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CUBA’S GLOBAL NETWORK OF TERRORISM,

INTELLIGENCE, AND WARFARE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 17, 2012

Serial No. 112–158

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

CONNIE MACK, Florida, Chairman 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Michelle Van Cleave, president, National Security Concepts, 

Inc. (former National Counterintelligence Executive under President George 

W. Bush) ............................................................................................................... 8

Mr. Christopher Simmons, founding editor, Cuba Confidential (retired Defense Intelligence Agency Supervisory Counterintelligence Officer) ............... 16

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Michelle Van Cleave: Prepared statement .................................. 10

Mr. Christopher Simmons: Prepared statement ................................................... 19

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 36

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 37

The Honorable Connie Mack, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere: 

Prepared statement .............................................................................................. 39

Letter dated May 17, 2012, to the Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton 

from Members of Congress .............................................................................. 41

(1)

CUBA’S GLOBAL NETWORK OF TERRORISM, 

INTELLIGENCE, AND WARFARE 

THURSDAY, MAY 17, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 o’clock p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Connie Mack (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. MACK. The subcommittee will come to order. I first want to 

thank everyone, especially our witnesses for coming today and 

being with us and we look forward to hearing your testimony and 

offering your insight. 

After I recognize myself and the chairman of the full committee 

and the ranking member of this committee for 5 minutes for opening statements, I will then recognize the members of the subcommittee for 2 minutes each for their opening statements. We will 

then proceed directly to hear testimony from our distinguished witnesses. The full text of the written testimony will be inserted into 

the record. 

Without objection, members may have 5 days to submit statements and questions for the record. After we hear from our witnesses, individual members will be recognized for 5 minutes each 

for questions of our witnesses. 

I would now like to recognize the chairman of the full committee, 

my dear friend from Florida, Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen for her remarks. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Mack. 

Thank you for holding this important hearing to highlight the continued threat to U.S. foreign policy priorities and U.S. national security interests posed by the Castro regime which is a state sponsor of terrorism operating 90 miles from our U.S. shores. 

And I’d like to point out and wish him much success that our 

chairman, Connie Mack, will be appearing at the Heritage Foundation jointly sponsored by the Victims of Communism Memorial 

Foundation tomorrow at 11 to 12:30 to talk about an act of solidarity with the people of Cuba, the struggle for freedom continues. 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I also would like to thank Ranking Member Engel for his continued support for the freedom and democratic aspirations of the 

Cuban people. Mr. Engel has had a lifelong record of solidarity 

with the Cuban people, even when it is difficult for him politically 

back home. He errs on the side of freedom, justice, liberty, and reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:24 Aug 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\112TH\TEXT\74240 HFA PsN: SHIRL
2

spect for human rights. So thank you, Mr. Engel, for the political 

courage that you show every day. 

But Mr. Mack, thank you, because the timing for your hearing 

could not be more appropriate as it raises grave questions about 

the administration’s policies toward the Castro dictatorship and the 

threats to our homeland. I’d like to focus, in particular, on the appalling open-door policy that the administration appears to have 

adopted for regime officials and operatives. We’re talking about 

agents of a State Department-designated state sponsor of terrorism, agents of a regime that seeks to destabilize our democratic 

partners in our hemisphere, and agents of a dictatorship that has 

a long-standing alliance with the Iranian regime. We’re talking 

about agents of a regime that has an active espionage operation 

against the United States. 

And one of your witnesses, Mr. Simmons, certainly knows about 

this act of espionage operation. It includes members of the Wasp 

network, convicted for trying to penetrate U.S. military installations. It also includes cyber attacks in the United States, State Department officials who were turned into spies for the Cuban regime 

and compromised important U.S. foreign policy information, and an 

espionage network that included a former senior defense intelligence official who provided highly classified information to the 

Cuban regime about U.S. military activities and whose spying may 

have caused the death of a U.S. serviceman operating in Latin 

America. This is serious stuff indeed. 

This is a regime responsible for the murder of three American 

citizens and the U.S. resident in 1996 in the Brothers to the Rescue 

shootdown. So it is incomprehensible and indeed appalling to see 

the Department of State facilitating access to our nation for these 

enemies of the United States. From Washington, DC, to San Francisco, Castro operatives want to travel to the United States and the 

State Department will grant them a visa. 

Just today, earlier today, news reports confirmed that State did, 

in fact, issue a visa to the daughter of dictator Raul Castro, 

Mariela Castro, to attend a conference in California next week. 

Mariela Castro is a communist regime sympathizer. She’s part of 

the regime. She has labeled Cuban dissidents as despicable 

parasites. Those are her words. 

There are also reports that Eusebio Leal tasked by the regime 

to expand tourism to the island under the guise of serving as a historian of Havana is also being granted a visa to speak at the 

Brookings Institute tomorrow, Friday. Just a few weeks ago, 

Josefina Vidal-Ferreiro, from the regime’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose husband was expelled from the United States for espionage activities, was also given a warm welcome by the Department of State. This disturbing pattern that is developing where the 

doors of the United States are opened to officials and activists from 

state sponsors of terrorism countries must not be allowed to continue. 

Three of our colleagues and I sent a letter to Secretary Clinton 

and it was drafted by our colleague Congressman Mario DiazBalart and signed by the three Cuban-American Members of Congress, Albio Sires, David Rivera, and me, saying that this is just 

inconceivable that such visas and such a wonderful welcome had 

3

been given to these individuals. And in that letter, we affirm the 

intent and the requirements that are in U.S. law that the Secretary of State and the Attorney General is supposed to enforce 

and that is a prohibition or a granting, on the granting of visas to 

Cuban regime or Cuban community party officials, operatives, or 

designees. That is the law. And now we’re faced with the possibility 

that State may seek to thwart congressional oversight over decisions regarding travel by Cuban regime officials. State employees 

and officials have indicated that they may stop to honoring a commitment. It’s been a long-standing agreement with me on behalf of 

the House Foreign Committee requiring notification of State actions concerning travel by Cuban regime officials. And this agreement was established in 1997 and it was adopted in lieu of legislative mandate that I had included in funding legislation and was 

honored by successive administrations except for this one. 

So I strongly urge the Department of State to immediately reverse its course, consider the threats to our nation’s security interest posed by the Cuban regime that will be discussed later today, 

right now, by Congressman Mack’s subcommittee. The administration must stop bending over backwards to accommodate the needs, 

the whims, the requests of state sponsors of terrorism that again 

is located just 90 miles from our shores. 

So thank you, Mr. Mack. Thank you Mr. Engel and thank you 

to the witnesses for appearing today and I thank you for leadership, sir. And Albio, I talked about you, and discussed the letter 

that we signed. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And thank you 

for your leadership, not only in obviously with Cuba, but in all foreign affairs. You are a strong advocate for the ideals of freedom 

and democracy and the belief in liberty and so we are very fortunate to have you as a chair of the full committee. And with that 

I want to say thank you. 

And also, without objection, would like to enter into the record 

the letter that you mentioned that the four of you had authored to 

Secretary Clinton, so without objection, that will be included into 

the record. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you. Now I recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

And as I begin, let me just say this: It’s shocking to me, shocking 

to me to think that we will give a visa to Raul Castro’s daughter 

and at the same time withhold visas from Hondurans who fought 

for their constitution and their freedom. I think this just shows 

how backwards the administration is in its dealings with friends 

and allies in Latin America. So on one hand, we allow a visa to a 

woman that clearly doesn’t believe in the ideals of freedom and democracy, but we continue to turn our back and punish those who 

stood up in Honduras to fight for their freedom, to fight for their 

democracy, to fight for their constitution. Now let me begin. 

It is important to note that when it comes to Cuba, there is much 

more than meets the eye. This is illustrated by the Cuban doctors 

who are shipped around the world to provide medical services 

while spying for the Castros’ benefit. 

Recent assertions that U.S. policy toward Cuba is a relic of the 

Cold War would indicate that the Castro regime has changed its 

4

ways since that time. Today’s hearing will reaffirm that it is the 

same regime operating in Cuba today that was alive and well during the Cold War. 

Let me be clear, Cuba is no friend to the United States. We are 

enemy number one. And although Cuba is a small island, it has a 

global reach that aims to undermine U.S. interests and security 

through terrorism, intelligence, and irregular warfare. 

Cuba has built key relationships that help the island expand its 

reach. Experts have identified that China has, and I quote, ‘‘developed a special relationship with Cuba for several reasons, ranging 

from loyalty to intelligence gathering.’’ However, these same experts explain that the public is often kept in the dark on such nefarious activity, because officials do not often testify on strategic 

concerns. 

Yet, the facts remain. The Cuban Intelligence Service ranks 

among the very best in the world and continues to engage in espionage operations in the United States. For example in June 2009, 

the FBI arrested Kendall Myers, a retired State Department official, and his wife, after they spied for the Cuban Government for 

over three decades. The 

DIA analyst, Ana Belen Montes, convicted in 2002 of espionage, 

provided classified U.S. military information to the Cuban regime. 

Meanwhile, the harm this has caused to U.S. troops goes unreported. 

Additionally, Cuban intelligence agents purposefully provided 

false leads ‘‘worldwide’’ in order to misdirect the U.S. investigation 

of the September 11th terrorist attacks. We also know that Cuban 

intelligence strives to create a perception in the United States that 

Cuba is not a threat, that we should normalize relations. Let’s not 

be fooled. Cuba is an enemy of the United States that has infiltrated our Government, steals classified information, trafficks information around the world, and counts Iran, Syria, Venezuela, 

China, and Russia among its best friends. We will never be able 

to quantify the level of harm Cuba has done against our men and 

women serving around the world. 

Despite all of this, the Obama administration is easing travel 

and remittance restrictions, and engaging the Cuban regime. President Obama is giving legitimacy to the Castro model and allowing 

negotiations to occur on the regime’s terms. And once again, the 

fact that we are going to give a visa to Raul Castro’s daughter in 

this model is just astonishing to me. 

This is just another example where U.S. foreign policy is backwards in Latin America. The goal of this administration has been 

reach out to our enemies, turn our back on our friends and allies. 

And this approach has hurt our national security. The Obama administration has abandoned U.S. citizen Alan Gross in prison while 

making concessions to a corrupt and lying regime. 

At the recent Summit of the Americas where Cuba took center 

stage, those of us in attendance saw firsthand how the Cuban regime continues to wield its influence. The Cuban people deserve to 

live in freedom. Once the Castro regime embraces freedom, Cuba 

can be included in the gatherings of free societies. 

I have repeatedly asked the Castro regime to start with three 

simple actions. First, release political prisoners including Alan 

5

Gross. Two, hold free and fair elections, And three, permit freedom 

of speech and a free press. Until the Castro regime can take these 

three steps, there should be no negotiations or talk of normalizing 

relations with Cuba. There is nothing holding them back but their 

own actions. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses to shed light on the 

terrorist activity and irregular warfare engaged in by the Castro 

Regime. And I urge everyone to take note of this serious and ongoing threat as the security of U.S. citizens depends upon it. 

Now I’d like to recognize Mr. Engel for 5 minutes for his opening 

statement. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I 

thank the chair of our full committee, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, and her 

kind words about me. As you know, I take a back seat to no one 

when it comes to being critical of the Cuban regime. I was critical 

of them when I was chairman of the subcommittee for 4 years, and 

as ranking member, both before I was chairman and now after. I 

have been critical of them. I was critical of them even before I entered Congress. The bottom line for me is if a regime doesn’t permit political pluralism or fair and free elections or runs their country with terror, I’m opposed to the regime. I don’t care if it’s a 

right-wing dictatorship or a left-wing dictatorship. To me, a dictatorship is despicable. 

And so I think the bulk of what you and our chair had to say 

on Cuba, I certainly agree with it. 

But I must depart from some of the characteristics of the Obama 

administration. I just came back from the Summit of the Americas 

with the President and you, Mr. Chairman, and I and others were 

there. And I saw first hand, the United States being virtually the 

only country standing up to a lot of these other regimes that want 

to normalize everything with Cuba and Cuba doesn’t have to do 

anything to get it. I’ve seen our administration, the Obama administration demand of the OAS that before Cuba can be admitted it 

has to adhere to democratic principles and Cuba chooses not to do 

that, so Cuba remains a pariah and is not admitted to the OAS. 

I saw the President stand up in Cartagena, saying that Cuba 

knows what it needs to do in order to get invites to future Summits 

of the Americas. So I think Secretary Clinton as well, I’ve had 

many discussions with her and I think that this administration has 

stood up in behalf of democracy and has been critical unequivocally 

of what’s going on in Cuba. 

So I appreciate today’s opportunity to discuss the situation in 

Cuba. When you ask most people in the United States about Latin 

America, one of the first things that comes to mind is the Castro 

dictatorship in Cuba. Their oppressive role for the past half century 

is undeniable and I’ve always argued, as I said before, that dictators from the left should be thought of no differently than dictators on the right. Those who try to romanticize Fidel Castro’s 

rule of Cuba are simply fooling themselves. He’s oppressed his people, restricted all forms of expression, and locked up all opponents 

of his rule. And these are basic violations of the universal declaration of human rights in the Inter-American Charter. 

And even though Fidel Castro stepped down from day-to-day 

leadership of Cuba a few years ago, I think it’s become very clear 

6

by now that very little has actually changed in Cuba. There clearly 

remains a profound denial of political pluralism there, while fundamental freedoms are still denied to the Cuban people who cannot 

speak freely or live their lives outside of the threat of arrest by 

Cuban security personnel. 

I support the continued embargo on Cuba, but regardless of 

where we stand on U.S. policy toward the island, we all want to 

see democracy in Cuba. 

Mr. Chairman, you and I, as well as other members of the subcommittee recently traveled to the Summit of the Americas and I 

was honored to have been able to join President Obama on Air 

Force One and participate as part of the official U.S. delegation to 

the Summit. As usual with these meetings, Cuba was a major topic 

on the agenda, and I remain perplexed by some of the countries of 

the Americas which on the one hand state their commitments to 

the inter-American democratic charter and on the other hand believe Cuba should rejoin regional meetings and the OAS before it 

establishes a democratic system and protects human rights. 

I say to my friends in the region, I think this is a mistake. It 

tells the Cuban dictatorship that it need not change to be accepted 

throughout the hemisphere. We need to be clear with the Castros 

that only when Cuba comes into compliance with the charter, 

should it be permitted to rejoin the bodies of the inter-American 

system. 

When I spoke at the OAS several weeks ago, I reiterated much 

of what I’ve just said, not only with Cuba, but with Venezuela and 

Nicaragua and some of the other countries as well. 

Now today’s hearing is entitled ‘‘Cuba’s Global Network of Terrorism, Intelligence, and Warfare.’’ And I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. 

But Mr. Chairman, I think this topic doesn’t necessarily get to 

the heart of the question we need to explore with Cuba. I think the 

key issues on Cuba are different. I think pressing for democracy, 

human rights, a market economy and the choices for our country 

in a post-Castro Cuba seem to be important for the subcommittee 

to consider. I know you and I share similar views on that. So I do 

welcome the opportunity to discuss Cuba. I’m not too worried about 

their international outreach. I think during the Cold War they 

were much more dangerous than they are today. I don’t diminish 

how dangerous they are, but I would rather concentrate on the 

utter lack of democracy and the oppression that the Cuban regime 

forces on its people. 

And finally, I don’t think we should let a moment go by without 

calling for the release of Alan Gross in prison. Mr. Gross did nothing wrong and should be released at once. Moreover, his health has 

deteriorated and, if for no other reason, he deserves to be released 

on humanitarian grounds; something which I think the Castros 

wouldn’t know if it hit them in the head. 

Mr. Chairman, I have to apologize in advance because I’ll have 

to leave a little early from our hearing and my good friend, Mr. 

Sires, will assume the role of ranking member when I depart. I 

yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much. Mr. Engel, as you say often 

and I agree, you and I do agree on a lot of things and I think—

7

not on everything, of course, but on a lot of things. I think when 

it comes to Cuba, we’re mostly together. So we appreciate the bipartisanship on this issue with you and others. And the assertion 

or the interest in another hearing that deals with other issues, we 

are certainly encouraged and would like to do that as well, so let’s 

work together on a hearing to do just that because as you say, 

there are lot of important topics when it comes to Cuba. 

I now would like to recognize Mr. Sires for 2 minutes for opening 

statement. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this 

hearing and my colleague, Congressman Engel, we do share many 

issues and many topics here and we certainly correlate on a lot of 

ideas here. 

Probably, I’ll start by saying I’m the only one serving in this 

Congress who ever lived in Cuba. I entered this country in 1962 

when I was 11 years old. I still remember very clearly when they 

took all of the books out of the schools and started the indoctrination process. And everything was based on getting rid of America. 

I remember when they started teaching how to march and they 

would march at the age of 11 and teach you how to take apart and 

put together a Czechoslovakian machine gun because the Americans were the evil empire. 

So having had that experience and how I come to Congress and 

people still think that this is a government that is not a dangerous 

government. There’s romanticism with this revolution. This is a 

dictator. Make no questions about it. This is a dictator that has 

over the years put spies in this country. 

We all forget how close we came to nuclear war in 1962. So it’s 

amazing to me how people still have this romantic idea about what 

the Cuban Government is. They are brutal. They don’t exercise any 

control—observe any human rights whatsoever. You look at the 

people that are in prison. I deal with people that were in prison 

every day in my district. I represent the second largest concentration of Cuban-Americans in this country outside of Florida. And 

many of the political prisoners are living in my district. And I 

share firsthand with them their experiences, why they were put in 

jail, why they were given 20 years, who is in jail now, and the 

abuses of human rights. 

You know, I was also at the Summit and it was very interesting 

to listen to some of the Presidents. But one particular President 

really opened up my eyes when he said to me, ‘‘You know, people 

know what Cuba is. People know what the Castro brothers are.’’ 

But of the 35 people who were Presidents, of the 35 Presidents who 

were there and we met with a lot of them, not one of them would 

say anything about the Castro brothers. Why? Because they’re 

afraid that the Castro brothers have the tentacles in their countries and they will stir up the students. They will stir up some of 

the organizations and before you know it, they have a problem in 

their own country. 

So what do they do? They keep quiet. And this is told to us by 

a President of a country. 

So I’m here to listen to what you have to say. I’m a strong supporter of the embargo. I think the embargo has morphed over the 

years and now it’s just a matter of putting pressure on Castro so 

8

we can have free elections, observe human rights and expressions 

in Cuba, which has none. But people say this embargo is from the 

1960s from the Russian Cuba, but it’s alright to call it sanctions 

when we talk about Iran. If we changed the name to sanctions in 

Cuba, I wonder how many people would say something, what they 

would say now. 

So I thank you for being here. I thank the chairman for holding 

this hearing and I look forward to listening to what you have to 

say. Thank you very much. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much. I now would like to introduce 

our witnesses. First, the Honorable Michelle Van Cleave. Ms. Van 

Cleave served as the National Counterintelligence Executive under 

President George W. Bush. As the head of the U.S. counterintelligence, Ms. Van Cleave was responsible for providing strategic direction to and ensuring the integration of counterintelligence activities across the Federal Government. Currently, Ms. Van Cleave 

serves as president and co-founder of National Security Concepts, 

Inc. of Washington, DC. Thank you very much for being here. 

Second, Mr. Christopher Simmons is the founding editor of Cuba 

Confidential, an online blog and source for news on Cuban espionage worldwide. Mr. Simmons is an international authority on the 

Cuban Intelligence Service and retired from the Defense Intelligence Agency with over 23 years of experience as a counterintelligence officer. Thank you very much for being here. 

And now I’d like to recognize Ms. Van Cleave, and you are recognized for 5 minutes for your opening comments. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHELLE VAN CLEAVE, 

PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPTS, INC. (FORMER 

NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE UNDER 

PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH) 

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It’s a 

pleasure to be here this morning. I have to say it’s nice to be back 

in the Rayburn Building. This is where I started my Washington 

career many years ago working for then Congressman Jack Kemp, 

a member of your delegation, Mr. Engel. So it is a special pleasure 

to be here. I do have a written statement for the record which has 

been provided to you. It will be ready for inclusion in the record 

as soon as it’s been appropriately cleared by my former employer. 

I’d like to speak to that for a moment. I did serve, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, as the National Counterintelligence Executive which is not a position that many people are familiar with. So 

for one brief moment let me tell you how that position came about. 

It was created by the Congress in the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 upon the recognition that foreign intelligence 

services were exploiting seams between the many counterintelligence agencies of the U.S. Government, principally the FBI, the 

CIA, and the military services. 

The position was created in the wake of the Aldrich Ames espionage case and it has been a real fascinating and I will say difficult 

assignment to try to bring strategic coherence to a group of very 

different agencies with different traditions and missions and not a 

real appreciation of what a strategic approach to countering foreign 

intelligence threats is all about and that has been the challenge of 

9

the office which now is housed in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 

Foreign intelligence threats to the United States have grown 

over the years and they remain very, very serious. In fact, one of 

the largest asymmetries I might suggest in the United States’ position and the world is our relative vulnerability to espionage, particularly human espionage, because our free and open society is 

really a paradise, if you will, for foreign spies who will come here 

to try to acquire information and insights of value to them and to 

disadvantage us. So dealing with those foreign intelligence threats 

remains a very important element of U.S. national security and 

strategy. And I would say that those threats are, in fact, growing 

in an era where the United States is properly consumed with concerns over terrorist threats and is involved in wars abroad, some 

of our attention is properly diverted to those areas of concern which 

means that some of the more traditional espionage threats against 

us may receive less attention than they have in times past. And so 

in that window of vulnerability, adversaries may see opportunity 

and so we see, I would suggest, increases in that threat. 

Among those increases is the presence of Russian intelligence 

personnel in the United States and active throughout the world. 

People do say properly, well, the Cold War is over, things must 

have changed and certainly that is true in many dimensions of our 

relationships with Russia. But one area where that has not 

changed is the behavior of the Russian intelligence services. Someone forgot to tell them that the Cold War is over and they’re still 

as active, if not more so in the United States than they were at 

the height of the Cold War. 

Many other intelligence services have gone to school, literally, on 

the practices of the KGB. And one of their star pupils, of course, 

was the Cuba intelligence service, the DGI. The DGI learned a 

great deal with the Russians and in fact, has an advantage perhaps 

over any other service in operating in the United States: Being so 

close by, having access, having familiarity with our territory, with 

our people, how things work here, they make it much easier to 

blend into American society and to score successes against us. 

Mr. Simmons is going to go into some of those specific activities 

in more detail, but let me mention one to you in particular. The 

damage assessment of Ana Montes was accomplished and completed on my watch when I was in office. And I can tell you that 

she is one of the most damaging spies the United States has ever 

found. After 16 years of spying on behalf of Cuba, she compromised 

everything, virtually everything that we knew about Cuba and how 

we operated in Cuba and against Cuba. So the Cubans were well 

aware of everything that we knew about them and could use that 

to their advantage. In addition, she was able to influence estimates 

about Cuba in her conversations with colleagues and she also found 

an opportunity to provide information that she acquired to other 

powers. That is maybe the biggest concern about Cuba. 

And I will close with this point and invite other questions which 

is that to the extent that Cuba is able to be successful against us, 

the intelligence insights they acquire here can be made available 

in a market, if you will, a market place of U.S. secrets. And those 

secrets are things that go to the heart of what keeps this country 

10

free and safe and secure, and our men and women in uniform, able 

to operate in the dangerous places where we send them and our 

public here at home safe. So these are very serious matters and I 

commend you, Mr. Chairman, and the subcommittee for holding 

this hearing today and having this discussion. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Van Cleave follows:]


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Mr. MACK. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

And so Mr. Simmons, you’re now recognized for 5 minutes for 

your comments. 

STATEMENT OF MR. CHRISTOPHER SIMMONS, FOUNDING EDITOR, CUBA CONFIDENTIAL (RETIRED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SUPERVISORY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 

OFFICER) 

Mr. SIMMONS. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for inviting me today to testify about the threat posed 

by the Castro regime. I would also like to thank you and the committee for the leadership on this key issue, one that sadly does not 

get the attention it deserves among the many competing foreign 

threats and policy priorities. 

Underestimated and misunderstood for much of the last 53 

years, Cuba continues to be a determined and deadly enemy of the 

United States. Its military and intelligence services continue their 

sustained offensive to carry their fight to our doorstep, most often 

using proxies to mitigate the risks posed by its reckless operations. 

In many respects, Cuba can be accurately characterized as a violent criminal organization masquerading as a government. The island’s five intelligence services exist not to protect the nation, but 

to ensure the survival of the regime. More importantly from the 

perspective of today’s discussion, several of these services, as well 

as the Cuban military, continue to operate as profit-making entities. From the trafficking of U.S. secrets to running Cuba’s tourism 

industry, this self-serving and hypocritical capitalism guarantees a 

continuation of the status quo. The financial livelihood of the midand senior levels of these organizations is tied to the existence of 

the regime. By incentivizing espionage, especially when fueled by 

the Castro brothers’ visceral hatred of the U.S., Havana has nurtured an organizational culture prone to extraordinarily high risk 

endeavors. I will address the most important of these now. 

Beginning with the intelligence threat. Cuba remains the world’s 

sole ‘‘Intelligence Trafficker,’’ providing America’s adversaries with 

an endless stream of U.S. secrets collected by its Signals Intelligence sites, complemented with reporting from traditional human 

spies. The brokering of this information, which reportedly now generates hundreds of millions of dollars annually is one of the primary revenue streams sustaining the regime. 

Cuba’s Directorate of Military Intelligence runs one of the largest 

and most sophisticated SIGINT programs in the world. It collects 

against a wide range of U.S. Government and commercial communications, as well as the satellite links between the U.S. and Europe. Specific targets are said to be all White House communications, key military communications nodes, NASA and U.S. Air 

Force communications associated with rocket telemetry and commercial services dealing with financial and commodity communications. Virtually all U.S. 

U.S. geosynchronous communications satellites are subject to 

DIM targeting. 

Cuba’s SIGINT efforts are then merged with the robust Human 

Intelligence capabilities of the Directorate of Intelligence, the foreign intelligence wing of the Ministry of the Interior. At the height 

17

of the Cold War, the DI was ranked the fourth best spy service in 

the world. Now, more than 20 years after the crippling loss of its 

massive Soviet subsidies, the DI is still assessed as among the top 

six services in the world. 

Transitioning to the issue of terrorism, Havana takes a three-tier 

approach to its involvement in terrorism: Regime-directed, regimesupported, and finally, alliances with state sponsors. For regime-directed activities we’re looking at specifically bona fide acts of terrorism, Cuban Intelligence Service targeting of the U.S. war on terrorism, and ‘‘Active Measures.’’

Moving on to regime-supported activities, this focuses on aid to 

any of the 40 groups the State Department currently lists as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Cuba currently has relations with 

four of those groups: Hezbollah; the Basque Fatherland and Liberty 

also known as ETA; and two Colombian groups, the Revolutionary 

Armed Forces of Colombia and the 

National Liberation Army. Regarding state sponsors of terrorism, 

that definition is self explanatory and I’ll continue to move right 

along. 

In the written testimony before you, I’ve kept the most important 

aspects of the Cuban threat. You may read those details at your 

leisure. However, I would like to touch on a few issues with reference to the Cuban intelligence missions. First, Cuban intelligence 

targeting of U.S. operations in Afghanistan. From April 2006 into 

the weeks leading up to the death of Osama bin Laden, Cuba’s mission Embassy in Pakistan was led by one of their premiere experts 

in the targeting of the United States. This officer who was thrown 

out of the United States for espionage is known as Gustavo Ricardo 

Machin. It is believed that Machin advised the Pakistani Government and their intelligence services using information supplied via 

Havana, the massive SIGINT and HUMINT capability we talked 

about earlier and provided much needed context to the Pakistanis 

to help them take their own operations against U.S. counterterrorism missions. 

It is important to understand when talking about Cuba’s collaboration with Pakistan is that the massive penetration of Pakistan’s 

directorate for intelligence services intelligence also makes it almost a certainty that al-Qaeda received information from the Cubans via the Pakistani Government. 

Transitioning to the Cuban intelligence targeting of U.S. operations in Iraq. In late 2002 through early 2003, Havana provided 

the Iraqi intelligence with information on U.S. troop movements 

and associated military activities. Cuba’s high-risk adventurism in 

this endeavor occurred on the heels of the revelations of the American traitor Ana Belen Montes’ espionage including her efforts to 

kill U.S. and host nations’ soldiers during the secret war against 

leftist guerrillas in El Salvador. 

Moving on to post-9/11, Cuba flooded U.S. Embassies with walkins claiming to provide intelligence on the terrorism threat. Of the 

normal 12 walk-ins we expect from the Cubans every year in the 

first 6 months they sent in almost 20 walk-ins to tie up U.S. resources. This is a 330 percent increase in the normal activities. 

Last, but not least, of the highlighted issues, I’d like to address 

Operation Scorpion which was addressed earlier as a shootdown of 

18

Brothers to the Rescue. While this mission on February 24, 1996 

predates the other information I discussed, it is important because 

this act of terrorism involves highest levels of the Castro regime. 

On February 24, 1996, Cuban MiGs shot down two U.S. search and 

rescue aircraft in international waters. Code named Operation 

Scorpion, it was led by General Eduardo Delgado Rodriguez, the 

current head of Cuban intelligence. It was personally approved by 

Fidel Castro and supported by Raul Castro, the current President 

of Cuba. Four Americans were murdered in this act of terrorism. 

Shifting to regime-supported activities, last summer you were 

briefed by Ambassador Noriego on his——

Mr. MACK. Mr. Simmons, if you could try to wrap it up real quick 

so we can have time for questions. 

Mr. SIMMONS. In conclusion, through its intelligence trafficking 

or own terrorist acts, Cuba has willfully and intentionally murdered Americans in the past and it will kill again. Furthermore, I 

believe Havana will covertly facilitate attacks on U.S. personnel, 

installations or interests using proxies to create situations in which 

it cannot be implicated as a sponsor. I also suspect Cuba will continue its efforts to cripple and degrade U.S. counterterrorism operations. The Castro regime sees U.S. inability to respond to its aggression as a sign of weakness. As a result, the threat to our national security has increased because our failure to act and our failure to act only emboldens this dangerous dictatorship. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Simmons follows:]

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Mr. MACK. Thank you very much and before we get to questions, 

I’d like to have Mr. Rivera—2 minutes for an opening statement. 

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rivera, if I could—I have to 

leave. I have a conflict in another committee. So I again want to 

leave our side in the able hands of Mr. Sires. And I want to thank 

our witnesses for providing extraordinary testimony. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Engel. Mr. Rivera? 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank both 

of you for being here for this important hearing. Thank you for 

holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman. I’m often amazed at just how 

naive we can be with respect to Cuban intelligence, not just by the 

fact that Cuba, of course, is on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, but just the entire history of the DGI going back decades 

and decades. We’re seeing in recent publications by Bryan Latell 

from the University of Miami how for decades Cuban intelligence 

has been involved in so many detrimental activities to U.S. interests from perhaps the Kennedy assassination going forward. 

I can recall just over 20 years ago with radio and Television 

Marti, Agent Orion, I remember that case of trying to infiltrate the 

official U.S. broadcast services for the Cuban people. Of course the 

Brothers to the Rescue operation that you spoke about, the entire 

Wasp network, the Ana Belen Montes case, which of course, I know 

Mr. Simmons, you’re very aware of as well. And you see this over 

and over and over again and you see decisions taken such as allowing Raul Castro’s daughter to travel to the United States. And it 

seems like a continuing pattern of unilateral concessions that only 

hardens intelligence officers, I would imagine inside Cuba to continue to try to penetrate U.S. national security interests which 

runs a great risk to this nature because of the relationships that 

Cuba possesses with many enemies of the United States and potential for them to continue sharing this intelligence information with 

those enemies and just augmenting the threat to U.S. national security. 

So I look forward to our colloquy, your question and answer session. And again, thank you for being here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Rivera. And now I recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions. And I want to, if I could, 

I am going to ask you both the same question and we’ll start with 

you, Ms. Van Cleave. 

I said in my opening statement I talked about that although 

Cuba is a small island that it’s got a global reach. And I think 

what is fascinating or concerning to me is that many would believe 

that there is not a global reach by Cuba. So I wanted to see, one, 

if you would agree that there is a global reach with terrorism and 

intelligence in irregular warfare and if so, if you could maybe highlight that a little bit and then I’ll also ask Mr. Simmons the same. 

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I certainly agree with your 

statement that Cuba has global reach and there are many reasons 

for this. The principal reason is that the activities of concern—

which is to say terrorist activities, as well as trafficking in intelligence and national security secrets—are themselves global activities. And what concerns me is that as we see foreign powers move 

26

more into the Western Hemisphere—an increasing Chinese presence, for example, in Latin America, certainly Iranian presence in 

this hemisphere and activities here, and for that matter, perhaps 

a renewed Russian interest in this hemisphere—that the Cubans 

represent an on-the-ground highly familiar and capable intelligence 

service that can supply access and insight and support to others 

who also have interests here. So it’s the nexus of all of those things 

that gives me pause. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you. Mr. Simmons. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Yes, I would agree with my esteemed colleague regarding Cuba’s international reach. I’d like to put it in the context 

of two different complementary tracks, first being the SIGINT capability we addressed earlier. To intercept your adversaries’ communications, satellite communications, the only thing necessary is 

for you to be in a downlink. Cuba is perfectly located to be in a 

downlink for all U.S. communications. 

It is, in fact, the only place outside of Fort Meade in the Western 

Hemisphere where large-scale interception of communications is 

possible. 

This ability makes it a lucrative broker for a lot of our enemies 

such as China which in and of itself is impossible for them to have 

their own SIGINT facility in this hemisphere and that I would suggest based on evidence that they don’t need because their friends, 

the Cubans, run an exceptional operation. 

Conversely, we have to put it in an economy of scale. The Wasp 

network, which was referred to earlier, involved a Cuban spy operation based in South Florida, but extending all the way to New 

York City and as far west as Louisiana and then also supported by 

Mexico. It involved approximately 42 officers and agents and its operating budget was $30,000 a year. I would suggest to you there 

are probably no other intelligence services that can run intelligence 

operations on the cheap as well as the Cubans can. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you. I want to get to this issue because a couple of times we’ve talked about how the Castro regime is a profitmaking center for them and I wondered if Mr. Simmons, if you 

wanted to talk to that. I believe you said hundreds of millions of 

dollars that they’re making as a profit, in your opinion, do you 

think that is something that can be disrupted? 

Mr. SIMMONS. Yes, sir. Several years ago, shortly, we believe, 

after the end of Soviet subsidies, the Castro brothers turned over 

the tourism sector to military intelligence services. And now it is 

run as just that, a profit-making center and we know from defectors that these services are actually allowed to take earnings and 

recycle it into their own budgets so they are further incentivized 

in what they do. 

When you look at the tourism industry, virtually every facet from 

a visitor applying for the visa to arriving in Cuba on a Cuban airline to the Hotel Nacional and the other hotels, it funds nothing 

but the Cuban intelligence services and military and the regime’s 

ability to repress it’s own people. 

It also, because of the structure, puts virtually every tourist in 

front of the intelligence services for assessment as future agents. 

I believe the tourism aspect could be crippled greatly by changing 

the rules of the game. The Cubans have no respect for America, 

27

never had and you see that in the way their intelligence services 

operate. And so taking the ability to profit off of tourism would not 

only significantly hurt the intelligence services, but it would have 

a ripple effect on the government’s ability to repress its own people. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you. My time has expired. I’d now like to recognize Mr. Sires for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. How can anybody respect 

us when we take Cuba so lightly? And that is, you know, they 

think they can do anything they want. How many criminals are 

there in Cuba now approximately? Somebody told me over 100, including from New Jersey. Joanne Chesselmar, who killed a state 

trooper. Would you have an idea who are seeking sanctions in 

Cuba currently? 

Mr. SIMMONS. From everything that I have heard, criminals are 

American terrorists in Cuba today. 

Mr. SIRES. I know that in New Jersey the Jersey troopers, they have a $1 million reward for Joanne Chesselmar for killing one of 

their state troopers on the highway and she fled to Cuba as she 

was being processed. 

Everybody in Washington is concerned about cyber warfare and 

I was just wondering if do you think Cuba is receiving any assistance from other countries to establish and develop cyber war capabilities against us? 

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. Well, Mr. Sires, I don’t have specific information on that, but I am happy to speculate. And on the basis of my 

understanding of the extent of cooperation among intelligence services have concerned the United States, I would be very surprised 

if there wasn’t cooperation in the arena of cyber exploitation. So I 

think one should assume that that kind of information exchange 

and assistance, in fact, takes place. 

Mr. SIRES. Mr. Simmons, would you care to comment? 

Mr. SIMMONS. Yes, sir. Just to add one specific example. 

Transitioning to signals intelligence, by and large, if you’re able to 

intercept communications of any sort, you’re also able to jam the 

very same communications or signals. And in July 2003, acting on 

behalf of Iran, Cuban intelligence jammed the transmissions of the 

National Iranian Television, Voice of America, and three other 

Iran-bound broadcast systems. The timing of the jamming coincided with Iran’s crackdown on dissidents and the commemoration 

of the historic 1999 student uprising. 

Moreover, Skynet, who owned the targeted satellite, was quickly 

able to identify the source of the jamming to a spot several miles 

outside of Havana, subsequently identified as the Cuban military 

intelligence base at Bejucal, head of their SIGINT program. 

They then tried to relocate. Prior to Cuba broadcast jamming 

system, the Iranians had jammed a different platform from a geosynchronous satellite over Europe and when that was shut down 

that’s when they moved to the U.S. communications and their 

Cuban allies were able to shut down those four programs. So yes, 

sir. They can do it at will and in that instance we know for a fact 

it was requested by Tehran. 

Mr. SIRES. Did you say the town of Bejucal? What’s the name of 

the town, Bejucal? 

Mr. SIMMONS. Yes, sir. 

28

Mr. SIRES. That’s where I was born. As a young boy, I remember 

not being able to go to this hill because there was a lot of construction, so everybody assumed there was something going on because 

they basically gutted the mountain. It’s not a mountain but—we 

could see the work actually being done from the town that I lived 

in and obviously it was all fenced off. Kids couldn’t go up there like 

we used to go, so now you’re telling me that there is a station there 

that’s a communication center? 

Mr. SIMMONS. Yes, sir. Those fields now grow satellite dishes. 

Mr. SIRES. This relationship with Iran fascinates me because you 

couldn’t have two more different countries, but yet there’s one common ground and that is destroy America. So I was just wondering 

if you can expand on that relationship with Iran and Cuba. And 

what are their plans? Not what are their plans, but obviously, they 

want to extend to the rest of the Central America and South America, their influence. So can you speak a little bit about that relationship? 

Mr. SIMMONS. Yes, sir. In many respects, Cuban foreign policy 

and the influence of the intelligence services can be viewed as very 

pragmatic. And I say that in the sense that when it comes to Iran, 

the Castro brothers embrace the idea of the enemy of my enemy 

is my friend. The relations with Iran actually go back to the earliest days of the Iranian revolution. Approximately half of the 

Cuban ambassadors who have served in Iran have been intelligence officers. 

Most recently, for about the last 20 years, there’s been a huge 

increase in Cuban-Iranian cooperation in biomedical technologies. 

As you’re aware, Cuba currently holds over 400 patents in this 

arena, many jointly with the Iranians and the field of biomedicine 

is one of those that what is medicine today can be a terrorist threat 

tomorrow. So yes, sir. When it comes to a mutual enemy, we are 

their mutual enemy. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much. And I now recognize Mr. Rivera for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you very much. I’m going to begin referencing 

what I mentioned earlier in terms of the Ana Belen Montes case 

and I’m wondering for both of you, particularly Mr. Simmons, if 

you believe that the DGI penetration of Defense Intelligence Agency or National Security Agency and all the different intelligence 

agencies that Ana Belen Montes was engaged with, if that penetration ended with Ana Belen Montes? 

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. Mr. Rivera, allow me to begin and I know that 

Mr. Simmons will have more to offer on this point. The Montes 

damage assessment was something that I oversaw when I was in 

office as the National Counterintelligence Executive and that damage assessment took several years to compile. We learned a great 

deal about what she had compromised. The damage assessment 

itself remains highly classified. But among the things that she was 

able to provide to the Cubans was insight into activities of very 

high national security sensitivity that were of little use to the Cubans, but perhaps of greater use to other powers. 

The trade craft of how the Cubans ran her was interesting, too, 

in that she was able to do a lot of reporting and meet with Cubans 

29

here in Washington, DC, over a period of 16 years. That’s astounding that they were able to operate that freely and I would suggest 

openly against American society. So what she did and the extent 

of her harm to the United States was enormous, but perhaps most 

disturbing is that they were able to recruit her so successfully and 

penetrate the highest reaches of our Cuban analytic community so 

well. 

Mr. RIVERA. My understanding——

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. I’m going to get to your punch line. 

Mr. RIVERA. As far as her sentencing, my understanding is she 

cooperated. 

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. She did. 

Mr. RIVERA. So if she cooperated, then I’m wondering just how 

much did she cooperate? Did it lead to any other intelligence 

breaches? Are we done with intelligence breaches now that we were 

done with Ana Belen Montes? 

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. Not even close. Now her cooperation, her plea 

agreement as is often the case with major spies, was accepted in 

order that we might gain understanding of what it is that she compromised and how that was done. So we did get a great deal from 

her about that, but my punch line to you is that the Cubans are 

so successful in going against the U.S. Government and have been 

able to do that for such a sustained number of years that there is 

no reason to believe that Montes, or for that matter the Myers 

team at the State Department are the last—they are simply the 

latest, they are the most recent that we have been able to talk 

about publicly. 

Mr. RIVERA. And do you think we’re trying to ferret out whatever 

remnants there may be post-Myers, post-Montes? 

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. I know we are. 

Mr. RIVERA. Mr. Simmons, do you want to add anything? 

Mr. SIMMONS. Yes, sir. Very quickly. Based on 53 years of Cuban 

intelligence protocols, it would be an anomaly for them to have only 

run one penetration of the Defence Intelligence Agency. 

According to their doctrine, there should be three penetrations of 

the Agency. The logic behind that is Cubans are very hesitant to 

run singleton operations because there’s no way to have feedback 

on the success or the veracity of the information being provided by 

the agent. In an organization like DIA, they would not run three 

analysts because then they’re going to get redundant reporting. 

They would look at somebody like Montes, use her to report on the 

analytic realm and then penetrate other sectors of the agency. 

Done correctly, all three agents would end up reporting on one 

another without the awareness that the others are actually agents. 

That according to the Cuban doctrine is the perfect way to run an 

agent operation. So yes, sir. There should be two more, at least two 

more penetrations of DIA. The Cubans have had decades to do it 

so it should not be a surprise. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you. And if the witnesses won’t mind, don’t 

mind, I’ve got a few more questions and I’m sure that my colleagues may have other questions, too. 

So I want to talk a little bit with you, Ms. Van Cleave, about policy and where—why haven’t we done a better job? And what kind 

30

of recommendations would you have for us for this committee as 

we look at how to deal with the problem with Cuba? 

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. Thank you very much for that question, Mr. 

Chairman. I believe that our vulnerabilities to Cuban espionage 

and indeed to other hostile intelligence services is a very serious 

national security matter. A major reason why we’ve had such losses 

to espionage in decades past is the way that counterintelligence 

grew up in the United States. 

There was—it began and grew out of the inherent missions of the 

several agencies that execute counterintelligence. The FBI is responsible for enforcing our espionage laws within the U.S. CIA is 

responsible for counterintelligence to the extent that it needs to 

protect its own human collection mission abroad. And the military 

services also have their own counterintelligence elements that are 

responsible for force protection to look after their ability to execute 

their operations plans and be secure abroad. But what we haven’t 

had historically is any entity in the United States that sits back 

and says what are the foreign intelligence threats to the United 

States and what are we going to do about those threats? 

So I bring that down to the level of Cuba and I say here you’ve 

got a very aggressive, capable and successful intelligence service directed against us. It has been our practice to deal with these 

threats, these penetrations, these spies on a case-by-case basis as 

they show up here in the United States. What we haven’t done is 

that we have not had a strategic look at what should we do as a 

nation about the threat that Cuban intelligence represents to the 

United States and our interests in this hemisphere and elsewhere 

in the world. We do not have a strategic counterintelligence program to try to assess and degrade their capabilities against us. And 

that is true with respect to Cuba and every other foreign intelligence service that may be of concern. 

So from a policy perspective, I have to say that this hearing is 

fascinating to me because it is so infrequently the case, I’m sorry 

to say, that the intelligence threat presented by regional actors is 

factored into policy discussions. Maybe one reason is because understanding that threat and what they’re doing is usually so very 

highly classified, so much of it, it’s difficult to discuss. 

But another reason is it seems that our national security policy 

community by and large is either unfamiliar with or not persuaded 

by the danger that these intelligence activities present to the 

United States. And so I commend you and the subcommittee for 

taking on this question very seriously. I would also urge you in 

your reports or any forward action that you might have to include 

as a question how we might not do a better job from a counterintelligence perspective in dealing with these threats as part of a larger 

U.S. policy and strategy toward Cuba. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much. Mr. Simmons, do you have 

some sort of guidance that you could give the committee? 

Mr. SIMMONS. Yes, sir. My guidance would be much more tactical 

in nature, if you will. In dealing with the Castro brothers, we need 

to bear in mind that dictators understand one thing and that is 

power. And so a surgical countermeasure to Cuban offenses is the 

best practice. An example that comes to mind is going back to the 

2003 Cuban intelligence targeting of Iraqi Freedom, that May we 

31

expelled 14 Cuban diplomats, all of whom were intelligence officers. 

Of the 14, two were husband-wife teams, so we actually threw out 

16 spies which removed about a third of their intelligence presence 

serving under diplomatic cover and it crippled Cuban intelligence 

operations in the United States for about 18 months to 2 years. 

Cubans understand focused, surgical—I should say the Castro regime understands focused, surgical countermeasures like that. And 

I would suggest that be used as a model to protect U.S. interests 

in the future. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you. It sounds to me that both are good ideas. 

And that one of the things I think we want to try to do in this committee is begin to push the envelope a little bit on what we can do, 

what kind of policy positions that we can take to understand better 

and to disrupt what’s happening in Cuba and elsewhere frankly, 

but for the purview of this committee and Cuba. 

Mr. Sires, you’re recognized for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. SIRES. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Last week, I think it was Wolf 

Blitzer, he had an interview with one of the foreign ministers in 

Cuba and all of a sudden Alan Gross—now is getting ready to talk 

about releasing Alan Gross. I’m just wondering, what do you think 

that’s all about? All of a sudden after this poor man is in jail, now 

they’re saying there possibly could be some talks to release him 

and talk about other things. What do you think that’s about? I 

mean obviously, many people here are concerned that there will be 

a swap, you know, for Alan Gross. We’re obviously all against it, 

but I was just wondering what’s your reaction to a move like that 

all of a sudden? Because they don’t make a move unless they think 

five moves ahead. So I was just wondering if you can surmise what 

they might be thinking. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Yes, sir. I’ve maintained from the start that Alan 

Gross was grabbed and imprisoned for no reason other than to be 

used as a pawn in a future spy trade. That was my position when 

interviewed by the Miami Herald several days after he was initially imprisoned. My position has not changed. 

When we look at the CNN interview you’ve referenced with 

Josefina Vidal who was thrown out of the United States for espionage activities, you may recall that in recent discussions actually 

in the initial discussions regarding access to Alan Gross and a subsequent trade, the head of the North American Division, Josefina 

Vidal, her deputy and the consular officer handling the Alan Gross 

situation were all intelligence officers thrown out of the United 

States. This, from its very inception, has nothing to do with Alan 

Gross’ activities. He was simply in the wrong place at the right 

time and the Cubans needed—they need leverage. 

Based on their disrespect for the United States, I believe that 

they’ve always known or believed that at some point the U.S. 

would relent and trade for an American because that’s what we’ve 

always done in the past. They have no reason to think we won’t 

do the same thing now. 

Mr. SIRES. It’s amazing to me this information that you have 

that she was thrown out of this country for spying, Josefina Vidal. 

I don’t ever remember hearing anybody mentioning that when this 

interview was going on. It’s just like we have, in this country, the 

shortest memory of anything, about everything. Why doesn’t someVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:24 Aug 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\112TH\TEXT\74240 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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body mention when they’re doing this interview that this is a 

former spy—a former—yes, a spy that was chased out of this country? And all of a sudden she’s now representing that the Cuban 

Government wants somehow to deal. It’s just unfortunate, you 

know. Thank you, Do you have any comments on that issue? 

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. I will confess that I was thinking while you 

were asking the question that gee, I wish that we had a definitive 

answer to exactly what it was they planned to do. And the only 

way you can have a definitive answer is if you’ve got very good intelligence on Cuban discussions and planning and thinking. So I 

come back to the need to have increased resources going into our 

intelligence collection directed against the Cubans. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you. Mr. Rivera, you’re recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We’ve mentioned a few 

times in the hearing the fact that Cuba is on the list, the State Department’s list of official sponsors of terrorism and I wonder if I 

could get your opinions regarding intelligence activity either being 

the sole purview of nation states or perhaps also activity that other 

actors engage in such as terrorist organizations. And so I wonder 

how many of the terrorist groups or terrorist organizations with 

which Cuba cooperates or perhaps activities on the island or off the 

island, but nexus with Cuba, how many of those organizations also 

engage in intelligence activity against the United States? 

Ms. Van Cleave? 

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. Well, Congressman, you are quite right that in 

traditional concept intelligence activities are practiced by many terrorist organizations throughout the world, precisely for the purpose 

of being able to gain the access, the insights, the information that 

they need to be successful in those terrorist operations. 

So we have a very careful counterintelligence dimension to U.S. 

counterterrorism activities, for example. 

Cuban involvement with terrorist groups, I would say, would be 

useful potentially to those terrorist groups depending on the kinds 

of insights that they were looking for and what they were planning 

to do. 

I was struck by our conversation earlier about Iran which, of 

course, is a state sponsor of terror, but Iran itself trying to carry 

out a terrorist operation here in the United States. You may recall 

how Iran fielded through apparently a Mexican drug cartel an assassination team to try to kill the Saudi Ambassador to the United 

States at a restaurant in Georgetown where you’ve probably been, 

I’ve been. And it’s amazing that Iran would escalate its aggressive 

actions and be so bold and brazen to come right into the U.S. and 

foster that kind of an activity. 

Well, they don’t have the insights within the United States, the 

ground expertise to carry that out. They need some help from an 

organization or an entity or people who do know the territory here. 

Mr. RIVERA. And that’s where the organizations come in. 

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. They turn to the Mexican drug cartel, but you 

can speculate about how that kind of activity on—it’s an example, 

if you will, of how local expertise can be valuable to others. 

33

Mr. RIVERA. So organizations such as whether it be ETA or 

FARC or Hezbollah or Hamas, those types of organizations with 

which the Castro dictatorship maintains relationships. What is the 

activity or intelligence activity against the United States from organizations like ETA or FARC or Hezbollah or Hamas? 

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. Well, certainly those organizations carry out 

terrorist operations against friends and allies of the United States 

and could find it very useful, may have themselves need for insight 

into specific national defense information, our relations, interactions, knowledge of activities that would be of value to them as 

they carry out their terrorist operations. 

I am spinning a web that suggests that espionage is a very complex business and that the specific things that may be targeted by 

a source, an asset inside the U.S. Government that might be funneled through the DGI, for example, to another customer, if you 

will, abroad provide a rich playing field of possibilities. 

Mr. RIVERA. Mr. Simmons, do you want to add anything with the 

30 seconds we have left? 

Mr. SIMMONS. Yes, sir. Just very quickly. Terrorist groups are 

evolving animals, much like other entities. Cuba has historically 

been tied to well over 40 different terrorist groups since the 1960s 

and their basic protocol is to provide them intelligence training 

first, let them get on their feet so they can begin conducting their 

own operations and then once they’re successful, migrate over to bilateral operations within their own lane of the road, if you will. 

So in essence, it allows Cuba to conduct intelligence operations 

by proxy. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Rivera. Mr. Smith, you’re recognized 

for 5 minutes for questions and you’re batting clean up. 

Mr. SMITH. I apologize, Mr. Chairman, for being late and I thank 

you for calling this hearing on this very important and very often 

under-focused-upon problem as it relates to Cuba. We do focus, as 

we ought to, you and all of us on this committee, on the human 

rights which is absolutely a priority, but the intelligence and the 

terror networks and all of that collaboration, I applaud you for 

doing that. I was late because I had a hearing of my own on 

Ukraine and the continued incarceration of the former prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko. So that’s why I’m late. 

I don’t have any questions, but again, I want to thank you and 

I look forward to reading the testimony and I apologize for being 

late. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much. I want to thank the witnesses. 

My take away is we have so much more to learn as a committee 

on what we should be looking at from policy position on espionage 

and counterintelligence in Cuba. And frankly, it sounds like not 

just in Cuba, but many other places. 

One of the things that you mentioned, Ms. Van Cleave, when you 

talked about Iran working with drug cartels, we—I and this committee are very concerned about the evolving nature of the drug 

cartels into a—these are my words that don’t necessarily make people happy, but into an insurgency. And that they’re being used by 

other terrorist organizations to affect not only Mexico, but the 

United States and other parts of Latin America. So I want to thank 

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both of you, Mr. Simmons and Ms. Van Cleave, for being here 

today, for your insight and we look forward to continuing to learn 

more and come up with some way to address this problem, so 

thank you very much and the meeting is adjourned. 

Sorry, Mr. Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. I also want to thank you, but I also want to thank 

the chairman for holding this hearing. This is a topic that is not 

often spoken about here on the Hill and he’s right on target to be 

concerned. So I want to thank you for holding this hearing today. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much. I always accept thanks. The 

meeting is now adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:24 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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