authorized? There are two authorized methods of transporting and paying for the movement of HHG, PBP&E and temporary storage. Your agency will determine which of the following methods will be authorized. ( a ) *Commuted rate system.* Under the commuted rate system you assume total responsibility for arranging and paying for, at least the following services: packing/unpacking, crating/uncrating, pickup/deliver, weighing, line-haul, drayage, and temporary storage of your HHG and PBP&E with a commercial HHG carrier or by renting self drive equipment for a do-it-yourself move. When any PBP&E is transported as an administrative expense of your agency, all arrangements (e.g., packing/unpacking, pickup/delivery, weighing, temporary storage, etc.) will be handled and paid for by your agency.
( b ) *Actual expense method.* Under the actual expense method, your agency assumes the responsibility for arranging and paying for all aspects (e.g., packing/unpacking, pickup/delivery, weighing, line-haul, drayage, temporary storage, etc.), of transporting your HHG and PBP&E with a commercial HHG carrier.
[FTR Amdt. 98, 66 FR 58196, Nov. 20, 2001. Redesignated by FTR Amdt. 2011-01, 76 FR 18340, Apr. 1, 2011]
# AGENCY:

 Federal Trade Commission.

# ACTION:

 Notice.

# SUMMARY:

 The Federal Trade Commission announces the revised thresholds for interlocking directorates required by the 1990 amendment of section 8 of the Clayton Act. Section 8 prohibits, with certain exceptions, one person from serving as a director or officer of two competing corporations if two thresholds are met. Competitor corporations are covered by section 8 if each one has capital, surplus, and undivided profits aggregating more than $10,000,000, with the exception that no corporation is covered if the competitive sales of either corporation are less than $1,000,000. Section 8(a)(5) requires the Federal Trade Commission to revise those thresholds annually, based on the change in gross national product. The new thresholds, which take effect immediately, are $16,732,000 for section 8(a)(1), and $1,673,200 for section 8(a)(2)(A).

# EFFECTIVE DATE:

 January 24, 2000.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

 H. Gabriel Dagen, Bureau of Competition, Office of Accounting and Financial Analysis, (202) 326-2573.

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 19(a)(5).

By direction of the Commission.

Donald S. Clark,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 00-1653 Filed 1-21-00; 8:45am]

BILLING CODE 6750-01-M