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75–022 PDF 2012

S. HRG. 112–475

EXAMINING THE U.S. POLICY RESPONSE TO

ENTRENCHED AFRICAN LEADERSHIP

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 18, 2012

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

WILLIAM C. DANVERS, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware, Chairman

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Carson, Hon. Johnnie, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, U.S. 

Department of State, Washington, DC ............................................................... 10

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 14

Coons, Hon. Christopher A., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement . 1

Fomunyoh, Dr. Christopher, senior associate and regional director for Central 

and West Africa, National Democratic Institute, Washington, DC ................. 36

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 39

Gast, Earl, Assistant Administrator for Africa, U.S. Agency for International 

Development, Washington, DC ........................................................................... 18

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 20

Ibrahim, Dr. Mo, founder and chairman of the board, Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 

London, UK ........................................................................................................... 32

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 35

Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator from Georgia, opening statement .............. 9

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening statement ..... 1

(III)

(1)

EXAMINING THE U.S. POLICY RESPONSE TO 

ENTRENCHED AFRICAN LEADERSHIP 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 2012 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m. in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher A. 

Coons, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Coons, Kerry, Isakson, and Inhofe. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COONS,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 

Senator COONS. I’m pleased to chair this hearing of the African 

Affairs Subcommittee, and would like to welcome my good friend, 

our chairman, John Kerry, who has joined us for an opening conversation, and my good friend and colleague, Senator Isakson, and 

other members of the committee as well who have joined us here 

today. 

Today’s hearing will examine U.S. policy in response to entrenched African leadership. But before we move to that main focus 

for today’s hearing, I also want us to have the opportunity today 

to take advantage of some insights and some opportunities. 

Senator Isakson has just returned from a trip to Uganda. And 

given the distinguished panel we have before us, the chairman and 

I agreed this would be a great opportunity for us to examine developments on another critical issue in the region, that of the Lord’s 

Resistance Army and United States efforts to remove Joseph Kony 

from the battlefield, in partnership with our regional allies and 

United States efforts to counter the LRA and to lead the effort to 

recover from its crimes against humanity in Central Africa. 

With that, Chairman Kerry. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Coons. I 

really appreciate it. 

First of all, let me just say how much I really appreciate, and I 

think the whole committee does, your leadership, the leadership of 

Senator Isakson, and the leadership and commitment also of Senator Inhofe, who has been particularly focused on the LRA but also 

on issues of concern to Africa. 

2

We haven’t got a better twosome as subcommittee chair and 

ranking than these two folks here, these two Senators, who are 

providing critical oversight and engagement and creative thinking 

with respect to what sometimes has been a forgotten continent, but 

not under their stewardship. And I might add, not under Secretary 

Carson’s stewardship. 

The purpose of being here for the hearing, fundamentally, is to 

look at the topic of entrenched leadership and U.S. policy. I think 

it’s important to look at the impact of what happens when a President or Prime Minister or a party remains in office too long, sometimes through outright dictatorship, but often through more subtle 

means of domination. 

We’ve had examples in the last year or so, from Cairo to Dakar, 

to remind us that the consent of the governed has always been an 

essential force, and all the more so now that instant communication has the ability to transform descent into protest, and protest 

into revolution. 

Trust is the heart of governance, and I think it’s clear that people will no longer tolerate Presidents for life. 

So I’m very pleased that the subcommittee is going to look at the 

subject it is going to look at here today, with a very distinguished 

group of witnesses, including Dr. Mo Ibrahim, who first helped 

launch the telecommunications revolution in Africa and is helping 

to promote transformations to responsible governance. 

And we are so appreciative of your being here and respect your 

work. 

If I can just say, very quickly, the topic, therefore, is about entrenched leaders, but we want to focus, in these first moments, for 

a specific reason, on entrenched war criminals, entrenched menace 

to civility. And the reason we want to do that today is that Senator 

Isakson is just back from traveling, and Secretary Carson was not 

available next week when the full committee wanted to do this. 

I just thought, frankly, at Senator Coons’ suggestion, that we 

should take advantage of the freshness of Senator Isakson’s journey, and Secretary Carson’s presence here, to focus on something 

that really doesn’t deserve to wait a matter of weeks. It’s waited, 

frankly, for too many years. And that is the question of Joseph 

Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army. 

Senator Coons has introduced a resolution on the LRA. It is new 

to some Americans, but he has been an all too familiar nightmare 

to too many people for too long. 

Today the LRA consists of only a few hundred people, most 

likely. But it continues to inflict a level of pain and suffering far 

greater than its actual size. 

And for many of us, Kony is no stranger. Two years ago, we 

passed legislation to provide support to regional governments working to protect their people and to apprehend him and his top commanders, and to remove them from the battlefield. 

Senator Isakson and I both cosponsored that bill. And today, 

there are 100 U.S. military advisers in Central Africa to aid the 

counter-LRA efforts in that region. 

I’m also pleased to announce that, joined by Senators Coons and 

Isakson, as well as Senators Boozman and Landrieu, I’m going to 

be introducing legislation to strengthen our hand in the fight 

3

against war criminals like Kony by expanding the State Department’s rewards program, so that there’s a greater incentive and 

greater capacity to go after these folks. 

And we will take up this issue more a little later in the committee, but I wanted to take advantage of Senator Isakson’s journey. We’re very grateful to him for taking the time to do that. 

And I wonder, Senator Isakson, if you would mind sharing some 

of your takeaways from your trip to Uganda and the problem of 

Joseph Kony. 

And perhaps, Senator Coons, both you and Secretary Carson 

would just take a moment to do an overview here, very quickly, 

while we’re all present, of this issue. 

Senator. 

Senator ISAKSON. I thank you, Mr. Chairman and Chairman 

Coons. 

Senator Inhofe asked to be recognized for a quick statement, if 

that is OK with the chairman, because he has to leave for Armed 

Services. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you. 

And, Mr. Chairman, we have an Armed Services Committee 

hearing. It happens that I’m the ranking member, and my attendance is required. 

However, I just returned yesterday from my 123rd African country visit in 15 years, and I’m very interested in what is going on 

here. I have some thoughts that are not consistent with the administration on some of the things we’ve been doing in conjunction 

with Africa. So I am going to be coming back. 

My first exposure to the LRA and Joseph Kony took place in 

Gulu in 2005, so now it’s become a household word, and I’m very 

thankful for that. 

So I will excuse myself, but I will be coming back. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you for your courtesy, Mr. Chairman. I 

appreciate the opportunity to give a brief statement regarding our 

trip to Kampala and to Gulu, as a matter fact, and to Uganda. 

As most everybody knows, the attention on Joseph Kony was 

heightened when the Invisible Children organization did a 30-

minute video that went viral and has now been seen over 100 million times on the Internet. 

A lot of the information in it was correct. Some of it was incorrect. But the most important thing: It focused on Joseph Kony, who 

is a very bad individual by anybody’s judgment. 

Joseph Kony started in Uganda, but he is no longer there, and 

he’s been gone, really, for 5 to 6 years. 

Gulu, which was a strife-torn area with a number of individually 

displaced individuals because of Joseph Kony, is now relatively 

prosperous. It is crime and violence free, and we spent a full day 

in Gulu. And the people there on the border with the Congo are 

very happy and very appreciative that Joseph Kony is gone. 

We met with the leaders of the 100-man group that is now in 

Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African 

Republic, and with South Sudan, and I’m pleased to report on what 

our individual leaders are doing there. 

4

I might also add, President Obama deployed those people before 

the Joseph Kony video went on the Internet, and we have been 

focusing, as Senator Kerry said, for the last 2 years on Joseph 

Kony. 

But our advisers and forward people in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Central African Republic have a 

lot of information regarding Mr. Kony that we did not have before. 

And although we don’t know exactly where he is, we know a lot 

better about the area where he is than we have ever known before. 

We are beginning to gain certain intelligence. There are some 

things I’m not at liberty to say, because of the security of the briefing, or the insecurity of this briefing and the security of the one 

that I had. 

But suffice it to say that one of the most successful things the 

American forces have done is deploy leaflets in the villages near 

where some of his followers are, offering amnesty if his people will 

come back and bring information leading toward the capture or the 

location of Mr. Kony, which has caused a separation of Mr. Kony 

from a number of his supporters, which are thought to be, as the 

chairman said, about 200 now. 

Most of them are thought to be in the South Sudan or the Congo. 

He is thought to be in the Central African Republic. 

There have been some instances of violence recently that have 

been attributed to the Lord’s Resistance Army, which may or may 

not, in fact, have been copycats and not really the Lord’s Resistance Army. 

But there’s no question Joseph Kony is still alive, and there’s no 

question that he’s still a threat. 

We need to recognize that in 26 years, he’s abducted 66,000 children, displaced 2 million Africans, and killed tens of thousands of 

Africans in the name of the Lord’s Resistance Army. He is a very, 

very bad actor by anybody’s definition. 

And I’m proud that our country is assisting the African Union, 

the U.N., the troops from Uganda, and the Central African Republic, and the South Sudan, all of whom are focused on capturing 

Joseph Kony, who has been indicted by the International Criminal 

Court for crimes against humanity. 

So, Mr. Chairman, you would be very proud of the American personnel that are in Uganda and in Africa now, working on the hunt 

for Joseph Kony. We have a number of assets that have been 

deployed from an intelligence access standpoint, which are beginning to be very, very helpful. 

And it’s becoming popular to leave Joseph Kony now and come 

back, rather than join up with him, which is going to limit the ability for him to grow his forces in the future. 

So I want to pay a particular tribute, though, to the nation of 

Uganda. Their leadership has been exemplary in providing military 

troops and assistance to the countries in Central Africa in search 

of Joseph Kony, and point out that that government has done 

everything it could to bring back peace and prosperity in the north. 

We traveled the road that they built to connect Gulu back to 

Kampala and the main heart of Uganda, and met with the people 

in the villages in Gulu and the surrounding areas, all of whom 

5

were peaceful, all of whom were happy, and, in a relative term, 

prosperous. 

So my report is that Joseph Kony is alive. We’re closer to coming 

to Joseph Kony than we probably have ever been, although we 

don’t have him yet. But there are a number of forces at work there 

to do so. And as we gain intelligence and as we gain those who 

defect and come back because of the amnesty program, it’s highly 

likely that his days are numbered in terms of being missing. And 

that will be a good day for Africa and a good day for mankind. 

Senator COONS. Thank you very much, Senator Isakson, for that 

update, for your leadership on this issue, for your personal commitment and engagement. As I’ve seen in our time together on the 

subcommittee, your passion for justice and progress in Africa is exemplary and is one of the best things I’ve had a chance to support 

and contribute to in my time here in the Senate. 

And I just want to thank the chairman for ensuring this is a top 

priority for the committee, for his leadership in introducing legislation that will amend the justice awards program to add another 

sort of tool in the toolkit as we try to make sure that Joseph Kony 

is, in fact, removed from the battlefield, captured, and taken before 

the International Criminal Court. 

Yes, Senator. 

Senator ISAKSON. I’m glad that you said that. I wanted to tell the 

chairman that I specifically asked the briefers from the Americans 

that are deployed there if the reward program would be of help to 

them, and they said absolutely. They were very enthusiastic that 

the chairman was poised to introduce that legislation. I think the 

same legislation is being introduced in the House. 

And they think because of the defections that they’re getting and 

the fact that they think the noose is beginning to tighten, they 

think it will be extremely helpful in their search for Joseph Kony. 

Senator COONS. I’m eager to move to hearing from our witnesses 

on this topic, and then to get to the entrenched leaders point. 

Let me just say, if I could, tomorrow at 11:45 in the TV and 

Radio Gallery, we’re going to be releasing a video that all of us 

appear in that just summarizes the response from the United 

States, the resolution that Chairman Kerry referred to, that Senator Inhofe and Senator Isakson and I are on that has 41 cosponsors that just demonstrates there remains a broad, bipartisan consensus in the Senate in support of the administration’s action to 

deploy these 100 U.S. Special Forces troops; that commends our 

partners and our allies in the African Union and in the regional 

militaries that are working so hard to make sure that Joseph Kony 

is found and brought to justice; and then to continue to support 

USAID’s efforts for recovery and reconciliation, and for restoration 

of those communities like Gulu that have suffered for so long from 

the predation of the Lord’s Resistance Army. 

This Friday is the Kony 2012 movement day of action, and it’s 

our hope after these events next Tuesday to be back looking in 

more detail with some input from the Department of Defense, 

Department of State, USAID, on the path forward in the hunt for 

Kony and then to see how we can be supportive going forward. 

So with that, if I might, let me just ask Assistant Secretary of 

State Johnnie Carson or Assistant Administrator of USAID for 

6

Africa Earl Gast, if you have any comments for us at this point on 

our efforts and our investments in this particular matter. 

Ambassador CARSON. Thank you very much. 

Let me say, first of all, I am extremely pleased to be here, Chairman Kerry, Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, to talk not 

only about entrenched African leaders, but also the issue of Joseph 

Kony and the LRA. 

I want to thank all of you personally and professionally for your 

deep commitment in support of a broader international effort to 

bring Joseph Kony and the members of the LRA to justice. 

As Senator Isakson has pointed out, for far too long, Joseph Kony 

and his organization have gone through Central Africa killing, pillaging, raping, and destroying the lives of hundreds of thousands 

of Africans in Uganda, the Congo, Central African Republic, and 

now Southern Sudan. 

The administration is totally committed to doing everything that 

it can in partnership with the regional African states and with the 

AU and the U.N. to bring Joseph Kony and the remnants of his 

organization to justice. 

Joseph Kony’s organization has some 150 to 250 members dispersed, we believe, between some four or five different groups, 

operating largely in the Central African Republic, but also still in 

Southern Sudan and the northern parts of the Democratic Republic 

of the Congo. 

As Senator Isakson pointed out, they have not been active in 

Uganda since 2006. The Ugandan Government is to be applauded 

for taking the leadership in continuing to go after Joseph Kony, 

although he is no longer operating there. Their forces have led the 

way in trying to bring this man to justice. We are supporting that 

effort. 

The United States Government has been a strong supporter of 

the Ugandan Government in this effort for the last 31⁄2 years. And 

last year, we supplemented our effort by sending approximately 

100 U.S. military to advise the national militaries in the region 

that are pursuing the LRA and working to protect the local populations. 

Those 100 advisers are there to help do four essential tasks. The 

first is to help improve civilian protection in all of the areas where 

Kony is operating; to enhance regional coordination between the 

militaries of the four countries; to strengthen the integration of 

information and intelligence into operations, so that information 

and intelligence received is passed on to soldiers in the field in a 

more rapid and more efficient and more useful fashion; and finally, 

to help directly in trying to capture and to bring Kony to justice. 

We have done all of these things under the civilian protection 

umbrella. We have, along with our colleagues in USAID and also 

with a number of NGOs, sought to provide radios and UHF radios 

and cell phones to a number of communities in the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo, and also in the Central African Republic, so 

that if indeed villagers see and hear things that might suggest that 

Kony is in the vicinity or his people are in the vicinity, they can 

call back or radio back to government offices in order to get support 

to come after Kony and to protect them. 

7

We have also worked very hard to effectively bring about better 

coordination between the regional militaries, and we have stepped 

up our training, particularly with respect to the DRC. 

In the DRC, the U.S. Government under AFRICOM was responsible for training one battalion, the 391st Battalion, which is operating up in the northeastern corner of the DRC, in the Garamba 

Forest, focused mainly on going after the Lord’s Resistance Army 

and Joseph Kony. 

We are advising the forces in the Central African Republic, and 

also in South Sudan. 

In support of our efforts to help strengthen the integration of 

intelligence and information into operations, we have deployed certain intelligence assets to the region, and we are in the process of 

stepping up those assets. 

We appreciate enormously the support of the Congress on this. As you all know, the Congress authorized some $35 million under 

the Defense authorization bill to help support operations of the 

U.S. military and our diplomatic efforts in the region. We believe 

this is extraordinarily useful. We have, over the last several years, spent approximately $30 to $40 million each year to help the governments and militaries in the 

region. And this additional support, which will be coming out of the 

DOD budget, helps to supplement funding that we have been using 

from State funds. 

We have clearly helped to degrade the LRA, to disperse it, but 

we have not finished the mission of decapitating it. We hope that 

we will be able to continue to work closely with the countries in 

the region to bring Joseph Kony to justice and finish this project. 

Thank you. 

Senator COONS. Thank you very much, Assistant Secretary Carson. We look forward to next Tuesday’s hearing, where we will go 

into more detail and receive more updates and briefings from AID, 

the Department of Defense, the Department of State. 

I think it’s important that we now turn to our main focus today, 

which is U.S. policy options in response to entrenched African leadership, and some of the themes we just touched on, the role of the 

International Criminal Court, the role of rewards for behavior, for 

changes in leadership, will also come up in the broader context of 

this hearing. 

Specifically, for the rest of this hearing, we’re going to focus on 

the United States response and the African response to leaders 

who stayed in power for decades, whether through the manipulation of constitutions, institutions of governance, or through other 

means. 

This all too common scenario around the world in sub-Saharan 

Africa has challenged the objectives that the United States and 

many African nations share—objectives and values centered on the 

promotion of democracy, transparency, and the rule of law. 

Entrenched African leaders contribute to corruption, to economic 

stagnation, to a lack of accountability, and an inability of government to effectively represent and respond to the needs of people, 

and threatens to hamper the enormous potential of sub-Saharan 

Africa, and must, therefore, I think, be addressed and ultimately 

reversed. 

8

I’m pleased that among the policy aims of the United States in 

Africa is strengthening democracy and the systems of governance 

throughout the world. I’m also pleased that there are clear signs 

our efforts have helped to reinforce African-led efforts to ensure 

good governance, encourage the rule of law, and strengthen civil 

society. 

At the same time, the promotion of democracy and governance is 

one of many competing U.S. policy objectives, demonstrated by the 

fact that approximately three-quarters of all U.S. foreign aid for 

sub-Saharan Africa is directed toward health and humanitarian 

programs. 

While allocations of aid for democracy promotion in Africa have 

increased under the Obama administration, I am concerned that 

such resources in the total package of U.S. engagement remain relatively small. 

In responding to entrenched leaders, the United States frequently finds itself constrained by other priorities as well, and 

challenged in our efforts to effectively influence the longserving 

Presidents who cling to power. 

I understand and deeply value the importance of security and 

health as competing priorities, but believe democracy promotion 

must continue to be a central priority for the United States, the 

international community, and, most importantly, African nations 

and leaders. 

At today’s hearing, we will consider a range of examples throughout sub-Saharan Africa of the political dominance of a single party 

or figure. 

Equatorial Guinea’s President recently replaced Qadhafi of Libya 

as the continent’s longest serving at 33 years. The Presidents of 

Angola, Zimbabwe, and Cameroon have all been in power for 30 

years or more. Close behind, the leaders of the Uganda, Swaziland, 

Burkina Faso, Sudan, Chad—between 20 and 25 years. 

I was deeply concerned when President Biya of Cameroon 

recently changed the constitution of his nation to eliminate term 

limits, which paved the way for him to begin his 30th year in 

power. 

Key countries of strategic interest—Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda—

are governed by leaders who have been in power for many years, 

without allowing the emergence of effective opposition or demonstrating any signs of stepping down. 

Frankly, there is also a sad correlation between those countries 

that have entrenched leaders and those countries that rank at the 

bottom of human development indexes and political participation. 

According to the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, which compiles the 

index on African governance, the ranking of political participation 

closely correlates with the index of human development. 

Unfortunately, the list of countries we can talk about today goes 

on. I’d be remiss if I failed to mention the recent coups in Mali and 

Guinea-Bissau. These events are deeply troubling. 

But there are also positive results to be seen there in the 

strength and the leadership of a regional multilateral institution, 

in this case, ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African 

States, which took prompt and effective action, ranging from denouncing the coups, to sanctions, to diplomatic action. 

9

Political entrenchment is first and foremost a threat to the African people, and addressing it must be led by Africans and African 

nations. But I hope the United States and international community 

will continue to work with regional organizations, such as 

ECOWAS, to support free and fair elections. 

To tackle this complex issue, we have two extremely distinguished panels. On our first panel, as I’ve already mentioned, 

Assistant Ambassador Johnnie Carson, and Earl Gast, the newly 

confirmed Assistant Administrator for Africa USAID, who testifies 

before the subcommittee for the first time in his current role. 

On the second panel, we’re privileged to have Dr. Christopher 

Fomunyoh, a senior associate regional director of the National 

Democratic Institute, and Dr. Mo Ibrahim, founder and chairman 

of the board of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. 

Dr. Fomunyoh is originally from Cameroon and has a played a 

critical role in formulating and directing NDI’s valuable work in 

Africa. 

And I want to especially recognize and thank Dr. Ibrahim for 

traveling today from London to be with us. He has led a foundation 

which awards good governance and leadership in Africa with an 

annual cash prize of $5 million to democratically elected leaders 

who demonstrate excellence in office and peacefully step down. Of 

equal value is the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, a great 

resource for all who try to press for responsible transitions on the 

African continent. 

With that, I turn it over to Senator Isakson for his opening comments. 

Senator. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON,

U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will be brief. 

But I will begin by complimenting the chairman who took the leadership role on the Senegal issue and advised President Wade of the 

desire for the voters to speak and their vote to be respected. And 

the elections in Senegal were decisive and they were free, and 

President Wade did the right thing. 

And I think the chairman deserves a lot of credit for initiating 

that letter. 

I think it’s also important to recognize that entrenched leadership is not a problem that is unique to Africa. We had an incident 

in North Korea just last week that reminded us of what family 

leadership over decades can mean to an impoverished group of people. So Africa is not unique in that regard. 

Also, it’s important to point out there are leaders on the continent, like Commissioner Jega in Nigeria, who led the first free, 

relatively violence free, and satisfactory democratic elections in the 

history of Nigeria when Goodluck Jonathan was elected, and I hope 

Commissioner Jega stays in business long enough to help some of 

the other African countries make that transition. 

With that said, though, entrenched leadership is an issue that 

we should focus on, and promoting democratic institutions in African countries is a main part of the mission of the Department of 

State. 

10

And I appreciate the leadership that Secretary Clinton and 

Johnnie Carson both give that issue on the continent. 

And while we have a lot of entrenched leaders, we have a lot of 

rays of sunshine and light. 

And last, as always the case, you can’t categorically put everybody in one barrel, because there are exceptions. And we have seen 

exceptions where entrenched leaders have turned and done the 

right thing and helped countries make the transition. So we need 

to recognize that our encouragement for democratic institutions, 

our awareness of the importance for the voters to determine their 

leadership, are the critical institutions and instruments of democracy that make our country great, and we think will make the 

countries of Africa great as well. 

So, Mr. Chairman, congratulations on your effects on Senegal, 

and thank you for calling this hearing today. 

Senator COONS. Thank you so much, Senator Isakson. 

I’d like to invite Ambassador Carson to give his opening statement at this point. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador CARSON. Chairman Coons, thank you very much. 

And also Ranking Member Isakson, thank you very much for those 

very helpful and useful comments. 

Let me start off by making some initial comments on the state 

of democracy in Africa, and then turn, briefly, to the cases of Senegal and also the Cameroon. 

I have submitted longer testimony, and I’m certainly prepared to 

discuss any of the questions or any of the—take your questions and 

discuss any of the countries that directly concern you. 

Democracy is on the move in Africa. The democratic trajectory is 

positive and getting stronger. Over the last 2 years, we’ve seen a 

number of African countries hold successful democratic elections, 

large countries such as Nigeria and Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire, as 

well as smaller countries like Zambia, Niger, and Guinea-Conakry. 

In the elections that have taken place, we have seen sitting 

Presidents removed peacefully from power by the ballot box, as in 

the case of Senegal and Zambia. We have seen governments move 

from military to civilian rule, and the Presidents succeed themselves in fair, transparent, and peaceful elections in some other 

cases. 

Opinion polls conducted by respected African and United States 

organizations demonstrate that African support for democracy, as 

well as the freedoms and opportunities associated with it, are 

strong. 

As a result, every African leader, whether authoritarian or democratic, feels the need to profess their support for democracy. 

Despite the positive trajectory that I have described, we know 

that democratic progress is rarely smooth, linear, or direct. Setbacks occur and are inevitable. 

The recent military interventions in Mali and Guinea-Bissau 

reflect the problems that persist in Africa, where democratic instiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:04 Aug 03, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~2\2012IS~1\041812-I.TXT BETTY
11

tutions are weak and economic deprivation and impoverishment 

remain high. 

We also recognize that there could be other democratic backsliding in the future. But I remain optimistic that democracy is 

moving forward in Africa. 

As democracy continues to take root, a number of African leaders 

have managed to remain in power for long periods of time. Presidents Mugabe, Biya, al-Bashir, Dos Santos, Museveni, and Prime 

Minister Meles have all been in power for over two decades. 

Although they were all elected and reelected in multiparty contests, they have also manipulated or intentionally altered the political systems in their countries to ensure their political longevity. 

Presidents Museveni and Biya, in particular, have removed term 

limitations to stay in power. 

Some political leaders have also sought to transfer power to their 

children. 

We believe term limitations serve a valuable and useful purpose. 

They spur political mobility, help generate new ideas, break down 

political dynasties, and enhance accountability and good governance. They also prevent political rigidity and the monopolization of 

power by one person, or one family from one region, or from one 

ethnic group, from dominating the affairs of state, not only for a 

decade but for two or three. 

We have opposed third terms, but have generally reacted differently to them based on the country and the circumstances. Senegal and Cameroon are cases in point. We made our views clear on 

term limits most recently in Senegal when President Wade 

changed the constitution and sought a third term. We were deeply 

concerned that President Wade would throw his country into a constitutional or a political crisis by seeking a questionable constitutionally mandated third term, which he initially said he would not 

serve and which some of the country’s most distinguished lawyers 

said was probably not legal. 

We acted because we were afraid that Wade’s candidacy and victory might lead to widening violence and instability. Although the 

advocacy efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, this focused international attention on the conduct and outcome of a critical election. 

Ultimately, the Senegalese voters rejected Wade’s bid at the 

ballot box and demonstrated unequivocally that strongmen are 

trumped by an engaged electorate and an active civil society with 

strong democratic institutions. 

Former President Wade’s third-term bid is an example of a troubling countertrend. In the last 9 years, eight sub-Saharan countries 

have repealed the two-term limits on the Presidency. Those countries are Chad, Gabon, Burkina Faso, Togo, Cameroon, Guinea, 

Niger, and the Uganda. And the Presidents in other countries, including Malawi, Nigeria, and Zambia, tried unsuccessfully to repeal 

term limits. 

The repeal of term limits raised questions about process as well 

as outcome. Self-interested governments proposed changes which 

benefited sitting Presidents who then used their control of the state 

to assure their reelections. The resulting elections are often meaningless, pro forma exercises that only serve to legitimize the longstanding status quo. 

12

Such leaders have embraced the language of democracy, but not 

its full meaning. In fact, some African governments lack the will 

to conduct free and fair elections in which the leaders know they 

might lose political or economic power. 

Senegal’s civic and religious institutions proved to be a major 

positive force. Civic leaders and NGOs repeatedly assured us of 

their intent to support principles of good governance and to encourage their members to participate actively and peacefully in the 

political process. The majority of religious leaders remained impartial or nonpartisan, and made the greatest contribution to a successful process. 

Senegal has, thus, retained its democratic credentials and remains one of Africa’s most respected democratic nations. 

With the eyes of the entire continent watching, the Senegalese 

demonstrated that an engaged electorate and active civil society 

can always trump strongmen. 

Cameroon also presents a challenge to democracy in Africa. 

While that country abounds with potential from natural resources 

and its geographic location, Cameroon’s political leaders have taken 

advantage of their country’s relative stability, prosperity, and system of patronage to entrench their leadership. 

The absence of transparency in the political and economic activities of the country have allowed the country to grow economically 

slower than it should have. It has also increased corruption and 

cynicism among the opposition, and many of the country’s people. 

These policies have placed a premium on maintaining the status 

quo in lieu of embarking on reform. 

The 2011 Presidential election was seriously flawed. Polling stations opened late. Citizens were allowed to vote, in some cases, 

multiple times. And ballot box stuffing and voter intimidation were 

observed in various parts of the country. 

Even though the Cameroonian Supreme Court received credible 

complaints of irregularities from political parties, the court dismissed all the cases. 

Given Cameroon’s political history, the United States has focused 

its policy on finding ways to influence the Cameroonian Government to adopt political reforms. 

We made our views clear early on the 2008 constitutional revisions that ended term limits by going in and asking President Biya 

not to do so. In 2009 we met with government, civil society, and 

opposition parties, and then worked with other diplomatic missions 

to boycott the swearing-in of the stacked electoral commission, 

simultaneously issuing a statement expressing our displeasure 

with its composition. 

In 2011, we financed and launched two ongoing civil society 

strengthening programs, one of which led to the creation of the 

Civil Society Forum for Democracy, which has become one of Cameroon’s leading democracy advocacy organizations. 

We also worked with youth and women to encourage participation in politics and to get out the vote. 

I visited Cameroon in June 2011, and met with President Paul 

Biya to urge a transparent and free electoral process. In July 2011, 

Cameroon added six civil society and opposition members to its 

13

electoral commission and expanded enfranchisement to overseas 

Cameroonians. 

In October 2011, our Ambassador gave a strong speech, identifying lessons learned from the election and ways to bring about 

improvement. 

Following the conclusion of the elections, I wrote to President 

Biya, urging the reestablishment as soon as possible of term limits, 

the implementation of constitutional reforms, and a more transparent and independent electoral commission. 

We acted differently in Cameroon because the threat of violence 

and widespread stability were not as great or serious as they 

appeared to be in Senegal on the eve of the Presidential elections 

there. 

We also thought we should focus on empowering civil society and 

strengthening it, and encouraging President Biya to think of his 

legacy and to reverse his decision on term limitations. 

This year, we have worked with other diplomatic missions in 

Yaounde and sent a joint letter to the Prime Minister, suggesting 

possible improvements in the electoral process. 

Following our public and private comments, the government announced its decision to create a new voter roll based on a biometric 

voter card system, and to harmonize the election laws into a new 

single electoral code. 

I have laid out our concerns again to President Biya about the 

need for further democratic change. We hope that he will heed 

those concerns, looking toward his own legacy and the need to be 

able to ensure that Cameroon’s democratic institutions are more 

important than the interests of one single individual. 

Although there is more work to do in Cameroon, we are seeing 

signs of a revitalized civil society, increasingly energized political 

debate, and, ultimately, more government engagement about how 

the country can deepen its commitment to reform and chart out a 

more democratic future. 

Overall, I remain upbeat about trends in democracy across 

Africa, where I can send you to see progress and note the positive 

steps taken to address the bad news in Mali and Guinea-Bissau, 

with African countries unanimously demanding a return to civilian 

democratic rule immediately in both of those countries. 

These stories are reminders that democracy is a dominant trend, 

although we can expect setbacks from time to time. 

The overarching African policy of the Obama administration is to 

promote the development of stable and democratic partners committed to the rule of law, human rights, transparent governance, 

and the welfare of their citizens. 

We believe that the long-term strategy of supporting democratic 

institutions is already paying off. As a result, we are continuing to 

prioritize our democratic funding, not only to assist in elections, 

but also to help strengthen governance, the rule of law, the promotion of women and civil societies, and also strengthening legislatures and judiciaries. 

I will stop right here, Mr. Chairman, and will take any questions 

that you have. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Carson follows:]

14

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNNIE CARSON

Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson and members of the committee, I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today at this hearing: ‘‘Examining the 

U.S Policy Responses to Entrenched African Leadership.’’ 

Overall, I remain upbeat about trends in Africa, where I continue to see progress 

and note the recent good news coming out of Senegal and Malawi. Also I note the 

positive steps taken to address the bad news in Mali and in Guinea Bissau, with 

African countries unanimously demanding a return to civilian rule. All of these 

events are reminders that while progress in institutionalizing democracy is not 

always smooth and linear; democratization is the dominant trend around the 

continent. 

As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, this administration is committed to a positive 

and forward-looking policy in Africa. Indeed, we believe in Africa’s potential and 

promise. While Africa has some very serious and well-known challenges, President 

Obama, Secretary Clinton, and I are confident that Africa and Africans will meet 

and overcome these challenges. 

In order to underscore the importance that this administration attaches to democracy, good governance and accountability, President Obama chose to make his inaugural Africa trip to Ghana. His speech in Accra applauded the efforts of Ghanaians 

to institutionalize democracy, noting that ‘‘ . . . In the 21st century, capable, reliable, and transparent institutions are the key to success—strong Parliaments; honest police forces; independent judges; an independent press; a vibrant private sector; 

a civil society. Those are the things that give life to democracy, because that is what 

matters in people’s everyday lives. Now, make no mistake: History is on the side 

of these brave Africans, not with those who use coups or change constitutions to 

stay in power. Africa doesn’t need strongmen, it needs strong institutions.’’ 

In fact, our overarching Africa policy goal is to nurture the development of stable 

and democratic partners who are committed to the rule of law, human rights, transparent governance, and the welfare of their citizens. We believe that the long-term 

strategy of supporting, strengthening and sustaining democratic institutions is 

already paying off. As a result, we plan to continue to prioritize funding for democracy programs which reinforce good governance and the rule of law, and promote 

participation of women and civil society. 

We will also continue to work with the international community, including the 

Africa Union and African subregional organizations such as the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), the East African Community (EAC) and 

the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and others to strengthen 

democratic institutions and build upon the democratic gains made in recent years. 

We will continue to use every diplomatic tool at our disposal to nurture long-term 

progress. 

CHALLENGES

This brings us to the challenges at the heart of today’s hearing. Africa has been 

making steady progress since the ‘‘democratic third wave’’ in the early 1990s. That 

progress continues today driven by the rising expectations of a younger generation 

which is fueling greater demands for economic and political change. More than 40 

percent of the people living in Africa are under the age of 15 and nearly two-thirds 

are under 30. This new generation is increasingly urbanized, well educated, plugged 

into the Internet and demanding greater transparency and democratic accountability from their leaders. 

There exists a tension between the old and the new in sub-Saharan Africa today, 

where there are 11 leaders who have been in power for 15 years or more; and of 

those, 9 who have been in power for more than two decades. Some of these leaders 

emerged during their countries’ independence movements or times of armed conflict 

and see themselves as indispensable to their country’s future. Indeed, some of these 

leaders see themselves as the embodiment of the state. 

This dated desire to hold on to power conflicts with one of the most positive political trends in Africa over the last 20 years: the adoption of Presidential term limits. 

Twenty-three African countries limit Presidents to two terms in office. The introduction of terms limits has helped level the playing field and invigorated real political 

competition leading to opposition parties’ power in a dozen countries. 

The United States continues to encourage countries in Africa and elsewhere to 

respect executive term limits. Term limits encourage the development of new leadership and institutionalize a democratic process and permit new ideas and policies to 

move forward. When democracy is threatened by strongmen trying to maintain their 

grip on power, we are not shy about making our views clear on the importance of 

15

term limits as you saw, most recently in Senegal, when President Wade sought a 

third term. 

We were deeply concerned that President Wade would throw his country into a 

constitutional or political crisis by seeking a constitutionally questionable third 

term, which he initially said he would not serve and which some of the country’s 

most distinguished lawyers said was probably not legal. Although the advocacy 

efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, this did focus international attention on the 

conduct and outcome of this critical election. Ultimately, the Senegalese voters 

rejected Wade’s bid at the ballot box and demonstrated, unequivocally, that

strong men are trumped by an engaged electorate, an active civil society and strong 

institutions. 

Former President Wade’s third term bid is emblematic of a troubling countertrend. In the last 9 years, the governments of seven sub-Saharan countries have 

repealed the two-term limits on the Presidency (Chad, Gabon, Togo, Cameroon, 

Guinea, Niger, and Uganda). Niger has since reinstated term limits. Presidents in 

other countries, including Malawi, Nigeria, and Zambia tried, albeit unsuccessfully, 

to repeal term limits. 

The repeal of term limits raises questions about process as well as outcome. Selfinterested governments proposed changes which benefited sitting Presidents who 

then use their control of the state to assure their reelections. Weak judicial and legislative branches approve changes in the constitution giving the changes a veneer 

of legality. The resulting elections are often meaningless, pro forma exercises that 

only serve to legitimize the longstanding status quo, a phenomenon that the Electoral Institute for Southern Africa (EISA) calls ‘‘electoral autocracy.’’ Such leaders 

have embraced the language of democracy, but not its full meaning. 

To be blunt, some African governments lack the will to conduct free and fair elections in which they might lose political and economic power. Instead they rig the 

system by monopolizing the media, harassing opposition figures, and otherwise closing political space. On a continent where most political and economic power still 

resides in the State, elections are too often viewed as a zero-sum game in which 

all spoils go to the winner. 

CONSEQUENCES

Electoral autocracy has numerous negative consequences, captured in the data in 

international reports and studies compiled by Freedom House, the Mo Ibrahim 

Index, Transparency International, and the World Bank, among others. Most reveal 

a variety of problems including corruption, a lack of accountability, crony capitalism, 

and nepotism. These elements feed a rent-seeking class of well-connected elites who 

maintain a stranglehold on local economies. This behavior crowds out legitimate 

local entrepreneurs and fuels large disparities in income and opportunity. This can 

breed anger, resentment, and even violence, as we have seen in the countries impacted by the Arab Spring. 

STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE

The political and economic success of Africa depends a great deal on the effectiveness, sustainability, and reliability of its democratic institutions. That means a 

focus on process and progress, not personalities. African leaders must recognize that 

the United States is engaged in building long-term ties with their people and not 

just with them. Credible, strong, and independent institutions are the key to both 

a deeper relationship with the United States and to their long-term success. 

We will continue to support efforts to strengthen democratic institutions and participation, including in countries with entrenched leadership. Specifically, we will 

focus on supporting good governance, strengthening Parliaments, and increasing the 

efficiency of judicial systems, and we will continue to provide assistance to encourage civic participation, so that young people get involved, and to fund concrete solutions to corruption such as forensic accounting to advance transparency and 

accountability. We believe economic development programs help build democratic institutions as well, because an empowered citizenry is the foundation of every strong 

democracy. 

Our Africa policy is built on anticipating that change is inevitable and that it can 

best be channeled through constructive action rather than destructive reaction. We 

have the same value-based discussions with all African leaders, during which we 

highlight our views about the importance of building strong democratic institutions, 

good governance, accountability and the role of civil society. Clearly there are countries where governments are more receptive and, indeed, responsive to that message. But that message is a consistent part of policy and outreach in all African 

countries. 

16

In order to enhance the effectiveness of our policy, we have a number of tools at 

our disposal. Our best tools are generally positive and often rest on trying to convince leaders that strengthening core democratic institutions are in the long-term 

interest of the country and could be an important part of their historical legacies. 

When the situation warrants it we can use public criticism, and more punitive 

measures such as diplomatic isolation, financial and diplomatic sanctions including 

travel bans. We have used sanctions with limited success on entrenched leaders in 

Sudan, Eritrea, and Zimbabwe. The results, frankly speaking, indicate that sanctions are not necessarily a silver bullet, but they do send an important message. 

In our increasingly multilateral world new tools are emerging. But the most important voices supporting democracy are coming from Africans. This was evident, 

for example, recently when the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS strongly denounced the coup in Mali, sanctioned the military junta, and demanded an immediate return to civilian rule. ECOWAS was also quick to make a forthright statement denouncing the military takeover in Guinea-Bissau last week and demanding 

a return to democratic rule. We would like to build on this, for example by working 

with the AU in supporting implementation of the African Charter on Democracy, 

Elections and Governance. 

The use of these and other tools we have furthered the long-term efforts to build 

strong African institutions. This can happen even in countries with entrenched leaders. But this is a long-term strategy. Realistically, in some places, it may take years 

before we see results. Democratization is a process and lasting substantive change 

does not happen overnight; it is generational. There is no simple recipe for change 

and reform, but consistent direct exchange provides a solid foundation on which we 

can base our actions. 

The case studies of Senegal and Cameroon are indicative of these long-term challenges. Many of the strategies we just noted are those we pursued in both of these 

countries. In Senegal, our efforts contributed to a positive outcome. While we and 

the rest of the international community can take some of the credit, the Senegalese 

themselves bravely demonstrated their commitment to democracy. That commitment paid off. In the case of Cameroon, the hard work continues, but we are no less 

optimistic that our consistent efforts and those of the Cameroonians themselves will 

eventually pay off. Let me offer a few details of each case. 

CASE STUDIES

Senegal 

Our two countries share a longstanding commitment to democracy, good governance, and economic development. There has been a historical pattern of peaceful 

transitions of power through the ballot box in Dakar. The Senegalese take great 

pride in preserving the democratic values of their country, as evident by the coalition of opposition and civil society groups that formed to protest ex-President Wade’s 

proposed constitutional amendments to election rules (which the government withdrew). We repeatedly encouraged and applauded the Senegalese people for their 

enthusiasm, patience, and civic engagement in making the election process as 

smooth as possible. 

While we respected Senegal’s political and legal processes, we were concerned that 

President Wade’s insistence on running for a constitutionally questionable third 

term could precipitate a crisis that might spark civil unrest and unravel his achievements. 

Wade’s insistence on running for a third term also set a poor example for the 

spirit of democracy and good governance in the region. Especially since the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact signing ceremony in September 2009, 

we have tried to make clear to President Wade that democracy is government ‘‘by 

the people, of the people, and for the people,’’ which includes the right and ability 

of citizens to choose, participate in, and lead their governments—not merely a game 

of elections and candidates. We encouraged President Wade to put the interest of 

Senegal above his own personal interest to solidify his stature as a respected elder 

statesman. 

Senegal’s civic and religious institutions proved to be a major positive force. We 

repeatedly met religious and civic leaders and NGOs, who assured us of their intent 

to support principles of good governance, and to encourage their membership to participate actively but peacefully in the political process. The role of the overwhelming 

majority of religious leaders in remaining impartial or nonpartisan arguably made 

the greatest contribution to a successful process. 

With a long history in international peacekeeping and participation in the international coalition for ‘‘Operation Desert Storm’’ in the early 1990s, Senegal’s security services are among the most professional in Africa. State and DOD engaged 

17

them often, and they guaranteed they would maintain their unquestioned reputation for abiding by civilian authority and the rule of law. We congratulate them for 

their professional conduct. 

It was important that the USG collaborated with the international community in 

presenting a united front, particularly on election observation. Former Nigerian 

President Obasanjo led 200 observers from the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The European Union (EU) deployed over 120 observers. We allocated $850,000 in funding in FY 2011 to train 

and support 1,400 independent election observers, deployed through nonpartisan 

Senegalese organizations. 

Also, the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization worked with the Africa Bureau and 

U.S. Embassy Dakar to develop an elections observation plan for both rounds of voting, analysis of the elections landscape, and planning around different contingencies 

for both rounds and potential outcomes. 

In the end, international observers and the Senegalese themselves judged the 

elections to be a credible expression of the will of the Senegalese people. Clearly this 

was a victory for Senegal, which has retained its democratic credentials and remains at the vanguard of democratic nations in Africa. Indeed, this may turn out 

to be a watershed moment in the history of democracy in Africa. With the eyes of 

the whole continent watching, the Senegalese demonstrated, unequivocally, that 

strong men are trumped by an engaged electorate, an active civil society and strong 

institutions. 

Cameroon 

Originally a single party state, since 1990 Cameroon has had a multiparty system 

of government with over 250 political parties today. However, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) has remained in power since it was created in 

1985. On October 9, 2011, CPDM Chairman Paul Biya won reelection as president, 

a position he has held since 1982. 

With the largest economy in Central Africa and historically the subregion’s most 

stable country, Cameroon presents a dilemma for U.S. engagement. On the one 

hand, it abounds with potential from its natural resources, geographic location, climatic diversity, and rich soil. On the other hand, its relative prosperity and system 

of patronage has resulted in an entrenched leadership, tight restrictions on the political space of opposition groups, and an absence in transparency in political and 

economic activities. These policies have placed a premium on maintaining the status 

quo in lieu of embarking on reform. 

Our engagement with Cameroon has made some progress. The National Assembly 

passed an antihuman trafficking law and the judiciary convicted several child traffickers. The government presented a penal code that improves the rights of women, 

children, and detainees. The Cameroonian military intervened to deter elephant 

poaching and maritime piracy. Cameroon voted alongside us and even cosponsored 

resolutions with us at the U.N. And, as I will detail shortly, President Biya has 

made some efforts to improve electoral processes. 

The 2011 Presidential election was flawed by irregularities, including the failure 

to properly distribute all voter cards, late opening of polling stations, multiple voting, ballot-box stuffing, the absence of indelible ink, and intimidation of voters. Citizens residing overseas registered and voted for the first time. After the election the 

Supreme Court received 20 complaints from political parties, 10 of which demanded 

either the partial or complete annulment of results due to irregularities. On October 

19 the court dismissed all the cases for lack of evidence or late submission. 

Given Cameroon’s political history, the USG has focused its policy on finding ways 

to influence the Cameroonian Government to adopt political reforms. We made our 

views on the 2008 Constitutional revisions, which led to elimination of term limits, 

clear both privately to President Biya and in public comments. In fact, on March 

7 and 8, 2008, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, James 

Swan, visited Yaounde ́ to convey our displeasure with the constitutional change and 

the handling of the political violence in a one-on-one meeting with President Biya. 

At our urging and in consultation with us, the European Union and several other 

foreign missions issued a public statement urging more inclusive public debate on 

the constitutional amendment. 

In 2009 we met with government, civil society, and opposition parties and then 

worked with other diplomatic missions to boycott the swearing-in of the stacked 

election commission (Elections Cameroon or ELECAM), simultaneously issuing a 

statement expressing our displeasure with its composition. In 2011 we financed and 

launched two ongoing civil society strengthening programs—one of which led to the 

creation of the Civil Society Forum for Democracy, which has become one of CamVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:04 Aug 03, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~2\2012IS~1\041812-I.TXT BETTY
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eroon’s leading democracy advocacy organizations. We also worked with youth and 

women to encourage participation in politics and get out the vote. 

I visited Cameroon in June 2011, met with President Biya, Prime Minister Yang, 

other Ministers, opposition leaders, and civil society to urge a transparent election. 

In July 2011 Cameroon added six civil society and opposition members to ELECAM 

and gave Cameroonians residing abroad the right to vote. In October 2011 after extensive election observation and consultations, our Ambassador gave a strong speech 

identifying lessons learned from the election and ways to improve. I subsequently 

wrote to Biya urging the reestablishment of term limits, the implementation of 

stalled constitutional reforms and a more transparent and independent electoral 

commission. 

This year, we have worked with other diplomatic missions and sent a joint letter 

to the Prime Minister suggesting possible improvements in the electoral process. 

Following our Embassy’s most recent public and private comments, the Government 

announced its decision to create a new voter roll based on biometric voter cards, 

addressing a problem that has plagued previous elections, and to harmonize the various election laws in a single new electoral code. I have laid out some of our concerns in a letter this month to President Biya, as Cameroon’s National Assembly 

considers the revised electoral code. 

So although there is more work to do in Cameroon, and indeed the institutionalization of democracy is in its nascent stages, we are seeing signs of a revitalized 

civil society, increasingly energized political debate and ultimately more government 

engagement about how the country can deepen its commitment to reform and chart 

out a more democratic future. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I want to thank 

you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will be happy to answer any 

questions.

Senator COONS. Thank you very much, Ambassador Carson, both 

for your testimony and for your leadership regionally on these important issues. 

I would like to invite Assistant Administrator Gast to give his 

opening statement at this point. 

STATEMENT OF EARL GAST, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR 

AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. GAST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member Isakson. 

It’s a deep honor for me to be here before you. This is my first 

hearing, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, as the Assistant Administrator for Africa, so it truly is an honor. And I’m also very pleased 

to be before this committee once again. I had previously served as 

Senior Deputy Administrator for Africa Bureau. 

While the Mugabes and Bashirs of the continent dominate our 

overall impression of Africa, in reality, entrenched leaders are 

becoming the exception rather than the rule. 

Witness Malawi’s peaceful transition in power following the 

death of President Mutharika this month. Witness the process to 

restore democracy in Mali spurred by the swift and decisive leadership of ECOWAS. ECOWAS itself is led by the President of Cote 

d’Ivoire, another country to recently emerge from a crisis with a 

stronger democracy. 

When seen against the backdrop of Africa’s history, these events 

underscore striking improvements in democratic governance, 

despite the setbacks that grab our attention. 

As recently as the early 1990s, the region was dominated by a 

group of so-called ‘‘big men’’ who used fear and intimidation to 

cling to power and in the process decimated their country’s prospects for development. 

19

Today, these ‘‘big men’’ are being replaced by skilled civilian 

states-men and -women who are transforming their societies and 

serving as role models for a new generation of reformers. 

Increasingly, these leaders are looking out for their neighbors, as 

the events in Mali have demonstrated, and they are becoming partners in development. 

Given these trends, USAID’s response to the challenge of entrenched African leadership is based on three factors that have led 

to successful transitions elsewhere in the world. First, we are nurturing citizens’ growing demand for political change, an increasingly powerful influence in situations where democratic backsliding 

is a threat. 

As Assistant Secretary Carson mentioned, in Senegal, when 

President Wade’s effort to influence the electoral process became 

apparent, civil society forcefully rejected his attempt. Its voice was 

the engine that drew attention to the situation, prevented widespread fraud, and directly resulted in the peaceful transfer of 

power. 

Second, political transitions have involved increased pluralism, 

the gradual replacement of one-party states with multiparty systems that represent a diverse range of interests. In countries like 

Ghana, Malawi, and Zambia, power alternates among parties on a 

fairly regular basis. Since today’s ruling party may be tomorrow’s 

opposition, voters have meaningful choices to make and are an instrument of accountability and civility. 

In Uganda, President Museveni has overseen the gradual reopening of political space and the reintroduction of political pluralism. 

But, in exchange, he has tightened his grip on the Presidency. 

However, each election increases the risk of unrest by delaying the 

inevitable transition to a new generation of political leaders. 

The third element that we deem crucial in political transitions is 

strong checks and balances. Those are checks and balances that 

establish and enforce the rules of the game. 

Under intense pressure from civil society and the media, African 

Parliaments and electoral commissions have played a key role in 

upholding term limits in Ghana, Nigeria, and Zambia. USAID has 

spent years building the capacity of those institutions in advance 

of the ‘‘third term’’ debates each country. 

The leadership in Ethiopia lacks these checks and balances, and 

has significantly constrained political speech, human rights, civil 

society, and the media. As a result, Ethiopia has created an environment that is ripe for instability. It has also created a paradox 

about its position in the international community. 

On the one hand, the U.S. Government must maintain a close 

working relationship with Ethiopia as one of our key African partners in fighting terrorism and promoting food security, and in providing peacekeepers to some of the most difficult locations on the 

continent. 

In fact, with the exception of democracy-building, USAID’s programs in Ethiopia are among the most successful in Africa, helping 

lift millions out of poverty. 

On the other hand, there are long-term risks that come from suppressing basic freedoms. Ethiopia’s elections in 2005 could have 

resulted in the balance of power, but instead the ruling party 

20

attempted to destroy the opposition, and has since clamped down 

on basic freedoms. 

Unless restrictions are lifted and dissenting political views allowed, the country’s gains in development and poverty alleviation 

will be threatened. 

What we have learned is that developing the conditions for true 

democratic transformation is a process that takes many years, 

often decades. USAID helps to support environments in which 

these conditions can emerge, but that transformation can only 

occur through the commitment of African leaders to serve the 

needs of their people and other people to meaningfully participate 

in their government. 

Thank you again for inviting me here, and we look forward to 

your continued support of good governance in Africa. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gast follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR EARL GAST

Good afternoon Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, and members of the 

subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to speak with you today. It is always an 

honor to have the opportunity to discuss USAID’s work with you, and, for me personally, it is a pleasure to appear before you again. 

This is an especially thought-provoking issue for us to analyze today. While the 

Mugabes and Bashirs of the continent dominate our overall impression of Africa, in 

reality, these entrenched leaders are becoming the exception rather than the rule. 

Witness Malawi’s peaceful, constitutional transition of power following the untimely 

death of the late President Mutharika earlier this month. Witness the process to 

restore democracy and unity in Mali, spurred by the swift and decisive leadership 

of the Economic Community of West African States. ECOWAS itself is led by the 

President of Cote d’Ivoire—another country that recently came out of a political crisis with a stronger democracy. The recently ratified African Charter on Democracy, 

Elections and Governance also creates a powerful, African-owned platform for consolidating democratic gains and encouraging sound leadership on the continent. 

When seen against the backdrop of sub-Saharan Africa’s five decades of independence, these events underscore the striking improvements in democratic governance 

and leadership that have gradually occurred in the region despite the setbacks that 

grab our attention. A generation ago, the profile of Africa’s leaders left much to be 

desired. As recently as the early 1990s, the region was dominated by a group of socalled ‘‘big men,’’ many of whom came to power at the barrel of a gun rather than 

by the ballot box. Several were tyrants who ruled however they saw fit, using fear 

and intimidation to cling to power, and in the process, decimating their countries’ 

prospects for progress. Nobel Laureate and Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf 

wrote about that era, ‘‘Africa’s crisis was a failure of leadership and management. 

Sub-Saharan Africa is rich in resources, talent, energy, and spirit. But it has not 

been rich in leadership. It is made up of rich countries that were poorly managed, 

and the results have been disastrous.’’

Today, these ‘‘big men’’ are being replaced by skilled, civilian statesmen and 

women who are transforming their societies and serving as role models for a new 

generation of emerging reformers. In ECOWAS alone, 11 of the 15 current heads 

of state have served for two terms or fewer—a remarkable transformation from 

those days of long-reigning ‘‘big men.’’ These leaders include some of leading lights 

of not only Africa, but also of the developing world: President Johnson-Sirleaf of 

Liberia, former Fulbright Scholar and legal expert John Atta Mills in Ghana, and 

President Alassane Ouattara, who served as the deputy director of the International 

Monetary Fund before he began his decade-long journey to the Presidency of Cote 

d’Ivoire. These leaders, and a growing number of their peers on the African Continent, have come to power through peaceful and credible elections. Increasingly, 

they are supporting each other and looking out for their neighbors, as the events 

in Mali have demonstrated. Increasingly, they are becoming key partners in development through initiatives such as the Partnership for Growth whereby the leaders 

of Ghana and Tanzania are working hand-in-glove with the international community to identify and address key constrains to development. 

When their terms of office come to an end, a growing number of African heads 

of state now willingly and peacefully step down because of the term limits enshrined 

21

in their constitutions or because of an electoral defeat. According to the USAIDsupported African Presidential Center at Boston University, more than 30 African 

heads of state are now in retirement after a peaceful transfer of power to their 

elected successors. At the same time, USAID is working to support civil society 

actors and government officials to prevent democratic backsliding in countries such 

as the Democratic Republic of Congo, where President Joseph Kabila’s actions have 

brought his commitment to DRC’s hard-won democratic system and electoral process 

into question. 

Given these trends, USAID’s response to the challenge of entrenched African leadership is based on the three factors that have led to successful transitions elsewhere: channeling the growing demand for legitimate, accountable democratic government into development opportunities such as open political processes and civil 

society engagement; , developing a broader range of leaders and supporting 

reformists, and supporting regional organizations to define and improve the ‘‘rules 

of the game’’ in African politics. Africans themselves have led these important transformations; USAID has provided support and assistance to their efforts. 

The growing demand for political change derives from the increasingly important 

role of civil society and independent media across Africa, coupled with greater 

access to information and the growth of an African middle class and a growing number of reformists in government. The African Development Bank defines ‘‘middle 

class’’ as having between $2 and $20 to spend a day, and about a third of Africans 

now fall into that category. With 44 percent of its population under age 15, subSaharan Africa is the youngest region of the world, and it is these youth who will 

be the engines of Africa’s future. They have begun holding their leaders more 

accountable for performance, rather than ideology, and they are less willing to view 

politics as a zero-sum game waged between ethnic or regional factions for control 

over state resources. This new generation demands the ability to exercise its right 

to vote in free, fair, and credible elections, as well as to keep the political pressure 

on leadership to respond to the needs of their citizens once the campaigns have 

ended. 

In Senegal, USAID focused on supporting the role of civil society to demand 

reforms, improve transparency, register young voters, and encourage credible elections. Senegalese civil society played a critical role in drawing attention to the 

efforts of President Abdoulaye Wade to influence the electoral process and improve 

the odds that he and his family would retain power. In June 2011, President Wade 

proposed an amendment to the constitution that would remove term limits and 

establish a Vice Presidency—allegedly to install his son Karim as his successor. Senegalese civil society erupted in uncharacteristic protest, causing the President to 

withdraw the proposal. Discontent continued to simmer, fueled by the peaceful protest of youth organizations like Y’en a Marre ([yawn-a-MAR]: ‘‘We’ve Had Enough’’). 

By January 2012, when a Constitutional Court decision allowed Wade to formally 

declare his candidacy, the streets of Senegal erupted again, this time in sporadic 

violence and daily protest. 

The international community, including Senators Coons and Isakson, Congressmen Donald Payne and Christopher Smith, former President, Jimmy Carter, and 

former Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, appealed personally to President 

Wade to respect the letter of the constitution and will of the Senegalese people, and 

not pursue a third term. His public refusal to do so refocused attention on the electoral process and redoubled the commitment of Senegalese civil society to advocate 

for democratic principles. 

An orderly, peaceful election day demonstrated the will and maturity of civil society and the Senegalese political establishment. USAID-supported international and 

domestic election observation, as well as technical assistance to electoral management bodies and the election oversight committee, helped to shine a bright light on 

the electoral process and prevent the occurrence of widespread fraud or tampering. 

As the returns came in showing Wade trailing his opponent, former Prime Minister, 

Macky Sall, the President had no choice but to admit defeat. 

With this fair and credible election, Senegal reinforces its status as the vanguard 

of West African democracy, and may serve as an example to other African nations 

with leaders seeking to entrench themselves. President Sall has committed to 

strengthening the independence of key political institutions and pursuing numerous 

reforms, including a negotiated settlement of the decades-old rebellion in the 

Casamance region. USAID is coordinating with other members of the international 

community to continue to support the realization of these reforms and the consolidation of Senegalese democracy. 

In Sudan, the government regularly stifles open public discourse by cracking 

down on peaceful public protests and closing and intimidating media, which has severely limited citizens’ access to information, including on the violence in Darfur 

22

and the Three Areas—and a rejection of the principle of democratic transformation 

that is at the heart of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement Khartoum signed in 

2005. To encourage more open and inclusive public dialogue about Sudan’s future, 

USAID has been helping Sudanese youth and civil society leaders learn ways to 

make their demands for change heard, including building the capacity of youth organizations in marginalized regions to engage in promoting peace and reconciliation. 

USAID is also supporting grassroots efforts by Sudanese civil society to have a dialogue on creating a more democratic and inclusive government, and we support initiatives to promote public discourse on constitutional reform. Ultimately, these modest efforts at educating and engaging Sudanese citizens about their political future 

will help to serve as a foundation for the country’s eventual transition from dictatorship to a sustainable democracy. USAID’s partners continue to face challenges operating in Sudan because of government restrictions on visas and permits to travel 

within the country, an issue the United States Government has raised repeatedly 

with the government. 

In addition to the growing demand for change, transitions from entrenched leaders in Africa have involved increased political pluralism: the gradual replacement 

of one-party states and military-dominated governments with multiparty political 

systems that represent a more diverse range of interests and perspectives. In countries such as Ghana, Malawi, Senegal, and Zambia, power alternates among two or 

more major parties on a fairly regular basis. Since today’s ruling party may be 

tomorrow’s opposition, voters have meaningful choices on election day, and the empowerment to make those choices serves as an instrument of accountability and stability over the long term. In another group of countries, including Mozambique, 

Nigeria, and South Africa, a national ruling party shares power with other parties 

that govern various states, provinces, and municipalities. In all these countries, 

USAID has supported work by the National Democratic Institute and International 

Republican Institute to professionalize political parties, encourage party reform, 

support party coalitions, provide advice on organizing campaigns and develop the 

next generation of political leaders within and out of government, focusing on 

women as well as youth. 

In Uganda, so far, this strategy is making modest but measurable progress. President Yoweri Museveni has overseen the gradual reopening of political space and the 

reintroduction of political pluralism in exchange for the removal of term limits for 

his own Presidency. However, each election increases Uganda’s exposure to the risk 

of unrest by delaying the inevitable transition to a new generation of political leaders. Ugandans are becoming more and more impatient for change and intolerant of 

the growing evidence of corruption that has tarnished even the highest levels of government in recent years. 

To bolster multiparty democracy and representative governance, USAID implemented a 3-year program that strengthened linkages among and within three key 

actors in the Ugandan Government’s ‘‘nerve system’’: Parliament, local government 

structures, and civil society groups. The pioneering program, which worked to create 

a ‘‘voice’’ among the citizenry and ‘‘listeners’’ among the government, significantly 

strengthened key partners, particularly district and subcounty assemblies, the national official opposition, and civil society. The program also increased accountability 

and transparency in district governments by opening space for public scrutiny. 

The final element of success in political transitions is strong constitutional and 

institutional checks and balances that establish and enforce the rules of the game. 

Under intense pressure from civil society and the media, African Parliaments and 

electoral commissions have played a key role in upholding constitutional term limits 

in Ghana, Nigeria, Malawi, and Zambia. USAID spent years building the capacity 

of those institutions and organizations in advance of the ‘‘third-term’’ debates in 

each country. USAID also monitors the extent to which civil society and the media 

face repression or restrictions in various countries, through two annual indices on 

media and civil society sustainability that complement the State Department’s annual Human Rights Report and other independent sources of information, such as 

the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. 

An example of where these checks and balances were tested before a strong democratic foundation became sustainable is the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 

The Presidential and legislative elections held in November 2011 were widely anticipated as an opportunity for the DRC to continue to consolidate democratic gains 

made during its successful post-conflict transition, culminating in the democratic 

election of a President and Parliament in 2006 through a nationwide, transparent 

and credible electoral system. In the DRC’s second national election millions of Congolese citizens went to the polls to vote in an election that featured 11 Presidential 

candidates and over 18,000 legislative candidates. In contrast to the first postconflict national elections, international and domestic observers, noted considerable 

23

problems throughout the process—in the preelection period, on election day, during 

the tabulation of votes, and in the process for electoral dispute resolution. The management of the electoral process by the Independent National Election Commission 

(CENI), changed by the President just 8 months before election day, was generally 

inadequate. The environment in which citizens, political parties, civil society, news 

media, and other stakeholders sought to exercise their rights to participate in the 

political process was sometimes hostile and inequitable. And although political violence was significantly less severe than many feared, it was nonetheless a serious 

problem. 

Secretary Clinton stated that the entire process was ‘‘seriously flawed, lacked 

transparency, and did not measure up to the democratic gains we have seen in recent African elections.’’

The U.S. Government and the international community will likely have a role to 

play in ensuring that future elections in the DRC are more credible, and in preventing further democratic backsliding. However, the process must be driven by the 

Congolese leadership—and governed by laws and institutions established during the 

transition period that created a level playing field and a credible system for balloting, counting, confirming, and announcing winners and losers—if the results are 

to be meaningful and lasting. The new CENI leadership needs to demonstrate to 

the Congolese people that it has the capacity to successfully manage future elections 

in an efficient and transparent manner. A thorough investigation of election-related 

violence, including incidents perpetrated by members of the security services and 

the opposition, would send the message that the government of the DRC and the 

political class take seriously their commitment to promote democratic processes and 

human rights. Journalists and human rights defenders detained illegally for their 

work should be released. Successful reform will require professional and fair coverage by the media. Finally, it is vital that the judicial personnel of the appellate 

and trial courts are capable and well trained on election law in advance of performing their complaint adjudication responsibilities. 

Ethiopia is one of the starkest examples of the risks that emerge when a country 

lacks sufficient democratic checks and balances. By significantly constraining political speech, human rights, and the ability of civil society and the media to hold government officials accountable, the Ethiopian Government is creating an environment 

that is ripe for instability and that sends mixed messages about its place in the 

international community. 

On the one hand, the U.S. Government must maintain a close working relationship with Ethiopia as one of our key African partners in fighting terrorism, countering the effects of global climate change, promoting food security, and providing 

peacekeepers in some of the most difficult locations in Africa such as Darfur. In fact, 

with the exception of democracy-building, USAID’s programs in Ethiopia are among 

the most successful anywhere in Africa. Ethiopia commands a growing presence in 

global economics, and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and his colleagues in the Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) can take credit for lifting 

millions out of poverty and improving living standards in Africa’s second-most populous country. As seen in the Horn of Africa’s recent food crisis, millions of Ethiopians were able to withstand the worst effects of drought due in part to the Ethiopian Government’s work with the international community to build resilience to 

climatic shocks. 

On the other hand, the experiences of Ethiopia’s neighbors in Africa and the Arab 

World demonstrate the long-term risks of instability that come from suppressing 

basic freedoms. In 2005, Ethiopia held the most free and fair elections in its modern 

history, in which opposition parties appeared to have won a substantial minority of 

parliamentary seats. This outcome could have resulted in a balance of powersharing between the ruling party and opposition, and a real opportunity for political 

development to match the economic modernization underway in the country. Instead, the ruling EPRDF attempted to destroy the opposition or drive it underground. Since then, a systematic campaign has clamped down on basic freedoms. 

These actions, including domination of the 2010 elections and the passage of restrictive laws like the Charities and Societies Proclamation, have gained the EPRDF unprecedented control over the political life of Ethiopia and a brittle form of stability 

in the near term. However, in the long term, Ethiopia is now in danger of reliving 

its history of turbulent political transition. Unless restrictions on civil society and 

the media are lifted and dissenting political views are allowed, the country’s substantial gains in economic development and poverty alleviation will be threatened. 

Integrating democracy and governance work into the significant investments the 

United States is making in other sectors, such as food security and health, will give 

us important opportunities to support social and economic resilience in Ethiopian 

society outside of the ruling party structures and, to the extent feasible, 

24

participatory decisionmaking. To this end, USAID has developed a strategy that 

promotes a cross-cutting approach that builds democracy, human rights, governance, and conflict interests into its varied portfolio. The strategy will minimize 

investments in democracy and governance—such as human rights defenders and 

civil society support—until diplomatic or other efforts open the political space for 

more robust engagement. USAID has also developed a cross-sectoral objective in its 

strategy to promote citizen participation and social accountability around service 

delivery. 

In Zimbabwe, our top priority remains supporting the transition to a multiparty 

democracy that can address the needs of its population, as envisaged in the Global 

Political Agreement. The lack of development in Zimbabwe, a country that was once 

the breadbasket of southern Africa, is directly related to poor governance, making 

the country a tragic but notable example of the linkages among governance, food 

security, poverty, and health. 

USAID is supporting the efforts that exist within the government to improve basic 

conditions for Zimbabwe’s citizens. We seek partnerships to strengthen local organizations that are providing key services and support to the local population—not only 

to meet immediate needs, but also to demonstrate that better governance can lead 

to better lives. Operating in a transitioning state has been especially challenging for 

our local partners: in the process of trying to improve health, livelihoods, freedom, 

and human rights for their fellow Zimbabweans, they face harassment and threats 

from the very government that should be their ally. We know that change must 

come from within the country, and it will not happen overnight. USAID is currently 

working on a new Country Development Cooperation strategy for Zimbabwe that 

will help to advance such change. 

U.S. support has been able to make considerable progress in Zimbabwe in certain 

areas. USAID’s concerted efforts have assisted reform-minded elements of the government in carrying out institutional reforms critical for moving the country towards democracy. For example, the parliamentary committees are now regularly 

holding public hearings on key pieces of legislation including those addressing 

human rights and electoral processes and efforts to revise the parliamentary standing rules now allow the Prime Minister a question-and-answer time for the first 

time. 

Demand for change, political pluralism, and checks and balances, rule of law: 

these are among the most vital conditions for true democratic transformation—

a process that can take years, if not decades. USAID helps support environments 

in which these conditions can emerge, but that transformation can only occur 

through the sustained commitment of African leaders to serve the needs of their 

people, and of their people to have a meaningful voice in their government and the 

means to hold their leaders accountable. We must focus on the long-term institutional and structural weaknesses that compromise the rule of law, erode the quality 

of governance, and make citizens subservient to their governments, rather than the 

other way around. And it is only then that countries can begin to realize their development potential and begin to achieve sustainable progress and growth. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Isakson, and members of the subcommittee for inviting me here today and for your continued support of good governance overseas and USAID’s work to support it.

Senator COONS. Thank you very much to both of our witnesses 

from the first panel for your opening statements. 

I’m going to begin 7-minute rounds, and we’ll see how many we 

go through before we get to our second panel. 

I like to start, if I could, just by focusing in on Cameroon for a 

moment, and then perhaps on a few other examples. 

If you could, Ambassador, just tell us about the state of the political opposition in Cameroon, what are the scenarios in which there 

might be a transition to a more democratic and open regime there, 

a more improved system there? 

I was grateful for your detailing the many steps that were taken 

by our country, Ambassador; by you personally, by our allies. What 

else can or should be done, using regional leadership in partnership 

with African-led organizations, whether through retired senior 

statesmen from other countries, ECOWAS, the African Union, or 

25

others? What are the other players and the other roles that they 

might contribute to moving forward in Cameroon, in particular? 

Ambassador CARSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Change is inevitable, and democratic change is inevitable in 

Cameroon. President Paul Biya has been in power for close to three 

decades. He’s close to 80 years of age. And so time will catch up 

with him eventually. 

We have sought to engage him, to encourage him to think of his 

legacy and the interests of his country over his own personal ambitions. And we have argued for reestablishment of term limitations, 

improvement in the electoral commission, and implementing a 

number of constitutional changes that have been approved but 

never carried out. 

We have sought also to work and strengthen civil society, working with various of civil society groups in Cameroon to increase 

their capacity to speak clearly, openly, and actively about their 

interests. And we think that helping to strengthen civil society is 

an important part of the democratic process. 

We’ve also tried to encourage the strengthening of Parliament, so 

that the legislature is, in fact, a more independent, robust organ 

of government. 

We’re going to continue to push very hard in this area. I think 

that on the outside, your voice, the voice of this committee, your 

expressions of interest, your writing to President Biya in the same 

manner that you wrote to President Wade is a useful indication to 

him that the international community is very focused on what is 

happening in that country and the need to be able to put in place 

stronger institutions and methods of transition, which will ensure 

stable transition when it comes. 

As I mentioned in my testimony, we worked very closely with our 

other democratic partners in the international community, particularly the British and the French and the European Community, to 

also push for the kinds of changes that we think support democracy. And we hope that, over time, there will be a louder and more 

independent voice within the African Union, which will recognize 

the importance of maintaining term limitations in order to ensure 

peaceful transitions. 

This is very important. The AU has taken some democratic 

stances and policies that are very good. They do not allow Presidents in countries to sit in the AU when the leader has come to 

power through military intervention or a coup d’etat. They do not 

allow those countries to come back in until there have been elected 

leaders appointed in those countries. 

So those are some of the things that are out there. 

Senator COONS. If I could, just one other question about funding. 

You’ve recognized, Assistant Administrator Gast, that in Ethiopia, for example, you’ve got some of the most successful USAID 

programs around health, food, Feed the Future, PEPFAR, PMI, but 

some of the least successful in terms of democracy and governance, 

in terms of demonstrable progress. 

How do we account for the balance? How do we ensure the successful implementation of democracy and governance initiatives? 

And what can we do to advocate for stronger, more effective funding in this area? 

26

Mr. GAST. You ask a very good question, Senator Coons. It’s 

something that we have debated internally within AID, certainly 

with Assistant Secretary Carson and the interagency. 

Because the people of Ethiopia are so vulnerable to shocks, it is 

in our national interest to support the people of Ethiopia. And we 

do that through a variety of ways. You mentioned, of course, PMI, 

on malaria, and on HIV/AIDS, on food security. And as a result of 

our sustained efforts of working with the national government but 

also local organizations and local governments, we have had sustained, positive impact. 

As you point out, space for us to work with civil society organizations has essentially closed. It closed about 21⁄2, 3 years ago, with 

the passage of the charities law. And for us, in effect, our programs 

specifically working on independent media, promoting civil society, 

electoral reform, those programs have come to an end. 

What we do do in all of our programs, the initiative programs, 

is focus on trying to develop grassroots civil society organizations, 

within the context of the law, certainly, but recognizing that a 

grassroots approach is the approach that we can take now and will 

have positive effect in years to come. 

So what does that mean? It means that if we are working in improving the educational system, it’s helping to form PTAs and 

strengthen PTAs, so that they can advocate before local governments to improve services. 

So it’s essentially a strategy focused on, with regard to democracy and governance, strengthening user groups, so that they are 

able to advocate for better, improved services. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. I want to bring up a subject I’d like for both 

of you to just respond to, because it’s something that will wake me 

up at night, sometimes worrying on Africa in particular. 

My son wrote his doctoral thesis on something called the ‘‘Dutch 

Disease,’’ which primarily is a Middle Eastern derivative, where 

the countries have an infinite supply of wealth in terms of oil and 

petroleum. And they never develop infrastructure, and they use the 

money to maintain the power of whatever the ruling family is. 

In fact, with the exception of Israel and Jordan, that’s pretty 

much the modus operandi for most of the Middle East. 

Africa, with the discovery of oil and gas, particularly on the Gulf 

of Guinea and along the coast of West Africa, the potential for the 

Dutch Disease to infect some of those countries worries me, because if you had a leader who got in control of that wealth and 

used that wealth to placate the electorate, but not for the electorate 

to develop and develop the infrastructure necessary, then you could 

have a second situation like the Middle East. 

And I’d like for both of you to comment on that and see if that’s 

a justifiable fear, or if there is anything that we should be doing 

to help alleviate that from happening. 

Ambassador CARSON. Senator Isakson, a very good question, one 

that we are very much concerned about. 

Let me say that oil and petroleum riches in Nigeria have been 

an enormous curse for that country. As oil production has gone up 

since the early 1970s, agricultural production has gone down. As oil 

27

production has risen, corruption has spiraled. As oil production has 

gone up, we have seen greater immiseration and poverty in the 

northern part of the country, as well as in some other parts of the 

country. 

And we have seen leaders in that country take enormous advantage of their access to oil and cash, and undermine the interests 

of the people. 

Just yesterday, within the last 48 hours, a British court convicted a former Nigerian Governor, James Ibori, to 13 years in jail 

for stealing some 7.7 million dollars’ worth of revenue from Nigeria 

and from his state. 

This is one that is very sad. One could almost argue, and there 

are obviously people here who know more about Cameroon than I 

do, is that the little oil that Cameroon has helped to provide a 

cushion for President Paul Biya’s patronage system, and also 

helped to fuel corruption in that country. 

Cameroon has significantly less oil, but I would argue that oil 

has probably been behind some of the corruption, some of the 

patronage, that has helped to keep Paul Biya in power. 

The issue is important, as you point out, because there are new 

oil-producing states all around Africa, and gas-producing states as 

well. We see oil being found in places like Uganda, reports of major 

oil finds onshore in places like Kenya for the first time. There are 

huge gas deposits in Tanzania and Mozambique, and we see new 

oil just last year in very significant quantities in Ghana, and oil 

being discovered in Liberia and other places in West Africa. 

Senator Isakson, in my conversations with the leaders of Ghana, 

and with the leaders of Uganda, in particular, I have said very 

clearly that they should take the high road and not the low road, 

that as they start to develop their oil interests, they can go either 

one way or the other. They can follow the Nigerian route, where 

Dutch Disease and corruption and oil pollution have led to enormous problems, or they can follow the Norwegian route, where oil 

has helped to enrich that country, provide it with great infrastructure, great schools, and great hospitals. 

These are the alternatives out there. The Nigerian route where 

oil causes enormous poverty as it brings in billions of dollars in 

wealth, or it can go the Norwegian route, where government is 

made better. 

These conversations we do have, and they are, in fact, very candid, as I say here, very clearly, I have spoken to a number of African leaders who are just about to become rich with oil. And we 

have said, you won’t get a second chance to make a first good impression in the oil industry, if you go badly with us. 

I can say that the Ghanaian Government has done a very, very 

good job. They seem to be steering very, very correctly across—and 

following the laws and being transparent. We want others to pursue the same kind of transparency and not to become victims of the 

Dutch Disease. 

Senator ISAKSON. Mr. Gast. 

Mr. GAST. We are also very concerned about the possibility of 

Dutch Disease on the continent. One area of focus for us has been 

Ghana, and Ghana, as you know, is a Partnership for Growth 

country. 

28

Three years ago, USAID’s former chief economist led a mission 

out to Ghana specifically looking at Dutch Disease and consulting 

with the government. And as a result, we formed a project providing technical assistance for not only the U.S. Government but 

also international partners, to include the Norwegians, in advising 

the government to come up with an approach that will help to 

reduce the possibility of moving into Dutch Disease. 

As you know, of course, Senators, if an economy relies just on 

one commodity, exports, the currency is strengthened and, therefore, it weakens the competitiveness of any of its other potential 

exports. 

So part of the exercise that the interagency has done, U.S. Government interagency with Ghana, is to develop a partnership with 

Partnership for Growth with Ghana that looks at multiple aspects 

of the economy to help reduce the risks of falling into Dutch 

Disease. 

Senator ISAKSON. My time is up. Thank you both. 

Senator COONS. Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to have described to me the administration’s position 

on entrenched political leaders, the idea that longevity seems, in 

and of itself, to be bad. 

And I know that, Mr. Carson, you were quite outspoken back 

when Museveni was making the moves that he was making in 

terms of objecting to that. 

What is the thinking behind that? You know, in our country 

here, we didn’t—until the fourth term was over with FDR—we 

didn’t have term limits. I mean, can you tell me what the thought 

is behind that, to establish this policy for us to follow? 

Ambassador CARSON. Thank you, Senator, for that question. 

We think that third terms are not very useful for Africa because 

they monopolize power in the hands of one individual, one family 

group, one region, one ethnic community, for extended periods of 

time. When leadership at the top goes unchallenged, then it also 

becomes unaccountable. 

That leadership becomes entrenched, and we see things like corruption and political patronage spiraling out of control. And there 

is a lack of response and respectability and accountability to its 

citizens. 

It is something that is of concern, because there is a tremendous 

yearning across Africa for democracy and for the opportunities that 

democracy presents. 

Senator INHOFE. I think, you know, the poster child for that concept is Zimbabwe, when you stop and you study back in the 

Rhodesia days and what one person can do to destroy a country, 

one person. 

On the other hand, there are a lot of them that—are you getting 

into—I’m not really sure what side I’m on on this thing, I just want 

to find out the reasoning for this. Is there a thought that we should 

be—we’re actually not interfering. I think what you’re saying is 

they have a constitution, and we want to say, yes, you should live 

by your constitution. Is that generally what our position is? 

Ambassador CARSON. Let me say, Senator, that we hope we are 

on the side of accountable and responsible government. We hope 

29

that we are on the side of the people who should have a regular 

opportunity to select and choose their leaders. 

We believe that in many instances, once leaders take power, and 

stay in office for extended periods of time, they begin to manipulate 

the process, change the rules of the game, shrink the political space 

of the political opposition, and entrench themselves in power, to the 

detriment of the financial and political interests of the nation as 

a whole. That entrenched leadership tends to generate political 

unrest, and also instability at the same time. 

And we think that by allowing for term limits and the ability of 

political parties to be able to nominate people for the Presidency 

is a good thing, not only amongst the opposition, but also within 

the political parties that are in power themselves. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, have you thought about the fact that they 

might be thinking, are we interfering with what they would call 

their democratic process, their ability to make their determinations? 

It’s a tough call, and I understand that. I happen to believe 

that—I disagreed with you in the case of Uganda, and probably 

Ethiopia, too. But I also know what some of the problems are 

there. 

When we helped establish—and I was instrumental on the 

Armed Services Committee in doing this—AFRICOM, the year 

before it had been a part of three different commands, and I 

thought this would be a good thing, a unifying thing. At the time, 

my vision was that we should have the headquarters of AFRICOM 

in Africa, on the continent. 

And this is interesting because, since this is not an executive session, I wouldn’t want to mention the names, but four different 

Presidents that I brought this up to agreed with me, but they all 

said the problem is their electorate wouldn’t understand. They 

would see this as a movement back to the days—and I think that’s 

right. 

I only bring this up because I conceded to that, and I think they 

are correct. 

And of course, the day before yesterday, I was at Stuttgart, at 

the headquarters there. It’s working very well. They’re coordinating 

with EUCOM. 

But I also notice that it’s very difficult for politicians to resist the 

temptation to try to move these headquarters around. There’s been 

an effort in Texas and Florida. And I don’t know whether Georgia 

has been in on this deal or not, but anyway, I have a strong feeling 

that it would be a bad move to move the headquarters of 

AFRICOM to the continental United States. What do you think? 

Ambassador CARSON. Senator Inhofe, thank you for attempting 

to put my head into the jaws of a crocodile. 

[Laughter.] 

This is an issue that is the preserve of the Department of 

Defense. I think that the Defense Department has the mandate 

and responsibility for determining where its headquarters installations are to be located. And I will let them make the judgment. 

Senator INHOFE. OK, I understand that. I would just say that 

that shouldn’t be a determination. You should be under consultaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:04 Aug 03, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~2\2012IS~1\041812-I.TXT BETTY
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tion when those decisions are being made. And I can assure you 

that General Ham would welcome your opinions on such things. 

I know my time has expired, but just one last question, if I could. 

I know I offended a lot of people back when we were going 

through—when Alassane Ouattara won, according to some, the 

election against Laurent Gbagbo, I made nine speeches on the floor 

that I know offended a lot of people, but I had such strong feelings 

about it. And I happened to know at the time I was making those, 

and even to a lesser degree today it’s true, that Alassane 

Ouattara’s death squads are still roaming around the streets of 

Abidjan. And I’ve talked to people who are living on those streets, 

and I know that that’s true. 

I had made a recommendation, and I tried to get the State 

Department, with whom I disagreed, back during this election, 

Alassane Ouattara’s election was primarily motivated by the 

French, of course, and they brought the U.N. in, and we kind of 

followed course there. 

My feeling at that time was, even though—regardless of whose 

election votes you count, it was a close vote. And I thought for the 

long-term peace of Cote d’Ivoire, it would be a good idea, rather 

than go to The Hague with Gbagbo to go to a country that would 

offer asylum and not create hostility among the followers of 

Gbagbo. I still think that would’ve been a good idea, and we didn’t 

do it. And he is in The Hague now, and I’m sure we’ll never see 

him again. 

However, his wife is somewhere, and I don’t know where she is. 

Everyone tells me they know where she is but me. And I would 

only request that that might be a good option for her, because 

there are a lot of followers of the Gbagbos that that would make 

a very positive impression on. 

And I’m not asking for your opinion on this thing, because I 

know this is controversial, and it’s probably contrary to the administration’s view. But just as one member, and a member who has 

been over for 125 country visits as of 2 days ago, that I feel would 

be a good solution to that problem. 

Ambassador CARSON. Senator, thank you very, very much. 

Let me if I can quickly explain; we firmly believe that Alassane 

Ouattara won that election. We know what the vote count was 

throughout the country, because the count was given to the U.N., 

and they shared it with various missions. 

Mr. Gbagbo refused to step aside and sought to manipulate the 

process. We gave him an exit, sir. We gave him an exit. We were 

engaged on this on two accounts, on the democracy side and also 

on the side of trying to prevent and mitigate a conflict, which is 

one of our fundamental principles. 

President Obama sought to speak to Mr. Gbagbo on two different 

occasions. Secretary Clinton reached out to him. We arranged an 

opportunity for Mr. Gbagbo to leave Cote d’Ivoire and to take up 

residence in this country as a distinguished academic scholar. And 

he was a professor before he entered politics. 

He rejected all of those overtures, which would have given him 

an out. 

Between his arrest and transfer to The Hague, our people saw 

him when he was in incarceration in the northern part of the counVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:04 Aug 03, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~2\2012IS~1\041812-I.TXT BETTY
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try. He was always treated with respect and dignity, and was not 

in any way harmed or hurt. 

The same with respect to Mrs. Gbagbo. I personally asked our 

folks to go up and meet with her, to see whether she had been in 

any way harmed or assaulted by the troops who captured her. She 

was interviewed in private by a female Embassy officer, so that we 

could get information. 

I will find out where she is right now, and again ask my folks 

whether we can request to see her again. 

I was in Abidjan in January with Secretary Clinton. We had an 

opportunity to meet with most of the senior levels of the government, including President Ouattara and Foreign Minister Duncan. 

We saw an Abidjan that was in full recovery mode, a place that 

was returning to normalcy. 

We have not seen or heard of these death squads. And in fact, 

just 2 weeks ago, our Under Secretary for Management signed off 

on allowing our officers to take their children and their dependents 

back into Abidjan. 

I believe that the security situation is improving rapidly and 

continues to improve. Mr. Gbagbo is a case of an individual who 

engaged in illiberal democracy, who took power, and who was 

refusing to leave, even though he had sponsored an election and 

lost. 

Senator INHOFE. OK, I certainly don’t want to get into this. 

There are a lot of things that you have said that I disagree with. 

I would only say this, that the things that he was guilty of, in 

terms of his behavior in holding up and not taking us up on offers, 

he was convinced that the election was not an open and honest 

election. 

On the Senate floor, I presented a lot of different evidence that 

would back that up. I don’t know whether you looked at that, 

examined that. I never heard from anyone in the State Department 

during that time. 

But I only offer that at this time because I thought—and, by the 

way, in terms of Simone Gbagbo, we have pictures where her hair 

was pulled out and half-naked—I mean, we had a hearing on that. 

Remember that? 

Senator COONS. Yes. 

Senator INHOFE. We had a hearing here, and I didn’t know who 

the people were in the audience. It was kind of interesting. They 

were overwhelmingly in agreement with me, as opposed to the 

State Department, on this. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

We will now thank you for the testimony of our first panel. Given 

the march of time, we are going to move, if we can, to our second 

panel. 

We’re privileged to have Dr. Chris Fomunyoh and, as I mentioned before, Dr. Mo Ibrahim, who have come to join us and to 

share their perspectives on entrenched leadership and the various 

tools and mechanisms for making progress on the continent. 

Gentlemen, thank you so much for joining us today. 

Dr. Ibrahim, I would like to invite you to make your opening 

statement, if you could. 

32

STATEMENT OF DR. MO IBRAHIM, FOUNDER AND CHAIRMAN 

OF THE BOARD, MO IBRAHIM FOUNDATION, LONDON, UK 

Dr. IBRAHIM. Thank you, Chairman. And I’m really honored, Senator, to be here. Thank you very much for giving me this opportunity and this honor. 

And I’ll try to be brief. I know we’re running out of time maybe. 

Let me start by saying it’s really important to remember that 

democracy and good governance and human rights are really universal values. And this is not an American invention. 

And it’s very important in the language we use that we be careful with the language. I’m talking now from a position here of the 

Congress, we are not trying to impose in Africa an American way 

of life or an American—these are values which happen the American people, the American Government adheres to, and actually all 

civilized people ought to adhere to. So that sort of the language I 

think is important—to use when we address Africa. 

And a couple things are happening in Africa, which are very important. One is a rise of civil society, which is a new phenomenon, 

and it’s really important and changing what is going on there. 

The African institutions themselves are improving, and we can 

see the roles played by organizations like the African Union, or like 

ECOWAS, in dealing with conflicts, et cetera. 

And we really should focus on strengthening these institutions to 

allow them to help resolve the conflicts, like what happened in the 

recent conflicts in Mali. That’s much easier, because, the American 

Government will not put troops on the ground in Mali. I mean, I 

understand, it’s not easy, given the climate, what’s happened, et 

cetera. But it’s up to the African regional institutions to really do 

that. 

What the American Government should do is to support these 

institutions in playing the role they ought to play. 

One question, I heard people actually talking also about the 

AFRICOM. There is something called the African Standing Force. 

The African Union has agreed to put this standing force which 

is there to stop any kind of atrocities at the beginning, if there is 

a new Darfur or a new situation, it’s much easier to stop fires when 

they are small. 

And maybe that’s more important, actually than AFRICOM. 

With very little support in logistics, the United States can really 

help this African Standing Force to really deal with the issues. 

That would be less controversial than trying to put American soldiers in the group—or Special Forces, whatever. And that’s also 

being very acceptable to the American public and, indeed, to the 

African people as well. 

The issue of longstanding African leaders who refuse to budge is 

a problem. And it has a number of facets to it. 

One element of it I think is also human, which is those guys 

have nowhere to go. I mean, it’s also a human problem. You do 

your 4 years and say, OK, thank you very much. Give us the keys 

back and you can leave your helicopter here, and shall we call you 

a taxi? 

So, European leaders and U.S. leaders have a wonderful life after 

office. Actually, usually they start to make money after they leave 

office. Check everybody. The halls of JPMorgan or major banks and 

33

oil companies, et cetera, are full of ex-leaders, et cetera, which is 

fine. They have great experience to help businesses, et cetera. They 

publish books, memoirs, and they really are OK. 

Our African leaders don’t have that opportunity, and if after 

office, you’re really facing a life of poverty, it is a human problem. 

And what we need is to create space for us to use the experience 

of these leaders who served to really help resolve conflicts, do 

something at multilateral organizations, et cetera, or indeed the 

academic positions offered here to one leader who refused it, unfortunately, and ended up in The Hague, which is a very good example, actually, of people refuse a decent exit. They should end up in 

The Hague, in my view. 

So it’s really important to think positively instead of just negatively. How can we help people really do that transition? There is 

life after office, and that life can be wonderful. And you can always 

see American President—I always told Mr. Clinton, President Clinton, that, really, I think what he is doing now maybe is more important than what he did in office. He doesn’t like that, but I think 

that’s my personal view anyway. 

So there is good life after office, if people are engaged in, and we 

need to emphasize that for people. 

The United States is doing something wonderful, really, and nobody hears much about it, which is the Millennium Challenge Corporation. That is a wonderful and innovative piece of intervention. 

And not many people are aware of what the MCC, Millennium 

Challenge Corporation, is doing, and who has been given the 

grants and what for, et cetera. 

And I think it is really important to celebrate. We always look 

at the negative, have to shout or call names for people like 

Mugabe. We don’t think of how we celebrate the people who are 

doing good things, because that in itself can be an incentive for 

other people to also do good things. 

And I ask a question, if the Millennium Challenge Corporation 

this year, for example, decides that two countries qualified, they 

have done wonderful progress in the area of governance, and they 

really need to give them some grants, why don’t you get those two 

leaders here to have a cup of tea with President Obama, get some 

media, and everybody sees those guys. And then our leaders in 

Africa sees this happening and they think, oh, my God, I would like 

to be having tea with Obama over there. 

That’s great. It will cost you exactly $3, two cups of tea. That’s 

all it will cost you. And it’s something which really celebrates and 

shows the positive aspects of doing good for your country. 

In my foundation, I mean, we do a couple of things. One of them 

is a prize for the African leader who does wonderful work democratically, live democratically, clean hands, and really move the 

people forward. 

And the prize is $5 million and security, $200,000 for life, et 

cetera. The idea of that is to create a life for the leader afterward, 

and then you go on and live and work in civil society. 

But has also another objective in that it is honor, the honor of—

I mean, when you win the Nobel Prize, you don’t say, ‘‘Oh, I got 

$1 million.’’ You say, ‘‘I got the honor of winning the Nobel Prize.’’ 

So that honor is very important. Recognition is very important. 

34

And I hope the Congress or the White House can also recognize 

our winners. What bugs me as an African is that everywhere I go, 

I ask people in any lecture, who knows Mugabe? Everybody raises 

their hand. Who knows Mobutu? Everybody raises their hand. Who 

knows Omar Bashir? Everybody raises their hand. Who knows 

Chissano? Nobody knows. Who knows Mogae? Nobody knows. Nobody knows President—nobody knows who President is. 

We have a lot of unsung heroes, people who make tough decisions, brought peace to their lands, revise their economy, and left 

with clean hands and fine. Why the world doesn’t know these people? Those people should be recognized, and it costs nothing. 

Mr. Chairman, just a coke. Get the guys here, give them a coke, 

get the CNN to show it. That is important. 

When we did not give the prize, the year before, we did not 

award the prize. The effect was great, because everybody said, oh, 

why is this guy and this guy did not get the prize? It leads to scrutiny. So whether you give the prize or don’t give the prize, you do 

something important, which is you’re raising the issue. That becomes a central issue for the debate about governance and leadership. 

Why my leader did not win it? Why did this guy won it? Why 

is Obama honoring this man? Why is he not honoring him? This 

is also important issues in dealing with that. 

Of course, we do the index as well, which really shows what is—

how performance of each country, because governance is measured. 

It’s not because we like this guy or don’t like that guy. It is about 

good deliverables, and that’s really important. 

One thing also that’s really important, and I really want to 

thank the U.S. Congress for doing, very important, is the transparency bill you passed on natural resources, the oil and gas industries, the amendment by Senator Cardin and Senator Lugar. 

That was a wonderful piece of genius. It doesn’t cost anybody any 

money in this hard time. But it puts the light on a very important 

area. And I go all over Europe now. I’m talking to the European 

Parliaments and people, and say look at your colleagues in the 

United States. They switched on the light. You are sitting here lecturing us about transparency, but you’re doing nothing. 

You have a lot of Parliaments now trying to mimic what you’re 

doing by doing that. By ensuring transparency, you’re doing much 

more toward the development in Africa, actually, than all the aid 

money you give it, because Africa is not poor. Africa is rich. But 

we are mismanaged. We have corruption. We have money stolen, 

et cetera. 

Let us clear that area, and then we don’t need much aid really, 

after doing that. 

But I really thank you for showing leadership in fighting corruption. Yesterday, we heard about the British Government starting 

corruption case against an oil company in Africa. We should do 

that. Last year, seven European companies were fined something 

like $600 million or $700 million by the U.S. Government for corruption out there. And I again ask our friends in Europe, look, 

Europe is bankrupt. Why aren’t you, you know, prosecute your own 

guys and get the $700 million instead of the Americans? 

35

But that is something that is a brand of America, of really rule 

of law. And it carries a meaning—corruption. 

And we salute that brand. And it’s very important for you to 

maintain that brand of good governance. 

And I was really disappointed recently when I see U.S. again 

claiming ownership of the World Bank. What’s the big deal? Does 

it matter that the president of the World Bank is Zoellick or some 

other American citizen? Why doesn’t—when your ambassadors in 

Africa go to lecture our people about process, about openness, ‘‘you 

cannot put a finance minister in who is your cousin or who is from 

your tribe,’’ et cetera, how can he say that with a straight face 

when the U.S. decides that the World Bank international institutional really should not be run by merit, it should be run by passport? 

That is inconsistent. That damages the U.S. brand. 

So the United States also needs to walk the talk. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Ibrahim follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. MO IBRAHIM

As the Honourable Committee seeks to review United States policy options with 

regard to African heads of state whose behaviour challenges United States values 

and objectives, the wording might benefit from some amendments. 

The manipulation or disregard of constitutions by African heads of states is, primarily a violation of African values and objectives. Democracy and good governance 

are not American values, they are universal. All nations that subscribe to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international legal instruments must 

uphold those values. Therefore the approach of the United States in seeking to reinforce those norms must begin from this premise. 

Since the transformation of the OAU in to the AU in 2001, there has been a paradigm shift that has allowed states to intervene in the affairs of other sovereign 

states. Furthermore, in recent times we have seen African Regional Economic 

Communites, ECOWAS in particular, take a very strong and unified position on 

heads of state who behave unconstitutionally. The immediate expulsion of Niger 

from ECOWAS when President Tandja tried to extend his mandate (and more recent actions regarding Cote d’Ivoire and Mali) show the political cohesion and force 

that these communities can—probably in a more efficient and sustainable way than 

any foreign partner—bring to bear on errant member states. Thus, by supporting 

and endorsing regional economic communities to take the lead on such issues, the 

United States can bolster the capacity of these hugely underresourced African institutions to solve crises while avoiding accusations of interfering in the affairs of sovereign nations. And this is probably the most efficient way to get results 

Contrast this approach with that adopted by Prime Minister Blair in Durban in 

2002. By singling President Mugabe out for sustained criticism, Tony Blair 

inadvertedly caused other heads of state from the SADC region—who were at that 

time showing signs of frustration with regime—to close ranks against ‘‘colonialist 

arrogance.’’ Consequently, it has been impossible for SADC to take a progressive 

position on the political situation in Zimbabwe. 

More broadly, one must shift from a focus on individuals and naming and shaming to a focus on institutions and building incentives. While those institutions must 

be African, the incentives used can be more universal. 

One of the core reasons behind instituting the Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in 

African Leadership was the interest to to set examples for the continent and to 

prove that excellence in African leadership was indeed possible. But an equally important rationale was that of creating a life after office. While any retired heads of 

state elsewhere—whether or not he/she has demonstrated excellence in leadership—

can serve on corporate boards and leverage their previous experience into highprofile and highly lucrative work, such opportunities rarely exist in Africa. Therefore, there is an incentive for leaders to remain for as long as possible and to ensure 

their financial security while in office. 

While the Prize seeks to redress this, much more could be done in this regard. 

Retired heads of state have vast experience and networks that could be brought to 

bear on some of the challenges facing the continent. One traditional route is leading 

36

African Union or Commonwealth election observer missions. It is worth noting the 

extremely important, and unrecognised, role that Former Nigerian President, 

Olesegun Obasanjo, played as AU Head of Observer Mission during the recent elections in Senegal. 

Moreover, as we see the ‘‘African Renaissance’’ generation of heads of state drawing to a close and the rise of a much younger and more technocratic leadership generation whose agendas are more national than international, it may be appropriate 

to create mechanisms for former heads of state to represent Africa in a unified way 

in global climate and trade negotiations. Such challenging, high-profile, and prestigious roles would offer exactly the kind of life after office that could contribute to 

a higher turnover of leaders. 

The United States has successfully identified how incentives can promote the good 

governance agenda through the Millennium Challenge Corporation. Initiatives that 

seek to praise rather than blame and isolate are invariably more constructive. More 

could be done in this direction through endorsing initiatives such as the Extractive 

Industries Transparency Initiative and the Natural Resource Charter, as well as 

facilitating resolution of land tenure issues. Such initiatives that clearly delineate 

public assets and create a sense of public ownership will invariably help to mitigate 

the trend whereby heads of state conflate national and personal assets. Conversely, 

approaches that focus too much on the individual and seek to hold them up to great 

acclaim or condemnation, perpetuates personalised rule. 

The U.S. approach to democracy and good governance, in comparison with other 

countries, has the unique advantage of being consistent with the identity and brand 

of the United States. However, this is undermined when U.S. processes are not seen 

to conform to principles of good governance around contentious issues such as the 

U.S. ‘‘ownership’’ of the World Bank Presidency and even the debate that surrounded the United States Presidential election in Florida in 2000. In this regard, 

the most effective intervention would be to ensure that the government was able 

to practise what it preaches. If not, the subsequent loss of legitimacy will render 

good governance goals unattainable. 

Finally, in assessing the impact of the Ibrahim Prize on governance in Africa, I 

believe that the most important outcome is the debate that has been created, the 

speculation over whether incumbents will or could win or over whether predecessors 

should have won. It is exposing the record of heads of state to scrutiny and creating 

awareness that, upon retiring, they will be assessed by their peers very publicly. In 

her most recent book, President Johnson Sirleaf discusses her ambition to win the 

Prize. One other, now retired, head of state mentioned the Prize in his rationale for 

not seeking another term. For an initiative only 5 years old to begin to change 

behaviours is a source of real affirmation for the work of our organisation. Moreover, if we have had some success, it is because the Prize was designed as a response to a lack of incentives in this space and an understanding that individuals 

of all nationalities are motivated by the same things. Last, but not least, while we 

focussed on individuals, it was from the perspective of seeking to praise rather than 

blame. 

In summary, the greater the emphasis on supporting African institutional positions on these issues and working to align the incentives of heads of state with regular democratic transitions, the greater the likelihood of success.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Dr. Ibrahim. 

Dr. Fomunyoh. 

STATEMENT OF DR. CHRISTOPHER FOMUNYOH, SENIOR ASSOCIATE AND REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR CENTRAL AND WEST 

AFRICA, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, 

DC 

Dr. FOMUNYOH. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, on 

behalf of the National Democratic Institute, I really appreciate the 

opportunity to discuss potential United States policy responses 

toward entrenched African leadership. 

For more than 25 years, the National Democratic Institute has 

conducted programs alongside African Democrats to support and 

consolidate the democratic governance on the continent. The institute has conducted programs in 44 of Africa’s 54 countries, and I’ve 

37

been fortunate to have been part of that effort for the past 19 

years. 

Many Africans and African experts agree that the entrenched 

one-man rule, often autocratic in nature, is an impediment to political development in many African countries today. Despite the continent’s abundant human capital and rich mineral resources, longserving leaders inhibit the emergence of democratic political space, 

and many African countries still suffer a democracy deficit as a 

result. 

In some cases, these leaders are octogenarians holding tight at 

the tip of a demographic triangle where two-thirds of the adult population is under the age of 35. 

At the same time, significant political change has occurred in 

Africa in the last 2 decades. For example, between 1960 when 

many African countries achieved independence, and 1990, only 

three heads of states voluntarily retired from office in Africa. However, as a result of oncoming democratic transitions, by 2000 the 

number of heads of state that have either retired from office or 

stepped down after losing an election has risen to more than 30. 

Also, subregional organizations have adopted protocols on governance and elections that have facilitated the renewal of political 

leadership in member states. For example, by insisting on strict adherence to constitutionality and credible elections among member 

states, the Economic Community of West Africa States, ECOWAS, 

have given most of Africa a facelift. 

In fact, today only two of the regional blocs of 15 countries are 

ruled by leaders who have been in power for more than 10 years. 

Similarly, norms and guidelines adopted and enforced by the 

Southern Africa Development Community, SADC, have facilitated 

peaceful political transitions and renewed leadership in countries 

such as Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 

South Africa, and Zambia. 

Nevertheless, in still too many African countries, entrenched 

leaders hold onto power in defiance of democratic practices and 

norms enshrined in international instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which require that citizens 

have the opportunity to renew their political leadership through 

regular and credible elections. 

In June 2005, NDI and a number of organizations brought together 15 former African heads of state from 14 countries in 

Bamako, Mali, to share ideas on why some African leaders facilitated political transitions in their respective countries while others 

impeded the process. In the Bamako declaration issued at the end 

of the meeting, these African leaders affirmed that, ‘‘changes of 

power and political succession should always be based on constitutional rule in democratic principles.’’

In early 2012, Senegal’s democracy was tested by controversy on 

the candidacy of incoming President Abdoulaye Wade, which was 

viewed by many Senegalese as contrary to term limits enshrined 

in the country’s constitution. Thanks in large measure to effective 

grassroots mobilization by Senegalese civil society, the media, 

youth movements, and political parties, the electoral process was 

safeguarded, and the country experienced a credible transition of 

power. 

38

The Senegal example illustrates that other tenets of democracy 

had taken root across Africa, and when properly harnessed or 

mobilized can serve as the firewall to democratic backsliding, and 

in the process, remind African leaders that there is life after the 

statehouse. 

The experience of Senegal contrasts sharply with that of Cameroon, a country that obtained independence the same year, 1960, 

and that has comparable governmental institutions. For the past 

50 years, Cameroon has failed to conduct a national election that 

was not overshadowed by controversy. 

In Cameroon, the opaque handling of electoral processes and government-imposed hurdles impede the ability of civil society and 

independent media to monitor and report on elections. Cameroonian youth, prompted by restrictive laws and a lack of confidence in the country’s political system and institutions are becoming apathetic and apprehensive of their future. 

After the Presidential election of 2011, which was widely criticized as poorly conducted by both domestic and international 

observers, the incoming head of state, who has been in power for 

30 years, acknowledged publicly the need for electoral reform. Yet 

this commitment was followed a few days ago by amendments to 

the election law that restrict citizen participation in politics and 

shrink political space even more. 

There is increasing concern that the lack of political will to create the appropriate framework for credible and democratic elections 

in Cameroon while preserving an incumbent entrenched regime in 

power may push the country to the brink of violence and instability. 

The international community needs to demonstrate the political 

will to continually helping African democrats to uphold the high 

standards they have adopted for themselves. 

Along those lines, the African Union’s charter on democracy, election, and governance calls for states to regularly hold ‘‘transparent, 

free, and fair elections’’ that provide citizens a voice in the selection 

of their leaders, and authorizes sanctions when incoming governments fail to abide by the outcome of free and fair elections or 

amend their constitutions to infringe on the principles of democratic change of government. The international community and the 

African Union should ensure that African governments adhere to 

the provisions of the charter. 

An increasing number of brave and courageous Africans are holding themselves and their leaders to higher standards of democratic 

performance. 

Today, unlike 2 decades ago, the comparison is not between the 

poor performing African states or African regimes and the United 

States, or other established democracies. The comparison is 

between the poor performance in other African countries that face 

similar economic and development challenges but still endeavor to 

give their citizens their rights and dignity they deserve and being 

proud of their constitutions and their elections. 

Despite the setbacks faced by African democrats beaten down by 

entrenched regimes, citizens’ voices on the continent are being 

heard increasingly. And governance trends are moving in a positive 

direction for the most part. 

39

The continent is not doomed to failure, even on the leadership 

index. Africa has its share of emerging visionary leaders, and I 

remain optimistic that should the collective support for democracy 

be sustained and enhanced, new success stories will emerge. 

I’ve submitted longer testimony in writing, and I want to thank 

you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Isakson, for your time and attention. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Fomunyoh follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. CHRISTOPHER FOMUNYOH

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you to discuss 

potential U.S. policy responses to entrenched African leadership. For more than 25 

years, NDI has conducted programs alongside African democrats to support and consolidate democratic governance, advocate for fair and credible elections, strengthen 

political parties, and encourage citizen participation in politics, especially among 

women and youth. The Institute has conducted programs in 44 of Africa’s 54 countries, and I have been fortunate to be part of that effort in many of those countries 

for the past 19 years. That has meant numerous and sustained interactions with 

pro-democracy activists and democratically elected leaders across the continent. 

INTRODUCTION

Many Africans and Africa experts would agree that entrenched one-man rule, 

often autocratic in nature, is still an impediment to political development in many 

African countries today. Despite the continent’s valuable and abundant human capital and rich mineral resources, many African countries still suffer a democracy deficit because of long serving heads of state whose actions inhibit the emergence of 

an enabling environment that could permit the continent to realize its full democratic potential. In some cases, these leaders are octogenarians holding tight at the 

tip of a demographic triangle where two-thirds of the adult population is under the 

age of 35.1

At the same time, significant political change has occurred in Africa in the last 

two decades since the beginning of what has been termed the ‘‘third wave of democratization’’ in the early 1990s. For example, between 1960, when many African 

countries achieved independence, and 1990, only three heads of state voluntarily retired from office. However, as a result of ongoing democratic transitions, by 2000 

the number of heads of state that had either retired from office or stepped down 

after losing an election had risen to more than 30.2 In 1980, while rating democracies around the world, Freedom House ranked only 4 sub-Saharan African countries as ‘‘free’’ and 15 as ‘‘partly free’’; by 2011, 9 were ranked as ‘‘free’’ and 22 as 

‘‘partly free.’’ 3

Also, some subregional bodies have adopted protocols and guidelines on governance and elections that strengthen democracy and have facilitated the renewal of 

political leadership in member states. For example, by insisting on strict adherence 

to constitutionalism and credible elections among member states, the Economic 

Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has given most of West Africa a facelift despite the recent military incursions in the politics of Mali and Guinea Bissau. 

Today, only two of the regional bloc’s 15 countries are ruled by leaders who have 

been in power for more than 10 years. Similarly, because of norms and guidelines 

adopted and enforced by the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), 

Southern Africa has experienced peaceful political transitions and renewed leadership in countries such as Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 

South Africa, and Zambia. 

Nevertheless, Africa is a mosaic and a tapestry whose leaders project many 

shades of political performance and varying degrees of democratic credentials. In 

still too many African countries, entrenched leaders hold onto power and govern 

their countries in complete defiance of democratic practices and norms enshrined in 

international instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 

which call for citizens to have the opportunity to renew their political leadership 

through regular and credible elections. 4 In almost all cases, the provisions of the 

Universal Declaration are also adopted in the preambles of the constitutions of 

these countries, but they are ignored or amended at will to suit the personal quest 

for political self-preservation of the leader. 

As of the start of 2011, 10 African heads of state had been in power longer than 

20 years.5 The ‘‘Arab Spring’’ has reduced the number of North African autocrats 

40

in the past year, but the number of entrenched leaders remains high in sub-Saharan 

Africa. It is noteworthy that most of these leaders are concentrated either in the 

Horn of Africa or in the Gulf of Guinea, two areas that should be of significant 

geostrategic value to U.S. interests and attention. 

In June 2005, NDI brought together 15 former African heads of state from 14 

countries in Bamako, Mali, to share experiences and ideas on why some African 

leaders facilitated political transitions in their respective countries while others 

impeded the process. The group also discussed ways that former African heads of 

state could continue to contribute positively to addressing the major challenges of 

democratic governance and human development on the continent. The African 

Statesmen Initiative was developed in part to highlight the role that former leaders 

can play as elder statesmen. In a Bamako Declaration issued at the end of the meeting, these African leaders restated their firm belief that democracy remains the 

‘‘sole form of government that permits the development of the range of national institutions needed to ensure sustainable peace, security, economic growth, and social 

well-being,’’ and committed themselves to using their ‘‘good offices to promote development objectives and advance democratic governance.’’ 6 Members further affirmed 

that ‘‘changes of power and political succession should always be based on constitutional rule and democratic principles,’’ and they expressed grave concern that many 

countries on the continent still failed to meet such requirements for democratic 

transitions. 

Shortly after the Bamako summit, the heads of state present formally launched 

the Forum for Former African Heads of State and Government (Africa Forum), a 

group of 33 with ‘‘strong democratic credentials’’ that engages in activities to promote sustainable peace and security, enhance democratic governance and protect 

human rights.7 Many of these leaders have launched private foundations to continue 

good works in their respective countries, and are increasingly involved in conflict 

mediation and peacebuilding, election monitoring, and other humanitarian causes 

across the continent. 

SOURCES OF ENTRENCHMENT

In many cases, long-serving leaders stay in power by repressing political dissent 

and manipulating electoral and constitutional processes within their countries. 

While in the 1990s people-driven democratization efforts through national conferences and inclusive constituent assemblies led to successful constitutional reform 

in many countries, in the last decade we have seen constitutional backsliding in 

countries whose constitutions were amended to abolish term limits and thereby 

allow longserving leaders to prolong their stays in office. In most cases, the amendments were rushed through Parliaments without broad-based, inclusive discussions 

or extensive consultations that would have allowed more citizen input in the process. These cases epitomize the fragility of constitutionalism and institutions of 

checks and balances in many countries on the continent because while most constitutions in Africa may be well-written, their full and just implementation lags 

behind. 

As the bedrock upon which the nation-state is anchored, the fundamental law of 

the land ought not to be trampled upon with impunity else laws pertaining to issues 

such as human rights, the administration of justice, the protection of minorities, 

women’s interests, and the protection of private enterprise can be easily ignored or 

set aside. 

While more African countries now hold regular elections that meet international 

standards, there is a correlation between flawed Presidential electoral processes and 

longevity in office. Entrenched leaders are more apt to structure the rules governing 

elections to ensure victory. Even if some of these leaders publicly embrace the rhetoric of political pluralism and competitive elections, their actions are often geared 

toward limiting political space and participation by creating an uneven playing field. 

Although elections alone do not a democracy make, multiparty elections are a pillar of democratic governance. Elections also create multiple opportunities to gauge 

the vitality of a country’s democracy using benchmarks such as: the right of free 

association, as citizens and candidates engage in campaign activities across the 

country; the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, which may be called 

upon to rule on election-related grievances and needs to assure citizens that they 

can obtain fair and equitable recourse through nonviolent means; the professionalism and neutrality of security services; and the faith of citizens in civil discourse and tolerance of diverse viewpoints. Elections are a vehicle for the participation of citizens in the democratic process, and they help to build capacities that are 

central to achieving accountable, democratic governance. So when the rules around 

41

elections are designed to achieve a particular outcome, societal cleavages are exacerbated and the possibility of violence increases. 

In democracies, elections remain the sole mechanism through which leaders negotiate and enter into a social contract with citizens as they develop and debate policy 

positions, and ultimately obtain the mandate to govern. Should a leader steal an 

election or bend the rules in this very public negotiation, then it becomes easier for 

such a leader to transgress other laws and public obligations relating to accountability, transparency, the fight against corruption, honesty in government and other 

principles of good governance. Such issues become less significant in the eyes and 

daily conduct of that leader. 

IMPACT OF ENTRENCHED LEADERSHIP

Not only do entrenched leaders manipulate constitutions to deny citizens access 

to regular and credible elections, they are apt to further weaken governmental institutions to impede checks on their power. Moreover, state resources, including the 

public treasury, are likely to be diverted to serve private interests. Also, a disproportionate amount of national resources are likely to be allocated to regime security 

with vital aspects of human security relegated to the periphery. It is therefore no 

surprise that these longserving regimes measure poorly in multiple social accountability indicators such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 

Index (CPI), the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) and the Millennium Development Goals, even when they are oil-rich countries with moderate to 

high income per capita. 

African heads of state that insist on remaining in power for decades are antithetical to the growing sense of optimism among Africans and friends of Africa about 

the continent and its future. They also are an oddity on a continent in which an 

estimated 83-percent of the population is under the age of 40,8 which explains in 

part the reason why even though Africans remain strongly committed to democracy, 

they are equally less pleased with the performance of many of their leaders. Despite 

the challenges of democratization in today’s Africa, NDI is heartened by a recent 

Afrobarometer study that showed that a large majority of Africans continue to 

aspire to the ideals of democracy. While satisfaction with the performance of leaders 

in the countries sampled had dropped in the last decade from 61 to 56 percent, support for democracy among citizens had grown from 69 to 72 percent in the same 

period.9

TURNING THE TIDE

Through the first quarter of 2012, Senegal’s democracy was tested by controversy 

over the candidacy of incumbent President Wade, viewed by many Senegalese as 

contrary to the term limits enshrined in the country’s constitution. Thanks in large 

measure to effective grassroots mobilization by Senegalese civil society, the media, 

youth movements and political parties, the electoral process was safeguarded and 

the country experienced a credible transition of power. The Senegal example is significant because it illustrates that other tenets of democracy are taking root across 

Africa, and when properly mobilized can serve as a firewall to democratic backsliding. To Wade’s credit, his timely concession was unprecedented for an African 

leader who had tried at a minimum to push the envelope in terms of his stay in 

office. That concession is also a reflection of a greater trend toward democratic governance in many parts of Africa and an increasing recognition by African leaders 

that there is life after the State House. 

The experience of Senegal contrasts sharply with that of Cameroon, a country 

that obtained independence the same year—1960—and that has comparable governance institutions. Unlike in Senegal, for the past 50 years, even after the return to 

multiparty politics in 1990, Cameroon has failed to conduct a national election that 

was not overshadowed by controversy. Over the years in Cameroon, the opaque handling of electoral processes has aided manipulation by government official at all levels, and administrative hurdles impede the ability of civil society and independent 

media to monitor and report on elections. Political discourse is highly polarized, and 

there is a distinct unwillingness among the ruling elite to recognize the rich, diverse 

viewpoints that exist within Cameroonian society. Cameroonian youth, prompted by 

restrictive laws and a lack of confidence in the country’s political system and institutions, are becoming apathetic and apprehensive of their future. After the Presidential election of 2011, which was widely criticized as poorly conducted by both 

domestic and international observation missions,10 the incumbent head of state, who 

has been in power for 30 years, acknowledged publicly the need for electoral reform. 

Yet this commitment was followed a few days ago by the government adopting 

amendments to the election law that restrict citizen participation in politics and 

42

shrink political space even further. There is increasing concern that the lack of 

political will to create the appropriate framework and mechanisms for credible 

democratic elections, while preserving an entrenched regime in power, may be pushing the country to the brink of violence and instability. The cumulative effect of 

these factors impedes the bright and prosperous future for Cameroon that other 

African countries such as Senegal, Ghana, Benin, and Botswana have come to take 

for granted. Cameroonians realize that in the past 30 years, Senegal has had four 

Presidents—Leopold Sedar Senghor, Abdou Diouf, Abdoulaye Wade, and Macky 

Sall—and its reputation continues to grow across the continent and around the 

world; and they wonder why, over the same 30-year period, a de facto one-man rule 

has imposed itself on them. 

In a number of other African countries, Parliaments have vetoed attempts by incumbent Presidents to extend their terms of office, even when the majority in Parliament belonged to the incumbent party. This remarkable show of independence 

and commitment to constitutionalism and the rule of law among African legislators 

contributed measurably to fostering peaceful democratic transitions in Nigeria in 

2007, Malawi in 2002, and Zambia in 2001. 

These examples highlight the role that countervailing institutions—legislatures, 

the media, and civil society—play in balancing the power of the executive, with the 

corollary understanding that as these institutions gain in credibility and performance, they become more adept at curbing entrenched leadership. 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AT LARGE

Clearly, citizens living under entrenched regimes have no access to the freedoms 

that their peers enjoy in more democratic societies. They often live with a constant 

threat of repression, intimidation, and harassment if they attempt to make their 

voices heard. The absence of proper mechanisms for dialogue between citizens and 

those that govern in these societies means that citizens have no choice when their 

frustrations overflow than to express them in the public space, often at the risk of 

vociferous repression and loss of life. In Cameroon in 2008, riots linked in large part 

to grievances over the government’s decision to amend the constitution and eliminate term limits were severely repressed and officially left 40 young men and 

women dead, although credible human rights organizations, including the Catholic 

Church, reported over 100 deaths.11

By strengthening representative institutions and civil society organizations, the 

international community can help African democrats consolidate or deepen the fragile democratic gains of the last two decades. Independent election commissions are 

essential to holding credible elections that create a level playing field for all contestants, and nonpartisan citizen election observers can deter manipulation and provide 

information about the credibility of election results. A well-organized, vibrant civil 

society can be an effective watchdog against the emergence of entrenched leaders. 

More effective legislatures and independent judiciaries can provide safeguards to the 

many Africans that aspire to be governed democratically. While international support for development of these institutions can increase the possibility of strong 

counterbalances to entrenched leaders, consistent public diplomacy can go a long 

way in assuring African democrats that they are part of a global community of 

democrats with shared values and ideals. 

As African regional bodies operationalize protocols to promote and protect democratic governance, the international community should demonstrate the political will 

to support these regional networks in upholding the high standards they have 

adopted for themselves. Along these lines, the African Union’s Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, now ratified by enough African countries to be 

binding, calls for states to regularly hold ‘‘transparent, free, and fair elections’’ that 

provide citizens a voice in the selection of their leaders. Furthermore, the Charter 

authorizes sanctions when incumbent governments fail to abide by the outcomes of 

free and fair elections or amend their constitutions to infringe on the ‘‘principles of 

democratic change of government.’’ 12 Regional organizations such as ECOWAS and 

SADC have adopted similar protocols aimed at fostering democratic governance and 

have shown firm responsiveness to unconstitutional maneuvers such as the recent 

coups in Mali and Guinea-Bissau and the flawed Presidential election of November 

2011 in The Gambia. The international community and the African Union should 

ensure that African countries adhere to the provisions of the Charter and relevant 

protocols to foster democracy and consolidate the gains of recent years. 

The international community can also highlight the role of elder statesmen and 

increase recognition for leaders who govern justly and facilitate peaceful and meaningful leadership transitions that respect the letter and the spirit of the constitutions of their respective countries and international norms. Along these lines, NDI 

43

expresses its appreciation to Dr. Mo Ibrahim and his Foundation for his leadership 

in this regard and for helping reinforce the message to incumbent African leaders 

that there are meaningful opportunities in life after office. 

Even if more needs to be done in specific countries based on the particularities 

of each case study, the international community at large will do well to recognize 

more firmly that African aspirations for democracy are genuine and legitimate, 

borne not just in the universality of freedom and democratic values but also in the 

very fundamentals of African culture—respect for human life and human dignity. 

In today’s globalized world, as events in one country or continent impact developments in other spheres, denying leadership opportunities to a whole generation of 

African youth and emerging leaders deprives Africa and the rest of the world of the 

tremendous talent, exuberance, and energy that the continent is capable of contributing to a better world in the 21st century. It is a travesty of generational injustice 

that a handful of leaders should be the perpetrators of such deprivation. 

CONCLUSION

An increasing number of brave and courageous Africans are holding themselves 

and their leaders to high standards of democratic performance. Today, unlike two 

decades ago, the comparison is not between the poor performing African regimes 

and the United States or other established democracies; the comparison is between 

the poor performers and other African countries that face similar economic and 

developmental challenges, but still endeavor to give their citizens the rights and dignity they deserve in being proud of their constitutions and elections. 

Despite the setbacks faced by African democrats pinned down by entrenched 

regimes, citizens’ voices on the continent are being heard and governance trends are 

moving in a positive direction for the most part. The continent is not doomed to failure, even on the leadership index. Africa has its share of success stories with emerging visionary leaders, and I am optimistic that should the collective support for 

democracy be sustained and enhanced, new success stories will emerge.

————————

End Notes

1. U.S. Census Bureau, ‘‘International Data Base.’’ 2012 population estimates for Chad and 

Cameroon. 

2. Goldsmith, Arthur A. ‘‘Risk, Rule, and Reason in Africa.’’ African Economic Policy Discussion Paper 46, (Washington: USAID, 2000). 

3. Freedom House. ‘‘Freedom in the World’’ 1980 and 2011. (http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world) 

4. United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 21. (http://www.un.org/en/

documents/udhr/index.shtml#a21) 

5. Muammar Gaddafi of Libya (42 years as head of state), Teodoro Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea (32 years), Jose Santos of Angola (32 years), Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe (31 

years), Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (30 years), Paul Biya of Cameroon (29 years), Yoweri Museveni 

of Uganda (25 years), King Mswati III of Swaziland (24 years), Blaise Campore ́ of Burkina Faso 

(24 years), and Zine Ben Ali of Tunisia (23 years). 

6. Bamako Declaration of the African Statesmen Initiative.( http://asi.ndi.org/about/declaration/bamakoldeclaration.pdf) 

7. The Forum of Former African Heads of State and Government (Africa Forum): In Brief. 

(http://www.africaforum.org/images/stories/pdf/africa%20forum%20brief.pdf) 

8. U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base. 2012 population estimates for sub-Saharan 

Africa. 

9. Afrobarometer Surveys. (http://www.afrobarometer.org/index.php) 

10. ‘‘The Electoral Process in Cameroon: What Are the Lessons Learned?’’: Remarks by Ambassador Robert P. Jackson at the Civil Society Post-Election Roundtable. 19 October 2011. 

(http://yaounde.usembassy.gov/spl10192011.html) 

11. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘2008 Human Rights Report: Cameroon,’’ February 25, 2009. 

(http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/118990.htm) 

12. The African Union, ‘‘African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.’’ http://

www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/text/Charter%20on%20Democracy.pdf)

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

Senator Isakson, did you want to say something in conclusion? 

Senator Isakson has to leave. I will have a few more questions. 

Senator ISAKSON. I apologize for that. I want to commend Dr. 

Fomunyoh. Is that——

Dr. FOMUNYOH. That’s correct. 

Senator ISAKSON. With Isakson, I’m always sensitive to pronunciation. 

44

Dr. FOMUNYOH. Thank you. 

Senator ISAKSON. I want to commend you. Your prepared statement is a very thoughtful history, really, of Africa and democracy 

that everybody ought to read, and you make some outstanding 

points about the success of Nigeria and Malawi and Zambia as a 

trend that is taking place in Africa. 

And Chairman Coons and I visited Benin and Ghana last year 

about this time, with Ghana, President Mills has done a remarkable job. 

And I think what Dr. Ibrahim talked about in terms of that 

MCC, there’s no better example of the payback of MCC than in 

Ghana, where we had taken the pineapple industry, which for 

them was a great industry, but so perishable. And now, because of 

an MCC grant, we’ve been in the chiller where they have 14 plantations together, where they store, process, and then ship the pineapples. And it’s just been a phenomenal experience to see MCC and 

its requirements on doing away with corruption and making investment in the country pay off. 

So I want to thank both of you for your testimony and for your 

love of Africa. And I want to commend this history piece that you 

wrote for us, Doctor, it’s outstanding. And I’m going to take it with 

me and make it a part of my library. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Isakson. 

And thank you for your attendance and leadership today. 

I have a few more minutes and then there is a budget committee 

hearing, which I, too, must join. 

Dr. Fomunyoh, I just wanted to bear down for a moment on 

Cameroon in particular. 

You heard the testimony of Assistant Secretary Carson earlier. 

He urged us to write a letter to President Biya, much as we did 

jointly, Senator Isakson and I, to President Wade of Senegal. We 

talked about a variety of different tools available to the AU, to the 

African community, to civil society, and to the United States. 

What advice do you have for us about what we could do to

be constructive, to make progress in Cameroon? And what do you

see as the costs for Cameroonians of 30 years of governance by

one man and by one group? How has it affected the average 

Cameroonian? 

Dr. FOMUNYOH. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman. 

I think that it’s a lot that you have already been doing. Just by 

holding this hearing, I’ve been made to understand that there’s 

been a lot of discussion already in the independent media in Cameroon about the attention you are bringing to African issues within 

the U.S. Congress. 

There are a number of public diplomacy tools that really don’t 

cost anything, as Dr. Mo Ibrahim was saying, but that have a huge 

impact on the African Continent. I think when the U.S. Government speaks, any branch of the U.S. Government speaks out on 

African issues, people listen and people pay attention. 

I can say that the letter that you sent to President Wade on the 

Senegalese situation had a huge impact, because it did embolden 

the democrats of Senegal to know that they were not alone. And 

I think that’s a very important message to send to people who put 

45

their lives on the line on a daily basis, sometimes in extremely difficult circumstances, to realize that they are part of a global community of democrats and people who care about democracy and 

good governance around the world. 

For the average Cameroonian, they look at Senegal, and they 

realize in the last 30 years, Senegal has had four heads of state, 

Sedar Senghor, Abdou Diouf, Abdoulaye Wade, and now Macky 

Sall. But in the same 30-year period, Cameroon has been subjected 

to one-man rule. And it dampens a sense of—it reinforces a sense 

of hopelessness, which we cannot allow to be sustained within the 

youth population. 

And it explains, to a large degree, why the youth population is 

becoming very detached from political engagement. And it also 

raises the prospect that ultimately, at some point, if citizens lose 

faith in the electoral process and in the ability to change their leaders through a credible democratic process, they’re going to think of 

other means to have their voices heard. And I think the last thing 

we need on our hands is another incident of violence and instability 

on the African Continent. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Dr. Fomunyoh. 

Dr. Ibrahim, if you might, you talk about the need for incentives, 

for recognition, for legacy, for a place to go, for a peaceful and 

appropriate opportunity after national leadership. And in our own 

national history, George Washington gave us a huge gift by, at the 

moment that he could have made himself President for life or king, 

handing back the reins of power and receding, and so, too, President Mandela of South Africa, who has been honored by your 

foundation for this, gave an enormous gift of leadership by demonstrating his selflessness in relinquishing control of the Presidency of South Africa. 

I just want to start by thanking you for what your foundation 

has done, for what you have done, to celebrate and recognize. 

I’d be interested in your view of what we can to do to continue 

to celebrate and recognize. Your idea of having us have leaders for 

a coke or encourage our President to have them for a tea I find 

charming and hopefully effective. 

But when we’re talking about sending a letter to President Wade 

or President Biya, to some extent, this could be misinterpreted as 

a finger-wagging or shaming. Some have criticized the United 

States for not more vocally and publicly criticizing entrenched leaders like President Biya. But a lot of those communications have 

happened diplomatically, privately, in letters or communications 

that are less public. 

I’d welcome your advice on how to be most effective, how to be 

most respectful, but how the United States, given the sensitivities, 

how European countries like the United Kingdom—we spoke earlier about former Prime Minister Blair’s unconstructive role with 

Mugabe—how we can be effective in calling out those who perhaps 

deserve a trip to The Hague or perhaps deserve public opprobrium, 

and then how we balance that with offering encouragement and 

legacy and positive reinforcement for those who would seek that. 

Dr. IBRAHIM. I really think, by mixing the incentives with the 

finger-wagging, then it doesn’t become just finger-wagging. 

46

I think people should make a statement. I mean, I’m wondering 

why Mr. Sarkozy, for example, did not say anything about the election in Cameroon, unless he said something I haven’t heard about 

it. I’m sure he didn’t. Because that’s also power, which has an 

effect. 

But if the United States and France, both of them said, really, 

this is not nice. And you know want? You’re not going to be welcome in this country. That would be huge, a huge effect. 

At the same time, it would not be seen really as much as interfering in the internal affairs of the country, because you just made 

a statement—I will not give you a visa if you come to this country, 

which is not a big deal—but beside that, we need incentive for the 

good people as well, because that will always shed the light even 

on the guys who did not get it. And that I think is a balancing act 

between the two. 

Please, by any means, don’t be shy in pointing fingers. But do 

the other things as well, so we don’t appear only as just pointing 

a finger at people. 

And let us help build institutions and do things. I don’t, for example, I did not enjoy very much the sight of American activists 

being taken out of Cairo by private plane, having paid so many 

millions just to get out. What were American activists doing in 

Cairo anyway? They have a few million Egyptian activists. You 

help institutions and instead of trying to intervene yourselves, just 

more appreciate it—because there are some people there, for good 

reasons or bad reasons, they’re trying to find some reason to say, 

oh, the United States is trying to do something here, which in 

many cases is not fair. 

Senator COONS. Both of you have pointed out the very constructive role that ECOWAS has played. I take that advice about how 

we can work more constructively with regional institutions. 

I now need to bring this hearing to a close. We’re at a time when 

I must. 

Dr. IBRAHIM. Thank you, sir. 

Senator COONS. I have to speak also at the Budget Committee. 

I wanted to thank you for your constructive comments on the extractive industries part of the Dodd-Frank Act, also your positive 

comments on the Millennium Challenge Corporation. And we look 

forward to working together with you to find ways to further 

strengthen the recognition of those African leaders who make 

appropriate transitions. 

With that, we will keep the record open until Friday, April 20, 

for members of the committee who were not able to join us but 

have questions they would like to submit to either panel. 

Senator COONS. Thank you both very much for your testimony 

today. 

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNNIE CARSON TO QUESTION SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Question. As we discussed at the hearing, First Lady Simone Gbagbo of Cote 

d’Ivoire has been held in captivity by Ouattara’s rebel forces in the north of the 

47

country virtually incommunicado. She has been brutalized, starting when Rebel 

forces and French forces pulled her out of the Presidential Residence by her hair 

last April—I showed the public a picture of her bloody scalp on the Senate floor at 

the time and several times since. 

Mr. Assistant Secretary, now that President Gbagbo has been secretly transferred 

to the International Criminal Court in The Hague, and will probably never be released from prison, I want again to request that the U.S. Government help facilitate 

the release of Simone Gbagbo and allow her to leave Cote d’Ivoire and go into exile. 

I have already given you the name of one African country that will grant her 

asylum immediately. 

The United States has done this type of activity in the past. In 1986, the Reagan 

administration assisted Haiti’s ‘‘Baby Doc’’ Duvalier go into exile in France. 

This constitutes my second formal request on behalf of First Lady Gbagbo to the 

State Department, as I sent Secretary Clinton a letter on January 12, 2012, before 

her departure to Cote d’Ivoire, but have not received a formal response. I strongly 

believe that the process of reconciliation in war-ravaged Cote d’Ivoire can begin only 

if Simone Gbagbo is given asylum.

• Will the Department of State support and facilitate the release and transfer of 

Simone Gbagbo from Cote d’Ivoire to that African country, I have shared with 

you, that will grant her immediate asylum?

Answer. The Government of Cote d’Ivoire charged Simone Gbagbo with economic 

crimes against the state on August 16, 2011. We will continue to encourage the Government of Cote d’Ivoire to ensure that individuals who have been charged with 

crimes in Cote d’Ivoire are afforded due process, other fair trial guarantees, and 

held accountable if found guilty, or released if found innocent.

Æ