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106TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session 106–517

TRAFFIC STOPS STATISTICS STUDY ACT OF 2000

MARCH 13, 2000.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State

of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. HYDE, from the Committee on the Judiciary,

submitted the following

R E P O R T

[To accompany H.R. 1443]

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill

(H.R. 1443) to provide for the collection of data on traffic stops,

having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an

amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

The Amendment ......................................................................................... 1

Purpose and Summary .............................................................................. 3

Background and Need for the Legislation ................................................ 3

Hearings ...................................................................................................... 7

Committee Consideration .......................................................................... 7

Vote of the Committee ............................................................................... 7

Committee Oversight Findings ................................................................. 7

Committee on Government Reform Findings .......................................... 7

New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures ........................................ 7

Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate ............................................ 7

Constitutional Authority Statement ......................................................... 9

Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion ............................................ 9

Agency Views .............................................................................................. 10
2

The amendment is as follows:

Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act of 2000’’.

SEC. 2. ATTORNEY GENERAL TO CONDUCT STUDY.

(a) STUDY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Attorney General shall conduct a nationwide study

of stops for traffic violations by law enforcement officers.

(2) INITIAL ANALYSIS.—The Attorney General shall perform an initial analysis of existing data, including complaints alleging and other information concerning traffic stops motivated by race and other bias.

(3) DATA COLLECTION.—After completion of the initial analysis under paragraph (2), the Attorney General shall then gather the following data on traffic

stops from a nationwide sample of jurisdictions, including jurisdictions identified in the initial analysis:

(A) The traffic infraction alleged to have been committed that led to the

stop.

(B) Identifying characteristics of the driver stopped, including the race,

gender, ethnicity, and approximate age of the driver.

(C) Whether immigration status was questioned, immigration documents were requested, or an inquiry was made to the Immigration and Naturalization Service with regard to any person in the vehicle.

(D) The number of individuals in the stopped vehicle.

(E) Whether a search was instituted as a result of the stop and whether consent was requested for the search.

(F) Any alleged criminal behavior by the driver that justified the

search.

(G) Any items seized, including contraband or money.

(H) Whether any warning or citation was issued as a result of the stop.

(I) Whether an arrest was made as a result of either the stop or the

search and the justification for the arrest.

(J) The duration of the stop.

(b) REPORTING.—Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act,

the Attorney General shall report the results of its initial analysis to Congress, and

make such report available to the public, and identify the jurisdictions for which the

study is to be conducted. Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of

this Act, the Attorney General shall report the results of the data collected under

this Act to Congress, a copy of which shall also be published in the Federal Register.

SEC. 3. GRANT PROGRAM.

In order to complete the study described in section 2, the Attorney General may

provide grants to law enforcement agencies to collect and submit the data described

in section 2 to the appropriate agency as designated by the Attorney General.

SEC. 4. LIMITATION ON USE OF DATA.

Information released pursuant to section 2 shall not reveal the identity of any

individual who is stopped or any law enforcement officer involved in a traffic stop.

SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.

For purposes of this Act:

(1) LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY.—The term ‘‘law enforcement agency’’

means an agency of a State or political subdivision of a State, authorized by

law or by a Federal, State, or local government agency to engage in or supervise

the prevention, detection, or investigation of violations of criminal laws, or a

federally recognized Indian tribe.

(2) INDIAN TRIBE.—The term ‘‘Indian tribe’’ means any Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band, nation, pueblo, village, or community that the Secretary of the

Interior acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe.

SEC. 6. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to

carry out this Act.
3

1Thomas Fields-Meyer, Maria Eftimiades, Hugh Bronstein, Ron Arias, Shawn Lewis Ramirez,

Gail Schiller and Glenn Garelik, Under Suspicion, People, June 15, 1996 at 40.

PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

H.R. 1443, the Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act of 2000, requires the Attorney General to conduct a study by acquiring data

from law enforcement agencies regarding the characteristics of

those stopped for alleged traffic violations and the rationale for any

subsequent searches resulting from those violations. The Attorney

General is directed to perform an initial analysis, not later than

120 days after the date of enactment of the Act, of existing data,

including complaints and other information concerning traffic stops

motivated by race and other bias. In this initial analysis, the Attorney General will identify those jurisdictions which will participate

as sites for the collection and submission of data for the traffic stop

study. This initial analysis will be submitted to Congress and made

available to the public. The Attorney General will conduct a 2-year

study and provide the results of the findings of the study to Congress. In order to complete the study, the Attorney General is given

authority to provided grants to those law enforcement agencies participating in the study for the collection and submission of the data.

The 2-year study will include consideration of such factors as the

race, gender, ethnicity and age of the individual stopped, the traffic

infraction alleged to have been committed that led to the stop,

whether immigration documents were requested or an inquiry was

made to Immigration and Naturalization Service with regard to

any person in the vehicle, the number of individuals in the stopped

vehicle, whether the search was instituted as a result of the stop,

was consent given for the search, whether there was any alleged

criminal behavior by the driver that justified the search, whether

any contraband or money was seized, whether any warning or citation was issued as a result of the stop, whether an arrest was made

as a result of either the stop or the search and the duration of the

stop.

The data acquired under this section may not reveal either the

identity of any individual stopped or of any law enforcement officer

involved in the stop.

BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR THE LEGISLATION

Race-based traffic stops turn driving, one of our most ordinary

and quintessentially American activities, into an experience

fraught with danger and risk for people of color. The offense of

‘‘D.W.B.’’ or ‘‘driving while black or brown’’ is well-known to African-Americans and Hispanics across the country. There are virtually no African-American males—including Congressmen, actors,

athletes and office workers—who have not been stopped at one

time or another for a pretextual traffic violation.1 Because traffic

stops can happen anywhere and anytime, millions of African-Americans and Hispanics alter their driving habits in ways that would

never occur to most white Americans. Some completely avoid places

like all-white suburbs, where they fear police harassment for looking ‘‘out of place.’’ Some intentionally drive only bland cars or

change the way they dress. Others who drive long distances even
4

2Gallup News Service Poll, December 9, 1999

3 Report of John Lamberth, PhD., ACLU Freedom Network, www.aclu.org. 4 Id.

factor in extra time for the traffic stops that seem inevitable. H.R.

1443 is intended to provide a comprehensive analysis of the scope

and magnitude of the racial profiling problem.

While the catch phrase ‘‘driving while black’’ encapsulates the

perception of the minority community, the definition and legal implications of racial profiling defy such simplification. The most

sound definition of racial profiling embraces the widespread police

practice of using race as a factor in deciding whom to target for law

enforcement. Properly understood, racial profiling occurs whenever

police routinely use race as a negative signal that causes an officer

to react with suspicion.

Some commentators define racial profiling as occurring when a

police officer stops, questions or arrests someone solely on the basis

of race or ethnicity. This crude definition tells the reality of the exercise of power over one’s liberty by bigoted law enforcement officers intent on harassment. To fulminate against police officers who

engage in such tactics, however, requires no real confrontation with

the complex intersection between race, crime and law enforcement,

because few would defend police surveillance triggered solely by

race. Moreover, our legal system stands ready to sanction officers

who use race alone as a signal of suspicion. Such a definition, however, diverts attention from the more complex and problematical

use of race as trigger for suspicion that captures a disproportionate

number of innocent minorities.

Media coverage of the phenomenon of racial profiling has produced an abundance of anecdotal evidence concerning abusive practices. Front-page stories, editorials and columns have appeared in

every major national newspaper and countless local newspapers.

The phrase ‘‘driving while black,’’ used with bitter familiarity for

years in magazines and newspapers targeted for African-Americans, can now be found in the pages of national newspapers and

featured as lead stories in television news commentary shows.

While the media fascination with a social problem does not necessarily make it real, the dozens of stories in the press, combined

with the lawsuits and recent State legislative actions, make a powerful argument that ‘‘driving while black’’ is not just an occasional

problem.

The majority of white, as well as black Americans say that racial

profiling is widespread in the United States today. In a 1999 Gallup Poll Social Audit on Black/White Relations in the U.S., 59% of

a sample of national adults aged 18 and older say that racial

profiling is widespread. 81% of the American public say they disapprove of this practice.2

Statistical evidence gathered in the course of litigation shows a

clear pattern of racially discriminatory traffic stops and searches.

An ACLU analysis of Maryland State Police data showed that 73%

of cars stopped and searched on Interstate 95 between Baltimore

and Delaware from January 1995 through September 1997 were

those of African-Americans, despite the fact that only 14% of those

driving along that stretch were black.3 Moreover, police found nothing in 70% of those searches.4 Similarly, in Florida, 70% of the per-
5

5David A. Harris, ‘‘Driving While Black ans All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court

and Pretextual Traffic Stops,’’ The Journal of Law and Criminology, Vol. 87, No. 2 (1997) at

544–82. 6 ACLU Report, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling on Our Nation’s Highways (1999) at 27–

28.7Whitfield v. Board of County Commissioners of Eagle County, 837 F. Supp. 338 (D. Colo.

1993). 8Washington v. Skystone-Eagle Lambert, 98 F. 3d 1181 (9th Cir. 1996). 9 Id. at * 42. 10 Interim Report, New Jersey Attorney General’s Office (1999).

sons stopped on I–95 were African-American, even though they

made up less than 10% of the driving population.5

Data shows that Hispanics are similarly targeted for a disproportionate law enforcement focus. An ACLU analysis of Illinois State

Police data found that, while Hispanics comprise less than 8 percent of the population and take fewer than 3 percent of the personal vehicle trips, they comprise approximately 30 percent of the

motorists stopped by State police drug interdiction officers for discretionary offenses, such as failure to signal a lane change or driving one to four miles over the speed limit.6 Further, the data revealed that State troopers singled out Hispanics motorists for

searches of their vehicles, comprising 27 percent of all searches.

Paradoxically, though troopers asked a higher percentage of Hispanic motorists than white motorists for consent to search their vehicles, they found contraband in a lower percentage of the vehicles

driven by Hispanic motorists.

Dramatic statistics have formed the basis for legal findings of racial profiling across the nation. Lawsuits alleging racial profiling

have been filed in numerous States including Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania. For example, in Colorado a class action suit filed on behalf of 400 individuals asked the court to halt racially based stops by a sheriff’s department highway drug interdiction unit. Traffic infractions were

cited as the reason for stopping the motorists, but tickets were not

issued. The court ruled that investigatory stops based solely on a

motorist’s match with specified drug courier indicators violated the

fourth amendments’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures.7 A

settlement was reached that awarded damages to the plaintiffs and

disbanded the drug unit.

Similarly, in 1993, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized

racial profiling as a problem after reviewing the case of a Santa

Monica police officer who was found to have violated the rights of

two black men he stopped and arrested at gunpoint.8 The Court

found that the case was an example of how police routinely violate

the constitutional rights of minorities, particularly black men, by

stopping them without just cause.9 Most recently, a study commissioned by the State of New Jersey found that minorities were five

times more likely to be stopped on the New Jersey Turnpike than

non-minorities.10 Based upon these findings and the results of a

Department of Justice investigation, New Jersey settled a racial

profiling case brought by the Department under 42 U.S.C.A.

§ 14141 to remedy an alleged pattern or practice of racially discriminatory conduct by troopers employed by the New Jersey State

Police. The consent decree in that action appoints an independent

monitor, requires the State to collect traffic stop data and to create
6

11 U.S. v. State of New Jersey et al., Civil No. 99–5970 (D. N.J.). 12Whren v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996). 13David Harris, The Open Road is Not so Free, The Legal Times, July 14, 1997 at S42. 14 United States v. Robinette, 117 S.Ct. 417 (1996). 15 519 U.S. 408 (1997). 16 526 U.S. 295 (1999). 17The three departments were tasked with developing data collection plans within 120 days

and implementing field tests within 60 days of finalizing the plans. After 1 year of field testing,

the departments are to report on complaints received that allege bias in law enforcement activities, the process for investigating and resolving complaints and their outcome.

new citizen complaint, training and early warning procedures for

the State police.11

At the same time that racial profiling practices by law enforcement have been expanding, the Supreme Court’s sensitivity to

fourth amendment rights has been contracting. In Whren v. United

States, the Supreme Court declared that any traffic offense committed by a driver was a legitimate legal basis for a stop, regardless of the officer’s subjective state of mind.12 In practice, the

Whren decision has given the police virtually unlimited authority

to stop and search any vehicle.13 Because State traffic codes identify so many different infractions, every driver probably violates

some provision of the vehicle code at some time, during even a

short drive.

Since Whren, the Court has extended police power to stop and

search drivers and cars even further. In Ohio v. Robinette, the

Court rejected the argument that officers seeking consent to search

a car must tell the driver he is free to refuse permission and

leave.14 The Court in Maryland v. Wilson gave police the power to

order passengers out of stopped cars, whether or not there is any

basis to suspect they are dangerous.15 Most recently, in Wyoming

v. Houghton, the Court ruled that after the lawful arrest of the

driver, the police can search the closed purse of a passenger even

though she had nothing to do with the alleged traffic infraction and

had done nothing to suggest involvement in criminal activity.16 As

this line of cases have made traffic stops even harder to challenge,

the controversy around racial profiling will continue to grow.

Lack of comprehensive nationwide empirical data on racial

profiling has led to the call for systematic data collection. In June

1999, the President issued a memorandum on fairness in law enforcement that addressed the issue of racial profiling. The memorandum directed the Departments of Justice, the Interior and the

Treasury to design and implement a system for collecting and reporting statistics on the race, ethnicity and gender of individuals

who are stopped or searched by law enforcement.17 Several States

have introduced legislation that would require their State and/or

local police departments to collect data on the race of the drivers

pulled over for traffic stops. As of March of 2000, 20 State legislatures have data collection bills pending. Two States—North Carolina and Connecticut—have already passed comprehensive legislation requiring the collection and compilation of data on traffic

stops. Over 100 police jurisdictions have begun collecting data on

a voluntary basis including among others—the States of Michigan,

Rhode Island and Florida, and the cities of Houston and San Francisco.
7

CONCLUSION

Widespread racial profiling practices deeply undermine the legitimacy—and, therefore, the effectiveness—of the criminal justice

system, making police work that much more difficult and dangerous. Pretextual traffic stops fuel the belief that the police are

unfair and biased. H.R. 1443 requires the gathering of solid, comprehensive information to determine the nature and extent of the

problem of racial profiling.

HEARINGS

No hearings were held in the 106th Congress on H.R. 1443.

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

On March 1, 2000, the committee met in open session and ordered reported favorably the bill H.R. 1443 by a voice vote, a

quorum being present.

VOTE OF THE COMMITTEE

There were no recorded votes in the committee during the consideration of H.R. 1443

COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the Rules of the

House of Representatives, the committee reports that the findings

and recommendations of the committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM FINDINGS

No findings or recommendations of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight were received as referred to in clause

2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives.

NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY AND TAX EXPENDITURES

Clause 2(l)(3)(B) of House Rule XI is inapplicable because this

legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or increased

tax expenditures.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(C) of rule XI of the Rules of the

House of Representatives, the committee sets forth, with respect to

the bill, H.R.1443, the following estimate and comparison prepared

by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section

403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974:
8

U.S. CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, Washington, DC, March 9, 2000.

Hon. HENRY J. HYDE, Chairman,

Committee on the Judiciary,

House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 1443, the Traffic Stops

Statistics Study Act of 2000.

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased

to provide them. The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Mark

Grabowicz (for federal costs), who can be reached at 226–2860, and

Theresa Gullo (for the state and local impact), who can be reached

at 225–3220.

Sincerely,

DAN L. CRIPPEN, Director.

Enclosure

cc: Honorable John Conyers Jr.

Ranking Democratic Member

H.R. 1443—Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act of 2000.

CBO estimates that enacting this legislation would have no significant impact on the federal budget. The bill would not affect direct spending or receipts, so pay-as-you-go procedures would not

apply. H.R. 1443 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector

mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.

H.R. 1443 would require the Attorney General to conduct a nationwide study of stops of vehicles made by law enforcement officers for traffic violations. Under the bill’s provisions, the Attorney

General would collect and analyze data from a sample of law enforcement agencies and submit two reports to the Congress within

two years of the bill’s enactment. The Attorney General would be

authorized to provide grants to states to provide data for this

study; however, the agency anticipates cooperating with law enforcement agencies that already collect data required for this study.

Consequently, we estimate the cost of state and local grants that

could be provided under this bill would be minimal. Based on information from the Department of Justice, we estimate that implementing this legislation would cost less than $500,000 annually

over the next two years, assuming appropriation of the necessary

amounts.

H.R. 1443 would only have an impact on the budgets of state,

local, or tribal governments if those governments accept grant

funds and choose to provide information to the Attorney General in

connection with this study. In any event, the costs of providing this

information are not likely to be significant.

The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Mark Grabowicz (for

federal costs), who can be reached at 226–2860, and Theresa Gullo

(for the state and local impact), who can be reached at 225–3220.

This estimate was approved by Robert A. Sunshine, Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
9

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT

Pursuant to rule XI, clause 2(l)(4) of the Rules of the House of

Representatives, the committee finds the authority for this legislation in Article I, section 8 of the Constitution.

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Section 1. Short Title

The title of this Act is the ‘‘Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act of

2000.’’

Section 2. Attorney General to Conduct Study

Section 2 of H. R. 1443 authorizes the Attorney General of the

Department of Justice to conduct a study of law enforcement stops

for traffic violations. The study shall include a collection and analysis of information identifying the traffic infraction alleged to have

been committed that led to the stop; the race, gender, ethnicity and

age of the driver stopped; whether immigration status was questioned, immigration documents requested or an inquiry made to

the Immigration and Naturalization Service with regard to any

person in the vehicle; the number of individuals in the stopped vehicle; whether there was a search conducted as a result of the stop

and whether consent was requested for the search; whether any

items including contraband or money were seized; whether any

warning or citation was issued as a result of the stop; whether an

arrest was made as a result of either the stop or the search and

the justification for the arrest; and the duration of the stop. This

section gives the Attorney General no longer than 2 years to complete the study and report the results of the study to Congress.

This section also requires that within 120 days of enactment of

this Act, the Attorney General shall perform an initial analysis of

the existing data concerning traffic stops motived by race and bias,

report this to the Congress and identify the jurisdictions that will

participate in the study.

Section 3. Grant Program.

This section authorizes the Attorney General to provide grants to

law enforcement agencies to assist them in the collection and submission of traffic stops data.

Section 4. Limitation on Use of Data

The section provides that data acquired under this section may

not reveal either the identity of any individual stopped or of any

law enforcement officer.

Section 5. Definitions

This section defines ‘‘law enforcement agency’’ and ‘‘Indian tribe’’

for purposes of this Act.

Section 6. Authorization of Appropriations

This section authorizes such sums as may be necessary to carry

out this Act.
10

AGENCY VIEWS

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC, June 23, 1999.

Hon. HENRY J. HYDE, Chairman,

Committee on the Judiciary,

House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am writing to express the views of the

Department of Justice on H.R. 1443, the Traffic Stops Statistics

Act of 1999. The Department supports the collection of data on

traffic stops as envisioned in this legislation. We believe that a

study as outlined in the legislation would provide valuable information.

By studying data that reveal the race and ethnicity of motorists

who are stopped, the reason they are stopped and the outcomes of

the stops, we can begin to assess the extent of the profiling based

on race or ethnicity. Gathering the facts about traffic stops is an

important step in our work with law enforcement to develop possible solutions.

Also, we are pleased that the current version of the bill authorizes funding for the study, including grants to law enforcement

agencies to collect and submit traffic stop data that will be helpful

to the Attorney General’s analysis. I am sure you are aware that

one obstacle to a study of this kind is the lack of resources at the

local level for the collection of data.

We have also considered how the legislation would be implemented if enacted. One method of obtaining nationwide information

about traffic stops would be to collect data through the National

Crime Victimization Study (NCVS), an annual survey of households across the country. Such data would not, however, provide

data broken down by individual law enforcement agencies. Instead,

data on individual agencies would have to be collected directly from

those agencies. Thus, we would supplement the NCVS results with

data obtained from those agencies that are now beginning to collect

traffic stop data and from agencies receiving the grants contemplated by the legislation.

Finally, we would suggest that three revisions be made to the

legislation. First, we believe that the ‘‘initial analysis’’ called for in

the bill would be more detailed if the Attorney General had 180

days to complete the analysis. Second, we recommend deleting the

requirement that the Attorney General identify in the initial analysis those agencies from which the data for the study will be collected. The Justice Department will likely not know at that point

which agencies will be applying for grants to collect traffic stop

data. Third, we believe the Justice Department’s ability to report

statistics by individual agencies is dependent on the agencies’ willingness to undertake data collection and then submit the results to

the Department. Several organizations have urged that the data be

used solely for research and statistical purposes, and that the agency reporting the data be given an opportunity to address any problems that the data identify. We recommend that appropriate language regarding the limitations on use of the data be added to address these concerns.
11

The Office of Management and Budget has advised that there is

no objection from the standpoint of the Administration’s program

to the presentation of this report.

Sincerely,

JON P. JENNINGS, Acting Assistant Attorney General.

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