IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS

______________________________________

)

GLENDA MURPHY, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. 22-1382 C

)

v. ) Filed: March 23, 2023

)

THE UNITED STATES, )

)

Defendant. )

______________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Glenda Murphy, who is proceeding pro se, filed this action on September 26, 

2022, seeking injunctive relief to prevent the transfer of ownership and possession of her home, as 

well as an award of $6 million in punitive damages. Before the Court is the Government’s Motion 

to Dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the 

United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”), as well as Plaintiff’s Motion to Join the Estate 

of Eric Murphy and Mary Lee pursuant to RCFC 19(a)(1)(B) and Motion to Request Hard Copy 

Documents. For the reasons discussed below, the Government’s Motion is GRANTED and 

Plaintiff’s Motions are DENIED AS MOOT.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

The instant suit appears to relate to an eviction action filed against Plaintiff in California 

state court. Pl.’s Compl. at 1, ECF No. 1; Ex. 1 to Pl.’s Compl. at 1, ECF No. 1-1 (referring to 

Fontana Superior Court Case No. LLTVA 2202326). Based on a review of that docket, HIJ 

Investment LLC (“HIJ”) brought the state court action to initiate the eviction of Plaintiff, her late

husband (Eric Murphy), and Mary Lee from a home at 9965 McKinley Street, Rancho Cucamonga, 
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California. See HIJ Inv. LLC v. Murphy, No. LLTVA 2202326 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2022).

1

 HIJ 

alleged that it acquired the home at a foreclosure sale on or about February 14, 2022, and that 

Plaintiff and the other occupants were unlawfully in possession of the property. Unlawful Detainer 

Compl. ¶¶ 2, 7, HIJ Inv., No. LLTVA 2202326. The state court entered default judgment for HIJ 

on July 22, 2022. Clerk’s J. for Possession, HIJ Inv., No. LLTVA 2202326. 

The Complaint at issue here alleges that unnamed employees of the United States, State of 

California, County of San Bernadino, and/or City of Rancho Cucamonga violated an implied 

contract created by the United States Constitution. ECF No. 1 at 1, 3–4. The Complaint lacks 

specific allegations of misconduct but generally alleges that “[t]he court action of [r]ecord”—

presumably the state court action—is unconstitutional and unlawful, and it avers that taking “life, 

liberty, or property without a trial by jury” is a criminal violation. Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted). 

The Complaint cites the following constitutional provisions and federal statutes as the basis of 

Plaintiff’s claims: Article VI, Clause 2 (Supremacy Clause) and Clause 3 (Oaths of Office); the 

Seventh Amendment; 5 U.S.C. §§ 3333, 7311; and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242. As relief, Plaintiff

seeks an injunction to “cease and desist . . . any action or Court order to take [Plaintiff’s] house,” 

id., as well as an award of punitive damages, id. at 4. 

B. Procedural History

On January 5, 2023, the Government moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint under RCFC 

12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 16. Plaintiff 

submitted a filing on February 3, 2023, which the Court construed as a response to the 

Government’s Motion. See Answer & Notice/Mot. of Recission of Parcel, ECF No. 18. Since 

1 The filings in the state court eviction proceeding are accessible via the Superior Court of 

California, County of San Bernadino Court Access Portal available at https://cap.sbcourt.org/search.
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that filing, Plaintiff has filed two motions: (1) Motion to Join the Estate of Eric Murphy and Mary 

Lee pursuant to RCFC 19(a)(1)(B), and (2) Motion to Request Hard Copy Documents. See ECF 

Nos. 21, 22. The Government opposes both motions and suggests that the Court defer ruling on 

the joinder motion until it has ruled on the pending Motion to Dismiss. Def.’s Resp. to Mot. to 

Join Parties at 1, ECF No. 24; Def.’s Resp. to Mot. to Req. Hard Copy Docs., ECF No. 25.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Jurisdiction

The Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity and grants jurisdiction in the Court of Federal 

Claims to hear “any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any 

Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, . . . or for liquidated or unliquidated 

damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Tucker Act is “merely a 

jurisdictional statute and does not create a substantive cause of action.” Rick’s Mushroom Serv. v. 

United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 

398 (1976)). A plaintiff “must identify a separate source of substantive law” that establishes 

jurisdiction in this Court. Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing 

United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983)).

B. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion

Before considering the merits of a claim, the Court must ensure the action is within its 

subject-matter jurisdiction. See RCFC 12(b)(1), (h)(3). When evaluating a motion under RCFC 

12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction, the Court must “accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in the 

plaintiff’s complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Trusted 

Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Estes Express Lines v. 

United States, 739 F.3d 689, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2014). If facts are contested, however, the Court is 
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not confined to the “face of the pleadings” and is free to determine the facts of the case for itself 

when deciding whether to dismiss. Griffin v. United States, No. 21-2307T, 2022 WL 1101817, at 

*3 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 13, 2022); see Mark Smith Constr. Co. v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 540, 541 n.1 

(1986). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Griffin, 2022 WL 1101817, at *3 (citing Trusted Integration, 659 F.3d at 1163). If the 

Court finds jurisdiction is lacking, it must dismiss the case. Id.

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must construe her Complaint liberally “to 

raise the strongest arguments it suggests.” Ottah v. Fiat Chrysler, 884 F.3d 1135, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 

2018). That is not to say that the Court becomes “an advocate for the litigant.” Griffin, 2022 WL 

1101817, at *4. It ensures only that the pro se plaintiff’s pleading is read in such a way that gives 

her every opportunity to make her claim for relief. Id. Although pro se plaintiffs are held to “less 

stringent standards” than plaintiffs represented by counsel, Plaintiff nonetheless has the burden to 

prove that the jurisdictional requirements to bring suit in this Court have been met. Haines v. 

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); see Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 

(Fed. Cir. 1987). 

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s Complaint suffers from multiple jurisdictional defects and, as a result, must be 

dismissed. The Court addresses each defect in turn. 

A. The Complaint Asserts Claims Against Parties Other Than the United States.

Plaintiff’s Complaint vaguely asserts allegations against several parties, including United 

States officials, California state and local officials, as well as private corporate organizations. ECF 

No. 1 at 1, 3–4. None of the parties are specifically identified by name or entity, and it is not clear 

whether or how the United States is involved in either the foreclosure or state court eviction 
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proceedings that preceded this action. It is well established that “the only proper defendant for any 

matter before this court is the United States, not its officers, nor any other individual.” Stephenson 

v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 186, 190 (2003) (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588 

(1941)). Any relief sought against individuals or entities other than the United States must 

therefore “be ignored as beyond the jurisdiction of the court.” Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588; see 

Anderson v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 330, 331 (2014) (dismissing claims against state and local 

officials for lack of jurisdiction); Pikulin v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 71, 75 (2011) (dismissing 

claims against federal officials or judges); Edelmann v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 376, 380 (2007) 

(dismissing claims against private parties). Indeed, the allegations that give rise to Plaintiff’s 

claims stem from a judgment against Plaintiff in state court eviction proceedings, which this Court 

is powerless to review or set aside. See, e.g., Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of 

Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970). 

B. The Complaint Does Not Allege a Non-Frivolous Contract Claim or Money 

Mandating Source of Law Necessary to Invoke the Court’s Jurisdiction.

Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts a “Claim of Contract Violations” based on a purported 

“unilateral contract” created by the Constitution. ECF No. 1 at 1. Several decisions of this Court 

have held that the Constitution cannot, on its own, create an express or implied contract with the 

United States for the purpose of seeking relief under the Tucker Act. See Taylor v. United States, 

113 Fed. Cl. 171, 173 (2013); Griffith v. United States, No. 14-793C, 2015 WL 430285, at *3 (Fed. 

Cl. Jan. 30, 2015); Asmussen v. United States, No. 14-825C, 2015 WL 351611, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 

27, 2015). As such, Plaintiff has failed to state “more than a non-frivolous allegation of a contract 

with the government” necessary to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction. Engage Learning, Inc. v. 

Salazar, 660 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (emphasis omitted); see Perry v. United States, 149 

Fed. Cl. 1, 12 (2020), aff’d, No. 2020-2084, 2021 WL 2935075 (Fed. Cir. July 13, 2021). 
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Even assuming the Complaint purports to state a claim based directly on a violation of the 

Constitution, Plaintiff has not established that any constitutional provision cited creates a 

substantive right to money damages from the United States. See Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1173 (“[T]he 

absence of a money-mandating source [is] fatal to [this Court’s] jurisdiction under the Tucker 

Act.”). While the Complaint cites various constitutional provisions, Plaintiff appears to contend 

that the state court eviction action violated her right to a trial by jury under the Seventh 

Amendment. See ECF No. 1 at 2–4. The Federal Circuit has held that when a constitutional 

provision “neither explicitly nor implicitly obligate[s] the federal government to pay damages . . . 

it does not provide persons aggrieved by governmental action with an action for damages in the 

absence of some other jurisdictional basis.” United States v. Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 887 (Fed. 

Cir. 1983). Even assuming the Seventh Amendment applies in state court civil actions, the Court

does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims premised on the violation of an individual’s jury 

trial rights because the Seventh Amendment is not money-mandating. See, e.g., Allen v. United 

States, No. 2021-1631, 2022 WL 180760, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 2022) (per curiam); Abbas v. 

United States, 124 Fed. Cl. 46, 55–56 (2015), aff’d, 842 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Aside from 

the Constitution, the Complaint also does not identify any money-mandating statute or regulation 

upon which subject-matter jurisdiction can be based. See ECF No. 1 at 1 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 

242, which define criminal violations for conspiracy against rights and deprivation of rights under 

color of law); id. at 2 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 3333, 7311, which address federal employment 

requirements); id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(a), which sets forth procedures for jury trials in civil 

actions brought in federal court).

Nor would the Court have jurisdiction to the extent the Complaint could be construed as 

alleging criminal violations or constitutional tort claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six 
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Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Joshua v. 

United States, 17 F.3d 378, 379 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (no jurisdiction to adjudicate claims under the 

federal criminal code); Blassingame v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 504, 505 (1995), aff’d, 73 F.3d 

379 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (no jurisdiction over § 1983 claims); Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 

624 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (no jurisdiction over Bivens actions). 

C. The Court Lacks Authority to Enter the Injunctive Relief Requested.

In addition to punitive damages, Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks an order enjoining any actions 

to evict Plaintiff from her home and restoring her ownership interests in the home free from 

encumbrances. ECF No. 1 at 3, 4. Even assuming the Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff’s claims, the Tucker Act provides for equitable relief only in limited circumstances in 

actions asserted under § 1491(a)(1). See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) (permitting the Court, “as an 

incident of and collateral to any such judgment, [to] issue orders directing restoration to office or 

position, placement in appropriate duty or retirement status, and correction of applicable records”). 

In simple terms, the Court lacks authority to award non-monetary relief “unless it is tied and 

subordinate to a money judgment.’” James v. Caldera, 159 F.3d 573, 580 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 

(quoting Austin v. United States, 206 Ct. Cl. 719, 723 (1975)). The Complaint here presents the 

opposite scenario, as the principal relief requested is non-monetary and bears no relation to a

monetary award of punitive damages. 

D. The Motion to Join Parties and Motion to Request Hard Copy Documents are 

Denied as Moot.

In light of the Court’s finding that it lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims, the 

pending motions requesting joinder of third parties and hard copy documents must be denied as 

moot. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (quoting Ex parte 

McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868)) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when 
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it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and 

dismissing the cause.”). Plaintiff’s request for hard copies is moot for an additional reason. The 

Government represents in its response to that motion that “[a]ll prior Government filings were 

addressed to [the] P.O. Box” address to which Plaintiff requests that hard copies be sent. ECF No. 

25 at 1. And each of the Government’s filings contain the requisite certificates of service reflecting 

that copies of those filings were mailed to the proper address. See ECF Nos. 7, 16, 19, 24, 25.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court’s limited jurisdiction does not extend to Plaintiff’s 

claims. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s 

Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1).

Plaintiff’s Motion to Join Parties (ECF No. 21) and Plaintiff’s Motion to Request Hard Copy 

Documents (ECF No. 22) are DENIED AS MOOT. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment 

accordingly. 

The Court further CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from 

this order would not be taken in good faith because the alleged claims fall outside the Court’s 

statutorily prescribed jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 23, 2023 /s/ Kathryn C. Davis

KATHRYN C. DAVIS

Judge