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[House Report 106-672]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

106th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                     106-672

======================================================================

 
      WITHDRAWING THE APPROVAL OF THE CONGRESS FROM THE AGREEMENT 
               ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

                                _______
                                

 June 12, 2000.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

    Mr. Archer, from the Committee on Ways and Means, submitted the 
                               following

                             ADVERSE REPORT

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                      [To accompany H.J. Res. 90]

      [Including Cost Estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on Ways and Means, to whom was referred the 
joint resolution (H.J. Res. 90) withdrawing the approval of the 
United States from the Agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organization, having considered the same, report unfavorably 
thereon without amendment and recommend that the joint 
resolution do not pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
  I. Introduction.....................................................2
          A. Purpose and Summary.................................     2
          B. Background..........................................     2
          C. Legislative History.................................     3
 II. Explanation of the Resolution....................................3
III. Votes of the Committee...........................................7
 IV. Budget Effect....................................................7
          A. Committee Estimate of Budgetary Effects.............     7
          B. Statement Regarding New Budget Authority and Tax 
              Expenditures.......................................     7
          C. Cost Estimate Prepared by the Congressional Budget 
              Office.............................................     7
  V. Other Matters to be Discussed Under the Rules of the House.......8
          A. Committee Oversight Findings and Recommendations....     8
          B. Summary of Findings and Recommendations of the 
              Committee on GovernmentReform and Oversight........     9
          C. Constitutional Authority Statement..................     9
 VI. Additional Views................................................10

                            I. INTRODUCTION

                         A. PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

    H.J. Res. 90 would withdraw the approval of the Congress 
from the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).

                             B. BACKGROUND

The five-year review of U.S. participation in the WTO

    Sections 124-125 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) 
(P.L. 103-465) require the President to submit a special report 
on U.S. participation in the WTO every five years from the date 
the United States first joined the WTO. According to the Ways 
and Means Committee Report on the URAA, ``The purpose of this 
provision is to provide an opportunity for Congress to evaluate 
the transition of the GATT to the WTO and to assess 
periodically whether continued membership in this organization 
is in the best interest of the United States.''
    Congress received the first of the five-year WTO reports on 
March 2, 2000. Chapter II of the ``2000 Trade Policy Agenda and 
1999 Annual Report of the President's Trade Agreements 
Program'' is the President's review of the WTO. The review 
discusses accomplishments that took place during the last five 
years, including: (1) expanded market access; (2) protection 
for intellectual property rights; (3) development of a sound 
and effective system to settle disputes; (4) expansion of the 
rule of law; (5) conclusion of historic agreements governing 
financial services, basic telecommunications services, and 
information technology; (6) progress on the so-called ``built-
in'' agenda to continue to liberalize agriculture and services; 
(7) progress on negotiations on electronic commerce; (8) growth 
in WTO membership from 119 nations in 1995 to 135 in 1999; and 
(9) the significant progress toward accession of China and 
Taiwan, two countries comprising over 21 percent of the world's 
population. Issues related to the future operation of the WTO, 
which are discussed in the report, include moving forward with 
the built-in agenda on agriculture and services and addressing 
new issues such as biotechnology, electronic commerce, trade 
and labor, and trade and environmental protection.
    Following receipt of the report, any Member of either House 
of Congress may introduce a joint resolution to withdraw 
Congressional approval of the Agreement establishing the WTO. 
Congress then has 90 session days from receipt of the report to 
act on the joint resolution. The resolution is privileged and 
cannot be amended. The Committee on Ways and Means has 45 
session days after introduction of the resolution within which 
to act on it or be automatically discharged.
    H.J. Res. 90, a joint resolution which would withdraw 
Congressional approval from the Agreement establishing the WTO, 
was introduced March 6, 2000, by Rep. Ron Paul (R-TX).
    If the resolution is passed and vetoed by the President, 
each House may vote to override the veto before the end of the 
90-day period or within 15 session days from the date on which 
Congress receives the President's veto message, whichever is 
later.

The GATT/WTO system of multilateral trade rules

    Because of its strength as a trading nation and the 
openness of its market, the United States has long sought to 
establish an international trading system with a comprehensive 
set of enforceable rules. The Uruguay Round was the eighth 
round or series of multilateral trade negotiations under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These 
negotiations to expand trade, which date back to the 
establishment of the GATT in 1948, were a response to the Great 
Depression and the political upheaval and conflicts of the 
1930s, which deepened as a result of protectionist policies 
such as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff. Work under the GATT system 
aimed at raising living standards and promoting international 
economic growth through the opening of world markets has 
spanned six decades.
    The Uruguay Round Trade Agreements reached at the end of 
1993 were noteworthy in that they greatly expanded coverage of 
GATT rules beyond manufactured goods trade to include 
agricultural trade, services trade, trade-related investment 
measures, trade-related intellectual property rights, and 
textiles. The most visible accomplishment of this multilateral 
trade round was to establish the WTO to administer the GATT 
agreements and to settle disputes among WTO members. The 
strengthened dispute settlement system was a major goal of the 
United States going into the Uruguay Round trade negotiations, 
since the enforcement mechanism under the GATT was highly 
susceptible to delays and stonewalling by countries having 
political or other difficulties in bringing their trade 
measures into compliance with GATT rulings.

                         C. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Committee action

    H.J. Res. 90 was introduced on March 6, 2000, by 
Representative Ron Paul and was referred to the Committee on 
Ways and Means. On June 8, 2000, the Committee ordered 
adversely reported H.J. Res. 90 to the House of Representative 
by a recorded vote of 35-0.

Legislative hearing and oversight

    On February 8, 2000, the Trade Subcommittee held a hearing 
on the outcome of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Ministerial held in Seattle. On March 30, 2000, the Committee 
on Ways and Means held a hearing on the future of the WTO. At 
these hearings, Members of Congress, Minnesota Governor Jesse 
Ventura, former U.S. Trade Representative Clayton Yeuter, and 
representatives from the business community expressed their 
views on the United States' involvement in the WTO. Also, 
Chairman Crane led delegations from the Committee to the WTO's 
First Ministerial Conference in Singapore in December of 1996 
and the Third Ministerial Conference in Seattle in December of 
1999.

                   II. EXPLANATION OF THE RESOLUTION

Present law

    Under WTO rules, the United States may withdraw from the 
WTO by exercising the procedures set forth in Article XV of the 
WTO Agreement, which requires six-months notice to the WTO 
Director General.
    Section 125(b) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (P.L. 
103-465), which was approved by the House on November 29, 1994, 
establishes a procedure under which Congress may withdraw its 
approval of the WTO Agreement contained in section 101(a) of 
the Act. Sections 124-125 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act 
(URAA) require the President to submit a special report on U.S. 
participation in the WTO every five years from the date the 
United States first joined the WTO. Following receipt of the 
report, any member of either the House or Senate may introduce 
a joint resolution to withdraw Congressional approval of the 
WTO Agreement. Congress then has 90 session days from receipt 
of the report to act on the resolution. The resolution is 
privileged and cannot be amended.

Explanation of the resolution

    House Joint Resolution 90 states that Congress withdraws 
its approval, provided under section 101(a) of the Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act, of the WTO Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization entered into on April 15, 1994.
     While enactment of a resolution withdrawing Congressional 
approval under section 125 would call into question the future 
of U.S. participation in the WTO, it does not expressly provide 
for the President to withdraw from the WTO. Nor would the 
resolution put the United States in violation of its WTO 
obligations.

Reasons for change

    The Committee reports Mr. Paul's resolution to withdraw 
Congressional approval of the Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization adversely, because it concurs with the 
results of the President's five-year review of the WTO that 
U.S. participation in the global trading system is vital to 
``America's long term economic and strategic interests, 
continued prosperity and strengthening the rule of law around 
the world.'' While the WTO is a young institution that 
continues to evolve by a consensus process in response to 
concerns of Member countries, the Committee believes that the 
benefits of U.S. participation are clear and compelling.
    The Uruguay Round Trade Agreements are the most 
comprehensive in history. Consistent with the Committee's 
expectation when it considered legislation to implement these 
agreements in 1994, they have promoted economic growth, job 
creation, and an improved standard of living for Americans. By 
lowering tariffs and a wide range of other barriers to 
international trade and investment, they have led to increased 
levels of world and U.S. output, trade, real income, savings, 
investment, and consumption.
    The WTO serves U.S. interests through three major 
functions. First, WTO Member Governments agree on multilateral 
rules for trade, which support a stable and predictable basis 
for commercial decision-making that can by relied on by U.S. 
farmers, workers, and businesses. With only 4 percent of the 
world's population, and nearly four-fifths of the world's 
consumers living outside United States borders, Americans need 
the freedom to compete in foreign markets in order to generate 
jobs and economic growth at home. According to the Council of 
Economic Advisors, since 1994 approximately one-fifth of U.S. 
economic growth has been linked to an expanding export sector. 
It is well-known that export-related jobs are concentrated in 
high-skilled fields and generally pay 13-16% more than the 
national average. As the world's largest exporter, the United 
States is the country that gains the most from an open 
multilateral trading system.
    Secondly, the United States has benefitted significantly 
from the new system established in the WTO for enforcement and 
the prompt resolution of trade disputes between member 
countries. This new system has eliminated many of the 
shortcomings of the earlier GATT system where the dispute 
resolution process could be blocked by member countries and 
often dragged out indefinitely. In the first five years of 
operation, WTO Dispute Settlement panels and the Appellate Body 
have become the most active and productive system for settling 
conflicts currently operating in the field of international 
law.
    In general, the WTO dispute settlement process has proven 
to be a powerful instrument for reducing conflicts and bringing 
down barriers to U.S. exports. The United States has filed more 
complaints to date than any other WTO member and also 
participates actively as a third party in many other cases 
relevant to our commercial interests. The United States has 
prevailed in 25 of its 27 complaints acted on so far, either by 
successful settlement or panel victory. Furthermore, in many 
other instances the threat of litigation has led to a 
satisfactory outcome for the United States under the 
consultation procedures, without the need to invoke the formal 
panel process.
    As an example, enforcement is particularly important in the 
area of intellectual property rights. Because WTO Member 
Governments have accepted landmark rules for protecting 
patents, copyrights, trademarks, and other forms of 
intellectual property, the WTO has afforded unprecedented 
protection to property rights associated with American research 
and innovation.
    Of great concern to the Committee, there have been two 
instances where U.S. interests have been thwarted in the 
dispute settlement process, although the United States was 
victorious in the panel process. Specifically, the European 
Union has refused to come into compliance with WTO rulings 
against their import restrictions on bananas and hormone 
treated beef. The United States was able toinvoke WTO rights to 
suspend trade concessions (impose trade retaliation) in an amount 
equivalent to the damage to the United States caused by the illegal 
practices. The Committee intends to continue its oversight on this 
matter. In addition, the Committee is concerned about the EU's 
challenge to the U.S. Foreign Sales Corporation system (FSC). The 
Committee disagrees strongly with the adverse panel and Appellate Body 
decisions and believes the FSC rules, negotiated with the EU in the 
early 1980s, fully meet WTO rules. Nevertheless, the Committee 
recognizes the decision and intends to work with the Administration to 
ensure that the United States is in full compliance with its 
obligations. While the Committee strongly supports the U.S. objective 
of achieving further reforms to the dispute settlement system by 
addressing instances of recalcitrance and opportunities for delay, 
there is no doubt that the new system is significantly improved, as 
compared to the inconclusive panel process under earlier GATT rules.
    The third major function of the WTO is to provide a forum 
for ongoing negotiations to reduce trade barriers. In the five 
years since Congress approved the Uruguay Round Trade 
Agreements, WTO Members have concluded three new trade pacts, 
all of which allow Americans to capitalize on competitive 
strengths of our economy. Under the Information Technology 
Agreement, concluded in 1996, tariffs have been eliminated on 
$600 billion worth of trade including items such as 
semiconductors, computers, and network equipment. Concluded in 
1997, the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications reduced costs 
in 95 percent of the global market for telecommunications. Also 
in 1997, the WTO completed significant negotiations governing 
trade in financial services covering $29.5 billion in global 
security assets, $38 trillion in global domestic bank lending, 
and $2.1 million in world wide insurance premiums.
    Although the WTO Ministerial meeting, hosted by the United 
States in December 1999, failed to result in agreement to begin 
a new comprehensive round of WTO trade negotiations, Member 
Governments did succeed earlier this year in launching talks to 
reform further agriculture trade and to expand commitments from 
WTO Members with respect services trade. The Committee views 
both of these sectors as critical to U.S. economic growth. 
Agenda items supported by the Committee in relation to the 
future operation of the WTO include addressing new issues such 
as biotechnology and electronic commerce. The Committee also 
supports efforts to increase transparency in the WTO. In 
particular, the Committee believes that the dispute settlement 
process should be opened up by instituting the prompt public 
release of documents, public meetings of panels, and acceptance 
of amicus briefs.
    With respect to the argument made by proponents of H.J. Res 
90 that participation in the WTO threatens U.S. sovereignty, 
the Committee continues to give close consideration to this 
question, as it did when the Uruguay Round Agreements Act was 
first submitted for Congressional approval in 1994. It remains 
true that neither the WTO, nor its dispute settlement panels, 
can force a change in U.S. laws or regulations. The United 
States alone decides how to respond to panel decisions. The 
United States and all WTO Members retain the right to set the 
levels of environmental, health, and safety protection that 
they deem appropriate, even when such levels of protection are 
higher than those imposed by any other country. Generally, the 
WTO rules simply require that Members opt for less trade-
restrictive measures if possible and avoid discriminating 
against foreign products in favor of domestic products. For the 
protection of U.S. exporters, the WTO stipulates that food 
safety measures should be based on sound science.
    In the future, the Committee expects the WTO to remain 
fundamental to the formulation and execution of U.S. trade 
policy, with its rules and principles serving as a central 
guide for achieving new agreements to expand trade bilaterally, 
regionally, and multilaterally. While much remains to be done 
to improve the WTO, there is no doubt that it administers a 
system which ensures that when U.S. goods, agricultural 
products, and services are sent overseas, they receive more 
equitable treatment than would otherwise be the case. In the 
Committee's view, H.J. Res. 90 is dangerous and illogical, 
because it would isolate the United States from this system and 
damage our leadership in the international economy, thereby 
undermining U.S. national economic and security interests.

                      III. VOTES OF THE COMMITTEE

    In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the following statements are made 
concerning the votes of the Committee on Ways and Means in its 
consideration of the resolution, H.J. Res. 90.

                       MOTION TO REPORT THE BILL

    The resolution, H.J. Res. 90, was ordered adversely 
reported by a roll call vote of 35 yeas to 0 nays (with a 
quorum being present). The vote was as follows:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Representatives             Yea       Nay     Present    Representatives      Yea       Nay     Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Archer.....................        X   ........  .........  Mr. Rangel.......        X   ........  .........
Mr. Crane......................        X   ........  .........  Mr. Stark........  ........  ........  .........
Mr. Thomas.....................        X   ........  .........  Mr. Matsui.......        X   ........  .........
Mr. Shaw.......................        X   ........  .........  Mr. Coyne........        X   ........  .........
Mrs. Johnson...................        X   ........  .........  Mr. Levin........        X   ........  .........
Mr. Houghton...................  ........  ........  .........  Mr. Cardin.......        X   ........  .........
Mr. Herger.....................        X   ........  .........  Mr. McDermott....        X   ........  .........
Mr. McCrery....................        X   ........  .........  Mr. Kleczka......  ........  ........  .........
Mr. Camp.......................        X   ........  .........  Mr. Lewis (GA)...        X   ........  .........
Mr. Ramstad....................        X   ........  .........  Mr. Neal.........        X   ........  .........
Mr. Nussle.....................        X   ........  .........  Mr. McNulty......        X   ........  .........
Mr. Johnson....................        X   ........  .........  Mr. Jefferson....        X   ........  .........
Ms. Dunn.......................        X   ........  .........  Mr. Tanner.......        X   ........  .........
Mr. Collins....................        X   ........  .........  Mr. Becerra......        X   ........  .........
Mr. Portman....................  ........  ........  .........  Mrs. Thurman.....        X   ........  .........
Mr. English....................        X   ........  .........  Mr. Doggett......        X   ........  .........
Mr. Watkins....................        X   ........  .........  .................  ........  ........  .........
Mr. Hayworth...................        X   ........  .........  .................  ........  ........  .........
Mr. Weller.....................        X   ........  .........  .................  ........  ........  .........
Mr. Hulshof....................        X   ........  .........  .................  ........  ........  .........
Mr. McInnis....................        X   ........  .........  .................  ........  ........  .........
Mr. Lewis (KY).................        X   ........  .........  .................  ........  ........  .........
Mr. Foley......................        X   ........  .........  .................  ........  ........  .........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           IV. BUDGET EFFECTS

               A. COMMITTEE ESTIMATE OF BUDGETARY EFFECTS

    In compliance with clause 3(d)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the following statement is 
made concerning the effects on the budget of this resolution, 
H.J. Res. 90 as reported: The Committee agrees with the 
estimate prepared by CBO which is included below.

    B. STATEMENT REGARDING NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY AND TAX EXPENDITURES

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee states that 
enactment of H.J. Res. 90 would have no budgetary effect.

      C. COST ESTIMATE PREPARED BY THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, requiring a cost estimate 
prepared by the Congressional Budget Office, the following 
report prepared by CBO is provided.
                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                     Washington, DC, June 12, 2000.
Hon. Bill Archer,
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 
        Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.J. Res. 90, a joint 
resolution withdrawing the approval of the United States from 
the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Hester 
Grippando.
            Sincerely,
                                          Barry B. Anderson
                                    (For Dan L. Crippen, Director).
    Enclosure.

     V. OTHER MATTERS TO BE DISCUSSED UNDER THE RULES OF THE HOUSE

          A. COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

    With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives (relating to oversight findings), 
the Committee, based on public hearing testimony and 
information from the Administration, concluded that it is 
appropriate and timely to consider the resolution as reported.

H.J. Res. 90--A joint resolution withdrawing the approval of the United 
        States from the agreement establishing the World Trade 
        Organization

    CBO estimates that H.J. Res. 90 is likely to have no 
budgetary effect. The legislation would withdraw the U.S. 
Congress' approval of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
agreement that was provided under section 101(a) of the 
implementing legislation (Public Law 103-412). If the United 
States were to withdraw from the WTO, possible changes in U.S. 
collections of tariff duties could have significant budgetary 
effects. However, the ultimate impact of the legislation is 
unclear. In particular, it is not clear that enactment of this 
resolution would require the United States to withdraw from the 
WTO--and even if it did, there might not be any changes in 
tariffs. Based on information from the Administration that 
suggests that the legislation would not affect the application 
of the WTO agreement to the United States, CBO concludes that 
enacting H.J. Res. 90 would probably have no budgetary impact.
    H.J. Res. 90 contains no intergovernmental mandates as 
defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would 
not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments. 
Withdrawing from the WTO would broaden the conditions under 
which the U.S. government could impose trade restrictions on 
imports. Trade restrictions--such as increased tariff duties or 
quota limits more restrictive than under current law--would 
impose private-sector mandates on importers of affected items. 
However, because the legislation would probably not affect the 
application of the WTO agreement to the United States, CBO 
concludes that H.J. Res. 90 would likely impose no new private-
sector mandates as defined in UMRA.
    The CBO staff contacts are Hester Grippando (for federal 
costs), and Patrice Gordon (for private-sector impact). This 
estimate was approved by G. Thomas Woodward, Assistant Director 
for Tax Analysis, and Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

    B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
                    GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

    With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, no oversight findings or 
recommendations have been submitted to the Committee by the 
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight with respect to 
the subject matter contained in H.J. Res. 90.

                 C. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT

    With respect to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, relating to Constitutional 
Authority, the Committee states that the Committee's action in 
reporting the bill is derived from Article 1 of the 
Constitution, Section 8 (``The Congress shall have power to lay 
and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the 
debts and to provide for * * * the general Welfare of the 
United States.'')

                         VII. ADDITIONAL VIEWS

    We strongly support continued U.S. participation in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), and disapprove of H.J. Res. 90, 
which would withdraw Congressional approval of the WTO 
Agreement.
    The WTO, and its predecessor, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), have opened foreign markets around 
the world to U.S. goods and services, creating new 
opportunities for U.S. businesses, farmers and workers. The 
United States, which has one of the most open and transparent 
markets in the world, clearly has benefitted from the market 
opening work of the WTO and the GATT. The current strength of 
the U.S. economy is due in part to WTO rules. Moreover, on the 
whole, the WTO's dispute settlement system has been an 
effective means for enforcing U.S. rights.
    That being said, there is room for improvement. Five years 
experience with the WTO system shows key areas where we need to 
build on the solid foundation of the Uruguay Round and the six 
previous rounds of multilateral trade negotiations in he GATT. 
In particular, we see four key areas in need of reform.
    First, we must open up the WTO to public view and public 
input. Recent events made clear that as trade has increased and 
had greater impact on people's lives, three is a greater desire 
for knowledge about and participation in the development of 
trade rules. Currently, the public is not aware of what happens 
in the WTO, and as a result, there is widespread mistrust of 
the institution. Opening the process--by de-restricting 
documents more quickly, allowing public submissions to dispute 
settlement panels, and opening panel proceedings to public 
view--will help to de-mystify the institution, and ultimately 
will go a long way toward alleviating some of the suspicions 
surrounding it.
    Second, we must continue to develop the WTO as an 
institution that reflects the expanding scope of the trade 
policy agenda. It is axiomatic that the issues implicated by 
trade negotiations extend beyond tariff and other border 
measures, partially because of advances in technology and of 
increased economic integration. With respect to technological 
developments, e-commerce, breakthroughs in biotechnology, and 
other advances, have created new opportunities for increased 
global trade. We must continue to develop appropriate and 
effective policies and rules to address them. In the same vein, 
we must tackle the other issues that have increased salience in 
the trade context--including environmental protection and the 
operation of labor markets.
    We must promote greater understanding of the links between 
trade and labor market issues and ensure the more consistent 
enforcement of core labor standards as competition grows 
between evolving economies and developed economies. This means 
following through with the mandate set forth in section 131 of 
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act by establishing a working 
group on trade and labor in the WTO, as well as reaffirming the 
link between trade and labor issues in our bilateral and 
regional relationships. We also must move forward on bringing 
environmental issues more meaningfully into trade discussions. 
This means bringing the work of the WTO's Committee on Trade 
and the Environment to bear on the work of WTO negotiating 
groups. It also means committing additional resources to 
performing environmental impact assessments before entering 
into new trade agreements.
    Third, we must work to make developing countries our 
partners, rather than our opponents. This means not only 
ensuring that the process of negotiations enables all Members 
to participate in a meaningful manner, but also ensuring that 
the benefits of trade liberalization reach the poorest 
countries and the poorest people of the world. We need to 
pursue a coherent policy of trade and aid by relieving the 
least developed countries of overbearing debt and providing 
technical assistance and other aid that will, together with 
stronger trading relationships, provide the strongest possible 
foundation for increased living standards and the creation of a 
strong, global middle class by promoting growth with equity.
    Fourth, we must be certain that what has already been 
negotiated is functioning effectively. The importance of this 
point cannot be overstated. The Uruguay Round Agreements 
represent a balance of commitments by WTO Members. Failing to 
enforce commitments made, or attempting to redefine what has 
been agreed to through the dispute settlement process, 
undermines confidence in the system, and will make negotiating 
new agreements that much harder.
    To conclude, we believe that most of our colleagues in the 
House will agree that, on balance, the benefits of U.S. 
participation in the WTO far outweigh the costs, and that the 
organization has been a positive force in promoting and shaping 
global trade. But we also hope that our colleagues will look at 
consideration of this resolution as an opportunity to 
acknowledge candidly and constructively the current 
shortcomings of the WTO, and U.S. Trade policy, and to begin to 
develop and implement recommendations for improving both.

                                   Sander Levin.
                                   Benjamin L. Cardin.
                                   Robert T. Matsui.
                                   John Lewis.
                                   Richard E. Neal.
                                   Xavier Becerra.
                                   John Tanner.
                                   C.B. Rangel.
                                   Jim McDermott.
                                   William J. Coyne.
                                   William J. Jefferson.
                                   Jerry Kleczka.
                                   Michael R. McNulty.
                                   Lloyd Doggett.

         ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

    I fully concur with the views of my fellow Democrats 
regarding the continued U.S. participation in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). In committee I voted against H.J. Res. 90, 
which would have withdrawn Congressional approval of the WTO 
Agreement.
    I write separately to encourage Congress to consider a more 
effective way to review WTO decisions that are adverse to the 
economy of the United States.
    In 1994 the United States Trade Representative (USTR) wrote 
to then-Senator Bob Dole to endorse the establishment of a WTO 
Dispute Settlement Review Commission. The Commission would 
consist of five federal appellate judges, and would review all 
final and adopted WTO dispute settlement reports. The 
Commission, under the Dole proposal, would review adverse WTO 
findings, using a set of four criteria, to determine whether 
the WTO panel:
    (1) demonstrably exceeded its authority or its terms of 
reference;
    (2) added to the obligations, or diminished the rights, of 
the United States under the Uruguay Round;
    (3) acted arbitrarily or capriciously, engaged in 
misconduct, or demonstrably departed from established panel or 
appellate procedure; and
    (4) deviated from the applicable standard of review, 
including in antidumping cases, set forth in the 1994 GATT 
agreement.
    The Commission would issue its determination within 120 
days after the report is adopted. The Commission will play a 
vital role in determining whether the WTO panel acted 
improperly to the detriment of the United States.
    Upon the issuance of any affirmative determination by the 
Commission, any Member of each House would be able to introduce 
a joint resolution calling on the President to negotiate new 
dispute settlement rules that would address and correct the 
problem identified by the Commission. The resolution would be 
privileged and considered under expedited committee and floor 
procedures.
    If there are three affirmative determinations in any five-
year period, any Member of each House would be able to 
introduce a joint resolution to disapprove U.S. participation 
in the Uruguay Round agreements, again using expedited 
procedures.
    I am currently working with interested members of this 
committee and consulting with the Administration on drafting 
appropriate legislation, using the Dole proposal as the basic 
framework. While we may disagree on the appropriate remedy for 
responding to an adverse WTO panel decision, we all agree that 
we must closely monitor WTO panel decisions that affect 
American economic interests. The Review Commission would raise 
the visibility of important WTO decisions that have a profound 
effect on the economy of the United States. I hope that the 
Commission would also reinvigorate the Congressional oversight 
role regarding trade policy, and encourage members of Congress 
to seriously reflect on WTO decisions and their impact on the 
United States.

                                                      Ben Cardin.  

               ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CONGRESSMAN PETE STARK

    Although I oppose the resolution before us today, I do not 
want my opposition to be interpreted as support for the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). I have many concerns with the WTO and 
the way in which the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) measures 
the benefits of U.S. membership in the Organization. The lack 
of leadership from our Administration in the WTO has allowed 
transnational organizations to dictate U.S. trade policy while 
consumer protections, labor, environment and human rights have 
not been considered relevant issues in the world body. The 
Executive Branch has fought fervently for intellectual property 
rights but lacks the same zeal when it comes to the survival of 
the species. The World Trade Organization will make these 
issues an integral part of the trade agenda when the world's 
greatest trade advocate insists that these issues be of 
paramount importance.
    No one will dispute that trade increasingly involves broad 
public policy matters, yet there are no representatives of 
labor, environment, or human rights non-governmental 
organizations on most WTO trade advisory committees. Industry 
representatives are the sole members on the vast majority of 
trade advisory committees and this is simply wrong. We cannot 
expect to have the interests of labor, the environment and the 
oppressed represented by those who are motivated by the bottom 
line. Separating the environment and labor from other aspects 
of trade by creating side committees such as the Labor Advisory 
Committee or the Trade and Environment Policy Advisory 
Committee has little effect of addressing the impact trade has 
on these voiceless segments. These interests must be allowed 
fair representation in all of the Industry Sector Advisory 
Committees.
    The WTO is a highly surreptitious club. Members of the 
advisory committees have access to government information 
concerning overall negotiating objectives and positions of the 
U.S. that is not otherwise publicly available. The same 
advisory committee members are able to relay their views 
directly to government negotiators, giving the advisory 
committee members an obvious advantage for influencing 
positions. In addition, virtually all of the meetings are held 
in closed session and records are not uniformly available to 
the public. Freedom of information requests are often answered 
with extensive withholdings. The U.S. was founded on democratic 
and transparent principles. The WTO operates behind closed 
doors without concern for the views of the American public. 
USTR will only help their cause by spearheading efforts to shed 
light on this esoteric organization.
    Finally, the Administration must uphold domestic statute 
when dealing with other WTO member nations. The U.S. Congress 
executes the will of the American people through the various 
laws enacted. These laws must be upheld within our sovereign 
territory as well as in the global arena. On more than one 
occasion, the Administration has pressured other countries not 
to enact protections for the environment or public health. The 
U.S. lobbied against Japan's consideration of new fuel economy 
standards as well as Europe's proposals to protect children 
from toxic toys. Again, the public was unaware that this was 
taking place until after it had transpired. We must be 
encouraging stronger standards from all of our trading 
partners--even if that means regulating genetically modified 
organisms here in the U.S.
    If President Clinton is sincere in his pledge to put a 
human face on trade, then the Administration should take my 
views as first steps in improving trade for all consumers, all 
workers and our global environment. These various interests 
must be invited to the negotiating table to provide true 
balance to the current bias in the WTO. The process must be de 
transparent and open to all Americans. The U.S. must set the 
standard for improving domestic and global conditions, not lead 
in the race to the bottom for the sake of multinational profit.

                                                        Pete Stark.

                                  
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