# /'FILE / IN CLERKS OFFICE llJIMME COURT, STATEOFWMIINCrlal

# ~

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In re the Marriage of:
NEHA VY AS CHANDOLA, Respondent, and\, MANJUL VARN CHANDOLA, NO. 

### 89093-5
ENBANC
Filed 

### JUN 1 9 2014 ----=------'----=----'-----

GORDON McCLOUD, J.-This case concerns three prov1s1ons of a parentingplanthat limits contactbetweenthepetitioner, ManjulVamChandola, and his young daughter. The trial court imposed those restrictions under RCW 

### 26.09.191(3)(g), which authopi'zes a courtto "precludeorlimit anyprovisions ofthe parenting plan" if necessary to protect against "adverse effect to the child's best interests." This casepresents the questionwhattype of"adverseeffectto the child's**~:-'f~** best interests" a trial court must find before imposing parenting plan restrictionsIn reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)



### under the catchall provision, RCW 26.09.191(3)(g). We hold that restrictions imposedunderthat statutemustbereasonably calculatedto preventrelatively severe physical, mental, or emotional harm to a child. Applying that standard, we affirm the trial court's decision to impose two ofthe challenged restrictions but reverse its decision to impose the third. FACTS Manjul Yarn Chandola (Chandola) and Neha Vyas Chandola (Vyas) were married in 1998; Vyas gave birth to the couple's daughter, P.R.C., in 2008. Both Chandola and Vyas are attorneys, but Chandola was consistently unemployed or underemployed during theirmarriage. Accordingly, he was home with P.R.C. more oftenthanVyas was during the first two years ofP.R.C.'slife. Atdifferentintervals, both Vyas's mother and Chandola's parents also lived in the home. The grandparents provided a great deal ofchild care, and while Vyas and Chandolawere married, P.R.C. always slept in the same room as either her parents or one ofher grandmothers. Chandola's and Vyas's most serious conflicts arose after P.R.C. was born. Vyas accused Chandola of engaging in abusive behavior towards her-yelling at her, calling her names, and telling her that she was a bad mother. She felt that Chandola andhis parents weretrying to marginalizeher, encouragingP.R.C. to bond 2In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)



### with Chandola and minimizing Vyas's role. Vyas also objected to Chandola's parenting style. Particular sources ofconflict were Chandola's inability to maintain
a consistent meal and sleep schedule for P.R.C. and his obsessive concern that something badwouldhappen to her. According to Vyas, this concern manifested in Chandola's holding P.R.C. excessively, discouraging her from playing with other children, and insistingthat she be supervised by a family member at all times-even while she slept. In February 2011, Vyas filed for dissolution. She told Chandolathat she was concerned about the possibility ofsexual abuse because P.R.C. had complained of vaginal pain. When the couple separated in late February 2011, Chandola agreed to supervised visitation with P.R.C. at the advice of his attorney at the time. The supervised visitation was lifted in December 2011. The court-appointed parenting expert, Dr. Jennifer Wheeler, concluded that P.R.C.'s statements were not 

### evidence ofsexual abuse. In its findings offact, the trial court also dismissed the allegations, concluding instead that "[Vyas] may have needed to precipitate a crisis in order to escape the marriage and extended family dynamic." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 94. In short, the sexual abuse allegations were unsubstantiated.

3In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)

In the divorce proceedings, Chandola sought a 50-50 residential split. Vyas requested that Chandola's residential time with P.R.C. be limited under RCW 26.09.191(3)(b) and (e), whichallowatrial courtto "precludeorlimitanyprovisions ofthe parenting plan" upon certain findings. Subsection (3)(b) allows restrictions
on the basis ofa parent's "long-term emotional
... impairment which interferes with
. . . parenting functions." Subsection (3)(e) allows restrictions onthe basis of
a parent's "abusive use ofconflict
... which creates the danger ofserious damage to the child's psychological development." 1

1RCW 26.09.191(3) reads in full as follows: Aparent's involvement or conduct may have an adverse effect on the child's hP<;!t intPt'P<;!tQ !lnrt thP l"r\llt'f 1'YI!l" 1"\t'P.f"'JllrlP r\1" J;,'Y'I;f •H'Hl ..,..,.,-,.u;0;,-,..-,,., n.f' i-h=

__ - ¥**-~---- -~** **,.,~,** _.,....._ __,.. ---.--.- _ ..._.. ..,,..... .., --...._-"'V".,J .t"'..._ ...,...,...._...,._...,. ..._,.._ ....._....._..._......_..... " '-"'.&..l..J _t--'..1.. '-''I' .&.U..I.'-J.&..l.IJ V..l. \-..1...1.'-" parentingplan, ifany ofthe following factors exist: (a) A parent's neglect or substantial nonperformance of parenting functions; (b) A long-term emotional or physical impairment which interferes with the parent's performance of parenting functions as defined in RCW 26.09.004; (c) A long-term impairment resulting from drug, alcohol, or other substance abuse that interferes with the performance ofparenting functions; (d) The absence or substantial impairment ofemotional ties between the parent and child; (e) The abusive use ofconflict by the parent which creates the danger of serious damage to the child's psychological development; 4In reMarriage ofChandola 

### (No. 89093-5)



### Dr. Wheeler's written pretrial parenting evaluation stated that there was no basis on which to impose RCW 26.09.191 restrictions. It 

### acknowledged that Chandola appeared to have some problematic personality traits but concluded that they did not manifest frequently enough to "meet criteria for a major mental health
or personality disorder that would support restrictions to the residential schedule consistent with RCW 26.09.191(3)(b)." 2 Verbatim Report ofProceedings (VRP) (Jan. 31, 2012) at 297. Nevertheless, Dr. Wheeler recommended a residential schedule that limited Chandolato roughlythe same total amount ofcontacthe hadhadwithP.R.C. during the period ofsupervised visitation (before thejudge rejected the abuse allegations). The schedule she recommended amounted to about 20 hours per week (two sevenhour visits per week and one overnight stay every other Saturday). She also recommended a residential schedule in "phase[s]," whereby Chandola would progress to greater residential time with P.R.C. every few years ifhe successfully complied with certain recommendations. Id. 

### at 235-45. These recommendations
were fairly limited: Dr. Wheeler recommended that Chandola continue to see his
(f) A parent has withheld from the other parent access to the child for a protractedperiod without good cause; or (g) Such other factors or conduct as the court expressly finds adverse to the best interests ofthe child. 

### 5In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)
therapist and participate in individual parent training but did not recommend any restrictions on Chandola's conduct or his parents' contact with P.R.C. At trial, Dr. Wheeler agreed that her recommendations gave Chandola time with P.R.C. that was "significantly more limited than what would generally be the norm." !d. at 305. Whenpressedto explain these recommendations onthe witness stand, Dr. Wheeler disavowed her written evaluationto some extent: I also don'tthink I gave due consideration in my formulation of the .191 restrictionsto whatmyconcerns were andhowtheymightplay out in terms ofabusive use ofconflict. I was very focused as I read it here on domestic violence, sexual abuse allegations and the emotional impairment. My authority for my opinionis thatthepersonalitytraitsthat I've been describing all morning inmy opinion, theriskto [P.R.C.] ofthose traits is ongoing conflict that is essentially emotionally abusive to her. And 1do think that until those traits are betterregulated and [Chandola is] able to interact with [P.R.C.] in a way that does not perpetuate this conflict and parent in a way that does not continue to inflame this conflict, I do thinkthat [the] father is vulnerable to engaging in abusive use of conflict. That supports generally why I am limiting his residential schedule relative to what youjustreferred to as the normal, typical kind ofrecommendation. 

### !d. at 305-06. After six days oftestimony, the trial court found that "the father's parenting history has had an adverse effect on the child's best interests pursuant to RCW 26.09.191(3)(g)." CP at 80. Unlike RCW 26.09.191(3)(b) and (e)-the provisions thatVyas invokedinherbriefto thetrial court, which specifically address a parent's 6In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)

emotional impairment and abusive use of conflict-RCW 26.09.191(3)(g) is a catchall provision. It allows courts to "preclude or limit any provisions of the parenting plan" in light of "[s]uch other factors or conduct as the court expressly finds adverse to the best interests of the child." RCW 26.09.191(3)(g). In accordance with its finding of adverse effect, the trial court placed several restrictions and conditions on Chandola's contact with P.R.C. Thus, the court's parenting plan provided for a residential schedule in three stages. The first stage, which was to last approximatelytwo and ahalfyears, allows Chandola to have P.R.C. for one seven-hour visit every Tuesday evening, one overnight stay every other Thursday, and one overnight stay every other weekend. The second stage, whichis to last from August 1, 2014 until P.R.C. enteredthe third grade, increases Chandola's residential time with P.R.C. to one overnight stay per week and a full Friday afternoonthrough Sunday evening stay every otherweekend. The third and final stage allows Chandolato have P.R.C. stay every Thursday night and every other weekend from Friday after school until Monday morning. Undertheterms ofthis plan, eachnew stage commences only ifChandolahas complied with several conditions designedto improve his parenting skills: The parties shall only progress to the next stage if the father has routinely abided by the mother's bedtime routine and time (unless otherwise recommended by the case manager); the child sleeps in her ownroom atthe father's house (unless otherwise recommendedby the 7In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)

case manager); the father has remained compliant with counseling requirements; the father has successfully completedparenttraining; the father has abstained from discussing the case or any disputed facts/claims in the case withthe child; the father has compliedwiththe restrictions regarding paternal grandparent contact in Section 3.10; and the father has complied with any and all recommendations by the child'stherapist, the parenttrainer, andthe casemanager. Ifthe parties disagree about the father's compliance with these conditions to progress to the next phase ofresidential time, the father may (within two months ofthe dates for potential progress to the next phase) bring amotiononthe family lawmotionscalendarwithatleast 14 days notice to the motherto resolve the disagreement. CP at 81. The "restrictions regarding paternal grandparent contact," 

### id., are as follows: For Stage 1and 2 the father shall not facilitate or allow eitherpaternal grandparentto bepresentduringthe father's residential time except as follows: either orbothpaternal grandparents maybepresentupto 20% total of the father's time in any given calendar year. However the grandparents should not be present tor any parenting observations, training or coaching sessions. During the 20% time the father may leave the child with the grandparents i.e. he need not be present. This provision shall not be construed to create a right or entitlement for grandparent visitation but is intended to maintain the child's connection with her paternal grandparents while promoting direct parenting by the father without the presence ofthe grandparents. The father shallnotifythemother and case managerin advance ofanytime his parents visit. CP at 84. Chandolaappealed, arguingthathisparentingbehaviors didnothavethe kind of"adverse effect" onP.R.C. thatthe legislaturerequired inRCW 26.09.191(3). He also sought attorney fees. The Court ofAppeals affirmed, and Chandolapetitioned 8In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)

this court for review. 

### In reMarriage ofChandola, noted at 174 Wn. App. 1073, 

### review granted, 179 Wn.2d 1008,315 P.3d 531 (2013). Vyas cross-petitioned this court for attorney fees on appeal. ANALYSIS 

### Standardof Review A trial court's parenting plan is reviewed for an abuse ofdiscretion, which "occurs when a decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds
or untenable reasons." 

### In reMarriage of Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012) (citing 

### In reMarriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997)). The trial court's findings offact are treated as verities on appeal, so long
as they are supported by substantial evidence. 

### !d. (citing 

### Ferree v. Doric Co., 62 Wn.2d 561, 568, 383 P.2d900 (1963)). "Substantialevidence" is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person ofthe truth ofthe matter asserted. 

### !d. While a parenting plan is reviewed for abuse ofdiscretion, the trial court's discretion is cabined by several provisions in chapter 26.09 RCW, including the catchallprovision atissue inthis case: RCW26.09.191(3)(g). 

### !d. at 35-36. As noted above, RCW 26.09.191(3) bars the trial court from "preclud[ing] or limit[ing] any provisions of the parenting plan" (i.e., restricting parental conduct) unless the

9In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)



### evidence shows that "[a] parent's
... conduct may have an adverse effect on the child's best interests." Chandola makes two general arguments regarding the trial court's ruling and the Court ofAppeals' decision. First, he argues that the trial court improperlyrelied
on conditions that existed during the year before trial only because of Vyas's unfounded allegations of abuse. Second, he argues that the trial court applied an incorrect standardwhenitfound an "adverse effect"justifyingrestrictions onparentchild contact. RCW 26.09.191(3). For the reasons given below, we disagree with Chandola's first argumentwe find that the trial court did not rely at all on the discredited abuse allegations or
on conditions resulting from those allegations. With regard to Chandola's second argument, we take this opportunity to clarify the level of"adverse effect" necessary to sustain parenting plan restrictions under RCW 26.09.191(3)(g)'s catchall provision: that adverse effect must be similar in severity to the adversity illustrated by that subsection's neighboring provisions, RCW 26.09.191(a)-(f). Applying that standard, we affirm the Court ofAppeals' decision to uphold the restrictions on residential time and cosleeping. With respect to the third restriction (the limit on grandparental contact), however, we find that the trial court

10In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)



### abused its discretion. We therefore reverse the CourtofAppeals' decisionto uphold that restriction. I. 

### The Trial Court Did Not Improperly Rely on Conditions That Resulted from the Unfounded Abuse Allegations Chandola first argues that the trial court improperly relied on the unfounded abuse allegations in two ways: (1) by crediting the court-appointed expert's relatively negative assessment, based on an in-home observation, ofwhat Chandola contends was the "artificial environment" created by supervisedvisitation (imposed in the wake of the later-rejected sexual abuse allegations) and (2) by attributing P.R.C.'s improved social skills to her reduced contact with Chandola (and denying Chandola the opportunity to prove that his parenting skills had improved). Pet. for Review at 16-18. We are notpersuaded. The record shows that the trial court based its decision on conditions that existed before the allegations, before the separation, and before the supervised visitation-not on conditions that existed during the parenting expert's home visits. See 

### CP at 92 ("Prior to separation the father consistently engaged in a pattern of interaction with [P.R.C.] which
... lacked, in concerning degree, objectivity with respectto her healthy development."). The court did note thatP.R.C.'s socialization had improved after her father's influence was reduced, butthat is notunfairreliance
on the conditions resulting from the unfounded abuse allegations. Rather, it is a 11In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)

reasonable assessment of the facts that existed at trial, which is well within the court's discretion. As for Dr. Wheeler's in-home observation, it is true that she noted the "high energy" tenor ofthe observation. RP (Jan. 31, 2012) at 215-17. Butthis was due to Chandola's own behavior, rather than any fact that resulted from supervised visitation itself. !d. at 215 ("there was a lot more activity, a lot more energy ... in part because ofthe number ofpeople but also in part because father's style is very high energy"). Moreover, this observation does not appear to have played any significant role in the trial court's decision, which omitted any reference to Chandola's postseparation interactions with P.R.C. II. Restrictions Imposed under RCW 26.09.191(3)(g) Must Be Reasonably Calculated To PreventPhysical, Mental, or Emotional Harmto the Child There is some overlap between the trial court's authority under RCW 26.09.187, to establishthe terms ofthe parentingplan, and its authority underRCW 26.09.191(3), to "preclude orlimitanyprovisions oftheparentingplan." Practically speaking, a court can substantially restrict a parent's contact with his or her child simply by establishing a residential schedule pursuant to its discretion under RCW 26.09.187. Butthatis notwhatthe courtdid withthe challengedrestrictions here; instead, it proceeded under RCW 26.09.191(3). The "limitations" in that statute are 12In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)


### fundamentally different from the provisions necessaryto everyparentingplan under RCW 26.09.187. Restrictions on a parent's geographic location, for example, are not authorized as typical parenting plan provisions under RCW 26.09.187. See Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d at 54-55; LAWS OF 

### 2000, ch. 21. They are instead imposed under RCW 26.09.191(3). Similarly, restrictions on aparent's travel or conduct can be imposed onlyunder RCW 26.09.191-notas features ofthe parentingplanunder RCW 26.09.187. Katare, 175 Wn.2d at 35-37; In reMarriage ofWicklund, 84 Wn. App. 763,770-72,932 P.2d 652 (1996). Before imposing RCW 26.09.191(3)(g) restrictions, a trial court must find "'morethan the normal
...hardships which predictably result from a dissolution of marriage."' Katare, 175 Wn.2dat36 (alteration in original) (quotingLittlefield, 133 Wn.2d at 55). While the court "need not wait for actual harm to accrue before imposing restrictions," it may impose restrictions only where substantial evidence shows "'that a danger of
... damage exists."' Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting and citingIn reMarriage of Burrill, 113 Wn. App. 863, 872, 56 P.3d 993 (2002)). With respect to the level of harm required for restrictions under RCW 26.09.191(3)(g), Chandola makes two arguments. First, he urges this court to interpret RCW 26.09.191(3)(g) to impose a standard analogous to that applied in 13In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)


### nonparental custody proceedings. Under that approach, a trial court could not impose restrictions under RCW 26.09.191(3)(g) unless it found that a parent was incapable of"meet[ing] a child'sbasic needs" orthattherestrictions werenecessary to avoid '"actual detriment to [a] child's growth and development."' In re Custody 

### ofB.M.H, 179 Wn.2d 224,235-36,315 P.3d 470 (2013) (construing chapter 26.10 RCW, which governs nonparental actions for child custody (quoting In re Custody 

### of Shields, 

### 157 Wn.2d 126, 143, 136 P.3d 117 (2006))). Second, Chandola contends that where the parents' "differing views can both be accommodated" without the imposition ofRCW26.09.191(3) restrictions, any such restriction shouldbe subject to strict scrutiny. Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 2. Chandola contends that both of his arguments are compelled by the due process clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which protects a parent's fundamental right to "autonomyinparenting." Id. 

### at 5. We decline to analogize parenting plan restrictions to nonparental petitions for custody. The nonparental custody statutes are designed to address situations wholly different from a divorce. A restriction imposed under RCW 26.09.191(3) mightberelativelyminor-forinstance, as here, aparentmightberequiredto attend parenting classes-but the result sought in a nonparental custody petition is the

14In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)

termination ofparental custody. Thus, the legislature would likely disagree with Chandola's analogy. We also decline to subject Chandola'sparentingplanto strict scrutiny. To be sure, the right to parental autonomy is a '"fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,"' and the State may not intrude upon it absent a compelling interest and narrowtailoring. In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wn.2d 1, 14- 15, 969 P.2d 21 (1998) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982)). Strict scrutiny therefore applies to the state's infringement on parental autonomy in favor ofa nonparent's interest. But it does not apply in a proceeding characterized by the "equivalentparental positions ofthe parties." In re Parentage ofL.B., 155 Wn.2d 679, 710, 122 P.3d 161 (2005).2 But RCW 26.09.191(3)(g) does require a particularized finding ofa specific level of harm before restrictions may be imposed. Two principles of statutory interpretation compel this conclusion. First, the disputed catchall provision, RCW 26.09.191(3)(g), follows a list of specific "factors" that "may have an adverse effect on the child's best interests,"

2 This court has reached the same conclusion in numerous prior cases. See, e.g., Katare, 175 Wn.2d at 42 (strict scrutiny has no application to parenting plan, because adverse parties have equivalent interests); Parentage ofL.B., 155 Wn.2d at 710 (same). 15In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)
justifying restrictions on parent-child contact. RCW 26.09.191(3)(a)-(f). When a statute employs such a general catchall term in conjunction with specific terms, the general term is "deemed only to incorporate those things similar in nature or 'comparable to' the specific terms." 

### Simpson Inv. Co. v. Dep 't of Revenue, 141 Wn.2d 139,151,3 P.3d 741 (2000) 

### (quotingJohnH Sellen Canst. Co. v. Dep'tof Revenue, 87 Wn.2d 878, 883-84, 558 P.2d 1342 (1976)). In RCW 26.09.191(3), all ofthe factors specifically listed concern either the lack ofany meaningful parentchild relationship whatsoever or conduct by the parent that seriously endangers the child's physical or emotional well-being: A parent's involvement or conduct may have an adverse effect on the child'sbestinterests, andthe courtmaypreclude orlimit anyprovisions ofthe parenting plan, ifany ofthe following factors exist: (a)A parent's neglect or substantial nonperformance ofparenting functions; (b)A long-term emotional or physical impairment which interferes with the parent's performance of parenting functions as defined in RCW 26.09.004; (c)A long-term impairment resulting from drug, alcohol, or other substance abuse that interferes with the performance of parenting functions; (d)The absence or substantial impairment ofemotionalties between the parent and the child; (e)The abusive use of conflict by the parent which creates the danger ofserious damage to the child's psychological development; 16In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)

(f) A parent has withheld from the other parent access to the child for a protractedperiod without good cause. Consistent with the nature ofthese specific terms, trial courts typically invoke the catchall provision in RCW 26.09.191(3)(g) only after identifying a specific, and fairly severe, harm to the child. 3 Second, statutory language is to be interpreted in context, considering "'related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole."' 

### Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass 'n, 169 Wn.2d 516, 526, 243 P.3d 1283 (2010) (quoting 

### State v. Engel, 166 Wn.2d 572, 578, 210 P.3d 1007 (2009)). Thus, RCW 26.09.191(3)(g) must be read in light ofchapter 26.09 RCW's statement ofpolicy, codified atRCW 26.09.002. Itprovides that "the best interest ofthe child**i~** ordinarily served when the existing pattern ofinteraction between a parent and child is altered only to the extent necessitated by the changed relationship of the parents or as 

### required to protect the childfrom physical, mental, or emotional harm." RCW 26.09.002 (emphasis added).

3 E.g., Katare, 175 Wn.2d at 38 (permitting travel restrictions on the basis of evidence that father posed a risk of abduction). Courts have also relied on RCW 26.09.191(3)(g) to impose visitation restrictions designed to prevent young children from spending large amounts oftime in transit. E.g., In re Marriage of Fahey, 164 Wn. App. 42, 67-68, 262 P.3d 128 (2011). 17In reMarriage o[Chandola (No. 89093-5)

In light of this policy, as well as the nature of the specific grounds for parenting plan restrictions listed RCW 16.09.191(3)(a)-(f), we conclude that the legislature intended RCW 26.09.191(3) restrictions to apply only where necessary to "protect the child from physical, mental, or emotional harm," RCW 26.09.002, similar in severity to the harms posed by the "factors" specifically listed in RCW 26.09.191(3)(a)-(f). A trial court abuses its discretion ifit imposes a restriction that is notreasonably calculatedto prevent such a harm. III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Limiting Chandola's Residential TimewithP.R.C. orbyProhibiting Cosleeping; theTrial Court DidAbuseIts DiscretionbyRestrictingP.R.C.'sContactwithHerPaternal Grandparents Chandola challenges three restrictions imposed by the trial court: (1) the limitation ofhis residE.mtialtime with .PJ{.C. to one ovemighfstay arid one evening visit per week,4 (2) the prohibition on cosleeping, and (3) the restriction onP.R.C.'s contact with her paternal grandparents. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the first two restrictions: the record shows that they were reasonably calculated to prevent physical, mental, or emotional harm to P.R.C. The trial court

4The trial court imposedthe restrictions on Chandola's residential time withP.R.C. underRCW 26.09.191(3)(g). See CP at 93 ("Itis
...necessary to impose such restrictions as may best be anticipated [to] assure the mother's parenting is not diluted by the father. Certainly a 'fifty/fifty' parenting plan would not accomplish this." (emphasis added)). 18In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)

did abuse its discretion, however, by restricting P.R.C.'s contact with her paternal grandparents. 

### A. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting Chandola 's residential time with P.R. C. Vyas asserts that "the trial focused [primarily] on [Chandola]'s parenting deficits and troubling personality traits" and that both the court-appointed expert, Dr. SusanWheeler, andthe father's expertwitness, Dr. MarshaHedrick, agreedthat these deficits and traits were grounds to limit Chandola's parenting time. Resp't's Suppl. Br. at 2-3. There is ample support for this assertion in the record. The "deficits" and "traits" to which Vyas refers all involved Chandola's inability to provide P.R.C. with a proper diet, sleep schedule, or socialization. 

### Id. Vyas testified that when she was working full time, she would often arrive home in the evening to find that Chandola had not yet fed P.R.C. lunch, or that he had fed her only a cookie or donut. She also stated that Chandola persistently and "randomly" wokeP.R.C. up during the nightto holdher, andthathe would often be unable to eat or wash himselfwhile Vyas was at work because he could not bring himselfto putP.R.C. down. 3 VRP (Feb. 1, 2012) at 410-12. Several family friends testified to similar concerns, particularly relating to Chandola's constant holding of P.R.C., which prevented her from exploring and socializing, andto his refusal to establish a sleep or meal schedule for her. Indeed, 19In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)

even one ofChandola's lay witnesses testified about Chandola's tendency to hold P.R.C. too much and to perceive himselfas persecuted by friends and family who suggested that he alter his parenting practices. The common theme that emerged from the various witness' testimony was that prior to the separation (before Chandola's contact with P.R.C. was restricted) P.R.C. had been a fearful and sleepdeprived child. 5 Dr. Wheeler testified that she believed Chandola's "obsessive compulsive," overly protective parenting style appeared to be a means of "regulating his own anxiety versus recognizing what's really best for [P.R.C.]." 2 VRP (Jan. 31, 2012) at 189. She made similar comments about Chandola's habit offeeding P.R.C. milk at night, which was contrary to both Vyas's wishes and P.R.C.'s pediatrician's

- - - advice. Dr. Wheeler indicated that this was unhealthy for P.R.C. but done because it "felt good" to Chandola. 

### ld. at 191. Ultimately, Dr. Wheeler recommended that P.R.C. have very limited residential time with Chandolabecause:

... I feel like the personality traits that I observed, while they didn't rise to the level to be consistent with .191 restrictions from the emotional impairment standpoint, I do have concerns thatright nowhis
5 One of Chandola's lay witnesses contradicted this testimony, but credibility determinations are for the trial court. Chatwood v. Chatwood, 44 Wn.2d 233, 240, 266 P.2d 782 (1954) (trialjudge better positioned than appellate court to weigh evidence and credibility in custody proceeding). 20In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)



### skills are not sufficientto be able to overcome some ofthosepersonality problems and exhibit skills where he's kind ofmastered some ofthese deficits that he has right now that would bring him up to the level of being a good enough parent that would warrant having equivalent access.

. . . So that's why I'm recommending these kind oflengthy times that they can spend together and have very enriched, rewarding time together where they can accomplish a lot ofparent-child tasks to help foster and maintain the relationship thatthey already have, but without unduly exposingherto some ofthese moreproblematictraits untilthese can kind ofbe betterregulated. Id. at 235-37. Significantly, Dr. Hedrick testified that she shared Dr. Wheeler's
concerns about the nighttime bottle feeding, overly protective parenting, lack of structure, and lack of empathy. She agreed that Chandola's "difficulties

·· · -understanding normal child development''-particularly his need to hold P.R.C. instead ofletting her explore-were cause for concern. 3 VRP (Feb. 1, 2012) at 492-93. Dr. Hedrick testified at length about the legitimacy ofDr. Wheeler's report and recommendations. She stated that she considered Dr. Wheeler's written report to be fundamentally sound but also thought that Dr. Wheeler should have recommended more visitation time for Chandola and P.R.C. Dr. Hedrick testified that in orderto protectP.R.C.'s relationship with Chandola, the court would need to allow at least one overnight stay per week. The residential schedule ultimately 21In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)


### imposedbythe trial court met this criterion. (Dr. Wheeler'srecommended schedule afforded Chandola only one overnight stay every other week.) In light of this record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing restrictions on Chandola's residential time with P.R.C. Contrary to Chandola's assertions, the trial court's concerns were not simply a matter of parenting "style." Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 14. Rather, they involved fundamental human needs: sleep, nutrition, and socialization. The trial court's written findings make clear that it 

### believed P.R.C. had made substantial emotional and social progress since her parents' separation (which reduced her time with Chandola): "Itis telling that subsequentto separationthe child's behaviorrepertoire increased dramatically. As more than one lay witness observed since separation '[P.R.C.] is a changed child, more outgoing, interactive."' CP at 92-93 (citations omitted). In imposing the residential restrictions, the trial court clearly intended to
ensure that this progress continue unhindered. There is substantial evidence in the recordto supportthe conclusionthatthese restrictions were reasonably calculatedto accomplish that end. We therefore affirm the Court ofAppeals' decision upholding the parenting plan's residential schedule. B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it prohibited Chandolafrom cosleepingwith P.R. C. 

### 22In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)

Vyas contends, and we agree, that the cosleeping restriction was imposed so that P.R.C. could maintain a consistent sleep schedule-and not because of any innate distrust ofcosleeping. Vyas testified that Chandola's method ofputting P.R.C. to bed was to show her YouTube videos, sometimes until one or two in the morning, and that P.R.C.
was chronically sleep deprived as a result. She also testified that Chandola could not resist picking P.R.C. up in the middle of the night and that Vyas therefore believedthatcosleepingwas unhealthy for bothChandolaandP.R.C. Thetrial court apparently found this testimony credible.6 Chandola concedes that sleep deprivation 1s a harm justifying RCW 26.09.-191(3)(g) restrictions. He argues thatthecosieepirigprohibitionwas improper only because itwas notnarrowly tailoredto preventthatharm. He contends thatthe court should simply have prohibited him from picking P.R.C. up while she slept, instead ofprohibiting cosleeping altogether. He asserts that the blanketprohibition "forced [him] and P.R.C. to violate the standards oftheir culture." Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 20.

6With respectto the cosleeping issue, Dr. Wheeler made no recommendation other than to "comply[] with the parent trainer recommendations versus abiding by what the motherwants." 2 VRP (Jan. 31, 2012) at 241. 23In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)



### As explained above, parentingplanprovisions are not subjectto strict scrutiny and thus need not be narrowly tailored. Instead, restrictions imposed under RCW 26.09.191(3) need only be reasonably calculated to prevent the kind of harm described above. Thus, Chandola's narrow tailoring argument fails. Without doubt, a trial court must consider cultural factors when imposing a parentingplan. In re Parentage of Jannot, 

### 149 Wn.2d 123, 127, 65 P.3d 664 (2003) ("parenting plans are individualized decisions that depend upon a wide variety of factors, including 'culture, family history, the emotional stability ofthe parents and children, finances, and any ofthe other factors that bear upon the interests ofthe children"' (quoting In re Parentage of Jannot, 

### 110 Wn. App. 16, 20, 37 P.3d 1265 (2002))). In this case, the court heard testimony from both parents regarding their

- - -- -- -- -- - - - - -- - -- -- - - - - - -- --



### positive assessment ofcosleepingbeforeitprohibitedChandolafrom continuingthat practice. Butthe court also consideredtestimonythatP.R.C. was sleep deprived and only then determined that the cosleeping prohibition was necessary. It 

### also preserved flexibility, ordering that the prohibition be enforced "unless otherwise recommended by the case manager." CP at 81. The cosleeping restriction was therefore reasonably calculated to prevent mental and physical harm to P.R.C. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' decision to the extentthat it upholds this restriction. 24In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)

C. 

### The trial court abused its discretion when it ordered that Chandola 's parents be presentfor no more than 20 percent of Chandola 's residential time with P.R. C. Unlike the other two restrictions challenged in this case, the restriction on grandparental contact does not meet the RCW 26.09.191(3) standard. Vyas asserts that the trial court imposed this restriction because "the presence of [Chandola]'s parents prevented [Chandola] from developing the necessary parenting skills and contributed to conflictby demeaning and devaluing [Vyas]." Resp't's Suppl. Br. at 14.

_

-·-- Ihere_is_ample_supporLin_the_record_for_the_conclusion_thaLprior_to_the
______ _ separation, Chandola and his parents had diminished Vyas's role in the family and coached P.R.C. to choose her father over her mother. There is also ample support for the conclusionthat Chandolarelied on his parents to care for P.R.C. Butneither conclusion warrants the imposition ofthe trial court's third restriction. Assuming that Chandola's parents did undermine Vyas's bond with P.R.C., the severe restrictions on Chandola's parenting time are more than sufficient to remedy this harm. Nothing in the record suggests that Chandola and his parents could continue to diminish Vyas's role after she became the primary custodial parent.

25In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)



### With respect to Chandola's reliance on his parents, we are unable to discern what harm the trial court believed this was causing P.R.C. The trial court did not identify any particular harm in its ruling; it opined only that Chandola-the father, notthe child-was insufficiently independent: [Chandola]'s opportunities to parent and to learn from the opportunities must in large part be without the presence ofhis parents. The courtrecognizes that there are several cultural aspects to the history of the marriage and these may or may not include the paternal grandparents [sic] approach and influence. Or it may be due to [Chandola] being an only child, or likely a combination of both. Whatever the antecedents ofthe extended family dynamic the so called "team" approach at this time needs to stop. Therefore [Chandola]'s residential time must exclude his parents with occasional exceptions
.... CP at 93-94. This ruling is a statement ofopinion. It

### is an opinion that a father-an "only

----- --- -- - ----- ---- -- - -- --- - -- ----- -- - --
------ - -------- 

### child" ofIndian "cultural
...history"-reliestoo much on "extendedfamily" to help him raise his child. Id. That opinion is not sufficient to support RCW 26.09.191(3)(g) restrictions. It

### is not a finding that P.R.C. was atrisk ofaphysical, mental, or emotional harm comparable to the harms inherent in the factors listed in RCW 26.09.191(3)(a)-(f). Indeed, the facts here compel the opposite conclusion. The record contains
no evidence that Chandola's reliance on his parents was causingP.R.C. to go unfed, unwashed, or otherwise uncared for. Instead, it shows that Chandola's mother was 26In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)

a doting grandmother who carefully attended to P.R.C.'s needs. 7 The restriction on grandparent contact thus appears calculated to increase Chandola's independence rather than to prevent mental, physical, or emotional harm to P.R.C. This is not permitted under RCW 26.09.191(3)(g). Any other conclusion leaves families vulnerable to a trial court's biases. By requiringtrial courts to identify specificharms to the 

### childbefore orderingparenting plan restrictions, RCW 26.09.191(3) prevents arbitrary imposition of the court's preferences. 

### Wicklund, 84 Wn. App. at 770-71 (distinguishing trial court's disapproval ofhomosexuality from a finding ofharm sufficient tojustify parenting plan restrictions (citing 

### In reMarriage ofCabalquinto, 43 Wn. App. 518, 519, 718



### ___**_f.~q** 

## ?_**(}<;)~~))). _'f~Ls**  __**!sp~rti~lJJarly i~po~ta9:t** 

## in_**t~e**_f(lrngY**l~'Y- c_o_ntext,_wher~the**  trial court is empowered to regulate intimate aspects of the parties' lives. 

### See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762-63 (noting that in the family law context minority groups
are particularly "vulnerable tojudgmentsbased on cultural or class bias[es]"). We do not mean to imply that the trial court here was motivated by bias or cultural insensitivity; we conclude only that it did not justify the restriction on

7IfChandola'sbasic parenting skills remained deficient afterthe separation, P.R.C. might be harmed ifher grandmother were absent and Chandola could not independently provide for herbasicneeds. Butthe court-ordered "in-home"parenttraining is presumably sufficient to address that hypothetical harm. CP at 90. Ifit were not, then P.R.C. would certainly be harmed, ratherthan protected, by the restriction on grandparent contact. 27In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)
grandparent contact with the finding of relatively severe harm required by RCW 26.09.191(3)(g). Wetherefore reverse theportion ofthe Court ofAppeals' decision that upholds the restriction on grandparent contact. IV. Neither Party Is Entitledto Attorney Fees or Costs Both parties request attorney fees under RCW 26.09.140, which permits an appellate courtto award costs and/or fees after "considering the financial resources of both parties." 8 Vyas also requests fees on the basis of Chandola's alleged intransigence. A party's "intransigence"is anequitable as opposedto statutorybasis for awarding attorney fees. In reMarriage of Greenlee, 65 Wn. App. 703, 708-09, 829 P.2d 1120 (1992). We affirm the Court of Appeals' decision denying Chandola's request and deny bothparties' requests for attorney fees inthis court. A. Neitherparty is entitledto attorney fees underRCW26.09.140 RCW 26.09.140 provides that "[u]pon any appeal, the appellate courtmay, in its discretion, order a party to pay for the cost to the other party ofmaintaining the appeal and attorneys' fees in addition to statutory costs." This statute applies only

8 Under Rules ofAppellate Procedure (RAP) 18.1, a party has a right to recover reasonable attorney fees or expenses on review in the Supreme Court ifauthorized by law, and ifthe party has put the request in his or her opening brief. State ex rel. MMG. v. Graham, 159 Wn.2d 623, 637-38, 152 P.3d 1005 (2007). Chandola did not request attorney fees inhis briefs to this court, butunderRAP 18.1(b) "[ r]equests made atthe Court ofAppeals will be considered as continuing requests at the Supreme Court
...." 28In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)



### to dissolution proceedings and "invest[s] appellate courts with discretion to order a party to pay fees and costs to the opposing party [after] consider[ation] offinancial circumstances." In re Marriage of Rideout, 

### 150 Wn.2d 337, 357, 77 P.3d 1174 (2003). This court has awarded attorney fees under RCW 26.09.140 where the requesting party demonstrated "disparity in [the parties'] income." In reMarriage of Buecking, 

### 179 Wn.2d 438, 455, 316 P.3d 999 (2013). It has also denied fees on the basis that the requesting party did not "substantially prevail[] on appeal." In re Marriage of McCausland, 

### 159 Wn.2d 607,622, 152 P.3d 1013 (2007). Here, neither party satisfies those requirements. First, Chandolachallengedthree conditions imposedinthe parentingplan and

- -- ---- ----- -------- ------ ---- - ---- ----- - ---- - -- ------ -- ----- ------- -- -- - ----- 

### prevailed as to one. Thus, neither party here has "substantially prevailed" before this court. See State 

### v. Nolan, 

### 141 Wn.2d 620, 626, 8P.3d 300 (2000) (citing RAP 14.2 and collecting cases; noting that "when both parties prevail on major issues, there may be no substantially prevailing party"). Second, the record in this case does not establish a disparity in the parties' income that wouldjustify an award offees to either party. Vyas, who is employed full time, receives roughly $1,000 per month in child support payments and preschool tuition from Chandola, who is currently seeking full time work. 29In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)

The parties appear to have roughly equivalent savings. Both cite financial hardship. Vyas states that she is in debt for dental bills and that her mortgage exceeds the value ofher home. Chandola points out that he has had to bear 90 percent ofthe costs ofthe supervised visitation, has paid for counseling as a result of the unfounded sexual abuse allegations, and is underemployed. Both parties assert that the other receives substantial support from his or her parents. The financial affidavits submitted indicatethatbothhaverelied fairly heavily on support from family to fund this litigation. Based onthis record, we denybothparties' requests for discretionaryattorney fees under RCW26.09.140. B. c;Jz_qn_d_Q_lq_'s__alleged__**"intrans_igen~e ~'**  d_Of!S 710tjus_t(fy_a11 cnyar_d_Qf fees to Vyas '"A wards ofattorneyfees basedupontheintransigenceofonepartyhavebeen granted when the party engaged in "foot-dragging" and "obstruction"
... or simply when onepartymade the trial unduly difficult and increasedlegal costsbyhis orher actions."' J(atare, 175 Wn.2d at 42 (alteration in original) (quoting Greenlee, 65 Wn. App. at 708). This courtdeniedthemother'srequestfor attorneyfees inKatare,
even though the petitioner in that case "repeatedly reasserted arguments that had been rejected" over the course ofthree separate appeals. 

### !d. at 43 (Chambers, J., concurring). Despite Vyas's contraryviews, Chandolahas not engaged inbehavior 30In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)

like that ofthe petitioner inKatare. His arguments to this court are less extreme and fewer in number than those he advanced in the Court ofAppeals. Moreover, he prevailed on one ofthem. We therefore deny Vyas'srequest for attorney fees onthe basis ofintransigence. CONCLUSION Trial courts have broad discretion to create parenting plans tailored to the needs of the individuals involved in a particular dissolution. This discretion promotes finality, preventing "extendedlitigation [that] canbe harmful to children." Jannot, 149 Wn.2d at 127. Italso vests appropriate authority inthetrial court, which is best situatedto "assignthe properweightto each ofthe varied factors" relevantto
a particular case. 

### I d. (emphasis omitted). Butwhile trial courts have broad discretion inthe context ofaparentingplan, that discretion mustbe exercisedwithinthe bounds ofthe applicable statutes. Here, the applicable statute is RCW 26.09.191(3)(g). Itpermitsparentingplanrestrictions only when they are reasonably calculated to prevent relatively severe physical, mental, or emotional harm to the child. Two ofthe three challengedrestrictions inthis case satisfythat standard-the residential provisions and cosleeping prohibition. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' decision upholding these restrictions. The third challenged restriction31In reMarriage ofChandola (No. 89093-5)
limiting the child's contact with herpaternal grandparents-does not. We therefore
reverse the Court ofAppeals' decision upholding thatrestriction.

32Chandola v. Chandola (No. 89093-5)

WE CONCUR:

# ~~+)g.

33In re Marriage of Chandola

No. 89093-5
OWENS, J. (dissenting)

- One ofthe most important and difficult responsibilities ofourjudicial system is adjudicating family law cases. This burden

- - -- -- --- -- ------- ------------- ---- -- -- -- ----- --- - ----- -- - --- - -- --- ----- --- ------- -------- falls heaviest on ourtrial courtjudges, who personally oversee these deeply emotional proceedings. The decisions they face "are difficult at best," whichis whythis court has repeatedly instructed thatthose decisions should "seldombe changed upon appeal." In reMarriage of Landry, 103 Wn.2d 807, 809, 699 P.2d 214 (1985). The emotional and financial interests ofthe families "arebest served by finality." Id. Therefore, whenreviewing trial court decisions in family law cases, "[a]ppellate courts shouldnot encourage appeals by tinkering with them." I d. (emphasis added). Inthis case, the majority oversteps its role as a reviewing court and improperly substitutes itsjudgmentfor that ofthe trial court. I respectfully dissent.In re Marriage of Chandola 89093-5 Owens, J., Dissenting ANALYSIS A trial courthas wide discretion to set the terms ofaparenting plan, and we will not reverse its decision unless we find that it abused its discretion. In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 46,940 P.2d 1362 (1997). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's "decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds oruntenable reasons." !d. at 46-47. "A court's decision is manifestly unreasonable ifit is outside the range ofacceptable choices, given the facts and the applicable legal standard." Id. at 47. A court's decision "is based on untenable grounds ifthe factual findings are unsupported by the record." Id. A court's decision "is based onuntenable reasons ifit is based on an incorrect standard
orthe facts do not meet the requirements ofthe correct standard." !d. Inthis case, the trialjudgepresided over a trial that lasted more than a week and heard testimony from many witnesses, including family members, friends, and multiple parenting experts. Ultimately, the evidence showedthat the father, Manjul Yarn Chandola, lacked necessaryparenting skills and suffered from problematic personality traits. The trialjudge expressly found that the father's conduct was "adverse to the best interests ofthe child." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 92. The trialjudge found that Chandola "was unwilling or unable to establish boundaries, routines, schedules, and structure" and that he "discouraged exploration and independence." !d. The trialjudge also found that Chandolawas unable to recognize many ofthe

2In re Marriage of Chandola 89093-5 Owens, J., Dissenting issues with his parenting. This was consistent withthe parenting expert's finding that Chandolahad difficulty "integrating data inconsistent with his view ofreality." Id. at 93. To address the issues with Chandola's lack ofparenting skills, the trialjudge imposed "suchrestrictions as may best be anticipated [to] assure the mother's parenting is not diluted by the father." Id. The court imposed restrictions "designed to address increased awareness" for the father but also give himthe opportunityto parent regularly. Id. The court expected that this would allow evaluation of"his judgment and reasoning withregard to parenting decisions." !d. The majority does not objectto most ofthe restrictions imposed by the trial court, including requiring the father to:

- Abide by the mother's bedtime routine and time;

- Have his daughter sleep in her own room when at his house;

- Comply with counseling requirements;

- Complete parenttraining;

- Abstain from discussing this court case with his daughter; and

- Comply with any recommendations made by the child's therapist, the parent trainer, and the case manager. I agree with the majority that the trial court is allowed to impose these restrictions, which were designed to prevent immediate harmto Chandola's daughter and also improve hisparentingskills so thathe would be able to increase his time with her in the future without bringing any harm to his daughter. Itwas and is Chandola's lack of parenting skills thatharms his daughter, not any malicious intent. However, the

3In re Marriage of Chandola 89093-5 Owens, J., Dissenting majority singles out one restriction for reversal: the requirement that when Chandola spends time with his daughter, he must ensure that most ofthattime is spent without the presence ofhis parents so that he may gain necessary parenting skills. I see no basis for overturning that term ofthe parenting plan, which is reasonably calculatedto prevent future harm to Chandola's daughter. The majority claims that "[t]he trial court did not identify any particularharm in its ruling" that wouldjustifythe restriction, Majority at 26, butthat is untrue. The trialjudge clearly found that Chandola's daughter was being harmed byhis parenting deficiencies, and created a parenting plan designed to give Chandolathe opportunity and resources to develop needed parenting skills so thathe would be able to spend time parenting his daughter in the future without harming her. The trialjudge made a specific finding that Chandola needed to spend parenting time withouthis parents for the purpose ofdeveloping his parenting skills. CP at 84. Many ofthe other restrictions hadthe same goal, including the requirement that Chandola complete parent training. The restrictions-includingthe requirement that Chandola spendparenting time without his parents-were designed to prevent immediate harm to Chandola's daughter resulting from his lack ofparenting skills as well as harm over the long term. Itis clear that the restrictions were specifically designed to improve Chandola's parenting skills to avoid harmto his daughter because the restrictions were set to be

4In re Jvfarriage of Chandola 89093-5 Owens, J., Dissenting implemented in stages, with Chandola scheduled to have increased time withhis daughter after demonstrating compliance with the restrictions and presumably improving his parenting skills. The majority acknowledges thatparentingplanprovisions need not be "narrowlytailored" to prevent harm, only "reasonably calculated" to prevent harm. Majority at 24. Here, each ofthe restrictions in the parenting planwas reasonably calculated to eitherprevent immediate harm or help Chandola develop the parenting skills he needs to prevent harm in the long term. Thejudge carefully explained that the requirement that Chandola spendtime with his daughter practicing those parenting skills without his parents present was for that same purpose. Notably, this restriction is lifted after the first two stages ofthe parenting plan, presumably because those stages are designed to ensure that Chandolawill gainthose neededparenting skills. Thus, this restriction was temporary and tailored to fit the specific needs ofthe situation. The majority would overturnthejudge's conclusion based solely on its reading ofthe record. I disagree. Thejudgeheard from the family members and the parenting experts and concludedthat this temporary requirement, in combination withthe other provisions ofthe parenting plan, would help Chandola develop those parenting skills he needs to be able to spend time with his daughter withoutharming her. The trial court's assessment ofChandola'sproblematic lack ofparenting skills is supported in
5In re Marriage of Chandola 89093-5 Owens, J., Dissenting the record and confirmed by the dramatic improvement inhis daughter's behavior after the parents separated and the daughter began living withthe mother. Since the separation, witnesses testified that the daughter '"is a changed child, more outgoing, interactive."' CP at 93. The majority acknowledges that the child "made substantial emotional and social progress" after she began living primarily with her mother and that "the trial court clearly intended to ensure that [the daughter's] progress continue unhindered." Majority at 22. To ensure thatprogress continued, the trial court crafted
a parenting planreasonably calculated to improve Chandola's parenting skills, the ultimate issue causing harmto the daughter. Itdid not abuse its discretion in setting the terms ofthat parenting plan, so I would affirm. CONCLUSION Every family law case is unique. Each family faces different challenges, and trial courtjudges are responsible for crafting orders and plans thattake those challenges into account. Trialjudges have wide discretion in those decisions, and we seldom upset them on appeal. This case is no different: the trial courtjudge oversaw
an extensive trial, identified Chandola'sparenting deficits as the primary cause for concern, and carefully designed a parenting planto give Chandolathe opportunity and
resources to address those deficits while maintaining a relationship withhis daughter. While some members ofthis courtmight have designed a different plan to achieve those goals, that is not our decision to make. We mustbe cautious ofsubstituting our

6In re Marriage of Chandola 89093-5 Owens, J., Dissenting judgment for that ofthe trial courtjudge. I agree withthe Court ofAppeals' holding that the parenting plan in this case was within the discretion ofthe trial court. I respectfully dissent.

7In re Marriage of Chandola 89093-5 Owens, J., Dissenting

8