United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

GUY C. RHONE,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

DENIS MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2022-1360

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 20-2370, Chief Judge Margaret C. 

Bartley. 

______________________ 

Decided: November 17, 2022

______________________ 

GUY C. RHONE, Granite Falls, NC, pro se. 

 BORISLAV KUSHNIR, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by 

BRIAN M. BOYNTON, ELIZABETH MARIE HOSFORD, PATRICIA 

M. MCCARTHY; AMANDA BLACKMON, Y. KEN LEE, Office of 

General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans 

Affairs, Washington, DC. 

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2 RHONE v. MCDONOUGH

 ______________________ 

Before CHEN, BRYSON, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Plaintiff-Appellant Guy C. Rhone appeals the decision 

of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans 

Court) affirming a decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) determining that the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) lawfully withheld a portion of his 

disability compensation payments pursuant to a state 

court order for alimony payments. On appeal, Mr. Rhone 

argues the Veterans Court erred for two reasons: (1) federal statutes do not allow withholding of disability compensation for alimony payments; and (2) the VA’s denial of

substantive review of state court garnishment orders violates his right to due process within the VA adjudication 

system. Because the Veterans Court correctly interpreted 

the relevant statutes and the VA’s denial of review of state 

garnishment orders does not violate due process, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Mr. Rhone served in the United States Navy from February 1950 to December 1953 and in the United States Air 

Force from November 1959 to August 1988. Rhone v. 

McDonough, No. 20-2370, 2021 WL 2678674, at *1 (Vet. 

App. June 30, 2021) (Veterans Court Decision). In February 1986, Mr. Rhone and his former spouse, Jo Anne 

Rhone, divorced upon entry of a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage (Divorce Decree) by the Circuit Court for 

Hillsborough County, Florida (State Court). Appx. 251, 

255.1 Recognizing that Mr. Rhone would be eligible for military retirement within two years, the Divorce Decree

stated that Mrs. Rhone would receive 40% of Mr. Rhone’s

1 All Appx. citations refer to the appendix filed concurrently with Respondent-Appellee’s brief.

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RHONE V. MCDONOUGH 3

military retirement benefits. Appx. 252, 254–55. 

Mr. Rhone appealed, and the District Court of Appeals for 

the 2nd District of Florida (State Appellate Court) upheld 

the Divorce Decree. Appx. 249–50.

In 1988, Mr. Rhone separated from military service

due to physical disability. Appx. 39, 245. Effective August 

10, 1988, he had a combined disability rating of 60%. 

Appx. 248. This disability rating was subsequently increased to 70%, effective April 18, 1989. Appx. 242. To receive his disability compensation, Mr. Rhone elected to 

waive a portion of his military retirement pay on July 27, 

1990. Appx. 224. Such a waiver is required under 38 

U.S.C. § 5305 to receive VA disability compensation.2 As 

the Board found, it is undisputed that Mr. Rhone made 

such a waiver. Appx. 48. 

Mr. Rhone moved to modify his payment obligation under the Divorce Decree, which the State Court denied in an 

April 1990 order. Appx. 230–39. In doing so, the State 

Court clarified that the provision regarding Mrs. Rhone receiving 40% of Mr. Rhone’s military retirement benefits

2 Section 5305 provides that

any person who is receiving pay pursuant to any 

provision of law providing retired or retirement pay 

to persons in the Armed Forces . . . and who would 

be eligible to receive pension or compensation under the laws administered by the Secretary [of the 

VA] if such person were not receiving such retired 

or retirement pay, shall be entitled to receive such 

pension or compensation upon the filing by such 

person with the department by which such retired 

or retirement pay is paid of a waiver of so much of 

such person’s retired or retirement pay as is equal 

in amount to such pension or compensation. 

38 U.S.C. § 5305.

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4 RHONE v. MCDONOUGH

“constitute[s] a provision for the payment from the Former 

Husband to the Former Wife of permanent periodic alimony and do[es] not constitute a property division.” 

Appx. 230–31; see also Appx. 254–55. Thus, “[t]he Former 

Wife is and was, therefore, entitled to an amount equal to 

forty percent (40%) of the gross military retirement as permanent periodic alimony.” Appx. 231. Mr. Rhone appealed, and the State Appellate Court affirmed the April 

1990 order. Appx. 228–29.

In August 1991, the State Court issued a Continuing 

Writ of Garnishment directing the Air Force to withhold 

from Mr. Rhone’s military retirement pay the alimony payment due to Mrs. Rhone. Appx. 226–27. In November 

1991, the State Court issued an order to the VA indicating 

that the Continuing Writ of Garnishment also applied to 

the VA. Appx. 221–22. In December 1991, the VA’s Office 

of District Counsel determined that the State Court’s November 1991 order obliged the VA to make payments from 

Mr. Rhone’s disability compensation to Mrs. Rhone. 

Appx. 219–220. Mr. Rhone was notified that the VA would 

begin withholding a percentage of his disability compensation effective February 1, 1992. Appx. 218, 214–16. 

In June 1996, Mr. Rhone notified the VA of his intent 

to renounce his rights to VA benefits. Appx. 202. He subsequently filed a claim for individual unemployability, but 

did not receive those benefits due to his renouncement. 

Appx. 41; see also Appx. 178–202 (seeking individual unemployability benefits in 1996–1997). Despite renouncing 

his VA benefits, between 1998 and 2001, he repeatedly 

elected to receive disability compensation in lieu of retired 

pay, but withdrew his election upon being informed by the 

VA that it would be subject to garnishment. Appx. 41–42;

Appx. 173–76 (seeking disability compensation in 1998, 

but only if no garnishment was paid to his ex-wife); 

Appx. 150–66 (seeking disability compensation in 2000 and 

then renouncing); Appx. 148–49 (seeking disability compensation in 2001 but failing to pursue benefits).

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RHONE V. MCDONOUGH 5

In 2002, Mr. Rhone again sought to receive disability 

compensation. Appx. 145–47. This time, he received a different answer from the VA on the garnishment question. 

In January 2003, Regional Counsel at the VA determined 

that Mr. Rhone’s VA compensation benefits were not subject to garnishment. Veterans Court Decision, 2021 WL 

2678674, at *2; Appx. 143–44. As a result, in August 2003, 

a VA regional office (RO) issued a decision determining 

that Mr. Rhone’s “compensation benefits were erroneously 

withheld,” Appx. 138, and that Mr. Rhone would be reimbursed for “all benefits previously withheld,” Appx. 140. 

Mr. Rhone was reimbursed for $27,664 in August 2003. 

Appx. 117. 

The conflicting decisions on garnishment led to further 

consideration by the VA. In January 2005, the VA’s Office 

of Regional Counsel ultimately determined that “[the] VA 

must comply with the validly served Order awarding Jo 

Anne Rhone permanent alimony of 40% of the veteran’s 

military retirement pay.” Appx. 122. A VA RO notified 

Mr. Rhone as to this determination and resumed garnishing his disability compensation in March 2005. Appx. 43, 

46. Mr. Rhone objected and appealed. Veterans Court Decision, 2021 WL 2678674, at *2; Appx. 43, 117–21. 

Mr. Rhone continued his appeal even after Mrs. Rhone 

passed away in November 2005, ending the terms of the 

Divorce Decree for alimony payments. Appx. 43. 

Mr. Rhone’s appeal led to three rounds of Board decisions 

and remands by the Veterans Court. Veterans Court Decision, 2021 WL 2678674, at *2 (discussing remands from the 

Veterans Court in March 2011, December 2012, and October 2018). 

Following the Veterans Court’s remand in 2018, the 

Board issued the February 2020 decision at issue in this 

appeal. Id.; Appx. 36–54. Relevant here, the Board found 

that the State Court’s November 1991 order to the VA was 

“valid on its face” and the April 1990 order provided for 

“permanent periodic alimony.” Appx. 36. The Board 

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6 RHONE v. MCDONOUGH

distinguished Supreme Court cases addressing the division 

of community property, rather than alimony, and determined that the VA legally garnished Mr. Rhone’s disability 

compensation under 42 U.S.C. § 659(a) and (h)(1)(A)(ii)(V). 

Appx. 37, 46, 51–52. The Board also determined that it 

lacked authority to review the state court garnishment order, as this was “the province of state and federal courts, 

and not [the] VA.” Appx. 52–53. 

Mr. Rhone appealed the February 2020 Board decision 

to the Veterans Court. Veterans Court Decision, 2021 WL 

2678674, at *1. Affirming the Board, the Veterans Court 

determined that 42 U.S.C. § 659(a) and (h)(1)(A)(ii)(V) “authorize[] [the] VA to withhold a portion of a veteran’s VA 

disability payment for alimony or child support pursuant 

to legal process when a veteran has waived a portion of military retirement pay to receive VA benefits.” Veterans 

Court Decision, 2021 WL 2678674, at *4. The Veterans 

Court explained that, “[b]ecause Mr. Rhone waived a portion of his military retirement pay to receive VA disability 

benefits, those benefits are not exempt from apportionment 

for the purpose of alimony payment under 38 U.S.C. 

§ 5301(a)(1).” Id. The Veterans Court also determined that 

the VA lacks jurisdiction to “decide all questions of law and 

fact” associated with a state garnishment order because 

garnishment is a matter of state law. Id. at *5 (quoting 38 

U.S.C. § 511(a)). This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Our authority to review decisions of the Veterans Court 

is limited by statute. Goodman v. Shulkin, 870 F.3d 1383, 

1385 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Our review is limited to legal challenges regarding the “validity of any statute or regulation 

or any interpretation thereof . . . , and to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, to the extent presented 

and necessary to a decision.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c). We may 

review “a challenge to a factual determination” or “a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a 

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RHONE V. MCDONOUGH 7

particular case” only if the appeal presents a constitutional 

issue. Id. § 7292(d)(2). We must affirm a Veterans Court 

decision unless it is “(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; 

(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or in violation of a statutory right; or (D) without observance of procedure required by law.” Id. § 7292(d)(1).

I 

We first consider whether the VA is statutorily authorized to withhold disability compensation for court-ordered 

alimony payments. We determine that it is. 

Under 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1), VA benefits are generally 

exempt from any legal or equitable process, “except to the 

extent specifically authorized by law.” One such authorization is found in 42 U.S.C. § 659, which provides an exception for alimony and child support: 

Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . , effective January 1, 1975, moneys (the entitlement to 

which is based upon remuneration for employment) due from, or payable by, the United 

States . . . to any individual . . . shall be subject, in 

like manner and to the same extent as if the United 

States . . . were a private person, to withholding in 

accordance with State law . . . and to any other legal process brought, by a State agency administering a program under a State plan approved under 

this part or by an individual obligee, to enforce the 

legal obligation of the individual to provide child 

support or alimony. 

42 U.S.C. § 659(a). Thus, § 659(a) allows withholding of 

money “based upon remuneration for employment” to provide alimony obligated under State law. Moreover, money 

“based upon remuneration for employment” includes 

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8 RHONE v. MCDONOUGH

disability compensation from the VA under 

§ 659(h)(1)(A)(ii)(V): 

[M]oneys payable to an individual which are considered to be based upon remuneration for employment . . . consist of . . . compensation for a serviceconnected disability paid by the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs] to a former member of the Armed 

Forces who is in receipt of retired or retainer pay if 

the former member has waived a portion of the retired or retainer pay in order to receive such compensation[.] 

42 U.S.C. § 659(h)(1)(A)(ii)(V) (emphasis added). Accordingly, if a veteran has waived a portion of his military retirement pay in order to receive disability compensation, 

§ 659(a) and (h)(1)(A)(ii)(V) authorize the VA to withhold

disability compensation for alimony payments. The Board 

found that Mr. Rhone had in fact elected to make such a 

waiver, making his case fall within the plain language of

§ 659. Appx. 48, 52. 

Mr. Rhone argues that § 659 must be read in light of 

the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act

(USFSPA), 10 U.S.C. § 1408, which was enacted after 

§ 659.3 Specifically, Mr. Rhone argues that § 1408(d)(1) 

3 The USFSPA, § 1408, was enacted in response to 

the Supreme Court’s decision in McCarty v. McCarty, 

which held that “federal law [on military retirement] precludes a state court from dividing military nondisability retired pay pursuant to state community property laws.” 453 

U.S. 210, 211, 236 (1981). The USFSPA superseded 

McCarty by adding § 1408(c)(1), which permits a state 

court to treat a portion of a veteran’s retired pay as “divisible property, i.e., community property divisible upon divorce.” See Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct. 1400, 1403 (2017) 

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RHONE V. MCDONOUGH 9

requires alimony to be paid from “disposable retired pay,” 

which does not include disability compensation, and therefore § 659 “cannot be applied separately and independently 

from § 1408.” Appellant’s Br. at 9–10. He further argues 

that this case is governed by the Supreme Court decisions 

in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981); Mansell v. 

Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989); and Howell v. Howell, 137 S. 

Ct. 1400 (2017). Appellant’s Br. at 4, 6–8, 11–12. We disagree that § 1408 or the cited Supreme Court cases control

here because the cited authority relates to the ability to 

treat military retirement pay as community property and 

does not speak to whether alimony may be withheld from 

disability compensation, the latter being governed by 

§ 659. We address both arguments in turn. 

Section 1408(d)(1) authorizes the Secretary of the appropriate military department to make payments from a 

servicemember’s “disposable retired pay” to satisfy courtordered alimony:

After effective service on the Secretary concerned 

of a court order providing for the payment of child 

support or alimony . . . the Secretary shall make 

payments (subject to the limitations of this section) 

from the disposable retired pay of the member to 

the spouse or former spouse . . . in an amount sufficient to satisfy the amount of child support and 

(citing § 1408(c)(1), (a)(4)(A)(ii)). In light of the USFSPA, 

states may treat the nonwaived portion of a veteran’s retired pay as community property. § 1408(a)(4)(A)(ii); see

Howell, 137 S. Ct. at 1404 (explaining that the USFSPA 

“did not gran[t] the States the authority to treat total retired pay as community property” because “Congress excluded from its grant of authority the disability-related 

waived portion of military retirement pay” (alteration in 

original) (internal quotations and citation omitted)).

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10 RHONE v. MCDONOUGH

alimony set forth in the court order and, with respect to a division of property, in the amount of disposable retired pay specifically provided for in the 

court order. 

10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)(1) (emphasis added). Under 

§ 1408(a)(4)(A)(ii), “disposable retired pay” is defined as a 

veteran’s “total monthly retired pay . . . less amounts 

which . . . are deducted from the retired pay . . . as a result 

of a waiver of retired pay required by law in order to receive 

[disability benefits].” § 1408(a)(4)(A)(ii). While 

§ 1408(d)(1) regulates withholding from a certain portion 

of retirement pay—defined as disposable retired pay—

nothing in § 1408(d)(1) forecloses the Secretary of the VA 

from withholding alimony obligations from disability compensation. As explained above, that separate matter is 

governed by § 659.

Mr. Rhone’s reliance on § 1408(d)(1) ignores the fact 

that § 1408 and § 659 are directed to different departments 

and different sources of money. Section 1408 is in Title 10

of the U.S. Code, which governs the Armed Forces, and authorizes the Secretary of the appropriate military department to deduct child support, alimony, or community 

property from a member’s disposable retired pay—i.e., the 

pay earned for completing a prescribed time in service—in 

response to a court order. See § 1408(d)(1). In contrast, 

§ 659 is in Title 42 and authorizes the Secretary of the VA 

to garnish a member’s disability pay—i.e., the pay the 

member receives as compensation for a disability—in response to a court order. See § 659(a), (h)(1)(A)(ii)(V). A retired service member with a disability may receive both 

retired pay and disability compensation, and § 1408(d)(1) 

and § 659 work together to ensure that both forms of payment to the service member are subject to state orders to 

pay alimony. Thus, § 1408(d)(1)’s authorization for the 

Secretary of the appropriate military department to deduct 

alimony from “disposable retired pay” is irrelevant to 

whether the Secretary of the VA may withhold alimony 

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RHONE V. MCDONOUGH 11

from disability compensation under § 659. Under §§ 1408

and 659, alimony may be paid both (1) by the Secretary of 

the appropriate military department by deducting from a 

member’s disposable retired pay, and (2) by the Secretary 

of the VA by garnishing a member’s disability compensation. Contrary to Mr. Rhone’s arguments, § 1408 is entirely consistent with § 659, and therefore his view that 

§ 1408 supersedes § 659 is without merit.

Mr. Rhone’s argument also conflicts with the legislative history. The Senate Report accompanying the 

USFSPA expressly contemplates § 659 and § 1408 operating together to provide two, parallel methods for enforcing 

alimony obligations. S. Rep. No. 97-502, at 20 (1982), as 

reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1596, 1615. The Senate Report recognizes that § 659 required the government to 

honor “garnishment [orders] to enforce delinquent child 

support or alimony obligations” for members of the uniformed services while § 1408 “will provide a second method

of enforcing such obligations on the part of members of the 

uniformed services who are entitled to retired or retainer 

pay.” Id. (emphasis added). The Senate Report further 

states that “it is not the intent or purpose of the bill to deny 

proper parties the use of the enforcement provisions of 

[§ 659].” Id. Thus, Congress did not intend § 1408 to prohibit alimony payments from VA disability compensation, 

as Mr. Rhone argues.

None of the Supreme Court decisions relied upon by 

Mr. Rhone are inconsistent with the above-discussed statutes because those decisions (1) address community property, not alimony, and (2) never address § 659’s impact on 

disability compensation. In McCarty—a pre-USFSPA decision—the Supreme Court held that “federal law [on military retirement] precludes a state court from dividing 

military nondisability retired pay pursuant to state community property laws.” McCarty, 453 U.S. at 211, 236 (emphasis added). McCarty was subsequently superseded in 

part by the USFSPA, which permits treating the 

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12 RHONE v. MCDONOUGH

nonwaived portion of military retirement pay as community property. See supra note 3. 

The Supreme Court’s post-USFSPA decisions in Mansell and Howell also focused on community property rather 

than alimony, and considered the limits of § 1408, not 

§ 659. In Mansell, the Supreme Court held that state 

courts may not “treat as property divisible upon divorce

military retirement pay that has been waived to receive 

veterans’ disability benefits.” Mansell, 490 U.S. at 595 

(emphasis added). And in Howell, the Court considered 

whether a State could first “treat[] as community property

. . . a portion of the veteran’s total retirement pay” and 

then, after the veteran waived a portion of his retirement 

pay to receive disability benefits, “increase . . . the amount 

the divorced spouse receives each month from the veteran’s 

retirement pay in order to indemnify the divorced spouse 

for the loss caused by the veteran’s waiver.” Howell, 137 

S. Ct. at 1402 (emphasis added). Thus, McCarty, Mansell, 

and Howell prohibit treating waived retired pay as divisible community property. Because these cases address only 

community property and say nothing about withholding alimony benefits under § 659, they do not prohibit withholding disability compensation for alimony payments as 

Mr. Rhone argues.4

4 To the extent Mr. Rhone argues that (1) federal 

laws preempt the garnishment of disability compensation 

for alimony (see Appellant’s Br. at 5–8, 12, 16), or (2) that 

McCarty invalidated § 659, and specifically 

§ 659(h)(1)(A)(ii)(V) (see Appellant’s Br. at 17), he misapplies McCarty, Mansell, and Howell’s community property 

analysis to incorporate alimony. None of these cases address alimony, and thus cannot preempt or invalidate 

§ 659, which is directed only to “child support or alimony” 

and by definition excludes community property. See

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RHONE V. MCDONOUGH 13

Section § 659 is not in conflict with § 1408 or the Supreme Court’s decisions in McCarty, Mansell, and Howell. 

As previously stated, § 659 and § 1408 work together so 

that alimony may be paid from both a veteran’s disability 

compensation and military retirement pay. Accordingly, 

the Veterans Court correctly determined that § 659 authorizes the VA to withhold a portion of a veteran’s VA disability compensation for alimony when the veteran has waived 

a portion of military retirement pay to receive disability 

compensation. 

II

Mr. Rhone argues that he is entitled, under 38 U.S.C. 

§ 511(a), to review by the Board of the state garnishment 

order for alimony. Appellant’s Br. at 26–27. He argues 

§ 659(a); Compare Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct. at 1403 (explaining that “divisible property” is “community property 

divisible upon divorce”), with § 659(i)(2) (defining “child 

support” as “amounts . . . for the support and maintenance 

of a child . . . which provides for monetary support, health 

care, arrearages or reimbursement, and which may include 

other related costs and fees, interest and penalties, income 

withholding, attorney's fees, and other relief”), and

§ 659(i)(3)(A), (B)(ii) (defining “alimony” as “periodic payments of funds for the support and maintenance of the 

spouse (or former spouse) of the individual, and (subject to 

and in accordance with State law) includes separate 

maintenance, alimony pendente lite, maintenance, and 

spousal support” and “does not include . . . any payment or 

transfer of property or its value by an individual to the 

spouse or a former spouse of the individual in compliance 

with any community property settlement, equitable distribution of property, or other division of property between 

spouses or former spouse”). 

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14 RHONE v. MCDONOUGH

that the VA’s refusal to undertake such a review violates 

his due process rights. Id. We disagree.

We have explained that “[g]arnishment is purely a 

creature of state law” that is “routinely provided by state 

law for enforcement of court-ordered child support and alimony (a judgment debt).” Millard v. United States, 916 

F.2d 1, 3 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Because garnishment is a matter 

of state law, any violations of due process “would have been 

violated by the [state] court that issued the order, not the 

United States which merely complied with that order as it 

was required to do.” Id. at 8. Thus, any challenges to the 

garnishment order are properly heard in the state that issued the garnishment order. 

Because garnishment of alimony is a matter of state 

law provided by state courts, § 511(a) does not entitle a veteran to a second opportunity for adjudication of that matter 

within the VA system. Section 511(a) states that “[t]he 

Secretary shall decide all questions of law and fact necessary to a decision by the Secretary under a law that affects 

the provision of benefits by the Secretary to veterans or the 

dependents or survivors of veterans.” 38 U.S.C. § 511(a) 

(emphasis added). Without a decision by the Secretary, the 

Board has no jurisdiction. See Bates v. Nicholson, 398 F.3d 

1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Section 511(a) does not apply 

to every challenge to an action by the VA. . . . [I]t only applies where there has been a ‘decision by the Secretary.’” 

(citing Hanlin v. United States, 214 F.3d 1319, 1321 (Fed.

Cir. 2000))). Because garnishment of alimony is a matter 

of state law provided by state courts, it is not a decision “by 

the Secretary under a law that affects the provision of benefits by the Secretary.” Cf. id. Indeed, Mr. Rhone agrees 

that “[a]ny appellate review, if one takes place at all, is 

with the same state court that initially ordered the garnishment of the waived retired pay.” See Appellant’s Br. at 

27. Thus, the Veterans Court correctly determined that 

Mr. Rhone is not entitled, under § 511(a), to adjudication 

by the VA as to the merits of the garnishment order issued 

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RHONE V. MCDONOUGH 15

by the State Court and affirmed by the State Appellate 

Court.5

CONCLUSION

We have considered Mr. Rhone’s remaining arguments 

and do not find them persuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the Veterans Court. 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

5 Mr. Rhone also argues that VA General Counsel 

Precedential Opinion 4-97, 1997 WL 34674459 (Jan. 22, 

1997), violates his due process rights by foreclosing any review within the VA adjudication system of regional office 

decisions relating to state garnishment orders. Appellant’s 

Br. at 2, 24–29. Our determination that challenges to a 

state garnishment order must be heard in the state that 

issued the order remains true regardless of whether or not 

Precedential Opinion 4-97 is in effect.

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